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MEMBERSHI P
There are some things money can't buy and other things it tries to
buy but shouldn't-elections, for example, or in an earlier day, sal
vation. But the sale of elections, like the sale of indulgences, usu
ally brings a demand for reform. What is wrong with buying these
things? And where else should money's writ not rule? How the good
things in life should be distributed is the subject of Michael Walzer's
book Spheres of justice, which ofers an imaginative alternative to the
ongoing debate over distributive justice.
The debate is typically carried on beteen libertarians on the one
hand and egalitarians on the other. Libertarians argue that money,
the medium of free exchange, should buy whatever those who pos
sess it want; people should be free to use their money as they choose.
Egalitarians reply that money could be a fair instrument of distribu
tion only if everyone had the same amount. So long as some have
more and others less, some wil deal from strength, others from
weakness, and the so-called free market can hardly be fair. But crit
ics of the egalitarian approach respond that even if all wealth were
equally distributed, the equality would end when the dealing began.
Those favorably endowed by fortune or circumstance would do well;
those l ess favorably endowed less well . So long as people have differ
ent abilities and desires the reign of perfect equality can never last for
long.
Walzer rescues the case for equality from its critics and defenders
alie, by shifing the ground of the libertarian-egalitarian debate.
The key to his solution is to worry less about the distribution of
money and more about limiting the things that money can buy. This
is the point of talking about spheres of justice. He maintains that dif
ferent goods occupy diferent spheres, which are properly governed
by diferent principles-welfare to the needy, honors to the deserv
ing, political power to the persuasive, ofces to the qualifed, luxuries
to those able and willing to pay for them, divine grace to the pious,
and so on
.
For Walzer, the injustice of unequal wealth lies not in the yachts
and gourmet dinners that money commands but in money's power
to dominate in spheres where it does not belong, as when it buys po
litical infuence. And whie money may be the worst ofender, it is
not the only currency that wrongly rules beyond its own sphere. For
example, when an ofce is obtained by kinship instead of ability, that
is nepotism. Nepotism and bribery are easy to condemn because they
result in goods being distributed by principles alien to their spheres.
But as Walzer ackowledges, the idea of spheres, taken alone,
does not tell us how to distribute this or that good. Most of our po
litical arguments arise over precisely what goods belong to what
spheres. Wat sort of goods, for example, are health care and hous
ing and education? Should we regard them as basic needs to be pub
licly provided as required or as goods and services to be sold in the
market? Or, to take a diferent sort of example, in what sphere does
sex belong? Should sexual pleasure be "distributed" only on the basis
of love and commitment or also in exchange for cash or other goods?
Wheter we are debating the welfare state or sexual mores, we
need some way of deciding which goods ft which distributive princi
ples. One way of deciding, perhaps the most familiar way, is to try to
identif certain universal natural or human rights and to deduce
from these whatever particular rights may follow-the right to hous
ing or health care or the right to engage in prostitution, as the case
may be.
J usti ce as Membershi p 1 75
Walzer rejects the appeal to rights and adopts in its place a con
ception of membership in a community, a conception that poses a
powerfl challenge to political theories that put rights frst. For him,
distributive justice must begin with such membership because we are
all members of political communities before we are bearers of rights.
Whether we have a right to a particular good depends on the role
that good plays in our communal life and on its importance to us as
members.
Walzer illustrates this point with an argument for greater public
provision of medical care, an argument that appeals not to a univer
sal "right to treatment," but instead to the character of contemporary
Aerican life and the shared understandings that defne it. What the
care of souls meant to the medieval Christians, he argues, the cure of
bodies means to us. For them, eternity was a socially recognized
need-"hence, a church in every parish, regular services, catechism
for the young, compulsory communion, and so on." For us, a long
and healthy life is a socialy recognized need-"hence, doctors and
hospitals in every district, regular checkups, health education for the
young, compulsory vaccination, and so on." Medical care becomes a
matter of membership in the society. To be cut of from it is "not
only dangerous but degrading," a kind of excommunication.
In Walzer's conception, then, the case for equality is tied to the
case for membership. Different communities invest diferent goods
with diferent meanings and values, which give rise, in turn, to difer
ent understandings of membership. For example, Walzer reminds us
that in diferent times and places, bread has been "the staf of life, the
body of Christ, the symbol of the Sabbath, the means of hospitality
and so on." What matters is that each community be faithfl to its
shared understandings and open to political debate about what those
understandings require.
This is a humane and hopeful vision, and Walzer conveys it with
a wry and gentle grace. His book is laced with specifc illustrations
and historical examples, designed to bring out our own understand-
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ing of social goods-of ofces and honors, security and welfare,
work and leisure, schooling and dating, property and power-fen
by contrast with other cultures and traditions. If his approach is at
times more evocative than systematic, this is in keeping with his pur
pose-to resist the universalizing impulse of philosophy, to afrm
the rich particularity of our moral lives.
Some may take issue with this purpose on the grounds that it is
essentially conservative and uncritical. Societies faithfl to the shared
understandings of their members do not make for just societies, it
may be said, only consistent ones. If the notion of justice is to have
any critical force, one can frther argue, it must he based on stan
dards independent of any particular society; otherwise justice is lef
hostage to the very values it must judge. Walzer sometimes seems
vulnerable to this challenge, as when he doubts that we can ever
judge the meanings of communities other than our own.
But I don't think his pluralism requires that kind of moral rela
tivism. Walzer's relativist voice is in tension with a more afrmative
voice that gives his case its moral force. Implicit in his argument is a
particular vision of community, the kind that cultivates the common
life we share as members.
One expression of the knd of community Walzer has in mind is
the public holiday, an institution that he contrasts with the modern
vacation. Whereas vacations are private occasions, free of obliga
tions, a time to "go away" from our usual place, holidays are public
occasions ( sometimes religious, sometimes civic) , that we celebrate
together. In our own tie, those holidays that survive are increas
ingly attached to long weekends, to our private vacations.
He uses the history of the word "vacation" to show how far we
have come fom the communal life: "In Ancient Rome, the days on
which there were no religious festivals or public games were called
dies vacantes, 'empty days.' The holidays, by contrast, were full-fll
of obligation but also of celebration, full of things to do, feasting and
dancing, rituals and plays. This was when time ripened to produce
J usti ce as Membershi p 1 77
the social goods of shared solemnity and revelry. Who would give up
days like that? But we have lost that sense of fllness; and the days we
crave are the empty ones, which we can fll by ourselves as we please.''
Though Walzer leaves little doubt which form of rest makes for
the richer common life, he concludes nonetheless ( in his relativist
voice) that justice doesn't choose between holidays and vacations but
simply requires public support for whichever form happens to pre
vail. But this is at odds with the deeper suggestion implicit in his ac
count that a community that values vacations over holidays not only
lacks a certain flness but is unlikely to sustain the sense of belong
ing necessary if the community is to provide for such holidays.
It is one thing to expect a community to share the expenses of
public celebrations and another to demand that it subsidize private
vacations. The eclipse of holidays by vacations suggests the weaken
ing of those moral ties that any case for public provision must pre
suppose. This seems to me the larger force of Walzer's claim. Where
justice begins with membership, it cannot be concerned with distri
bution alone; it must also attend to the moral conditions that culti
vate membership.
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