vii

CONTENTS
List of Illustrations viii
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: The Mediterranean Equilibrium 15
Chapter 2: The Calm before the Storm 31
Chapter 3: The Austro-Italian War Scare 51
Chapter 4: The Italo-Turkish War and Its Consequences 82
Chapter 5: Britains Mediterranean Crisis 106
Chapter 6: The Austro-Italian Combination 132
Chapter 7: The French 19e Corps and Mediterranean Control 155
Conclusion 179
Notes 189
Selected Bibliography 205
Index 209
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viii
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures
Figure I.1. Naval Spending, 19041914 5
Figure 2.1. Tonnage of Mediterranean Navies, 1904 37
Figure 2.2. Broadside Throw Weights (in pounds), 37
Mediterranean Navies, 1904
Figure 3.1. Battle Line Tonnage, Austria-Hungary and Italy, 19061911 61
Figure 3.2. Broadside Throw Weights, Austria-Hungary and Italy, 62
19061911
Figure 5.1. Tonnage of Mediterranean Fleets, 1914 116
Figure C.1. Tonnage of the Mediterranean Combinations by Year, 182
19131920
Figure C.2. Broadside Throw Weights, Mediterranean Combinations 183
Tables
Table I.1. Naval Spending, 19041914 5
Table 3.1. Tonnages of Austrian and Italian Battle Lines, 19061911 61
Table 3.2. Broadside Throw Weights, Austria-Hungary and Italy, 62
19061911
Table C.1. Tonnage of Mediterranean Combinations by Year, 182
19131920
Table C.2. Broadside Throw Weights, Mediterranean Combinations 183
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ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Jennifer Siegel, Dr. John Guilmartin, Dr. Alan Beyerchen,
and Dr. James Bradford for their assistance and advice in producing this work.
Without their help, this project would have never succeeded. I would also like to
thank the archivists in London, Paris, Vienna, and Rome for their assistance in
helping a young, none-too-bright historian nd the documents that he needed.
Finally, I would like to thank the U.S. Naval Academys Class of 1957, the
Tyng Fund, the Bradley Foundation, the Mershon Center, and The Ohio State
University for nancial assistance.
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1
INTRODUCTION
T
he Mediterranean Sea has long been one of the worlds crossroads. A place
where climatic zones, cultures, and trade routes meet, it has played a major
role in the history of numerous civilizations. Its relatively calm seas and
numerous ports made it a place for humanity to begin its efforts to go down
to the sea in ships. A hotbed for shipping, the fortunes of people and nations
were won and lost along the shores of the Mediterranean. For the majority of
history, the Mediterranean was anarchic, without a single power controlling
passage through the region and guaranteeing the safety of merchant trafc. By
1904, however, the Mediterranean had enjoyed nearly a century under the vir-
tual control of Great Britain, with the free movement of ships and general peace
enforced by the power of the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy had won control of
the Mediterranean from a series of rivals in a century of war, culminating with
the destruction of the Franco-Spanish squadrons at Trafalgar that ended impe-
rial Frances bid to topple Great Britain on the seas. However, Great Britains
dominance of the Mediterranean was, in 1904, starting to unravel. It would
not have been obvious at the time, since the Royal Navy seemed as indomitable
as ever. However, the slow, almost unnoticed rise of Austria-Hungary from the
status of a coastal defense power that was content to control the waters along its
shoreline to the status of a Mediterranean-wide power, combined with the strain
of protecting British Home Waters from the German navy, threatened to break
the Royal Navys hold on the Mediterranean. The collapse of British power in
the Mediterranean, ultimately averted by the unexpected outbreak of World War
I, combined with the rise of the Austrians to a major regional power, would have
ushered in a new Mediterranean equilibrium, a new order that was well on its
way to becoming established by 1912.
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2 INTRODUCTION
Britain gained dominance in the Mediterranean during the age of sail. Using
wind-powered wooden ships that were armed with smoothbore cannon, the
Royal Navy defeated rst the Spanish and then the French, the Mediterraneans
traditional powers. In these wars, the British gained control of numerous, well-
fortied bases across the Mediterranean. The most signicant of theseGibraltar,
Malta, and Alexandriagave Britain a chain of fortied, mutually supporting
naval facilities that allowed it to station and support ships permanently in the
Mediterranean, and to base those ships close to any sort of crisis zone that might
develop. Not only did Great Britain establish control over the Mediterranean,
no small feat in itself, but it also managed to maintain that control in a period
of immense technological change. By the 1850s the products of the Industrial
Revolution had come to the navies of the world. Steam engines replaced sails.
Steel became cheap enough to serve as a replacement for wood. Improved met-
allurgy allowed for ried guns that could be larger and longer, and withstand
higher pressures. When combined with improved propellants, this meant that
naval artillery could re even farther. Improved metallurgy also led to better
armor and to better shells to pierce that armor. These new technologies brought a
fresh challenge to Britains naval superiority. France looked to these new techno-
logical marvels to give it the edge it needed to overcome Britains material advan-
tages. However, with each attempt by the French to surpass the British, Britain
responded by adapting to new technologies, and then out-producing the French.
New weapons, new ships, new ways of ghting at sea all came from the massive
technological shifts of the era, but through it all the Royal Navy remained the
top dog in the Mediterranean.
Despite preserving its status as the leading power in the Mediterranean for
nearly a century, by 1904 Great Britains lead was starting to slip away. Britains
attentions were pulled away from the Mediterranean as Germany increased its
presence in the North Sea and began exing its muscles across the globe. With
Britains hold weakening, a new equilibrium would have to emerge amongst
the Mediterranean powers. The quest to establish this new balance required
naval growth. Naval budgets for the three major Mediterranean powers
France, Italy, and Austria-Hungaryincreased. The total tonnage of major
surface combatantsbattleships and armored cruisersunder the command of
the Mediterranean powers increased, and the pace of growth accelerated after
1910. The number of light eet elementslight and protected cruisers, destroy-
ers, and torpedo boatsalso increased. Compared to older ships, the new ships
that came into service were vastly more powerful, armed with more and bet-
ter guns and torpedoes, protected by better armor, and used improved engines
that produced more speed. However, in the face of the growing Mediterranean
navies, the Royal Navys Mediterranean Fleet shrank, then stagnated. In an
environment of explosive growth, stagnation was the same as shrinking. With
Great Britains hold weakening, the Mediterranean powers would have to shift
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INTRODUCTION 3
into a new alignment, one where Great Britain would be forced into the role of
junior partner.
Italy lay in the center of this new alignment. Italy enjoyed a central position
in the Mediterranean, with the Italian peninsula and Sicily nearly evenly dividing
the Mediterranean Basin into halves: the Eastern Basin and the Western Basin. Its
long coastline required a navy capable of defending it. This forced the Italians into
signicant investments in shipbuilding, steel production, and naval construction
over the kingdoms short life, making the Italians into a regional naval power.
Diplomatically, too, the Italians helped stabilize the region. The Italians, along
with Germany and Austria-Hungary, were members of the Triple Alliance that
offered Italy security to its landward side. By allying with Austria and Germany,
the Italians gained protection from an Austrian invasion, if for no other reason
than Germanys desire to keep the Alliance together. Italy also gained protection
from France, Germanys main rival on the continent, since a French attack on
Italy was certain to pull Germany in on Italys side. However, the Italians played
a double game at sea. While they relied on Germany and Austria on land, they
relied on Britain for stability at sea. Since, at the founding of the Triple Alliance,
neither Austria nor Germany was a major naval power and Britain was enjoying
its period of splendid isolation, this position made sense. However, as Britain
became more and more entangled with the affairs on the continent, this position
became less and less tenable for the Italians. Fortunately for them, however, the
growth of the Austrian navy gave the Italians a potential solution to their prob-
lem, at the cost of tearing apart the Mediterranean system that had ruled the
nineteenth century.
That said, these trends were yet to develop in 1904. In fact, in that year
Britains lead in the Mediterranean seemed quite secure. Britains Mediterranean
Fleet was as strong as any in the Sea, and could easily be reinforced by the
British Atlantic Fleet in Gibraltar, free for service in either the Mediterranean
or Home Waters. While the growth of the German navy was becoming a threat
to Britains interest, and the rivalry between the two powers was growing, nei-
ther the naval race nor the rivalry had reached the fever pitch that it would
in coming years. Britains lead at sea was still comfortable, and there was still
hope for some sort of diplomatic agreement. However, to guard against any
German antagonism, the British came to a series of agreements with France.
These agreements smoothed points of friction between the two powers, draw-
ing them closer together. While France made progress on the diplomatic front,
its power at sea began to waver. A new government, formed by the Radicals,
attacked naval spending. New ship construction slowed to a halt. Money slated
for construction and improvement was funneled to political cronies. Admirals
were red in an effort to democratize the French navy. Maintenance on older
ships suffered, cutting their service life and reducing their availability. The French
navy was not the only one suffering from political problems. The Italian navy,
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once among the strongest in the world, had fallen on hard times. Naval budgets
suffered as the Italian economy went south in the 1890s. Even when the money
returned, a new problem emerged: a parliamentary investigation into ineffective
Italian naval spending uncovered a series of scandalspayoffs to political allies;
materials ordered before they could be used, then going to waste and having to
be reordered; and delays in construction projects. The worst part of the scan-
dal, however, was the discovery that the Italian armor plant, Terni, had falsied
results in its armor plate testing, resulting in more-expensive and less-effective
armor plate. The discovery that the Italian navy had essentially been duped by a
snake-oil sales pitch damaged that navys reputation considerably. The Austrians
were the only Mediterranean navy that experienced notable growth. However,
that growth caused trouble in Vienna. Hermann von Spaun, the admiral push-
ing this growth program, was not an effective politician, and his efforts made
too many enemies. His moment of triumph, the ordering of a new class of large
battleships, cost him his job. Doubtless, a less-aggressive reformer would replace
him, to appease the navys foes in Vienna.
That, however, did not happen. The Austrian navy had gained the sup-
port and patronage of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This support allowed Count
Admiral Rudolf Montecuccoli, von Spauns replacement, to pursue efforts
designed to continue expanding the Austrian navy. Where von Spaun had made
enemies by refusing to play politics, Montecuccoli was willing to do whatever
it tookincluding lying, cheating, and spending money he did not yet haveto
secure more ships and men for the Hapsburgs. His efforts, and continued survival,
provoked a certain amount of fear in Italian naval circles. This fear allowed the
Italian navy to reverse its fortunes after the Terni scandal, and prompted a wave
of shipbuilding in Italy. This tension between Italy and Austria occurred shortly
after a major French diplomatic effort in Italy. That effort, led by the French
foreign minister, Thophile Delcass, aimed at removing Italy from the Triple
Alliance and pulling it into the Franco-Russian fold. This effort made some prog-
ress: after renewing the Triple Alliance in 1902, Italy promised the French that
it would not join a Franco-German War, and the Italians supported the French
over the Germans at Algerias. However, the crisis that prompted that confer-
ence cost Delcass his position, which led to a decline in French efforts to court
Italy. While the tension between Italy and Austria was good for their respective
navies, leading to new ships and funding, war was not really in the best interest
of either power. The Austrians made conciliatory gestures toward Italy. Between
Austrias efforts to repair poor Austro-Italian relations, and Frances declining
interest in Italys friendship, the Italians decided to pursue a closer relationship
with the Triple Alliance.
By 1911 Italy had sufciently repaired its relationship with Austria for the
Italian government to take advantage of the diplomatic situation to gain one of
Italys long-cherished goals, a foothold in North Africa. A major focus of Italian
4 INTRODUCTION
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