FLORESCA vs PHILEX MINING CORPORATION Case Digest

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA et al vs PHILEX MINING CORPORATION et al

FACTS:

Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died
as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex,
in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions
for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant
to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned
before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued
because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

HELD:

Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they
will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil
courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that
Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they
may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be
granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go
strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the
law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said,
the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

Republic Vs. CA & Roridel O. Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Supreme Court Decision
Civil Law : Psychological Incapacity
The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila;
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity
and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money;
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated: That the parties herein were legally
married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.Augustine, Manila;
That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
That the respondent is not asking for damages;
That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner
was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings
"that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that: As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range
of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul
for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
The Issue
Whether or not the opposing and conflicting relationship between the couple constitutes a Psychological
Incapacity?
Whether or not the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial courts judgment is within the standards required
by Art. 36 or Psychological Incapacity? And thus CAs affirmation is correct?

The Holding
No, the Supreme Court granted the petition and the marriage is valid, In Leouel Santos vs. Court of
Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity.
It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband couldnor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Case Digest on People vs. Licera
PEOPLE V. LICERA [65 S 270 (1975)] - F: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of
Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at
the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were
exempt from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be
held applicable.
HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not law,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by
the old rule.
Aisporna v CA (1982)

Facts
Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited the application of Eugenio Isidro
in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros without the certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner.
Isidro passed away while his wife was issued Php 5000 from the insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal
instigated criminal action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the Insurance code for feloniously acting as agent
when she solicited the application form.
In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a renewal, not a new policy
from Isidro through the phone. She did this because her husband was absent when he called. She only left a note on
top of her husbands desk to inform him of what transpired. (She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her
services)
Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in 1971 in the Cabanatuan city
court.
In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code.
The OSG kept on repeating that she didnt violate sec 189 of the insurance code.
In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court:
1. the receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code
2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner
Issues: Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1
st
par of the sec 189 of the IC without reference to the
2
nd
paragraph of the said section. Or
Is it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1
st
paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by
the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph

Decision: Aisporna acquitted

Ruling:
Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that No insurance company doing business with the Philippine Islands nor l any
agent thereof shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance
unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an
agent of such company as herein after provided.
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance
without obtaining a certificate from the Insurance Commissioner.
Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance for any for any insurance compna or
offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall be an insurance agent in the intent of this section
and shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to which an insurance agent is subject.
Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company violating the provisions of the section.
The court held that the 1
st
par prohibited a person to act as agent without certificate of authority from the
commissioner
In the 2
nd
par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulated
The third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1
st
2 rules
The appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st paragraph and not the 1nd. The fact that she
didnt receive compensation wasnt an excuse for her acquittal because she was actually punished separately under
sec 1 because she did not have a certificate of authority as under par 1.
The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to be limited to paragraph 2 and not
applicable to the 1
st
paragraph.
The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits insurance for compensation,
but in the 1
st
paragraph, there was no necessity that a person solicits an insurance compensation in order to be called
an agent.
The SC said that this was a reversible error.
The CA said that Aisporna didnt receive compensation.
The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec 189 (check the law) The
definition in the 2
nd
paragraph qualified the definition of an agent used in the 1
st
and third paragraphs.
DOCTRINE: The court held that legislative intent must be ascertained from the consideration of the statute as a
whole. The words shouldnt be studied in isolated explanations but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to pronounce the harmonious whole.
Noscitur a sociis provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself, the true
meaning may be made clear in the company it is fixed in. In applying this, the court held that the definition of an
insurance agent in the 2
nd
paragraph was applicable in the 1
st
paragraph.
To receive compensation be the agent is an essential element for violation of the 1
st
paragraph.
The appellate court said that she didnt receive compensation by the receipt of compensation wasnt an essential
element for violation of the 1
st
paragraph.
The SC said that this view wasnt correct owing to the American insurance laws which qualified compensation as a
qualifying factor in penalizing unauthorized persons who solicited insurance (Texas code and snyders law)

CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): CHINA BANKING CORP vs. Ortega
G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973

Facts:
Petitioner refuses to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any
information relative to bank deposits.

Issue:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit
of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held:
No. It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of
Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does
not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case,
and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard
to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts,
even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a
bank

Board of Administration of the P.V.A. vs. Bautista

Facts:

Calixto Gasilao was a veteran who was disabled during the last war. He filed his claim with the PVA board as early
as July 1955, but his claim was denied because his supporting papers were incomplete. It was in only 1968 that
Gasilao was able to complete all the necessary papers and the Board thereafter approved his pension, starting from
the date of approval.
In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the board to recover the pension which he claims he is entitled to, from July
1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved.

CFI Ruling:
The trial court granted the amount claimed. The Board filed a petition to review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of 1968?

Petitioner's (PVA Board) Contention:

Petitioner cited Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 65 (Veteran's Bill of Rights) which provides:
"Sec. 15. Any person who desires to take advantage of the rights and privileges provided for in this act should file
his application with the Board"

Petitioner contends that since the foregoing section impliedly required that the application filed should first be
approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of
pension benefits should commence from the date of approval of application.

Held:
The stand to the petitioner does not appear to be in consonance with the spirit and the intent of law. Considering that
R.A. No. 65 is a veteran's pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to
favor those entitled to rights, privileges, and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old
positions is government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotional examinations, a life pension for
the incapacitated, pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical care benefits.

The purpose of the Congress in granting veterans pensions is to compensate, as far as may be, a class of men who
suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more particularly, those
who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in the line of duty. A
veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered
service for the country, especially during times of war and revolution, by extending to them regular momentary aid.
For this reason, it is a general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled
pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with other guides
to interpretation and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language.

On the other hand, if the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be
dependent upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12
years. The noble and humanitarian purposes for which the law had enacted could easily be thwarted or defeated.

Gasilao's claim was sustained.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)

FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a
parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the
nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the
deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.

ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part
of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is
to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there
is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.The court, however, said that
the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner
will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were
legitimated by marriage.