Hurricane Katrina

On the morning of August 28, 2005, the National Weather Service issued an apocalyptic
warning which stated, in part: At least one half of well-constructed homes will have roof and
wall failure; Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or perhaps longer; Persons, pets, or
livestock exposed to the winds will face certain death if struck (Eldridge). Hurricane Katrina was
about to strike the Central Gulf coast of the United States. With flood water rising up to 17 feet,
and winds reaching up to 140 miles per hour and stretching 400 miles across, it would create
massive destruction wherever it came across (history.com). It would become the costliest and
third deadliest hurricane in the history of our nation (Reible 54). This paper will explore the
scientific causes of Hurricane Katrina, along with an evaluation of its damage, short and long-
term consequences, and the lessons learned from such a devastating tragedy.
McCallum has traced the storm back to its origin. Katrinas origins were a somewhat
complex mix of a tropical wave, the remnants of an earlier tropical depression and an upper
tropospheric trough (McCallum 3). A combination of these factors resulted in a tropical
depression near the Bahamas. The storm gained strength with the help of sea temperatures,
which were above 27 degrees Celsius, as well as a relatively weak vertical wind shear, high
mid-level humidity and upper-level outflow (McCallum 3). It became a tropical storm in
Florida, where it lost some low-level heat moisture supply over land. But as it traveled through
the Gulf of Mexico, over constant sea-surface temperatures of 30 degrees Celsius, it regained its
power, growing into a Category 5 hurricane with winds of 175 mph and a central pressure of 902
mbar. It eventually found its way through the loop current, where it found a sea-surface height
that was above average. McCallum and Heming state that this deep, warm water is one of
the several critical factors to enable hurricanes to intensify and was undoubtedly a contributory
factor to the intensity of Hurricane Katrina (McCallum).
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall. From that point on, this natural
disaster simply could not be ignored. Earlier Category-5 winds on the Gulf and the sheer
magnitude of the storm resulted in a catastrophic storm surge on the coasts of Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Alabama, along with damage as far east as the Florida panhandle (MMWR). In
New Orleans, a state of emergency had been declared, and a mandatory evacuation ordered.
More than 200,000 residents managed to escape to evacuation centers in over 18 states. But in a
city dealing with a poverty rate of 23 percent, almost twice the national average, mass evacuation
proved more difficult. More than 20 percent of the population, or 100,000 residents, had no
means of transportation. They remained in the city, and soon enough, the harsh reality of the
storm kicked in. (Eldridge).
New Orleans was especially vulnerable due to its location below sea level. The citys
protection included levee structures and pumping stations to drain water from tracts of reclaimed
lowlands. Katrinas force was so incredibly fierce that it tore through the protection system
around the city, and flooding took over at a very fast rate (Reible). Storm-induced breeches in
the New Orleans levee system resulted in the catastrophic flooding of approximately 80 percent
of the city (MMWR). Most deaths resulted from storm surges and flooding. Approximately
1,000 deaths were reported in Louisiana, 200 in Mississippi, and 20 in Florida, Alabama, and
Georgia. No other hurricane since 1928 had had such a tragic effect in this country (MMWR).
Hurricane Katrina disrupted basic utilities, food-distribution systems, health-care
services, and communications in large portions of Louisiana and Mississippi (MMWR). A
water main that served New Orleans became impaired, causing drinking water to become
unavailable. In the outer Gulf area, the number of people without power soared to 1.7 million
(NOAA). Power generation facilities shut down, preventing the operation of flood control
pumping stations. Most of New Orleans became covered by water, which in extreme cases,
reached as high as 17 feet. The flooding destroyed about 350,000 automobiles and 750,000 white
goods, which include washers, dryers, and refrigerators. The amount of construction and
demolition debris reached 120 million cubic yards (Reible), and according to NOAA, total
damage losses exceeded $100 million. In terms of economic loss, its important to note that the
Gulf of Mexico accounted for 25 percent of the oil production of the United States (Eldridge).
NOAA states that the hurricane resulted in a decline of oil production by 1.4 million barrels per
day, or 95 percent of the daily production in the area, causing gasoline prices to skyrocket across
the country.
Scientists were immediately concerned about the storms impact on human life. The
flooding which covered the city contained sewage, gas, and chemicals. Many feared it could
cause widespread contamination. On top of the list were also the tracking of high levels of metals
such as lead and arsenic, especially in old inner-city neighborhoods; toxic materials including
herbicides and pesticides, commonly found in homes; and the evaluation of contaminated sites
from petroleum-producing facilities operating in the area. Flood waters were present in New
Orleans for a period of about 6 weeks. Sampling showed elevated levels of inorganic and
organic contaminants and biological constituents, including pathogens. The level of inorganic
contaminants was generally low, even compared with drinking water standards. High levels of
arsenic were noted (Reible).
In terms of air quality, mold began to grow in homes throughout the city, posing one of
the most serious short-term challenges residents faced during reconstruction. With the aid of
respiratory protection, however, the risk of airborne mold could be minimized. More experts
raised concerns regarding indoor safety. There was some evidence that pointed to riskier
biological and chemical hazards indoors when compared to outdoors. Since most homes and
buildings in the city were sheltered, there was high potential for the growth of biological hazards,
such as bacteria and mold, as well as chemical hazards due to household hazardous materials.
Limited indoor sampling showed a significant concentration of hazards, making these spaces
unsafe for habitation for quite some time (Reible).
Aside from these toxic hazards, Katrina brought about challenging environmental
concerns. Much of the solid waste and debris was disposed of in less-secure landfills, posing a
risk when it comes to the long-term hazards on nature. A number of experts observed the storms
impact on Lake Pontchartrain, the source of much of the water which had flooded New Orleans.
Eventually, the water was returned to the lake, which is rich with active commercial fishery. One
estimate found that 200 billion gallons of floodwater, representing about 11 percent of the entire
lakes volume, had been pumped from the city. Upon examination, low levels of dissolved
oxygen were detected in floodwaters and discharged water, which likely resulted in low oxygen
levels in the immediate vicinity of the discharge point, but which had a minimal effect on the
lake as a whole (Reible).
Another specific case, however, may have posed more taxing short and long-term
consequences. Located just 15 minutes away from New Orleans French Quarter was a leveed
bottomland hardwood forest at Bayou Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge. J erome J . Howard
studied the impact of the hurricane in this natural habitat. The effect on the woody plant
community was instantly clear. The storm destroyed almost 70 percent of all trees. The levees
surrounding the levees trapped storm surge flooding for almost 3 weeks, and was responsible for
most of the impact. In this case, Katrinas devastation was much greater than other recent
hurricanes. The floods diminished community diversity, and according to Howard, the plant
community appears likely to shift from a canopy dominated by native species to one dominated
by Chinese tallow. Had there been no levees, flooding would have drained more quickly,
reducing the impact on wildlife (Howard 1). It is ironic that a technology designed to save lives
ended up destroying others, which is why a case like this might cause some to ponder over the
drawbacks of levee engineering.
It is this very technology, however, that allowed life in New Orleans to flourish prior to
the hurricane. In a symbolic way, it contained the energy and spirit of a place like no other. The
Crescent City was the heart of Louisiana, pulsing with some of the worlds best jazz, cuisine,
and architecture. From one day to the next, it found itself in shambles. The hundreds of
thousands it displaced, along with millions of others watching from afar, had one question in
mind Would New Orleans rebuild, or would it make more sense to abandon it, to let it be
taken over by the forces of nature? It, of course, chose the former. In the long months that
followed, thousands and thousands of people returned to New Orleans to resume their lives. It
was challenging, to say the least. Amid high rates of poverty and unemployment, communities
relied on public support. Such support was, unfortunately, small and slow (Green, Kouassi, and
Mambo 153).
New Orleans might forever be defined by two eras the one before Hurricane Katrina,
and the one following it. The process of recovery, as described in Rivlins story, has been slow,
chaotic, controversial, and will have long-term effects on the structure of the city. For one, the
landscape has clearly changed, as local authorities and residents had to decide which
neighborhoods to rebuild in, and which ones to abandon (Rivlin). Now, as we approach a decade
since the disaster, the city continues to rebuild, though to a certain extent, it has returned to its
groove.
Perhaps the greatest impact of Hurricane Katrina was that it forced us to look in the
mirror as a society. First, it was a reminder of the role of government when it comes to
responding to natural disasters. Federal, state, and local agencies took the heat for what many
called the neglect of a community in such a dire circumstance. The blame even escalated to
President George W. Bush, who was clear to state, We have a duty to confront poverty with
bold action. Nature magazine wrote that the ramifications of this tragedy will run deep, and
added that if [the Presidents] pledge is to be followed through, it will involve serious
changes in research priorities. The article, published in 2005, endorses more research, which
can help our administrators tackle these issues more effectively. Katrina has brought to the
surface some critical issues that have been wantonly ignored in Washington in recent years and
now deserve some attention (Nature 452). Katrina highlights two areas of environmental
research in particular water management and climate change. In another article in Nature,
Michael Hopkin reports that it is impossible to say for certain if climate change is to blame for
the disaster. Science shows that hurricanes are growing more intense, but this might be caused by
natural changes. However, sea surface temperatures are expected to keep rising, and as they do,
might directly affect the strength of hurricanes (Hopkin).
This paper explored the scientific causes of Hurricane Katrina, along with an evaluation
of its damage, short and long-term consequences, and the lessons learned from such a
devastating tragedy. It is worth remembering the words of Donald Menzel, who said that the
true test of a society is how we treat those who are poor and powerless at the times when they
need our help the most. [But] it is also vital that we address the implications of crisis
management on social, economic, and environmental justice.


Works Cited
Green, Rodney D., Marie Kouassi, and Belinda Mambo. "Housing, Race, and Recovery from
Hurricane Katrina." The Review of Black Political Economy 40.2 (2013): 145-63. Web.
"Hurricane Katrina." History.com. A&E Television Networks, n.d. Web. 16 J une 2014.
Hopkin, Michael. "Briefing: Devastation in New Orleans." Nature 1 Sept. 2005: n. pag. Web. 17
J une 2014.
Howard, J erome J . "Hurricane Katrina Impact on a Leveed Bottomland Hardwood Forest in
Louisiana." The American Midland Naturalist 168.1 (2012): 56-69. Web.
Inside Hurricane Katrina. By Michael Eldridge. National Geographic, 2005. YouTube.com.
Mccallum, Ewen. "Hurricane Katrina: An Environmental Perspective." Philosophical
Transactions: Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences.Vol. 364, No. 1845,
Extreme Natural Hazards (2006): 2099-115. J STOR. Web. 20 J une 2014.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/25190316?ref=search-
gateway:b3bee09a5b5753728fabd1723e28091b>.
Odom-Forren, J an. "Hurricane Katrina." NOAA.gov. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Association, 29 Dec. 2005. Web. 15 J une 2014.
"The Path of Hurricane Katrina." Public Administration Review 67. Special Issue on
Administrative Failure in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina (2007): 7-21. J STOR. Web. 20
J une 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/4624677?ref=search-
gateway:a81008aadde66831c17588f182efd2c9>.
"Public Health Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Louisiana, 2005." Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report 55.2 (2006): 29-30. J STOR. Web. 20 J une 2014.


<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23316336?ref=search-
gateway:c62a9e9c1e7fc92feaf5f7356f303458>.
Reible, Danny. "Hurricane Katrina: Environmental Hazards in the Disaster Area." Cityscape 9.3,
Planning for Catastrophe (2007): 53-68. J STOR. Web. 20 J une 2014.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/20868631?ref=search-
gateway:4ee267f917898d5bc6c63861400c922f>.
Rivlin, Gary. "All Parts of City In Rebuild Plan Of New Orleans." The New York Times. The
New York Times, 07 J an. 2006. Web. 17 J une 2014.
"Science After Katrina." Nature 22 Sept. 2005: 452. Print.