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Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update

Luc Laeven and Fabin Valencia

























WP/12/163



2012 International Monetary Fund WP/12/163
IMF Working Paper
Research Department
Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update
Prepared by Luc Laeven and Fabin Valencia
1

Authorized for distribution by Stijn Claessens
June 2012
Abstract
We update the widely used banking crises database by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010)
with new information on recent and ongoing crises, including updated information on
policy responses and outcomes (i.e. fiscal costs, output losses, and increases in public
debt). We also update our dating of sovereign debt and currency crises. The database
includes all systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises during the period 1970
2011. The data show some striking differences in policy responses between advanced and
emerging economies as well as many similarities between past and ongoing crises.
JEL Classification Numbers: E50; E60; G20
Keywords: banking crisis; financial crisis; bank restructuring; crisis resolution; fiscal costs
Authors E-Mail Address: llaeven@imf.org; fvalencia@imf.org

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The authors thank Ashok Bhatia, Luis Brandao, Mali Chivakul, Charalambos Christofides, Stijn Claessens,
Luis Cortavarria-Checkley, Enrica Detragiache, Lorenzo Forni, Gary Gorton, Phil de Imus, Yuko Kinoshita,
Toshiyuki Miyoshi, Marialuz Moreno Badia, Iva Petrova, Dmitriy Rozhkov, and Gonzalo Salinas for comments
and suggestions, and Jeanne Verrier for excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF Board.
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the
author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
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Contents Page
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................1
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................3
II. Banking Crises Episodes .......................................................................................................4
A. Ongoing Banking Crises ...........................................................................................5
B. Banking Crisis Cycles .............................................................................................10
III. Currency and Sovereign Debt Crisis..................................................................................11
A. Occurrence of Twin and Triplet Crises ...................................................................11
B. Sequencing of Financial Crises ...............................................................................12
IV. Policy Responses and Outcomes in Banking Crises..........................................................13
A. Policy Response ......................................................................................................13
B. Outcomes .................................................................................................................15
V. Conclusions .........................................................................................................................23

Tables
1. Systemic Banking Crises, 20072011 ...................................................................................6
2. Banking Crises Outcomes, 19702011 ................................................................................17
3. Comparison of Market and Accounting Values of Bank Equity, end-2010 ........................21
4. Crises Outcomes and Resolution in the Euro Area and the United States...........................22

Figures
1. Frequency of Starting Month of Banking Crises ...................................................................8
2. Frequency of Systemic Banking Crises Around the World, 19702011 ...............................9
3. Banking Crises Cycles .........................................................................................................10
4. Simultaneous Crises .............................................................................................................12
5. Timing of Currency and Sovereign Debt Crises Relative to Banking Crises ......................13
6. Differences in the Mix of Crisis Policies .............................................................................14
7. Output Losses for Selected Crises Episodes ........................................................................16
8. Costliest Banking Crises Since 1970 ...................................................................................19
9. Fiscal Costs Relative to GDP and Financial System Assets ................................................20

Appendix Tables
A1. Banking Crises Dates and Costs, 19702011 ...................................................................24
A2. Direct Fiscal Outlays, Recoveries to Date, and Asset Guarantees, 20072011 ................27
A3. Systemic Banking Crises Policy Responses, 20072011 .................................................29

References ................................................................................................................................32

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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been five years since the start of a global financial crisis that has given rise to the
largest wave of banking crises seen since the Great Depression. Unlike previous crises over
this period, the recent wave of crises has (thus far) affected mostly advanced economies. The
effects of the crises are still lingering and in many cases the crisis is still ongoing.
This paper updates the banking crises database of Laeven and Valencia (2008), which was
published prior to this recent wave of crises. The update adds information on recent crisis
episodes, and presents descriptive statistics on the frequency of banking crises, their
resolution, and their real effects. We show that some of the recent banking crises rank among
the costliest crises in terms of fiscal outlays and output losses. In total, we identify 147
banking crises, of which 13 are borderline events, over the period 19702011. We also count
218 currency crises and 66 sovereign crises over this period.
We also collect data on policy responses for a subset of the 147 episodes identified, allowing
for a comparison of the policy mix used to resolve banking crises. We find that monetary and
fiscal policies are used more extensively during banking crises in advanced economies than
in emerging and developing countries. One explanation is that advanced economies have
better financing options to use countercyclical fiscal policy and generally have more space to
use monetary policy. Consistent with the greater reliance on macroeconomic policies in
advanced economies, we find that fiscal outlays associated with financial sector interventions
(including bank recapitalization with public funds) in advanced economies are about half that
in emerging and developing countries, despite relatively larger banking systems in advanced
economies.
In terms of the real effects of banking crises, we find that advanced economies tend to
experience larger output losses and increases in public debt than emerging and developing
countries. These larger output losses in advanced economies are to some extent driven by
deeper banking systems, which makes a banking crisis more disruptive (Kroszner, Laeven,
and Klingebiel, 2007). The relatively larger increase in public debt in advanced economies is
related to larger output losses and a greater use of countercyclical fiscal policy. Although
expansionary macroeconomic policies indirectly support banks by enhancing their growth
prospects, such policies risk slowing down actual bank restructuring. Indeed, the large gap
that has arisen in recent crises between the market and book values of bank equity points to
significant recapitalization needs of banks in some countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II updates the list of banking
crises, presenting a complete list of banking crises for the period 19702011. Section III
presents the updated list of currency and sovereign crises since 1970. Section IV presents the
policy responses and outcomes in terms of fiscal costs and real costs during banking crises.
Section V concludes.
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II. BANKING CRISES EPISODES
A banking crisis is defined as systemic if two conditions are met:
1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by
significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations)
2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses
in the banking system.
We consider the first year that both criteria are met to be the year when the crisis became
systemic. We consider policy interventions in the banking sector to be significant if at least
three out of the following six measures have been used:
2

1) extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents)
2) bank restructuring gross costs (at least 3 percent of GDP)
3) significant bank nationalizations
4) significant guarantees put in place
5) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP)
6) deposit freezes and/or bank holidays.
In implementing this definition of systemic interventions, we consider liquidity support to be
extensive when the ratio of central bank claims on the financial sector to deposits and foreign
liabilities exceeds 5 percent and more than doubles relative to its pre-crisis level.
3
We also
include any liquidity support extended directly by the Treasury. This measure of liquidity
captures the impact of currency swap lines among central banks, as the amounts swapped and
extended to the financial sector will generally be included in central bank claims on the
financial sector. However, it does not include liquidity that subsidiaries of a multinational
bank receive in a foreign country. For instance, liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to

2
We express our measure of fiscal costs in terms of GDP rather than the size of a countrys financial system to
control for the ability of a countrys economy to support its financial system. This naturally results in higher
measured fiscal costs for economies with larger financial systems. We nevertheless also report, whenever
available, fiscal costs expressed in percent of financial system assets.
3
We exclude domestic non-deposit liabilities from the denominator of this ratio because information on such
liabilities is not readily available on a gross basis. For euro area countries, we also consider liquidity support to
be extensive if in a given semester the increase in this ratio is at least 5 percentage points. The reason is that
data on euro area central bank claims are confounded by large volumes of settlements and cross-border claims
between banks in the Eurosystem. As a result, the central banks of some euro area countries (notably Germany
and Luxembourg) had already large pre-crisis levels of claims on the financial sector.
5

U.S. subsidiaries of Swiss banks would not be measured as liquidity support in Switzerland,
but would be included in U.S. liquidity support. However, this limitation has no impact on
the identification of systemic crises in our sample. A broader related aspect is that some
crises do not originate domestically but are imported from abroad when foreign subsidiaries
of domestic banks get in trouble. One concrete example among recent crisis cases is Austria,
where most of the problems originated in Austrian banks foreign subsidiaries.
Bank restructuring costs are defined as gross fiscal outlays directed to the restructuring of the
financial sector, such as recapitalization costs. We exclude liquidity assistance from the
treasury because we include this in our measure of liquidity support. We consider
restructuring costs to be significant if they exceed 3 percent of GDP. We focus on gross
fiscal costs instead of net because the gross amount reflects the intensity of the intervention.
Asset purchases from financial institutions include those implemented through the treasury or
the central bank. We define significant asset purchases as those exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
4

A significant guarantee on bank liabilities indicates that either a full protection of liabilities
has been issued or that guarantees have been extended to non-deposit liabilities of banks.
5

Actions that only raise the level of deposit insurance coverage are not included.
Significant nationalizations are takeovers by the government of systemically important
financial institutions and include cases where the government takes a majority stake in the
capital of such financial institutions.
In the past, some countries intervened in their financial sectors using a combination of less
than three of these measures but on a large scale (for example, by nationalizing all major
banks in the country). Therefore, we consider a sufficient condition for a crisis episode to be
deemed systemic when either (i) a countrys banking system exhibits significant losses
resulting in a share of nonperforming loans above 20 percent or bank closures of at least 20
percent of banking system assets) or (ii) fiscal restructuring costs of the banking sector are
sufficiently high exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
A. Ongoing Banking Crises
Table 1 lists recent and ongoing cases that meet our definition of a systemic banking crisis. A
number of changes compared to Laeven and Valencia (2010) are noteworthy. First, in the
previous release we had classified Spain, Greece, and Kazakhstan as borderline systemic

4
Asset purchases also provide liquidity to the system. Therefore, an estimate of total liquidity injected would
include schemes such as the Special Liquidity Scheme (185 bn pounds sterling) in the United Kingdom and
Norways Bond Exchange Scheme (230 bn kronas), as well as liquidity provided directly by the Treasury.
5
Although we do not consider a quantitative threshold for this criteria, in all cases guarantees involved
significant financial sector commitments relative to the size of the corresponding economies.
6

banking crises because they met only two of our significant policy intervention criteria. With
fiscal costs in the first two cases now surpassing our threshold and significant
nationalizations taken place in the third case, three conditions are met and therefore they are
now labeled as systemic banking crises. A second important change is the addition of the
banking crisis in Nigeria. In 2009, Nigeria deployed significant liquidity support and
guarantees on bank liabilities. In 2010, Nigeria established an asset management company,
and in 2011 a significant transfer of nonperforming loans took place, with total fiscal costs
associated with bank restructuring by far exceeding our threshold.
Table 1. Systemic Banking Crises, 20072011

Country
Start
of
crisis
Date
when
systemic
Extensive
liquidity
support
Significant
guarantees
on liabilities
Significant
restructuring
costs
Significant
asset
purchases
Significant
nationalizations
Systemic Cases
Austria 2008 2008
Belgium 2008 2008
Denmark 2008 2009
Germany 2008 2009
Greece 2008 2009
Iceland 2008 2008
Ireland 2008 2009
Kazakhstan 2008 2010
Latvia 2008 2008
Luxembourg 2008 2008
Mongolia 2008 2009
Netherlands 2008 2008
Nigeria 2009 2011
Spain 2008 2011
Ukraine 2008 2009
United Kingdom 2007 2008
United States 2007 2008
Borderline Cases
France 2008
Hungary 2008
Italy 2008
Portugal 2008
Russia 2008
Slovenia 2008
Sweden 2008
Switzerland 2008
Source: Authors calculations.
Notes: Systemic banking crises are defined as cases where at least three of the listed interventions took place, whereas
borderline cases are those that almost met our definition of a systemic crisis. Extensive liquidity support is defined as a
situation where the amount of central bank claims on the financial sector and liquidity support from the Treasury exceeds 5
percent of deposits and foreign liabilities and is at least twice as large as pre-crisis levels; direct bank restructuring costs are
considered significant when they exceed 3 percent of GDP and exclude liquidity and asset purchase outlays; guarantees on
liabilities are considered significant when they include actions that guarantee liabilities of financial institutions other than just
increasing deposit insurance coverage limits; nationalizations are significant when they affect systemic financial institutions.

7

We have also added Italy to the list of borderline systemic banking crises because in 2011
liquidity support to the banking system surpassed our threshold. Prior to 2011, Italy had
already provided significant guarantees on bank liabilities. Finally, we also update
information on asset purchases in Ireland. In Laeven and Valencia (2010), we had not
considered asset purchases by Irelands National Asset Management Agency (NAMA)
because transfers of assets had not started until after December 2009, our previous cutoff.
Since then, NAMA has acquired loans with a face value of 74 billion from domestic
financial institutions, qualifying as significant asset purchases according to our definition.

In this release, we refine our crisis dating by reporting the date when a crisis started,
corresponding to the first signs of significant distress. This year corresponds to the start of
the crisis as reported in Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010). In addition, we report the date
when the crisis became systemic, which we define as the date when our definition of a
systemic crisis was first met.
The starting dates for the recent crises are as follows: U.S. and U.K. start in 2007, Nigeria in
2009, and all the other cases in 2008. In each of these cases, banking systems showed
significant signs of distress followed by government intervention during the starting year of
the crisis. However, the crisis reached systemic proportions according to our definition only
in 2009 in Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Mongolia, and Ukraine, in 2010 in
Kazakhstan, and in 2011 in Nigeria and Spain.
We also include the corresponding month for the reported dates as well as the month when
liquidity support peaked, allowing for an analysis of banking crises at a monthly frequency.
6

Figure 1 depicts the frequency of banking crises by month of all banking crises since the
1970s. An interesting pattern emerges: banking crises tend to start in the second half of the
year, with large September and December effects.


6
Monthly crisis dates (including the start of the crisis, the date when the crisis became systemic, and the date
when liquidity support peaked) can be found in the companion data file to this paper.
8

Figure 1. Frequency of Starting Month of Banking Crises

Source: Authors calculations.

Banking crises are a worldwide phenomenon. Figure 2 shows the regional distribution of
crises, highlighting countries that experienced multiple systemic banking crises during 1970
2011. Many countries experienced more than one crisis over this period, but only two
countries, Argentina and the Democratic Republic of Congo, experienced more than two
systemic banking crises.
In total, we count 147 banking crises since 1970, of which 13 are borderline events, including
those reported in Table 1. The complete dataset, together with this paper, is available on the
IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
9

Figure 2. Frequency of Systemic Banking Crises Around the World, 19702011


Source: Authors calculations.
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B. Banking Crisis Cycles
Consistent with earlier work (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), we find that crises occur in
waves. Figure 3 presents the number of banking crises that start in a given year, showing a
marked pick up in crisis activity in the early 1980s. During the 1990s, there were three clusters
of crises in the transition economies, in Latin America during the Tequila crisis, and in East Asia
during the Asian financial crisis. The early 2000s were a relatively calm period, but ended with
the most recent wave, consisting of the largest number of crises since 1970. These crisis cycles
frequently coincide with credit cycles. Out of 129 banking crises episodes for which credit data
are available, 45 episodes (or about one in three) were preceded by a credit boom.
7

Figure 3. Banking Crises Cycles 1/

Source: Authors calculations.
1/ Number of systemic banking crises starting in a given year.




7
Following DellAriccia et al. (2012), we define credit boom years as those during which the deviation of credit-to-
GDP ratio relative to its trend is greater than 1.5 times its historical standard deviation and its annual growth rate
exceeds 10 percent, or years during which the annual growth rate of the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 20 percent. A
country-specific cubic trend is computed over the preceding 10-year period.
0
5
10
15
20
25
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
2
0
1
0
Asian
Crisis
Great
Recession
Latin American
debt crisis
Transition
Economies
Tequila
crisis
11

III. CURRENCY AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
In addition to updating our banking crisis dates and policy responses, we update the list of
currency and sovereign debt crisis reported in Laeven and Valencia (2008). As in our earlier
work, our definition of a currency crisis builds on Frankel and Rose (1996)s approach. We
define a currency crisis as a nominal depreciation of the currency vis--vis the U.S. dollar of at
least 30 percent that is also at least 10 percentage points higher than the rate of depreciation in
the year before.
8
Using this approach, 218 currency crises can be identified during the period
19702011, of which 10 episodes occur during 20082011.
We date episodes of sovereign debt default and restructuring by relying on information from
Beim and Calomiris (2001), World Bank (2002), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), IMF
Staff reports, and reports from rating agencies. The information compiled includes the year of
sovereign default to private creditors and the year of debt rescheduling. Using this approach, we
identify 66 episodes of sovereign debt crisis and debt restructuring during the period 19702011,
of which 3 episodes during 20082011. Greece restructured its public debt in the first half of
2012, which yields one additional sovereign debt crisis case for the year 2012.
9

A. Occurrence of Twin and Triplet Crises
Banking crises frequently occur together with currency or sovereign debt crises. Figure 4 reports
the frequency with which simultaneous crises occur, including twin crises (the simultaneous
occurrence of banking and currency, currency and sovereign debt, or banking and sovereign debt
crises) or triplet crises (the simultaneous occurrence of banking, currency, and sovereign debt
crises).
10
Triplet crises appear to be quite rare (we count only 8 such cases). Among twin crises,
those associated with currency crises (either together with banking or sovereign debt crises) are
most common, while those involving both banks and sovereign debt are least common.



8
We compute exchange rate depreciation as the percent change of the end-of-period official nominal bilateral dollar
exchange rate from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database of the IMF. For countries that meet the currency
crisis criteria for several continuous years, we use the first year of each 5-year window to identify the crisis.
9
While Greece has not had a unilateral default, the restructuring of its debt involved using collective action clauses
which amounted to a credit event for CDS purposes. Therefore, we consider it a sovereign debt crisis.
10
We define a twin crisis in year t as a banking crisis in year t, combined with a currency (sovereign debt) crisis
during the period [T-1, T+1], and we define a triple crisis in year t as a banking crisis in year T, combined with a
currency crisis during the period [T-1, T+1] and a sovereign debt crisis during the period [T-1, T+1]. Identifying the
overlap between banking (currency) and sovereign crises follows the same approach, with T the year of a banking
(currency) crisis.
12

Figure 4. Simultaneous Crises


Source: Authors calculations.

B. Sequencing of Financial Crises
It is also common for banking crises to precede currency and sovereign debt crises (e.g.,
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Figure 5 shows the frequency of
currency and sovereign debt crises (relative to the total number of banking crises) that take place
in the same country as the banking crisis over the period T-3 to T+3, where T is the starting year
of the banking crisis. We find that currency crises and especially sovereign debt crises tend to
follow banking crises. While 16% of banking crises are preceded by a currency crisis in the same
country within three years prior to the starting year of the banking crisis, 21% of banking crises
are followed by a currency crisis within three years following the starting year of the banking
crisis. The difference is even starker for sovereign debt crises. Only 1% of banking crises in our
sample are preceded by a sovereign debt crisis within three years prior to the start of the banking
crisis, whereas 5% of banking crises are followed by a sovereign debt crisis within three years of
the onset of the banking crisis.

99 18 11
153
29 28
8
Banking
crises
Currency
crises
Debt
crises
13

Figure 5. Timing of Currency and Sovereign Debt Crises Relative to Banking Crises

(In percent of the number of banking crises)

Source: Authors calculations.
Note: T denotes the starting year of the banking crisis.

IV. POLICY RESPONSES AND OUTCOMES IN BANKING CRISES
We update the policy responses during the crises, including monetary expansion and liquidity
support, with information up to end-2011. This update is particularly relevant for recent crisis
cases which had just started or were still unfolding at the time of writing our earlier data release
in Laeven and Valencia (2010). In addition, we also update our estimates of the outcomes of
banking crises, which include output losses, fiscal costs, increases in public debt, and peak
nonperforming loans (NPLs).
11

A. Policy Response
The differences in policy mix between advanced economies and emerging economies is
summarized in Figure 6. The figure shows the fraction of episodes in which the corresponding
policy was used, differentiating countries by income level.

11
Comparisons based on NPL data should be interpreted with caution given that definitions of NPLs vary markedly
across countries.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3
Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
14

Deposit freezes, while rare, are most frequently used by emerging economies, whereas
guarantees on bank liabilities are more common among advanced economies. Guarantees are
more common among advanced economies, perhaps because of generally better institutions and
access to international capital markets, rendering the announcement of guarantees more credible.
However, as noted in Claessens et al. (2011), guarantees in recent crises were on average less
comprehensive (more targeted) than in past crises, when they generally covered a broad set of
liabilities and were mostly announced in the form of blanket guarantees.
We collect data on whether deposit insurance was in place at the start of the crisis for about half
the crises episodes. In 70 percent of episodes for which we collected data, a deposit insurance
scheme was already in place when the crisis erupted. Moreover, the data show that emerging
economies are more likely to adopt deposit insurance around the time of a crisis. Only in 40
percent of cases, losses are imposed on bank creditors, suggesting that implicit guarantees are
important. Recapitalization packages and extensive liquidity support are also more common in
advanced countries, albeit only marginally, whereas nationalizations of financial institutions are
equally common in advanced and other economies.
Figure 6. Differences in the Mix of Crisis Policies

Source: Authors calculations.

To gain insights into the relative use of fiscal and monetary policy, we construct measures of
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies (reported in our dataset as monetary and fiscal policy
indices) that take a value of one if the policies are expansionary, and zero otherwise. We first
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Deposit f reeze
Guarantees on
bank liabilities
Liquidity
support
Nationalizations Recapitalization
Expansionary
monetary policy
Expansionary
f iscal policy
Advanced economies Emerging economies
15

construct a variable equal to the difference between the increase in public debt (reported in Table
2) and the fiscal cost of bank intervention policies. The median for this variable is close to 7
percent. This means public debt, after subtracting increases in public debt resulting from fiscal
outlays associated with financial intervention packages, increases by about 7 percent for the
median country. We use this difference as a proxy for the magnitude of discretionary fiscal
policies as well as automatic stabilizers. It is admittedly a crude measure, but it should provide a
broad indication of the intensity of factors other than bank recapitalization that affected the fiscal
position of a country, including discretionary fiscal policy.
For the purpose of the chart, we consider fiscal policy to be expansionary when this variable
takes on a value that exceeds its mean by half a standard deviation. Similarly, we define
expansionary monetary policy as instances when the increase in reserve money is half a standard
deviation above its mean. Figure 6 shows that both expansionary monetary and fiscal policies
were more commonly used in advanced economies. The difference, however, is much more
pronounced in the case of fiscal policy. Because advanced economies have better access to
financing large fiscal deficits, they are in a better position than other economies to allow for
fiscal automatic stabilizers to operate during banking crises or even to enact countercyclical
discretionary fiscal packages.
B. Outcomes
We measure outcomes of the crises with four main variables: the fiscal costs of a crisis
(computed as the direct fiscal outlays due to financial sector rescue packages), the output losses
(computed as the cumulative loss in income relative to a pre-crisis trend), the increase in public
debt, and the peak in NPLs. Direct fiscal costs include fiscal outlays committed to the financial
sector from the start of the crisis up to end-2011.
12
Output losses are computed as deviations of
actual GDP from its trend. The increase in public debt is measured as the change in the public
debt-to-GDP ratio over the four-year period beginning with the crisis year.
13
Specifically, we
compute the increase in public debt measured in percent of GDP over [T-1, T+3], where T is the
starting year of the crisis.
14


12
To compute fiscal costs we take the figures in domestic currency and divide by the GDP of the corresponding year
when the outlays took place. For Greece, we include the recapitalization package included in the 2012 IMF program,
although it had not been fully used as of May 2012.
13
Output losses are computed as the cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real GDP over the
period [T, T+3], expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP, with T the starting year of the crisis. Trend real GDP
is computed by applying an HP filter (with =100) to the log of real GDP series over [T-20, T-1] (or shorter if data
is not available, though we require at least 4 pre-crisis observations). Real GDP is extrapolated using the trend
growth rate over the same period. Real GDP data are from the Fall 2011 WEO. This methodology is somewhat
different than the one used in Laeven and Valencia (2008), which explains why the numbers changed.
14
Our choice of data sources is guided by the availability of data on general government debt. When such data is not
available, we use data on central government debt instead. Our primary data source is Abbas et al. (2010) for crisis
episodes prior to 2007 and the Fall 2011 WEO for crisis episodes since 2007. When debt data are not available in
Abbas et al. (2010), we use the OECD Analytical Database and IMFs Government Finance Statistics.
16


Figure 7. Output Losses for Selected Crises Episodes 1/


Sources: World Economic Outlook and authors calculations.
1/Year T equals 2007 for USA, 2008 for Ireland and Germany, 1994 for Mexico, 1997 for Thailand and Japan. GDP
in T-4 is set equal to 100.

Table 2 shows the median values for the outcome variables across all episodes reported in our
database, over 19702011. Table A1 shows individual country level data. The episodes are
classified according to income level at the time of the crisis. In addition to the outcome variables
listed above, Table 2 also reports quantitative measures on policy intervention, which
complements the frequency of tools used described in the previous section. We report peak
liquidity support provided by central banks measured as the highest level of central bank claims
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 T+8
USA
Output loss Actual GDP Pre-crisis trend
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 T+8
Ireland
100
105
110
115
120
125
T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 T+8
Germany
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 T+8
Mexico
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 T+8
Thailand
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 T+8
Japan
17

against financial institutions,
15
normalized by financial institutions deposits and foreign
liabilities. The difference between this peak and the pre-crisis level of central bank claims is
reported as liquidity support provided during the crisis. We also report the duration of the crisis,
computing as the difference between the end and start years of the crisis, measured in years.
Finally, we report data on the monetary expansion computed as the change in the monetary base
between its peak during the crisis and its level one year prior to the crisis, expressed in
percentage points of GDP.
16

Table 2. Banking Crises Outcomes, 19702011

Country
Output
loss
Increase
in debt
Monetary
expansion
Fiscal
costs
Fiscal
costs
Duration
Peak
liquidity
Liquidity
support
Peak
NPLs

Medians

In percent of GDP
In percent
of financial
system
assets
In years
In percent of
deposits and
foreign liabilities
In percent
of total
loans
All 23.0 12.1 1.7 6.8 12.7 2.0 20.1 9.6 25.0
Advanced 32.9 21.4 8.3 3.8 2.1 3.0 11.5 5.7 4.0
Emerging 26.0 9.1 1.3 10.0 21.4 2.0 22.3 11.1 30.0
Developing 1.6 10.9 1.2 10.0 18.3 1.0 22.6 12.3 37.5
Source: Authors calculations.

As in Laeven and Valencia (2010), we report end dates for each crisis, except for recent crises
where our condition for determining the end of a crisis is not (yet) met.
17
We also report the peak
level of nonperforming loans, over the period [T, T+5], where T is the starting year of the crisis.
For the recent episodes, where a 5-year window may not be available yet, the peak is computed
over the period [T, latest data available]. These outcome variables are constructed for illustrative

15
Liquidity support is computed as the ratio of central bank claims on deposit money banks (line 12 in IFS) to total
deposits and liabilities to non-residents. Total deposits are computed as the sum of demand deposits (line 24), other
deposits (line 25), and liabilities to non-residents (line 26). In the case of euro area economies, central bank claims
on deposit money banks include Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) operations conducted by national central
banks within the Eurosystem.
16
Data on reserve money come from IFS. For euro area countries, reserve money corresponds to the aggregation of
currency issued and liabilities to depository corporations, divided by euro area GDP.
17
We define the end of a crisis as the year before both real GDP growth and real credit growth are positive for at
least two consecutive years. In case the first two years record positive growth in real GDP and real credit, the crisis
end date equals the starting date of the crisis. In computing end dates, we use bank credit to the private sector (in
national currency) from IFS (line 22d). Bank credit series are deflated using CPI from WEO. GDP in constant prices
(in national currency) also comes from the WEO. When credit data is not available, the end date is determined as the
first year before GDP growth is positive for at least two years. In all cases, we truncate the duration of a crisis at 5
years, starting from the first year of the crisis.
18

purposes to gauge the consequences of banking crises. It is important to note that they reflect the
total impact of the crisis, including any feedback effects and other factors contemporaneous to
the banking crisis. Therefore, when we report output losses or increases in debt, they should not
be attributed to the banking crisis alone.
The data show that output losses and increases in public debt tend to be larger in advanced
economies. Output losses in advanced economies are larger in part because with deeper financial
systems, a banking crisis is more disruptive. Moreover, for the crises that started in 2007
onwards, the median output loss reaches 25 percent, whereas the non-crisis countries exhibit a
median output loss of 0 percent. Clearly, countries that experienced a banking crisis suffered
more than those which did not. In contrast, fiscal costs are larger in developing and emerging
economies. This is the case irrespective of whether we measure fiscal costs in percent of GDP or
in percent of financial system assets, to account for differences in the relative size of financial
systems. In fact, the gap in fiscal costs between advanced and other economies widens
substantially once we account for the size of financial systems.
18
Moreover, while increases in
public debt during banking crises in emerging and developing economies are mostly due to fiscal
outlays associated with financial sector intervention policies, in advanced economies such fiscal
outlays constitute only a fraction of the overall increase in public debt, with discretionary fiscal
policy and automatic stabilizers playing a much more important role.
We noted in the previous section a marked difference among advanced and other economies in
the use of macroeconomic policies. Similarly, increases in public debt and monetary expansion
tend to be larger in advanced economies than in emerging and developing economies. Note that
the difference in monetary expansion between advanced economies versus emerging and
developing countries is now significant, consistent with what one would expect, unlike our
earlier results based on a binary measure of monetary expansion. Emerging and developing
countries face capital outflows and large currency depreciations upon which they respond by
tightening monetary policy.
The greater reliance on macroeconomic tools may also explain why crises tend to last longer in
advanced economies. If macroeconomic policies are used to avoid a sharp contraction in
economic activity, this may discourage more active bank restructuring that would allow banks to
recover more quickly and renew lending to the real economy, with the risk of prolonging the
crisis and depressing growth for a prolonged period of time (see also Claessens et al., 2011).

18
Financial system assets data are taken from the World Banks Financial Structure database. They consist of
domestic claims on the private sector by banks and non-bank financial institutions. They exclude foreign claims by
banks and non-bank financial institutions. In the case of European Union countries, for which cross-border claims
can be sizeable, we instead use data from the European Central Bank (ECB) on the consolidated assets of financial
institutions (excluding the Eurosystem and other national central banks), after netting out the aggregated balance
sheet positions between financial institutions. Moreover, in the case of Iceland where cross-border claims are also
sizable we use the assets of monetary and other financial institutions obtained from its national central bank.
19

The costs of banking crises vary markedly. Figure 8 reports the ten costliest crises in terms of
fiscal costs, increases in public debt, and output losses. Along all three dimensions, recent and
ongoing crises feature among the ten costliest crises since the 1970s. In terms of fiscal costs, the
still ongoing banking crises in Iceland and Ireland already rank among the ten costliest crises.
Fiscal costs have reached very high levels in Iceland and Ireland in part because of the relatively
large size of the financial systems in these economies, amounting to multiples of GDP.

Figure 8. Costliest Banking Crises Since 1970


Source: Authors calculations.

Iceland and Ireland also feature among the ten costliest banking crises in terms of overall
increase in public debt, with public debt in both cases increasing by more than 70 percent of
GDP within four years. In terms of output losses, the ongoing crises in Ireland and Latvia are
among the ten costliest banking crises since the 1970s, with output losses exceeding 100 percent
in both cases. Ireland holds the undesirable position of being the only country currently
57
55
44 44 44
43
41
32 32
31
I
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r
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2
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K
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1
9
9
7
Fiscal cost
(In percent of GDP)
108
103
88
83
82
73 72
68
65
63
G
u
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B
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1
9
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N
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g
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1
9
9
1
Increase in debt
(In percent of GDP)
143
130
121
109
106 106 106 106
102
98
K
u
w
a
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t

1
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E
c
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d
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r

1
9
8
2
Output loss
(In percent of GDP)
20

undergoing a banking crisis that features among the top-ten of costliest banking crises along all
three dimensions, making it the costliest banking crisis in advanced economies since at least the
Great Depression. And the crisis in Ireland is still ongoing.
Figure 9. Fiscal Costs Relative to GDP and Financial System Assets




Source: Authors calculations.

The size of the financial sector is an important driver of fiscal costs. Figure 9 shows a
comparison between the median fiscal costs in emerging markets and advanced economies in our
data, with fiscal costs expressed either in percent of GDP or in percent of financial system assets.
For brevity, we only show the median value for emerging economies. For the median emerging
market economy, fiscal costs double in magnitude when they are expressed in terms of financial
system assets, highlighting the relatively low level of financial development in these economies.
For advanced economies, Iceland, Ireland, and Israel stand out when fiscal costs are expressed
relative to GDP, with Iceland being the costliest crisis in terms of fiscal costs to GDP at 44.2
percent of GDP. However, given the relatively large banking systems in Iceland and Ireland,
fiscal costs are significantly lower in these countries when expressed relative to financial system
assets. When normalized by financial system assets, the highest fiscal outlays took place during
Israels banking crisis of 1977.
Fiscal costs consist primarily of bank recapitalizations and asset purchases. Table A2 shows the
breakdown of fiscal costs for the recent crises episodes, as well as detailed information on asset
guarantees. The median fiscal cost for the recent episodes, excluding borderline cases, is 4.7
0
10
20
30
40
50
E
m
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9
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G
e
r
m
a
n
y

0
8

In percent of
financial system
assets
In percent
of GDP
21

percent of GDP (2.8 percent with borderline episodes). Since most countries suffering a banking
crises since 2007 are advanced economies, the median fiscal cost is similar to that for past crises
in advanced economies. This number, however, is less than half of that for crises in emerging
and developing countries. One explanation is that this time not all costs are born in the
conventional way, that is, through a comprehensive restructuring of the banking system.
Reliance on loose monetary policy can be seen as an alternative recapitalization of highly
leveraged sectors, including financial institutions, albeit at a slower pace than through direct
equity injections into financial institutions. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, the market valuation of
financial institutions (as of end-2010) indicated in many cases still a sizable gap between the
market and book value of banks. While overshooting in stock prices may be partly driving these
gaps, they can also be interpreted as suggesting that some banks may have sizeable capital
shortfalls. At the country level, the median gap between market and book values for banks with
market-to-book values below one is about 3.3 percent of GDP.
Table 3. Comparison of Market and Accounting Values of Bank Equity, end-2010


Difference between market and book value of distressed banks 1/
Country In percent of GDP In percent of total banking assets
Austria 4.7 2.9
Belgium 2/ 6.7 2.4
Denmark 0.8 0.4
France 5.9 2.0
Germany 1.6 1.2
Greece 7.7 3.2
Ireland 2/ 6.1 3.0
Italy 7.8 4.7
Kazakhstan 2/ 0.4 0.8
Netherlands 4.6 1.8
Portugal 2/ 3.3 2.3
Slovenia 2/ 0.8 2.4
Spain 3.0 1.1
Sweden 2/ 0.2 0.1
Switzerland 2.9 0.5
Ukraine 2/ 0.0 0.1
United Kingdom 6.1 1.5
United States 1.5 1.1
Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, and authors calculations.
1/ Country aggregate of the dollar value difference between the market and book values of bank equity for banks with a
market-to-book value less than one. These gaps between market and book values of equity are expressed either relative to
country GDP or total banking assets, where banking assets are computed by aggregating the consolidated balance sheets of
individual banks in the sample at the country level.
2/ Country aggregate based on less than 5 banks.

Net fiscal costs, after asset recoveries, are significantly lower than gross outlays in some cases.
For example, the Swiss authorities more than fully recovered the fiscal outlays associated with
the convertible notes program offered in support of UBS. However, net fiscal outlays are not
22

necessarily the right metric for assessing the success of a government program because taxpayer
money was put at great risk in the process and because government interventions associated with
market failures can be welfare enhancing even when outlays are positive.
The recent wave of crises includes a significant number of countries in the euro area. Given that
monetary policy is decided at the euro area level (plus financial institutions established in the
euro area can freely provide their services throughout the euro area under EU single passport
rules), it is interesting to compare crisis resolution policies and outcomes in the euro area with
those in the United States when treating the euro area as a single economy.
19
The comparison is
for illustrative purposes only because circumstances vary widely across countries within the euro
area, but it serves the purpose of illustrating that the severity of crisis in the euro area, despite
being unevenly spread among euro area countries, is comparable to that of the U.S. if the euro
area could be seen as a single economy, enjoying not only a monetary union but also a common
financial safety net, backed by some form of fiscal federalism. Table 4 shows the comparison
when we aggregate resolution policies and outcomes across the euro area.
Table 4. Crises Outcomes and Resolution in the Euro Area and the United States

Country
Output
loss
Increase
in debt
Monetary
expansion
Fiscal
costs
Fiscal costs
Peak
liquidity
Liquidity
support
Peak
NPLs

In percent of GDP
In percent of
financial system
assets
In percent of
deposits and
foreign liabilities
In percent
of total
loans
Euro area 23.0 19.9 8.3 3.9 1.7 19.3 13.3 3.8
United States 31.0 23.6 7.9 4.5 2.1 4.7 4.7 3.9
Source: Authors calculations.

The table shows that according to our three metrics of crisis outcomes and costs (fiscal costs,
output losses, and increases in public debt), the crisis in the euro area as a whole has thus far
been comparable in magnitude to that in the United States. However, liquidity support has been
much larger in the euro area, indicating the significant role played by the Eurosystem (including
the ECB) in meeting liquidity needs of banks, including through Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA) and Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) operations. Nevertheless,
monetary expansion has been similar thus far. Of course, with sovereign debt and banking sector
problems continuing to put pressure on a number of euro area countries, and the increasing
interlinkages between sovereign and banking sector risks, the final tally could be very different.


19
Importantly, banking supervision and resolution are still largely a national affair in the euro area.
23

V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides an update of the widely used IMF database on systemic banking crises by
Laeven and Valencia (2008). Compared to our earlier version of the database, we add several
recent crises, update information on output losses and fiscal costs for crises that are ongoing, and
date banking crises not only at an annual frequency but also at a monthly frequency. These
updates are particularly significant in the case of euro area economies that are currently
experiencing banking crises.
The data point to several interesting issues that require further research. First, while traditionally
costly banking crises were associated with emerging economies, more recent cases also involve
advanced economies. This raises questions about whether there has been any systematic change
that has led to increased fragility of banking systems in advanced economies that are otherwise
generally perceived to enjoy deeper financial markets and higher quality institutions. Second,
while macroeconomic policies have been used aggressively in recent advanced economy crises,
actual bank restructuring has been relatively slow. This raises questions about the pace of
recovery and the optimal policy mix in resolving financial crises in advanced economies.
24

Table A1. Banking Crises Dates and Costs, 19702011

Country Start End
Output
loss
1/
Fiscal
Costs
2/
Peak
liquidity
3/
Liquidity
support
3/
Peak
NPLs
4/
Increase in
public debt
5/
Monetary
expansion
6/
Credit
boom
7/
Albania 11/ 1994 1994 ... 7.6 ... 26.8 ... ... ...
Algeria 1990 1994 9/ 41.4 ... 37.6 29.9 30.0 19.1 -4.7 0
Argentina 1980 1982 8/ 58.2 55.1 64.6 62.2 9.0 33.1 10.6 1
Argentina 1989 1991 12.6 6.0 151.6 135.7 27.0 -21.3 10.0 0
Argentina 10/ 1995 1995 0.0 2.0 71.4 63.0 17.0 8.7 -0.8 1
Argentina 2001 2003 71.0 9.6 22.9 22.6 20.1 81.9 8.2 0
Armenia 4/ 1994 1994 8/ ... 41.4 23.0 ... ... ... 0
Austria 2008 14.0 4.9 11.7 7.7 2.8 14.8 8.3 0
Azerbaijan 11/ 1995 1995 8/ ... ... 127.6 84.5 ... 0.9 ... ...
Bangladesh 1987 1987 0.0 ... 26.0 2.8 20.0 3.5 1.4 0
Belarus 11/ 1995 1995 ... ... 35.8 ... ... -16.5 ... 0
Belgium 2008 19.0 6.0 19.7 14.1 3.1 18.7 8.3 1
Benin 1988 1992 9/ 14.9 17.0 99.6 48.6 80.0 5.7 13.0 1
Bolivia 1986 1986 49.2 ... 57.5 25.9 30.0 -107.3 1.7 0
Bolivia 1994 1994 0.0 6.0 31.9 12.9 6.2 -19.2 1.6 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11/ 1992 1996 9/ ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0
Brazil 10/ 1990 1994 9/ 62.3 0.0 11.3 10.7 ... -22.6 7.7 1
Brazil 1994 1998 0.0 13.2 20.1 17.6 16.0 -33.8 -4.3 1
Bulgaria 1996 1997 59.5 14.0 17.3 9.9 75.0 -30.1 -2.2 0
Burkina Faso 1990 1994 ... ... 9.4 4.5 16.0 8.9 2.8 0
Burundi 1994 1998 9/ 121.2 ... 23.4 18.3 25.0 10.9 2.6 0
Cameroon 1987 1991 9/ 105.5 ... 59.1 40.9 65.0 18.0 1.0 0
Cameroon 1995 1997 8.1 ... 12.3 6.2 30.0 -1.1 0.4 0
Cape Verde 1993 1993 0.0 ... 4.0 ... 30.0 18.2 -40.6 0
Central African Rep 1976 1976 0.0 ... 90.8 10.5 ... -4.8 2.5 1
Central African Rep 1995 1996 9.0 ... 24.8 20.9 40.0 -16.3 0.7 ...
Chad 1983 1983 0.0 ... 199.3 41.3 ... -7.2 -0.3 0
Chad 1992 1996 9/ 0.0 ... 120.9 41.4 35.0 27.1 -0.8 ...
Chile 1976 1976 19.9 ... 32.2 23.6 ... -69.5 1.6 0
Chile 1981 1985 9/ 8.6 42.9 61.2 52.7 35.6 87.9 0.5 1
China, Mainland 1998 1998 19.4 18.0 62.0 7.2 20.0 11.2 0.0 0
Colombia 1982 1982 47.0 5.0 21.1 7.7 4.1 16.6 -0.8 1
Colombia 1998 2000 43.4 6.3 5.1 4.3 14.0 15.4 0.5 0
Congo, Dem Rep 1983 1983 1.4 ... 20.0 18.9 ... 39.5 ... 0
Congo, Dem Rep 1991 1994 9/ 129.5 ... 44.7 30.2 ... 42.2 ... 0
Congo, Dem Rep 1994 1998 9/ 79.0 ... 77.3 77.1 75.0 39.3 ... 0
Congo, Rep 1992 1994 47.4 ... 30.7 16.6 ... 103.5 1.4 0
Costa Rica 1987 1991 0.0 ... 20.2 6.1 ... -27.5 2.9 0
Costa Rica 1994 1995 0.0 ... 15.2 6.3 32.0 4.8 1.1 1
Cote d'Ivoire 1988 1992 9/ 45.0 25.0 76.9 22.5 50.0 13.6 -3.3 0
Croatia 11/ 1998 1999 ... 6.9 3.2 3.1 10.5 14.1 5.2 0
Czech Republic 10/ 11/ 1996 2000 9/ ... 6.8 12.7 4.2 18.0 1.8 -1.3 0
Denmark 2008 36.0 3.1 20.1 11.4 4.5 24.9 1.2 0
Djibouti 1991 1995 9/ 42.6 ... 5.2 3.2 ... ... ... ...
Dominican Rep 2003 2004 ... 22.0 43.4 38.1 9.0 16.5 6.7 1
Ecuador 1982 1986 9/ 98.2 ... 146.7 100.0 ... 24.4 -1.7 0
Ecuador 1998 2002 25.4 21.7 26.0 22.5 40.0 9.1 -0.5 1
Egypt 1980 1980 0.9 ... 66.7 22.7 ... -4.2 -2.3 1
El Salvador 1989 1990 0.0 ... 51.6 11.5 37.0 -29.6 ... 1
Equatorial Guinea 1983 1983 8/ 0.0 ... 75.8 ... ... ... ... 0
Eritrea 1993 1993 8/ ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0
Estonia 11/ 1992 1994 ... 1.9 30.9 ... 7.0 ... ... 0
Finland 1991 1995 69.6 12.8 12.0 5.5 13.0 43.6 ... 1
France 10/ 2008 23.0 1.0 8.9 7.4 4.0 17.3 8.3 0
Georgia 11/ 1991 1995 9/ ... ... ... ... 33.0 ... ... 0
25


Country Start End
Output
loss
1/
Fiscal
Costs
2/
Peak
liquidity
3/
Liquidity
support
3/
Peak
NPLs
4/
Increase in
public debt
5/
Monetary
expansion
6/
Credit
boom
7/
Germany 2008 11.0 1.8 11.5 3.6 3.7 17.8 8.3 0
Ghana 1982 1983 45.3 6.0 0.2 0.1 35.0 15.5 -0.5 ...
Greece 2008 43.0 27.3 44.3 42.3 14.7 44.5 8.3 1
Guinea 1985 1985 8/ 0.0 3.0 ... ... ... ... ... 0
Guinea 1993 1993 0.0 ... 14.6 3.9 45.0 6.7 ... ...
Guinea-Bissau 1995 1998 29.6 ... 137.3 39.2 45.0 108.1 11.4 ...
Guyana 1993 1993 0.0 ... 1.8 1.7 ... -241.0 -10.5 0
Haiti 1994 1998 37.5 ... 4.8 ... ... -119.4 -5.8 0
Hungary 11/ 1991 1995 9/ 0.0 10.0 47.0 4.6 23.0 19.6 4.5 0
Hungary 10/ 2008 40.0 2.7 1.4 1.3 13.3 -0.3 -0.8 1
Iceland 2008 43.0 44.2 21.2 16.8 61.2 72.2 -2.3 1
India 1993 1993 0.0 ... 4.3 3.6 20.0 -7.7 1.3 0
Indonesia 1997 2001 9/ 69.0 56.8 23.1 17.2 32.5 67.6 4.5 0
Ireland 2008 106.0 40.7 20.0 16.3 12.9 72.8 8.3 1
Israel 1977 1977 76.0 30.0 43.2 16.5 ... ... 28.4 1
Italy 2008 32.0 0.3 7.7 5.7 11.0 8.6 8.3 0
Jamaica 1996 1998 37.8 43.9 0.4 0.3 28.9 2.9 7.6 0
Japan 1997 2001 9/ 45.0 14.0 2.4 1.6 35.0 41.7 7.2 0
Jordan 1989 1991 106.4 10.0 20.7 16.1 ... -61.0 15.5 0
Kazakhstan 10/ 2008 0.0 3.7 5.5 5.0 31.9 9.1 3.3 0
Kenya 1985 1985 23.7 ... 2.0 1.9 ... 11.0 0.5 0
Kenya 1992 1994 50.3 ... 25.2 24.3 ... 12.1 7.4 0
Korea 1997 1998 57.6 31.2 27.4 11.9 35.0 9.9 -0.4 1
Kuwait 1982 1985 143.4 ... 9.6 2.9 40.0 16.2 2.5 0
Kyrgyz Rep 11/ 1995 1999 9/ ... ... 286.1 51.8 85.0 42.9 ... 0
Latvia 11/ 1995 1996 ... 3.0 9.2 5.5 20.0 0.4 ... ...
Latvia 2008 106.0 5.6 3.6 3.4 15.9 28.1 -2.7 1
Lebanon 1990 1993 102.2 ... 4.4 2.8 ... ... ... ...
Liberia 1991 1995 9/ ... ... 85.2 84.2 ... ... ... ...
Lithuania 11/ 1995 1996 ... 3.1 27.5 18.9 32.2 10.8 ... 0
Luxembourg 2008 36.0 7.7 14.7 4.1 1.3 14.6 8.3 ...
Macedonia, FYR 11/ 1993 1995 0.0 32.0 22.3 ... 70.0 ... ... 0
Madagascar 1988 1988 0.0 ... 20.2 19.4 25.0 -25.8 1.0 0
Malaysia 1997 1999 31.4 16.4 9.7 8.8 30.0 0.2 4.0 1
Mali 1987 1991 9/ 0.0 ... 50.5 14.8 75.0 -11.3 1.7 0
Mauritania 1984 1984 7.5 15.0 48.4 27.7 70.0 ... 1.2 0
Mexico 1981 1985 9/ 26.6 ... 5.3 2.6 ... 22.6 5.0 0
Mexico 1994 1996 13.7 19.3 16.8 15.8 18.9 16.4 0.4 1
Mongolia 2008 0.0 4.2 10.5 9.4 ... -5.0 3.0 0
Morocco 1980 1984 9/ 21.9 ... 22.1 8.6 ... 35.6 -1.0 0
Mozambique 1987 1991 9/ 0.0 ... 4.2 4.2 ... 60.9 -36.6 0
Nepal 1988 1988 0.0 ... 14.6 3.8 29.0 11.7 2.1 0
Netherlands 2008 23.0 12.7 5.9 3.7 3.2 26.8 8.3 0
Nicaragua 1990 1993 11.4 ... 195.1 156.5 50.0 -31.0 ... ...
Nicaragua 2000 2001 0.0 13.6 21.8 20.9 12.7 14.9 3.3 1
Niger 1983 1985 97.2 ... 45.6 14.1 50.0 25.9 3.5 1
Nigeria 1991 1995 9/ 0.0 ... 6.6 5.4 77.0 63.3 7.2 ...
Nigeria 2009 14.0 11.8 25.3 11.7 30.1 7.7 -0.5 0
Norway 1991 1993 5.1 2.7 16.9 4.2 16.4 19.2 0.5 0
Panama 1988 1989 85.0 12.9 3.6 3.2 ... -2.6 0.1 0
Paraguay 1995 1995 15.3 12.9 27.3 23.8 8.1 -1.2 3.2 1
Peru 1983 1983 8/ 55.2 ... 16.8 9.7 ... 14.3 5.2 0
Philippines 1983 1986 91.7 3.0 19.4 1.5 19.0 44.8 8.4 1
Philippines 10/ 1997 2001 9/ 0.0 13.2 1.4 0.7 20.0 10.4 0.8 1
Poland 11/ 1992 1994 0.0 3.5 45.9 8.7 24.0 -21.6 -0.7 0

26


Country Start End
Output
loss

1/

Fiscal
costs

2/

Peak
liquidity

3/

Liquidity
support

3/

Peak
NPLs

4/

Increase in
public debt

5/

Monetary
expansion

6/

Credit
boom

7/

Portugal 10/ 2008 37.0 0.0 18.0 16.7 7.3 33.6 8.3 0
Romania 11/ 1990 1992 8/ 0.0 0.6 129.1 ... 30.0 ... 6.3 0
Russia 11/ 1998 1998 8/ ... 0.1 23.7 21.1 40.0 -7.1 ... 0
Russia 10/ 2008 0.0 2.3 24.8 23.9 9.6 6.4 1.0 1
So Tom & Prncipe 1992 1992 8/ 1.9 ... ... ... 90.0 -706.3 ... 0
Senegal 1988 1991 5.6 17.0 74.7 6.6 50.0 -14.2 2.0 0
Sierra Leone 1990 1994 9/ 34.5 ... 0.0 0.0 45.0 62.9 -0.8 ...
Slovak Rep 1998 11/ 2002 9/ 0.0 ... 13.0 4.8 35.0 15.4 -1.0 1
Slovenia 11/ 1992 1992 ... 14.6 10.0 ... 3.6 ... ... 0
Slovenia 10/ 2008 38.0 3.6 10.2 9.6 12.1 18.0 8.3 1
Spain 1977 1981 9/ 58.5 5.6 7.6 3.5 5.8 3.8 ... 0
Spain 2008 39.0 3.8 8.3 6.4 5.8 30.7 8.3 1
Sri Lanka 1989 1991 19.6 5.0 8.0 2.0 35.0 -5.5 -1.0 0
Swaziland 1995 1999 9/ 45.7 ... 3.6 3.2 ... 2.5 -1.0 0
Sweden 1991 1995 32.9 3.6 3.1 0.2 13.0 36.2 5.1 1
Sweden 10/ 2008 25.0 0.7 13.2 13.0 2.0 11.1 6.3 0
Switzerland 10/ 2008 0.0 1.1 4.6 3.0 0.5 -0.2 7.6 0
Tanzania 1987 1988 0.0 10.0 100.9 97.6 70.0 64.6 ... 0
Thailand 1983 1983 24.8 0.7 8.5 2.0 ... 15.7 0.3 0
Thailand 1997 2000 109.3 43.8 5.1 4.4 33.0 42.1 3.9 1
Togo 1993 1994 38.8 ... 6.2 1.7 ... 23.8 -3.0 0
Tunisia 1991 1991 1.3 3.0 31.5 15.1 ... 4.2 0.1 1
Turkey 1982 1984 35.0 2.5 71.7 29.3 ... 12.3 2.4 1
Turkey 2000 2001 37.0 32.0 20.5 15.2 27.6 15.3 ... 1
Uganda 1994 1994 0.0 ... 7.6 3.9 ... -26.9 0.6 ...
Ukraine 11/ 1998 1999 0.0 0.0 19.1 3.3 62.4 6.0 3.4 ...
Ukraine 2008 2.0 4.5 30.1 9.2 15.5 28.9 1.7 1
United Kingdom 2007 25.0 8.8 9.0 5.6 4.0 24.4 9.4 1
United States 10/ 1988 1988 0.0 3.7 0.1 0.1 4.1 10.5 -0.1 0
United States 2007 31.0 4.5 4.7 4.7 5.0 23.6 7.9 0
Uruguay 1981 1985 9/ 38.1 31.2 24.6 18.5 ... 83.3 3.2 1
Uruguay 2002 2005 27.4 20.0 12.8 7.9 36.3 37.0 2.0 1
Venezuela 1994 1998 9/ 1.2 15.0 2.9 1.6 24.0 -23.0 1.3 0
Vietnam 1997 1997 0.0 10.0 64.9 24.8 35.0 -52.7 4.9 0
Yemen 1996 1996 16.4 ... 0.8 0.7 ... -56.7 -12.4 0
Zambia 1995 1998 31.1 1.4 27.9 24.9 ... 36.2 -1.7 ...
Zimbabwe 1995 1999 9/ 10.4 ... 8.6 5.0 ... 20.9 1.9 1
Sources: WEO, IFS, IMF Staff reports, Laeven and Valencia (2008), and authors calculations.
1/ In percent of GDP. Output losses are computed as the cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real GDP over the period [T,
T+3], expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP, with T the starting year of the crisis.
2/ In percent of GDP. Fiscal costs are defined as the component of gross fiscal outlays related to the restructuring of the financial sector. They include
fiscal costs associated with bank recapitalizations but exclude asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the treasury.
3/ Liquidity is measured as the ratio of central bank claims on deposit money banks (line 12 in IFS) and liquidity support from the Treasury to total
deposits and liabilities to non-residents. Total deposits are computed as the sum of demand deposits (line 24), other deposits (line 25), and liabilities to
non-residents (line 26).
4/ In percent of total loans. NPLs data come from IMF Staff reports and Financial Soundness Indicators.
5/ In percent of GDP. The increase in public debt is measured over [T-1, T+3], where T is the starting year of the crisis. For the 2007-2009 crises, it is
computed as the difference between pre- and post-crisis debt projections.
6/ In percent of GDP. Monetary expansion is computed as the change in the monetary base between its peak during the crisis and its level one year
prior to the crisis. Monetary expansion is the same for all euro area countries, measured at the euro area level to reflect the common monetary policy.
7/ As defined in Dell'Ariccia et al. (2012).
8/ Credit data missing. For these countries, end dates are based on GDP growth only.
9/ We truncate the duration of crises at 5 years, starting with the first crisis year.
10/ Borderline cases.
11/ No output losses are reported for crises in transition economies that took place during the period of transition to market economies. Output losses
are computed as the cumulative difference between actual and trend real GDP, expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP for the period [T, T+3]
where T is the starting year of the crisis. Trend real GDP is computed by applying an HP filter (=100) to the GDP series over [T-20, T-1].


27

Table A2. Direct Fiscal Outlays, Recoveries to Date, and Asset Guarantees, 20072011
(In percent of GDP)
Country Type of outlay Specific fiscal outlay
Gross
outlays 1/
Recoveries
2/
Net
outlays
Austria Recapitalization Capital Injection Program 2.9

Asset purchase Impaired assets and liquidity 2.0


Total fiscal outlays 4.9

Asset guarantee Asset guarantee program 0.6

Belgium Recapitalization Ethias, Fortis, KBC, and Dexia 5.8

Other Capital for Fortis SPV 0.2


Total fiscal outlays 6.0

Asset guarantee Asset relief facility 6.0


Fortis SPV 1.3


Fortis portfolio 0.4


Total asset guarantees 7.7

Denmark Recapitalization Capital Assistance Program 2.7


Capital injection in Fionia Bank 0.1

Other Loan to Fionia Bank 0.3


Total fiscal outlays 3.1

France Recapitalization SPPE acquisition of subordinated bonds 0.5


Second stage recapitalization (BNP, SG, Dexia) 0.5


Total fiscal outlays 1.0

Asset guarantee Financial Security Assurance Inc. 0.3

Germany

Recapitalization

Federal and state recapitalizations and guarantees for
capital support
1.7



Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 0.1


Total fiscal outlays 1.8

Asset purchase Asset purchase program 11.1

Asset guarantee Bad Bank Act 3/ 6.1

Greece Recapitalization
Capital injection package I

1.7




Agricultural Bank of Greece 0.2


Capital Injection package II 0.5


2012 Capital Injection package III (IMF estimate) 23.0

Other Liquidity 1.9


Total fiscal outlays 27.3

Hungary Recapitalization Capital injection in FHB (mortgage lender) 0.1

Other FX loans to large banks 2.6


Total fiscal outlays 2.7 1.6 1.1
Iceland Recapitalization Securities lending 6.2




Commercial banks recapitalizations 14.7


Recapitalization of the House Financing Fund 2.1


Savings banks 1.3

Other Central bank recapitalization
18.1



Called guarantees of the State Guarantee Fund 1.8


Total fiscal outlays 44.2 23.7 20.5
Ireland Recapitalization BoI, AIB, Anglo Irish, EBS, INBS 29.5


Capital injections to meet PCAR stress test results 11.2


Total fiscal outlays 40.7

Asset purchase Assets purchased by NAMA 20.3

Asset guarantee NAMA 19.1

Italy Recapitalization Recapitalization scheme 0.3

Kazakhstan Recapitalization BTA, Halyk, Alliance, and KKB 2.4

Other Liquidity through deposits of the development agency 1.3


Total fiscal outlays 3.7

28

Country Type of outlay Specific fiscal outlay
Gross
outlays 1/
Recoveries
2/
Net
outlays
Latvia Recapitalization Parex and MLBN 3.1 0.8 2.3
Other Liquidity 2.5


Total fiscal outlays 5.6 0.8 4.8
Luxembourg Recapitalization Fortis and Dexia 7.7

Mongolia Recapitalization Recapitalization and restructuring costs 4.2

Netherlands Recapitalization Fortis, ING, SNS, and AEGON 6.6

Other Loans to Icesave and Icelandic deposit Insurance 0.2


Loan to Fortis 5.9


Total fiscal outlays 12.7 7.1 5.6
Asset guarantee ABN AMRO/Fortis Mortgage portfolio 6.0


ING Alt-A RMBS portfolio 4.8


Total asset guarantees 10.8

Nigeria Recapitalization Recapitalizations and purchase of bad assets 11.8
Russia

Recapitalization

State Mortgage Agency, VTB, Rosselhozbank,
Rosagroleasing, VEB

1.0



Subordinated loans from VEB 0.9


Liquidity through government deposits in commercial banks 0.4


Total fiscal outlays 2.3

Slovenia Recapitalization NLB and NKBM 0.8

Liquidity Public sector deposits in banks (proceed from bond issue) 2.8


Total fiscal outlays 3.6
Spain



Recapitalization Recapitalization of cajas and other banks 4/ 2.0

Asset purchase Purchase of high-quality securities from credit institutions 1.8


Total fiscal outlays 3.8

Asset guarantee Asset protection scheme for BBK (takeover of Cajasol) 0.0

Sweden Recapitalization Recapitalization package 0.2

Other Initial contribution to stabilization fund 0.5


Total fiscal outlays 0.7

Switzerland Recapitalization Mandatory convertible notes UBS 1.1 1.5 -0.4
Ukraine Recapitalization Public recapitalization program 4.5

United Kingdom Recapitalization RBS, Lloyds, LBG, and Northern Rock 5.0

Other Dunfermline Building Society takeover 0.1


Deposit compensation 1.8


Loans to Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley 1.9


Total fiscal outlays 8.8 2.2 6.6
Asset guarantee Pool of RBS assets and CoCos 14.5

United States Recapitalization Capital Purchase Program (CPP) 1.5 1.5 0


AIG 0.5 0.1 0.4


Targeted Investment Program 0.3 0.3 0


Support to GMAC 0.1 0 0.1


Support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 1.2 0.2 1.0
Other Automotive Industry Financial program 0.5 0.3 0.2
Asset purchase MBS purchase 0.3 0 0.3


Public-Private Investment Program 0.1 0 0.1


Total fiscal outlays 4.5 2.4 2.1
Asset guarantee Citigroup asset guarantee small
Sources: IMF staff reports and official websites.
1/ Gross fiscal costs and recoveries differ somewhat from those in the IMFs Fiscal Monitor (February 2012, Table 7, p. 23), partly
reflecting the different time periods used. For Germany, the Fiscal Monitor figures include financial sector support measures taken
by subnational governments. And for Greece, the Fiscal Monitor figures do not include the Spring 2012 capital injection package.
2/ Includes repayments up to end-2011 of capital support as well as interest and fees generated from loans and guarantee
programs for the cases where the data was available.
3/ Includes guarantees issued by the Stabilization Fund (items related to the Bad Bank Act and debt issued by financial institutions).
4/ Recapitalized banks include Catalunya Caixa, Unnim, Espana-Duero, Nova Caixa Galicia, Banco Financiero y de Ahorros, Banco
Mare Nostrum, Banca Civica, Caja del Mediterraneo, and Banco de Valencia.

29

Table A3. Systemic Banking Crises Policy Responses, 20072011

Country Liquidity
Support
Gross
Restructuring
Costs
Asset Purchases
and Guarantees
Guarantees on Bank Liabilities Significant nationalizations
(percentage
points increase in
central bank
claims on financial
institutions over
deposits and
foreign liabilities)
3/
(recapitalization
and other
restructuring costs,
excluding liquidity
support, in percent
of GDP)
(funded by
treasury and
central bank, in
percent of GDP)
(significant guarantees on bank liabilities in addition to
increasing deposit insurance ceilings)
(state takes control over institutions;
year of nationalization between
brackets)
Austria 8 4.9 Guarantees: 0.6 Unlimited coverage to depositors Hypo Group Alpe Adria,
Kommunalkredit (2009)
Bank and non-bank bond issues
Belgium 14.1 6.0 Guarantees: 7.7 DI raised from 20,000 to 100,000 Fortis (2008), Dexia Bank Belgium
(2011)
Deposit-like insurance instruments
Interbank loans and short-term debt
Specific guarantees on Dexia
Denmark 11.4 2.8 Deposits and unsecured claims of PCA banks Fionia Bank (2009)
France 7.4 1.0 Guarantees: 0.3 DI already higher than EU new limit
360 billion in guarantees for refinancing credit
institutions
Guarantee on 55 billion of Dexias debt
Germany 3.5 1.8 Guarantees: 6.1
Purchases: 11.1
Unlimited coverage of household deposits Hypo Real Estate (2009)
Interbank loans and bank debt (capped at 400 bn)
Greece 1/ 42.3 25.4 DI raised from 20,000 to 100,000
Funding guarantees up to 15 billion, expanded to
15 billion in 2011
Hungary 1.3 0.1 Unlimited protection to depositors of small banks
Iceland 16.8 44.2 Unlimited coverage to domestic deposits Kaupthing, Landsbanki, Glitnir,
Straumur-Burdaras, SPRON and
Sparisjdabankinn (all 2008)
Ireland 16.3 40.7 Guarantees: 19.1
Purchases: 20.3
Unlimited coverage to most liabilities of 10 banks Anglo Irish Bank (2009), EBS limited
and Irish Nationwide Building Society
(2010), Irish Life and Permanent (2011)
Italy 5.7 0.3 DI already higher than the EU limit
State guarantee for new bank liabilities

30

Country Liquidity
Support
Gross
Restructuring
Costs
Asset Purchases
and Guarantees
Guarantees on Bank Liabilities Significant nationalizations
(percentage
points increase in
central bank
claims on financial
institutions over
deposits and
foreign liabilities)
3/
(recapitalization
and other
restructuring costs,
excluding liquidity
support, in percent
of GDP)
(funded by
treasury and
central bank, in
percent of GDP)
(significant guarantees on bank liabilities in addition to
increasing deposit insurance ceilings)
(state takes control over institutions;
year of nationalization between
brackets)
Kazakhstan 5 2.4 DI raised from T0.7 million to T5 million Bank Turan Alem, Alliance Bank (2009)
Latvia 3.4 3.1 DI raised to 50,000 Parex Bank (2008)
Guarantee on Parex syndicated loans
Luxembourg 4.1 7.7 DI raised from 20,000 to 100,000 Fortis and Dexias subsidiaries (2008)
4.5 billion guarantee on Dexias debt
Mongolia 9.4 4.2 Unlimited coverage to all deposits Zoos Bank (2009)
Netherlands 3.7 6.6 Guarantees: 3.3 DI raised to 100,000 ABN-AMRO/Fortis (2008)
Interbank loans of solvent banks
Fortis bonds (5 bn) and ING bonds (10 bn)
Nigeria 11.7 11.8 Purchases: 9.3 Guaranteed on all interbank transactions, foreign
credit lines, and pension deposits
Afribank Plc, Bank PHB Plc, Spring
Bank Plc (2011)
Portugal 2/ 16.7 0 DI raised from 25,000 to 100,000
Debt securities issued by credit institutions (20% of
GDP)
Russia 23.9 1.9 DI raised from R400,000 to R700,000
Interbank lending for qualifying banks
Slovenia 9.6 0.8 Unlimited protection for all deposits by individuals and
small enterprises until end-2010, and capped at
100,000 thereafter

New debt issued by financial institutions until end-
2010
Spain 3.5 3.8 Purchases: 1.8 DI raised from 20,000 to 100,000
Guarantees on new debt issued by financial
institutions until end-2010 (capped at 200 billion)
Sweden 13 0.7 DI raised from SEK 250,000 to SEK 500,000
Medium-term debt of banks and mortgage institutions
(up to SEK 1.5 trillion)
31

Country Liquidity
Support
Gross
Restructuring
Costs
Asset Purchases
and Guarantees
Guarantees on Bank Liabilities Significant nationalizations
(percentage
points increase in
central bank
claims on financial
institutions over
deposits and
foreign liabilities)
3/
(recapitalization
and other
restructuring costs,
excluding liquidity
support, in percent
of GDP)
(funded by
treasury and
central bank, in
percent of GDP)
(significant guarantees on bank liabilities in addition to
increasing deposit insurance ceilings)
(state takes control over institutions;
year of nationalization between
brackets)
Switzerland 0.7 1.1 Purchases: 6.7 DI raised from SFr 30,000 to SFr 100,000
Ukraine 9.2 4.5 DI raised from UAH 50,000 to 150,000 Prominvest (2008), Nadra, Inprom,
Volodimrski, Dialog, Rodovid, Kiev,
Ukrgaz (all 2009)
United Kingdom 5.6 6.9 Purchases: 16.3 DI raised from 35,000 to 50,000 Northern Rock (2008); RBS (2008).
Guarantees: 14.5 Guarantee on short- to medium-term debt (capped at
250 billion)
Blanket guarantee on Northern Rock and
Bradford & Bingley wholesale deposits
United States 4.7 4.5 Purchases: 13.0 DI raised from $100,000 to $250,000 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG (all
2008).
Money market funds (capped at $50 billion)
Full guarantee on transaction deposits
Newly issued senior unsecured debt
Sources: IMF staff reports, official websites, and authors calculations.
1/ Greeces fiscal cost includes the bank recapitalization funds for 23 percent of GDP included in the 2012 program. Since these funds will cover losses triggered by the debt
exchange, we include them although they were not fully used as of May 2012.
2/ For Portugal, the funds allocated for bank restructuring purposes are not included because they have not been used yet and it is unclear how much and when they will be used.
3/ Includes liquidity support from the Treasury in the case of Austria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Russia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

32

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