BIRAOGO VS PTC

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all
the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although
it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds
for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under
the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of
the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily
include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution,
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President
to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding
body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate
funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to
the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-
parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-
party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He
has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws
have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which
the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on
the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for
the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts
so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Manila International Airport Authority vs CAGR No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 591
Facts:Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airportlocated at Paranaque City. The
Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate taxdelinquency. MIAA then settled some of the amount. When
MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, theofficers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings
of MIAA,which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do so withinthe 60 days
reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with theSupreme Court a day before the public
auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately theTRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the
public auction.MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are withMIAA still the ownership
is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is aninstrumentality of the government and as such exempted from
real estate tax. That the land and buildingsof MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On
the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporationtherefore not
exempted to real estate tax.Issues:Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned
andcontrolled corporation and as such exempted from tax.Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public
dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.Ruling:Under the Local
government code, government owned and controlled corporations are notexempted from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government
owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no members. MIAA is
aninstrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government functions.Under the civil code, property may
either be under public dominion or private ownership. Thoseunder public dominion are owned by the State and are utilized for public
use, public service and for thedevelopment of national wealth. The ports included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports
or airports. When properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form part
of the patrimonial property of the State.The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since
theairport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for
support of its operation and for regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public
dominion. As part of the public dominion the landand buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to levy
and public auction iscontrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings
from public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As longas the land and buildings are for public
use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.
Ganzon vs. Ca

Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office.
The Secretary of Local Government issued a 600 day suspension against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against
him. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987
Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987
Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The SC had occasion to discuss the scope
and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to
him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion
the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however
overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.