Natalie Depraz Published online: 5 July 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008 Abstract This contribution seeks to explicitly articulate two directions of a con- tinuous phenomenal eld: (1) the genesis of intersubjectivity in its bodily basis (both organic and phylogenetic); and (2) the re-investment of the organic basis (both bodily and cellular) as a self-transcendence. We hope to recast the debate about the explanatory gap by suggesting a new way to approach the mind-body and Leib/ Korper problems: with a heart-centered model instead of a brain-centered model. By asking how the physiological dynamics of heart and breath can become con- stitutive of a subjective (qua intersubjective) point of view, we give an account of the specic circular and systemic dynamic that we call the rainbow of emotions. This dynamic, we argue, is composed of both structural and experiential compo- nents and better evidences the seamless, non-dual articulation between the organic and the experiential. Keywords Emotions Intersubjectivity Neurophenomenology Heart Coupling 1 Introduction This contribution seeks to explicitly articulate two directions of a continuous phenomenal eld: (1) the genesis of intersubjectivity in its bodily basis (both organic and phylogenetic); and (2) the re-investment of the organic basis (both N. Depraz (&) Philosophy, University of Rouen, Rouen, France e-mail: natalie.depraz@univ-rouen.fr N. Depraz University of Paris IV, Sorbonne, Paris, France 1 3 Cont Philos Rev (2008) 41:237259 DOI 10.1007/s11007-008-9080-y bodily and cellular) as a self-transcendence, the excess of the organic over itself. 1 We aim to revisit the Merleau-Pontian inspired notion of intercorporeity, which thinks the body and intersubjectivity together, so as to more precisely show its originary affective component. The rst of these two movements is directed toward the living in its basic, elementary form as autopoiesis; it follows the Merleau- Pontian method of tracing the basic meaning of consciousness back to the living itself. The second is directed toward the intersubjective sphere; it revisits the Husserlian method of pursuing the subtler layers of consciousness into non- individual elds and toward an openness that embodies its transcendence. We are seeking to give an account of the seamless, non-dual articulation between the organic and the experientialan articulation already presented by Husserl as Korper/Leib. The pivotal ground and center-point of this articulation is the organism itself, that is, the level of closure/coupling where lived experience is found directly, and where a practical method can be put into action. 2 By weaving together body, intersubjectivity, and time, we aim to give an account of the specic circular and systemic dynamic that we call the rainbow of emotions, which is composed both of structural and experiential components. We will describe some key features of this dynamic and outline four of its dimensions: (1) coupling, (2) valence, (3) heart, and (4) self-previousness. One of the salient contributions we hope to make in this article is to recast the debate about the explanatory gap. We suggest a new way to approach the mind- body and Leib/Korper problems: with a heart-centered model instead of a brain- centered one. The leading question then will be: How can the physiological dynamics of the rhythmicity of the heart and breath become constitutive of a subjective (qua intersubjective) point of view? Coupling, on the intersubjective level, and valence, on the affective level, are the initial correlative keystones of this heart-system model. Self-previousness points to the specic temporality of the heart. Finally, we suggest the rainbow of emotions as an experiential and descriptive model of the heart system in each of its possible concrete emotions. We argue that what the heart-system model contributes at the conceptual, theoretical level can be developed and validated at an experiential, descriptive level by taking into account a network of concrete and polarized emotions. 2 Coupling: the self-other fold With the term coupling, we intend to indicate that intersubjectivity is a dynamic relationshipa foldthat is situated beneath the division between self and other. 1 This project originally matured during discussions and email exchanges with Francisco Varela, as early as June 1997. We sketched the general structure as it appears in the introduction and then planned to begin by giving a central role to the articulation between Paarung and acoplamiento under the generic term of coupling. 2 In this article, we are suspending two investigations that will be at the core of our project. The rst of these is a deeper investigation of the double-faced qualities of the organism, beyond attesting to its phenomenal truth. Is it possible to understand the organisms temporalization, its specic generativity? The second of these investigations asks whether we can understand the heart as the focal place of emotions, the place where the excess of the body over itself has been traditionally pointed out. 238 N. Depraz 1 3 The structure of the fold is undivided, in the same way one speaks of a joint account when different members of a family collectively govern a household. Though different partners are involved, primacy is given to its coalition. The image of the fold 3 is remarkably illustrative of this unitary process, because the crease of the folding indicates a clear distinction without bringing about a disjunctive separation. In order to provide this general, formal structure with concrete contents, we will evoke different examples deriving from various elds: the archaic felt affective link (both biological and intersubjective) between a child and her mother; sexual intercourse as the apprenticeship of a mutual letting-go; the tonglen practice in Tibetan Buddhism as a practice of exchanging places with the other; the three Persons of the Trinity in Christian theology as exemplary of the experience of reciprocal circularity. These examples are not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive. In that respect, they are not meant to produce a closed meaning. They are intended as heuristics to facilitate further investigation. Thus, should they become obstacles, by all means just throw them out! Consider two experiential-conceptual structures where such a fold, which neither creates confusion nor brings about disjunction, is at work. Both include the same four components: (1) a bodily anchorage, (2) a temporally founded dynamic, (3) a relational meaning, and (4) the creation of a linkage that necessarily admits alterity. These structures can be found, on the one hand, in Husserlian genetic phenom- enology under the name Paarung and, on the other hand, in the Chilean school of autopoiesis under the name acoplamiento. We would like to compare both descriptions of the coupling experience in order to show their complementarity, their potential mutual enrichment, as well as their irreducible differences. The phenomenological structure of Paarung, in its basic meaning, indicates a relationship between (1) sensory elds or data (visual, tactile, acoustic) that are characterized by (2) experientially circular time-dynamics, and whose (3) relation involves a double chiasmatic crossing of Korper and Leib, which is accomplished by means of (4) a passive associative synthesis. 4 In short, Paarung is the key relational structure of two elements that enter into an associative synthesisa synthesis which is anterior to all objectifying identications. Paarung contributes to the elucidation of intersubjectivity insofar as it reveals its deep bodily anchorage, but it is also a process that links sensory data in the kinesthetic framework or in the temporal dynamic of retentions with the impressional present. This associative link involves an originary relationality through which each ego is intrinsically constituted. Therefore, both externalism (empiricism) and representationalism (idealism) are irrelevant to this basic scheme. The structure of acoplamiento, on the other hand, has a (1) bodily component that does not correspond to the link between sensory modalities, but rather to the far broader relationship between an organism and its environment. This bodily link is not symmetrical but inclusive. Whereas, in the case of Paarung, there is a kind of 3 About the image of the fold, cf. Depraz et al. (2003, pp. 4143). 4 Cf. Husserl (2001a, b); Depraz (2001a, pp. 169178), where the four different levels (bodily-passive, imaginative-active, linguistic-interpretative and ethical-emotional) of the Paarung are detailed. Here we only deal with the rst level. The rainbow of emotions 239 1 3 interactive reciprocity between sensory modalities (elds or data), in acoplamiento, the organism is situated within an environment, like a part within a whole. The (2) time-dynamics of this organic coupling between organism and natural context is called an auto-poiesis, from the very name of the Chilean School, because through it the organism emerges in its integrity by virtue of its very relationship with its environment. The organism does not develop in isolation from what happens around it; it is literally created (hence poien) by nature, while at the same time modifying both nature and itself. In this respect, autopoiesis more accurately describes what in the phenomenological structure of Paarung is generally presented as an experiential circularity, because the former stresses that the autonomy of the living (self) is the very result of its contextual dependence. The (3) relational component of acoplamiento, although it is (at rst sight paradoxically) illustrated with the image of the individual organism closing in upon itself, involves a doubled crossing of the objective and subjective components of the body. The closure involved in this crossing is said to be operational (clausura operacional), because of the way that context nourishes the very autonomy of the living being. It is precisely thanks to its openness to its immediate constitutive environment that the individual organism accomplishes its autonomya process which reveals alterity as constitutive of the identity of the living being. 5 The structure of synthesis at work in the experience of Paarung is, in a similar way, a passive association; it includes a contrast between sensory data, which are constitutive of bodily experience, that never amounts to a rigidly closed identity, but always to a moving and mobile reality. 6 In sum, the concept of acoplamiento as operational closure helps us understand the possibility of an individual that is at one and the same time altered by its context according to a natural drift, 7 and self- generated in virtue of its own inner dynamics. Here, too, both empiricism and representationalism are nonsensical within such a framework. The phenomenological account of Paarung and the biological account of acoplamiento similarly attend to an alterity at the very core of the self-constitution of the living individuals bodily identity. It is important to point out, however, that the scope of the bodily experiences they describe is different; the inclusive organism/environment structure is not coincident with the mutual relationship between two lived bodies. The account of Paarung is interesting for its strong intersubjective structuring, which allows for the extension of the account of organic- based coupling to the level of the relationship between persons. The account of acoplamiento enables the investigation of extremely elementary organic functions (unicellular) and thus can contribute to a more detailed analysis of the kinesthetic sensory level. 5 Operational needs to be taken quite literally, in its practical meaning of what is being put to work. It designates the very praxis of the living being in its openness to its environment. It might in some sense evoke Husserls notion of fungierende Intentionalitat, and Merleau-Pontys interpretation of intention- alite operante. Varela does not refer to these authors in his development of this point. It seems to me that the phenomenologists use operation to designate non-objectifying lived experience, whereas Varela had in mind the radical working or effectuation of the living being. 6 Maturana and Varela (1998); Varela (1980/1987). 7 Varela et al. (1991, Chap. 9). 240 N. Depraz 1 3 We now turn our attention to the affective meaning of these sensory and organic accounts of coupling, in order to attest to the intricacy between sensations and experiential bodily experience, on the one hand, and affect, on the other. 3 Valence: the attractionrepulsion dynamic Our contention in this section is that affect is originally embedded in the bodily self- other coupling, at the phenomenological level (Paarung) as well as at the biological level (acoplamiento). We would like to show how affect is at work at the very origination of life as a movement. The focus of our phenomenological approach will thus be more generative than genetic; our biological approach will be both evolutionary and neurological. In the domain of genetic-generative phenomenology, the movement (e-motion) that informs the initial self-other folded coupling is called affection; in the realm of evolutionary neurobiology it is referred to as valence, and in psychology it is commonly referred to as emotion. Each of these terms, from distinct perspectives, name complementary aspects of the affective dimension that originally permeates intersubjective relations. Valence emerges from evolutionary neurobiological research and accounts for the originary move of life within living beings; it points to the micro-bodily generation of intersubjectivity within what is probably the most archaic part of our bodily functioning: the subpersonal neuro-vegetative system. At this level of functioning, our body is essentially governed by primary, involuntary attractions and repulsions. Valence seems to be an appropriate name for this micro-bodily dynamic, because it both speaks to the originary polarization of affective sensory modalities (negative/positive) and indicates the way that this underlying subper- sonal dynamic occasions and informs the initial dynamic of our interpersonal relationships. In our encounters with others, we immediately feel if we are attracted or repelled by somebody. This attraction/repulsion dynamic is deeply anchored in our somatic organization and it often reveals itself through the most archaic sensory modality of taste. One need only note the axiological alternative of gust/disgust and its affective transposition as pleasure/displeasure. This is precisely the pendular, binary functioning of our bodily attitude that the term valence describesa dynamic that is reected at the neurobiological level through the activation of the amygdala and the hippocampus brain areas. 8 A binary dynamic of this type is found at each level, be it neuro-vegetative/ subpersonal, sensory/perceptive, or psychological. Although we contend that it originates at the archaic level of neuro-vegetative impulses, we dont want to go so far as to cast such an originary level as the absolute explanatory one. Such a move would amount to advocating a reductionist attitude, which is certain to deliver one- sided results. While it is important not to overlook the importance of this primary anchoring of intersubjectivity, the self-other coupling is not reducible to neuro- vegetative valence. The sensory and psychological levels importantly enhance the whole scope of the account of intersubjective coupling. On the one hand, 8 Pankseep (1998); Derryberry and Tucker (1992). The rainbow of emotions 241 1 3 affection refers to the phenomenological features of this attraction/repulsion dynamic. Husserl engages in detailed analyses of the dynamic of allure (Reiz) and disappointment (Enttauschung) that informs the subjects relationships to otherness (though his focus is primarily on the perceptive-, object-oriented aspect of this dynamic). Emotion, on the other hand, captures the psychological dimension of constituted affects, by means of which the individual ceaselessly oscillates, for example, between suffering and rejoicing, hating and loving, anxiety and tranquility. 9 We maintain that there is a continuity between neuro-vegetative dispositions and sensory perceptive activities, that neither level enjoys an explanatory primacy over the other, but rather that both levels are mutual constraining and enriching. In this article, we wish to remain at the organic, somatic level of analysis in order to allow the conjunction of valence and affection to arise. The continuous eld of affect, including both valence and affection, constitutes the core of the temporalization process. 10 How is it that the originary move of the living, in its immediate constitution through the otherness it encounters, may unfold itself as temporalization? Isnt there a gap between bodily movement, valence, alteration and temporality? If their common ground lies in the process-dynamics of the living, where is the unitary experiential basis of such a phenomenon? 4 The heart as a self-transcending physiological system: a response to the explanatory gap These four dimensions of our bodily intersubjective experience are not as heterogeneous as they might rst appear. Bodily movement, affect, alterity, and temporality, we contend, are different names given, at upper experiential levels, to a unique concrete experience. An exemplary concrete bodily mode of access to this vital dynamic is through the organ of the heart, insofar as it opens the way for the basic rhythmicity of our existence as living, related beings. Our hypothesis is that the heart is a self-transcending physiological system. Let us characterize more precisely what we mean by the idea of bodily self- transcendence. To describe this originary movement of the lived body, we rst rely on Richirs argument that the body is characterized by an inner excess that is both inherent in it and trespasses it. This is evidenced when the physical limitations of our body are trespassed once we are also able to become conscious of them. 11 Many discussions in the cognitive sciences since the 1940s have broached the issue of the relationship between the body, the mind, the brain, and the environment, with more or less reductionist options: from various forms of eliminativism, which reduce the 9 We therefore speak below of a rainbow of emotions, because emotions refer to multifarious, differentiated, and strongly constituted states, while affect refers to a more basic valence-laden movement towards the object. 10 Varela and Depraz (2005); Depraz (1994). 11 Cf. Richir (1993): [Le] lieu du vivre incarne nest pensable dans lexperience que sil y a, en quelque sorte, dans le corps, quelque chose qui exce`de le corps, qui tend a` sen echapper, et par rapport a` quoi le corps para tra toujours plus ou moins limite [...] (7). 242 N. Depraz 1 3 mind to the brain, and the body to external behavior; to enactivism, which proves to be the most dynamic and systemic approach to the phenomenon. We want to follow and radicalize the enactive line of thought by introducing the concept of self- transcendence as a process of liberation from every local or closing conception. 12 According to this line of thought, self-transcendence corresponds to the dynamic of the bodily self as a self that contains the inherent ability to create new events from itself. We contend that, more than the brain, which only materially rules the body and its immediate context and supports a formal-functionalist approach of cognition, the heart, as the body of the body, 13 gives us the most basic and global experience of ourselves as embodied self-present subjects, that is, as subjects enacting cognition. By attending to the physiology of the heart, we aim to undo the remnant dichotomy between mind and brain, that is, the residual discontinuity between the phenomenal and the biological levels. In order to do so, we will identify various interfaces or transversal spaces in which such a distinction is no longer operative, and which attest to the structure of excess of the body over itself: (1) the heart as organic pulsation; (2) the heart as affective thumos and as Gemut; and (3) the heart as rhythm of spiritual inspiration/ expiration. 14 4.1 The organic pulsation of the heart The heart as a muscle operates as a kind of mechanical pump that is designed to make the blood circulate throughout the body: along the arterieswhich, starting from the heart ventricles, distribute the blood to the whole bodyand along the veinswhich bring the blood back from the capillary blood-vessels to the heart. The rhythmic pulsation of the heart is characterized by a double, complementary movement, from the center to the periphery and from the periphery to the center: contraction (systole) and dilation (diastole). The pendular physiology of the heart, as a ruler of bodily vitality, attests to a specic phenomenality: the lived rhythm we are able to capture when we sensorially feel the beats of our heart with pressure of our hand being placed either on our chest or on the chest of our child or of our beloved. We sense its growing quickness after a long run or when we are stressed or emotionally moved; we sense the way our face blushes when we feel shame, pleasure or jealousy, or the way it pales when we feel fear or anxiety. In short, there is a strong continuity between the physiological appearance of the heartits holistic bodily function as an integrated, circular blood networkand its lived manifes- tation with respect to concretely expressed feelings, emotions, and affects. What is indicated in the dictionary as (so it seems) a sheer metaphori.e. the heart is the 12 Depraz and Mauriac (2006). 13 Such an understanding of the heart as the body of the body stresses the amazingly bodily character of the heart as center or hearth of the body. The stylistic emphatic expression aims at deepening the role of the heart within the body as a the fundamental experience of inner feeling. Within the context of Eastern Christian theology the heart is thus described as the body of the body precisely because it provides us with such an inner self-transcending intensity. 14 As a rst step, see Depraz (1999). The rainbow of emotions 243 1 3 seat of the emotionsexists in direct continuity with the physiological dynamic between the heart and the body as a whole. Recent neuroscientic research shows that emotions are produced in the different areas of the brain that make up the limbic system (i.e. the hippocampus, amygdala, and cingular cortex). One might ask: is there any contradiction between a brain- centered model of neuro-physiological regulation and a heart-centered model of affectivity? Maybe not, because the functioning of the brain and the one of the heart are strikingly similar. There is a rather similar structural dynamic at work in the relationship between the brain and the body as far as sensorimotor functioning is concerned. Efferent and afferent nerves produce a double movement from the brain- center to the organ-periphery and vice-versa. The circularity of the nervous system is responsible for our bodily movements and actions in a way that is parallel to the way that the circularity of the circulatory system is responsible for our bodily tonicity and dynamism. We contend that these two systems exist in an integrated parallelism, each playing a role complementary to the other. The brain system is more directly action- oriented, with a primacy given to the objectivation of actions and their formal cognitive counterpart; whereas the heart system creates the inner dynamics of the living body and gives access to affective-embodied cognition. Until now, our description of the organic pulsation of the heart has remained situated at the correlative level of physiology and psychology, thus providing us with an interesting continuity between the biological and the phenomenal aspects of the heart-experience. In order to provide such a psycho-phenomenological level of analysis with an empirical-transcendental dimension, we need to introduce the ontological experience of pulsional intentionality (Triebintentionalitat). 15 Con- trary to the basic sort of objectifying intentionality, through which we are able to identify an object, pulsional intentionality is strictly operative, which means that it does not give a primacy to the result of the intention but rather to the process itself. As Husserl described it, it is (quite astonishingly) an intentionality without an object. This non-objectifying movement, in its lived, immanent operation, is constitutive of the very process of emergence. The dynamics of pulsional intentionality, we argue, reveal the transcendental-ontological aspect of the organic pulsation of the heart. 4.2 Thumos and Gemut as integrative dimensions of the heart The brain and heart systems are not only parallel in the sense of being formally correlative. They are also mutually constraining, in the methodological sense that Varela proposed in his model for the reciprocal generativity of rst-person and third-person approaches to cognition. In that respect, the rst advantage of the heart- centered model is that the heart system is double-faced in the same way as the body 15 The German concept Trieb, used widely by Freud and invoked by Husserl in his later manuscripts, was rst commonly translated in English psychoanalytic literature as instinct, but has more recently (and more aptly) been rendered by the term drive. The French translation of Trieb is pulsion, the English cognate of which is being employed here because of the way that it preserves the continuity between Triebintentionalitat and the pulsation of the heart. See Depraz (2001c). 244 N. Depraz 1 3 system as a whole: it is both objective and subjective, physical and lived. In German, we benet from two different words to describe such a distinction. In the same way that the Korper/Leib polarity distinguishes between the physical body and the lived body but also describes the unied reality of the body (corps in French) as seen from two perspectives; Herz refers to the objective, physical heart, while Gemut refers to the heart as lived, both being two aspects of the one reality of the heart (cur in French). The brain system, by contrast, remains one-sidedly physical and objective. For this reason, it is limited to the third-person approach, for which the mind or consciousness can only appear as correlative (though irreducible) dimensions. Similar to the way the Korper/Leib system indicates the relation between the physical and phenomenal aspects of embodiment, the heart system furnishes us with the relation between the physical and phenomenal aspects of affectivity. Further- more, it deepens the integrative complexity that is already furnished by the Korper/ Leib system, in so far as it enables us to articulate the subpersonal, neural aspects of emotional mechanisms (via the limbic system, and the physiology of blood circulation) with the immanent lived, expressive aspects of emotions at the subjective phenomenal level. To empirically and more concretely elaborate how the heart system bridges (i.e. unies) the physical and phenomenal dimensions, one would have to investigate the self-regulation inherent in the thymic system and its ability to increase immunity not by resisting aggressions from the outside, but by welcoming them as parts of ones own thymicity. 16 A correlative transcendental way to elaborate this bridge can be found in contemporary psychotherapy and ethics in the investigation of the status of the person as an individuated and integrated unity with intrinsic relational abilities. 17 In both contexts, the heart is a central experience, both as a thymic regulator of the integrity of the subject and as an indicator of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the subjects relations with others as a persons. In this light, it is also interesting to explore other words that reference the heart at a generic subjective level, not to prove or explain anything, but only to conrm the validity of our contention about the heart-system. In Plato, for example, thumos refers to a vital force that is situated beyond or beneath the body/soul distinction. 18 The same linguistic root is shared by the thymic system, the modern name given to the physiological system that is linked to humoral dispositions. Thumos also indicates the articulation between the heart (the Latin cordis, which is manifested in the English adjective cordial) and the virtue of courage. 19 Besides, contra the post-Cartesian brain-centered, physiological model of cognition and perception, Aristotles approach is in many ways heart-centered. For, just as he claims that the eye is the seat of sight, Aristotle claims that the heart is the seat of all the sensory 16 Varela shows such a generative continuity of rst- and third-person approaches with regard, not to the heart, but to the thymic system and its self-regulative function in the framework of immunology. Cf. Varela (1997). 17 Boszormenyi-Nagy (1987); Michard (1991). 18 Plato (1997). 19 Tellenbach (1961, Chap. 2). The rainbow of emotions 245 1 3 capacities, as well as motor and nutritive capacities. 20 In Eckhart as well as in Kant, for example, Gemut also accounts for the global, broadly affective notion of subjectivity, which encompasses the different faculties, and even Geist insofar Gemut endows the latter with a non-exclusively intellectual meaning. 21 Further- more, the heart is the locus of a remarkable spiritual opening, which is exemplarily manifest in the Eastern orthodox heart-prayer. From the most subpersonal, neural dimensions of the limbic system to the most personal, spiritual dimension of the heart-prayer, the heart may be unfolded in a multiplicity of levels via the inner circular physiology of the blood system, its psychic expressivity through sensory modalities, as well as its felt proto-ethical meaning as thumos and Gemut. 22 Of course, that there is a generative discursive tradition according to which the heart is taken as embracing both the physiological and phenomenal dimensions, doesnt necessarily mean that there is an ontological articulation of these two levels. Our claim is rather that the generative discursive reference to the heart as the seat of emotions is indicative of such a non-dual ontological articulation of the physical and the phenomenal, which is supported by phenomenological and physiological evidence. 4.3 Breath, rhythmicity, and the overcoming of interior/exterior 23 To this seamless continuityexemplied by the dynamics of the heart system, between the neurally-anchored physiological circularity of emotions and their phenomenally-situated expressivitywe would like to graft the primal, self-other experiential eld. In fact, the very organic rhythm of the heart (systole/diastole) paves the way for intersubjective experience in its broadest sense. In addition to its pulsating function in blood circulation, which remains centered in the interior, the heart-rhythm is also originally manifest at the level of the breath. Inspiration and expiration are part of the basic activity of the living being. Breathing is regular, ceaseless, and preconscious, which means that it is always there without my having to pay attention to it. In a sense, this involuntary mode of operation is characteristic of every inner organ of our body: the liver, the stomach, the intestine; they constantly operate within our body without our being conscious of their activity. Interestingly enough, though, the unique characteristic of breathing lies (1) in the fact that we can quite easily become aware of it, and (2) in its exemplary situation at the conjunction of inner sensation and outer expression. Breath, in this way, provides a strictly organic key for the very possibility of the inner-outer distinction as an intersubjective dynamic between myself and otherness. 20 Aristotle (1941, Book II, Chap. 1), Aristotle (1978, Chap. 11). 21 Eckhart (1963); Kant (1998). 22 Cf. the articles Cur and Gemut in Cassin (2004, Vol. 27, pp. 493494). 23 We do not intend to go into the etymology of breath and its link to soul and life (in Latin, in Greek and in Hebrew), which will need an article as such. For a rst step, cf. Alter 3 (1995): Lanimal. As for the link with speech, which is also noted in these traditions, it would require an articulation between the living being and the human being, which we prefer to leave open here. 246 N. Depraz 1 3 While we are breathing, we literally take otherness within ourselves (welcoming it) and expulse it outside of ourselves (rejecting it). Breathing is a heart-centered, organic emergence of the self-other relationship. The innerouter distinction of the correlational structure of intentionality might be seen to emerge from recurrent patterns of inspiration/expiration, somewhat parallel to the way that Varela, Thompson and Rosch argue that cognitive structures emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns of involvement. 24 Hence the central role of breath, for example, in meditation and prayer activities within religious contexts, according to which in breathing the most organic preconscious activity of the living being coincides with a unique relatedness between the living being and the divine. As we shall argue below, such a co-incidence is absolutely not involuntary or metaphorical (i.e. used only heuristically in meditation practice). We contend, on the contrary, that it is quite literal, that the heart is the very organ of the body where such a coincidence is able to operate. In what sense? Allow us to make a comparison: breathing is like walking. While walking, you experience the to-and-fro of your right and left feet and the unity of your body achieved thereby. In short, co- incidence maintains the distinction, which is the condition of a deeper unity which we will call an antinomic model. These three analyses of the heartas organic pulsation, as affective thumos, and as spiritual rhythmicityattest to what we are calling the structure of bodily self- transcendence: the excess of the body over itself. This structure offers an inspiring and provocative response to the current issue of the explanatory gap, which has been much discussed in recent years within the debate about consciousness in the elds of cognitive science and philosophy of mind. While there are proposals in the philosophy of mind 25 and phenomenology 26 that acknowledge the irreducibility of consciousness to neurobiological networks, or that argue that consciousness is generative of neural dynamics itself. 27 To our knowledge, none of these proposals takes into account the functioning of the heart. The most integrative (i.e., non- reductionist) analysis of emotions relies exclusively on the neural dynamics of emotions and searches for an inner continuity with inner lived emotional experiences. 28 Another interesting attempt is to consider (in the Jamesian vein reinterpreted) that emotions are strictly identical with the physiological changes undergone by the body. 29 As we already mentioned, our own proposal is not directed against such integrative, enactive approaches. On the contrary, acknowledging the relevance of such advances, we want to articulate our proposal as it is positioned with respect to it. When Varela and I rst began asking why the heart was never taken into account as an access to cognition that might offer an interesting alternative to the brain, we 24 Varela et al. (1991). 25 Cf. e.g., Chalmers (1995, 1996) (available at http://consc.net/papers/facing.html). 26 Given the general anti-naturalism of phenomenological philosophy, the literature here is too extensive to sight, as it would include the majority of the eld. 27 Roy et al. (1999). 28 Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003). 29 Cf. e.g., Pickard (2003). The rainbow of emotions 247 1 3 were answered (by scientists) that the heart was a sheer muscular organ, poor when compared to the cognitive complexity of the brain, or (by metaphysicians) that it had an affective and spiritual meaning that was purely (and fortunately!) metaphorical, that is, symbolic. The heart was either strictly biological, or strictly spiritually symbolic! This is precisely our point: the heart system provides us with something that the brain system, in virtue of its analytical complexity, does not; namely, the synthetic globality and amplitude of the affectively anchored intersubjective structure of experience. Recently, there have been phenomenolog- ically more sophisticated accounts of the hard problem from the side of experience, accounts which might structurally map onto our own concern. However, they either remain situated at the transcendental level to the exclusion of the empirical, 30 or they remain only on the level of the bodily system. 31 In either case, while they provide relevant indications toward a renewed epistemological direction, they neglect to explicitly broach the issue of the heart system. 5 Self-previousness: the co-generation of awaiting and being surprised What we have approached thus far, rst at the phenomenologically structural level, as a circular dynamics of (intersubjective) coupling and (affective) valence, and then at the physiologically emergent level, as a self-transcendent bodily process through the heart-experience, now needs to be situated at its specic temporal level. The next step we would thus like to take is to situate the bodily-intersubjective dynamics of coupling and valence, which is centered within the self-transcendent heart-experience, with respect to its own temporalization. As an essential component of our existence as human beings, the temporality of bodily self- transcendence through coupling and valence, must be accounted for in order to articulate its concrete dynamic. We will conduct this description using the generic term of what we have elsewhere called self-previousness. 32 By self-previousness we mean a kind of temporalizing process that is particularly open to the indetermination of the future. In this respect, the concept stresses a temporal horizon that Heidegger already underlined, in contrast to Husserl, who gave more weight to the temporal horizon of the past and to its possible reactivation. Our proposal is near to Husserl, however, insofar as we consider such an openness toward the future as not completely indeterminate, but insofar as the future is under certain conditions anticipated in the form of awaiting. We therefore rely here on Husserls careful attention to the possible cognition of events that are not given through the memory of the past. But such cognition is only possible if one is attentive to the emerging quality of the future event, to its very process of arising. Husserl calls this kind of presence to the future protention. Similarly, self-previousness aims to describe the quality of presence to that which is not programmed or predelineated to happen, that is, a 30 Bruzina (2004). 31 Hanna and Thompson (2003). 32 Depraz (1998). 248 N. Depraz 1 3 kind of knowledge of that which is not yet given. Self-previousness combines a sense of anticipation with an attitude of welcoming the radical newness of the event. This is why we have posed the experience of surprise as an exemplar, in the emotional realm, of the temporalizing process of self-previousness. 33 5.1 The generic dynamics of self-previousness 34 How might the temporality of the processual dynamics of the lived body be more specically characterized as an affective and intersubjective structure? Contrary to Husserls presentation of lived time as a living present composed of retentions, impressions, and protentions, we contend that time-consciousness is guided by the experience of the future. In contrast to the similar position that Heidegger puts forth in Being and Time, however, we argue that future-oriented lived time is originally affect-laden. This does not mean that affectivity has a primacy over temporality, but rather that the temporalizing process is not a merely formal dynamics, from which affect can remain absent. In our article about valence, Varela and I contend that affect is at the core of time in a sense that is meant to abolish the primacy given to the one or to the other. 35 The dynamic of self-previousness proper is articulated according to three phases: the future component, which we call imminence; the present component of the crisis; and the aftermath, which corresponds to a possible return to what happened. The characteristics of the three phases lie in the intrinsic emotional content of their temporal process. Moreover, the dynamic of self-previousness is obviously non-linear (i.e., non-successive), given the primacy of futurity to the very approach of present and past. This primacy of the future is central to the emotion- embedded time we are attempting to bring into view. If each affective-temporal phase is itself governed by valence, we arrived at the correlative series outlined in Table 1. 5.2 The scales of self-previousness Self-previousness is a circular time-dynamic that unfolds in correlation with multifarious modes of givenness, which in turn correspond to various scales of time. It is thus necessary to distinguish different degrees of this time-dynamic and to unfold its correlative types of affectivity. While self-previousness designates a generic, standard-form of an affect-laden, future-oriented dynamic, we need to articulate and differentiate levels of time and qualities of affect. The term of scale was rst thematized by Varela as a way to overcome the tendency to present an overly formal, compact, and homogenous characterization of the structure of temporality. 36 33 Varela and Depraz (2005). 34 For a discussion of the French use of this notion and a more detailed analysis of the concept, see Depraz (2001b). 35 Heidegger (1968); Varela and Depraz (2005). 36 Varela (1999). The rainbow of emotions 249 1 3 Varela rst suggested a three-scaled model of affective temporalization, starting from Husserls own distinction between (1) a pre-individual living present, comprising retention, impression, and protention; (2) an individual constituted time, linking the horizons of past, present, and future; and (3) a generative collective temporality, comprising sedimentation, habituality, and reactivation. Varela then described the types of affect relevant to each of these time-processes: respectively, (1) unconscious organic uctuations (valence); (2) individual constituted affects (affection); and (3) generative collective emotions (emotionality). In attempt to exhibit its non-successive circularity, Varela and I renamed the elements of this three-scaled model and added a level so as to more clearly distinguish an intersubjective, collective emotional temporality from a generative, phylogenetic one (Table 2). 5.3 Surprise: the emotional quality of unexpectedness 38 Having identied the generic temporal structure of self-previousness and specied the scales of its unfolding, we can nowfocus on what we take to be the core of this dynamic: the experience of being surprised. The experience of surprise is involved at each time- scale, whatever ability we develop to forecast the future event. At the pre-individual time-scale, even when we are prepared by means of a disciplined stabilization of attention to, for example, the emergence of a gure against a background in perception, we cant help but feel a slight touch of joy or pleasure at the very moment of its appearance, which attests to our rejoiced surprise. If we are less prepared or completely unprepared for its perceptual appearance, we might feel disturbed or shocked. As a matter of fact, however, affectivity is an intrinsic component of the phenomenon of surprise, varying only in the degree of its positive or negative value. 39 Table 2 The scales of self-previousness 37 Scale Imminence Crisis Aftermath Pre-individual Presentiment Instant Remnance Individual Anticipation Event Working memory Intersubjective-historical Awaiting Crisis Commemoration Generative-phylogenetic Futurity Mutation Immemoriality Valence Hope/fear Marvel/disaster Serenity/depression Table 1 The valence-phase correlations of self-previousness (Depraz 2001b, p. 103) Future horizon Present horizon Past horizon Phase Imminence Crisis Aftermath Valence Hope/fear Marvel/disaster Serenity/depression 37 Depraz (2001b, p. 103). 38 For more details on this matter, cf. Depraz (2003). 39 Cf. e.g., Lutz et al. (2002, 2004); Varela and Depraz (2004). 250 N. Depraz 1 3 At the individual time-scale, although, for example, epileptics may develop or be provided with third- and rst-person techniques in order to help them anticipate the oncoming of a seizure, the arrival of such an event remains somatically shocking, or at least laden with depressive features. 40 At the intersubjective-historical time-scale, the sudden occurrence of an historical crisise.g., the French Revolution or the economic crisis of 1929though it may have been awaited, was inevitably experienced by subjects as a deeply anchored and long-lasting state of turmoil. Finally, at the generative-phylogenetic scale, the slow emergence of a species mutation over the course of evolutionary time, characterized as it is by randomness, is open toward the future in such a way that its scientic observers remain constantly astonished by the form changes of living organisms. 41 A differentiated micro-temporal analysis such as this paves the way for understanding how the self-present living being generates directly from itself and globally experiences unexpected novelty. At present, I wish to deal with the subtle quality of unexpectedness via with the experience of surprise at the very level of the individual living being. To do this, I will begin by reviewing the development of Varelas work from the biological principle of autonomy to the cognitive and evolutionary principles of enaction and natural drift, respectively. The relation that I am attempting to articulate between the experience of surprise, or the phenomenal appearance of novelty, and the emergence of novelty in natural living systems is the following: regardless of the scale of the time-dynamic, the experience of unanticipable phenomena has a common structure, which provokes an emotional shock when it appears. Because such a shock is not absolute, insofar as we are necessarily related one way or another to that which we experience in surprise, it is precisely by means of this relatedness that we might anticipate the experience of surprise itself. I would like to show how Varela explicitly understood the living being as an intrinsically surprised qua surprising being. As early as 1981, in an analysis of the arising of novelty in the natural world, Varela displays the threads of embodiment and temporality as tightly woven together. 42 In a remarkable synthesis of his groundbreaking work Principles of Biological Autonomy, Varela offers a renewed presentation of the autonomy of living beings. 43 He employs the idea of autonomy to characterize a system endowed with a strong inner self-determination, also called self-afrmation. Varela considers this notion necessary for understanding natural systemscells, multicellular organisms, the nervous system or the immune systembecause it calls for an understanding of the system in terms of its inner coherence or operational closure, i.e. as a structural coupling between the self-regulated organism and the world with which it interacts. Varela makes a clear-cut distinction between (computational) input coupling and (embodied) structural coupling. The rst is 40 Cf. e.g., Le Van Quyen et al. (1999); Varela and Depraz (2004), second part. 41 For a general and detailed account of these four time-scales of self-previousness, cf. Depraz (2001b, pp. 85102). 42 Varela (1983). 43 Varela (1980/1987). The rainbow of emotions 251 1 3 behaviorist, in that it depends upon an exteriority of a representational kind; the second is phenomenological, governed by an intrinsic interconnectivity and production of creativity. The phenomenon of novelty is not a product of privation, due merely to the ignorance or partiality of our perspective; rather it is a positive phenomenon, proceeding directly from our immanent self-knowledge, understood as a cultivated ability to question a system in its behavior whilst interacting with it. Less than 10 years later, Varela develops two concepts to describe what in the analyses of 19791981, given their stress on the autonomous identity of the living being, had been left relatively in the shadows: namely, the radical unexpectedness, or contingency of life. In the earlier analyses, the originary world-organism coupling was at the service of the coherent self-afrmation of the system. In the analysis of the early nineties, 44 the project of enactive cognitive scienceat the developmental leveland the theory of natural driftat the evolutionary level endeavor in parallel fashion to account for the decisive role that nature (both ancestral and environmental) plays in our organization as living beings. The enactive approach to embodied cognition requires that we rethink self-organization as the co-emerging or co-originating of living being and world. The autonomy of the living being proceeds directly from this reciprocal process of structural coupling. Enaction designates this mutual emergence, emphasizing its practical operation and its distinction from any representational or hermeneutical process. The notion of natural drift represents an interesting attempt to remove the representationalist presuppositions that underlie the adaptationist notion of tness in evolutionary biology, while still accounting for the possible arising of unknown events that would affect and transform the inner dynamic of the living being. Against the notion of an optimal adaptation (an efciency coping) of the living being to/with the world, understood as a regular process of progressive tness, the idea of natural drift describes the evolution of the living being as a co-determination of the self and its world in which both results are interwoven or co-implicated. This inner coupling between living being and world requires a more explicit study of its intrinsic temporality. Therefore, in The specious present: A neuro- phenomenology of time-consciousness, Varela directly tackles the issue of the neural-dynamic roots of the horizons of present experience, while relying on Husserls detailed account of time-consciousness. 45 What is at stake here is to bring together the third-person account of the dynamic synchronization of long-distance neuronal assemblages in the brain, and the rst-person account of lived time. The underlying hypothesis is that the two accounts describe processes that are not only isomorphic but that literally co-generate each other, that is, produce both (1) new experience and (2) renewed categories on both sides. The nature of the co- generation we describe is clearly twofold: it is (1) a phenomenal-biological co- generation in which the co-generative elements are (a) conscious activity and (b) neuronal activity, which co-generate each other (along the lines, e.g., of contemporary neuroscientic research on neuro-plasticity); but it is also, correla- tively, (2) a discursive co-generation in which the co-generative elements are (c) the 44 Varela, et al. (1991, Chaps. 8 and 9). 45 Varela (1999). 252 N. Depraz 1 3 discursive accounts of phenomenologists and (c) the discursive accounts of biologists, which commingle to co-generate further cross-disciplinary accounts. These two levelsi.e. the discursive and the (prediscursive) phenomenal/biolog- icalclearly need to be conceptually disarticulated, but they also need to be experientially coupled and assumed as interwoven. If not, the conceptual-discursive will, in the nal instance, tend to unduly guide the co-generation. This two-fold analysis of the living present led Varela to insist on the role of protention as playing a generating part in the constitution of the extended now, and on the part played by the emotional dimension therein. The generative role of protention and its emotional component, which are not explicitly present in Husserls analysis (though they are implicitly indicated), become central in Varelas description of the now, because the neuro-dynamic analysis itself seems to support them. Being present comes to refer to the cultivation of the ability to anticipate the unexpected, and to becoming aware of the strong emotional quality of such an unexpectation. Welcoming what is radically unexpected is the very experience of the surprise. 5.4 Is the time of the heart a self-previous time? How are self-previousness and the heart-system related? That is, how is this temporal dynamic related to the rhythmicity of the heart as a physiological system? This is, of course, a very difcult problem both philosophically and scientically, so I wont be able to conduct any kind of full-blown investigation of the problem in the present paper. But something needs to be said about the connection between the phenomenal and the physiological, i.e., between self-previousness and heart rhythmicity. The time of the heart is characterized by its rhythm or beat. A heart rhythm has the temporal characteristics of regularity (repetition and recurrence) and harmony (stability and pendularity), as is also exemplied in musical and poetic meter, as well as in nature. What we generally construe as objective time (i.e., the clock time of quantitative measurement) is phenomenally lived primarily as aesthetic and psychological. In a sense, the experience of rhythm undoes the distinction between objective and subjective time; the heart-rate embodies such an experience. The pre-consciously lived, recurrent regularity of the organic beating of the heart intrinsically includes an emotional component that contributes to the way it is subjectively thrown in relief as lived. The heart quickens while one is expecting news, it slows down when one gets bored, it utters when one experiences strong emotions (such as those related to trauma). Indeed, through its rhythms, the heart functions as an organic, pre-conscious recorder of every emotional uctuation of my inner psychic life. The temporal uctuations of the heart-rhythm range from normal speeding or slowing; to pathological arrhythmia, bradycardia, tachycar- dia, tachyarrhythmia (seizures); to the liminal rhythms of fainting, cardiac arrest, or heart attack. The notion of a non-precarious, absolutely regular heartbeatthough sometimes considered normalis completely idealistic; it is as abstract and ctive as the idea of an un-affected self. As lived temporality is intrinsically The rainbow of emotions 253 1 3 valence-laden, so the heart is immanently permeated with an always potentially self- altered rhythm. In that respect, the temporal rhythm of the heart is immanently self-previous: it is open to the possibility of alteration due to unexpected (i.e., surprising) emotional events, while basically remaining within a temporality composed of awaited regular recurrences. Of course, the details of the phenomenal/physiological connection qua self- previousness/heart-rhythmicity remain to be worked out by future transcendental- empirical research that would contribute to investigating the possibility of such a connection. 46 Here we wish only to suggest such a possibility by proposing the heart-centered approach as an alternative to the current route through neural networks. The analysis of self-previousness is thus intended as a recasting, at the temporal level, of the heart-system proposal we made above in response to the problem of the explanatory gap. 6 The rainbow: a generative network of emotions We have outlined how (Sect. 2) coupling, on the intersubjective level, and (Sect. 3) valence, on the affective level, serve as the two correlative keystones of (Sect. 4) our heart-proposal about the explanatory gap, and how (Sect. 5) self-previousness provides us with the possible temporality of the heart. We now offer the rainbow of emotions as a descriptive model of the heart system in each of its possible concrete emotions. What the heart-system model contributes at the conceptual, theoretical level can be developed and validated at an experiential, descriptive level by taking into account a network of concrete and polarized emotions. In moving from the heart to the rainbow of emotions, we move, metaphorically speaking, from the hearth to its radiating energies or from the sun to the rays. We intend our description of the rainbow of emotions as a phenomenological validation of our heart-model proposal. The model of the rainbow-structure was rst suggested and delineated by Varela as a way to show the concrete valence of emotions in their intricacy with intersubjective coupling and with ontological existential underpinning. Varelas scheme (Fig. 1) provides the four components that we are looking for, though they carry different names: valence is the general transversal component (the horizontal line); concern refers to the intersubjective component; being corresponds to the time-dynamic of self-previousness; assessment expresses the heart component. As such, however, the scheme remains a bit mysterious and in need of explication. It is for this very reason that I propose the scheme here. 47 There is a central focus, which corresponds to the crossing of the three directions or axis, that remains undetermined. If I follow the image of the rainbow, I may determine 46 Allow me to mention the ongoing neurodynamical work done in the Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Cerebrale (Paris) by Michel Le Vanquyen and some of his students on heart rhythms, as well as a common project (both empirical and philosophical) we have with Diego Cosmelli based on the experience of breathing. 47 Varela did not suggest a detailed understanding of his scheme. While, I could proffer some ideas and hypotheses, I was left with the task of explicating it. 254 N. Depraz 1 3 this center as the color white, from which every color radiates like a prism, each linked to a particular emotion. The center might refer to the bodily subject itselfto the heart as body of the bodywhich generates the multifarious emotions from him- or herself like the rays of the sun. The horizontal valence axis, which is situated upward in the scheme and provides it with its general dynamic, seems to conrm this interpretation, since it unfolds on both sides from the self (self-to- others/self-in-public), narrowly linking it to the coupling experience of self and other. In any case, the bodily subject is white, i.e. the non-color containing all colors, insofar as it is the zero-point of valence. The bodily subject is generative of valence, as well as its modes of relationship with others, its temporalization, and its heart-bodily self-transcendent dynamic. Another striking dimension of the scheme is that as it proceeds from the center to the periphery (whichever axis one considers), it correlatively proceeds from negative to positive emotions. The scheme thus dynamically represents the double movement of opening and closing, dilatation and contraction. The more I open up toward others, the more I am led to welcome them, to be receptive to their positive and negative emotions, to their joy or to their suffering; the more I turn toward myself, the more I contain my own feelings, be they negative (e.g., despise) or positive (e.g., admiration). This dichotomy is, of course, abstract and simplistic. Sometimes opening up toward others occasions a great deal of pain and turning Fig. 1 Varelas rainbow of emotions The rainbow of emotions 255 1 3 inwards can have a rejuvenative affect. However, I would contend that the suffering linked to opening toward others contains a possibility of self-freedom, whereas the positive affect generated by an exclusive inwardness ultimately leaves one detached and dissatised. The very dynamic of the rainbow is activated and created by the pulsation of the heart as the source of the generative bodily subject, where affective valence and the intersubjective self-other fold play together. Moreover, insofar as surprise is the experience of the very process of self-previousness, temporality functions as the very source of the heart-dynamic. 48 7 Conclusion Our suggestion that the brain-centered model be displaced in favor of a heart- centered model is an attempt to contribute to the general effort of research in phenomenology and cognitive science to move beyondi.e. beyond the gap, 49 beyond traditional paradigms. 50 We suggest that the investigative elaboration of a heart-centered model might lead toward a renewed understanding of the body as a deeply unitary and circular experiencethe heart as the body of the bodyin which neural-dynamics, mental-dynamics, physiological-dynamics, and lived intersubjective experiences are integrated and immanently articulated, that is, restored in their mutual generativity. Whereas the brain-model, which is prevalent among scientists of cognition, is neurobiologically-centered and often excludes/ reduces the phenomenal dimension, and whereas the consciousness-model, which is favored by many philosophers of cognition, is phenomenally-centered and often excludes/reduces the natural dimension, the heart-model offers an alternative, affectively-centered model that opens up a greater possibility of unifying both poles. Of course, many directions remain to be explored. For example, on the descriptive level of a phenomenological psychology, we need to further investigate the relevance of these different emotions through specic regional studies, e.g. on shame, etc. On the interpretive level of a hermeneutical phenomenology, we need to develop a structured comparison between the dynamic, generative typology of the rainbow of emotions and the classical philosophical (e.g., Descartes and Spinoza) 48 In my view some crucial emotions are still lacking here: (1) hope, which the French language would differentiate in espoir or esperance, and which would well t in the Being/Self-previousness axis along with joy and opposed to despair; (2) happiness will take place on the same axis near to serenity; (3) suffering, pity, compassion may be situated on the Concerns/Intersubjectivity axis, between fear and anxiety for the rst one, with respect and love for the two others; (4) as for anxiety, I would situate it on the Being/Self-previousness axis, and not on the Concerns/Intersubjectivity one, because it has to do with my ontological state more than with my relationship with others; (5) as for shame, we have in French two possible translations of it, either as honte or as pudeur. Pudeur is a positive emotion, which has to do with tact, modesty and a sense of decency. Furthermore, it seems to enter into a certain way of being with others, more than merely being in public, as honte, which is a more negative feeling associated with guilt and disgrace; nally I nd that self-esteem and pride are in English basically positive emotions, whereas in French they possess an intrinsic ambivalence: self- esteem is at the same time estime de soi (+) and vanite (-); pride is erte (+) and orgueil (-). But these are minor complements, additions or modications to the general scheme. 49 Roy et al. (1999). 50 Bruzina (2004). 256 N. Depraz 1 3 and psychological typologies of emotions. The philosophers of the seventeenth century provided typologies of the emotions which are motivated by metaphysical concerns. 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Systems and Emergence, Rationality and Imprecision, Free-Wheeling and Evidence, Science and Ideology. Social Science and Its Philosophy According To Van Den Berg. Mario Bunge