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I affirm.

I offer the following definitions. Carrie Manning, a professor of political science at Georgia State University
explains what aid conditionality is.
(Bilateral donors and aid conditionality in post-conict peacebuilding: the case of MozambiqueJ. of Modern African Studies, 48, 1 (2010), pp. 143169.)
The concept of conditionality refers to the promise or increase of aid in the case of
compliance by a recipient with conditions set by a donor, or its withdrawal or reduction in the
case of noncompliance (Frerks 2006: 21). Building on this definition, Frerks (ibid. : 16) notes that peace conditionality is aid that is
used as a lever to persuade conflicting parties to make peace, to implement a proposed peace accord, and to consolidate peace.

Merriam Webster defines the word just.
("Just." Just Definition. Merriam Webster, n.d. Web. 31 Mar. 2014.)
agreeing with what is considered morally right or good: treating people in a way that is
considered morally right

Observation 1: The resolution implies that we must evaluate political conditions on humanitarian aid in general.
Thus, the burden of the affirmative is to prove that political conditions are unjust in general and the negative
must prove that they are on balance permissible or just.

Observation 2: The actors in the resolution are developed governments. Prefer this for two reasons.
1) Developed governments contribute most of all humanitarian aid. Global Humanitarian Assistance
breaks down the amount of aid given by donors.
("United States." Global Burden Sharing. Global Humanitarian Assistance, n.d. Web. 31 Mar. 2014.)
According to 2011 estimates, developed countries including the EU contributed 98% of the
total amount of aid.
2) Developing or undeveloped countries have no ability to provide humanitarian aid and/or require
aid themselves.

Observation 3: The resolution only asks for a decision to be made regarding the moral nature of political
conditions on humanitarian aid. Therefore, the negative must defend political conditions while the affirmative
does not have to defend any form of alternate implementation or unrestricted humanitarian aid. Even if the
negative proves that humanitarian aid without political conditions is unjust, that still does not necessitate a
negative ballot.
I value Culpability, the ability to be responsible for ones actions. Prefer this value for 2 reasons.
1) All moral actions require culpability. Any form of moral action requires a moral agent. If an
action is not made by a moral agent, then it is not a moral action and cannot be evaluated through
moral theories or regarded as moral or immoral. Joel Parthemore, from the Center for Cognitive
Semiotics at the University of Lund, explains what a moral agent is.
(Parthemore, Joel, and Blay Whitby. What Makes Any Agent a Moral Agent. Thesis. University of Lund, n.d. N.p.: International Journal of
Machine Consciousness, 2013. Print.)


We take a moral agent to be [is] any agent to which it is appropriate to attribute moral agency:
that is, to be morally accountable for ones action and their consequences. A moral agent is, we
believe, necessarily a conceptual agent i.e., an agent that possesses and employs concepts.
Therefore, prior to any moral action, there must be an agent that is culpable for that action. A
robot can be programmed to perform and action, but it would be illogical to classify that action
as either moral or immoral because the robot is not a moral agent.
2) Culpability comes before any other moral theory because if an actor cannot take responsibility
for breaking that moral theory, then that theory cannot effectively govern behavior. Moral
theories do not represent a functioning concept to animals as they lack the cognition to take
responsibility for their actions to conform them to a moral theory.
Thus, the value criterion is fulfilling the duty to reparation. For a moral actor to recognize and act to repair
the harms that his or her actions have caused is critical in achieving full culpability for actions. Without such a
duty, culpability could not be properly attained, and by extension, neither could morality. The duty of reparation
requires action that places the intent to repair harms above personal intentions so long as the sacrifice of
personal intent does not irreparably damage or outweigh the benefits caused by action. Also, the action must
improve the issue it seeks to alleviate, or else the increase in harm would require further reparation.

Ultimately, the negative has the burden to prove three things in order to win and link in under the affirmative
framework.
1) Political conditions place the goal of alleviating harms above all other secondary goals or externalities
that are in the better interest of the donor.
2) Placing political conditions on humanitarian aid is effective in reducing harms beyond aid without
conditions.
3) Developed nations are not the cause of harms within countries requiring assistance.

Contention: Political conditions violate the duty of reparation.
Subpoint A: Donor countries are the reason that the recipient countries need aid, so they have the duty to
reparation. Developed countries are the leading source of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, forcing
global temperatures to fluctuate. Nick Gier, a professor at the University of Idaho explains.
(AMERICA'S MORAL OBLIGATION FOR GLOBAL WARMING, Apr. 3, 2007. Retrieved Sept. 1, 2012)
There is now an overwhelming scientific consensus that human are the major cause of the
increase in global warming since the Industrial Revolution. The American contribution is way out of proportion compared to
other countries. Each American releases 5 tons of carbon into the atmosphere each year, while
each Japanese and European annually produces 2.25 tons. The world average is one ton
per person each year.

Kathleen Moore, a professor at Oregon State University concurs.
(MORAL GROUND: ETHICAL ACTION FOR A PLANET IN PERIL, 2010, 291.)
People in the poorest situations now, and increasingly in the future, will pay the costs of the profligate use of
fossil fuels by people in the richest nations. Both intergenerationally and internationally, those who reap the short-term
benefit of abusing the world are not the ones who will pay the price. This is not fair. We all seem to be committed to the concept of justice, but


we sometimes mean different things. This matters not one bit, because by any definition of justice, forcing others to
bear the burden of your benefit is unfair.

This fluctuation causes desertification and thus, malnutrition and starvation in Africa. Helen Clark, from the
UN Development Programme describes the casual relationship.
(AFRICA NEWS, Aug. 21, 2013. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2013 from Nexis.)
The International Panel on Climate Change's projections indicate that an increasingly dry
and hot climate in Sub-Saharan Africa will make its land less viable for agriculture, by reducing the
length of growing seasons, lowering yields, and thereby shrinking incomes. West-Africa's Sahel region
and the Horn of Africa have experienced exceptionally severe droughts in recent years, weakening the
traditional resilience of their people. Early last year, I visited Niger with the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and saw for myself the disturbing
impact of the severe drought there.

The Huffington Post directly links starvation in Africa to global climate change.
(Knafo, Saki. "Scientists Link Famine In Somalia To Global Warming." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 19 Aug. 2011. Web. 01 Apr. 2014.)
The other day, Funk explained how he identified climate change as a culprit for the humanitarian
disaster in Somalia. Funk and his team of researchers came to their conclusions about East African weather patterns
after studying the weather in the region for about a decade. "We've noticed some pretty large declines
in the spring rain," he said. "That might not have been that important if they were in New Hampshire, but because they were in these
incredibly insecure areas of Ethiopia and Kenya and Somalia, we really wanted to find the cause of them."

This evidence allows us to conclude that the developed nations of the world are the cause of starvation in
Africa. These countries then have the obligations to take action in the direction of correcting the starvation that
they have caused.

Subpoint B: Political conditions do not place the intent to repair over personal interests. Political
conditions are never in the interest of repairing harm. The conditions use the suffering of the people as leverage
to further the economic and political interests of the donor. This results in a sense of detachment for developed
countries in relation to the damage that they have caused. They would only like to fix the damages that they
have caused if it results in some measurable benefit for them. James Boyce, director of health policy research at
the University of Massachusetts, provides empirical evidence.
("Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Constraints", Development and Change 33(5), 2002.)
One need not be an economic determinist to recognize that commercial motives can exert a strong influence on
foreign policy. Securing access to key raw materials, such as petroleum, has long been regarded as a major foreign-policy concern (see,
for example, Krasner, 1978). More surprising, perhaps, is the extent to which more mundane commercial interests for example,
the pursuit of contracts for laying sewerage pipes can impinge on donor decisions. The short-term quest for
commercial advantage can undermine the political will of donors to exercise peace conditionality. When criticized
by the Australian government for its human rights record in the mid-1990s, the Cambodian government retaliated by cancelling business deals
with several Australian firms. The lesson was not lost on other donor governments. What is important for many of these
ambassadors is to defend their few miserable contracts, remarked a United Nations official interviewed in
Phnom Penh in November 1998. It is as if they represent their companies, rather than their countries.



The interests of promoting the best solutions to food distribution are placed below economic interests when
political conditions are implemented. This also occurs with political interests. Devon Curtis from the Overseas
Development Institute explains.
(Curtis, Devon. Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension. Rep. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2001. Print.)
According to Mohammed Haneef Atmar, current humanitarian aid policies and practices in Afghanistan are
determined by Western foreign-policy goals, rather than by the actual conditions required
for principled humanitarian action. Humanitarian aid in Afghanistan acts as a fig leaf for political inaction, and as a foreign-policy instrument to isolate the
Taliban. The humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence are secondary to
foreign-policy interests, and are abandoned when they conflict with them.

When donor countries fail to place the importance of reducing the starvation that they caused above their own
economic and political interests, they fail the first requirement of duty to reparation.

Subpoint C: Political conditions are not more effective than unrestricted aid. Political conditions often fail
or worsen conditions when compared to unrestricted aid. Ravi Kanbur of Cornell University elaborates.
("Aid, Conditionality, and Debt in Africa", Finn Tarp (ed), Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for he Future, Routledge, 2000.)
In fact, the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank pointed to precisely this problem, only more generalized (World Bank, 1992).
They concluded that although compliance rates on conditions were below 50%, tranche release
rates were close to 100%. Mosley et. al. (1995) make precisely the same point in a more academic analysis. These studies,
and Oxfams own cautions above, suggest that the problem is not simply what the conditions are (although
there is debate enough to be had on that score!)--it is that conditionality of whatever type has failed in Africa
(for an overview of this failure, see Collier, 1997).

Additionally, political conditions reduce the efficacy of humanitarian aid. Karol Boudreaux, A researcher at
George Mason University found that
(Sr. Research Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason U.), ENVIRONS: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, Fall 2008, 177.
The requirement that food-aid be carried on U.S. vessels, even if serving national defense purposes, means the
U.S. pays significantly higher costs to transport food-aid. The GAO estimates that 65 percent of the expenditures under Title II
are for transport. Transport costs are rising, and as a result, the U.S. is shipping less food-aid. The
GAO estimates that if the U.S. had shipped as much food-aid in 2006 as in 2002, "they
could have fed over 35 million more people during a typical peak hungry season lasting 3
months."

Thus, political conditions are not more effective at reducing starvation than humanitarian aid alone, and
in fact reduce efficacy.

For these reasons, I urge and affirmative ballot and now stand for cross examination.