DEBEN NUESTROS JUECES SER FILSOFOS?

PUEDEN SER FILSOFOS?

*
RONALD DWORKIN
Traduccin: Lenard !arc"a Jara#i$$
E%&udian&e de Derec'( U) de Ca$da%( C$#*ia
Rna$d D+r,in) Profesor de los departamentos de Derecho y de Filosofa, Universidad de New
York, donde ensea desde 19!" #eci$i% dos tt&los en filosofa 'bachelor degrees( por las
&niversidades de )arvard y *+ford, se,&idos de &n --"." del Departamento de Derecho de
)arvard" -&e,o f&e dependiente del /&e0 -earned )and, est&vo asociado a la firma de a$o,ados
1&llivan 2 3romwell, y ense% en el Departamento de Derecho de la Universidad de Yale entre 1945
y 1949" De 1949 a 1996 f&e profesor de filosofa del derecho 'Jurisprudence( en *+ford y desde
1996 ha sido Quain Professor of Jurisprudence del University 3olle,e, de -ondres" 7&tor de ocho
li$ros, incl&yendo Taking Rights Seriously 8199, Laws Empire 819649, el c&al reci$i% la
presti,iosa oif !ward de la 7merican .ar 7ssociation, y "reedoms Law 819949" 1& li$ro m:s
reciente es So#ereign $irtue% The Theory y Practice of E&uality, p&$licado en 5;;; por la )arvard
University Press" <am$i=n contri$&ye frec&entemente con p&$licaciones especiali0adas y no
especiali0adas, especialmente en The 'ew (ork Re#iew of )ooks"
I) E$ di$e#a
>l tt&lo dado a este artc&lo s&,iere &n dilema" >n s& la$or cotidiana los /&eces toman
decisiones so$re m&chos as&ntos ?&e son tam$i=n, por lo menos en apariencia, o$/eto de
&na importante literat&ra filos%fica" Por e/emplo, los /&eces toman decisiones so$re personas
mentalmente enfermas ac&sadas de &n delito, las c&ales, sin em$ar,o, res&ltan responsa$les
de s&s actos, y so$re si &na acci%n partic&lar del demandado ca&s% realmente la lesi%n al
demandante @y los conceptos de responsa$ilidad y de ne+o ca&sal 'causation( son temas
perennes del est&dio filos%fico@" -os as&ntos filos%ficos son partic&larmente relevantes en el
Derecho 3onstit&cional y son inevita$les en las decisiones recientes m:s dram:ticas de la
1&prema 3orte so$re el a$orto, la acci%n afirmativa, el s&icidio asistido y la li$ertad de
e+presi%n"
A BUn feto es &na persona con derechos e intereses propiosC Y de ser as, Bestos derechos
incl&yen &n derecho a no ser asesinado, incl&so si la contin&aci%n del em$ara0o res&lta
seriamente per/&dicial o daina para s& madreC Y en caso contrario Be+iste al,Dn otro
f&ndamento para ?&e el >stado proh$a o re,&le el a$ortoC
A B >s &na violaci%n de los as&ntos concernientes a la i,&aldad ?&e &na naci%n de$e respetar
a s&s ci&dadanos c&ando permite ?&e las instit&ciones y los or,anismos del >stado ten,an en
c&enta la ra0a en la aceptaci%n de los aspirantes a las &niversidades y a las esc&elas
profesionalesC B>s esto distinto del hecho de tratar de forma diferente a los aspirantes
*
83opyri,ht E 5;;; $y #onald Dworkin9 -a versi%n ori,inal de este ensayo f&e presentada ori,inalmente,
como *ust +ur Judges )e Philosophers, an They )e Philosophers,, en &na conferencia pD$lica en New
York en oct&$re 11 de 5;;;, honrando el nom$ramiento de Dworkin como F&rista del ao 'Scholar of the
(ear( del 3onse/o de New York para las )&manidades" -a conferencia f&e a&spiciada por la Firma de
7$o,ados *rrick, )errin,ton 2 1&tcliffe --P"
dependiendo de s& p&nta/e en las pr&e$as de aptit&d o de s& ha$ilidad para el $aloncestoC
A BDe$emos asi,nar siempre rec&rsos escasos so$re la $ase del m=ritoC BG&= si,nifica
Hm=ritoIC
A B-os ,o$iernos respeta$les violan principios f&ndamentales al ne,ar a los ci&dadanos
a,oni0antes el derecho a morir c&:ndo y c%mo ellos deseanC BG&e los ci&dadanos ten,an
derecho de independencia moral en las decisiones personales, si,nifica ?&e la manera como
de$en morir es s& decisi%n personalC B<al derecho es parte del concepto mismo de li$ertad
ordenada 'ordered liberty(, el c&al ha dicho la 1&prema 3orte ?&e es la f&nci%n ?&e de$e
prote,er la cl:&s&la del de$ido procesoC
A B3&:l es la cone+i%n entre el a$orto y el s&icidio asistidoC B1i la 3onstit&ci%n concede a
las m&/eres em$ara0adas el derecho al a$orto, como la 1&prema 3orte ha dictaminado, se
si,&e ?&e tam$i=n concede a los pacientes mori$&ndos el derecho a decidir c%mo y c&:ndo
morirC B3&:l es el papel, en la controversia por el s&icidio asistido, de la distinci%n
frec&entemente citada entre HmatarI y Hde/ar morirIC B)ay &na distinci%n moralmente
relevante entre el acto ne,ativo de mantener el soporte artificial de la vida y el acto positivo
de prescri$ir pldoras letalesC
A BPor ?&= se re?&iere del ,o$ierno la protecci%n especial al derecho de li$ertad de
e+presi%nC B<al derecho incl&ye el derecho de los ci&dadanos intolerantes a referirse a las
minoras en t=rminos ins&ltantes y ofensivosC BJncl&ye el derecho de los candidatos a
p&estos polticos a ,astar todo el dinero ?&e p&edan reca&dar en s&s campaas, o el derecho
de los donantes a contri$&ir a esas campaas con todo el dinero ?&e deseenC
Kstas no son esencialmente pre,&ntas de tipo emprico ?&e p&edan resolverse por la ciencia,
la economa, la sociolo,a o la historia" Jnd&da$lemente los hechos y las predicciones
importan @al,&nas veces decisivamente@ c&ando las confrontamos" Pero el p&nto importante
en cada &na son c&estiones de valores, no de hechos, y ellos no nos convocan s%lo por el
compromiso de resolver y aclarar principios, sino para refle+ionar so$re los p&ntos
concretos y la correcta aplicaci%n de estos principios, adem:s de las relaciones y posi$les
conflictos entre ellos" >sa es la vocaci%n de los fil%sofos morales y polticos" -os /&eces y los
fil%sofos no comparten simplemente temas y as&ntos entrecr&0ados 'o#erlapping(
A
, como
los astr%nomos y los astr%lo,os" Por el contrario, los o$/etivos y los m=todos de los /&eces
incl&yen los de los fil%sofosL am$as profesiones ap&ntan m:s e+actamente a form&lar y
entender me/or los conceptos claves en los c&ales se e+presa n&estra moralidad poltica
predominante y n&estra ley or,:nica 'basic law("
Por tanto, parecera nat&ral esperar ?&e los /&eces ten,an al,&na familiaridad con la
literat&ra filos%fica, como esperamos ?&e la ten,an con la economa y, en el caso de los
/&eces constit&cionales, con la historia constit&cional" No podran, por s&p&esto,
simplemente remitirse a las resp&estas a los pro$lemas filos%ficos ?&e aparecen en al,&nos
man&ales oficiales o revisar el estado del arte, por?&e los fil%sofos discrepan radicalmente
so$re las me/ores teoras de la responsa$ilidad, el ne+o ca&sal, lo ?&e si,nifica HpersonaI
'personhood(, la i,&aldad y la li$ertad de e+presi%n, y so$re si Hde/ar morirI es lo mismo
?&e HmatarI" Pero eso difcilmente /&stifica ?&e los /&eces i,noren lo ?&e han escrito los
*
<rad&0co Mo#erlappingN como Mentrecr&0adoN para darle el mismo mati0 ?&e en el sentido ?&e se trad&ce el
Mo#erlapping consensusN rawlsiano" ''ota del traductor(
fil%sofosL sera ins&ltante tanto para los /&eces como para los fil%sofos ?&e los primeros
creyeran no $eneficiarse del est&dio de las teoras op&estas y diferentes de los se,&ndos, de
i,&al manera como los fil%sofos se $enefician leyendo los escritos de los a$o,ados ?&e
defienden tesis op&estas en &na disc&si%n" -o ?&e hacen los /&eces es de &na ,ran
importancia, no s%lo para las partes en el proceso sino tam$i=n, partic&larmente en el
derecho constit&cional, para el ,o$ierno de la Naci%n" B1i los pro$lemas ?&e afrontan han
sido de$atidos entre hom$res y m&/eres ed&cadas ?&e les dedicaron s&s vidas a estos
de$ates, c%mo p&eden los /&eces i,norar responsa$lemente lo ?&e esos hom$res y m&/eres
han escritoC
>sa es la primera parte del dilemaL Bdeben n&estros /&eces se fil%sofosC 7hora consideremos
la se,&ndaL Bpueden ser fil%sofosC Parece m&y poco realista pedirle a la mayora de los
/&eces ?&e intenten o$tener &na formaci%n de pre,rado en filosofa y as lo,ren &n mayor
entendimiento de la e+i,ente, milenaria y enorme literat&ra filos%fica" 7dem:s de carecer de
tiempo, los /&eces consideraran a$s&rdo ?&e les endil,aran n&evas responsa$ilidades como
las de atender de ,olpe c&rsos en los c&ales aprendan las tesis y los ar,&mentos principales
de incl&so los fil%sofos morales y polticos contempor:neos m:s importantes, tales como
<homas Na,el, Fohn #awls, <homas 1canlon o .ernard Oilliams 8sin contar a los ,randes
fil%sofos cl:sicos9" Jncl&so si, por &na com$inaci%n e+cepcional de dedicaci%n y est&dio, la
mayora de /&eces se convirtieran conscientemente en fil%sofos, no ?&isi=ramos ?&e
redactaran s&s fallos en el len,&a/e propio de la filosofa profesional, ya ?&e s&s escritos
de$en ser m-s accesi$les al pD$lico en ,eneral, no menos" B#ealmente ?&isi=ramos encontrar
a n&estros /&eces divididos en partidos filos%ficos, con Pant, por e/emplo, dominando el
1e,&ndo 3irc&ito, y )o$$es el 1=ptimoC BNo sera &na pesadilla si las decisiones /&diciales
dependieran de ?&= fil%sofo atrap% la ima,inaci%n del respectivo /&e0C
-os /&eces tienen la o$li,aci%n de proceder filos%ficamente, pero a la ve0 no p&eden ser y
?&i0:s no de$en ser fil%sofos" >ste es el dilema ?&e pretendo plantear, y hay dos maneras
para intentar escapar de =l" Podramos ar,&mentar ?&e no es verdad, desp&=s de todo, ?&e
los /&eces de$an ser fil%sofos, o podramos ar,Qir ?&e, desp&=s de todo, tampoco es verdad
?&e no p&edan ser fil%sofosL podramos entonces lle,ar a pensar ?&e ellos ser:n
s&ficientemente fil%sofos como para aliviar el a,&i/%n del dilema 'dilemmas sting(" -a
primera de estas r&tas de escape es en ,ran medida la m:s pop&lar y le dedicar= las
si,&ientes secciones" 1in em$ar,o, si estoy en lo correcto, se si,&e ?&e todas las estrate,ias
en esta direcci%n de escape fallar:n y tendremos ?&e considerar, desp&=s, ?&= tan e+itosa
ser: la se,&nda"
II) L% cnce-&%( $a 'i%&ria .ur"dica / $a in&encin ri0ina$
7firmo, /&sto ahora, ?&e a los /&eces les preoc&pan los mismos conceptos ?&e los fil%sofos
han est&diado" Pero esta afirmaci%n podra ser o$/etadaL si, a pesar de la apariencia inicial,
no es cierto, entonces ?&e los /&eces p&eden, sin ries,o al,&no, i,norar la filosofa" -a forma
m:s dram:tica de la o$/eci%n dice ?&e las pala$ras ?&e &san los a$o,ados y los /&eces
@Hresponsa$ilidadI, Hne+o ca&salI, Hi,&aldadI, Hli$ertadI y dem:s@ se refieren act&almente a
conceptos estrictamente /&rdicos, m&y diferentes de los conceptos del len,&a/e ordinario
con los ?&e los fil%sofos aplican estas pala$ras" >s verdad ?&e los a$o,ados &tili0an al,&nas
veces /&sto las mismas pala$ras y de la misma manera ?&e las pala$ras ?&e son &tili0adas en
el len,&a/e ordinario, pero lo hacen con si,nificados m&y diferentesL c&ando &n a$o,ado
dice ?&e &n contrato no es o$li,ante a menos ?&e se den ciertas HconsideracionesI, esta
pala$ra tiene m&y poco ?&e ver con la idea de consideraci%n" Pero es llamativamente d&doso
?&e esto sea verdad respecto a los conceptos ?&e nom$r=" -os hom$res de estado y los
/&eces ?&e estip&laron ?&e nadie de$e ser casti,ado si no es responsa$le de s&s actos, o ?&e
las personas de$en ser tratadas como i,&ales ante la ley, ?&isieron llevar los /&icios morales
corrientes a la pr:ctica /&rdica y por lo tanto emplearon los conceptos en los c&ales se
e+presan estos /&icios y principios" 1i, por el contrario, s&p&si=ramos ?&e los le,isladores
'law.makers( est&vieron constr&yendo conceptos /&rdicos completamente diferentes y
especiales, para los c&ales ellos &saron las mismas pala$ras Hresponsa$leI e Hi,&alI,
creeramos ?&e lo hicieron de manera perversa o sin motivo"
)ay, sin em$ar,o, &na forma m:s sofisticada y convincente del mismo reto" -a pr:ctica
/&rdica y los precedentes confi,&ran a men&do el si,nificado de &na pala$ra tomada del
len,&a/e ordinario, de tal manera ?&e la li$ertad ?&e tiene el /&e0 act&al de interpretar esas
pala$ras de ac&erdo con &na teora o es?&ema filos%ficos, podr: estar m&y limitada" >l
derecho penal, el de propiedad, el de contratos y el civil e+tracontract&al 'law of tort(, de$en
ser estr&ct&rados principalmente por re,las t=cnicas c&ya aplicaci%n p&eda ser anticipada
con ra0ona$le confian0a por los ci&dadanos, los propietarios de casas, los testadores, los
hom$res de ne,ocios y las compaas de se,&ros, y los precedentes, por tanto, tienen &n alto
valor en estos as&ntos" 1i &n precedente esta$lece lo ?&e c&enta como responsa$ilidad en el
Derecho Penal, o como ne+o ca&sal en el derecho civil e+tracontract&al, y &n /&e0 no es li$re
de modificar 'o#errule( tal precedente, Bpor ?&= de$e entonces averi,&ar si al,Dn fil%sofo
presenta o$/eciones convincentes a lo ?&e &n precedente ha esta$lecidoC
Pero a&n?&e el precedente limita la responsa$ilidad de los /&eces para &na n&eva
comprensi%n de los conceptos $:sicos, no lo e+ime, incl&so en estas :reas del derecho
privado, de esa responsa$ilidad" Jnevita$lemente confrontar: n&evos casos con n&evos ,iros
?&e lo o$li,ar:n a desarrollar los conceptos de manera no anticipada por los precedentes, y
c&ando lo ha,a, necesariamente emplear: s& propio criterio so$re c&:ndo la ,ente es de
hecho responsa$le de lo ?&e hace, o c&:ndo &n acontecimiento determinado es realmente la
ca&sa de otro, y dem:s" >s cierto ?&e incl&so en estos Hcasos difcilesI los /&eces tienen la
responsa$ilidad de respetar la inte,ridad con la historia /&rdica pasadaL no de$en apelar a
los principios ?&e no tienen f&ndamento en las decisiones y las doctrinas anteriores" -a
inte,ridad de$iera prohi$ir lo ?&e llamaramos outr/ 8e+a,erado9 o filosofa parad%/icaL si la
refle+i%n so$re mec:nica c&:ntica cond&/era a al,&nos fil%sofos a &na n&eva perspectiva
radical de la ca&salidad @incl&so m:s esc=ptica, di,amos, ?&e la de )&me@ los /&eces no
seran responsa$les de eval&ar ese n&evo desarrollo, por lo menos hasta c&ando f&ese
aceptado por la com&nidad en ,eneral" Pero de n&evo, a&n?&e estas e+i,encias de inte,ridad
limitan la li$ertad de los /&eces, ellos no convierten los conceptos /&rdicos en al,o diferente
de los conceptos ordinarios ?&e los ori,inaronR incl&so si &n /&e0 enfoca s& atenci%n hacia
las doctrinas de la ca&salidad ?&e no pareceran e+traas a la ley, tendr: ?&e de/ar de lado en
el camino m&cha literat&ra filos%fica"
Por otra parte, en las :reas m:s pD$licas del derecho, de las c&ales me estoy oc&pando
principalmente a?&, la necesidad de los /&eces de confrontar as&ntos filos%ficos es m:s
,rande y evidente" -os /&eces constit&cionales toman elecciones filos%ficas no de manera
ocasional c&ando se presenta al,Dn caso partic&larmente difcil, sino como &na c&esti%n de
r&tina" -a referencia de la Primera >nmienda a Hla li$ertad de e+presi%nI se refiere a la
misma li$ertad ?&e los fil%sofos li$erales han cele$rado y e+plorado, y si &n /&e0 de$e
determinar si &na forma partic&lar de e+presi%n @p&$licidad comercial, por e/emplo@ cae
dentro de esa li$ertad, afrontar: las mismas disc&siones so$re principios ?&e inconta$les
fil%sofos polticos han escrito en n&merosos li$ros al respecto" Por s&p&esto ?&e incl&so en
el derecho constit&cional, el precedente es &n determinante importante de &na decisi%n
/&dicial y limita la li$ertad del /&e0 para formar &n concepto constit&cional en s& propia
teora del concepto moral del c&al deriva" Pero los casos ?&e re?&ieren n&evos /&icios son
m:s frec&entes en el derecho constit&cional" >n las decisiones /&diciales ?&e se toman en el
derecho privado los casos n&evos son difciles, ,eneralmente, de$ido a ?&e ellos se
enc&entran en las fronteras de lo ?&e se est: decidiendo" >n la decisi%n /&dicial de as&ntos
constit&cionales, por otra parte, los casos son difciles a men&do no por?&e se enc&entran en
los $ordes de la doctrina, sino por?&e c&estionan los f&ndamentos s&$yacentes de la
doctrina" -a pre,&nta de si el derecho a la li$ertad de e+presi%n, apropiadamente entendido,
prote,e el len,&a/e car,ado de odio, ofensivo o ins&ltante a minoras perse,&idas, por
e/emplo, o si &na cierta prohi$ici%n de tal e+presi%n es necesaria en &na sociedad
,en&inamente democr:tica, re?&iere refle+ionar so$re al,&nos de los as&ntos m:s prof&ndos
de la moralidad poltica" >l precedente es menos percepti$le en tales casos, y los /&eces ?&e
piensan ?&e el precedente es incorrecto, por?&e limita inde$idamente los derechos
individ&ales m:s importantes, tienen menos ra0%n para respetarlo ?&e los /&eces ?&e piensan
?&e al,Dn precedente esta$lecido en el Derecho 3ons&et&dinario 'ommon Law( esta$a
e?&ivocado"
De$emos considerar, finamente, &na tercera forma del ar,&mento, ?&e ha tenido sin,&lar
importancia en el derecho constit&cional, se,Dn el c&al los /&eces y los fil%sofos tienen
diferentes o$/etivos" >sta forma comien0a concediendo ?&e los principales conceptos
constit&cionales de la Primera y la Decimoc&arta >nmienda, por e/emplo, son de hecho los
conceptos ?&e los fil%sofos han est&diado" Pero insiste ?&e los /&eces no de$en tener el
prop%sito de encontrar la me/or teora de la responsa$ilidad, de la li$ertad, o de lo ?&e
si,nifica persona, en virt&d de lo c&al sera conce$i$le ?&e apelar:n a la ay&da de los
fil%sofos para ?&e las encontraran, sino ?&e m:s $ien insiste ?&e los /&eces de$en tener el
prop%sito de encontrar c&:l era la me/or teora de ?&ienes hicieron estas ideas parte del
pensamiento /&rdico, lo c&al es &na c&esti%n de historia, no de filosofa"
>ste modelo de $&scar la Hintenci%n ori,inalI en la decisi%n /&dicial en as&ntos
constit&cionales, es menos pop&lar ahora entre er&ditos del derecho constit&cional de lo ?&e
&na ve0 f&e, y s&s o$/eciones son $ien conocidas" Pero incl&so si acept:ramos el modelo, no
ofrecera nin,Dn escape del dilema ?&e descri$, por?&e hara el derecho constit&cional m-s
entrela0ado con c&estiones filos%ficas, no menos" -os /&eces ?&e aceptan el modelo de$en
afrontar &n con/&nto de pre,&ntas ?&e est:n entre las c&estiones ?&e los de/an m:s perple/os
en filosofa de la mente, filosofa del len,&a/e y filosofa poltica" Podemos si,nificar cosas
m&y diferentes c&ando nos referimos, como &n rec&rso interpretativo, a la teora, la
intenci%n o la comprensi%n de &n e+tenso ,r&po de personas tales como los ?&e hicieron
con/&ntamente la 3onstit&ci%n y s&s enmiendas" Pero al,o ?&e no podemos indicar
comprensi$lemente es la teora, la intenci%n o la comprensi%n ?&e todos ellos compartieronL
la mayora de ellos pres&mi$lemente no tenan en a$sol&to teora so$re la protecci%n de la
li$ertad de e+presi%n, por e/emplo, y ?&ienes la tenan, pres&mi$lemente discrepa$an entre
ellos"
B>ntre las posi$ilidades interpretativas restantes, c&:l de$emos adoptarC Jncl&so si f&=ramos
a ele,ir, ar$itrariamente, &n individ&o partic&lar c&yas opiniones aceptaramos como
decisivas @di,amos, el redactor 'draftsman( ?&e escri$i% la mayor parte de la cl:&s&la en
c&esti%n, si al,&no lo hi0o@ n&estras dific&ltades filos%ficas apenas comen0aran"
1&pon,amos ?&e desc&$rimos 8lo c&al parece $astante pro$a$le, dado el len,&a/e ?&e
emple%9 ?&e el redactor principal de la cl:&s&la de i,&al protecci%n contenida en la
>nmienda D=cimo c&arta, pretenda ?&e la ,ente de$e ser i,&al ante la ley de ac&erdo con la
me0or comprensi%n de lo ?&e eso si,nifica, y no de ac&erdo con s& propia comprensi%n en
ese entonces 8la c&al el podra ha$er considerado como incompleta9 BG&= respeto a esa
intenci%n ori,inal se re?&erira en estas circ&nstanciasC BUn /&e0 contempor:neo estara
comprometido con la intenci%n ori,inal para interpretar la cl:&s&la de ac&erdo con lo ?&e el
redactor act&almente intenta$a prom&l,arC 1i es as, B?&= no lo remitira a la filosofa
poltica ?&e la doctrina de la intenci%n ori,inal prometa evitarC BNo de$emos pre,&ntar,
para decidir c&estiones como =stas, por &u/ los /&eces de$en mirar a la intenci%n ori,inalC
-a resp&esta, podra decirse, descansa en la democracia o en el >stado de Derecho 'rule of
law(" Pero de$emos ele,ir entre las concepciones rivales de esos ideales nota$lemente
a$stractos para decidir ?&= resp&estas p&eden ofrecer a las pre,&ntas ?&e nos conf&nden @y
este e/ercicio nos invol&crara en c&estiones filos%ficas aDn m:s comple/as@" BG&=, desp&=s
de todo, es la democraciaC Bo el >stado de DerechoC
III) In%&in& e in&uicin
7s, la primera r&ta de escape @?&e, desp&=s de todo, los /&eces y los fil%sofos no comparten
&n tema y &n o$/etivo comDn@ es &na il&si%n, al menos para los conceptos /&rdicos m:s
importantes, incl&yendo los propios conceptos constit&cionales" Por lo tanto de$emos
considerar otra forma m:s am$iciosa de ne,ar la primera parte del dilema ?&e he constr&ido"
Podramos recomendar, primero, ?&e los /&eces decidan c&estiones filos%ficas ,&iados por
s& instinto primario o por s&s reacciones viscerales m:s $ien ?&e cons&ltando a los fil%sofos"
>n los casos de s&icidio asistido a la 1&prema 3orte se le re?&iri% decidir si hay &na
diferencia moralmente relevante entre &n doctor ?&e retira el soporte artificial de la vida de
&n paciente deseoso de morir @?&e la 3orte, en efecto, ha sostenido ?&e los estados p&eden
permitir@ y &n doctor ?&e ay&da al s&icidio de &na forma m:s activa prescri$iendo pldoras
?&e le permitiran a &n paciente aca$ar con s& vida por s mismo, por e/emplo, o d:ndole a
&n paciente ?&e r&e,a por s& propia m&erte e incapa0 de tomar pldoras, &na inyecci%n letal"
B1i &n >stado p&ede no prohi$ir lo primero, tiene el derecho de prohi$ir lo se,&ndoC >se es
&n aspecto de &na anti,&a disc&si%n filos%fica @Bc&:ndo y ?&= tan diferente es de/ar morir a
al,&ien, moralmente diferente de matarloC@ y los ma,istrados de la 1&prema 3orte podran
ha$er cons&ltado la literat&ra filos%fica e intentado e+plicar de ?&= lado de la disc&si%n se
&$icaron y por?&=" Por s&p&esto ?&e m&chos ci&dadanos ?&e tomaron el otro lado de la
disc&si%n, $ien podran no ha$er sido convencidos por el ar,&mento de la 3orte, pero ellos
ha$ran sa$ido ?&e los /&eces de la 1&prema 3orte tenan d&das so$re el caso desde s&
propio p&nto de vista, y ha$ran intentado e+plicar por?&= lo encontraron poco pers&asivo"
De ac&erdo con la s&,erencia ?&e estamos considerando ahora, sin em$ar,o, no de$en hacer
esto" De$en i,norar a los fil%sofos y e+poner simplemente s& reacci%n inmediata y no
est&diada so$re el tema en disc&si%n"
>l ma,istrado de la 1&prema 3orte .yron Ohite, di/o &na ve0 ?&e a&n?&e no podra definir
la o$scenidad, lo sa$ra en c&anto est&viera frente a ella" N&estra n&eva s&,erencia
,enerali0a esa estrate,iaL los /&eces no de$en intentar anali0ar conceptos o ideas filos%ficas
difciles, sino ?&e solamente de$en informar s& reacci%n instintiva" 1i &n /&e0 int&itivamente
siente ?&e le es permitido a &n doctor retirar el soporte artificial de la vida c&ando &n
paciente se lo e+i,e, pero no prescri$irle pldoras letales, no de$e preoc&parse so$re si
podra defender esa distinci%n mediante &n ar,&mento ra0onado, sino ?&e apenas de$e
afirmar ?&e es as como lo siente, o como la mayora de ,ente siente, o como al,&ien del
mismo ,r&po siente"
>sta s&,erencia ha tenido al,&nos distin,&idos proponentes /&diciales" *liver Oendell
)olmes di/o ?&e /&0,% si &n procedimiento &sado por la polica para o$tener evidencia
viola$a la cl:&s&la del de$ido proceso, pre,&ntando si tal procedimiento lo haca sentir
na&seas" 8>sa p&do ha$er sido la f&ente del ada,io del as llamado Hrealista /&rdicoI de ?&e
la /&sticia depende de lo ?&e el /&e0 desay&n%9" Pero este es &no de los aspectos m:s
valiosos de la decisi%n /&dicial @en efecto, creo ?&e la le,itimaci%n de la decisi%n /&dicial
como instr&mento de ,o$ierno, depende de esto@ ?&e los /&eces deciden con $ase en
ra0ones y e+plican s&s ra0ones" BG&= 8con e+cepci%n del deseo de ahorrarse &na tarea difcil9
podra /&stificar a los /&eces al decidir casos cr&cialmente importantes en &na forma
aparentemente arro,ante o ap:ticaC
P&edo pensar en dos ar,&mentos, pero am$os, de n&evo, es m:s lo ?&e s&scitan ?&e lo ?&e
impiden la formaci%n de $arreras filos%ficas, por?&e am$os dependen de posiciones
filos%ficas altamente controversiales" 1i =stas son las ra0ones ?&e nosotros acordamos para
e+plicar por ?&= los /&eces no necesitan ser fil%sofos, entonces los /&eces tendran ?&e
convertirse en fil%sofos para entenderlos" >l primero de estos dos ar,&mentos se aplica
partic&larmente a los conceptos ?&e he tomado como mis e/emplos m:s frec&entesL los
conceptos morales ?&e fi,&ran en las decisiones constit&cionales" >l ar,&mento descansa
so$re &na tesis filos%fica llamada Hint&icionismoI, la c&al sostiene ?&e las personas @o, en
c&al?&ier caso, las personas correctas@ tienen fac&ltades nat&rales ?&e les permiten int&ir
directamente la verdad so$re c&estiones morales, sin apoyarse en c&al?&ier ar,&mento o
refle+i%n" 8De ac&erdo con al,&nas versiones del int&icionismo, la refle+i%n y el ar,&mento
de hecho apa,a o entorpece el sentido de /&sticia9" >l int&icionismo no es act&almente
aceptado por los fil%sofos morales, al menos en la rama an,loamericana de ese campo, pero
por s&p&esto ?&e de ah no se si,&e ?&e es e?&ivocado" .ien podra ser revivido en &na
d=cada o &n da y as convertirse en la preferencia filos%fica del mes" 1in em$ar,o, esto
enfrenta serias dific&ltades ?&e parecen descalificarlo por?&e servira de /&stificaci%n a los
/&eces ?&e no ?&isieran dar ra0ones" >l ar,&mento depende de &na s&p&esta capacidad
h&mana intrnseca para la int&ici%n no refle+iva y no ar,&mentada, so$re &n modelo de
percepci%n sensorial@ pero es &n total misterio c%mo los hechos morales podran interact&ar
conce$i$lemente con &n sistema nervioso h&mano" Y s&poner ?&e los seres h&manos como
especie tienen esta capacidad entra en contradicci%n con la ,ran diversidad y los conflictos
en las opiniones morales entre ellos" -os int&icionistas insisten en ?&e la perspectiva de
al,&nas personas est: n&$lada" Pero creemos ?&e no tenemos forma de decidir c&:l visi%n
est: n&$lada @ c&:les capacidades son defect&osas para la int&ici%n @, e+cepto pre,&ntando
si est:n de ac&erdo con nosotros so$re las c&estiones morales, y esto tam$i=n parece
insatisfactorio"
>l se,&ndo ar,&mento a favor de instr&ir a los /&eces a decidir con $ase en /&icios
instintivos, inmediatos o irrefle+ivos, tam$i=n aplica con &na f&er0a partic&lar a los
conceptos morales" >ste es el Hescepticismo moralI, ?&e declara ?&e no hay resp&esta
correcta a las as llamadas c&estiones filos%ficas, como en ?&= consiste la personalidad, la
li$ertad, la i,&aldad o la democracia, y ?&e los /&eces por lo tanto no de$en derrochar
tiempo investi,ando cada &na" P&esto ?&e c&al?&ier resp&esta es s%lo &na elecci%n, con nada
m:s prof&ndo ?&e la f&ndamente, los /&eces desempean me/or s& la$or respondiendo
inmediatamente las pre,&ntas ?&e les preoc&panL ahorran tiempo y ener,a para otros
as&ntos" 8)olmes, el a&tor de la pr&e$a de la na&sea 'puke test(, f&e &n apasionado y
comprometido esc=ptico moral, y ,ran parte de s& vida y de s&s escritos son e+plica$les s%lo
c&ando consideramos en toda s& amplit&d este hecho9" De n&evo, como di/e, este ar,&mento
para i,norar la filosofa depende de &na controvertida posici%n filos%fica" 8Desde mi p&nto
de vista, es &na posici%n indefendi$le y, de hecho en s&s formas m:s pop&lares ahora, es
tam$i=n incoherente
1
9" -a mayora de los /&eces no son como )olmesL no son esc=pticos
morales, y el ar,&mento de ?&e p&eden i,norar la filosofa por?&e el esceptiscismo es
correcto, no les parecer: &na me/or ra0%n a ellos de lo ?&e me parece a m y, espero, ?&e a
&stedes tam$i=n"
I1) 2ra0#a&i%#
)asta ahora hemos sondeados y descartado dos vas de escape del dilema ?&e descri$,
ne,ando la primera parte de tal dilema @?&e los /&eces de$en ser fil%sofos@" No podemos
escapar diciendo ?&e la historia ha formado los conceptos /&rdicos de la relaci%n ca&sal, de
lo ?&e si,nifica persona o de la i,&aldad de tal manera ?&e ahora son conceptos diferentes
de a?&ellos est&diados por los fil%sofos" -a historia de hecho ha formado los conceptos
/&rdicos, pero si,&en estando a$iertos al desarrollo y los /&eces desarrollando los conceptos
de$en hacerse las mismas pre,&ntas ?&e se hacen los fil%sofos" <ampoco de$emos intentar
escapar diciendo ?&e los /&eces actDan de la me/or manera posi$le al contestar estas difciles
pre,&ntas, c&ando responden de ac&erdo con s&s instintos inmediatos sin est&dio ni
refle+i%n"
1in em$ar,o, hay &na tercera estrate,ia posi$le ?&e ha ase,&rado recientemente &na mayor
m:s pop&laridad entre los a$o,ados acad=micos" S&chos de ellos proponen ?&e los /&eces
evitan los pro$lemas ?&e han oc&pado a los fil%sofos d&rante si,los @tales como lo ?&e
realmente si,nifican la responsa$ilidad, la relaci%n ca&sal, la i,&aldad o la li$ertad de
e+presi%n, o si de/ar morir es realmente diferente de matar@ aco,iendo &na tradici%n
filos%fica diferente y aparentemente radical, llamada pra,matismo, la c&al los anima a
pre,&ntar, en cam$io, si el &so de estos conceptos por parte del /&e0 hacen &n diferencia en
c&anto al f&t&ro de la com&nidad y, de ser as, c&:l consideraci%n ase,&rara &n me/or
f&t&ro" >n l&,ar de permitir las c&estiones controvertidas, como si los estados p&eden
prohi$ir el a$orto, ?&e s&scitan rompeca$e0as filos%ficos altamente a$stractos @por e/emplo,
si &n feto tiene por s mismo derechos e intereses@ de$emos enfocarnos en temas m&cho
m:s pr:cticos y mane/a$les ?&e no re?&ieran de la filosofa para responderL BProhi$iendo el
a$orto se prod&ciran me/ores consec&encias para la com&nidad en el lar,o pla0oC
Por s&p&esto ?&e las post&ras filos%ficas tienen s& Hc&artos de horaI de fama, y el
1
Ter, #onald Dworkin, H*$/ectivity and <r&thL Yo&Nd .etter .elieve JtI, enL Philosophy 1 Public !ffairs
Tol" 5!, No" 5 8Primavera9 1994"
pra,matismo y s& hermana incl&so m:s de moda, la socio$iolo,a, est&vieron en $o,a a
trav=s del paisa/e acad=mico por &n tiempo, y lo si,&en estando en las Fac&ltades de
Derecho donde las modas calientes se v&elven ti$ias y l&e,o m&eren" Pero en el act&al
conte+to, por lo menos, el pra,matismo es vaco y no ofrece nin,&na ay&da para escapar de
n&estro dilema" >l pra,matismo nos dice ?&e los /&eces p&eden de/ar a &n lado los
rompeca$e0as a$stractos so$re el a$orto y pre,&ntar s%lo si las consec&encias ser:n me/ores
si se les proh$e a las m&/eres ?&e se les practi?&en a$ortos" Pero no podemos decidir si las
consec&encias de &na decisi%n constit&cional son me/ores ?&e las consec&encias de &na
decisi%n diferente sin confrontar, de n&evo, las mismas c&estiones filos%ficas ?&e el
pra,matismo espera evitar"
1i el a$orto est: constit&cionalmente prote,ido, as&mamos, ha$r: m:s a$ortos y menos
m&/eres c&yas vidas hayan sido marchitadas con &n hi/o indeseado" 8Por s&p&esto ?&e
tam$i=n ha$r:n m&chas otras consec&encias, al,&nas m:s difciles de predecir, pero =stas son
las m:s destaca$les9" B>stas consec&encias $ien conocidas, consideradas por ellas mismas,
si,nifican ?&e las cosas han ido me/orC, Bo peorC B3%mo podemos decidir so$re a$ortar sin
decidir antes, en efecto, si el a$orto es &n homicidioC 1i esto es as, entonces las cosas no
han ido me/or, no importa c&an m&cho pare0can ir de otras maneras" 1&p%n,ase, de otra
parte, ?&e los tri$&nales hayan decidido ?&e &n a$orto no est: constit&cionalmente
prote,ido, y m&chos estados hayan contin&ado declar:ndolo criminal" -a c&esti%n
lentamente se desvanecera de la controversia pD$lica, y cada &no ha$ra aceptado &na
posici%n en la c&al, por e/emplo, las m&/eres con s&ficientes medios econ%micos ha$ran
podido via/ar entre estados donde el a$orto f&era permitido y a?&ellas ?&e no podran ha$er
tenido s&s hi/os sin reclamos" Desde &n p&nto de vista, las cosas ha$ran ido m&cho me/orL
ha$ra ha$ido menos enfrentamiento pD$lico" Pero no podramos decidir si las cosas
h&$ieran f&ncionado me/or en con/&nto sin decidir si las m&/eres a las ?&e se les ha$an
ne,ado a$ortos, o hecho inc&rrir en ,randes costos monetarios y pro$lemas para lo,rarlo,
f&eron tratadas in/&stamente" Por s&p&esto ?&e podemos pensar ?&e el tratamiento in/&sto
para al,&nos depende de si la com&nidad, en s& con/&nto, es m:s feli0 8o est: menos
dividida, por lo menos9 como res&ltado de ne,ar a$ortos" Pero si tenemos el derecho a
pensar ?&e depende aDn de otro de$ate moral de alcance filos%fico, a sa$er si el &tilitarismo
es verdad" 7s, el pra,matismo es &na post&ra vaca ?&e no lle,a a nada por?&e la pr&e$a
?&e propone @Bson $&enas las consec&enciasC @ divide a las personas precisamente por&ue
discrepan so$re las me/ores resp&estas a las pre,&ntas ?&e el pra,matismo intenta evitar"
1) E$ nue3 4r#a$i%#
-a sorprendente pop&laridad de esa teora vaca 8el pra,matismo9 dem&estra aDn m:s ?&e el
dilema ?&e descri$ al principio es prof&ndo y preoc&pante" Dado ?&e realmente cal% entre
los a$o,ados norteamericanos hace al,&nas d=cadas, ese positivismo /&rdico formalista es
&na visi%n desesperadamente inadec&ada de lo ?&e hacen los /&eces norteamericanos, en
tanto han temido afrontar la alternativaL tomar decisiones /&diciales re?&iere /&icios so$re
c&estiones morales tan prof&ndas y polari0antes ?&e son el o$/eto del prof&ndo y contin&o
est&dio y divisi%n filos%fica" Parece horroroso ?&e los /&eces no ele,idos posean el poder de
imponer a los liti,antes y la naci%n &n con/&nto de resp&estas a tales pre,&ntas tan
persistentes" Pero la idea de ?&e los /&eces p&eden decidir casos difciles de al,&na manera,
incl&yendo difciles casos constit&cionales, cam$iando s& enfo?&e de principios
controversiales a hechos demostra$les y s&s consec&encias, es precisamente otro e/emplo de
la lamenta$le disposici%n de al,&nos er&ditos /&rdicos a enterrar s&s ca$e0as en la arena" Ya
es hora de ?&e la profesi%n /&rdica confronte a$iertamente el hecho de ?&e los ci&dadanos
norteamericanos est:n prof&ndamente divididos en c&estiones morales, ?&e las decisiones
/&diciales inevita$lemente s&ponen tales c&estiones, y ?&e los /&eces tienen la
responsa$ilidad de admitir esto y de e+plicar por ?&= han tomado c&al?&iera de las
posiciones ?&e tienen"
1in em$ar,o, hay otra posi$ilidad" 1i el derecho tal como est: instit&ido @como la historia y
la pr:ctica lo han conformado@ ,ira so$re conceptos de dimensiones filos%ficas, si todos los
variados rec&rsos ?&e p&di=ramos constr&ir para permitirles a los /&eces decidir los casos sin
invol&crarse ellos mismos en controversias intermina$les so$re si esos conceptos de$en
fallar, si encontramos poco realista e inacepta$le ?&e de$en convertirse ellos mismos en
fil%sofos, entonces nos ?&eda solamente &n rec&rsoL podemos convertir el derecho tal como
est: en &n me/or derecho adaptado a &nos /&eces m:s disciplinados y menos am$iciosos" De
esta manera, de$emos volver, finalmente, a la opci%n escapatoria m:s radical ?&e han
ofrecido, la c&al ha sido llamada el Hn&evo formalismoI" Feremy .entham, ?&e odi% la
instit&ci%n ?&e llam% HF&e0 y compaaI 8Jue2 1 o"9, ale,% ?&e el poder de los /&eces para
act&ar como fil%sofos de$e ser contenido mediante la codificaci%n de toda la ley, de modo
?&e las decisiones /&diciales realmente f&eran mec:nicas" 7&n?&e esto le pare0ca
sorprendente a &n a$o,ado de mi ,eneraci%n, el esprit& de .entham est: m:s vivo ahora
?&e hace dos si,los" )ay &n ent&siasmo creciente por &n sistema /&rdico ?&e posi$ilite ?&e
la decisi%n /&dicial se v&elva cada ve0 m:s mec:nica"
>ncontramos este n&evo ent&siasmo en la o$ra de variados est&diosos y de /&eces ?&e
difieren entre ellos de m&chas manerasL <homas Urey, 7ntonin 1calia, Frederick 1cha&er y
3ass 1&nstein, por e/emplo" >l o$/etivo compartido de los n&evos formalistas @lo ?&e estas
fi,&ras tan diferentes entre ellas tienen en comDn@ es &n deseo de cam$iar el derecho y la
pr:ctica /&rdica de &na forma ?&e red&0ca el :m$ito de los /&icios a$iertos a los /&eces para
decidir lo ?&e es el derecho" #ecomiendan &na variedad de estrate,ias, desde la codificaci%n
8en el estilo de .entham9, a instar a los /&eces c&ando hacen n&evas doctrinas a ?&e
form&len re,las claras 'crisp rules( ?&e p&edan ser aplicadas mec:nicamente desp&=s 8en
l&,ar de s%lo ofrecer principios ,enerales9, y a la prop&esta de 1calia para la interpretaci%n
invaria$le 'statutory interpretation( 8la c&al pide a los /&eces no espec&lar so$re las
intenciones o los prop%sitos ?&e los le,isladores p&dieron ha$er tenido al hacer las leyes ?&e
hicieron, sino e+i,ir el si,nificado m:s literal de lo ?&e realmente di/eron9"
>l n&evo formalismo tam$i=n es responsa$le de &n n&evo ent&siasmo por la doctrina de la
Hintenci%n ori,inalI de la decisi%n /&dicial ?&e he disc&tido anteriormente" >l primer imp&lso
para esa doctrina f&e sem:ntico e interpretativoL s&s defensores insistieron en ?&e la
3onstit&ci%n, tal como est:, consiste en la comprensi%n de los conte+tos de los conceptos
morales ?&e se enc&entran en la 3onstit&ci%n, no en la me/or comprensi%n de estos
conceptos" -a versi%n del n&evo formalismo no es sem:ntica sino estrat=,ica, sin em$ar,o,
insta a los /&eces a $&scar &na intenci%n ori,inal, no de la ra0%n positiva ?&e representa lo
?&e realmente si,nifica la 3onstit&ci%n, sino de la ra0%n ne,ativa ?&e los /&eces ?&ienes
deciden casos de esa forma ?&e no necesiten desple,ar s&s propias convicciones morales o
filos%ficas" 3omo ya he ar,&mentado, esta estrate,ia de$e fallar en s& metaL no es &na forma
de permitir ?&e los /&eces escapen de la filosofa, sino de invol&crarlos m:s prof&ndamente
dentro de la controversia filos%fica"
Pero de$emos considerar los m=ritos del n&evo formalismo como estrate,ia ,eneral" No
p&ede ser &na ra0%n para aceptar el re,reso a la /&rispr&dencia mec:nica 'mechanical
0urisprudence( ?&e precisamente relevar: a los /&eces de tomar decisiones difciles o
controversiales" >sto permitira ?&e la cola meneara el perroL primero de$emos decidir con
?&e clase de estr&ct&ra /&rdica deseamos ser ,o$ernados, y l&e,o determinamos ?&= rol
de$en desempear los /&eces en tal estr&ct&ra" Podemos tener al,&nas ra0ones para ?&erer
ser ,o$ernados por &n ,r&po de re,las m:s mec:nicas, y estas p&eden ser $&enas ra0ones en
al,&nas :reas del derecho, partic&larmente en las del Derecho privado" Podemos creer ?&e
tra$a/amos me/or en estas :reas pidi=ndoles a los /&eces ?&e limiten s&s intervenciones en los
as&ntos de la ,ente a lo estrictamente necesario $a/o las tersas leyes ?&e &n c&erpo
le,islativo ele,ido ha creado, de/:ndole a la le,islat&ra decidir c&ando al,&nas clarificaciones
o cam$ios en estas re,las sean desea$les" 1in em$ar,o, no estoy pers&adido de esto y creo
?&e perderamos m:s de lo ?&e ,anaramos e+tendiendo el domino del derecho en el c&al las
decisiones /&diciales son mec:nicas"
3&ando volvemos al tema de mis e/emplos principales @derecho constit&cional@ mis
o$/eciones hacia el n&evo formalismo se enca&0an m:s prof&ndamenteL derri$aran el t:cito
s&p&esto de toda n&estra empresa constit&cional, c&al es ?&e los ci&dadanos tienen derechos
?&e de$en ser prote,idos de los cam$ios y de los veredictos a&to interesados de las
instit&ciones mayoritarias" 3omo di/e antes, la vie/a esc&ela de la intenci%n ori,inal as&ma
como &n as&nto de sem:ntica y de historia, ?&e esos derechos est:n limitados a c%mo los
comprendieron los hom$res de estado fallecidos tiempo atr:s" -a vie/a esc&ela de la
intenci%n ori,inal crey% ?&e res,&arda$a el ac&erdo 3onstit&cional como realmente es" -os
n&evos formalistas en el derecho constit&cional no hacen tal s&posici%nR s&s ar,&mentos son
revol&cionarios, no interpretativos" 7ceptan ?&e el cam$io ?&e proponen dismin&ir:
nota$lemente el poder de los /&eces para hacer c&mplir lo ?&e consideran derechos
constit&cionales de las personas" Ksa es s& meta y esta$lecen la doctrina de la intenci%n
ori,inal s%lo como &na manera conveniente para llevar a ca$o ese cam$io, mediante la
ret%rica a la ?&e est: acost&m$rada el p&e$lo" -a ret%rica hace ?&e el cam$io pare0ca menos
radical de lo ?&e es realmente"
BG&= /&stificaciones podramos encontrar para esa dram:tica transformaci%n de n&estra
pr:cticaC Podramos decir, primero, ?&e el c&erpo le,islativo har: &n me/or tra$a/o ?&e el
?&e hacen los /&eces identificando y haciendo c&mplir los verdaderos derechos
constit&cionalesL ?&e el c&erpo le,islativo ser: me/or en la filosofa ?&e lo ?&e son los
/&eces" Pero eso es poco convincente" * podra decirse en se,&ndo l&,ar, ?&e n&estra
3onstit&ci%n, tal como est:, no es democr:tica, y ?&e el cam$io en el poder me/orar:
n&estra democracia" Pero esa afirmaci%n descansa en &na pec&liar definici%n de democracia
@?&e si,nifica solamente la vol&ntad de la mayora@ y esa afirmaci%n es en s misma a/ena a
n&estra historia" >stas no parecen ra0ones adec&adas para pretender ?&e n&estra
3onstit&ci%n sea s%lo &n accidente hist%rico, /&sto la codificaci%n de las opiniones polticas
concretas y de los /&icios de moda entre la elite del si,lo VTJJJ y de los hom$res de estado y
los polticos del si,lo VJV" >sto sera &na traici%n de n&estra herencia poltica, incl&yendo
&na traici%n de lo ?&e los hom$res de estado y los polticos pensaron ?&e esta$an creando"
Para $ien o para mal @se,&ramente para $ien@ creemos ?&e n&estra le,islaci%n en ,eneral, y
?&e n&estra 3onstit&ci%n en partic&lar, descansa so$re principios y no so$re &n accidente
hist%rico, y sera &n ,ran traspi=s en n&estro propio entendimiento colectivo ren&nciar a esa
idea ahora"

Jncl&so no podemos citar la a&toridad de .entham para /&stificar tal cam$io, de$ido a todas
s&s afirmaciones so$re la codificaci%n y por toda s& desconfian0a en los /&eces" P&esto ?&e
=l tena &na ,ran filosofa @el &tilitarismo@ ?&e, al menos desde s& p&nto de vista, sera
respetada insistiendo ?&e los le,isladores disean re,las ?&e no contienen t=rminos morales
a$stractos, sino ?&e apenas estip&lan las prohi$iciones, sol&ciones y casti,os ?&e &n c:lc&lo
&tilitario $ien reali0ado aplicara a los actos partic&lares" >l &tilitarismo es s%lo otra
controversia filos%fica, y adem:s poco atractiva" 7 menos ?&e deseemos aco,erla, o al,&na
otra forma red&ccionista de consec&encialismo, no de$emos tratar de eliminar los /&icios de
las refle+iones de n&estros /&eces so$re lo ?&e re?&iere la /&sticia le,al en casos individ&ales"
1I) Ac&i&ud 4i$%4ica / -r4undidad 4i$%4ica
Tolvemos al comien0o de este tra$a/o" N&estra le,islaci%n le pide a los /&eces ?&e tomen
decisiones so$re c&estiones ?&e han sido est&diadas con ,ran c&idado por fil%sofos de
diferentes clases y esc&elas, y no podemos pensar en nin,Dn cam$io acepta$le en n&estras
e+pectativas hacia los /&eces, o en la estr&ct&ra o el car:cter de n&estro derecho, ?&e altere
ese hecho" De$emos e+aminar ahora la se,&nda parte del dilema ?&e e+p&se Bpueden los
/&eces ser fil%sofosC De$emos tener c&idado, al responder esta pre,&nta, para evitar
c&al?&ier caricat&ra de lo ?&e esto si,nificara" 1era a$s&rdo s&,erirle a los /&eces ?&e
pidieran permiso para a&sentarse de s& tra$a/o con el o$/etivo de o$tener Doctorados
8Ph"D"9 en filosofa, y ?&e l&e,o a s& re,reso al tri$&nal, ?&e escri$ieran opiniones /&diciales
?&e p&dieran ser p&$licadas en revistas especiali0adas en filosofa" Nada similar a esto
oc&rri%, sin em$ar,o, c&ando los /&eces f&eron m:s conscientes de la importancia de la
economa formal en el an:lisis /&rdico" -os /&eces no se volvieron e+pertos en el estado del
arte de la econometra o del an:lisis matem:tico del comportamiento econ%mico, y sin
em$ar,o s&s opiniones f&eron m:s sensi$les y sofisticadas en aspectos econ%micos"
No necesitamos pedirle m:s a la filosofa" BPero ?&= mostrara &na mayor sensi$ilidad
creciente so$re el temaC Para empe0ar, los /&eces de$en entender ?&e los conceptos ?&e
mane/an @responsa$ilidad, si,nificado, intenci%n, i,&aldad, li$ertad y democracia, por
e/emplo@ son conceptos dif3ciles, ?&e estamos le/os de resolver o tener claro c&:l es la
me/or posici%n o ac&erdo so$re ellos, y ?&= sera &n error pensar ?&e n&estra le,islaci%n,
n&estra historia o n&estra c&lt&ra, ha acordado &na resp&esta disponi$le y ?&e no re?&iere de
&lterior /&stificaci%n para &so de los /&eces" De$en entender ?&e todos los res&midos
e+pedientes ?&e aca$amos de considerar @int&icionismo y pra,matismo, tanto como el
formalismo@ son il&siones, y ?&e de$en ele,ir entre los principios rivales ?&e se ofrecen para
e+plicar conceptos constit&cionales, y ?&e de$en estar listos para presentar y defender s&s
elecciones" >stos podran parecer s%lo avances limitados, pero de todos modos seran m&y
importantes"
BG&= podramos esperar ra0ona$lemente m:s all: de esoC De$emos esperar &n cam$io en
n&estras $ases c&lt&rales ?&e determine lo ?&e los /&eces @y m:s aDn, lo a$o,ados@
consideren relevantes en los ar,&mentos /&rdicos" <ales $ases c&lt&rales han aceptado la
economa y, partic&larmente en el caso del derecho constit&cional, la historia constit&cional
y poltica" -os a$o,ados entienden ?&e no s%lo se les permite, sino ?&e est:n o$li,ados a
est&diar estas disciplinas con la esperan0a de encontrar ar,&mentos Dtiles para s&s
posiciones, con el fin de presentarlas en el tri$&nal" J,&almente, la c&lt&ra de$e aco,er el
material filos%fico pertinente como relevante" -os a$o,ados ?&e de$aten la comprensi%n
correcta de la cl:&s&la de i,&al protecci%n, por e/emplo, de$en animarse a constr&ir y
distin,&ir las concepciones de i,&aldad, y a disc&tir por?&= &na m:s ?&e otra es la
concepci%n correcta para entender la f&er0a de la cl:&s&la" No ?&iero decir ?&e ellos o los
/&eces a ?&ienes se diri,en de$en citar o copiar los ar,&mentos de al,Dn fil%sofo en
partic&lar" -os a$o,ados entrenados de forma correcta p&eden conce$ir s&s propios
ar,&mentos filos%ficos, los c&ales podran ser m&y diferentes de los presentados por &n
fil%sofo acad=mico, y los /&eces, por s& parte, p&eden valorar esos ar,&mentos sin tenerse
?&e s&/etar a &n fil%sofo determinado" 1in em$ar,o no sera irra0ona$le esperar ?&e los
/&eces y a$o,ados por i,&al t&vieran cierta familiaridad con al menos las principales esc&elas
contempor:neas de la filosofa /&rdica, moral y poltica, por?&e eso parece indispensa$le
para &na apreciaci%n adec&ada de c&al?&ier ar,&mento filos%fico so$re el ?&e de$an
meditar" Podramos pensar en &n /&e0 constit&cional desc&idado ?&e no t&viera &na
comprensi%n mnima de los historiadores principales de la 3onvenci%n 3onstit&cional y las
>nmiendas de la U&erra 3ivil" BPor ?&= no de$emos insistir tam$i=n ?&e los /&eces
constit&cionales est=n enterados de las o$ras de Fohn #awls o )"-"7" )art, por e/emploC
Por s&p&esto ?&e no ?&iero decir ?&e los /&eces de$en considerarse ellos mismos como s&s
discp&los" G&iero decir e+actamente lo contrarioL ?&e de$en tener &na comprensi%n
s&ficiente del tra$a/o de los principales fil%sofos en las ramas pertinentes de la filosofa para
leer a tales fil%sofos crticamente"
De$o repetir, sin entrar en de$ates, ?&e no estoy s&poniendo ?&e c&al?&ier incremento de la
sofisticaci%n /&dicial en la filosofa eliminara la controversia entre los /&eces" B3%mo podra
darse si los mismos fil%sofos discrepan tan dram:ticamente entre ellosC Pero se p&ede
red&cir la controversia" >s &na an=cdota $ien conocida ?&e al,&nos ma,istrados de la
1&prema 3orte ?&e f&eron nom$rados por?&e eran a&t=nticos conservadores, tales como
Oarren, .rennan o 1o&ter, res&ltaron ser m:s li$erales de lo esperado, y ?&e al,&nos
nom$rados por?&e eran ,en&inos li$erales, como Frankf&rter, res&ltaron ser m:s
conservadores" -a refle+i%n filos%fica pone a pr&e$a los s&p&estos ende$les, y prod&ce por
lo tanto m:s cam$ios, ?&e c&al?&ier otra clase de refle+iones" No estoy promoviendo &na
mayor sofisticaci%n filos%fica para ?&e elimine o red&0ca la controversia, sino para ?&e la
ha,a 8si &sted perdonara la piedad9 m:s respeta$le, o al menos m:s il&minada" B3%mo no
p&ede ay&dar si los /&eces c&ando discrepan so$re lo ?&e es realmente la democracia, son
conscientes de las dimensiones filos%ficas de s& desac&erdo, y tienen al,&na familiaridad con
las ideas de las personas ?&e han dedicado m&cho tiempo y paciencia a p&lir la controversiaC
3omo mnimo, de$e ay&darles y ay&darnos a entender so$re lo ?&e realmente discrepan"
1II) Fi$%4"a / educacin .ur"dica
>stoy ha$lando como si nada de lo ?&e espero ver todava e+istiera, y eso es incorrecto" )ay
ya &n ,ran consenso de lo,rar &na mayor sofisticaci%n filos%fica de la ?&e sola ha$er, tanto
entre a$o,ados y /&eces, como en la ed&caci%n /&rdica" -os ma,istrados de la 1&prema
3orte, .reyer y 1tevens, para nom$rar dos /&eces prominentes, han citado fil%sofos en s&s
conceptos en aos recientes" )ay fil%sofos acad=micos profesionales en las principales
fac&ltades de derecho norteamericanas, incl&yendo las &niversidades de New York, Yale y
3hica,o" <odas las principales fac&ltades ofrecen c&rsos de filosofa /&rdica como parte de
s& plan de est&dios, y estos c&rsos est:n ,eneralmente m&cho m:s inte,rados con la filosofa
,eneral de lo ?&e solan estar"
1i la profesi%n va a crecer constantemente m:s consciente de la importancia de la filosofa en
las decisiones /&diciales, la presencia de este tema en la ed&caci%n /&rdica de$e
incrementarse" De$en ha$er m:s c&rsos introd&ctorios y avan0ados en filosofa poltica y
moral s&stantiva en m:s fac&ltades de derecho" 1in em$ar,o, la ed&caci%n /&rdica se
enc&entra atestada de c&rsosL hay ya demasiado para tres aos, lo ?&e si,nifica ?&e m&chos
est&diantes no se sentir:n capaces de aprovechar la oport&nidad de tomar m:s materias
filos%ficas electivas ofrecidas" Pero tam$i=n las fac&ltades de derecho de$en proc&rar
introd&cir a la filosofa dentro de los c&rsos /&rdicos m:s $:sicos" Un c&rso so$re
responsa$ilidad /&rdica e+tracontract&al, por e/emplo, formara a los est&diantes m:s en las
teoras filos%ficas rivales so$re la responsa$ilidad moral del dao, tal como de las teoras
econ%micas rivales so$re las consec&encias de la responsa$ilidad /&rdica e+tracontract&al en
los costos totales de los accidentes" >n las clases de derecho constit&cional de$en est&diarse
diferentes concepciones de la democracia y de los diversos roles ?&e la comprensi%n de las
ideas so$re la li$ertad, la i,&aldad y la /&sticia social, /&,aran en la interpretaci%n
constit&cional"
No ten,o la menor d&da de ha$er ofendido a m&chos a$o,ados en esta defensa de la
filosofa, y ahora me arries,o a ofender a los fil%sofos tam$i=n" De mi parte, pienso ?&e no
s%lo la filosofa poltica y moral s&stantiva son temas apropiados para incl&ir de diferentes
formas dentro de los planes de est&dio de las Fac&ltades de Derecho, sino ?&e las fac&ltades
de derecho p&eden ser &n me0or l&,ar para reali0ar tales est&dios ?&e c&al?&ier otra
Fac&ltad en las &niversidades, incl&yendo los departamentos de filosofa" Por?&e en &n
conte+to /&rdico entendemos partic&larmente $ien las implicaciones act&ales de diferentes
principios morales y polticosL ale/amos los an&ncios 'the staples( de m&chos c&rsos de
filosofa @historias fant:sticas so$re carr&a/es f&,itivos ?&e podran matar a dos o a veinte
personas atadas a diferentes secciones de &n riel@ y consideramos las c&estiones morales en
conte+tos cam&flados y reales, tales como la economa farmac=&tica ?&e ata /&ntos los
intereses de investi,aci%n, comercio y el dolor en la vida corriente 8para citar &n
e/emplo9" No hay oport&nidad para el imperialismo territorial so$re en esta materiaL las
c&estiones morales han sido est&diadas con &na delicade0a e+trema en casi todas las :reas
acad=micas, de la poesa a la medicina" Pienso, sin em$ar,o, ?&e eso trae a los fil%sofos a las
fac&ltades de derecho, y los anima a pensar y a ensear /&nto a los a$o,ados, es entonces
partic&larmente fr&ctfero para am$as disciplinas"
1III) 2ara 4ina$i5ar
)e estado ha$lando so$re el poder de las ideas, y podra estar $ien, o casi, terminar
recordando la e+hortaci%n del poeta alem:n )eineL =l advirti% ?&e i,noramos para n&estro
propio ries,o el poder ?&e tienen las ideas filos%ficas para cam$iar la historia" Pero en
realidad ?&iero terminar con la ?&e considero &na e+presi%n m:s act&al, por?&e p&edo
res&mir mi conse/o a mi profesi%n, y partic&larmente a s&s /&eces en dos frases ?&e espero
m&estren &na f&er0a en la act&alidadL 1ean p&lcros 'ome lean( y T&=lvanse realistas '4et
Real(" 1ean p&lcros con el papel ?&e los conceptos filos%ficos realmente /&e,an en el
imponente diseo y en los e+?&isitos detalles de n&estra estr&ct&ra /&rdica" T&=lvanse
realistas so$re el d&ro tra$a/o ?&e afrontar:n para c&mplir la promesa de esos conceptos"
New York Council for the Humanities
Scholar of the Year Lecture (2000)
Must Our Judges Be Philosophers?
Can They Be Philosophers?
Ronald Dworkin
Ronald Dworkin is a professor in both the School of Law and the Philosophy Department at New
York University, where he has taught since 1975. Dworkin received a pair of bachelor degrees
from Harvard and Oxford Universities, followed by an LL.B. from Harvard Law School. He then
clerked for Judge Learned Hand, was associated with the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, and
taught at Yale University Law School between 1962 and 1969. From 1969 to 1998 he was
Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford; since 1998 he has been the Quain Professor of
Jurisprudence at University College London. Dworkin is the author of eight books, including
Taking Rights Seriously (1977), Laws Empire (1986), which received the American Bar
Associations prestigious Coif Award, and Freedoms Law (1996). His most recent book is
Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, published earlier this year by Harvard
University Press. Dworkin is also a frequent contributor to both scholarly and non-specialist
publications, notably The New York Review of Books. This essay is copyright 2000 by Ronald
Dworkin. It was originally presented as a public lecture in New York City on October 11, 2000,
honoring Prof. Dworkins appointment as the New York Council for the Humanities 2000 Scholar
of the Year. The lecture was sponsored by the law firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.
I. The Dilemma
My title suggests a dilemma. In the ordinary course of their work, judges make decisions
about many matters that are also, at least on the surface, the subjects of a great
philosophical literature. Judges make decisions about when mentally ill people accused of
crime are nevertheless responsible for their acts and about whether a particular defendants
action actually caused the plaintiffs injury, for example and the concepts of
responsibility and causation are perennial subjects of philosophical study. Philosophical
issues are particularly prominent in constitutional law; they were inescapable in the most
dramatic of the Supreme Courts recent decisions about abortion, affirmative action,
assisted suicide, and free speech.
* Is a fetus a person with rights and interests of its own? If so, do these rights include
a right not to be killed, even when a continuing pregnancy would be seriously
disadvantageous or harmful to its mother? If not, is there any other basis for a states
prohibiting or regulating abortion?
* Is it a violation of the equal concern a nation owes its citizens when it permits state
bodies to count race in considering applications to colleges and professional schools? Is
that different from treating applicants differently depending on their scores on aptitude
tests, or on their basketball ability?
* Should we always allocate scarce resources on the basis of merit? What does
merit mean?
* Does it violate fundamental principles of decent government to deny dying citizens
the right to die when and how they wish? Do citizens have a right of moral independence
in personal decisions that means that how they die is up to them? Is such a right part of the
very concept of ordered liberty, which the Supreme Court has said it is the task of the due
process clause to protect?
* What is the connection between abortion and assisted suicide? If the Constitution
grants pregnant women a right to an abortion, as the Supreme Court has decided it does,
does it follow that it also grants dying patients a right to decide how and when to die?
What is the role, in the assisted suicide controversy, of the often-cited distinction between
killing and letting die? Is there a morally pertinent distinction between the negative act
of withholding life support and the positive act of prescribing lethal pills?
* Why is government required to give special protection to a right of free speech?
Does that right include the right of bigots to denounce minorities in insulting and offensive
terms? Does it include the right of candidates for political office to spend as much money
as they can raise on their campaigns, or the right of donors to contribute as much money as
they wish to those campaigns?
These are not essentially empirical questions that might be disposed of by science or
economics or sociology or history. Of course facts and predictions matter sometimes
crucially in confronting them. But the issues at the core of each are issues of value not
fact, and they call not just for commitment to settled and clear principles but for reflection
on the point and accurate formulation of these principles, and on the interconnections and
possible conflicts among them. That is the vocation of moral and political philosophers.
Judges and philosophers do not merely share overlapping subject-matters, like astronomers
and astrologers. On the contrary, the aims and methods of judges include those of
philosophers: both professions aim more accurately to formulate and better to understand
the key concepts in which our reigning political morality and our basic law are expressed.
It would therefore seem natural to expect judges to have some familiarity with the
philosophical literature, just as they are now expected to have some familiarity with
economics and, in the case of constitutional judges, constitutional history. They could not,
of course, simply look up the answers to the philosophical issues they face in some official
or state-of-the-art philosophical manual, because philosophers disagree radically about the
best theories of responsibility, causation, personhood, equality and free speech, and about
whether letting die is the same as killing. But that hardly justifies judges ignoring what
the philosophers have written: it would be insulting to both judges and philosophers to
suppose that the former could not benefit from studying the different and conflicting
theories of the latter, just as they benefit from reading lawyers briefs on opposing sides of
some issue. What judges do is of immense importance, not only for the parties to the cases
they adjudicate but also, particularly in constitutional law, for the governance of the nation.
If the issues they face have been debated among educated men and women who have
devoted their lives to these debates, how can the judges responsibly ignore what these men
and women have written?
That is the first leg of the dilemma. Now consider the second. It seems wholly
unrealistic to ask most judges to try to gain even an undergraduate philosophy majors
understanding of the demanding, ancient, and enormous literature of philosophy. Judges
are short of time as it is, and it would strike most of them as preposterous that they should
add to their other responsibilities a crash course in which they learn the main claims and
arguments of even the leading contemporary moral and political philosophers like Thomas
Nagel, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon or Bernard Williams (let alone the great classical
philosophers). Even if, by some combination of extraordinary dedication and application,
most judges did become self-conscious philosophers, we would not want them to write
their opinions in the vocabulary of professional philosophy, because such opinions should
be more accessible to the general public, not less. Do we really want our judges to divide
into philosophical parties, with Kant capturing, say, the Second Circuit and Hobbes the
Seventh? Wouldnt it be a nightmare if judicial decisions depended on which philosopher
caught the imagination of which judge?
Judges must be philosophers, but judges cant and perhaps shouldnt be philosophers.
That is the dilemma I mean to pose. There are two ways to try to escape it. We might
argue that it is not true, after all, that judges must be philosophers. Or we might argue that
it is not true, after all, that they cant be philosophers: we might come to think that they can
be philosophical enough to relieve the dilemmas sting. The first of these escape routes is
by far the more popular, and I will devote the next several sections to it. If I am right,
however, then all of the strategies for this direction of escape fail, and so we will have to
consider, later, how far the second escape route is more successful.
II. Concepts, Legal History, and Original Intention
I said, just now, that judges worry about the same concepts that philosophers have
studied. But that claim might be challenged: if, in spite of first appearances, it is not true,
then judges can safely ignore philosophy. The most dramatic form of the challenge argues
that the words lawyers and judges use responsibility, causation, equality, liberty
and the rest actually refer to strictly legal concepts that are different from the ordinary-
language concepts that philosophers use these words to name. It is true that lawyers do
sometimes use words spelled the same way as words in the ordinary language but with very
different meanings: when a lawyer says that a contract is not binding unless consideration
has been given, the word has little to do with the ordinary idea of consideration. But it is
strikingly implausible that this is true of the concepts that I named. The statesmen and
judges who stipulated that no one is to be punished who was not responsible for his actions,
or that people are to be treated as equals before the law, meant to carry familiar moral
judgments and principles into legal practice, and they therefore used the concepts in which
those judgments and principles are expressed. If we were to suppose, instead, that the law-
makers were deploying entirely different and specially legal concepts, which they used
words spelled responsible and equal to designate, then we would make what they did
unmotivated or perverse.
There is, however, a more sophisticated and plausible form of the same challenge. Legal
practice and precedent often shape the meaning of a word taken from ordinary language so
that a contemporary judges freedom to interpret that word in accordance with a
philosophical theory or understanding might be very limited. The law of crime, property,
contract, and tort must be structured mainly by technical rules whose operation can be
predicted with reasonable confidence by citizens, homeowners, testators, businessmen, and
insurance companies, and precedent therefore has a high value in these areas. If precedent
fixes what counts as responsibility in the criminal law, or causation in the law of tort, and a
judge is not free to overrule that precedent, why should he inquire whether some
philosopher has cogent objections to what precedent has established?
But though precedent limits a judges responsibility for fresh understanding of central
concepts, it does not, even in these private law areas, extinguish that responsibility. He will
inevitably confront fresh cases with new twists that will force him to develop the concepts
in ways unanticipated by the precedents, and when he does so he will necessarily be using
his own judgment about when people really are responsible for what they do, or when some
event really is the cause of another, and so forth. True, even in these hard cases, judges
have a responsibility for respecting integrity with past legal history: they must not appeal to
principles that have no grounding in past decisions and doctrine. Integrity would forbid
what we might call outr or paradoxical philosophy: if reflection on quantum mechanics
led some philosophers to a radical new view of causation even more skeptical, say, than
Humes judges would not be responsible for evaluating that new development, at least
until it had taken hold more generally in the community at large. But once again, though
these demands of integrity limit a judges freedom, they do not convert legal concepts into
something different from the ordinary concepts from which they spring: even if a judge
limits his attention to doctrines of causation that would not seem foreign to the law, he will
have much philosophical literature left to roam through.
In the more public areas of the law, moreover, which I am mainly discussing here, the
need for judges to confront philosophical issues is both greater and more evident.
Constitutional judges make philosophical choices not occasionally, when some particularly
difficult case arises, but as a matter of routine. The First Amendments reference to the
freedom of speech refers to the same freedom that liberal philosophers have both
celebrated and explored, and if a judge is to determine whether a particular form of speech
commercial advertising, for example falls within that freedom, he will face the same
underlying issues of principle that countless political philosophers have written countless
books about. Of course, even in constitutional law, precedent is an important determinant
of a judicial decision, and precedent does limit a judges freedom to shape a constitutional
concept to his own theory of the moral concept from which it derives. But cases calling for
fresh judgment are more frequent in constitutional law. In private law adjudication novel
cases are hard, generally, because they lie at the boundaries of what is settled. In
constitutional adjudication, on the other hand, cases are often hard not because they lie at
the borders of doctrine, but because they call into question the underlying grounds of
doctrine. The question whether the right of free speech, properly understood, protects hate
speech or speech insulting or offensive to persecuted minorities, for instance, or whether
some prohibition of such speech is necessary in a genuinely democratic society, requires
reflection on some of the deepest issues of political morality. Precedent is thinner in such
cases, and judges who think that precedent is wrong, because it unduly limits important
individual rights, have less reason to respect it than judges do who think that some settled
common law precedent was a mistake.
We must consider, finally, a third form of the argument that judges and philosophers have
different aims, which has had particular importance in constitutional law. This begins by
conceding that the great constitutional concepts of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
for example, are indeed the concepts that philosophers have studied. But it insists that
judges should not aim to discover the best theory of responsibility or personhood or liberty,
which they might conceivably go to philosophers for help in finding, but rather should aim
to discover what those who made these ideas part of the law thought was the best theory,
which is a matter of history not philosophy.
This original intention model of constitutional adjudication is now less popular among
constitutional law scholars than it once was, and objections to it are well known. But even
if we accepted the model, it would offer no escape from the dilemma I described, because it
would make constitutional law more entwined with philosophical issues, not less. For
judges who accept the model must face a battery of questions that are among the most
perplexing issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and political philosophy.
We can mean many different things when we refer, as an interpretive device, to the theory
or intention or understanding of a very large group of people like those who together made
the Constitution and its amendments. But one thing we cannot intelligibly mean is the
theory or intention or understanding that they all shared: most of them presumably had no
theory at all about the point of protecting free speech, for example, and those who did
presumably disagreed with one another.
Which, among the remaining interpretive possibilities, should we adopt? Even if we were
to choose, arbitrarily, one particular individual whose opinions we would take to be
decisive say the draftsman who wrote most of the clause in question, if any one
draftsman did our philosophical difficulties would only have begun. Suppose we
discover (and this seems quite likely, given the language that he used)that the main
draftsman of the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection clause himself intended that
people should be equal before the law according to the best understanding of what that
means, and not according to his own understanding at the time (which he might well have
realized could be incomplete). What would deference to the original intention require in
these circumstances? Would a contemporary judge committed to original intention then be
required to interpret the clause in accordance with what the draftsman actually intended to
enact? If so, would that not send him back to the political philosophy that the original
intention doctrine promised to avoid? Should we not ask, in order to decide questions like
that, why judges should look to original intention? The answer might be said to lie in
democracy or in the rule of law. But we must choose among rival conceptions of those
remarkably abstract ideals to decide what answers they offer to the questions that perplex
us and this exercise would involve us in even more complex philosophical issues. What,
after all, is democracy? Or the rule of law?
III. Instinct and Intuition
So the first escape route that judges and philosophers do not after all share a subject
matter and an aim is an illusion, at least for the most important legal concepts, including
the constitutional ones. We must therefore consider other, more ambitious, ways of
denying the first leg of the dilemma I constructed.
We might recommend, first, that judges decide philosophical issues not by consulting
philosophers, but by raw instinct or gut reaction. In the assisted suicide cases, the
Supreme Court was required to decide whether there is a morally relevant difference
between a doctor withdrawing life support from a patient anxious to die which the
Court, in effect, had held that states may not forbid and doctors aiding suicide in a more
active way, by prescribing pills that would let a patient kill himself, for example, or giving
a patient who begs for death, but cannot take pills, a lethal injection. If a state may not
forbid the first, does it have the right to forbid the second? That is one aspect of an old
philosophical issue when and how far is letting someone die morally different from
killing him? and the justices might have consulted the philosophical literature and tried
to explain which side they were taking and why. Of course many citizens who took the
other side would not have been convinced by the Courts argument, but they would have
known that the justices had puzzled over the case for their own view, and tried to explain
why they found it unpersuasive. According to the suggestion we are now considering,
however, they should not do this. They should ignore the philosophers and simply declare
their immediate and unstudied reaction to the issue.
Justice Byron White once said that though he could not define obscenity, he knew it when
he saw it. Our new suggestion generalizes that strategy: judges should not try to analyze
difficult philosophical concepts or ideas, but should only report their instinctive reaction. If
a judge intuitively feels that it is permissible for a doctor to withdraw life support when a
patient demands it, but not to prescribe fatal pills, he should not worry about whether he
could defend that distinction in reasoned argument, but just declare that that is how he
feels, or most people feel, or something of the sort.
The suggestion has had some distinguished judicial proponents. Oliver Wendell Holmes
said that he judged whether some procedure the police used to obtain evidence violated the
due process clause by asking whether it made him puke. (That may have been the source of
the adage of the so-called legal realist s that justice depends on what the judge had for
breakfast.) But it is one of the most valued features of adjudication indeed, I believe
that the legitimacy of adjudication as an instrument of government depends on this that
judges decide on reasons and explain their reasons. What (other than a desire to spare
themselves a difficult task) could justify judges in deciding crucially important cases in that
apparently cavalier way?
I can think of two arguments, but they both, once again, raise rather than lower the
philosophical stakes, because they both depend on highly controversial philosophical
positions. If these are the reasons we settle on to explain why judges neednt be
philosophers, then the judges would have to become philosophers in order to understand
them. The first of these two arguments applies particularly to the concepts I have taken as
my most frequent examples: the moral concepts that figure in constitutional adjudication.
The argument rests on a philosophical thesis called intuitionism, which holds that people
or, in any case, the right kind of people have native faculties that enable them to
intuit the truth about moral issues directly, without benefit of any reflection or argument.
(According to some versions of intuitionism, reflection and argument actually dull the
sense of justice.) Intuitionism is not currently in favor among moral philosophers, at least
in the Anglo-American branch of that field, but of course it does not follow that it is
wrong. It may well be revived in a decade or a day and become the philosophical flavor of
the month. It does, however, face serious difficulties that seem to disqualify it from serving
as the justification for judges who would decline to give reasons. It depends on a
supposedly built-in human capacity for non-reflective and non-argumentative intuition, on
the model of a sense perception but it is wholly mysterious how moral facts could
conceivably interact with a human nervous system. And the supposition that human beings
have this capacity as a species seems contradicted by the great diversity and conflict in
moral opinion among them. Intuitionists insist that some peoples vision is clouded. But
we seem to have no way of deciding whose vision is clouded whose capacities for
intuition are defective except by asking whether they agree with us about morals, and
this, too, seems unsatisfactory.
The second argument in favor of instructing judges to decide on instinct or immediate,
unreflective, judgment also applies with particular force to the moral concepts. This is
moral skepticism, which declares that there is no right answer to the so-called
philosophical questions of what personhood or liberty or equality or democracy consist in,
and that judges therefore shouldnt waste time searching for one. Since any answer is just a
choice, with nothing deeper to recommend it, judges do better to settle on the answers that
strikes them as right at once: they save time and energy for other uses. (Holmes, the author
of the puke test, was a passionate, committed moral skeptic, and much of his life and
writings are explicable only when we take the full measure of that fact.) Once again, as I
said, this argument for ignoring philosophy depends on a controversial philosophical
position. (In my view it is an indefensible and, indeed, in its most popular forms right now,
an incoherent position.*) Most judges are not like Holmes: they are not moral skeptics, and
the argument that they may ignore philosophy because skepticism is right will not seem any
better a reason to them than it does to me and, I hope, you.
IV. Pragmatism
We have now canvassed and rejected two ways of escape from the dilemma I described
by denying the first leg of that dilemma that judges must be philosophers. We cannot
escape by declaring that history has so shaped the legal concepts of causation or
personhood or equality that they are now different concepts from those that philosophers
study. History has indeed shaped the legal concepts, but they remain open to development,
and the judges developing the concepts must ask themselves the same questions as the
philosophers do. Nor should we try to escape by declaring that judges do best, in
answering those difficult questions, when they answer according to their immediate
instincts with no study or reflection.
There is a third possible strategy, however, which has recently secured much more
popularity among academic lawyers. Many of them propose that judges by-pass the
traditional issues that have occupied philosophers like the issue of what responsibility or
causation or equality or free speech really means, or whether letting die is really different
from killing by embracing a different and apparently radical philosophical tradition,
called pragmatism, which encourages them to ask, instead, whether it makes an actual
difference to the communitys future which account of these concepts judges use, and, if it
does, which account would produce the best future. Instead of allowing the vexing
question of whether states may prohibit abortion to turn on highly abstract philosophical
puzzles does a fetus have rights and interests of its own, for example we should make
it turn on a much more practical and tractable question that we do not need philosophy to
answer: Would prohibiting abortion produce the best consequences for the community in
the long run?
Philosophical stances have their fashions, of course, and pragmatism and its even more
fashionable sister, sociobiology, were in vogue across the academic landscape for a time,
and still are in law schools where hot fashions go to cool down and die. But in the present
context, at least, pragmatism is vacuous, and of no help in escaping from our dilemma. The
pragmatist tells us that judges may set the abstract puzzles about abortion aside and ask
only whether the consequences will be better if women are prohibited from obtaining
abortions. But we cannot decide whether the consequences of a constitutional decision are
better than the consequences of a different decision without confronting, once again, the
very philosophical issues that the pragmatist hopes to avoid.
If abortion is constitutionally protected, let us assume, there will be more abortions and
fewer women whose lives have been blighted with an unwanted child. (Of course, there
will be many other consequences as well, some harder to predict, but these will be among
the most prominent.) Do these prominent consequences, considered by themselves, mean
that things have gone better? Or worse? How can we decide without deciding, in effect,
whether abortion is murder? For if it is, then things have not gone better, no matter how
much better they seem in other ways. Suppose, on the other hand, that the courts had
decided that an abortion is not constitutionally protected, and many states had continued to
declare it criminal. The issue would slowly have faded from public controversy, and
everyone would have accepted an accommodation in which, for example, women of
sufficient means could have traveled to states in which abortion was permitted and those
who could not would have borne their children without complaint. In one way things
would then have gone much better: there would have been less public strife. But we could
not decide whether things had gone better overall without deciding whether the women
who had been denied abortions, or caused to incur great expense and trouble in order to
obtain one, had been treated unjustly. Of course we may think that unjust treatment for
some depends upon whether the community, on the whole, is happier (or at least less
divided) as a result of denying abortions. But whether we are entitled to think that depends
on yet another moral issue of philosophical scope, which is whether utilitarianism is true.
V. The New Formalism
The surprising popularity of that empty theory (i.e., pragmatism) is more evidence that
the dilemma I described at the outset is deep and troubling. Since it really sunk in among
American lawyers, a few decades ago, that formalistic legal positivism is a hopelessly
inadequate account of what American judges do, they have feared the alternative: that
judicial decision-making requires judgments about moral issues so deep and divisive that
they are the object of deep and continuing philosophical study and division. It seems
horrifying that un-elected judges should have the power to impose one set of answers to
such enduring questions on litigants and the nation. But the idea that judges can somehow
decide hard cases, including hard constitutional cases, by switching their focus from
controversial principles to demonstrable facts and consequences is just another example of
the sad disposition of some legal scholars to hide their heads in the sands. It is time the
legal profession openly confronted the fact that American citizens are deeply divided about
moral issues, that judicial decision inevitably involves such issues, and that judges have the
responsibility to admit this and explain why they have taken whatever position that they
have.
There is another possibility, however. If the law as it stands as history and practice
have made it turns on concepts of philosophical dimension, if all the various devices we
might construct for allowing judges to decide cases without embedding themselves in the
unending controversies over those concepts must fail, if we find it unrealistic and
unacceptable that they should become philosophers themselves, then we have only one
recourse: we can change the law as it stands into a law better suited to more disciplined and
less ambitious judges. So we must turn, finally, to the most radical of the escapes that have
been offered, which has been called the new formalism. Jeremy Bentham, who hated the
institution that he called Judge & Co., argued that the power of judges to act like
philosophers should be curbed by codifying all law so that judicial decisions really did turn
out to be mechanical. Surprising though this seems to a lawyer of my generation,
Benthams spirit is alive again, more than two centuries later. There is growing enthusiasm
for a legal system that would allow adjudication to be more mechanical.
We see this new enthusiasm in the work of a variety of scholars and judges who differ
from one another in many ways: Thomas Grey, Antonin Scalia, Frederick Schauer, and
Cass Sunstein, for example. The shared aim of the new formalists what these very
different figures have in common is a desire to change law and legal practice in a way
that decreases the scope of judgment left open to judges in deciding what the law is. They
recommend a variety of strategies, from codification (in the style of Bentham), to urging
judges who make new doctrine to formulate crisp rules that can be applied mechanically
thereafter (rather than just offering general principles), to Scalias design for statutory
interpretation (which asks judges not to speculate about the intentions or purposes that
legislators may have had for making the laws that they did, but to enforce the most literal
meaning of what they actually said).
The new formalism is also responsible for a new enthusiasm for the original intention
doctrine of constitutional adjudication that I discussed earlier. The first impetus for that
doctrine was semantic and interpretive: its defenders insisted that the Constitution, as it
stands, consists in the framers understandings of the moral concepts the document uses,
not the best understanding of these concepts. The new formalists version is not semantic
but strategic, however: they urge judges to look for an original intention not for the positive
reason that it represents what the Constitution really means, but for the negative reason that
judges who decide cases that way neednt deploy their own moral or philosophical
convictions. As I have already argued, this strategy must fail in its goal: it is not a way of
allowing judges to escape philosophy, but of plunging them more deeply into philosophical
controversy.
But we should consider the merits of the new formalism as a general strategy. It cannot
be a reason for accepting a return to mechanical jurisprudence just that it will relieve judges
from making difficult or controversial decisions. That would be allowing the tail to wag
the dog: we should first decide what kind of a legal structure we wish to be governed by,
and then determine what role judges must play in such a structure. We may have some
reasons for wanting to be governed by a more mechanical set of rules, and these may be
good reasons in some areas particularly private law areas of the law. We may believe
that we do better, in these areas, to ask judges to confine their interventions in peoples
affairs to what is clearly required under crisp rules that some elective legislative body has
created, leaving it to the legislature to decide when some clarification or change in these
rules is desirable. I am not myself persuaded of this, however; I believe that we would lose
more than we would gain by enlarging the domains of the law in which judicial decisions
are mechanical.
When we turn to the area of my main examples constitutional law my objections to
the new formalism run deeper: it would subvert the underlying assumption of our whole
constitutional enterprise, which is that citizens have rights that should be protected from the
shifting and self-interested verdicts of majoritarian institutions. The old original intention
school assumed, as I said, as a matter of semantics and history, that those rights are limited
to what long-dead statesmen understood them to be. The old original intention school
believed it was guarding the Constitutional arrangement as it really is. The new formalists
in constitutional law make no such assumption; their argument is revolutionary not
interpretive. They accept that the change they propose will sharply decrease the power of
judges to enforce what they take to be peoples constitutional rights. That is their goal, and
they fix on the original intention doctrine as only a convenient way, made available by
rhetoric to which the public has become accustomed, to accomplish that change. The
rhetoric makes the change seem less radical than it really is.
What justifications could we find for that dramatic transformation of our practice? It
might be said, first, that legislatures will do a better job of identifying and enforcing actual
constitutional rights than judges do: that legislatures will be better at philosophy than
judges are. But that is implausible. Or it might be said that our Constitution, as it stands, is
undemocratic, and that the switch in power will improve our democracy. But that claim
rests on a peculiar definition of democracy that it means only majority will and that
claim is itself foreign to our history. These do not seem adequate reasons for pretending
that our Constitution is just an historical accident, just the codification of the concrete
political opinions and judgments fashionable among elite eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century statesmen and politicians. That would be a betrayal of our political heritage,
including a betrayal of what those statesmen and politicians thought they were creating.
For better or for worse surely for the better we believe that our law in general, and
our Constitution in particular, rest on principle not historical accident, and it would be a
great wrench in our collective self-understanding to give that idea up now.
We cannot cite even Benthams authority, for all his talk of codification and for all his
distrust of judges, to justify such a change. For he had a grand philosophy utilitarianism
that, at least in his view, would be served by insisting that legislators design rules that
contain no abstract moral terms but just stipulate the prohibitions, remedies and
punishments that a grand utilitarian calculation would attach to particular acts.
Utilitarianism is just another controversial philosophy, and an unattractive one. Unless we
wish to embrace it, or some other reductionist form of consequentialism, we should not try
to eliminate judgment from our judges reflections about what legal justice requires in
individual cases.
VI. Philosophical Attitude and Philosophical Depth
We are back at the beginning. Our law asks judges to make decisions about issues that
have been studied with great care by philosophers of different kinds and schools, and we
cannot think of any acceptable change in our expectations of judges, or in the structure or
character of our law, that would alter that fact. So we must now examine the second leg of
the dilemma I constructed. Can judges be philosophers? We must take care, in answering
this question, to avoid any caricature of what that would mean. It would be silly to ask
judges to takes leaves of absence to get Ph.D.s in philosophy, and then, upon their return
to the bench, to write judicial opinions that could be published in philosophical journals.
Nothing like that happened when judges became more aware of the importance of formal
economics in legal analysis, however. Judges did not become state-of-the-art proficient in
econometrics or the mathematical analysis of economic behavior, and yet their opinions
became both more sensitive to and sophisticated about economic considerations.
We need ask no more for philosophy. But what would count as an increased sensitivity
to that subject? Judges should come to understand, for a start, that the concepts they wield
the concepts of responsibility, meaning, intention, equality, liberty, and democracy, for
example are difficult concepts, that it is very far from plain or settled what the best
account of these concepts is, and that it would be a mistake to think that our law or history
or culture has settled on one account that is therefore available, without further inspection,
for judges use. They should come to understand that all the short-cut expedients we just
considered intuitionism and pragmatism as well as formalism are illusions, that they
must choose among competing principles all of which offer to explicate constitutional
concepts, and that they must be ready to state and defend their choices. These might seem
only limited advances, but they would be very important.
What might we reasonably expect beyond that? We should hope for a change in the
background culture that fixes what judges and lawyers more generally take to be
relevant to a legal argument. That background culture has accepted economics and,
particularly in the case of constitutional law, constitutional and political history. Lawyers
understand that they are not only permitted but obliged to study these disciplines in the
hope of finding arguments helpful to their position, and to present any they find to the
court. The culture should embrace pertinent philosophical material as relevant in the same
way. Lawyers debating the proper understanding of the equal protection clause, for
example, should be encouraged to construct and distinguish conceptions of equality and to
argue why one rather than another of these is the appropriate conception through which to
understand the force of the clause. I do not mean that either they or the judges they address
should cite or copy the arguments of any particular philosopher. Lawyers trained in the
right way can make their own philosophical arguments, which might be different from
those any academic philosopher has offered, and judges can assess these arguments without
pinning them to any philosopher. Nevertheless it would not be unreasonable to expect
judges and lawyers alike to have some familiarity with at least the leading contemporary
schools of legal, moral, and political philosophy, because that seems indispensable to a
proper appreciation of any philosophical argument they are asked to ponder. We would
think a constitutional judge remiss who did not have a working understanding of the
leading historians of the Constitutional Convention and the Civil War Amendments. Why
should we not also insist that constitutional justices be aware of the writings of, say, John
Rawls or H.L.A. Hart? Of course I do not mean that judges should regard themselves as
disciples. I mean exactly the contrary: that they should have enough understanding of the
work of the leading philosophers in the pertinent branches of philosophy to read those
philosophers critically.
I should say again, out of caution, that I am not supposing that any increased judicial
sophistication in philosophy would eliminate controversy among judges. How could it,
since philosophers disagree so dramatically among themselves? But it may reduce
controversy. It is a familiar story that some justices who were appointed to the court
because they were safe conservatives, like Warren or Brennan or Souter, turned out to be
more liberal than expected, and some who were appointed because they were safe liberals,
like Frankfurter, turned out to be more conservative. Philosophical reflection is more
testing of flaccid assumption, and therefore more likely to work such a change, than any
other kind. I do not urge greater philosophical sophistication because it will eliminate or
reduce controversy, however, but because it will make controversy (if you will forgive the
piety) more respectable, or at least more illuminating. How can it not help if judges who
disagree, as they are bound to disagree, about what democracy really is are aware of the
philosophical dimensions of their disagreement, and have some sense of the ideas of people
who have devoted great time and industry to sharpening the controversy? At a minimum, it
should help them and us to understand what they are really disagreeing about.
VII. Philosophy and Legal Education
I am speaking as if nothing of what I hope to see yet exists, and that is wrong. There is
already a great deal more sophistication about philosophy among lawyers and judges, and
in legal education, than there used to be. Justices Breyer and Stevens, to name but two
prominent judges, have both cited philosophers in their opinions in recent years. There are
professional academic philosophers on the faculties of leading American law schools,
including NYU, Yale, and Chicago. All the leading schools offer courses in legal
philosophy as part of their curriculum, and these courses are generally much more
integrated with general philosophy than they used to be.
If the profession is to grow steadily more aware of the importance of philosophy in
adjudication, however, the place of that subject in legal education must increase. There
should be more introductory and advanced courses in substantive moral and political
philosophy in more law schools. Legal education is already crowded, however: there is
already too much for three years, which means that many students will not feel able to take
up the opportunity that more philosophy electives would offer. But law schools should
aim to bring philosophy into the more basic legal courses as well. A course in tort law, for
example, should make students as aware of rival philosophical theories about moral
responsibility for damage as they are about rival economic theories about the consequences
of tort law for the overall costs of accidents. Constitutional law classes should study
different conceptions of democracy, and of the different roles that ideas about liberty,
equality, and social justice might be understood to play in constitutional interpretation.
I have no doubt offended many lawyers in this defense of philosophy, and I now risk
offending philosophers as well. For I think not only that substantive moral and political
philosophy are appropriate subjects to inject, in different ways, into a law school
curriculum, but that law schools may be a better place for such studies than any other
quarter of the universities, including philosophy departments. For in a legal context we
understand particularly well the actual implications of different moral and political
principles: we put away the staples of many philosophy courses fantastic stories about
runaway trolleys that might kill two or twenty people tied to different sections of a track
and we consider moral issues in clotted and real contexts, such as the pharmaceutical
economy that ties together the interests of research, commerce and pain in ordinary life (to
cite one example). There is no occasion for territorial imperialism on this matter: moral
issues have been studied with marvelous delicacy in almost every academic area, from
poetry to medicine. I do think, however, that bringing philosophers into a law school, and
encouraging them to think and teach alongside lawyers, is particularly fruitful for both
disciplines.
VIII. Closing
Ive been talking about the power of ideas, and it might be well to end, or almost, by
recalling the German poet Heines admonition: he warned that we ignore at our peril the
power of philosophical ideas to change history. But I will actually close in what I take to
be a more contemporary idiom, because I can summarize my advice to my profession, and
particularly to its judges, in two phrases with I hope a modern force: Come Clean and Get
Real. Come clean about the role that philosophical concepts actually play both in the grand
design and in the exquisite details of our legal structure. Get real about the hard work that
it takes to redeem the promise of those concepts.
NOTE
* See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: Youd Better Believe It, Philosophy &
Public Affairs 25:2 (Spring 1996). {return to text}