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Douglas Valentine

THE PHOENIX PROGRAM


1990, 2000 by Douglas Valentine

Source: http://www.american-buha.com/phoeni!progtoc.htm
Publisher: i"ni#erse $%ugust &, 2000'
(n his autobiography, In the Midst of Wars, )ansale gi#es an e!ample o* the counterterror tactics he employe in the
+hilippines. ,e tells how one psychological war*are operation -playe upon the popular rea o* an asuang, or
#ampire, to sol#e a i**icult problem.- .he problem was that )ansale wante go#ernment troops to mo#e out o* a
#illage an hunt /ommunist guerrillas in the hills, but the local politicians were a*rai that i* they i, the guerrillas
woul -swoop own on the #illage an the bigwigs woul be #ictims.- 0o, writes )ansale:
% combat psywar 1psychological war*are2 team was brought in. (t plante stories among town resients o*
a #ampire li#ing on the hill where the ,u3s were base. .wo nights later, a*ter gi#ing the stories time to
circulate among ,u3 sympathi4ers in the town an ma3e their way up to the hill camp, the psywar s5ua
set up an ambush along a trail use by the ,u3s. 6hen a ,u3 patrol came along the trail, the ambushers
silently snatched the last man o* the patrol, their mo#e unseen in the ar3 night. .hey puncture his nec3
with two holes, #ampire *ashion, hel the boy up by the heels, raine it o* bloo, an put the corpse
bac3 on the trail. 6hen the ,u3s returne to loo3 *or the missing man an *oun their blooless comrae,
e#ery member o* the patrol belie#e that the #ampire ha got him an that one o* them woul be ne!t i*
they remaine on the hill. 6hen aylight came, the whole ,u3 s5uaron mo#e out o* the #icinity.
)ansale e*ines the incient as -low humor- an -an appropriate response ... to the glum an ealy practices o*
communists an other authoritarians.-
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/ounterterror was one way o* co-opting uncommitte ci#ilians. .o *acilitate their political awa3ening, accoring to
8an4ione, -6e le*t our calling car naile to the *orehea o* the corpses we le*t behin. .hey were playing car si4e
with a light green s3ull with re eyes an re teeth ripping bloo, set against a blac3 bac3groun. 6e hammere
them into the thir eye, the pituitary glan, with our pistol butts. .he thir eye is the seat o* consciousness *or
9uhists, an this was a *orm o* mutilation that ha a power*ul psychological e**ect.-
/uriously, terror tactics o*ten in#ol#e mutilating the thir eye $the seat o* insight an secret thoughts' an playing on
*ears o* an -all-seeing- cosmic eye o* :o. "se by morale o**icers in 6orl 6ar (, the eye o* :o tric3 calle *or pilots
in small aircra*t to *ly o#er enemy camps an call out the names o* ini#iual soliers. ; )ansale applie the
techni5ue in the +hilippines. -%t night, when the town was asleep, a psywar team woul creep into town an paint an
eye $copie *rom the ;gyptian eye that appears atop the pyrami in the :reat 0eal o* the "nite 0tates' on a wall
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*acing the house o* each suspect,- )ansale writes. -.he mysterious presence o* these male#olent eyes the ne!t
morning ha a sharply sobering e**ect.-
.o appreciate the -sobering e**ects- o* the -male#olent- an -mysterious- eye o* :o, it helps to 3now something o* the
archetype<s mythological origins. (n ancient ;gypt, the eye o* :o was pluc3e *rom ,orus, an anthropomorphic sun-
go with a *alcon<s hea. +icture as the morning sun cresting a pyrami, the eye o* :o represents the awn o* sel*-
awareness, when the ego emerge *rom the i an no longer re5uire human sacri*ice to o#ercome its prime#al
an!iety. %we by the *alcon<s superlati#e sight, talons, an *light, the ;gyptians enowe ,orus with the bir<s
preatory prowess, so he coul a#enge the murer his *ather, =siris, whose name means -seat o* the eye.- 0et on
high, scanning the earth *or the *orces o* ar3ness, the *alcon as sun-go -- as the mani*estation o* enlightenment --
carries out the wor3 o* organi4ation an paci*ication, imposing moral orer on earth.
.he eye o* :o assumes its mysterious -counterespionage- 5ualities through this myth o* the eternal cycle -- the battle
between goo an e#il -- in which, i* the per*iious gos o* ar3ness can guess the sun-go<s secret name, they can
rob him o* his powers an trap him *ore#er in the unerworl. .hus a *alcon emblem was place abo#e the gates o* all
;gyptian temples, scanning *or the sun-go<s enemies, while the sun-go relie on coe names to conceal his ientity.
=ly enough, the eye o* :o was the symbol o* the /ao Dai sect, whose gallery o* saints inclue /on*ucius, 9uha,
>oan o* %rc, >esus, an Victor ,ugo. (nsie the /ao Dai catheral in .ay ?inh /ity, the /ao Dai pope i#ine upon his
planchette the secrets o* the :reat pyrami@ o#er the temple oor loome a huge blue -all-seeing- eye surroune by
sna3es an trees. Aor this reason, some people suggest that the /ao Dai eye o* :o enowe +hoeni!, the all-seeing
bir o* prey that selecti#ely snatche its prey, with its ubi5uity.
(n 0outh Vietnam the eye o* :o tric3 too3 a ghastly twist. /(% o**icer +at 8c:ar#ey recalle to 0eymour ,ersh that
-some psychological war*are guy in 6ashington thought o* a way to scare the hell out o* #illagers. 6hen we 3ille a
V/ there, they wante us to sprea-eagle the guy, put out his eye, cut a hole in the bac3 1o* his hea2 an put his eye
in there. .he iea was that *ear was a goo weapon.- )i3ewise, ears were cut o** corpses an naile to houses to let
the people 3now that 9ig 9rother was listening as well.
-?ow e#eryone 3nows about the airborne interrogation -- ta3ing three people up in a chopper, ta3ing one guy an
saying, <.al3,< then throwing him out be*ore he e#en gets the chance to open his mouth. 6ell, we wrappe et
1etonator2 cor aroun their nec3s an wire them to the etonator bo!. %n basically what it i was blow their
heas o**. .he interrogator woul tell the translator, usually a 0outh Vietnamese intelligence o**icer, <%s3 him this.< ,e<
as3 him, <6ho ga#e you the gunB< %n the guy woul start to answer, or maybe he wouln<t -- maybe he< resist -- but
the general iea was to waste the *irst two. .hey planne the snatches that way. +ic3 up this guy because we<re pretty
sure he<s V/ care -- these other two guys Cust run errans *or him. =r maybe they<re noboy@ .ran, the *armer, an
his brother ?guyen. 9ut bring in two. +ut them in a row. 9y the time you get to your man, he<s tal3ing so *ast you got to
pop the weasel Cust to shut him up.- %*ter a moment<s silence he ae, -( guess you coul say that we wrote the boo3
on terror.-
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.he most #aluable 5uality possesse by e*ectors, eserters, an criminals ser#ing in -sensiti#e- /(% proCects was
their e!penability. .a3e, *or e!ample, +roCect 2D, which employe ?V% o**icers an senior enliste men. /aniates
*or +roCect 2D were #ette an, i* selecte, ta3en out *or inner an rin3s, to a brothel, where they were
photographe, then blac3maile into Coining special reconnaissance teams. .raine in 0aigon, out*itte with capture
?V% or V/ e5uipment, then gi#en a -one-way tic3et to /amboia,- they were sent to locate enemy sanctuaries. 6hen
they raioe bac3 their position an that o* the sanctuary, the /(% woul -arc-light- $bomb with 9E2<s' them along with
the target. ?o +roCect 2D special reconnaissance team e#er returne to 0outh Vietnam.
?otably, mins capable o* creating +roCect 2D were not a#erse to e!ploiting e#iants within their own community, an
0=: occasionally recruite %merican soliers who ha committe war crimes. Father than ser#e time in prison or as a
way o* getting release *rom stoc3aes in Vietnam or elsewhere, people with e*ecti#e personalities were li3ely to
#olunteer *or angerous an reprehensible Cobs.
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=n the *orbien subCect o* torture, accoring to 8uloon, the 0pecial 9ranch ha -the ol Arench methos,-
interrogation that inclue torture. -%ll this ha to be stoppe by the agency,- he sai. -.hey ha to be retaught with
more sophisticate techni5ues.-
(n Falph >ohnson<s opinion, -the Vietnamese, both /ommunist an :V?, loo3e upon torture as a normal an #ali
metho o* obtaining intelligence.- 9ut o* course, the Vietnamese i not concei#e the +(/s@ they were the stepchilren
o* Fobert .hompson, whose aristocratic ;nglish ancestors per*ecte torture in ingy castle ungeons, on the rac3 an
in the iron lay, with thumbscrews an braning irons.
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%s *or the %merican role, accoring to 8uloon, -you can<t ha#e an %merican there all the time watching these things.-
-.hese things- inclue: rape, gang rape, rape using eels, sna3es, or har obCects, an rape *ollowe by murer@
electrical shoc3 $-the 9ell .elephone ,our-' renere by attaching wires to the genitals or other sensiti#e parts o* the
boy, li3e the tongue@ -the water treatment-@ -the airplane,- in which a prisoner<s arms were tie behin the bac3 an
the rope loope o#er a hoo3 on the ceiling, suspening the prisoner in miair, a*terwhich he or she was beaten@
beatings with rubber hoses an whips@ an the use o* police ogs to maul prisoners. %ll this an more occurre in
+(/s.
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-( ha#e escribe the intelligence ser#ice as a socially acceptable way o* e!pressing criminal tenencies,- 1?elson
9ric3ham2 sai. -% guy who has strong criminal tenencies -- but is too much o* a cowar to be one -- woul win up in
a place li3e the /(% i* he ha the eucation.-
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1.he counterterror teams<2 uno**icial emblem was the >olly Foger s3ull an crossbones. 6hen wor3ing, /.s ispense
with the regalia, onne blac3 paCamas, an plunere nationalist as well as /ommunist #illages. (n =ctober 19GE,
upon returning *rom a *act-*ining mission to Vietnam, =hio 0enator 0tephen Houng charge that the /(% hire
mercenaries to isguise themsel#es as Vietcong an iscreit /ommunists by committing atrocities. (nee, /. teams
isguise as the enemy, 3illing an otherwise abusing nationalist Vietnamese, were the ultimate *orm o* psywar. (t
rein*orce negati#e stereotypes o* the Vietcong, while at the same time supplying 0pecial 9ranch with recruits *or its
in*ormant program.
(n his autobiography, 0olier, %nthony ,erbert tells how he reporte *or uty with 0=: in 0aigon in ?o#ember 19GE
an was as3e to Coin a top-secret psywar program. -6hat they wante me to o was to ta3e charge o* e!ecution
teams that wipe out entire *amilies an trie to ma3e it loo3 as though the V/ themsel#es ha one the 3illing.
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( remember one e#ening on an )0., right a*ter an operation, sensing there was nothing but anarchy borering on
iiocy in how we were conucting the war ... (t was Cust absolute chaos out there ... (t was absolutely insane.
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=perationally our biggest grapple was the eman to go out an capture V/ care,- 6ilbur continue. -6or woul
come own *rom 0aigon: <6e want a pro#ince-le#el care,<- 6ilbur sai. -6ell, #ery rarely i we e#en hear o* one o*
those. .hen /olby woul say, <6e<re out here to get the in*rastructureI 6ho ha#e you got in the in*rastructureB< <6ell,
we on<t ha#e anyone in the in*rastructure. 6e got a #illage guy an a hamlet chie*.< 0o /olby woul say, <( want some
istrict people, goammitI :et istrict peopleI< 9ut operationally there<s nothing more i**icult to o than to capture
someboy who<s got a gun an oesn<t want to be capture. (t<s a nightmare out there, an you on<t Cust say, <+ut up
your hans, you<re uner arrestI<
-Airst o* all,- 6ilbur e!plaine, -the targets in many cases were illusionary an elusi#e. (llusionary in that we ne#er
really 3new who the V/ istrict chie* was. (n some cases there wasn<t any istrict there. %n e#en i* there was
someone there, to *in out where he was going to be tomorrow an get the machinery there be*ore him -- that<s the
elusi#e part. =perationally, in orer to o that, you ha#e to wor3 #ery comprehensi#ely on a target to the e!clusion o*
all other emans. .o get a istrict chie*, you may ha#e to isolate an agent out there an set in motion an operation
that may not culminate *or si! months. (t was much easier to go out an shoot people -- to set up an ambush.
.he problem with the +F", writes 6arren 8ilberg, was that -the iea o* going out a*ter one particular ini#iual was
generally not #ery appealing, since e#en i* the ini#iual was capture, the healines woul not be #ery great in terms
o* boy counts, weapons capture, or some other measure o* success.- %s 8ilberg obser#es, -careers were at
sta3e ... an impressi#e results were e!pecte.-
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%s a 0;%) in Juang .ri +ro#ince in 19GD ;lton 8an4ione resse li3e the enemy, wor3e with /.s who committe
atrocities as stanar proceure, an was tol to ignore the rules o* engagement. -9ut there was no sense o* our role
in the war,- he sai to me *orlornly. ,e resente the *act that he was traine to 3ill. -(n psychology it<s calle cogniti#e
issonance -- the notion that once you ma3e a commitment, it<s impossible to go bac3. (t<s something about the human
psyche that ma3es a person reluctant to amit a mista3e. .his is what training is all about. Hou<#e alreay 3ille the
goo3. 0o what i* it isn<t a ummy in the be this timeB 0o what i* it<s a li#ing, breathing human beingB .his is what
you<re suppose to o. %n once the *irst time comes an goes, it<s not as har the secon time. Hou say to yoursel*,
<6ell, hey, (<#e 3ille people be*ore. 6hy shoul ( ha#e any compunctions about oing it nowB<-
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-.raining is brainwashing. .hey estroy your ientity an supply you with a new one -- a uni*orm ientity that e#ery
solier has. .hat<s the reason *or the uni*orm, *or e#eryone ha#ing the same haircut an going to inner together an
eating the same thing .... .hey estroye the street 3i *rom ?ewar3 an create the sailor. .hey estroye the sailor
an create the 0;%). 9ut people aren<t robots, an espite their training, e#entually they react@ they turn on their
trainers an con*ront the outsie *orces that ha#e use them. .hat<s what happene to me.
-( was a guinea pig,- 8an4ione insiste. -.here is no oubt in my min toay, an there was #ery little oubt then,
e#en a*ter *i#e months in Vietnam. %ll the training an all the <special< programs -- it e#entually began to bac3*ire on
them. ( thought, <=h, yeah, great program you got here@ you<re using me to see how ( react. (<m e!penable. (<m a
pawn.< %n that<s 3in o* a hea#y reali4ation when you<re an eighteen-year-ol 3i.
-(t<s a parao!. Hou 3now,- 8an4ione continue, -they woul sen a guy o#er there to be a replacement *or a speci*ic
person who was being pulle out. 0o what consciously came across to you was <(<m *unctioning as a part o* a machine.
%n i* ( *ail as a part or brea3 own as a part ... then another part will come along to replace me.< .hen you *in
yoursel* thin3ing, <.he last time ( loo3e at someboy as not a part o* the machine, an ( thought he was a really great
guy, an he<s a *rien o* mine, he steppe on a lan mine an came own ust, hair, teeth, an eyeballs.<
-.hen you reali4e, <( can<t a**or to o that. 9ecause ( *eel terrible *or a month a*terwars.< %n you can<t *unction when
you *eel terrible. .he only thing we coul eal with at any particular time was sur#i#al. <6hat o ( want to o toayB (
want to eat, sleep, an stay ali#e.< %n you i it. %n you relate to those 3ins o* things. 0uenly you loo3e
aroun an sai, <6ait a minuteI .hat<s what those little guys in blac3 paCamas are oing, tooI- Hou get to a point
where you begin to see these people Cust want to be le*t alone to grow their rice.
-(<ll gi#e you one last e!ample o* what (<m tal3ing about. (<m sure you<#e hear about the laser-guie smart bombs we
ha. 6ell, they woul rop these laser-guie smart bombs, an what the V/ woul o was ta3e a bunch o* ol rags
an tires an stu** an start a bon*ire with lots o* smo3e. %n the laser beam woul hit the smo3e particles, an it
woul scatter, an the bombs woul go cra4y. .hey< go up, own, sieways, all o#er the place. %n people woul
smile an say, <.here goes another smart bombI< 0o smart a goo3 with a match an an ol tire can *uc3 it upI
-.he whole per#erse iea o* putting this technological, semiantiseptic sort o* war*are against these people -- who in<t
ha#e much more than a stic3 -- was absur. .he stic3s wonI-
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-(n the Delta,- 6illson tol me, -the #illages were #ery small, li3e a moun in a swamp. .here were no names *or some
o* them. .he people in these #illages ha been tol to go to relocation camps, because this was all a *ree *ire 4one,
an technically anyone there coul be 3ille. 9ut they wouln<t lea#e their animals or burial grouns. %t the same time,
the ".0. %ir Aorce ha spotters loo3ing *or mu44le *lashes, an i* that *lash came *rom that ot, they< wipe out the
#illage. (t was that simple.
-(t was the epitome o* immorality,- 6illson suggeste. -=ne o* the times ( counte boies a*ter an air stri3e -- which
always ene with two napalm bombs which woul Cust *ry e#erything that was le*t -- ( counte si!ty-two boies. (n my
report ( escribe them as so many women between *i*teen an twenty-*i#e an so many chilren -- usually in their
mothers< arms or #ery close to them -- an so many ol people. 6hen ( went to .an 0on ?hut a *ew ays later, (
happene to see an a*ter-action report *rom this #illage. % guy ( 3new showe me where to loo3. .he report sai one
hunre-thirty V/ ea.
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-(t was part o* the regime<s ieology that anyone who oppose them must be a /ommunist. .hey coul not accept the
*act that there might be people who hate them *or the tra#esty they ha mae o* the country<s li*e, *or their intolerance
an corruption an col ini**erence to the lot o* their countrymen.-
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Falph 8c:ehee *oun the /(% s5uaring statistical *acts with ieological preconceptions in Vietnam, Cust as it ha in
.hailan. -.he station<s intelligence brie*ings on the situation in 0outh Vietnam con*irme all my *ears,- he writes. .he
brie*ers -tal3e only about the numbers o* arme Viet /ong, the slowly increasing ?orth Vietnamese regular army, an
the occasional member o* the /ommunist in*rastructure. .hey mae no mention o* the mass-base Aarmer<s
)iberation %ssociation, or the /ommunist youth organi4ation, all o* which in some areas certainly inclue entire
populations.-
.he reason *or this eception, 8c:ehee contens, was that -".0. policyma3ers ha to sell the iea that the war in the
0outh was being *ought by a small minority o* /ommunists oppose to the maCority-supporte emocratic go#ernment
o* ?guyen Van .hieu. .he situation, howe#er, was the opposite .... .he ".0. was supporting .hieu<s tiny oligarchy
against a population largely organi4e, committe, an eicate to a communist #ictory.-
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8c:ehee blames the %merican e*eat in Vietnam on -policy being ecie *rom the top in a#ance, then intelligence
being selecte or create to support it a*terwars.- (n particular, he singles out 6illiam /olby as the principal apostle o*
the 9ig )ie. % #eteran o* the Aar ;ast Di#ision, 8c:ehee at one point ser#e as /olby<s acolyte at )angley
hea5uarters an bases his accusations on *irsthan obser#ations o* /olby in action -- o* watching /olby eli#er
brie*ings which were -a complete hoa! contri#e to ecei#e /ongress.- 6rites 8c:ehee o* /olby: -( ha#e watche
him when ( 3new he was lying, an not the least *lic3er o* emotion e#er crosses his *ace.- 9ut what mae /olby e#en
more angerous, in 8c:ehee<s opinion, was his manipulation o* language. -/olby emphasi4e the importance o*
selecting Cust the right wors an charts to con#ey the esire impression to /ongress. ,e regare wor usage as an
art *orm, an he was a master at it.-
-,ere the ".0. was trying to *ight an enemy it only slightly ac3nowlege. 6hyB 6hat ha happene to all the
iealism, all the rules o* getting an reporting intelligenceB 6hy i the agency blin itsel* while pretening to loo3 *or
intelligenceB 6hy i we insist on 3illing people instea o* tal3ing to themB ,ow long woul this insanity go onB-
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-+hoeni!,- 1; 8urphy2 sai, -was a bounty-hunting program -- an attempt to eliminate the opposition. 9y which (
mean the opposition to us, the %mericans, getting what we wante. 6hich was to control the Vietnamese through our
clients -- the Diems, the Kys, the .hieus.- Aor 8urphy, all other e*initions o* +hoeni! are merely -intellectual Cargon.-
-(n orer to get into military intelligence school,- 8urphy continue, -( an the other caniates ha to write an essay
on the ebate about the Vietnam 6ar. %n the thrust o* my paper was <6hat we o in Vietnam will come bac3 to us.< (t
was a one worl thesis. 6ell, ( go to Vietnam an ( see the bullshit going own. .hen ( come bac3 to the "nite 0tates
an see the e!act same thing going on here. (<m at the ,unre 0i!teenth 8( unit, an as you lea#e the room, they
ha#e nine slots *or pictures, eight o* them *ille: Fennie Da#is, %bbie ,o**man, 9en 0poc3, >erry Fubin. %n (<m being
sent out to spot an ienti*y these people. .his is +hoeni!. .his is +hoeni!,- he repeate, then ae *or emphasis,
"This is Phoenix!" ... an it still is use in the "nite 0tates.-
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,ow the 0enate hearings came to aress +hoeni! is unusual. (t concerns Arancis Feitemeyer, a 0eton ,all Di#inity
0chool ropout who was ra*te an attene o**icer caniate school in late 19GL. %long with *orty other air e*ense
artillery o**icers, Feitemeyer was traine at Aort ,olabir *or uty as a +hoeni! coorinator in Vietnam. ,e was
appalle by the instruction he recei#e *rom #eteran +hoeni! a#isers. )oath to participate in what he consiere a
program that targete ci#ilians *or assassination, Feitemeyer approache %merican /i#il )iberties "nion lawyer
6illiam Minman in ?o#ember 19GL. =n behal* o* Feitemeyer, Minman *ile a petition *or conscientious obCector status
in ".0. District /ourt on Aebruary 1D, 19G9, while the rest o* Feitemeyer<s class was eparting *or Vietnam.
(n the petition Feitemeyer sai that he was tol that he woul super#ise an *un eighteen mercenaries -who woul be
e!plicitly irecte by him- to -*in, capture an/or 3ill- as many V/( as possible within a gi#en area. .he V/( were
e*ine as -any male or *emale o* any age in a position o* authority or in*luence in the #illage who were politically loyal
or simply in agreement with the V/ or their obCecti#es.- Feitemeyer was tol that he woul be re5uire to maintain a
-3ill 5uota- o* *i*ty boies per month an that *or him to locate V/(, -resort to the most e!treme *orms o* torture was
necessary.- %s an e!ample o* what was e!pecte o* him, Feitemeyer was tol o* one V/( suspect being 3ille by -sai
mercenaries an therea*ter ecapitate an ismembere so that the eyes, hea, ears an other parts o* the
eceent<s boy were isplaye on his *ront lawn as a warning an an inucement to other V/ sympathi4ers, to
isclose their ientity an turn themsel#es in to the %#isor an the mercenaries.-
Feitemeyer was tol that +hoeni! -sought to accomplish through capture, intimiation, elimination an assassination
what the ".0., up to this time, was unable to accomplish through the ... use o* military power.- .he Vietnamese were
characteri4e in racist terms, so that the cruelties perpetrate upon them might be more easily rationali4e.
Feitemeyer was tol that i* capture, he coul be trie *or war crimes uner -preceents establishe by the ?uremberg
.rials as well as ... the :ene#a /on#ention.-
=n the basis o* this account o* his +hoeni! instruction, Feitemeyer was grante conscientious obCector status on >uly
1D, 19G9. .he %rmy *ile an appeal but, *or public relations purposes, withrew it in =ctober, Cust as the 8arch %gainst
Death was getting uner way.
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.he press tene to characteri4e +hoeni! as an absurity. (n a Aebruary 1L, 19&0, article in .he ?ew Hor3 .imes,
>ames 0terba sai that -the program appears more notorious *or ine**iciency, corruption an bungling than *or terror ....
(* someone ecie to ma3e a mo#ie about +hoeni! ... the lea woul be more a :omer +yle than a >ohn 6ayne.-
+laying on the notion that the Vietnamese, too, were too corrupt an too stupi to be e#il, .om 9uc3ley wrote that the
+F" -were 5uic3er to ta3e the money, get run3, an go o** on their own e!tortion an robbery operations than they
were to sweep out into the angerous boonoc3s.- .here was no moti#e behin the maness. +hoeni! was a comey
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o* errors, opey isguises, an mista3en ientities. .here was nothing tragic in their epictions@ e#en the people
irecting the show were caricatures subCect to riicule. .wenty years later the *acts spea3 *or themsel#es.
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6hat is important to remember is that in orer to achie#e internal security in 0outh Vietnam, %merica<s war managers
ha to create an prolong an -emergency- which Custi*ie rule by secret ecree an the imposition o* a military
ictatorship. %n in orer to gain the support o* the %merican public in this #enture, it was necessary *or %merica<s
in*ormation managers to isguise the military ictatorship -- which supporte itsel* through corruption an political
repression -- as a bastion o* /hristian an emocratic #alues besiege by emonic /ommunists.
Table o !ontents
=pening +ages
(ntrouction
/hapter 1: (n*rastructure
/hapter 2: (nternal 0ecurity
/hapter N: /o#ert %ction
/hapter D: Fe#olutionary De#elopment
/hapter E: +(/s
/hapter G: Aiel +olice
/hapter &: 0pecial 9ranch
/hapter L: %ttac3 on the V/(
/hapter 9: (/;O
/hapter 10: %ction +rograms
/hapter 11: +F"
/hapter 12: .et
/hapter 1N: +aralla! Views
/hapter 1D: +hoeni! in Alight
/hapter 1E: 8ous Vi#eni
/hapter 1G: %#isers
/hapter 1&: %ccelerate +aci*ication
/hapter 1L .ransitions
/hapter 19: +syops
/hapter 20: Fe*orms
/hapter 21: Decay
/hapter 22: ,earings
/hapter 2N: Dissension
/hapter 2D: .ransgressions
/hapter 2E: Da ?ang
/hapter 2G: Fe#isions
/hapter 2&: )egalities
/hapter 2L: .echnicalities
/hapter 29: +hoeni! in Alames
;pilogue
%ppeni!
:lossary
?otes
OPENING PAGES
"No book to date conveys the hideousness of the Vietnam War as thorouhly as this one." !! Publishers Weekly
This book is dedicated to my darlin "ife# $lice. %&ecial thanks to my father for his editorial assistance' the
(itchbur $rts )ouncil for its financial aid' $dria *enderson# +ill Mc)oy# ,ack Madden# ,ohn -elly# and Nick
Proffitt for their comradeshi&' %andy -elson# .arry *ill# and $ny Mc-evitt for their enerosity' /ave )oeshall#
Ian (lemin# the (at $nel# and 0obert 1raves for ins&iration' .ucy Nhiem *on Nuyen# .ien ,ohnson# and
Pham Thi Noc )han for their efforts on my behalf' .arry Tunison for the niht on the to"n' and all those "ho
contributed to this book.
6
/oulas Valentine lives "ith his "ife $lice in "estern Massachusetts. *e is the author of The *otel Tacloban# a
"idely &raised account of life and death in a ,a&anese &risoner!of!"ar cam&.
INTROD"!TION
(t was well a*ter minight. ;lton 8an4ione, his wi*e, )ynn, an ( sat at their 3itchen table, rin3ing steaming cups
o* co**ee. Foc3 <n< roll music throbbe *rom the li#ing room. % lean, ar3 man with large 8eiterranean *eatures,
;lton was chain-smo3ing +all 8alls an telling me about his e!periences as a twenty-year-ol ".0. ?a#y 0;%)
in Vietnam in 19GD. (t was hot an humi that sultry :eorgia night, an we were e!hauste@ but ( presse him *or
more speci*ic in*ormation. -6hat was your most memorable e!perienceB- ( as3e.
;lton loo3e own an with consierable e**ort, sai 5uietly, -.here<s one e!perience ( remember #ery well. (t
was my last assignment. ( remember my last assignment #ery well.
-.hey,- ;lton began, re*erring to the ?a#y commaner an 0pecial Aorces colonel who issue orers to the
0;%) team, -calle the three o* us 1;lton, ;ie 0wet4, an >ohn )aboon2 into the brie*ing room an sat us
own. .hey sai they were ha#ing a problem at a tiny #illage about a 5uarter o* a mile *rom ?orth Vietnam in the
D8M. .hey sai some choppers an recon planes were ta3ing *ire *rom there. .hey ne#er really e!plaine why,
*or e!ample, they Cust in<t bomb it, which was their usual response, but ( got the iea that the #illage chie* was
politically connecte an that the thing ha to be one 5uietly.
#$e %or&e' in %hat %ere calle' hunter(&iller tea)s*# ;lton e!plaine. -.he hunter team was a *our-man
unit, usually all %mericans, sometimes one or two Vietnamese or /hinese mercenaries calle counterterrorists --
/.s *or short. Most !Ts %ere ene)+ sol'iers %ho ha' 'eserte' or South Vietna)ese cri)inals, =ur Cob
was to *in the enemy an nail him in place -- spot his position, then go bac3 to a prearrange place an call in
the 3iller team. The &iller tea) %as usuall+ t%el-e to t%ent+(i-e South Vietna)ese S.ecial /orces le' b+
Green 0erets, .hen we< Coin up with the 3iller team an ta3e out the enemy.-
9ut on this particular mission, ;lton e!plaine, the 0;%)s went in alone. -.hey sai there was this *i*ty-one-
caliber antiaircra*t gun somewhere near the #illage that was ta3ing potshots at us an that there was a speci*ic
person in the #illage operating the gun. .hey gi#e us a picture o* the guy an a map o* the #illage. (t<s a small
#illage, maybe twel#e or *i*teen hooches. <.his is the hooch,< they say. <.he guy sleeps on the mat on the le*t
sie. ,e has two aughters.< .hey on<t 3now i* he has a mama-san or where she is, but they say, <Hou guys are
going to go in an get this guy. Hou 1meaning me2 are going to snu** him.< 0wet4 is gonna *in out where the gun
is an blow it. )aboon is gonna hang bac3 at the #illage gate co#ering us. ,e<s the stoner@ he<s got the machine
gun. %n (<m gonna go into the hooch an snu** this guy
-<6hat you nee to o *irst,< they say, <is sit alongsie the trail 1leaing *rom the #illage to the gun2 *or a ay or
two an watch where this guy goes. %n that will help us unco#er the gun.< 6hich it i. 6e watche him go
right to where the gun was. 6e were thirty yars away, an we watche *or a while. 6hen we weren<t watching,
we< ta3e a brea3 an go another si! hunre yars own the trail to rela!. %n we i that *or maybe two ays
-- watche him coming an going -- an got an iea o* his routine: when he went to be@ when he got up@ where
he went. Di he go behin the hooch to pissB Di he go into the CungleB .hat sort o* thing.
-.hey tol us, <Do that. .hen come bac3 an tell us what you *oun out.< 0o we went bac3 an sai, <6e 3now
where the gun is,< an we showe them where it was on the map. 6e were bac3 in camp *or about si! hours,
7
an they sai, <=3ay, you<re going out at o-*our-hunre tomorrow. %n it<s li3e we say, you 1meaning me2 are
going to snu** the guy, 0wet4 is going to ta3e out the gun, an )aboon<s going to co#er the gate.<-
;lton e!plaine that on special missions li3e this the usual proceure was to -snatch- the targete V/ care an
bring him bac3 to Dong ,a *or interrogation. (n that case ;lton woul ha#e slippe into the hooch an renere
the care unconscious, while 0wet4 emolishe the antiaircra*t gun an )aboon signale the &iller tea) to
'escen' u.on the -illage in its blac& !IA(su..lie' helico.ters. .he 0;%)s an their prisoner woul then
climb on boar an be e!tracte.
(n this case, howe#er, the care was targete *or assassination.
-6e le*t out o* /am )o,- ;lton continue. -6e were ta3en by boat partway up the ri#er an wal3e in by *oot --
maybe two an a hal*, three miles. %t *our in the morning we start mo#ing across an area that was maybe a
hunre yars wie@ it<s a clearing running up to the #illage. 6e<re wearing blac3 paCamas, an we<#e got blac3
paint on our *aces. 6e<re oing this #ery care*ully, mo#ing on the groun a 5uarter o* an inch at a time -- mo#e,
stop, listen@ mo#e, stop, listen. .o chec3 *or trip wires, you ta3e a blae o* grass an put it between your teeth,
mo#e your hea up an own, *rom sie to sie, watching the en o* the blae o* grass. (* it bens, you 3now
you<#e hit something, but o* course, the grass ne#er sets o** the trip wire, so it<s sa*e.
-(t ta3es us an hour an a hal* to cross this relati#ely short stretch o* open grass because we<re mo#ing so
slowly. %n we<re being so 5uiet we can harly hear each other, let alone anyboy else hearing us. ( mean, (
3now they<re out there -- )aboon<s *i#e yars that way, 0wet4 is *i#e yars to my right -- but ( can<t hear them.
-%n so we crawl up to the gate. .here<s no booby traps. ( go in. 0wet4 has a satchel charge *or the *i*ty-one-
caliber gun an has split o** to where it is, maybe si!ty yars away. )aboon is sitting at the gate. .he #illage is
#ery 5uiet. .here are some ogs. .hey<re sleeping. .hey stir, but they on<t e#en growl. ( go into the hooch, an
( spot my person. 6ell, someboy stirs in the ne!t be. (<m carrying my commano 3ni*e, an one o* the things
we learne is how to 3ill someboy instantly with it. 0o I .ut )+ han' o-er her )outh an' co)e u. un'er the
secon' rib* go through the heart* gi-e it a lic&1 it sna.s the s.inal cor', ?ot thin3ingI 9ecause ( thin3 <,eyI<
.hen ( hear the e!plosion go o** an ( 3now the gun is out. 0omeboy else in the corner starts to stir, so I .ull
out the si'ear) an' .ut it against her hea' an' shoot her, 0he<s ea. =* course, by this time the whole
#illage is awa3e. ( go out, waiting *or 0wet4 to come, because the gun<s been blown. +eople are 3in o*
wanering aroun, an (<m pretty a4e. %n ( loo3 bac3 into the hooch, an there were two young girls. (<
3ille the wrong people.-
;lton 8an4ione an his comraes returne to their base at /am )o. 0trung out *rom De!erine an remorse,
Elton %ent into the a))o 'u). an' sat on to. o a stac& o a))unition crates %ith a grena'e* its .in
.ulle'* bet%een his legs an' an M(23 cra'le' in his ar)s, He sat there reusing to bu'ge until he %as
gi-en a tic&et ho)e,
777
(n early 19LD ;lton 8an4ione was the *irst person to answer a 5uery ( ha place in a Vietnam #eterans<
newsletter as3ing *or inter#iews with people who ha ser#e in the +hoeni! program. ;lton wrote to me, saying,
-6hile ( was not a participant in +hoeni!, ( was closely in#ol#e in what ( thin3 was the *orerunner. (t was part o*
what was 3nown as =+)%? ND. .his was the ol 4ea.ing 4ena iniltration .rogra) *or )FF+ 1long-range
reconnaissance patrol2 operations into )aos. During the time ( was in#ol#e it beca)e the %ell(&no%n Delta
.rogra), $hile all this ha..ene' beore Phoeni5* the o.erations %ere essentiall+ the sa)e, =ur primary
*unction was intelligence gathering, but we also carrie out the <unermining o* the in*rastructure< types o* things
such as 3inapping, assassination, sabotage, etc.
-.he story nees to be tol,- ;lton sai, -because the %hole aura o the Vietna) $ar %as inluence' b+
%hat %ent on in the 6hunter(&iller6 tea)s o Phoeni5* Delta* etc, That %as the .oint at %hich )an+ o us
reali7e' %e %ere no longer the goo' gu+s in the %hite hats 'een'ing ree'o) (( that %e %ere
assassins* .ure an' si).le, .hat isillusionment carrie o#er to all other aspects o* the war an was
e#entually responsible *or it becoming %merica<s most unpopular war.-
777
.he story o* +hoeni! is not easily tol. 8any o* the participants, ha#ing signe nonisclosure statements, are
legally prohibite *rom telling what they 3now. =thers are silence by their own consciences. 0till others are
pro*essional soliers whose careers woul su**er i* they were to re#eal the secrets o* their employers.
/alsiication o recor's )a&es the stor+ e-en har'er to .ro-e, /or e5a).le* there is no recor' o Elton
Man7ione6s e-er ha-ing been in Vietna), Het, *or reasons which are e!plaine in my *irst boo3, The *otel
8
Tacloban, ( was preispose to belie#e 8an4ione. I ha' conir)e' that )+ ather6s )ilitar+ recor's %ere
'eliberatel+ altere' to sho% that he ha' not been i).risone' or t%o +ears in a 8a.anese .risoner o %ar
ca). in $orl' $ar II, .he e**ects o* the co#er-up were e#astating an ultimately cause my *ather to ha#e a
heart attac3 at the age o* *orty-*i#e. .hus, long be*ore ( met ;lton 8an4ione, ( 3new the go#ernment was capable
o* concealing its misees uner a cloa3 o* secrecy, threats, an *rau. %n ( 3new how terrible the
conse5uences coul be.
.hen ( began to woner i* co#er-ups li3e the one concerning my *ather ha also occurre in the Vietnam 6ar,
an that le me in the *all o* 19LN to #isit Da#i ,oule, irector o* #eteran ser#ices in ?ew ,ampshire. ( as3e
Da#e ,oule i* there was a part o* the Vietnam 6ar that ha been conceale, an without hesitation he replie,
-+hoeni!.- %*ter e!plaining a little about it, he mentione that one o* his clients ha been in the program, then
ae that his client6s ser-ice recor's (( li&e those o Elton Man7ione6s an' )+ ather6s (( ha' been
altere', The+ sho%e' that he ha' been a coo& in Vietna),
( as3e to meet ,oule<s client, but the *ellow re*use. Aormerly with 0pecial Aorces in Vietnam, he was isable
an arai' the Veterans A')inistration %oul' cut o his beneits i he tal&e' to )e,
.hat *ear o* the go#ernment, so incongruous on the part o* a war #eteran, mae me more etermine than e#er
to unco#er the truth about +hoeni!, a goal which has ta3en *our years to accomplish. .hat<s a long time to spen
researching an writing a boo3. 9ut ( belie#e it was worthwhile, *or +hoeni! symboli4es an aspect o* the Vietnam
6ar that change *ore#er the way %mericans thin3 about themsel#es an their go#ernment.
De-elo.e' in 293: b+ the !entral Intelligence Agenc+ ;!IA<* Phoeni5 co)bine' e5isting
counterinsurgenc+ .rogra)s in a concerte' eort to #neutrali7e# the Vietcong inrastructure ;V!I<, .he
euphemism -neutrali4e- means to 3ill, capture, or ma3e to e*ect. .he wor -in*rastructure- re*ers to those
ci#ilians suspecte o* supporting ?orth Vietnamese an Vietcong soliers li3e the one targete in ;lton
8an4ione<s *inal operation. !entral to Phoeni5 is the act that it targete' ci-ilians* not sol'iers, As a result*
its 'etractors charge that Phoeni5 -iolate' that .art o the Gene-a !on-entions guaranteeing .rotection
to ci-ilians in ti)e o %ar, -9y analogy,- sai =gen Fei, a member o* a congressional committee
in#estigating +hoeni! in 19&1, -i* the "nion ha ha a +hoeni! program uring the /i#il 6ar, its targets woul
ha#e been ci#ilians li3e >e**erson Da#is or the mayor o* 8acon, :eorgia.-
"n'er Phoeni5* or Phung Hoang* as it %as calle' b+ the Vietna)ese* 'ue .rocess %as totall+
none5istent, 0outh Vietnamese ci#ilians whose names appeare on blac3lists coul be 3inappe, torture,
etaine *or two years without trial, or e#en murere, simply on the wor o* an anonymous in*ormer. At its
height Phoeni5 )anagers i).ose' =uotas o eighteen hun're' neutrali7ations .er )onth on the people
running the program in the *iel, opening up the program to abuses by corrupt security o**icers, policemen,
politicians, an rac3eteers, all o* whom e!torte innocent ci#ilians as well as V/(. 4egen'ar+ !IA oicer
4ucien !onein 'escribe' Phoeni5 as #A -er+ goo' blac&)ail sche)e or the central go-ern)ent, 6I +ou
'on6t 'o %hat I %ant* +ou6re V!,#6
9ecause +hoeni! -neutrali4ations- were o*ten conucte at minight while its #ictims were home, sleeping in
be, +hoeni! proponents escribe the program as a -scalpel- esigne to replace the -blugeon- o* search an
estroy operations, air stri3es, an artillery barrages that iniscriminately wipe out entire #illages an i little to
-win the hearts an mins- o* the Vietnamese population. Het, as ;lton 8an4ione<s story illustrates, the scalpel
cut eeper than the ".0. go#ernment amits. (nee, Phoeni5 %as* a)ong other things* an instru)ent o
counterterror (( the .s+chological %arare tactic in %hich V!I )e)bers %ere brutall+ )ur'ere' along
%ith their a)ilies or neighbors as a )eans o terrori7ing the neighboring .o.ulation into a state o
sub)ission, Such horren'ous acts %ere* or .ro.agan'a .ur.oses* oten )a'e to loo& as i the+ ha'
been co))itte' b+ the ene)+,
.his boo3 5uestions how %mericans, who consier themsel#es a nation rule by laws an an ethic o* *air play,
coul create a program li3e +hoeni!. 9y scrutini4ing the program an the people who participate in it an by
employing the program as a symbol o* the ar3 sie o* the human psyche, the author hopes to articulate the
subtle ways in which the Vietnam 6ar change how %mericans thin3 about themsel#es. This boo& is about
terror an' its role in .olitical %arare, (t will show how, as successi#e %merican go#ernments sin3 eeper an
eeper into the #orte! o* co#ert operations -- ostensibly to combat terrorism an /ommunist insurgencies -- the
%merican people graually lose touch with the emocratic ieals that once e*ine their national sel*-concept.
This boo& as&s %hat ha..ens %hen Phoeni5 co)es ho)e to roost,
9
%23T*4$%T $%I$
)20P% $N/ P02VIN)4% 2( %23T* VI4TN$M
!HAPTER 2: Inrastructure
6hat is the V/(B (s it a *armer in a *iel with a hoe in his han an a grenae in his poc3et, a erange
sub#ersi#e using women an chilren as a shielB =r is it a sel*-respecting patriot, a *reeom *ighter who was
ri#en unergroun by corrupt collaborators an an oppressi#e *oreign occupation armyB
(n his testimony regaring +hoeni! be*ore the 0enate Aoreign Felations /ommittee in Aebruary 19&0, *ormer
Director o* /entral (ntelligence 6illiam /olby e*ine the V/( as -about &E,000 nati#e 0outherners- whom in
19ED -the /ommunists too3 north *or training in organi4ing, propagana an sub#ersion.- %ccoring to /olby,
these cares returne to the 0outh, -re#i#e the networ3s they ha le*t in 19ED,- an o#er se#eral years *orme
10
the ?ational )iberation Aront $?)A', the Peo.le6s Re-olutionar+ .art+* liberation co))ittees* %hich %ere
#.reten'e' local go-ern)ents rather than si).l+ .olitical bo'ies*# an' the #.reten'e' Pro-isional
Re-olutionar+ Go-ern)ent o South Vietna), Together*# testiie' !olb+* #all o these organi7ations an'
their local )aniestations )a&e u. the V! Inrastructure,# >2?
% political war*are e!pert par e!cellence, /olby, o* course, ha no intentions o* portraying the V/( in sympathetic
terms. ,is abbre#iate history o* the V/(, with its *re5uent use o* the wor -pretene,- eliberately
o#ersimpli*ies an istorts the nature an origin o* the re#olutionary *orces lumpe uner the generic term -V/(.-
.o unerstan properly +hoeni! an its prey, a more etaile an obCecti#e account is re5uire. 0uch an
account cannot begin in 29@A (( %hen the So-iet "nion* !hina* an' the "nite' States s.lit Vietna) along
the si5teenth .arallel* an' the "nite' States irst inter-ene' in Vietna)ese aairs (( but )ust
ac&no%le'ge one hun're' +ears o /rench colonial o..ression, /or it %as colonialis) %hich begat the
V!I* its strateg+ o .rotracte' .olitical %arare* an' its guerrilla an' terror tactics,
The /rench con=uest o Vietna) began in the se-enteenth centur+ %ith the arri-al o 8esuit .riests bent
on sa-ing .agan souls, %s Vietnam historian 0tanley Karnow notes in his boo3 Vietnam5 $ *istory, -(n 1GGD ...
/rench religious lea'ers an' their business bac&ers *orme the 0ociety o* Arench 8issionaries to a#ance
/hristianity in %sia. (n the same year, by no coincience, /rench business lea'ers an' their religious
bac&ers create the ;ast (nia /ompany to increase trae .... =bser#ing this co4y relationship in Vietnam, an
;nglish competitor reporte home that the Arench ha arri#e, <but we cannot ma3e out whether they are here to
see3 trae or to conuct religious propagana.<-
-.heir obCecti#e, o* course,- Karnow 5uips, -was to o both.- 122
/or the ne5t t%o centuries /rench .riests e)broile' the)sel-es in Vietna)ese .olitics* e-entuall+
.ro-i'ing a .rete5t or )ilitar+ inter-ention, 0peci*ically, when a Arench priest was arreste *or plotting
against the emperor o* Vietnam in 1LDE, the Arench ?a#y shelle Da ?ang /ity, 3illing hunres o* people, e#en
though the priest ha escape unharme to 0ingapore. .he Vietnamese respone by con*iscating the property
o* Arench /atholics, rowning a *ew >esuits, an cutting in hal*, lengthwise, a number o* Vietnamese priests.
0oon the status 5uo was one o* open war*are. 9y 1LE9 Arench Aoreign )egionnaires ha arri#e en masse an
ha establishe *orti*ie positions near maCor cities, which they e*ene against poorly arme nationalists
staging hit-an-run attac3s *rom bases in rural areas. Airepower pre#aile, an in 2B32 a /rench a')iral
clai)e' Saigon or /rance, -in*licting hea#y casualties on the Vietnamese who resiste.- 1N2 Aearing that the
rampaging Arench might massacre the entire city, the emperor abicate ownership o* three pro#inces aCacent
to 0aigon, along with /on 0on (slan, where the Arench immeiately built a prison *or rebels. Soon thereater
Vietna)ese .orts %ere o.ene' to Euro.ean co))erce* !atholic .riests %ere .er)itte' to .reach
%here-er 0u''hist or Taoist or !onucian souls %ere lur&ing in the 'ar&ness* an' /rance %as
guarantee' #uncon'itional control o-er all o !ochinchina,# >A?
9y 1LG2 Arench colonialists were reaping su**icient economic bene*its to hire Ailipino an /hinese mercenary
armies to help suppress the burgeoning insurgency. Fesistance to Arench occupation was strongest in the north
near ,anoi, where nationalists were aligne with anti-6estern /hinese. .he rugge mountains o* the /entral
,ighlans *orme a natural bu**er *or the Arench, who were entrenche in /ochin /hina, the southern thir o*
Vietnam centere in 0aigon.
.he bounary lines ha#ing been rawn, the .aciication o Vietna) began in earnest in 2BBC, The /rench
strateg+ %as si).le an' began %ith a reign o terror: %s many nationalists as coul be *oun were roune
up an guillotine. ?e!t the imperial city o* ,ue was plunere in what Karnow calls -an orgy o* 3illing an
looting.- 1E2 .he Arench isbane the emperor<s /ouncil o* 8anarins an replace it with Arench a#isers an
a bureaucracy sta**e by suppletifs (( sel(ser-ing Vietna)ese* usuall+ !atholics* %ho collaborate' in
e5change or .o%er an' .osition, The suppletif creme de la creme stu'ie' in* an' beca)e citi7ens o*
/rance, The Vietna)ese Ar)+ %as co))an'e' b+ /rench oicers* an' Vietna)ese oicers %ere
suppletifs %ho ha' been gra'uate' ro) the /rench )ilitar+ aca'e)+, 0+ the t%entieth centur+ all o
Vietna)6s .ro-inces %ere a')inistere' b+ suppletifs* an' the e).eror* too* %as a lac&e+ o the /rench,
(n places where -security- *or collaborators was achie#e, Aoreign )egionnaires were shi*te to the outer
perimeter o* the paci*ie 4ones an internal security was turne o#er to collaborators commaning :%8=s --
group aministrati#e mobile organi4ations. The ho.e %as that .aciie' areas %oul' s.rea' li&e oil s.ots,
Suppletifs %ere also installe' in the .olice an' securit+ orces* %here the+ )anage' .rostitution rings*
o.iu) 'ens* an' ga)bling casinos on behal o the /rench. Arom the 1LL0<s onwar no legal protections
e!iste *or nationalists, *or whom a 'ungeon at !on Son Prison* torture* an' 'eath %ere the .enalties or
.ri'e, So* outgunne' an' outla%e' in their ho)elan'* the nationalists turne' to terroris) (( to the bullet
in the bell+ an' the bo)b in the cae, Aor while brutal Arench paci*ication campaigns pre#ente the rural
Vietnamese *rom tening their *iels, terrorism i not.
11
.he *irst nationalists -- the *ouning *athers o* the V/( -- appeare as early as 1LE9 in areas li3e the /a 8au
+eninsula, the +lain o* Fees, an the Fung 0at -- malaria-in*este swamps which were inaccessible to Arench
*orces. ,ere the nationalists hone an per*ecte the guerrilla tactics that became the traemar3 o* the Vietminh
an later the Vietcong. Fe*erre to as selecti#e terrorism, this meant the .lanne' assassination o lo%(
ran&ing go-ern)ent oicials %ho %or&e' closel+ %ith the .eo.le1 or e5a).le* .olice)en* )ail)en* an'
teachers, %s Da#i :alula e!plains in )ounter!Insurency Warfare5 Theory and Practice, -Killing high-ran3ing
counterinsurgency o**icials ser#es no purpose since they are too *ar remo#e *rom the population *or their
eaths to ser#e as e!amples.- 1G2
.he purpose o* selecti#e terror was psychologically to isolate the Arench an their su&&letifs, while
emonstrating to the rural population the ability o* the insurgents to stri3e at their oppressors until such time as a
general uprising was thought possible.
In the +ears ollo%ing $orl' $ar I* Vietna)ese nationalists organi7e' in one o three %a+s: through
religious sects* li&e the Hoa Hao or !ao Dai* %hich secretl+ ser-e' as ronts or anti(/rench acti-it+1
through o-ert .olitical .arties li&e the Dai Viets an' the Vietna) Duoc Dan Dang ;VNDDD<1 or b+
beco)ing !o))unists, %ll *orme secret cells in the areas where they operate, an all wor3e towar
ousting the Arench. (n return, the Arench intelligence ser#ice, the Deu!ieme 9ureau, hire secret agents an
in*ormers to ienti*y, capture, imprison, an murer core members o* the unergroun resistance.
(n instances o* open rebellion, stronger steps were ta3en. $hen VNDDD sailors )utinie' in 29CE in Fen 0ai
an' &ille' their /rench oicers* the /rench retaliate' b+ bo)bing scores o VNDDD -illages* &illing )ore
than thirt+ thousan' .eo.le, 8ass eportations *ollowe, an many V?JDD cares were ri#en into e!ile.
)i3ewise, when the Arench caught win o* a general uprising calle *or by the /ommunists, they arreste an
imprisone 90 percent o* its leaership. In'ee'* the V!I lea'ershi. %as )ol'e' in !on Son Prison* or Ho
!hi Minh "ni-ersit+* as it %as also &no%n. .here etermine nationalists trans*orme ar3 ungeons into
classrooms an common criminals into har-core cares. 6ith their li#es epening on their ability to etect
spies an agents pro#ocateurs whom the Arench ha plante in the prisons, these *ore*athers o* the V/(
became masters o* espionage an intrigue an *ormiable opponents o* the reae Deu!ieme 9ureau.
(n 19D1 the /ommunist son o* a manarin, ,o /hi 8inh, gathere the #arious nationalist groups uner the
banner o* the Vietminh an calle *or all goo re#olutionaries -to stan up an unite with the people, an throw
out the >apanese an the Arench.- 1&2 )eaing the charge were :eneral Vo ?guyen :iap an his Airst %rme
+ropagana Detachment -- thirty-*our lightly arme men an women who by early 19DE ha o#errun two Arench
outposts an were preaching the gospel accoring to ,o to anyone intereste in inepenence. 0+ )i'(29A@
the Viet)inh hel' si5 .ro-inces near Hanoi an' %as %or&ing %ith the orerunner o the !IA* the Oice o
Strategic Ser-ices ;OSS<* reco-ering 'o%ne' .ilots o the ",S, /ourteenth Air /orce, A stu'ent o
A)erican 'e)ocrac+* Ho 'eclare' Vietna) an in'e.en'ent countr+ in Se.te)ber 29A@,
Fegrettably, at the same time that =00 o**icers were meeting with ,o an e!ploring the notion o* supporting his
re#olution, other %mericans were bac3ing the Arench, an when a ".0. %rmy o**icer trae a pouch o* opium *or
,o<s ossier an unco#ere his lin3s to 8oscow, all chances o* coe!istence #anishe in a pu** o* smo3e. .he
9ig .hree powers in +otsam i#ie Vietnam along the si!teenth parallel. !hinese orces aligne' %ith
General !hiang Gai(she& an' the Guo)intang %ere gi-en control o the North, (n 0eptember 19DE a
i#ision o* /hinese *orces a#ise by :eneral +hillip :allagher arri#e in ,anoi, plunere the city, an
isarme the >apanese. .he Arench returne to ,anoi, ro#e out the Vietminh, an isplace /hiang<s *orces,
which obtaine 0hanghai in e!change.
8eanwhile, )or )ouis 8ountbatten $who use the phoeni! as an emblem *or his comman patch' an the
9ritish were put in charge in the 0outh. .wenty thousan :ur3has arri#e in 0aigon an proceee to isarm
the >apanese. .he 9ritish then outlawe ,o<s /ommittee o* the 0outh an arreste its members. (n protest the
Vietnamese hel a general stri3e. On Se.te)ber EC the 0rits* buc&ling un'er the %eight o the $hite Man6s
0ur'en* release' ro) .rison those /rench 4egionnaires %ho ha' collaborate' %ith the Na7is 'uring the
occu.ation an' ha' a')inistere' Vietna) Hointl+ %ith the 8a.anese, The 4egionnaires ra).age'
through Saigon* )ur'ering Vietna)ese %ith i).unit+ %hile the 0ritish &e.t sti u..er li.s, %s soon as
they ha regaine control o* the city, the Arench reorgani4e their 5uislings an secret police, onne surplus
".0. uni*orms, an became the nucleus o* three i#isions which ha recon5uere 0outh Vietnam by the en o*
the year. .he 9ritish e!ite, an the su&&letif 9ao Dai was reinstalle as emperor.
0+ 29A3 the Viet)inh %ere at %ar %ith /rance once again* an in mi-19DG the Arench were up to their ol
tric3s -- with a #engeance. .hey shelle ,aiphong, 3illing si! thousan Vietnamese. ,o slippe unergroun,
an A)erican oicials .assi-el+ obser-e' %hile the /rench con'ucte' #.uniti-e )issions ,,, against the
rebellious Anna)ese,# 1L2 During the early years o* the Airst (nochina 6ar, /(% o**icers ser#e pretty much in
that same limite capacity, urging the Arench to *orm counterguerrilla groups to go a*ter the Vietminh an, when
12
the Arench ignore them, slipping o** to buy contacts an agents in the military, police, go#ernment, an pri#ate
sectors.
.he outgunne Vietminh, meanwhile, e**ecte their strategy o* protracte war*are. 0ecret cells were organi4e,
an guerrilla units were *orme to monitor an harass Arench units, attac3 outposts, set booby traps, an
organi4e arme propagana teams. %ssassination o* collaborators was part o* their Cob. /ompany an battalion-
si4e units were also *orme to engage the Arench in main *orce battles.
9y 19DL the Arench coul neither protect their con#oys *rom ambushes nor locate Vietminh bases. Aear*ul
Arench citi4ens organi4e pri#ate paramilitary sel*-e*ense *orces an spy nets, an Arench o**icers organi4e,
with /(% a#ice, commano battalions $.ien-Doan Kinh Juan' speci*ically to hunt own Vietminh propagana
teams an cares. %t the urging o* the /(%, the Arench also *orme composite airborne commano groups,
which recruite an traine 8ontagnar hill tribes at the coastal resort city o* Vung .au. Feporting irectly to
Arench /entral (ntelligence in ,anoi an supplie by night airrops, Arench commanos were targete against
clanestine Vietminh combat an intelligence organi4ations. The G!MAs %ere or)e' concurrentl+ %ith the
",S, Ar)+6s /irst S.ecial /orces at /ort 0ragg* North !arolina,
0+ the earl+ 29@Is A)erican sol'iers %ere ighting alongsi'e the /rench* an' the C@I()e)ber ",S,
Militar+ Assistance an' A'-isor+ Grou. ;MAAG< %as in Saigon* 'is.ensing an' accounting or ",S,
largess, All in all* ro) 29@I through 29@A* the "nite' States ga-e o-er three billion 'ollars to the /rench
or their counterinsurgenc+ in Vietna)* inclu'ing our )illion a +ear as a retainer or E).eror 0ao Dai*
%ho s=uirrele' a%a+ the lion6s share in S%iss ban& accounts an' oreign real estate,
(n %pri1 19E2, %merican a#isers began training Vietnamese units. (n December 19EN, an %rmy attachP unit
arri#e in ,anoi, an its o**icers an enliste men began interrogating Vietminh prisoners. 6hile 8%%:
posture to ta3e o#er the Vietnamese %rmy *rom the Arench, the 0pecial .echnical an ;conomic 8ission
pro#ie /(% o**icers, uner station chie* ;mmett 8c/arthy, with the co#er they neee to mount political
operations an negotiate contracts with the go#ernment o* Vietnam $:V?'.
/inall+* in 8ul+ 29@A* ater the Viet)inh ha' 'eeate' the /rench at Dien 0ien Phu* a truce %as 'eclare'
at the Gene-a !onerence, Vietna) %as 'i-i'e' along the se-enteenth .arallel* .en'ing a nation%i'e
election to be hel' in 29@3* %ith the Viet)inh in control in the North an' 0ao Dai in control in the South,
The /rench %ere to %ith'ra% ro) the North an' the Viet)inh ro) the South* %here the "nite' States
%as set to 'is.lace the /rench an' install its o%n can'i'ate* Ngo Dinh Die)* a !atholic )an'arin ro)
Hue, .he /(% i this by organi4ing a cross section o* Vietnamese labor leaers an intellectuals into the /an
)ao ?ham Vi $+ersonalist )abor party'. Die) an' his brothers* Nhu* !an* an' Thuc ;the archbisho. o
Hue<* thereater controlle' tens o thousan's o !an 4ao ollo%ers through an interloc&ing )a7e o
clan'estine cells .resent in the )ilitar+* the .olice an' securit+ ser-ices* the go-ern)ent* an' .ri-ate
enter.rise,
(n Vietnamese *istory from 6787!679:, law pro*essor ?guyen ?goc ,uy, a Dai Viet politician who was e!ile by
Diem in 19ED, says about the Diem regime: -.hey persecute those who i not accept their orers without
iscussion, an tolerate or e#en encourage their *ollowers to ta3e bribes, because a corrupt ser#ant must be
loyal to them out o* *ear o* punishment .... .o obtain an interesting position, one ha to *ul*ill the three D
conitions: Dang 1the /an )ao party2@ Dao 1the /atholic religion2@ an Dia phuong 1the region -- /entral
Vietnam2. .hose who met these conitions an moreo#er ha ser#e Diem be*ore his #ictory o#er his enemies
in 19EE enCoye unbelie#able promotions.- 192
Onl+ through a .ersonalit+ cult li&e the !an 4ao coul' the !IA %or& its %ill in Vietna)* or Die) 'i' not
issue ro) or ha-e the su..ort o the 0u''hist )aHorit+, He %as* ho%e-er* a nationalist %hose anti(
/rench re.utation enable' the A)ericans to sell the)sel-es to the %orl' as a'-isers to a so-ereign
go-ern)ent* not as colonialists li&e the /rench, (n e!change, Diem arrange *or /an )ao businessmen an
their %merican associates to obtain lucrati#e go#ernment contracts an commercial interests once owne
e!clusi#ely by the Arench, with a percentage o* e#ery transaction going to the /an )ao. O..ose' to Die) %ere
the /rench an' their suppletifs in the Surete an' the Vietna)ese Maia* the 0inh Xu+en, Together %ith
the Hoa Hao an' !ao Dai religious sects* these grou.s or)e' the "nite' Sect /ront an' cons.ire'
against the "nite' States an' its can'i'ate* Die),
(nto this web o* intrigue, in >anuary 19ED, steppe ".0. %ir Aorce /olonel ;war )ansale. % con*iential agent
o* Director o* /entral (ntelligence %llen Dulles an his brother, 0ecretary o* 0tate >ohn Dulles, )ansale
e*eate the "nite 0ect Aront by either 3illing or buying o** its leaers. ,e then hurriely began to buil, *rom
the top own, a Vietnam in*use with %merican #alues an ollars, while the Vietcong -- as )ansale christene
the once heroic but now #ili*ie Vietminh -- built slowly *rom the groun up, on a *ounation they ha lai o#er
*orty years.
13
)an3y, lai-bac3 ; )ansale arri#e in 0aigon *resh *rom ha#ing manage a success*ul anti-/ommunist
counterinsurgency in the +hilippines, where his blac3 bag o* irty tric3s inclue counterterrorism an the
assassination o* go#ernment o**icials who oppose his lac3ey, Famon 8agsaysay. (n the +hilippines his tactics
earne him the nic3name o* the "gly %merican. ,e brought those tactics to 0aigon along with a team o*
eicate Ailipino anti-communists who, in the wors o* one #eteran /(% o**icer, -woul slit their granmother<s
throat *or a ollar eighty-*i#e.- 1102
In his autobiogra.h+* In the Midst of Wars* 4ans'ale gi-es an e5a).le o the counterterror tactics he
e).lo+e' in the Phili..ines, He tells ho% one .s+chological %arare o.eration #.la+e' u.on the .o.ular
'rea' o an asuang* or -a).ire* to sol-e a 'iicult .roble),# .he problem was that )ansale wante
go#ernment troops to mo#e out o* a #illage an hunt /ommunist guerrillas in the hills, but the local politicians
were a*rai that i* they i, the guerrillas woul -swoop own on the #illage an the bigwigs woul be #ictims.-
0o, writes )ansale:
A co)bat .s+%ar >.s+chological %arare? tea) %as brought in, It .lante' stories a)ong to%n
resi'ents o a -a).ire li-ing on the hill %here the Hu&s %ere base', .wo nights later, a*ter
gi#ing the stories time to circulate among ,u3 sympathi4ers in the town an ma3e their way up to
the hill camp, the psywar s5ua set up an ambush along a trail use by the ,u3s. $hen a Hu&
.atrol ca)e along the trail* the a)bushers silentl+ snatched the last )an o the .atrol* their
)o-e unseen in the 'ar& night, The+ .uncture' his nec& %ith t%o holes* -a).ire ashion*
hel' the bo'+ u. b+ the heels* 'raine' it o bloo'* an' .ut the cor.se bac& on the trail, 6hen
the ,u3s returne to loo3 *or the missing man an *oun their blooless comrae, e#ery member o*
the patrol belie#e that the #ampire ha got him an that one o* them woul be ne!t i* they remaine
on the hill. 6hen aylight came, the whole ,u3 s5uaron mo#e out o* the #icinity. 1112
)ansale e*ines the incient as -low humor- an #an a..ro.riate res.onse ,,, to the glu) an' 'ea'l+
.ractices o co))unists an' other authoritarians,# 1122 %n by oing so, *ormer a#ertising e!ecuti#e
)ansale -- the merry pran3ster whom author :raham :reene ubbe the Juiet %merican -- came to represent
the hypocrisy o* %merican policy in 0outh Vietnam. /or 4ans'ale use' Ma'ison A-enue language to
construct a s=uea&+(clean* 0o+ Scout i)age* behin' %hich he )as&e' his o%n .er-erse 'elight in
atrocit+,
(n 0aigon, )ansale manage se#eral programs which were esigne to ensure Diem<s internal security an
which later e#ol#e an were incorporate into +hoeni!. .he process began in >uly 19ED, when, .osing as an
assistant Air /orce attachJ to the ",S, E)bass+* 4ans'ale got the Hob o resettling nearl+ one )illion
!atholic reugees ro) North Vietna), As chie o the !IA6s Saigon Militar+ Mission* 4ans'ale use' the
e5o'us to )ount o.erations against North Vietna), .o this en he hire the Ailipino-sta**e Areeom
/ompany to train two paramilitary teams, which, .osing as reugee relie organi7ations su..lie' b+ the !IA(
o%ne' airline* !i-il Air Trans.ort* acti-ate' sta+(behin' nets* sabotage' .o%er .lants* an' s.rea' alse
ru)ors o a !o))unist bloo'bath, In this last regar'* a )issionar+ na)e' To) Doole+ concocte' luri'
tales o Viet)inh sol'iers6 'ise)bo%eling .regnant !atholic %o)en* castrating .riests* an' stic&ing
ba)boo sli-ers in the ears o chil'ren so the+ coul' not hear the $or' o Go', Doole+6s tall tales o
terror gal-ani7e' A)erican su..ort or Die) but %ere unco-ere' in 29:9 'uring a Vatican sainthoo'
in-estigation, 1/-12
Arom )ansale<s clanestine in*iltration an -blac3- propagana program e#ol#e the Vietnamese 0pecial
Aorces, the )uc )uong Duc 9iet $))D9'. .raine an organi4e by the /(%, the ))D9 reporte irectly to the
/(%-manage +resiential 0ur#ey =**ice. %s a palace guar, says Ke#in :enerous in Vietnam5 The %ecret War#
-they ... were always a#ailable *or special etails reame up by +resient Diem an his brother ?hu.- 11N2
.hose -special- etails sometimes in#ol#e -terrorism against political opponents.- 11D2
%nother )ansale program was aime at se#eral thousan Vietminh stay-behin agents organi4ing secret cells
an conucting propagana among the people. %s a way o* attac3ing these agents, 4ans'ale hire' the
/ree'o) !o).an+ to acti-ate O.eration 0rotherhoo', a parameical team patterne on the t+.ical S.ecial
/orces A tea). "ner /(% irection, O.eration 0rotherhoo' built 'is.ensaries that %ere use' as co-er
or co-ert counterterror o.erations. =peration 9rotherhoo spawne the ;astern /onstruction /ompany,
which pro#ie *i#e hunre har-core Ailipino anti-/ommunists who, %hile buil'ing roa's an' 'is.ensing
)e'icines* assiste' Die)6s securit+ orces b+ i'enti+ing an' eli)inating Viet)inh agents,
(n >anuary 19EE, using resettle /atholic re*ugees traine by the Areeom /ompany as care, )ansale began
his /i#ic %ction program, the centerpiece o* Diem<s ?ational 0ecurity program. =rgani4e an *une by the
/(% in conCunction with the De*ense 8inistry, but aministere through the 8inistry o* (nterior by the pro#ince
chie*s, /i#ic %ction aime to o *our things: to inuce enemy soliers to e*ect@ to organi4e rural people into sel*-
e*ense *orces to insulate their #illages *rom V/ in*luence@ to create political cares who woul sell the iea that
Diem -- not the Vietminh -- represente national aspirations@ an to pro#ie co#er *or counterterror. (n oing
14
these things, !i-il Action ca'res 'resse' in blac& .aHa)as an' %ent into -illages to 'ig latrines* .atch
roos* 'is.ense )e'icines* an' 'eli-er .ro.agan'a co).ose' b+ 4ans'ale. (n return the people were
e!pecte to in*orm on Vietminh guerrillas an #ote *or Diem in the 19EG reuni*ication elections stipulate by the
:ene#a %ccors. ,owe#er, the mile-class northern /atholics sent to the #illages i not spea3 the same
ialect as the people they were teaching an succeee only in alienating them. ?ot only i /i#ic %ction *ail to
win the hearts an mins o* the rural Vietnamese, but as a unilateral /(% operation it recei#e only lip ser#ice
*rom Die) an' his !an 4ao cronies* %ho* in 4ans'ale6s %or's* #%ere arai' that it %as so)e sche)e o
)ine to loo' the countr+ %ith secret agents,# >2@?
=n 8ay 10, 19EE, Diem *orme a new go#ernment an banishe the Arench $who 3ept eighty thousan troops
in the 0outh until 19EG' to outposts along the coast. Diem then appointe Ngu+en Ngoc 4e as his irst 'irector
general o the National Police, A longti)e !IA asset* 4e %or&e' %ith the /ree'o) !o).an+ to organi7e
the Vietna)ese Veterans 4egion, %s a way o* e!tening /an )ao party in*luence, Vietnamese #eteran legion
posts were establishe throughout Vietnam an, with a#ice an assistance *rom the ".0. (n*ormation 0er#ice,
too& o-er the 'istribution o all e5isting ne%s.a.ers an' )aga7ines. .he legion also sponsore the *irst
?ational /ongress, hel on 8ay 29, 19EE, at /ity ,all in 0aigon. =ne month later the !an 4ao intro'uce' its
.olitical ront* the National Re-olution Mo-e)ent,
On 8ul+ 23* 29@@* &no%ing the 0u''hist .o.ulation %oul' -ote o-er%hel)ingl+ or the Viet)inh* Die)
renounce' the reuniication elections re=uire' b+ the Gene-a Accor's, Instea'* he rigge' a hastil+
calle' national reeren'u), %nnounce on =ctober G an hel on =ctober 2N, the elections, says +ro*essor
,uy, -were an absolute *arce. /aniates chosen to be electe ha to sign a letter o* resignation in which the
ate was #acant. (n case a*ter the election the representati#e was consiere unesirable, ?hu ha only to put a
ate on the letter to ha#e him e!pelle *rom the ?ational %ssembly.- 11G2
;lecte presient by a #ast maCority, Diem in 19EG issue Or'inance @:(A, Mar&ete' b+ 4ans'ale as agrarian
reor)* it re.lace' the centuries(ol' custo) o -illage sel(go-ern)ent %ith councils a..ointe' b+
'istrict an' .ro-ince chies, Diem, o* course, appointe the istrict chie*s, who appointe the #illage councils,
which then employe local security *orces to collect e!orbitant rents *or absentee lanlors li#ing the high li*e in
0aigon. "ni#ersal ispleasure was the response to =rinance E&-%, the cancellation o* the reuni*ication
elections, an the rigge election o* 19EE. Depri#e o* its chance to win legal representation, the Vietcong
launche a campaign o* its own, emphasi4ing social an economic awareness. .error was not one o* their
tactics. 0ays Ran' !or.oration anal+st 8, 8, Kaslo in "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam 1954-
19!": #There is no e-i'ence in our inter-ie%s that -iolence an' sabotage %ere .art o their
assign)ent,# Father, communist cares were tol -to return to their home pro#inces an were instructe, it
appears, to limit their acti#ities to organi4ational an propagana tas3s.- 11&2
,owe#er, on the basis o !IA re.orts sa+ing other%ise* Die) initiate' the notorious Denunciation o the
!o))unists ca).aign in 29@3. .he campaign was manage by security committees, which were chaire by
/(%-a#ise security o**icers who ha authority to arrest, con*iscate lan *rom, an summarily e!ecute
/ommunists. In 'eter)ining %ho %as a !o))unist* the securit+ co))ittees use' a three(.art
classiication s+ste): A or 'angerous .art+ )e)bers* 0 or less 'angerous .art+ )e)bers* an' ! or
lo+al citi7ens, As ha..ene' later in Phoeni5* securit+ chies use' the threat o an A or 0 classiication to
e5tort ro) innocent ci-ilians* %hile categor+ A an' 0 oen'ers (( e' b+ their a)ilies (( %ere .ut to
%or& %ithout .a+ buil'ing houses an' oices or go-ern)ent oicials,
.he military, too, ha broa powers to arrest an Cail suspects while on sweeps in rural areas. Non(
!o))unists %ho coul' not aor' to .a+ #ta5es# %ere Haile' until their a)ilies ca)e u. %ith the cash,
/ommunists *are worse. Vietminh *lags were burne in public ceremonies, an portable guillotines were
ragge *rom #illage to #illage an use on acti#e an inacti#e Vietminh ali3e. In 29@3 in the !entral
Highlan's ourteen thousan' .eo.le %ere arreste' %ithout e-i'ence or trial (( .eo.le %ere Haile' si).l+
or ha-ing -isite' a rebel 'istrict (( an' b+ +ear6s en' there %ere an esti)ate' t%ent+ thousan' .olitical
.risoners nation%i'e, >2B?
(n see3ing to ensure his internal security through the enunciation campaign, Diem persecute the Vietminh an
alienate much o* the rural population in the process. 9ut -the most tragic error,- remar3s +ro*essor ,uy, -was
the li5uiation o* the /ao Dai, ,oa ,ao an 9inh Ouyen *orces. 9y estroying them, Diem wea3ene the
e*ense o* 0outh Vietnam against communism. (n *act, the remnants ... were oblige to Coin the Vietnamese
0talinists who were alreay rein*orce by Diem<s anti-communist struggle campaign.
-Diem<s *amily ealt with this problem,- ,uy goes on, -by a repressi#e policy applie through its secret ser-ice,
This organ bore the -er+ innocent na)e o the Political an' Social Research Ser-ice, (t was le by Dr.
.ran Kim .uyen, a e#ote /atholic, honest an e**icient, who at the beginning sought only to establish a
networ3 o* intelligence agents to be use against the communists. (t ha in *act obtaine some results in this
*iel. 9ut soon it became a repressi#e tool to li5uiate any opponent.- 1192
15
9y then ; )ansale ha ser#e his purpose an was being unceremoniously rotate out o* Vietnam, lea#ing
behin the harrie /i#ic %ction program to his protege, Fu*us +hillips. 8eanwhile, -=ther %mericans were
wor3ing closely with the Vietnamese,- )ansale writes, noting: -0ome o* the relationships le to a e#elopment
which ( belie#e coul bring only e#entual isaster to 0outh Vietnam.-
-.his e#elopment was political,- )ansale obser#es. -8y *irst in3ling came when se#eral *amilies appeare at
my house one morning to tell me about the arrest at minight o* their men-*ol3, all o* whom were political *igures.
.he arrests ha a strange aspect to them, ha#ing come when the city was asleep an being mae by hea#ily
arme men who were ienti*ie as <special police.<- 1202
0ensing the stupiity o* such a program, )ansale appeale to %mbassaor :eorge Feinhart, suggesting that
-%mericans uner his irection who were in regular liaison with ?hu, an who were a#ising the special branch
o* the police, woul ha#e to wor3 harer at in*luencing the Vietnamese towar a more open an *ree political
concept.- 9ut, )ansale was tol, -a ".0. policy ecision ha been mae. 6e %mericans were to gi#e what
assistance we coul to the builing o* a strong nationalistic party that woul support Diem. 0ince Diem was now
the electe presient, he neee to ha#e his own party.- 1212
-0hoc3e- that he ha been e!clue *rom such a critical policy ecision, )ansale, to his creit, trie to
persuae Diem to isban the /an )ao. 6hen that *aile, he too3 his case to the Dulles brothers since they
-ha ecisi#e #oices in etermining the ".0. relationship with 0outh Vietnam.- 9ut sel*-escribe -#isionary an
iealist- )ansale<s #iews were ismisse o**-hanely by the pragmatic Dulleses in *a#or -o* the one their
political e!perts in 0aigon ha recommene.- )ansale was tol he shoul -isengage mysel* *rom any
guiance to political parties in Vietnam.- 1222
.he mas3 o* emocracy woul be maintaine. 9ut the ieal was iscare in e!change *or internal security.
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
4ibrarian6s !o))ent:
1/-12 >uly N0, 19&9 Vol. 12 ?o. E 1L Hears %*ter Dr. .om Dooley<s Death, a +riest (nsists ,e 6as a 0aint, ?ot a
/(% 0poo3, 9y Fosemary Fawson
.om Dooley was a real tas3master, an he ha an (rish temper, there<s no oubt about that,- says the Fe#.
8aynar Kegler. -9ut the ocuments in no way imply that he was an agent o* the /(%.- .he papers in 5uestion
are recently isclose agency recors that ienti*y Dr. Dooley as a sometime /(% in*ormant $but not as an actual
spy'. .hey ha#e spar3e a new *lurry o* interest in the contro#ersial meical missionaryRonce 3nown as -Dr.
%merica-Rwhose wor3 in )aos capture the hearts an mins o* his countrymen in the innocent 'a+s beore
the %ar in Vietna). "ltimately, suspicions about the octor coul torpeo a cause Aather Kegler has promote
*or *i#e yearsRthe ele#ation o* Dooley, who ie in 19G1, to sainthoo in the Foman /atholic /hurch.
Aather Kegler, ED, acte as ".0.-base liaison between his religious orer, the =blates o* 8ary (mmaculate, an
Dooley *rom 19EL to 19G1. -( spent time with him in this country, not in )aos,- says Kegler, -an got to 3now him
well.- %*ter Dooley<s eath *rom cancer, Kegler, now irector o* a 9u**alo, 8inn. retreat house, began the
research that woul enable him to argue the case *or Dooley<s beati*ication. (t is the *irst step in the comple!
process o* attaining sainthoo.
Kegler claims he was not surprise when his in#estigation le him to the /(%. .here he *oun E00 unclassi*ie
ocuments showing that Dooley occasionally helpe the agency an that it 3ept a close watch on him. #He ga-e
the) inor)ation out o .atriotis)* lo-e o countr+ an' all that the "nite' States stoo' or in 29@B*#
Gegler insists, #He %as %illing to 'o that in return or ha-ing a little )ore ree'o) to 'o his %or& an' a
little less harass)ent, 0ut he 'i'n6t initiate contact %ith the !IA* an' he too& no )one+ or his %or&,#
?onetheless, Dooley<s reputation has ta3en a beating in recent years *rom critics on both the le*t an the right. (n
the <G0s antiwar acti#ists came to regar his bran o* sel*-righteous anti-/ommunism as one o* the causes o*
".0. inter#ention in Vietnam. =thers ha#e ismisse him as an aggressi#e sel*-publicist who practice
ine**ecti#e -hit-an-run- meicine. A un' set u. to continue Doole+6s %or& ater his 'eath %ent ban&ru.t*
an' the )an %ho succee'e' hi) in 4aos 'ie' b+ his o%n han',
Aather Kegler, howe#er, belie#es Dooley has been maligne. -%ll o* the people ( ha#e inter#iewe who 3new
.om personally ha#e been #ery positi#e,- he reports. -.he negati#e response was all *rom people who ne#er
3new him an ne#er wor3e with him.- %s e#ience o* Dooley<s sanctity, the priest cites his ecision, while a
?a#y surgeon, to e#ote his li*e to (nochina. -6hen he saw the plight o* those hunres o* thousans o*
people,- Kegler reports, -he sai, <8y :o, ( can<t go home an lea#e them.< "p until that time ( belie#e .om
16
Dooley was Cust an orinary /hristianRmaybe not e#en that.- .he priest is e5ually impresse with Dooley<s
courage in *ighting his cancer. #The e5a).le he ga-e %hile acing suering* acing 'eath* %as a great
ser-ice to the A)erican .eo.le*# sa+s his s.onsor, #!ancer is the greatest ear in the countr+ to'a+,#
Kegler<s 5uest to establish Dooley<s sainthooRtechnically, church certi*ication that a ea person is now in
hea#enRis *ar *rom o#er. ,e may possibly ha#e to pro#e that Dooley is responsible *or two certi*iable miracles,
then must submit his entire case to Vatican-appointe -e#il<s a#ocates- who will attempt to pic3 it apart. Kegler
remains con*ient. -6hen we interpret .om Dooley<s actions in )aos, we ha#e to o it in the conte!t o* what he
3new o* the /(% at the time,- he conclues. -(n no way will this connection hurt his cause *or sainthooRin *act, (
thin3 it<s going to help it.-
!HAPTER E: Internal Securit+
(n 19ED, in the pro*esse belie* that it ought to e!ten the -%merican way- abroa, 8ichigan 0tate "ni#ersity
$80"' o**ere to pro#ie the go#ernment o* Vietnam with a huge technical assistance program in *our areas:
public in*ormation, public aministration, *inance an economics, an police an security ser#ices. .he contract
was appro#e in early 19EE, shortly a*ter the ?ational 0ecurity /ouncil $?0/' ha enorse Diem, an o#er the
ne!t se#en years MS"6s Police A')inistration Di-ision s.ent iteen )illion 'ollars o ",S, ta5.a+ers6
)one+ buil'ing u. the GVN6s internal securit+ .rogra)s, (n e!change *or the lucrati#e contract, the
8ichigan 0tate "ni#ersity :roup $80":' became the #ehicle through which the /(% secretly manage the
0outh Vietnamese -special police.-
80":<s +olice %ministration Di#ision contribute to Diem<s internal security primarily by reorgani4ing his police
an security *orces. Airst, 9inh Ouyen gangsters in the 0aigon police were replace with -goo cops- *rom the
0urete. ?e!t, recruits *rom the 0urete were inucte into the 0ecret 0er#ice, /i#il :uar, an 8ilitary 0ecurity
0er#ice $800', which was *orme by ; )ansale in 19ED as -military coup insurance.- =n aministrati#e
matters the 800 reporte to the Directorate o* +olitical 6ar*are in liaison with the /(%, while its operations sta**
reporte to the Fepublic o* Vietnam %rme Aorces $FV?%A'<s >oint :eneral 0ta** in liaison with 8%%:
counterintelligence o**icers. %ll general irectors o* police an security ser#ices were military o**icers.
.he 0urete $plainclothesmen hanling in#estigations, customs, immigration, an re#enue' was rename the
Vietnamese 9ureau o* (n#estigations $V9(' an combine with the municipal police $uni*orme police in twenty-
two autonomous cities an 0aigon' into a :eneral Directorate o* +olice an 0ecurity 0er#ices within the 8inistry
o* the (nterior. .his early attempt at bureaucratic streamlining was unermine by Diem, howe#er, who 3ept the
#arious police an security agencies spying on one another. Diem was especially wary o* the V9(, which as the
0urete ha *aith*ully ser#e the Arench an which, a*ter 19ED, uner /(% management, was beyon his control.
%s a result, Diem Cuge the V9( by the e!tent to which it attac3e his omestic *oes, spie on the 8ilitary
0ecurity 0er#ice, an 3ept pro#ince chie*s in line.
9ecause it manage the central recors epository, the V9( was the most power*ul security *orce an recei#e
the lion<s share o* %merican -technical- ai. 6hile other ser#ices got rusty weapons, the V9( got riot guns,
bulletproo* #ests, gas mas3s, lie etectors, a high-comman school, a moern crime lab an moern
interrogation centers@ an the )ost .ro)ising V0I oicers %ere traine' b+ the !IA an' /0I at the
International Police Aca'e)+ at Georgeto%n "ni-ersit+ in agent hanling, criminal in#estigations,
interrogation, an counterinsurgency. The V0I ;the !ong An to Vietna)ese< is one o the t%o oun'ation
stones o Phoeni5,
6hereas the maCority o* 8ichigan 0tate<s police a#isers were *ormer state troopers or big-city etecti#es, the
)en %ho a'-ise' the V0I an' traine' Die)6s Secret Ser-ice %ere !IA oicers %or&ing un'er co-er as
.roessors in the Michigan State "ni-ersit+ Grou., ;ach morning myopic 80": employees watche *rom
their 5uarters across the street as senior V9( a#iser Faymon 9abineau an his team went to wor3 at the
?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter, which, :raham :reene writes in The ;uiet $merican, -seeme to smell o*
urine an inCustice.- 112 )ater in the ay the 80": contingent watche while truc3loas o* political prisoners --
mostly ol men, women, an chilren arreste the night be*ore -- were hancu**e an carte o** to /on 0on
+rison. %merica<s *irst colonialists in 0aigon loo3e, then loo3e away. Aor *our years they are not enounce
the mass arrests or the *act that roo) P(AI in the Saigon Koo %as use' as a )orgue an' torture cha)ber,
?o one wante to incriminate himsel* or get on the wrong sie o* 9abineau an his proteges in the -special
police.-
.he *ear was palpable. (n his boo3 War )omes to .on $n, >e**rey Face 5uotes a pro#ince chie*: -( harly e#er
are to loo3 aroun in the o**ice with all the /an )ao people there watching me, an in those ays it was Cust
impossible to resign -- many others ha trie -- they were Cust le o** in the mile o* the night by Diem<s men
resse as V/, ta3en to +-D0 or +oulo /onore 1/on 0on +rison2 an ne#er hear *rom again.- 122
17
6hile the V9( e!iste primarily to suppress Diem<s omestic opponents, it also ser#e the /(% by proucing an
annual +an Tran .iet Viet )on $Vietcong orer o* battle'. /ompile *or the most part *rom notes ta3en by secret
agents in*iltrate into V/ meetings, then assemble by han at the central recors epository, the +an Tran .iet
was the /(%<s biography o* the V/( an the basis o* its anti-in*rastructure operations until 19GD.
(n 19E9 Diem hel another sham election. 0ai one Vietnamese o**icial 5uote by Face: #The 29@9 election
%as -er+ 'ishonest, Inor)ation an' !i-ic Action !a're %ent aroun' at noon %hen e-er+one %as ho)e
na..ing an' stue' ballot bo5es, I the results 'i'n6t co)e out right the+ %ere a'Huste' at 'istrict
hea'=uarters,# 6hen as3e i* anyone complaine, the o**icial replie, -;#eryone was terri*ie o* the
go#ernment .....he /ong %n beat people an use <the water treatment.< 9ut there was nothing anyone coul
o. ;#eryone was terri*ie.- 0ai another o**icial: -During the Diem perio the people here saw the go#ernment
was no goo at all. .hat is why L0S o* them *ollowe the V/. ( was the #illage chie* then, but ( ha to o what
the go#ernment tol me. (* not, the secret police 1V9(2 woul ha#e me pic3e up an torture me to eath. .hus (
was the #ery one who rigge the elections here.- 1N2
As is a..arent* Die)6s securit+ orces terrori7e' the Vietna)ese .eo.le )ore than the V!I, In act* as
Kaslo note' earlier* .rior to 29@9 the V!I carrie' out an oicial .olic+ o non-iolence, -9y aopting an
almost entirely e*ensi#e role uring this perio,- Face e!plains, -an by allowing the go#ernment to be the *irst
to employ #iolence, the +arty -- at great cost -- allowe the go#ernment to pursue the con*lict in increasingly
#iolent terms, through its relentless reprisal against any opposition, its use o* torture, an, particularly a*ter 8ay
19E9, through the psychological impact in the rural areas o* the proclamation o* )aw 10/E9.- 1D2
(n Phoenix<Phun *oan5 $ %tudy of Wartime Intellience Manaement, /(% o**icer Falph >ohnson calls the
10/E9 )aw -the :V?<s most serious mista3e.- "ner its pro#isions, anyone con#icte o* -acts o* sabotage- or
-in*ringements on the national security- coul be sentence to eath or li*e imprisonment with no appeal. 8a3ing
matters worse, >ohnson writes, was the *act that <.he primary :V? targets were *ormer Viet 8inh guerrillas --
many o* whom were nationalists, not /ommunists -- regarless o* whether or not they were 3nown to ha#e been
participating in sub#ersi#e acti#ities.-< The 2IL@9 4a% resulte' in the Hailing o it+ thousan' .olitical
.risoners b+ +ear6s en', 9ut rather than suppress the insurgency, Vietnamese *rom all wal3s o* li*e Coine the
cause. Vietminh cares mo#e into the #illages *rom seclue base camps in the /entral ,ighlans, the Fung
0at, the /a 8au swamps, an the +lain o* Fees. %n a*ter *our years o* Diem style emocracy, the rural
population welcome them with open arms.
.he non#iolence policy practice by Vietcong change abruptly in 19E9, when in response to the 10/E9 )aw an
/(% intrusions into ?orth Vietnam, the )ao Dong /entral /ommittee organi4e the EE9th .ransportation an
0upport :roup. Known as Doan EE9, this combat-engineer corps car#e out the ,o /hi 8inh .rail through the
rugge mountains an *e#er-rien Cungles o* 0outh Vietnam, )aos, an /amboia. Doan EE9 pa#e the way
*or those Vietminh #eterans who ha gone ?orth in 19ED an returne in 19E9 to organi4e sel*-e*ense groups
an political cells in /ommunist-controlle #illages. 9y the en o* 19E9 Doan EE9 ha in*iltrate *orty-*i#e
hunre regroupees bac3 into 0outh Vietnam.
Sent to sto. Doan @@9 ro) iniltrating troo.s into South Vietna) %ere ",S, Ar)+ S.ecial /orces
co))an'os traine' in #behin'(the(lines# anti(guerrilla an' intelligence(gathering o.erations, 6or3ing in
twel#e-member % teams uner co#er o* /i#ic %ction, the :reen 9erets organi4e paramilitary units in remote
rural regions an 06%. team-type security *orces in cities. (n return, they were allowe to occupy strategic
locations an in*luence political e#ents in their host countries.
De#elope as a way o* *ighting cost e**ecti#e counterinsurgencies, the rough-an-tumble Green 0erets %ere an
a'Hunct o the !IA (( %hich )a'e the) a threat to the ",S, Ar)+, 9ut 0pecial Aorces troopers on temporary
uty $.DH' coul go places where the :ene#a %ccors restricte the number o* regular soliers. Aor e!ample,
in )aos, the -0nea3y +etes- wore ci#ilian clothes an wor3e in groups o* two or three, turning +athet )ao
eserters into ouble agents who returne to their *ormer units with electronic trac3ing e#ices, enabling the /(%
to launch air attac3s against them. =ther ouble agents returne to their units to lea them into ambushes. %s
; )ansale e!plains, once insie enemy ran3s, -they coul not only collect in*ormation *or passing secretly to
the go#ernment but also coul wor3 to inuce the ran3 an *ile to surrener.- Volunteers *or such -ris3y
business,- )ansale as, were traine singly or in groups as large as companies that were -able to get close
enough in their isguise *or surprise combat, o*ten han to han.- 1G2
9y the late 19E0s, increasing numbers o* %merican 0pecial Aorces were in 0outh Vietnam, practicing the
terri*ying blac3 art o* psychological war*are.
777
%rri#ing in 0aigon in the spring o* 19E9 as the /(%<s eputy chie* o* station was $illia) !olb+, An OSS
-eteran* Princeton gra'uate* liberal la%+er* an' 'e-out !atholic, /olby manage the station<s paramilitary
18
operations against ?orth Vietnam an the Vietcong. ,e also manage its political operations an o#ersaw eep-
co#er case o**icers li3e %ir %merica e!ecuti#e /lye 9auer, who brought to 0outh Vietnam its Aoreign Felations
/ouncil, /hamber o* /ommerce, an )ions< /lub, in 9auer<s wors, -to create a strong ci#il base.- 1&2 !IA
oicers un'er !olb+6s 'irection unnele' )one+ to all .olitical .arties* inclu'ing the 4ao Dong* as a %a+
o establishing long(range .enetration agents %ho coul' )onitor an' )ani.ulate .olitical
'e-elo.)ents,
"ner /olby<s irection, the /(% increase its a#ice an assistance to the :V?<s security *orces, at the same
time that 80": cease being a /(% co#er. MS"G a'-isers ranging across South Vietna)* con'ucting
stu'ies an' re.orting on -illage lie* ha' oun' the)sel-es stu)bling o-er secret .olice)en .osing as
-illage chies an' !IA oicers )as=uera'ing as anthro.ologists, %n e#en though these ploys helpe
security *orces catch those in the V/(, they also put the 80": a#isers s5uarely between Vietcong cross hairs.
0o it was that while Faymon 9abineau was on #acation, assistant 80": proCect chie* Fobert 0cigliano boote
the V9( a#isory unit out *rom uner 80": co#er. The State De.art)ent =uic&l+ absorbe' the !IA oicers
an' .lace' the) un'er the Agenc+ or International De-elo.)ent6s Public Saet+ Di-ision ;AIDLPSD<*
itsel create' b+ !IA o**icer 9yron ;ngel in 19ED to pro#ie -technical assistance- an training to police an
security o**icials in *i*ty-two countries. (n 0aigon in 19E9, %(D/+0D was manage by a *ormer )os %ngeles
policeman, Aran3 6alton, an its *iel o**ices were irecte by the /(%-manage /ombine 0tuies :roup,
which *une cares an hire a#isers *or the V9(, /i#il :uar, an 8unicipal police. Through AIDLPSD*
technical assistance to .olice an' securit+ ser-ices increase' e5.onentiall+, (ntrouce were a
telecommunications center@ a national police training center at Vung .au@ a rehabilitation system *or e*ecting
/ommunists which le to their #oluntary ser#ice in /(% security programs@ an an A9(-sponsore national
ienti*ication registration program, which issue (D cars to all Vietnamese citi4ens o#er age *ourteen as a
means o* ienti*ying /ommunists, eserters, an *ugiti#es.
0e#eral other maCor changes occurre at this Cuncture. =n the assumption that someay the /ommunists woul
be e*eate, 80": in 19E& ha reuce the /i#il :uar in strength an con#erte it into a national police
constabulary, which ser#e primarily as a security *orce *or 'istrict an' .ro-ince chies ;all o %ho) %ere
)ilitar+ oicers ater 29@9< an also guare briges, maCor roas, an power stations. /(% a#isers assigne
to the constabulary e#elope clanestine cells within its better units. =perating out o* police barrac3s at night in
ci#ilian clothes, these ragtag Fe 05uas were targete against the V/(, using intelligence pro#ie by the V9(.
,owe#er, in December 19G0 the ".0. 8ilitary %ssistance %#isory :roup sei4e control o* the constabulary an
began organi4ing it into company, battalion, an regimental units arme with automatic ri*les an machine guns.
.he constabulary was rename the Fegional Aorces an place uner the 8inistry o* De*ense. .he remaining
eighteen thousan rural policemen therea*ter ser#e to en*orce cur*ews an maintain law an orer in
agro-illes (( garrison co))unities consisting o orceull+ relocate' .ersons, e#elope by 80": in
19E9 in response to ; )ansale<s *aile /i#ic %ction program.
6ith the emise o* /i#ic %ction teams, paci*ication e**orts were by e*ault umpe on the Vietnamese %rmy,
whose hea#y-hane tactics *urther alienate the rural Vietnamese an enable the Vietcong to in*iltrate the
0el*-De*ense /orps an eroe the program *rom within. (n an attempt to stop the bleeing, /i#ic %ction cares
were reirecte towar organi4ing -community e#elopment- programs, in which class % an 9 /ommunist
o**eners were *orce to buil agro#illes, as well as roas leaing to an *rom them. 6hen construction ha
been complete, 0outh Vietnamese army units le#ele the surrouning #illages, -resettle- the inhabitants in
agro#illes, an manne outposts along the roas as a means o* *acilitating the mo#ement o* security *orces in
search o* /ommunist o**eners.
.he iea behin agro#illes was to control the rural population by physically mo#ing the sea o* sympathetic
people away *rom the guerrilla *ish. 9y ma3ing relocate persons buil agro-illes (( tent cities .rotecte' b+
)oats* )u' %alls* an' ba)boo sta&es -- internal security, it was imagine, coul be establishe, laws
en*orce, an potential re#olutionaries tacitly in#ol#e in the *ight against the guerrillas an thus psychologically
prone to act as in*ormers to V9( case o**icers. .heir in*ormation woul then lea to the elimination o* the
insurgent political cells through their imprisonment, assassination, or e*ection. Agro-illes %ere 'een'e' b+
Regional /orces an' the Po.ular /orce (( 'eri-e' ro) Sel(Deense !or.s (( traine' an' a'-ise' b+ ",S,
Ar)+* AIDLPSD* an' !IA .ersonnel,
.he seconary nation-builing goal o* the agro#ille program was physically to construct a social an economic
in*rastructure connecte to the :V?. (n reality, though, by uprooting the people *rom their ancestral homes, the
program generate legions o* Vietcong sympathi4ers. 8oreo#er, the massi#e in*usion o* %merican ai amounte
to a boonoggle *or the corrupt go#ernment o**icials aministering the program. +ile on top o* a lan re*orm
program that stole *rom the poor an ga#e to the rich an o* the 10/E9 )aw, agro#illes replace /i#ic %ction as
the main target o* the burgeoning insurgency an its ?orth Vietnamese sponsors.
19
(n response, when he became chie* o* the /(%<s 0aigon station in 19G0, 6illiam /olby accelerate the pace o*
/(% operations into ?orth Vietnam. ,e an :ilbert )awton $a /(% o**icer isguise as a 0pecial Aorces colonel'
also launche the /i#ilian (rregular De*ense :roup $/(D:' program as a means o* pre#enting ?orth Vietnamese
%rmy $?V%' an ro#ing Vietcong guerrilla units *rom mo#ing through, rawing sustenance *rom, or maintaining
agents in :V?-monitore #illages. ;!trapolate *rom the Arench commano program begun in 19E1, the /(D:
program use Vietnamese 0pecial Aorces to organi4e -*a#orable minorities- into static 0el*-De*ense /orps
through /i#ic %ction, which were arme, traine, an targete by the /(% against /ommunist political an
military units.
Aather ,oa<s 0ea 0wallows e!empli*y the /(D: program in operation. I).risone' in the 29AI6s b+ the
!o))unist !hinese or cons.iring %ith the Guo)intang* /ather Ngu+en 4oc Hoa le' t%o thousan'
!atholic con-erts into 4aos in 29@I* shortl+ ater !hiang Gai(she& ha' le' to Tai%an %ith his Nationalist
Ar)+, Eight +ears later* ater en'uring religious .ersecution in 4aos* /ather Hoa %as .ersua'e' b+
0ernar' Foh (( a Guo)intang intelligence oicer on loan to the !IA (( to resettle his loc& in the -illage o
0inh Hung on the !a Mau Peninsula in southern South Vietna), The 'eal %as this: /ather Hoa %as
a..ointe' chie o a 'istrict %here 9I .ercent o the .eo.le %ere Vietcong su..orters, He %as gi-en
=uantities o )ilitar+ ai' an' a'-ice ro) a series o !IA oicers 'isguise' as S.ecial /orces colonels,
In e5change* /ather Hoa ha' )erel+ to ight the Vietcong* as he 'i' %ith -igor, %s Don 0chrane reporte
in the %aturday 4venin Post o* Aebruary 1&, 19G2, -Aather ,oa personally le his piti*ully small *orce into the
swamps nightly to stri3e the enemy on his own groun.- 1L2
0tuc3 in the mist o* a V/ stronghol, 9inh ,ung #illage resemble a military outpost, replete with an obstacle
course Aather ,oa calle -our own little Aort 9ragg.- %s istrict chie* Aather ,oa use /(% *uns to run -an
intelligence networ3- consisting o* -a #olunteer apparatus o* *rienly *armers an a *ew *ull time agents.- =n the
basis o* this intelligence Aather ,oa mounte rais against ini#iual Vietcong cares. 9y 19G2 he ha corralle
1DL prisoners, whom he use as sla#e laborers in the #illage<s rice paies. In the e-enings Sea S%allo%
ca'res in'octrinate' their ca.ti-es %ith religious an' .olitical .ro.agan'a, prompting the wea3lings to
e*ect an Coin the ran3s o* Aather ,oa<s +opular Aorce battalion -- *i#e hunre Vietnamese resse in ill-*itting
".0. %rmy-supplie 3ha3i uni*orms.
9ecause it was compose o* Vietnamese, the +opular Aorce battalion was not trustworthy, howe#er, an i not
inclue the 0ea 0wallows< own care. Describe by 0chrane as *ormer 9oy 0couts who ga#e the three-
*ingere salute, this -group o* blac3-cla commanos arme to the teeth- was -1c2lustere aroun the priest li3e
a personal boyguar.- 192 "nli3e their Vietnamese neighbors, Aather ,oa<s /hinese /atholic 4ealots hel what
9ernar Hoh calls -an ieology that there can be no compromise with /ommunism.- 1102
.he image o* a e*iant ban o* *oreigners, transplante by the /(% to Vietnam to suit its purposes an
surroune by capti#es, e*ectors, an enemies, symboli4es per*ectly the state o* the counterinsurgency in the
early 19G0<s. .hings were not going well insie the :V? either. .he 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice was in*iltrate by
/ommunist agents, an in >une 19E9 the V9( arreste the personal boyguar to the %FV? chie* o* sta** an
charge him with spying. (n >anuary 19G0 two o**icers in the =perations Di#ision o* the Vietnamese >oint
:eneral 0ta** $>:0' were arreste as Vietcong agents. ;#en the /an )ao was penetrate by /ommunist
agents, as e#ents pro#e. .he situation clima!e in ?o#ember 19G0, when a group o* isgruntle Dai Viet
paratroopers le a coup against Diem. %lthough a *ailure, the coup attempt rew attention to Diem<s lac3 o*
popular support, a situation mae worse when his brother ?hu sicce the secret police on the Dai Viets an their
9uhist allies. .his purge sent the 9uhists unergroun an into alliances with the /ommunists, an what
was calle -the 9uhist crisis- ensue, e#entually causing the emise o* the ?go regime.
0ensing that Diem was on the ropes an bolstere by the 9uhists< ha#ing Coine their cause, the /ommunists
on December 20, 19G0, announce the *ormation o* the ?ational Aront *or the )iberation o* 0outh Vietnam an
calle *or the e!pulsion o* all %mericans. ,o /hi 8inh appointe )e Duan secretary-general o* the southern
branch o* the party, an one year later the +eople<s Fe#olutionary party $+F+' was acti#ate in the 0outh. .he
insurgency ha begun in earnest.
777
,ow the insurgency was organi4e is essential to unerstaning +hoeni!, which was targete speci*ically
against its leaership, the V/(. %t the top o* the V/( organi4ational chart was the /entral =**ice o* 0outh
Vietnam $/=0V?', an e!ecuti#e committee answering to the )ao Dong /entral /ommittee<s Feuni*ication
Department in ,anoi. Arom its *loating hea5uarters along the /amboian borer, /=0V? in turn irecte the
acti#ities o* the +eople<s Fe#olutionary party, the ?ational )iberation Aront, an the )iberation %rmy -- a3a the
Vietcong. /=0V?<s marching orers were sent to si! regional committees in 0outh Vietnam, plus one more *or
the 0aigon capital 4one. +ro#ince committees in turn irecte istrict committees, which were *orme by
groupings o* at least three #illage committees. )i3ewise, each #illage committee was compose o* at least three
hamlet-le#el chapters, which constitute the *unamental lin3 to the rural population. ,amlet chapters ha three
20
to *i#e members, who were organi4e into cells with electe leaers. .he cell was the smallest V/(
organi4ational unit but coul not e!ist unless integrate into a chapter.
.he ?ational )iberation Aront sought to mobili4e the -people- through associations encompassing all sectors o*
society. .he ?)A coorinate the /ommunist party with other 0outh Vietnamese political parties through its
/entral /ommittee, which *loate along the /amboian borer in the area re*erre to as the +arrot<s 9ea3.
6hen operations were mounte against it, the /entral /ommittee slippe into the (ron .riangle area north o*
0aigon, or into the *amous tunnels o* /u /hi, or into .ay ?inh /ity. Fegarless o* where it was hea5uartere,
the ?)A was most #iable at the grass-roots le#el. There ar)ers6 associations .reache' lan' reor)1
%o)en6s associations traine' nurses1 an' liberation +outh associations o..ose' the 'rat, )iberation
associations e!iste *or all classes o* society, incluing writers an 9uhists.
(nitially, only /ommunist party members heae ?)A associations, an all ambitious re#olutionaries sought
amission to the +eople<s Fe#olutionary party, which by 19G2 boaste hal* a million members. ;ntrance to the
+F+ re5uire a sponsor, a bac3groun chec3, an a trial membership. %s the insurgency<s managers, party
members were the primary target o* +hoeni! an its preecessor organi4ations.
.opping the hit list were party secretaries -- the people irecting Vietcong operations at region, pro#ince, an
istrict le#els. %lthough usually 3nown by name, they were ne#ertheless har to *in. V/( -uty e!pert- Fobert
0later, a Marine ca.tain on contract to the !IA *rom 19G& to 19G9, writes: -(n o#er three years in Vietnam, (
3new o* no +ro#ince +arty 0ecretary e#er being capture.- 6hy so har to 3illB -0ince he is the most important
V/ committee member in the pro#ince, access to him is limite to pro#ince an istrict committee members.
.his is to pre#ent any attempte assassination by %llie penetration agents or V/ <sell-outs.<- 1112
,igh on the list was the istrict party secretary, in 0later<s wors, -the inispensable lin3 between /=0V?,
region, pro#ince an the #illages.- %rme an always on the mo#e, the -D+0 usually oes not sleep in the same
house or e#en hamlet where his *amily li#es,- 0later notes, -to preclue any inCury to his *amily uring
assassination attempts or %llie rais.- 0uch precautions i not always wor3. 6rites 0later: -.he %llies ha#e
*re5uently *oun out where District +arty 0ecretaries li#e an raie their homes@ in an ensuing *ire *ight the
secretary<s wi*e an chilren ha#e been 3ille an inCure.- 1122
.he #illage party secretary was another priority target. .ra#eling alone to hamlets to conuct person-to-person
business in rice paies, ca*es, an barbershops, the #illage secretary was responsible *or *eeing, billeting, an
guiing V/ an ?V% troops in the area. 8ore #isible than istrict or pro#ince care, #illage secretaries were
consiere easy pic3ings.
8anaging re#olutionary intelligence operations in 0outh Vietnam was the /entral Fesearch %gency $/uc ?ghien
/uu' reporting to the ?ational De*ense /ommittee in ,anoi in conCunction with the Feuni*ication Department o*
the )ao Dong /entral /ommittee. .he tas3 o* /uc ?ghien /uu agents in 0outh Vietnam, accoring to /(%
o**icer Falph >ohnson, was the penetration o* :V? o**ices, -to etermine plans an capabilities, to recruit :V?
military members, an to pro#ie intelligence *or paramilitary acti#ities, espionage, sub#ersion, an other political
operations.- 11N2 %gents o* the /uc ?ghien /uu reporte through an intricate raio an courier networ3 irectly
to ,anoi, where intelligence ata were analy4e an collate with in*ormation *rom elsewhere in 0outh Vietnam
an abroa. .he /uc ?ghien /uu maintaine secret bases an courier networ3s in the 0outh as a means o*
supplying its agents with irection an e5uipment.
(ntrouce into 0outh Vietnam in 19G0 as the insurgency<s security ser#ice was the %n ?inh. /ompose mainly
o* ?orth Vietnamese agents who reporte to ,anoi<s 8inistry o* +ublic 0ecurity, the %n ?inh in#estigate V/(
members suspecte o* being ouble agents or potential e*ectors. Arom its hea5uarters in /=0V?, the %n
?inh ran intelligence nets, propagana campaigns, an counterespionage operations at the #illage le#el,
rawing up blac3lists o* ouble agents an manning arme reconnaissance teams that 3inappe an
assassinate :V? o**icials. More than an+ other branch o the !o))unist sha'o% go-ern)ent in South
Vietna)* the An Ninh %as res.onsible or 'estabili7ing the GVN, Falph >ohnson calls it -the glue that hel
the V/( together.- 11D2 The !uc Nghien !uu an' the An Ninh %ere the !IA6s archene)ies an'* ironicall+*
the )o'els or its Phoeni5 coor'inators,
(nee, as the /(% saw how the insurgency was organi4e, it structure its counterinsurgency accoringly.
"nable to a')it that nationalis) %as the cause o the insurrection an' that the "nite' States %as
-ie%e' as an intru'er li&e the /rench* the !IA instea' argue' that !o))unist organi7ational
techni=ues* es.eciall+ its use o selecti-e terror* co).elle' the Vietna)ese .eo.le to su..ort the
insurgenc+, %s 6illiam /olby testi*ie be*ore /ongress, -the implication or latent threat o* *orce alone was
su**icient to insure that the people woul comply with /ommunist emans.- 11E2
(n rumming up public support in %merica *or military inter#ention, the /(% portraye all arme anti-:V? sects
as /ommunist puppets, an because the agenc+ asserte' that the #.eo.le# %ere not behin' the
21
insurgenc+ but %ere )in'less .easants %ho ha' been coerce' b+ a cle-er )i5 o .ro.agan'a an'
terror* the legiti)ate grie-ances o the .eo.le (( .ri)aril+ their anger at Die)6s 'ictatorshi. (( coul' be
ignore', This being the case* the GVN 'i' not ha-e to co).l+ %ith the Gene-a Accor's* .ro-i'e air
elections* or enact lan' reor), It 'i' not ha-e to en' .reerential treat)ent or !atholics* curb .olice
corru.tion* or 'isci.line ARVN sol'iers, All grie-ances %ere 'is)isse' as s)o&e an' )irrors 'isguising
the cri)inal a)bitions o the !o))unists,
.his re#isionist #iew is what 0tanley Karnow calls -the myth ... that the Vietcong was essentially an inigenous
an autonomous insurgent mo#ement.- 11G2 .he re#isionists argue that the wily /ommunists ha recogni4e
the legitimate grie#ances o* people, then aapte their organi4ation to e!ploit local conitions. ,a#ing gaine
toehols in the #illages, they use selecti#e terror to eliminate :V? authority an *righten the people into Coining
?)A associations an arme V/ units. I.so acto the V!I an' the #.eo.le# %ere in no real sense
connecte'* an' one ha' onl+ to 'estro+ the V!I (( the a..aratus (( to sto. the re-olution,
Key to re#isionist theory was the notion that selecti#e terror was a more e**ecti#e social control than the :V?<s
suppressi#e terror, which only *anne the re#olutionary *ires. %s >e**rey Face notes, -#iolence will wor3 against
the user, unless he has alreay preempte a large part o* the population an then limits his acts o* #iolence to a
sharply e*ine minority.- 11&2 (ronically, by using selecti#e terror e**ecti#ely, the V/( hane the /(% the
rationale it neee to e#elop counterterror teams. %n by announcing the *ormation o* the ?)A in a bi *or
political legitimacy -- Cust as this notion o* 3illing o** the enemy<s ci#ilian leaership was being a#ance -- the
V/( o**ere itsel* as a target.
8eanwhile, as the /(% became aware o* what political war*are entaile, Diem an his brother ?hu began to be
percei#e as liabilities. !on-ince' that $illia) !olb+ ha' organi7e' the No-e)ber 293I cou. atte).t*
Nhu .rohibite' his !an 4ao ollo%ers ro) consorting %ith the !IA, .his eict threw a wrench into /(%
attempts to organi4e internal security in 0outh Vietnam, an in 8ay 19G1 %mbassaor ;lbrige Durbow as3e
Diem to abolish the /an )ao, claiming it enie a#ancement to the maCority o* Vietnamese an nulli*ie
emocratic re*orms.
"nwilling to i#est himsel* o* his power base, Diem re*use, an instea sought to appease the %mericans by
authori4ing a statute legali4ing the creation o* the /entral (ntelligence =rgani4ation $/(=', a mo#e /olby creits
as the beginning o* +hoeni!. 0tation chie* /olby then irecte Faymon 9abineau to pro#ie the people an the
e5uipment re5uire to put the /(= in business. 11L2 /olonel ?guyen Van H was name chie*, a builing in
0aigon was selecte as his hea5uarters, an he recruite his sta** *rom a *action o* the /an )ao that inclue
:eneral .ran .hien Khiem, the man who e#entually manage +hoeni!, an ?guyen Van .hieu, the army
colonel who e#entually became presient o* 0outh Vietnam. ?ot limite to the coorination o* police an military
intelligence, the /(= also manage political an *oreign intelligence operations. 0maller an more sophisticate
than the /ong %n, the !IO beca)e the ner-e center o the counterinsurgenc+,
Knowing that the single-mine %mericans woul carry the *ight against the ?orth, Diem, through his spymaster,
Dr. .uyen, an the =**ice o* +olitical an 0ocial 0tuies, reouble his attac3 against his omestic opponents.
,owe#er, Karnow writes, -.uyen *eare that Diem<s *ailings woul bring about a /ommunist ta3eo#er. (ronically,
he *ille his *action with issenters he ha blac3liste, an he also attracte isgruntle Cunior o**icers. ,e
teame up as well with /olonel +ham ?goc .hao, unaware o* .hao<s clanestine /ommunist ties. .hao<s
*ollowers inclue a young air *orce pilot, ?guyen /ao Ky.- 1192
9elie#ing .hao to be trustworthy, ?hu appointe him to manage the strategic hamlet program, which replace
the agro#ille program in 19G2. .hus, by *orcing Diem an ?hu into greater epenence on reactionary programs
an a /ommunist ouble agent, the *ormation o* the /(= in 19G1 *urther hastene the emise o* the ?go
regime.
8eanwhile, in orer to stem the tie o* cheap little wars o* liberation that ?i3ita Khrushche# promise woul
-bury- the 6est, +resient >ohn Kenney *orme the ?ational 0ecurity /ouncil 0pecial :roup to manage ".0.
counterinsurgency e**orts in Vietnam an elsewhere. % special assistant *or co#ert an special acti#ities
$0%/0%' was assigne to the chairman o* the >oint /hie*s o* 0ta**, *ormer )ansale aie :eneral 6illiam 9.
Fosson was mae the special war*are assistant to the %rmy<s chie* o* sta**, an the /(% got a new hea5uarters
in )angley, Virginia.
6hen, on 0eptember 1L, 19G1, an %n ?inh terror s5ua ecapitate the /atholic chie* o* +huoc )ong +ro#ince.
Presi'ent Genne'+* ignoring troo. li)its set at the Gene-a Accor's* rushe' legions o S.ecial /orces
a'-isers to the South Vietna)ese, .he &0Dth 8ilitary (ntelligence :roup arri#e an began a#ising the
8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice, an the %rmy sent its *irst pro#ince a#isers to Vietnam, supplementing 8%%: with the
8ilitary %ssistance /omman, Vietnam $8%/V'. /(% psywar an paramilitary o**icers, their brains bursting with
big ieas an their %bercrombie an Aitch sa*ari Cac3et poc3ets bulging with big buc3s, con#erge on Vietnam
*rom /uba, %*rica, :reece, Korea, the +hilippines, )aos, an (nonesia. 0+ the en' o 293E nearl+ t%el-e
22
thousan' A)erican sol'iers %ere in South Vietna)* l+ing helico.ters* 'ro..ing na.al) on !o))unist
-illages* s.ra+ing Agent Orange* a'-ising ARVN battalions* .atrolling ri-ers an' the coast* con'ucting
#behin'(the(lines# )issions* an' )ounting anti(inrastructure o.erations that inclu'e' attac&s on
Die)6s .olitical o..osition, The counterinsurgenc+* too* ha' begun in earnest,
!HAPTER C: !o-ert Action
The '+na)ics o .olitical %arare* as concei-e' b+ the !o))unists an' co.ie' b+ the !IA* re-ol-e'
aroun' ar)e' .ro.agan'a tea)s, (n 0outh Vietnam a Vietcong arme propagana team $%+.' woul enter a
#illage at us3, an the political cares, being *rienly an -upright,- woul go *rom person to person introucing
themsel#es an getting e#eryone<s attention. .hey woul then gather e#eryone together *or entertainment -- ol
tunes with a re#olutionary twist -- *ollowe by propagana on :V? corruption an %merican war crimes, *or
e!ample, a lecture on how %merican-mae e*oliants estroye crops an cause isease or a s3it epicting an
%merican solier raping a Vietnamese girl. ?e!t came the obligatory sel*-criticism session, an last but not least,
the recruitment o* people into clanestine cells, liberation committees, guerrilla units, an in*ormant nets.
%s stanar proceure, an arme propagana team woul return to the #illage to repeat the per*ormance, an i*
the #illagers resiste o#er a perio o* time, terror came into play. .he %+. woul go through its routine, then
announce that a spy ha been isco#ere -- usually a secret policeman or corrupt #illage chie*, sometimes a
wi*e an chilren, too. .he un*ortunate person was put on trial be*ore a -people<s court- an, a*ter being
summarily con#icte, was brutally murere in the center o* the #illage. % eath notice was pinne to the boy,
an the boy put on isplay.
.he message was clear. .he /(% etermine early the economic a#antages o* this #illage-le#el selecti#e terror
approach. =nly %hen selecti-e terror %as use' b+ the !IA* it %as calle' counterterror. .he origin o* the
/(%<s counterterror octrine in 0outh Vietnam may be trace to political war*are pioneer Falph >ohnson. %
/hicago nati#e, #eteran o* the Alying .igers, an notorious laies< man, whose most *amous liaison was with
?guyen /ao Ky<s wi*e, >ohnson was escribe by one colleague as -a goo-loo3ing, *ast-tal3ing sna3e-oil
salesman.- 112 >ohnson ubbe his counterterror octrine /ontre /oup an, in The Phoenix Proram5 Planned
$ssassination or .eitimate )onflict Manaement, escribes it as #Turning the !o))unist terrorist strateg+*
%hich ha' .ro-en eecti-e* into a ",S,(Saigon .aciication strateg+,# 122
/(% o**icer >ohnson *ormulate his theory in the +hilippines in the mi-19E0<s an as a police a#iser in
(nonesia in 19E& an 19EL, prior to the *aile 0u3arno coup. ,is co#er ha#ing been blown in >a3arta, he was
poste to )aos an assigne to the remote northern region borering /hina an ?orth Vietnam. .here, wor3ing
unerco#er *or the %gency *or (nternational De#elopment, >ohnson began organi4ing 8ontagnar tribesmen an
+athet )ao e*ectors into /i#ic %ction/commano teams on the ; )ansale -combat psywar- moel.
(n mi-19G0, shortly be*ore the 9uhist crisis, >ohnson was trans*erre to ,ue to ser#e as the /(% o**icer in
charge o* 0outh Vietnam<s northern pro#inces an to implement a program similar to the one he ha create in
)aos. (n sta**ing the pilot programs they create, >ohnson an his /(% colleagues spotte, #ette, an hire
5uali*ie military an police o**icers as agents. .hese Vietnamese nationals were etache *rom the military or
the police an ser#e at the pleasure o* the local ci#ilian authority. 0uch was the arrangement that enable
>ohnson an Vietnamese %rmy /aptain )e Ouan 8ai to e#ise the Mountain Scouts* a .olitical action
.rogra) e).lo+ing tactics an' techni=ues 8ohnson ha' co.ie' ro) the !o))unists an' .erecte' in
4aos,
%ccoring to 0tu 8eth#en, a #eteran /(% o**icer who *ollowe >ohnson *rom )aos to ,ue in early 19G1, the
8ountain 0couts were a unilateral /(% operation manage by /(%-*une pro#ince an istrict chie*s. .he
scouts were compose o* 8ontagnar tribesmen recruite by Vietnamese agents in the /(%<s employ. .he
-Hars- an their Vietnamese o**icers were then organi4e into *i*teen-man teams that -- li3e the V/<s arme
propagana teams -- ha both paramilitary an political action capabilities. .heir Cob, says 8eth#en, was to
-ma3e the :V? presence *elt outsie the istrict capitals.- =nce insie a V/ #illage, the 8ountain 0cout political
o**icer woul enounce the /ommunists an ma3e a pro-:V? speech, co-written by 8ai an >ohnson. =ther
team members woul ta3e a census an ma3e a map o* the #illage. (* possible, the team returne with
e*ectors, le*t in*ormers behin, an stuc& a V! hea' on a .ole as the+ let. .he latter was a counterterror
*unction, istinct *rom any strictly paramilitary *unction, which in#ol#e combat with enemy units.
?ow a special assistant to the #ice-presient o* the /enter *or ?a#al %nalysis, 8eth#en co-manage the
8ountain 0cout program with Falph >ohnson in 19G1 an 19G2. .o counter what he percei#e as rampant V/
terror, 8eth#en began e!tracting the most aggressi#e ini#iuals *rom 8ountain 0cout teams an hiring
mercenaries -- o*ten Vietnamese con#icts or /hinese ?ungs -- to act as counterterrorists, to o unto the
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Vietcong<s arme propagana teams what they were oing to :V? o**icials. $ith the creation o these
counterterror tea)s* the secon' o Phoeni56s oun'ation stones %as set in .lace,
Falph >ohnson e*ines the /.s as -small teams ... particularly well traine, aggressi#e, an consisting o* a large
percentage o* *ormer Viet /ong who ha become isillusione an were now #iolently anti-Viet /ong. Designe
li3e 06%. units employe by the +olice Departments o* any maCor city, the /ounter-.error .eams were
constitute o* *i#e to 20 men whose mission was to collect intelligence in /ommunist-controlle areas, as well as
to apprehen 3ey Viet /ong leaers. %t ma!imum strength the /ounter-.error .eams ne#er totale more than
N,E00 throughout all 0outh Vietnam, but because o* their /(% support, an the nee to protect not only .eam
members but their *amilies *rom Viet /ong reprisals, an aura o* mystery an secrecy came to surroun these
units.- 1D2
6ith the appearance o* /. teams in 19G2, three separate an istinct programs began to emerge@ political
action, paramilitary, an counterterror. %t this point Falph >ohnson was trans*erre to 0aigon as an a#iser to
se#eral important go#ernment o**icials, an the /(% station<s chie* o* co#ert action, /li** 0trathern, assigne
8eth#en the tas3 o* selling the 8ountain 0cout program to the pro#ince chie*s in ( /orps an (( /orps. %ssiste
by hal* a o4en /(% contract o**icers, 8eth#en e#entually installe the program in thirteen pro#inces with a *orce
o* *i*teen thousan men. 1E2
0elling the 8ountain 0cout program to pro#ince chie*s, what he calle -*ostering local initiati#es,- was easy,
8eth#en recalle, -because we ga#e them money an supplies.- +ro#ince chie*s also *oun the program
attracti#e because as a unilateral /(% operation the 8ountain 0couts were not uner :V? control an because
ha#ing the teams uner their control strengthene the han o* pro#ince an istrict chie*s in their ealings with
0aigon.
(n e!paning the 8ountain 0cout program, 8eth#en note, -8%%: was our biggest supporter.- 9ut in return *or
logistical support, 8%%: ultimately assume control. %n being less concerne with political action than with
*ighting ?V% an V/ combat units, 8%%: a#isers began trans*orming the 8ountain 0couts an other
paramilitary /(D: teams *rom -static- e*ense groups into mobile stri3e $8i3e' *orces. .he /(%, howe#er, i not
*orsa3e its political action or counterterror missions, an while 8%%: increase the si4e o* the units uner its
control, the /(% purposely 3ept its /. an political action teams in small units -- usually *ewer than two hunre
men in a pro#ince -- an in this way maintaine greater control o#er political e#elopments at the local le#el.
6ith the militari4ation o* the 8ountain 0couts, hunter/3iller teams *irst appeare on the scene. /ompose o* two
or three 8ontagnars or mercenaries an one or two %merican a#isers, the hunter team penetrate enemy
areas, reconnoitere *or intelligence, an conucte 3inapping an assassination $snatch an snu**'
operations. 6hen the hunter teams, which per*orme as counterterrorists, stumble on large enemy troop
concentrations, they calle in 3iller teams in blac3, unmar3e helicopters pro#ie by the /(%. %lthough they
wor3e in tanem, hunter teams were not uner the operational control o* 3iller teams.
Also at this ti)e the !IA began using selecti-e terror not Hust to 'o to the Vietcong %hat the+ %ere 'oing
to GVN oicials, Gno%ing that an act o selecti-e terror against one Montagnar' %oul' sen' the %hole
-illage scurr+ing to a reugee center or a strategic ha)let* %here the+ %ere then recruite' into !IDG
tea)s* the !Ts began 'isguising the)sel-es as Vietcong an' co))itting acts o selecti-e terror against
ethnic ri-als,
,owe#er, as became increasingly clear uring the early 19G0<s, organi4ing *a#orable minorities through the
/(D: program was not enough to stem the /ommunist tie. .hrough arrogance an repression, Diem ha
alienate the 9uhist maCority, an e#en his generals were plotting against him. 8eanwhile, the ?)A was
organi4ing more an more 9uhist #illages, an the /(% was *ailing to o li3ewise on behal* o* the :V?. %s
>e**rey Face points out, -.he 1:V?2 coul not create a #iable <unergroun< apparatus li3e the +arty<s, because
o* the low le#el o* moti#ation o* the go#ernment<s operati#es an their lac3 o* a sympathetic en#ironment.- 1G2
Aor V/ an /(% ali3e, the purpose o* political action was three*ol: to e!pan in*luence through propagana an
ci#ic action, to organi4e #illagers to *ight enemy military units, an to estroy the enemy<s in*rastructure --
meaning that i* the counterinsurgency was to succee, the /(% ha to create cares that were e#ery bit as
moti#ate as the Vietcong. 0o, in the spirit o* /ontre /oup, the /(% turne to e*ectors to sprea its message in
the rural #illages o* Vietnam, in e**ect, into enemy territory.
%ccoring to 6illiam /olby, -.he %rme +ropagana .eam has 1a number o*2 *ormer Vietcong who are recruite
to wor3 *or you .... .heir *unction is to go aroun in the countrysie an inicate to the people that they use to
be Vietcong an that the go#ernment has recei#e them an ta3en them in an that the /hieu ,oi 1amnesty2
program oes e!ist as a way o* V/ currently on the other sie to rally. .hey contact people li3e the *amilies o*
3nown V/, an pro#ie transportation to e*ector an re*ugee centers. 1&2
24
As !olb+ e5.laine'* co))unication is the essence o .olitical %arare. .hus, to unerstan political
war*are an how +hoeni! *its within that conte!t, it is essential *irst to unerstan the role o* language.
(n its broaest political war*are application, language is the means by which go#ernments, through subtle
suggestion an isin*ormation, shape public opinion on issues. /ommunists an capitalists ali3e recogni4e the
power o* slogans an pac3aging to sell political as well as commercial proucts. Aor e!ample, the Vietcong use
language to pele a totalitarian state in the guise o* social Custice, while language allowe ; )ansale to wrap
the Diem ictatorship in the robe o* >esus /hrist an sell it as a emocracy. .he i**erence in Vietnam, o*
course, was that the Vietcong slung their slogans at the rural population, proclaiming, -)an *or the )anless,-
while )ansale $who prior to 6orl 6ar (( hanle accounts *or an a#ertising agency in 0an Arancisco'
eclare straight-*ace that -/hrist has mo#e 0outh,- a pitch ob#iously aime at the %merican public.
)ansale was not unaware o* what he was oing. The irst obHecti-e o a co-ert action .rogra) is to create
.lausible 'enial (( s.eciicall+* in South Vietna)* to cloa& the !IA6s role in organi7ing GVN re.ression,
The !IA 'i' this b+ co).osing an' .lanting 'istorte' articles in oreign an' 'o)estic ne%s.a.ers an'
b+ co).osing #oicial# co))uni=ues %hich a..eare' to ha-e originate' %ithin the GVN itsel, This
'isinor)ation ca).aign le' .re'is.ose' A)ericans to belie-e that the GVN %as a legiti)atel+ electe'
re.resentati-e go-ern)ent* a con'ition %hich %as a necessar+ .rere=uisite or the )assi-e ai'
.rogra)s that su..orte' the !IA6s co-ert action .rogra)s, Insoar as language (( inor)ation
)anage)ent (( .er.etuate' the )+th that A)ericans %ere the GVN6s a'-isers* not its )anuacturer*
.ublic su..ort %as rallie' or continue' inter-ention,
?e!t, the /(% Cuges a co#ert action program on its intelligence potential -- its ability to prouce in*ormation on
the enemy<s political, military, an economic in*rastructure. .hat is why the /(%<s co#ert action branch operates
as an intelligence arm uner co#er o* ci#ic action. 6hat ma3es these intelligence operations co#ert is not any
mista3en impression on the part o* the enemy, but rather the /(%<s ability to eny plausibly in#ol#ement in them
to the %merican public. ,ere again, language is the 3ey.
Aor e!ample, uring 0enate hearings into /(% assassination plots against Aiel /astro an other *oreign
leaers, -plausible enial- was e*ine by the /(%<s eputy irector o* operations Fichar 9issell as the use o*
circumlocution an euphemism in iscussions where precise e*initions woul e!pose co#ert actions an bring
them to an en. 1L2
.he /hurch /ommittee report says, -(n ?o#ember 19G2 the proposal *or a new co#ert action program to
o#erthrow /astro was e#elope. .he +resient<s %ssistant, Fichar :oowin, an :eneral ;war )ansale,
who was e!perience in counter-insurgency operations, playe maCor sta** roles in creating this program, which
was name =peration 8=?:==0;.- % special group was create to o#ersee 8ongoose, an )ansale was
mae its chie* o* operations. .hose operations inclue -e!ecuti#e actions.- 192
% memo written by )ansale an introuce uring the hearings in part states that the -$ttack on the care o*
the regime incluing 3ey leaers ... shoul be a <0pecial .arget< operation. /(% e*ector operations are #ital
here. :angster elements might pro#e the best recruitment potential *or actions against police :-2 o**icials.-
6hen 5uestione about his language, )ansale testi*ie that the wors -actions- an -attac3- actually meant
3illing. ,e also testi*ie that -criminal elements- were contracte *or use in the attac3 against /astro. ,e
euphemistically calle these gangsters the /aribbean 0ur#ey :roup. 1102
/urther to ensure .lausible 'enial* the !IA con'ucts co-ert action un'er co-er o .ro.rietar+ co).anies
li&e Air A)erica an' the /ree'o) !o).an+* through -eterans an' business organi7ations* an' -arious
other ronts, As in the case o a&e ne%s.a.er articles an' oicial co))uni=ues* the i'ea is to use
'isinor)ation to suggest initiati-es ostering .ositi-e -alues (( ree'o)* .atriotis)* brotherhoo'*
'e)ocrac+ (( %hile 'oing 'irt+ 'ee's behin' the scenes, (n /(% Cargon this is calle blac3 propagana an
is the Cob o* political an psychological $++' o**icers in the co#ert action branch. ++ o**icers playe a maCor role
in pac3aging +hoeni! *or sale to the %merican public as a program esigne -to protect the people *rom
terrorism.- 1112
777
)anguage, in its narrowest political-war*are application, is use to create e*ectors. Not onl+ %ere 'eectors
-alue' or their abilit+ to sa. the ene)+6s %ill to ight* but ha-ing %or&e' on the insi'e* 'eectors %ere
also the )ost accurate an' ti)el+ source o intelligence on Vietcong an' NVA unit strength an'
location, Aor that reason they mae the best guies an trac3ers. %*ter e*ecting, many returne immeiately to
their area o* operations with a reaction *orce to locate hien enemy arms or *oo caches. =thers, upon turning
themsel#es in, were screene an interrogate by security o**icers. =nce turne, these e*ectors became
penetration leas bac3 into the V/(. De*ectors who returne to their *ormer positions insie enemy military units
25
or political organi4ations were pro#ie with a -secure- means o* contacting their V9( case o**icer, whom they
*e in*ormation leaing to the arrest or ambush o* enemy cares, soliers, an secret agents.
V9( case o**icers monitoring the e*ector program *or potential recruits also conucte /(%-a#ise political
reeucation programs *or /ommunists an common criminals ali3e. Fecycle wrongoers were trans*orme by
/(% a#isers into counterterrorists an political action cares who then co-opte *ormer comraes, prepare
lea*lets, an conucte interrogations. 6here harene criminals were una#ailable, counterterror elements were
e!tracte *rom political action teams an hien in seale compouns insie 0pecial Aorces camps an /(%
sa*e houses.
0o it was that political an psychological war*are e!perts mo#e to the *ore*ront o* the counterinsurgency in the
early 19G0<s, *ighting, uner co#er o* /i#ic %ction, a plausibly eniable war against enemy agents an soliers,
using blac& .ro.agan'a* 'eectors* cri)inals ;the entire /it+(secon' Ranger 0attalion %as recruite'
ro) Saigon .risons<* selecti-e terror* orcible relocations* an' racial hatre' to achie#e its goal o* internal
security.
.he importance o* in*ormation management in political war*are also meant a larger role in Vietnam *or the ".0.
(n*ormation 0er#ice $"0(0'. =stensibly the o#erseas branch o* the ".0. (n*ormation %gency -- per*orming the
same propagana an censorship *unctions outsie %merica as the "0(% per*orms within -- the "SIS has as its
raison '6etre .ro)otion o the #A)erican %a+# in its narro%est big business sense, (n its crusae to
con#ert the worl into one big /hamber o* /ommerce, the "0(0 employs all manner o* meia, *rom .Vs, raios,
an satellites to arme propagana teams, wante posters, an counterterror.
.he "0(0 o**icer most eeply in#ol#e in +hoeni! was Aran3 0cotton. % grauate o* %merican "ni#ersity<s
/ollege o* (nternational Felations, 0cotton recei#e a ".0. go#ernment grauate assistantship to the East($est
!enter at the "ni-ersit+ o Ha%aii. %bout the !IA(s.onsore' East($est !enter, 0cotton sai in an inter#iew
with the author, -(t was a co#er *or a training program in which 0outheast %sians were brought to ,awaii an
traine to go bac3 to Vietnam, /amboia, an )aos to create agent nets.- %*ter passing the Aoreign 0er#ice
e!am, 0cotton was persuae by a patron to Coin the "0(0, which -ealt with people,- unli3e the 0tate
Department, which -obser#e *rom a istance.- 1122
% *abulously charismatic personality, tall an swarthy, 0cotton ha recently returne *rom a trip to .hailan --
which inclue ta3ing his teenage son on a patrol into /amboia, where they were shot at by Khmer Fouge
guerrillas -- when 6illiam /olby introuce us in 19LG. %ccoring to 0cotton, when he arri#e in 0aigon in
?o#ember 19G2, he was met by an *ell uner the in*luence o* ;#erett 9umgartner, chie* o* "0(0 *iel
operations in Vietnam. % )ansale isciple, 9umgartner ha launche wante poster an e*ector programs in
)aos in 19ED an implemente similar programs in Vietnam a*ter he arri#e there in 19E9.
9umgartner introuce 0cotton to >ohn +aul Vann, the senior a#iser to the %FV? 0e#enth Di#ision an a
*rien o* /olonel .ran ?goc /hau<s, the contro#ersial Kien ,oa +ro#ince chie*. % grauate o* Aort 9ragg, where
he roome with ?guyen Van .hieu, /hau was a /(% asset who in 19G2 ha Cust *inishe a si!-year tour as chie*
o* the :V?<s +sychological 6ar*are 0er#ice. =#er the ne!t ten years /hau<s relationship with 0cotton,
9umgartner an Vann came to symboli4e +hoeni! an the uplicitous nature o* ".0. Vietnamese relations.
0cotton, 9umgartner, an Vann are escribe by ?go Vinh )ong in The )I$ and the Vietnam /ebacle5
Aran3 0cotton was the originator o* the +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits program, the preecessor
o* the +hoeni! program. Aor years he wor3e closely with 8ohn Paul Vann* the a)ous !IA
o.erati-e %ho s.eciali7e'* a)ong other things* in blac& .ro.agan'a* %hich in-ol-e' hi) in
)ur'er* orger+ an' the outright 'ece.tion o the A)erican .ress in or'er to 'iscre'it the
N4/ in .articular an' the o..osition to A)erican inter-ention in general, ;#erett 9umgartner
was /olby<s eputy an use to o#ersee paci*ication e**orts in the central pro#inces o* Vietnam. %ny
person who has the *aintest 3nowlege o* the paci*ication program woul 3now what isasters ha#e
#isite the Vietnamese people as a result o* such programs. 9umgartner was also in charge o* the
+hoeni! program in that area. 11N2
6hen 0cotton arri#e in Vietnam, 9umgartner assigne him to the /entral ,ighlans, the e!pansi#e area
between 0aigon an Jui ?hon /ity, the capital o* 9inh Dinh +ro#ince. 9umgartner thought there was -a #acuum
o* 3nowlege- in the highlans an irecte 0cotton -to energi4e the Vietnamese- in what 0cotton calls
-prere#olutionary e#elopment.- %s 0cotton li3es to say, -paci*ication wasn<t e#en a term then.- 11D2
The e).hasis at the ti)e %as on the strategic ha)let .rogra) (( se.arating the guerrilla ish ro) the
sea o .eo.le through orce' relocations, 0egun in March 293E %ith O.erations Sea S%allo% in !a Mau
Pro-ince an' Ro+al Phoeni5 in 0inh Dinh Pro-ince* )ore than our )illion Vietna)ese ha' been
relocate' into strategic ha)lets in )ost o South Vietna)6s ort+(our .ro-inces b+ the ti)e Scotton
26
arri-e' in(countr+. .he program was aministere by /(%-a#ise pro#ince security o**icers reporting to ?go
Dinh ?hu<s con*iential agent in 0aigon, the notorious ouble agent +ham ?goc .hao. ,owe#er, because V/
guerrillas ha at least the tacit support o* the rural population, police an security o**icials ha i**iculty
conucting law en*orcement an intelligence operations outsie strategic hamlets or other secure, generally
urban areas. (n *ollowing 9umgartner<s orers to *ill the #acuum o* 3nowlege in /entral Vietnam, 0cotton tol
me, -6e woul ta3e a Vietnamese employee o* the Vietnam (n*ormation 0er#ice $V(0' an put him in the
pro#incial in*ormation system an ha#e him pro#ie resources -- lea*lets, school 3its, *ilms that sort o* thing. (n
return we e!pecte reporting.-
,a#ing place his agent net, 0cotton turne his attention to the Cob o* -energi4ing- the Vietnamese. ,owe#er, as
a result o* /(% machinations against his regime, Diem ha instructe his pro#incial appointees to resist
%merican in*luence an to blunt ".0. e**orts to escalate the war against the /ommunists. (nee, Diem<s brother
?hu was secretly negotiating with the ?orth Vietnamese in hopes o* reaching a settlement before the "nite
0tates *oun a prete!t to call in the 8arines, as the +entagon seeme intent on oing.
(n loo3ing *or moti#ate ini#iuals to mol into political cares, 0cotton turne to the /(%<s e*ector program,
which in %pril 19GN was place uner co#er o* the %gency *or (nternational De#elopment an name the /hieu
,oi $=pen %rms' amnesty program. .here 0cotton *oun the raw material he neee to pro#e the #iability o*
political action programs. .ogether with Vietnamese 0pecial Aorces /aptain ?guyen .uy $a grauate o* Aort
9ragg<s 0pecial 6ar*are /enter who commane the Aourth 0pecial =perations Detachment' an .uy<s case
o**icer, ".0. 0pecial Aorces /aptain ,owar 6alters $a Korean 6ar #eteran an psywar e!pert', 0cotton
wor3e through an e!tension o* the 8ountain 0cout program Falph >ohnson ha establishe in +lei3u +ro#ince.
%s part o* a pilot program esigne to inuce e*ectors, 0cotton, 6alten, an .uy crosse the %n )ao Valley,
set up an ambush eep in Vietcong territory, an waite till ar3. 6hen they spotte a V/ unit, 0cotton yelle
through a bullhorn, -Hou are being misleI Hou are being lie toI 6e promise you an eucationI- .hen, *ull o*
purpose an allegory, he shot a *lare into the night s3y an hollere, -6al3 towar the lightI- .o his surprise, two
e*ectors i wal3 in, con#incing him an his /(% sponsors that -a eter- mine :V? unit coul contest the V/
in terms o* combat an propagana.-
9ac3 in camp, accoring to 0cotton, -6e tol the V/ e*ectors that they ha to i#est themsel#es o* untruths.
6e sai that certainly the ".0. perpetrate war crimes, but so i the V/. 6e ac3nowlege that theirs was the
stronger *orce, but that in<t mean that e#erything they i was honorable an goo an Cust.- (n this manner,
0cotton inoctrinate cares *or his political action teams. 11E2
777
9ut these were tumultuous times in 0outh Vietnam, as wil as the 19EE battle *or 0aigon. (n early 19GN, two
hunre lightly arme V/ guerrillas route an %FV? *orce o* twenty-*i#e hunre, a#ise by >ohn Vann an
supporte by ".0. bombers an helicopters at %p 9ac, a mere *orty miles *rom 0aigon. .he incient rea**irme
what e#eryone alreay suspecte: that the top-hea#y, bloate, corrupt %FV? was no match *or the
unere5uippe, star#ing, but etermine Vietcong.
?e!t, Diem<s brother Thuc* the archbisho. o Hue* orba'e the 'is.la+ o 0u''hist lags at a cere)on+ in
Hue co))e)orating the E@B:th birth'a+ o 0u''ha. % emonstration le by 9uhist priest .hich .ri Juang
erupte on 8ay L, an ?hu sent the ))D9 in to put it own. (n oing so, they 3ille nine people, mostly women
an chilren. =**icial communi5ues blame V/ -terrorists,- but the 9uhists 3new better@ they strengthene
their alliance with the ?)A an began organi4ing massi#e emonstrations. On 8une 22* 293C* a 0u''hist
)on& 'ouse' hi)sel %ith gasoline an' set hi)sel on ire in Saigon, Soon others %ere 'oing li&e%ise
across Vietna), #4et the) burn*# Ma'a)e Nhu* the Dragon 4a'+* cooe'* #an' %e shall cla. our han's,#
>23?
.wo months later, while ?hu negotiate with the ?orth Vietnamese an the >oint :eneral 0ta** pressure Diem
to eclare martial law, a 0outh Vietnamese 0pecial Aorces unit isguise as %FV? troops attac3e 0aigon<s Oa
)oi .emple, the city<s most sacre 9uhist shrine. 9uhists immeiately too3 up arms an began *ighting the
))D9 in ,ue. .he spectacle was repeate across Vietnam, as thousans o* 9uhists were arreste, Caile, an
summarily e!ecute. (n response, on %ugust 21, 19GN, the 0pecial :roup in 6ashington orere the /(% to pull
the *inancial plug on the Vietnamese 0pecial Aorces. .he search *or a more epenable, unilaterally controlle
army began, an the nascent counterterror teams emerge as the most promising caniates.
8eanwhile, in 0aigon Diem<s own*all was originating within his own palace guar. /(% asset .ran Van Don
conspire with secret police chie* Dr. .ran Kim .uyen, ?V% ouble agent +ham ?goc .hao, an, among others,
:eneral Duong Van 8inh $3nown as 9ig 8inh', who ha the bac3ing o* the Dai Viets in the %FV?. /olonel
?guyen Van .hieu an .ran .hien Khiem Coine the plot. (n =ctober +resient Kenney suspene economic
27
ai, an the pope orere .huc to lea#e his post in ,ue, a ecision -that ease the conscience o* the /atholic
plotters.- 11&2
%s plotters swirle aroun them, ?hu an Diem instructe the Vietnamese 0pecial Aorces chie* /olonel )e
Juang .ung to prepare a counter-coup. 9ut .ung was summone to the senior o**icers< club at >oint :eneral
0ta** hea5uarters an shot ea by 9ig 8inh<s personal boyguar. .hat prompte ((( /orps /ommaner
:eneral .on .hat Dinh to withraw the 0pecial Aorces uner his comman *rom 0aigon. .he /(%-controlle
palace guar #acate the premises, an the military began arresting Diem loyalists. Knowing the en was near,
?hu an Diem *le to a *rien<s house in /holon, then sought sanctuary in a nearby church. 0oon a military
con#oy arri#e, arreste them, an too3 them *or a rie. 6hen the con#oy reache ,ong .hap .u %lley,
between /ao .hang an )e Van Duyet streets, the brothers were shot ea. -.he military men in the #ehicle,
who hate ?hu, stabbe his corpse many times.- 11L2
%merica enure a similar blooletting three wee3s later, when +resient >ohn Kenney was caught in a
cross*ire o* gun*ire in Dallas, .e!as. The assassination* curiousl+* ca)e shortl+ ater Genne'+ ha'
.ro.ose' %ith'ra%ing ",S, a'-isers ro) Vietna), Three 'a+s ater 8/G6s 'eath* Presi'ent 4+n'on
8ohnson signe' National Securit+ Action Me)oran'u) E:C* authori7ing .lanning or co-ert )ilitar+
o.erations against North Vietna), /oncei#e in secrecy, the ensuing policy o* -pro#o3e response- pa#e
the way *or *ull-scale ".0. military inter#ention *or which the /(% was laying the grounwor3 through its three-
part co#ert action program in 0outh Vietnam<s pro#inces.
=n December 19, 19GN, the +entagon<s planning branch in the +aci*ic, /(?/+%/ $/ommaner in /hie*,
+aci*ic', presente its plans to the 0pecial :roup. .wo wee3s later )9> appro#e =+)%? ND%, an 8arine
:eneral Victor Krula3, 0%/0%, hane operational control to 8%/V. .he 0pecial =perations :roup $0=:' was
*orme in 0aigon to implement =+)%? ND%, an attac3s against ?orth Vietnam began in Aebruary *rom +hoeni!
(slan o** the coast o* Da ?ang.
On 8ul+ C2* 293A* SOG achie-e' its goal o creating a .ro-o&e' res.onse, That night SEA4s Elton
Man7ione an' Genn+ Van 4esser le' t%ent+ South Vietna)ese )arines in a rai' against Ron Me Islan',
Dro..e' at the %rong en' o the islan'* Man7ione an' Van 4esser aile' to &noc& out their target (( an
NVA ra'ar installation (( but the rai' 'i' .ush the North Vietna)ese into attac&ing the "SS Maddo"*
%hich %as )onitoring NVA electronic 'eenses acti-ate' b+ the attac&, The inci'ent %as sol' to the
A)erican .ublic as a North Vietna)ese #irst stri&e# an' resulte' in !ongress6s .assing the Gul o
Ton&in Resolution, The resulting air stri&es against North Vietna) are cite' b+ )an+ historians as the
start o the Vietna) $ar, .on3in :ul* also allowe )9> to sell himsel* as tougher than Fepublican caniate
9arry :olwater an to win the 19GD presiential election.
(n 0aigon, 0outh Vietnamese arme *orces /ommaner Duong Van 8inh, who was supporte by the important
generals, the Dai Viets, an the /(%, sur*ace as the new chie* o* state. 9ig 8inh appointe :eneral Khiem (((
/orps commaner, an, in league with ?guyen Van .hieu, ha :eneral .on .hat Dinh, the Vietnamese 8ilitary
0ecurity 0er#ice chie* 8ai ,uu Ouan, /(= chie* ?guyen Van H, an .ran Van Don arreste. :enerals .hieu an
Khiem then use the unpopular arrests to unercut 9ig 8inh, their main a#ersary, whom they replace with
:eneral Duong Van Khanh. :eneral Khanh, in the spirit o* the times, calle *or an in#asion o* ?orth Vietnam.
9ut the plan was sub#erte three ays later, when Air Marshal Ngu+en !ao G+ (( ire' ro) O.eration
Ha+lit or s)uggling o.iu) on his #blac&# lights (( re-eale' that the !IA ha' been sen'ing tea)s into
North Vietna) since 8ul+ 293C, Diem<s spy chie*, Dr. .uyen, was sent into honorable e!ile as ambassaor to
;gypt. ?V% ouble agent +ham ?goc .hao temporarily escape etection an was appointe 9en .re pro#ince
chie*@ he ser#e until 19GE, when he was 3ille by .hieu, who suspecte .hao o* wor3ing against him on behal*
o* Ky. .hieu, Khiem, an Ky emerge as the big three power bro3ers an in#ite Dai Viet leaers ?guyen .on
,oan an +ro*essor ,uy to return *rom ten years< e!ile in Arance to Coin a new but #ery loose coalition
go#ernment. 1192
(n the wa3e o* the coup, accoring to Aran3 0cotton, -aministrati#e paralysis set in. .he V/ e!ploite that an
physically ismantle the strategic hamlets as espise symbols o* the :V?.- %n as the grate*ul inmates
returne to their #illages, the country erupte in open re#olt. ;#en the roa leaing *rom 0aigon to >ohn Vann<s
hea5uarters in 8y .ho was unsa*e, so in December 19GN ;# 9umgartner sent 0cotton to )ong %n +ro#ince, a
*ew miles south o* 0aigon. 0cotton brought along his political care *rom Juang ?gai +ro#ince, /i#ic %ction
recruits were pro#ie by the )ong %n pro#ince chie*, an 0cotton set about -seeing what was wrong an
getting a *i! on the hamlets.- ,e i this by using -small arme teams see3ing in*ormation.- 1202
6or3ing with the %merican pro#ince a#iser, 0cotton organi4e three sur#ey teams, which operate in three
neighboring hamlets simultaneously: ;ach si!-member team was e5uippe with blac3 paCamas, pistols, a raio,
an a submachine gun. 0tanar proceure was to regroup at the last moment be*ore aybrea3, then shi*t at
awn to a *ourth hamlet, where the team woul sleep uring the ay. %t night they sat besie trails use by the
V/ cares they ha ienti*ie uring #isits to the hamlets. 6hen Vietcong arme propagana teams uner their
28
sur#eillance eparte *rom a hamlet, 0cotton<s care woul mo#e in an spea3 to one person *rom each
househol, so the V/ -woul ha#e to punish e#eryone a*ter we le*t. 9ut that ne#er happene. % woman V/
leaer woul bring in a unit a*ter us,- 0cotton ae, -but there were ne#er any recriminations.
-.he mission o* these sur#ey teams,- accoring to 0cotton, -was intelligence, not an attac3 on the V/(. 9ut )ong
%n pro#e the #iability o* small units. ( *elt con*ient that moti#ate small units coul go in an isplace the V/
simply by their presence. $ill an' intent ha' to be .ri)ar+, though@ i* they were, then the metho generate
use*ul reports.-
6ith Diem ea, three 5uarters o* 0outh Vietnam<s pro#ince chie*s *ire *rom their Cobs, an no more
prohibitions on ta3ing /(% money, the time was ripe *or -local initiati#es.- )ocal o**icials, along with legions o*
Diem loyalists purge *rom go#ernment a*ter the coup, were hire by the /(% an put in management positions
in its co#ert action programs in the pro#inces an istricts. 9ut it was an %merican war now, with :V? stature at
an all-time low, ma3ing it harer than e#er to wage political war. %n o* course the situation was e!ploite by the
?orth Vietnamese, who starte in*iltrating regular ?V% troops, not Cust regroupees, into 0outh Vietnam.
=ther changes were also *orthcoming as a result o* the coup. 6ith =peration 0witchbac3 an the trans*er o* the
/(D: program to 8%/V, Falph >ohnson launche a new co#ert action program in Dam +ao outsie +lei3u.
/alle .ruong 0on, it organi4e 8ontagnars into small units ha#ing ci#ic action, counterterror, an intelligence
*unctions. 8eanwhile, 0tu 8eth#en was assigne to the Delta to stimulate -local initiati#es- among the new
generation o* pro#ince chie*s.
8eth#en<s plan was to create a three-part program with separate teams *or ci#ic action, counterterror, an
intelligence. ,owe#er, because the *ighting was less intense in the Delta than in central Vietnam, 8eth#en
a#ocate easily monitore teams no larger than si! men each -- the type 0cotton was toying with in )ong %n.
8eth#en also incorporate ieas e#elope in Kien ,oa +ro#ince by .ran ?goc /hau, whose inno#ati#e census
grie#ance teams were pro#ing 5uite success*ul. "sing /hau<s an 0cotton<s programs as his moels, 8eth#en
sol -local initiati#es- to pro#ince chie*s across 0outh Vietnam.
9ehin e#ery pro#ince chie*, o* course, was a /(% paramilitary o**icer promoting an organi4ing the /(%<s three-
part co#ert action program. 6alter 8ac3em, who arri#e in Vietnam in early 19GD, was one o* the *irst. %*ter
spening two months obser#ing the /(D: program in 9an 8e .huot, 8ac3em was trans*erre to the Delta to
institute similar programs in %n :iang, /hau Doc, 0a Dec, an Vinh )ong pro#inces. 8ac3em also reporte
irectly to 6ashington on the political acti#ities o* the #arious sects an *a#orable ethnic minorities in his area o*
operations, the most important o* which were the ,oa ,ao $.hera#aa 9uhists' an the closely relate ethnic
/amboians, the Khmer.
Accor'ing to Mac&e)* there %ere no counterterror tea)s .rior to his arri-al on the scene, 6hat i e!ist
were pri#ate armies li3e the 0ea 0wallows, an those belonging to the sects. (t was *rom these groups, as well
as *rom pro#ince Cails an e*ector programs, that 8ac3em got recruits *or his /. teams. .he composition o* the
teams i**ere *rom pro#ince to pro#ince epening -on what *orm opposition to the :V? too3, an on the
moti#es o* the pro#ince chie*- -- as 8ac3em puts it, -i* he wante the /. program tiy or not.- .he biggest
contributors to 8ac3em<s /. teams were the Khmer, who -in<t get along with the Vietnamese,- while the
arme propagana team ser#e as -a ,oa ,ao Cob corps.- 1212
8ac3em personally selecte an traine his /. an political action cares. ,e resse in blac3 paCamas an
accompanie them on missions eep into enemy territory to snatch an snu** V/( cares. -( wanere aroun
the Cungle with them,- 8ac3em amitte. -( i it mysel*. 6e were *ree-wheeling bac3 then. (t was a combination
o* The Man Who Would +e -in an $&ocaly&se No"!-
.o obtain in*ormation on ini#iual V/( in :V? #illages, accoring to 8ac3em, the /.s relie on a#isers to the
V9(, -the liaison types who set up an ;mbassy ,ouse.- (n*ormation on V/( members in their own #illages, or
those in ispute, was pro#ie by unerco#er agents in the #illages, who, because o* their #ulnerability, -ha a
more bene#olent approach 1towar the V/(2 than the police.-
Such %as the situation ollo%ing the cou., The Vietcong controlle' )ost o the countr+si'e* an' the
Vietna)ese 0ureau o In-estigations ha' little role to .la+ outsi'e Saigon an' the )aHor cities, In the
countr+si'e counterterror an' ar)e' .ro.agan'a tea)s* ai'e' b+ secret agents in the -illages*
gathere' intelligence on an' attac&e' the Vietcong inrastructure, Mean%hile* ",S, air.lanes* artiller+*
an' co)bat units arri-e' an' began 'ri-ing the rural .o.ulation into reugee ca).s or un'ergroun',
,owe#er, the i#ision o* labor within the /(% station, which pitte police a#isers against paramilitary a#isers,
ha to be resol#e be*ore an e**ecti#e attac3 on the V/( coul be mounte, an *irst, the /(% woul ha#e to
incorporate its co#ert action programs within a cohesi#e strategy *or political war*are. 0uch is the subCect o* the
ne!t chapter.
29
!HAPTER A: Re-olutionar+ De-elo.)ent
(n Aebruary 19GD Aran3 0cotton returne to Jui ?hon to wor3 on what =gen 6illiams, the senior %merican
a#iser in neighboring Juang ?gai +ro#ince, calle -a +hoeni!-type thing.- (n e#eloping this +hoeni!-type
program, 0cotton teame up with (an .iege, an Australian .ara)ilitar+ a'-iser on contract to the !IA, an
8aCor Fobert Kelly, the 8%/V istrict a#iser. -Kelly was the %merican on the spot,- 0cotton recalle. -( a#ise
on training an eployment.- 112 .iege was the pro*essional solier, eciing how to *ight the enemy.
Aormal relations between 8%/V an /(% o**icers at the istrict le#el ha begun only one month earlier, when
:eneral 6illiam 6estmorelan arri#e in 0aigon as 8%/V commaner an, in an e**ort to strengthen the
%merican han, assigne' MA!V a'-isers to each o South Vietna)6s E@I 'istricts. 8ilitary intelligence
a#isers assigne to the Ai*th 0pecial Aorces also entere the istricts at this point. ,owe#er, coorination
among 8%/V a#isers, /(% o**icers, an their Vietnamese counterparts epene primarily on personal
relationships an #arie *rom place to place.
?otably, the impetus *or 0cotton<s +hoeni!-type program on the Vietnamese sie came *rom the .u ?ghia
District police chie*, /olonel +ham .uong. % long-staning /(% asset, .uong ante up a platoon o* #olunteers,
all o* whom ha been #ictimi4e by the V/, in e!change *or e5uipment, money, an a#ice. -.hey wante to
*ight,- 0cotton sai, -but they in<t want to lose.- 8oney an supplies were pro#ie by Falph >ohnson. %
*i*teen-ay -accelerate- training cycle was set up using what Scotton calle' his )oti-ational in'octrination
.rogra), Mo'ele' on !o))unist techni=ues, the process began on -a con*essional basis. =n the *irst ay,-
accoring to 0cotton, -e#eryone woul *ill out a *orm an write an essay on why they ha Coine.- .he istrict<s
Vietnam (n*ormation 0er#ice representati#e -woul stuy their answers an e!plain the ne!t ay why they were
in#ol#e in a special unit. .he instructors woul lea them to stan up an tal3 about themsel#es.- .his
moti#ational *unction was hanle by the unit<s morale o**icer, chosen by his peers through what 0cotton
re*erre to <<as the only honest elections hel in 0outh Vietnam.- .he morale o**icer<s Cob, he sai, -was to 3eep
people honest an ha#e them amit mista3es.-
Not onl+ 'i' Scotton co(o.t !o))unist organi7ational an' )oti-ational techni=ues* but he also relie'
on !o))unist 'eectors as his ca're, -6e *elt e!-Vietminh ha uni5ue communication s3ills. .hey coul
communicate octrine, an they were people who woul shoot,- he e!plaine, aing, -(t wasn<t necessary *or
e#eryone in the unit to be e!-Vietminh, Cust the leaership.-
(n copying the /ommunists, 0cotton was selecti#e. -+eople *rom the other sie 3new the #alue o* moti#ation, but
they con*esse too much. 0o we re*ine the techni5ue base on what the Vietminh isli3e the most: that the
party set itsel* up as the sole authority. 6e in<t ha#e the party as number one. 6e ha the group as the maCor
moti#ational *actor.-
Key to 0cotton<s moti#ational inoctrinational program was the notion o* a -special- unit. .o enhance this esprit
e corps, 0cotton<s units were better e5uippe an better pai than regular %FV? units. /arbines were replace
with submachine guns, an instea o* wearing uni*orms, the cares wore blac3 paCamas -- Cust li3e the a#erage
Vietnamese. 0cotton<s teams were also special inso*ar as they reporte irectly to the pro#ince security chie*
an, ipso *acto, the /(%.
-.uong<s original group was thirty-*our,- 0cotton sai, noting that Juang ?gai was a more hea#ily conteste
pro#ince than )ong %n an that the teams re5uire more men an greater *irepower, -so we bumpe it up to
*orty an starte a secon group in an aCacent istrict. .hat<s three teams o* twel#e men each, strictly arme.
.he control element was *our men: a commaner an his eputy, a morale o**icer, an a raioman. .hese are
commano teams,- 0cotton stresse, -isplacement teams. .he iea was to go into conteste areas an spen
a *ew nights. 9ut it was a local responsibility so they ha to o it on their own.-
0cotton name his special unit the Trun!doi biet kich Nham dou $people<s commano teams'. -.wo *unctions
split out o* this,- 0cotton sai. -Airst was paci*ication uner ?guyen 9e. 0econ was the anti-V/( *unction ta3en
out to *orm the +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits. .he +F" thing irectly e#ol#es *rom this.- (nee, the phrase
-9iet Kich,- meaning -commano,- is the name the Vietnamese applie to counterterrorists an later the +F".
777
/oncurrent with the creation o* the people<s action teams $+%.s', as 0cotton<s teams were rename by station
chie* +eer De0il#a, there began a synthesis o* 6hite ,ouse policies an police an paramilitary programs that
culminate three years later in +hoeni!. (t was, in e**ect, a blueprint *or political war*are, conceptuali4e by
Falph >ohnson, aapte to Vietnamese sensibilities by )e Ouan 8ai, an *ormali4e by Aran3 0cotton, 9ob
Kelly, (an .iege, an 0tu 8eth#en. At its heart %as the 'octrine o !ontre !ou.* .articularl+ the notion o
counterterror, which more than any other *actor sei4e the imagination o* station chie* De0il#a, uner whose
irection the synthesis began.
30
(n his autobiography, %ub 0osa, De0il#a escribes arri#ing in Vietnam in December 19GN an being introuce
to V/ terror by one o* his /(% o**icers. .wo V/ cares ha impale a young boy, a #illage chie*, an his
pregnant wi*e on sharp poles. -.o ma3e sure this horrible sight woul remain with the #illagers, one o* the terror
s5ua use his machete to isembowel the woman, spilling the *etus onto the groun.- ,a#ing arri#e on the
scene moments a*ter the atrocity ha occurre, De0il#a writes, -( saw them, the three impale boies an the
unborn chil lying in the irt. % /atholic member o* the #illage was ma3ing the sign o* the cross o#er each boy,
murmuring a prayer in Vietnamese.- 122
% white-collar intelligence o**icer who put agent wor3 abo#e political war*are, De0il#a was shoc3e by what he
saw. #The Vietcong*# he %rites* #%ere )onstrous in their a..lication o torture an' )ur'er to achie-e
the political an' psychological >author6s e).hasis? i).act the+ %ante',# 0ut DeSil-a also recogni7e'
that #This i).lacable use o terror in its o%n %a+ ser-e' an intelligence .ur.ose*# that #A bloo'+ act o
terror in a .o.ulate' area %oul' i))obili7e the .o.ulation nearb+* )a&e the local inhabitants
res.onsi-e to the Vietcong an'* in return* unres.onsi-e to the go-ern)ent ele)ent re=uests or
coo.eration,# >C?
0o De0il#a authori4e the e!traction o* counterterror teams *rom 0cotton<s +olitical %ction .eams. ,e escribes
this -raically i**erent *orm o* acti#ity- as -a counterterror program consisting o* small teams,- resse in blac3
paCamas, arme with *oling stoc3 carbines which coul be hien uner their blac3 tunics, an with grenaes
carrie in the poc3ets o* their loose-*itting shorts. 1D2
.he iea, De0il#a continues, was -to bring anger an eath to the Vietcong *unctionaries themsel#es,
especially in the areas where they *elt secure. 6e ha obtaine escriptions an photographs o* 3nown cares
who were *unctioning as committee chie*s, recruiters, pro#ince representati#es an heas o* raiing parties.
9ase on these photographs an their 3nown areas o* operation, we ha recruite really tough groups o*
ini#iuals, organi4e in teams o* three or *our, who were willing an able by #irtue o* prior resience to go into
the areas in which we 3new the Vietcong senior cares were acti#e an to see what coul be one to eliminate
them.- 1E2
,ere De0il#a is escribing +hoeni!, the attac3 on the V/( on its own tur*, using intelligence pro#ie by
commanos an selecti#e terror conucte by counterterrorists. =ne o* the soliers who participate in
De0il#a<s counterterror program was ;lton 8an4ione. % sel*-escribe -supersolier,- 8an4ione recei#e
e!tensi#e training in han-to-han combat, combat swimming, sniping, parachuting, an emolition. 6hen his
schooling was complete, 8an4ione was roppe in the Cungles o* +anama with a 3ni*e an a compass an tol
to *in his way out, an he i. -9y then,- he note with no small egree o* unerstatement, -( was *airly
competent.-
(n December 19GD 8an4ione le*t /ali*ornia aboar an oil tan3er an, ten ays later, crosse o#er to a guie
missile estroyer, the "00 .a"rence, in the mile o* the +aci*ic =cean. .o ensure plausible enial,
Man7ione6s ser-ice recor's %ere #shee.('i..e'# an' in'icate that he ne-er got o the #a$rence,
8an4ione steppe ashore in /am Fanh 9ay in >anuary 19GD an was met by a 0pecial Aorces colonel who
brie*e him on his mission. 8an4ione was tol he woul be wor3ing *or the 0pecial =perations :roup uner a
number o* irecti#es calle =+)%?0 which ha been rawn up to accomplish speci*ic goals. (nso*ar as 0=:
ha absorbe the /ombine 0tuies :roup, he woul be wor3ing *or ".0. %rmy an ci#ilian personnel, as well
as the ".0. ?a#y. ,e was sent to the ,oa /am .raining /enter near Da ?ang, where in 19G1 Falph >ohnson
ha base the 8ountain 0cout training camp an where in 19GD the /(% traine its special operations personnel
in long-range reconnaissance patrols.
%t ,oa /am 8an4ione complete an intensi#e orientation course. ,e was taught a#ance trac3ing an
camou*lage techni5ues, mae *amiliar with 0o#iet an /hinese weapons, put on a steay iet o* =riental *oo,
tol not to bathe an not to sha#e. %n he was brie*e on the #arious =+)%? irecti#es an goals. -.he actual
goals were to stop the in*iltration *rom the ?orth o* arms an supplies,- he recalle. -,ow i they phrase itB
<"nermining the enemy<s ability to *ight in the 0outh.< %nother goal was to eal with enemy #iolations o* the
international accors -- (<m assuming the 19G2 :ene#a %ccors. (t meant ta3ing out comman centers in )aos.
%n there was anti- in*rastructure stu**, too.-
8an4ione was ne!t assigne to ?am Dong in the /entral ,ighlans, where he an two other 0;%)s were
5uartere insie a ".0. 0pecial Aorces camp. -9asically what they sai was, <6elcome to ?am Dong. .his is the
town you<ll wor3 out o*. Hou<re gonna get orers to o something, an the orers are going to be #erbal.< .he
orers were always #erbal an ne#er sai, <Do this speci*ically.< (t was always <:o there an o what you thin3
you ought to o.< (t was so *ree-*orm it was har to connect being in the military, let alone the ?a#y.-
(n 8arch the 0;%)s starte running -o#er-the-*ence- missions as part o* SOG6s 4ea.ing 4ena .rogra). .hree
5uarters o* the missions were in )aos, the emilitari4e 4one, an ?orth Vietnam. %t times the 0;%)s sat along
31
the ,o /hi 8inh .rail counting enemy troops an truc3s. =ther times they mo#e *rom one set o* coorinates to
another, reconnoitering. .hey also shot *iel-grae ?V% o**icers, 3inappe prisoners, escorte e*ectors *rom
the ?orth to the 0outh, emolishe owne ".0. aircra*t, an engage in counterterror.
(n regar to this last *unction, the 0;%)s wor3e with !Ts* %ho) Man7ione 'escribe' as #a co)bination o
ARVN 'eserters* V! turncoats* an' ba' )otheruc&er cri)inals the South Vietna)ese coul'n6t 'eal %ith
in .rison, so they turne them o#er to us. =*ten they< been parone to *ight /ommunists. 0ome actually ha
an incenti#e plan: (* they 3ille O number o* /ommies, they got O number o* years o** their prison terms.- The
!Ts taught Man7ione an' his SEA4 co)ra'es the secrets o the .s+%ar ca).aign* %hich in .ractice
)eant e5.loiting the su.erstitions* )+ths* an' religious belies o the Vietna)ese, =ne techni5ue was
base on the 9uhist belie* that a person cannot enter hea#en unless his li#er is intact. 0o 8an4ione woul
snatch an ?V% courier o** the ,o /hi 8inh .rail or snea3 into a V/(<s hooch at night, crush the man<s laryn!,
then use his agger to remo#e the man<s li#er. So)e o the !Ts %oul' actuall+ 'e-our their ene)ies6 -ital
organs,
(n the summer o* 19GD 8an4ione was assigne to 0=:<s northern hea5uarters in Dong ,a. -9ac3 then,- he
sai, -being as close to the D8M as we were, it was har to tell where any particular Vietnamese ci#ilian came
*rom.- ,ere he re*erre to the *act that the emilitari4e 4one separate *amilies an communities without regar
*or their political a**iliations. (n light o* this ambiguity, counterterror %as one %a+ o co(o.ting unco))itte'
ci-ilians, To acilitate their .olitical a%a&ening* accor'ing to Man7ione* #$e let our calling car' naile' to
the orehea' o the cor.ses %e let behin', The+ %ere .la+ing car' si7e %ith a light green s&ull %ith re'
e+es an' re' teeth 'ri..ing bloo'* set against a blac& bac&groun', $e ha))ere' the) into the thir'
e+e* the .ituitar+ glan'* %ith our .istol butts, The thir' e+e is the seat o consciousness or 0u''hists*
an' this %as a or) o )utilation that ha' a .o%erul .s+chological eect,#
!uriousl+* terror tactics oten in-ol-e )utilating the thir' e+e ;the seat o insight an' secret thoughts<
an' .la+ing on ears o an #all(seeing# cos)ic e+e o Go', "se by morale o**icers in 6orl 6ar (, the eye
o* :o tric3 calle *or pilots in small aircra*t to *ly o#er enemy camps an call out the names o* ini#iual
soliers. ; )ansale applie the techni5ue in the +hilippines. #At night* %hen the to%n %as aslee.* a
.s+%ar tea) %oul' cree. into to%n an' .aint an e+e ;co.ie' ro) the Eg+.tian e+e that a..ears ato.
the .+ra)i' in the Great Seal o the "nite' States< on a %all acing the house o each sus.ect*# 4ans'ale
%rites, #The )+sterious .resence o these )ale-olent e+es the ne5t )orning ha' a shar.l+ sobering
eect,# >3?
.o appreciate the -sobering e**ects- o* the -male#olent- an -mysterious- eye o* :o, it helps to 3now something
o* the archetype<s mythological origins. (n ancient ;gypt, the eye o* :o was pluc3e *rom ,orus, an
anthropomorphic sun-go with a *alcon<s hea. +icture as the morning sun cresting a pyrami, the eye o* :o
represents the awn o* sel*-awareness, when the ego emerge *rom the i an no longer re5uire human
sacri*ice to o#ercome its prime#al an!iety. %we by the *alcon<s superlati#e sight, talons, an *light, the
;gyptians enowe ,orus with the bir<s preatory prowess, so he coul a#enge the murer his *ather, =siris,
whose name means -seat o* the eye.- 0et on high, scanning the earth *or the *orces o* ar3ness, the *alcon as
sun-go -- as the mani*estation o* enlightenment -- carries out the wor3 o* organi4ation an paci*ication,
imposing moral orer on earth.
.he eye o* :o assumes its mysterious -counterespionage- 5ualities through this myth o* the eternal cycle -- the
battle between goo an e#il -- in which, i* the per*iious gos o* ar3ness can guess the sun-go<s secret
name, they can rob him o* his powers an trap him *ore#er in the unerworl. .hus a *alcon emblem was place
abo#e the gates o* all ;gyptian temples, scanning *or the sun-go<s enemies, while the sun-go relie on coe
names to conceal his ientity.
=ly enough, the e+e o Go' %as the s+)bol o the !ao Dai sect, whose gallery o* saints inclue
/on*ucius, 9uha, >oan o* %rc, >esus, an Victor ,ugo. (nsie the /ao Dai catheral in .ay ?inh /ity, the !ao
Dai .o.e 'i-ine' u.on his .lanchette the secrets o the Great .+ra)i'1 o-er the te).le 'oor loo)e' a
huge blue #all(seeing# e+e surroun'e' b+ sna&es an' trees. Aor this reason, some people suggest that the
/ao Dai eye o* :o enowe +hoeni!, the all-seeing bir o* prey that selecti#ely snatche its prey, with its
ubi5uity.
In South Vietna) the e+e o Go' tric& too& a ghastl+ t%ist, !IA oicer Pat McGar-e+ recalle' to Se+)our
Hersh that #so)e .s+chological %arare gu+ in $ashington thought o a %a+ to scare the hell out o
-illagers, $hen %e &ille' a V! there* the+ %ante' us to s.rea'(eagle the gu+* .ut out his e+e* cut a hole
in the bac& >o his hea'? an' .ut his e+e in there, The i'ea %as that ear %as a goo' %ea.on,# 4i&e%ise*
ears %ere cut o cor.ses an' naile' to houses to let the .eo.le &no% that 0ig 0rother %as listening as
%ell,
32
.he subliminal purpose o* terror tactics was to ri#e people into a state o* in*antile epenence. (n this sense,
/(% psywar e!perts were not e!orcists come to heal Vietnam an *ree it *rom /ommunist emons@ their spells
were meant to brea3 up the society an proCect its represse homicial impulses onto the /ommunists -- cast as
carrion an sna3es.
-(t was all part o* the counterterror octrine e#elope by the "gly %merican to beat the enemy at his own
game,- ;lton 8an4ione sai. (n beating the V/ at their own game, the 0;%)s were tol to ignore the rules o*
engagement. -=ur camp was always separate,- he e!plaine. ->ust /.s an us. 0ometimes a 0pecial Aorces
colonel woul wal3 in, but rarely. ?am Dong was not populate by the spoo3y hunter-3iller type *ol3s you
associate with the :reen 9erets. % lot o* them were meical specialists, or agricultural specialists, or language
specialists that wor3e with the #illagers on i**erent things. 0o the great maCority o* this particular 0pecial
Aorces camp were not hit team types. 6e were, howe#er, an our camp was separate by wire an a gate.
-?ow e#eryone 3nows about the airborne interrogation -- ta3ing three people up in a chopper, ta3ing one guy
an saying, <.al3,< then throwing him out be*ore he e#en gets the chance to open his mouth. 6ell, %e %ra..e'
'et >'etonator? cor' aroun' their nec&s an' %ire' the) to the 'etonator bo5, An' basicall+ %hat it 'i'
%as blo% their hea's o, .he interrogator woul tell the translator, usually a 0outh Vietnamese intelligence
o**icer, <%s3 him this.< ,e< as3 him, <6ho ga#e you the gunB< %n the guy woul start to answer, or maybe he
wouln<t -- maybe he< resist -- but the general iea was to waste the *irst two. .hey planne the snatches that
way. +ic3 up this guy because we<re pretty sure he<s V/ care -- these other two guys Cust run errans *or him.
=r maybe they<re noboy@ .ran, the *armer, an his brother ?guyen. 9ut bring in two. +ut them in a row. 9y the
time you get to your man, he<s tal3ing so *ast you got to pop the weasel Cust to shut him up.- %*ter a moment<s
silence he ae, #I guess +ou coul' sa+ that %e %rote the boo& on terror,#
,a#ing seen the intelligence potential in 0cotton<s +%.s an /.s, De0il#a, accoring to 0tu 8eth#en, -ecie
he wante a #ersion in each pro#ince in 0outh Vietnam.- .he Cob o* stanari4ing the political action teams,
along with the counterterrorists an /hau<s /ensus :rie#ance program, was gi#en to 8eth#en, whose *irst step
was to *in them a permanent home on the Vung .au +eninsula. 8eth#en i this with the help o* .ran Juoc
9uu, a wealthy Vietnamese warlor an *ouning member o* the /an )ao party who in 19ED ha heae the
/(%-*une Vietnamese Aeeration o* )abor. 9uu ha been charge by Diem with launering /an )ao ra3e o**s
through the *eeration<s *oreign accounts. 9uu, howe#er, poc3ete the money an use it to buy huge parcels o*
lan, incluing a portion o* Vung .au.
%*ter the coup the tables turne on 9uu, whose association with Diem le to his imprisonment@ in nee o* cash
to buy his way out o* Cail, he sol 8eth#en a choice piece o* property on the Vung .au +eninsula. )ocate at /at
)o, 9uu<s estate ha been use by the Arench as a transshipment point in their lucrati#e opium trae an as a
training camp *or their 8ontagnar ma5uis. 9uu himsel* ha use /at )o as a training camp *or his pri#ate army
o* resettle /atholic re*ugees. /alle the 0hrimp an /innamon 0oliers, *or their ci#ilian Cobs, 9uu<s troops
were highly moti#ate an, accoring to 8eth#en, were amire by ?guyen Van .hieu because -unli3e the
%FV?, they staye at their posts at night.- 6ith .hieu<s consent, 8eth#en arrange *or /(% contract employees
to start training counterterror, census grie#ance, an political action cares at 9uu<s Vung .au *acility. .his was
a unilateral /(% operation, e!tralegal, with no :V? o#ersight. (solate an accessible only by %ir %merica, Vung
.au was the per*ect place *or such a co#ert action unerta3ing.
Vung .au became the seebe o* the /(%<s political cares, who were traine to enter V/ #illages, to con#ince
the people that the :V? represente their interests an, ha#ing one that, to help the #illagers *orm sel*-e*ense
*orces to *ight the V/. ,owe#er, the generals who ominate the :V? #iewe the image o* an arme citi4enry
with alarm an were reluctant to support the program. ;#en 8%/V commaner 6estmorelan argue that
anyone with a gun shoul be in the army. .hus, be*ore the :V? coul Coin the synthesis, it *irst ha to put its
house in orer -- which, in the summer o* 19GD, was a remote possibility at best.
.o begin with, the 8ontagnars ha mutinie against their 0pecial Aorces o**icers in 9an 8e .huot an *our
other istricts, temporarily i#erting the /(%<s attention. 8eanwhile, the Dai Viets ha assume control o* the
go#ernment, create a Directorate o* +olitical 6ar*are, an establishe their own paci*ication program manage
by +ro*essor ?guyen Van ,uy. /alle Fural /onstruction an centere in .hu Duc, the program use mobile
care teams to organi4e #illagers into pro-:V? associations. 9ut the Dai Viets were split internally o#er the
issue o* allowing V?JDD cares into the program, an when other, more power*ul Dai Viets launche an
unsuccess*ul coup against :eneral Khanh in %pril, ,uy an his associates were e!ile once again.
6ith the /(D: program an the :V? in shambles, the /(% loo3e to its nascent Vung .au program *or stability.
.he /(% o**icer chosen to buil the *acility an create a national paci*ication program that coul maintain
operations inepenently o* the :V? by *ostering local initiati#es was a garrulous, blustering (rish-%merican
name .om Donohue. % prouct an practitioner o* /oo3 /ounty politics, Donohue resemble 6./. Aiels in
loo3s an mannerisms an, you get the *eeling, in ethics, too@ to wit, he Coine the /(% when he percei#e the
col war as -a growth inustry.- 6hen he spo3e, his wors came in meloramatic e!clamations. %s he
33
ponere, he pace ner#ously, li3e a pool hustler circling the table, pic3ing his ne!t shot. (n all these respects,
Donohue was the prototypical /(% o**icer -- a cagey position player using a glib e!terior to mas3 a calculating
min.
6hen we met in 19LG, .om Donohue was wor3ing as the 8ieast representati#e *or a Ailipino construction
company. 6hen he arri#e in 0aigon twenty-two years earlier to replace /li** 0trathern as chie* o* co#ert action,
he wor3e uner 0tate Department co#er in the embassy<s political o**ice. =ne o* his Cobs at the time, he sai,
was managing -a small training camp own in Vung .au which ha about a hunre stuents run by a #ery
ynamic guy -- )e Ouan 8ai.
#I s.ent a lot o ti)e %ith Mai*# Donohue recalle'* #an' %as )ight+ i).resse', Mai %as a %i7ar' at
a..ealing to a .articular sensor+ ele)ent the Vietna)ese see)e' to ha-e about the atherlan', He ha'
the abilit+ to inter%ea-e Vietna)ese )+th an' )o'ern('a+ nationalis) that see)e' so)eho% to )a&e
an i).act on the tutore' an' the untutore' ali&e, He %as trilingual*# Donohue sai' %ith a')iration* #but
he %as contro-ersial, $hat &in' o ar)+ oicer goes aroun' tal&ing about airies an' 'ragonsM# >B?
Donohue immeiately pic3e up where 0tu 8eth#en ha le*t o**, hammering out a eal with the minister o* the
interior to rent an e#en larger chun3 o* the Vung .au +eninsula. ,e then got 8ai a promotion to maCor an
arrange *or -a guy who ha been training agency people to come up with three or *our others to run the camp.
.his is an early program calle arme propagana team,- what he terme an arme social wor3ing element.
-%nyway,- Donohue sai, -( ecie this was the route we shoul be *ollowing, an ( began loo3ing *or a means
o* e!paning the program. ( got ri o* most o* the other stu** ( ha responsibility *or, an *rom that point on
programming e#ol#e rapily. 6e began to buil up the program with more an more o**icers coming in *rom
6ashington on permanent change o* station.-
Donohue lease' a !atholic se)inar+, whose owners ha -ecie it was time to cut an run,- an use
0eminary /amp, as it became 3nown, as hea5uarters *or his sta**. -(t was really Cust a stopgap,- Donohue
e!plaine, -but it ga#e us the ability to ha#e a goo permanent base. -.hen we starte builing our training
*acility -- Fige /amp. (t was *i#e miles beyon the airport, so we built roas. 6e built barrac3s, mess halls,
classrooms, armories, an o**ices. 6e built a training camp *or *i#e thousan an opene it on the *i*teenth o*
>anuary, 19GE.-
,a#ing put his management team an *acilities in place, Donohue ne!t ha to emonstrate that the /(% coul
e#elop people<s action teams *or e#ery pro#ince, which meant centrali4e training an using 0cotton<s *orty-
man moel *rom Juang ?gai. Donohue also arrange *or the training o* /.s an /ensus :rie#ance care. .o
manage the /. training program, he importe -a couple o* guys *rom hea5uarters. .hey were e!perts. .hey
taught how to get in, how to abuct prisoners, an how to get the hell out with goo sources *or interrogation. (
brought them out .DH an 3ept tal3ing them into e!tening, an they both ene up oing a *ull tour.- 9oth,
Donohue sai in 19LG, -are still gain*ully employe by the /(%.-
Donohue<s pet program was /ensus :rie#ance, -the most sophisticate program in the whole goamne
country -- the most e**ecti#e political tool, i* you accept the *act that the go#ernment really in<t care what
people thought or what their political nees were.- ?oting that the V/ ha mae the problem worse by cutting
the lines o* communication, -through the s3ill*ul use o* terror,- Donohue sai, -the population ha been cut ari*t,
an /ensus :rie#ance was the ersat4 system that allowe us to say, <6e accept the *act that there are no
normal political lines o* in*luence, so we<ll put this on an hope to :o we can Cump-start this boy politic.<-
Donohue e!plaine /ensus :rie#ance li3e this: -;#eryboy 3nows the go#ernment ta3es a census, so you<
ha#e a guy ma3e a map o* e#ery house in the #illage -- put e#erything into perspecti#e. .hen the eict was
issue that once a month e#ery hea o* househol ha to tal3 to the /ensus :rie#ance o**icer. 6e trie to get
someboy *rom the #illage who was oler -- retire teachers, retire ci#il ser#ants -- oler people who appeare
harmless but were respecte.- To )a&e it .ossible or a hea' o househol' to s.ea& .ri-atel+ %ith the
!ensus Grie-ance oicer* #$e %oul' .ut together a little t%o(b+(our shac& ;.atterne' on the !atholic
conessional< so that there ain6t nobo'+ else aroun',
-9asically the census, scale own, ha three 5uestions: $=ne' 6hat woul you li3e the :V? to o *or youB %ll
o* the basic precinct-type nees. <% brige across this particular canal woul sa#e us a three-mile wal3 to get our
prouce to mar3et.< Very legitimate nees. $.wo' (s there anyboy in the :V? gi#ing you a har timeB %re the
police at the chec3point charging you a toll e#ery time you ta3e your rutabagas to mar3etB $.hree' (s there
anything you want to tell me about the VietcongB (* the answer was no, the whole thing wasn<t pursue, but once
a month the hea o* househol ha to touch base. (* the /ensus :rie#ance o**icer *ins that O number o* people
say they nee a brige, you begin to get a consensus. =3ay, money is allocate. (* it went to the wrong things,
you might as well 3eep it bac3 here. 0o the point we woul ma3e with the pro#ince an istrict chie*s was <.his
is a political nee. (* you are responsi#e to it, people will loo3 at you in a i**erent light.<-
34
-/ensus :rie#ance prouce a goo bit o* intelligence,- Donohue conclue. -0o i the care program. 9ut
there were areas that were so tough an so inaccessible that there was Cust no intelligence coming out. 0ome o*
the /hieu ,ois woul bring it in, but we ne#er really ha what we thought was a goo enough hanle on
continuin intellience, which is a terrible blin spot i* you<re trying to win a war that<s got all the built in problems
that Vietnam ha.-
.he ne!t problem Donohue *ace was -how to imprint a political system on a *oreign country.- .hat was no easy
tas3, e#en *or an irrepressible huc3ster li3e .om Donohue. Donohue escribe the typical pro#ince chie* as -a
military o**icer who was a prouct o* a manarin system,- a person with total iscretion o#er how to spen *uns,
who -couln<t care less about what some grubby little ol peasant lay in blac3 paCamas ha to say. ,e in<t
ha#e a political bone in his boy.- 9y way o* comparison he ae, -.hey<re as ba as our military. .hey ne#er
unerstoo either what we were oing.- %ll that le Donohue to say, -6e were running a coaching school *or
army o**icers.-
Aurther complicating things was the *act that corruption in the pro#inces was a way o* li*e. 0o Donohue spent a
goo eal o* time -trying to 3eep the local parties *rom using it to their own a#antage. .he V?JDD element ha
to be goamne care*ul that they weren<t pushing the long-range interests o* the party,- he sai, re*erring to
8ai<s habit o* inserting *our V?JDD cares into e#ery +%. team. -.he same is true when you get into ,oa ,ao
country. (* you ha a pro#ince chie* who loo3e upon it as a source o* re#enue or i* a guy wante to use it as a
pri#ate army, then you ha real trouble.-
Donohue tol each pro#ince chie*, -(* you use these people in the way they<#e been traine, we<ll *ee them, pay
them, an e5uip them. (* you ecie at any time they<re a hinrance rather than a help, you gi#e me a call, an
within thirty ays we<ll get them out o* here. (* ( ecie that you<re not using them properly -- that you<re using
them as a palace guar here in the pro#ince -- (<ll gi#e you thirty ays< notice an pull them out.- %n that was
the agreement. (t was that simple. ?othing in writing. ?othing went through the central go#ernment.
-?e!t, (< ta3e an agency o**icer -- or o**icers in a big pro#ince -- an stic3 him in the pro#ince an tell him, <Ain
a place to li#e. :et some sanbags. 6e<ll try to get you some ?ung guars. 0tay ali#e an o as you see *it.<
%n then he was responsible *or the irection o* the teams -- payroll, logistics, the whole smear.- .he /(% o**icer
then selecte -a #igorous young lieutenant- whom the pro#ince security o**icer woul appoint to his sta** as the
Fural /onstruction care liaison, -so we woul ha#e a guy we coul wor3 with ay in an ay out. .hen we
woul wor3 own to the istrict le#el, where we ha a similar arrangement, an then into a #illage.-
%s soon as the istrict chie* ha #ouche *or his recruits, -6e< put them on an airplane an sen them own to
Vung .au,- Donohue sai. -.his is pretty heay stu**. .hese guys ha ne#er been out o* the #illage be*ore. .he
*oo was spectacular. 0uenly they ha more protein in their systems than they<#e e#er ha be*ore, an they<re
able to stay awa3e in class. =ur training program was #igorous as hell, but they all put on weight. 6e treate
them *or worms as soon as they came in the oor. Then Mai began telling the) stories about the airies an'
the 'ragons an' the great cultural heritage o the Vietna)ese .eo.le, He ha' all sorts o )+ths %hich
%ere at least a..arent to )an+ o these .eo.le, Then he %oul' %or& in the .olitical a..licabilit+ o
to'a+,#
%ccoring to Donohue, this is -precisely- what political war*are is all about: ,a#ing been selecte into a -special-
program an gi#en -special- treatment, /(% political cares were taught the corporate sales pitch. (n e**ect, rural
youths were put on a political assembly line, pumpe *ull o* protein an propagana, cross-traine as
interchangeable parts *or e**iciency, then gi#en one last moti#ational booster shot. -.he grauation ceremonies
at Vung .au were something else.- Donohue chortle. -%t night. .otal ar3ness. .hen the one canle lit. =hI
.his is the schmalt4I Femember, these are 3is that ha#e ne#er seen anything li3e this. .he pageantryI-
.he Ne" =ork Times reporter F.6. %pple escribe on Aebruary 21, 19GE the Fige /amp grauation
ceremony occurring in an amphitheater the si4e o* a *ootball *iel. Ailipino trainers were present an, writes
%pple, -.he ceremony ha a theatrical, almost religious 5uality. Vietnamese national symbols, incluing the ol
imperial *lag, were arraye be*ore an altar. 8ulti-colore pennants bearing the names o* the nation<s ancient
heroes were mounte behin the spea3er. /aptain 8ai stoo at an illuminate lectern. .he recruits were
groupe on the three other sies o* the arena. %t a signal, all the lights e!cept one *ocuse on /aptain 8ai went
out, an the recruits strippe o** their white shirts an ar3 trousers. 6hen the lights came on again, all were
cla in blac3 paCamas.-
6hippe into an ieological *er#or, the /(%<s political cares were then sent into #illages to sprea emocratic
#alues an unermine the in*rastructure.
#It6s a GVN .resence that6s reall+ co).rise' o +our o%n .eo.le that ha-e* b+ Go'* gone o an' been
%ashe' in the bloo' o the la)b, The+6-e been traine' an' the+6-e seen the light*# Donohue pala#ere.
35
-.hey spo3e the local ialect, an they<re there to e*en an *ocus people on their own e*ense, to try to enlist
the people into oing something positi#e. (* the go#ernment can<t protect you, it ain<t no go#ernment.-
O course* the GVN %as not a go-ern)ent but a )ilitar+ 'ictatorshi. %hich %as o..ose' to
in'e.en'ence in the countr+si'e, The GVN at that ti)e* %rites Proessor Hu+* #coul' be curiousl+
co).are' to that o the "SSR %ith the Ar)e' /orces !ouncil as the Su.re)e So-iet* the !o))ittee
4ea'ing the Nation as its Presi'iu)* an' the !entral E5ecuti-e !o))ittee as the So-iet go-ern)ent
beore $orl' $ar T%o %hen its )inisters %ere calle' co))issars, :eneral ?guyen Van .hieu was electe
chairman o* the /ommittee )eaing the ?ation an so became chie* o* state. :eneral ?guyen /ao Ky was
appointe chairman o* the /entral ;!ecuti#e /ommittee, i.e. the go#ernment.- 192
(n >une 19GE the ?ational /ouncil o* 0ecurity was create an place uner Ky, who reporte to .hieu but in
*act e!ercise greater power than .hieu. %s prime minister controlling the (nterior 8inistry, Ky appointe his
people to the /(% <s co#ert action program an appointe his con*iential agent, :eneral ?guyen ?goc )oan,
irector o* the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice in >une 19GE, irector general o* the ?ational +olice in =ctober 19GE,
an hea o* the /entral (ntelligence =rgani4ation in %pri1 19GG.
;!plains ,uy:
?guyen /ao Ky was strongly bac3e by the %mericans an!ious to *in a leaer *or the Vietnamese.
% program calle Fural De#elopment, later calle the +hoeni! program, was set up. (t aime at
etecting an estroying the communist cells in #illages an reconstructing the countrysie. .his
program was unerta3en with means pro#ie by the "0%. (t was smaller than what we ha trie to
apply when ?guyen .on Foan was eputy prime minister in charge o* +aci*ication. .he only
i**erence was that now, the personnel in use were not politically moti#ate an traine cares, but
merely ispirite employees o* the go#ernment. 1102
Aran3 0cotton was also critical o* Vung .au. -( shie away *rom Vung .au,- he sai, -because the %merican
han became too big an because ha#ing a *i!e comple! was spiritually uncom*ortable. 0piritually the thing to
o was to go into the #illages. %t Vung .au they were not ealing with uncon#entional war*are, but with
warehousers. .here was always the threat that <6e<ll turn o** the water< i* you on<t o it our way.- 1112
,e also critici4e the -e#elopment o* incantation an rote- an the resulting -octrinaire- min-set that le to
the Fural /onstruction program<s being compare with ,itler<s 0trength .hrough >oy camps. (ts care stuie
the ninety-eight uties, the ele#en-point criteria, an the twel#e phases o* action. .hey sang the -?ew )i*e
,amlet /onstruction- song, with its symbolic twel#e stan4as an ninety-eight notes, an recite the ritual Ai#e
=aths: -0taning be*ore the altar o* our Aatherlan an the national Alag, we, in the capacity o* rural
construction cares, ta3e the oath ... to remain *aith*ul ... to *irmly belie#e ... that cares are create by the
people ... to mingle with the people ... an to ma3e constant e**orts in stuy in orer to progress in beha#ior,
eucation an techni5ues.- 1122
0cotton<s biggest complaint, howe#er, was the shi*t *rom intelligence an isplacement to ci#ic action. .he
change too3 place in early 19GE, when Fobert Kelly Coine the /(% an too3 his team o* instructors to uplicate
the Juang ?gai program in other pro#inces. %t that point ,arry -.he ,at- 8on3 too3 o#er in 9inh Dinh +ro#ince
an began wor3ing as case o**icer to 8aCor ?guyen 9e, the *ormer insurgent who, be*ore e*ecting, ha been
party secretary *or the ?inth Vietcong 9attalion. % #isionary, 9e wante Fural /onstruction to be more than an
attac3 on the V/(@ he wante to pro#ie ser#ices to the people as well. +ercei#ing the +%.s as -too %merican,-
he retraine his people as they returne to 9inh Dinh *rom Vung .au an, with the help o* 8on3, combine
-mobile- /ensus :rie#ance cares, +%.s, an /.s, an came up with the *i*ty-nine-man Fe#olutionary
De#elopment $FD' team.
9e<s *i*ty-nine-man FD teams ha group leaers an psywar, intelligence, an meical specialists in sta**
positions. .here were three ele#en-man teams constituting an -action element- an ha#ing a counterterror
mission, an there was a Fural /onstruction leaer with a si!-man /i#ic %ction team@ a si!-man -mobile-
/ensus :rie#ance team uner the intelligence o**ice@ an a si!-man economic unit. 0e6s tea)s %ere calle'
Pur.le Peo.le Eaters b+ A)erican sol'iers* in reerence to their clothes an' terror tactics, To the rural
Vietna)ese the+ %ere si).l+ #i'iot bir's,#
0ai 0cotton: -9e was trying to create a climate to ma3e the V/ bluner into ambushes an *ear the
unpreictable.- ,is goal was to neutrali4e the V/, but his style was -be nice to V/ agents, gi#e them gi*ts,
smother them with a**ection, an then let them try to e!plain that to their superiors.- (t was a style 0cotton i not
appro#e o*, although he lo#e 9e himsel*. -9e was li3e an oler brother to me an an uncle to my chilren,-
0cotton sai. -,e li#e with us *rom 19&G until he ie in summer o* 19L1.-
36
Despite 0cotton<s compunctions, by mi-19GE the /(% was using 9e<s *i*ty-nine-man moel as its stanar team,
at which point the Fural /onstruction /are program was rename the Fe#olutionary De#elopment /are
program. 6ith larger teams an stanari4ation came the nee *or more a#isers, so Donohue began recruiting
military men li3e >oe Vacarro, a 0pecial Aorces sergeant wor3ing as a +ublic 0a*ety a#iser in Juang ?am
+ro#ince. -( met >oe an chatte with him,- Donohue sai, -an he loo3e interesting, so ( went to %(D, an he
was sort o* secone to me@ although he still wor3e *or %(D, ( wrote his *itness reports. .hen ( wor3e out a
irect hire *or him, an he came bac3 here to D./., i some *ormal Vietnamese training, then went bac3 out *or
another tour.- Vaccaro was to become hea#ily in#ol#e in the +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nit training program
at Vung .au. Donohue also hire >ean 0au#ageot out o* the %rmy. 0au#ageot was to become the scion o* Vung
.au an a close aie to Aran3 0cotton, his mentor, an 6illiam /olby.
#$e get to the .oint*# accor'ing to Donohue* #%here the !IA %as running a .olitical .rogra) in a
so-ereign countr+ %here the+ 'i'n6t &no% %hat the hell %e %ere teaching, 0o ( ha .hieu an Ky own to
Vung .au, an ( i all the right things. 9ut what 3in o* program coul it be that ha only one sponsor, the /(%,
that says it was oing gooB (t ha to be sinister. %ny re-blooe %merican coul unerstan that. 6hat the
hell is the /(% oing running a program on political actionB
-0o ( went out to try to get some cosponsors *or the recor. .hey weren<t easy to come by. ( went to 1"0(0 chie*2
9arry Morthian. ( sai, <9arry, how about gi#ing us someoneB< ( tal3e to 8%/V about getting an o**icer assigne.
( ha %(D gi#e me a guy.- 9ut most o* it, Donohue sai, -was winow ressing. 6e ha the *uns@ we ha the
logistics@ we ha the transportation.-
.he /(% also ha the approbation o* Ky an .hieu. -Ky an .hieu saw the wisom o* it,- Donohue sai, -so they
o**ere up $as their liaison to the program' :eneral ?guyen Duc .hang. %n he was ine*atigable. ,e went
e#eryplace.- .here was, howe#er, one catch. %s a way o* monitoring the 0aigon station, in %ugust 19GE the
0pecial :roup assigne ; )ansale as senior liaison to :eneral .hang, who instantly a#ocate trans*erring
the entire Fe#olutionary De#elopment program to the De*ense 8inistry.
-; )ansale was an in#ention o* ,ubert ,umphrey<s,- Donohue grumble. -.he iea was <6e i it be*ore, we
can o it again.< 0o )ansale came out two years too late. ,e brought a lot o* his ol cohorts@ some were agency
guys that he< suborne. ,e ha some %rmy people an some retire *ol3s, but there was really nothing,-
Donohue sai wearily, -*or them to o.-
-8y boss 1:oron >orgenson, who replace +eer De0il#a in Aebruary 19GE2 sai, <.ell them e#erything.< ( sai
o3ay, an ( spent two an a hal* hours brie*ing his *ull group about a wee3 a*ter they arri#e. %n they sai,
<)et<s ha#e a Coint o**ice.< 0o we ha our logistics people put in o**ices an all the right things. .hen ( ha to get
someboy to run the o**ice. .hang sai, <6ho o you wantB< %n ( sai, </hau.<-
.ran ?goc /hau, accoring to Donohue, -was a *arsighte, bright guy with an ability to 3eep meaning*ul
statistics -- which is not #ery Vietnamese. ,e< been the apple o* Diem<s eye uring the strategic hamlet
program, an he ha a special phone to the palace -- Diem was on the horn to him constantly. 9ecause he ha
that 3in o* sponsorship, he was able to o an aw*ul lot o* e!perimentation. 0o we use Kien ,oa as a pro#ing
groun. ( spent a lot o* time between 8ai an /hau loo3ing at programs,- Donohue recalle, -trying to introuce
re*inements.-
9y ha#ing /hau trans*erre to Vung .au, Donohue also got greater control o#er his pet proCect. -6e too3
/ensus :rie#ance an e!pane it,- he sai. -( got a #illa in :ia Dinh an set up a training school *or /ensus
:rie#ance people. 6e woul bring people in that ha been spotte in #arious #illages an run them through the
training@ then they woul go bac3 to their pro#inces. ( ha a Arench gent, 8atisse, who ran the school. 6e
traine in small groups, an it was a much *aster process than the +%.s@ but these were literate people, so they
were 5uic3 on the upta3e. %n it was #ery pleasant surrounings. (t was a well-hanle program.- .o it Donohue
assigne >ohn =<Feilly, >ohn 6oosman, Dic3 Aortin, an >ean 0au#ageot.
-9ut ( ha *orce the trans*er,- Donohue con*esse, -an /hau was so amn ma that he was in a permanent
pout. 0o he ecie to go own to Vung .au an shape the place up. 6hich we really in<t nee. </ause here
you ha#e two ynamic personalities 18ai an /hau2 who couln<t stan each other.-
.he con*lict was resol#e in 19GG, when 8ai was reassigne to the >oint :eneral 0ta**, while /hau too3 o#er the
Vung .au training program. Donohue minimi4e the e**ect. -( couln<t really o much business out there
anyway,- he note, -because ( neee our own system to tal3 to people. 9ut at least *or the recor it loo3e
pretty goo. 6e ha a 8%V/ guy, an %(D guy, an a "0(0 guy own at Vung .au, so all the bases ha been
touche. Hou see,- he ae, #at this .oint all %e %ere tr+ing to 'o %as e5.an' the thing an' sa+ that
there6s at least .lausible 'enial that the agenc+ is solel+ res.onsible,#
37
(nee, with the creation o* Vung .au an the synthetic Fe#olutionary De#elopment /are program, 0outh
Vietnam began slouching towar emocracy. 9ut it was an empty gesture. .he rule in 0outh Vietnam was one
step *orwar *ollowe by two steps bac3.
!HAPTER @: PI!s
-% census, i* properly mae an e!ploite, is a basic source o* intelligence. (t woul show, *or instance, who is
relate to whom, an important piece o* in*ormation in counterinsurgency war*are because insurgent recruiting at
the #illage le#el is generally base initially on *amily ties.- 112
As counterinsurgenc+ e5.ert Da-i' Galula notes abo-e* a census is an eecti-e %a+ o controlling large
nu)bers o .ersons, .hus, while /(% paramilitary o**icers use /ensus :rie#ance to gather intelligence in V/-
controlle #illages, /(% police a#isers were conucting a census program o* their own. (ts origins are trace to
Fobert .hompson, a 9ritish counter-insurgency e!pert hire in 19G1 by Foger ,ilsman, irector o* the 0tate
Department<s =**ice o* Fesearch an (ntelligence, to a#ise the "nite 0tates an :V? on police operations in
0outh Vietnam. 9asing it on a system he ha use in 8alaya, .hompson propose a three-pronge approach
that coorinate military, ci#ilian intelligence, an police agencies in a concerte attac3 on the V/(.
On Tho).son6s a'-ice* the National Police in 293E initiate' the /a)il+ !ensus .rogra)* in %hich a
na)e list %as )a'e an' a grou. .hoto ta&en o e-er+ a)il+ in South Vietna), The .ortrait %as ile' in a
.olice 'ossier along %ith each .erson6s .olitical ailiations* inger.rints* inco)e* sa-ings* an' other
rele-ant inor)ation* such as %ho o%ne' .ro.ert+ or ha' relati-es outsi'e the -illage an' thus ha' a
legiti)ate reason to tra-el, .his program was also instrumental in leaing to the ienti*ication o* *ormer sect
members an suppleti*s, who were then blac3maile by V9( case o**icers into wor3ing in their #illages as
in*ormers. 9y 19GE there were &,DEN registere *amilies.
.hrough the Aamily /ensus, the /(% learne the names o* /ommunist cell members in :V?-controlle #illages.
A..rehen'ing the ca're that ran the cells %as then a )atter o arresting all )inor sus.ects an' %or&ing
the) o-er until the+ inor)e', .his system wea3ene the insurgency inso*ar as it *orce political cares to
*lee to guerrilla units enuring the harships o* the Cungle, epri#ing the V/( o* its leaership in :V? areas. .his
was no small success, *or, as ?guyen Van .hieu once obser#e, -,o /hi 8inh #alues his two cares in e#ery
hamlet more highly than ten military i#isions.- 122
.hompson<s metho was success*ul, but only up to a point. 9ecause many V/( cares were *ormer Vietminh
heroes, it was counterproucti#e *or +olitical %ction .eams an counterterrorists to hunt them own in their own
#illages. 8any V/( were not terrorists but, as :alula writes, -men whose moti#ations, e#en i* the
counterinsurgent isappro#es o* them, may be per*ectly honorable. .hey o not participate irectly, as a rule, in
irect terrorism or guerrilla action an, technically, ha#e no bloo on their hans.- 1N2
.hompson<s ragnet techni5ue engenere other problems. 8ista3es were mae, an innocent .eo.le %ere
routinel+ torture' or subHect to e5tortion b+ croo&e' co.s. =n other occasions V/( agents eliberately le
+olitical %ction .eams into arresting people hostile to the insurgency. Fecogni4ing these *acts, .hompson
suggeste that the /(% organi4e a police special branch o* pro*essional interrogators who woul not be
con*use with +%.s wor3ing to win hearts an mins. (n 19GD, at .hompson<s suggestion, the +olice 0pecial
9ranch was *orme *rom the Vietnam 9ureau o* (n#estigation an plans were mae to center it in +ro#ince
(ntelligence /oorinating /ommittees $+(//s' in 0outh Vietnam<s pro#inces.
/reation o* the police 0pecial 9ranch coincie with the reorgani4ation o* the -0pecial 9ranch- o* the
Vietnamese 0pecial Aorces into the 0pecial ;!ploitation 0er#ice $0;0', the :V?<s counterpart to the 0pecial
=perations :roup. 0=: an 0;0 intelligence operations were coorinate with those o* the 0pecial 9ranch
through the /(=, though only at the regional an national le#el, an inae5uacy the +(//s were esigne to
o#ercome.
.he birth o* the police 0pecial 9ranch also coincie with the ,op .ac $+aci*ication (ntensi#e /apital %rea'
program, acti#ate in >uly 19GD to bring security to the besiege capital. % #ariation on the oil spot techni5ue,
,op .ac introuce twenty-*i#e hunre national policemen into se#en pro#inces surrouning 0aigon. (n
=ctober 19GD the ?ational (enti*ication an Aamily /ensus programs were combine in the Fesources /ontrol
9ureau in the ?ational +olice Directorate, an a +ublic 0a*ety a#iser was place in each region speci*ically to
manage these programs. 9y December 19GD thirteen thousan policemen were participating in ,op .ac, se#en
thousan cops were manning se#en hunre chec3points, more than si! thousan arrests ha been mae, an
%9/ .V ha one a ocumentary on the program. (n the pro#inces, +ublic 0a*ety a#ise policemen-en*orce
cur*ews an regulations on the mo#ement o* persons an goos uner the Fesources /ontrol program.
38
%lso in 0eptember 19GD, as part o* the e**ort to combine police an paramilitary programs, Aran3 0cotton was
irecte to apply his moti#ational inoctrination program to ,op .ac. %ssiste by cares *rom his Juang ?gai
+%. team, 0cotton *orme paramilitary reaction *orces in se#en 3ey istricts surrouning 0aigon. 0cotton<s
cares were traine at the ,o ?goc .au 0pecial Aorces camp where 0=: base its /0 program *or operations
insie /amboia. ;5uipment, supplies, an training *or 0cotton<s teams were pro#ie by the /(%, while 8%/V
an 0pecial Aorces pro#ie personnel. )ists o* e*ectors, criminals, an other potential recruits, as well as
targets, came *rom 0pecial 9ranch *iles.
.he aim o* the moti#ational inoctrination program, accoring to 0cotton, was to -e#elop impro#e combat
s3ills -- increase commitment to close combat -- *or 0outh Vietnamese. .his is not psywar against ci#ilians or
V/. .his is ta3ing the most highly moti#ate people, saying they eserte, typing up a contract, an using them
in these units. Our .roble)*# Scotton sai'* #%as in'ing s)art Vietna)ese an' !a)bo'ians %ho %ere
%illing to 'ie,# 1D2
.he *irst istrict 0cotton entere in search o* recruits was .an 9inh, between 0aigon an .an 0on ?hut airport,
where he e!tracte cares *rom a +opular Aorce platoon guaring Vinh )oc #illage. .hese cares were traine
to 3eep mo#ing, to sleep in the Cungle by ay an attac3 V/ patrols at night. ?e!t, 0cotton traine teams in ?ha
9e, :o Vap, an .hu Duc istricts. ,e recalle going two wee3s at a time without a shower, -subliminating the
ris3 an anger,- an participating in operations. -6e ha a cheap ruc3sac3, a submachine gun, an goo
*riens. 6e weren<t intereste in ma3ing history in the early ays.-
0o success*ul was the moti#ational inoctrination program in support o* ,op .ac that 8%/V ecie to use it
nationwie. (n early 19GE 0cotton was as3e to introuce his program in 0=:<s regional camps, in support o*
+roCect Delta, the successor to )eaping )ena. Fecruits *or 0=: proCects were pro*it-moti#ate people whom
0cotton persuae to esert *rom ".0. 0pecial Aorces % camps, which were strung out along 0outh Vietnam<s
borers. =n a portable typewriter he type a single-page contract, which each recruit signe, ac3nowleging
that although liste as a eserter, he was actually employe by the /(% in -a sensiti#e proCect- *or which he
recei#e substantially higher pay than be*ore.
The )ost -aluable =ualit+ .ossesse' b+ 'eectors* 'eserters* an' cri)inals ser-ing in #sensiti-e# !IA
.roHects %as their e5.en'abilit+, Ta&e* or e5a).le* ProHect EA* %hich e).lo+e' NVA oicers an' senior
enliste' )en, !an'i'ates or ProHect EA %ere -ette' an'* i selecte'* ta&en out or 'inner an' 'rin&s* to a
brothel* %here the+ %ere .hotogra.he'* then blac&)aile' into Hoining s.ecial reconnaissance tea)s,
Traine' in Saigon* outitte' %ith ca.ture' NVA or V! e=ui.)ent* then gi-en a #one(%a+ tic&et to
!a)bo'ia*# the+ %ere sent to locate ene)+ sanctuaries, $hen the+ ra'ioe' bac& their .osition an' that
o the sanctuar+* the !IA %oul' #arc(light# ;bo)b %ith 0@E6s< the) along %ith the target, No ProHect EA
s.ecial reconnaissance tea) e-er returne' to South Vietna),
?otably, mins capable o* creating +roCect 2D were not a#erse to e!ploiting e#iants within their own community,
an SOG occasionall+ recruite' A)erican sol'iers %ho ha' co))itte' %ar cri)es, Father than ser#e
time in prison or as a way o* getting release *rom stoc3aes in Vietnam or elsewhere, people with e*ecti#e
personalities were li3ely to #olunteer *or angerous an reprehensible Cobs.
(n >une 19GE /olonel Don 9lac3burn commane 0=:. ,is sta** numbere aroun twel#e an inclue the
commaners o* the Airst an Ai*th 0pecial Aorces groups, plus #arious special war*are 8arine, %ir Aorce, an
?a#y o**icers. 0=: hea5uarters in 0aigon planne operations *or the *our hunre-o #olunteers in its
operational units. ,owe#er, 19GE was rough going *or borer sur#eillance. .he 8ontagnars were no longer
e**ecti#e a*ter their re#olt, an as compensation, +roCect Delta was organi4e to pro#ie intelligence *or newly
arri#e ".0. %rmy an 8arine i#isions. %bout the paramilitary police, 0=:, an paci*ication programs he an
his compatriots e#elope, 0cotton sai, -Aor us, these programs were all part o* the same thing. 6e i not
thin3 o* things in terms o* little pac3ages.- .hat -thing,- o* course, was a gran scheme to win the war, at the
bottom o* which -were the pro#ince interrogation centers.
777
>ohn +atric3 8uloon, +icaoon to the people who 3new him in Vietnam, was the *irst irector o* the +(/
program in Vietnam. 0i! *eet *our inches tall, well o#er two hunre pouns, 8uloon has a scarlet *ace an a
booming bass #oice remar3ably li3e Fobert 8itchum<s. ,e was *rienly an not o#erly impresse with either
himsel* or the /(% mysti5ue. .hat ma3es 8uloon one o* the *ew emancipate retire /(% o**icers who o not
*eel obligate to call hea5uarters e#ery time a writer as3s a 5uestion about Vietnam.
% :eorgetown "ni#ersity ropout, 8uloon Coine the agency in 19EL, his entry grease by two sisters alreay
in the /(%<s employ. ,e i his *irst tour in :ermany an in 19G2 was sent to 0outh Korea. -( wor3e
interrogation in 0eoul,- 8uloon recalle. -(< ne#er been in#ol#e in interrogation be*ore. Fay Valentine was my
boss. 0yngman Fhee ha been replace by +ar3 /hung ,ee, who was running the show. +ar3<s cousin /olonel
39
Kim /hong +il was irector o* the F=K 1Fepublic o* Korea2 /(%. .here was a Coint K/(%-/(% interrogation center
in Hon Don .ho, outsie 0eoul.-
,ere it is worth pausing *or a moment to e!plain that in recruiting cares *or the Korean /(%, the /(% use the
same metho it use to sta** the Vietnamese /(=. %s re#eale by >ohn 8ar3s in The %earch for the Manchurian
)andidate, the /(% sent its top psychologist, >ohn 6inne, to 0eoul to -select the initial care- using a /(%-
e#elope psychological assessment test. -( set up an o**ice with two translators,- 6inne tol 8ar3s, -an use
a Korean #ersion o* the 6echsler.- /(% psychologists -ga#e the tests to 2E to N0 police an military o**icers,-
8ar3s writes, -an wrote up a hal*-page report on each, listing their strengths an wea3nesses. 6inne wante to
3now about each caniate<s ability to *ollow orers, creati#ity, lac3 o* personality isorers, moti#ation -- why he
wante out o* his current Cob. (t was mostly *or the money, especially with the ci#ilians.- 1E2
(n this way secret police are recruite as /(% assets in e#ery country where the agency operates. (n )atin
%merica, 8ar3s writes, -.he /(% ... *oun the assessment process most use*ul *or showing how to train the anti-
terrorist section. Accor'ing to results* these )en %ere sho%n to ha-e -er+ 'e.en'ent .s+chologies an'
nee'e' strong 'irection# -- irection that came *rom the /(%. 8ar3s 5uotes one assessor as saying, -%nytime
the /ompany spent money *or training a *oreigner, the obCect was that he woul ultimately ser#e our purposes.-
/(% o**icers -were not content simply to wor3 closely with these *oreign intelligence agencies@ they insiste on
penetrating them, an the +ersonality %ssessment 0ystem pro#ie a use*ul ai.- 1G2
Aollowing his tour in Korea, 8uloon was assigne to Vietnam in ?o#ember 19GD. -( was brought own to the
?ational (nterrogation /enter 1?(/2 an tol, <.his is where you<re going to wor3 ....Hou<re going to a#ise O
number o* interrogators. .hey<ll bring you their initial ebrie*ing o* the guy they<re wor3ing on@ then you<ll gi#e
them aitional /(% re5uirements.<-
.he /(% ha i**erent re5uirements, 8uloon e!plaine, because -the 0outh Vietnamese wante in*ormation
they coul turn aroun an use in their battle against the Vietcong. .hey Cust wante to 3now what was going on
in the 0outh .... 9ut we were intereste in in*ormation about things in the ?orth that the 0outh Vietnamese
couln<t care less about. %n that<s where the %merican a#isers woul come in -- to tell them, <Hou gotta as3
this, too.<-
-6e ha stanar re5uirements epening on where a guy was *rom. % lot o* V/ ha been traine in ?orth
Vietnam an ha come bac3 own as #olunteers. .hey weren<t regular ?V%. 0o i* a guy came *rom the ?orth,
we wante to 3now where he was *rom, what unit he was with, how they were organi4e, where they were
traine .... (* a guy ha been ?orth *or any length o* time, we wante to 3now i* he< tra#ele on a train. 6hat
3in o* ienti*ication papers i he neeB %nything about *oreign weapons or *oreigners a#ising them. .hat sort
o* thing.-
9uilt in 19GD, the ?ational (nterrogation /enter ser#e as /(= hea5uarters an was where ci#ilian, police, an
military intelligence was coorinate by the /(%. -(t was locate own on the 0aigon Fi#er,- 8uloon recalle,
<<as part o* a great big na#al compoun .... =n the le*t was a wing o* o**ices where the %merican military chie*, an
%ir Aorce maCor, was locate. (n that same wing were the chie* o* the /(= ... his eputy an the /(% a#isers.-
8uloon re*erre to the /(= chie* by his nom e guerre, /olonel 0am. -.here was only one /(= chie* the whole
time ( was there,- he ae, -up until %ugust 19GG. ,is eputy was there the whole time, too, an the same
interrogators.-
8uloon estimate there were se#eral hunre prisoners in the ?(/ an *our interrogator-a#isers. 8uloon
was the *i*th. .hree were %ir Aorce enliste men ser#ing uner an %rmy captain. 8uloon<s boss, the /(% chie*
o* the ?(/, was (an -0ammy- 0ammers, who wor3e uner the station<s senior liaison o**icer, 0am ,opper, who
ha super#ise construction o* the ?(/ in early 19GD.
=ne year later, accoring to 8uloon, -.here was a con*erence in ?ha .rang, in late %pril 19GE. .hey were
putting together an interrogation center in an e!isting builing they ha ta3en o#er, an they as3e *or help *rom
the ?(/. 0o ( was sent up there with the %rmy captain to loo3 at the place, *igure out what 3in o* sta** we
neee, an how we were going to train them .... %n while we were up there trying to brea3 these guys in, the
police liaison guy in ?ha .rang, .ony 9artolomucci, as3e 0ammy i* they coul 3eep me there *or this
con*erence, at which all o* our people were going to meet >ac3 <Fe< 0tent, who was ta3ing o#er *rom +aul
,oges as chie* o* *oreign intelligence. 9artolomucci wante to show o** his new interrogation center to all these
big shots.
-.he military people *rom the ?(/ ha one their Cob,- 8uloon continue, -so they le*t. 9ut ( staye aroun.
.hen .uc3er :ougleman an Fe showe up *or this con*erence. .uc3er was chie* o* 0pecial 9ranch *iel
operations, an things were Cust starting to get o** the groun with the +(/s. % couple were alreay uner way --
one in +han .hiet an one in +huoc )e -- an .uc3er tol me, <6e<re going to buil, buil, buil, an ( nee
someone to o#ersee the whole operation. ( want you to o it.<-
40
-0o we ha this big con*erence, an they pac3e the interrogation center *ull o* prisoners. 9artolomucci wante
to show o** with a bunch o* prisoners, so he got his police buies to bring in a bunch o* prostitutes an what
ha#e you an put them in the cells. ( on<t thin3 they ha one V/ in the place. %*ter the con*erence they all went
bac3 to the regular Cail, an ( went to wor3 *or .uc3er.-
>ohn 8uloon spo3e a**ectionately about .uc3er :ougleman. -.uc3er was lou an *oulmouthe, an he ha a
terrible temper@ but it was all a big *ront. ,e was #ery easy to get to 3now ... a li3able guy. %lways in a short-
slee#e shirt an snea3ers. ,e was marrie three times, i#orce three times. ,e ha aopte a girl in Korea,
an in Vietnam he ha what he calle his *amily. ,e was bac3 in 0aigon trying to get them out when he was
pic3e up. 6hen the e#acuation was o#er, he was still there, staying in the hotel. =ne ay he came own, got
o** the ele#ator, wal3e into the lobby, an they were waiting *or him. .hey too3 him out, threw him in a car, an
too3 him to the ?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter. % Arench newspaper guy saw it happen. .he ?orth
Vietnamese enie they ha him, but they returne his boy about a year later.
#It6s unn+* but )e an' Tuc&er use' to tal& about the PI!s, He sai' so)ething li&e 68ohn* i %e lose this
%ar one 'a+* %e coul' en' u. in these go''a))e' things i %e get caught,6
-<6ell,< ( as3e, <what woul you o i* you were in thereB<
-,e sai he thought he< 3ill himsel* rather than go through interrogation. 9ut he in<t. .he report ( hear was
that when his boy got to the gra#es registration people in =3inawa, the bro3en bones ha yet to heal. 0o
ob#iously they ha torture him right up until the time he ie. %n (< be willing to bet he in<t say a amn thing
to help them. ( can see him spitting in their *aces.-
Mul'oon laughe', #Tuc&er %ante' to turn the PI!s into %horehouses, The interrogation roo)s ha' t%o(
%a+ )irrors,
-.uc3er was a hero in the 8arine /orps in 6orl 6ar .wo,- 8uloon ae. -,e Coine the agency right a*ter
an wor3e with 1station chie*2 >ohn ,art in Korea, running operations behin the lines. ,e was in %*ghanistan
an wor3e in training, too. ,e got to Vietnam in 19G2 an was base chie* in Da ?ang running e#erything 1i2 that
ha to o with intelligence an paramilitary operations .... ,e was no longer the Da ?ang base chie* when (
arri#e in 0aigon,- 8uloon continue, -but he han<t ta3en o#er *iel operations yet either. He %as in Saigon
tr+ing to set u. the Pro-ince Intelligence !oor'ination !o))ittees %ith 8ac& 0arlo%* a 0ritish gu+ ro)
MI Si5, 9arlow ha been in %*rica an 8alaya with Fobert .hompson, an they were the e!perts. .hey<
succeee in 8alaya, an we wante them to show us how to o it. 9arlow an .uc3er wor3e han in han. (
share an o**ice with them at the embassy anne! -- which ( ha besies my o**ice at the ?(/ -- an that<s where
( *irst met .uc3er.-
Aorerunner to the +ro#ince (nterrogation /enter program, the +ro#ince (ntelligence /oorination /ommittee
program, establishe in ?o#ember 19GD, was esigne to e!ten /(= operations into the pro#inces. ;ach +(//
was to ser#e as the senior intelligence agency within each pro#ince an to guie, super#ise, an coorinate all
military, police, an ci#ilian operations.
-9arlow was the guy pushing the +(//s, an .uc3er agree it was a goo iea,- 8uloon recalle. -9ut they
weren<t able to con#ince the military to go along with them. (t was bought by us an the embassy, but not by the
military, an that<s the one you neee -- <cause they were the ones who initially ha control o* the prisoners.
%n the Vietnamese military wasn<t going to go along unless the ".0. military appro#e it. 0o when the ".0.
military sai, <Don<t turn those prisoners o#er,< there was no way we were going to get them. 0o the +(// proCect
ne#er got o** the groun. .hen a*ter the embassy bombing 1Aebruary 19GE2 they ha a reorgani4ation, an
.uc3er became chie* o* *iel operations. 6e starte builing the +ro#ince (nterrogation /enters, an it was
thought that people woul say, <,ey, man, this is a great spotI 6e<ll sen all our prisoners hereI< an that then
they< start mo#ing in an set up the +(//s aroun the +(/s. 9ut that ne#er happene either.
-0o a*ter the ?ha .rang con*erence we went own to +huoc )e to set up a training scheule *or the +(/ that ha
alreay been built own there. .he paramilitary guy, +at, wante to cooperate, an he ha great relations with
the pro#ince chie* an the military. .he intelligence guy, 9en, was serious about ma3ing e#erything in his
pro#ince wor3. ,e wasn<t happy that he got stuc3 with builing the interrogation center an being the a#iser,
but he wante to be the best. %n he ha great relations with the 0pecial 9ranch an the /(=. ?ow some
paramilitary an liaison guys in<t e#en tal3 to each other, but together +at an 9en were able to ma3e the
thing wor3. (t cost a lot o* loyal Vietnamese their li#es, but 9en woul get hamlet in*ormants to tell us who the V/
were@ then +at woul sen the /.s out to get the names.-
6hat 8uloon escribe was the one-two punch o* the counterinsurgency -- the +ro#ince (nterrogation /enters
an the counterterrorists. .hrough the +(/s, the /(% learne the ientity an structure o* the V/( in each
pro#ince@ through the /.s, the /(% eliminate ini#iual V/( members an estroye their organi4ation.
41
.he problem with the +huoc )e +(/, accoring to 8uloon, was its esign. -9en ha built his +(/ with the guar
posts outsie each corner, so there was no way *or the guars to get bac3 into the inner compoun uring an
attac3. =nce the shooting starte an they ran out o* ammunition, they were *inishe. 0o the *irst thing we i
was change the esign so they were still on each corner an coul see in all irections but ha a oor leaing
insie the compoun.-
/(% architects settle on a stanar esign base on the moi*ie +huoc )e +(/. 0trictly *unctional, it minimi4e
cost while ma!imi4ing security. "ner co#er o* +aci*ic %rchitects an ;ngineers $+%T;', the /(%<s logistics sta**
hire local Vietnamese contractors to buil interrogation centers in e#ery pro#ince. Auns an sta** salaries
came *rom the 0pecial 9ranch buget. %*ter it was built, the /(% bought the interrogation center, then onate it
to the ?ational +olice, at which point it became a ?ational +olice *acility uner the irection o* the 0pecial
9ranch. (n practice, howe#er -- because they got their operating *uns irectly *rom the /(% -- 0pecial 9ranch
employees wiele more power than their super#isors in the ?ational +olice, who recei#e %i-in-Kin *uns
inirectly *rom the %gency *or (nternational De#elopment through the ?ational +olice Directorate in 0aigon.
;ach pro#incial capital woul e#entually ha#e a +(/. ,owe#er, regional interrogation centers were built *irst an
were larger, holing two to three hunre prisoners each. (n (V /orps<s regional capital, /an .ho, where the
Arench ha built a Cail capable o* holing two thousan prisoners, e!isting *acilities were reno#ate. (n choosing
where to buil in the pro#inces, each /(% regional o**icer selecte priority pro#inces. .hen, accoring to
8uloon, it was up to the liaison o**icer in the pro#ince to tal3 to the pro#ince chie* an his /(= counterpart to
*in a spot near the pro#incial capital. -</ause that<s where our guy li#e. 0ome o* the guys ha a hell o* a time
getting +(/s starte,- 8uloon note, -because some pro#ince chie*s wante money uner the table.-
=nce the interrogation center was built, the liaison o**icer became its a#iser, an 8uloon helpe him recruit its
sta**. .here were ealines *or each phase, an part o* 8uloon<s Cob was to tra#el aroun an monitor
progress. -(n one place construction woul be hal* one,- he recalle, -an in another they< be trying to *in a
piece o* lan. (t was a #ery big unerta3ing. 6e e#en ha nit-+(/s, which were smaller #ersions *or smaller
pro#inces.- 8ost interrogation centers were built or uner construction by the time 8uloon le*t Vietnam in
%ugust 19GG, at which point he %as transerre' to Thailan' to buil' the !IA6s huge interrogation center in
"'orn, -where the /(% ran the )aos war *rom the %ir %merica base.- 8uloon was replace as +(/ chie* in
Vietnam by 9ob ,ill, a #ice cop *rom 6ashington, D./. ,ill replace 8uloon in .hailan in 19GL.
777
=ne story high, *ashione *rom concrete bloc3s, poure cement, an woo in the shape o* a hollow s5uare, an
interrogation center was *our builings with tin roo*s lin3e aroun a courtyar. (n the center o* the yar was a
combination loo3out-water tower with an electric generator uner it. -Hou couln<t get the guars to stay out
there at night i* they in<t ha#e lights,- 8uloon e!plaine. -0o we ha spotlights on the corners, along the
walls, an on the tower shooting out all aroun. 6e also bullo4e aroun it so there were no trees or bushes.
%nyboy coming at it coul be seen crossing the open area.- +eople entere an e!ite through green, steel-
plate gates, -6hich were wie open e#ery time ( #isite,- sai 8uloon, who #isite only uring the ay. -Hou
in<t want to #isit at night,- when attac3s occurre. +(/s were locate on the outs3irts o* town, away *rom
resiential areas, so as not to enanger the people li#ing nearby, as well as to iscourage rubbernec3ing.
-.hese were sel*-containe places,- 8uloon emphasi4e. .elephone lines to the +(/s were tappe by the /(%.
=n the le*t sie were interrogation rooms an the cellbloc3 -- epening on the si4e, twenty to si!ty solitary
con*inement cells the si4e o* closets. 8en an women were not segregate. -Hou coul wal3 right own the
corrior,- accoring to 8uloon. -(t was an empty hallway with cells on both sies. ;ach cell ha a steel oor
an a panel at the bottom where you coul slip the *oo in an a slot at the top where you coul loo3 in an see
what the guy was oing.- There %ere no toilets* Hust holes to s=uat o-er, #The+ 'i'n6t ha-e the) in their
ho)es,# Mul'oon laughe', #$h+ shoul' %e .ut the) in their cellsM#
Prisoners sle.t on concrete slabs, #De.en'ing on ho% coo.erati-e the+ %ere* +ou6' gi-e the) a stra%
)at or a blan&et, It coul' get -er+ col' at night in the highlan's,# % system o* rewars an punishments
was part o* the treatment. -.here were little things you coul gi#e them an ta3e away *rom them, not a lot, but
e#ery little bit they got they were grate*ul *or.-
Depening on the amount o* V/( acti#ity in the pro#ince an the personality o* the +(/ chie*, some interrogation
centers were always *ull while others were always empty. (n either case, -6e in<t want them sitting there
tal3ing to each other,- 8uloon sai, so -we woul buil up the cells graually, until we ha to put them ne!t to
each other. The+ %ere co).letel+ isolate', The+ 'i'n6t get ti)e to go out an' %al& aroun' the +ar', The+
sat in their cells %hen the+ %eren6t being interrogate', Ater that the+ %ere sent to the local Hail or %ere
turne' bac& o-er to the )ilitar+* %here the+ %ere .ut in PO$ ca).s or ta&en out an' shot, .hat part (
ne#er got in#ol#e in,- he sai, aing parenthetically, -.hey were treate better in the +(/s than in the local
Cails alreay there *or common criminals. +ublic 0a*ety was a#ising them, wor3ing with the ?ational +olice.
42
So)eti)es the+ ha' si5t+ to se-ent+ .eo.le in a cell that shoul'n6t ha-e ha' )ore than ten, 0ut the+
'i'n6t care, I +ou6re a cri)inal* +ou suer, I +ou 'on6t li&e it* too ba', Don6t be a cri)inal,#
.he interrogation process wor3e li3e this. -%s we brought prisoners in, the *irst thing we i was ... run them
through the shower. .hat<s on the le*t as you come in. %*ter that they were chec3e by the octor or nurse. .hat
was an absolute necessity because :o 3nows what iseases they might be carrying with them. The+ )ight
nee' )e'ication, The+ %oul'n6t 'o +ou )uch goo' i the+ 'ie' the irst 'a+ the+ %ere there an' +ou
ne-er got a chance to interrogate the), That6s %h+ the )e'ical oice %as right insi'e the )ain gate, (n
most +(/s,- 8uloon note, -the meical sta** was usually a local %FV? meic who woul come out an chec3
the prisoners coming in that ay.-
%*ter the prisoner was cleane, e!amine, repaire, weighe, photographe, an *ingerprinte, his biography
was ta3en by a 0pecial 9ranch o**icer in the ebrie*ing room. .his initial interrogation e!tracte -hot- in*ormation
that coul be immeiately e!ploite -- the whereabouts o* an ongoing party committee meeting, *or e!ample --
as well as the basic in*ormation neee to come up with re5uirements *or the series o* interrogations that
*ollowe. .hen the prisoner was gi#en a uni*orm an stuc3 in a cell.
.he interrogation rooms were at the bac3 o* the +(/. 0ome ha two-way mirrors an polygraph machines,
although sophisticate e5uipment was usually reser#e *or regional interrogation centers, where e!pert
interrogators coul put them to better use. Most .ro-ince liaison oicers %ere not traine' interrogators,
#The+ 'i'n6t ha-e to be*# accor'ing to Mul'oon, #The+ %ere there to collect intelligence* an' the+ ha' a
list o %hat the+ nee'e' in their o%n .ro-ince, %ll they ha to o was to ma3e sure that whoe#er was running
the +(/ *ollowe their orers. %ll they ha to say was <.his is the re5uirement ( want.< .hen they rea the initial
reports an went bac3 an ga#e the 0pecial 9ranch interrogators aitional re5uirements, Cust li3e we i at the
?(/.-
.he guars -- usually policemen, sometimes soliers -- li#e in the +(/. %s they returne *rom guar uty, they
stac3e their weapons in the *irst room on the right. .he ne!t room was the +(/ chie*<s o**ice, with a sa*e *or
classi*ie ocuments, hanguns, an the chie*<s bottle o* scotch. .he +(/ chie*<s Cob was to turn those in the V/(
-- ma3e them 0pecial 9ranch agents -- an maintain in*ormant networ3s in the hamlets an #illages. Aarther
own the corrior were o**ices *or interrogators, collation an report writers, translator-interpreters, clerical an
3itchen sta**. .here were *ile rooms with loc3e cabinets an map rooms *or trac3ing the whereabouts o* V/(s in
the pro#ince. %n there was a /hieu ,oi room where e*ectors were encourage to become counterterrorists,
political action care, or Git !arson scouts (( a .la+ on the na)es 0iet Gich an' Git !arson* the ca-alr+
a'-iser %ho ga-e a re%ar' or Na-aHo scal.s, Kit /arson scouts wor3e e!clusi#ely *or the 8arines.
=nce an interrogation center ha been constructe an a sta** assigne, 8uloon summone the training team
*rom the ?(/. ;ach member o* the team was a specialist. .he %rmy captain traine the guars. %ir Aorce
0ergeant Aran3 Fygals3i taught report writers how to write proper reports -- the tangible prouct o* the +(/.
.here were stanar reporting *ormats *or tactical as oppose to strategic intelligence an *or /hieu ,oi an
agent reports. .o compile a *inishe report, an interrogator<s notes were re#iewe by the chie* interrogator, then
collate, type, copie an sent to the 0pecial 9ranch, /(=, an /(%. Translations %ere ne-er consi'ere'
totall+ accurate unless rea' an' conir)e' in the original language b+ the sa)e .erson* but that rarel+
ha..ene', 4i&e%ise* interrogations con'ucte' through inter.reters, %ere ne-er consi'ere' totall+
reliable* or signiicant inor)ation %as generall+ lost or )isre.resente',
%nother %ir Aorce sergeant, Dic3 Aal3e, taught interrogators how to ta3e notes an as3 5uestions uring an
interrogation. -Hou on<t Cust sit own with ten 5uestions, get ten answers, then wal3 away,- 8uloon
commente. -0ome o* these guys, i* you ga#e them ten 5uestions, woul get ten answers *or you, an that<s it.
% lot o* them ha to learn that you on<t rop a line o* 5uestioning Cust because you got the answer. .he answer,
i* it<s the right one, shoul lea you to si!ty more 5uestions. Aor e!ample,- he sai, -Juestion one was <6ere
you e#er traine in ?orth VietnamB< Juestion two was <6ere you e#er traine by people other than
VietnameseB< 6ell, lots o* times the answer to 5uestion two is so interesting an gi#es you so much in*ormation
you 3eep going *or an hour an ne#er get to 5uestion three, <6hen i you come to 0outh VietnamB<-
Aor 0pecial 9ranch o**icers in region interrogation centers, a special interrogation training program was
conucte at the ?(/ by e!perts *rom the /(%<s 0upport 0er#ices 9ranch, most o* whom ha wor3e on Fussian
e*ectors an were brought out *rom 6ashington to hanle important cases. .raining o* 0pecial 9ranch
aministrati#e personnel was conucte at region hea5uarters by pro*essional secretaries, who taught their
stuents how to type, *ile, an use phones. .his sie o* the program was run by a *ormer pro*essional *ootball
player with the :reen 9ay +ac3ers name :ene, who chain-smo3e an e#entually ie o* emphysema. -(n
between pu**s, he< put this bo! to his mouth, s5uee4e it, an ta3e a breath o* o!ygen,- 8uloon recalle.
43
On the orbi''en subHect o torture* accor'ing to Mul'oon* the S.ecial 0ranch ha' #the ol' /rench
)etho's*# interrogation that inclu'e' torture, #All this ha' to be sto..e' b+ the agenc+*# he sai', #The+
ha' to be retaught %ith )ore so.histicate' techni=ues,#
In Ral.h 8ohnson6s o.inion* #the Vietna)ese* both !o))unist an' GVN* loo&e' u.on torture as a
nor)al an' -ali' )etho' o obtaining intelligence,# >:? 0ut o course* the Vietna)ese 'i' not concei-e
the PI!s1 the+ %ere the ste.chil'ren o Robert Tho).son* %hose aristocratic English ancestors
.erecte' torture in 'ing+ castle 'ungeons* on the rac& an' in the iron la'+* %ith thu)bscre%s an'
bran'ing irons,
As or the A)erican role* accor'ing to Mul'oon* #+ou can6t ha-e an A)erican there all the ti)e %atching
these things,# #These things# inclu'e': ra.e* gang ra.e* ra.e using eels* sna&es* or har' obHects* an'
ra.e ollo%e' b+ )ur'er1 electrical shoc& ;#the 0ell Tele.hone Hour#< ren'ere' b+ attaching %ires to the
genitals or other sensiti-e .arts o the bo'+* li&e the tongue1 #the %ater treat)ent#1 #the air.lane*# in
%hich a .risoner6s ar)s %ere tie' behin' the bac& an' the ro.e loo.e' o-er a hoo& on the ceiling*
sus.en'ing the .risoner in )i'air* ater%hich he or she %as beaten1 beatings %ith rubber hoses an'
%hi.s1 an' the use o .olice 'ogs to )aul .risoners, All this an' )ore occurre' in PI!s,
=ne reason was ine!perience a#isers. -% lot o* guys in Vietnam were career trainees or Cunior o**icer
trainees,- 8uloon e!plaine. -0ome ha been in the military@ some ha Cust grauate *rom college. .hey put
them through a si!-month course as either intelligence or paramilitary o**icers, then sent them o#er. .hey were
Cust learning, an it was a hell o* a place *or their baptism o* *ire. .hey sent whole classes to Vietnam in 19GN
an 19GD, then later brought in oler guys who ha e!perience as region a#isers ... .hey were suppose to hit
e#ery pro#ince once a wee3, but some woul o it o#er the raio in one ay.
-.he a#iser<s Cob was to 3eep the region o**icer in*orme about real operations mounte in the capital city or
against big shots in the *iel,- 8uloon sai, aing that a'-isers %ho %ante' to 'o a goo' Hob ran the PI!s
the)sel-es* %hile the others hire' assistants (( or)er co.s or Green 0erets (( %ho %ere .ai' b+ the !IA
but %or&e' or the)sel-es* 'oing a 'irt+ Hob in e5change or a line on the insi'e trac& to the blac&
)ar&et* %here V! in nee' o cash an' s.ies see&ing na)es 'ealt in ar)s* 'rugs* .rostitution* )ilitar+
scri.* an' %hate-er other co))o'ities %ere a-ailable,
+(/s are also *aulte *or proucing only in*ormation on low-le#el V/(. 6hene#er a V/( member with strateic
in*ormation $*or e!ample, a care in ,ue who 3new what was happening in the Delta' was capture, he was
immeiately grabbe by the region interrogation center, or the ?(/ in 0aigon, where e!perts coul prouce
5uality reports *or 6ashington. .he lac3 o* *eebac3 to the +(/ *or its own pro#ince operations resulte in a
re#ol#ing oor synrome, wherein the +(/ was reuce to pic3ing up the same low-le#el V/( people month a*ter
month.
.he #alue o* a +(/, accoring to 8uloon, -epene on the number o* people that were put in it, on the caliber
o* people who manne it -- especially the chie* -- an how goo they were at writing up this in*ormation. So)e
gu+s thought the+ %ere the biggest %aste o ti)e an' )one+ e-er s.ent because the+ 'i'n6t .ro'uce
an+thing, %n a lot o* them in<t prouce anything because the guys in the pro#inces in<t push them. =ther
people say, <(t<s not that we in<t try@ it<s Cust that it was a umb iea in the *irst place, because we couln<t get
the military -- who were the ones capturing prisoners -- to turn them o#er. .he military weren<t going to turn them
o#er to us until they were *inishe with them, an by then they were washe out.<
-.his,- 8uloon concee, -was part o* the o#erall plan: )et the military get the tactical military intelligence *irst.
=b#iously that<s the most important thing going on in a war. 9ut then we *elt that a*ter the military got what they
coul use tomorrow or ne!t wee3, maybe the /(% shoul tal3 to this guy. .hat was the whole iea o* ha#ing the
+ro#ince (ntelligence /oorination /ommittees an why the +(/s became part o* them, so we coul wor3 this
stu** bac3 an *orth. %n in pro#inces where our guys went out o* their way to wor3 with the 8%/V sector
a#iser, they were able to get something one.-
.he military<s sie o* the story is gi#en by 8aCor :eneral >oseph Mc!hristian, who arri#e in 0aigon in >uly
19GE as 8%/V<s intelligence chie*. 8c/hristian recogni4e the threat pose by the V/( an, in orer to estroy
it, propose -a large countrywie counterintelligence e**ort in#ol#e in countersabotage, countersub#ersion an
counterespionage acti#ities.- 1L2 (n structuring this attac3 against the V/(, 8c/hristian assigne military
intelligence etachments to each ".0. %rmy brigae, i#ision, an *iel *orce, as well as to each 0outh
Vietnamese i#ision an corps. ,e create combine centers *or intelligence, ocument e!ploitation,
interrogation, an materiel e!ploitation an irecte them to support an coorinate allie units in the *iel. %n
he orere the construction o* military interrogation centers in each sector, i#ision, an corps.
8c/hristian reaily concee the primacy o* the /(% in anti-V/( operations. ,e ac3nowlege that the military
i not ha#e sophisticate agent nets an that military a#isers at sector le#el *ocuse on ac5uiring tactical
44
intelligence neee to mount o**ensi#e operations. 9ut he was #ery upset when the /(%, -without coorination
with 8%/V, too3 o#er control o* the *iles on the in*rastructure locate- in the +(/s. ,e got an e#en bigger shoc3
when he himsel* -was re*use permission to see the in*rastructure *ile by a member o* the 1/(%2.- In'ee'*
because the !IA .re-ente' the )ilitar+ ro) entering the PI!s* the )ilitar+ retaliate' b+ reusing to sen'
the) .risoners, As a result* anti(V!I o.erations %ere .oorl+ coor'inate' at .ro-ince le-el, >9?
8eanwhile, 8%/V assigne intelligence teams to the pro#inces, which *orme agent nets mainly through
Fegional an +opular Aorces uner military control. .hese a#isory teams sent reports to the political orer o*
battle section in the /ombine (ntelligence /enter, which prouce complete an timely intelligence on the
bounaries, location, structure, strengths, personalities an acti#ities o* the /ommunist political organi4ation, or
in*rastructure. 1102
(n*ormation *iltering into the /ombine (ntelligence /enter was place in an automatic ata base, which enable
analysts to compare 3nown V/( o**eners with 3nown aliases. %gent reports an special intelligence collection
programs li3e +roCect /orral pro#ie the military with in*ormation on low-le#el V/(, while in*ormation on high-
le#el V/( came *rom the /ombine 8ilitary (nterrogation /enter, which, accoring to 8c/hristian, was the -*ocal
point o* tactical an strategic e!ploitation o* selecte human sources.- 1112
.he 0outh Vietnamese military branch responsible *or attac3ing the V/( was the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice uner
the irection o* :eneral )oan. )iaison with the 800 was hanle by 8%/V<s /ounter-(ntelligence Di#ision within
the E2Eth 8ilitary (ntelligence :roup. .he primary mission o* counterintelligence was the e*ection in place o*
V/( agents who ha penetrate %FV? channels, *or use as ouble agents. 9y mi-19GG ".0. military
intelligence employe about a thousan agents in 0outh Vietnam, all o* whom were pai through the E2Eth<s
(ntelligence /ontingency Aun.
.he E2Eth ha a hea5uarters unit near )ong 9inh, one battalion *or each corps, an one wor3ing with 0=: in
thir countries. (nternally the E2Eth was i#ie into bilateral teams wor3ing with the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice
an %FV? military intelligence, an unilateral tea)s %or&ing %ithout the &no%le'ge or a..ro-al o the
GVN. =perational teams consiste o* *i#e enliste men, each one an agent hanler reporting to an o**icer who
ser#e as team chie*. $hen assigne' to the iel'* agent han'lers in unilateral tea)s li-e' on their o%n*
#on the econo)+,# To a-oi' #la.s*# the+ %ere gi-en i'entiication as /oreign Ser-ice oicers or
e).lo+ees o .ri-ate A)erican co).anies* although the+ &e.t their )ilitar+ IDs or access to classiie'
inor)ation* areas* an' resources, "pon arri#ing in-country, each agent hanler $a3a case o**icer' was
assigne a principal agent, who usually ha a *unctioning agent networ3 alreay in place. 0ome o* these nets
ha been set up by the Arench, the 9ritish, or the /hinese. ;ach principal agent ha se#eral subagents wor3ing
in cells. )i3e most spies, subagents were usually in it *or the money@ in many cases the war ha estroye their
businesses an le*t them no alternati#e.
/ase o**icers wor3e with principal agents through interpreters an couriers. (n theory, a case o**icer ne#er met
subagents. (nstea, each cell ha a cell leaer who secretly met with the principal agent to e!change
in*ormation an recei#e instructions, which were passe along to the other subagents. 0ome subagents were
political specialists@ others attene to tactical military concerns. +osing as woocutters or rice *armers or
secretaries or auto mechanics, subagents in*iltrate Vietcong #illages or businesses an reporte on ?)A
associations, V/( cares, an the :V?<s criminal unerta3ings as well as on the si4e an whereabouts o* V/
an ?V% combat units.
/ase o**icers hanling political -accounts- were gi#en re5uirements, originate at battalion hea5uarters, by
their team leaers. .he re5uirements were *or speci*ic in*ormation on ini#iual V/(s. .he cell leaer woul
report on a particular V/( to the principal agent, who woul pass the in*ormation bac3 to the case o**icer using
stanar traecra*t methos -- a cryptic mar3 on a wall or telephone pole that the case o**icer woul perioically
loo3 *or. .he case o**icer woul, upon seeing the signal, sen a courier to retrie#e the report *rom the principal
agent<s courier at a prearrange time an place. .he case o**icer woul then pass the in*ormation to his team
leaer as well as to other customers, incluing the /(% liaison o**icer at the embassy house, as /(%
hea5uarters in a pro#ince was calle.
.he *inishe proucts o* positi#e an counterintelligence operations were calle army in*ormation reports.
Re.orts an' agents %ere rate' on the basis o accurac+* but insoar as )ost agents %ere in it or
)one+* accurac+ %as har' to Hu'ge, A s.+ )ight i).licate a .erson %ho o%e' hi) )one+ or a ri-al in
lo-e* business* or .olitics, 8any sources were ouble agents, an all agents were perioically gi#en lie
etector tests. Aor protection they were also gi#en coe names. .hey were pai through the 8%/V (ntelligence
/ontingency Aun, but not well enough to sur#i#e on their salaries alone, so many abble in the blac3 mar3et,
too.
The inal stage o the intelligence c+cle %as the ter)ination o agents* or %hich there %ere three
)etho's, /irst %as ter)ination b+ .a+ing the agent o* s%earing hi) to secrec+* an' sa+ing so long,
45
Secon' %as ter)ination %ith .reHu'ice* %hich )eant or'ering an agent out o an area an' .lacing his or
her na)e on a blac&list so he or she coul' ne-er %or& or the "nite' States again1 thir' %as ter)ination
%ith e5tre)e .reHu'ice* a..lie' %hen the )ere e5istence o an agent threatene' the securit+ o an
o.eration or other agents, !ase oicers %ere taught* in o(the(recor' sessions* ho% to ter)inate their
agents %ith e5tre)e .reHu'ice, !IA oicers recei-e' si)ilar instruction,
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. Karnow calls :ougleman -the principal a#iser- to =+)%? ND%.
!HAPTER 3: /iel' Police
/our O.inions on Paciication
.he corporate warrior: -+aci*ication was the ultimate goal o* both the %mericans an the 0outh Vietnamese
go#ernment. % comple! tas3 in#ol#ing military, psychological, political, an economic *actors, its aim was to
achie#e an economically an politically #iable society in which the people coul li#e without constant *ear o*
eath or other physical harm- -- 6())(%8 6;0.8=F;)%?D, % 0olier Feports
.he poet: -De*enseless #illages are bombare *rom the air, the inhabitants ri#en into the countrysie, the
cattle machine-gunne, the huts set a*ire with inceniary bullets: this is calle paci*ication- -- :;=F:;
=F6;)), +olitics an the ;nglish )anguage, 19DG
.he reporter: -6hat we<re really oing in Vietnam is 3illing the cause o* <wars o* liberation.< (t<s a testing groun --
li3e :ermany in 0pain. (t<s an e!ample to /entral %merica an other guerrilla prone areas- -- 9;F?%FD A%)),
-.his (sn<t 8unich, (t<s 0pain,- Famparts $December 19GE'
.he warlor: -% popular political base *or the :o#ernment o* 0outh Vietnam oes not now e!ist. .he e!isting
go#ernment is oriente towar the e!ploitation o* the rural an lower class urban populations. (t is in *act a
continuation o* the Arench colonial system o* go#ernment with upper class Vietnamese replacing the Arench.
.he issatis*action o* the agrarian population ... is e!presse largely through alliance with the ?)A- -- >ohn +aul
Vann, 19GE
In retaliation or selecti-e terror attac&s against A)ericans in South Vietna)* Presi'ent 4+n'on
8ohnson or'ere' in 293@ the bo)bing o cities in North Vietna), The rai's continue' into 293B* the i'ea
being to 'eal the !o))unists )ore .unish)ent than the+ coul' absorb, Although co).arisons %ere
unorthco)ing in the A)erican .ress* North Vietna) got a taste o %hat Englan' %as li&e 'uring the
Na7i terror bo)bings o $orl' $ar II, an li3e the 9rits, the ?orth Vietnamese e#acuate their chilren to the
countrysie but re*use to say uncle.
;nrage by in*iltrating ?orth Vietnamese troops, )9> also orere the bombing o* )aos an /amboia. .o help
the %ir Aorce locate enemy troops an targets in those -neutral- countries, 0=: launche a cross-borer
operation calle +rairie Aire. 6or3ing on the problem in )aos was the /(%, through its top secret +roCect D0D.
,ea5uartere in Vientiane, +roCect D0D sent agents into the countrysie to locate targets *or 9-E2<s statione in
:uam an on aircra*t carriers in the 0outh /hina 0ea. The )assi-e bo)bing ca).aign turne' )uch o 4aos
an' !a)bo'ia into a %astelan',
The sa)e %as true in South Vietna)* %here the strateg+ %as to 'e)orali7e the !o))unists b+ blo%ing
their -illages to s)ithereens, 9ecause o* the e#astation the bombing wrought, hal* a million Vietnamese
re*ugees ha *le their #illages an were li#ing in temporary shelters by the en o* 19GE, while another hal*
million were wanering aroun in shoc3, homeless. %t the same time nearly a 5uarter million %merican soliers
were mire in the muc3 o* Vietnam, a small percentage o* them engage in paci*ication as #ariously e*ine
abo#e. .he +entagon thought it neee hal* a million more men to get the Cob one.
46
Feacting to the presence o* another generation o* *oreign occupation troops, /=0V? commaner :eneral
?guyen /hi .hanh calle *or a renewe insurgency. .he hea o* the ?)A, ?guyen ,uu .ho, agree. .he battle
was Coine. %n with the reCu#enate re#olution came an increase eman by the /(% *or V/( prisoners.
,owe#er, the V!I ish %ere sub)erge' in the sea o reugees that %as rolling li&e a ti'al %a-e o-er South
Vietna), Ha-ing been s%a).e' b+ the hu)an 'eluge* onl+ three thousan' o Saigon6s eighteen
thousan' National Police)en %ere a-ailable to chase the V!I1 the rest %ere bus+ 'irecting traic an'
)anning chec&.oints into Saigon,
)i3ewise, in the countrysie, the hapless police were capturing *ew V/( *or interrogation -- *ar *ewer, in *act, than
".0. combat units caught while conucting coron an search operations, in which entire #illages were here
together an e#ery man, woman, an chil subCecte to search an sei4ure, an worse. %s >ohn 8uloon
note, the military rarely mae its prisoners a#ailable to the police until they were -washe out.-
8a3ing matters worse was the *act that pro#ince chie*s eager to *oster -local initiati#e- o*ten mae eals with the
/(% o**icers who *une them. %t the irection o* their paramilitary a#isers, pro#ince chie*s o*ten pursue the
V/( with counterterror teams, inepenently o* the police, put the V/( in their own pro#ince Cails an sent them
to +(/s only i* the /(%<s 0pecial 9ranch a#iser learne what was going on, an complaine lou enough an
long enough. 8eanwhile, ami the in o* saber-rattling coming *rom the +entagon, the plainti#e cries o* police
an paci*ication managers began to echo in the corriors o* power in 6ashington. 0omething ha to be one to
put some punch in the ?ational +olice.
6hat was ecie, in the summer o* 19GE, was to pro#ie the ?ational +olice with a paramilitary *iel *orce that
ha the mission an s3ills o* counterterror teams an coul wor3 Cointly with the military in coron an search
operations. .he man gi#en the Cob was /olonel 6illiam -+appy- :rie#es, senior a#iser to the ?ational +olice
Aiel Aorces *rom %ugust 19GE till 19&N.
#I %as tr+ing to create an A(One .olice orce starting ro) scratch*# :rie#es tol me when we met at his
home in 19LG. 112 % blen o* roc3-soli integrity an irre#erence, :rie#es was the son o* a ".0. %rmy o**icer,
born in the +hilippines an reare in a series o* army posts aroun the worl. ,e attene 6est +oint an in
6orl 6ar (( saw action in ;urope with the OV /orps %rtillery, then came the 6ar /ollege, Cump school at Aort
9enning $he mae his last Cump at age si!ty' an an interest in uncon#entional war*are. As MAAG chie o sta
in Greece in the )i'(29@I6s* Grie-es %or&e' %ith the !IA* the S.ecial /orces* an' the Gree& airborne
rai'ing orce in .ara)ilitar+ o.erations behin' ene)+ lines,
:rie#es ene his career as eputy commaner o* the 0pecial 6ar*are /enter at Aort 9ragg uner :eneral
6illiam Harborough. -(<#e o*ten thought that i* he ha gone to Vietnam instea o* 6estmorelan, the war woul
ha#e ta3en a i**erent course. 8ore woul ha#e been put on the Vietnamese. Harborough,- sai :rie#es,
-reali4e that you can<t *ight a war on the *our-year political cycle o* the "nite 0tates -- which is what we were
trying to o. (<m con#ince the war coul ha#e been won, but it woul ha#e ta3en a long time with a lot less ".0.
troops.- .he notion that -you can<t go in an win it *or someboy, <cause you<ll ha#e nothing in the en<- was the
philosophy +appy :rie#es brought to the ?ational +olice Aiel Aorces.
Da+s beore his retire)ent ro) the ",S, Ar)+* Grie-es %as as&e' to Hoin the Agenc+ or International
De-elo.)ent6s Public Saet+ .rogra) in South Vietna), -9yron ;ngel, the chie* o* the +ublic 0a*ety
+rogram in 6ashington, D./., ha a representati#e at the 0pecial 6ar*are /enter who approache me about
ta3ing the Cob,- :rie#es recalle. -,e sai they were loo3ing *or a guy to hea up the paramilitary *orce within the
?ational +olice. .hey speci*ically selecte me *or the Cob with the Aiel +olice, which were Cust being organi4e
at the time, because they neee someone with an uncon#entional war*are bac3groun. 0o ( went to
6ashington, D./., was inter#iewe by 9yron ;ngel, among other people, too3 a 5uic3 course at the "0%(D
+olice %caemy, an as a result, when ( retire in >uly 19GE, by the en o* the ne!t month ( was in Vietnam.
-)et me gi#e you a little bac3groun on what the Aiel +olice concept was,- :rie#es continue. -(n a country li3e
Vietnam you ha a situation where a policeman couln<t wal3 a beat -- li3e 9loo %lley in +aris. (n orer to wal3
a beat an bring police ser#ices to the people, in most parts o* Vietnam you ha to use military tactics an
techni5ues an *ormations Cust *or the policeman to sur#i#e. 0o you wal3 a beat by s5uas an platoons. .he
military woul call it a patrol, an, as a matter o* *act, so i the police.
-.hat was the basic concept. 6hether you ha an out*it calle +hoeni! or not, there was a police nee *or a *iel
*orce organi4ation in a counterinsurgency role. .he 9ritish *oun this necessary in 8alaya, an they create
+olice Aiel Aorces there. (n *act, the original iea o* the Vietnamese +olice Aiel Aorces came out o* 8alaya.
Fobert .hompson recommene it. %n when ( got to Vietnam, they ha a contract %ustralian ... who ha ta3en
o#er *or himsel* the +olice Aiel Aorces: .e 0erong. (* you loo3e at the paper, he was hire by %(D as a
consultant@ but he was pai by the /(%, which was reimburse by %(D. .his arrangement allowe the /(% to
ha#e input into how the Aiel +olice were manage.
47
-6hen ( got to Vietnam,- :rie#es continue, -( *oun mysel* responsible on the %merican sie o* this thing, an
yet 0erong was in there, not as an a#iser, but irectly operating. He ha' so)e )one+ co)ing in ro)
Australia* %hich he %oul' 'is.ense to get >Vietna)ese? to co)e o-er to his si'e* an' he ha' i-e or si5
Australian .ara)ilitar+ a'-isers* .ai' b+ the !o).an+ >!IA?* sa)e as hi),#
.he problem was that the /(% wante to establish the Aiel +olice uner its control, not as a police *orce but as
a unit against the in*rastructure. .he /(% trie to o that by ha#ing 0erong suborn the Vietnamese o**icers who
manage the program, so that he coul run it li3e a pri#ate army, the way the agency ran the counterterror
teams. -"ner 0erong an the /(%,- :rie#es e!plaine, -the Aiel +olice program was not *or the bene*it o* the
Vietnamese@ when they were gone, there wasn<t going to be anything le*t. 6ell, they coul run it li3e the
counterterror teams, or they coul be a#isers.-
%s a matter o* principle, :rie#es *elt obligate to run his program legitimately. -?ow 0erong an ( were both
ealing with the same Vietnamese,- he recalle, -with him on the groun trying to ma3e it anti-V/(. .hen (
isco#ere that some #ery peculiar things were going on. .here was no accountability. .he /(% was *urnishing
piasters an weapons to get the Aiel +olice going, but these things were roppe by the /ompany *rom
accountability when they le*t 0aigon. Serong %oul' ta&e a Hee.* shi. it b+ Air A)erica u. to the training
center in Da 4at* shi. it bac& on the ne5t air.lane out* an' he6' ha-e a -ehicle o his o%n o the boo&sN
A lot o .iasters %ere being use' to .a+ .ersonal ser-ants* to bu+ li=uor* things o that nature, %n he
ha sources o* in*ormation. ,e was going with the irector o* %(D<s aministrati#e assistant, an she woul ta3e
things 0erong was intereste in an let him see them be*ore 1"0%(D Director2 /harlie 8ann i. .here were all
sorts o* things going on, an this Cust put me across the barrel.
-(t too3 me a couple o* months to *igure it out- -- :rie#es sighe -- -an it mae it har to put the Aiel +olice
bac3 on the police trac3, which was my Cob. 0o the *irst thing we i was try to get ri o* that crow. 9ut 9ob
)owe, who was the hea o* +ublic 0a*ety in 0outh Vietnam an my boss through the chie* o* operations, wante
me to stay out o* it. 0erong ha pulle the wool o#er his eyes, an he Cust wasn<t intereste. .hen >ohn
8anopoli replace )owe, an >ohn calle me in an sai he wante to see me get into it@ he ha a irecti#e to
get ri o* 0erong, an ( supplie the ammunition.
#It %as >not? Hust his .ersonalit+*# Grie-es sai' in retros.ect* #but his han'ling o un's* e=ui.)ent* an'
e-er+thing else %as co).letel+ i))oral, An' e-entuall+ it all ca)e out, Ater about a +ear the ser-ices
o 0riga'ier Serong %ere 'is.ense' %ith1 his an' his .eo.le6s contracts ran out or %ere turne' o-er to
the !o).an+* an' )+ relationshi. %ith the !IA station soure' as a result,#
The inal .arting o %a+s ca)e %hen Grie-es %as as&e' to %or& or the !IA %ithout the &no%le'ge o
his AID su.eriors, /ro) his e5.erience %ith the agenc+ in Greece* Grie-es &ne% that !IA sta oicers
%ere .rotecte' but that contract e).lo+ees %ere e5.en'able, He 'i' not trust the !IA enough to .ut
hi)sel in the tenuous .osition o ha-ing to 'e.en' on it,
:rie#es<s re*usal to bring the Aiel +olice uner /(% control ha a signi*icant e**ect. -(n the eyes o* 0erong an
that crew, the Aiel +olice were to be an outlet o* the /ompany,- :rie#es e!plaine. #So %hen it beca)e
ob-ious the+ %ere a .art o the National Police* the !IA 'e-elo.e' the Pro-incial Reconnaissance "nits
;PR"< (( units o.erating se.aratel+* hire' an' co))an'e' b+ !o).an+ .eo.le,# "nortunatel+* he
a''e'* #The /iel' Police coul' ne-er 'e-elo. across the boar' as long as PR" e5iste',# (nee, the +F"
an the Aiel +olice wor3e at cross-purposes *or years to come, re*lecting parochial tensions bet%een ",S,
agencies an unermining the ".0. war e**ort in Vietnam.
.he Aiel +olice was *ormally establishe on >anuary 2&, 19GE, at the same time as the 8arine +olice. (ts
mission, as written by :rie#es, was -*or the purpose o* e!tening police ser#ices to the people o* Vietnam in
areas where more con#entionally arme *orces an traine ?ational +olice coul not operate, an to pro#ie a
tool to assist in the e!tension o* the ?ational +olice into the rural areas.- Aiel +olice units were to patrol rural
areas, control ci#il isturbances, pro#ie security *or the ?ational +olice, act as a reser#e, an conuct rais
against the V/( base on in*ormation pro#ie by the 0pecial 9ranch.
?otably, :rie#es place the anti-V/( role last, a priority that was re#erse two years later uner +hoeni!. (n the
meantime, he was intent on bringing orer, iscipline, an a public ser#ice purpose to the Aiel +olice. -.he
hea5uarters was in 0aigon, collocate with +ublic 0a*ety,- :rie#es recalle. -%s soon as we coul, howe#er,
we constructe a separate hea5uarters an a warehouse on the outs3irts o* 0aigon. 6e hire ?ungs as
security. .here was a ?ung platoon in /holon at our central warehouse an *orty to *i*ty ?ungs at our training
center in Da )at. 6e got them through /hinese bro3ers in /holon.
-9etween 19GE an 19GG,- :rie#es e!plaine, -the Aiel +olice were Cust getting organi4e. "ner 0erong the
planne strength was eighteen thousan, but the actual *orce in >uly 19GE was two thousan.- .here were si!
companies in training at the original center in ?am Dong, which 0erong mo#e to .ri 8ot, about si! miles
48
outsie Da )at. #He %as also 'ealing %ith .iaster un's on the blac& )ar&et* using the .roits to buil' a
.ri-ate -illa or his -acations u. there*# Grie-es re-eale',
.he .ri 8ot *acility accommoate twel#e companies. .he %merican in charge was retire 0pecial Aorces
0ergeant 8aCor /huc3 +etry. .raining o* *iel policemen began with a two-month course at the ?ational +olice
training center in Vung .au, *ollowe by a three-month course at .ri 8ot. Aiel policemen were assigne to
pro#inces initially as a unit, later as ini#iuals. =**shore training in Cungle operations an riot control was gi#en
to selecte recruits at the 8alayan +olice Aiel Aorce training center $create by 0erong' through the /olombo
+lan, while other *iel policemen were traine at the (nternational +olice %caemy in 6ashington. .he *irst two
Aiel +olice companies, *rom )ong %n an :ia Dinh pro#inces, complete their training in December 19GE.
:rie#es then arrange *or 8%/V to pro#ie logistical support to the Aiel +olice through ".0. %rmy channels on
a reimbursable basis. (n orer to ma3e sure that supplies were not sol on the blac3 mar3et, e5uipment was
issue irectly into the %merican warehouse an parcele out by :rie#es an his sta**. -6e i not issue it to
the Vietnamese,- he sai, -until they ha the troops *or it. 6e in<t gi#e them twenty-se#en companies< worth o*
e5uipment when they only ha ten companies o* people.
-6e were the aministrators@- :rie#es e!plaine, -which *orce us to account *or *uns an o a lot o* things
that were not in an a#isory capacity. 9ut it was the only way to get the Cob one. Arom the #ery beginning the
iea was to turn it bac3 to the Vietnamese when they coul hanle it, but at *irst we ha to e!pan our a#isory
role to create this *orce.
-8y *irst counterpart,- :rie#es recalle, -*or about eight months was a 0pecial Aorces lieutenant colonel name
.ran Van .hua. ,e was assigne to the ?ational +olice an was wor3ing with .e 0erong. .hua meant well but
was not a strong o**icer. ,e was attempting to play us against each other by not allowing himsel* to become too
aware o* it. .hen ?guyen ?goc )oan became irector general o* the ?ational +olice, an he brought in /olonel
0anh, an army airborne o**icer.- %t that point .hua was reassigne as chie* o* the ?ational +olice training center
at Vung .au. -/olonel 0anh was an impro#ement o#er .hua, but he was also a little har to get along with,-
accoring to :rie#es. -,e ha no real interest in the police sie o* it. ,e came *rom one o* the /ombat +olice 1i2
battalions an was intereste primarily in the riot control aspect o* the Aiel +olice.-
Fe*lecting :eneral )oan<s priorities, /olonel 0anh in early 19GG re#ise Aiel +olice operating proceures to
emphasi4e ci#il isturbance control, an he irecte that Aiel +olice units in emergencies woul be a#ailable as
a reser#e *or any police chie*. /oncurrently with this re#ise mission, the two e!isting /ombat +olice battalions
-- still a#ise by .e 0erong uner /(% auspices -- were incorporate into the Aiel +olice. %#ailable as a
nationwie reaction *orce, the /ombat +olice was use by :eneral )oan to suppress 9uhist emonstrations
in the spring o* 19GG in Da ?ang, ,ue, an 0aigon. )i3ewise, Aiel +olice units in pro#inces aCacent to 0aigon
were o*ten calle into the capital to rein*orce ongoing riot control operations. (n such cases platoons woul
generally be sent in *rom )ong %n, :ia Dinh, an 9inh Duong pro#inces.
-.he traine pro#isional Aiel +olice companies were *inally eploye to their pro#inces in >uly 19GG,- :rie#es
sai, -a*ter being hel in 0aigon *or riot control uring the 9uhist struggle mo#ement, which ominate the *irst
hal* o* that year. 9y year<s en there were *orty-*i#e Aiel +olice companies, *our platoons each, *or a total o* *i#e
thousan *i#e hunre *orty *i#e men.- 9y the en o* 19G& the Aiel +olice ha twel#e thousan men in *i*ty-nine
companies.
-8y counterpart *or the longest time,- sai :rie#es, -was 8aCor ?guyen Van Dai, who starte out as a ranger
captain in the Delta. Dai was the best o* the bunch -- an ol solier an a real har roc3. ,e was the one who
really built the Aiel +olice.-
Arom >uly 19GL until Aebruary 19&1 Dai ser#e as assistant irector o* the ?ational +olice 0upport Di#ision an
as commanant o* the ?ational +olice Aiel Aorces. -=#er two years an a hal*,- sai Dai, <<as commanant
?+AA, my relationship with /olonel :rie#es an his sta** was #ery *rienly. 6e ha open iscussions to *in an
appropriate an reasonable solution to any i**icult problems. %*ter twenty-two years in the army, most o* that in
combat units, ( ha#e only one concept: Juality is better than 5uantity. %ll soliers in my comman must be
iscipline, an the leaer must emonstrate a goo e!ample *or others.- 122
-Dai,- :rie#es sai with respect, -brought to the ?ational +olice Aiel Aorces the attitue o* <ser#ice to the
people.<
-8y personnel,- e!plaine :rie#es, -the Aiel +olice a#isers, were hire in this country an sent o#er to
Vietnam. (n aition, because they were coming o#er so slowly, we got a couple o* local hires who were military
an too3 their ischarges in Vietnam. .he Aiel +olice a#isers were all ci#ilians. 1=* 2N0 +ublic 0a*ety a#isers
in Vietnam, 1E0 were on loan *rom the military.2 6e also ha a bunch o* peculiar eals. ( neee a#isers, an (
neee them ba. .he Ai*th 0pecial Aorces at ?ha .rang meanwhile ha a re5uirement *or men in ci#ilian
49
clothes in three particular pro#inces where ( neee a#isors, too. .heirs was an intelligence re5uirement, mine
was a wor3ing *unction, but a guy coul o both Cobs. 6hen this came out, ( went an lai it on the table with my
boss. ( wasn<t pulling anything unerhane, an ( got their permission to o this. .hese guys came along an
were ocumente as local hires by %(D, but actually they were still in the military. .hey too3 o#er an i a
amn *ine Cob in the pro#inces.
-.here were some o**icers, too,- :rie#es sai, aing that -most o* them were sta** members. $e also ha' an
e5()ilitar+ .olice )aHor as an a'-iser to t%o /iel' Police co).anies %or&ing %ith the /irst !a-alr+ near
Dui Nhon* rooting out V!, He %as there t%o 'a+s an' sai' he %ante' a tic&et ho)e, He sai'* 6I6' ha-e
sta+e' in the Ar)+ i I %ante' this,6
-0o ; 0chlacter too3 o#er in 9inh Dinh,- :rie#es continue. -9ase on 0pecial 9ranch intelligence that
Vietcong guerrillas were in the #illage, aroun *irst light the Airst /a#alry woul go in by chopper an circle the
#illage, *ollowe by a Aiel +olice s5ua, platoon, or company. 6hile the /a# pro#ie security, the /iel'
Police %oul' search .eo.le an' loo& in the rice .ot, The A)ericans ne-er &ne% %hat %as going on* but
the Vietna)ese in the /iel' Police %oul' &no% ho% )an+ .eo.le %ere ee'ing b+ loo&ing in the rice .ot,
I the+ sa% enough rice or ten .eo.le but onl+ sa% si5 .eo.le in the hooch* the+ &ne% the rest %ere
hi'ing un'ergroun',#
%bout the 0pecial 9ranch, :rie#es commente, -.hey ha a security an intelligence gathering *unction. 0pecial
9ranch *urnishe the intelligence on which the Aiel +olice woul react. .hey coul pic3 up two or three guys
themsel#es an actually in<t nee to call in the Aiel +olice unless it was a big eal.
#$hat %e 'i' %as .ut a co).an+ o /iel' Police in each .ro-ince*# :rie#es e!plaine. -=riginally the plan
was *or a *i!e company: *our platoons an a hea5uarters. (* you ha a big pro#ince, put in two companies.
.hen it became ob#ious, i* you<re going to put platoons in the istricts, that it woul be better to ha#e one
company hea5uarters an a #ariable number o* platoons. 0o the basic unit became the *orty-man three-s5ua
platoon. .hey ha 8-si!teens an were semi-mobile.
-(n theory, each company ha an a#iser, but that was ne#er the case. .here were ne#er enough. (n *act, some
o* the places where we in<t ha#e a Aiel +olice a#iser, the +ublic 0a*ety a#iser ha to ta3e it o#er. 6hen (
*irst went out there, some +ublic 0a*ety people ha to co#er three pro#inces an were suppose to ta3e the
Aiel +olice uner their wing. (n most cases, howe#er, they in<t ha#e any interest, an it in<t wor3 too well.
9ut when the thing got going, the +ublic 0a*ety a#iser ha the Aiel +olice a#iser uner him, an by the #ery
en the companies were so well traine that they coul run themsel#es.-
777
Doug 8c/ollum was one o* the *irst +ublic 0a*ety a#isers to manage Aiel +olice units in Vietnam. 9orn in ?ew
>ersey an reare in /ali*ornia, 8c/ollum ser#e three years in the ".0. %rmy be*ore Coining the 6alnut /ree3
+olice Department in 19G1. Ai#e years later one o* 8c/ollum<s colleagues, who was wor3ing *or +ublic 0a*ety in
Vietnam, wrote an suggeste that he o li3ewise. =n %pril 1G, 19GG, Doug 8c/ollum arri#e in 0aigon@ two
wee3s later he was sent to +lei3u +ro#ince as the +ublic 0a*ety police a#iser.
-.here was no one there to meet me when ( arri#e,- 8c/ollum recalle, -so ( went o#er to the pro#ince senior
a#iser ... who in<t 3now ( was coming an was surprise to see me. ,e in<t want me there either because
o* the pre#ious +ublic 0a*ety a#iser, who was then li#ing with his wi*e in /amboia. Fogers in<t thin3 +ublic
0a*ety was any goo.- 1N2
?ot many people i. .o gi#e the e#il his ue, howe#er, it was har *or a +ublic 0a*ety a#iser to istinguish
between unlaw*ul an customary beha#ior on the part o* his Vietnamese counterpart. .he pro#ince police chie*
bought his Cob *rom the pro#ince chie*, an in turn the police chie* e!pecte a percentage o* the pro*its his
suborinates mae selling licenses an paroles an whate#er to the ci#ilian population. 8any police chie*s were
also ta3ing payo**s *rom blac3-mar3eteers, a *act they woul naturally try to 3eep *rom their a#isers -- unless
the a#isors wante a piece o* the action, too.
.he problem was compoune *or a Aiel +olice commaner an his a#iser. %s :rie#es note, -the
Vietnamese Aiel +olice platoon leaer coul not operate on his own. ,e recei#e his orers an his tas3s *rom
commaners outsie the Aiel +olice, an the ?ational +olice commaners he wor3e *or were in turn subCecte
to the orers o* pro#ince an istrict chie*s who ha operational control o* the ?ational +olice.-
%nother limitation on the Aiel +olice was the *act that Vietnamese policemen were prohibite *rom arresting
%merican soliers. /onse5uently, Doug 8c/ollum wor3e closely with the 8ilitary +olice in +lei3u to reuce
tensions between %merican soliers an Vietnamese an 8ontagnar peestrians who o*ten *oun themsel#es
50
uner the wheels o* ".0. %rmy #ehicles. 6ith the cooperation o* his counterpart, 8c/ollum an the 8+s set up
stop signs at intersections an put raar in place in an e**ort to slow tra**ic. .o reuce tensions *urther,
8c/ollum an the 8+s restricte soliers to bars in the military compoun.
% eicate pro*essional who is now an intelligence analyst *or the )abor Department, 8c/ollum belie#e he
-was oing something *or our country by helping police help people.- =ne o* his accomplishments as a +ublic
0a*ety a#iser was to reno#ate the pro#ince Cail, which be*ore his arri#al ha male an *emale prisoners
incarcerate together. He ins.ecte' the PI! once a %ee&* 'i' )an.o%er stu'ies %hich re-eale' #ghost#
e).lo+ees on the .olice .a+roll* an manage the national ienti*ication program, which presente a uni5ue
problem in the highlans because -it was har to ben the *ingers o* a 8ontagnar.- 8c/ollum also le the Aiel
+olice in Coint patrols with the 8+s aroun +lei3u /ity<s perimeter.
0oon 8c/ollum was running the +ublic 0a*ety program in three pro#inces -- +lei3u, Kontum, an +hu 9on. %s
a#iser to the police chie* in each pro#ince 8c/ollum was responsible *or collecting intelligence -*rom the police
sie- on enemy troop mo#ements, caches, an cares an *or sening intelligence reports to his regional
hea5uarters in ?ha .rang. .hen, in Aebruary 19G&, 8c/ollum was reassigne to 9an 8e .huot, the capital city
o* Darlac +ro#ince. There he ha' the .olice set u. #a )a7e o barbe' %ire* allo%ing onl+ one %a+ into the
cit+, ( put people on roo*tops an ha the Aiel +olice on ro#ing patrols.- 8c/ollum also began monitoring the
/hieu ,oi program. -.hey< come in, we< hol them, *ee them, clothe them, get them a mat. .hen we<
release them, an they< waner aroun the city *or a while, then isappear. (t was the biggest hole in the net.-
8c/ollum<s *eelings re*lect the growing tension between people in#ol#e in police programs an those in#ol#e
in Fe#olutionary De#elopment. %t times the two approaches to paci*ication seeme to cancel each other out. 9ut
they also o#erlappe. 0ai :rie#es about this parao!ical situation: -6e use to sen Aiel +olice s5uas an
platoons own to Vung .au *or FD training, which was political inoctrination, an *or +F" training, which was
rais an ambushes. No% the RD !a're %ere .atterne' on the !o))unists6 .olitical ca're* an' the+
.arallele' the ci-ilian go-ern)ent, 9ut most were city boys who went out to the #illages an Cust tal3e to the
girls. =n the other han, the Vietcong ha been training since they were twel#e. 0o the /(% was trying to o in
twel#e wee3s what the /ommunists i in si! years.-
+hoeni! e#entually arose as the ultimate synthesis o* these con*licting police an paramilitary programs. %n
with the *ormation o* the Aiel +olice, its component parts were set in place. The !IA %as )anaging !ensus
Grie-ance* RD !a're* counterterror tea)s* an' the PI!s, Militar+ intelligence %as %or&ing %ith the MSS*
ARVN intelligence* an' the Regional an' Po.ular /orces, AID %as )anaging !hieu Hoi an' Public
Saet+* inclu'ing the /iel' Police, All that re)aine' %as or so)eone to bring the) together un'er the
S.ecial 0ranch,
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. .he two /ombat +olice battalions $later calle =rer +olice' were /(%-a#ise paramilitary police units use to
brea3 up emonstrations an pro#ie security *or go#ernment *unctions.
!HAPTER :: S.ecial 0ranch
?elson 9ric3ham is *iercely inepenent, hungry *or in*ormation, an highly s3ille at organi4ing comple!
systems in simple terms. -(<#e been calle an organi4ational genius,- he sai moestly, -but that<s not true. (<m
Cust well rea.- 112 ,e is also engaging, cani, an will*ul, with interests ranging *rom yachting an bir watching
to religious stuies. $hen %e )et in No-e)ber 29B3* he ha' Hust co).lete' a )aster6s thesis on the /irst
0oo& o 8ohn,
,is moti#e *or spea3ing with me, howe#er, ha nothing to o with atonement@ in his wors, it was a matter o*
-#anity,- the chance that -maybe (<ll win up as a *ootnote in history.- 0ai 9ric3ham: #I eel that I* as %ell as a
nu)ber o other .eo.le* ne-er got recognition or so)e o the things %e 'i',# 9ric3ham also belie#e his
analysis o* the /(%<s role in the Vietnam 6ar might help re#erse what he saw as a angerous ri*t to the right in
%merican politics. #The e-ents %e6-e seen in recent +ears*# he tol' )e* #are a reaction to the .s+chic
trau)a o the countr+ ollo%ing Vietna)* a reaction %hich* on a ar )ore )o'est scale* is si)ilar in
character (( an' here6s %here it6s 'angerous (( to the rustration an' bitterness o the Ger)an nation
ater the /irst $orl' $ar,#
51
/oming *rom a /(% o**icer who i e#erything in his power to win the war, to the e!tent o* creating +hoeni!, such
a warning carries ouble weight. 0o, who is ?elson 9ric3hamB +rior to Coining the /(% in 19D9, 0ric&ha)
atten'e' Fale "ni#ersity, *rom which he was grauate magna cum laue with a egree in international politics.
,is *irst /(% assignment was on the /4echoslo#a3ian es3 in the =**ice o* Feports an ;stimates. During the
Korean 6ar 9ric3ham wor3e *or the agency<s 0pecial (ntelligence 9ranch, gathering intelligence on 0o#iet
political an *oreign o**icers. ?e!t came a stint in the =**ice o* /urrent (ntelligence, where he got in#ol#e in
-epth research- on the 0o#iet political process an prouce with se#eral colleagues the lanmar3 /aesar
+roCect on the selection process o* 0o#iet leaers a*ter 0talin<s eath. %s a result o* the /aesar +roCect,
0ric&ha) %as in-ite' to 4on'on as a guest o 0ritish intelligence ( MI3, =#erseas tra#el an liaison with
*oreign nationals appeale to him, an in 19EE he trans*erre *rom the seate Directorate o* (ntelligence to the
0o#iet Fussia $0F' Di#ision in the *reewheeling Directorate o* +lans, where the /(%<s clanestine operations
were then being hatche.
(n 19EL 9ric3ham was appointe chie* o* the operations research branch o* the 0F Di#ision, where he planne
co#ert operations into 0o#iet territory. .hese operations inclue the emplacement o* photographic an signet
e5uipment near 0o#iet military bases an the preparation o* *alse ocuments *or -blac3- agents. 9ric3ham also
wrote research papers on speci*ic geographic targets.
Then the Russians sent u. S.utni&* %hich #scare' e-er+one*# 0ric&ha) recalle'* #an' so I %as .ut in
charge o a )assi-e research .roHect 'esigne' to 'e-elo. collection targets against the So-iet )issile
.rogra), 6ell, in 19ED ( ha rea a report *rom 9ritish intelligence escribing how they ha e#elope a target
plot approach to guiing espionage an other collection acti#ities. (n applying that target plot iea to the 0o#iet
problem, it immeiately occurre to me to magni*y it as a systems analysis stuy so we coul go a*ter the whole
0o#iet missile program. (t was the *irst time,- he sai, -that any go#ernment agency ha ta3en a systems
approach towar a 0o#iet target. 6e wante to pull together all in*ormation *rom whate#er source, o* whate#er
egree o* reliability, an collect that in*ormation in terms o* its geographic location. %n *rom that e**ort a series
o* natural targets sprang up.-
% systems approach means assembling in*ormation on a weapons system *rom its theoretical inception, through
its research an e#elopment stage, its serial prouction, its introuction to the arme *orces, *inally to its
eployment. -Aor the *irst time,- 9ric3ham sai, -there was a complete #iew o* e#erything 3nown about Fussian
military an missile e#elopment systems. .he 9ritish calle this the best thing achie#e by %merican research
since the war.-
(nso*ar as +hoeni! sought to combine all e!isting counterinsurgency programs in a coorinate attac3 on the
V/(, 9ric3ham<s notion o* a systems approach ser#e as the conceptual basis *or +hoeni!, although in +hoeni!
the targets were people, not missile silos.
6ith yet another *eather in his cap, 9ric3ham was poste in 19G0 to .eheran, where he manage intelligence
an counterintelligence operations against the 0o#iets in (ran. %s one o* only three neutral countries borering
the "00F, (ran was a plum assignment. Aor 9ric3ham, howe#er, it e#ol#e into a personality con*lict with his
es3 o**icer in 6ashington. Arustrate, he re5ueste a trans*er an in 293A %as sent to the Sino(So-iet
Relations 0ranch* %here he )anage' blac& .ro.agan'a o.erations 'esigne' to cause riction bet%een
the "SSR an' !hina, At the heart o these blac& o.erations %ere alse lag recruit)ents* in %hich !IA
case oicers .ose' as So-iet intelligence oicers an'* using legiti)ate So-iet ci.her s+ste)s an'
)etho'olog+* recruite' !hinese 'i.lo)ats* %ho belie-e' the+ %ere %or&ing or the Russians* although
the+ %ere actuall+ %or&ing or the !IA, .he /(% case o**icers, on 9ric3ham<s instructions, then use the
unsuspecting /hinese agents to create all manner o* mischie*. %lthough it was a Cob with -lots o* room *or
imagination,- 9ric3ham was unhappy with it, an when the agency ha its -call-up- *or Vietnam in the summer o*
19GE, 9ric3ham #olunteere to go.
,is preparation inclue brie*ings *rom e!perts on the Vietnamese es3, reaing boo3s an newspaper articles,
an re#iewing reports an cable tra**ic prouce by e#ery go#ernment agency. "pon arri#ing in 0aigon in
0eptember 19GE, he was assigne to the station<s liaison branch as eputy chie* o* police 0pecial 9ranch *iel
operations. ,is boss was .uc3er :ougleman.
.he chie* o* station was :oron >orgenson, -a 3inly, thought*ul person. ,e< been through the bombing o* the
embassy the pre#ious Aebruary. +eer De0il#a, who was hurt in the e!plosion, went home, an >orgy, who ha
been his eputy, became station chie*. 9ut within a matter o* months he went home, too, an >ohn ,art came
out as the new chie* o* station in >anuary 19GG.- .he subCect o* >ohn ,art ga#e 9ric3ham pause. #I ha-e
'escribe' the intelligence ser-ice as a sociall+ acce.table %a+ o e5.ressing cri)inal ten'encies*# he
sai', #A gu+ %ho has strong cri)inal ten'encies (( but is too )uch o a co%ar' to be one (( %oul' %in'
u. in a .lace li&e the !IA i he ha' the e'ucation, (< put >ohn ,art in this category -- a mercenary who *oun
a socially acceptable way o* oing these things an, ( might a, getting #ery well pai *or it.
52
->ohn ,art was an egomaniac,- 9ric3ham continue, -but a little bit more uner control than some o* the ba
ones. ,e was a smart one. % big, imposing guy o#er si! *eet tall with a #ery regal bearing an almost a 9ritish
accent. ,e claims to be ?orman, an he spo3e *luent Arench an was always trying on e#ery occasion to press
people to spea3 Arench. Fe 0tent use to say that you coul tell someboy who paraes his 3nowlege o*
Arench by the way he uses the subCuncti#e, an >ohn ,art use it properly. 9ut >ohn ,art ha both *eet on the
groun. ,e was a bright guy, #ery energetic, an #ery hea#y into tennis -- he playe it e#ery ay.
-6hen >ohn ,art came out as chie* o* station, ( was one o* his escort o**icers@ our Cob was to ta3e him on a tour
o* the whole country, to #isit the *acilities an e!plain what was going on. %n my Cob was in 5uestion at that
moment because ,art ha another guy -- his pet, >ohn 0herwoo -- slate to replace .uc3er as chie* o* *iel
operations .... %nyway,- 9ric3ham sai, -there6s a great 'i-ision in the /oreign Ser-ice %orl' bet%een
.eo.le %ho get out on the local econo)+ an' tr+ to eat nati-e an' in' out %hat6s going on -ersus the
.eo.le that hole u. in the A)erican colon+* the so(calle' gol'en ghetto .eo.le, 0o we<re sitting aroun,
tal3ing about Vietnamese *oo an about the guys who go own to the 8%%: compoun *or inner e#ery night,
an ,art ma3es this sort o* sneerli3e remar3 to me at the restaurant where we<re ha#ing inner@ he says, <6ell,
really, ( woul ha#e *igure you *or the 3in o* person who woul eat inner in the 8%%: compoun e#ery night.<
6ell, he later *oun out that wasn<t true, an he was persuae to appoint me to the position o* chie* o* *iel
operations. %n e#en though ( starte out with that base o* insecurity, ,art respecte me. %n later on that
became 5uite e#ient.-
+erhaps as a result o* his eating habits, 9ric3ham got assigne as chie* o* 0pecial 9ranch *iel operations in the
spring o* 19GG, a*ter .uc3er :ougleman<s tour ha ene an he was trans*erre to ?ew Delhi. %n once
installe in the Cob, he began to initiate the organi4ational re*orms that pa#e the way *or +hoeni!. .o trace that
process, it is help*ul to unerstan the conte!t.
-6e were within the liaison branch,- 9ric3ham e!plaine, -because we wor3e with the Vietnamese nationals,
ealing with the /(= an 0pecial 9ranch on 5uestions o* intelligence an counterespionage. .he chie* o* the
liaison branch was >ac3 0tent.- 0ric&ha)6s oice %as in the e)bass+ anne5, while 0pecial 9ranch
hea5uarters was locate in the ?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter. %s chie* o* *iel operations 9ric3ham ha
no liaison responsibilities at the national le#el. -( ha *iel operations,- 9ric3ham e!plaine, -which meant the
pro#ince o**icers. ( manage all these liaison operations in the pro#inces, but not in the 0aigon-:ia Dinh military
istrict. .hat was hanle by a separate section uner Fe 0tent within the liaison branch.-
%s *or his uties, 9ric3ham sai, -(n our particular case, *iel operations was wor3ing both positi#e intelligence
programs an counterespionage, because police o not istinguish between the two. 6ithin the /(% the two are
separate i#isions, but when you<re wor3ing with the police, you ha#e to co#er all this.- 9ric3ham compares the
0pecial 9ranch -with an intelligence i#ision in a maCor city police *orce, bearing in min that it is within a
national police organi4ation with national, regional, pro#ince, an istrict police o**icers. There is a -ertical
chain o co))an', 0ut it is not co).arable %ith /0I* not co).arable %ith MI /i-e* not co).arable %ith
Surete, It6s the 0ritish S.ecial 0ranch o .olice .... %n with the 0pecial 9ranch being concerne speci*ically
with intelligence, it was the natural ci#ilian agency towar which we woul gra#itate when the /(% got intereste.
"ner /olby, the 0pecial 9ranch became signi*icant.-
(* uner /olby $who was then chie* o* the /(%<s Aar ;ast Di#ision' the 0pecial 9ranch became signi*icant, then
uner 9ric3ham it became e**ecti#e. 9ric3ham<s Cob, as he e*ine it, -was to bring sharpness an *ocus to /(%
*iel operations.- ,e i#ie those operations into three categories: the ,amlet (n*ormant program $,(+', which
concerne low-le#el in*ormants in the #illages an hamlets@ the +ro#ince (nterrogation /enter program, incluing
/hieu ,oi an capture ocuments@ an agent penetrations. -( i not organi4e these programs,- he
ac3nowlege. -.hey were alreay in place. 6hat ( i o was to clean up the act ... bureaucrati4e ....6e ha
some pro#ince o**icers trying to buil +(/s, while some in<t care. 6e e#en ha police liaison people putting
whistles on 3ites at night to scare away the V/ when that wasn<t part o* their Cob. 6e were not suppose to be
propaganists@ that<s co#ert operations< Cob.-
%s 9ric3ham saw it, a 0pecial 9ranch a#iser shoul limit himsel* to his primary uties: training Vietnamese
0pecial 9ranch case o**icers how to mount penetrations o* the V/(, gi#ing them cash *or in*ormers an *or
builing interrogation centers, an reporting on the results. 9ric3ham i this by imposing his management style
on the organi4ation. %s e#elope o#er the years, that style was base on three principles: -=perate lean an
hungry, on<t get bogge own in numbers, an *igure some way to hol their *eet to the *ire.
-6hen ( got there, we ha about *ourteen pro#ince o**icers who were not istribute e#enly aroun the country
but were concentrate in population centers, the maCor ports, an pro#inces o* particular interest. A lot o
.ro-inces %ere e).t+* so %e ha' to ill the) u., an we e#entually got our strength up to *i*ty.-
.raining o* incoming o**icers was one in 6ashington, although 9ric3ham an his sta** $incluing >ohn 8uloon
an an o**icer who hanle logistics' ga#e them brie*ings on personal security, aircra*t security, emergency
53
beha#ior, an proceure -- -what to o i* your plane is shot own in V/ territory or i* the V/ o#errun a #illage
you<re wor3ing in .... 0ome guys too3 it seriously@ some i not,- 9ric3ham note. -6e also ga#e them reaing
material -- a .ime maga4ine article on the /hinese min an se#eral boo3s, the most important o* which was
Village in Vietnam. 9ut we ha to cut bac3 on this because the stu** was constantly isappearing. .hen, as the
police a#isory program e!pane, 6ashington set up another training program *or e!-police o**icers being
brought in on contract an *or military o**icers an enliste men assigne to the agency .... 6e ha a bunch o*
guys on contract as pro#ince o**icers who were not /(% o**icers, but who were hire by the agency an gi#en to
us.-
?ot the sort o* man to su**er *ools, 9ric3ham 5uic3ly began weeing out the cha** *rom the wheat, recommening
home lea#e *or pro#ince o**icers who ha operational *un shortages or were not at their posts or otherwise
coul not cut the mustar. 9ric3ham<s metho o* e#aluating o**icers was a monthly report. -( wante a pro#ince
o**icer to tell me once a month e#ery place he< been an how long he< been there. ?ormally this 3in o* thing
wouln<t show up in a report, but it was important to me an it was important to the Vietnamese that our people
<show the *lag< an be there when the action was going on. Feporting ma3es *or accountability.
-% 0pecial 9ranch monthly report, as ( esigne it, woul go up to *our pages in length an woul ta3e pro#ince
o**icers two or three ays to complete .... .he reports were then sent in *rom the pro#ince through the region
o**icer 1a position 9ric3ham place in the chain o* comman2, who wrote his report on top o* it. 6e stuie them
in 0aigon, pac3age them up, an sent them on to 6ashington, where they ha ne#er seen anything li3e it.-
.o streamline the rapily e!paning 0pecial 9ranch a#isory program *urther, 9ric3ham set up si! regional
o**ices an appointe region o**icers@ :oron Fothwell in Da ?ang, *or ( /orps@ Dic3 %3ins in ?ha .rang,
hanling the coastal pro#inces in (( /orps@ .om 9ur3e in 9an 8e .huot, hanling 8ontagnar pro#inces@ 0am
Dra3ulich in 9ien ,oa in ((( /orps@ 9ob /ollier in 8y .ho *or the northern Delta@ an Kinloch 9ull in /an .ho *or
the southern pro#inces. 9ric3ham<s liaison branch was the *irst to ha#e region o**icers@ the rest o* the station was
not operating that way. (n *act, while the liaison branch ha one o**icer in each pro#ince, reporting to a region
o**icer, the iscombobulate co#ert action branch ha *i#e or si! programs in each pro#ince, with an o**icer *or
each program, with more than two hunre o**icers coming in an out o* hea5uarters, each operating uner the
irect super#ision o* .om Donohue.
Donohue sco**e at 9ric3ham<s attention to reporting. -8y point, o* course, was 5uite the opposite o*
9ric3ham<s,- he sai. -( *elt it was better to 3eep those guys wor3ing an not tie them up with paper wor3 $that
can be hanle elsewhere'. 6hat ( i was ta3e raw reporting an gi#e it to an o**icer who was not really any
goo in the *iel, an he was responsible *or oing nothing but proucing *inishe reporting *rom raw reporting.
.hat ta3es the problem o** the guys in the *iel. (t<s the same problem that so many sales organi4ations ha#e: Do
they want their people on the street or oing reportsB- 122
Donohue<s buget $-about twenty-eight million ollars a year-' was consierably larger than his archri#al
9ric3ham<s, which was appro!imately one million ollars a year. =therwise, accoring to 9ric3ham, -.he main
i**erence between Aoreign (ntelligence an +aramilitary was the *act that we ha region o**icers, but the +8
people wor3e irectly out o* 0aigon .... %n it was this situation that ,art wante to straighten out.
-,art<s *irst mo#e was to aopt this regional o**icer concept *rom the liaison branch,- 9ric3ham e!plaine.
-0econ was to establish pro#ince o**icers so all /(% operations in a particular pro#ince came uner one
coorinate comman. .he *act that it operate on the other basis *or as long as it i is almost unbelie#able,
but there %as Hust too )uch )one+ an' not enough .lanning,
#The co-ert action .eo.le are a bree' a.art# (( 0ric&ha) sighe' (( #es.eciall+ the .ara)ilitar+ t+.es,
The+6-e ha' a sort o chec&ere' histor+ %ithin the agenc+* an' in Vietna) )ost o the) %ere reugees
ro) the !uban ailure, More than one o the) sai' the+ %ere 'a)ne' i the+ %ere going to be on the
losing en' o the Vietna) o.eration* too,# 9ac3ing away *rom the 3nuc3le raggers, 9ric3ham note: -6e
ha #ery little to o with one another. .hey were locate across the hall *rom us in the embassy anne!, an we
3new each other, an we were *riens, an we ran3 beer together. 9ut we ha our separate programs, theirs
being the co#ert programs the station was conucting in the pro#inces. .he +8 shop was basically an
intelligence arm uner co#er, getting its own intelligence through arme propagana teams, /ensus :rie#ance,
an the whole 8ontagnar program run out o* +lei3u .... Then the+ ha' the so(calle' counterterror tea)s*
%hich initiall+ %ere e5actl+ as letist .ro.agan'a 'escribe' the), The+ %ere tea)s that %ent into V!
areas to 'o to the) %hat the+ %ere 'oing to us, It gets sort o interesting, $hen the V! %oul' co)e into
-illages* the+6' lea-e a cou.le o hea's stic&ing on ence .osts as the+ let, That &in' o thing, ". there
in I !or.s there %as )ore than one occasion %here ",S, a'-isers %oul' be oun' 'ea' %ith nails
through their orehea's,#
%s *or the /ensus :rie#ance program, manage by >ohn 6oosman, 9ric3ham sai, -6e wante access to its
intelligence because they coul get intelligence we in<t ha#e access to. 9ut because we were more
54
compartmente within oursel#es than we shoul ha#e been, the police coul not necessarily absorb this stu** ....
.he basic contract with the Vietnamese peasant,- 9ric3ham e!plaine, -was that anything that was learne
through /ensus :rie#ance woul not be turne o#er to the police authorities. .his was to get the con*ience o*
the rural population. 0o we ha almost nothing to o with it. (t was *or the pro#ince chie*<s a#ice an guiance.
.hey too3 /ensus :rie#ance stu** an turne aroun an use it in the counterterror teams, although on
occasion they might turn something o#er to the military.- 9ric3ham cite /hieu ,oi as -one o* the *ew areas
where police an paramilitary a#isers cooperate.-
Fegaring his own programs, 9ric3ham sai, -%ll counterinsurgency epens in the *irst instance on in*ormants@
without them you<re ea, an with them you can o all sorts o* things. .his is something that can only be a local
operation. (t<s a *amily a**air. % *ew piasters change hans.-
(n -.he Auture %pplicability o* the +hoeni! +rogram,- written *or the %ir "ni#ersity in 19&D, /(% +ro#ince =**icer
6arren 8ilberg calls the ,amlet (n*ormant program the *ocus o* the 0pecial 9ranch<s -brea-an-butter-
acti#ities, esigne speci*ically -to gain in*ormation *rom an on the people who li#e in rural hamlets .... .he
problem,- he writes, -was in recruiting in*ormants in as many hamlets as possible.- .his tas3 was mae i**icult
by the *act that in*orming is angerous wor3, so -it became necessary to o etaile stuies o* #arious
moti#ational *actors.- /onse5uently, at the to. o S.ecial 0ranch recruit)ent lists %ere #.eo.le %ho ha'
been -icti)s o Viet !ong atrocities an' acts o terroris),# 1N2
Fecruiting #ictims o* V/ terror as in*ormers was a conition that o#e-taile neatly with counterterror an the
octrine o* /ontre /oup. Aor, as Da#i :alula e!plains, -pseuo insurgents are another way to get intelligence
an to sow suspicion at the same time between the real guerrillas an the population.- 1D2
0+ 293@ 'eectors %ho Hoine' counterterror tea)s ha' the %or's Sat Gong ;Gill !o))unist< tattooe' on
their chests as .art o the initiation cere)on+ to &ee. the) ro) returning to or)er V! an' NVA units,
Their unit insignia %as a )achete %ith %ings* %hile their unoicial e)ble) %as the 8oll+ Roger s&ull
an' crossbones, $hen %or&ing* !Ts 'is.ense' %ith the regalia* 'onne' blac& .aHa)as* an' .lun'ere'
nationalist as %ell as !o))unist -illages, This %as not a act re.orte' onl+ b+ the letist .ress, In
October 293@* u.on returning ro) a act(in'ing )ission to Vietna)* Ohio Senator Ste.hen Foung
charge' that the !IA hire' )ercenaries to 'isguise the)sel-es as Vietcong an' 'iscre'it !o))unists
b+ co))itting atrocities, #It %as allege' to )e that se-eral o the) e5ecute' t%o -illage lea'ers an'
ra.e' so)e %o)en*# the Heral' Tribune re.orte' Foung as sa+ing, >@?
In'ee'* !T tea)s 'isguise' as the ene)+* &illing an' other%ise abusing nationalist Vietna)ese* %ere
the ulti)ate or) o .s+%ar, It reinorce' negati-e stereot+.es o the Vietcong* %hile at the sa)e ti)e
su..l+ing S.ecial 0ranch %ith recruits or its inor)ant .rogra),
In his autobiogra.h+* Sol'ier* Anthon+ Herbert tells ho% he re.orte' or 'ut+ %ith SOG in Saigon in
No-e)ber 293@ an' %as as&e' to Hoin a to.(secret .s+%ar .rogra), #$hat the+ %ante' )e to 'o %as to
ta&e charge o e5ecution tea)s that %i.e' out entire a)ilies an' trie' to )a&e it loo& as though the V!
the)sel-es ha' 'one the &illing, .he rationale was that other Vietnamese woul see that the V/ ha 3ille
another V/ an woul be *rightene away *rom becoming V/ themsel#es. =* course, the #illagers woul then
be incline to some sort o* allegiance to our sie. 1G2
-( was tol,- writes ,erbert, -that there were Vietnamese people in the #illages who were being pai to point the
*inger.- (ntrigue, he as3e how they 3new *or certain that the in*ormer might not ha#e ulterior moti#es *or
leaing the eath s5uas to a particular *amily. -( suggeste that some o* their in*ormers might be moti#ate, *or
instance, by re#enge or personal monetary gain, an that some o* their stool-pigeons coul be ouble or triple
agents.- 1&2
8ilberg concees the point, noting that the 0pecial 9ranch recruite in*ormants who -clearly *abricate
in*ormation which they thought their 0pecial 9ranch case o**icers wante to hear- an that when -this
in*ormation was compile an prouce in the *orm o* blac3lists, a 'istinct .ossibilit+ e5iste' that the na)es
on such lists ha' little relation to actual .ersons or that the .eo.le so na)e' %ere not* in act* )e)bers
o the V!I.- 1L2
0uch concerns, un*ortunately, were o#erloo3e in the rush to obtain in*ormation on the V/(. -.he 0pecial 9ranch
3ept recors o* people who ha been #ictims o* Viet /ong atrocities an acts o* terrorism, o* people who ha
been unreasonably ta!e by the Viet /ong, o* *amilies which ha ha sons an husbans impresse into Viet
/ong guerrilla bans, an those people who, *or i**ering reasons, isli3e or istruste the Viet /ong.
Depening on the incenti#e, be it patriotism or monetary gain, many hamlet resients were esirous o* pro#iing
in*ormation on the acti#ities o* the local V/(. .he 0pecial 9ranch then constructe sometimes elaborate,
sometimes simple plans to either bring these potential in*ormants into pro#ince or istrict towns or to sen
unerco#er agents to the hamlets to inter#iew them on a regular basis.- 192
55
(n recommening -sa*e, anonymous- ways *or in*ormers to con#ey in*ormation, counterinsurgency guru Da#i
:alula cites as e!amples -the census, the issuing o* passes, an the remuneration o* wor3ers.- 6rites :alula:
-8any systems can be e#ise *or this purpose, but the simplest one is to multiply opportunities *or ini#iual
contacts between the population an the counterinsurgent personnel, e#ery one o* whom must participate in
intelligence collection.- 1102 .he iea, o* course, is that -intelligence collection- is the primary tas3 o* the
counterinsurgent an that all his contacts with the population are geare towar this purpose, whate#er ulterior
moti#e they may appear to ha#e.
%part *rom the ,amlet (n*ormant program, 0pecial 9ranch a#isers also manage the PI! .rogra) (( %hat
0ric&ha) calle' #a oun'ation stone u.on %hich it %as later .ossible to construct the Phoeni5 .rogra),
The PI!s %ere .laces %here 'eectors an' .risoners coul' be ta&en or =uestioning un'er controlle'
circu)stances*# he e!plaine. -Fesponsibility was hanle by a small group assemble by .uc3er
:ougleman. .his group wor3e with pro#ince o**icers setting up training programs *or translators, cler3s oing
*iling an collation, an interrogators. >ohn 8uloon was the chie* o* this little group. ,e was /(% sta**, an he
ha a goo program there. ;#erything le me to belie#e that he was top-notch.-
.he thir maCor program run by the 0pecial 9ranch was agent penetrations, what 9ric3ham terme -recruitment
in place o* Vietcong,- aing, -.his is by *ar the most important program in terms o* gathering intelligence on the
enemy. 8y motto was to recruit them@ i* you can<t recruit them, e*ect them $that<s /hieu ,oi'@ i* you can<t e*ect
them, capture them@ i* you can<t capture them, 3ill them. .hat was my attitue towar high-le#el V/(.-
.he penetration process wor3e as *ollows, accoring to =00 #eteran >im 6ar, the /(% o**icer in charge o* (V
/orps between 19G& an 19G9. %n athletic, goo-loo3ing man, 6ar note, when we met together at his home,
that the 0pecial 9ranch 3ept ossiers on all suspecte V/( in a particular area o* operations, an that e#ience
was gathere *rom +(/ interrogations, capture ocuments, an -wal3-ins- -- people who woul wal3 into a
police station an in*orm on an allege V/(. 6hen the accumulate e#ience inicate that a suspect was a
high-ran3ing V/( agent, that person was targete *or recruitment in place. -Hou in<t sen out the +F" right
away,- 6ar tol me. -Airst you ha to *igure out i* you coul get access to him an i* you coul communicate
with him once you ha a relationship. ;#eryboy in the Aar ;ast operates primarily by *amily, so the only
opportunity o* getting something li3e that woul be through relati#es who were accessible people. Does he ha#e
a sister or wi*e in town that we can ha#e access toB % brotherB 0omeboy who can reach himB 0omeboy he
can trustB (* that coul be arrange, then you loo3e *or a wea3ness to e!ploit. (s there any reason to belie#e
he<s been in this position *or *i#e years an hasn<t been promote when e#eryboy else aroun him has been
mo#ing up the laerB Does he bear resentmentB %nything you can *in by way o* #ulnerability that woul
inicate this guy might be amenable to persuasion to wor3 *or us.- 1112 0ribes* se5* blac&)ail* an' 'rugs all
%ere legiti)ate )eans o recruit)ent,
0pea3ing o* the 5uality o* 0pecial 9ranch penetration agents, 9ric3ham remar3e, -6e ha some that were
*airly goo. 9y which ( mean their in*ormation chec3e out.- .hat in*ormation, he ae, concerne -the
mo#ements an acti#ities o* istrict an pro#ince an /=0V? care. /=0V? people might come aroun on an
inspection tour or an inoctrination mission. 0ometimes they ha maCor political con*erences where you might
ha#e a number o* pro#ince an /=0V? care together in one place. ?ow this is the 3in o* thing we< go right
a*ter howe#er we coul. (t was usually militarily@ artillery i* you coul reach it.-
9ecause o* the unparallele -intelligence potential- o* penetrations, one o* the main Cobs o* liaison a#isers was
training 0pecial 9ranch case o**icers to hanle penetration agents. %t the same time, accoring to 9ric3ham, -i*
the opportunity came their way, our own people woul ha#e a unilateral penetration into the V/( without their
0pecial 9ranch counterparts 3nowing. .hese things *or the most part were low-grae, but occasionally we ha
some people on the payroll as penetration agents who wor3e at istrict le#el, an as ( recall, we ha three or
*our at pro#ince le#el, which is *airly high up.-
(n 19G&, 9ric3ham tol me, the /(% ha -se#eral hunre penetration agents in 0outh Vietnam, most o* them
low-le#el.- .hey were not culti#ate o#er a perio o* years either. -(n a counterinsurgency,- he e!plaine, -it<s
either 5uic3ly or not at all. ,owe#er, the unilateral operations branch in the station went a*ter some #ery high-
le#el, #ery sophisticate target penetration operations.- 0ince this unit playe a maCor role in +hoeni!, it re5uires
a brie* accounting.
.he /(%<s special operations unit *or unilateral penetrations was largely the wor3 o* 0am Dra3ulich, the senior
0pecial 9ranch a#iser in ((( /orps in 19GE. -(<#e always ha a notion e#er since ( was a 3i,- 9ric3ham sai,
-that it<s the cra4y people that ha#e the bright ieas. 0o (<#e always been willing to play along with people li3e
that, e#en though they<re ignore by the other 3is in school. 0ame thing with Dra3ulich. ,e ha a lot o* goo
ieas, but he was a little *la3y -- an he got more so. ,e re*use to li#e in 9ien ,oa, an he was the region
o**icer in charge. ?ow ( wante all the region o**icers to li#e in their capitals. %nyway, Dra3ulich ha a place to
li#e out there, an it han<t been bombe in thirty years@ but he was terri*ie, so he came to 0aigon e#ery night.
56
.he point came 18arch 19GG2 where he was not super#ising the pro#ince operations, an there*ore, ( persuae
.uc3er to relie#e him o* uty.
-,owar <Foc3y< 0tone 1>ac3 0tent<s replacement as chie* o* Aoreign (ntelligence $A('2 ha Cust come into country
an was putting on pressure *or V/( penetrations. 0o what .uc3er an ( i -- to respon to 0tone, on the one
han, an to sol#e the Dra3ulich problem, on the other -- was to create a high-le#el V/( penetration unit an
switch Dra3ulich to run it.-
Dra3ulich claime to me, in a 19LG inter#iew, that he ha written a proposal *or the high-le#el penetration unit
be*ore he was gi#en the Cob by 9ric3ham. 9ig an power*ully built, Dra3ulich sai he esigne the unit
speci*ically to ienti*y a group o* high-le#el V/( that ha 3ille, in broa aylight, a /(% o**icer on the main street
o* 9ien ,oa. ,ence his angst about sleeping o#ernight in 9ien 9oa. In an+ e-ent* Dra&ulich 'e-ise' a s.ecial
unit or .enetrating the high(le-el V!I %ho %ere targeting !IA oicers or assassination* an' it %as his
contention that this s.ecial unit* %hich su..lie' blac&lists to a s.ecial !T unit in Saigon* %as the
.rotot+.e or Phoeni5, 1122
.he special unit organi4e by Dra3ulich consiste o* se#eral high-ran3ing /(% o**icers who tra#ele through the
country re#iewing all penetration cases. .his team woul #isit each pro#ince o**icer, inter#iew e#eryone on his
sta**, e#aluate all the cases, in some instances meeting with the agent, then etermine which o* the cases were
promising enough to set up special arrangements. .he special unit woul bring bac3 to 0aigon the cases that
were promising, an in 0aigon, 9ric3ham sai, -6e woul apply special care to their e#elopment. 6e woul
nurture them, generate re5uirements, an ma3e sure they ha communications an *ull e!ploitation.
-Fegarless o* the potential importance o* this Cob,- 9ric3ham ae, -0am coul ne#er aCust to the *act that he
ha been relie#e o* his regional o**icer Cob, an so he le*t Vietnam in the summer o* 19GG. %n that was the en
o* that. .hen Foc3y 0tone set up his special unit 1uner 9ur3e Dunn2 ( to ta3e o#er what 0am Dra3ulich was
suppose to be oing, an suenly these cases, i* they were thought to be goo, woul isappear *rom our
pur#iew all together.
-0tone presse #ery har *or unilateral operations. ,e was intereste in high-le#el penetrations o* the V/(@ ( was
intereste in *ighting a counter-insurgency war. %s a result, he set up this separate shop, which too3 away my
best operations -- which is always a source o* resentment. 0tone an ( later became best o* *riens, but not in
this perio.- 9ric3ham too3 a eep breath, then sai solemnly, -.his competition *or intelligence sources is one
o* the unerlying, chronic con*licts that you can<t a#oi. .here<s a tension because there are two i**erent
purposes, but you<re utili4ing basically the same resources.
-%nyway, the penetrations 0tone wante to ta3e away were our unilaterals. =ut in the pro#inces we woul
pro#ie a#ice an guiance to the 0pecial 9ranch *or their penetrations into the V/(. 9ut on our sie, maybe
through /hieu ,oi or some other resource, we woul e#elop inepenent unilateral penetrations un3nown to
the police. 6e ha a number o* these aroun the country, an it<s that 3in o* thing that 0tone<s special unit was
intereste in re#iewing. %n i* it was #ery goo, they< ta3e it away *rom us.-
?ot only i Foc3y 0tone abscon with the special unit, but he also too3 steps to ha#e 0pecial 9ranch *iel
operations e!pelle *rom the station. .his issue is central to +hoeni!. -.here was always a big *ight in the
agency as to how co#ert it shoul be,- 9ric3ham e!plaine. -(n particular, there was a lot o* opposition in the
station to the e!tent o* e!posure we ha in 0pecial 9ranch *iel operations. 0o 0tone came in an trie to
reuce that operation in *a#or o* unilateral espionage into the V/(. 6hich ( resiste.-
% belie#er in Da#i :alula<s theories on political war*are, 9ric3ham state, -8y *eelings were simple. 6e<re in a
war, an intelligence war, meaning *ought on the basis o* intelligence. (t will either succee or *ail on intelligence.
0pecial 9ranch *iel operations are a crucial element o* this whole thing with 0pecial 9ranch operations --
in*ormants, e*ectors, +(/s -- critical against the enemy in*rastructure. A)erican bo+s are o-er here %ho are
being &ille', $e 'on6t ha-e ti)e to %orr+ about bureaucratic niceties, $e 'on6t ha-e ti)e to %orr+ about
re.utations, $e got to %in the go''a)ne' thingN
-0o ( was all gung ho *or continuation an impro#ement o* *iel operations. 9ut 0tone sai, <:et ri o* *iel
operations. ( on<t want it as part o* my responsibility.< 0o ( was turne o#er to the new Fe#olutionary
De#elopment /are unit that was run by )ou )apham, who was brought out *rom 6ashington especially *or that
purpose.-
57
!HAPTER B: Attac& on the V!I
(n the summer o* 19GG steps were *inally ta3en in 6ashington an 0aigon to resol#e the ebate o#er who
shoul manage the paci*ication o* 0outh Vietnam. %t the heart o* the problem was the *act that espite the ".0.
%rmy<s success against ?V% main *orce units in the /entral ,ighlans, the Vietnamese people were not
supporting the :V? to the e!tent that +resient )ynon >ohnson coul withraw %merican *orces an lea#e the
Vietnamese to manage the war on their own.
=n one sie o* the ebate was the +entagon, recommening a single chain o* comman uner 8%/V
commaner 6estmorelan. .he reasons were simple enough: .he military was pro#iing 90 percent o*
paci*ication resources, a single chain o* comman was more e**icient, an there was anger in ha#ing
unsuper#ise ci#ilians in a battle 4one. =n the other han, the ci#ilian agencies were a*rai that i* the military
manage paci*ication, any political settlement calling *or the withrawal o* troops woul also re5uire ci#ilians
uner military management $in, *or e!ample, re*ugee programs' to epart *rom Vietnam along with ".0. soliers.
(n 19GE %mbassaor ,enry /abot )oge ha hane the problem to ; )ansale, whom he appointe senior
liaison to the 8inistry o* Fe#olutionary De#elopment. 9ut )ansale $a -*i*th wheel,- accoring to 9ric3ham' was
unwante an ignore an *aile to o#ercome the bureaucratic ri#alries in 0aigon. 9y 19GG the problem was
bac3 in 6ashington, where it was etermine that paci*ication was *ailing as the result o* a combination o* poor
management an the V/(<s ability to isrupt Fe#olutionary De#elopment. %s a way o* resol#ing these
interrelate problems, Presi'ent 8ohnson su))one' his %ar )anagers to a conerence at $arrenton*
Virginia* in 8anuar+ 2933* the result o %hich %as an agree)ent that a single .aciication )anager %as
nee'e', =nce again, this point o* #iew was a#ance by the military through its special assistant *or
counterinsurgency an special acti#ities, :eneral 6illiam +eers, who suggeste that the 8%/V commaner be
put in charge o* paci*ication, with a ci#ilian eputy.
%lthough the ci#ilians continue to obCect, >ohnson wante 5uic3 results, the 3in only the military coul pro#ie,
an shortly therea*ter he name ?ational 0ecurity /ouncil member Fobert Komer his special assistant *or
paci*ication. Komer was an a#ocate o* military control, whose master plan was to unite all agencies in#ol#e in
paci*ication uner his personal management an irect them against the V/(.
8eanwhile, the 0aigon ;mbassy commissione a stuy on the problem o* interagency coorination. 9egun in
>uly 19GG uner mission coorinator :eorge ->a3e- >acobson, the Foles an 8issions 0tuy mae eighty-one
recommenations, si!ty-si! o* which were accepte by e#eryone. /onsensus ha been achie#e, an a maCor
reorgani4ation commence. ?otably, the policy *or anti-V/( operations as state by the Foles an 8issions
0tuy was -that the +olice 0pecial 9ranch assume primary responsibility *or the estruction o* the Viet /ong
(n*rastructure.- 112
-6e i claim in Foles an 8issions,- accoring to 9ric3ham, the /(% representati#e on that committee, -that
the police shoul ha#e a maCor ci#ilian role an be the spearhea o* the e**ort because it was the police o#er the
long haul, an in terms o* ultimate #ictory, that woul ha#e to settle the problem ... an that there*ore we shoul
not let the military run e#erything till the en o* the war, then let e#erything *all into chaos when the military was
brought out.- 122
0ut in .ursuit o total -ictor+* the si7e an' .ace o )ilitar+ o.erations %ere stea'il+ escalating in 2933*
)ore an' )ore to the e5clusion o the concerns o the ci-ilian agencies in-ol-e' in .aciication, Aor
e!ample, the military was more concerne with gathering intelligence on the si4e an location o* enemy combat
units than on its political in*rastructure. Militar+ agent nets an' interrogators 7eroe' in on this t+.e o
inor)ation* relecting %hat 0ric&ha) ter)e' the )ilitar+ )entalit+* the obHect o %hich is #to set u. a
battle,# .he police mentality, accoring to 9ric3ham, is -to arrest, con#ict, an sen to Cail,- while the intelligence
mentality -is to capture, interrogate, an turn in place.-
;!paning on this theme, 9ric3ham sai, -(* the military were going into a pro#ince, the sector a#iser an the
sector 0-two 1sector intelligence a#iser2 woul be brought in, o their thing, an come out without e#er being
aware o* the enormous intelligence capability resiing in the 0pecial +olice. 6hen -- in pro#inces manne by
bright military o**icers -- they i bring in the 0pecial +olice, it was one on an a hoc basis. /on#ersely,
anytime the military too3 o#er a ci#ilian operation or acti#ity, nine times out o* ten it woul be a per#ersion o* the
ci#ilian capability into a military support arm. %n when that happene, we woul almost in#ariably *in that the
so-calle ci#ilian intelligence operation was 5uic3ly per#erte to pro#ie tactical combat intelligence *or ".0. or
%FV? *orces. .his was a tenency which ha to be constantly oppose. -
,owe#er, 9ric3ham 5uali*ie his opposition to the emphasis on tactical military concerns by noting: -.he /(%
coul not claim e!clusi#e Curisiction *or an attac3 on the V/(. 6e woul not ha#e wante to. 0pecial 9ranch
wasn<t strong enough. (t su**ere *rom incompetent leaership an *rom poor training, e#en though 0pecial
9ranch personnel an leaership were a cut abo#e the regular sta**ing o* the ?ational +olice.-
58
6hat was neee was cooperation. 9ut while tur* battles between the /(% an the military were obstructing the
war e**ort, the problem was e!acerbate when the Vietnamese were *actore into the e5uation. -.al3 about
bureaucratic in*ighting.- 9ric3ham laughe. -6ell, it was *ar worse on the Vietnamese sie. .here was
un5uestionably contempt hel by the %FV? *or the ?ational +olice. .he Vietnamese military ha no use *or
them. %n to the e!tent that the ".0. military may ha#e re*lecte the %FV? point o* #iew, i* there was a Coint
%FV?-%merican operation, well, the 0pecial +olice woul ha#e been systematically cut out o* the thing.-
(nto this bureaucratic mine*iel in %ugust 19GG steppe Fobert Komer, pac3ing a manate *rom +resient
>ohnson an intent upon e**ecting the military ta3eo#er o* paci*ication. +reictably the ci#ilian agencies recoile
in horror. .he 0tate Department cite the political nature o* paci*ication, an neither the %gency *or (nternational
De#elopment nor the /(% thought the military capable o* oing the Cob. 0o, uner pressure *rom %mbassaor
)oge $who bestowe upon Komer the nic3name 9lowtorch', +resient >ohnson ga#e the ci#ilians one last shot.
.he result was the =**ice o* /i#il =perations $=/='.
/or)e' in October 2933* O!O co)bine' the iel' o.erations units o AID* "SIS* an' !IA an' on this
basis %as organi7e' into branches or .s+chological o.erations* .olitical action* 'eectors* .ublic
saet+* reugees* an' econo)ic 'e-elo.)ent, "ner the irector, 6ae )athram, an his military eputy,
:eneral +aul 0mith, =/= region irectors were assigne to each corps@ >ohn Vann *rom %(D in (( /orps@ 0tate
Department o**icer %rt Koren in ( /orps@ /(% o**icer Vince ,eyman in (V /orps@ an Fobert 8attson in (( /orps.
; )ansale was slate *or 8attson<s Cob but turne it own.
:i#en *our months to show results, the =**ice o* /i#il =perations was oome *rom the start, but it i pro#e
#aluable by *orcing the ci#ilian agencies to wor3 together. Aace with the prospect o* military control, agency
chains o* comman -- e!tening *rom 6ashington to 0aigon to the pro#inces -- were wrenche apart an
realigne. %n e#en though nothing was achie#e in terms o* impro#ing paci*ication, the *ormation o* the =**ice
o* /i#il =perations spare 8%/V commaner 6estmorelan *rom ha#ing to reorgani4e the ci#ilian agencies
himsel*. (n 8arch 19G& +resient >ohnson was to incorporate =/= within 8%/V uner the Fe#olutionary
De#elopment 0upport Directorate, manage by :eneral 6illiam Knowlton. %nnounce in 8ay 19G&, the 8ilitary
%ssistance /omman *or /i#il =perations an Fe#olutionary De#elopment $/=FD0' was to be the bureaucratic
#essel *rom which +hoeni! woul be born.
-During the big reorgani4ation at the en o* 19GG,- 9ric3ham recalle, -they were trying to clean up the FD
programs an streamline the war e**ort. 0o all the *iel operations, both co#ert an police 0pecial 9ranch, were
more or less i#orce *rom the station an put uner =/=, which was later calle /=FD0, in the Fe#olutionary
De#elopment /are Di#ision. )ou )apham came out *rom 6ashington to become the new eputy chie* o* station
an chie* o* the FD/. ( mo#e o#er *rom Foc3y 0tone<s Curisiction to )apham<s Curisiction an answere to
him. )ou was a #ery 5uiet, lai-bac3 e!-pro*essor with thic3-rimme glasses. ,e i not ha#e a paramilitary
bac3groun@ his bag was propagana an psychological war*are.
-FD/ too3 o#er the /(%<s co#ert action programs uner its operations branch, FD//=,- 9ric3ham e!plaine,
-while a secon branch, FD//+ 1+lans2, too3 o#er police *iel operations. .hat was my shop. ( no longer ha the
title o* chie* o* *iel operations. 9ut it was the same Cob with basically the same uties, e!cept we were
theoretically wor3ing towar a coorinate system. ( became chie* o* FD//+, an %e an' RD!LO )o-e' ro)
the e)bass+ anne5 to another buil'ing calle' "SAID T%o. Donohue went home, an a new guy, Fen4
,oe3sema, came out *rom 6ashington an too3 o#er that shop. Fen4 an ( ha one two tours together in
.eheran. ,e was a har-ri#en o**icer, #ery smart ... one o* those 8iwest Dutchmen o* whom we ha#e se#eral
in the agency.- 9ric3ham escribe ,oe3sema as -ruthless- an -an e!pert on sel*-promotion.-
-During the reorgani4ation,- 9ric3ham continue, -the station aopte the 0pecial 9ranch *iel operations
organi4ational structure as a moel *or coorinating liaison an co#ert operations, only instea o* using si!
regions, they use the *our corp 4ones. 8y .ho an 9an 8e .huot were no longer regional o**ices.- %*ter that all
/(% acti#ities in a region were brought uner one o**icer calle the region o**icer in charge $F=(/'. )i3ewise,
pro#ince o**icers in charge *ollowe automatically. -.he +=(/ was in charge o* all /(% operations, co#ert an
liaison, in a pro#ince,- 9ric3ham e!plaine. -,e coul ha#e been rawn *rom liaison or co#ert operations,
epening on who the F=(/ thought was the best guy in the pro#ince. (ncientally, we i not actually assign
+=(/s right away, because the ri#alry an lac3 o* trust between A( an +8 people wouln<t allow it. 6hen ( tal3
about coorination problems in Vietnam, the *act is that we coul not e#en coorinate the station programs in
pro#ince.
-%*ter the F=(/s were name, we set up bases. .he engineers went out an built #aults in each o* these places
an set up the complete multi-channel automatic teleprinter encryptographic system raio communications.
Arom this point on the line comman went *rom the chie* o* station to the eputy chie* o* station *or FD/, to the
F=(/s, then to the +=(/s. Fen4 ,oe3sema an ( were no longer super#isors in the chain o* comman to the
*iel operations@ we were now running branches as sta** assistants to the chie* o* FD/, outsie the station. (t
59
mae little i**erence, e!cept the F=(/s woul occasionally thumb their noses at us. 9ut ( in<t obCect. Hou
couln<t run it any other way.
-0o the maCor result o* the *all 19GG ecision was to separate the station an the counterinsurgency e**ort. .hat
was a result o* 0tone<s attitue towar this. %n he was right. (t<s mi!ing oil an water.-
=ne other signi*icant e#ent occurre at this Cuncture. -.he +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits were o**ere to me
in the *all o* 19GG,- 9ric3ham recalle. -(t was one o* the options iscusse at the time o* the reorgani4ation. .his
o**er was mae to me in terms o* >ohn ,art<s issatis*action with the reputation the /.s ha ac5uire. ,e
wante to turn the /.s into an intelligence arm *or capturing prisoners an ocuments, an not a paramilitary
ser#ice. 9ut ( in<t want them,- 9ric3ham sai, -mainly because ( in<t thin3 we coul manage them properly.
8y Aoreign (ntelligence guys were in no way, in terms o* e!perience, able to control or irect +F" teams.-
/onse5uently, as o* ?o#ember 19GG the recycle counterterrorists were calle +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits
an were therea*ter manage by /(% o**icer 6illiam Feel in Fen4 ,oe3sema<s operations shop in /=FD0<s
Fe#olutionary De#elopment /are Di#ision.
777
(t is commonly agree that the ".0. military went to Vietnam to *ight a con#entional war. ,owe#er, by late 19GG it
was clear that gains on the battle*iel were transitory an that the war woul not be won by sei4ing pieces o*
territory. Gru'gingl+ the )ilitar+ %as orce' to a')it that V!I .olitical .o%er coul' oset ",S, ire.o%er,
-9ear in min,- 9ric3ham tol me, -that the military was only o#er there *rom mi-19GE, so it too3 a perio o* time
*or this reali4ation to sin3 in. .he e!ploitation o* pro#ince ?ational +olice resources by the ".0. military was
sporaic at best up until the *all o* 19GG, when we mae a systematic proceure out o* it.-
(nee, the process o* systemati4ing the attac3 against the V/( began in the *all o* 19GG, when Foc3y 0tone
arrange *or ?elson 9ric3ham to brie* :eneral 6estmorelan on the subCect. .he impetus *or the brie*ing came
*rom the Foles an 8issions 0tuy an the conclusion reache at the 19GG /ombine /ampaign +lan that
#increase' e).hasis %ill be gi-en to i'enti+ing an' eli)inating the V! Inrastructure an' to s)all unit
o.erations 'esigne' s.eciicall+ to 'estro+ guerrilla orces,# 1N2
-.hese things were all e#ol#ing an coming together because o* the =**ice o* /i#il =perations,- 9ric3ham note.
-+eople wante to 3now what you meant when you sai <attac3 against the V/(.<- 0o, while preparing *or his
hour-long brie*ing o* 6estmorelan, 9ric3ham wrote a paper aptly title -%ttac3 %gainst the Viet /ong
(n*rastructure.- ,is purpose was to summari4e e#erything that was 3nown about intelligence sources an
reaction *orces in#ol#e in the antisub#ersi#e *acet o* the war. -( on<t thin3 6esty ha e#er hear o* the 0pecial
9ranch be*ore our brie*ing,- 9ric3ham 5uippe, -or the *act that we ha pro#incial interrogation centers or
political orer o* battle *iles on V/ in the #illages an istricts.-
(n any e#ent, -%ttac3- was circulate among the 8%/V an /(% sta**s an was accepte as the e*initi#e
statement on the V/(. $ritten on No-e)ber EE* 2933* #Attac&# is signiicant or three reasons, /irst %as
its 'einition o the V!I 66as the V! organi7ational hierarch+* the )anage)ent structure* as o..ose' to
guerrillas* troo.s* an' e-en in )an+ cases V! terrorists, Man+ i not )ost o these categories ((
guerrillas* troo.s an' e-en terrorists (( are +oung .eo.le %ho ha-e been either i).resse' or se'uce'
into the V! an' cannot in an+ %a+ be consi'ere' 6har' core6 !o))unists,# >A?
0peci*ically cite in -%ttac3- as V/( were -all +arty members an *ront organi4ation o**icers, as oppose to the
ran3 an *ile o* these *ront organi4ations. .hus all members o* a #illage chapter, all District /ommittee an all
+ro#ince /ommittee care are inclue, as o* course are the higher echelons, Fegion an /=0V?. 6e woul
also inclue members o* the so-calle sapper units -- these people are harene /ommunist troops, organi4e
in military *ormations to carry out sabotage an terrorism o* the larger an more ramatic nature -- hotel
bombings in 0aigon, )ong 9inh %mmunition ump, :eneral 6alt<s resience. .hese latter are not casual acts o*
terrorism, but care*ully planne an *ully organi4e military operations -- /ommano type operations.- 1E2
%bout the wor -in*rastructure,- 9ric3ham sai uring our inter#iew, -it may be peculiarly applicable to
insurgency, ue to the animistic conceptual #iew hel by rural people in want o* literacy an hygiene, let alone
technology.- 0ric&ha) hel' the re-isionist -ie% that in an insurgenc+ a)ong such .eo.le* onl+ @ .ercent
o the .o.ulation is .oliticall+ acti-e* %ith E(2LEO .ercent or the insurgents* an' E(2LEO .ercent against
the), .he rural population is not the ri#ing *orce. .heir attitue, he sai, is -a po! upon both your houses.-
-6ithout an in*rastructure,- 9ric3ham sai, -there is only a healess boy. Destroy the in*rastructure, you
estroy the insurgency. ,owe#er, this is not such an easy thing to o, espite any isa**ection on the part o* the
maCority o* the people. ?or is it e!clusi#ely a matter o* winning hearts an mins. .hat only ma3es it easier to
estroy the in*rastructure.- 0ric&ha) -ie%e' the V!I as a cri)inal cons.irac+* a Maia o.erating un'er the
.retense o .olitical i'eolog+* coercing .eo.le through the selecti-e use o terror, .he insurgency, in his
60
opinion, attracte people oriente towar #iolence an, through political *ronts, -nai#e- ini#iuals. .he presence
o* such marginal characters, he contens, mae the attac3 on the V/( a i**icult tas3.
0econly, -%ttac3- is signi*icant in that it e*ines -the attac3 against the V/(- in terms o* 0pecial 9ranch *iel
operations -- in*ormants, interrogations, an penetrations -- o* which interrogations are -by *ar the most
important source.- (n*ormant operations prouce in*ormation mostly on hamlet an #illage cares an
guerrillas, while penetrations coul prouce -substantial boies o* in*rastructure in*ormation -- ienti*ication o*
care, mo#ements an acti#ities -- an at times a#ance in*ormation o* meetings an con*erences.- %s o*
0eptember N0, 19GG, as state in -%ttac3,- there were 1N& penetrations o* istrict committees, 9N belonging to
0pecial 9ranch, DD to the /(=. 0pecial 9ranch was then e#eloping 92 more penetrations, an the /(= G1.
.he -action tools- in the attac3 on the V/( were primarily -ambushes by the police, +F" or Fegional Aorces an
0pecial Aorces elements- an -military search an estroy, hamlet search, or </ountry Aair< type operations. Aor
these operations,- 9ric3ham e!plains in -%ttac3,- -the police prepare search lists *rom their *iles ... an collect
V/ e*ectors an other sources to use as <ienti*iers< o* V/ caught in these coron an sweep operations.- ;#en
though 6illiam /olby later testi*ie to /ongress that +hoeni! was a 0outh Vietnamese police program,
9ric3ham in -%ttac3- states: -% *inal an not insigni*icant tool are irect military operations .... Aor e!ample, 1&Em
artillery *ire was irecte on the reporte site o* a combine con*erence 1o*2 /=0V? representati#es.- =n the
basis o* a*ter-action reports, 9ric3ham writes, -we are con*ient that the amage to the in*rastructure, in terms o*
3ey personnel 3ille, is signi*icant.- 1G2
-%ttac3- also mentions -% special .as3 Aorce ... organi4e to launch a combine intelligence/police/military
assault against the 8F-D $0aigon//holon/:ia Dinh 0pecial Mone /ommittee' hea5uarters an base area.- 1&2
.his is the thir signi*icant point raise by -%ttac3.- /alle /ong .ac (V by its Vietnamese creators, it is the
operational moel *or +hoeni! an as such eser#es a etaile e!planation.
:eneral 8c/hristian writes that /ong .ac (V e#ol#e, concurrently with the Coint ".0.-Vietnamese /ombine
(ntelligence 0ta**, *rom an intensi#e intelligence program $+roCect /orral' which he initiate in the spring an
early summer o* 19GG an irecte against 8F-D. .he purpose was to prouce -intelligence on the ienti*ication
an location o* Viet /ong operating in 8F-D- an -the issemination o* this intelligence to user agencies *or
apprehension an e!ploitation o* enemy personnel.- 1L2
(n 0eptember 19GG 8c/hristian met with :eneral )oan to iscuss his plans *or a combine intelligence sta**.
.he iea was appro#e in ?o#ember by +rime 8inister Ky, the Vietnamese >oint :eneral 0ta**, an the ".0.
8ission /ouncil. %s a result -- an as a substitute *or ,op .ac -- =peration Aair*a! was begun in December,
using three %merican an three %FV? battalions *or the purpose o* -searching out an estroying V/ main *orce
units, guerrillas, an in*rastructure in the 8F-D area.- =peration Aair*a! an the /ombine (ntelligence 0ta**
$/(0' were the primary elements o* /ong .ac (V. 192
-.he initial actions o* the /ombine (ntelligence 0ta**,- 8c/hristian writes, -were to compile a blac3list o* 8F-D
in*rastructure personalities in support o* the combine "0 an Vietnamese military actions in this area.- (n the
process, the /ombine (ntelligence 0ta** compile, by han, more than three thousan names, which were
store in a central registry an mae a#ailable to ".0. an Vietnamese units. )ater -the systematic ienti*ication
an location o* V/ an the rapi retrie#al o* these ata in usable *orm was 1sic2 mae possible by the use o* the
automate ata processing system locate at the /ombine (ntelligence /enter, Vietnam.- 1102
(n *act, the *ounation *or the /ombine (ntelligence 0ta** was lai, on the %merican sie, in 19GD, when /(%
security chie* Fobert :ambino create the /ombine 0ecurity /ommittee insie 0aigon<s Airst +recinct
hea5uarters. Through a secure ra'io net%or& lin&ing each o Saigon6s nine .recincts* the !o)bine'
Securit+ !o))ittee coor'inate' !IA an' State De.art)ent securit+ oicers at the A)erican E)bass+
%ith MA!V an' Vietna)ese Militar+ Securit+ Ser-ice oicers at Tan Son Nhut an' %ith the S.ecial
0ranch at National Police hea'=uarters an' alerte' the) o .en'ing V! attac&s, .he /ombine 0ecurity
/ommittee was irecte by /olonel ?guyen ?goc Oinh, chie* o* sta** o* the 0aigon police an the eputy to the
0aigon police chie*, )ieutenant /olonel ?guyen Van )uan. 9y mi-19G& the /ombine 0ecurity /ommittee<s
-9lue ?etwor3- co#ere all o* /. (V.
777
Aor eeper insights into /ong .ac (V we turn to .ulius %campora, a ".0. %rmy counterintelligence o**icer an
Korean 6ar #eteran who was etache to the /(% in >une 19GG as :eneral )oan<s a#iser. %s an o**icer on
:eneral >ames Van Aleet<s sta** in Korea, %campora ha ha prior ealings with >ohn ,art, who as station chie*
in Korea ha mas5uerae as an %rmy colonel an ha inter*ere in military operations to the e!tent that
:eneral Van Aleet calle him -an arrogant 0=9.- 1112 .he ol gruges were carrie *orwar in 0aigon to the
etriment o* +hoeni!.
61
#I assiste' Hart,# Aca).ora sighe' %hen %e irst )et in 29B3 at /t, M+ers, #He calle' )e in an' sai'*
6$e6re 'ealing %ith an enig)a, A cobra, General 4oan,6 No% 4oan ha' a )an'arin Dai Viet bac&groun'*
an' his ather ha' rescue' Die), !onse=uentl+* un'er G+* 4oan %as -er+ .o%erul1 an' Hart resente'
4oan6s concentration o .o%er, Although he %as not a .olitical ani)al* 4oan %as substantial, So Hart
too& a%a+ irst his su.er-ision o the Militar+ Securit+ Ser-ice an' e-entuall+ his o-ersight o !entral
Intelligence Organi7ation, 9ut *or a while )oan ran them both, along with the ?ational +olice.
#$hen I arri-e' in Saigon*# Aca).ora continue'* #at the national le-el* the ",S, E)bass+* %ith the
agenc+ an' MA!V* ha' 'eci'e' to ta&e o-er e-er+thing in or'er to change the political climate o
Vietna), .hrough the /(=, the agency was running all sorts o* counteroperations to V/ in*iltration into political
parties, trying to *in com&atible elements to create a counter*orce to ta3e o#er control *rom Ky, who was a
peacoc3. .his was one by intercepting V/ political care: sur#eilling them, then arresting them or mo#ing
towar them, then buying them o#er to your sie in orer to estroy the integrity o* the V/.- %campora 5uali*ie
this statement by noting: -.he V/ woul always say yes, but they were usually oubles.
-(t was a ual-le#el scheme,- %campora went on. -6e were *ace with the threat o* terrorism *rom sappers, but
we also ha to stop them at the political le#el. 6e stoppe them at sapper le#el with +F" uner the 0pecial
=perations :roup an at the political le#el through the /(= -- the centerpiece o* which was the ?ational
(nterrogation /enter uner 10pecial 9ranch chie* ?guyen2 .ien. .he /(= operate o#er an abo#e /. Aour. (t
coul ta3e whate#er it wante -- people or in*ormation or whate#er -- *rom any o* its elements. (ts Cob was to turn
aroun capture V/( an preempt )oan. 6hen it came to /. Aour, howe#er, )oan wante control. )oan sai to
,art, <Hou Coin us@ we won<t Coin you.< (n e**ect, )oan tol ,art to go screw himsel*, an so ,art wante me to
assuage )oan -- to bring him in tow.-
9ut this was not to be, *or :eneral )oan, a ye-in-the-wool nationalist, ha his own agena. (n *act, the basis
*or /. (V eri#e, on the Vietnamese sie, *rom a countersub#ersion program he commissione in the summer
o* 19GG. .he thrust o* the program was to pre#ent V/ agents *rom in*iltrating pro-:V? political parties an to
pre#ent sappers *rom entering 0aigon. /alle the +hung ,oang program, it was, accoring to %campora,
-wholly inspire an conucte by the Vietnamese.-
.he man who concei#e +hung ,oang at the re5uest o* :eneral )oan was the 0pecial 9ranch eputy irector,
/olonel Dang Van 8inh, a /laue Fains type o* character who, accoring to %campora, was -a stoic who too3
the path o* least resistance.- 9orn on /on 0on (slan, where his *ather was a nurse, 8inh at age eighteen Coine
the accounting epartment o* the Arench 0urete. During the Ngo regi)e he recei-e' !IA training o-erseas
an' %as then a..ointe' chie o the 8u'icial Police -- the only ?ational +olice branch with the power to
arrest. %*ter the coup 8inh became eputy irector o* the 0pecial 9ranch.
(nsulate behin his es3 at 0pecial 9ranch hea5uarters on Vo .hanh 0treet, 8inh weathere each
successi#e regime by ser#ing his bosses as -a pro*essional intelligence o**icer.- (nee, when ( met 8inh at his
o**ice in 19LG, he attribute' the all o Saigon to #the )an+ changes o co))an' in Saigon* %hile North
Vietna) ha' onl+ one lea'er an' one chain o co))an',- 1122 .hat, plus the *act that the Vietcong ha
in*iltrate e#ery *acet o* the :V? -- a *act )oan also ac3nowlege when he con*esse to %campora, -6e<re
twenty percent in*iltrate, at least.-
Minh6s attac& against the V!I %as )easure'* so.histicate' an' 'ia)etricall+ o..ose' to A)erican
.olic+, In contrast %ith 0ric&ha)* Minh -ie%e' the V!I as -illage(le-el ca'res #to be )onitore'* not
&ille',# %s 8inh concei#e the attac3 on the V/(, all Vietnamese agencies recei#ing in*ormation on the V/(
woul *orwar their reports to the 0pecial 9ranch *or inclusion in its political orer o* battle *ile. .he goal was the
-combination o* intelligence,- as 8inh terme it, &hoi ho& in Vietnamese. See&ing an a..ro.riate acron+)*
Minh borro%e' the %h ro) phoi an' the &o ro) hop an' christene' the .rogra) Phung Hoang* ater
the )+thological Vietna)ese bir' o conHugal lo-e that a..ears onl+ in ti)es o .eace, In Vietna)ese
)+th* the Phung Hoang bir' hol's a lute an' re.resents -irtue* grace* .eace* an' concor', Its song
inclu'es the i-e notes o the Vietna)ese )usical scale* an' its eathers inclu'e the i-e basic colors,
0eore long* ho%e-er* Phung Hoang %as transor)e' into Phoeni5* the )+thological bir' that
.er.etuall+ rises ro) its o%n ashes, As the A)ericans 're% it* the bir' hel' a blac&list in its cla%, In
this )aniestation* Phoeni5 is an o)ni.otent* .re'ator+ bir' that selecti-el+ snatches its .re+ (( a
s+)bol o 'iscor' rather than har)on+,
?owhere is the gap between %merican an Vietnamese sensibilities more apparent than in their interpretations
o* +hoeni! an +hung ,oang, which also represent the struggle between :eneral )oan an >ohn ,art *or
control o#er the attac3 on the V/(. (n this contest, )oan score *irst when, *or legal reasons, /ong .ac (V was
place uner his control. )oan assigne as many as *i*ty o**icers to the program *rom the participating
Vietnamese agencies, with 8aCor ?guyen 8au in charge o* operations, assiste by Dang Van 8inh. .he "nite
0tates pro#ie twenty 8%/V counterintelligence o**icers, each o* whom ser#e as a es3 o**icer in a 0aigon
62
precinct or outlying istrict capital. /(% o**icer .om 9ec3er super#ise the hea5uarters sta**@ the %ustralians
assigne their embassy security o**icer, 8i3e )eslie@ an the Koreans pro#ie a representati#e. 8embers o* /.
(V were not part o* any separate unit but remaine ienti*ie with their parent agencies an i not ha#e to bac3-
channel to bring resources to bear.
/ong .ac (V came into e!istence on ?o#ember 1, 19GG, the ay )ou )apham arri#e in 0aigon to ta3e o#er the
-secon- station, as the Fe#olutionary De#elopment /are program was sometimes calle. /uriously, it was the
same ay that V/ mortars *irst *ell on 0aigon. ".0. generals, o4ing in re#iewing stans only a *ew bloc3s away,
were obli#ious o* the *act that the V/ were using a nearby church spire as a triangulation point *or their *ire.
Arom ?o#ember 1 onwar, .ully %campora manage /. (V with 8aCor 8au. .he program 3ic3e in when .om
9ec3er, assiste by 8%/V o**icers )arry .racy an >ohn Aor aopte the stanar %merican police (D 3it
$replete with =cciental *acial *eatures'. 6ith their (D 3its in han, /. (V es3 o**icers #enture into the precincts
an istricts, accompanie by 0pecial 9ranch an 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice o**icers. .hey screene suspects
who ha been corralle by military units conucting coron an search operations, too3 photographs, put
together composites o* suspecte V/( members, then compile the results an sent their reports to /. (V
hea5uarters in the ?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter in 0aigon, where it was collate, analy4e, an use to
compile blac3lists o* the V/(.
#The+ calle' it .olice %or&*# Aca).ora sai'* #because the .olice ha' the constitutional res.onsibilit+
or countersub-ersion, 0ut it %as .ara)ilitar+, (n any e#ent, )oan was going to bring it all together, an he
i, until Komer came out in Aebruary 19G& an was brie*e by 8au an .racy.-
(n a 19LG inter#iew with the author, .racy agree that the emise o* /. (V came *rom -politic3ing- on the part o*
the %mericans. -(t was short-li#e,- he tol me, -because Komer saw it as a prototype an wante to ma3e it
nationwie be*ore wor3ing out the methoology. Komer wante to use /. Aour as a showcase, as part o* the
/ombine (ntelligence 0ta**, but :eneral )oan was reluctant to participate an ha to be strong-arme by
Komer in Aebruary 19G&.- 11N2
9y %pril 19G& the /ombine (ntelligence 0ta** woul ha#e entere more than si!ty-*i#e hunre names in its
/ong .ac (V ata base an woul be aing twel#e hunre per month. %s the methoology was e#elope, a
search unit consisting o* three *orty-nine-man Aiel +olice platoons began accompanying the ".0. an
Vietnamese military units conucting coron an search operations in 8F-D. 6ith the military pro#iing a shiel,
the Aiel +olice chec3e (Ds against blac3lists, arreste V/( suspects, an release innocent bystaners.
%ccoring to :eneral 8c/hristian, -Arom the inception o* the /ombine (ntelligence 0ta** until 1 December
19G&, appro!imately E00 V/ action agents were apprehene in 0aigon an en#irons. .he signi*icance o* these
arrests -- an the success o* the sta** -- cannot be *ully measure, but un5uestionably contribute to the
/ommunist *ailures in 0aigon uring the 19GL .et o**ensi#e.- 11D2
6hether or not .et was a *ailure *or the V/ will be iscusse later. 9ut once the /(% ha committe itsel* to the
attac3 on the V/(, it neee to *in a way o* coorinating its e**orts with the other ci#ilian agencies, %merican
an Vietnamese, wor3ing inepenently o* each other in the pro#inces. /onsiering the number o* agencies
in#ol#e, an their antipathy, this was no easy thing to o. .o wit, at ?elson 9ric3ham<s re5uest, the liaison
o**icer in :ia Dinh +ro#ince, 8ohn TerHelian* 'i' a stu'+ on the .roble) o coor'ination, #The count he
)a'e*# 0ric&ha) recalle'* #%as so)ething li&e t%ent+(t%o se.arate intelligence agencies an'
o.erations in his .ro-ince alone, (t was a /hinese *ire rill, an it in<t wor3 because we ha so many
#iolently con*licting interests in#ol#e in this thing.-
9ut while the bureaucratic titans clashe in 0aigon, a *ew military an /(% o**icers -- in remote pro#inces where
battles rage an people ie -- were trying to cooperate. (n the northernmost region, ( /orps, the 8arines an
the /(% ha especially goo relations, with the 8arines supplementing many o* the agency<s personnel nees
an the /(% in turn sharing its intelligence. 9ecause o* this reciprocal relationship, a solution to the problem o*
interagency coorination was e#elope there, with much o* the creit going to 9ob 6all, a /(% paramilitary
o**icer in Juang ?gai +ro#ince. (n December 19GG 6all was mae eputy to ( /orps region o**icer in charge,
>ac3 ,organ. 6all recalle, when we met in 19L&: -(n the winter o* 19GG to <G&, :eneral )ou 6alt was the Airst
8arine %mphibious commaner an we $the /(% region sta**2 woul cross the ri#er to atten his brie*ings each
morning. /asualties were minimal, an he was the picture o* a marine, ta3ing his brie*ings 5uic3ly, sitting erect
at his es3. 6ithin the ne!t two months, howe#er, casualties rose *rom two or three a ay to ninety a ay -- an
yet the V/ boy count was minimal.- 0ai 6all: -6alt went to the picture o* abCect *rustration, slumpe at his
es3, his hea in his hans. ,e neee help. 11E2
-8y e!perience ha been as care o**icer in Juang ?gai, where ( ran the +%.s, the +F", an /ensus
:rie#ance,- ae 6all. -Aorbes was the 0pecial 9ranch a#iser but there was no coorination between us an
the military or %(D. .here were about *i*teen separate programs in Juang ?gai, an it too3 me awhile to reali4e
this was the problem. .hen ( got trans*erre to Da ?ang, where as a result o* 6alt<s inability to ma3e contact
63
with the enemy, ( personally propose +hoeni!, by name, to establish intelligence close to the people. 9ase on
a 9ritish moel in 8alaya, we calle it a D(=//, a District (ntelligence an =perations /oorination /enter. -
,a#ing learne through the Juang ?gai +ro#ince (nterrogation /enter the structure o* the V/( in the pro#ince,
6all was aware that the V/( operate *rom the hamlet up an that to estroy it the /(% woul ha#e to create in
the istricts what the +(/s were oing in the pro#inces. ,ence the D(=//.
-6alt grabbe it,- 6all recalle. -,e assigne a crac3erCac3 sergeant to ma3e the necessary e5uipment
a#ailable, an this sergeant set it up in Dien 9an, Cust south o* Da ?ang in Juang ?am +ro#ince. .hen we i
two more- -- in ,ieu ?hon an +huong Dien istricts in .hua .hien +ro#ince.
.he Dien 9an D(=// went into e**ect in >anuary 19G& an was the moel on which +hoeni! *acilities were later
built throughout Vietnam. % pre*ab builing ten by *orty *eet large, it was built by marines an locate in their
istrict compoun. =n uty insie were 0ergeant Aisher an )ieutenant 8orse, along with two people *rom
/ensus :rie#ance, one *rom FD /are, an one *rom 0pecial 9ranch. .here were two interpreter-translators
an three cler3-typists. /ensus :rie#ance supplie es3s, typewriters, an a *ile cabinet. .he 8arines supplie
the wall map an an electric *an. =**ice supplies came *rom the /(% <s paramilitary o**icer in Juang ?am
+ro#ince. % raio was use *or high-priority tra**ic, with normal communications going by lanline to other
istricts an .hir 8arine ,J. (t was not a sophisticate a**air.
The .ur.ose o the DIO!! %as that o an intelligence clearinghouse: to re-ie%* collate* an' 'isse)inate
critical inor)ation .ro-i'e' b+ the -arious intelligence agencies in the area, 9ut what mae it inno#ati#e
was that issemination was immeiate at the reaction le#el, whereas the member agencies ha pre#iously
reporte through their own channels to their pro#ince hea5uarters, where the in*ormation was laterale to other
intereste agencies, which then passe it own to the istricts. %lso, a summary was mae at the en o* each
ay. (n the Dien 9an D(=//, the %mericans hanle the recor 3eeping, with )ieutenant 8orse managing the
orer o* battle reporting an 0ergeant Aisher ta3ing care o* the V/( *iles an source control cars. (n orer to
protect agents, each agency ienti*ie its own sources by number.
)ocal 8arine an %FV? commaners mae units a#ailable as reaction *orces *or the D(=//. 8ore than one
hunre policemen in Dien 9an were also mae a#ailable, along with the +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nit *rom
the pro#ince capital in ,oi %n. .he D(=// pro#ie guies *rom /ensus :rie#ance, an the police supplie (D
3its, to the operating units. .he 8arines screene ci#ilian etainees $/Ds' arreste in operations, using
in*ormants or 0pecial 9ranch o**icers to chec3 names against the D(=//<s blac3list. 6hen a positi#e
ienti*ication was mae, they eli#ere the suspect to the +(/ in ,oi %n. % marine etache to the +(/, 6arrant
=**icer Ficharson, mae a aily run *rom the +(/ to the D(=//, bringing interrogation reports an other
pro#ince-generate in*ormation. Most !Ds %ere turne' o-er to 'istrict .olice* at %hich .oint* the
A)ericans co).laine'* the+ .ai' bribes an' returne' ho)e* there to be arreste' again an' again,
-+hoeni!,- insiste 6all, -represente the strategy that coul ha#e won the war. .he problem was that +hoeni!
*ell outsie Aoreign (ntelligence, an paramilitary programs are historically trouble *or intelligence. 0o +hoeni!
ne#er got primary attention. 8%/V i not ha#e the mentality to wor3 with the police, the police were not traine
to win hearts an mins, an 18inister o* (nterior2 Khiem, *earing a coup, mistruste the police an woul not
assign 5uality personnel. Phoeni5 'i' not %or& in Vietna) because it %as 'o)inate'*# $all tol' )e* #b+
the )ilitar+ )entalit+, The+ coul'n6t belie-e the+ %oul' lose,#
!HAPTER 9: I!EX
(n 8ay 19G& /(% o**icer Fobert Komer arri#e in 0aigon as eputy *or /i#il =perations an Fe#olutionary
De#elopment. .herea*ter he was calle the D;+/=FD0, a Cob that a**ore him *ull ambassaorial ran3 an
pri#ileges an ha him answering only, in theory, to 8%/V /ommaner 6illiam 6estmorelan an %mbassaor
;llsworth 9un3er.
-(< 3nown Komer *rom 19E2, when he was with the =**ice o* ?ational ;stimates,- ?elson 9ric3ham tol me, 112
-which *rom the beginning was a high-le#el organi4ation. Komer woul go on to mo#e *rom one high-le#el Cob to
another, an in 19G&, o* course, he was wor3ing *or the national security a#iser, 6alt Fostow, in the 6hite
,ouse. Komer an ( always chatte when he came aroun an tal3e to the branches, as he ha been oing
since Aebruary 19G&. 9ut in 8ay he was e#en more acerbic than be*ore. Komer was intensely ambitious,
intensely energetic, intensely results-oriente.
-(n 8ay,- 9ric3ham continue, -in connection with Komer coming out to run /=FD0, ,art calle me into his
o**ice one ay an sai, <( want you to *orget your other uties -- you<re going home in >une anyway -- an ( want
64
you to raw me up a plan *or a general sta** *or paci*ication.< ( was still chie* o* *iel operations,- 9ric3ham note,
-so my replacement, Da#e 6est, was sent out early to *ree me up while ( was wor3ing on this special paper.
.hen ( as3e *or another o**icer in the station 1>ohn ,ansen2 to wor3 with me on this paper. ,e was
counterespionage. 9ut he was also into computers, an he coul say the right things about computers an be
persuasi#e in ways that ( coul not. 0o ,ansen was assigne to me, an we set about writing it up. ,ansen
*ocuse on the computer en o* this thing, an ( *ocuse on the organi4ational en.
-(n complying with >ohn ,art<s re5uest *or a general sta** *or paci*ication, there were three things ( ha to re#iew:
strategy, structure, an management. No% the i).ortant thing to re)e)ber is that %e %ere ne-er at %ar in
Vietna), The a)bassa'or %as co))an'er in chie, The MA!V co))an'er %as un'er hi), So all the
annual )ilitar+ o.erations an' e-er+thing else %ere ocuse' un'er the !ountr+ Plan rather than a
strictl+ )ilitar+ .lan, %n ( was the principal agency representati#e each year *or the e#elopment o* ne!t
year<s /ountry +lan.
-Fegaring strategy, basically this was it: 6e ha an army to pro#ie a shiel *rom ?orth Vietnamese *iel units
an to engage in military sweeps to go a*ter Vietcong units .... %n the Vietnamese %rmy i basically the same
thing. .hat<s in-country military. +aci*ication e**orts ...were to operate behin the military shiel to stabili4e an to
secure the situation. .hat<s the ci#ilian sie. .hen you ha out-o*-country military, which was aircra*t
reconnaissance, na#al bloc3aes, bombing operations in the D8M an along the ,o /hi 8inh .rail, an
operations in ?orth Vietnam, )aos, an /amboia.
-8y point,- 9ric3ham emphasi4e, -was not to change anything, Cust o it better. 6e in<t nee more
intelligence@ we neee better intelligence, properly analy4e an collate. .hat<s the strategy.
-?e!t, the structure, which, o* course, was interagency in nature an encompasse 8%/V, /(%, /=FD0,
Fe#olutionary De#elopment, an the embassy. ?ow when you start *ooling aroun with other agencies, you<re in
trouble. ;ach one has its own legislati#e manate, meaning its Cob prescribe by /ongress or as e*ine in the
/onstitution. .hen there is legislati#e *uning, *uns allocations, accounting proceures, an the 5uestion o* who
is going to pay *or something. .hose legislati#e gi#ens ha#e to be respecte. ( as a /(% o**icer cannot set up an
organi4ational arrangement where (<m going to spen +entagon money unless the +entagon gi#es it. %n e#en i*
they gi#e it to me, it still has to be within the *ramewor3 o* the congressional appropriation. .hen there are the
bureaucratic empires, in both 0aigon an 6ashington, all eeply committe to these things. Hou ha#e o#erlap,
contraictory programs, ill-concei#e #entures which recei#e hearings@ time is waste, an you get corruption,
embe44lement, an low morale. %n yet somehow you ha#e to pull all these i**erent agencies together.-
(n loo3ing *or a solution, 9ric3ham sei4e on the personality an presiential manate o* Fobert Komer. -Komer
ha alreay ac5uire the nic3name 9lowtorch,- 9ric3ham sai, -an his position was a bureaucratic anomaly.
,e was a eputy ambassaor on a par with :eneral 1/reighton2 %brams ... but actually he was reporting to
)ynon >ohnson, an e#eryone 3new that. 0o my iea was to set up a boar o* irectors in which each agency
hea or his eputy was a member, then establish a reporting system that woul allow a guy li3e Komer to hol
their *eet to the *ire -- to ma3e each agency responsi#e, to gi#e it goals an targets, an to critici4e its *ailures in
per*ormance, whether eliberately or ina#ertently through sloppiness.
-Femember, the strategy was to sharpen up intelligence collection an analysis an to spee up the reaction
time in responing to intelligence, whether on a military or a police le#el. 0o the iea was to set up a structure in
which agencies ha to participate an ha to bring their own resources an *uns to bear, without inter*ering
with their legislati#e manate or *inancial proceures.-
In 'eter)ining ho% to 'o this* 0ric&ha) borro%e' an organi7ational )o'el ro) the /or' Motor
!o).an+* %hich* he sai'* ha' #set u. a co))an' .ost to run their o.erations* %ith the .olic+ o the
cor.oration co)ing ro) the chie e5ecuti-e oicer an' a boar' o 'irectors, !all it the o.erating
co))ittee at the to.* su..orte' b+ a statistical re.orting unit that .ut e-er+thing together or the chie
e5ecuti-e an' the boar' o 'irectors* gi-ing )anage)ent the botto) line or the) to consi'er an' )a&e
'ecisions .... .his became the basic structure *or the general sta**, which ,art was calling (/;O -- intelligence
coorination an e!ploitation. ( wrote it so the i**erent agencies woul pro#ie their own money, personnel, an
irection, but as part o* a machinery by which they woul be irecte to a speci*ic purpose.-
,a#ing *ormulate a strategy an structure, 9ric3ham turne to management, which *or him boile own to two
things: the bottom line, telling management only what it neee to 3now@ an using reporting as a tool to shape
beha#ior, as articulate by Fensis )i3ert in Ne" Patterns of Manaement.
-9asically,- 9ric3ham e!plaine, -a reporting *ormat *osters sel*-impro#ement, i* the people reporting 3now what
they are e!pecte to o, an are pro#ie with obCecti#e measurements o* per*ormance in terms o* those
e!pectations .... 0o we esigne the reporting structure to pro#ie critical types o* in*ormation to the (/;O boar
65
o* irectors, primarily Komer. 9ut also, by *ocusing attention in the regions an the pro#inces on the things we
*elt were important, we trie to guarantee that those things wor3e properly.-
(n particular, 9ric3ham hope to correct -the gra#e problem o* istortion an co#er-up which a reporting system
must aress.- (n e!plaining this problem to Komer, 9ric3ham 5uote a /(% o**icer who ha critici4e -the
current system o* reporting statistics that pro#e ... that successi#e generations o* %merican o**icials in Vietnam
are more success*ul than their preecessors.- .he o**icer obser#e that #A)ericans in the iel'* the )aHorit+
o %ho) ser-e a one(+ear tour ,,, go through a hone+)oon .hase in %hich the+ tr+ to see e-er+thing
goo' about their counter.art an' about the situation an' re.ort it thus, Then the+ go through a .erio' o
'isillusion)ent in %hich the+ reali7e that nothing has been acco).lishe'* but b+ this ti)e the+ ha-e
beco)e the -icti)s o their o%n .ast re.orts an' the+ ha-e to )aintain the iction, "lti)atel+ the+ go
out o there -er+ 'iscourage' an' .robabl+ -er+ unha..+ %ith their o%n .eror)ance because about
the sa)e ti)e the+ beco)e &no%le'geable enough to reall+ 'o so)ething the+ are on their %a+ ho)e
an' ha-e no 'esire to hurt their o%n .roessional career,#
;!plaine 9ric3ham: #The &e+ to I!EX %as 'ecentrali7ation# -- in other wors, *orcing *iel o**icers to o their
Cobs by putting responsibility on the scene, while at the same time trying to eli#er to these o**icers the 3ins an
amounts o* in*ormation they neee, *ast. -.his means *eebac3,- 9ric3ham stresse, -which re*lects an
recogni4es the pro#ince o**icer<s own acti#ities, tells him what other people are oing, ienti*ies to him the
important an reportable acti#ities, an inuces a competiti#e an emulati#e spirit.-
Keye to 0pecial 9ranch reporting cycles, the initial (/;O reporting *ormat was submitte monthly an containe
narrati#e an statistical ata responing to re5uirements *rom 6ashington, 0aigon, an the regions. (t re*lecte
the acti#ities, unerstaning, an writing abilities o* *iel o**icers, enabling managers li3e Komer to Cuge
per*ormance. (t also re#eale program progress an *unctioning o* relate systems. 8eanwhile, >ohn ,ansen
was e#eloping a comprehensi#e input sheet capable o* listing e#ery piece o* biographical in*ormation on V/(
ini#iuals, operations, an organi4ation in general. ,e was also esigning collate printouts on the V/(, which
were to be sent to region, pro#ince, an istrict (/;O o**icers plugge into the (/;O computer system.
-%nyway,- sai 9ric3ham, -those were the ieas that in#ol#e this statistical reporting unit *or the (/;O sta**,
which was to pull e#erything together an analy4e it. .he statistical reporting unit was the guts, with a plans an
programs unit an a special in#estigations unit tac3e onto it.-
=n 8ay 22, 19G&, ?elson 9ric3ham an >ohn ,ansen eli#ere to Komer a three-page memo title -% /oncept
*or =rgani4ation *or %ttac3 on V/ (n*rastructure.- ,urriely prepare, it recommene *our things. Airst was the
creation o* a boar o* irectors chaire by the D;+/=FD0 an incluing the senior intelligence an operations
o**icers *rom 8%/V, /(%, an /=FD0 -- a general sta** *or paci*ication uner Fobert Komer. ?e!t, it
recommene the creation o* a comman post in 0aigon an (/;O committees in the regions an pro#inces.
.hirly, it recommene that the %mericans -coorinate an *ocus- the attac3 on the V/( an that they
-stimulate- their Vietnamese counterparts. )astly, it recommene that pro#ince o**icers create D(=//s, which
9ric3ham calle -the essential ingreient in the +hoeni! 1as (/;O woul e#entually be rename2 stew.- .he
concept paper was appro#e by the /(% station, then sent to Komer, who turne it own. %s 9ric3ham recalle,
-Komer sai, <% concept paper is not what ( want. ( want a missions an *unctions paper -- something in military
style that the military can unerstan.<-
-%t this point,- 9ric3ham sai, -( was secone o#er to Komer<s o**ice. ,e was buying e#erything that we
propose to him, but he wante to e#elop <action papers.< ,e 3ept repeating, o#er an o#er again, that he
wante a <ri*le shot< approach -- a sniper<s attac3, not a shotgun approach -- against the V/(. %n Komer is a
stic3ler. ,e was constantly throwing papers bac3 at me to rewrite o#er an o#er again until they satis*ie him in
those terms.-
(n response to Komer<s emans, 9ric3ham an ,ansen incorporate the maCor themes o* the concept paper
into a etaile missions an *unctions paper title -% +roposal *or the /oorination an 8anagement o*
(ntelligence +rograms an %ttac3 on the V/ (n*rastructure an )ocal (rregular Aorces.- 6hat resulte, accoring
to 9ric3ham, -was not a general sta** planning boy, but an e!ecuti#e action organi4ation that was *ocuse on
getting the Cob one, not thin3ing about it, by ta3ing a#antage o* Komer<s ynamic personality.-
;le#en pages long $plus anne!es on interrogation, ata processing, an screening an etention o* V/(', -%
+roposal- was accepte by Komer in early >une 19G&. (ts state purpose was: -to unerta3e the integration o*
e**orts o* all "0 an :V? organi4ations, both in intelligence collection an processing an in operations irecte
against the elimination o* the V/ (n*rastructure an irregular *orces- an -to insure that basic programs
conucte by i**erent organi4ations an components, as they relate to the elimination o* the V/(, are mae
mutually compatible, continuous, an *ully e**ecti#e.- 122
66
(/;O as the emboiment o* e!ecuti#e action ha emerge as the solution to the problem pose by the V/(. (t
was a -machine- compose o* Coint committees at national, corps, pro#ince, an istrict le#els. %t the top sat
Fobert Komer as chairman o* the boar, setting policy with the appro#al o* the ambassaor an 8%/V
commaner. 0er#ing as Komer<s comman post was the (/;O Directorate in 0aigon, to be heae by -the
senior ".0. coorinator *or organi4ing the o#erall attac3 on the V/(.- 1N2
.he (/;O Directorate was to be subi#ie into three units. .he intelligence unit was to be compose o* two
senior liaison o**icers -- one *rom 8%/V an one *rom the /(% -- who were to prepare brie*ings, conuct special
in#estigations, an e#aluate the e**ecti#eness o* the attac3 on the V/(.
.he operations $a3a the plans an programs' unit was to be compose o* three program managers who planne
acti#ities, set re5uirements, manage *uns, an were responsible *or three speci*ic problem areas: $1'
intelligence collection programs an their coorination an reaction operations@ $2' screening, etention, an
Cuicial processing o* V/ ci#il e*enants@ an $N' the interrogation e!ploitation o* V/ capti#es an e*ectors.
,ow (/;O hanle these problem areas will be iscusse at length in /hapter 10.
.he reports management unit was to re*ine the attac3 on the V/( through the science *iction o* statistical
analysis. Feports o**icers were to help program managers -in e#eloping reports to be re5uire *rom Fegion an
+ro#ince- an to analy4e those reports. .he reports ealt with pro#ince sta**ing@ prisoner an e*ector accession
an isposition@ FD team locations, actions, an casualties@ 5uantitati#e an 5ualitati#e escriptions o*
intelligence reports an +F" operations@ an pro#ince inspection reports, among other things. The re.orting
unit inclu'e' an ins.ections tea) because* as 0ric&ha) obser-e'* #E-er+bo'+ lies .... .hese guys are
suppose to be on the roa most o* the time, ropping in une!pectely to loo3 at your *iles an to #eri*y what
was being reporte to us in writing was true.-
(/;O *iel operations were to be gra*te onto the /(%<s liaison an co#ert action programs, with the region an
pro#ince o**icers in charge continuing to manage those programs an in most cases assuming the ae Cob o*
(/;O coorinator. .he (/;O +ro#ince /ommittee was to be -the center o* gra#ity o* intelligence operations
against the V/(.- .he (/;O pro#ince coorinator in turn was to establish an super#ise D(=//s $usually se#en
or eight per pro#ince', -where the bul3 o* the attac3 on the low le#el in*rastructure an local guerrilla *orces must
be generate an carrie out.- (/;O committees at each le#el were to be compose o* the senior intelligence,
operations, an paci*ication o**icers. %n the (/;O coorinator was to -recommen an generate operations *or
the attac3 on in*rastructure- an -stimulate Vietnamese interagency cooperation an coorination.- 1D2
-(<m a great a#ocate o* committee meetings,- 9ric3ham tol me, -pro#ie they<re properly run. .hat<s why
+hoeni! woun up as a committee structure at nation, region, pro#ince, an istrict le#els. % Coint sta** at e#ery
le#el own to istrict is the essence o* +hoeni!. 6e hope the committee structure woul be a nonoperati#e
3in o* thing, but we ha to ha#e some machinery *or bringing together e#eryboy in#ol#e in these programs.-
%e 9ric3ham: -0ome +hoeni! coorinators were *rom the %gency *or (nternational De#elopment or the
military. .hey in<t ha#e to be /(%. 0ame with the pro#ince o**icer in charge@ the +=(/ woul be a member o*
the +hoeni! committee, whether or not he was the coorinator.- ,owe#er, inso*ar as the +(/s an the +F"
were the *ounation stones o* +hoeni!, i* someone other than the /(% pro#ince o**icer in charge was the (/;O
+ro#ince /ommittee chairman. or its coorinator, that person was totally epenent on the +=(/ *or access to
in*ormation on, an reaction *orces *or use against, the V/(. (n aition, the committee structure allowe the /(%
to eny plausibly that it ha anyone operating in the D(=//s.
-( was oppose to the D(=//s at the beginning,- 9ric3ham amitte, -but a*ter ( #isite three places up north
an wrote the early >une paper, ( ha con#erte into belie#ing in them as important .... %n then Komer sai we
coul ha#e as many men as we as3e *or, an at that point we trie to get istrict o**icers.- (n any e#ent,
accoring to 9ric3ham, -(/;O institutionali4es the thing.-
-=3ay,- sai 9ric3ham. -Komer appro#e this, an we sent a cable to 6ashington hea5uarters outlining the
situation an re5uesting appro#al. %n we got a cable bac3 *rom /olby which basically sai, <6ell, we on<t
3now what you<re going to o.< %n as ( recall, they suggeste that we sort o* pull in our horns.-
-6ell, we sai, <.his is the only way to o it, so we<ll Cust go ahea an o it.< 6e came up with the ambassaor<s
appro#al out there in the *iel, so bac3 in 6ashington they were le*t with a *ait accompli. An' the iron+ is*
!olb+ ha' nothing to 'o %ith I!EX or Phoeni5, He ha' to go along %ith it, It %as a..ro-e' b+ Go)er an'
the a)bassa'or an' the $hite House* so %e i).le)ente' it,# %t that point ?elson 9ric3ham returne to
6ashington *or a Cob on the Vietnamese es3, an a new personality appeare on the scene, willing an reay
to pic3 up where 9ric3ham ha le*t o**.
777
67
,a#ing chatte with Foger .rin5uier in Vung .au in 19E2, ;#an +ar3er, >r., was no stranger to Vietnam. As the
son o an A)erican .ilot %ho ha' ser-e' in Ging George6s Ro+al /l+ing !or.s in the /irst $orl' $ar*
Par&er %as also %ell connecte', ".on gra'uating ro) !ornell "ni-ersit+ in 29AC* Par&er* %ho %as
luent in /rench* %as in-ite' to Hoin the ashionable OSS, .raine with the Caunty >eburghs, 1i2 he was
slate to parachute into Arance but instea was sent to 9urma, where he ser#e in Detachment 101, as an
interrogation an logistics o**icer *ighting with Kachin hill tribes behin the >apanese lines. +ar3er later ser#e as
Detachment 101<s liaison o**icer to 8errill<s 8arauers an the 9ritish .hirty-si!th Di#ision. ,is ser#ice with the
=00 $*ollowe by a brie* stint as a tra#eling salesman' le to a career in the /(%<s clanestine ser#ices an to
personal relationships with many o* the maCor Vietnamese, Arench, an %merican players in Vietnam.
+ar3er began his /(% career as a courier in the Aar ;ast, then was grauate to case o**icer, operating mostly in
,ong Kong an /hina. =#er the ensuing years, he tol me when we met in 19LG, he mae -*our or *i#e- trips to
Vietnam an, when he arri#e again in 0aigon in >une 19G&, was slate to become the station<s e!ecuti#e
irector, its thir-highest-ran3ing position. ,owe#er, Fobert Komer an >ohn ,art thought that +ar3er coul
better ser#e -the cause- as (/;O<s *irst irector.
+ar3er was chosen to manage (/;O, *irst an *oremost, because Komer neee a senior /(% o**icer in that
position. The !IA alone ha' the e5.ertise in co-ert .ara)ilitar+ an' intelligence o.erations* the !IA alone
%as in liaison %ith the S.ecial 0ranch an' the !IO* an' the !IA alone coul' su..l+ )one+ an'
resources on a )o)ent6s notice* %ithout the re' ta.e that stra..e' the )ilitar+ an' the State
De.art)ent, %s a :0-1G with the e5ui#alent ran3 o* a brigaier general, ;#an +ar3er, >r., ha the status an
the security clearances that woul allow him access to all these things.
+ar3er<s persona an pro*essional recor also mae him the per*ect caniate *or the Cob. ,a#ing Cust complete
a tour as the !IA oicer assigne' to the Pentagon6s Paciic !o))an', +ar3er ha helpe raw up the
military<s strategic plan *or Vietnam an was well aware o* how Vietnam *itte into the -big picture.- +ossessing
the persuasi#e s3ills an political connections o* a seasone iplomat, +ar3er also enCoye the status an the
style necessary to soothe the monumental egos o* obstinate military o**icers an bureaucrats. %n <<as the
e!pert on uncon#entional war*are,- which was how .ully %campora *acetiously re*erre to him, ;#an +ar3er ha
the traecra*t 5uali*ications re5uire to launch a top secret, highly sensiti#e, coorinate attac3 on the V/(.
"pon arri#ing in 0aigon, +ar3er prepare himsel* by reaing 9ric3ham<s papers an re#iewing -the *i*ty to si!ty-
programs we alreay ha in place to eal with the -in*rastructure,- a wor +ar3er escribe to me as -hieous.-
1E2 1ii2 %t an in*ormal con*erence in Da ?ang calle to iscuss the attac3 on the V/(, +ar3er learne that
9ric3ham -an his partners in crime- wante to concentrate their e**orts initially on the %mericans, then on the
Vietnamese, but that Komer *irst ha to ram (/;O through the imper#ious 0aigon bureaucracy.
.his was not har to o, consiering that +resient >ohnson ha gi#en Komer a manate that encompasse not
only the *ormulation o* an integrate attac3 on the V/( but also the reorgani4ation o* the Fepublic o* Vietnam<s
arme *orces, management o* the =ctober 19G& Vietnamese presiential elections, an re#itali4ing 0outh
Vietnam<s economy. 6hen *ace with the irresistible *orce calle Fobert -9lowtorch- Komer, the immo#able
0aigon bureaucracy ga#e way 5uic3ly, i* not altogether #oluntarily.
Alan3e by >ohn ,art an :eneral :eorge Aorsythe, 8%/V<s chie* o* Fe#olutionary De#elopment, Komer on
>une 1D, 19G&, presente 8%/V<s chie*s o* sta** with 9ric3ham<s -+roposal.- Komer mae a *orce*ul
presentation, writes Falph >ohnson, but :enerals +hillip 9. Da#ison >r., 6alter Kerwin, an 6illiam +earson
bal3e, -because 8%/V personnel re5uirements were not inclue.- 1G2
9ut it i not matter that the maCority o* D(=// a#isers were slate to be military men. Komer, bac3e by ,art,
simply too3 his case to 8%/V commaner 6estmorelan, who, ha#ing been in*orme o* +resient >ohnson<s
wishes in the matter by %mbassaor 9un3er, o#errule his sta** on >une 1G. % *ew ays later the 6hite ,ouse
/oorinating /ommittee $Director o* /entral (ntelligence Fichar ,elms, 0ecretary o* 0tate Dean Fus3,
/hairman o* the >oint /hie*s o* 0ta** ;arle 6heeler, an /hairman 6illiam 0ulli#an' noe their *inal appro#al.
%n so it was that (/;O -- soon to be +hoeni! -- was born. %n not without resentment. :eneral 8c/hristian
recalle, -=n my last ay in Vietnam, ( became aware that a new plan *or attac3ing the V/( was to be
implemente. (t was to be calle (/;O. .o put it milly, ( was ama4e an ismaye.- 8c/hristian was ama4e
that he ha not been tol earlier, an was ismaye because (/;O was going to replace /ong .ac (V.
=n the morning o* >une 20, 1iii2 ;#an +ar3er met with :eneral Da#ison $8c/hristian<s replacement as 8%/V
intelligence chie*' an :eneral +earson, the 8%/V chie* o* operations. %t this meeting, +ar3er recalle, the
generals agree -to sta** this thing out.- 9ut, he ae, -( thin3 *rom the point o* #iew o* the military, well, they
may ha#e *elt this was being sho#e own their throats by the chie* o* station.
-%nyway,- sai +ar3er, -1Komer an ,art2 sai, <Do it,< an they ienti*ie me as the man they propose to hea
up this sta**, an the agency sai they woul supply assistance. =3ay, but immeiately you ha#e a problem
68
because there are alreay a#isers to the 0pecial 9ranch ... an i* all o* a suen ( come in an am put in
charge, that means (<m getting into someboy else<s business. 0o i* ( want to get to the 0pecial +olice, ( ha#e to
soun out the %merican a#iser to see i* he wants to cooperate with this. 8aybe he wants to, an maybe he
oesn<t. 8aybe he *eels he<s alreay oing this.
$<6ell, he may not li3e it- -- +ar3er smile -- -but he has to o it, because the chie* o* station tells him to. 0o he
oes it. 9ut that oesn<t ma3e the pill any easier to swallow. (n e**ect he<s getting another layer o* comman or, (
shoul say, coorination, o#er him.-
E' 0ra'+* an Ar)+ oicer on contract to the !IA an assigne to the (/;O Directorate, elaborate when we
met in his o**ice in 19L&. -.here certainly was a con*lict going on,- 9ray sai. 1L2 -Da#e 6est 1?elson
9ric3ham<s replacement2 in<t want to share his prerogati#es with another power*ul /(% guy .... 6hy shoul
there be two organi4ations wor3ing with the 0pecial 9ranchB (t wasn<t propose that 1(/;O2 be uner his control.
(t was propose that it interact with the 0pecial 9ranch on a separate basis an that separate 0pecial 9ranch
o**icers woul be assigne o#er there to o that. %n 6est wouln<t ha#e any control or in*luence o#er it.
-.he 0pecial 9ranch,- 9ray e!plaine, -was suppose to be carrying out internal sur#eillance an operations
against sub#ersi#es. .hat<s its Cob. The .roble) ,,, %as that the -ast )aHorit+ o S.ecial 0ranch energ+
%ent into sur-eilling* re.orting on* an' th%arting o..osition .olitical .arties, Non(!o))unists, E-er+
no% an' then the+ 'i' so)ething about a V! (( i he %as in Saigon, 0ut the+ 'i'n6t ha-e an+ s+ste)atic
.rogra) against the !o))unists, Their )ain acti-it+ %as to &ee. the e5isting regi)e in .o%er* an' the
.olitical threat to the e5isting regi)e %as not the !o))unist .art+* 6cause the !o))unist .art+ %as
outla%e'N $hat the S.ecial 0ranch %as 'oing %as &ee.ing trac& o the so(calle' lo+al o..osition ((
&ee.ing trac& o %hat Tran Van Don or %hat !o Minh Tang or %hat the Vietna) Duoc Dan Dang %as
'oing,
-+hoeni!,- 9ray e!plaine, -at an absolute minimum cause a *ocus to be brought to bear on anti-/ommunist
acti#ities.-
,a#ing pulle ran3 to get 8%/V an the liaison branch in line, >ohn ,art then assigne *our /(% o**icers to ;#an
+ar3er on a temporary basis, as well as the ser#ices o* -3ey /(% personnel statione outsie o* 0aigon- an
-integrate an /(%-*une programs such as /ensus :rie#ance .eams, +F", FD /are, an 0pecial +olice.-
192 +ar3er was then tol to select a military eputy, an he as3e *or an ol *rien *rom =00 Detachment 101,
/olonel >unichi 9uhto, then the 8%/V chie* o* counterintelligence.
->unichi agree to assist,- +ar3er sai when we met at his home, -e#en though he ha plenty to o in his own
Cob. (t was agree he woul 3eep his regular Cob an be my assistant on a part-time basis as another uty. %n
with his assistance we *oun a bunch o* %rmy o**icers, all o* whom were near the en o* their tours but who
coul be spare *rom whate#er they were oing. %n so it went. .hat<s the (/;O sta**.
-.hen the police were brought into it,- +ar3er ae, re*erring to the ?ational +olice. -)ea#ing asie the agency
people, the 3ey people are >ohn 8anopoli an mysel* because he was hea o* the ?ational +olice.-
A retire' Ne% For& State Police lieutenant* Mano.oli ha' ser-e' as a .olice a'-iser in Vietna) ro)
29@3 through 29@9 an' ha' returne' to Saigon as chie o Public Saet+ in 2933, %lthough he ha no
authority o#er 0pecial 9ranch, as senior a#iser to the ?ational +olice, 8anopoli was responsible *or meeting
its, as well as (/;O<s, logistical an aministrati#e nees.
-8anopoli,- +ar3er pointe out, -was actually the senior police a#iser in-country. ( in<t ha#e that 3in o*
responsibility. 8ine was a sta** responsibility. 6e in +hoeni! were not put o#er the police or military@ we simply
ga#e a irecti#e in the name o* 8%/V or Komer or /olby. .he iea was to come up with an organi4ation that
woul pool intelligence on the in*rastructure an try to get these people to use that intelligence to go out an
arrest them. .his is so easily sai an so i**icult to o because all these agencies ha#e their own Cobs an they
e!iste long be*ore +hoeni!.-
8anopoli also got the Cob o* 3ic3ing .ully %campora out o* his o**ice an mo#ing +ar3er<s sta** in. -.hey *oun
some space *or us in "0%(D .wo,- +ar3er sai. -6e were s5uee4e in.- ,e was gi#en some part-time
secretarial help, an with the o**icers lent *rom ,art, -what we i *irst was come out with a 8%/V sta** paper
which escribe what this program was, what we were going to o, an what this coorinate program -- this
(/;O -- was going to be.-
.his sta** paper, title -(ntelligence, (ntelligence /oorination, an ;!ploitation *or %ttac3 on V/ (n*rastructure
$/',- short title: (/;O $"', commonly 3nown as 8%/V NL1-D1, was promulgate on >uly 9, 19G&, an mar3e
69
the birth o* (/;O as a *ormal entity. (t also signale the en to the escalation o* the Vietnam 6ar. Ai#e ays later
the De*ense Department impose a E2N,000-man troop limit on the >oint /hie*s o* 0ta**.
=ne o* the authors o* 8%/V NL1-D1 was /(% o**icer >im 6ar, who was then preparing to replace Kinloch 9ull
as region o**icer in charge o* (V /orps. -.he *irst meeting bac3 in those ays,- 6ar recalle, -was between
;#an, me, an >unichi 9uhto. .hat<s early >uly 19G&. I ha' &no%n 8uni ro) Ger)an+ an' OSS Detach)ent
One(oh(one, 8ust b+ chance all three o us ha' been in Detach)ent One(oh(one o OSS in $orl' $ar
T%o, In act* E-an an' I %ere together at !a). Da-i'* %here the 8e'burghs %ere traine',# 1102
% paramilitary e!pert who ha commane a unit o* Kachin guerrillas operating behin >apanese lines, 6ar --
whose /(% career began in 19DL in 8alaya, where he was schoole by /laue Aenner -- was well aware o* the
prominence o* the 0pecial 9ranch in counterinsurgency war*are. %ccoring to 6ar, -.he 3ey to the Vietnam
6ar ... was the political control o* people. %n the /ommunists were oing a better Cob o* this than we were, an
the best way to stop this was to get at the in*rastructure. ?ot the people who were sympathi4ers or supporters in
any way o* the V/. .hey in<t count. .he people who counte were the 3ey members o* the +eople<s
Fe#olutionary party. .hese were the people behin the ?)A.
-%nyway, ;#an set up this meeting. ,e wante input *rom someone with *iel operations e!perience an 3now-
how, an what we tal3e about was concepts: what we ha to o to bring e#eryboy together who was
collecting intelligence an that e#eryboy shoul be channeling intelligence into the D(=//. .here intelligence
woul be collate, analy4e, interprete, an then reaction operations coul be unerta3en almost immeiately.
%n new intelligence irecti#es woul be ra*te. 6hoe#er was in charge was suppose to be oing that all the
time -- that is, letting people 3now that a particular piece o* in*ormation 1neee to mount an operation against a
particular V/(2 was missing, or as3ing, <6hat<s the pattern o* this guy<s mo#ements e#ery ayB< .hen you ecie
who shoul get these irecti#es -- the police i* you<re tal3ing about an in*rastructure guy or the military i* you<re
tal3ing about a battalion o* V/. %nyway, the guy who runs the D(=// -- be it 0pecial 9ranch or 800 or 0-two or
whoe#er -- usually oes the laying o* re5uirements.
-Airst we tal3e about the coorination o* intelligence. Aor instance, in the Delta there were appro!imately ten
thousan intelligence reports a month coming in *rom i**erent le#els ... a *ew hunre were coming up through
police channels, some through %FV? an %merican battalions, an others through the :reen 9erets an their
1Vietnamese2 counterparts. %ll o* them were sening in*ormation through their own chains o* comman, rather
than using it laterally an e!ploiting it locally. %n we wante them, at the reaction le#el 1the D(=//2, to collate
the in*ormation an e!ploit it. .hat<s the *irst obCecti#e.
-.he secon obCecti#e -- assuming the military intelligence gets e!ploite by the military units -- is ma3ing sure
the in*rastructure intelligence gets e!ploite by whoe#er appears to be the most appropriate unit to coorinate it.
(* it<s the 3in o* thing that can be hanle only by a large military organi4ation, *ine. ;#en the largest o* the
%merican out*its get in#ol#e in this, li3e the Airst %ir /a#alry an the ,unre Airst %irborne, which was
especially goo at coron an search operations. .hey woul ta3e +F" or Aiel +olice units along with them
an 0pecial 9ranch units to o the interrogating. 9ut generally the out*it that<s best e5uippe to get a single guy
in a remote place is the +F".-
.hese concepts o* intelligence collection an e!ploitation, as outline by 6ar, were incorporate in 8%/V NL1-
D1 along with 9ric3ham<s organi4ational concepts. .imetables were set *or the region o**icers in charge to ra*t
missions an *unctions statements, to etermine in which istricts the *irst D(=//s were to be built, an to
prepare guielines *or D(=// operations. %ll this was to be one by the en o* >uly. 8%/V NL1-D1 also charge
the /(%<s region o**icers in charge with brie*ing their Vietnamese counterparts as soon as possible.
6ith 8%/V NL1-D1 in han, ;#an +ar3er an >ohn ,art #isite each F=(/. -6e tol them what we ha in
min,- +ar3er recalle, -what the obCecti#e was an what their *unction was. 0riel+ state'* the+ %ere to be the
nucleus to get it going, This %as all 'one orall+ ,,,, The+ %ere si).l+ tol'* 6Fou6-e no% hear' %hat E-6s
in charge o (( +ou6ll get it 'one here1 +ou6ll .ass the %or' to +our .eo.le,6 Then %e briee' the senior
)ilitar+ .eo.le in the our regions,#
+ar3er attribute his success in co-opting the F=(/s to the *act that -in aition to being the +hoeni! *ellow, (
was also a senior /(% o**icer wearing my other hat.- (n that capacity he attene /(% station meetings three
times each wee3. (n >uly 19G& the F=(/0, who may be thought o* as +hoeni!<s *irst *iel generals, were >ac3
,organ in ( /orps, Dean %lmy in (( /orps, Kinloch 9ull in (V /orps, an 9ob 6all in ((( /orps.
;ach region was uni5ue, geographically an politically, an +hoeni! in *light con*orme to those contours. %s
+ar3er e!plains, -Aour /orps was i**erent because there weren<t as many %mericans there.- .he Delta was
also the breabas3et an population center o* Vietnam, thus the locus o* the counterinsurgency an +hoeni!. (
/orps was istinct by #irtue o* its pro!imity to ?orth Vietnam an the e!tent to which +hoeni! was irecte
against .hieu<s omestic political opponents. ,ea5uartere in ?ha .rang uner the shaow o* Ai*th 0pecial
70
Aorces, (( /orps was an ami!ture o* 0=: an +hoeni! operations. %n as the region encompassing 0aigon
an the /entral =**ice o* 0outh Vietnam, ((( /orps was perhaps the most critical region -- although one in which,
accoring to ?elson 9ric3ham, there was little success against the V/(.
777
(n >une 19G& Fobert Komer sent a cable to Fichar ,elms commening ?elson 9ric3ham *or -an outstaning
Cob in helping esign new attac3 on in*rastructure- an as3ing that 9ric3ham be mae a#ailable *or occasional
temporary uty in Vietnam -i* critical problems arise.- .hree wee3s a*ter arri#ing bac3 in )angley, with yet
another *eather in his cap, 9ric3ham was trans*erre *rom the Vietnamese es3 to the o**ice o* the special
assistant *or Vietnamese a**airs $0%V%'.
-0%V% was up at the D/( le#el,- 9ric3ham note, <<as a coorination point *or an agency an interagency
acti#ities relating to Vietnam. .he reason ( was brought up there was that 10%V% Director :eorge2 /ar#er was
oblige to brie* 1the secretary o* e*ense2 an other people on (/;O/+hoeni!, an he in<t ha#e a clue. ,e
couln<t unerstan. ?oboy in 6ashington coul unerstan what we ha one out there in the station. 0o
/ar#er calle me in an as3e me to write a memoranum.-
0ric&ha) 'escribe' Fale gra'uate !ar-er as the .erson %ho #.ro-i'e' the theoretical basis or ",S,
inter-ention in Vietna) in an article he %rote or /oreign Aairs )aga7ine >#The /aceless Viet !ong#? on
the nature o the Vietna) insurgenc+ an' A)erican interests there,
-( staye in 0%V% *or two months,- 9ric3ham continue. -.hen ( went bac3 out to Vietnam .DH to wor3 with ;#
+ar3er ... to assist him in the reporting *ormats, the re5uirements, an this an that an to implement the
philosophy ( e!plaine earlier. %n it was at this point that we ran into problems with 9ob 6all.
-9ob 6all was a paramilitary type.- 9ric3ham sighe. -,e was *irst assigne as a pro#ince o**icer, then as
eputy in ( /orps, an in that capacity he was instrumental in creating the *irst D(=//s. ,e in#ite some 9rits
*rom Kuala )umpur to e!plain what they ha one there, an he was always hustling papers aroun the station.
,e was not a regional o**icer be*ore the reorgani4ation, but he ene up as our F=(/ in .hir /orps, in 9ien
,oa. ?ow that was shortly be*ore ( le*t country, an ( ha #ery little to concern mysel* with that situation. (t was
when ( came bac3 .DH to help ;#an +ar3er in the *all o* 19G& that it became e#ient that 9ob 6all was one o*
our less satis*actory region o**icers.
-=ne o* our problems in Vietnam,- 9ric3ham philosophi4e, -is that that part o* the worl seems to generate the
warlor. (t<s the amnation o* the Aar ;ast an a isease that in*ects the white man when he goes there .... An'
the u.shot in Vietna)* beore so)eone ca)e out %ith the sle'geha))er to &noc& hea's together* %as
that +ou ha' ort+(our 'ierent %ars in ort+(our 'ierent .ro-inces an' ort+(our 'ierent %arlor's ,,,
an' A)erican region a'-isers oten %oul' all -icti) to this sa)e -irus: 0ob $all is a .ri)e e5a).le, 0o
( recommene isciplinary action an relie* *rom uty.
-;# +ar3er, o* course, was in charge o* it, an he in<t o that. (< ne#er 3nown ;# +ar3er be*ore that, but Cust a
*iner gentleman you<ll ne#er 3now@ he<s what the Fussians woul call a culture ini#iual. ?ow ;# +ar3er is less
abrasi#e than ( am@ he woul see a problem an see3 a iplomatic solution. 6hereas ( woul roc3 a boat an
sometimes sin3 it, ;# +ar3er woul steer it in a i**erent course, so it wouln<t ta3e the wa#es. ;# +ar3er has a
/hinese min, an he chose a i**erent way to so*ten 6all<s position.-
.hat position, accoring to 9ric3ham, was that -9ob 6all was permitting the military people in .hir /orps to
turn the entire intelligence operation into a military support aCunct, ignoring the in*rastructure. ;#en though he
was pushing the D(=//s li3e cra4y, he an his military counterpart in Fegion .hree were using the +F" as
bloc3ing *orces *or military operations. ,e was not *ollowing policy. ,e was pursuing his own war out there in the
region. .his became the issue between 9ob 6all an mysel* in .hir /orps.-
9ob 6all, a baling, roly-poly man, emphatically enie 9ric3ham<s charges. -?o wayI- he sai, aing that it
was per*ectly proper to use the +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits in #illage sweeps, because -the +F" coul
actually eal with the people. .hey spo3e their language an 3new what to loo3 *or, whereas ",S, orces %ere
onl+ intereste' in &illing .eo.le,#
6all i solicit the help o* his corps<s eputy intelligence chie*, )ieutenant /olonel >ohn Ki4irian, who ante up
*i*teen secon lieutenants as D(=// a#isers in ((( /orps. 9ut that in itsel* i not ma3e him a warlor. Aor a
/(% region o**icer coul push +hoeni! only to the e!tent that his military counterpart pro#ie 5uali*ie personnel
to run the D(=//s. %n the military always wante something in return. %n then, o* course, there was the
o#erriing 5uestion o* Vietnamese participation.
71
=n this issue 9ric3ham sai, -6e put 1+hoeni!2 together an presente, it to the Vietnamese. :eneral )oan by
this time was chie* o* the ?ational +olice. ;#eryboy 3nows what he loo3s li3e -- they<#e seen pictures o* him
shooting the V/ on .V -- but (<m con#ince that )oan was an absolutely honest, eicate patriot. %nyway, this
I!EX .ro.osal %as .resente' to 4oan* an' it 'i'n6t ta&e hi) long to turn it 'o%n* )ainl+ because the+
loo&e' u.on it as an inringe)ent on their so-ereignt+, $hen I sa+ 4oan %as a .atriot* he %asN He %as
loo&ing out or the Vietna)ese, ,e recogni4e the *act that Vietnamese an %merican interests were not
always ientical. 0o they turne it own *lat.
#$e sai'* 6$ell* that6s o&a+ 6cause %e6re gonna 'o it an+%a+,6 ... Fegarless o* what the Vietnamese were
going to o, we were going to go ahea with it anyway, i* nothing else, to try to ser#e as an e!ample. %n there
was really no nee *or the Vietnamese to string along with us, although up in Da ?ang they i. 6hich, as you
3now, is where the name +hoeni! came *rom.
->ac3 ,organ was our F=(/ up there,- 9ric3ham went on. -,e was in goo liaison with both the Vietnamese
military an police, an when he presente this to the Vietnamese up there, one o* them sai, <6ell, we shoul
really call this +hoeni!, because it<s to rise *rom the ashes an see3 #ictory.< 0o >ac3 ,organ came own with a
cable an sai, <9y the way, so-an-so has coine the name +hoeni! *or this acti#ity- an it too3 immeiately. (t
became 3nown as =peration +hoeni!, an e#eryboy was happy with that. 9y then it was beginning to go.-
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. Elite OSS oicers traine' at !a). Da-i', !olb+* $ar'* Par&er* an' 0uhto all %ere 8e'burghs,
ii. %ccoring to +ar3er, Komer li3e the phrase -attac3 on the in*rastructure- because -he thought it soune
se!y.-
iii. .hat a*ternoon +ar3er ha -a brie* con#ersation with :eneral )oan,- uring which )oan reCecte the (/;O
proposal, claiming it in*ringe on Vietnamese so#ereignty.
!HAPTER 2I: Action Progra)s
9e*ore he bae aieu to Vietnam in ?o#ember 19G&, ?elson 9ric3ham helpe put together what was entitle
-%ction +rogram *or %ttac3 on V/ (n*rastructure 19G&-19GL.- 0igne by the /=FD0 assistant chie* o* sta**,
6ae )athram, -%ction +rogram- represente Fobert Komer<s aministrati#e an operational irecti#es *or the
(/;O program. (t is the most signi*icant +hoeni! ocument, charting the program<s imensions an course o#er
its *irst eighteen months. (t set in place 9ric3ham<s reporting re5uirements, establishe tables o* organi4ation,
ienti*ie maCor problems, an *orme groups to *in solutions.
-%ction +rogram- consiste o* twel#e separate tabs, each aressing a separate mission or *unction to be
accomplishe by a speci*ic ealine. Airst on the list, .ab 1, calle *or promulgating the (/;O mission irecti#e,
8%/V NL1-D1. .ab 2 calle *or brie*ing all corps senior a#isers, an .ab N irecte the /(% region o**icers to
esignate corps an pro#ince (/;O coorinators, all by >uly N1, 19G&. 9y year<s en (/;O committees were
operating in thirty-nine pro#inces, thirty-*our o* which were chaire by /(% o**icers. 8ost were meeting monthly
an ha initiate anti-V/( operations. %lso by year<s en twenty-nine +ro#ince (ntelligence =perations
/oorination /enters $the pro#ince e5ui#alents o* a D(=//' were *unctioning an sening reports to the (/;O
Directorate. (n certain pro#inces, such as Vinh )ong in the Delta, the +(=// ouble as a +hoeni! committee.
.ab D calle *or continuation an e!pansion o* D(=// e#elopment. %t the time -%ction +rogram- was issue,
10 D(=//s were in operation@ by year<s en there were 10N, although most were gathering tactical military
intelligence, not in*iltrating an attac3ing the V/(. (n ?o#ember 19G& more than hal* a million ollars were
authori4e *or D(=// construction, salaries o* Vietnamese employees, o**ice e5uipment an supplies, an
transportation. -.hese were not operational *uns in the sense o* supporting anti-in*rastructure acti#ities.- 112
8oney *or anti-V/( operations came *rom the parent agency.
.o his creit, ;#an +ar3er i not appro#e o* the rapi pace at which +hoeni! was e!paning. -( in<t thin3 we
neee an elaborate structure e#erywhere in the country,- he tol me. -0ome o* the pro#inces in<t ha#e
enough people or acti#ity in them to warrant it. ( woul ha#e pre*erre to concentrate on the more populate
acti#e areas where you 3new that you ha people to wor3 with an something to wor3 against.- 122
72
.here were too many #ariables, +ar3er contene, to ha#e -a uni*orm program.- .he methoology ha not been
per*ecte, an too much epene -on the personal li3es an isli3es o* the senior Vietnamese people in the
*iel ... an their a#iser .... Aor instance, in ( /orps there was a lot o* acti#ity, not so much concerne with the
V/( as with the machinations o* ri#al political parties -- the 9uhists or whate#er .... .hese are things that were
hung o#er *rom the Arench ays .... .his was always the problem with .hieu .... 1it2 was sort o* open season on
the enemy -- o* settling scores.-
.ab E o* -%ction +rogram- prescribe (/;O sta** organi4ation along the committee lines propose by 9ric3ham.
(n 0aigon the (/;O boar o* irectors consiste o* the D;+/=FD0 as chairman, the /(% station chie*, the
8%/V intelligence $12' an operations $1N' chie*s, an the /(% chie* o* Fe#olutionary De#elopment. (n *act, the
boar met only once, an Fobert Komer 5uic3ly assume control o* +hoeni!, setting policy as he saw *it, with
the irectorate ser#ing as his personal sta**. -Komer or /olby 1who replace Komer as D;+/=FD0 in
?o#ember 19GL2 sai, <Hou<ll o it.< 8y Cob,- e!plaine +ar3er, -was to say, <=3ay, /olby says you<ll o this, an
this is how you<re gonna go about oing it.< 6hat ( i was help people carry out what they were orere to o.
%n ( *irmly belie#e in the so*t sell.-
(n practice, +ar3er<s /(% 3inship with Komer an especially /olby enable him to manage the +hoeni!
Directorate without ha#ing to consult agency heas. ,e ha merely to state his wishes to the D;+/=FD0 in
orer to bypass the #arious chains o* comman.
-/olby was my i#ision chie* in the *iel, an in 6ashington also,- +ar3er e!plaine. -( ser#e with him in 6orl
6ar .wo when ( was in ;nglan. ( met him when we were both in a program 3nown as the >eburghs. ,e went
into the *iel in ;urope, an ( went into the *iel in the Aar ;ast.
-/olby is a *ine gentleman, (<ll tell you. ,e was tremenously help*ul to me. 0o was Komer. 9ut their
personalities were #ery i**erent. Komer was essentially a rasping, grating sort o* #oice ... but he was
consistently staunch in his support o* the program .... ,e may ha#e gi#en orers, he may ha#e been sarcastic --
all those things -- but at the same time he was not one to stan on ceremony, not one to o things because
that<s the way it<s always been one. ,e in<t gi#e a amn about that. ,e< say, <( want +ar3er<s organi4ation to
get *our truc3sI ( on<t gi#e a goo goamn where they come *rom, Cust gi#e him *our truc3sI<
-/olby was 5uieter, more so*t-spo3en, but Cust as *irm in terms o* getting things one.... ,e woul suenly say,
<)et<s go #isit so-an-so,< in a pro#ince or region. .hat meant you woul call up an get a helicopter or a plane,
with no notice, an he woul Cust go there an see them. .hat mae it a whole lot more secure because we
tra#ele without boyguars.-
/ase in point: 6hile ser#ing as +hoeni! coorinator in Juang .ri +ro#ince, 6arren 8ilberg was #isite by
/olby, who was on an inspection tour. %s 8ilberg recalle it, /olby ecie to spen the night, so 8ilberg
assigne a ?ung guar to watch o#er him. .hat night there was a mortar attac3. .he ?ung guar grabbe /olby
by the scru** o* the nec3, ragge him bac3war own the stairs $8ilberg arri#e in time to see /olby<s heels
bouncing on the steps' into the basement o* the builing, threw him on a cot, an threw himsel* on top o* the
*uture irector o* /entral (ntelligence. 0omewhat ismaye at the treatment the ?ung ha a**ore the
D;+/=FD0, 8ilberg hal* e!pecte the a! to *all when /olby an his entourage assemble *or brea3*ast the
*ollowing morning. 9ut /olby merely than3e the earnest ?ung *or the gesture o* concern.
.he consummate insier, /olby woul win many *riens with his -Cust *ol3s- management style, while using his
consierable in*luence to re*ine an reirect the broa policies put in place by Komer -- the outsie agitator who
roe roughsho o#er e#eryone. .ogether, Komer an /olby were the per*ect one-two combination re5uire to
Cump-start +hoeni! an 3eep it running *or *i#e years.
%s o* %ugust 1E, 19G&, +ar3er<s part-time sta** ha been replace by three permanent /(% o**icers: >oe 0artiano
as e!ecuti#e irector@ 6illiam )aw as chie* o* operations@ an >ames 9rogon as aministrati#e o**icer@ /olonel
6illiam >. :reenwalt ha replace >unichi 9uhto as eputy irector, an si! 8%/V o**icers were assigne as
*ull- time employees, along with a smattering o* %(D an 0tate Department people.
-6e set up a wor3ing organi4ation built aroun agency people,- +ar3er sai, -with other ini#iuals mae
a#ailable *rom the i**erent agencies, but still pai *or by the agencies they belonge to.- 9y then there were
%merican women ser#ing as secretaries, 8%/V an /(% o**icers a#ising the Vietnamese, an others in the
o**ice 3eeping recors. -.here were probably three or *our people ( counte on more than anyone else,- +ar3er
remar3e, but -in orer to ma3e this wor3, ( woul say that the core people were the agency people in charge o*
the special police -- the senior agency a#isers.-
777
73
.ab G pro#ie *or military augmentation o* (/;O *iel units. %s +ar3er put it, -.hen you reali4e you<re going to
ha#e a nationwie organi4ation as well as a hea5uarters sta**, an that you<re going to nee a lot more people
than you en#isione. 0o the %rmy becomes the principal.
-(n ue course a table o* organi4ation was set up which assigne people to region, then to pro#ince, an most o*
them were %rmy. Hou< ha#e a captain at pro#ince an a maCor or 1lieutenant colonel2 at region with assistants --
corporals an sergeants an so *orth. 8%/V too3 the boies at *irst as they came in-country an assigne them
regarless o* the *act that they may ha#e been intene *or something else. Aor e!ample, my eputy was going
to a military unit but *oun himsel* in (/;O instea. %nother *ellow who was going to be assigne to 8%/V
counterintelligence instea was assigne to an intelligence *unction in (/;O. .hat<s where the *irst people came
*rom.-
.he *irst 8%/V allotment to +hoeni! was *or 12G military o**icers an noncommissione o**icers $?/=s', all
counterintelligence specialists. =ne o**icer, one ?/=, an one cler3-typist ha been sent to each corps by
0eptember 1E, an one o**icer an/or ?/= to each pro#ince. 9y the en o* 19G& one ?/= ha been assigne
to each o* the 10N D(=//s then in e!istence. All )ilitar+ oicers an' enliste' )en assigne' to the Phoeni5
.rogra) in 293: too& or'ers ro) the !IA,
.ab & pro#ie *or brie*ing an coorination with senior :V? o**icials. 6hile the grounwor3 was being lai on
the %merican sie o* the program, +ar3er sai, -we were wor3ing with the Vietnamese to sell them the iea.
%lthough they were militarily assisting, the Vietnamese police ha the maCor role because a*ter all, you<re ealing
primarily with ci#ilians. 0o the person who wor3e most closely with us was the irector general o* the ?ational
+olice.-
9ut :eneral ?guyen ?goc )oan was wary o* the /(%, which was supporting ?guyen Van .hieu -- not ?guyen
/ao Ky -- in the campaign leaing up to the =ctober 19G& presiential elections. %n e#en though Ky was
persuae to run as .hieu<s #ice-presient $they Coine *orces against -peace- caniate .ran Van D4u', the two
were bitter enemies. %s Ky<s en*orcer :eneral )oan oppose +hoeni! not only because it in*ringe on
Vietnamese so#ereignty but because he belie#e it was being use to promote .hieu. .heir opposition to
+hoeni! was to spell trouble *or :eneral )oan an his patron, Ky.
:eneral )oan<s opposition to +hoeni!, howe#er, i not mean that he re*use to wor3 with %mericans on an
e5ual basis. ,is support *or /. (V ispro#es that. %n /ong .ac (V -was a program that was oing well, too,-
sai .ully %campora, -until Aebruary 19G&. .hen Fobert Komer arri#e, grabbe the political implications, an,
a*ter returning to 6ashington an con*erring with his boss, 6alt Fostow, purloine it *rom the Vietnamese.- 1N2
/. (V i**ere, *unamentally, *rom +hoeni! in that the ".0. military units it employe were not empowere to
arrest Vietnamese ci#ilians. +hoeni!, on the other han, relie primarily on the +F", which operate uner the
e!clusi#e Curisiction o* the /(% an thus were beyon :eneral )oan<s control. :eneral )oan naturally pre*erre
to wor3 with :eneral 8c/hristian<s /ombine (ntelligence 0ta**. 9ut when 8c/hristian le*t Vietnam in >uly 19G&,
Komer immeiately e!ploite the situation. %t Komer<s irection, 8%/V o**icers assigne to /. (V were
graually withrawn by 8c/hristian<s replacement, :eneral +hillip Da#ison, whom .ully %campora escribe
as -beholen- to Komer *or his Cob.
-Komer was isastrous,- %campora stresse. -,e more than anyone politici4e 8%/V. ,e was *orcing *or a
treaty, promoting +hoeni! an promising 6estmorelan the Cob o* %rmy chie* o* sta**, i* he went along. (n mi-
19G& it was a completely political situation.-
In'ee'* b+ 'e'ucting )ore than a hun're' thousan' Sel(Deense /orces an' #.olitical ca're# ro) the
ene)+ or'er o battle* $est)orelan'* Go)er* an' Hart %ere able to sho% success an' in the .rocess
con-ince Presi'ent 8ohnson that #the light# reall+ %as at the en' o the tunnel, 8eanwhile, ha#ing bac3e
themsel#es into a corner, they ecie to o the Cob themsel#es. 0o what i* :eneral )oan was resistantB %s
?elson 9ric3ham ha sai, -.hat<s o3ay <cause we<re gonna o it anywayI-
0ymboli4ing this -get tough- policy was +hoeni!, rising *rom the e#astation o* two years o* a stalemate war.
+hoeni! in this haw3ish mani*estation represente the *inal solution to the problem o* istinguishing between a
co#ert /ommunist enemy an an inscrutable ally. "ninhibite by *amily ties, %mericans in charge o* irregular
*orces, or by themsel#es, began hunting the V/( in its #illages, oing what the Vietnamese were reluctant to o
-- e#en though they were ne#er 5uite sure o* whom they were stal3ing.
This 'es.erate .olic+ %as not %ithout its A)erican 'etractors, Te).estuous Tull+ Aca).ora calle' it
#'etri)ental an' contra'ictor+,# E' 0ra'+* the Ar)+ ca.tain assigne' to the Phoeni5 Directorate as a
co-er or his !IA acti-ities* concurs, #It6s -er+ har' to carr+ out secret co-ert o.erations an' re.ressi-e
&in's o things in or'er to se.arate guerrillas ro) .eo.le (( an' then )a&e a s.eech to the) about ho%
their in'i-i'ual rights are so i).ortant*# 0ra'+ sai' in an inter-ie% %ith Al Santoli, >A?
74
9ut while %campora an 9ray belie#e the "nite 0tates ha no business preempting the Vietnamese when it
came to the attac3 against the V/(, other %mericans thought that the time *or patience an cooperation ha
come an gone. Arom ;#an +ar3er<s perspecti#e, the problem was competition between the 0pecial 9ranch an
the %FV?. -(t in#ol#e one Vietnamese agency saying, <6ell, we can<t gi#e 1in*ormation2 to them, because
they<re penetrate by the V/.< .hat sort o* thing. %n in some cases unoubte it was true.-
+ar3er raise a legitimate point. (n orer *or an intelligence coorination an e!ploitation program li3e +hoeni! to
wor3, institutional mistrust between the police an the military ha to be o#ercome. 9ut, +ar3er e!plaine,
-,a#ing the 0pecial 9ranch ha#e such an acti#e role mae it i**icult in many pro#inces an many o* the more
rural areas, because the special policeman was probably the e5ui#alent o* a sergeant. 0o ... he oesn<t ha#e
much clout .... %n the 1outgunne, outmanne2 police are pretty suborinate to the military, so you ha#e all this
business o* army #ersus police. (t<s a woner it wor3e at all.-
8oreo#er, *rustration with Vietnamese security lea3s ga#e %mericans yet another reason not to wait *or the
Vietnamese to throw their support behin +hoeni!. %s ;#an +ar3er sai, -=ne o* the great problems with the
Vietnamese in getting this starte was that the classi*ication o* the irecti#e was so high -- in orer to pre#ent it
*rom *alling into enemy hans -- that it was #ery i**icult to hanle these ocuments in the *iel ... an tell people
what they were suppose to o.-
.ypically, .ully %campora re*ute +ar3er<s e!planation an interprete the emphasis on secrecy in political
terms. %ccoring to %campora, *or whom the switch *rom /. (V to +hoeni! meant a loss in status, +ar3er
-always en#isione +hoeni! as a wholly ".0.-promote, -manage, an -supporte program.- 8oreo#er, -,art<s
one mission was to unermine )oan<s in*luence, to reuce his power base, an to superimpose +hoeni! on /.
Aour. .hey bought o** the hea o* 0pecial 9ranch, 8aCor ?guyen .ien. .hen +ar3er starte suborning guys on
the 8%/V intelligence sta**. ,e seuce /olonel >unichi 9uhto 18%/V<s chie* o* counterintelligence2 by
promising to ma3e him a :0-nineteen i* he went along with the /(% .... Da#ison<s mission was to estroy /.
Aour, an in %ugust, Da#ison an the /(% began withrawing %mericans *rom the /ombine (ntelligence 0ta**.
.his in#ol#es the election o* 19G&.-
.here is no oubt that +hoeni!, in its *legling stage, was concei#e an implemente by the /(%. Aurthermore,
Falph >ohnson writes, -.he results obtaine by (/;O by the en o* 19G& were primarily, i* not totally, stimulate
an supporte by the %mericans.- 1E2 .here was early acceptance o* +hoeni! by the Vietnamese in ( /orps, but
as +ar3er himsel* note, much o* that acti#ity was irecte against .hieu<s non-/ommunist political opponents.
=therwise, the maCority o* Vietnamese hesitate to embrace a program as politically e!plosi#e as +hoeni!. %s
>ohnson obser#es, -most pro#ince chie*s were waiting *or instructions *rom the /entral :o#ernment.- 1G2
.he *irst step in that irection was ta3en in late December 19G&, two months a*ter .hieu ha been electe
presient an Ky ha begun to lose in*luence. =n December 20, 19G&, +rime 8inister ?guyen Van )oc signe
Directi#e L9-.h. ./V+/8, legali4ing +hung ,oang, the Vietnamese clone o* +hoeni!. ,owe#er, the irecti#e was
not signe by +resient .hieu an thus carrie little weight with cautious pro#ince chie*s heging their bets while
.hieu establishe himsel* more solily.
(t is also important to note that +rime 8inister )oc<s reasons *or authori4ing +hung ,oang were irectly relate
to Fobert Komer<s attempt to unermine :eneral )oan an ?guyen /ao Ky by ening support *or /. (V. %*ter
December 1, 19G&, when Komer manage to terminate =peration Aair*a!, )oc ha no choice but to support
+hoeni!. %n, accoring to .ully %campora, by withrawing the ".0. units that shiele /. (V<s Aiel +olice,
-Komer opene up all the a#enues which le to .et.- 8a3ing matters worse, in an attempt to stimulate the 0outh
Vietnamese economy an, in the process, allow .hieu to reap the political rewars, Komer went so *ar as to
remo#e police roabloc3s an chec3points aroun 0aigon.
8eanwhile, .ully %campora was pleaing with as many %merican generals as he coul *in, as3ing them not to
withraw %merican *orces *rom /. (V. -)oan was saying that there was a massi#e in*lu! o* V/ into 0aigon,-
%campora recalle, -but Komer was calling it light, an ,art bac3e him. .hey wouln<t listen to )oan, who was
trying to con#ince them *or si!ty ays prior to .et.-
?elson 9ric3ham, *or one, amitte to ha#ing been *oole. -.he V/ ha pulle their goo people out an sent
them up ?orth in 19GG. 6e 3new that. .hen, in the summer an *all o* 19G&, they came bac3. 9ut (
misinterprete it. (n =ctober 19G& ( tol /olby that we were in a position that no ?V% or V/ unit coul mo#e
without us 3nowing it. 6e saw )oan<s warnings as crying wol*.- 1&2
-6e were pic3ing up massi#e numbers o* in*iltrators,- %campora tol me, -so )oan countermane the >oint
:eneral 0ta**<s orers to withraw@ he re*use to pull out all o* his people. ,e 3ept a paratroop unit an a marine
unit in 0aigon an cancele all police lea#es. .hose units, with the police, met the *irst assault in .et. .hen, o*
course, )oan was resurrecte.- 9ut by then it was too late. In Aca).ora6s Hu'g)ent* Go)er6s )achinations
brought about Tet, #The act is*# he sai'* #that Par&er contribute' to that 'isaster* too, Par&er sai'
75
Phoeni5 %as the onl+ i).e'i)ent* that it turne' 'eeat into -ictor+, 0ut the e)bass+ %as attac&e'N Ho%
coul' that ha..enM The act is* Phoeni5 %as a ailure* an' it %as onl+ because o 4oan that the V!
suere' a setbac&,#
-(n any e#ent, the prime minister sai, <Do it.< ,e ga#e the orer,- ;#an +ar3er sai, -an he wrote the letters to
empower them to o it, an +hung ,oang came into being on the Vietnamese sie .... % +hung ,oang sta** was
set up by the Vietnamese consisting primarily o* people *rom 0pecial 9ranch. .hen they set up 5uarters *or them
- at the ?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter. -.he two organi4ations ha separate 5uarters,- +ar3er ae,
-because we wante the Vietnamese to *eel that +hoeni! was a Vietnamese program an that the %mericans
were simply a#isers.-
-0o anyway- -- +ar3er sighe -- -we went through this organi4ational phase. .he Vietnamese went through the
same thing, pulling together the police an whate#er, trying to set up sta**s, *ining places *or them to sit,
pro#iing them with pencils an paper, an trying to get them to actually conuct some sort o* operations. %n
here you come to the nitty-gritty.-
777
.ab L o* -%ction +rogram- calle *or re#iew o* V/( intelligence collection re5uirements an programs, especially
+roCect /orral, a unilateral %merican operation starte in =ctober 19GG solely to collect in*ormation on the V/( at
pro#ince le#el. %*ter completing their re#iew, /(% o**icers on the +hoeni! sta** began to prepare a stanar
brie*ing on the V/( *or incoming o**icers an intereste o**icials. .hey also began compiling hanboo3s,
interrogation guies, an -relate materials- li3e most wante lists.
;specially e**ecti#e against the V/(, most wante lists ha been use *or years by 0pecial Aorces when, in %pril
19G&, Fen4 ,oe3sema<s eputy, Fobert 9rewer, initiate a 8ost 6ante program in 0aigon an e!pane it
nationwie. -;#ery pro#ince was irecte to e!amine its *iles *or a list o* ten,- 1L2 9rewer e!plaine noting that
the obCect o* the e!ercise was to show that the enemy was not -*aceless.- 0oon most wante -posters,- replete
with composite rawings $prepare by 0pecial 9ranch o**icers using ?ew Hor3 /ity +olice Department ma3eup
3its, o* V/( suspects were being naile to trees, D(=// walls, an mar3et stalls throughout Vietnam. .he
posters o**ere cash rewars an ha a picture o* the phoeni! to catch people<s attention. $0ee enclosure.'
(n the spring o* 19G& Komer appointe 9rewer as senior a#iser in Juang .ri +ro#ince. -6hen ( got there, ( got
all the intelligence-gathering out*its together,- 9rewer recalle, -an we wrote up a list o* the twenty-one most
wante V/(. =ne guy on my list, 9ui .u, ha 3ille a istrict a#iser<s sergeant, an ( wante to get him. 0o (
went to the high school an *oun his picture in the yearboo3. .hat really pai o**. =n a sleepy a*ternoon in >uly
the wor came in *rom 0pecial 9ranch that 9ui .u was in the area. .he D(=// noti*ie istrict, istrict noti*ie
#illage, an the 8arine combine action patrol went a*ter him.
-9ui .u ha been spotte in a shelter on a rice pay. .hree guys Cumpe up an ran, an the +opular Aorce
team an the 8arines mowe them own. 9ui .u was number one. .he top. ,e ha captain<s bars an a
brie*case *ull o* notes, with a 5uarter inch o* papers on meI .hey 3new where ( slept in the compoun an they
were planning to 3ill me.- .han3s to 9ui .u<s ocuments an in*ormation pro#ie by the e*ector, 9rewer sai,
-6e blew the V/( apart.-
6hat 9rewer escribe is a typical +hoeni! operation: % most wante poster le to a high-ran3ing V/( suspect<s
being spotte an 3ille, while his capture ocuments re#eale the whereabouts an ientities o* many o* his
V/( comraes. Most %ante' .osters also ser-e' to inhibit the V!I, As 8i) $ar' e5.laine' to )e* #All o a
su''en this gu+ %ho use' to tra-el ro) .lace to .lace begins to %on'er %ho is going to turn hi) inN It
begins to .re+ on hi), $e oun' out later that this reall+ ha' a signiicant .s+chological i).act on
these gu+s* )a&ing the) hi'e an' beco)ing less eecti-e,# Sai' $ar': #It suppresses the),# >9?
9y the en o* 19G& thirty-*i#e pro#inces were compiling blac3lists o* V/( members, an twenty-two more ha
most wante lists. 1102
.ab 9 o* -%ction +rogram- calle *or re#iew an recommenations *or action programs to e!ploit in*rastructure
intelligence. (n theory this meant the training, irection, an coorination, by ".0. personnel, o* Aiel +olice an
+F" in anti-V/( operations. 9etween the two, the +F" were more e**ecti#e, accounting *or 9L percent o* all anti-
V/( operations in ( /orps alone. (n ?o#ember 19G&, Falph >ohnson writes, -(( /orps an ((( /orps reporte that
2NG signi*icant V/( were eliminate by the +F", which continue as the main action arm o* the <ri*le shot<
approach.- 1112
-9asically the +F" were e**ecti#e,- +ar3er state. -(n some cases the police were e**ecti#e. %n in many areas
more got one in capturing V/( in military operations. 9ut ( was intereste in getting 3ey people. Hou can arrest
76
the little ones, but the operation goes on an on, an you ha#en<t really hurt them. 9ut it<s #ery har to get a
really important man.
-( personally wasn<t in#ol#e in any operations,- +ar3er stresse. -=perational control was e!ercise at whate#er
le#el it was happening at, by the so-calle action agencies. .he iea was to use resources where#er they
were .... (* there neee to be cooperation, the Vietnamese woul consult ... i* they truste the hea o* the other
agency. "n*ortunately the %mericans woul conuct operations without telling the Vietnamese. %n #ice #ersa.-
9y the en o* 19G& the Aiel +olice were conucting anti-V/( operations in twenty-si! pro#inces@ thirty-nine
pro#inces were using systems taught by +hoeni! sta**ers on how properly to -ebrie*- e*ectors, who were use
as spotters, +F", an interrogators. (nclue in the +hoeni! arsenal were Coint military-police search an
estroy an coron an search operations, population an resources control, an ri#erine an maritime
operations.
.ab 10 charge the +hoeni! program with impro#ing the ci#ilian etention system. %bout this subCect ?elson
9ric3ham remar3e, -.he one maCor element le*t out o* all this was the ci#ilian etainee problem. (t starts with
the +ro#ince (nterrogation /enters, but the larger problem is, ,ow o you screen etainees, an then what o
you o with ienti*ie V/(B
#$hen +ou6' go through these -illage s%ee.s* +ou6' ha-e %hole corrals ille' ull %ith Vietna)ese Hust
sitting there loo&ing at +ou all 'a+ long, In rural .ro-inces +ou6' %in' u. %ith barbe'(%ire cages %ith tin
roos .ac&e' %ith .eo.le, It %as a )aHor .roble) basicall+ because %e %ere running a re-ol-ing('oor
o.eration, $e6' ca.ture V!1 then a %ee& later %e6' ca.ture the) again ,,,assu)ing the+ %ere V!, The
Vietcong al%a+s &ne% about these s%ee.s se-eral 'a+s beorehan' an' al%a+s .ulle' out beore %e hit,
In a lot o s%ee.s all +ou %oul' get %ere the ol' )en an' %o)en an' &i's, There %ere V! in there*
too ,,, but nobo'+ &no%s really %ho the+ are,
#There %ere legal =uestions, Do %e rein'octrinate the)M Do %e shoot the)M Do %e .ut the) bac& on
the ar)M It %as Hust out o control, So one o 8ohn Hart6s tas&s on the original I!EX charge %as* $hat
to 'o %ith these ci-ilian 'etaineesM Do the+ ha-e .risoner o %ar statusM Re)e)ber* there6s no %ar
going onN 0ut in Gene-a A)ericans %ere sa+ing* 6$e6re treating these .eo.le li&e PO$s,6 The S%iss
%ere sa+ing* 6O&a+, $e %ant a loo& into the .rison s+ste),6 0o ,art became concerne with the problem,
an the reason it shows up in the (/;O proposal is at >ohn ,art<s insistence.
-(t went <roun an <roun, an the long an short o* it was, noboy wante to get the name o* the >ailer o*
Vietnam attache to them. "0%(D in<t want to touch the problem with a ten-*oot pole .... 0ame with the
military. .heir attitue was <,e<s a +=6. Aorget him. 6hen the war<s o#er, we<ll ship him bac3 to the *arm.< An'
so one o our tas&s %as to in-estigate the .roble) an' reco))en' a solution to it, 0ut %e ne-er 'i',
$hat %e 'i' %as to beg the =uestion, $e tas&e' the .roble) o-er to the ne% .lans an' .rogra)s
ele)ent o the I!EX sta, $hat the+ 'i'* I 'on6t &no%,#
6hat the (/;O sta** i was state the problem. %s liste in .ab 10, the maCor issues were: $1' o#ercrowing,
substanar li#ing conitions, an iniscriminate crowing o* +=6s, common criminals, V/ suspects, an
innocent bystaners in ramshac3le etention *acilities@ $2' lac3 o* an ae5uate screening mechanism to
etermine who shoul be interrogate, Caile, or release@ an $N' a Cuicial system $lac3ing ue process,
habeas corpus, arrest warrants, an lawyers, that might elay someone<s trial *or two years while he languishe
in a etention camp or else might release him i* he coul a**or the bribe.
(n see3ing solutions to these problems, .ab 10 propose: $1' the construction o* permanent etention *acilities@
$2' a registration system, coorinate with re*ugee an /hieu ,oi programs, to eliminate the re#ol#ing-oor
synrome@ an $N' Cuicial re*orm aime at the rapi isposal o* pening cases, as e#ise by Fobert ,arper, a
lawyer on contract to the /(%. (n aition, a stuy team *rom the /=FD0 Fesearch an %nalysis Di#ision $where
+hoeni! operational results were sent along with a wee3ly summary o* signi*icant acti#ities, conucte -a
comprehensi#e an e*initi#e stuy o* all aspects o* the problems o* Cuicial hanling an etention o* ci#ilian
in*rastructure.- 1122 .his three-man stuy team $>ohn )ybran, /raig >ohnstone, an Do 8inh ?hat' reporte on
apprehension an interrogation methos@ the conition an number o* Cails, prisons, an stoc3aes@ an gra*t
an corruption.
Regar'ing o-ercro%'ing* b+ earl+ 2933 there %as no )ore s.ace a-ailable in the GVN6s .rison s+ste)
or #!o))unist oen'ers,# An' as )ore an' )ore .eo.le %ere ca.ture' an' .lace' in PI!s* Hails* an'
'etention ca).s* a large .ercentage %as necessaril+ s=uee7e' out, Hence the re-ol-ing 'oor,
(n the *all o* 19G& the *orty-two pro#ince Cails where most V/( suspects were imprisone ha a total capacity o*
1D,000. =* the *our national Cails, /on 0on +rison hel about N,EE0 V/( members@ /hi ,oa +rison in 0aigon hel
Cust o#er D,000@ .an ,iep +rison outsie 9ien ,oa hel nearly 1,000@ an .hu Duc hel about G&E V/(, all
77
women. %ppro!imately NE,000 +=6s were hel in si! 8%/V camps scattere aroun 0outh Vietnam. V/ an
?V% prisoners *ell uner ".0. military super#ision while %FV? camps hanle %FV? eserters an war
criminals. 11N2
777
%s attorney ,arper wrestle with the problem o* Cuicial re*orm, a mil-mannere, meium-built, retire 8arine
/orps colonel, Fanolph 9er3eley, tac3le the etention camp problem. 9e*ore retiring in 19GE, 9er3eley ha
been the corps<s assistant chie* o* sta** *or intelligence. (n 19GG he was hire by the ,uman 0ciences Fesearch
/orporation to o a stuy in Vietnam on ci#il a**airs in military operations, an in early 19G& he brie*e Komer in
the 6hite ,ouse on the subCect. Komer li3e what he hear an hire 9er3eley $who ha no corrections
e!perience' as his senior a#iser on corrections an etentions' in which capacity 9er3eley returne to 0aigon
in >uly 19G& as a member o* the (/;O sta**.
"pon arri#ing in 0aigon in >uly 19G&, 9er3eley was assigne by ;#an +ar3er to manage the 0(D; $screening,
interrogation, an etention o* the enemy' program. 9er3eley an *i#e assistants -- all e!perience corrections
o**icers -- were liste on paper as employees o* +ublic 0a*ety<s Department o* /orrections.
-0hortly a*ter my arri#al,- 9er3eley recalle in a letter to the author, -( was calle to report to :eneral
6estmorelan. ( *oun him with sta** members an %mbassaor Komer, an it was e!plaine to me that (
neee to ra*t a plan, within a *ew wee3s, which woul ma3e the prisons secure *rom attac3s, as #aluable li#es
were being lost in capturing V/ who woul then be sprung 5uic3ly to *ight again .... .he 6estmorelan meeting
turne me into an operator so busy with his re5uirements,- 9er3eley e!plaine, -that my *ocus was more on
prisons than etentions. 11D2
-.he /(% pro#ie me space in one o* their o**ices at 8%/V hea5uarters, an *or se#eral wee3s ( *lew about in
an %ir %merica plane, scouting locations *or attac3proo* etention *acilities an prisons, ta3ing aerial
photographs mysel*, an e#eloping the plan.- 6hile oing this, 9er3eley learne: -.here were o#er *orty
prisons nationwie, etention *acilities 1usually <Cust a barrac3s surroune by barbe wire<2 in e#ery pro#ince,
an the :V? ha neglecte all o* them in nearly e#ery aspect, incluing protection *rom attac3 by the enemy.
-6hen my plan was presente on scheule, :eneral 6estmorelan appro#e it an irecte that ( e!ecute it. (n
the ne!t *ew months the prisons were pro#ie e*ensi#e weapons an guars traine to use them, an ...
attac3s on prisons 5uic3ly lost their popularity. =ne other e#ice we use was to *ly V/ prisoners to /on 0on
(slan, which was secure *rom any enemy attac3.-
,a#ing satis*ie 6estmorelan<s re5uirement *or prison security, 9er3eley turne to the issue o* etention
*acilities. -( #isite 0ingapore an 8alaya to loo3 at pre*ab construction *or possible use in etention camp
construction but ecie it was cheaper to o the Cob with local resources a#ailable in Vietnam. 8eaning the
etention problem was roppe li3e a hot potato, this time into the hans o* the :V?.- (/;O 8emo ?o. E, ate
?o#ember 2, 19G&, hane responsibility *or the operation an security o* etention camps to the pro#ince
chie*s, with a#ice an some resources pro#ie by 8%/V through 9er3eley an the Department o*
/orrections.
=n December 2&, 19G&, 8%/V issue Directi#e NL1-DG, creating /ombine .actical 0creening /enters an
stating: -.he sole responsibility *or etermining the status o* persons etaine by ".0. *orces rests with the
representati#es o* the ".0. %rme Aorces.- /ase close. (n e#ery /ombine .actical 0creening /enter, the
etaining unit i the screening, interrogating, an classi*ying o* rows an ci#ilian etainees, sening enemy
soliers to +=6 camps or to 0aigon i* they ha strategic intelligence, to pro#incial Cails i* they were common
criminals, or to +(/s i* they were eeme to be V/(.
-.here were, in e**ect,- ;#an +ar3er e!plaine, -two prison systems: -the ci#il one uner "0%(D an the military
one *or +=6s. +(/s were separate an sta**e as an agency program ... but there ha to be a lot o*
unerstaning between us in orer not to waste money.- Aor e!ample, the /(% woul pro#ie +(/s with #ans but
not gas or oil or mechanics. .he +hoeni! coorinator woul then ha#e to persuae the +ublic 0a*ety a#iser to
persuae the Vietnamese police chie* to pro#ie these materials an ser#ices to the 0pecial 9ranch, which,
consiering the ongoing ri#alries, got one grugingly, i* at all.
-.he problem +hoeni! ealt with,- ;#an +ar3er ae, -was ma3ing sure that when a 3nowlegeable person got
pic3e up, the right person got to tal3 to him an he Cust in<t isappear in the system.- .his weeing-out
process happene in the +(/s -because there you ha the Vietnamese whose salaries were pai by the agency.
.hey weren<t beholen to the military or %(D.-
78
"lti)atel+ Phoeni5 'i' nothing to alle-iate the .roble)s o ci-ilian 'etainees, Rather* as Phoeni5 thre%
its 'ragnet across South Vietna)* tens o thousan's o ne% .risoners .oure' into the alrea'+
o-ercro%'e' s+ste)* an' the re-ol-ing 'oor s+n'ro)e %as si).l+ con-erte' b+ .ro-ince chies into a
)one+)a&ing .ro.osition, Mean%hile* I!EX la%+ers trie' to .a.er o-er the .roble) b+ co).iling a
han'boo& on national securit+ la%s an' .roce'ures* %hich legali7e' the attac& against the V!I b+
.er)itting the a')inistrati-e 'etention o V!I sus.ects or u. to t%o +ears %ithout trial, No ste.s %ere
ta&en to establish 'ue .rocess or ci-ilian 'etainees,
777
.ab 11 calle *or the +hoeni! Directorate -to conuct an on the groun re#iew o* interrogation *acilities, practices
an proceures, incluing coorination, e!ploitation, an *ollow through, with a #iew to optimum support to the
attac3 on the in*rastructure.- .he obCect was to *ocus interrogations on intelligence concerning the V/( at
pro#ince an istrict le#els an to impro#e coorination with other agencies. ?o report was re5uire *rom the
/(% compartment within the +hoeni! Directorate on this sensiti#e subCect.
Fegaring the -practices- o* the +(/ program, what is 3nown o* o**icial policy comes *rom ?elson 9ric3ham. #I
ha' an absolute .rohibition in iel' o.erations acti-ities to%ar' con'ucting or sanctioning or %itnessing
an+ acts o torture*# he sai', #I sai' the sa)e thing to )+ .ro-ince oicers ro) the thir' 'a+ I %as in(
countr+, M+ state)ent >%hich he ne-er .ut in %riting? si).l+ %as 6An+ o +ou gu+s get caught in this
stu* I6ll ha-e +ou going ho)e %ithin t%ent+(our hours,6 An' there ne-er %as such a case that ca)e
into e5istence* although it6s .ossible that there %as an' the re.orts ne-er got to )e,#
0ric&ha) also 'irecte' his .ro-ince oicers #to run the PI!s ro) a 'istance, It6s a S.ecial 0ranch
o.eration1 A)ericans are not to be i'entiie' %ith the .rogra), These gu+s %ere not to go near the PI!s
on a 'a+(to('a+ basis, The+ %ere not to .artici.ate in interrogations there or an+thing li&e that,#
0ric&ha)6s 'irecti-e %as ignore', $arren Milberg* or e5a).le* s.ent #2@ .ercent# o his ti)e in the
Duang Tri PI!* su.er-ising interrogations an' a'-ising on =uestions an' to.ics to .ursue, ,is
e!perience is typical@ an earnest +hoeni! o**icer had to be at the interrogation center to obtain intelligence
5uic3ly. (nee, in the *inal analysis, interrogation practices were Cuge on the 5uality o* the reports they
prouce, not on their humanity. -+hoeni! a#isers who too3 an interest in +(/ operations,- 8ilberg writes,
-normally attempte to impro#e the 5uality o* interrogation techni5ues by care*ully going o#er reports an
pointing out leas that were misse an other items which shoul ha#e been e!plore in greater etail.- 11E2
As or torture* #$hile the brutali7ation o .risoners 'i' occur* intereste' Phoeni5 .ersonnel coul' curtail
su..ort or the PI! unless such unauthori7e' acti-ities cease',# Ho%e-er* Milberg a''s* #Since )ost
a'-isers %ere neither intelligence nor interrogation e5.erts* the ten'enc+ e5iste' to .ro-i'e .assi-e
su..ort an' not to tr+ an' i).ro-e PI! o.erations,# >23?
%ccoring to Fobert 0later, irector o* the +ro#ince (nterrogation /enter program *rom >uly 19G& until %pril 19G9,
-.he *irst thing the Vietnamese wante to o was tie the guy up to a Double ;-eight.- As a'-isers* ho%e-er*
there %as little he an' his training tea) coul' 'o to .re-ent this use o* an electric generator, other than to
try to raise the pro*essional stanars o* +(/ personnel. 0later an his team $augmente an e#entually
replace by a Vietnamese team' taught 0pecial 9ranch employees how to trac3 V/( suspects on maps, how to
3eep *iles an statistics on suspects, an how to ta3e an process photos properly. .hey i not teach agent
hanling@ that was one in 0aigon by /(% e!perts importe *rom 6ashington. #The %hole conce.t o the PI!*#
accor'ing to Slater* #%as to get the) in an' turn the) aroun', Ma&e the) our agents, It 'i'n6t %or& or
us* though* because %e 'i'n6t re%ar' the) %ell enough,# >2:?
.he maCor -proceural- problem in the +hoeni! interrogation program concerne the isposition o* high-ran3ing
V/( suspects. %ccoring to +ar3er, -,igh-le#el prisoners an ,oi /hanhs were in#ariably ta3en to higher
hea5uarters an ne#er hear *rom again.- 8ilberg agrees: #Peo.le >at region or in Saigon? grabbe' our
best 'etainees on a regular basis* so +ou ten'e' not to re.ort that +ou ha' one, Fou6' &ee. hi) or t%o
or three 'a+s*# to get %hate-er intelligence he ha' on other V!I agents in the .ro-ince* then re.ort that
+ou ha' hi) in custo'+,# 8ilberg writes that when -prisoners o* high position in the V/( were remo#e *rom
local +(/s *or e!ploitation at other le#els, morale o* +(/ personnel ecrease. =*ten the result was that the +(/s
became au!iliary Cails an were use to house common criminals.- 11L2
Aor Fobert 0later, the trans*er o* important V/( prisoners to higher hea5uarters was merely stanar operating
proceure. -6e traine 0pecial 9ranch people how to properly 3eep statistics an *iles, how to use a boar in
the o**ice to trac3 cases, but most important, to sen hot prospects *rom pro#ince to region to the ?ational +olice
(nterrogation /enter 1?+(/2.- (n other wors, +hoeni! interrogation proceures at the pro#ince $tactical' le#el
were supersee by interrogation proceures at the national le#el -- the political-le#el +hoeni! see3ing strategic
intelligence.
79
,a#ing been the /(%<s senior a#iser at the ?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter, 0later ha #aluable insights
into the interrogation system at its summit. ,is story began at /amp +enleton in early 19G&, when he was
as3e to Coin a presientially irecte counterinsurgency program that traine an sent *i*ty Vietnam #eterans
*rom the #arious military ser#ices bac3 to Vietnam to ser#e as pro#ince o**icers an +hoeni! coorinators. -9ut (
was a separate entity,- he note in a con#ersation with the author, -... although we went o#er at the same time.-
% Vietnamese linguist with three years o* interrogation e!perience in-country, 0later was assigne to the ?+(/
-on the basis o* a ecision mae in 0aigon. Da#e 6est sai he won me in the lottery, when the station people
sat aroun an re#iewe the resumes o* the people coming o#er.-
0later<s co#er es3 was in "0%(D ((, where he sat besie his boss, a tall, muscular, blon /(% o**icer name
Fon Faa, who ser#e as an a#iser to Dang Van 8inh. 0later attene brie*ings gi#en by 8inh e#ery morning
at the ?+(/ on Vo .hanh 0treet, where he ha his co#ert o**ice. -6hen a prisoner came in *rom, say, Da ?ang,-
0later e!plaine, -the reports woul come o#er to my section. (< put them on an eight-*oot-long blac3boar an
report anything hot to Fon.- %t that point Faa an 8inh<s interrogators went to wor3.
,ea5uarters *or both the 0pecial 9ranch an the ?ational +olice, the ?+(/ was -a monstrous Arench
compoun with a separate, restricte wing *or the 0pecial 9ranch. 6e cleane it up,- 0tater sai. -%ctually
whitewashe it.- Ater Tet* the !IA also built the S.ecial 0ranch social club* the !o 4ac 0o* on the
gra-esite o the V! &ille' 'uring Tet, .he ?+(/ hel between three an *our hunre prisoners, most o*
whom, 0later says, -were pac3e *orty or *i*ty in little blac3 holes o* /alcutta.-
The act is that .rison con'itions an' interrogation .ractices in Vietna) %ere brutal (( es.eciall+ those
ta&en out o sight, !ase in .oint: #At a =uarter ater t%el-e on 8une 23* 293:* I %as 'ri-ing ho)e ro)
%or& to ha-e lunch %ith )+ %ie*# %rites Tran Van Truong in ' Vietcong Memoir, Su''enl+ a car cut hi)
o, T%o )en Hu).e' out* .ushe' their %a+ into his car* an' tol' hi) that General 4oan ha' #in-ite' hi)
to co)e in or a tal&,# Instea' o going to the NPI!* ho%e-er* Truong6s ca.tors too& hi) to the ol' 0inh
Xu+en hea'=uarters in !holon, As he %as le' into the rece.tion roo)* he oun' hi)sel #ace to ace
%ith a burl+* unior)e' )an %hose slit e+es an' brutal e5.ression %ere i5e' on )e in concentrate'
hatre' ,,, a .roessional torturer %ho ha' .ersonall+ 'one in )an+ .eo.le,# The interrogator sai' to
Truong* #I ha-e the right to beat +ou to 'eath, Fou an' all the other Vietcong the+ bring in here, There
aren6t an+ la%s here to .rotect +ou, In this .lace +ou are )ine,# >29?
Truong 'escribes this secret interrogation center, #S.ra%le' out on the loor the %hole length o the
corri'or %ere .eo.le chaine' together b+ the an&les, Man+ o their aces %ere bloo'+ an' s%ollen1 here
an' there* li)bs Hutte' out at unnatural angles, So)e %rithe' in agon+* others Hust la+ an' stare' 'ull+,
/ro) the tangle o bo'ies ca)e groans an' the soun' o %ee.ing* an' the air %as ille' %ith a lo%*
continuous %ail, M+ heart began to race, On one si'e o the hall%a+ %ere the 'oors that a..arentl+ le'
to the interrogation roo)s, /ro) behin' these ca)e curses an' s.as)o'ic screa)s o .ain,# >EI?
4ater Truong %as in-ite' insi'e one o these roo)s1 it #loo&e' li&e a )e'ie-al torture cha)ber*# he
%rites, #Iron hoo&s an' ro.es hung ro) the ceiling* as 'i' chains %ith an&le an' %rist rings, These
latter 'e-ices %ere %ell &no%n a)ong the acti-ists an' /ront .risoners* %ho calle' the) the Air.lane, In
one corner %as a '+na)o, Se-eral tables an' benches stoo' in the )i''le o the loor or %ere .ushe'
u. against the %alls,# $hat ha..ene' ne5t* +ou can i)agine,
.he last tab o* -%ction +rogram,- .ab 12, irecte ;#an +ar3er an his sta** to establish -re5uisite- reporting
systems, -*or purposes o* program management an e#aluation, an *or support to *iel collection an collation
acti#ities an operations against in*rastructure.- 1212 %t *irst, each agency use its e!isting system. +ro#ince
o**icers gathere in*ormation on the V/( *rom the collation sections o* +(/s. .hey then sent this in*ormation to
region o**icers, who use liaison branch reporting *ormats to relay the in*ormation to FD/ hea5uarters in
0aigon. .here it was analy4e an plugge into a ata base -against which *uture e#elopments an progress
may be measure.- 8%/V sector personnel sent their reports on the V/( through military channels to the 8%/V
>oint =perations =**ice in 0aigon, which then coorinate with (/;O.
%s 8%/V an /(% +hoeni! personnel were graually incorporate within /=FD0 pro#ince a#isory teams an
assigne to +(=//s an D(=//s, monthly narrati#e reports were sent irectly to the +hoeni! sta** in 0aigon@
meanwhile, the Vietnamese use their own parallel, uncoorinate reporting systems.
0tanari4e reporting was *ully authori4e on ?o#ember 2E, 19G&, an *ocuse on three things: $1' the number
o* signi*icant V/( agents eliminate@ $2' the names o* those eliminate@ an $N' signi*icant ac5uisition, utili4ation,
an other remar3s. "ntil mi-19GL reports about the D(=//s woul occupy as much time as reports generate
by the 10N D(=//s in business at the time. "ltimately in*ormation gathere on ini#iual V/( suspects in the
D(=//s became the grist o* the +hoeni! paper mill.
80
!HAPTER 22: PR"
(n early 19G& Aran3 0cotton le*t his post in .aiwan an returne to 0aigon to help set up /=FD0. "pon arri#ing
in-country, 0cotton *oun /olonel ?guyen 9e, who was in#estigating corruption within FD units, -in Jui ?hon
being set up *or assassination. 6hile the hit team 1ispatche by :eneral )u )am, the (( /orps commaner2 was
hunting him own,- 0cotton tol me, -( *lew him to sa*ety in +lei3u.- 112 (n the meantime, ; )ansale arrange
with the FD minister, :eneral ?guyen Duc .hang, *or 9e to assume control o* Vung .au *rom .ran ?goc /hau.
/hau went on to campaign *or a seat in the ?ational %ssembly, itsel* recently institute uner 0outh Vietnam<s
new constitution.
0oon a*ter this changing o* the guar, .om Donohue $then :eorge /ar#er<s eputy at 0%V%', pai a #isit to
Vung .au. Fobert ;schbach ha replace %ce ;llis as irector o* the ?ational .raining /enter@ >ean 0au#ageot
ha ta3en o#er the Fe#olutionary De#elopment /are training program@ an .uc3er :ougleman manage the
+F". =n the Vietnamese sie, Donohue tol me, -9e was in charge. 9ut he wasn<t in the same league as 8ai,-
who -was in the 0aigon o**ice cutting paper olls.- 122
"ner the tutelage o* ?guyen 9e, accoring to >im 6ar, -the FD teams no longer ha a security mission.- 1N2
In or'er to oster a 'e)ocratic societ+* 0e ha' transor)e' RD ro) the #intelligence an' 'is.lace)ent#
.rogra) /ran& Scotton ha' starte' three +ears earlier in Duang Ngai Pro-ince into one that e).hasi7e'
#nation buil'ing,# 0ut %ith little success, O South Vietna)6s iteen thousan'(o'' -illages* onl+ a e%
hun're' %ere secure enough to hol' elections in 293:, An' %here elections %ere hel'* the+ %ere
t+.icall+ a sha), The RD tea)s ha' no)inate' all the #electe'# -illage chies ater the chies ha' been
recruite' b+ the !IA an' traine' at Vung Tau, ?e#ertheless, the #illage chie*s really in<t 3now what they
were suppose to o or represent, an, as a matter o* practicality, their top priority o*ten was accommoating
the local V/. %n so with the Fe#olutionary De#elopment teams on the e*ensi#e, the attac3 against the V/( *ell
to +hoeni! or was contracte out. /or e5a).le* in or'er to erret out the V!I in critical Ta+ Ninh Pro-ince*
Presi'ent 8ohnson hire'* at the cost o thirt+(nine )illion 'ollars* the ser-ices o a /ili.ino !i-ic Action
tea), >A?
Mean%hile* in Saigon antastic a)ounts o )one+ %ere being s.ent ;se-ent+(i-e )illion 'ollars in 293:<
in su..ort o RD, 0ut corru.tion %as rie* an' )uch o the )one+ %as 'i-erte' into .eo.le6s .oc&ets,
Aor e!ample, while inspecting Juang ?gai +ro#ince in mi-19G&, FD//= chie* Fen4 ,oe3sema *oun eight
hunre -ghost- employees out o* a total o* thirteen hunre cares on the pro#ince FD /are payroll.
,oe3sema set up a *ingerprinting system to pre#ent *urther abuses, which, consiering that each care was pai
the e5ui#alent o* ten ollars a month, continue unabate.
Despite the problems o* corruption an accommoation, the FD program continue to ha#e -intelligence
potential,- mainly through its static an mobile /ensus :rie#ance elements. %ccoring to Fobert +eartt, who in
late 19G& replace Fen4 ,oe3sema, the FD program<s primary mission was still to -put eyes an ears in istricts
where there were none be*ore.- 1E2 .o this en, +eartt manage 2LD paramilitary o**icers in the pro#inces, each
o* whom *e in*ormation on the V/( into D(=//s an +(=//s, while passing in*ormation gotten *rom unilateral
sources to the /(% station in 0aigon through secure agency channels. =n the Vietnamese sie, in*ormation on
the V/( was *e to the pro#ince chie*s, who, accoring to >im 6ar, -may or may not turn this o#er to +hoeni!.-
(n any e#ent, the political war was not going well in late 19G&, an with the shi*t in emphasis to -nation builing,-
+hoeni! emerge *rom the FD matri! as the /(%<s main weapon against the V/(. (ts two maCor action arms, as
state in 8%/V Directi#e NL1 an %ction +rogram .ab 9, were the +F" an Aiel +olice. =* the two, the +F"
were -by *ar the most e**ecti#e an su**ere the lowest casualties,- accoring to the 19GG /ombine /ampaign
+lan, which also note that -the type o* target attac3e by the +F" was strategically most signi*icant.- 1G2
.his chapter *ocuses on the +F", which more than any other program is associate with +hoeni!. 9ut *irst a
5uic3 re#iew o* the Aiel +olice, which at the behest o* Fobert Komer was to be -reirecte- against the
in*rastructure, <<as its main *unction.-
Naturall+ !olonel $illia) #Pa..+# Grie-es 'i' not res.on' a-orabl+ to this #re'irection# o the /iel'
Police* calling it #a )isrea'ing o its )ission# an' calling Phoeni5 #a .hase that set us bac&,# 1&2 %s an
e!ample o* the proper use o* Aiel +olice, :rie#es, in a brie*ing *or :eneral %brams, cite =peration Dragnet in
9inh Dinh +ro#ince, -in which three companies o* Aiel +olice at a time, *or two *our-month cycles, wor3e with
the 1st /a#alry Di#ision in /oron an 0earch operations.- %s another e!ample o* the proper use o* Aiel
+olice, :rie#es cite /. (V an =peration Aair*a!, in which Aiel +olice -search- teams operate uner the
protection o* security s5uas pro#ie by the 199th )ight (n*antry 9rigae. 6or3ing in si!-man teams, the Aiel
+olice searche hooches *or hien ocuments an weapons an set up screening centers *or suspects, where
they chec3e names against blac3lists an *aces against photos obtaine *rom the Aamily /ensus program.
Aiel policemen also chec3e (D, #oter registration, an ra*t cars. 0uch were the *unctions :rie#es belie#e
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were appropriate *or a law en*orcement organi4ation eicate to pro#iing police ser#ices to the public. ,e
complaine to %brams:
.hen +hoeni! was upon us. %t the irection an insistence o* %mbassaor Komer, the Aiel +olice
0=+ was rastically reoriente an rewore, with new emphasis on the anti-sub#ersi#e mission,
which was the only mission which was spelle out, an which was emphasi4e as the *irst priority
mission.
.his mission statement resulte in the tremenous uner-utili4ation o* the Aiel +olice. +roper Aiel
+olice missions, other than anti-sub#ersi#e, were ignore. Police co))an'ers* local oicials*
an' "S a'-isors consi'ere' the Hob 'one %hen a /iel' Police .latoon %as gi-en carte
blanche to a DIO!!* co).letel+ ignoring the act that Phoeni5 agencies %ere not .ro'ucing
enough real targets to &ee. an+ o the )ulti.licit+ o reaction orces a-ailable to the) ull+
occu.ie' on this single )ission,
+er*ectly appropriate an suitable missions assigne to Aiel +olice units, not *ully in use by +hoeni! were
constantly reporte by "0 a#isers an obser#ers, incluing Komer, as misuse o* Aiel +olice.
In other %or's* in the rush to 'estro+ the V!I* a successul .olice .rogra) %as 'eraile', )i3ewise, with
the reirection o* the Aiel +olice against the V/(, much to :rie#es<s ismay, Public Saet+ a'-isers li&e Doug
Mc!ollu) oun' the)sel-es %or&ing )ore closel+ than e-er %ith the S.ecial 0ranch an' its !IA
a'-isers, (n accorance with proceures institute by Fobert Komer, 8c/ollum began recei#ing %i-in-Kin
*uns through the pro#ince senior a#iser. -( was gi#en twenty thousan ollars a month,- he recalle, -which (
had to spen, to e#elop agent networ3s in Darlac +ro#ince.- 1L2
8c/ollum e#elope three nets, comprise 90 percent o* 8ontagnars, an presente the intelligence these
nets prouce at wee3ly meetings among himsel*, the /(%<s pro#ince o**icer, an the 8%/V sector intelligence
o**icer. .hese meetings compare notes on enemy troop mo#ements, V/( suspects, ouble agents, an ouble
ippers -- agents who were wor3ing *or more than one ".0. agency. .he /(%<s pro#ince o**icer, accoring to
8c/ollum, got his intelligence *rom the +F" an the .ruong 0on 8ontagnar FD program. 6hen V/( members
were ienti*ie, ini#iual or Coint operations were mounte. 6hen calle upon to contribute, 8c/ollum
ispatche his Aiel +olice company uner *ormer 0pecial Aorces 0ergeant 9abe Futh %nerson. .he +F"
a#iser, Foger, was a mercenary hire by an reporting only to the pro#ince o**icer.
-(t was two hal#es o* the apple,- 8c/ollum recalle. -/ollection an operations. 6e woul get blac3lists *rom the
pro#ince o**icer with names o* people in #illages or hamlets. .he Aiel +olice went out with %FV? units or
elements o* the ".0. Aourth Di#ision, usually on coron an search operations. 6e< select a target. .he ay
be*ore we were going to hit it, we< get pic3e up in the morning by %hite Air A)erica cho..ers, (< ta3e
twenty-*i#e or thirty Aiel +olice, an we< lan about ten miles away an set up a base camp with elements o*
the Aourth Di#ision.
-6e< get up at three %.8., surroun the #illage, an at aybrea3 sen in a s5ua to chec3 *or booby traps.
.hen we< go in, search the place, segregate women an chilren *rom men, chec3 people against the blac3list,
an ta3e them into custoy. 6e< get money, boots, an meicine an sometimes ?V%. (* the V/( were
classi*ie % or 9, har core, they were sent to the +(/. %t that point it was out o* my hans. 6e< ta3e the other
prisoners bac3 to 9an 8e .huot in police custoy@ we i not gi#e them to the military. /oming bac3 to camp,
the ".0. Aourth Di#ision woul use the Aiel +olice as point men.-
%s 8c/ollum escribe them, the Aiel +olice were use $as :rie#es intene' as ro#ing patrols outsie 9an
8e .huot more o*ten than they were use against the V/(. ,owe#er, because they i on occasion go a*ter the
V/(, by 19G& the Aiel +olice were being compare with the +F". (n an =ctober 19G& article in 0am&arts,
Da-i' $elch =uotes the Ghanh Hoa Pro-ince .s+chological %arare oicer as sa+ing that the /iel'
Police #%or& Hust li&e the PR" bo+s, Their )ain Hob is to 7a. the in(bet%eeners (( +ou &no%* the .eo.le
%ho aren6t all the %a+ %ith the go-ern)ent an' aren6t all the %a+ %ith the Viet !ong either, The+ igure i
+ou 7a. enough in(bet%eeners* .eo.le %ill begin to get the i'ea,# >9?
->ust li3e the +F" boys-B "nli3ely. =n Aebruary 1L,19G&, /halmers Foberts, reporting *or the Washinton Post
on the subCect o* counterterror, wrote that -one *orm o* psychological pressure on the guerrillas which the
%mericans o not a#ertise is the +F". The PR" %or& on the theor+ o gi-ing bac& %hat the Viet !ong
'eals out (( assassination an' butcher+, Accor'ingl+* a Viet !ong unit on occasion %ill in' the
'ise)bo%ele' re)ains o its ello%s along a %ell tro' canal ban& .ath* an eecti-e )essage to
guerrillas an' to non(co))itte' Vietna)ese that t%o can .la+ the sa)e bloo'+ ga)e,#
Komer may ha#e wishe that the Aiel +olice woul operate li3e the +F", an in some cases it i, but the +F"
ha counterterror an intelligence collection missions which the Aiel +olice ne#er ha, e#en uner +hoeni!.
82
8oreo#er, the +F" were not a law en*orcement organi4ation@ in *act, as /(% assets they operate outsie the
law an ha no legal powers o* arrest. .he +F" were the personi*ication o* the 0pecial Aorces< behin-the-lines
mentality, which in a counterinsurgency meant getting the V/( in its own #illages.
>im 6ar put it this way: -.o get a guy in enemy territory, you<#e got to get an arme intelligence collection unit
where the guy<s got the balls to go into an area to per*orm the mission. Hou<re not going to get police o**icers
who are wal3ing a beat in town or the 0pecial 9ranch guy who eals with agents. :enerally, the +F" is the
out*it that<s best e5uippe.-
.he problem with the +F", writes 6arren 8ilberg, was that #the i'ea o going out ater one .articular
in'i-i'ual %as generall+ not -er+ a..ealing* since e-en i the in'i-i'ual %as ca.ture'* the hea'lines
%oul' not be -er+ great in ter)s o bo'+ counts* %ea.ons ca.ture'* or so)e other )easure o
success,# As Milberg obser-es* #careers %ere at sta&e ,,, an' i).ressi-e results %ere e5.ecte',# >2I?
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(n #iew o* these con*licting pressures -- the o**icial call *or small-unit operations against the V/( an the irth o*
-impressi#e results- the Cob a**ore -- by 19G& a new bree o* o**icer was being introuce to the Vietnam 6ar.
6hile con#entional warriors continue to search *or big battles, highly traine an moti#ate uncon#entional
war*are o**icers, with an abiing appreciation *or public relations, were calle upon to manage the
counterinsurgency.
=ne o* the new bree was ?a#y )ieutenant >ohn 6ilbur, a tall, hus3y, sensiti#e Hale grauate. (n %pril 19G&
6ilbur Courneye to Vietnam as eputy commaner o* 0;%) .eam 2, a twel#e-man etachment, with no combat
#eterans in its ran3s, which was assigne to a na#al ri#erine war*are group an 5uartere in a Juonset hut at
the 8y .ho Fi#er oc3 *acility in the mile o* the 8e3ong Delta.
-Aran3ly,- 6ilbur $now an attorney in +alm 9each' tol me, -the ?a#y in<t 3now what to o with us. .hey in<t
3now how to target us or how to operationally control us. 0o basically they sai, <Hou guys are to go out an
interict supply lines an conuct harassing ambushes an create estruction upon the enemy howe#er you
can.< 8ostly, we were to be reacti#e to, an protecti#e o*, the ?a#y<s +9Fs 1ri#er patrol boats2. .hat was
probably our most unerstanable an irect mission. .he +9F s5uaron leaers woul bring us intelligence
*rom the +9F patrols. .hey woul report where they saw enemy troops or i* there was an ambush o* a +9F.
.hen we< go out an get the guys who i it.- 1112
Knowing what to o an oing it, howe#er, were two #astly i**erent things. Despite their being highly traine
an iscipline, 6ilbur con*esse, #That irst )onth %e starte' out %ith the t+.ical 'isastrous scre%(u.
o.erations, In our irst o.eration ,,, %e %ent out at lo% ti'e an' en'e' u. getting stuc& in )u' lats in
broa' 'a+light or si5 hours beore %e coul' be e5tracte' ,,,, $e 'i'n6t ha-e an+ Vietna)ese %ith us*
an' %e 'i'n6t un'erstan' -er+ basic things ,,,,$e 'i'n6t &no% %hether it %as a V! ca're or a gu+ tr+ing
to .ic& u. a .iece o ass late at night, The onl+ things %e ha' %ere cure%s an' ree ire 7ones, An'
%hat a cure% %as* an' %hat a ree ire 7one %as* beca)e sort o an a')inistrati-e(.olitical 'ecision,
/or all %e &ne%* e-er+bo'+ there %as terrible,
#$e got lost, $e got hurt, Peo.le %ere shooting bac& at us* an' other ti)es %e ne-er got to a .lace
%here %e coul' in' .eo.le to shoot at ,,,, There %as a lot o rustration*# $ilbur sai'* #o ha-ing no
assurance that the inor)ation +ou got %as at all reliable an' ti)el+,#
%s an e!ample, 6ilbur cite the time -we raie an islan across *rom where the ".0. ?inth (n*antry Di#ision
was base. 6e surroune the settlement that morning an came in with our guns bla4ing .... I re)e)ber
cra%ling into a hut (( %hich in Vietna) %as a sort o she' enco).assing a )u' .illbo5 %here .eo.le
%oul' hi'e ro) attac&s (( loo&ing or a V! iel' hos.ital, There I %as %ith a han' grena'e %ith the .in
.ulle'* )+ han' on )+ auto)atic* gu+s running aroun'* a'renaline going cra7+* .eo.le screa)ing ((
an' I 'i'n6t &no% %ho the hell %as shooting at %ho, I can re)e)ber that I Hust %ante' to thro% the
go''a)ne' grena'e in the hut* an' scre% %hoe-er %as in it, An' all o a su''en 'isco-ering there %as
nothing but %o)en an' chil'ren in there, It %as a -er+ .oignant e5.erience,
-.his was uring that *irst two-month perio,- 6ilbur sai, sha3ing his hea. -.hen one ay a 0;%) .eam =ne
enliste man who was assigne to the /(% came own to 8y .ho. ,is name was Da#e, an he was one o* two
a#isers to the +F", whom we #aguely 3new to be inepenent. Da#e presente us with a whole new
perspecti#e. ,e was resse in blue Ceans an a 3ha3i shirt, he ha his own Ceep, an he went where he wante
an i what he wante to o. ,e ha a sense o* place. ,e ga#e me a *airly broa brie*, which attracte the hell
out o* me. .hen he sai, <(<#e got some people, an (< li3e to run some operations with you.<-
83
(n e!change, the 0;%) team pro#ie the +F" with increase *irepower. ;!plaine 6ilbur: -6e ha all the toys:
8-se#enty-nines, /%F *i*teens, 0weish Ks, grease guns, an grenaes. ?ot only that, we ha tremenous
support capabilities through the ?a#y chopper s5uaron 1the 0ea 6ol#es2 an the +9Fs. %n we got immeiate
reaction through the ?a#y chain o* comman. 0o it was a#isable *or the +F" to wor3 with us. .he Vietnamese
wante helicopter ries an that reaction re5uirement. (n e!change, they ha the s3ills, the intelligence, an the
e!perience to 3now where the ba guys were -- who to shoot at an who not to shoot at. (t ha the potential *or
a #ery bene*icial relationship.-
=ne o* the attributes o* the +F" was that they were re5uire to be *rom the pro#ince in which they operate. -0o
they ha relati#es an *riens in the area,- 6ilbur e!plaine, an -they ha their own intelligence networ3 set up.
.hey< go bac3 to their hometown *or a couple o* ays, sit aroun an rin3 tea an say, <6hat<s happeningB<
%n a *rien woul say, <.ran<s a buy o* mine@ (<ll tell him about the V/ istrict chie* meeting.<- .ran woul then
tell the +F" a#iser an, 6ilbur sai, -Da#e, woul come own an say, <8y guy says there<s a V/ istrict chie*
meeting. 6e nee some helicopter gunship support. 6e want to be able to air-e#ac. Hou gi#e us the 0ea
6ol#es, we<ll gi#e you the operation, an together we<ll score a #ictory.<-
%t *irst Da#e assigne one o* the +F" to 6ilbur as a scout, so the the 0;%)s coul aCust to wor3ing with a
Vietnamese. .he teenage scout -coul more or less inicate where the V/ were set up, when they might come
by, an where we might ambush them,- 6ilbur tol me. -,e was the 3in o* person to say, <6e aren<t going to
go on a +9F into this town. 6e<ll ta3e a little water ta!i, an we<ll hie on the ri#er till night, then go in at three
%.8. an ... go there.<-
-,e helpe us chart a course *or the war,- 6ilbur ae respect*ully. -,e ga#e me a sense o* con*ience an
mae us *eel that we weren<t spinning our sel*-estructi#e wheels. I %as -er+ a%are o ho% )ini)all+ traine'
)ost A)ericans %ere, I re)e)ber being in the Sea $ol helico.ters* an' .eo.le shooting at .easants
on %ater bualoes* or at isher)en in 'ugouts because the+ ha..ene' to be in ree ire 7ones* or
roc&eting huts an' burning things 'o%n, 9ut with the +F", ( ha the ability to control things better than the
6illiam /alleys i. ( was a pro*essional o**icer in an elite organi4ation that ha a lot o* prie, an we were not
going to mess up.
#I re)e)ber one e-ening on an 4ST* right ater an o.eration* sensing there %as nothing but anarch+
bor'ering on i'ioc+ in ho% %e %ere con'ucting the %ar,# $ilbur sighe', #I re)e)ber %riting a letter in
)+ )in' to >Fale "ni-ersit+ Presi'ent? Ging)an 0re%ster* telling hi) ho% i).ortant it %as or .eo.le
%ho ha' so)e )oral training an' e'ucation to be on the groun' to .re-ent the negligent cruelties that
occurre', I sa% )+sel as that .erson, ( saw an opportunity *or 0;%) team assets an training to multiply
e!ponentially by wor3ing with the +F". ( in<t ha#e any master plan, but ( *elt, when ( am with this 3i, ( thin3 (
3now where he<s going, an when he puts his han on my arm an whispers, <Don<t shoot,< ( 3now that (
shouln<t shoot. %n those were signi*icant things. Hou *elt he was guiing you to o something you ought to o
an pre#enting you *rom oing what you ought not to o.
-.his guy pro#e himsel* to me,- 6ilbur state emphatically. -,e was able to comman in the *iel. ,e was at
home, an ( wante to be li3e that. ,e was a #ery goo in*luence: Plus %hich the Vietna)ese are -er+ s%eet*
aectionate .eo.le, Fou6' go to .laces an' the+6' be %al&ing aroun' hol'ing han's %ith A)erican
sergeants, Or the+6' co)e u. behin' +ou* .ut their ar)s aroun' +ou* hug +ou* an' oer +ou so)e
cigarettes, .he 3i was li3e that. ,e was *rienly. ,e reacte. ,e hung aroun an became our mascot, which
he li3e.-
6ilbur was also intrigue by the /(% mysti5ue. -Da#e ha this *reeom an economy. ,e was wor3ing with
intelligent people, whom ( got to 3now, an so ( inicate to him that (< li3e to get into the +F" program. 9y
coincience, this happene Cust when the agency wante to e!pan the +F" an e#elop its mission -- as they
en#isione it, a +F" unit in e#ery pro#ince with a 0pecial Aorces a#iser oing the aily operational control.
0pecial Aorces, incluing 0;%)s, Aorce Fecon 8arines, :reen 9erets, an 0%0 $9ritish 0pecial %ir 0er#ice2.
-0o, lo an behol, Cust as ( became an!ious to get into this area, wor came own that the ?a#y was to suggest
an o**icer to go up to a two-wee3 brie*ing in 0aigon, to e#elop a 0;%) a#iser system in this program. .his was
>uly 19G&. ( was sent to ?a#y hea5uarters in 0aigon an tol to go to a huge house with ser#ant 5uarters
aroun the walls outsie. .here we were organi4e by 9ill Feel. .his was his baby,- 6ilbur sai. -.here were
no Vietnamese #isible, unli3e the FD program. The PR" .rogra) %as A)erican(controlle'* %hich is
absolutel+ essential, It %as the brea&'o%n o that control that e-entuall+ le' to the 'estruction o the
PR" conce.t,#
(t is also important to recall that be*ore >uly 19G& +F" teams were organi4e an irecte by /(% a#isers at
the pro#ince le#el through the pro#ince chie*<s special assistant *or paci*ication. (t was only with the *ormation o*
(/;O that the +F" became a national program uner /(% o**icer 6illiam F. Feel, a #eteran o* :reece an
Korea who wore a 8arine /orps colonel<s uni*orm. -,e an ( were ol an close *riens,- sai ;#an +ar3er, a
84
lieutenant colonel in the ".0. %rmy Feser#e, -an there again we cooperate with him an helpe.- 1122
/ollocate in "0%(D ((, Feel an +ar3er wor3e as e5ual partners.
-,is program was also *or going a*ter the V/(,- accoring to +ar3er. -.hese were paramilitary people, mostly
*ormer Vietcong. (n many instances the pro#ince chie* pre*erre to use them as his action arm against the
in*rastructure, rather than regular army *orces, which were not as responsi#e. .hat<s the 3ey@ the +F" were
irectly responsi#e because you were ealing with the con#ince.-
>ohn 6ilbur recalle: -9ill Feel was a goo-loo3ing guy: ?oric, blue eyes, tanne -- a moel type o* guy. ,e
was a goo salesman, too, smooth bureaucratically an #ery political. ,e grease palms well.
-9ill organi4e it li3e a tour,- 6ilbur sai o* the brie*ing in 0aigon. -.here were *i*teen or twenty o* us@ 0;%)s ...
0pecial Aorces ... Aorce Fecon 8arines, an straight-leg %rmy in*antry types. 8aybe *our or *i#e o* each. .he
way it was set up, the Aorce Fecon people were to be a#isers in E+e !or.s@ by an large the 0pecial Aorces in
.wo /orps@ the %rmy in .hree /orps, an the 0;%)s in Aour /orps. 8ost o* us were o**icers or senior enliste
men.
-During the *irst wee3 we all staye at the same hotel ... an we were inoctrinate in what /i#il =perations an
Fe#olutionary De#elopment 0upport $/=FD0' was all about -- /ensus :rie#ance, Fe#olutionary De#elopment,
et cetera. 6e were gi#en a presentation inicating that we were all #olunteers, then were tol what the +F"
mission was to target the political in*rastructure o* the Vietcong, to gather an compile accurate in*ormation
about it, an to react upon that in*ormation to try to estroy the political an economic in*rastructure o* /=0V?.
% lot o* our brie*ing concerne /=0V?<s political, economic, an military arms. 6e were tol what the V/( was,
how it operate, an why we were targete against it. (t was almost li3e learning about /=FD0. (t was e!citing
an heay, too. !o)ing ro) the )ilitar+ en-elo.e* I %as a%a&ene' into this %hole ne% %orl', It %as
6He+N This is a secret6 an' 6$e6re the tough gu+sN6 I %as .rett+ i).resse' %ith )+sel,
-.hen we spent two ays own at the Vung .au training camp. (t was actually a short helicopter rie north, o** in
the unes on the 0outh /hina 0ea. .he training *acility was a corrugate iron compoun with classrooms an
barrac3s, a chow hall, an lecture rooms. .wo or three hunre people. .hen there were ri*le ranges an the
operational course. .here were %merican instructors, but not many, an the chie* aministrator was an
%merican -- one o* the color*ul names -- balheae, barrel-cheste, tough, marinish. (t was also at Vung .au
that ( met Kinloch 9ull. .hen we all returne to our tactical areas o* responsibility. ( went to /an .ho to tal3
*urther with Kinloch 9ull.-
Describe' b+ Nelson 0ric&ha) as #a strange .erson* 'e-ious an' sl+*# >2C? 0ull %as one o the e%
/oreign Intelligence oicers to ser-e as a !IA region oicer in charge, A conir)e' bachelor* 0ull
%or&e' un'erco-er as the 'irector o a !atholic boar'ing school* %here he %oul' #.resi'e at the hea'
o the table li&e a hea')aster,# Tall an' thin an' asti'ious* 0ull %as a gour)et coo& an' .rotege o
$illia) !olb+6s, He %as also an intellectual %ho coni'e' to $ilbur that his a)bition %as to sit at a
t+.e%riter on the southern ti. o the !a Mau Peninsula an'* li&e !a)us* %rite e5istential no-els,
-6e li#e in 9inh 0e 8oi,- recalle 6ilbur, -the motor #ehicle hub o* /an .ho. %ctually it was about *i#e
3ilometers up the ri#er, hal*way between the city an the airport. 6e were own an alley surroune by
whorehouses an massage parlors where all the enliste troops woul go. .here were *i#e or si! o* us in the
place, an ( was by *ar the Cunior. .he others were all in their secon careers. .here was 9ill Dos, a retire
%rmy colonel with uncon#entional war*are e!perience in Korea an %*rica. ,e was the FD//= in charge o* the
paramilitary program o* which the +F" was a part. %nother guy li#ing there was 6ayne >ohnson, the +hong
Dinh pro#ince o**icer. .he 0pecial 9ranch person, the FD//+, li#e with Kinloch. .hey were all #ery paternal,
#ery loyal, #ery *ine people.
#So I starte' %or&ing or Ginloch 0ull*# $ilbur sai'* #but the Na-+ %ante' )e still to %or& or the), The+
%ante' to )a&e the PR" .rogra) theirs* so the+ coul' brag about it, 0ut the !IA tol' )e not to .ro-i'e
the Na-+ %ith o.erational re.orts* so the Na-+ trie' to ha-e )e relie-e', At %hich .oint Ginloch sai'*
6$ell* %e6ll &ic& the Na-+ out o the Delta .rogra) then,6 It .rogresse' into a tre)en'ous bureaucratic
tug(o(%ar, E-er+bo'+ %ante' to ha-e the PR" because the+ inlate' their statistics,#
(n escribing how the +F" program was structure, 6ilbur recalle, -6hen ( got to /an .ho in >uly, ele#en o*
the si!teen pro#inces ha +F" units. 9y 0eptember they all i. .he number o* +F" #arie *rom pro#ince to
pro#ince. 6e ha a #ery large etachment in /an .ho, maybe a hunre. .he smallest was twenty in Kien
:iang.
-( trie to ma3e sure my a#isers were all senior enliste men,- 6ilbur continue, -*rom either 0;%) .eam =ne
or .wo. ( ha about hal* an hal*. 6e wante them *or a long perio o* time, but the 0;%) teams wante to
85
rotate as many people as possible in the program, to 3eep it theirs. ( recommene one-year billets, but it turne
out to be si! months.
-.he a#isers were assigne to /=FD0 pro#ince teams an came uner the irect comman o* the /(%<s
pro#ince o**icer,- 6ilbur e!plaine. -.hey were not uner my irect operational control, an much to my horror, (
*oun mysel* in an aministrati#e position. An' the senior enliste' .eo.le %ere -er+ .olitical in ter)s o
ho% the+ trie' to )a5i)i7e their in'e.en'ence, The+ lo-e' %earing ci-ilian clothes an' sa+ing the+
%or&e' or the !IA* ha-ing co-er na)es an' their o%n .ri-ate ar)ies* an' no bloo'+ oicers or bullshit
%ith barrac&s, 0o a lot o* my Cob was ... maintaining goo relations between the +F" a#isers an the pro#ince
o**icers, many o* whom were retire 0pecial Aorces sergeant maCors with istinguishe military careers. =*ten
there were spar3s between the +F" a#iser an pro#ince o**icer because it was a little too close to their ol
pro*essions.-
+ro#ince o**icers with military bac3grouns o*ten e!erte more control o#er the +F" teams than young, college
grauate-type o**icers who ha i**iculty controlling their har-bitten +F" a#isers, many o* whom were #eterans
o* =+)%? ND% an the counterterror program be*ore it was saniti4e. -0o where ( ha the most problems,-
6ilbur e!plaine, -it was usually when the pro#ince o**icer ha more e!pertise in what the +F" were oing an
woul run it more hans-on an, in many instances, better than the +F" a#iser. %n in those instances ( ha to
relie#e the +F" a#iser ... %lso, to be honest, a tot o* +F" a#isers were being manipulate by their +F"
people. Hou can<t ha#e people go out on combat operations three times a wee3 ine*initely. (t<s li3e ha#ing
teams in the ?ational Aootball )eague play two games a wee3. (t ta3es time to reco#er, an the +F" ha a
natural an unerstanable esire to bag it. 0o the +F" woul *igure out e!cuses to get their a#isers to resist
the operation. .hen the +F" a#iser woul become the man in the mile. 0ometimes he< say, <6ell, we can<t
go out@ we on<t ha#e enough people.<
-(n other cases the +F" a#isers trie to win popularity contests with their care,- accoring to 6ilbur, -an then
the pro#ince o**icer woul get ma at the +F" a#iser *or being less responsi#e to him than the +F" care
themsel#es. .hen that woul create a problem between me an the +F" a#iser an in many instances
between me an the pro#ince o**icer. 9ill Feel ha the same problem. ,e was the national +F" a#iser, but he
ha no authority o#er the region o**icers. ,e woul tell me to o things, an ( woul o e!actly what my enliste
men woul o. (* ( in<t want to o it, (< go to >im 6ar an say, <Do ( ha#e to o thisB< %n he< say, <?o. (<m
going to tell 9ill Feel to go sho#e it.< (n the same way, my +F" a#isers woul hie behin their pro#ince
people, so as not to o what ( wante them to o.-
%s *or the 5uality o* his +F" a#isers, 6ilbur sai, -.he original 0;%)s were tough guys who i a lot o* training
but han<t *ought in any wars. .hen they went o#er to Vietnam. 0+ that ti)e the+ ha' &i's an' the+ %eren6t
that aggressi-e, .he senior guys wante to sen the +F" people out on operations an stay by the raio.
6hich was a problem.
#$e ha' one situation %here %e got the o.erational re.ort that the+ %ent out an' &ille' t%o .eo.le an'
ca.ture' t%o %ea.ons, 0ut the+ 'i'n6t &ill an+one the secon' ti)e ,,, an' it %as the sa)e %ea.on, M+
PR" a'-iser %oul' 'ro. the PR" tea) o in his Hee.* an' he6' .ic& the) u.* an' he6' trans.ort the)
bac& an' orth, So he ne-er 'isco-ere' that the+ %ere going out an' .lanting %ea.ons,
-=ther guys really rose to the occasion,- 6ilbur note, aing that because the ol'er )en .la+e' it sae* the
.eo.le %ho starte' 'o)inating the SEA4 ran&s #%ere the +oung tiger enliste' )en, The+6' go out an'
%aste .eo.le,#
777
=ne o* those -young tiger enliste men- was ?a#y 0;%) 8i3e 9eamon, who wor3e -on the +hoeni! program in
the 9en .re an 8y .ho areas- *rom mi-19GL through Aebruary 19G9. 9eamon<s recollections o* the +F"
resemble ;lton 8an4ione<s more than >ohn 6ilbur<s. He 'escribe' the PR" as #)a'e u. b+ an' large o
gu+s %ho %ere 'oing Hail ti)e or )ur'er* ra.e* thet* assault in Vietna), The !IA %oul' bail the) out o
Hail un'er the con'ition that the+ %oul' %or& in these )ercenar+ units,# >2A?
0ea)on s.o&e o the PR" using ears as e-i'ence to .ro-e the+ ha' assassinate' a .articular V!I an'
o PR" stealing %ea.ons ro) South Vietna)ese ar)ories an' selling the) to the !IA, #I can re)e)ber
a)bushing a lot o ta5 collectors*# he a''e', #Ater the+ )a'e all the collections* +ou6' hit the) in the
)orning an' rob the) o the )one+ an'* o course* &ill the), An' then re.ort that all the )one+ %as
'estro+e' in the ire ight, The+6' carr+ a thousan' 'ollars at a ti)e, So %e6' ha-e =uite a .art+,# >2@?
Arom 9eamon<s perspecti#e, +hoeni! was a -care*ully esigne program to isrupt the in*rastructure o* the Viet
/ong #illage systems. %n apparently on some occasions the plan was to come in an assassinate a #illage
chie* an ma3e it loo3 li3e the Viet /ong i it.- The i'ea* he e5.laine'* %as to #brea& 'o%n the entire Viet
86
!ong s+ste) in that area ,,,,# (( a .lan %hich 'i' not %or& because #the Viet !ong 'i'n6t organi7e in
hierarchies, >23?
#I +ou organi7e in a big hierarch+*# 0ea)on e5.laine'* #an' ha-e one &ing at the to. an' +ou %i.e out
the &ing* that is going to 'isru.t the lea'ershi., On the other han'* i +ou organi7e in s)all guerrilla
units* +ou6ll ha-e to %i.e out e-er+ single lea'er, Plus i +ou organi7e in s)all units* +ou ha-e
co))unication across units an' e-er+bo'+ can assu)e lea'ershi. ,,,, It is )+ eeling*# he sai'* #that
later on %e %ere hitting .eo.le that the Viet !ong %ante' us to hit* because the+ %oul' ee' inor)ation
through us an' other intelligence sources to the !IA an' set u. a target that )a+be %asn6t a Viet !ong*
but so)e .erson the+ %ante' %i.e' out, It )ight e-en ha-e been a South Vietna)ese lea'er, I 'i'n6t
un'erstan' Vietna)ese, The gu+ coul'6-e sai' he %as Presi'ent or all I &ne%, He %asn6t tal&ing %ith
)e, I ha' a &nie on hi), It %as Hust absolute chaos out there, Here %e are* their to. unit, It %as
absolutel+ insane,# >2:?
-Arom that you can percei#e what my Cob was,- 6ilbur tol me, re*erring to the ichotomy between the
theoretical goals o* aministrati#e o**icers an the operational realities enure by enliste men trying to achie#e
( those goals. -(t was 5uality control,- he sai. -( spent a lot o* time tra#eling between the pro#inces, oing
inspections an *iel chec3s on the e**iciency o* these groups. 8y obCecti#e was to go out on operations with all
the units so ( coul report *rom *irsthan 3nowlege on what their capabilities an problems were. ( was
constantly on the roa, e!cept when Dos woul ma3e me sit in the o**ice an hanle the reports which were
sent to me *rom the +F" a#isers in the *iel. .he biggest problem was the thousans o* reports. ;#eryboy
became es3boun Cust trying to supply the paper that *e 0aigon an 6ashington.-
The+ %ere not onl+ 'es&boun' but obli-ious as %ell, #Intelligence .eo.le o.erate in a closet a great
'eal*# accor'ing to $ilbur, #It got so the gu+* literall+ 'i'n6t &no% %hat %as ha..ening on the street
corner %here he %as* iteen eet a%a+ ro) hi)* %hen he coul' in' the ans%er b+ as&ing so)eone
o-er coee,#
#O.erationall+ our biggest gra..le %as the 'e)an' to go out an' ca.ture V! ca're*# $ilbur continue',
#$or' %oul' co)e 'o%n ro) Saigon: 6$e %ant a .ro-ince(le-el ca're*6# $ilbur sai', #$ell* -er+ rarel+
'i' %e e-en hear o one o those, Then !olb+ %oul' sa+* 6$e6re out here to get the inrastructureN $ho
ha-e +ou got in the inrastructureM6 6$ell* %e 'on6t ha-e an+one in the inrastructure, $e got a -illage
gu+ an' a ha)let chie,6 So !olb+ %oul' sa+* 6I %ant so)e 'istrict .eo.le* go''a))itN Get 'istrict
.eo.leN6 0ut o.erationall+ there6s nothing )ore 'iicult to 'o than to ca.ture so)ebo'+ %ho6s got a gun
an' 'oesn6t %ant to be ca.ture', It6s a night)are out there* an' +ou 'on6t Hust sa+* 6Put u. +our han's*
+ou6re un'er arrestN6
#/irst o all*# $ilbur e5.laine'* #the targets in )an+ cases %ere illusionar+ an' elusi-e, Illusionar+ in
that %e ne-er reall+ &ne% %ho the V! 'istrict chie %as, In so)e cases there %asn6t an+ 'istrict there,
An' e-en i there %as so)eone there* to in' out %here he %as going to be to)orro% an' get the
)achiner+ there beore hi) (( that6s the elusi-e .art, O.erationall+* in or'er to 'o that* +ou ha-e to %or&
-er+ co).rehensi-el+ on a target to the e5clusion o all other 'e)an's, To get a 'istrict chie* +ou )a+
ha-e to isolate an agent out there an' set in )otion an o.eration that )a+ not cul)inate or si5 )onths,
It %as )uch easier to go out an' shoot .eo.le (( to set u. an a)bush,
-0o what happene, the %merican eman *or immeiate results to Custi*y this new program, (/;O, starte to
swamp our operational capabilities. %lso at this particular Cuncture, the pro#ince chie*s starte seeing the +F"
as their only e**ecti#e combat reaction *orce, an they ultimately were not guys you coul say no to all the time.
0o the pro#ince a#iser ha to spen a tremenous amount o* time trying to 3eep the pro#ince chie* *rom using
the +F" as his personal boyguars, to guar his house or briges or to go *ight V/ battalions. 6e literally ha
times when the pro#ince chie*s orere the +F" to go engage a battalion, an therein was the aily tension o*
trying to 3eep the +F" on trac3, to respon to the eman *or high-le#el care-type targets.-
The -alue o .ursuing such an illusionar+ an' elusi-e .olic+ %as* o course* 'ebate' %ithin the !IA
itsel* %ith 8i) $ar' an' Ginloch 0ull .ersoni+ing the !IA6s schi7o.hrenia on the subHect, #Ginloch %as
a .lans(oriente' .erson*# $ilbur state', #He sa% the .roble)s o the inabilit+ to control a PR"(t+.e
o.eration, It %as the battle o the bulge, 4ess sta .eo.le ,,, )ore contract .eo.le ,,, an' less =ualit+
a)ong the contract .eo.le, More an' )ore .rogra)s, More in-ol-e)ent in o-ert .ara)ilitar+ acti-ities,
Pa+ing or Re-olutionar+ De-elo.)ent an' things other than classic intelligence unctions,#
9ut whereas 9ull trie to stem the tie, his replacement, >im 6ar, hastene the ine#itable. -+F" was >im
6ar<s baby,- 6ilbur remar3e. -.hat was his lo#e.-
-+F" in the Delta,- sai 6ar, -were the *inest *ighting *orce in the country.-
87
,ow oes 6ar 3nowB -( went out with the +F",- he answere, -but Cust to see how they were operating.- %n
6ar e!pecte his pro#ince o**icers to o li3ewise. -6e encourage the pro#ince o**icers to go on enough o*
these operations to ma3e sure they<re properly connecte. 9ut the 0;%) guy ha to go on more,- he ae.
-Doc 0ells own in 9ac )ieu +ro#ince use to go on three-man operations. ,e went out at night resse in blac3
paCamas, his *ace ar3ene with root Cuices .... .hey< go eep into enemy territory. .hey< grab some *igure an
they< bring him bac3.-
=n the subCect o* terror, 6ar sai, -.he +F" starte o** as a counterterror program, but that wasn<t too well
recei#e in certain areas. .hat wasn<t the basic mission anyway. .hey were to get at the guys who were
orering the assassinations o* schoolteachers an the #illage heamen. .hey were trying to <counter< terror.
.heir basic mission was as an arme intelligence collection unit -- to capture prisoners an bring bac3
ocuments.-
FD/ chie* )ou )apham agree, when ( spo3e with him in 19LG, saying that he irecte that the +F" capture
V/( members an ta3e them to +(/s *or interrogation. #0ut none o us %ere so nai-e*# he a''e'* 66as to
thin& that %e coul' sto. e-er+ PR" tea) ro) carr+ing out the assassination )ission the+ ha' as
!Ts ,,,, $e li-e' in the real %orl', Fou Hust cannot control the .eo.le ighting the %ar# (( >2B? as Phoeni5
atte).te' to 'o,
->im 6ar wante (/;O to wor3,- 6ilbur sai apologetically. -(/;O was something that >im came in an
proselyti4e. /ommittees were set up. 9ut since (/;O was a broa term that assume coorination o* multi-
agencies, ( percei#e it as something that was going to ma3e the intelligence-gathering capabilities more
e**icient an that we in the +F" program were simply going to continue oing what we were oing. .he iea o*
(/;O was to gi#e us better an more timely in*ormation on the V/(, an we were to be the reaction arm o* (/;O.
.he Aiel +olice were the reaction arm o* the plans people. 6e<re on call@ (/;O comes in with a hot number, an
we go out with the ambulance. (/;O was a name an appeare to create a process, but the process was
in*ormally in place anyway.-
%s *or the #iability o* the +hoeni!-+F" program, 6ilbur commente, #Peo.le 'i'n6t recogni7e the .ractical
'iiculties o achie-ing %hat its aca'e)ic obHecti-e %as to be* which somehow was to be an ambulance
s5ua that went out an anestheti4e the istrict people an brought them in 1to the D(=// or +(=// or the
+(/2, where they were mentally issecte an all this in*ormation woul come in. It %as a rhetorical a..roach
that Hust 'i'n6t %or& out there,#
(n any e#ent, 6ilbur sai, -.et put all that in abatement. .et happens an it<s <Don<t gi#e me all this (/;O crap.
:o out an get the guys with the guns.< Tet .ro.elle' the PR" into con-entional(t+.e s)all(unit inantr+
tactics* %hich* reall+* the+ elt )ore co)ortable %ith than this so.histicate' )ission* %hich %as elusi-e
an' illusionar+, <.here<s a V/ s5ua in the woosI )et<s go get <emI< (t was a more tangible an interesting
thing to o. (t<s easier to go on an ambush.-
.his issolution o* the +F", accoring to 6ilbur, mar3e the beginning o* the en o* the program. -+eople
began percei#ing them as a stri3e *orce, a shoc3 troop sort o* thing,- he sai, aing, #$ith Tet* the PR" got
-isible, The+ .ro'uce' staggering statistics* %hich beca)e attracti-e or )ani.ulation an' 'istraction,
The obHecti-es starte' beco)ing slogans,#
!HAPTER 2E: Tet
(n 0eptember 19G& >ohn ,art e#elope etache retinas $-Arom playing too much tennis,- ?elson 9ric3ham
5uippe' 112 an was mee#ace to the 0tates *or treatment. %t 6illiam /olby<s re5uest, FD/ chie* )ou )apham
steppe in as acting station chie*, Cuggling both Cobs until late ?o#ember, when ,art returne to 0aigon, at which
point, accoring to .ully %campora, -,art *ell out o* be- 122 an etache his retinas again. .hree wee3s later,
*earing *or his sight, woul-be solier o* *ortune >ohn ,art le*t Vietnam *ore#er. (n >anuary 19GL )ewis )apham
was o**icially appointe 0aigon chie* o* station.
"nli3e his -ynamic- preecessor, scholarly )ou )apham *a#ore classic intelligence rather than paramilitary
operations. ,is priorities, as he articulate them to the author, were: the political stability o* the :V?,
unerstaning the :V?<s plans an intentions, unilateral penetrations o* the V/( an /=0V?, an FD
programs, incluing +hoeni!.
4a.ha) assure' GVN stabilit+* his nu)ber one .riorit+* b+ len'ing to Presi'ent Thieu %hate-er su..ort
%as necessar+ to &ee. hi) in .o%er* %hile steering hi) to%ar' ",S, obHecti-es through the use o
#co).atible let# .arties )anage' b+ !IA assets li&e Senator Tran Van Don, As or .riorit+ t%o*
88
4a.ha)6s senior ai'es secretl+ recruite' Vietna)ese ci-ilians an' )ilitar+ oicers #%ith so)ething to
tell us about GVN .lans an' strategies,# >C?
Vietnamese nationals wor3ing *or the /(% i so without the 3nowlege o* their bosses. .heir moti#e, *or the
most part, was money.
"nilateral penetrations o* the V/(, )apham<s thir priority, were manage by Foc3y 0tone<s special unit.
%ccoring to )apham, -.his was the toughest thing, getting an agent out in .ay ?inh into /=0V?, to learn about
V/ an ?V% plans an strategies. 9ut we thought we i. .he operation was a #ali one when ( le*t 1in
December 19GL2.- 1D2
)apham escribe his *irst three priorities as -strategic- intelligence. +hoeni!, the other FD programs, an 0=:
were -tactical.- -+hoeni! was esigne to ienti*y an harass V/(,- )apham sai, while -the station 3ept its
strategic penetrations an operations secret.- %n e#en though tactical intelligence was not as esirable as the
strategic sort, )apham was care*ul to point out that it was not always easy to elineate between them. -6hat you
get at a low le#el o*ten re*lects a high-le#el irecti#e. .hat<s why the station has analysts reaing capture
ocuments, intelligence reports *rom region o**icers, an brie*ings *rom interrogators. .hey put it all together *or
us, with bits an pieces aing up to re*lect guielines *rom ,anoi. .hat<s how you o it, unless you can rea
,o<s reports.-
6hen put in the proper conte!t, +hoeni!-generate intelligence on occasion ha strategic implications. 0o /(%
o**icers on the +hoeni! sta** also brie*e station o**icers in liaison with the /(=, an ;#an +ar3er himsel*
attene station meetings thrice wee3ly. (n these ways the station 3ept abreast o* strategic intelligence +hoeni!
stumble on while coorinating its sapper-le#el programs.
Despite its strategic potential, +hoeni! was esigne primarily to sharpen the attac3 against the sapper-le#el
V/(. Fen4 ,oe3sema e!plaine how: -6ith the +F" you in<t ha#e controlle sources, an so the in*ormation
wasn<t reliable .... .hat<s why ( in<t min +hoeni!. (t was a way to corroborate low-le#el intelligence. Aor
instance, i* 0pecial 9ranch has an in*ormer, say, a ric3sha ri#er, who *alls into something an passes the
in*ormation bac3, then we<#e got to chec3 on it. 9ut otherwise, e#eryboy was too busy with their own operations
to chec3. +hoeni! steps in to o coorinating.- 1E2
-.hat<s why,- )apham sai, -the relationship between 0pecial 9ranch an the +F" is so important. .he +F"
was the only station means to respon in an operational way to the V/(. 6hen we got hot in*ormation through a
D(=// or +(=//, we coul mount an attac3.-
/learly, in its *legling stage, when the maCority o* +hoeni! coorinators were /(% o**icers operating uner co#er
o* /=FD0, the program was esigne primarily to impro#e coorination between the station<s liaison an co#en
action branches. (t also pro#ie +hoeni! coorinators with %merican an Vietnamese military augmentation
an intene to reirect them, by e!ample, against the V/(. ,owe#er, as >ohn 6ilbur e!plaine, -.et put all that
in abatement.- 1G2
%n .et was a result o* Fobert Komer<s esire to show success, which prompte him to withraw ".0. *orces
*rom /ong .ac (V -- e#en though :eneral )oan was preicting a maCor assault against 0aigon -- an to realign
0outh Vietnam<s political *orces behin .hieu. .his is the strategic -political- aspect o* +hoeni! -- allue to
earlier by Vietnam<s Diogenes, .ulius %campora -- as conucte by the /(=. .he /(=, accoring to )ou
)apham, -in<t trust the police an wouln<t lea#e high-le#el penetrations to the 0pecial 9ranch.- %n because
-.hieu an Ky were Cust as concerne with suppressing issients as Diem,- )apham e!plaine, -.here was an
element in the police uner the /(= *or this purpose.-
)iaison with the /(=, an organi4ation )apham escribe as -basically military intelligence,- was hanle by the
special unit create by Foc3y 0tone, which met with the /(%<s region an pro#ince o**icers an abscone with
their best penetrations.
-.he /(% is strategic intelligence,- ,owar -Foc3y- 0tone asserte when we spo3e in 19L&. -6e were more
intereste in tal3ing than in 3illing .... 0o in 19G& ( set up an intelligence i#ision at the ?ational (nterrogation
/enter with the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice an with 8c/hristian.- 6ithin this i#ision, 0tone re#eale, -( set up a
separate unit to select targets -- to recruit people with something to tell us. .his is the precursor to +hoeni!. 9ut
when ( escribe +hoeni! to 1Director o* /entral (ntelligence Fichar2 ,elms, he sai, <:i#e it to the military.<
%n the military broaene it into something else.- 1&2
0hort, moon*ace, an a member o* the /(%<s Vince )ombari cli5ue, 0tone sai solemnly, -.his has ne#er
been tol, but we thought that by contacting ?orth Vietnamese an 0outh Vietnamese /ommunists an gi#ing
them secure communications, we coul initiate a ialogue towar a settlement. 6e began negotiating with
89
power*ul people. (t was only a*ter 10enator ;ugene2 8c/arthy entere the 1".0. presiential2 race 1on ?o#ember
N0, 19G&2 that problems e#elope.-
6hat those problems were, 0tone woul not i#ulge, but he i re*er obli5uely to -lines o* communication being
compromise.- ,e woul also li3e to ha#e the recor show that -we were close in terms o* timing an political
consierations. .here were potential a#enues *or political negotiations in late 19G&, but when those collapse,
the Vietnamese thought we were elaying. ?egotiations became impossible in 19GL, an that resulte in .et.-
0tone<s re#elation *lies in the *ace o* contemporary wisom. 0tanley Karnow, *or one, writes that a settlement
was impossible in late 19G& because the /ommunists -ha been planning a maCor o**ensi#e since the
summer ... that woul throw the %mericans an the 0aigon regime into utmost con*usion.- 1L2
Fegarless o* why it happene, .et surely i throw the :V? into utmost chaos. On 8anuar+ C2* 293B*
thousan's o V! si)ultaneousl+ attac&e' hun're's o South Vietna)6s cities an' to%ns an' in the
.rocess 'estro+e' the cre'ibilit+ o the A)erican %ar )anagers %ho ha' .ointe' to #the light at the en'
o the tunnel,# ?ot only i .et pour gasoline on the smolering antiwar mo#ement, hastening the %merican
withrawal, but it also prompte the war managers to poner how the V/( coul mount such a massi#e
campaign without being etecte.
/(% analyst 0am %ams suggests that by lulling people into a *alse sense o* security, imprecise estimates o*
V/( strength precipitate .et. .hat opinion is bac3e by .om 8c/oy, the /(%<s chie* o* ;ast %sian political an
psychological operations, who 5uit the agency in ?o#ember 19G& to Coin 8c/arthy<s campaign. Sai' Mc!o+:
#408 %as the -icti) o a )ilitar+ sno% Hob, Three )e)bers o the !IA %ere bac&(channeling inor)ation*
contra-ening the a'-ice o McNa)ara* the State De.art)ent* an' the 8oint !hies o Sta,# 9ut -the
irecti#e *rom the *iel was to report positi#ely,- an -the /(% was outistance by regular channels o*
communication.- 192
(n any e#ent, .et pro#e to the worl that the V/( shaow go#ernment not only e!iste but was capable o*
mobili4ing masses o* people. Arom the moment it erupte, .et re#eale, *or all the worl to see, the intrinsically
political nature o* the Vietnam 6ar. ;#en i* the ".0. an 0outh Vietnamese go#ernments *oun it impossible to
amit that the outlawe V/( was a legitimate political entity, they coul not eny that it ha, uring .et, ictate
the course o* e#ents in 0outh Vietnam. %n that *act pushe +hoeni! into the limelight. Aor while operations
against the V/( were o#ershaowe by the military crisis uring .et, in many areas the D(=//s were the only
places where intelligence on V/ military units coul be *oun.
777
%t N:00 %.8. on >anuary N1, 19GL, >ohn 6ilbur ragge himsel* out o* be, grabbe his weapons, strappe on
his gear, strale his )ambretta, an put-putte *rom 9ien 0e 8oi to /an .ho airport. .he trip was une#ent*ul,
the roa empty o* tra**ic, an 6ilbur<s thoughts were on the awn rai the +F" were planning to conuct that
morning in Kien .uong +ro#ince. 9ut when he steppe into the operations center in the /(%<s comman post, -(t
was li3e wal3ing into panemonium. +eople were going cra4y. ;#eryboy was on raios, an all the big 0pecial
Aorces sergeants who ha *inally grauate to the / .eam were wal3ing aroun with *la3 Cac3ets an guns. (
as3e, <6hat<s going onB<
-=ne o* the sergeants sai, <;ye /orps, .wo /orps, .hree /orps, an twel#e pro#ince capitals in the Delta are
uner simultaneous attac3.< %ll the calls coming in were *rom pro#ince o**icers saying, <6e<re uner attac3. 6e<re
uner attac3I<
-0o,- 6ilbur recalle, -( ran out to the helicopter pa, an here come these helicopters. ( thin3, <.his must be my
operation.< 0o ( literally ran out to this helicopter, an the closer ( got to it, the closer it got to meI %n the
helicopter starts laning right on top o* meI ( was yelling -- an you can imagine the noise -- <(s this the +F"
operation to Kien .uongB<
-%n the guy sai, <+F" operationB 9ullshitI 6e<#e Cust e#acuate *rom Vinh )ongI .he airport at Vinh )ong is
uner V/ controlI< %n that,- sai 6ilbur with a sha3e o* his hea, -was the commencement o* .et.-
(t was the same all o#er 0outh Vietnam, but particularly ba in Juang .ri, where the pro#ince capital was uner
siege *or *i#e ays an e#eryboy ha been reporte 3ille. #The irst t%ent+(our hours %ere .rett+ )uch
run on a'renaline*# $arren Milberg re)ar&e' %hen %e )et in 29B3, #Then the ighting taile' o* an' I
began to reali7e that %e ha' -er+ little chance o sur-i-ing an+ &in' o )asse' assault, This is %hen I
began to burn iles an' )a&e .re.arations or )+ 'eath,# >2I?
90
9ut 8ilberg ecie to stic3 it out, e#en though the pro#ince chie* climbe on a helicopter an le*t. -( 3new i* ( le*t
the pro#ince, which ( ha the option to o, ( coul ne#er come bac3 an be e**ecti#e,- he sai. -0o ( staye *or
*i#e ays. %n somehow ( sur#i#e.
-6hen the .et o**ensi#e was o#er,- 8ilberg went on, -the month o* Aebruary was one o* cleaning up an trying
to resurrect whate#er 3ins o* agent networ3s you ha -- o* *ining out who sur#i#e.- Aor 8ilberg, this meant
tra#eling to ,ue to loo3 *or 9ob ,ubbar, one o* se#eral /(% pro#ince o**icers 3ille uring the *irst hours o* .et,
when the V! ai)e' their attac&s at the !IA6s interrogation centers an' e)bass+ houses, 1i2 8ilberg
escribe ,ue as -a scene o* what :ermany must ha#e been li3e uring the %llie bombings. (< ne#er seen
anything li3e it. Aighting was still going on. Hou hear shots here an there. 0ome armor units were still in a
pitche battle against the ?V% in the citael.
-6hat happene in ,ue was pretty traumatic *or me,- 8ilberg con*ie. #At one .oint* in loo&ing through the
rubble or Hubbar'* I stu)ble' on a Marine colonel ali-e an' %ell an' looting bo'ies ,,,, I nearl+ &ille'
hi)* I %as so angr+, 0ut I %oun' u. 'ra%ing )+ .istol instea'* ta&ing hi) into custo'+ an' 'ri-ing hi)*
screa)ing an' shouting* to the nearest Militar+ Police unit, I %on6t gi-e +ou his na)e* but he %as court(
)artiale',
-?e!t,- sai 8ilberg, -( con*ronte what the ?orth Vietnamese ha one in the city o* ,ue an probably
elsewhere. .hey ha lists o* all the people who ha collaborate with the %mericans an apparently ha line a
lot o* these people up an summarily shot them. 9ut the most grotes5ue thing was to *in some o* the gra#es
where hunres o* people ha been pushe in ali#e an were burie.- %*ter a long perio o* silence 8ilberg
ae so*tly, -(t<s the 3in o* thing ( still thin3 about.-
6hen as3e i* he thought the lists use by the ?V% an V/ in ,ue were any i**erent *rom +hoeni! blac3lists,
8ilberg sai, -( see a lot o* 5ualitati#e i**erences.- ,e woul not say what those 5ualitati#e i**erences were.
Juantitati#e iscrepancies nee e!plaining, too. .he number o* persons burie in ,ue, as estimate by +olice
/hie* Doan /ong )ap an reporte by 0tewart ,arris in the 8arch 2&, 19GL, .imes o* )onon, was two
hunre. The )a+or o Hue* accor'ing to Harris* oun' the bo'ies o three hun're' local oicials an'
.ro)inent citi7ens in the )ass gra-e, Stanle+ Garno% agrees %ith these igures but =uestions ho%
)an+ o the 'ea' in the )ass gra-es %ere ci-ilians &ille' in the retaliator+ ",S, bo)bar')ent #that also
inlicte' a hea-+ toll on the ci-ilian .o.ulation,# >22?
8ournalists allo%e' to -ie% the gra-es %hile the+ %ere being o.ene' re.orte' seeing tire trac&s an'
scour )ar&s aroun' the e'ges, !onsi'ering that the NVA 'i' not ha-e bull'o7ers* this suggeste' that
ci-ilians &ille' in the retaliator+ bo)bing %ere bull'o7e' into the gra-es, >ust as isturbing is a Aebruary
19&2 article in the Washinton Monthly# by =riana Aallaci, title -6or3ing "p to Killing.- Aallaci writes that more
than a thousan people were 3ille after the liberation o* ,ue -by 0aigon *orces,- incluing V/( cares, who
sur*ace uring .et an were ienti*ie an 3ille by the secret police.
=ne person who 3nows what happene in ,ue in Aebruary 19GL is +V., the ( /orps +F" an +hoeni!
inspector. .he bac3groun o* this unilaterally controlle /(% asset bears e!amination. 9ecause his *ather was a
police o**icer in ,ue, +V. was accepte into the 0urete Aeerale in 19ED. 6hen the %mericans too3 o#er in
19EE, he mo#e o#er to the Vietnamese 9ureau o* (n#estigation, rising through the ran3s to become chie* o*
Fegion 1 in ,ue. "n*ortunately *or his career, his Cob inclue in#estigating the 9uhist immolations, an a*ter
the Diem coup +V. was Caile on suspicion o* being /an )ao. Felease a *ew months later, he an many o* his
tainte /atholic colleagues went to wor3 *or the /(% -because they in<t li3e the go#ernment- o* :eneral
?guyen Khanh.
(ntelligent an tough, +V. ser#e the /(% well as a 0pecial 9ranch aministrator in ?ha .rang, +han .hiet, an
8y .ho. (n 19GE, when ?guyen /ao Ky sol the /(% the right to organi4e /ounterterror, /ensus :rie#ance, an
+olitical %ction *ranchises in the pro#inces, +V. went to wor3 *or /(% o**icer Fuy ;ners in 9ien ,oa, as his
special assistant *or paci*ication. % *ast *rienship *orme between the two men, an when ;ners was
reassigne to ( /orps as the /(%<s senior paramilitary a#iser, +V. tagge along an helpe his patron manage
the region<s +F", FD /are, /ensus :rie#ance, 0pecial 9ranch, an +hoeni! programs.
.he /(% o**icer in charge o* ,ue in Aebruary 19GL was 6illiam 8elton, -an oler man,- accoring to +V., -har
an mean,- who was angere o#er the eath o* his +F" a#iser. 6hile the battle *or ,ue was raging, ;ners
came own *rom Da ?ang to len 8elton a han. %*ter a 5uic3 loo3 aroun ;ners ecie to go a*ter -the V/(
who ha sur*ace at .et. 6e ha troop ensity,- ;ners e!plaine to me, -an we ha all these 1(/;O2 *iles, so
now we grab hol.- 1122
%lso arri#ing on the scene at that moment were ;#an +ar3er, .ully %campora, an :eneral )oan, who a *ew
ays earlier, on Aebruary 2, 19GL, ha achie#e notoriety when, in retaliation *or the murer o* se#eral o* his
91
secret policemen, he ha summarily shot a V/ sapper in the hea in *ront o* a .V camera crew. 9ringing the
same a#enging spirit to ,ue, )oan o**icially sanctione Vietnamese participation in +hoeni! operations in (
/orps when he tac3e the (/;O chart to the wall o* the ,ue /ity police station.
9ut in orer actually to -grab hol- o* the V/( operating in ,ue, Fuy ;ners re5uire the ser#ices o* +V.,
whom he brought own *rom Da ?ang to interrogate V/( prisoners. %s +V. tol it, he an -a small team o* *i#e
or si! people- crosse the +er*ume Fi#er into ,ue an went irectly to the interrogation center, where -Fuy le*t
me in charge.- +V. an his team then interrogate the capture /ommunists an -too3 photos an *ingerprints
an mae blac3lists.-
Feports Karnow: -/lanestine 0outh Vietnamese teams slippe into ,ue a*ter the /ommunist occupation to
assassinate suspecte enemy collaborators@ they threw many o* the boies into common gra#es with the
Vietcong<s #ictims.- 11N2
=n Aebruary 2D, 19GL, the most bitter battle o* the Vietnam 6ar ene, an out o* the mass gra#es o* ,ue rose
+hoeni!, its success prompting De*ense 0ecretary /lar3 /li**or to recommen on 8arch D, 19GL, that
-=peration +hoeni! ... be pursue more #igorously- an that -Vietnamese arme *orces ... be e#ote to anti-
in*rastructure acti#ities on a priority basis.- 11D2
=ne ay later, on 8arch E, 19GL, with the +entagon, hence the %rme Aorces o* Vietnam, now embracing the
/(%<s contro#ersial +hoeni! program, +rime 8inister ?guyen Van )oc orere the acti#ation o* +hung ,oang
committees at all echelons, an he appointe Dang Van 8inh chie* o* a special +hung ,oang .as3
8anagement 9ureau. Doubling as the 0pecial 9ranch representati#e on the +hung ,oang /entral /ommittee,
8inh immeiately assigne 0pecial 9ranch teams to the most important D(=//s an +(=//0 on a twenty-*our-
hour basis an charge them with coorinating intelligence, the theory being that i* +hoeni! wor3e in ,ue, it
coul wor3 anywhere.
=n 8arch 1G, 19GL, the same ay as the 8y )ai massacre, :eneral /reighton %brams replace 6illiam
6estmorelan as 8%/V commaner. %n by the en o* the month )ynon >ohnson ha pulle himsel* out o*
the upcoming presiential campaign. 6arren 8ilberg, who was on lea#e in the 0tates, recalle the moo o* the
country: -( remember coming bac3 an listening to )9> tell e#eryboy that he wasn<t going to see3 reelection.
.hat 3in o* rein*orce in my min the *utility o* the whole enea#or. (t really mae a big impact on me. ( mean,
408 %as a casualt+ o the Tet oensi-e -- among other things.-
8any eicate %merican soliers an ci#ilians, a*ter .et, *elt the same way. =n the other han, %hile
'e)orali7ing )an+ A)ericans* the trau)a o Tet s.urre' others on to greater acts o -iolence, Aor them,
+hoeni! woul become an instrument to e!act #engeance on a cripple, e!pose enemy. -"p until the 19GL
o**ensi#es,- Fobert 0tater writes, -the V/( care were almost untouchable. %ny losses su**ere prior to then
were insigni*icant. /on*ient o* almost certain #ictory uring the .et =**ensi#es, howe#er, they sur*ace their 3ey
care. .he results are well 3nown@ the attac3s cost the Viet /ong thousans o* their most #aluable care,
incluing irreplaceable #eterans with ten to twenty years o* re#olutionary acti#ity.- 11E2
+ro*essor ,uy concurre, writing that -many agents whom the V/ ha plante in the towns an cities were
isco#ere because o* their acti#ities uring the attac3, an were eliminate by the 0aigon go#ernment.- 11G2
(t is a *act that .et was a psychological #ictory *or the V/(. 9ut it was a pyrrhic #ictory, too, *or in pro#ing itsel* a
#iable political entity, the V/( bac3e the :V? into a corner. Aear, an a chance to e!act re#enge, *inally
brought +hoeni! to the *ore*ront o* the :V?<s attention. %ll that remaine was *or )ieutenant /olonel Fobert
(nman to bring e#eryone together at the mile management le#el.
777
,a#ing ser#e in Vietnam with the %rmy 0ecurity %gency *rom 19GN till 19GE, Fobert (nman ha alreay ha,
li3e many +hoeni! o**icers, a tour o* uty uner his belt. %lso li&e )an+ Phoeni5 -eterans %ho contribute' to
this boo&* In)an is co).assionate* intelligent* an' )ore than a little irre-erent. -%t the time ( arri#e in
0aigon in early 19GL,- he tol me, -there was a ".0. sta** but no corresponing Vietnamese sta**. =n the ".0.
sie there were about twenty people, mostly military, although the 3ey management-le#el positions at the
irectorate were /(% .... 6e ha two rea *iles: one *or e#eryboy an one *or the /(% only. .he istinction was
maintaine throughout my tour, but- -- he chuc3le -- -( got to rea the /(% stu**.- 11&2
.he reason *or the compartmentation, accoring to (nman, was that -/(% coorination with 0pecial 9ranch
continue at a higher le#el than +hoeni!.- )i3ewise, the parallel chains o* comman e!tene into the *iel, with
/(% pro#ince o**icers recei#ing operational irection *rom F=(/s while at the same time, in their capacity as
+hoeni! coorinators an members o* the /=FD0 pro#ince a#isory team, reporting aministrati#ely to the
92
/=FD0 pro#ince senior a#iser. ".0. military personnel ser#ing as +hoeni! coorinators *ell aministrati#ely
within /=FD0 but recei#e operational irection *rom 8%/V. .he /(%-8%/V schism was to be narrowe in
some pro#inces, but the gap was ne#er uni#ersally brige.
%t the time (nman arri#e at the +hoeni! Directorate, there were three State De.art)ent oicers on sta:
4ionel Rosenblatt* 0ernar' Picar'* an' their boss* 8ohn E, MacDonal', Accor'ing to In)an*
MacDonal'6s Hob #%as ne-er re-eale',# Picar'* no% a .ro)inent $ashington la%+er* %oul' not e5.lain
to )e %hat he 'i', Fosenblatt merely sai, -%s a 1twenty-two-year- ol2 Cunior o**icer ... ( was assigne to
/=FD0-+hoeni! in December 19G& an ser#e there till >une 19G9. During this time my principal uties were:
$one' orientation an #isits to D(=//s, December 19G& until 8arch 19GL@ $two' /am Fanh /ity +hung ,oang
coorinator, 8arch 19GL through 0eptember 19GL@ an $three' +hung ,oang liaison o**icer in 0aigon.- 11L2
;!ecuti#e Director >oe 0artiano, (nman recalle, -spent a lot o* time with agency o**icers in the pro#inces, trying
to coorinate the FD//+ people who ran the +(/s with the FD//= people who ran the +F" uner the pro#ince
o**icer system.-
(nman himsel* was assigne to the operations section o* the +hoeni! sta**, o* which, he sai, -.here was a
unilateral agency e**ort an a binational e**ort. %n they were separate, too.- The Phoeni5 Re.orts 0ranch*
un'er 4ieutenant !olonel 4e)ire* %as hea'=uartere' not in "SAID II but in the ol' e)bass+ buil'ing on
the ri-er, -?othing was computeri4e,- (nman state. -(t was all pens an pencils an paper.- .here were, in
aition, a plans an training section uner )ieutenant /olonel %shley (#ey an an aministrati#e section uner
/(% o**icer >ames 9rogon.
%s *or the moo o* the +hoeni! sta**, accoring to (nman, -.he problem on the ".0. sie was that cynicism was
e#eloping. :oo3s, slopes, in3s: Hou in<t hear those wors in the 0aigon o**ice, but the attitue was there.-
.his racist attitue generally belonge to proponents o* unilateral operations, as oppose to people, li3e (nman,
who wante to han the Cob to the Vietnamese. -.here were e*initely two sies.- ,e sighe, aing, -% lot o*
people a*ter three months sai, <6hy shoul ( waste my time with the Vietnamese at the national le#elB ( can get
into the 0pecial 9ranch *iles, an ( can run the +F", so what the hellB<- 6hen as3e i* this was ue to legitimate
security concerns, (nman respone, #4ac& o securit+ %as oten Hust an e5cuse or inco).etenc+,#
(nman i not blame ;#en +ar3er *or the bigotry e#ient at the +hoeni! Directorate. -+ar3er was not paternal,-
he sai. -9ut he ha reache a point in his career where he was *unctioning more on a iplomatic than an
operational le#el. %n ;# ha *rustrations with his own people insie the /(% who #iewe the FD//+ an FD//=
systems as competiti#e. ;ach sie woul say, <Heah, tal3 to them, but on<t tell them too much.< ?o one wante
to i#ulge his sources.-
.here were other problems with +hoeni!. -Aor e!ample,- (nman commente, -one pro#ince in .hree /orps was
relati#ely paci*ie, an the pro#ince senior a#iser there thought +hoeni! woul only stir things up. ,e thought
his ninety-*i#e percent ,;0 1,amlet ;#aluation 0ystem2 rating woul rop i* they starte loo3ing *or trouble.- .he
problem, (nman e!plaine, was that -.he ".0. ha tremenous resources, enough to *un twenty-*i#e programs,
all *irst priority. 9igger pigs, an better rice, an +hoeni!. ?ow, some pro#ince senior a#isors simply sai,
<.here<s no way to o it all,< an pic3e one or two to *ocus on -- an not always +hoeni!.-
.he other maCor problem, (nman sai, was that -+hoeni! was use *or personal #enettas.-
6hen (nman arri#e at the +hoeni! Directorate, ;#an +ar3er<s military eputy was /olonel 6illiam :reenwalt,
-an aministrator trappe in an o**ice.- (nman an his best *rien on the +hoeni! sta**, )ieutenant /olonel
6illiam 0ingleton, conclue that -the /(% ha :reenwalt there to ta3e the rap i* anything went wrong.- 6hat
went wrong was :reenwalt<s career. :reenwalt was slate to become a brigaier general, but by #irtue o* his
association with the /(%, #ia +hoeni!, his career Cumpe trac3, an he retire as a colonel when his +hoeni!
tour ene.
-=perations was run by a ci#ilian,- (nman recalle, -a retire *ull colonel on contract to the /(%. ,is name was
6illiam )aw. ,e< been the military attachP in )aos. 0ingleton an ( were assigne to )aw, an )aw tol us to
re#iew e#erything in the *iles because he in<t 3now what the ne!t step was going to be. %*ter a month it got to
be a rag, so ( complaine to :reenwalt. ( sai, <( want another Cob. (<m wasting my time.<-
:reenwalt relente. -,e ga#e me an 0ingleton three or *our actions, which we resol#e in about an hour,-
(nman recalle, an shortly therea*ter -)aw was sent own to the Delta to be the /(%<s contact with the ,oa
,ao.- )aw was replace by :eorge Arench, -a #ery personable, #ery e!perience /(% o**icer who ha one
some #ery ramatic things in his career, *rom the =00 to /uba.-
93
:eorge Arench<s *irst Cob was as a emolitions e!pert in an %ri4ona lea mine, in the years be*ore 6orl 6ar ((.
Aor that reason he was recruite into the =00<s "nerwater Demolitions "nit in 19DN an assigne to
Detachment D0D in /eylon. =#er the course o* his /(% career, Arench i tours in Korea, .ur3ey, +a3istan, an
0aipan an, as a member o* the /(%<s 0pecial =perations Di#ision, in )aos, /amboia, an elsewhere. (n the
summer o* 19G& Arench was assigne to ((( /orps as 9ob 6all<s eputy in charge o* +F", e#en though he
actually outran3e 6all. ?or i he appreciate that 6all acte -li3e a ictator.- 0o he as3e *or a trans*er an
was assigne to the +hoeni! Directorate, replacing 6illiam )aw as operations chie*. Arench escribe the Cob as
mostly tra#eling to the pro#inces to see what was going on an as3ing, -,ow<s your boy countB- .he rest o* the
Cob, he tol me, -was Cust paper shu**ling: compiling in*ormation an passing it on up to 8%/V.- 1192
(n 8arch 19GL the +hoeni!-+hung ,oang program began to gel. +assing up the opportunity to manage the
0o#iet/Fussia Di#ision $with Foc3y 0tone as his eputy', 6illiam /olby instea ha returne to Vietnam, at the
re5uest o* Fichar ,elms, to ser#e as acting chie* o* sta** o* /=FD0. 9ecause he was too o#erbearing to
communicate e**ecti#ely with the Vietnamese, Fobert Komer neee /olby to wor3 with (nterior 8inister .ran
.hien Khiem in *ormulating counterinsurgency policy an proceure at the national le#el. /olby unerstoo
Vietnamese sensibilities an 3new enough about the country to select an assign /=FD0 a#isers where they
were neee most. ,e also unerstoo the ynamics o* the attac3 on the V/(: that +hoeni! a#isers were
neee speci*ically to help local authorities e#elop car *iles an ossiers moele on the Diem-era %9/
system. (n the process /olby was to achie#e in*amy as the man most closely associate with +hoeni! an as its
principal apologist.
-%t the time ( arri#e,- (nman recalle, -+ar3er was meeting with /olby an Khiem, e#eloping propose action
programs, writing ocuments, an sening them own. Khiem was saying yes to e#erything, but nothing was
happening on the Vietnamese sie. 0o ( went to :reenwalt an as3e permission to contact some lieutenant
colonels an maCors in the Vietnamese 8inistry o* the (nterior. :reenwalt sai o3ay, an ( approache +han ,uu
?hon, my counterpart uring my *irst tour an the >-se#en special intelligence o**icer to the >oint :eneral 0ta**.
?hon sent me to see )ieutenant /olonel )oi ?guyen .an, the action o**icer *or +hoeni! at the (nterior 8inistry,
where he ha a es3, but nothing coming in.-
,ere it is worthwhile to pause an reali4e that one reason the Vietnamese were slow in creating their own
#ersion o* the +hoeni! Directorate was their i**iculty in *ining a suitable translation *or the wor -in*rastructure.-
.o sol#e the problem, +resient .hieu appointe a commission consisting o* senior %merican an Vietnamese
intelligence o**icials. %ttening as an interpreter-translator was Fobert 0later.
-%*ter *i#e lengthy an rather hot $both in temperature an temperament' sessions,- 0later writes, -a ecision
was reache that the term that was presently in use woul be retaine. .he Vietnamese term was ha tan co
so ... meaning <the lower layer o* an installation< or <the unerlying *ounation.<- %ccoring to 0later, this
misinterpretation was the -cru! o* the problem in the %llie attac3 against the V/(. (* the 0outh Vietnamese
go#ernment cannot get across to the 0outh Vietnamese people the anger o* the V/( through an ae5uately
escripti#e wor, then how can they hope to combat themB- 1202
.he -cru!- o* the problem, o* course, was not a lac3 o* unerstaning on the part o* the Vietnamese but the *act
that the %mericans insiste on e*ining the V/( in terms that con*orme to their ieological preconceptions. ;
9ray put the problem in perspecti#e when he e!plaine that *or the Vietnamese, -/ommittees at lower le#els
are the in*rastructure o* any higher-le#el committee.- (n other wors, #illage committees are the in*rastructure o*
istrict committees, istrict committees o* pro#ince committees, an so on a nauseam. %ccoring to 9ray,
-.he wor <in*rastructure< rew no istinctions at all, an whate#er le#el the V/( e!iste at epene solely on
each ini#iual<s own semantic interpretation.- 1212
-.hey were writing ocuments,- (nman sai, -an sening them own *or translations, but no one unerstoo
what the wor <in*rastructure< meant, an no one are go bac3 to Khiem an say, <( on<t unerstan.< .an sai
to me, <6hat is this in*rastructureB< .hey were loo3ing it up in the ictionary an coming up with highways an
electrical systems an such .... ( sai, <(t<s their leaers.<
-%n .an sai, <=h. )an bo. -/are.- .hat<s what we call them.-<
6hat .hieu<s national commission coul not resol#e in *i#e ays, two lieutenant colonels resol#e in *i#e
minutes. ?e!t, (nman sai, -.an introuce me to a maCor who was .hieu<s personal chie* o* sta**. .an, this
maCor, an ( sat own an wrote up .hieu<s +resiential Directi#e. 1ii2 .hen this maCor got the papers to .hieu.
.he papers were issue in >uly, an .an mo#e into the ?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter, with about ten
senior people *rom 0pecial 9ranch, as Khiem<s man in charge o* +hung ,oang. Duong .an ,uu 1a *ormer
precinct chie* in 0aigon an, be*ore that, ?ha .rang police chie*2 was assigne as the senior ?ational +olice
o**icer. 8aCor +ham Van /ao became the ay-to-ay manager o* the +hung ,oang =**ice, an ( spent the ne!t
eight months there as liaison to the Vietnamese national-le#el sta**.-
94
% sel*-proclaime -true belie#er- in the right o* the Vietnamese to settle their own a**airs, (nman ha little to o
with the ".0. sie o* +hoeni!. -( was mostly at ?+(/ hea5uarters,- he state. -8y role was as salesman. (<
chec3 in with :eorge Arench *or thirty minutes in the morning, sometimes only once or twice a wee3. (< get
input through him *rom a lot o* people@ he< say, <0ell this to the Vietnamese.< (< channel policies an irecti#es
an manuals *rom Arench -- all in ;nglish -- o#er to the +hung ,oang =**ice, an they translate them. .hen (<
spen time getting e#eryboy to rea an unerstan an sign o** on them. (< run them past /ensus :rie#ance
an FD, Aiel +olice an 0pecial 9ranch, the (nterior 8inistry an %FV? , an e#eryboy woul sign o**.- %n
that is how the Vietnamese +hung ,oang =**ice got its marching orers *rom /olby an the +hoeni!
Directorate.
.he other reason why the Vietnamese were slow in creating the +hung ,oang =**ice concerne the struggle
between +resient .hieu an Vice +resient Ky, a struggle that in 19GL re*lecte changes in the relationship
between %merica an 0outh Vietnam brought about by .et. .he *irst signs o* realignment appeare when
+resient >ohnson withrew *rom the presiential campaign, at which point his in*luence in 0aigon began to
wane. >ohnson, howe#er, remaine committe to a negotiate settlement because success at the bargaining
table was the Democratic party<s only chance o* getting ,ubert ,umphrey electe.
9ut Fepublican caniate Fichar ?i!on sei4e the issue an use it to sub#ert the Democrats. The 'arling o
the Guo)intang(inance' !hina 4obb+* Ni5on* through inter)e'iaries in Saigon* .ersua'e' Thieu to
.ost.one negotiations until ater the elections* assuring hi)sel the .resi'enc+ o the "nite' States* at
the e5.ense o .rolonging the Vietna) $ar,
Fe*lecting those e#elopments in 6ashington, a similar political realignment began in 0aigon in 8ay 19GL,
when the V/ initiate a secon wa#e o* attac3s on 0aigon, an .hieu, writes +ro*essor ,uy, <<as usual ha no
5uic3 response.- 9ut Ky i react ecisi#ely. -,e trie to mobili4e young people *or the e*ense o* 0aigon an
recei#e a *a#orable response.- 1222
-6ith .et,- sai .ully %campora, -)oan mae a comebac3. .hieu was in another camp, watching an waiting.
.hrough Aebruary the attac3s increase, an by 8ay, with the secon o**ensi#e, )oan thin3s he can wal3 on
water. .hen he gets shot outsie o* 800 hea5uarters, an that<s the beginning o* the en. (t<s all ownhill a*ter
that.-
=n 8ay E, 19GL 1iii2 :eneral ?guyen ?goc )oan was seriously woune an 5uic3ly replace as irector
general o* the ?ational +olice by (nterior 8inister Khiem, who appointe his own man, /olonel .ran Van +ham.
?e!t, writes +ro*essor ,uy, .hieu -began his plan to wea3en Ky.- 12N2 ,is *irst mo#e was to ismiss +rime
8inister )oc an replace him with .ran Van ,uong, a *ormer mayor o* 0aigon an a bitter enemy o* Ky<s. During
the 19G& elections Ky ha coerce -peace- caniate .ruong Dinh D4u into pressing blac3mail charges against
,uong. %n so, as soon as he was appointe prime minister, ,uong taste sweet re#enge by ismissing most
o* Ky<s bac3ers in the aministration.
#Then*# %rites Hu+* #G+ recei-e' a ne% blo% %hen se-eral oicers lo+al to hi) an' ser-ing in the
Saigon .olice %ere &ille' at the beginning o 8une in !holon 'uring their ca).aign against the secon'
attac& o the !o))unists, The+ %ere &ille' b+ a roc&et launche' ro) an A)erican helico.ter,
A..arentl+ this %as a )ista&e* but )an+ .eo.le thought it %as 'ue to the A)erican 'ecision to hel.
Thieu against G+,# 12D2
The inci'ent occurre' on 8une E* 293B* %hen a roc&et ire' ro) a ",S, Marine helico.ter gunshi.
#)alunctione'# an' sla))e' into a %all in a school+ar' on Guong To Street, The %all colla.se'* &illing
se-en high(ran&ing oicials %ho ha' been in-ite' b+ the A)ericans to the battleront in the belie that
the V!I lea'ershi. %as hi'ing in the ho)e o the 0u''hist lea'er Tri Duang, Kille were +ho Juoc /hu,
)oan<s brother-in-law an chie* o* the +ort %uthority@ )ieutenant /olonel Dao 9a +houc, commaner o* the Ai*th
Fanger 9attalion@ )ieutenant /olonel ?guyen Van )uan, 0aigon police chie*@ 8aCor )e ?goc .ru, /holon police
chie* an )oan<s personal aie@ 8aCor ?guyen ?goc Oinh, /ombine 0ecurity /ommittee an Airst +recinct
police chie*@ an 8aCor ?guyen 9ao .huy, chie* o* sta** to )ieutenant /olonel Van Van /ua, )oan<s brother-in-
law an the mayor o* 0aigon.
777
Aour ays later +resient .hieu appointe /olonel .ran Van ,ai irector general o* the ?ational +olice. =n the
same ay that he too3 o**ice, ,ai ismisse Ky<s eight remaining police chie*s in 0aigon an replace 0pecial
9ranch chie* ?guyen .ien with his *rien 8aCor ?guyen 8au, who re*use to accept +hoeni! within the 0pecial
9ranch an instea incorporate the /ombine (ntelligence 0ta** within a new /apital 8ilitary District /omman
$/8D/'.
95
% by-prouct o* .et, the /apital 8ilitary District was *orme *or two reasons: to organi4e better the resources
against the V/( cares that ha aie V/ sapper units uring .et an to regulate the hal* million re*ugees
prouce uring .et an pouring into 0aigon. (t was also with the creation o* the /apital 8ilitary District that
.hieu an Khiem wrenche control away *rom Ky an )oan once an *or all. ;ncompassing 0aigon<s nine
precincts an :ia Dinh +ro#ince, the /8D ha as its %merican counterparts 8%/V<s /apital 8ilitary %ssistance
/omman an a +hung ,oang committee in Airst +recinct ,ea5uarters. +rior to the /8D, +hoeni! personnel
*rom :ia Dinh +ro#ince ha patrolle 0aigon<s precincts on a circuit rier basis@ as o* >une 19GL, +hoeni!
a#isers were place in D(=//s in each o* the precincts. +hoeni! precinct a#isers reporte to )ieutenant
/olonel 6illiam 0ingleton through his eputy, 8aCor Danny ). +ierce, whom Fobert (nman escribes as -an
acti#e 8ormon who tra#ele all o#er the country on 0unays holing ser#ices.- (n this capacity, (nman in*orms
us, -0ingleton an +ierce were in#ol#e irectly in intelligence an reaction operations in the bac3 alleys o*
0aigon.-
/(% operations in the /apital 8ilitary District -- a3a Fegion Ai#e -- were manage by a series o* #eteran /(%
o**icers uner their co#er boss, ,atcher >ames, the senior "0%(D a#iser to the mayor o* 0aigon.
,ea5uartere behin /ity ,all, the Fegion Ai#e o**icer in charge monitore all +hoeni! operations in the
/apital 8ilitary District.
% *ew ays a*ter the /8D was create, :eneral ?guyen Khac 9inh was appointe irector o* the /(= an
5uic3ly con*erre upon station chie* )ou )apham -a charge *rom .hieu to run intelligence operations anywhere
in the country, going a*ter the big ones.-
6ith Ky<s people in the gra#e or the hospital, +resient .hieu began to shape the go#ernment o* Vietnam in his
own image, appointing ministers, police an pro#ince chie*s, an military commaners who woul o his
biing. %lso, by issuing )aw 2L0, .hieu li*te the mon3ey o** the ".0. ;mbassy<s bac3, an in return, the
%mericans loo3e away when he began persecuting omestic opponents whose -compatible le*t- political
organi4ations *ell uner )aw 2L0<s e*inition o* V/( -care.- Arom >uly 19GL onwar the tas3 o* ensuring the
:V?<s internal security *ell to :eneral .ran .hien Khiem, who, accoring to Dang Van 8inh, was -the real boss
o* aministration an intelligence.- !IA asset Ghie) (( ser-ing as interior )inister* 'e.ut+ .ri)e )inister
or .aciication* an' chair)an o the Phung Hoang !entral !o))ittee (( thereater %or&e' han' in han'
%ith $illia) !olb+ in steering Phoeni5 into ina)+,
6ith the promulgation o* )aw 2L0 -- which compelle Vietnamese corps commaners an pro#ince chie*s to
organi4e +hung ,oang committees -- an, one wee3 later, 8%/V Directi#e NL1-D1, which orere ".0. military
an ci#ilian organi4ations to support +hung ,oang -- +hoeni! was reay to run on both its %merican an
Vietnamese cyliners.
%ll that remaine was *or )ieutenant /olonel (nman to sprea the wor. -=ne o* my principal *unctions,- he sai,
-was to ta3e .an 1<polishe< an <abo#e it all<2 an /ao 1<blunt an o**ensi#e<2 to #isit the +(=//s an D(=//s
an gi#e a pep tal3. ( probably #isite e#ery istrict in my last eight months.- 9ut, he ae, -(t was not my Cob to
sell +hoeni! to the ".0., so we in<t announce our arri#al@ the istrict senior a#iser wouln<t e#en 3now ( was
there. 8y Cob was to sell +hung ,oang to the Vietnamese, an ( staye on the Vietnamese sie.-
.he people sale with the chore o* selling +hoeni! to the %mericans were the region +hoeni! coorinators --
*iel-grae military o**icers who began arri#ing in Vietnam in >anuary 19GL. .heir role is iscusse in /hapter
1D. 9ut *irst some statistics on +hoeni! through %ugust 19GL.
?o aspect o* +hoeni! is more signi*icant than its impact on ci#ilian etainees, an espite the increase in the
number o* /Ds a*ter the :V?<s acceptance o* +hoeni! in >uly 19GL, the construction o* *acilities capable o*
holing them ne#er materiali4e. (nstea, har-core V/( were transporte *rom mainlan camps to /on 0on
(slan, an *our -mobile- military *iel courts were authori4e in =ctober 19G& to supplement the *our courts
authori4e in 19G2. !onir)e' V!I %ere trie' b+ .ro-ince securit+ co))ittees* %hose .rocee'ings %ere
close' to the .ublic (( the 'een'ant ha' no right to an attorne+ or to re-ie% his 'ossier, 0ecurity
committees coul release a suspect or sen him to prison uner the %n .ri $aministrati#e etention' )aws or to
a special court. Due process *or /Ds remaine on the rawing boar.
?e#ertheless, in compliance with )aw 2L0, the *our Vietnamese corps commaners $:eneral ,oang Ouam )am
in ( /orps, :eneral Vinh )oc in (( /orps, :eneral ?guyen Duc .hang in (V /orps, an :eneral ?guyen Khanh in
((( /orps', *orme Coint +hoeni!-+hung ,oang wor3ing groups an corps-le#el +hung ,oang committees,
bringing the military an police into #arying egrees o* cooperation, epening on the commaner<s personal
pre*erences. Aor e!ample, )ieutenant /olonel )emire reporte that :eneral Khanh -was reluctant to support
police type operations with military resources.- 12E2 Khanh assigne a mere captain as his regional +hung
,oang coorinator.
96
-(n ;ye /orps an .wo /orps,- )emire note, -the coron an search, using +hung ,oang blac3lists, appears to
get the best results. (n Aour /orps the +F" is still the main action arm. (n .hree /orps the Coint
+F"/+olice/FA/+A istrict operation seems to be most proucti#e.-
;#erywhere the egree o* Vietnamese participation in +hoeni! rose steaily. 9y %ugust 19GL +hung ,oang
committees e!iste in D2 pro#inces an 111 istricts@ 190 D(=//s ha been built, at an a#erage cost o* *i*teen
thousan ollars each, an 1D0 were actually operating, along with N2 +(=//s. % total o* 1EE +hoeni! a#isers
were on the Cob. ,owe#er, con*usion still e!iste about the proper relationship between +(=//s an +hung
,oang committees. (n some pro#inces the two were merge, in others they were separate, an sometimes only
one e!iste. 8any +hung ,oang committees ha no relationship at all with D(=//s, which were o*ten #iewe
as an unrelate acti#ity. .he change in name *rom (/;O to +hoeni! to +hung ,oang ae to the con*usion. (n
+lei3u +ro#ince the (/;O /ommittee became the +hoeni! /ommittee but met separately *rom the +hung ,oang
/ommittee. ;#erywhere %mericans an Vietnamese continue to conuct unilateral operations, an tension
between the 0pecial 9ranch an the military persiste as the biggest +hoeni!-relate problem.
The other )aHor .roble)s* cite' in a Ma+ 293B re.ort %ritten b+ !ORDS ins.ectors !raig 8ohnstone an'
8ohn 4+bran'* %ere lac3 o* traine D(=// a#isers@ lac3 o* agreement on the e*inition o* the wor
-in*rastructure-@ inae5uacy o* reaction *orces at istrict le#el, the e!ception being when +F" were sent own
*rom pro#ince@ improper use o* Aiel +olice *orces@ torture o .risoners1 1i#2 lac3 o* a stanari4e *iling
system@ poor source control mechanisms@ lac3 o* coorination between +hoeni! an other *ree worl *orces@ an
/ensus :rie#ance participation in +hoeni!.
.o *acilitate +hoeni! operations nationwie, the /(% issue two hanboo3s in >une 19GL. .he *irst, a thirty-one-
page ocument title The V) -ey 2rani>ation from )entral .evel do"n to Villae and *amlet .evels, outline
the V/( *or +hoeni! operators. .he other was the +hoeni! Directorate<s *irst manual o* proceures, outlining the
program *rom 0aigon own to the D(=//s. %t this point a etaile picture o* the estimate se#enty thousan
V/( was emerging, targeting was becoming speci*ic an scienti*ic, an results were impro#ing. )ieutenant
/olonel )emire reporte that <<as the D(=//s an +(=//s ha#e re*ine ata bases, gaine e!perience, an
mounte more operations against targette ini#iuals, the neutrali4ation rate has been well o#er 1000 per
month *or the last *our months.- (n :ia Dinh +ro#ince, )emire reporte, -the combination o* an aggressi#e
+ro#ince /hie* an a eicate +hoeni! /oorinator has more than 5uaruple the monthly rate o* 3ille,
capture, an rallie V/(.-
8uch emphasis was place on neutrali4ation rates, which were eeme the only obCecti#e way o* measuring
+hoeni! success. %s reports poure into the irectorate *rom all o#er the country, numbers were tabulate an
scores poste@ by the en o* >une 19GL, more than si! thousan V/( ha been -neutrali4e,- with e!act
numbers a#ailable *rom each D(=// so +hoeni! managers coul Cuge per*ormance.
%s ;#an +ar3er e!plaine it, -Hou<#e got people. Hou<#e got some sort o* structure set up, some *acilities an
money an resources. .hen you nee a recor-3eeping system. "n*ortunately,- he ae, -people li#e on
reporting .... (n orer to get brownie points, a guy woul say, <6e conucte O many +hoeni! operations,< an
that loo3s goo on your recor. 0ut si).l+ because the+ %ere or'ere' to con'uct s%ee.s* the+ )ight .ic&
u. so)e V!* but the+ coul' Hust as easil+ ha-e been sol'iers as ci-ilians, 6hate#er the results were, it
was conucte in the name o* +hoeni!. % lot o* things were one in the name o* +hoeni!. %n this goes into
your recor-3eeping system.-
Falph >ohnson writes: -(t was this reporting wea3ness which *or a long time attracte much o* the *oreign press
criticism o* +hung ,oang.- 12G2
-.hen- -- +ar3er groane -- -Komer too3 it one step beyon an assigne goals *or the number o* V/(
neutrali4e. Komer was a great one *or setting obCecti#es, then 3eeping score o* your per*ormance against these
obCecti#es. %n this is how 5uotas got e#elope in the summer o* 19GL.-
9orrowing military -3ills- to meet Komer<s 5uotas was more than in*lationary. >ohn /oo3, the +hoeni!
coorinator in Di %n District in :ia Dinh +ro#ince, in his boo3 The $dvisor notes that switching the ientity o* a
V/ solier 3ille in combat with that o* a 3nown member o* the in*rastructure meant that -(* at a latter ate the
real member was capture or 3ille, this action coul not be reporte, *or you can only eliminate a man once.-
12&2 -Komer in<t unerstan the police nature o* the attac3 against the V/(,- 9ob 6all sai sco**ingly. -6hen
)9> put pressure on him, he in#ente 5uotas as a management tool, an this estroye +hoeni!. Duotas ga-e
star-ing .olice)en a %a+ to ee' a)ilies, It let the) bring in bo'ies an' sa+ the+ %ere V!I,# >EB?
-( resiste li3e ma the iea o* 5uotas,- insiste ;#an +ar3er, -because ( *elt this woul lea to cheating, or in
innocent people being arreste, an this loo3ing goo on the 5uota. =r there might e#en be names liste on
arrest reports that in<t e#en e!ist. (n one area ( was tol they were ta3ing names o** the gra#estones .... 9ut- --
97
he sighe -- #the+ ha' =uotas* an' the+ trie' to )eet =uotas* an' that6s ho% +ou get the i'ea that this
%as so)e sort o )ur'er organi7ation,#
(nee, +hoeni! was labele an assassination program, e#o3ing the specter o* war crimes an leaing many
people to minimi4e the impact o* 5uotas. -( thin3 it was moot,- 6arren 8ilberg sai. -(t was something ( Cust
ignore. Aor the most part it was coming to you *rom people in 0aigon who were going home at night an sitting
uner the #erana o* the /ontinental ,otel. Hou Cust in<t ta3e that stu** seriously. .hey couln<t relate to what
you were oing, Cust li3e you couln<t relate to what they were oing. (t was a i**erent war. (t was a i**erent part
o* the worl.-
Another Phoeni5 coor'inator* a !IA !7echoslo-a&ian 'es& oicer sent to 0ien Hoa Pro-ince in 293B*
sa% co).arisons bet%een Phoeni5 an' Gesta.o tactics in $orl' $ar II, /or hi)* #The re.orts I sent in
ro) )+ .ro-ince on the nu)ber o !o))unists that %ere neutrali7e' re)in'e' )e o the re.orts
Hitler6s concentration ca). co))an'ers sent in on ho% )an+ in)ates the+ ha' e5ter)inate'* each
co))an'er l+ing that he ha' &ille' )ore than the others to .lease Hi))ler,#
6hy one person remaine silent an went along with +hoeni! while another spo3e out against it is the subCect o*
the ne!t chapter.
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. /(% compouns in the pro#inces were calle embassy houses, because they were e!tensions o* the 0tate
Department<s consulates.
ii. Decree )aw 2L0 e*ine the V/( as all party members *rom /=0V? to hamlet le#el an as care that -irect
an control other parties an organi4ations such as ... the %lliance o* ?ational Democratic an +eace Aorces, or
other similar organi4ations in the *uture.- .he only people name as not being V/( were -V/ military units- an
-citi4ens *orce to per*orm as laborers.- )aw 2L0 charge the 8inistry o* the (nterior, not the De*ense 8inistry,
with *ooting the +hung ,oang bill.
iii. =ne ay later /olonel )uu Kim /uong, commaner o* the Airst .ransport :roup an a senior aie to Ky, was
3ille by borer police on the outs3irts o* 0aigon.
i#. 6rites >ohnstone: -.he truncheon an electric shoc3 methos o* interrogation were in wiesprea use, with
almost all a#isors amitting to ha#e witnesse instances o* use o* these methos.-
!HAPTER 2C: Paralla5 Vie%s
-=ur +F" in Juang .ri were all #ictims o* /ommunist terror,- sai 9ob 9rewer, who, li3e many /(% o**icers in
Vietnam, belie#e he was single out *or assassination. % eicate anti-/ommunist who *elt personally
threatene, 9rewer was moti#ate, an so were his +F". -.hey were so re hot you ha to control them,- he
ae with elight. 112
.he man with the Cob o* controlling the +F" in Juang .ri +ro#ince was 6arren 8ilberg. ;legant an
sophisticate, 8ilberg toay is the consummate corporate %merican male. ,is employer, the .itan /orporation,
esigns -0tar 6ars- lasers. %n more than twenty years a*ter the *act -- espite a lingering resentment against
cynical war managers who sen iealistic young soliers on suicial rites o* passage -- 6arren 8ilberg still
embraces the col war ieology an its corresponing +hoeni! mythology.
%t the core o* 8ilberg<s melancholy are two relate e!periences. 9oth happene in 19GE uring his *irst tour in
Vietnam, when he was eputy chie* o* security at the Da ?ang air base. .here 8ilberg<s in#ol#ement with agent
nets brought him into contact with local /(% operators, who li3e his style an in#ite him to participate in the
ongoing 0=: operation calle +rairie Aire. Milberg Hoine' SOG %ithout the &no%le'ge o his Air /orce
su.eriors, ,e put on blac3 paCamas an wor3e with a team o* ?ung mercenaries, leaing them on long-range
patrols into )aos to monitor an interict ?V% units. 0ometimes they sat on the ,o /hi 8inh .rail an shot *iel-
grae ?V% o**icers *rom a thousan yars away, -so they ne#er e#en hear the report.- 122
-.his is where things starte to get e!citing,- recalle 8ilberg, who along with his other uties, began organi4ing
counterterror teams. -( was oing training o* Vietnamese an %mericans -- 8arines an some %rmy people.- As
98
or his in'igenous .ersonnel* #The Vietna)ese %ere gangsters an' thugs (( )ercenaries %ho %e traine'
an' %ho %ere in our .a+ ,,,, 0ut )+ .erce.tion o the role o the !T tea)s %as to stri&e terror into the
ene)+ (( the NVA an' V! (( not the .o.ulation,#
-(t was uring this perio o* time,- 8ilberg continue, -when ( starte to thin3 more about the war an my role in
it. %n ( also began to see e#ience o* how the Vietcong were operating in the hamlets. ( saw the messages *or
the ta! collectors an the political o**icers. An' %hat %ill al%a+s stan' out in )+ )in' %as the terror an'
torture the+ use' to stri&e ear an' get co).liance ro) the -illagers ,,, an e-ent %here a .articular
-illage chie6s %ie* %ho %as .regnant* %as 'ise)bo%ele' an' their unborn bab+6s hea' %as s)ashe'
%ith a rile butt, 6e stumble on this incient 5uite by accient within hours o* it happening. (< ne#er seen
anything li3e it in my li*e.-
8ilberg woul not tal3 about the other traumatic incient, other than to say he was as3e by the /(% to
parachute into ?orth Vietnam. .hat he i, e#en though he ha ne#er Cumpe *rom an airplane be*ore. %n
something terrible happene, something too pain*ul to escribe, something that mae him 5uestion the moti#es
o* war managers who woul as3 him to o such a rec3less thing. ,e wonere i* the mission ha any purpose
other than testing the men in#ol#e -- to see how *ar they coul be pushe an to prepare them *or e5ually
preposterous missions in the *uture. ,e wonere i* he was a guinea pig.
-.his e#ent resulte in my being a*rai, which was a new e!perience *or me. ( spent a lot o* time between tours
thin3ing about it an wonering how ( woul react the ne!t time. 0o it was almost li3e ( neee to test it again.-
(n this way 6arren 8ilberg<s sel*-oubt compelle him to return to Vietnam in %ugust 19G&, at the re5uest o* the
/(% as part o* the +resientially Directe /ounter-(nsurgency +rogram that *leshe out (/;O.
=n the other han, remorse ro#e ;lton 8an4ione out o* Vietnam, out o* the military, an nearly out o* his min.
/onsier the cases o* 8an4ione an 8ilberg: two men e5ually e!pose to a blen o* secrecy an terror.
;nliste man 8an4ione turne on his masters, renounce %merican imperialism, an spo3e out against the
misees o* the /(%. =**icer 8ilberg submitte to authority an in return became one o* the protecte *ew,
accepte into the cult o* the phoeni!, reware with the %merican ream.
8an4ione an 8ilberg are remar3ably ali3e. .hey ha#e the same 3in o* buil, are the same age, an come
*rom the :reater ?ew Hor3 8etropolitan %rea. 9oth ha#e ar3 comple!ions an comple!es, ar3 curly hair, an
e!perience in special operations. 9oth are thought*ul, aggressi#e, high-strung. 6here they part company is
where %merica, too, is i#ie: o#er the 5uestion o* #alues.
%s a 0;%) in Juang .ri +ro#ince in 19GD ;lton 8an4ione resse li3e the enemy, wor3e with /.s who
committe atrocities as stanar proceure, an was tol to ignore the rules o* engagement. -9ut there was no
sense o* our role in the war,- he sai to me *orlornly. ,e will not tal3 about his comraes who ie while on
illegal missions into ?orth Vietnam an )aos. 9ut, he note, -what annoys me is they<re not on the 6ashington
monument simply because they ene up getting grease somewhere where they weren<t suppose to be.- 1N2
Man7ione6s anger %ent be+on' an+ lac& o recognition, He resente' the act that he %as traine' to &ill,
#In .s+cholog+ it6s calle' cogniti-e 'issonance (( the notion that once +ou )a&e a co))it)ent* it6s
i).ossible to go bac&, It6s so)ething about the hu)an .s+che that )a&es a .erson reluctant to a')it a
)ista&e, This is %hat training is all about, Fou6-e alrea'+ &ille' the goo&, So %hat i it isn6t a 'u))+ in
the be' this ti)eM So %hat i it6s a li-ing* breathing hu)an beingM This is %hat +ou6re su..ose' to 'o,
An' once the irst ti)e co)es an' goes* it6s not as har' the secon' ti)e, Fou sa+ to +oursel* 6$ell* he+*
I6-e &ille' .eo.le beore, $h+ shoul' I ha-e an+ co).unctions about 'oing it no%M6#
#Training is brain%ashing, The+ 'estro+ +our i'entit+ an' su..l+ +ou %ith a ne% one (( a unior)
i'entit+ that e-er+ sol'ier has, That6s the reason or the unior)* or e-er+one ha-ing the sa)e haircut
an' going to 'inner together an' eating the sa)e thing ,,,, The+ 'estro+e' the street &i' ro) Ne%ar&
an' create' the sailor, The+ 'estro+e' the sailor an' create' the SEA4, 0ut .eo.le aren6t robots* an'
'es.ite their training* e-entuall+ the+ react1 the+ turn on their trainers an' conront the outsi'e orces
that ha-e use' the), That6s %hat ha..ene' to )e,
#I %as a guinea .ig*# Man7ione insiste', #There is no 'oubt in )+ )in' to'a+* an' there %as -er+ little
'oubt then* e-en ater i-e )onths in Vietna), All the training an' all the 6s.ecial6 .rogra)s (( it
e-entuall+ began to bac&ire on the), I thought* 6Oh* +eah* great .rogra) +ou got here1 +ou6re using )e
to see ho% I react, I6) e5.en'able, I6) a .a%n,6 An' that6s &in' o a hea-+ reali7ation %hen +ou6re an
eighteen(+ear(ol' &i',
#It6s a .ara'o5, Fou &no%*# Man7ione continue'* #the+ %oul' sen' a gu+ o-er there to be a re.lace)ent
or a s.eciic .erson %ho %as being .ulle' out, So %hat consciousl+ ca)e across to +ou %as 6I6)
unctioning as a .art o a )achine, An' i I ail as a .art or brea& 'o%n as a .art ,,, then another .art %ill
99
co)e along to re.lace )e,6 Then +ou in' +oursel thin&ing* 6The last ti)e I loo&e' at so)ebo'+ as not a
.art o the )achine* an' I thought he %as a reall+ great gu+* an' he6s a rien' o )ine* he ste..e' on a
lan' )ine an' ca)e 'o%n 'ust* hair* teeth* an' e+eballs,6
#Then +ou reali7e* 6I can6t aor' to 'o that, 0ecause I eel terrible or a )onth ater%ar's,6 An' +ou can6t
unction %hen +ou eel terrible, The onl+ thing %e coul' 'eal %ith at an+ .articular ti)e %as sur-i-al,
6$hat 'o I %ant to 'o to'a+M I %ant to eat* slee.* an' sta+ ali-e,6 An' +ou 'i' it, An' +ou relate' to those
&in's o things, Su''enl+ +ou loo&e' aroun' an' sai'* 6$ait a )inuteN That6s %hat those little gu+s in
blac& .aHa)as are 'oing* tooN# Fou get to a .oint %here +ou begin to see these .eo.le Hust %ant to be
let alone to gro% their rice,
#I6ll gi-e +ou one last e5a).le o %hat I6) tal&ing about, I6) sure +ou6-e hear' about the laser(gui'e'
s)art bo)bs %e ha', $ell* the+ %oul' 'ro. these laser(gui'e' s)art bo)bs* an' %hat the V! %oul' 'o
%as ta&e a bunch o ol' rags an' tires an' stu an' start a bonire %ith lots o s)o&e, An' the laser
bea) %oul' hit the s)o&e .articles* an' it %oul' scatter* an' the bo)bs %oul' go cra7+, The+6' go u.*
'o%n* si'e%a+s* all o-er the .lace, An' .eo.le %oul' s)ile an' sa+* 6There goes another s)art bo)bN6
So s)art a goo& %ith a )atch an' an ol' tire can uc& it u.N
#The %hole .er-erse i'ea o .utting this technological* se)iantise.tic sort o %arare against these
.eo.le (( %ho 'i'n6t ha-e )uch )ore than a stic& (( %as absur', The stic&s %onN#
6arren 8ilberg ha a i**erent point o* #iew. ,e enCoye being a member o* the close society, in which relating
to the enemy in human terms was cause *or e!pulsion. Aor him, the image o* the isembowele mother an her
murere *etus -*orme opinions an Custi*ications *or what ( was oing. (t was the iea that you neee to hate
the enemy. (t was the beginning o* my own personali4ation o* my role in the con*lict. (t was what resulte in me
going bac3 to Vietnam when e#eryboy -- my parents, my *riens, my wi*e -- tol me no one in his right min
woul go bac3 to Vietnam. ( really belie#e that ( was helping these people e*en themsel#es *rom the bully.
%n sometimes that wor3e well, an sometimes it was horrible .... (t was horrible i* you mae some small little
#illage on the periphery o* the uni#erse belie#e they coul in *act stan tall an e*en themsel#es against this
thing we unerstoo as the enemy, then came bac3 the ne!t ay an *oun them all slaughtere. (t happene.
%n then you ha to as3 yoursel*, <6hat i ( o hereB ( mae these people belie#e they coul o something,
an now they<re all ea. 8aybe it woul ha#e been better i* ( ha Cust one nothing. >ust le*t these people
alone.<
-(<m still reconciling it. ( still on<t thin3 (<#e wor3e it all the way through.-
6arren 8ilberg stare into the istance, seeing sights that only combat #eterans see. #Things that ha-e
ha..ene' since then ha-e le' )e to belie-e that I 'on6t %ant to be an instru)ent o .olic+ an+)ore*# he
conclu'e', #I thin& the .eo.le %ho 'e-ise the .olicies an' cause i'ealistic +oung )en to go o to %ar
.robabl+ nee' to e5.erience so)e o the things I6-e e5.erience' to te).er their Hu'g)ents,#
!HAPTER 2A: Phoeni5 in /light
6hen his *irst tour in Vietnam ene in the spring o* 19GG, 6arren 8ilberg returne to the "nite 0tates an
was assigne to an %ir Aorce base in 0outh Da3ota. 9ut his name an accomplishments remaine on *ile at /(%
hea5uarters in 6ashington, an one year later 8ilberg was one o* *i*ty o**icers an enliste men *rom the
#arious military ser#ices $all Vietnam #eterans' whom the +entagon in#ite to Coin a +resientially Directe
/ounter-insurgency +rogram through a participating agency/ser#ice agreement. .hose who #olunteere were
teste an, i* accepte by the /(% as Cunior o**icer trainees, gi#en e!tensi#e training an returne to Vietnam to
ser#e at the iscretion o* the senior /(% o**icers in 0aigon an the regions. 8ost were assigne to the pro#inces
as FD//+ or FD//= a#isers, an many became +hoeni! coorinators.
Notabl+* the t%o other Air /orce oicers as&e' to Hoin the .rogra) both %ith're%* one 66as a )atter o
conscience,# 8ac=ues Gline* %ho is 8e%ish* %as born an' reare' in /rance 'uring $orl' $ar II an'
%ith're%* accor'ing to Milberg* because #he elt the )eans an' )etho's that he thought %ere going to
be use' in it %ere si)ilar to the )eans an' )etho's use' b+ the Na7is in $orl' $ar T%o,# >2?
8ilberg, who is also >ewish -- but ob#iously i not agree with Kline -- returne to Vietnam in >uly 19G& an was
assigne to /(% region o**icer in charge >ac3 ,organ in Da ?ang. -( woun up getting a ma3e-wor3 Cob on the
sta** there, as liaison to some military units in an aroun Da ?ang, trying to coorinate an intelligence collection
an analysis unit *or things, li3e motor units, that the V/ use to harass the air base an the city. (t was pretty
une!citing. ( staye there *or maybe a month, bore out o* my min. .hen the FD//+ o**icer in Juang .ri was
100
relie#e by ,organ, which le*t them with a gap. %n when ( hear about that, ( went to him an sai, <(< li3e to
ta3e the Cob in Juang .ri.< %n he was surprise that ( i that -- that anyboy woul want to go to the
pro#inces .... 9ut Juang .ri was the en o* the line, an it was a way *or ,organ to get ri o* me.
-0o ( went up to Juang .ri an was elighte to *in that when ( got there, someboy actually met me. .his was
the guy who was lea#ing. ,e ha three ays le*t in Juang .ri, an in those three ays he was going to orient me
as to what was going on. %*ter spening #irtually the whole ay an night tal3ing, we loae up two Ceeps, one
*ull o* ?ung boyguars, then ro#e aroun to all the istricts an met all the people in the 0pecial 9ranch, the
/(=, an anyboy else we ealt with that were part o* his bilateral operations. %n ( remember as we crosse
the Juang .ri Fi#er brige, heaing up ,ighway =ne towar Dong ,a, thin3ing, <(<m bac3. ?ow (<m really bac3,<
an wonering what this was all going to be li3e.
-( guess we couln<t ha#e been ri#ing *or more than hal* an hour when a bus, one o* those %sian buses with
pigs an chic3ens an people hanging o** the roo* an out the winows, blows up about *i*ty yars ahea o* us.
.he highway was Cust a little two-lane roa, running along the coastal plain. .he bomb was a lan mine,
constructe out o* an une!ploe ".0. *i#e-hunre-poun bomb, remotely etonate, an probably meant *or
us. 9ut either a *aulty etonator or #ibrations set it o**. 6hate#er, here were a lot o* innocent ci#ilians either ea
or woune, an it was li3e eCa #u: <,ere ( am again. 6hat am ( oing hereB 6hat is this whole thing aboutB<
An' I guess I %ent through a .erio' o 'e.ression earl+ on* thin&ing* 6There6s no %a+ to %in this thing,
This %ar is going to go on ore-er, All these .rogra)s an' acti-ities are Hust a %aste o hu)an an'
econo)ic resources,6
-%ll ( ha le*t -- to Custi*y why ( was there -- was to o the same thing ( ha one be*ore, which was to
personali4e it. 6hat ( i while ( was there in the mist o* all the turmoil an pain an agony -- a thing that mae
absolutely no sense to me -- was to apply my own #alue system to it, which was such that ( was going to 3eep
pregnant women *rom being isembowele. %n it got to be a #ery personal war *or me.-
%*ter ta3ing o#er Juang .ri *rom his preecessor, 8ilberg -learne right away that the people you inherite, the
counterparts in 0pecial 9ranch or /(=, ha a lot to o with the 3in o* tour you were going to ha#e. .hey were
either goo an competent people or bureaucratic, corrupt *unctionaries -- or #ariations in between. %n ( was
really *ortunate to win up wor3ing with a man name ?guyen Van Khoi, the 0pecial 9ranch chie* in Juang
.ri .... ( was there to a#ise an assist him, only to *in he ha been *ighting the war his whole li*e. ,e was a pro.
%n increible man ... who sur#i#e my tour there, o*ten times at great ris3 to himsel*.- $Khoi was reportely 3ille
by %FV? eserters in ,ue in %pril 19&E.'
(n #iew o* Khoi<s e!pertise, there was little *or 8ilberg to o in terms o* a#ising on 0pecial 9ranch operations.
%part *rom *ighting *or his li*e uring .et, conucting unilateral operations, an monitoring the +ro#ince
(nterrogation /enter, 8ilberg wor3e largely in *inancial aministration. -( ha to go to Da ?ang once a month to
account *or *uns ( ha e!pene an to bring the region o**icer an his sta** up-to-ate on what was going on.
%n ( can remember thin3ing that ( controlle more money as a single ini#iual, that ( was sprin3ling aroun the
pro#ince in one way or another, than what the entire 1/=FD02 pro#ince buget was. I ha' con-ersations %ith
the ello% %ho %as the 'e.ut+ in Da Nang about the act that %e thought that %e %ere .ro-i'ing so)e
)easure o econo)ic stabilit+ an' reall+ %eren6t intereste' in the =ualit+ o the intelligence %e %ere
bu+ing (( that b+ s.rin&ling this )one+ as %e 'i'* to these lo%(le-el inor)ant nets* %e %ere creating
econo)ic stabilit+ as o..ose' to engaging in intelligence o.erations, Interesting conce.t an' i'ea,
-=nce a 5uarter ( was calle into 0aigon,- 8ilberg continue, -an when ( went to 0aigon, ( staye at the Duc
,otel. %n ( *elt li3e i* the Vietcong e#er targete the hotel or the city, it woul be a piece o* ca3e. ( was in the
business o* planning these 3ins o* things, an ( 3new that i* ( ha to o it, it woul be a simple thing to o. (
use to say to mysel*, <8y :o. (* this happens, what the hell am ( going to o here in 0aigonB .hey ha#e no
plans.< +eople were carrying aroun little pistols in shouler holsters because it was *ashionable .... It %as a
bureaucratic %ar in Saigon, All these .eo.le su..ose'l+ in-ol-e' in intelligence collection an' anal+sis*
.lanning or the use o intelligence resources an' the .artici.ation o .ara)ilitar+ orces (( all these
.eo.le %ere 'oing nothingN The+ li-e' in their -illas in an' aroun' to%n in gran' s.len'or, .hey< come
to wor3 at eight %.8. an lea#e at *i#e p.m. (t was Cust li3e being in an o**ice builing, an they ha no iea what
was going on outsie 0aigon. ?one. %n ( Cust *elt helpless an e!pose when ( was there. ( couln<t wait to get
bac3 to the pro#inces.
-.his probably souns strange,- 8ilberg con*esse, -but ( *elt #ery much at home in Juang .ri, which was really
nothing more than a sleepy pro#ince capital consisting o* two cross streets an a population between *i*teen to
twenty thousan people. 6hen ( got to 0aigon, with its teeming millions, ( *elt in more anger than ( i up-
country in my little rural compoun in Juang .ri.
-=* course, ( wasn<t out on operations in the Cungle all the time, li3e ( was on my *irst tour. 9ut whene#er we i
go out, we were re5uire to sen in little spot reports on what we i an why we i it an what the result was.
101
E-er+bo'+ %as )anic about bo'+ counts (( all that &in' o cra., (n any e#ent, ( 3ept getting warne by the
guy 1>ac3 ,organ<s replacement, ,arry 8usta3os2 who was in the region o**ice not to go out on operations. .hat
wasn<t my Cob. %n this was a guy who was totally paranoi about being in Vietnam. ,e was li#ing in Da ?ang in
relati#e com*ort ne!t to the police station, an he coul ne#er unerstan why there was a nee to go out on
operations when your counterpart was going on those operations, that there was no way you were going to stay
home an still maintain creibility with that counterpart. %n ( remember getting irect orers *rom him not to o
that. 6hich ( ignore.
-( ha a compoun that was relati#ely com*ortable as things go,- 8ilberg sai -an a personal guar *orce o*
?ung mercenaries whose only Cob was to 3eep me ali#e. ( ha #irtually unlimite resources to pay *or a sta** that
translate an prouce intelligence reports, which ( isseminate to anyboy in the pro#ince, ".0. military or
otherwise, that ( thought coul ta3e action on those reports. %n ( owne an operate a *orty-man +F" *orce
1see photo2 which was my personal army. I %oun' u. ha-ing a )arine %or&ing or )e %ho I thin& %as a
.s+cho.ath, I ne-er sa% or .artici.ate' in %hat he 'i'* but I %as a%are o it,# ;In #The /uture
A..licabilit+ o the Phoeni5 Progra)*# Milberg calle' #those abuses that 'i' occur ,,, the 6nor)al6
aberrations %hich result in an+ or) o %arare,# >E?<
-+F" belonge to the FD//= sie o* the pro#ince organi4ation until the consoliation,- 8ilberg tol me. -(
starte out as the plans o**icer, but towar the en o* 19G& ( was appointe the pro#ince o**icer in charge o* both
programs. .his is where ( actually control an irect the +F" mysel*. +rior to this, i* ( ha nee o* the +F",
because o* some intelligence ( ha e#elope, what ( i was go an see the FD//= people -- which was a
relati#ely large program, *i#e or si! %mericans in#ol#e -- whereas FD//+ was only me. ( li#e by mysel* away
*rom them. 9ut (<m not sure i* that<s the way it was in e#ery pro#ince.-
(n regar to +hoeni!, 8ilberg sai, -(<m not sure how you boun +hoeni!, but it certainly *alls right in the mile.
0ut at this .oint the agenc+ %as beginning to turn the reins o the .rogra) o-er to the ",S, Ar)+* as
a'-isers to the Vietna)ese* an' going through %hate-er Or%ellian )in'(set %as necessar+ to )a&e
belie-e this %as a Vietna)ese .rogra),#
+hoeni! operations in Juang .ri +ro#ince were i**erent *rom +hoeni! operations in other pro#inces, 8ilberg
e!plaine, in that -a lot o* military acti#ity was going on, as oppose to the Vietcong insurgency. /learly, both
things were going on, but it was a hea#ily militarily oriente pro#ince. 0o there was a lot o* action there.-
(n -.he Auture %pplicability o* the +hoeni! +rogram,- 8ilberg escribes a typical +hoeni! operation. /apitali4ing
on their assets in the /(=, +F", an 0pecial 9ranch, 8ilberg an Juang .ri +ro#ince 0enior %#iser 9ob
9rewer mounte a +hoeni! operation in the -illage o Thuong Xa* ourteen )iles south o the DMK, As
Elton Man7ione note' earlier* in this area it %as har' to 'eter)ine an+one6s .olitical ailiations* an' the
ten'enc+ %as to consi'er e-er+one a Vietcong s+).athi7er. (nee, .huong Oa ha ser#e as a staging
area *or the Vietminh in the Airst (nochina 6ar, an in 19GL its inhabitants were supporting the Vietcong in the
same manner against the %mericans. 8ilberg writes this was because -the people were a*rai to o**er
in*ormation since they *eare V/ reprisals.- 1N2
% ecision to conuct a +hoeni! operation o* -massi#e proportions- against .huong Oa was mae by Juang
.ri<s +ro#ince 0ecurity /ouncil at 9rewer<s urging. =nce permission ha been grante, -=nly the barest
essential in*ormation was gi#en to the #arious Vietnamese agencies in Juang .ri,- 8ilberg writes. (n this way, it
was thought, those Vietnamese o**icials who ha been coerce by the V/ coul not inter*ere with the -planning
process.- .o ensure security, -.he actual name o* the targete #illage was not release to the Vietnamese until
the ay be*ore the operation.- 1D2
(n preparing the .huong Oa operation, in*ormation *rom 0pecial 9ranch in*ormers an +(/ reports was *e into
D(=//s in an aroun .huong Oa -- a phenomenon rarely obser#e in pro#inces where the +hoeni!
coorinator was an 8%/V o**icer, not a /(% employee. %s a blac3list o* suspecte V/( was compile in Juang
.ri<s +ro#ince (ntelligence an =perations /oorination /enter, it was cross-chec3e with neighboring Juang
.in<s +(=// an -against master +hoeni! lists- in 0aigon $to ensure that penetration agents were crosse o**
the list', then *e to Juang .ri<s D(=//s.
?e!t, +F" teams were sent to locate an sur#eil targete V/(. ;scape routes were stuie *or ambush sites,
an -the 1pro#ince senior a#iser2 personally arrange- *or local ".0. %rmy an 8arine units to act as a -bloc3ing
*orce- to seal o** the entire town. 1E2 %t awn on the ay o* the operation 8%/V psywar planes roppe lea*lets
on .huong Oa urging ienti*ie V/( to surrener an o**ering rewars an /hieu ,oi status to in*ormers.
?o one too3 a#antage o* the eal. (nstea, the resients o* .huong Oa brace *or the shoc3. (n the early
morning hours twenty-*i#e-man +F" teams -- accompanie by 0pecial 9ranch interrogators an /(% a#isers --
began searching hooches *or booby traps, weapons, ocuments, *oo caches, an V/( suspects. .hey
-compare the names an escriptions on the blac3lists with e#ery man, woman, an chil in .huong Oa.- 1G2
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0uspects were sent to screening 4ones, where innocent bystaners were *e an -entertaine- by FD teams.
.he har-core V/(, meanwhile, were systematically ri#en into the northeast corner o* town, where they were
cornere, then 3ille or capture as they trie to escape through 9rewer<s -ring o* steel.-
The result %as t%o V!I ca.ture', One %as the 'istrict .art+ chie1 the other %as the chie o the local
N4/ ar)ers6 association, 0oth %ere sent to the interrogation center in Da Nang, Eight other targete'
V!I %ere &ille' or esca.e', T%o it+(nine()e)ber Re-olutionar+ De-elo.)ent tea)s sta+e' behin' to
assert the GVN6s .resence* but %ithin a )onth the+ %ere 'ri-en out o to%n an' Thuong Xa re-erte' to
Vietcong control, As Milberg obser-es* #E-en %ith this unusual a)ount o coor'ination* the act that the
-illage re-erte' to co))unist control an' &no%n )e)bers o the V!I esca.e' strongl+ suggests that
the o.eration aile' as a uture )o'el or counterinsurgenc+ o.erations,# >:?
+erhaps the inhabitants o* .huong Oa resiste the intrusion into their #illage because they *eare Vietcong
reprisals. =r maybe they really i support the Vietcong. (n either case, the point is the same. E-en un'er i'eal
con'itions Phoeni5 o.erations aile' %here the Vietna)ese %ere 'eter)ine' to resist, $here i'eal
con'itions 'i' not e5ist (( %here Vietna)ese oicials %ere inclu'e' in the .lanning o o.erations an'
%here ",S, )ilitar+ oicers re.lace' !IA oicers as Phoeni5 coor'inators (( the .rogra) aile' to an
e-en greater 'egree,
777
(n early 19GL each o* the /(%<s region o**icers in charge was assigne a military intelligence o**icer, either a
maCor or a lieutenant colonel, to ser#e as his +hoeni! coorinator. (n (V /orps the Cob was gi#en to )ieutenant
/olonel Doug Dillar, an easygoing :eorgian who, at si!teen, lie about his age, enliste in the ;ighty-secon
%irborne 9rigae, an *ought in 6orl 6ar ((. %*ter the war Dillar became a commissione o**icer, an in Korea
he ser#e in the /ombine /omman *or Feconnaissance %cti#ity, which, uner /(% auspices, coorinate
special operations behin enemy lines. Dillar gaine *urther espionage e!perience in the late 19E0<s as a case
o**icer in :ermany running agent operations in conCunction with the %rmy<s attachP o**ice an the /(%. %*ter a
stint teaching airborne an amphibious -o**ensi#e- counterintelligence operations at Aort ,olabir, Dillar was
mae eputy chie* o* intelligence at the /ontinental %rmy /omman, where he traine an eploye -practically
e#ery army intelligence unit that went to Vietnam.- 1L2
0pea3ing in a rawl, Dillar tol me, -( went o#er to Vietnam in Aebruary 19GL as the +hoeni! coorinator *or
Aour /orps, reporting to the /(%<s region o**icer in charge. 9ranch calle me an sai, <6e ha#e what we
consier a critical re5uirement. 6e can<t iscuss it o#er the phone -- it<s classi*ie -- but you<ll *in out what it is
when you get there.<
-0o,- Dillar continue, -when ( arri#e in 0aigon, ( immeiately contacte se#eral o* my *riens. =ne, /olonel
Fuss /onger, the senior a'-iser in Phong Dinh Pro-ince* ga-e )e so)e ti.s on getting 'ierent
agencies to coo.erate an' on o-erco)ing the terrorist .s+cholog+ in the -illages an' ha)lets. ,e also
in*orme me that there were many people aroun who *elt +hoeni! was a threat to them -- to their power base. -
(n other wors, military o**icers commaning units in the *iel -consiere +hoeni!, on occasion, as getting in
their way an inhibiting resources they coul otherwise use *or their own operations.-
Fight away Dillar unerstoo that his Cob woul be to brige the gap, so that con#entional military *orces coul
be mae a#ailable *or uncon#entional +hoeni! operations planne by the /(%. 9ut he also sense another
problem *estering beneath the sur*ace. -(t<s 3in o* in con*lict to our culture an e!perience o#er the years,- he
e!plaine, -to ta3e a ".0. %rmy element -- whate#er it may be -- an irect it not only towar the military an
paramilitary enemy *orces but also towar the ci#ilians that cooperate with them.-
General 0ruce Pal)er* co))an'er o the ",S, Ninth Inantr+ Di-ision in 293B* .ut it )ore bluntl+, #M+
obHection to the .rogra)*# he %rote in a letter to the author* #%as the in-oluntar+ assign)ent o ",S,
Ar)+ oicers to the .rogra), I 'on6t belie-e that .eo.le in unior)* %ho are .le'ge' to abi'e b+ the
Gene-a !on-entions* shoul' be .ut in the .osition o ha-ing to brea& those la%s o %arare,# >9?
8ost military o**icers, howe#er, resente +hoeni! on other than legal grouns. .he notion o* attac3ing an elusi#e
an illusionary ci#ilian in*rastructure was anathema to con#entional warriors loo3ing *or spectacular main *orce
battles. Aor an ambitious o**icer assigne to +hoeni!, -the healines woul not be #ery impressi#e in terms o*
boy counts, weapons capture, or some other measure o* success,- as 6arren 8ilberg notes. (n aition,
+hoeni! coorinators were merely a#isers to their counterparts, not commaners in the *iel.
%*ter being in*ormally brie*e by his *riens, Dillar reporte to the +hoeni! Directorate, which -represente the
program at the national le#el, ensuring that we got the 3in o* personnel an logistical support we *elt we
neee.- ,owe#er, because o* the sta**<s -#ery narrow aministrati#e type o* intelligence bac3groun,- it i not
-unerstan how the program was going to e#elop. %s the (/;O program,- Dillar e!plaine, -it was run irectly
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at the pro#ince le#el, principally by the agency. 9ut +ar3er<s sta** in<t grasp that when 8%/V too3 o#er an
*leshe out +hoeni! with hunres o* military o**icers an money, it really was a Coint operation -- that /(% was a
supporter an partial sponsor, but really 8%/V ha to account *or it. .his is how it e#ol#e.-
6hile the 0aigon sta** was content to #iew +hoeni! as a /(% subsiiary, Dillar set about asserting 8%/V<s
presence in +hoeni! operations in the Delta -- a tas3 mae easier by the relati#e absence o* regular military
units an by Dillar<s engaging personality an wie e!perience in comman, sta**, an operational positions.
"ltimately, though, Dillar<s le#erage was logistics.
-%s a matter o* protocol between itsel* an the /(%,- Dillar e!plaine, -8%/V assume hal* o* the agency<s
operational e!penses in support o* +hoeni!. Aor e!ample, e#ery time the agency<s aircra*t were use to support
a +hoeni! acti#ity, technically it shoul ha#e been charge against the *un allocation 8%/V ha gi#en to the
+hoeni! program. 0o when ( *oun out about that, ( contacte the %ir %merica operations people in Aour /orps
an sai, <>ust to 3eep e#eryboy honest, ( want a recor o* what you<re charging *or aircra*t support against the
+hoeni! program.< %n therea*ter ( trie to get air support *rom ".0. %rmy region hea5uarters at /an .ho, so (
in<t ha#e to s5uaner 8%/V operational *uns reimbursing the agency *or use o* its aircra*t.-
9y protecting 8%/V<s *inancial interests, Dillar won the support o* (V /orps commaner, :eneral :eorge
;c3hart. -8ost o* my wor3 with the 8%/V sta** was either with :eneral ;c3hart irectly, or with the
intelligence chie*, /olonel .e :reyman,- Dillar recalle. -.e an ( wor3e han in han coorinating the
acti#ity, an it pai o** .... :eneral ;c3hart an /olonel :reyman set asie *or me a light gun platoon an si!
helicopter gunships to run +hoeni! operations throughout the region.- .his contingent became -a regional
reaction *orce to haul troops an pro#ie *ire support.- 6ith it, Dillar was able to pro#ie the +F" with air
mobility an thus get access to /(% intelligence in e!change.
>im 6ar spo3e highly o* Doug Dillar, saying, -,e was assigne to me because they wante the best man they
coul get own in the Delta.- 1102 .he amiration was mutual. %bout 6ar an his eputy, %ny Fogers, Dillar
sai, -.hey were great guys to wor3 with. .here was an immeiate acceptance o* my creentials.- .hat was not
always the case. 9ut Dillar an 6ar agree on what constitute a legitimate +hoeni! operation -- be it an
ambush reame up at a D(=// or a multipro#ince operation concocte by the /(% -- an together they woul
push +hoeni! beyon the narrow ri*le shot parameters a#ocate by Fobert Komer.
Dillar<s liberal interpretation o* +hoeni! is partially the result o* his perception o* the -terrorist psychology- in
Vietnam. -( arri#e in /an .ho on a Ariay a*ternoon,- he recalle. -.he two army sergeants that ha come in to
be my aministrati#e assistants met me at the airport an too3 me o#er to the compoun an settle me in the
/(%<s regional house, which was also being use by the local +hong Dinh +ro#ince /(% personnel. .here was a
#acant room, so ( too3 it, an the ne!t morning ( reporte in to %ny Fogers. ( was gi#en a little o**ice with the
two enliste men 1who2 hanle reports an re5uests *rom the *iel. ( was also assigne a eputy, 8aCor Keith
=gen.
-%nyway, ( *oun out there was a helicopter going up to /hau Doc +ro#ince on the /amboian borer on
0unay morning, so ( went up there. (t was my *irst introuction to the real war .... (t was right a*ter .et, an
there was still a lot o* acti#ity. .he young sergeant there, Drew Di!, ha been in a little #illage early that
morning .... .he V/ ha come in an got a couple out that were accuse o* collaborating with the go#ernment,
an they< shot them in the ears. .heir boies were lying out on a cart. 6e ro#e out there, an ( loo3e at
that ... an ( ha my *irst awareness o* what those nati#es were up against. 9ecause uring the night, the amn
V/ team woul come in, gather all those #illagers together, warn them about cooperating, an present an
e!ample o* what happene to collaborators. .hey shot them in the ears on the spot.
-0o ( 3new what my Cob was. ( reali4e there was a tremenous psychological problem to o#ercome in getting
that speci*ic group o* #illagers to cooperate in the program. 9ecause to me the +hoeni! program was one
re5uiring ae5uate, timely, an etaile in*ormation so we coul intercept, ma3e to e*ect, 3ill, maim, or capture
the Vietcong guerrilla *orces operating in our area. =r put a stri3e on them. (* either through intercepting
messages or capturing V/(, you coul get in*ormation on some o* the main *orce guerrilla battalion acti#ity, you
coul put a 9-*i*ty-two stri3e on them, which we i in Aour /orps.-
Aor >im 6ar, -intelligence was the most important part o* +hoeni!.- ,anling that tas3 *or 6ar was -a regular
sta**er with the agency who wor3e *ull time on intelligence -- the real sensiti#e, important operations- --
meaning unilateral penetrations into the V/( an :V?. .he sta**er -ha military people assigne to him,-
wor3ing as liaison o**icers in the pro#inces, as well as /(%, 0tate Department, an "0(0 o**icers an policemen
*rom the "nite 0tates. ,is Cob was -ma3ing sure they were properly super#ise.- =* course, the station<s
special unit coul abscon with any penetrations that ha national signi*icance.
%t the other en o* the spectrum, -the *irst an most important purpose o* the D(=//,- accoring to 6ar, -the
one that got :eneral .hanh behin +hoeni!,- was getting tactical military intelligence. 6hen manage by a
104
military o**icer, as they usually were, D(=//s *ocuse on this area, while the +(=//s, where the /(% e!erte
greater in*luence, *ocuse on the V/(.
%ccoring to 6ar, when in*ormation generally obtaine *rom interrogation centers or hamlet in*ormants
inicate that a person was a V/(, the /(%<s liaison o**icer starte a three-by-*i#e car *ile on that person at the
+ro#ince (ntelligence an =perations /oorination /enter, which was o*ten locate in the embassy house.
6hen a secon piece o* in*ormation came in -- *rom the pro#incial reconnaissance units or the Fegional an
+opular Aorces -- a *oler was opene. %*ter a thir source ha incriminate the suspect, he or she was targete
*or penetration, e*ection, or capture an interrogation at the +(/, then turne o#er to the +ro#ince 0ecurity
/ommittee with e#ience *or sentencing.
.his was the ri*le shot approach. 9ut where large concentrations o* people or security teams surroune the
targete V/(, >im 6ar *a#ore a #ariation on the coron an search metho employe by 9rewer an 8ilberg
in Juang .ri, -where you mo#e in at three %.8., surroun the entire area, an bloc3 e#eryboy o**.- ,owe#er,
because 6ar lac3e the -troop ensity- enCoye in ( /orps, in his +hoeni! operations he use light obser#ation
helicopters -to bu44 the pay *iels to 3eep people *rom running o**. Hou on<t ha#e enough men to coron o**
an entire #illage when you ha#e only a hunre +F" an two %mericans,- he sai, the two %mericans being the
+F" a#iser an the +hoeni! coorinator.
"sing this approach, which relie on surprise, 6ar woul conuct *i#e operations in a ay. -.hey woul go in
on one sie o* the #illage. .he *irst out*it woul Cump o** a helicopter with one a#iser an set up a bloc3. .hen
another helicopter woul lan a hunre yars *urther own. .hen a thir an a *ourth, with the other ".0.
a#iser. .hese guys woul branch out in a s3irmish line an start mo#ing into town. .hey woul catch e#eryboy
with ri*les stac3e, unprepare. 6hen a helicopter is coming in low,- 6ar e!plaine, -you on<t e#en hear it
coming in your irection. %ll o* a suen there<s a tremenous roar, an they see people laning in i**erent
places.
-.he +F" 3new e!actly what to o,- 6ar continue. -.hey< get all these people 1V/( suspects2 out in a larger
helicopter an ta3e them bac3 to where the pro#ince chie* coul put them in a special stoc3ae. .hen they< get
0pecial 9ranch people going through ienti*ying each one. 8eanwhile, the +F" woul ree5uip with more ammo
an go to the ne!t rop.-
$ar'6s )etho' closel+ rese)ble' the hunter(&iller techni=ue 'e-elo.e' in 293E an' 'etaile' b+ Elton
Man7ione, O)itte' ro) $ar'6s saniti7e' account* ho%e-er* %as %hat ha..ene' beore the arri-al o the
&iller tea)* %hen the hunter tea) #snatches an'Lor snus# the ca're, $ar' also neglecte' to 'escribe
the con'uct o the PR",
#So)eti)es %e6' go out %ith a %hole .ac& o )ercenaries*# recalle' Mi&e 0ea)on, #The+ %ere -er+
goo' going in* but once %e got there an' )a'e our target* the+ %oul' co).letel+ .illage the .lace ,,,, It
%as a co).lete carni-al ,,,,# >22?
777
(n balancing 8%/V<s an the /(%<s interests in +hoeni!, /olonel Doug Dillar was estine to rain on
someboy<s parae. (n (V /orps the man who got soa3e was the regional +ublic 0a*ety a#iser, Del 0piers.
Dillar as the regional +hoeni! coorinator ha the Cob o* bringing police resources to bear against the V/(. .he
iea was to pre#ent region o**icers in charge li3e >im 6ar an 9ob 6all *rom using +F" as bloc3ing *orces
uring +hoeni! operations, so the +F" woul be a#ailable to conuct ri*le shot operations. -=ur concept,-
Dillar sai, -was to put the Aiel +olice in a location as a bloc3ing *orce an let the +F"s o the irty wor3.-
(n 19GL, howe#er, most pro#ince chie*s were still *eeling the a*tershoc3s o* .et an pre*erre to use the Aiel
+olice as boyguars in the pro#ince capital. -"nless you ha an e**ecti#e Fegional an +opular Aorces
organi4ation at the istrict le#el,- Dillar e!plaine, -the only thing you ha ... was the Aiel +olice, an hell, he
was guaring the pro#ince chie*<s house, not out trying to run operations in support o* your acti#ity.-
/ompouning the problem were the +ublic 0a*ety a#isers themsel#es, whom Dillar escribe as -principally
responsible *or getting new Ceeps an raios an supplies an *uns *or the ?ational +olice. %n that was about
it. .heir procli#ity was to support the Aiel +olice, as oppose to trying to see that *orce engage in operations.
-%s ( began to get out in the pro#inces,- Dillar continue, -it seeme the +ublic 0a*ety a#iser was ne#er there.
,e was either en route to 0aigon or coming bac3 *rom 0aigon. 6hen ( tal3e to the ".0. people in the pro#ince,
they woul say, <6ell, this guy is either run3 or shac3e up with his girl *rien.< ... 8any o* them were *ormer
105
policemen or policemen on lea#e,- Dillar grumble, -or they came *rom some law en*orcement acti#ity an
were plunge into that en#ironment ... 1an2 base on my e!perience, there was almost a total incompetence.-
?or was the problem alle#iate when -a*ter .et, they brought in a group o* enliste men out o* the 8ilitary
+olice. .hey were going to be a#isers to the Aiel +olice, but many o* them were inept, too. ( 3now *rom tal3ing
to them that they ha ne#er been in combat, an their e!perience was analogous to 0hore +atrol,- Dillar sai.
-.hey were principally e!perience as physical security guars, an many o* them ha rin3ing problems.
-%nyway, we Cust wrote the Aiel +olice o**. 6hen it came to trying to get their resources on the groun, to put
them in helicopters an mo#e them aroun, we began to *in that the pro#ince chie* ha one problem a*ter
another: ;ither the Aiel +olice weren<t a#ailable, or the +ublic 0a*ety a#isers weren<t aware o* the nature o*
+hoeni! operations, or 1the operations weren<t2 cleare with the pro#ince chie*. %n the +ublic 0a*ety a#iser
woul be running against the grain i* he too3 the pro#ince chie*<s resources or e#en trie to in*luence him to *ree
up the Aiel +olice to run our operations.
-0o the senior /=FD0 a#isor, </oal 9in< 6illie 6ilson, came own to Aour /orps, an he calle me o#er an
as3e, <6hat can we o to impro#e the +hoeni! programB< %n ( complaine about the lac3 o* use o* Aiel
+olice. ( sai ( wante to use it as a light in*antry stri3e *orce, which woul gi#e us, i* you ae in the +F",
about a *our- thousan-man stri3e *orce in the Delta. <6e 3now the +F" are amn goo,< ( sai, <but we can<t get
them all 3ille trying to o e#eryboy<s Cob.<
-6hat ( propose is that there be some 3in o* central control set up that woul gi#e us the capability to use
police in the Delta to support +hoeni! ( operations. ( ae that with the 3in o* people there were out a#ising
in the pro#inces, <that ain<t e#er gonna get one.<-
6hen con*ronte by /oal 9in 6illie, Doug Dillar recalle, Del 0piers sai, -( can<t *ire the pro#ince senior
a#iser. ( ha#e to put up with the people he assigns to me. (t<s not li3e the military,- where an o**icer can trans*er
an unsatis*actory suborinate.
0ai Dillar: -6ell, ( am a military man, an ( ha#e a Cob to get one.- %n *rom that ay on the Aiel +olice an
their +ublic 0a*ety a#isers were the +hoeni! program<s scapegoats in the Delta. %t their e!pense Dillar
achie#e peace between the /(% an 8%/V in the Delta. ,e con#ince the /(% that by sharing its in*ormation,
military resources coul be use against the V/(. In e5change or su..orting the !IA6s attac& on the V!I*
the )ilitar+ beneite' ro) !IA intelligence on the location o )ain orce ene)+ units, That translate'
into higher bo'+ counts an' brighter careers,
-( coul o what ( wante within the guielines o* the +hoeni! program,- Doug Dillar sai with satis*action,
-which to me was the o#erall coorination o* the units that e!iste in the Delta to estroy the in*rastructure.- 6ith
his regional reaction *orce reay an raring to go, Dillar mounte regional +hoeni! operations on the 6ar
mini-coron an search techni5ue.
-%t the pro#ince le#el we ha almost aily in#ol#ement with the /(%<s pro#ince a#iser an 0;%) team +F"
a#iser,- Dillar e!plaine. -.his was either trying to help them get resources or going o#er the potential *or
operations. % goo e!ample is the time we got goo intelligence on the V/ sta** on sampans in the " 8inh
Aorest. .he iea was to wor3 in coorination with the ".0. ?inth (n*antry Di#ision in /huong .hien +ro#ince. (t
was goo timing because they ha troops an coul e!pan their artillery *ire into %n Ouyen, where the " 8inh
Aorest was. 6e ecie to use the +F" team *rom Kien :iang, with their 0;%) a#iser, an 8aCor )eroy
0uath 1the +hong Dinh paramilitary a#iser, who as a maCor general in 19LG commane the Airst 0pecial
=perations /omman at Aort 9ragg2.-
%s in the 8ilberg-9rewer operation in Juang .ri, the Vietnamese were cut out o* the planning. -6e ecie we
shoul li*t out without a lot o* notice,- Dillar sai. -0o the 0;%) a#iser put his +F" on alert. 9ut we in<t want
to spoo3 them, so they were tol they were going on an operation in their pro#ince .... 6e too3 the +F" team
out o* Kien :iang with )eroy in the lea, an with the ?inth Di#ision helicopters an artillery support to co#er our
in*iltration an e!*iltration. .his way we coul put the +F" on the canal, capture those people, an get in an out
uring aylight.
-6e went o#er to /buong .hien an loae out o* there. ( *lew out o* there in the comman an control
helicopter. 6e went up to Kien :iang, an )eroy ha the +F" team reay .... 6e loae up early that morning,
*lew own, an inserte the team on the canal. .hen the chopper went bac3 to /huong .hien@ ( staye o#er
there with the raio an tal3e to )eroy to get a progress report. )eroy went in with the +F"-0;%) team. .here
were two %mericans, an the rest were Vietnamese. .hey scar*e up twel#e people almost immeiately but
couln<t *in the sampan they were loo3ing *or. 6e thin3 the amn operation got lea3e, an they got spoo3e.-
106
As in the Thuong Xa o.eration* 'es.ite elaborate .lanning an' securit+ .recautions* a large(scale
Phoeni5 o.eration aile' to acco).lish its )ission, ,owe#er, by showing that military assets coul be use
in support o* +ro#ince Feconnaissance "nits an that /(% intelligence coul generate a si4able operation, the "
8inh Aorest operation i pro#e to 8%/V that +hoeni! was a #iable coorinating mechanism.
777
-(n wor3ing with .e :reyman in the /an .ho %#isory :roup,- Dillar sai, -we were trying to piece together
patterns o* the main *orce guerrilla battalions, which constitute the single greatest anger to a istrict or e#en a
pro#ince. .e #ery closely coorinate with us in our +hoeni! acti#ities, plotting in*ormation where V/ attac3s
ha occurre, in what *orce, when, an so *orth. 6hen these *acts came together, he woul coorinate a 9-*i*ty-
two stri3e in that area.-
(n particular, Dillar was concerne with the mo#ements o* the 8uoi .u 9attalion, which perioically emerge
*rom its sanctuary in /amboia an conucte operations in /hau Doc, Kien +hong, an Kien .uong pro#inces.
-%nnually they< come own an cut a wie swath through these three pro#inces, then go bac3 into /amboia,-
Dillar e!plaine. -.hat<s where .e :reyman an ( began to wor3 #ery closely to try to plot e#ery piece o*
in*ormation that we coul get on the 8uoi .u 9attalion.-
.he Cob o* *ining the 8uoi .u in /amboia belonge to the 0pecial =perations :roup an its Vietnamese
assets, which ran agent nets an reconnaissance missions into /amboia. 9ut, e!plaine Dillar, -Juite o*ten
there was a lot o* clumsy, hea#y-hane type o* acti#ity, an ( on<t thin3 10pecial Aorces2 were appreciati#e o*
the nuances o* being supercautious in collecting an e#aluating intelligence be*ore running operations. ( thin3 it
was in Kien +hong on the borer@ the sun rose one morning, an they went into position there, an e#ery man
on the line ha been shot through the bac3 o* the hea. .his was the Vietnamese 0pecial Aorces. .hey were
in*iltrate constantly by the V/.-
Disperse along 0outh Vietnam<s borers since 19G2, the Ai*th 0pecial Aorces % teams, augmente by the D0N
0pecial =perations Detachment an an unnumbere intelligence group, routinely *e intelligence to 8%/V an
the /(%. -.he sophistication o* the intelligence apparatus,- :eneral 8c/hristian writes, -allowe *or operations
against the in*rastructure.- 1122
Ho%e-er* b+ Se.te)ber 293: it %as clear* as Doug Dillar' note'* that the Vietna)ese S.ecial /orces
%ere too hea-il+ iniltrate' to be truste', So concurrent %ith the creation o I!EX an' the reorgani7ation
o SOG* the !IA co))issione' ProHect Ga))a, Also &no%n as Detach)ent 0(@:* Ga))a %as charge'
%ith the )ission o organi7ing cross(bor'er counter(intelligence o.erations to in' out %ho %ithin the
!a)bo'ian go-ern)ent %as hel.ing the NVA an' V! iniltrate an' attac& S.ecial /orces A ca).s*
recon tea)s* an' agent nets, $hile .osing as )e'ical an' agricultural s.ecialists in a #'u))+# ci-il
aairs unit* Ga))a .ersonnel coor'inate' intelligence ro) A tea)s* i'enti+ing the &e+ V!I ca'res that
%ere )ounting .enetration o.erations against the), Detachment 9-E& coorinate its acti#ities with 0=:
an the #arious 0pecial Aorces proCects, incluing Delta, 0igma, =mega, an 9lac3Cac3 out o* .ay ?inh. (n
e*ense o* its % camps, 0pecial Aorces mounte its own attac3 on the V/( through a combination o* agent nets,
-speciali4e patrolling,- mobile stri3e *orces, an a -3ill on sight- rewars program. (n this way, 0=: an
+hoeni! were unite.
As or the #hea-+(han'e'ness# cite' b+ Dillar'* on No-e)ber E:* 293:* /ith S.ecial /orces !a.tain
8ohn Mc!arth+ %as sitting besi'e his .rinci.al agent* Inchin Hai 4a) ;a !a)bo'ian %or&ing or 0(@:
out o Duang 4oi<* in the ront seat o a car .ar&e' on a street in Ta+ Ninh, A sus.ecte' 'ouble agent*
4a) %as a )e)ber o the Gh)er Serai* a 'issi'ent !a)bo'ian .olitical .art+ create' b+ the !IA to
o-erthro% !a)bo'ia6s Prince Sihanou&, $ithout %arning* Mc!arth+ turne' an' .ut a bullet bet%een
4a)6s e+es,
8c/arthy was trie *or )am<s murer, an the ensuing scanal raise 5uestions about the legality o*
-terminating with e!treme preCuice- suspecte ouble agents. .he issue woul sur*ace again in regar to
+hoeni!.
Fegarless o* where the V/( were -- in 0outh Vietnam, /amboia, )aos, or ?orth Vietnam -- -the iea,- sai
Dillar, -was that i* we 3new their pattern an i* we coul put the *ear o* :o in them, then we coul in*luence
their mo#ements so they coul ne#er assemble as a battalion. =ur *orces coul resist any company-si4e
attac3s, an that pretty much cut bac3 their capabilities by pre#enting them *rom operating at a battalion-le#el
*orce.-
8%/V -coul o a *i*ty-two stri3e pretty easily,- Dillar e!plaine. %n once 8%/V began using 9-E2 stri3es as
a way o* harassing V/ guerrilla units, -.herea*ter we ha pretty goo e#ience that the V/ were oing Cust what
we wante them to o. .hey were not assembling in large battalion-si4e *orces, an we coul route them
107
aroun. 6e continue to try to o that *rom the summer o* 19GL on, an we starte getting in some pretty goo
e*ectors because o* that pressure. .he o#erall coorination was wor3ing.-
(nee, when 9-E2 stri3es were mounte, coorination was essential. Aor e!ample, the /(% coul not run a +F"
operation in enemy territory without *irst consulting 8%/V, because, as Dillar put it, -it<s concei#able that the
operations people ha#e scheule a stri3e in that area. - Fet e-er+one )ounte' unilateral o.erations
an+%a+. -%n element o* the *i#e-twenty-*i*th- -- Dillar sighe -- -their collection an special security unit, was
trying to get the V/( to e*ect -- this was in the summer o* 19GL. .hey ha a lea to a V/( care meeting, an
they ran the operation, an there was nothing there. 6e were all calle into :eneral ;c3hart<s o**ice to *in out
who the hell ha appro#e this special operation without .e :reyman 3nowing it.
-.here<s always that problem,- Dillar contene, -when some out*it percei#es that they<re going to pull o** a
coup. .hen it bac3*ires. .he amn thing was a total embarrassment. >ust li3e the sale o* arms to (ran.-
%s long as unilateral operations persiste, +hoeni! coul ne#er *ly. -(t was 3in o* har at times to etermine Cust
who was operating in that en#ironment,- Dillar remar3e. -Juite o*ten the main mission o* the 0pecial 9ranch
guy may ha#e been to 3eep tabs on the %FV? people. (n the case o* the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice, i* ( was able
to get to the guy through 1his counterpart, 800 /olonel2 +huoc or through the %rmy security unit in the Delta ... (
woul try to push an operation or try to *in out what they 3new that we were not being in*orme o*. 9ut in the
whole time ( was there, ( was con#ince that there was a lot o* unilateral reporting that i not get into the ".0.
system, whether it was +hoeni! or something else. (t ha to o with the i**erent a!es people ha to grin.-
!HAPTER 2@: Mo'us Vi-en'i
.he inclusion o* the Vietnamese in +hoeni! in the summer o* 19GL was not welcome by meticulous /(%
security o**icers. These .roessional .aranoi's* Doug Dillar' sai' %ith a sigh* #'i' not reali7e +ou cannot
beco)e so secreti-e that +ou can6t e-en run an o.eration, 6e were always aware o* the nee *or secrecy,
an where we suspecte there was a lea3 we trie to hol e#erything as close as possible. 9ut sometimes you
Cust couln<t o it. Fou ha' to .lan an' coor'inate %ith the Vietna)ese to run o.erations.- 112
On the other han'* ro) the Presi'ential Palace to the )ost 'ecre.it DIO!!* V! agents %ere
e-er+%here, (t was a *act that was *actore into e#ery e5uation, it was the reason why +hoeni! began as a
unilateral operation, an it was why the program *aile, *or +hoeni! was not a counterintelligence program
meant to unco#er enemy agents but a positi#e intelligence program esigne to neutrali4e the people managing
the insurgency.
.he Cob o* counterintelligence was share by the 0pecial 9ranch an the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice, with the
0pecial 9ranch protecting the go#ernment an the 800 protecting the 0outh Vietnamese arme *orces, at times
at cross purposes. Aor e!ample, li3e many o* his 800 colleagues, !olonel Ngu+en Van Phuoc %as .lace'
un'er house arrest an' accuse' o being i).licate' %hen Die) an' Nhu %ere assassinate', Ater%ar'
Phuoc %as #tainte'# but %as resuscitate' b+ the !IA* %hich -alue' hi) or his contacts* accor'ing to
Dillar'* in #the !atholic intelligence net%or& that e5ten'e' into !a)bo'ia, %s a matter o* *act, he o**ere to
bring them into the *ol because o* the sanctuary that main *orce guerrilla battalions enCoye in /amboia.-
$ith !IA s.onsorshi.* Phuoc %as to enHo+ a nu)ber o .ro)inent .ositions, not least as eputy (V /orps
commaner an counterpart to Doug Dillar an %ny Fogers. 0ut Phuoc li-e' on the e'ge an'* li&e
Generals Do !ao Tri an' Tran Thanh Phong* e-entuall+ .erishe' in a )+sterious .lane acci'ent,
-/olonel +huoc<s problems on the Vietnamese sie were greater than ours because the pro#ince chie*s were
appointe by the presient,- Dillar e!plaine. -.here were all 3ins o* rumors about <some bought their Cobs,<
an there were other 3ins o* arrangements, too. There %ere businesses that lourishe' an' %ere ne-er
bothere' b+ the V! in the .ro-inces* so it %as ob-ious that so)eone %as being .ai' o,#
(n *airness to the Vietnamese, a point shoul be mae about cultural #alues. /or %hat A)ericans 'eine as
corru.tion* the Vietna)ese consi'er .erectl+ .ro.er beha-ior, Acce.ting gits an' returning a-ors ((
ta&ing bribes an' )a&ing .a+os (( %ere ho%* ater generations o colonial o..ression* Vietna)ese
oicials su..le)ente' )easl+ salaries an' su..orte' e5ten'e' a)ilies, The s+ste) %as a or) o
.reben'* the sa)e right )inisters ha-e to a .ortion o the Sun'a+ oering as a sti.en', An' rather than
ight the s+ste)* the !IA co).ensate' or it b+ .a+ing its Phung Hoang* secret .olice* an' PR" assets
e5orbitant salaries, /on#ersely, *or the a#erage Vietnamese citi4en caught in a war-torn economy, ealing with
the Vietcong was a matter o* sur#i#al. %n while this mous #i#eni pro#ie %merican intelligence o**icers with
a line o* communication to the enemy, it also ga#e them migraine heaaches.
108
-Aor e!ample,- Dillar sai, -in 9ac )ieu there was a great suspicion that the pro#ince chie* was on the ta3e *rom
the V/ ta! collector. .he +F" team leaer in 9ac )ieu, Doc 0ells, ha *irsthan e#ience o* that. 9ut the V/ ta!
collector, who li#e in 9a Ouyen +ro#ince, was a wealthy businessman, an the way he staye wealthy was by
paying e!tortion an ransom.... ?ow Doc 3new, base on the way the pro#ince chie* ha acte in the past, that
ne#er in the worl woul they 1the +F"2 be allowe to coorinate an operation in 9a Ouyen without
compromising it. 0o the 9ac )ieu +F" ran an operation o#er into 9a Ouyen an 3inappe this guy. (t cause all
3ins o* grie* between the two pro#inces, an when it sur*ace at our le#el, they ha to release him. .hen there
were threats that <6ell, ne!t time he won<t sur#i#e.< .hey put a price on Doc<s hea. ( remember a 3i came into
the restaurant where Doc was eating an put a cigarette lighter on the table. (t was a booby trap that e!ploe
but luc3ily in<t hurt him.-
All this )eans that i the V!I %as a cri)inal cons.irac+* then its .artners in cri)e %ere go-ern)ent
oicials (( .articularl+ .ro-ince chies* .olice* an' securit+ oicials, Robert Slater %rites: #During the
.erio' 293A(293:* it %as airl+ co))on to rea' o a han' grena'e being thro%n into a bar, This %as
nor)all+ attribute' b+ the .ress to terroris)* but .olice in-estigations usuall+ sho%e' that the o%ner
ha' reuse' to .a+ ta5es to the V!, It is unco))on to rea' or e-en hear o this no% >in 29:I?1
un'oubte'l+ the bar o%ners ha-e agree' to .a+ their ta5es,# 4i&e%ise* #/ro) 293@ to 2939*# Slater &ne%
#o no A)erican oil co).an+ truc&s being a)bushe', On one occasion a V! roa' bloc& let an A)erican
oil co).an+ truc& .ass b+* then iteen )inutes later sto..e' a South Vietna)ese bus* 'ise)bar&e' all
the .assengers* collecte' 6ta56 )one+* an' then shot t%o ARVN sol'iers %ho %ere in unior),# >E?
This )o'us -i-en'i bet%een the V!I an' GVN oicials rustrate' )an+ Phoeni5 coor'inators %ho %ere
tr+ing to 'istinguish one ro) the other, So)e si).l+ thre% u. their han's* hel' their breaths* an'
)ar&e' ti)e, Others %ere s.urre' to in'iscri)inate acts o -iolence, .hose who too3 the har line, li3e (((
/orps D;+/=FD0 >ohn Vann, belie#e that it was not enough *or the Vietnamese simply to be pro-+hoeni!.
%ccoring to Vann<s eputy *or plans an programs, who shall herea*ter be 3nown as >ac3, Vann insiste that in
orer *or +hoeni! to succee, the Vietnamese ha to *ight acti#ely against the V/(. 9ut that was impossible,
>ac3 e!plaine, because -the Vietnamese were protecte in the ay by the :V?, but were le*t to the V/ at night.
So the little gu+ in the -illage sur-i-e' 'a+ to 'a+ &no%ing %hen to sa+ +es an' %hen to sa+ no, The
%rong ans%er coul' cost hi) his lie,# 1N2
"nortunatel+ or the Vietna)ese %ho .reerre' to re)ain neutral* it %as the )ost highl+ )oti-ate'
A)ericans (( those %ho %ere )ost a-i'l+ anti(!o))unist (( %ho %ere listene' to in $ashington an'
%ho i.so acto 'eter)ine' .olic+,
%s har as it was to in#ol#e pro#ince chie*s in the attac3 on the V/(, the rural population was e#en harer to
incite. ;arnest +hoeni! coorinators li3e Doug Dillar trie -to get the people in the #illages to tell you when the
V/ were coming, so you coul put the +F" on them or a 9-*i*ty-two stri3e.- Ho%e-er* %h+ the Vietna)ese
%oul' not coo.erate is un'erstan'able* es.eciall+ in the case o 0(@E stri&es* #one o %hich*# Dillar'
recalle'* #occurre' right bet%een Gien Hoa an' Dinh Tuong, There %as .rett+ goo' e-i'ence that a V!
battalion ha' asse)ble' in that area*# Dillar' sai'* #an' Te' .ut a stri&e on it, The+ %ent in later to
assess the 'a)age* an' sai' it loo&e' li&e a butcher sho.,#
/or that reason* 'a)age assess)ent %as not a .o.ular Hob in Vietna) an was a tas3 o*ten assigne to
+F" units or unpopular %merican soliers li3e %ir Aorce /aptain 9rian 6illson who, with the L2N /ombat
0ecurity +olice 05uaron, commane a mobile security unit at 9inh .huy %ir 9ase *our miles west o* /an .ho.
As .unish)ent or raterni7ing %ith enliste' )en* $illson %as gi-en the Hob o 'a)age assess)ent in
areas bo)be' b+ 0(@E6s,
#In the Delta*# $illson tol' )e* #the -illages %ere -er+ s)all* li&e a )oun' in a s%a)., There %ere no
na)es or so)e o the), The .eo.le in these -illages ha' been tol' to go to relocation ca).s* because
this %as all a ree ire 7one* an' technicall+ an+one there coul' be &ille', 0ut the+ %oul'n6t lea-e their
ani)als or burial groun's, At the sa)e ti)e* the ",S, Air /orce ha' s.otters loo&ing or )u77le lashes*
an' i that lash ca)e ro) that 'ot* the+6' %i.e out the -illage, It %as that si).le, >A?
#It %as the e.ito)e o i))oralit+*# $illson suggeste', #One o the ti)es I counte' bo'ies ater an air
stri&e (( %hich al%a+s en'e' %ith t%o na.al) bo)bs %hich %oul' Hust r+ e-er+thing that %as let (( I
counte' si5t+(t%o bo'ies, In )+ re.ort I 'escribe' the) as so )an+ %o)en bet%een iteen an' t%ent+(
i-e an' so )an+ chil'ren (( usuall+ in their )others6 ar)s or -er+ close to the) (( an' so )an+ ol'
.eo.le, $hen I %ent to Tan Son Nhut a e% 'a+s later* I ha..ene' to see an ateraction re.ort ro) this
-illage, A gu+ I &ne% sho%e' )e %here to loo&, The re.ort sai' one hun're'(thirt+ V! 'ea',
-%nother time ( was ri#ing up near 0a Dec. (t was a coincience. ( in<t e#en 3now it was happening. .here
was an air stri3e, an ( was #ery near this #illage where it was happening. (< ne#er seen a locali4e air stri3e on
a #illage be*ore. ( was stunne. .he groun shoo3 li3e an earth5ua3e, an that was scary. 9ut there ( was,
109
watching as the last sweep came in an roppe some napalm, sening up balls o* *ire that *inally wipe
e#erything out. %n ( was staning in my Ceep, 3in o* in shoc3, an this ol man came running out o* the #illage.
( was about one hunre *i*ty *eet *rom him, an our eyes met *or li3e two secons. .hen he turne an ran
away.
-( remember ri#ing own this little lane ... thin3ing (< wa3e up an not be there. ( ro#e *or three or *our miles
li3e that. .hen ( saw this ol Vietnamese woman with a yo3e on her bac3, holing a couple o* pails o* water.
.hen ( saw this water bu**alo Cust 3in o* meanering through a rice pay. ( remember stopping an thin3ing,
<8an, ( am here. (<m still in Vietnam.< (< been there three months. Ater that I %ante' to 'esert,#
777
$h+ %oul' the inhabitants o a Vietna)ese -illage -oluntaril+ announce to ",S, or GVN authorities the
.resence o V! guerrillas or .olitical ca'res* i 'oing so )eant a bath in i-e(hun're'(.oun' bo)bs or a
.ac& o .lun'ering PR"M This =uestion reaches to the heart o Phoeni5 an' the #collateral 'a)age# it
cause',
One e5.lanation %as oere' in a series o articles %ritten in late 29:I an' earl+ 29:2 or the liberal
!atholic ne%s.a.er (in Sang )Morning *e$s+, Publishe' in Saigon b+ Ngo !ong Duc* a nationalist in
the Vietna)ese legislature* hal o all its issues %ere coniscate' b+ the .olice on or'ers ro) the
)inister o inor)ation* Truong 0uu Die)* a long(stan'ing !IA asset, Nearl+ all issues* ho%e-er* are
.reser-e' in the Fen !hing 4ibrar+ at Har-ar' "ni-ersit+, .ranslate by a Vietnamese woman at the
"ni#ersity o* 8assachusetts, this series o* articles, title -.he .ruth %bout +hoeni!,- pro#ies rare insights into
the Vietnamese perspecti#e on +hoeni!.
The author o #The Truth About Phoeni5# use' the alias Dinh Tuong An* but his true i'entit+ is &no%n to
!IA oicer !l+'e 0auer* %ho clai)s An %as a !o))unist s+).athi7er, Re'(baiting* o course* re=uires
no substantiation, 0ut it is a act* as corroborate' b+ Phoeni5 a'-iser Richar' I'e* that An %as a
translator or MaHor Oscar 4, 8en&ins* the !IA6s S.ecial 0ranch a'-iser in the Trung Giang inner(Me&ong
area, running +hoeni! operations in 0a Dec, Vinh )ong, an Vinh 9inh pro#inces in 19GL an 19G9.
#Phoeni5*# %rites An* #is a series o big continuous o.erations %hich* because o the bo)bing* 'estro+
the countr+si'e an' .ut innocent .eo.le to 'eath ,,,, In the s&+ are ar)e' helico.ters* but on the groun'
are the blac& unior)s* 'oing %hat the+ %ant %here the helico.ters an' 0(@E6s 'o not reach ,,,,
A)ericans in blac& unior)s*# accor'ing to An* #are the )ost terrible,# >@?
%lso accoring to %n, the /(% always sent +F" teams in the ay be*ore coron an search operations, to
capture people targete *or interrogation. .he ne!t ay, %n notes, the +F" woul return in ".0. ?a#y helicopters
with %FV? troops. #$hen the+ go bac& to their base at Dong Ta) >the s.ra%ling PR" acilit+ near M+
Tho?* the+ bring .eo.le6s blee'ing ears, 0ut*# as&s An rhetoricall+* #are these the ears o the V!M# >3?
The .ur.ose o Phoeni5* An conten's* %as #to a-enge %hat the V! 'i' 'uring Tet, 6hich is why .hieu i
not hesitate to sign +hoeni! into law. 9ut,- he as, -local o**icials 3new nothing about the program e!cept the
ecree. .he central go#ernment in<t e!plain anything. Aurthermore, the /(% an their assistants ha a har
time trying to e!plain to pro#ince chie*s about operations to paci*y the countrysie an estroy the V/(.- 1&2
In'ee'* the Vietna)ese %ere conuse' b+ contra'ictor+ A)erican .rogra)s, /or e5a).le* 0(@E stri&es
an' Agent Orange 'ustings ser-e' onl+ to i).o-erish rural -illagers* .ro).ting the) to 'e'uce that
these o.erations* %ere 'irecte' against them* not the V!I, Ma&ing )atters %orse* .ro-ince chies
re.orte' the 'a)age* ostensibl+ to get co).ensation or those hurt b+ the attac&s* but &e.t the )one+
or the)sel-es, Then Re-olutionar+ De-elo.)ent !a're a..eare'* .ro)ising to oset the 'a)age %ith
econo)ic 'e-elo.)ent, Mean%hile* the ",S, Ar)+ %as .ursuing a scorche'(earth .olic+ an' the
Agenc+ or International De-elo.)ent %as %ith'ra%ing su..ort or RD reconstruction .roHects (( a
re-ersal in .olic+* An conten's* that ste))e' ro) the !IA6s belie that reconstruction .roHects onl+
hel.e' the %i-es an' a)ilies o V! %ho returne' ro) their Hungle hi'eouts %hen the .roHects %ere
'one, 1L2 %ll that le most Vietnamese to agree with %n that -Fe#olutionary De#elopment only teaches the
%merican line.-
The en' result o the contra'ictor+ .rogra)s an' 'ouble(tal& %as a lac& o trust in the GVN* not in the
V!I* %hich rarel+ aile' to )a&e goo' on .ro)ises, )i3ewise, the Vietnamese interprete +hoeni!, the
program esigne to pro#ie security to the rural population, as an attempt by the %mericans to prolong the war.
4i&e 0(@E stri&es an' Agent Orange* Phoeni5 onl+ )a'e .eo.le6s li-es )ore 'iicult, Peo.le %on'ere'*
An inor)s us* ho% Phoeni5 coul' turn things aroun', >9?
110
In res.on'ing to these concerns* An %rites* the !IA argue' that Phoeni5 %as nee'e' because 0(@E
stri&es an' 'eoliation o.erations 'i' not 'estro+ #the V! lo%er structure,# 0ut in attac&ing the V!I* the
!IA ne-er consi'ere' the hu)an concerns o the Vietna)ese* 'eclares An, /or e5a).le* )an+ rice
iel's %ere o%ne' b+ Vietcong* an' as )ore an' )ore iel's %ere 'estro+e' b+ Agent Orange* .eo.le
ha' no choice but to bu+ rice ro) these V!, This inclu'e' %ealth+ )erchants %ho %ere subse=uentl+
accuse' b+ securit+ orces o collaborating %ith the ene)+ an' %ere orce' to .a+ bribes to &ee. ro)
being arreste', In this %a+ GVN oicials e5torte' ro) .eo.le caught in bet%een the) an' the Vietcong,
Nor* An a''s* 'i' the !IA care that )an+ Vietna)ese 'uring Tet (( inclu'ing .olice)en an' sol'iers ((
-isite' their a)ilies in areas controlle' b+ the Vietcong* thus beco)ing V!I sus.ects the)sel-es, Or
that Vietna)ese ci-il ser-ants* es.eciall+ schoolteachers %ith a)ilies li-ing in V! areas* beca)e
inor)ants si).l+ as a %a+ o getting a'-ance notice o Phoeni5 o.erations* so the+ coul' %arn their
relati-es o .en'ing attac&s, In return or .rotecting their a)ilies* these Vietna)ese %ere sur-eille' an'
e5torte' b+ go-ern)ent securit+ orces,
?or i the /(% ta3e steps to protect people *rom *alse accusations. %n cites the case o* *i#e teachers wor3ing
*or a /atholic priest in Vinh )ong +ro#ince. .hese women re*use to atten a V/ inoctrination session. 6hen
the V/ were later capture by +F", they name these teachers as V/ cares. .he teachers were arreste an
Caile without trial or e#ience. -.hat<s why people *eare +hoeni!,- %n e!plains. -.he biggest *ear is being
*alsely accuse -- *rom which there is no protection. .hat<s why +hoeni! oesn<t bring peace or security. .hat<s
why it estroys trust in the :V?, not the V/(.- 1102
A''ing to this )istrust %as the act that the !IA re%ar'e' securit+ oicials %ho e5torte' the .eo.le,
#The !IA*# An %rites* #s.en's )one+ li&e %ater,# %s a result, 800 an 0pecial 9ranch operators pre*erre
to sell in*ormation to the /(% rather than -gi#e- it to their Vietnamese employers. %n e#en though the /(% ha
no way o* corroborating the in*ormation, it was use to buil cases against V/( suspects. The !IA also .asse'
=uantities o cash to the -arious religious sects, #Man+ .riests in the inner(Me&ong*# An re.orts* #ha-e
relations %ith the !IA* so .eo.le in the .ro-inces reuse to ha-e contact %ith the), >22?
-8any agents *rom the i**erent police in (V /orps recei#e money *rom the /(%,- %n reports, -in the *orm o* merit
pay.- 8oney was spent beauti*ying 0pecial 9ranch o**ices -- buying telephones, generators, air conitioners,
)ambrettas, an Oero! machines *or uti*ul policemen an pretty secretaries. 9ig buc3s were la#ishe on local
o**icials, particularly those sitting on +hoeni! committees. -/on#eniences- gi#en to committee members, writes
%n, mae it easier *or them -to e!plore in*ormation *rom agents,- leaing to the arrest o* suspecte V/(. 1122
Fecall what 6arren 8ilberg sai: -( ha #irtually unlimite resources to e#elop agent operations, to pay *or a
sta** that translate an prouce intelligence reports ... more money ... than what the pro#ince buget was.-
11N2 9ut while 8ilberg saw this as -creating economic stability,- the incenti-e to sell inor)ation ha' the si'e
eect o tearing a.art Vietna)ese societ+,
Perha.s the )ost 'isturbing charge )a'e b+ An is that !IA o.erators encourage' the illegal acti-ities
o Phoeni5 .ersonnel, ,e cites as an e!ample the time 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice agents in 0a Dec obser#e
0pecial 9ranch agents ta3ing payo**s *rom the local V/ ta! collector. ?aturally, the 800 agents sol this
in*ormation to the /(%, which too3 no action -- because payo**s were a #ehicle *or penetration operations. 6rites
%n: #The !IA %or&s to &ee. so)e !o))unist areas intact so the+ can get inor)ation,# >2A? This* o
course* %as in 'irect o..osition to the Phoeni5 )ission,
%s an e!ample o* the intelligence potential o* the mous #i#eni, %n notes that unilateral /(% penetration agents
into the V/( o*ten pose as pharmacists an were supplie with esperately neee antibiotics, which they
woul smuggle into Vietcong Cungle hieouts in /amboia in e!change *or in*ormation. -+hoeni!,- e!plains %n,
-was watching an tal3ing to the V/ while at the same time wor3ing to pre#ent the ?)A *rom reorgani4ing the
V/(.- 11E2
All this lea's An to conclu'e that A)erica %as ne-er intereste' in en'ing the %ar, Instea'* he thin&s the
goal %as to sho% success* #e-en i )an+ li-es )ust be lost,# /or An* Phoeni5 %as not a )echanis) to
en' the %ar =uic&l+* but a )eans to e5ten' it in'einitel+* %ith a )ini)u) o A)erican casualties, The
nature o Phoeni5* he suggests* %as to .it the Vietna)ese against each other* to un'er)ine their eorts
at ra..roche)ent %hile ueling the conlict %ith )one+ an' lies an' .s+chological o.erations 'esigne'
to 'estabili7e the culture, >23?
(n conclusion, %n contens that the Vietnamese neutralists wante only *or the "nite 0tates to grant 0outh
Vietnam the same status it grante .aiwan an (srael. 9ut this was not to be, *or in 0outh Vietnam a#ocating
peace with the /ommunists was punishable by eath or imprisonment without trial *or two years uner the %n
.ri $aministrati#e etention' )aws. An' li&e Phoeni5* An Tri %as a boon'oggle or corru.t GVN oicials,
Persons arreste' as V!I sus.ects or s+).athi7ers coul' be hel' in'einitel+ an' %ere release' onl+
111
%hen their a)ilies scra.e' together enough )one+ to bribe the local Securit+ !o))ittee chair)an,
That is %h+* An suggests* the roun'u. %as the %orst o all the har'shi.s Phoeni5 i).ose' on the
Vietna)ese .eo.le,
The .ractice o e5torting ranso)s ro) V!I sus.ects ser-e' !IA interests ho%e-er* b+ ele-ating
securit+ .ersonnel into a .ri-ilege' class that %as utterl+ 'e.en'ent on the !IA* in the .rocess*
thoroughl+ 'estabili7ing the societ+, .hrough the (/;O screening, interrogation, an etention program, the
/(% e!pane this psywar tactic into the istricts, enabling e#ery minor o**icial to get a piece o* the action.
%s /olonel Dillar remar3e, -( became a maCor construction tycoon in the Delta as a sieline to my +hoeni!
business.- %s well as gi#ing *i*teen thousan ollars to e#ery istrict chie* to buil a D(=//, he wor3e with the
/(% in builing -those little Cails, as ( call them, which really were interrogation centers.- Dillar recalle: -.he
agency sent own an elerly gentleman *rom 8arylan who was a contractor. ,is Cob in the Delta, one o* many,
was to get these interrogation centers constructe .... +aci*ic %rchitects an ;ngineers i the wor3, but this guy
was an agency employee. 11&2
-6hat you neee in a lot o* these little erelict-type istricts in the Delta where they really in<t ha#e any
*acilities,- sai Dillar, -was a place to secure an interrogate prisoners .... .hey were *or anyone .... I
re)e)ber going into one %e6' built in !hau Duc that ha' se-eral )on&s insi'e, The+ ha' a steel chain
chaine' to their legs so the+ %oul'n6t run o,
-6e pretty much constructe them throughout the Delta. .hose that went up 5uic3est were in the istricts that
were most accessible. 9ut as *ast as they went up, the V/ 3noc3e them own with satchel charges.- .hat i
not isturb the istrict chie*s, *or whom each new construction proCect meant another lucrati#e ra3e-o**. In'ee'*
the Phoeni5 .rogra) oere' a %i'e range o inancial o..ortunities,
-+hoeni! in 0a Dec,- %n writes, -was an occasion *or many nationalists to get rich illegally. 8any innocent
people were chase away *rom their homes to the istrict hall where they were e!torte or con*ine in the
interrogation center behin the town hall. E-en %ater bualo guar'ians %ere ta&en to the 'istrict hall* an'
their .arents ha' to .a+ or their release or else the+ %oul' be sent to Vinh 4ong Prison,# 11L2
6rites %n: -=ne #isiting ".0. congressman sai our pro#ince was luc3y because we ha no prison. 9ut actually
this is un*ortunate, because innocent .eo.le (( an' the Police S.ecial 0ranch &no% %ho is innocent (( are
conine' in the to%n hall, There is no roo) to lie 'o%n there, The .eo.le suocate, The+ are .ut in an
e).t+ .ool %ithout %ater,# 1192
As a result o Phoeni5 .lacing interrogation centers in the 'istricts* the GVN soon gaine' the re.utation
as a .rison regi)e, The catch.hrase o its Hailers %as &hong* 'an& c&o co ;i the+6re innocent* beat the)
until the+6re guilt+<* bringing to )in' the Sale) %itch trials, 9ut whereas in 0alem the moti#e *or torture was
an ingrown libio, the moti#e *or torture in Vietnam was an ingrown ieology. .ran Van .ruong, mentione in
/hapter 10, e!plains: #It %as .art o the regi)e6s i'eolog+ that an+one %ho o..ose' the) )ust be a
!o))unist, The+ coul' not acce.t the act that there )ight be .eo.le %ho hate' the) or the tra-est+
the+ ha' )a'e o the countr+6s lie* or their intolerance an' corru.tion an' col' in'ierence to the lot
o their countr+)en,# 1202
.ruong writes *rom e!perience. 9y bribing -a high ?ational +olice o**icial *or the in*ormation,- .ruong<s wi*e
isco#ere that her husban was being hel in a secret prison. Aearing her husban woul be 3ille there, -an
noboy woul e#er 3now,- she persuae .ruong to sign a *ull con*ession. -%bout ten ays later,- .ruong writes
-( was bunle into a car an ri#en to ?ational +olice hea5uarters. 8y wi*e ha inee *oun someone else to
bribe. ( *oun out later it was the butcher himsel*. ,is price ha been UG,000.- 1212
.ruong<s wi*e pai two bribes -- one to locate him, an one to ha#e him trans*erre *rom the secret Cail to the
?+(/.
.ruong as rue*ully, -,a she 3nown about conitions at the 1?+(/2, it isn<t li3ely that my wi*e woul ha#e pai
anything to anyone.- ,e escribes si! months o* solitary con*inement an -sensory epri#ation- in a pitch-ar3
cement cell with a steel oor an no winows. -( was li3e an animal in a ca#e .... ( thought o* my cell as my
co**in.- 1222
.he /(% treate its prisoners at the ?ational (nterrogation /enter no better. (n /ecent Interval, *ormer /(% o**icer
Aran3 0nepp cites the case o* ?guyen Van .ai, the /uc ?ghien /uu agent who organi4e the attac3 on the ".0.
;mbassy uring .et. .ai was capture in 19&0 an, -6ith %merican help the 0outh Vietnamese built him his
own prison cell an interrogation room, both totally white, totally bare e!cept *or a table, chair, an open hole *or a
toilet -- an ubi5uitous hien tele#ision cameras an microphones to recor his e#ery wa3ing an sleeping
112
moment. ,is Cailers soon isco#ere one essential psychic-physical *law in him. )i3e many Vietnamese, he
belie#e his bloo #essels contracte when he was e!pose to *rigi air. ,is 5uarters an interrogation room
were thus out*itte with hea#y-uty air conitioners an 3ept thoroughly chille.- 12N2
In A.ril 29:@* Sne.. notes* #Tai %as loa'e' onto an air.lane an' thro%n out at ten thousan' eet o-er
the South !hina Sea, At that .oint he ha' s.ent o-er our +ears in solitar+ conine)ent* in a sno%(%hite
cell* %ithout e-er ha-ing ull+ a')itte' %ho he %as,# >EA? As .er-erse as an+thing 'one in Sale)* Tai
%as 'is.ose' o li&e a bag o garbage si).l+ because he %oul' not coness,
9ut unli3e .ruong an .ai, most Vietnamese Caile uner +hoeni! were anonymous pawns whose only #alue
was the small bribe their *amilies o**ere *or their release. %nyone con*ine in a +(/ or pro#ince or istrict prison
was in the belly o* the beast. The range an' e5tent o torture are be+on' the co).rehension o the
a-erage )i''le(class A)erican but are %ell 'ocu)ente'* as is the act that A)erican a'-isers rarel+
inter-ene' to re'uce the le-el o abuse,
0o the 5uestion then becomes, 6ho were these %merican a#isersB
!HAPTER 23: A'-isers
9y 19GL, hal* a million %merican soliers were in 0outh Vietnam, supporte by sailors on aircra*t carriers in the
0outh /hina 0ea, airmen maintaining 9-E2<s on :uam, an *ree worl *orces *rom Korea, %ustralia, the
+hilippines, an .hailan. 8any thousan more ci#ilians were a#ising the :V? on e#ery concei#able *acet o*
its operations, *rom police an public aministration to engineering an agriculture. %ll were Coine with the
go#ernment an the %rme Aorces o* 0outh Vietnam in a war against a well-organi4e, well-iscipline
insurgency supporte by ?orth Vietnam an other nonaligne thir worl, socialist, an /ommunist nations.
$ith nearl+ one thousan' NVA an' V! sol'iers '+ing each %ee&* an' no one &ee.ing count o ci-ilian
'eaths* the un'eclare' %ar in Vietna) ha' reache' e.ic .ro.ortions* but its )eaning %as shrou'e' in
a)biguities an' contra'ictions. .he insurgency was sai to be manage along a single chain o* comman
emanating *rom ,anoi, but the insurgent leaership was elusi#e, its numbers impossible to gauge. %n while the
enemy was uni*ie but illusory, the allie e**ort was clearly e*ine but hopelessly iscombobulate. 0omething
ha to be one, an that something *ell to se#eral hunre +hoeni! a#isers, each ser#ing a one-year tour.
-.his was mo#ing so *ast in early 19GL,- Doug Dillar recalle, -that young lieutenants an captains coming
through the 8%/V a#isory assignment system began arri#ing in-country, recei#ing orers, an going right out
to the istrict or pro#ince. +eople in<t e#en 3now they were getting a +hoeni! assignment at this stage o* the
game. 9ut the program ha one o* the highest priorities in 8%/V *or personnel, an as *ast as they arri#e in-
country, they were assigne out irectly to the pro#ince an istrict. (n Aour /orps we trie to intercept them, i* (
coul *in out about it in time an coorinate earlier with 0aigon. =thers we ha to pull bac3 *rom the *iel. 6e<
arrange to ha#e them stay in /an .ho *rom two to three ays so we coul gi#e them an orientation an tell them
what we e!pecte o* them as +hoeni! coorinators.- 112
%t this orientation, accoring to Dillar, -6e outline their mission, which was to be aware o* the entities
operating in their area o* responsibility, to establish contact with the personalities, to e#elop a rapport ... an to
try to con#ince them that the only thing we were trying to o in +hoeni! was to *ocus all our resources on the
V/(. %n to report irectly to me any obstacles they were encountering, to see i* there was anything we coul o
about it. ( mae an e**ort to establish irect one-to-one relationships with them so they 3new ... that ( was their
*rien an truly meant what ( sai in trying to help them. %n time an time again it pai o**. .hey woul come in
emorali4e, an (< *in out about it an wor3 it out with the istrict a#iser to let the guy come in to /an .ho.
6e< put him up in our own *acility an ta3e him o#er to the club so he coul ha#e a ecent meal.-
?or i Doug Dillar sit in /an .ho an wait *or problems to come to him. -+huoc an ( trie #ery har to
breathe some li*e into the coorination process,- he sai. -6e trie to hit one or two istricts e#ery ay. ( woul
get the ".0. people together an really gi#e them the har sell on ma3ing +hoeni! wor3. <6hat are the
problemsB Do they ha#e resourcesB ,ow can ( helpB< %n while ( was oing that, +huoc woul get the
Vietnamese istrict people together out in the istrict compoun an gi#e them a patriotic lecture. 6e i that
ay a*ter ay.
-( remember going to +hong ,iep District.- Dillar cite as an e!ample. -.hat was a ba istrict *or V/ acti#ity,
an /olonel +huoc an ( went own there, an we were wal3ing *rom the helicopter pa towar the istrict
compoun when this 3i came out shouting, <,e<s Cust no gooI< an <( almost 3ille him mysel*I<
113
-( sai, </alm own, /aptain. )et<s go ha#e a rin3 an you tell me what happene.<
#$ell* the+6' been out on an o.eration that )orning to 7a. so)e V!I* an' as I recall* one o the V!I %as
the lea'er o the co))unications ca're* an' the+ ran into hi) on the canal an' ha' a ire ight an'
ca.ture' this gu+, The+ %ere tr+ing to sub'ue hi)* but he &e.t on resisting* -iolentl+* so the Vietna)ese
S(t%o .ulle' out his .istol an' shot hi), M+ ca.tain al)ost %ent out o his )in', He sai'* 6/or !hrist6s
sa&e* +ou Hust &ille' the best source o inor)ation or V! acti-it+ in the 'istrict, $h+6' +ou 'o thatM6
An' the S(t%o sai'* 6$ell* he ob-iousl+ %ante' to 'ie* the %a+ he %as resisting,6
-0o, you see- -- Dillar sighe -- -you ha a mentality problem.-
9ut there was another sie o* the -mentality problem.- -Down in 9ac )ieu,- Dillar sai, -one o* the istrict chie*s
ha a group, an they went out an ran an ambush. .he istrict chie* steppe on a lan mine an ha a leg
blown o** an ble to eath be*ore the mee#ac chopper got there. 0o ( got a report on this an tol >im 6ar,
an we got it into the system so the corps commaner coul aress the problem, the problem being i* these
guys see they<re not going to be mee#ace when they<re seriously woune, they<re not going to go out.-
.o show success to his e#aluators in the 0aigon Directorate, a +hoeni! a#iser neee a competent
Vietnamese counterpart. 9ut it is wrong to blame the *ailure o* the program solely on the Vietnamese -mentality.-
.o o so is to assume that +hoeni! a#isers unerstoo the purpose o* the program an the intelligence
process an that all were mature enough to wor3 with interpreters in a *oreign culture. 8any were not. %s >im
6ar note, #Ver+ e% ha' the .ro.er training or e5.erience or their %or& ,,,,# 122
6ar i not blame any one ini#iual. -.he e**ecti#eness o* a +ro#ince or District (ntelligence an =perations
/oorination /enter,- he sai, -generally epene on three people: the %merican a#iser an the senior 0outh
Vietnamese army an police o**icial assigne to the center. 6hen all three were goo an ha a harmonious
wor3ing relationship, the D(=// *unctione e**ecti#ely.- 9ut har)on+ %as the e5ce.tion* an' as in )ost
grou.s* the strongest .ersonalit+ 'o)inate' the others. (* it was the Vietnamese army intelligence o**icer,
then D(=// operations *ocuse on gathering tactical military intelligence. (* the Vietnamese policeman was
ominant, then the D(=// concentrate on the V/(. 9ut because the %FV? 02 generally pre#aile, the o#erall
impact o* +hoeni! in the Delta, accoring to 6ar, -was spotty. Feally e**ecti#e in some istricts, partially
success*ul in hal*, an ine**ecti#e in the rest.-
/ontributing to the misirection o* +hoeni! operations away *rom the V/( towar military targets was the
wiening gap between +ro#ince an District (ntelligence an =perations /oorination /enters. ;!plaine 6ar:
-9ecause most +hoeni!-+hung ,oang planning too3 place at pro#ince 1where the /(% 0pecial 9ranch a#iser
was base2, an because the D(=// was run by the %FV? 02 a#ise by ".0. %rmy o**icers as part o* the
8%/V istrict a#isory team, the /(% 0pecial 9ranch a#iser was not going to share his intelligence or ossiers
with these people.- .his lac3 o* cooperation rein*orce the tenency on the part o* military intelligence o**icers to
o what they coul: to gather in*ormation on impening guerrilla attac3s, not the V/(.
Aor this reason, sai /olonel :eorge De!ter, who organi4e 0pecial Aorces % teams in Vietnam in the early
19G0<s an ser#e as the /=FD0 assistant chie* o* sta** in (V /orps in 19&2, #It %oul' see) that Ar)+
Intelligence !or.s oicers %ere not a goo' choice or this role since the+ %ere basicall+ oriente' to%ar'
co)bat intelligence rather than .olice intelligence, Ho%e-er* ",S, ci-ilians >)eaning !IA oicers? %ere
al)ost ne-er assigne' at 'istrict le-el because the ris& o co)bat %as too high,# >C?
6arren 8ilberg suggests that #the biggest 'eicienc+ in the a'-isor+ .rogra) %as the lac& o an
6institutional )e)or+,6 Phoeni5 a'-isers 'i' not &no% the histor+ o their .ro-inces >or? ho% the
insurgents o.erate' there,# 8oreo#er, -?othing was one to impro#e the situation .... Not being able to
s.ea& the language o their counter.arts* an' &no%ing the+ %ere onl+ going to sta+ in Vietna) or a
relati-el+ short .erio' o ti)e* )ost a'-isers ten'e' to neglect the .olitical an' social as.ects o the
situation in %hich the+ oun' the)sel-es, "nable to co.e %ith* or acce.t* the .eo.le o the RVN* )an+
a'-isers beca)e ineecti-e* an' the o-erall result %as the 'egra'ation o the Phoeni5(Phung Hoang
.rogra),# 1D2
/olonel De!ter was more *orgi#ing: -.he lieutenant spent his whole tour in Vietnam as a member o* a *i#e or si!-
man istrict a#isory team in a small town in the mile o* nowhere, <a#ising< a Vietnamese counterpart $who
was probably se#eral years oler an surely many more years e!perience in the war' an holing own any
number o* aitional uties within the a#isory team.- 0ai De!ter: -,is success epene primarily on the
competence o* his counterpart an, to a lesser egree, on his own energy an imagination. His )aHor han'ica.
%as the inabilit+ to s.ea& Vietna)ese %ith an+ 'egree o luenc+,#
114
A 'iicult language an' an inscrutable culture1 lac& o training an' e5.erience1 institutional ri-alries an'
.ersonal -en'ettas1 isolation an' alienation: all %ere obstacles the t+.ical Phoeni5 'istrict a'-iser ha'
to ace, All in all* it %as not an en-iable Hob,
777
/olonel Dillar<s *atherly concern *or his young istrict a#isers, -*resh out o* college an through the basic
course at Aort ,olabir,- was as e!ceptional as the harmony he ha achie#e with the /(% in the Delta. 8ore
o*ten than not, +hoeni! a#isers recei#e little guiance or support *rom cynical region an pro#ince o**icers.
?or were the *irst +hoeni! a#isers e#en minimally prepare *or the intrigues they encountere. .he *irst batch
o* Cunior o**icers sent to Vietnam in Aebruary 19GL -- speci*ically as +hoeni! a#isers -- consiste o* *orty secon
lieutenants traine in the art o* air e*ense artillery -- o* which there was no nee in 0outh Vietnam inso*ar as the
Viet cong ha no aircra*t. (n aition, most were Feser#e =**icer .raining /orps grauates who ha been calle
upon to meet the unanticipate personnel re5uirements impose on the %rmy (ntelligence /orps a*ter the eeply
resente troop limit ha been impose on the >oint /hie*s o* 0ta**.
0uch was the case with ,enry 8c6ae. % 19GE grauate o* ;ast .ennessee 0tate, 8c6ae was
commissione a secon lieutenant in 19GG an calle to acti#e uty in 19G&. (n December 19G& he attene
Aort ,olabir, where, in his wors, #%e %ere traine' in Euro.ean )etho's or the col' %ar,# 1E2 (n 8ay 19GL
8c6ae an twenty-one other secon lieutenants, a group he re*erre to as -the last iealists,- were sent to
0outh Vietnam as +hoeni! istrict a#isers. ?ow a realist, 8c6ae tol me wearily, #The+ nee'e' se-en(+ear
ca.tains,#
Aollowing a wee3<s orientation at the /ombine (ntelligence /enter, 8c6ae was assigne to :o Vap District in
:ia Dinh +ro#ince as part o* /=FD0 %#isory .eam DD. He resi'e' in a .reab acilit+ %ith other )e)bers
o the 'istrict tea)* %hile the .ro-ince Phoeni5 coor'inator* MaHor 8a)es G, Da)ron* li-e' in o.ulent
s.len'or in the !IA6s la-ish e)bass+ house* #a cathe'ral# co).lete %ith a helico.ter lan'ing .a' on the
roo an' a contingent o PR" bo'+guar's (( a #goon s=ua'# %ho) #the Vietna)ese eare' an'
consi'ere' cri)inals,#
#He ga-e us no 'irection at all*# Mc$a'e sai' o Da)ron, #The .eo.le at the PIO!! ,,, locate' i-e )iles
a%a+ in the ol' S.ecial 0ranch hea'=uarters ,,, &e.t us at ar)6s length, The e% ti)es %e 'ro-e u.
there* the+ ga-e us no gui'ance or a'-ice at all, Onl+ )one+,# Aor 8c6ae, this was a big isappointment.
-%s a green secon lieutenant ( neee that operational guiance. 9ut ( in<t get it .... An' the !o).an+ )an*
the S.ecial 0ranch a'-iser* Hust 'i'n6t 'eal %ith us at all, .hey ha their own a#isory system
compartmente away *rom +hoeni!.
-.he program ha been more autonomous, *le!ible, an e!perimental uner the agency,- 8c6ae continue.
-9ut as %rmy a#isers -- whom /(% o**icers consier amateurs -- *iltere in at e#ery le#el, the program shi*te
uner the /=FD0 pro#ince senior a#isers or their eputies. An' i the !IA can6t control it*# Mc$a'e
e5.laine'* #the+ get ri' o it,#
Arom his D(=// in :o Vap, 8c6ae obser#e that 8aCor Damron was -an empire builer. The lie(st+les %ere
incre'ible, Da)ron contracte' %ith an A)erican construction co).an+ to buil' sae houses* %here he
entertaine' an' &e.t %o)en, ,e ha ci#ilian ienti*ication that allowe him to go anywhere. ,e carrie a /%F-
1E until the "4i became *ashionable. .hen he carrie that. An' Da)ron %as shre%', $hen the .ro-ince
senior a'-iser or his 'e.ut+ %as aroun'* he tal&e' intelligence Hargon, He ha' iles an' co).uters, 0ut
%hen the+ %ere gone# (( Mc$a'e %in&e' (( #the con-ersation %as all construction, Da)ron %as the best
at buil'ing buil'ings, He built great DIO!!s an' sae houses, 0ut he coul'n6t catch an+ V!I,#
.he +hoeni! program ha begun in 19G& uner the management o* /(% pro#ince o**icers, but as Hunior gra'e
ar)+ oicers li&e Henr+ Mc$a'e )ounte' the Phoeni5 ra).arts in 293B* the !IA instructe' its oicers
to retreat to the saet+ an' seclusion o the e)bass+ houses,# An' once the+ oun' out I %as against
.h+sical torture*# Mc$a'e a''e'* #the+ .reerre' that I sta+ a%a+ ro) the .ro-ince interrogation center
altogether,# Thereater* %hene-er the Go Va. DIO!! .ro'uce' a V!I sus.ect* #the+ re)o-e' the
.risoner ro) our sight, The+ sol-e' the .roble) b+ ta&ing it out o sight,#
/omplicating matters, 8c6ae sai, was the *act that -the 0pecial 9ranch was playing us against the /(%.- (n
other wors, in orer to meet +hoeni! 5uotas, the Vietnamese 0pecial 9ranch woul arrest common criminals
an present them as V/(, while behin the scenes they were e!torting money *rom genuine V/( in e!change *or
not arresting them.- %n the /(%,- 8c6ae sighe, -was stretche too thin to 3now.-
As or o-ersight ro) the Phoeni5 Directorate* Mc$a'e sai' it %as negligible, #The+6' sen' 'o%n a
co).uter .rintout >containing biogra.hical inor)ation on &no%n V!I?, $e got the) s.ora'icall+, /it+
na)es .er .age* si5 inches thic&, 0ut %e coul'n6t use the) because the+ lac&e' the 'iacritical )ar&s
115
%hich %ere necessar+ or .ro.er i'entiication,# An' that .rett+ )uch let Mc$a'e on his o%n to
)anage Phoeni5 o.erations in Go Va.,
Vietnamese assigne to the :o Vap D(=// inclue +F", a Fegional an +opular Aorces company, /ensus
:rie#ance care, ?ational +olice, an Aiel +olicemen. 8c6ae<s counterpart was the %FV? 02, -a wea3
person ( put too many emans on. .he only time he mo#e was the time a ranger brigae came to :o Vap to
conuct coron an search operations with the police. 6hen 0aigon units, which were there to pre#ent coups,
came out to our area, things happene. .hen it was a genuine +hoeni! operation.-
=therwise, sai 8c6ae, -6e ran e#ery concei#able type o* operation, *rom night ambushes in the rural areas
north o* :o Vap, to Fambo-style counterintelligence operations in the city -- the 3in where you personally ha
to react.- 8c6ae went on #illage sweeps with the local Fegional an +opular Aorces company, chec3ing
.hunres o* (Ds with the police. 9ase on tips gotten *rom in*ormers, he woul also sur#eil an target houses in
:o Vap where V/( suspects li#e, contact points where V/( met, an places where commo-liaison cares
crosse the ri#er. ,e too3 photographs, submitte reports, an -*e the computer in 0aigon.-
#$e %ere going out e-er+ other 'a+* so)eti)es e-er+ 'a+*# he recalle', #I %or&e' eighteen hours a 'a+*
si5 or se-en 'a+s a %ee&,# An' +et* he %as ne-er reall+ in control, #I ha' no o.erational control o-er an+
units* an' I ha' to rel+ one hun're' .ercent on )+ counter.art*# he sai', #So e-er+ o.eration ha' to be
si).le*# .ri)aril+ because o language, #I %as at the )erc+ o an inter.reter %ith a i-e(hun're'(%or'
-ocabular+*# Mc$a'e sighe', #It %as li&e being 'ea an' 'u)b, An' I Hust assu)e' e-er+ o.eration %as
co).ro)ise'* at a )ini)u) because )+ inter.reter %as an un'erco-er Militar+ Securit+ Ser-ice agent,#
An' e-en though he )onitore' agent nets* #No one re.orte' 'irectl+ to )e1 it %oul' ha-e been
i).ossible to tr+* i +ou can6t s.ea& the language, There %as no such thing as a secure agent* an' %e
'i'n6t ha-e %al&(ins because the .eo.le coul'n6t trust the .olice,# Ma&ing )atters %orse* there %ere at
least a 'o7en intelligence agencies o.erating in the area* each %ith %hat it assu)e' %ere its o%n
unilateral agents in the iel', 0ut because the -arious intelligence agencies reuse' to share their iles
%ith one another* the+ ne-er reali7e' that each agent* as Mc$a'e .ut it* #%as selling inor)ation to
e-er+bo'+,#
The .icture is one o total chaos, In'ee'* )ost o Mc$a'e6s initial o.erations %ere con'ucte' (( %ithout
his reali7ing it (( b+ his .olice counter.arts against co))on cri)inals or 'issi'ents, ,e recalle his *irst
ay on the Cob, which coincie with the beginning o* the secon .et o**ensi#e. -.he *irst one in Aebruary came
through /holon,- 8c6ae sai. -.his one came through :o Vap. 6e were out with the Fegional an +opular
Aorces company, pic3ing up anyone who loo3e li3e an %FV? ra*t oger. 8eanwhile the Vietnamese police
were sha3ing them own, although ( in<t learn about it till much later.-
.here were other surprises. In an area outsi'e Go Va.* or e5a).le* o-er thirt+ thousan' reugees li-e' in
a s.ra%ling ghetto, Mc$a'e tol' )e* #The+ %ere )ostl+ .rostitutes %or&ing or organi7e' cri)e ((
)eaning the .olice, I thought %e %ere in-estigating the V!I* but actuall+ I %as use' b+ )+ .olice
counter.art to rai' the )a'a)s %ho ha'n6t .ai' hi) o,# 6hen he *igure out what was really going on,
8c6ae sai, -( e#elope what ( calle <8c6ae<s Fule<@ *i*teen percent *or gra*t, eighty-*i#e percent *or the
program. %n this was a complete re#ersal o* what was happening when ( arri#eI-
9ut ,enry 8c6ae i not become bitter, nor was he unable to cope with Vietnamese culture. "nli3e many o*
his colleagues, he i not interpret Vietnamese customs as insiious schemes esigne to ecei#e him. #The
Vietna)ese ha' a 'ierent -ocabular+ an' 'ierent goals, The+ %ere not intereste' in ac=uiring
bo'ies*# he sai', #The+ %ere intereste' in ac=uiring )one+ an' ite)s on the blac& )ar&et,# In other
%or's* their )oti-es %ere .ractical* geare' to%ar' sur-i-ing in the .resent* %hile it %as generall+ onl+
their A)erican a'-isers %ho %ere obsesse' %ith eli)inating !o))unists ro) the ace o the earth,
777
%s a means o* bringing Vietnamese an %merican proceures into closer sync, the +hoeni! Directorate in >uly
19GL issue its *irst stanar operating proceures $0=+ 1' manual. 0=+ 1 stresse the leaership role o* the
police an the nee *or paramilitary *orces to support the police in the attac3 on the V/(. (t subi#ie
(ntelligence an =perations /oorination /enters $(=//s' into three areas. .he +lans an =perations /enter
e#ise plans an organi4e a#ailable *orces in operations against guerrilla units an ini#iual V/(. .he
0ituation /enter maintaine *iles, hanle agent security an operations, prouce reports, an set
re5uirements. (t ha a military orer o* battle section uner the Vietnamese army intelligence o**icer, the 02,
gathering intelligence on an targeting guerrilla units, an a political orer o* battle section uner the 0pecial
9ranch, targeting V/(. .he 8essage 0ection communicate with the istrict or pro#ince chie*, who e!ercise
o#erall responsibility *or any particular (=//.
116
(n practice, 0=+ 1 ha little e**ect. -(t in<t o any harm,- ,enry 8c6ae obser#e@ but it was issue only to
%mericans, an the Vietnamese continue to organi4e the (=//s accoring to their own -separate goals an
missions. .he ouble stanar persiste, e#en a*ter a translation $minus iacritical mar3s' was circulate.-
Falph >ohnson ac3nowleges this, noting that the :V?<s instructions to its own people -- by ma3ing no
re*erence to the role o* ".0. +hoeni! a#isers in the (=//s -- wiene the gap between %mericans an
Vietnamese. %t *irst only the /(%, which -controlle the salaries, training an support o* critical elements in
+hung ,oang,- was able to e!ert in*luence, by parceling out resources an *uns. =therwise, when +hoeni!
a#isers recei#e ae5uate *uns through /=FD0, they, too, -were able an willing to use monetary le#erage to
ri#e home neee a#ice an guiance. An' a !ORDS agree)ent %ith Presi'ent Thieu ga-e !ORDS the
right to call attention to oicials %ho shoul' be re.lace',# >3?
In an+ e-ent* Phoeni5 a'-isers oun' the)sel-es caught in the )i''le o intrigues be+on' their
co).rehension, $oeull+ un.re.are'* the+ stoo' bet%een their Vietna)ese ar)+ an' .olice
counter.arts1 their !IA an' ",S, Ar)+ su.eriors1 an' the GVN an' the sect or o..osition .olitical .art+
in their area o o.eration, E-er+thing %as e5.ecte' o the)* but in realit+* -er+ little %as .ossible,
0heing light on the problems o* +hoeni! a#isers is ; 9ray, a slener %rmy o**icer who ser#e his *irst tour
in Vietnam in 19GE as an a#iser to the .wenty-secon Fanger 9attalion in +lei3u. %*ter that, 9ray #olunteere
*or another tour an was assigne as a Fegional an +opular Aorces a#iser in Da )at, where he learne about
the connection between politics an the blac3 mar3et in Vietnam. #0oth the V! an' the ARVN trie' to a-oi'
)ilitar+ o.erations in Da 4at*# 0ra'+ tol' )e* a''ing that as .art o the )o'us -i-en'i* it %as #a neutral
cit+ %here +ou coul' ha-e )eetings an' %here inancial transactions coul' ta&e .lace* legal an' illegal,
It %as a .lace %here the V! coul' raise an' %ash an' change )one+, It %as sort o %hat Gene-a %as
li&e in $orl' $ar T%o, .here were many businesses in the pro#ince, li3e woocutting, rubber an tea
plantations, an the ngoc mom 1*ish sauce2 inustry. %ll were sources o* money *or the V/ an the :V?.- 1&2
(n Da )at 9ray wor3e with /(% +ro#ince =**icer +eter 0co#e, who introuce him to .e 0erong, who at the
time was haning o#er control o* the Aiel +olice to +appy :rie#es. -( was learning a lot,- 9ray sai. -( learne
Vietnamese *rom the o**icer ( was wor3ing with ... the wors that ealt with money an corruption. .hen 0erong
as3e me i* ( woul be willing to go on loan to his team. .hey ha a new 3in o* platoon ... that they wante to
train in small-unit tactics. 8ore li3e guerrilla war*are than what the police i. %n woul ( be willing to train this
platoon because he in<t thin3 that the %ustralian warrant o**icers he ha there were the right peopleB-
9ray agree an spent the ne!t *ew months at the Aiel +olice center, training what turne out to be -the *irst
e!perimental +F" team in .uyen Duc +ro#ince ... recruite by the /(% to be the action arm o* the pro#ince
o**icer.- The .latoon ha' our s=ua's* t%o co).ose' o Nungs an' t%o o Montagnar's, #The+ coul'n6t
s.ea& to each other,# There %ere also s=ua' lea'ers an' a .latoon co))an'er* all o %ho) %ere South
Vietna)ese S.ecial /orces oicers* none o %ho) coul' s.ea& Montagnar' or Nung or English either,
-(t was really the strangest thing you e#er saw,- 9ray sai. -%n ( taught them small-unit tactics.-
%s was generally the case, 9ray<s association with the /(% spelle trouble *or his military career. -( ha a lot o*
problems with my sector boss o#er these acti#ities,- he tol me. -,e thought ( shoul eat in the sector house
with the rest o* the team, not with the %ussies an /(% people. ( also spent most o* my o** time with Vietnamese
o**icers in their homes, in bars, oing the things they i. ( rente a house on my own, li#e o** the economy,
learne how you buy your Cobs, an met a lot o* general o**icers< mistresses who li3e to come to Da )at *or the
weather. .he %merican colonel ( wor3e *or thought this was atrocious, an ( got a 4ero on my per*ormance
report.-
,a#ing been suborne by the /(%, entice by the Vietnamese, an e!communicate by the %rmy, 9ray --
whose *amily was connecte to a power*ul ".0. senator an the ((( /orps commaner -- was reassigne to the
Vietnamese >oint :eneral 0ta** $>:0', -in their comman center. 6e were a i#ision o* the 8%/V /ombat
=perations /enter. .he main purpose o* this group was to collect ata on Vietnamese operations an *ee it to
the 8%/V so it coul be reporte to 6ashington.-
-:eneral /ao Van Vien was commaner o* the >oint 0ta**,- 9ray continue, -an these guys were his
operations sta**. .hey tra#ele to e#ery maCor Vietnamese battle to *in out what happene -- they place no
reliance on any o**icial message -- an ( went on e#ery one o* those trips. ( met all the 3ey commaners. +lus
which ( was mo#ing in Vietnamese social circles.-
9ray became *riens with :eneral Vien<s e!ecuti#e o**icer an with the >:0 operations chie*, 8aCor :eneral
.ran .ran +hong. -%n *or some reason,- he ae, -a number o* the ranger o**icers an people ( 3new in Da
)at ha mo#e into 3ey positions in .hieu<s aministration. .hey ha sort o* been in e!ile when ( met them -- you
in<t get assigne to a ranger out*it because you were in goo graces with the aministration ... -- but later they
117
showe up in 0aigon. %n ( ha a great bon with them. (< been in combat an brothels with them. 9ut they
were now *ull colonels. %n ( met many o* their bosses, who were generals in power*ul positions.-
6hen 9ray<s tour at the >:0 ene, the /(% station as3e him to capitali4e on his well-place connections an
report on what he learne about :V? plans an strategies. 9ray agree, an was assigne to the +hoeni!
Directorate as a co#er *or his espionage acti#ities. -0omeboy calle me up one ay an sai, <6e<re starting a
new organi4ation, an we< li3e you to consier Coining it.< .his was (/;O. 0o ( went o#er there ... an spent a
couple hours tal3ing to ;#an +ar3er. ,e sai, 6$e6re intereste' in targete' o.erations against the ci-ilian
.art o the !o))unist .art+, The )ain orce %ar 'oesn6t a''ress the real .roble) ,,, the sha'o%
go-ern)ent,6 %n ( was reay *or that -- psychologically an emotionally. ;#erything ( 3new sai, <.hat<s e!actly
right.<
-(/;O was to wor3 with the 0pecial 9ranch,- 9ray continue, -which set up a separate builing in the ?ational
+olice compoun to be the +hung ,oang /entral =**ice. .hey etaile mostly 0pecial 9ranch policemen to wor3
there, but there were a *ew military o**icers an a *ew ?ational +olice o**icers to roun out the sta**. .heir o**ice
was only two months ol when ( arri#e. .here were a couple o* /(% a#isers own there to be the people who
wor3e with them. >oe 0artiano was the senior /(% guy own in the +hung ,oang /entral =**ice. %n me an
9ob (nman were own there *rom the +hoeni! operations section.-
.he +hoeni! assignment put 9ray in close contact with Dang Van 8inh, Duong .han ,uu, an )ieutenant
/olonel )oi ?guyen .an. %bout his relationship with .an, 9ray sai, -0ince /olonel .an was a military o**icer,
we 3new people in common, so there was an immeiate rapport. .an was #ery *rienly, #ery easy to tal3 to. 9ut
he was not, *rom an %merican point o* #iew, emaning. 6e woul go out on inspection teams together, to
operations centers, an he< ha#e a iscussion with the chie*. Mean%hile* his Vietna)ese subor'inate an' I
.ore' through the 'ossiers* loo&e' at their .roce'ures an' %hat o.erations the+ ha' run recentl+, An'
a lot o it %as a sha) (( a aca'e that the+ %ere )eeting the letter o the la%, So the+ ha' a hun're'
'ossiers, 0ig 'ealN Se-ent+(i-e ha' nothing in the), /iteen o the other t%ent+(i-e ha' a cou.le o
ne%s.a.er cli..ings ro) the local ne%s.a.er about the V! 'istrict chie, 0ut the+ ha' no real
intelligence* no real targete' o.erations that the+ %ere setting u. or running, %n .an woul ne#er crac3
own on them or lean on them in some way that was acceptable to us *rom the 6est.
-?ow in Vietnamese he woul ma3e a *ew remar3s to them: <Hou really ought to try to o better.< %n when he
got bac3, he< *ile a report that this place was not in #ery goo shape. 9ut he in<t say, <Damn it, (<m going to be
bac3 here in three wee3s an you< better ha#e something going by thenI< .hat<s why it<s i**icult to say i* he was
e**ecti#e.-
9ray, who has eep a**ection *or the Vietnamese, e!plaine why their approach to +hoeni! was at os with
the one presse by ;#an +ar3er: -(* you really want to get own to cases, no Vietnamese o* any signi*icance in
the military or in the police in<t 3now who the truly high-le#el people were -- the istrict chie*s an the pro#ince
chie*s. )et me gi#e you an e!ample. /olonel .an an 8r. ,uu an ( were eating in a mar3et stall up near the
borer in .hree /orps. .he place was a hotbe o* V/( support *or ?V% units. There %as lots o )one+
lo%ing there* 'onate' b+ /rench rubber .lantation o%ners %ithout )uch coercion, The+ 'i'n6t li&e the
GVN, %nyway, this woman comes in. 0he<s got three or *our 3is, the youngest is maybe two, the olest about
se#en. %n .an says to me, <Hou see this womanB< 6e<re there eating soup an rin3ing Vietnamese co**ee.
0he<s there *eeing her 3is at a nearby table in the mar3et stall.
-( say, <Heah.<
-,e says, <Hou 3now who she isB 0he<s the pro#ince chie*<s wi*e.<
-( loo3e aroun an sai, <( on<t see the pro#ince chie*. Hou<re telling me there<s an honest pro#ince chie*, an
his wi*e oesn<t own a Ceep an go aroun collecting money all ayB<
-?o, no,- he says. -.he V/ pro#ince chie*.-
-0o, being young an nai#e, ( say, <6ell, loo3 at how many young 3is she has. 0he either goes to see him, or
he comes to see her. =r she<s got a lo#er.<
-,e says, <Fight.< 9ut they are his 3is. .hey e#en loo3 li3e him.
-0o ( say, <6ell, he must come in to see her, then, or she goes to see him.< (<m really e!cite. ( say, <.his is
something we can really wor3 with.<
118
#He sa+s* 6Fou 'on6t un'erstan', Fou 'on6t li-e the %a+ %e li-e, Fou 'on6t ha-e an+ a)il+ here, Fou6re
going to go ho)e %hen this o.eration is o-er %ith, Fou 'on6t thin& li&e +ou6re going to li-e here ore-er,
0ut I ha-e a ho)e an' a a)il+ an' &i's that go to school, I ha-e a %ie that has to go to )ar&et ,,,, An'
+ou %ant )e to go &ill his %ieM Fou %ant )e to set a tra. or hi) an' &ill hi) %hen he co)es in to see
his %ieM I %e 'o that* %hat are the+ going to 'o to our %i-esM6
-,ow many wi#es were e#er 3illeB- 9ray as3e rhetorically. -Mero -- unless they happene to ri#e o#er a lan
mine, an then it was a ranom eath. .he V/ in<t run targete operations against them either. There %ere
set rules that +ou .la+e' b+, I +ou %ent out an' con'ucte' a )ilitar+ o.eration an' +ou chase' the)
'o%n air an' s=uare in the Hungle an' +ou ha' a ight* that %as o&a+, I the+ a)bushe' +ou on the %a+
bac& ro) a )ilitar+ o.eration* that %as air, 0ut to con'uct these clan'estine .olice o.erations an'
reall+ get at the heart o things* that %as &in' o i))oral to the), That %as not cric&et, An' the
Vietna)ese %ere -er+* -er+ leer+ o u.setting that,#
4i&e%ise* as Tran Van Truong notes in ' Vietcong Memoir: #Thieu6s chie o .s+%ar hi' in his o%n
house a sister(in(la% %ho %as the Vietcong ca're in charge o the Hue Peo.le6s ".rising !o))ittee,
Neither ha' an+ .articular lo-e or their ene)ies* but a)il+ lo+alt+ the+ consi'ere' sacrosanct,# >B?
-%trocities happene,- 9ray sai. -.hose things happene by ini#iual pro#ince o**icers or people who wor3e
*or them an the +F"s .... (t happene in the ".0. units. M+ 4ai ha..ene', No )atter %hat an+bo'+ sa+s
about 6it 'i'n6t ha..en*6 it 'i' ha..en, I6-e %atche' .eo.le torch Montagnar' -illages or no real reason
e5ce.t the+ %ere rustrate' b+ not being able to catch the V!, %n the 8ontagnars must ha#e 3nown
about the V/, which ( belie#e they i. 9ut we in<t ha#e to burn their houses.-
$hen as&e' i Phoeni5 encourage' atrocities* 0ra'+ ans%ere' that it 'e.en'e' on %hether or not the
PR" an' the PI!s %ere 'eine' as .art o Phoeni5, #I +ou %ant to sa+ that all the intelligence acti-ities
that %ere supposed to be coor'inate' b+ Phoeni5 are a .art o Phoeni5* then +es*# 0ra'+ sai', #0ut i
+ou %ant to sa+* 6Di' Phoeni5 go 'o these thingsM*6 then )+ ans%er is no, 0ecause Phoeni5 %as too
inacti-e* too inco).etent* an' too .assi-e, No%* Phoeni5 shoul' ha-e been 'oing )an+ )ore things
'irectl+* an' i it ha'* then )+ belie is that Phoeni5 %oul' ha-e .er.etrate' so)e atrocities* because
the+ %oul' ha-e been in the .osition these other .eo.le %ere in* %here the+ %ere rustrate'* the+ %ere
angr+* an' the+ %oul' ha-e 'one so)e things,
-Aurthermore,- 9ray ae, -you can ma3e the case that +hoeni! was helping to repress the loyal opposition
political parties an pre#ente a neutral Vietnam *rom occurring. .he Vietnamese sai that, because the 0pecial
9ranch guy who planne the operation to nulli*y their political operations was also running +hoeni!
operations .... 0o it epens on how you want to interpret the ata an how you want to say things were
connecte together .... (< say either o* those interpretations are #ali.
-( thin3 the irector o* +hoeni! ne#er planne such things,- 9ray conclue in e*ense o* ;#an +ar3er an
%merican policy in general. 9ut he also sai, #Fes* .eo.le assigne' to Phoeni5 'i' such things,#
!HAPTER 2:: Accelerate' Paciication
.he election o* Fichar ?i!on in ?o#ember 19GL signale a shi*t in ".0. policy in Vietnam. Fe*lecting the esire
o* most %mericans, in the wa3e o* .et, *or an honorable withrawal, the .olic+ balance' negotiations %ith the
bo)bing o North Vietna), !alle' the Ni5on Doctrine* the .olic+ ha' as its .re)ise that the "nite'
States has a )oral obligation to su..ort oreign go-ern)ents ighting !o))unist insurgents* on the
con'ition that those go-ern)ents su..l+ their o%n cannon o''er,
0hortly a*ter ta3ing o**ice, ?i!on instructe his national security a#iser, ,enry Kissinger, to start negotiating with
the ?orth Vietnamese in +aris. =n the assumptions that .et ha ealt the V/( a eathblow an that the .hieu
regime was *irmly in control o* the country, ?i!on began planning *or troop reuctions. Aollowing in the *ootsteps
o* the Arench, ".0. *orces began a graual retreat to coastal encla#es. %n MA!V* un'er General $illia)
$est)orelan'6s re.lace)ent* General !reighton Abra)s* .re.are' to ight a sanctuar+ %ar base' on
!IA esti)ates that ort+ thousan' NVA sol'iers hun&ere' 'o%n in !a)bo'ia constitute' the )aHor
outsi'e threat to the Thieu regi)e, The bo)bing o these .otential in-a'ers began in /ebruar+ 2939*
%ith the consent o !a)bo'ia6s Prince Noro'o) Sihanou&* %hose agents .ro-i'e' the S.ecial
O.erations Grou. ;SOG< %ith inor)ation on the location o ene)+ orces* )an+ o %hich %ere locate'
in 'ensel+ .o.ulate' areas, !on'ucte' in secret* the illegal rai's into !a)bo'ia %ere re-eale' in Ma+
2939 an' resulte' in increase' o..osition to ",S, go-ern)ent con'uct in Southeast Asia,
119
The Ni5on Doctrine as a..lie' in Vietna) %as calle' Vietna)i7ation* an' the )an u.on %ho) the
)antle o Vietna)i7ation ell %as $illia) !olb+, go*ather o* the /o#ert %ction program that ha set the
stage *or %merican inter#ention ten years earlier. (n ?o#ember 19GL /olby was appointe D;+/=FD0,
replacing Democratic party loyalist Fobert Komer, whom +resient >ohnson ha name ".0. ambassaor to
.ur3ey. /olby reporte to ,enry Kissinger, who supporte /olby<s ambitious paci*ication program, geare to
*acilitate Vietnami4ation.
/olby subi#ie his paci*ication plan into three main categories, beginning with military security, which he
calle -the *irst step in the paci*ication an e#elopment process- -- in other wors, borrowe *rom ?elson
9ric3ham, -shieling the population *rom the /ommunist main *orces,- a Cob which -is the tas3 o* the Vietnamese
regular *orces.- 112
Oten generate' b+ Phoeni5 intelligence* the resulting air rai's* artiller+ barrages* an' search an'
'estro+ o.erations %ere an integral .art o .aciication* insoar as the+ create' 'eectors* .re-ente'
guerrillas ro) asse)bling in large concentrations* an'* b+ creating reugees* se.arate' the ish ro)
the %ater,
+art (( o* /olby<s strategy was territorial security, the 19G9 mani*estation o* Fe#olutionary De#elopment, in which
the Fegional an +opular Aorces -- therea*ter calle .erritorial 0ecurity Aorces -- were a#ise by ".0. %rmy
mobile a#isory teams $8%.s' uner the auspices o* /=FD0. (n combating / guerrilla units an the V/(,
.erritorial 0ecurity Aorces were assiste by the +eople<s 0el*-De*ense Aorces.
(n a De*ense Department report title $ %ystems $nalysis of the Vietnam War 67?:!679@, .homas .hayer says
that as o* 19GL, #The Re-olutionar+ De-elo.)ent .rogra) ha' signiicant .roble)s in recruiting an'
retaining high =ualit+ .ersonnel,# The RD !a're 'esertion rate %as o-er EI .ercent* #higher than or an+
GVN )ilitar+ orce* .erha.s because the+ ha-e a CIO better chance o being &ille' than the )ilitar+
orces,# .hayer notes that in response, the FD ministry ha irecte its care -to concentrate on builing
hamlet security an to e*er, at least temporarily, the hamlet e#elopment proCects which *ormerly constitute si!
o* the teams< ele#en FD tas3s.- 122
"n'er these re-ise' gui'elines* .ro-i'ing intelligence to Phoeni5 re.lace' #nation buil'ing# as the RD
.rogra)6s to. .riorit+, Fe*lecting this change, the FD /are program was incorporate within the /=FD0
+aci*ication 0ecurity /oorination Di#ision in No-e)ber 293B* at %hich .oint MA!V oicers an' "SAID
e).lo+ees )o-e' in to )anage the .rogra)* bringing about* accor'ing to Robert Peartt an' 8i) $ar'*
a 'ecline in .eror)ance an' )orale, (n line with )ou )apham<s reirection o* the station away *rom
paramilitary operations bac3 towar classic intelligence *unctions, the /(%<s role in FD iminishe, although it
continue to s3im o** whate#er strategic intelligence was prouce. %s +eartt note, the station was -intereste
in going a*ter region people, an woul get in#ol#e at that point in FD//= operations.- 1N2 .o a lesser egree,
the /(%<s +F" program was also a**ecte.
-.he agency mae a ecision,- >ohn 6ilbur sai, -to get their ass out o* Vietnam as *ast as they coul, *or all the
reasons Kinloch 9ull *oretol. (t was losing control ... iluting its care ... being misirecte. (t ha become the
sponsoring agency *or a hogepoge thing, an +hoeni! was going to be the mechanism by which it was going
to withraw its control an sponsorship ... an transition it o#er to the military. %n that ... meant that the +F"
were no longer going to be the /(%<s e!clusi#e boys, which *oretol a real human crisis in the units.- 1D2 .heir
-elan an morale ha been care*ully nurture,- 6ilbur e!plaine. -6e protecte them *rom the ilution o*
control ... *rom the pro#ince chie*s an battalion commaners. 6e insulate them *rom being use *or whate#er
multiple goo an ba reasons other people wante to use them *or. 6e woul pay them a little better, we woul
ta3e care o* their epenents, an we woul pro#ie them with the best military support there was.- .hat,
accoring to 6ilbur, moti#ate them to -go out an o the things they i.-
9ut, he ae, -they ha incurre a lot o* resentment by the Vietnamese to whom they ha pre#iously been
untouchable .... .he leaership le#els were mar3e men among many Vietnamese political *orces.- An' as
soon as the Vietna)ese got control in the su))er o 293B* #e-er+bo'+ starte' )essing %ith the),# The
PR" began to be use' as bag)en,
-( was hurt in the last attac3 on /an .ho,- 6ilbur continue, -an when ( got bac3 1*rom the hospital2, my
replacement ha alreay arri#e ... an ( spent most o* the ne!t si! wee3s introucing /huc3 1)ieutenant
/ommaner /harles )emoyne2 to the pro#inces, to all the hunres o* people he woul ha#e to eal with.- %t
that point 6ilbur went home, where he remaine until 8ay 19GL, when the /(% as3e him to return to Vietnam
to help 9ill Feel -e#elop a national +F" unit which was targete to reco#er %merican +=6s in 0outh
Vietnam. (t was the only thing that seeme worth *ighting *or,- 6ilbur sai, so he accepte the Cob. ,e was
trans*erre to a na#al security group, assigne to 8%/V, gi#en an o**ice $*ormerly occupie by >oe Vacarro' on
the secon *loor o* "0%(D ((, an went to wor3 *or Feel.
120
-6e were going to set up a unit that woul go aroun the pro#inces an try to collate whate#er e!tant
in*ormation there was, an in the e#ent there was something that inicate 1a +=6 camp2 was there, we woul
try to put an in-place person, or try to e#elop ... someboy to eal with an agent in place, an then gather the
intelligence su**iciently to mount some sort o* rescue operation.-
9ut the rescue program was scuttle, an 6ilbur instea got the Cob o* trans*erring management o* the +F" to
the Vietnamese. ,e was introuce to 0pecial Aorces 8ayor ?guyen Van )ang, 1i2 the *irst +F" national
commaner, an they began tra#eling aroun the country together. - %n it became #ery apparent when (
showe up with a Vietnamese colonel ... what was going to happen. (t meant the military, an that meant that
the leaership elements o* the +F" were in Ceopary o* maintaining allegiance -- they weren<t colonels an
maCors an captains.-
6ilbur sighe an sai *orlornly, -.he *act that there was no national o#erlay allowe the /(% to maintain
autonomy o#er the +F" program longer than they woul ha#e otherwise.- 9ut by the summer o* 19GL -.he
o**icial wor ha to go out that the +F" was becoming part o* the +hoeni! program: <6e<re going to lose control.
:et reay *or the transition.<
-(t was the issolution o* %merican protection o* the units that was manate in our withrawal,- 6ilbur
e!plaine, -that corrupte the 5uality o* control, which in turn allowe the +F" to be turne into a epartment
store. %n ( became an agent o* that. ( was going to try to con#ince people to gi#e up control o* the +F", a*ter (
ha spent all this time arguing *or its insulation an control an inepenence.-
777
To eect territorial securit+* !olb+ inten'e' #to get %ea.ons into the han's o the Vietna)ese -illagers*
so the+ coul' .artici.ate in their o%n 'eense# an' to .ro-i'e #un's to the electe' -illage lea'ers to
carr+ out local 'e-elo.)ent .rogra)s,# 1E2 .he mechanism *or this was Falph >ohnson<s #illage chie*
program at Vung .au, about which +ro*essor ,uy writes: -1%2*ter 19GL, when .hieu succeee to restore
security in the countrysie, se#eral pro#ince an istrict chie*s use *rau an threats to put their men in the
#illage an hamlet councils. .hese men were o*ten the chilren o* rich people li#ing in cities. .hey neee the
title o* <electe representati#es o* the population< to enCoy a temporary e!emption *rom military ser#ice, an their
parents were reay to pay a high price *or their selection as #illage councilors. .hus, e#en the *iercely anti-
/ommunist groups became bitter an resent*ul against .hieu.- 1G2
That brings us to Part III o !olb+6s .lan* internal securit+* other%ise &no%n as Phoeni5* the t%o(trac&
!IA .rogra) to 'estro+ the V!I an' ensure the .olitical stabilit+ o the Thieu regi)e b+ insulating hi)
ro) the bac&lash o his re.ressi-e .olicies, %s it was in the beginning, the paci*ication purpose o* +hoeni!
was to wea3en the lin3 between the -people- an the V/(, while the political-le#el +hoeni! was esigne to
e!ploit that lin3.
.o implement his plan, /olby *orge ahea with a three-month stan-up program ubbe the accelerate
paci*ication campaign $%+/'. 0egun in No-e)ber 293B* AP! %as 'esigne' to bolster Gissinger6s
negotiating .osition in Paris b+ boosting the GVN .resence in the ha)lets* an' %as e5.ecte' to sho%
its eect b+ Tet >o 2939?, .he goal was to a twel#e hunre hamlets to the *i#e thousan alreay classi*ie
uner the ,amlet ;#aluation 0ystem $,;0' as -relati#ely secure.- %*terwar %+/ was to be *ollowe by an
annual -*ull year paci*ication an e#elopment program.- .o *acilitate this process, /olby create the /entral
+aci*ication an De#elopment /ouncil as his personal sta** an pri#ate conuit to .ran .hien Khiem, who
replace .ran Van ,uong as prime minister in %ugust 19G9.
0ai ;#an +ar3er about his patron 6illiam /olby: -.he interesting thing was his relationship with Khiem ... they
woul tra#el aroun the countrysie in the same plane, each sitting there with his brie*case an a stac3 o*
wor3ing papers, writing li3e ma, answering memorana, writing memorana, passing memoranum bac3 an
*orth .... .here<s your coorination on this stu** -- one o* them or both woul use his authority to support what (
was as3ing the Vietnamese to o.-
.o assist him on the council, /olby hire /layton 8c8anaway as program manager@ .ony %llito *or ,;0 reports@
,arry -9u44- >ohnson *or territorial security@ an ;# 9umgartner an Aran3 0cotton *or political liaison. 6ith his
personal sta** in tow, /olby spent two ays each wee3 can#assing the pro#inces, bringing pressure to bear on
people in the *iel, an promoting the accelerate paci*ication campaign.
Phoeni5 a'-iser 8ohn !oo& 'escribes the accelerate' .aciication ca).aign as #an all out nation%i'e
eort to .ut as )an+ ha)lets un'er go-ern)ent control as soon as .ossible, The Viet !ong -iolentl+
o..ose' this action* since its .ri)ar+ .ur.ose %as to eli)inate the) an' their control, It in-ol-e' large
)ilitar+ o.erations cou.le' %ith .s+chological o.erations* resulting in increase' e).hasis on the
.aciication .rogra),# Insoar as the attac& on the V!I strengthene' Henr+ Gissinger6s bargaining
121
.osition* !oo& %rites* #Pressure %as .lace' on the Intelligence an' O.erations !oor'inating !enters to
.ro-i'e )ore -ali' inor)ation about the ene)+6s location, This re=uire' )ore o an eort ro) all o us*
%hich )eant an increase in the nu)ber o rai's* a)bushes an' o.erations,# >:?
.he hour o* +hoeni! was at han. 6ith %merican troops withrawing an emphasis being shi*te *rom military to
political operations, the pressure began to mount on +hoeni! a#isers, who were e!pecte to eliminate any
#estiges o* re#olutionary acti#ity in 0outh Vietnam. Feasons why they *aile to accomplish this goal are o**ere
by >e**rey Face in his boo3 War )omes to .on $n.
9laming -o#ercentrali4ation,- Face obser#es that the istrict, where the D(=//s were locate, -was the lowest
operational le#el- o* +hoeni!, -one ha#ing no signi*icance in terms o* social or li#ing patterns, an sta**e by
outsiers whose interests bore no necessary connection to the istricts. 9y contrast, the re#olutionary
organi4ation was the essence o* simplicity ... an intimately *amiliar with the local population an terrain.- Race
traces the lac& o #securit+# at the -illage le-el to the GVN6s 'is'ain or the co))on .eo.le an' its
#ailure to 'e-elo. a highl+ )oti-ate' an' traine' local a..aratus,# >B?
=perational as well as organi4ational errors also *actore into the e5uation. Aorces un'er the Phoeni5
.rogra)* Race e5.lains* #o.erate' in the )anner o a con-entional %ar co)bat organi7ation ((
in'e.en'entl+ o their en-iron)ent (( an' so the+ 'i' not ha-e the enor)ous a'-antage enHo+e' b+ the
.art+ a..aratus o o.erating continuousl+ in their ho)e area through a .ersonall+ res.onsi-e net%or&
o rien's an' relati-es, .his in turn se#erely hanicappe their ability to locate intene targets an to
recogni4e *ortuitous ones. .he program was also hanicappe in e#eloping a sympathetic en#ironment by the
use by the 0aigon authorities o* *oreign troops an by the program<s intene purpose o* maintaining a
istributi#e system percei#e as un*a#orable to their interests by much o* the rural population.- 192
Res.on'ing to the grie-ances o the rural .o.ulation an' ta&ing ste.s to correct social inHustices )ight
ha-e enable' the GVN to collect intelligence an' contest the V!I in the -illages, 0ut ac&no%le'ging the
nature o the conlict %oul' ha-e un'er)ine' the reason or ighting the %ar in the irst .lace, An'
rather than 'o that* Race sa+s* #attention %as turne' to the use o such ne% 'e-ices as starlight sco.es*
groun' sur-eillance ra'ar* an' re)ote listening 'e-ices* as %ell as the .re-iousl+ e).lo+e' inrare'
an' ra'io trans)ission 'etection 'e-ices,# >2I?
777
In August 293B* concurrent %ith Robert Go)er i).osing* as #a )anage)ent tool*# a nation%i'e =uota o
eighteen hun're' V!I neutrali7ations .er )onth* the science iction as.ect o Phoeni5 %as enhance'
%ith the a'-ent o the Viet !ong Inrastructure Inor)ation S+ste), V/((0 clima!e a process begun in
Aebruary 19GG, when 0ecretary o* De*ense Fobert 8c?amara establishe the De*ense Department<s 0outheast
%sia +rograms Di#ision. The .rocess %as carrie' or%ar' in Saigon in 8anuar+ 293:* %hen the !o)bine'
Intelligence Sta e' the na)es o three thousan' V!I ;asse)ble' b+ han' at area co-erage 'es&s< into
the I0M 2AI2 co).uter at the !o)bine' Intelligence !enter6s .olitical or'er o battle section, At that
.oint the era o the co).uteri7e' blac&list began,
%s the attac3 against the V/( e!ploe across 0outh Vietnam in 19GL, reports on the results poure into the
+hoeni! Directorate, inunating its analysts with reams o* unreliable in*ormation on ini#iual V/( an anti-V/(
operations. (n D(=//s the ata coul be processe manually, but in 0aigon it re5uire machines. Hence* %ith
in.ut ro) the Deense Intelligence Agenc+* the /0I an' the !IA (( all o %hich ha' an interest in
anal+7ing the inishe' .ro'uct (( V!IIS beca)e the irst o a series o co).uter .rogra)s 'esigne' to
absol-e the %ar eort o hu)an error an' %ar )anagers o in'i-i'ual res.onsibilit+,
.he cerebellum o* +hoeni!, V/((0 compile in*ormation gathere *rom all ".0. an *ree worl *iel units on V/(
bounaries, locations, structures, strengths, personalities, an acti#ities. .he en prouct, a monthly summary
report, was a statistical summary o* +hoeni! operational results by pro#ince, region, an the country as a whole
an showe the le#els an methos o* neutrali4ations at each echelon within the V/ in*rastructure. % monthly
acti#ity listing liste each -neutrali4e- V/( by name. In 8ul+ 29:I the Vietna)ese %ere in-ite' to contribute
to the .rogra) an' starte' &e+ .unching at the National Police Interrogation !enter, "ntil then the
co).uteri7e' blac&list %as a unilateral A)erican o.eration,
(n >anuary 19G9 V/((0 was rename the +hung ,oang 8anagement (n*ormation 0ystem. .he +,8(0 *ile
inclue summary ata on each recore V/( in the *ollowing categories: name an aliases@ whether or not he
or she was -at large-@ se!, birth ate, an place o* birth@ area o* operations@ party position@ source o* in*ormation@
arrest ate@ how neutrali4e@ term o* sentence@ where etaine@ release ate@ an other biographical an
statistical in*ormation, incluing photographs an *ingerprints, i* a#ailable. %ll con*irme an suspecte V/(
members were recore in this manner, enabling +hoeni! analysts instantly to access an cross-re*erence ata,
122
then ecie who was to be erase. All o this a''e' u. to har' ti)es or N4/ s+).athi7ers* Thieu
o..onents* an' those unortunate enough to be cre'itors or ri-als o Phoeni5 agents,
As a )anage)ent tool PHMIS %as use' b+ Go)er an' !olb+ to )easure an' co).are the .eror)ance
o Phoeni5 oicers (( unless one belie-es those li&e To) Mc!o+* %ho clai)s that Go)er %as a rau'
%ho %ent to Vietna) #not to do .aciication but to pro,e that it %as being 'one,# >22? In that case the
nu)bers ga)e %as co).uteri7e' .resti'igitation (( an Or%ellian )ani.ulation o statistics to sha.e
.ublic o.inion,
%ccoring to 8c/oy<s scenario, +,8(0 was part o* a larger hoa! begun in >anuary 19G&, when Fobert Komer
introuce the ,amlet ;#aluation 0ystem $,;0' -- eighteen *actors subCect to computer analysis *or each o*
0outh Vietnam<s *i*teen thousan hamlets. .hese *actors inclue ata on V/ military acti#ity, :V? security
capabilities, the strength o* the V/(, Fe#olutionary De#elopment acti#ities, etc. .he ata were assemble by
8%/V istrict a#isers, with the computer then putting the hamlets into one o* three classes: %, secure@ 9,
conteste@ or /, controlle by the V/.
=n the #erge o* .et in December 19G&, nearly hal* o* 0outh Vietnam<s hamlets were rate %. =ne year later
more than hal* were rate %. %s +ublic 0a*ety chie* Aran3 6alton tol me, #$e %oul' get re.orts o .ro-inces
being eight+(i-e .ercent .aciie' an' ninet+ .ercent .aciie'* an' then* %hen it got to the .oint that
the+ %ere near a hun're' .ercent* igures ha' to be re-ise' 'o%n%ar', It %as 'one %ith co).uters* an'
that6s %here I irst hear' the ter) 6GIGO6 or 6garbage in1 garbage out,6# >2E?
.he ,amlet ;#aluation 0ystem also inclue input on -the 3nown strengths o* the N19 currently ienti*ie,
upper-le#el V/( organi4ations at /=0V? region, pro#ince an istrict le#els.- .he ,;0 guesstimate o* V/(
strength in >anuary 19G9 was &E,E00.
Statistics on the V!I1 'einitions o the V!I1 attitu'es to%ar' the V!I (( all %ere subHecti-e, Fet 'es.ite
his o%n a')ission that #%e &ne% there %as a V!I* but %e coul' not be sai' to &no% -er+ )uch about
it*# $illia) !olb+ set about attac&ing it, Ar)e' %ith technolog+ that ren'ere' 'ue .rocess obsolete* he
#set u. stan'ar's an' .roce'ures b+ %hich to %ee' out the alse ro) the correct inor)ation,# .o
ensure that +hoeni! operations were mounte on *actual in*ormation, -.he general rule was establishe that
three separate sources must ha#e reporte a suspect be*ore he coul be put on the rolls.- .hus, the V/( was
put into three classes o* o**eners: %, *or leaers an party members@ 9, *or holers o* other responsible Cobs@
an /, *or ran3. an-*ile members an *ollowers. -%n the ecision was ta3en that those in the </< category
shoul be ignore, since +hoeni! was irecte against the V/( comman an control structure an not the
occasional aherent or supporter.- 11N2
.o complement these sa*ety proceures, +hoeni! a#isers an their Vietnamese counterparts were issue, in
>uly 19GL, the Fello% 0oo&* .ublishe' b+ the !IA un'er co-er o the RAND !or.oration, Oiciall+ title'
(he Modus Operandi of Selected %olitical -adre, the Hellow 9oo3 escribe the operational patterns an
proceures o* V/( care an suggeste -possible actions- to e!ploit them.
(n ?o#ember 19GL came 0=+ 2, telling how to manage a D(=//, an in December 19GL appeare the :reen
9oo3, )urrent +reakdo"n of 4xecutive and %inificant V)I )adre. .he bible o* +hoeni! a#isers, the :reen
9oo3 liste all V/( Cob titles, assigne each an %, 9, or / rating, an prescribe the uration o* etention
suitable *or each *unctionary. (t tol how the V/( route messages, how they constructe an hi in tunnels, who
was li3ely to 3now whom in the party organi4ation, an other tips that woul allow earnest +hoeni! a#isers to
prioriti4e their targets, so they coul go a*ter the big *ish recore in the 9lac3 9oo3 3ept in the situation section
o* each D(=// an +(=//.
=ther publications mae a#ailable to +hoeni! a#isers inclue a bi-wee3ly newsletter that enable a#isers to
share their *a#orite interrogation, operational, an brie*ing techni5ues@ 8%/V<s monthly -0ummary o* V/(
%cti#ities-@ /ombine Document ;!ploitation /enter an /ombine (ntelligence /enter reaouts@ the +,8(0
monthly report@ an an eagerly awaite +hoeni! ;n o* Hear Feport.
+erhaps the most *ar-reaching inno#ation o* 19GL was the +hoeni! /oorinators =rientation /ourse $+/=/',
which hel its *irst classes at Vung .au<s 0eminary /amp in ?o#ember 19GL. .he +/=/ represente a *inal
recognition that, as Doug Dillar remar3e, -8%/V really ha to account *or it.- 11D2 .o state it simply, military
careers were now hitche to the +hoeni! star.
.he a#ent o* the +/=/ o#etaile neatly with the *olerol o* the accelerate paci*ication campaign an the
in*usion into the +hoeni! Directorate o* a new generation o* sta** o**icers, who brought with them new ieas an
were con*ronte with new concerns, most concerning public relations. =n the /(% sie, Fobert ;. ,aynes
replace >oe 0artiano as e!ecuti#e irector, an 0artiano an two 0tate Department o**icers began writing a
123
plan to put +hung ,oang uner the control o* the ?ational +olice. =n the military sie, /olonel Fobert ;. >ones
replace 6illiam :reenwalt as eputy irector.
(n 0eptember, %rmy 0ecurity %gency o**icer )ieutenant /olonel Fichar 9raish steppe in as the military
liaison to 0pecial 9ranch. 9raish -pro#ie irect assistance- to the +hung ,oang sta** in 0pecial 9ranch
hea5uarters at the ?+(/. ,e an the sergeant assisting him were the only military personnel who ha es3s
there. -6e were #ery busy,- 9raish tol me, -primarily a#ising the 0pecial 9ranch in anti-in*rastructure
operations.- 11E2 9raish also a#ise Vietnamese inspectors #isiting +hung ,oang committees on -how to
bolster morale an impro#e recor 3eeping on V/( neutrali4ations.-
0ra'ish note' that Par&er6s )ilitar+ 'e.ut+* !olonel 8ones* 'i' not .ro-i'e #close su.er-ision*# a
con'ition that %as #characteristic o the %hole thing ,,,, I %as co).art)ente'*# 0ra'ish sai' about
hi)sel an' the other )ilitar+ .ersonnel on the sta, #$e %ere outsi'ers, $hen I %as there* S.ecial
0ranch %as Phung Hoang# (( )eaning that the !IA still controlle' Phoeni5* %ith the )ilitar+ there as
%in'o% 'ressing, 4i&e%ise* 0ra'ish obser-e'* the Vietna)ese at the Phung Hoang Oice #%ere .utting
on a sho%, The+ %ere not acting li&e the+ %ere at %ar* but li&e it %as a nor)al Hob,# In his Hu'g)ent*
#The North Vietna)ese %ere )ore co))itte',#
.he /entral +hung ,oang +ermanent /ommittee as o* ?o#ember 19GL loo3e li3e this:
/hairman: :eneral .ran .hien Khiem
%ssistant /hairman: /olonel )y .rong 0ong
+hung ,oang +lan: )ieutenant /olonel )oi ?guyen .an
+lanning 9ureau: 8r. Duong .han ,uu
(ntelligence =perations: 8r. ,a Van .ien
%ction +rograms: 8r. 8ai Viet Dich
(nspections 9ureau: 8r. ?guyen Van ,ong
/hieu ,oi Fepresentati#e: 8r. )e Doan ,ung
0tatistics 9ureau: 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice /aptain Dinh Ouan 8ai
%lso arri#ing at the +hoeni! irectorate in 0eptember 19GL, concurrent with its reorgani4ation into separate
branches *or plans an training, was )ieutenant /olonel 6alter Kolon. +ut in charge o* training, Kolon<s Cob was
-to prepare incoming personnel at 0eminary /amp at Vung .au,- 11G2 which in 19G9 was still the pri#ate
property o* the /(%@ only %ir %merica was authori4e to *ly in an out. ,a#ing wor3e with the agency at #arious
stages in his career, incluing his *irst tour in Vietnam in 19GE with the 0pecial 8ilitary (ntelligence %#isory
.eam $08(%.', +hoeni! was a program that 6alter Kolon was well suite *or. %ssemble by /(% o**icer 6illiam
.iwell within 8%/V<s .echnical (ntelligence 9ranch, 08(%. was a eep co#er *or sophisticate -blac3-
operations against the V/( be*ore +hoeni!. #The .re)ise an' charter o SMIAT*# sai' Golon* #lai' the
groun'%or& conce.tuall+ or Phoeni5,#
6hen Kolon arri#e on the scene, /(% contract o**icers li3e 9ob 0later an #eteran +hoeni! coorinators li3e
Doug Dillar an ,enry 8c6ae were teaching classes at Vung .au. Fecalle Dillar: -.here was a compoun
an classrooms an i**erent 3ins o* training *acilities out on the grouns. /olonel 9e was there with his FD
/are training school, although they 3ept them separate. %n o* course, ( was in#ol#e only with %merican
personnel. .hey ha agency people who ha been with (/;O as instructors. .he ".0. care own there were all
agency people@ later they began to get some %rmy personnel in.-
+hoeni! personnel assigne to 0eminary /amp share their mess hall with +F" a#isers. -6e ha two
elements,- 6alter Kolon recalle. -=ne was the +hoeni! school@ the other was +F". .hose were the only two
there. .he FD/ training area was separate. 9ut the people being assigne were neither *ish nor *owl@
counterintelligence an intelligence people ha no unerstaning o* police or Cuicial proceures, an *ormer
policemen were not the solution either,- he ae, noting that they an people *rom other agencies sometimes
ha no intelligence training at all. -6hat was neee was a new bree o* cat, a person who unerstoo
collection, analysis, an response units li3e the ?ational +olice Aiel Aorce, an how all that Cibe with gathering
e#ience an builing a case.-
0o, Kolon continue, -6e mae recommenations to /olby to get a new program uner way in the 0tates. .hen
( went bac3 to brie* the people at 0%/0%, /(%, Aort ,olabir, an the /ontinental %rmy /omman at Aort )ee
as to what our nees were, not Cust immeiately, but into the *oreseeable *uture as well -- always remembering
that +hoeni! was a coorinati#e *unction. %s a result, the military intelligence branch o* the %rmy, on instructions
*rom the acting chie* o* sta** *or intelligence, acti#ely began ienti*ying in the "nite 0tates people to #olunteer
as +hoeni! a#isers, on the unerstaning that they woul be able to choose their ne!t assignment a*ter
Vietnam. .his woul e#entually e#elop into what was calle the +hoeni! /areer +rogram.-
124
Phoeni5 curriculu) %as soon intro'uce' to the /oreign Ser-ice Institute1 the Deense Intelligence
School1 the Ar)+ Intelligence School1 the Institute or Militar+ Assistance at /ort 0ragg1 the !i-il Aairs
School at /ort Gor'on ;ho)e o the Militar+ Police<1 the Ar)+ Intelligence School in O&ina%a1 an' 8oint
",S, Militar+ A'-isor+ Grou. in Thailan', 6alter Kolon then returne to Vung .au, where he super#ise the
creation o* the ten-ay bimonthly +hoeni! /oorinators< =rientation /ourse. .he sta** was -originally about a
o4en people. 0ome were *ormer D(=// a#isers, an the /(% also supplie a number o* guest lecturers.-
%bout his e!perience as a +hoeni! *acilitator, ,enry 8c6ae sai, -( ga#e two classes. .he *irst class was how
the D(=// shoul be, as set *orth in 0=+ =ne an 0=+ .wo. (n the secon class ( sai, <Aorget the *irst class@
this is how it really is.< .hen ( e!plaine how they ha to aCust to the Vietnamese, how they woul get money *or
e!penitures but no money *or boies, an how sometimes they woul get money *or agents.-
Kolon an his eputy, 8aCor Kelly 0tewart, also pro#ie a#ice an support to 0pecial 9ranch training courses
begun in 9ien ,oa in December 19GL, then e!pane to the other corps. (n this capacity Kolon tra#ele with ;
9ray an )oi ?guyen .an. 9y the en o* 19G9 corps centers ha traine eighteen hunre stuents, primarily
in how to be case o**icers. 9eginning in Aebruary 19G9, %merican a#isers to %FV? ranger battalions, along
with police a#isers an Aree 6orl 8ilitary %ssistance Aorces, were also gi#en +hoeni! instruction.
(n aition to classes at Vung .au, the /(% ga#e instruction to +hoeni! a#isers at the Vietnamese /entral
(ntelligence 0chool. >ohn /oo3 attene one o* the sessions. ,e writes:
There %ere ort+ o us in the class* hal A)erican* hal Vietna)ese, The irst 'a+ at the school
%as 'e-ote' to lectures b+ A)erican e5.erts in the insurgenc+ business, "sing a s)ooth*
slic& 'eli-er+* the+ re-ie%e' all the .o.ular theories concerning co))unist(oriente'
re-olutions ,,,, 4i&e so )an+ )achines .rogra))e' to .eror) at a higher le-el than
necessar+* the+ 'ealt %ith .latitu'es an' theories ar abo-e our 'irt+ little %ar, The+ s.o&e in
i).ersonal tones about %hat ha' to be 'one an' ho% %e shoul' 'o it* as i %e %ere in the
business o selling lie insurance* %ith a bonus going to the )an %ho sol' the )ost .olicies,
Those 'istricts that %ere .eror)ing %ell %ith the =uota s+ste) %ere .raise'1 the .oor
.eror)ers %ere a')onishe', An' it all itte' together nicel+ %ith all the charts an' igures
the+ oere' as su..ort o their i'eas, >2:?
4i&e )an+ o his colleagues* !oo& resente' #the .retentious )en in high .osition# %ho ga-e hi)
unattainable goals* then co).laine' %hen he 'i' not reach the), (n particular, as a result o* mounting
criticism in the %merican press, +hoeni! a#isers were calle to tas3 *or their *ailure to capture rather than 3ill
V/(. .he problem stemme *rom the press<s e5uating +hoeni! with the +F" teams it employe. Aor e!ample, in
Dece)ber 293: the Minnea.olis (ri.une 'escribe' the PR" as #s.eciall+ traine' Vietna)ese assassins#
%ho #sli. silentl+ b+ night into slee.ing ha)lets to carr+ out their 'ea'l+ unction,# The (ri.une note':
#This as.ect o I!EX has a tra'ition that goes bac& ar be+on' the Vietna) conlict* an' its )etho's are
those o hire' &illers e-er+%here,#
.he -hire 3iller- label was to stic3 to +hoeni!, with hapless D(=// a#isers ta3ing the heat *or +F" a#isers
conucting their business with impunity. $riting or the Wall Street /ournal on Se.te)ber @* 293B* re.orter
Peter Gann 'escribe' the V!I as #the in-isible oe*# a''ing that #the target is assassinate'* so)eti)es
brutall+ as an obHect lesson to others,#
In this %a+ Phoeni5 'e-elo.e' a re.utation as an assassination .rogra), That is %h+ it beca)e
i).erati-e that the !IA 'isassociate itsel ro) the .rogra) through .ublic state)ents buil'ing a case
or .lausible 'enial, Such %as the tac& $illia) !olb+ too& at a .ress conerence hel' or thirt+ ne%s
corres.on'ents on Dece)ber EB* 293B* in res.onse to )ounting .ublic =ueries about Phoeni5, In his
o.ening state)ent !olb+ calle' Phoeni5 #a Vietna)ese .rogra)# in %hich A)ericans %ere in-ol-e'
#onl+ as .art o )ilitar+ o.erations,# The MA!V inor)ation oicer assisting !olb+ a''e' that no
A)erican units %ere allocate' to Phoeni5, !olb+ stresse' that the goal %as to ca.ture* not to &ill* V!I,
Nothing %as sai' about %ante' 'ea' or ali-e .osters* the PR"* or the Ar)+6s co)bine' reconnaissance
an' intelligence .latoons ;!RIPS<* %hich 8ere+ Race calls #/ar )ore eecti-e than e-en the PR" at
eli)inating )e)bers o the V!I,# >2B?
$hen as&e' ho% a'-isers .re-ente' .eo.le ro) using Phoeni5 as a co-er or .olitical assassination*
!olb+ cite' s+ste)atic recor' &ee.ing as the ail(sae )echanis)* .ro'ucing charts an' gra.hs to sho%
statistics bac&ing his clai)s, He 'i' not )ention the )assacre o G+6s .eo.le on 8une E* 293B* or Tran
Van Don6s clai) that Phoeni5 hel.e' Truong Dinh D7u in the 293: election* or the station6s s.ecial unit*
%hose -icti)s6 na)es ne-er a..eare' on Phoeni5 rolls,
125
!olb+ )a'e no reerence to the !IA6s ha-ing built the .ro-ince interrogation centers an' sai' that
a'-isers %ere #sel'o)# .resent at interrogations, He then outline' A)erican(concei-e' legal
.roce'ures or 'etaining sus.ects,
The essence o !olb+6s 'isse)bling %as his 'einition o Phoeni5 as an organi7ation rather than a
conce.t, As state' in the .re-ious cha.ter* %hen E' 0ra'+ %as as&e' i Phoeni5 generate' atrocities*
his ans%er %as that it 'e.en'e' on %hether or not the PR" an' the PI!s %ere 'eine' as .art o
Phoeni5, The reason or !olb+6s ignoring these t%o oun'ation stones o Phoeni5 %as to conceal !IA
in-ol-e)ent in the .rogra)* as %ell as to .rotect unilateral !IA .enetrations, what ?elson 9ric3ham calle
-the most important program in terms o* gathering intelligence on the enemy. -6hat >im 6ar calle -the real
sensiti#e, important operations.- 1192 %n, accoring to /olby, it wor3e: -6e were getting more an more
accurate reports *rom insie V/( pro#incial committees an regional +arty hea5uarters *rom bra#e Vietnamese
holing high ran3s in such groups. - 1202
-/=FD0 pro#ie an umbrella,- sai >ohn Vann<s eputy, >ac3. -9ut people, especially the /(%, were always
bac3-channeling through their own agencies to unermine it .... Komer insiste that /(% people woul run
+hoeni! through regular channels. 9ut on highly sensiti#e matters, li3e trac3ing high penetrations, it wasn<t
reporte in /=FD0.-
In a con-ersation %ith the author* 8ac& note' that the inor)al lines o co))an' are )ore i).ortant
than or)al lines* that* as he .ut it* #real .o%er gra-itates o the organi7ational charts, .he way it gets
organi4e isn<t critical@ it ha to be one some way, an it can aapt. Aor e!ample, in ,au ?ghia it was military,
while in :ia Dinh it was 0pecial 9ranch. (t has to be *le!ible to account *or ,;0 % an 9 hamlets as oppose to
/ an D hamlets. 8ilitary or police, epening on the en#ironment. (n any e#ent the /(% a#ise 0pecial 9ranch
ha cogni4ance o#er +hoeni!.- 1212 An' Phoeni5 %as a conce.t* not an organi7ation,
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. )ang<s sister ha marrie .uc3er :ougleman when :ougleman was managing 0=: operations in Da ?ang in
19GD.
!HAPTER 2B: Transitions
0aigon has been calle a wic3e city. (t is sai that the pungent smell o* opium permeate its bac3 alleys, that
its casinos ne#er close, that its brothels occupie entire city bloc3s, an that a man coul sell his soul *or a
hunre ollars, then use the money to hire an assassin to 3ill his lo#er, his boss, his enemy.
%nything was possible in 0aigon. %n gi#en the massi#e in*usion o* %merican soliers, ollars, an materiel that
began in 19GE, criminally mine ini#iuals ha the chance to ma3e *ortunes. .his coul be one in all the
usual ways: by selling military supplies an e5uipment on the blac3 mar3et, by ta3ing 3ic3bac3s *or arranging
ser#ice an construction contracts, an through e!tortion, gambling, prostitution, narcotics, an money
changing. The 'i)ensions o the blac& )ar&et %ere li)itless an' inclu'e' corru.t oicials* s.ies
see&ing untraceable un's an' contact %ith the ene)+* an' )aiosi in league %ith )ilitar+ oicers an'
business)en out to )a&e a ast buc&, 9y late 19GL, with the psychological e*eat brought about by .et, the
crime wa#e was cresting, an the transition *rom a 5uest *or military #ictory to ma3ing a pro*it ha begun in
earnest.
As one !IA oicer recalle'* #$hen the so(calle' Vietna)i7ation o the %ar began* e-er+one &ne% that
e-en though the !o).an+ %oul' still be running !ORDS* it %as the beginning o the en', The contract
e).lo+ees began getting lai' o* es.eciall+ those running o.erations in 4aos, The others* )ostl+ e5(
Ar)+ t+.es* &ne% their turn %as co)ing* so the+ began tr+ing to )a&e as )uch )one+ as the+ coul',
Air A)erica .ilots 'ouble' the a)ount o o.iu) the+ carrie', >i? The A)ericans in !ORDS* %ith the hel.
o the PR"* began sha&ing 'o%n the Vietna)ese* arresting the) i the+ 'i'n6t .a+ .rotection )one+*
e-en ta&ing bribes to ree sus.ects the+6' alrea'+ arreste', E-er+one %ent cra7+ or a buc&,#
#Here +ou ha-e a -er+ corru.t en-iron)ent* a culture that tolerates corru.tion*# E' 0ra'+ obser-e'*
#an' no% +ou6re going to run co-ert o.erations,# >2?
/onsiering that the 0pecial 9ranch -- which ha cogni4ance o#er +hoeni! -- was responsible *or in#estigating
corruption, it was ine#itable that some +hoeni! coorinators woul abuse the system. Much o that abuse
126
occurre' in Saigon un'er the nose o 8ohn O6Geee* the !IA oicer in charge o the !a.ital Militar+
District, Describe by ?elson 9ric3ham as a -#ery capable o**icer- 122 an a -raconteur- who spo3e e!cellent
+arisian Arench, =<Kee*e was a #eteran case o**icer with years o* e!perience in ;urope. (n Vietnam he ha
ser#e as the o**icer in charge o* /hau Doc +ro#ince an ,ue be*ore being trans*erre to 0aigon in 0eptember
19GL.
,ea5uartere on the secon *loor o* the three-story builing behin /ity ,all on ?guyen ,ue 9oule#ar,
O6Geee on .a.er re.orte' to Hatcher 8a)es* the senior "SAID a'-iser to Saigon Ma+or Do Gin Nhieu*
%hose 'e.ut+ #reall+ ran things# ;ore)ost a)ong those things being the loan an' 'eault .a+)ents the
GVN o%e' the #i-e co))unes*# the .rinci.al !hinese a)ilies in !holon %ho ser-e' as South
Vietna)6s )aHor )one+len'ers<, Tall* %ith san'+ hair an' a on'ness or 'rin&ing scotch %ith the !IA6s
notorious inance oicer* alias General Mono.ol+* at the !os)os* O6Geee su.er-ise' S.ecial 0ranch
an' Phoeni5 o.erations in Saigon beginning in Se.te)ber 293B,
%lso arri#ing in 0aigon in 0eptember 19GL was /aptain 0helby Foberts. (n 19GE Foberts ha been a warrant
o**icer *lying photoreconnaissance missions *or 8%/V<s .arget Fesearch an %nalysis Di#ision, locating targets
*or 9-E2 stri3es. %nother creation o* 9ill .iwell<s, .F%/ was use by :eneral 8c/hristian as the nucleus *or the
/ombine (ntelligence /enter . (n 19GG Foberts was commissione an o**icer an, a*ter completing the military
a#iser training program at Aort 9ragg, returne to Vietnam an was assigne as +hoeni! coorinator to
0aigon<s high-rent neighborhoo, +recinct 1. 0nuggle on the east sie o* 0aigon, *ar *rom the s5ualor o*
/holon an .an 0on ?hut<s sprawling shantytowns, Precinct 2 ha' been the .ri-ate 'o)ain o the /rench
colonialists, 0+ 2939 )an+ o those ra)bling -illas %ere occu.ie' b+ A)ericans* inclu'ing 8ohn
O6Geee* Hatcher 8a)es* an' $illia) !olb+* %ho li-e' on tree(line' Hong Ta. Thu Street,
%butting +recinct 1 on the east was :ia Dinh +ro#ince, *ie*om o* 8aCor >ames K. Damron, whom Foberts
escribe in an inter#iew with the author as -the agency<s man in :ia Dinh- an -a warlor who went o#erboar
an built a tremenous builing. 9ut he playe *rom a position o* power,- Foberts sai. -,e emane total
loyalty *rom his people, an the Vietnamese respecte that an were terribly loyal to him.- 8aCors >ames
Damron an Danny +ierce -- who ser#e as eputy coorinator o* the /apital +hung ,oang /ommittee -- were
-business partners.- 1N2
Roberts 'escribe' Dann+ Pierce as #an o.erator# %ho #abuse' the s+ste),# An oicer in the Mor)on
!hurch* Pierce %as lin&e' to the blac&()ar&et su..l+ an' ser-ice in'ustr+ through a secret #ring(
&noc&# i'entiication s+ste), +ierce was allegely *ire *or possession o* a stolen Ceep trace to the 0=:
motor pool locate at 10 ,oang ,oa .am 0treet, where the %rmy /ounterintelligence /orps ha originally set
up shop in Vietnam in 19G2.
(n early 19G9 /aptain Foberts replace 8aCor Danny +ierce as the /apital +hung ,oang /ommittee eputy
coorinator. .herea*ter once a month Foberts #isite the :ia Dinh +ro#ince embassy house to e!change
in*ormation with warlor Damron, until Damron himsel* was reassigne by 6illiam /olby in early 19G9 to an
aministrati#e post in the (V /orps +hoeni! program.
"nli3e his *reewheeling preecessor, who ha *allen uner the in*luence o* the /(%, 0helby Foberts was not a
member o* the +hoeni! Directorate. (n an e**ort to achie#e greater control o#er the program, 8%/V ha Foberts
report to >ohn =<Kee*e on operational matters, while reporting aministrati#ely to the chie* o* 8%/V<s 0aigon
/apital %#isory :roup $0/%:'. %s a result, Foberts was not as closely in#ol#e in /(% operations in 0aigon as
+ierce ha been. 9ut he was collocate with =<Kee*e, an he i ha#e insights into the /(% sie o* +hoeni!
operations in 0aigon.
-8y o**ice was behin /ity ,all, on the *loor below =<Kee*e<s o**ice,- Foberts recalle. -6e ha about twenty
Vietnamese employees, eight in the translation section, the rest oing clerical wor3.- .he o**icer representing the
+hoeni! Directorate in 0aigon was )ieutenant /olonel 6illiam 0ingleton, whom Foberts escribe as -wor3ing
on the operations sie, in co#ert acti#ities. ,e ha sa*e houses an a plantation house with a small sta**.- % tall
man *rom .ennessee, 0ingleton was -particularly intereste in /holon.- .he 0pecial 9ranch o**icer running
+hoeni! operations in 0aigon was /aptain +ham Juat .an, a *ormer %FV? intelligence an psywar o**icer
*eature in a >anuary 12, 19GL, .ife maga4ine article.
Accor'ing to Roberts* Phoeni5 in the !a.ital Militar+ District %as entirel+ a !IA o.eration run out o
S.ecial 0ranch hea'=uarters, #$e e' nothing to the Phoeni5 Directorate*# Roberts sai', #The re.orts
all %ent bac& to the !o)bine' Intelligence !enter* or I %oul' gi-e a brieing to O6Geee* an' he6' go to
the e)bass+* to the si5th loor# (( here anal+sts in the station6s s.ecial unit site' through na)es an'
chose can'i'ates or .enetration,
%nti-in*rastructure operations in 0aigon were i**icult at best. .he city ha ten precincts, with those outsie
owntown 0aigon resembling the suburbs in :o Vap District, as escribe by ,enry 8c6ae. 0ecurity in
127
outlying precincts was maintaine not by the 8etropolitan +olice but by the paramilitary =rer +olice patrolling in
armore cars, %merican in*antry brigaes, an ranger battalions. .here was a strict cur*ew, an in the a*termath
o* .et new interrogation centers were built in all o* 0aigon<s precincts. (n +recinct 1 a large interrogation center
was built by Paciic Architects an' Engineers irectly behin the ".0. ;mbassy. (n other precincts
interrogation centers were constructe -uner e!isting roo*s.- (n either case Foberts tene to a#oi them. -(
was reluctant to get in#ol#e because the 0pecial 9ranch trie to use me uring interrogations. .hey< say, <(*
you thin3 we<re ba, he<ll coo3 you an eat youI< 0o ( in<t care to participate.-
;ach precinct ha wars calle &hun, which were *urther subi#ie into khun, a group o* *amilies, usually
ten, which the 0pecial 9ranch monitore through -*amily boo3s- maintaine by the 8etropolitan +olice. The
inishe' .ro'uct o the /a)il+ !ensus .rogra)* a)il+ boo&s containe' biogra.hical inor)ation an' a
.hotogra.h o e-er+ a)il+ )e)ber, One o the 0hung a)ilies %as res.onsible or &ee.ing trac& o
-isitors to the other a)ilies* an' on the basis o these a)il+ boo&s* the S.ecial 0ranch co).ile'
blac&lists o sus.ecte' V!I )e)bers,#
In 'iscussing the tactics o the S.ecial 0ranch* Shelb+ Roberts sai'* #The+ ran all their o.erations at
night, The+6' turn the loo'lights on* tear 'o%n entire neighborhoo's ,,, an' arrest entire a)ilies, The+
%ere )ainl+ intereste' in sha&e'o%ns, The 6Sen' +our 'aughter to )+ oice6(t+.e harass)ent, An'
)a&ing )one+ on the si'e, E-er+one*# Roberts a''e'* #%as in the blac& )ar&et,#
.here were other intrigues. #$e chase' co))o(liaison .eo.le*# Roberts e5.laine'* #an' i %e caught
the)* the .olice %oul' get re%ar' )one+ an' )one+ or their ca.ture' %ea.ons, This le' to the sa)e
%ea.ons being turne' in o-er an' o-er again, O-er hal a )illion %ere .ai' or* but there %ere less than
a =uarter )illion at the ar)or+,# 8eanwhile, -.he 0pecial 9ranch hi in*ormation *rom us so it wouln<t go up
to =<Kee*e an the /(%. (t was common 3nowlege that i* you ga#e goo in*ormation to +hoeni!, you wouln<t
get the rewar money.- %n that, accoring to Foberts, -was the eath o* the program.-
Despite its hea#y-hane methos, -.he 0pecial 9ranch was consiere a white-collar Cob,- Foberts e!plaine,
-whereas the 0aigon 8etropolitan +olice ... were loo3e own upon.- 0o out o* spite the 8etropolitan +olice
turne *rom law en*orcement to gra*t. +recinct chie*s sol licenses *or e#ery concei#able enterprise, *rom mar3et
stalls to restaurants an hotels, an manage prostitution, gambling, an narcotics rac3ets. .he police were
pai o** by the croo3s an the Vietcong ali3e. %s a result, accoring to Foberts, -.hey -got no respect. .hey
were so corrupt they trie to corrupt the +hoeni! coorinators.-
Ma&ing )atters %orse* Roberts sai'* %as the act that %hen inor)ation on sus.ecte' V!I )e)bers %as
orthco)ing* Phoeni5 coor'inators (( relecting the !IA6s 'esire to ha-e total control o-er sources that
)ight generate strategic intelligence (( %ere tol' to ignore it, This .rohibition an' the rustration it
cause'* .lus the act that the .olice trie' to bribe the .recinct coor'inators* resulte' in )ore than
t%ent+ Phoeni5 a'-isers .assing through Saigon6s ten .recincts in 2939, Most laste' onl+ a e% %ee&s*
although those %ho %ere suborne' b+ the !IA hel' their Hobs or +ears, Aor e!ample, /aptain Keith )ange,
who replace Foberts in +recinct 1, was -pulling o** national-le#el operations- *or two an a hal* years. =n the
other han, Foberts put /aptain Daniel 8oynihan in +recinct 2, -so ( coul watch him, because he ha trouble
with *inance.-
(nee, money was the answer to, an cause o*, all problems in 0aigon. (nso*ar as %(D withrew its +ublic
0a*ety a#isers *rom 0aigon a*ter .et, Foberts sai, -6e, the +hoeni! coorinators, were the only %mericans in
the precincts. 0ome guys were so busy they slept in their o**ices.- %n because the /(% was no longer
isbursing *uns through %(D, +hoeni! coorinators by e*ault became the conuit o* monetary ai to the
?ational +olice an the 0pecial 9ranch. -0o the police chie*s really li3e us a lot,- Foberts ae.
Phoeni5 coor'inators also beca)e the con'uit or AID un's ostensibl+ 'estine' or co))unit+
'e-elo.)ent* reugee* an' health .rogra)s, In realit+* the )one+ bought inor)ation an' inluence,
Foberts recalle one housing proCect in an area o* /holon that ha been le#ele uring .et. .he cost was
U1E0,000. Foberts got the money *rom /(% *inance o**icer :eneral 8onopoly at the embassy anne!. #Short*
.otbellie'* an' in his si5ties*# General Mono.ol+ #sat in the sa)e seat e-er+ night at the !os)os, He
%as there at three o6cloc& e-er+ 'a+ 'rin&ing scotches %ith Da)ron* Singleton* an' O6Geee,#
%s the pursuit o* money began to ri#al the pursuit o* intelligence, a new twist was ae to The Ga)e* as the
co).etition or intelligence sources %as calle'. -;specially in +recinct Ai#e 1which encompasse /holon2,-
Foberts sai, -we< get ".0. eserters wor3ing with the V/( through the blac3 mar3et. .hey were ealing arms
an supplies *rom the +O. 6e 3new o* *i#e eserters in /holon. ;ach one was operating with se#eral (Ds. .he
8+s an /(D ran a number o* operations to get one guy in particular. ,e woul snea3 past guars,
mas5ueraing as an enliste man. %n he was actually etaine se#eral times. 9ut because he ha phony (D,
he was always release.-
128
There )a+ be another reason %h+ this traitor %as ne-er caught, It has to 'o %ith the !IA6s .ractice o
nurturing 'e-iant co))unities as a source o assassins, >ohn 9erry 5uotes one such -contractor- in his
boo3 Those 1allant Men on Trial in Vietnam: #$ell* I %al& behin' this screen an' I 'on6t see this gu+6s ace*
but he gi-e )e @*III .iasters an' a .icture an' an a''ress* an' I go &ill the 'u'e an' then go get )+
other @*III,# >A?
777
6ith Vietnami4ation, +hoeni! came uner closer scrutiny. .he repercussions were e#ient e#erywhere. .owar
the en o* 19GL, ,enry 8c6ae recalle, -8aCor Damron got into a power play *or intelligence resources- 1E2
an Damron<s bosses reache the conclusion that he was all smo3e an mirrors.
#Da)ron %as losing control*# Mc$a'e e5.laine', #So he .ut the bla)e on us* the DIO!! a'-isers* to
gain ti)e an' s.ace or hi)sel, $e %ere sacriice',# % *ew ays later 8c6ae an a group o* scapegoats
$not incluing >ohn /oo3' were trans*erre out o* :ia Dinh to other pro#inces. 8c6ae lane in ,au ?ghia in
((( /orps as eputy to the pro#ince +hoeni! coorinator, /aptain Daniel ). 0mith.
9ac3 in :ia Dinh, Damron an his loyalists were hun3ering own, 9ut /olby was intent on cleaning house, an
Damron was trans*erre out o* :ia Dinh. Doug Dillar recalle the scanal precipitate by Damron<s in*amous
e!cesses: -(<ll ne#er *orget /olby<s amonition to us on one o* his #isits own in the Delta. "p in .hree /orps
there was an agency guy who ha built a magni*icent builing with a helicopter laning pa on the roo*. %n
/olby sai, <.here ain<t gonna be any more monuments built in Vietnam. (<m gla to see you guys ha#e a
conser#ati#e program *or Cust getting the Cob one.<- 1G2
Ironicall+* the ne% Gia Dinh .ro-ince oicer in charge .ro-e' )ore troubleso)e or !olb+ than Da)ron,
Aor whereas Damron was guilty o* mere gree, the new pro#ince o**icer was prey to a *ar more angerous
master: his conscience. % #eteran /(% paramilitary o**icer, Falph 8c:ehee ha alreay spent *i*teen years
*ighting the ,oly 6ar in a number o* %sian countries when he arri#e in Vietnam in =ctober 19GL. ,is biggest
success ha been in .hailan, where he ha e#elope sur#ey teams *or rooting out the /ommunist
in*rastructure. McGehee6s sur-e+ tea)s consiste' o .olice* )ilitar+* an' securit+ oicials %ho entere'
Thai bor'er to%ns to #interrogate an+one o-er ten +ears ol'# >:? about !o))unist eorts to organi7e
secret .olitical cells, Ho%e-er* in a cruel t%ist o ate %hich engen'ere' his crisis o aith an' his all
ro) grace* McGehee nai-el+ rela+e' inor)ation unco-ere' b+ his sur-e+ tea)s in'icating that the
!o))unist insurgenc+ ha' o-er%hel)ing .o.ular su..ort, Although accurate in their assess)ent o
the situation* his re.orts 'eie' .olic+ an' %ere su))aril+ 'is)isse' b+ his bosses in $ashington,
/eeling reHecte'* McGehee arri-e' in Saigon teetering on the brin& o heres+, $hat he sa% o Phoeni5
.ushe' hi) o-er the e'ge,
%s the /(%<s :ia Dinh pro#ince o**icer in charge, 8c:ehee reporte to the /(%<s ((( /orps F=(/@ as the :ia Dinh
+ro#ince +hoeni! coorinator, he reporte to the /=FD0 pro#ince senior a#iser. (n his boo3 /eadly /eceits,
he writes that -the primary /=FD0 program was the +hoeni! operation- an that -/(% money was the catalyst.-
1L2 9ut 8c:ehee<s problem with +hoeni! ha nothing to o with the attac3 on the in*rastructure@ in an inter#iew
*or this boo3, he sai the +F" program -was amirable.- 8c:ehee<s gripe was that -the agency was not allowe
to report the truth.-
6rites 8c:ehee: -.he assignment to :ia Dinh ga#e me the opportunity to see how the agency<s intelligence
program wor3e, or more accurately how it i not wor3 at that le#el. One or t%o sentence intelligence
re.orts .oure' in* %ere translate'* an' %ere ile' or thro%n a%a+, A t+.ical re.ort* one o hun're's li&e
it recei-e' each %ee&* sai': 6T%o ar)e' V! %ere seen )o-ing south o the -illage o ,,, this )orning,6 A
)assi-e agenc+L!ORDSLPhoeni5 ile s+ste) .rocesse' this 'ail+ lo% o nonsense, !ollation an'
anal+sis ne-er a..lie', I %on'ere' ho% this intelligence eort coul' .ossibl+ gi-e our lea'ers an'
generals an+thing e-en a..roaching an accurate .icture o %hat %as going on, >9?
#Our .olic+*# McGehee 'e'uce'* #%as base' on 6intelligence6 re.orts o the nu)bers o co))unists in
Vietna) that ha' nothing to 'o %ith realit+, Either the+ %ere the result o unbelie-able inco).etence or
the+ %ere 'eliberate lies create' to 'u.e the A)erican .eo.le,# >2I?
McGehee settle' on the secon' e5.lanation* a belie he shares %ith Sa) A'a)s* the contro-ersial !IA
anal+st %ho =uit the agenc+ in 29:C in .rotest o-er %hat he clai)e' %as #the slo..+ an' oten
'ishonest %a+ ",S, intelligence con'ucte' research on the struggle in In'ochina,# >22? % member o*
:eorge /ar#er<s 0%V% sta**, %ams wrote the /(%<s hanboo3 on the V/( an *or *i#e years taught a class on
the V/( to /(% case o**icers boun *or Vietnam. %*ter 5uitting the agency, %ams claime that the /(% ha
*alsi*ie statistics, an in 29BE in a !0S 'ocu)entar+ calle' (he 1ncounted 2nemy3 ' Vietnam 4eception*
he accuse' General $illia) $est)orelan' o a 'eliberate co-er(u., Hu)iliate'* $est)orelan' ile' his
a)ous P2EI )illion libel suit against !0S,
129
The origins o the #Vietna) 'ece.tion# 'ate bac& to 8anuar+ 22* 293:* %hen SAVA 'irector !ar-er %rote
a )e)o* intro'uce' as e-i'ence at the $est)orelan' trial* in'icating that the nu)ber o conir)e'
Vietcong* .ut at o-er a =uarter o a )illion b+ MA!V* %as #ar too lo% an' shoul' be raise'* .erha.s
'ouble',# Despite inications presente by :eneral 8c/hristian substantiating the /(% estimate, 8%/V
reCecte it an instea, by e!cluing Vietcong 0el*-De*ense Aorces *rom its orer o* battle, contri#e a lower
number. /(% analysts persiste in arguing *or an estimate approaching hal* a million, an a stalemate ensue
until %ugust N0, 19G&, when Director o* /entral (ntelligence Richar' Hel)s* 'escribing the issue as #charge'
%ith .olitical an' .ublic relations o-ertones*# >2E? arrange' or !ar-er to lea' a 'elegation o senior
intelligence oicers to Saigon to negotiate an agree)ent on the e5act si7e o NVA an' V! orces,
.wo ays a*ter arri#ing in 0aigon an meeting with 8c/hristian<s replacement, :eneral Da#ison, /ar#er
noti*ie ,elms that 8%/V was -stonewalling- an that #circu)stantial in'icators ,,, .oint to inesca.able
conclusion that $est)orelan' ,,, has gi-en instructions tanta)ount to 'irect or'er that strength total
%ill not e5cee' CII*III ceiling, Rationale see)s to be that higher igure %oul' not be suicientl+
o.ti)istic an' %oul' generate unacce.table le-el o criticis) ro) the .ress,# >2C?
%lthough the /(% 3new that the estimate 120,000 V/ 0el*-De*ense Aorces $which 6estmorelan escribe as
-ol men, ol women an chilren-' were the integral element o* the insurgency, /ar#er, a*ter being shown
-e#ience that ( han<t hear be*ore,- cut a eal on 0eptember 1N. ,e sent a cable to ,elms saying: #!ircle
no% s=uare' .... 6e ha#e agree set o* *igures 6estmorelan enorse.- 11D2 (n ?o#ember ?ational 0ecurity
%#iser 6alt Fostow showe +resient >ohnson a chart inicating that enemy strength ha roppe *rom
2LE,000 in late 19GG to 2D2,000 in late 19G&. +resient >ohnson got the success he wante to show, an
Vietnam got .et.
Sa) A'a)s6s clai) that the agenc+ ha' #)isinor)e' .olic+)a&ers o the strength o the ene)+# %as
bac&e' at the !0S libel trial b+ !ar-er6s 'e.ut+* George $, Allen* %ho clai)e' that $est)orelan' #%as
ulti)atel+ res.onsible# or #this .rostitution# an' that the !IA* #b+ going along %ith it*# ha' #sacriice'
its integrit+ on the altar o .ublic relations an' .olitical e5.e'ienc+,# %llen ae that the en result o* the
eception was that 6ashington was le*t -essentially with an inae5uate unerstaning o* what we were up
against- in Vietnam. %ccoring to %llen, the 0el*-De*ense Aorces were not ol women an chilren but harene
guerrillas who were responsible *or D0 percent o* all ".0. combat casualties in Vietnam.
%s a result o* %ams<s claims, a congressional in5uiry was conucte in 19&E. .he in#estigating committee,
chaire by =tis +i3e, conclue that Cuggling o* numbers -create *alse perceptions o* the enemy ".0. *orces
*ace, an pre#ente measurement o* changes o#er time. 0econ, pressure *rom policyma3ing o**icials to
prouce positi#e intelligence inicators rein*orce erroneous assessments o* allie progress an enemy
capabilities.- 11E2
777
0am %ams has sai that -the reason 1+hoeni!2 i not wor3 was that its nees, although recogni4e in theory,
were ne#er *ul*ille in practice. The 'i-orce bet%een ho.e an' realit+ beca)e so %i'e that the .rogra)
'egenerate' into a ga)e o statistics* in %hich nu)bers %ere .ara)ount* an' the obHect o the e5ercise
(( the cri..ling o the !o))unist Part+ (( %as ne-er e-en a..roache',# >23?
4i&e%ise* Ral.h McGehee oun' the !IA s=uaring statistical acts %ith i'eological .reconce.tions in
Vietna)* Hust as it ha' in Thailan', #The station6s intelligence brieings on the situation in South Vietna)
conir)e' all )+ ears*# he %rites, The brieers #tal&e' onl+ about the nu)bers o ar)e' Viet !ong* the
slo%l+ increasing North Vietna)ese regular ar)+* an' the occasional )e)ber o the !o))unist
inrastructure, The+ )a'e no )ention o the )ass(base' /ar)er6s 4iberation Association* or the
!o))unist +outh organi7ation* all o %hich in so)e areas certainl+ inclu'e' entire .o.ulations,# >2:?
The reason or this 'ece.tion* McGehee conten's* %as that #",S, .olic+)a&ers ha' to sell the i'ea that
the %ar in the South %as being ought b+ a s)all )inorit+ o !o))unists o..ose' to the )aHorit+(
su..orte' 'e)ocratic go-ern)ent o Ngu+en Van Thieu, The situation* ho%e-er* %as the o..osite ,,,,
The ",S, %as su..orting Thieu6s tin+ oligarch+ against a .o.ulation largel+ organi7e'* co))itte'* an'
'e'icate' to a co))unist -ictor+,# >2B?
McGehee bla)es the A)erican 'eeat in Vietna) on #.olic+ being 'eci'e' ro) the to. in a'-ance* then
intelligence being selecte' or create' to su..ort it ater%ar's,# In .articular* he singles out $illia)
!olb+ as the .rinci.al a.ostle o the 0ig 4ie, A -eteran o the /ar East Di-ision* McGehee at one .oint
ser-e' as !olb+6s acol+te at 4angle+ hea'=uarters an' bases his accusations on irsthan' obser-ations
o !olb+ in action (( o %atching !olb+ 'eli-er brieings %hich %ere #a co).lete hoa5 contri-e' to
'ecei-e !ongress,# >29? $rites McGehee o !olb+: #I ha-e %atche' hi) %hen I &ne% he %as l+ing* an'
not the least lic&er o e)otion e-er crosses his ace,# 0ut %hat )a'e !olb+ e-en )ore 'angerous* in
130
McGehee6s o.inion* %as his )ani.ulation o language, #!olb+ e).hasi7e' the i).ortance o selecting
Hust the right %or's an' charts to con-e+ the 'esire' i).ression to !ongress, He regar'e' %or' usage
as an art or)* an' he %as a )aster at it,# >EI?
Hears later they met again in :ia Dinh +ro#ince, at which point 8c:ehee escribes /olby as -a harrie, sel*-
important, istracte bureaucrat- who -began calling *or statistics. <,ow many V/ 3ille this monthB ,ow many
captureB ,ow many *ire*ightsB< ;ach unit chie* answere. /olby chec3e the replies against the *igures in his
boo3s, an 5uestione each chie* about iscrepancies or outstaning *igures.- %ll this was a waste o* time,
8c:ehee contens. #Here the ",S, %as tr+ing to ight an ene)+ it onl+ slightl+ ac&no%le'ge', $h+M
$hat ha' ha..ene' to all the i'ealis)* all the rules o getting an' re.orting intelligenceM $h+ 'i' the
agenc+ blin' itsel %hile .reten'ing to loo& or intelligenceM $h+ 'i' %e insist on &illing .eo.le instea'
o tal&ing to the)M Ho% long %oul' this insanit+ go onM# >E2?
(n his e*ense /olby sai to me, -6e were getting all the statistics, an i* you coul get them on the computer,
you coul play them bac3 an *orth a little better, an see things you couln<t see otherwise. (t was really 5uite
interesting. ( ne#er really belie#e the numbers as absolute, but they helpe you thin3 about the problems. 6e
woul use it *or control o* how local people were oing,- he e!plaine, -how i* one pro#ince reporte they ha
capture a lot o* category /s, but no %s, an another pro#ince sai it capture 1E category %s, *irst you< chec3
i* there were any truth to the secon story, an i* it is true, you 3now the secon pro#ince is oing better then the
*irst one. Hou on<t belie#e the numbers o**-han, you use them as a basis *or 5uestions.- 1222
?umbers as a basis *or 5uestions were a management tool, but they were also a way o* manipulating *acts. %n
6illiam /olby is a scion o* the gray area in between. In his autobiogra.h+* &onora.le Men* !olb+ e5.lains
ho% his ather con-erte' to !atholicis)* an' ho% !olb+ hi)sel* %hen he entere' Princeton* %as
e5clu'e' ro) the in cro%' as a result, %n articulate man traine as a lawyer an spy, but with only one *oot
in the oor, /olby embrace -the art o* the possible- an culti#ate his -grey man- mentality to achie#e success
in the /(% bureaucracy, as well as to issol#e the lines between right an wrong, enabling him to gi#e +hoeni! a
clean bill o* health. #I ha-e no =ual)s about acce.ting res.onsibilit+ or it*# he %rites, >EC?
0o it was in Vietnam, that Cust as criticism o* +hoeni! was builing, within the program, the press began turning
its attention towar the subCect. .he calamity calle .et ha subsie, the elections were o#er, an the +aris-
+eace .al3s were about to start. The !o))unist sha'o% go-ern)ent %as e)erging into the light o 'a+*
an' ",S, eorts to 'eal %ith it beca)e the .ressing concern,
:limpses o* +hoeni! began appearing in print. On 8une E9* 293B* in his #4etter ro) Saigon# colu)n in (he
*e$ 5or0er* Robert Sha.len i'entiie' the .rogra) b+ its Vietna)ese na)e* Phung Hoang* calling it the
#all(seeing bir',# 0haplen rehashes the thrust o* the program, citing statistics an 5uoting Fobert Komer as
saying -some E,000 arrests ha#e been mae o* allege members o* the 1V/2 comman structure.- %ccoring to
0haplen, the program<s maCor wea3ness was -a tenency on the part o* the Vietnamese to buil up a massi#e
ossier on a suspect until he gets win o* what is happening an isappears.- 0haplen notes that -istrict an
#illage chie*s are sometimes loath to *urnish or act on intelligence on the grouns that the war may soon be
o#er.-
(nee, the possibility o* a negotiate settlement raise the specter o* those in the V/( -- the people +hoeni!
was arresting and killin -- gaining legal status. %n that scenario sent chills running up an own e#ery war
manager<s spine. 0ut the transition ro) su..orter to critic o A)erican con'uct o the %ar 'i' not co)e
easil+ to re.orters use' to acting as cheerlea'ers, Reasons or %ith'ra%ing su..ort ha' +et to be
unco-ere', Ho%e-er* sensing )o)entu) in that 'irection* the inor)ation )anagers began to search
or sca.egoats, An' %ho better to bla)e than the Vietna)ese the)sel-esM GVN shortco)ings* %hich
%ere .re-iousl+ s%e.t un'er the car.et* %ere su''enl+ being aire', Su''enl+ the Vietna)ese %ere
corru.t an' inco).etent* an' that* not an+ ault on the .art o the A)ericans* e5.laine' %h+ the
insurgenc+ %as gro%ing,
Moreo-er* %ar cri)es in 293B still %ent unre.orte', The V! %ere #aceless*# an abstract statistic %hose
sco.e %as negotiate' b+ the !IA an' MA!V, Wall %treet ,ournal reporter +eter Kann, in a 0eptember 19GL
article on +hoeni!, calle the V/( -the in#isible *oe.- Aor Kann, they were an insiious -unergroun- enemy
who coul only be eliminate -at night- in their homes.
Kann employe similar imagery in 8arch 19G9 in an article title -.he ,ien 6ar: ;lite +hoeni! Aorces ,unt
Vietcong /hie*s in (solate Villages.- Here Phoeni5 is characteri7e' as a #s+ste)atic* so.histicate'
a..lication o orce,# The PR" an' their ",S, a'-isers are #elite*# %hile ar ro) ha-ing an+ .o.ular
su..ort* the V!I )e)bers are outcasts in #isolate' -illages*# ar re)o-e' ro) cities an' ci-ili7ation,
=n >anuary G, 19G9, The Ne" =ork Times reporter Drummon %yres ga#e +hoeni! a *a#orable re#iew, saying
that -more than 1E,000 o* the L0,000 V/ political agents thought to be in 0outh Vietnam are sai to ha#e been
131
capture or 3ille.- ,e also e!presses the belie* that -the general course o* the war ... now appears to *a#or the
:o#ernment- an preicts that +hoeni! woul -achie#e much greater success as the center<s *iles grow.-
Despite the goo re#iews, the sur*acing o* +hoeni! in the press sent the publicity-shy /(% running *or co#er.
"ner ?ational 0ecurity /ouncil Directi#e 10/2, the /(% is authori4e to unerta3e secret political an
paramilitary operations. %s Falph >ohnson writes, -/(% was empowere to e#elop an test programs through
its covert assets. (* these programs were success*ul, an i* appro#e, an i* they supporte ".0. policy
obCecti#es, then they woul be turne o#er to appropriate overt ".0. agencies.- %n so, in December 19GL, the
newly arri#e /(% station chie* in*orme D;+/=FD0 6illiam /olby -that the %gency ha *ul*ille its *unction.
1+hoeni!2 was now *unctional an /(% propose to withraw all its management an o#erall responsibility.- 12D2
Ma&ing this .i-otal 'ecision %as Te' Shac&le+. % #eteran /(% o**icer with e!perience in :ermany an in
8iami running operations against /uba, 0hac3ley ha Cust complete a two-year tour as station chie* in
Vientiane, )aos, where he ha ac5uire a etaile unerstaning o* the situation in 0outh Vietnam, primarily
through meetings in thir countries with >ohn ,art an )ou )apham, at which regional issues were iscusse,
strategy was coorinate, an brie*ings o* eep-co#er agents were hel. -.he big item,- accoring to )apham,
-was the ?V% coming own the ,o /hi 8inh .rail.- 12E2
.all, thin, an pale, 0hac3ley, in an inter#iew conucte in his %rlington o**ice, concurre. -(t was the same war
in the )aotian panhanle,- he sai, -although )aos, in aition, ha the basic political problem o* coalition.- 12G2
?o stranger to the types o* programs the /(% was running in 0outh Vietnam, 0hac3ley re#iewe them all upon
arri#ing in 0aigon in ?o#ember. -(t became clear to me then,- he tol me, -that the paci*ication programs ha
come o* age ... that the agency contribution was no longer re5uire. 0o my original proposal was to see about
getting others to manage these ... programs, to *ree up /(% resources to impro#e the 5uality o* the intelligence
prouct, to penetrate the Vietcong, an the ?V% supporting them, an to concentrate more against the ?orth
an the V/ an the ?V% in /amboia.
#So negotiations %ere un'erta&en*# Shac&le+ continue'* #an' an agree)ent %as reache' to .hase out
the !IA, +aci*ication programs were to go to the :V?, an /=FD0 was to pro#ie the transition. 6e too3 a
mission approach. ;ach program was approache speci*ically, incluing +hoeni!, an a certain le#el o* top
management was pro#ie *or coorination. 0tatic /ensus :rie#ance was ta3en apart@ some *unctions went to
Fe#olutionary De#elopment, some to the ,amlet ;#aluation 0ystem, an some were roppe. 9y 19G9, static
/ensus :rie#ance was out o* business. FD an .erritorial 0ecurity were merge an +hil +otter an Fo
)anreth saw that the :V? too3 o#er the +F" program.- %n +hoeni!, too, was iscare.
=n December 1D, 19GL, 8%/V noti*ie D;+/=FD0 6illiam /olby o* its intention to assume -responsibility *or
intelligence matters as they pertain to the V/ in*rastructure.- 12&2 9y >une 19G9 the trans*er o* +hoeni! *rom /(%
to 8%/V->2 was complete.
(n early December, ;#an +ar3er recalle, -( became the author o* memos bac3 an *orth *rom /olby to 0hac3ley
putting mysel* out o* business.- +ar3er, howe#er, was not please with the reorgani4ation, his main obCection
being that #the )ilitar+ sta oicers %ere not rea'+ to ta&e o-er,# >EB?
-.his was a i**icult assignment *or the military,- 0hac3ley concurre, because there -ha to be liaison with the
0pecial 9ranch. Hou ha to ha#e a manager to coorinate intelligence problems. /or instance* lea's ca)e out
o the PI!s an' ha' to be coor'inate' %ith the highest le-els o !IA,#
To acilitate the .rocess* !olb+ incor.orate' the Phoeni5 .rogra) as a 'i-ision %ithin !ORDS* but %ith
a senior !IA sta oicer as 'irector* unctioning as the A)erican counter.art to the secretar+ general o
the !entral Phung Hoang Per)anent Oice, (n this way the /(% coul, when necessary, irect +hoeni!
a#isers an e!ercise Curisiction o#er prisoners an penetration agents spun out o* the program. /hairmanship
o* +hoeni! committees at region an pro#ince became the responsibility, respecti#ely, o* the corps D;+/=FD0
an the pro#ince senior a#iser. /(% region an pro#ince o**icers became eputy chairmen an ostensibly
supporte their new military managers with /(% intelligence. 1292
#The i'ea*# accor'ing to Shac&le+* #%as that E-an Par&er* an' three or our others* %oul' slo%l+ .eel
bac& .eo.le as the )ilitar+ )arche' in,# .herea*ter the role o* the +hoeni! irector was to meet -once or
twice a wee3 with the 1Vietnamese2 to iron out problems. 6as there a pro#ince chie* not willing to cooperate with
the +(/B 6as he *unneling people to the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice, rather than to the 0pecial 9ranchB 8aybe
there was o#ercrowing in a +(/ that pro#ince or region couln<t resol#e. 6hat to oB 6ell, the +hoeni! irector
woul go to the secretary-general an cite speci*ic cases. .here might be a 3nowlegeable source in a +(/ who
neee to be brought to 0aigon. 6ere the line managers loo3ing at the ossiersB Hes or noB-
132
Des.ite the act that the Phoeni5 'irector* a senior !IA sta oicer* ha' cogni7ance o-er the PI!
.rogra)* #Phoeni5*# insiste' Shac&le+* #ha' nothing to 'o %ith intelligence o.erations, (t was completely
separate *rom 0pecial 9ranch trying to penetrate the Vietcong. %ny guy who coul be use as a penetration
agent was spun out o* +hoeni!.- .hat was the Cob in 19G9 o* special unit analysts uner the management o* /(%
o**icer :eorge 6eis4. (n this way, +hoeni! e#ol#e into a massi#e screening operation, with its parent
organi4ation, the 0pecial 9ranch, ha#ing, in the wors o* Falph >ohnson, the -intelligence coorination mission-
o* -3eying important V/( political leaers an acti#ists so as not to clog up the system with #olumes o* low le#el
V/( care or *ront members.- 1N02
An' so* in 8une 2939* the !IA rece'e' into the 'ar& corners o !ORDS, ;#an +ar3er, ha#ing brought the
+hoeni! program to *ruition, was appointe eputy chie* o* the /(%<s 0pecial =perations Di#ision an was
replace as +hoeni! irector by #eteran /(% o**icer >ohn 8ason. Describe by 0hac3ley as -a highly ecorate
6orl 6ar .wo %rmy colonel who ser#e with the agency mostly in ;urope $an with :eorge Arench in
.ur3ey',- 8ason was a personal *rien o* :eneral /reighton %brams. -,e *ollowe %brams<s tan3s through
;urope with an in*antry battalion,- sai >im 6ar, who, as the /(%<s Vietnam es3 o**icer in 19G9, as3e 8ason
to ta3e the Cob. %t *irst he re*use, but e#entually 8ason succumbe to 6ar<s supplications -- to his eternal
regret.
#Mason caught all the Phoeni5 la&,# $ar' sighe', #The last ti)e I s.o&e %ith hi)* the onl+ thing he sai'
to )e %as 6Fou bastar',6#
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. Drugs %ere also s)uggle' on !IALSOG blac& lights* %hich %ere e5e).t ro) custo)s chec&s,
4i&e%ise* SOG .ersonnel carrie' )ilitar+ assistance a'-iser #Get out o 8ail /ree# car's* e5e).ting
the) ro) search an' sei7ure b+ their a'-ersaries in the Militar+ Police an' !ri)inal In-estigation
Di-ision,
!HAPTER 29: Ps+o.s
.he *abric o* 0outh Vietnamese society, always loosely 3nit, began to unra#el in 19G9. %s prospects *or a clear-
cut military #ictory *or either sie slippe away, psychological operations became the weapon o* choice in what
was an increasingly political war. 0oth si'es .la+e' the .s+%ar ga)e, Its onl+ rule: Post +our o%n score,
.he insurgents score the *irst points in >une 19G9, when they *orme the +ro#isional Fe#olutionary
:o#ernment $+F:' to represent them in 0outh Vietnam an at the negotiating table in +aris. .he +F: was
immeiately recogni4e by thirteen /ommunist bloc an ten nonaligne nations -- mostly %rab. 0upport was
e!presse as well by 0canina#ian, %*rican, an )atin %merican countries. =ne month later /=0V? issue
Fesolution 9 irecting its o**icers -to prepare political care to insure a capability to go#ern in anticipation o* a
coalition go#ernment in 0outh Vietnam.- 112 )iberation /ommittees were mae suborinate to the +F: an were
rename Fe#olutionary /ommittees. At the -illage an' ha)let le-el the insurgenc+ %as rein-igorate',
0ac& at !IA hea'=uarters in $ashington* it %as recogni7e' that: #There %ere suicient co))unist
orces to &ee. the %ar going* an' .rogress 'e.en'e' on the )orale an' 'eter)ination o the
co))unists,# 122 8orale, howe#er, is intangible, so /(% propaganists cite irre*utable statistical e#ience as
proo* that the V/( was losing, not gaining -- as was the reality 1N2 -- support in the #illages. (n %pril 19G9 ,;0
reports inicate that more than three 5uarters o* all Vietnamese were li#ing in -secure- #illages.
The .ur.orte' success %as attribute' to V!I )an.o%er shortages cause' b+ aerial an' artiller+
bo)bar')ent* 'eoliation ca).aigns* orce' relocations* an' )ass arrests, The V!I %as sai' to be
collecting less ta5 )one+ as a result o Phoeni5 an'* out o 'es.eration* to be using as ca're chil'ren
%ho %ere too +oung to be issue' IDs, 0ut #the bul& o )an.o%er shortages*# the Phoeni5 2939 En' o
Fear Re.ort clai)e'* #%ere cause' b+ 'eserters %ho rallie' to the GVN,# In Vinh 4ong an' Sa Dec
.ro-inces* it sai'* #)an.o%er shortages at 'istrict* -illage an' ha)let le-els range' ro) A@ to 2II
.ercent 'uring 2939, "nable to co.e %ith the GVN accelerate' .aciication ca).aign* V!I )e)bers b+
late No-e)ber 2939 ha' le' to areas o s.arse .o.ulation an' e-en !a)bo'ia %here the+ coul' e5ert
little inluence o-er the .o.ulation,# >A?
Arom the language o* the +hoeni! report, one coul easily thin3 that the *ew V/( members who ha not e*ecte
were hiing in /amboia. 9ut the author o* -.he .ruth %bout +hoeni!,- whose area o* operations inclue 0a
133
Dec an Vinh )ong pro#inces, claims that most /hieu ,ois simply regurgitate the %merican line in orer to win
amnesty, ma3e a 5uic3 #isit to their *amilies, enCoy a *ew home-coo3e meals, then return to the *ray, *at an
reste. )egitimate /hieu ,ois, %n writes, were pariahs who were not accepte bac3 in their #illages, while other
/hieu ,ois were traine by the V/ to in*iltrate the program an become spies. 1E2
(n any e#ent, *rom 19G& onwars, all -rallie- V/( members were inclue in +hoeni! neutrali4ation statistics,
an by 19G9 more than a hunre thousan e*ectors ha been processe through *i*ty-one /hieu ,oi centers.
.he /hieu ,oi program was manage *rom 19GG until 8arch 19G9 by =gen 6illiams, then turne o#er to
;ugene +. 9able, a career /(% o**icer who ha ser#e with Falph >ohnson in the Alying .igers.
;#an +ar3er state that /hieu ,oi o**ere more satis*action than +hoeni!, an -/hieu ,oi,- sai >im 6ar, -was
a great program. 6ell one.- $ar' e5.laine' that )ost !hieu Hoi a'-isers %ere ro) the ",S, Inor)ation
Ser-ice* although so)e %ere State De.art)ent or )ilitar+ oicers, -9ut they wouln<t ha#e more than one
%merican a#iser in a pro#ince an,- 6ar ae, -it was usually the Vietnamese operating at istrict le#el.- 1G2
".on arri-ing at the !hieu Hoi center* the 'eector %as #inter-ie%e'# an'* i he ha' inor)ation on the
V!I* %as sent to the PI!1 i he ha' tactical inor)ation* he %as sent to )ilitar+ interrogators, Ne5t ca)e
.olitical in'octrination* lasting ro) ort+ to si5t+ 'a+s* 'e.en'ing on the in'i-i'ual, -.hey ha a *ormal
course,- sai 6ar. -.hey were shown mo#ies an gi#en lectures on emocracy.- ".on gra'uation each %as
gi-en an ID car'* a )eal* so)e )one+* an' a chance to re.ent, +olitical inoctrination was hanle by
e*ectors who sai they ha been well treate by the %mericans an ha ecie it was better to li#e *or a *ree
Vietnam than to ie *or the totalitarian ?orth Vietnamese. -/hieu ,oi ha lots o* guys who ha been with the
enemy be*ore,- 6ar continue, -who 3new how to tal3 to these people an woul persuae them to Coin the
.erritorial Aorces or the +F".- =thers Coine arme propagana teams, which went bac3 into V/ territory to
contact Vietcong *amilies an recruit more Vietcong e*ectors.
#The great thing about the !hieu Hoi .rogra)*# $ar' note'* #is that %e 'i'n6t ha-e to .ut .eo.le in Hails
or .rocess the) through the Hu'icial s+ste)* %hich %as alrea'+ o-ercro%'e', Fou coul' tal& to the
!hieu Hois %hen +ou brought the) in (( tal& to the) about %hat the go-ern)ent %as 'oing or the
.eo.le,
#The+6' sa+* 60ut it6s a croo&e' go-ern)ent,6
#Fou6' sa+* 6$ait a )inute, The go-ern)ent6s .ro-i'ing see's or rice, This enables us to gro% three to
our ti)es as )uch rice in the Delta as in the .ast, No% that6s goo',6
-.he guy< say, <( in<t 3now that.< %ll they< hear *rom the communists were the contraictions they< e#ise, i*
they in<t alreay e!ist. 9ut now he was getting the picture *rom our sie. %n a lot o* them woul *lip-*lop
because o* it. ?ow some guys woul come in, /hieu ,oi, spen time with their *amilies, then go bac3 out in the
*iel again. .hat happene, but not to the e!tent that you might thin3. (< say less than ten percent.-
Despite his praise *or the /hieu ,oi program, >im 6ar sai that -%mericans shoul ha#e been targete only
against the ?orth Vietnamese an le*t the 0outh Vietnamese *orces to hanle the insurgency,- e#en though
such a strategy woul ha#e preclue +hoeni!. ,owe#er, ha#ing mae the mista3e o* military inter#ention,
A)ericans loo&e' or .s+chological .lo+s* other than an a..eal to nationalis)* to %in .eo.le o-er to
the GVN, High on the list %ere bount+ .rogra)s, .he +hoeni! 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport cites as an e!ample
Kien +hong +ro#ince, where the +hung ,oang /ommittee printe an ha istribute a wante poster *eaturing
photographs o* eight members o* the /ao )anh /ity sapper unit. -6hile a FD /areman was tac3ing up a
poster he saw one o* the members passing by,- the report says. -,e calle the police who arreste the suspect.
.wo other members were later arreste. .hree were inuce to rally claiming they were renere ine**ecti#e
ha#ing their names an *aces 3nown.- 1&2
In Phong Dinh Pro-ince the Vietna) Inor)ation Ser-ice ;VIS< broa'cast the na)es o V!I through
lou's.ea&ers )ounte' on sa).ans %hile tra-eling through the canals o Phung Hie. District, -6hile the
team was conucting the operation, a #illage le#el V/( care wal3e into the +hung .huan D(=//,- saying he
ha to rally, -because Phun *oan must 3now about him i* the members o* the District Fe#olutionary
/ommittee were 3nown to +hung ,oang, as broacast by V(0.- 1L2
No one %ante' to in' his na)e on a Phoeni5 blac&list1 it )eant the PR" %oul' cree. into his hooch
so)e night* or blac& helico.ters %oul' s%oo. 'o%n on his -illage, An' because ear o Phoeni5 %as an
eecti-e )eans o creating inor)ers an' 'eectors* an intensi-e .ublicit+ ca).aign calle' the Po.ular
Inor)ation Progra) began in October 2939, "ner the banner o* -+rotecting the +eople *rom .errorism,-
".0. an :V? psywar teams crisscrosse the countrysie, using +hoeni!-supplie raios, lea*lets, posters, .V
shows, mo#ies, banners, an louspea3ers mounte on truc3s an sampans to sprea the wor. "sing the e+e
o Go' techni=ue* ta.e' broa'casts %ere .itche' at s.eciic V!I )e)bers, A t+.ical broa'cast %oul'
134
sa+* #$e &no% +ou* Ngu+en Van Ngu+en1 %e &no% %here +ou li-eN $e &no% +ou are a co))unist
traitor* a lac&e+ o Hanoi* %ho illegall+ collects ta5es in Vinh Thanh Ha)let, Soon the sol'iers an' .olice
are co)ing or +ou, Rall+ no%* Ngu+en Van Ngu+en1 rall+ no% %hile there is still ti)eN# >9?
So i).ortant %ere .s+o.s that the Phoeni5 Directorate .ro'uce' a thirt+()inute )o-ie e5.laining ho%
Phoeni5 #Hel.s Protect the Peo.le ro) Terroris),# % copy o* the *ilm was sent to each pro#ince *or use on
local .V stations an in mo#ie theaters. 6rites +hoeni! /oorinator >ohn /oo3: -1.2he concept was simple@ in
practice it was suicial.- 1102 0uicial, he e!plains, because the V/ *oun the lightly arme psyops teams easy
targets. /oo3 there*ore use the psyops team as bait to *lush out the V/, whom he then ambushe with his
+hoeni! tas3 *orce. In this %a+ .s+o.s %ere trans.ose' into co)bat o.erations* turning .s+chological
'eeat into )ilitar+ -ictor+* %ith a bo'+ count to boot,
In a''ition to the Phoeni5 )o-ie* hun're's o thousan's o co.ies o #an illustrate' boo&let 'escribing
the Phung Hoang Progra) in cartoon >i? or)at# %ere also 'istribute' throughout Vietna) ;in
Montagnar' an' !a)bo'ian 'ialects as %ell<* #%ith the goal o .lacing ten to iteen in each ha)let,
!ulture('ra)a tea)s use' the boo&let as a scenario or s&its,# >22?
=n >anuary 22, 19&0, thirty-eight thousan o* these lea*lets were roppe o#er three #illages in :o Vap District.
%resse to speci*ic V/( members, they rea: -0ince you ha#e Coine the ?)A, what ha#e you one *or your
<*amily or your #illage an hamletB =r ha#e you Cust bro3en up the happiness o* many *amilies an estroye
houses an lanB 0ome people among you ha#e been awa3ene recently, they ha#e eserte the /ommunist
ran3s an were recei#e by the :V? an the people with open arms an *amily a**ection. Hou shoul be reay
*or the en i* you remain in the /ommunist ran3s. Hou will be ealing with i**iculties bigger *rom ay to ay an
will su**er serious *ailure when the %FV? e!pan strongly. Hou ha better return to your *amily where you will be
guarantee sa*ety an helpe to establish a new li*e.- 1122
Ps+o.s lealets stresse' tra'itional !onucian -alues o obe'ience to authorit+ an' a)il+ an' .ortra+e'
the !o))unists as a sociall+ 'isru.ti-e orce that coul' be sto..e' onl+ b+ Phoeni5, 9ut the *act that the
:V? coul reach the -people- only through -meia- li3e lea*lets an louspea3ers inicates how *ar remo#e it
was *rom the reality o* li*e in rural #illages. %s %n notes in -.ruth %bout +hoeni!- while the :V? relie upon
cartoon boo3s to sell itsel* to a largely illiterate people, -.he V/ goes *rom person to person tal3ing to ears,-
pro#ing that technology was no substitute *or human contact. 11N2
/onse5uently, in 19G9, the +hoeni! Directorate irecte +hung ,oang +ro#ince committees to e!pan the
,amlet (n*ormant program $,(+' rastically. District chie*s were instructe to conuct classes -on :V?
programs, progress, potential an ieology *or resients who ha V//V/( relati#es or leanings.- .here was a
one-wee3 course -with e!tensions *or problem ini#iuals.- Day care an lunch were mae a#ailable in
-#acate- homes. /hieu ,oi was emphasi4e, -counseling- was pro#ie, an inso*ar as the goal was the
neutrali4ation o* V/(, #the .o.ulace %as encourage' to re.ort the acti-ities o the V!I b+ 'ro..ing a note
a''resse' to the .olice in local )ailbo5es,# .his metho -was creite with appro!imately D0S o* the
in*ormation use in +hung ,oang operations- in Dinh .uong +ro#ince. 11D2
+syops in support o* +hoeni! became such a potent weapon in the attac3 on the V/( that in %ugust 19&0
0%/0% escribe +hoeni! as -the number one 8%/V +0H=+0 priority.- 11E2 Aour months later >ohn 8ason
reporte: #There ha-e been )ore than t%el-e )illion lealets* .osters* banners an' boo&lets .rinte' an'
'istribute' throughout Vietna) in su..ort o the .rogra),# >23?
Des.ite the e).hasis on .s+o.s* co)bat o.erations %ere still .reerre' b+ the )ilitar+ oicers
)anaging the Phoeni5 .rogra) in the iel', 0uch operations most o*ten began at the hamlet le#el when pai
in*ormers reporte to Vung .au-traine #illage chie*s, who then mobili4e .erritorial Aorces uner their
comman, an a#ise by %merican military o**icers, against V/( suspects. )i3ewise, unilateral %merican
+hoeni! operations usually began with in*ormants< *eeing names to a D(=//, whose a#iser then in*orme the
counterintelligence section o* the nearest %merican out*it. %n operation was then mounte. In the %ee hours o
the )orning a unit o inantr+)en %oul' be 'e.lo+e' aroun' the -illage to .ro-i'e securit+* an' a tea)
o co))an'os %oul' snatch the V!I sus.ect an' bring hi) or her to the )ilitar+ intelligence
interrogation center, Such %as the stan'ar' .roce'ure %hich in-ol-e' the a-erage A)erican sol'ier in
Phoeni5 o.erations,
!IA .ara)ilitar+ oicers also continue' to )ount unilateral Phoeni5 o.erations -ia their PR" a'-isers,
%s reporte in the December 19LG issue o* 0olier o* Aortune maga4ine, )ong %n PR" a'-iser !a.tain /ran&
Thornton circu)-ente' or'ers not to acco).an+ his PR" into the iel' b+ .utting his na)e on the SEA4
Detach)ent Al.ha roster #or a')inistrati-e .ur.oses*# an' #Saigon ne-er &ne% the 'ierence,# %
combat enthusiast, Thornton obtaine' intelligence on the location o V!I )e)bers ro) a PR" agent net
co).rise' o #ol' %o)en* &i's an' or)er ARVN sol'iers %ho6' lost ar)s an' legs ighting the V!, .o
ensure security, he rarely passe along his intel proucts other than to 0;%)s.-
135
=n =ctober 11, 19G9, .hornton<s agents reporte a istrict-le#el V/( meeting in /an :iuoc istrict. +utting two
0;%)s an *our +F" in a /obra -3iller- helicopter *or bac3up, .hornton climbe into a light obser#ation -hunter-
chopper, *lew to a point near the target area, got out, an alone $Cust as ;lton 8an4ione ha one *i#e years
earlier' slippe into the V/(<s hooch, grabbe him, an raioe *or e!traction. .he man he snatche, +ham Van
Kinh, was the commaning o**icer o* *our V/ battalions. .he mission garnere .hornton a Vietnamese /ross o*
:allantry, aware by Fung 0at 0pecial Mone +F" commaner 8aCor ?guyen ,iop.
.hornton<s heroic ee was the e!ception, howe#er, not the rule. (n -.he +hoeni! 8urers- >oseph .reaster
5uotes an %rmy captain who spent three years a#ising +F" teams: -"nless someboy mae a mista3e, you<re
not going to *in a guy alone. %n i* you go in an try to tangle with a whole #illage, you<re in eep .... (* the guy
is important, it<s #ery har to e!tract him.- 1112
This ca.tain recalle' onl+ one case %hen the PR" targete' a s.eciic in'i-i'ual* a V! 'istrict oicial in a
.ro-ince on the !a)bo'ia bor'er, It %as the )an6s %e''ing 'a+ (( he %as )arr+ing the 'aughter o a
GVN -illage oicial (( an' the PR" burst into the roo)* +elling or e-er+one to ree7e, #0ut*# the ca.tain
tol' Treaster* #so)e V! in the %e''ing .art+ goes or his gun an' our gu+ o.ens u., The ne5t t%o or
three gu+s through the 'oor o.en u.* too* an' the irst thing +ou &no%* there6s a lot o bloo' on the
san', So that 'i'n6t %or& too %ell, $e 'i'n6t lose an+bo'+* but there %ere EE .eo.le in the %e''ing
.art+ an' EI %ere &ille',#
777
% typical istrict-le#el +hoeni! operation, cite in the 19G9 year-en report, began when Deputy +arty 0ecretary
Dang was caught in a tunnel. During interrogation, Dang in*orme on his comraes, who were capture along
with incriminating ocuments. =ne o* them re#eale uring his interrogation that the istrict party chairman,
?guyen Van Kia, was a horse cart ri#er. +F" teams were statione at the main tra**ic intersection in Kia<s area
o* operations. ,e was caught the same ay without a *ight. Aour other care members were snatche in their
homes. -.he ne!t target was ?guyen .hi 9ah, the message section chie*@ a escription o* her route o* tra#el was
*urnishe by the D(=//. .he +F" pose as V/ an setup an ambush along her usual route. =n the secon
e#ening o* the trail watch, 9ah was capture.- 11L2
+ro#ince-le#el +hoeni! operations, li3e the *ollowing one in )ong Khanh, tene to be more elaborate. (n this
case the operation e#elope when the pro#ince chie* assigne the Cob o* resources control to the +hoeni!
coorinator an his +hoeni! tas3 *orce. (n response, the +hoeni! coorinator mounte three concurrent long-
term operations lasting two months. 1192
+art ( was the establishment o* -mobile resource control chec3points.- .hree si!-man teams -- two national an
two *iel policemen an two +F" -- were assigne to chec3points. .he ?ational +olice pro#ie truc3s@
blac3lists came *rom the 0pecial 9ranch. Foabloc3s were set up, an while the ?ational +olice chec3e (Ds
an the Aiel +olice stoo guar, the +F" searche an etaine suspects, who were carte o** to the +(/ *or
interrogation.
+art (( occurre in three phases. Airst, a special airmobile resource control $0%F/' team was *orme to interict
V/( commerce. ?e!t, uner the comman o* the +hoeni! coorinator an his interpreter, a search element
consisting o* two +F", three 0pecial 9ranch an one national policeman, was *orme. % security element was
*orme o* two s5uas *rom the ".0. Airst /a#alry. .hirly, the ca#alry pro#ie a comman an control chopper,
a light obser#ation helicopter $)=/,', an a /obra gunship -- the traitional hunter-3iller team with an ae
-eye in the s3y.- 0%F/ operations were mounte on the basis o* intelligence re.orts .ro-i'ing #targets o
o..ortunit+,# 6hen a target o* opportunity presente itsel*, the 0%F/ *orce woul gal#ani4e into action, swoop
own *rom the s3y, coron o** areas, sen in search teams, stop #ehicles, an capture an 3ill V/( members.
+art (((, =peration /uto**, was esigne to capture suspects who coul prouce leas to the V/(. .o this en,
D(=//s sent lists to the +(=//, where priority targets were selecte. %*ter two months o* preparation, thirty-
eight hamlets were targete. 0pecial 9ranch pro#ie lists o* relati#es o* the suspects. .erritorial Aorces an the
".0. 199th (n*antry 9rigae pro#ie security *orces to coron o** each hamlet. =perations began at D:00 %.8.
with ?ational an Aiel +olice an +F" searching hooches while a psywar team broacast names an
instructions o#er louspea3ers. +eople were gathere together at a 0pecial 9ranch -processing station,- where
(Ds were chec3e against blac3lists. FD /are rama teams entertaine the innocent while #arious agencies
interrogate suspects, who were then sent to the +ro#ince (nterrogation /enter.
9y the en o* the )ong Khanh +hoeni! campaign, 1GL V/( -sympathi4ers- ha been caught an con*ine.
%lthough suppliers an supporters were category /, not genuine V/(, they i in*orm on their authentic %- an
9-grae comraes. =#er the ne!t three months V/( neutrali4ations in )ong Khanh soare to their highest le#els
e#er. .here was a corresponing rise in ,oi /hanhs. 1202
136
777
% typical 0aigon operation began in 8arch 19G9, when a +eople<s (ntelligence =rgani4ation agent submitte a
report on ?guyen ?uoi to the Airst +recinct 0pecial +olice. 0uspecting ?uoi o* being V/(, the +hoeni!
coorinator assigne a si!-man sur#eillance team to watch him. .he si! special policemen wor3e in two-man
teams, one on *oot, one on a bi3e. (n this way they learne where ?uoi li#e an wor3e an where his -contact
points- were. .he 0pecial 9ranch set up agents in business in a soup shop one bloc3 away *rom ?uoi<s house
an establishe a bicycle repair shop near his *a#orite ca*e. .wo agents continue to *ollow him. .hree houses
?uoi *re5uente were also place uner sur#eillance.
.hree wee3s later ?uoi was arreste along with se#eral comraes in the sa*e houses who ha lea*lets prouce
by the 0aigon 6omen<s Fe#olutionary %ssociation. During interrogation ?uoi in*orme on his bosses in the
party. ,is testimony le to more arrests, incluing se#eral cares in the istrict party committee. =ne member
was -entice to wor3 *or the police- an went bac3 to the party committee as a penetration agent. ,e staye
there three months in his *ormer position, secretly channeling in*ormation to the 0pecial 9ranch which le to
more arrests.
%s the 19G9 +hoeni! ;n o* Hear Feport notes, -9e*ore allowing their penetration agent to be *ree, 0pecial
+olice personnel too3 photos o* the agent enCoying himsel* in the company o* other 0pecial +olice agents an
re5uire him to sign a sworn statement that he was in *act wor3ing *or the :V?. .hese ocuments woul *in
their way bac3 to the V/ i* the agent i not cooperate with the police in the *uture. % sur#eillance team was
assigne to watch the agent<s acti#ities as an ae precautionary measure.- 1212
777
0o success*ul was +hoeni! in 19G9 that the irectorate boaste in its ;n o* Hear Feport that -the *irst
generation- o* /=0V? military proselyti4ers has been reuce to se#en personnel.- (n supporting its claims o*
success at e#ery le#el, the report 5uotes a high-ran3ing V/( who escribe /=0V? Fesolution 9 as -a
esperate V/ plan, written in an attempt to sa#e an otherwise hopeless political an military situation. ,e sai
that the +hung ,oang $+hoeni!' program has been gi#en top priority *or estruction by the V/.- 1222
=ne coul euce *rom this that the :V? stoo on the #erge o* a great #ictory. 9ut the #iew *rom the *iel was
not so rosy. %s +hoeni! a#iser 6ayne /ooper sai to >oseph .reaster,
% typical D(=// woul ha#e an impossible clutter, with wheat an cha** *ile together. .he
alphabetical *iles we insiste they 3eep woul not be cross-re*erence by alias, *amily location, or
any other use*ul esignation. .he ossiers so #ital to pro#ince security committee prosecution woul
contain poor s3etchy in*ormation@ perhaps enough *or an operation but not enough *or prosecution.
=ther *iles -- 8ost 6ante lists, potential guie *iles, mug shots, an so on -- were maintaine so
poorly as to be useless, or ne#er 3ept at all. .here woul be no intelligence collection plan, an
agents recei#e little irection. 12N2
Falph >ohnson agrees with /ooper<s ismal assessment o* 0pecial 9ranch capabilities. -D(=// *iles on V/(
personalities i not re*lect much progress towar +hung ,oang intelligence obCecti#es,- he writes. He also
contra'icts !olb+6s state)ent that #$e %ere getting )ore an' )ore accurate re.orts ro) insi'e V!I
.ro-incial co))ittees an' Regional Part+ hea'=uarters ro) bra-e Vietna)ese hol'ing high ran&s in
such grou.s,# >EA? Sa+s 8ohnson: #The S.ecial 0ranch rarel+ i e-er )anage' to recruit agents %ho ha'
access to high(le-el V!I .lanning,# ,e as that -the :V? arreste suspecte agents an attempte to
estroy V/( organi4ations instea o* sur#eilling or recruiting agents in place *or long term e!ploitation.- .he
result was that -most V/( capture were low-le#el in the pro#ince or below,- an -most intelligence was
generate an e!ploite *rom counter-guerrilla operations, casual wal3- in in*ormants, capture V/(, V/( caught
in Fesource /ontrol operations, capture ocuments, coron an search operations, an especially /hieu ,oi
e*ectors *rom V/(.- 12E2
6ith the transition o* +hoeni! to /=FD0, a new an impro#e means o* Cuging, e#aluating, an pro#ing
success was neee. ,ence, 9ig 8ac3, -%n instructi#e type ocument that irects the territorial intelligence
system to 5uantitati#ely an 5ualitati#ely e#aluate the V/( an lower le#el military units.- 12G2 9ig 8ac3 reporte
on the number o* ienti*ie an unienti*ie V/( members, their in*luence in the area, an their ientity by
position *or inclusion in the :reen 9oo3. /ompile monthly by ".0. military a#isers without Vietnamese input,
9ig 8ac3 re*lecte the military<s emphasis on operations against enemy military units, the type that resulte in
big boy counts.
-(t was a reporting re5uirement that coul cho3e a mule,- recalle /olonel Doug Dillar, -to the point o*
esigning ata entry sheets to *ee the computer in 0aigon .... ( met with .e Gre+)an, an we coorinate
with other sta** members, an we came to the conclusion that i* we implemente 9ig 8ac3, we woul stop
137
pursuing the war an start reporting on it.- 9ut the 0aigon bureaucracy pre#aile, an -- Dillar sighe -- -we
began implementing portions o* 9ig 8ac3.- 12&2 9y the en o* 19G9 9ig 8ac3 reports were pouring into 0aigon
*rom 0outh Vietnam<s 2E0 istricts. A co).arison %ith the statistics ro) 293B sho%s the nu)ber o
ca.ture' V!I 'ecrease'* %hile the nu)ber o V!I &ille' )ore than 'ouble', >EB?
19GL 19G9
/apture 11,2LL L,E1E
Kille 2,229 D,LN2
Fallie 2,2E9 G,1L&
.otal 1E,&&G 19,END
6ithin this total, D,00& V/( security agents were cite as ha#ing been neutrali4e: N /=0V? le#el V/(@ GD
regional V/(@ 22G *rom pro#inces, LL1 *rom istricts, 2NE *rom cities, 2,0L1 *rom #illages, an E11 *rom hamlets.
%n estimate &D,000 V/( were still -at large-@ but o#erall, neutrali4ations were up, an the irectorate boaste
that G0 percent were % an 9 priority targets. 8eanwhile, the V/( in 19G9 ha -murere- G,000 :V? o**icials
an -orinary citi4ens,- ha -3inappe- G,000 people, an ha woune 1E,000 more. 1292
Statistical e-i'ence o success so .lease' the $ashington brain trust that a''itional co).uter s+ste)s
%ere =uic&l+ intro'uce', (n 8arch 19G9 the ?ational +olice ;#aluation 0ystem went on-line, recoring -police
assignment ata- *or analysis an -counter-measures.- (n 19&0 9ig 8ac3<s bilingual replacement, the 9ig 8ac3
0pecial /ollection +rogram, shi*te the buren o* reporting an accountability to the FV? .erritorial (ntelligence
0ystem. (n >anuary 19&0 the V/( ?eutrali4ation (n*ormation 0ystem was inaugurate to recor all anti V/(
operations. .he ?ational +olice /riminal (n*ormation 0ystem $?+/(0' was implemente in %pril 19&0 to trac3
V/( who were hel beyon -statutory limitations.- Designe to -inter*ace- with a /hieu ,oi -trac3ing system,-
which aie pro#ince security committees in the -post-apprehension monitoring o* release V/(,- ?+/(0 was
also compatible with the V/( ?eutrali4ation an (enti*ication (n*ormation 0ystem, which store in its classi*ie
*iles -a history o* the V/( member *rom the time o* his ienti*ication to his neutrali4ation.- 1N02
/omplementing these -trac3ing systems- was the ?ational (D Fegistration +rogram 0ystem. 6ithin twenty-*our
hours o* arrest, etainees were boo3e. % report was then sent to the proper +ro#ince (ntelligence an
=perations /oorination /enter, an a *ingerprint car sent to the ?ational (entity Fecors /enter in 0aigon,
where a ata sheet was plugge into the computer. (n the *iel, nearly two thousan policemen wor3e in two
shi*ts, se#en ays a wee3, sening twenty thousan ocuments *rom the pro#inces to 0aigon e#ery ay. 9y
?o#ember 19&0 more than se#en million laminate *ingerprint cars ha been classi*ie, searche, an place
in the *ingerprint ban3 *or instant access.
/lima!ing the computer process in >anuary 19&1 was the ?ational +olice (n*rastructure %nalysis 0ub-0ystem-((
$?+(%00-((', which was use to plan -countermeasures- against the &N,&N1 con*irme an suspecte V/( still
-at large- $an calle -logical recors- in its *iles'. ?+(%00-(( *unctione until 8arch 19&N, when, with the
assistance o* technicians *rom the /omputer 0cience /orporation, it was trans*erre to the Vietnamese along
with +,8(0 an the ?ational +olice (enti*ication Aollow-up 0ub-0ystem $?+(A"00'. Het another -trac3ing
system,- ?+(A"00 -pro#ie a means o* etermining the action ta3en on wante person notices an statistics
on the isposition o* wante person cases.- .here was e#en a ?ational +olice Directory .able 0ub-0ystem on
?ational +olice units an correction centers. ,owe#er, the reliance on computer systems was a poor substitute
*or a Cuicial system base on ue process. %s +ublic 0a*ety o**icer ). 8. Fosen wrote on ?o#ember 2&, 19&0,
-.he ?+/(0 will not o* itsel* impro#e the aministration o* Custice or the processing o* etainees.- 1N12 Aurther
re*orms remaine to be mae.
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. 0ee %enum 1 in %ppeni!.
!HAPTER EI: Reor)s
/aught between its state goal o* builing emocratic institutions an its operational goal o* ensuring internal
security, the 0outh Vietnamese go#ernment, in orer to impro#e its public image #is-a-#is the +ro#isional
Fe#olutionary :o#ernment, began instituting in 19G9 a series o* cosmetic -re*orms- esigne to s5uare its
138
security nees with the ci#il rights o* its citi4ens. (n essence it was an attempt to resol#e the problem pose by
?elson 9ric3ham bac3 in 19G&, when he as3e, -6hat o you o with ienti*ie V/(B-
The #reor)# .rocess got o to a eeble start on March EA* 2939* %ith Ministr+ o Interior !ircular :@:*
#!lassiication an' Rehabilitation Gui'elines or Pro.er Processing o V!I,# Signe' b+ Interior Minister
Tran Thien Ghie)* it %as create' b+ $illia) !olb+ s.eciicall+ to enable .ro-ince securit+ co))ittees
to ensure aster .rosecution an' sentencing o V!I sus.ects, Ho%e-er* as Ral.h 8ohnson notes* #there
%as a general recognition that the circular %as neither un'erstoo' nor .ro.erl+ a..lie' throughout the
countr+,# >2?
/ircular &E& reiterate who was a class %, 9, or / /ommunist o**ener, how long each coul be etaine, an
who ecie. (t irecte the coorination o* -%ll local ?ational +olice 0er#ices ... with the +hung ,oang
/ommittee an the /orrection /enter in#ol#e.- %s *or the status o* V/( hel in etention centers, &E& reasone
circularly that -.he metho o* classi*ication an the etention perio *or these /ommunist =**eners shall be
carrie out li3e that *or those who are capture uner the +hung ,oang +lan.- 122
In a''ition* !ircular :@: 'irecte' the National Police to establish #Ps+$ar Grou.s# to #carr+ out the
rehabilitation o oen'ers,# Ps+$ar Grou.s %ere to teach !o))unist oen'ers ho% to recogni7e an'
abi'e b+ constitutional go-ern)ent, !ircular :@: also or'ere' GVN6s Directorate o !orrections to or)
i-e Mobile !orrections Grou.s an' to inclu'e in the) #!orrections !a're =ualiie' in culture an'
.ro.agan'a in'octrination,# /ares came *rom the ministries o* (n*ormation an /hieu ,oi an the /(%-
a#ise Directorate o* +olitical 6ar*are, which ha cogni4ance o#er the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice. =ne mobile
group was assigne to each corps, an the *i*th hanle /on 0on, /hi ,oa, .hu Duc, an .an ,iep prisons.
Mobile !orrection Grou.s su..orte' Ps+$ar Grou.s in the #rehabilitation# o !o))unist oen'ers an'
.ro-i'e' co-er or !IA #talent scouts# %ho recruite' con-icts into the PR" an' ar)e' .ro.agan'a
tea)s* an' as .rison inor)ers,
.o o#ersee psywar an intelligence operations insie correctional *acilities, in 0eptember 19G9 the /(% create
the :V?<s /entral 0ecurity /ommittee, chaire by :eneral Khiem an incluing Director o* /orrections /olonel
?guyen +su 0anh $a#ise by Donal 9oren3ircher', the irector general o* the ?ational +olice, an the prison
warens. 8ore important, the /entral 0ecurity /ommittee re#iewe cases o* /ommunist o**eners consiere
*or conitional or early release *rom the *i#e national correction centers, recommening *urther etention i* the
o**ener was eeme angerous, as was uni#ersally the case. .he Vietnamese ?ational %ssembly trie
unsuccess*ully to abolish the /entral 0ecurity /ommittee in December 19&0.
Pro-ince Securit+ !o))ittees %ere reorgani7e' to inclu'e a .ro-ince .rosecutor as legal a'-iser*
although the 'e.ut+ chie or securit+ (( the !IA asset on the .ro-ince chie6s sta (( secretl+ )anage'
the aairs o the !o))ittee, Pressure or )ore )eaningul reor)s %as brought* ho%e-er* %hen the
lo%er house o the National Asse)bl+ inter.ellate' the )inisters o Hustice* 'eense* an' the interior on
8une EI* 2939* concerning allege' abuses b+ oicials in the Vinh 0inh Pro-ince Phoeni5 .rogra), This
action ca)e ater a 'elegation co).ose' o the Interior* RD* an' Anticorru.tion co))ittee chair)en
returne' ro) Vinh 0inh Pro-ince %ith re.orts o illegal arrests* torture* corru.tion* an' abuses o
authorit+, .he interpellation resulte *rom a petition signe by eighty-si! eputies as3ing *or an e!planation o*
the no longer secret +hoeni! program.
>ustice 8inister )e Van .hu outline the state goals o* the program, noting that the Pro-ince Securit+
!o))ittees ha' the .o%er to sentence V!I )e)bers or u. to t%o +ears %ithout accusing or con-icting
the) o an+ s.eciic cri)e, His e5.lanation that the .ractical 'iiculties o a)assing soli' e-i'ence
)a'e it necessar+ to arrest e-er+one sus.ecte' o co).licit+ or urther interrogation an' in-estigation
%as not %ell recei-e', % cross section o* legislators bitterly cite e!amples o* abuses in their own pro#inces.
.in 0ang publisher an %nticorruption /ommittee /hairman ?go /ong Duc charge the Vinh 9inh police chie*
with -3nowingly- arresting innocent people *or the purpose o* e!tortion. % 9uhist legislator *rom .hua .hien
+ro#ince allege that suspects were o*ten etaine *or si! to eight months $instea o* the one-month ma!imum
cite by >ustice 8inister .hu' be*ore their cases were hear an that sus.ects %ere re=uentl+ torture' to
e5tract conessions, She sai' the .eo.le #hate'# the go-ern)ent or starting the Phoeni5 .rogra),
Other 'e.uties %ere incense' that A)erican troo.s orceull+ an' illegall+ 'etaine' sus.ects 'uring
)ilitar+ o.erations, Deputy ,o ?goc ?huan, a 0aigon /atholic, charge that #illage chie*s were not consulte
be*ore V/( suspects were arreste uring military operations, contrary to what .hu an Khiem claime.
Khiem respone by promising *urther re*orms. ,e sai the >oint :eneral 0ta** ha alreay mo#e to pre#ent
*urther etentions by %merican *orces, with the e!ception o* the V/( caught *lagrante elicto. ,is conciliatory
tone assuage the eputies, an an impro#e circular was issue.
139
%s a remey *or what Falph >ohnson calls -#arious e*iciencies- in the Cuicial system, /olby an Khiem, in
%ugust 19G9, issue /ircular 2212, -(mpro#ements o* the 8ethos o* Fesol#ing the 0tatus o* =**eners.- 1N2 %s
a result o* /ircular 2212, a +olitical 0ecurity =**ice was *orme to pro#ie policy guiance *or the three :V?
agencies -- the /entral +hung ,oang /ommittee, the ?ational +olice, an the Directorate o* /orrections -- that
were in#ol#e in processing /ommunist o**eners. +lans were mae to sen more prosecutors to the pro#inces
to assist -in the proper legal hanling o* such cases- an -to ensure the proper *unctioning o* +ro#ince 0ecurity
/ommittees.- 1D2 ,owe#er, in a nation with *ewer lawyers than warlors, establishing ue process was li3e tilting
at winmills.
%s a way o* reucing prison o#ercrowing an ening the re#ol#ing-oor synrome, /ircular 2212 pro#ie *or
the -manatory- sentencing an trans*er o* class % an 9 V/( *rom the mainlan to /on 0on +rison. +ro#ince
0ecurity /ommittees were gi#en thirty ays to open an o**ener ossier on each V/( etainee, scrutini4e the
e#ience therein, an pass Cugment. .o spee the process, a short-*orm o**ener ossier $on which the
etainee signe a con*ession' highlighte the incriminating e#ience which the 0ecurity /ommittee neee *or a
5uic3 con#iction. .o reuce bac3log, /ircular 2212 re5uire security committees to meet at least once a month
an to submit transcripts to the +olitical 0ecurity =**ice *or re#iew be*ore passing Cugment. 0uch was the
Cuicial system in 0outh Vietnam.
777
(n response to the charges le#ele by the lower house eputies in >une, Anne5 II o !olb+6s 29:I .aciication
an' 'e-elo.)ent .lan* #Protection o the Peo.le ro) Terroris)*# calle' or #notiication to -illage
chies o .lanne' Phoeni5 o.erations in their -illages,# Ho%e-er* noti+ing -illage chies %as tanta)ount
to noti+ing the V!I* an' again* the o.erational goal o securit+ %as at o''s %ith the state' goal o
notiication* %hich in .ractice rarel+ occurre', 0o a *ew more +hoeni! re*orms were cra*te, incluing an
impro#e 5uota system stipulating that V/( be ienti*ie be*ore they were neutrali4e, rather than -re#eale-
a*ter being capture or 3ille. "ner this proposal, suspecte V/( were to be counte as -capture- only a*ter
being con#icte an sentence, rather than upon apprehension.
The other signiicant an' relate' #reor)# o 2939 %as Decree IAA* 'ate' March 2E* 2939* .lacing the
PR" un'er the Huris'iction o the 'irector general o the National Police, !anceling out this 'ecree %as a
long(stan'ing la%* ne-er rescin'e'* that .rohibite' PR" ro) ser-ing in the Vietna)ese Ar)+ or
go-ern)ent in an+ ca.acit+, =perational control in each pro#ince remaine with the pro#ince chie* in
conCunction with a +F" pro#ince commaner, an e#en though, as o Se.te)ber 2939* A)ericans %ere
.rohibite' ro) -enturing out on PR" o.erations* the+ 'i' ;see /ran& Thornton in the .re-ious cha.ter<,
A)ericans continue' to a'-ise an' assist in the .lanning o o.erations,
+rior to >une 19GL, when +resient .hieu embrace +hoeni!, the +F" operate only at pro#ince le#el uner the
irection o* the /(%. %*ter >une 19GL the national +F" commaner, 8aCor ?guyen Van )ang occupie himsel*
primarily by selling -+F"-ships- to the highest biers at the pro#ince an region le#els.
.he /(% sta** o**icers who manage the +F" program at the national le#el along with )ang<s brother-in-law
.uc3er :ougleman were +hil Potter an Fo )anreth. Har-ar' gra'uate Phil #Potts# Potter %as an ol'
Vietna) han' %ho in the earl+ 29@I6s ha' been case oicer to E).eror 0ao Dai an' ha' hire' so)e o
the !IA6s irst assets in the Surete. During the battle *or 0aigon +otter ha ser#e as acting chie* o* station, as
liaison to ?go Dinh ?hu an Dr. .ran Kim .uyen, an as control o* the station<s ten or twel#e intelligence o**icers
running agents in the *iel. During his stint as acting chie o station* %hile Saigon %as in tur)oil an' the
.iaster %as nearl+ %orthless* Potter ha' .urchase' .ro.ert+ (( sae houses an' such (( or the !IA at 2I
to 2@ .ercent o its real -alue, ,is e**orts in this respect lai the grounwor3 *or a generation o* spoo3s to
come.
Potter also ser-e' as station chie in Tan7ania an' Greece an' as consul general in Nor%a+ an' Hong
Gong, 9ut his heart was in Vietnam, where he *orme close *rienships with Falph >ohnson an .uc3er
:ougleman. -During his years in 0aigon +otter e#elope personal an pro*essional relationships with the most
in*luential Vietnamese, incluing the /(= chie*, :eneral ?guyen Khac 9inh, an +resient .hieu. Airst an
*oremost, though, +otter was an intelligence o**icer acti#ely engage in recruiting an running agents in the *iel.
1E2
.he other +F" manager, Foney )anreth, escribe by a colleague, ,arry -9u44- >ohnson, as -the 3in o* guy
you< li3e to ha#e as an uncle,- arri#e in 0aigon in 19G& an ser#e as a eputy to .e 0hac3ley. Station
!hie Shac&le+* 'escribe' b+ 0u77 8ohnson as #a col' .ale ish*# 1G2 relie on li3able Fo )anreth to
represent him at iplomatic *unctions an on the interagency committees *orme to in#estigate :V? corruption
an rug ealing. 6hile +otter was case o**icer to /(= /hie* 9inh, )anreth was case o**icer to :eneral Dang
Van Juang, .hieu<s national security chie*. +otter an :ougleman are creite with ha#ing organi4e the
140
0pecial 9ranch, while Falph >ohnson an )anreth wor3e more closely with the /(=. %ll *our were intimately
in#ol#e in *ormulating /(% policy regaring +hoeni!, the 0pecial +olice, an the +F".
O.inions -ar+ on the i).act Potter* 8ohnson* Gougle)an* an' 4an'reth ha' on the course o e-ents in
South Vietna), To so)e .eo.le the+ %ere the consu))ate insi'ers1 to others the+ %ere tire' ol' )en
%ho %ere totall+ out o touch %ith the %ar in the -illages an' %ho* li&e clones o the colonialists the+
ha' 'is.lace'* gathere' e-er+ e-ening at the !ircle S.orti to 'rin& b+ the .ool an' bas& in the
a'oration o beautiul Vietna)ese %o)en,
)i3ewise, the inner circle o* )anreth, >ohnson, :ougleman, an +otter ha little patience with the ambitious
technocrats )angley sent out to 0aigon to play at being station chie*, or with their corrupt :V? lac3eys. In
.ri-ate the+ ri'icule' Te' Shac&le+* calling hi) Tran Van Shac&le+ or his reliance on Senator Tran Van
Don, .om +olgar, who replace 0hac3ley in 19&2, *are e#en worse an was escribe as -rigi- an -a
bureaucrat- who -was not well #erse in intelligence *iel wor3.- 1&2
Aor his part, .om +olgar calle )anreth an +otter -*ine o**icers- who were -past their prime.- 1L2 ; 9ray
concurre: #These .eo.le ha' their Hobs ,,,, 0ut the+ %eren6t tr+ing to achie-e an+thing, The+ ha' no
obHecti-es,# >9?
9ray ga#e an e!ample o* how the 6ashington bureaucrats shame -ol Vietnam han- +otter into submission.
-+otter li#e with a Vietnamese woman whom he wante to marry,- 9ray recalle. -,e was near retirement, but
the agency, citing operational security, sai, <?o. (* you marry her, you<re through. 9ut it<s o3ay i* you li#e with
her.< (t was the height o* hypocrisy.-
+erhaps the -ol Vietnam hans- o symboli4e the proprietary, but essentially moribun, %merican policy in
Vietnam a*ter 19G9@ those who ha unerstaning were suborinate to the ieologues an *unctionaries. )i#ing
in spleni san castles, they alternately curse an ignore the rising tie o* corruption an eception that was
engul*ing 0outh Vietnam. Aor e!ample, )anreth<s main Cob was chairing the interagency committee charge
with in#estigating the blac3 mar3et, an in5uiry he e*lecte away *rom the /(%. 4i&e%ise* the interagenc+
narcotics co))ittee chaire' b+ 4an'reth ocuse' entirel+ on the North Vietna)ese* stu'iousl+ a-oi'ing
General Dang Van Duang* %ho Stanle+ Garno% notes %as #accor'e' the rice an' o.iu) ranchise in his
region# while commaner in the Delta. 6rites Karnow: -%mong those allegely in#ol#e in the trae were +rime
8inister ?guyen /ao Ky an his successor, :eneral .ran .hien Khiem, sai to ha#e *unnele the procees
*rom the business into their political machines.- 1102
%lthough Fo )anreth was the agency<s liaison to :eneral Juang, who on behal* o* +resient .hieu set +F"
policy, the ay-to-ay business o* the +F" was hanle by /(% o**icers 9en 8anich an 6illiam 9uc3ley, both
o* whom are ecease, as are +otter, )anreth, :ougleman, an >ohnson. =* those who were in#ol#e in +F"
matters, only Falph >ohnson has le*t behin statements *or the recor. -.he impact o* the :V? on the +F" was
negati#e,- >ohnson writes, because o* -the *ailure o* +F" commaners to wor3 closely with the +(=//s. .he
+F" commaners, supporte by the +ro#ince chie*s, e!cuse this *ailure by citing poor security in the +(=//s,
as a result o* which the +F" were *ailing to report intelligence to the /oorinating /enters.- Aurthermore, says
>ohnson, -when the %FV? an the FA/+A absorbe the tactics o* the +F" uring 19GL-19G9, then the +F"
probably shoul ha#e been isbane an their members integrate into one o* the nation-builing programs
which constitute the maCor portion o* the +aci*ication +rogram. =r, the +F" shoul ha#e been returne to their
nati#e #illages as part o* the Fe*ugee +rogram, to bolster the +eople<s 0el*-De*ense Aorces.- 1112
Veteran /(% paramilitary o**icer Fuy ;ners isagree when we met an insiste that the +F" operate
e**ecti#ely at least until the cease-*ire, when they were put uner control o* the 0pecial 9ranch. 1122 In an+ case*
the March 2939 'ecree .utting the PR" un'er the National Police acilitate' .lausible 'enial, It enable'
$illia) !olb+ to s%ear on a stac& o 0ibles that the !IA %as not o.erationall+ in-ol-e', The GVN
beca)e accountable as the !IA )aneu-ere' to sca.egoat its obli-ious client, 9ut the :V? coul not
a**or $e#en with /(%-sanctione corruption an rug tra**ic3ing' to support the +F" on its own, nor was the /(%
willing to abanon the ri*le shot approach at the moment it sai it ha the V/( on the ropes. 0ut resources
channele' through the Phoeni5 .rogra) coul' not co).ensate or the re'uction in !IA su..ort an'
su.er-ision* so the PR" turne' to sha&e'o%ns o lucrati-e targets in the .ri-ate sector to &ee. their
organi7ation intact, Phoeni5 an' the PR" beca)e ca.ti-e to cri)inal enter.rises an' the subHect o
increasing contro-ers+,
%lways ine!tricably lin3e, the +hoeni! an +F" programs were simultaneously brought uner military re#iew in
19G9. =n =ctober 20, 19G9, in a secret memo to De*ense 0ecretary 8el#in )air, %rmy 0ecretary 0tanley Fesor
re*erre to -the social an moral costs an the esirability o* a selecti#e attac3- an e!presse -concern o#er
these programs.- 11N2 )ater that ay )air con#eye his concern o#er -lac3 o* progress in the +hoeni!/+hung
,oang +rogram- to :eneral ;arle 6ea#er, chairman o* the >oint /hie*s o* 0ta**. 11D2 =ne month later )air,
141
re*erring to the 8y )ai massacre an the :reen 9eret murer case, in*orme 6heeler o* his -growing an!iety
o#er the +F" 1sic2 program in #iew o* recent e#ents concerning ".0. military conuct in 0outh Vietnam.- 11E2
(n response to De*ense 0ecretary )air<s concerns about the +hoeni! program, 8%/V /ommaner %brams
assure 6ashington that #Statisticall+ >sic? the .rogra) has )a'e signiicant .rogress in recent )onths,#
%brams recounte the -re*orms- cite on the preceing pages but then o**ere a cani an somewhat ominous
appraisal, saying, -1(2t is clear to me an to the commaners in the *iel that the program oes not yet ha#e the
egree o* sophistication an epth necessary to combat the highly e#elope an long e!perience V/
in*rastructure $V/(' in 0outh Vietnam.- %brams note that %mbassaor 9un3er ha agree to tal3 to +resient
.hieu about +hoeni!, -especially with respect to impro#ing :V? local o**icial attitues.- %brams close by
promising -a separate report ... on the +F".- 11G2
%t this point the +entagon ha three elements intereste in +hoeni!: .he >oint /hie*s were in#ol#e through
0%/0%, the De*ense Department was in#ol#e through its o**ice o* (nternational 0ecurity %ssistance $(0%', an
8%/V was in#ol#e through /=FD0.
Aor its part, SA!SA %as not in an+ chain o co))an' but ser-e' the 8oint !hies b+ bringing together
re.resentati-es ro) the State De.art)ent* !IA* ",S, Inor)ation Agenc+* Agenc+ or International
De-elo.)ent* an' the De.art)ent o Deense, 9roa policies came own to 0%/0% *rom the 6hite ,ouse
through the ?ational 0ecurity /ouncil, while speci*ic ieas regaring psywar an counterinsurgency came up
*rom 8%/V or the ini#iual ser#ices. 0%/0% assigne sta** members to present recommenations *or
consieration by the >oint /hie*s. 6hen the chie*s reache a ecision on how a policy was to be implemente,
the ser#ice responsible *or implementing that policy was irecte to pro#ie manpower, materiel, an money.
.he %rmy (ntelligence /orps ha responsibility o#er +hoeni!.
0%/0% itsel* was i#ie into three parts: *or special operations in 0outh Vietnam@ *or special operations
elsewhere@ an *or Fe#olutionary De#elopment programs in Vietnam, incluing +hoeni!. 8%/V reporte ata on
+hoeni! to 0%/0% only when solicite. 0%/0%<s Fe#olutionary De#elopment component i stuies an
ra*te papers on +hoeni! *or the >oint /hie*s< signature.
/ro) the ince.tion o Phoeni5 until 8anuar+ 2939* MaHor General $illia) DuPu+ ser-e' as SA!SA, A
or)er !IA 'e.ut+ 'i-ision chie* DuPu+ )et regularl+ %ith State De.art)ent oicer Phil Habib an' !IA
/ar East Di-ision chie $illia) !olb+ to coor'inate uncon-entional %arare .olic+ in South Vietna).
Du+uy was replace by 8aCor :eneral >ohn Areun, commaner o* the 199th (n*antry 9rigae while it
supporte /ong .ac (V. Areun ha little clout with the >oint /hie*s an was *ire a*ter si! months. Feplacing
him was the *ormer 0=: commaner 9rigaier :eneral Donal 0lac&burn, uner whose management 0%/0%
ha little in#ol#ement in +hoeni!.
The Deense De.art)ent6s oice o International Securit+ Aairs ;ISA< %as* b+ co).arison* )ore 'ee.l+
in-ol-e' %ith setting Phoeni5 .olic+, %ccoring to its charter, (0% -pro#ies super#ision in areas o* security
assistance, 8ilitary %ssistance %#isory :roups an 8issions, an the negotiating an monitoring o*
agreements with *oreign go#ernments.- (nso*ar as +hoeni! was a security assistance program *une by the
military through /=FD0 -- which (0% authori4e in 8ay 19G& -- ISA ha' o-erall su.er-ision o the .rogra),
!alle' the Pentagon6s State De.art)ent b+ Robert Go)er* ISA coor'inate' State an' Deense
'e.art)ent .olic+ on Vietna), (0% representati#es sat on the 0tate Department<s % ,oc +syops /ommittee,
an (0% representati#es, along with /(% o**icers >ac3 ,organ an .om Donohue, sat on the 0tate Department<s
Vietnami4ation .as3 Aorce, which, through the ?ational 0ecurity /ouncil, etermine how to turn the war,
incluing +hoeni!, o#er to the Vietnamese.
6ithin (0%, policy regaring Vietnami4ation was coorinate by the Vietnam .as3 Aorce $V?.A'. /reate in
mi-19G9, the V?.A was heae by 8aCor :eneral :eorge 9lanchar until =ctober 19&0, by 8aCor :eneral
Are Karhohs till 8ay 19&2, an by 9rigaier :eneral Da#i =tt till the cease-*ire. ;ach V?.A chie* in turn
reporte to (0% chie* 6arren ?utter<s eputy *or ;ast %sian an +aci*ic a**airs, Dennis Doolin, an Doolin<s
assistant, .om /onstant. (t was at the V?.A that +hoeni! policies were coorinate between 0aigon an the
concerne parties in 6ashington.
So it ca)e to .ass that in No-e)ber 2939 the VNT/ %as sa''le' %ith the tas& o bringing into line %ith
#"SAID bu'gets an' the la%*# as one VNT/ coor'inator .ut it* a .rogra) that ha' been concei-e' b+ the
!IA %ithout an+ regar' or legalities* an' to 'o it %ithout trea'ing on the !IA6s abilit+ to con'uct co-ert
o.erations, (t was a tic3lish Cob that re5uire s5uaring the har reality o* political war*are in Vietnam with the
*luctuating political situation in 6ashington. The )aHor eects %ere to bring the )ilitar+ into an a'ulterous
relationshi. %ith the S.ecial 0ranch an' to set the State De.art)ent on a collision course %ith
international la%,
142
.he Vietnam .as3 Aorce<s assistant *or concepts an strategies became the sta** o**icer responsible *or
+hoeni!. A Marine lieutenant colonel stan'ing o-er si5 eet tall an' %eighing o-er t%o hun're' .oun's*
he %as a tough Gorean $ar -eteran %ith a resu)e that inclu'e' e).lo+)ent %ith the !IA an' the State
De.art)ent as %ell as %ith the )ilitar+, Arom 19GD to 19G& he prepare military o**icers *or ci#il operations
ser#ice in Vietnam, an *rom late 19G& to early 19G9 he was a member o* /=FD0, ser#ing as >ohn Vann<s
eputy *or plans an programs in ((( /orps. 8ac&* as he has been 'ubbe'* .reerre' to re)ain anon+)ous
%hen %e )et at his ho)e in 29B:.
>ac3 was at the center o* the +hoeni! rama as it was acte out in 0aigon an 6ashington, an accoring to
him, the V?.A was -)air<s baby@ it was his locus.- 11&2 8ac& oten briee' the 'eense secretar+ an'
.re.are' #hun're's# o )e)os or his signature1 he %rote .a.ers or an' briee' the ISA 'irector
$arren Nutter1 he coor'inate' on a 'ail+ basis %ith )e)bers o the National Securit+ !ouncil* the
Vietna) $or&ing Grou.* the S.ecial Stu'ies Grou.* the Vietna)i7ation Tas& Grou. ;o-er %hich the
VNT/ #ha' cogni7ance#<* an' To) Donohue at SAVA, On )atters aecting the 8oint !hies* 8ac&
coor'inate' %ith its re.resentati-e* !olonel Paul Gell+ (( later co))an'ant o the Marine !or.s, 8ac&6s
contact at SA!SA %as !olonel Ra+ Singer* an' he %or&e' %ith )e)bers o !ongress in-estigating
-arious acets o the Vietna) $ar, All in all* 8ac& %as the )an in the )i''le, He is an e5.erience',
)ilitar+ theorist* an' his recollections an' assess)ent o the Phoeni5 .rogra) are es.eciall+ incisi-e
an' %ell %orth noting,
>ac3 ahere to Fobert .hompson<s theory that in orer to succee, a counterinsurgency re5uires a coorinate
military-police-intelligence attac3 against the insurgent<s political leaership. 9ut, >ac3 contene, although the
theory is #ali, .hompson<s e!trapolation *rom 8alaya to Vietnam was oome to *ail, *or whereas the ethnic
/hinese leaing the insurgency in 8alaya were #isibly i**erent *rom the 8alayan people, those in the V/( were
inistinguishable *rom other Vietnamese an impossible to trac3 by *oreigner a#isers. 6hat<s more, sai >ac3,
-the 9rits were shrew enough to o**er large rewars ... to in*ormers. 9ut no Vietnamese was going to turn in
"ncle ,o *or *i*ty buc3s.- 1i2 >ac3 cite this misuse o* resources as a maCor *law in %merica<s counterinsurgency
policy in Vietnam. -Komer was trying to sol#e problems through %i-in-Kin,- he e!plaine. -Komer woul
e#aluate people on how many piasters they ga#e away. ,e i what corporate managers o@ he set goals ...
which were higher than people coul achie#e. 9ut these were managerial-type solutions, a repeat o* 6orl 6ar
.wo, an this was a political war. An' the %a+ to %in hearts an' )in's %as through securit+,#
(n orer to establish security, >ac3 sai, -Hou on<t nee to get each ini#iual V/(@ you Cust nee to neutrali>e
their organi4ation. Aor e!ample, the presence o* a terrorist unit con*ers in*luence, so the iea is to pre#ent any
accommoation. %s >ohn Vann e!plaine, it<s not enough to agree not to *ight. .hat means you can still sell
guns an meicine to enemy, li3e the Ailipino group i in .ay ?inh. .hat is an acti#e accommoation. The
.eo.le ha' to ha-e a 'ual co))it)ent, The+ ha' to reHect the V! and su..ort the GVN, Man+ %oul'
su..ort GVN* but not betra+ V!* an' that %as the .roble),#
;#en i* the Vietnamese ha not ienti*ie with the V/(, an e#en i* %merican resources ha been properly use,
Tho).son6s three(.ronge' attac& on the V!I %as 'oo)e' to ail* e5.laine' 8ac&* because the !IA 'i'
not re.ort to !ORDS on highl+ sensiti-e )atters* li&e trac&ing high(le-el .enetrations, Phoeni5 coul'
ha-e been eecti-e onl+ i the !IA ha' brought its !IO* PR"* an' S.ecial 0ranch assets to bear, 9ut
when the /(% relin5uishe control o* the program in 19G9, it too3 those assets -- which were the only e**ecti#e
tools against the V/( -- with it. (n orer to protect its political intelligence operations, the /(% ne#er share its
sources with the military o**icers or +ublic 0a*ety a#isers assigne to +hoeni! -- unless, o* course, those
people ha been suborne. 1ii2 In this %a+ the !IA &ic&e' out ro) un'er Phoeni5 one o the three legs it
stoo' u.on, Ater 8une 2939 the agenc+ con'ucte' its o%n unilateral o.erations against the V!I* a.art
ro) Phoeni5* through the PR" in rural areas an' through the S.ecial 0ranch in the cities, 8%/V an the
=**ice o* +ublic 0a*ety in 0aigon complaine to their hea5uarters in 6ashington, ma3ing re*orm o* the 0pecial
9ranch an the +F" the central +hoeni!-relate issues, but these were areas o-er %hich the Deense an'
State 'e.art)ents ha' no inluence,
%*ter mi-19G9 8%/V trie esperately to obtain access to 0pecial 9ranch intelligence in the D(=//s. 9ut, as
>ac3 e!plaine, 0pecial 9ranch wor3e at the pro#ince le#el an abo#e, primarily in urban areas, an a#oie
the rural areas where most D(=//s were locate. ?or i the 0pecial 9ranch esire to share sources with its
ri#al, the 800, *orcing the /(% into greater epenency on the +F" *or its rural operations. ,a#ing been
e!clue by the /(%, military a#isers to +hoeni! relie totally on their %FV? counterparts, with a corresponing
emphasis on tactical military rather than political operations.
.here were rare instances when a /(% pro#ince o**icer woul sen the +F" own to a D(=// to assist the
+hoeni! a#iser. Other ti)es the PR" e' #%ashe'(out# bo'ies into the PI!s, On the other si'e o the
coin* the S.ecial 0ranch %as usuall+ chasing 'issi'ents* not the V!I, A stu'+ b+ Robert Tho).son on
behal o the National Securit+ !ouncil re-eale' the S.ecial 0ranch to be un'ertraine'* un'erstae'*
suering ro) ba' )orale* an' rac&e' b+ corru.tion, 8ac& .ut it this %a+: #$hereas the a-erage co. on
the street %oul' ta&e it+ .iasters as a bribe* %hen the S.ecial 0ranch got in-ol-e'* the .rice %ent u.,#
143
He a''e'* #There %as goo' reason to belie-e that the V! ha' .enetrate' the inner circle o the S.ecial
0ranch, .his is why /olby re5ueste that two A9( agents be sent to 0aigon to set up a counterintelligence
operation.-
Gno%ing that the PR" an' S.ecial 0ranch %ere racture' be+on' re.air but that .roble)s %ithin the)
%oul' re)ain hi''en un'er la+ers o !IA securit+ an' that !IA oicers %oul' continue to )ount their
o%n o.erations a.art ro) Phoeni5* the State an' Deense 'e.art)ents %ere co).elle' to see& other
solutions, .he 5uestion became whether -- in the absence o* intelligence o**icers -- soliers or policemen were
better suite to mount anti-in*rastructure operations.
-6hat you neee,- >ac3 suggeste, -was to be *le!ible in orer to con*orm to ,amlet ;#aluation 0ystem
ratings@ you neee police *orces in secure areas, an the military in areas controlle by the enemy. 9ut
generally, in guerrilla war*are it<s more military than police, an so that<s where the emphasis shoul *all.-
?e#ertheless, >ac3 e!plaine, this *le!ible approach, applie to +hoeni! a*ter 19G9, was slow to e#elop an
basically ine**ecti#e. -(n the beginning o* the +hoeni! program,- he sai, -the %rmy an 8arines ha a surplus o*
armor an artillery o**icers, who were assigne to the program but ha no 3nowlege o* running intelligence
operations. 6e were sening out the thir team against the *irst team. .hen, when they began sta**ing the
D(=//s an +(=//s with military intelligence o**icers, it beca)e clear that their training %as ina'e=uate or
the Hob, Si5 %ee&s is not enough ti)e to train a S.ecial 0ranch oicer,
-0o it became clear that what they neee was e!perience police o**icers, an in 19&0 the police through
"0%(D began playing a larger role. 9ut there were e*ects on this sie, too. The+ shoul' ha-e ha' seasone'
ci-ilians co)ing into AID* but instea' the+ got all the losers in that one, The ci-ilians co)ing to AID
%ere running a%a+ ro) ba' )arriages an' ba' careers, Man+ %ere alcoholics1 the+6' get a Vietna)ese
girl an' enHo+ the chea. li-ing, .hese people ha a goo war.- 9ut they ha little success against the
in*rastructure.
>ac3 sai he belie#e that military policemen were the answer, an on his a#ice, on a trial basis, /olonel %lbert
;scola was appointe the +hoeni! region coorinator in (V /orps. ?ow corporate secretary o* 9echtel, ;scola
ha recei#e a egree in police aministration *rom 8ichigan 0tate in 19E& an was 3nown as a protege o*
:eneral %brams<s. Aor -impro#ing proceures against the V/(@- ;scola was aware the )egion o* 8erit in 19&0
an a *ew years later was promote to maCor general -- rewars ne#er bestowe upon Doug Dillar.
(n any e#ent, +hoeni! as an organi4ation pro#e *ar less than the sum o* its parts. 8oreo#er, b+ 2939 concerns
about its conce.t ha' )o-e' ro) the boar'roo) into the courtroo)* %here Phoeni5 %as co)ing un'er
attac& as an assassination .rogra), 0uenly its problems were legal an moral, not organi4ational an
proceural.
8ac& sai'* #!olb+ .ushe' Ghie) to get Phoeni5 legiti)i7e' so it %oul' ha-e a constitutional basis in
Vietna)ese la%* si)ilar to the /0I or the !IA, !olb+ trie' to )a&e Phoeni5 legiti)ate internal securit+ ((
that to be a )e)ber o the !o))unist .art+ is illegal, This is the nail u.on %hich Phoeni5 is hung: I
+ou6re a !o))unist* +ou6re brea&ing the la%, Then Phoeni5 goes out an' gets these gu+s,#
=* course, +hoeni! ha been going out an getting those guys *or *i*teen years by the time 19&0 rolle aroun.
.he e**ect o* those *i*teen years o* illicit co#ert action, on both Vietnamese an %mericans, is the ne!t subCect.
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. >ac3 suggeste that a point system -- ten points *or a /=0V? care own to one point *or a messenger boy --
with a monetary e5ui#alent woul ha#e resulte in a truly 5ualitati#e attac3.
ii. Accor'ing to Michael Mc!ann* Saigon Public Saet+ 'irector ro) 8ul+ 2939 until A.ril 29:E* his
biggest Phoeni5 .roble) %as that the !IA use' the Public Saet+ .rogra) as a co-er or its case
oicers* bringing all Public Saet+ a'-isers un'er sus.icions, 11L2 )i3ewise, sai Are Dic3, chie* o* the
9ureau o* ?arcotics an Dangerous Drugs in Vietnam, #E-er+one ha' his roc& to hi'e un'er* but !IA &e.t
using our roc&s* listing its oicers as narcotics a'-isors to the e)bass+,# 1192
!HAPTER E2: Deca+
144
%*ter %ugust 19G9, writes +ro*essor ,uy, -+ower in 0aigon belonge to three generals: ?guyen Van .hieu as
+resient@ .ran .hien Khiem as +rime 8inister@ an /ao Van Vien as /hie* o* the >oint 0ta**. .hey 3ept their
positions until the e#e o* 0outh Vietnam<s collapse.- 112
As %as custo)ar+ in Vietna)* accor'ing to Hu+* .o%er %as a')inistere' b+ each )an6s %ie, -8rs.
.hieu ealt with the businessmen, especially those o* /hinese origin, an ha her shares in pro*its obtaine
*rom import, e!port an international trae.- 8rs. Khiem -*i!e a price *or new appointments *or the posts o* chie*
o* pro#ince, chie* o* istrict, an chie* o* police ser#ices at the pro#incial an istrict le#els. 8rs. Vien<s omain
was the army: contractors wor3ing with the army coul pass through her intermeiary, an she ha her tari** *or
a 5uic3 promotion in the army.- 122
6ith the consoliation o* power by these three men came a resurgence o* what /(% 0ummary 0NL&/G9, ate
0eptember 12, 19G9, calle -in*luence by the wiely hate /an )ao group o* the Diem era.- .he /(% memo
name as members o* the neo(!an 4ao cabal -Aoreign 8inister )am, as well as the ministers o* in*ormation,
economy, *inance an legislati#e liaison.- The )e)o note' that Duong Van #0ig# Minh ha' .re'icte' #that
rene%e' !an 4ao inluence coul' lea' to a tragic clash bet%een !atholics an' 0u''hists,# %n, the
memo note, -apprehension is li3ely to increase o#er reports that the new in*ormation minister 1.hieu<s cousin,
,oang Duc ?ha2 has appointe some 20 care *rom the ?han Oa +arty -- a neo-/an )ao group -- to 3ey
suborinate positions.-
(nee, political e#elopments in 19G9 mirrore those o* 19EE, when ; )ansale was tol that Diem -neee to
ha#e his own political party.- 1N2 4i&e%ise* to strengthen Thieu6s .osition* the !IA in 2939 inance' the
creation o the National Social De)ocratic /ront* 'escribe' b+ or)er !IA oicer /ran& Sne.. as #a .ro(
go-ern)ent coalition o .olitical .arties,# An'* Hust as in Die)6s 'a+* Sne.. %rites* #the !IA la-ishe'
large su)s o )one+ on the Thieu go-ern)ent to be use' in co%ing an' 6neutrali7ing6 its o..osition*#
>A? the o..osition being those nationalist .arties* li&e the Dai Viets* that ha' relations %ith the
0u''hists, 6ith the %mericans chasing the V/(, these omestic groups became primary targets o* the 0pecial
9ranch an its stepchil, +hung ,oang.
(n particular, .hieu *elt threatene by .ran ?goc /hau, the popular nationalist whose persecution was sai to
symboli4e the -*ratricial- nature o* the Vietnam 6ar. 9ut in *act, /hau<s persecution ha less to o with regional
i**erences than with rampant corruption, itsel* *uele by the /(%<s bottomless blac3 bag an irrational obsession
with internal security at any cost.
!hau6s .roble)s began in 2939* %hen he launche' an anti(corru.tion ca).aign against Thieu* his ol'
class)ate ro) /ort 0ragg, The gist o !hau6s clai) %as that Ngu+en !ao Thang (( a %ealth+ .har)acist
an' or)er !an 4ao ro) Hue (( %as using !IA un's to un'er)ine the National Asse)bl+, !hau6s
crusa'e %as seen as a threat to GVN stabilit+* an' as a result* the !IA sent t%o case oicers to oer hi)
enough )one+ to start his o%n .olitical .art+ in e5change or bac&ing o, $hen !hau 'ecline'* Ro'
4an'reth inor)e' General Dang Van Duang that !hau %as secretl+ in contact %ith his brother* Tran
Ngoc Hien* a senior !uc Nghien !uu oicer in North Vietna), Duang issue' an arrest %arrant or !hau*
charging hi) %ith the ca.ital cri)e o es.ionage,
,ien was arreste, /hau went into hiing, an on orers *rom 6ashington, %mbassaor 9un3er orere /hau<s
case o**icer, >ohn Vann, to brea3 o** contact. %t that point Vann, in >une 19G9, summone Aran3 0cotton *rom
.aiwan an arrange *or him an /hau to meet in a sa*e house in :ia Dinh. .he con#ersation, accoring to
0cotton, went li3e this: -( sai to /hau, <0ergeant >ohnson is staning by near the /amboian borer with some
o* his 0pecial Aorces *riens. .hey<re epenable, an they<ll help you get out. 9ut it<s now or ne#er.< 1E2
-/hau was #ery emotional that night in :ia Dinh,- 0cotton continue. -,e sai, <.o run now woul be the same
as amitting (<m a /ommunist. %n (<m not. 0o ( will not run.<- %n so /hau remaine in hiing until capture in
late 19G9.
777
Ironicall+* %hile Thieu %as using Phoeni5 to re.ress his 'o)estic o..onents* his o%n cabinet %as
cra%ling %ith !o))unist agents, 9ut in orer to perpetuate the myth o* :V? stability, the /(% was reluctant
to publici4e this *act. /onse5uently, says renegae /(% o**icer 0am %ams, in Ma+ 2939 station chie Te'
Shac&le+ #in'icate' on a -isit to $ashington his belie that the Vietcong ha' onl+ EII agents in the
South Vietna)ese Go-ern)ent, He s.o&e ro) ignorance, An in('e.th research stu'+ going on at that
ti)e suggeste' the real nu)ber o such agents %as )ore li&e CI*III,# 1G2
%lthough thirty thousan souns improbably high, the e!tent to which the :V? was in*iltrate was re#eale in a
counterintelligence operation mounte by /(% o**icer Falph 8c:ehee in 19G9. 9egun in 19G2, =peration
+roCectile relie on a penetration agent insie what the 19G9 +hoeni! ;n o* Hear Feport calle -a /=0V? le#el
145
intelligence net irecte against the o**ice o* the +resient o* 0outh Vietnam an other ministries o* the :V?.-
The lea'er o the s.+ ring %as Vu Nhoc Nha* Presi'ent Thieu6s rien' an' chie a'-iser on !atholic
aairs, ?ha, a /atholic, ha resettle in 0outh Vietnam uring the 19ED )ansale-inspire e!ous *rom ?orth
Vietnam. .he spy ring<s highest-ran3ing member was ,uynh Van .rong, .hieu<s special assistant *or political
a**airs an irector o* the /entral (ntelligence 0chool, a position that place him at the top o* the /(=.
8c:ehee inherite +roCectile in 19G9, when, a*ter si! wee3s as :ia Dinh pro#ince o**icer in charge, he became
the /(%<s liaison to the 0pecial 9ranch in Fegion V. -(n this capacity,- he e!plaine, -( super#ise 1si!2 other
agency case o**icers wor3ing with speci*ic elements o* the 0pecial +olice in an aroun 0aigon.- 1&2
.he principal Vietnamese player in the ri#e against the /uc ?ghien /uu<s strategic intelligence networ3s was
0pecial 9ranch chie* ?guyen 8au. 9orn in ?inh .huan +ro#ince $where .hieu was born an reare', 8au was
grauate *rom the Da )at 8ilitary %caemy in 19ED. (n 19GN Diem appointe him sector commaner an
pro#ince chie* o* .hua .hien +ro#ince an mayor o* ,ue, in which capacity he put own the 9uhist crisis
leaing up to the coup. (n the reorgani4ation a*ter the coup, 8au was mae a 8ontagnar tas3 *orce
commaner with the %FV? .wenty-secon Di#ision, a Cob he hel until 19G&, when he was put in charge o*
/ong .ac (V. .he *ollowing year he was promote to lieutenant colonel an mae irector o* the 0pecial 9ranch
o* the ?ational +olice.
Sot(s.o&en an' s)art* Mau %ante' nothing to 'o %ith Phoeni5, In a letter to the author* he sa+s his
#great concern in ta&ing co))an' o the S.ecial 0ranch %as the unHustiie' arrest* alse accusation an'
arbitrar+ 'etention, Those ba' )ani.ulations coul'n6t be sto..e' since the .ro-ince chies* .olice
chies an' other oicials %oul' 'o an+thing to )a&e Phoeni5 score* %hich assure' the) Hob securit+
an' higher regar', .hey 3new that +hoeni! was uner the super#ision o* an %merican %mbassaor, an that
+resient ?guyen Van .hieu always listene to this power*ul personage. .hey 3ept the 0pecial 9ranch in the
pro#inces too busy with arrest in #illage, con*ession wor3sheet an charge proceure at the +ro#incial 0ecurity
/ommittee, while ( wante to irect the 0pecial 9ranch into pro*essional acti#ities: organi4ational penetration
gathering in*ormation relating to policies an campaign plans, spotting the 3ey leaers *or neutrali4ation. 9ut (
i not argue with them. ( *elt so alone ( 3ept my mouth shut.-
8outh shut, 8au concentrate on smashing the /uc ?ghien /uu<s strategic intelligence networ3s within the
:V?. 6hen 8c:ehee gathere enough e#ience to con#ince 0hac3ley to let him roll up ?ha<s net, 8au
gal#ani4e his *orces, an the 0pecial 9ranch sprang into action. 8au<s -small secret police care prepare
ini#iual *iles on each person to be arreste,- 8c:ehee writes. -)ate one a*ternoon he calle a tas3 *orce in to
his o**ice, then cut them o** *rom outsie contact: ,e brie*e each three-man arrest team separately then passe
them copies o* the *ile on their target ini#iual. %t minight the police *anne out through 0aigon an pulle in
the net.- 1L2
.he operation was a smashing success. ,ouse searches turne up -micro*ilm o* secret ocuments, ocument
copying cameras, one-time raiop encoing an ecoing pas, raios, secret in3- 192 an other tools o* the
trae. .he 0pecial 9ranch also ha the goo *ortune o* arresting a #isitor o* one o* the targets, who -turne out
to be the hea o* a military intelligence net- 1102 in the 800. %ll in all, *i*ty people were arreste an *orty-one
spies were trie an con#icte. .he group inclue businessmen, military o**icers, teachers, stuents, an two
top-ran3ing /hieu ,oi o**icials.
,owe#er, showing that the :V? was -so rile by enemy spies that they were able to operate uner the nose
o* the +resient,- 8c:ehee laments, was -not the 3in o* success that the /(%<s top o**icials wante to see.-
.hat rein*orce his suspicion that the /(% was unwilling to amit either the strength o* the enemy or the
wea3ness o* its ally. To McGehee #it %as ob-ious that %e %ere bolstering a ho.elessl+ corru.t
go-ern)ent that ha' neither the su..ort nor res.ect o the Vietna)ese .eo.le,# >22?
8eanwhile, other /(% o**icers were reaching the same conclusion. $hen /ran& Sne.. arri-e' in Saigon in
2939* he %as assigne' the tas& o .utting together bac&groun' .roiles on targets or assassination b+
#.lo%ing through 'ocu)ents# an' con'ucting interrogations at the National Interrogation !enter, #I
%oul' .ut together a list an' I %oul' turn it o-er to Mr, !olb+6s .eo.le*# Sne.. sa+s in (he (en
(housand 4ay War, #He %oul' ee' this list out to the stri&e tea)s* an' the+ %oul' go to %or& ,,,, An'
that is ho% +ou beco)e a collaborator in the %orst o the terrorist .rogra)s* in the )ost atrocious
e5cesses o the "S go-ern)ent,# >2E?
=thers became in#ol#e in other ways. /onsier the case o* 9art =sborn, a +hoeni! critic who enliste in the
%rmy in =ctober 19GG, was traine at Aort 9ragg an Aort ,olabir, an was classi*ie an intelligence area
specialist. #M+ training %as 'esigne' to .re.are )e as an agent han'ler an' consiste' o classes
'esigne' to teach recruit)ent an' training o agents an' )anage)ent o agent net%or&s*# Osborn
testiie' beore !ongress in 29:C, 0e a''e' that his training inclu'e' a session concerning the
ter)ination o agents through -arious )etho's* inclu'ing assassination, >2C?
146
% corporal with no 3nowlege o* Vietnamese language, history, or culture, =sborn arri#e in Da ?ang in
0eptember 19G& an was assigne to the E2Eth 8ilitary (ntelligence :roup. ,is area o* operations was south o*
Da ?ang, outsie a 8arine air base in Juang ?am +ro#ince. ,a#ing been assigne' to the unilateral branch
o the )ilitar+ intelligence tea)* %hose acti-ities %ere #e5tra(legal*# Osborn use' an alias an'* or
.lausible 'enial* %as .ro-i'e' %ith alse i'entiication in'icating he %as a ci-ilian e).lo+ee %ith the
!ORDS reugee .rogra), =sborn slippe into his military uni*orm when it was necessary *or him to see military
maps or ocuments.
=sborn<s team leaer put him in touch with a principal agent who was running si! subagents in a single cell. .he
subagents were political specialists, gathering positi#e intelligence on V/ cares. ;ager to e!pan his networ3,
Osborn hire' as a''itional agents .eo.le %hose na)es he got ro) the e).lo+)ent iles o a local
A)erican construction co).an+, ,e sent his intelligence reports to the 1st 8arine Di#ision, the N 8arine
%mphibious Aorce, the E2Eth 8(:, the %merican Di#ision, an, un3nown to him, the Da ?ang +hoeni!
coorinator.
=sborn<s association with +hoeni! was cemente when, to his surprise, he was tol that the E2Eth<s (ntelligence
/ontingency Aun was empty an that he woul hence*orth be unable to pay his agents. %t this point =sborn
ha two principal agents, *orty subagents in *i#e cells, an operating e!penses a#eraging hal* a million piasters
per month -- lac3 o* which prompte him to chec3 his list o* users *or new sources o* re#enue. Fecalle =sborn:
-( was able to ascertain that the +hoeni! program was recei#ing an utili4ing my in*ormation .... ( #isite the
+hoeni! /oorinator, a "0 %rmy maCor, an tal3e to him about the in*ormation that was laterally isseminate
to him. ,e ... tol me that any in*ormation ( gathere woul be use in the conte!t o* the +hoeni! program. (n
return ( was guarantee *inancial remuneration *or my agents, use o* #arious <sa*e houses< *or clanestine
meetings, an access to %ir %merica transportation.- 11D2
=sborn also obtaine rugs, ra*t e*erments *or his agents through phony enrollment in the /i#ilian (rregular
De*ense :roup program, an *i*teen thousan ollars 5uarterly *or bribing the local police. .he +hoeni!
coorinator also o**ere a bonus o* a hunre thousan piasters *or high-ran3ing V/( members. (n this way,
regular military personnel across 0outh Vietnam became in#ol#e in +hoeni! abuses.
6hen as3e to e!plain why +hoeni! abuses occurre, 0nepp says the program was -Cerry-built- because o* -the
/(%<s concern that the V/ ha penetrate the 0pecial 9ranch an 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice. .he more
*ragmentation, the better the security. .hey in<t want it central so it coul be e!ploite.- 11E2
"n*ortunately, writes 0nepp, -Aor lac3 o* *inite guiance the +hoeni! stri3e teams opte *or a scattershot
approach, pic3ing up anyone who might be a suspect, an e#entually, when the Cails were pac3e to
o#er*lowing, they began simply ta3ing the law, such as it was, into their own hans.- 11G2
;!planations *or why +hoeni! was open to abuse epen on a person<s politics. 0nepp, who harbors a gruge
against the /(%, says his *ormer employer -Cerry-rigge- +hoeni! *or its own security. =thers say +hoeni! was
hane to the military as a co#er *or /(% negotiations with the V/( in .ay ?inh an 0aigon. Arom +hoeni!
irector >ohn 8ason<s perspecti#e, accommoation was the root cause o* all +hoeni! woes. (n an %ugust 19,
19G9, Ne" =ork Times article, .errence 0mith 5uotes 8ason as saying, -Aa#oritism is a part o* it. 0ometimes
*amily relationships are in#ol#e. 6e 3now #ery well that i* one o* our units pic3s up the istrict chie*<s brother-in-
law, he<s going to be release.-
Aor ?guyen 8au, +hoeni! was subCect to -ba manipulations- by o**icials see3ing Cob security an high regar.
)i3ewise, 0outh Vietnamese nationalists pointe to corrupt o**icials as the e#il inherent in +hoeni!, as was mae
clear in >une 19G9, when legislators complaine that the police use +hoeni! to e!tort money *rom wealthy
citi4ens an that V/( agents supplie names o* loyal citi4ens to the police, getting aroun the /olby *ail-sa*e
cross-chec3 system by reporting through se#eral i**erent agencies. (n this way, innocent people *oun their
names on the reae +hoeni! blac3list.
8ismanagement by esign, ineptitue, accommoation, corruption, an ouble agents were reasons why
+hoeni! abuses occurre. ,owe#er, the actual reporting o* abuses *ell to .hir Aorce Vietnamese an non-
career %merican military personnel. (t is to this aspect o* the +hoeni! story that we now turn.
777
=ne o* the *irst people to critici4e +hoeni! publicly was ; 8urphy, a nati#e o* 0taten (slan, ?ew Hor3, who
spent nine months in a /atholic seminary be*ore enlisting in the ".0. %rmy. Aollowing his tour in Vietnam,
8urphy, *rom >une 19G9 through >anuary 19&0, was statione in 6ashington, D./., oing bac3groun
in#estigations an security chec3s *or the 11Gth 8ilitary (ntelligence :roup. %t the time he was one o* a growing
number o* Vietnam #eterans, almost e!clusi#ely enliste men, who were publicly emonstrating against the war.
(n =ctober 19G9 ; 8urphy was also one o* the *ew %mericans ac5uainte with +hoeni!.
147
Mur.h+6s 'eter)ination to )a&e Phoeni5 a .olitical issue in the "nite' States began on October 2@*
%hile he %as .artici.ating in the March Against Death outsi'e the Pentagon, There he encountere'
colleagues ro) the 223th MIG. -( was being sur#eille,- he tol me. -( 3now, because the people oing it tol
me so. <(<#e been reaing about you,< one o* the o**icers sai.- 11&2
Ha-ing ought or his countr+ in 'eense o its liberties* Mur.h+ %as angr+ to in' that )ilitar+
intelligence %as being use' against A)erican citi7ens %ho %ere e5ercising their constitutional rights,
To hi)* this re.resente' #the Phoeni5 )entalit+ in the "nite' States,# >ust how serious 8urphy consiere
this threat is mae clear by his e*inition o* the program. #Phoeni5*# he sai'* #%as a bount+(hunting .rogra)
(( an atte).t to eli)inate the o..osition, 0+ %hich I )ean the o..osition to us* the A)ericans* getting
%hat %e %ante', $hich %as to control the Vietna)ese through our clients (( the Die)s* the G+s* the
Thieus,# /or Mur.h+* all other 'einitions o Phoeni5 are )erel+ #intellectual Hargon,#
8urphy is a man o* conscience, a *ormer no#itiate at a seminary in 9altimore whose eep-seate patriotism
prompte him to enlist, espite his compunctions about the morality o* the Vietnam 6ar. %*ter basic training,
8urphy was sent to Aort ,olabir, where he was traine as a counterintelligence specialist, then to the De*ense
)anguage (nstitute in .e!as *or Vietnamese-language training. Arom there he was assigne to Aort )ewis. #On
the .lane ro) /ort 4e%is to !a) Ranh 0a+*# he recalle'* #I %as gi-en an article to rea', It %as a stu'+
b+ the A)erican Me'ical Association on ,,, interrogation )etho's use' in the So-iet "nion, It sho%e'
ho% to 'o things %ithout la+ing a han' on a .erson (( ho% +ou coul' torture a .erson Hust b+ ha-ing
the) stan' there,# That )anual %as his intro'uction to the 'octrine o !ontre !ou.,
"pon his arri#al in Vietnam on 8ay 12, 19GL, 8urphy was assigne to Aourth Di#ision hea5uarters outsie
+lei3u /ity, where his unerstaning o* counterinsurgency war*are rapily e#ol#e *rom theory to reality. .here
were *i#e enliste men in his counterintelligence team, each with a sector, each sector ha#ing ten agents.
Mur.h+6s Hob %as to con'uct sabotage in-estigations an' to run un'erco-er agents* urnishe' b+ the
MSS* %ho acte' as 'a+ %or&ers on the )ilitar+ base, 8urphy also inherite agents ele#en miles away in
+lei3u /ity an acte as the Aourth Di#ision<s liaison to the local Phoeni5 coor'inator* a !IA contract oicer
na)e' Ron %ho %as .osing as a Public Saet+ a'-iser con'ucting currenc+ in-estigations,
=nce a wee3 8urphy went to the local /(% compoun, along with #arious ci#ilian an military intelligence people
in the #icinity, to submit to the +hoeni! /ommittee the names o* V/( suspects their agents ha *ingere.
0urroune by a concrete wall, its gate manne by a 8ontagnar +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nit, the embassy
house was locate in a remote corner o* +lei3u. Insi'e the co).oun' %as a barbe'(%ire #co% cage# or
.risoners, The cage* accor'ing to Mur.h+* %as too s)all or .risoners to stan' u. in, Mur.h+ %as not
.er)itte' in the PI!, which -sat on a hill an loo3e li3e a "-shape school.-
As or the i'entit+ o the .eo.le his agents sur-eille' an' targete'* Mur.h+ sai'* #I %oul' ne-er see a
North Vietna)ese or Vietcong sol'ier, This is .ost Tet* an' those .eo.le are all 'ea', $hat %e6re tal&ing
about are ci-ilian inrastructure .eo.le su..orting the NVA an' V!, It coul' be an+bo'+, It coul' be
so)ebo'+ %ho %or&s in a )o-ie theater ,,, so)ebo'+ s%ee.ing u.,#
$hen as&e' %hat &in' o inor)ation he nee'e' beore he coul' ha-e a sus.ect arreste'* Mur.h+
ans%ere'* #None, $hate-er +ou %ante',# $hen as&e' %hat sort o criteria he use' to classi+ V!I
sus.ects* Mur.h+ re.lie'* #Nothing, One o )+ agents sa+s so)ebo'+6s a s.+, I I ha' reason to
belie-e ,,, that he %as telling the truth* an' i I %ante' to bring so)ebo'+ in or interrogation* I coul' 'o
it, It %as that eas+, I ha' an agree)ent %ith the tea) lea'er that I coul' 'o an+thing I %ante', I e-en
%ore ci-ilian clothes, M+ co-er i'entit+ %as as a construction %or&er %ith Paciic Architects an'
Engineers,#
8urphy calle his agents -hustlers -- entrepreneurs ma3ing money o** intelligence.- %*ter noting the i**iculty o*
#eri*ying in*ormation submitte by agents at +hoeni! /ommittee meetings, -the lac3 o* *iles an things li3e that,-
Mur.h+ tol' ho% one sus.ect %as ra.e' an' torture' si).l+ because she reuse' to slee. %ith an
agent,
#Phoeni5*# sai' E' Mur.h+* #%as ar %orse than the things attribute' to it, It %as heinous* but no %orse
than the bo)bing, %n ( on<t apologi4e. 9ut it was a watershe *or me. (t *ocuse things. ( reali4e it wasn<t
Cust a war, but that base on the assumption that nothing is worse than communism, the go-ern)ent o
Vietna)* bac&e' b+ the ",S,* elt Hustiie' in su..ressing all o..osition %hile e5ten'ing its control
throughout the countr+,# That control* Mur.h+ e5.laine'* ser-e' an econo)ic* not an i'ealistic*
.ur.ose, #Phil 4a.itosa >an e).lo+ee at Paciic Architects an' Engineers? tol' )e about t%o )illion
'ollars in )ateriel an' cash being unaccounte' or at PA an' E ,,, that goo's being sol' on the blac&
)ar&et 'i'n6t co)e ro) the Vietna)ese* but ro) the A)ericans,
148
-(n orer to get into military intelligence school,- 8urphy continue, -( an the other caniates ha to write an
essay on the ebate about the Vietnam 6ar. %n the thrust o* my paper was <6hat we o in Vietnam will come
bac3 to us.< (t was a one worl thesis. 6ell, I go to Vietna) an' I see the bullshit going 'o%n, Then I co)e
bac& to the "nite' States an' see the e5act sa)e thing going on here, I6) at the Hun're' Si5teenth MI
unit* an' as +ou lea-e the roo)* the+ ha-e nine slots or .ictures* eight o the) ille': Rennie Da-is*
Abbie Ho)an* 0en S.oc&* 8err+ Rubin, An' I6) being sent out to s.ot an' i'enti+ these .eo.le, This
is Phoeni5, This is Phoeni5*# he re.eate'* then a''e' or e).hasis* "(his is %hoeni"6"
-(n ?am ( ha composite escriptions,- 8urphy ac3nowlege. -9ut then ( wasn<t in a place where we ha
technology. (t oesn<t ma3e any i**erence. .he point is that it was use in Vietnam, it was use in the ".0., an
it still is use in the "nite 0tates.-
.hus, 8urphy *elt Custi*ie in ta3ing tactics the military ha taught him an using them against his *ormer
masters. -.o me,- he e!plaine, -+hoeni! was a le#er to use to stop the war. Hou use what you got. ( got
+hoeni!. (<m a *ormer intelligence agent, *luent in Vietnamese, in#ol#e in +hoeni! in the /entral ,ighlans.
.hat means (<m creible. (<m using it.-
(ntent on ma3ing +hoeni! a omestic political issue to be use to stop the war, 8urphy Coine two other Vietnam
#eterans -- 9ob 0temme an 8i3e "hl -- in an e**ort to in*orm the public. %t news con*erences hel
simultaneously in ?ew Hor3, 0an Arancisco, an Fome on %pril 1D, 19&0, the three #eterans issue a Coint press
release -- without naming names -- laying out the *acts about +hoeni!. %n e#en though the release was not
wiely reporte, it i perpetuate the contro#ersy that ha begun in Aebruary, when +hoeni! was *irst e!amine
by the 0enate Aoreign Felations /ommittee. 9y then +hoeni! was nearly three years ol.
,ow the 0enate hearings came to aress +hoeni! is unusual. (t concerns Arancis Feitemeyer, a 0eton ,all
Di#inity 0chool ropout who was ra*te an attene o**icer caniate school in late 19GL. %long with *orty
other air e*ense artillery o**icers, Feitemeyer was traine at Aort ,olabir *or uty as a +hoeni! coorinator in
Vietnam. He %as a..alle' b+ the instruction he recei-e' ro) -eteran Phoeni5 a'-isers. 4oath to
.artici.ate in %hat he consi'ere' a .rogra) that targete' ci-ilians or assassination* Reite)e+er
a..roache' A)erican !i-il 4iberties "nion la%+er $illia) Kin)an in No-e)ber 293B, =n behal* o*
Feitemeyer, Minman *ile a petition *or conscientious obCector status in ".0. District /ourt on Aebruary 1D, 19G9,
while the rest o* Feitemeyer<s class was eparting *or Vietnam.
(n the petition Feitemeyer sai that he was tol that he woul super#ise an *un eighteen mercenaries -who
woul be e!plicitly irecte by him- to -*in, capture an/or 3ill- as many V/( as possible within a gi#en area.
The V!I %ere 'eine' as #an+ )ale or e)ale o an+ age in a .osition o authorit+ or inluence in the
-illage %ho %ere .oliticall+ lo+al or si).l+ in agree)ent %ith the V! or their obHecti-es,# Reite)e+er
%as tol' that he %oul' be re=uire' to )aintain a #&ill =uota# o it+ bo'ies .er )onth an' that or hi) to
locate V!I* #resort to the )ost e5tre)e or)s o torture %as necessar+,# As an e5a).le o %hat %as
e5.ecte' o hi)* Reite)e+er %as tol' o one V!I sus.ect being &ille' b+ #sai' )ercenaries an'
thereater 'eca.itate' an' 'is)e)bere' so that the e+es* hea'* ears an' other .arts o the 'ece'ent6s
bo'+ %ere 'is.la+e' on his ront la%n as a %arning an' an in'uce)ent to other V! s+).athi7ers* to
'isclose their i'entit+ an' turn the)sel-es in to the A'-isor an' the )ercenaries,#
Reite)e+er %as tol' that Phoeni5 #sought to acco).lish through ca.ture* inti)i'ation* eli)ination an'
assassination %hat the ",S,* u. to this ti)e* %as unable to acco).lish through the ,,, use o )ilitar+
.o%er,# The Vietna)ese %ere characteri7e' in racist ter)s* so that the cruelties .er.etrate' u.on the)
)ight be )ore easil+ rationali7e', Reite)e+er %as tol' that i ca.ture'* he coul' be trie' or %ar cri)es
un'er #.rece'ents establishe' b+ the Nure)berg Trials as %ell as ,,, the Gene-a !on-ention,#
On the basis o this account o his Phoeni5 instruction* Reite)e+er %as grante' conscientious obHector
status on 8ul+ 2A* 2939, The Ar)+ ile' an a..eal but* or .ublic relations .ur.oses* %ith're% it in
October* Hust as the March Against Death %as getting un'er %a+, 8eanwhile, the rami*ications o* the case
set in motion the series o* e#ents that brought +hoeni! uner congressional scrutiny. Feitemeyer was satis*ie
with ha#ing escape ser#ice in +hoeni! an *ae into obscurity. Minman, howe#er, li3e 8urphy, saw +hoeni!
as a le#er to be use to stop the war. ,e presse a copy o* the petition into the palm o* a senator on the Aoreign
Felations /ommittee. 6hile the committee prepare to hol hearings on /=FD0 in Aebruary 19&0, a sta** aie
to 0enator 6illiam Aulbright lea3e a copy o* the petition to reporters >uy /oburn an :eo**rey /owan. .heir
in#estigation resulte in an article title -.raining *or .error: % Deliberate +olicyB- +rinte in the Village Voice in
December 19G9, the article brought the subCect o* +hoeni! into open ebate.
.he military respone to /oburn an /owan<s article an Feitemeyer<s -wil allegations- on the ay they
appeare in print. !olonel Marshall /all%ell* co))an'ant o /ort Holabir'* suggeste' that so)e
instructors )ight ha-e tol' #%ar stories*# but he insiste' that torture an' assassination %ere not .art o
the school6s curriculu), ,e i ac3nowlege that Aort ,owar containe a moc3 Vietnamese #illage where
149
+hoeni! a#isers -+lan1ne2 an mount1e2 an operation *or sei4ure o* the #illage,- then rehearse interrogating
V/( suspects whom they ienti*ie *rom blac3lists. 9ecause the obCect o* such -proacti#e- operations was
unco#ering the enemy<s secret agents, this was calle an o**ensi#e counterintelligence operation.
Aallwell<s answers *ell short o* allaying congressional concerns, howe#er, an one wee3 later gasoline was
poure on the smolering contro#ersy when :eorge :regory -- an attorney representing one o* se#en soliers
charge with murering a Vietnamese agent -- iscusse his in#estigation at the %tlanta +ress /lub. %ccoring
to :regory, +hoeni! a#isers were *loc3ing to military lawyers in 0aigon in the wa3e o* the *amous :reen 9eret
murer case, in which se#en %merican %rmy o**icers in the 9-E& etachment were nearly put on trial *or
murering one o* their agents. %pparently, the +hoeni! a#isers were concerne that they were susceptible to
similar charges.
,ere it is important to note that the 3illing o* enemy spies was a counterintelligence *unction, while the attac3
against the V/( was a -positi#e- intelligence *unction aime at bureaucrats managing the insurgency<s terror
campaign. ,owe#er, the termination with e!treme preCuice o* agents an the assassination o* ci#ilian members
o* the enemy<s unergroun organi4ation i o#erlap in cases in which penetration agents insie the V/( were
*oun to be oubles, playing both sies o* the *ence. Dealing with such people was the prerogati#e o* the /(%
an its special unit.
(n any e#ent, the results o* the :reen 9eret murer case were the termination o* 9-E& an a blow to the morale
o* +hoeni! a#isers in the *iel -- although their an!ieties were relie#e in 0eptember 19G9, when, at the re5uest
o* +resient Fichar ?i!on an D/( Fichar ,elms, charges against the soliers were roppe by %rmy
0ecretary Fesor. .he agent<s wi*e, who wor3e *or the /(%, was aware eath bene*its, an the case was
close. % :allup poll showe EL percent o* all %mericans isappro#e o* the war.
777
On 8anuar+ 2E* 29:I* *e$s$ee0 ran a stor+ calle' #The Rise o Phoeni5*# in %hich the .rogra) %as
'escribe' as #a highl+ secret an' uncon-entional o.eration that counters V! terror %ith terror o its
o%n,#
(n response, (0%<s irector o* ;ast %sian an +aci*ic a**airs, Dennis Doolin, pro*esse that a counterterror
program o* the 3in +hoeni! was allege to be -woul sub#ert an be counter-proucti#e to the basic purpose o*
paci*ication in reorienting the allegiance o* all the 0outh Vietnamese people towar support o* the go#ernment o*
Vietnam.- 11L2 %n rather than ac&no%le'ge !ontre !ou. as oicial .olic+ (( as legiti)ate conlict
)anage)ent (( the %ar )anagers )ounte' a congressional #inor)ation# ca).aign, 4ea'ing the charge
u. !a.itol 0ill %as Henr+ Gissinger* #%ho*# %rites Er%in Gnoll* #is &no%n to belie-e the .rogra) can
.la+ a crucial role in 'estro+ing the Vietcong o..osition 'uring the .erio' o A)erican )ilitar+
%ith'ra%al ro) South Vietna). ;missaries *rom Kissinger<s 6hite ,ouse ?ational 0ecurity sta**,- Knoll says,
-ha#e carrie encouraging reports on +hoeni! to /apital ,ill.- 1192
%s the 0enate hearings approache, the battle lines were rawn. =n one sie were senators who on *aith
accepte Kissinger<s e!planation that +hoeni! was part o* an o#erall strategy to protect the retreating %merican
army -- harly something a patriot coul *ault. 1i2 .hese senators use the hearings to praise +hoeni! as it was
e*ine by 6illiam /olby an his entourage, which inclue >ohn Vann, then (V /orps D;+/=FD0@ /layton
8c8anaway@ ,awthorne 8ills, the .uyen Duc +ro#ince senior a#iser@ a istrict senior a#iser@ a mobile
a#isory team a#iser@ an a member o* the Juang ?am 8arine combine action platoon.
?o +hoeni! a#isers were in#ite to testi*y, so presenting the other sie o* the argument were se#eral senators
arme with newspaper an maga4ine articles written by establishe reporters sent to Vietnam speci*ically to
in#estigate +hoeni!. %mong the Cournalists were Fobert Kaiser o* the Washinton Post an +eter Kann *rom the
Wall %treet ,ournal. +ortions o* their articles portraye +hoeni! as a program employing -assassination- an
-counterterror.-
=ne article in particular, -.he /(%<s ,ire Killers,- by :eorgie %nne :eyer, raise congressional eyebrows.
/alling the +F" -the best 3illers in Vietnam,- she compare them to terrorists, with the 5uali*ication that -our
terror- was i**erent *rom -their terror- in that -there was no real political organi4ation -- no political ieology --
behin our terror. .heir boys i it *or *aith@ our boys i it *or money.- 1202
%part *rom :eyer<s *ailure to recogni4e the worship o* 8ammon as religion, her allegation that the /(% hire
3illers to commit terror cast a ar3 clou o#er the hearings, one that 6illiam /olby, espite his initial opposition
to the program, was calle on to ispel. /olby<s testimony earne him the reputation as +hoeni!<s staunchest
e*ener.
150
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. Gissinger )ean%hile %as .lotting the !a)bo'ian in-asion or the sa)e .ur.ose,
!HAPTER EE: Hearings
=n Aebruary 1&, 19&0, the same ay the 0enate Aoreign Felations /ommittee began hearing testimony on ".0.
go#ernment paci*ication policy in 0outh Vietnam, Robert Gaiser re.orte' that so)e .eo.le %ere calling
Phoeni5 #an instru)ent o )ass .olitical )ur'er ,,, sort o Vietna)ese Mur'er Inc,# >2? !o)ing on to. o
the Green 0eret )ur'er case an' re.orts about the M+ 4ai )assacre* sensational re.orts li&e Gaiser6s
or)e' a 'isturbing .attern* one suggesting that terror an' .olitical re.ression %ere oicial .olicies o
the ",S, go-ern)ent, .he senators wante to 3now i* that was true. 6illiam /olby was willing to put their mins
at ease.
!olb+6s strateg+ %as outline' in State De.art)ent Telegra) 02DN91, ate Aebruary 1&, 19&0, which says
in part: #$e belie-e the line o =uestioning atte).ting to establish the Phoeni5 .rogra) as an
assassination .rogra) >can be? successull+ blunte' b+ re.eate' assertions regar'ing "SLGVN .olicies*
cou.le' %ith a')issions o inci'ents o abuses,# "sing this a..roach* !olb+ alternatel+ conoun'e'
an' assuage' his congressional challengers, 0+ sa+ing* #I %ill not .reten' to sa+ that no one has been
%rongull+ &ille' there*# >E? !olb+ ca)e across as a 'ecent* honest* allible hu)an being, He 'i' not
a')it .re)e'itate' )ur'er* but the )aster o the #art o the .ossible# 'i' la+ a cre'ible oun'ation or
the .lausible ictions that ollo%e',
8a3ing his Cob easier were the absence o* witnesses who might contraict his claims, the *act that luri reports
o* +hoeni! abuses were o*ten eri#e *rom seconhan sources an were replete with meloramatic language
which etracte *rom their reliability, an the lac3 o* bac3groun in*ormation a#ailable to the senators -- a blan3
slate /olby use to his a#antage early in the proceeings by introucing a care*ully prepare -0tatement *or
the Fecor on the +hung ,oang +rogram,- which e*ine +hoeni! not as a broa symbol o* /ontre /oup, but in
the conte!t o* the /=FD0 bureaucracy. Phoeni5 in this )aniestation %as )erel+ a bloc& in an
organi7ational chart* a bo5 on a shel %ith a %arning label listing all its 'angerous ingre'ients* not a
conce.t o counterterror,
/olby e*ine +hoeni! as an internal security program esigne to protect -the people- *rom -/ommunist
terrorism.- %n b+ 'eining #the .eo.le# a.art ro) the V!I* as the obHect o V!I terror an' as -oluntaril+
.artici.ating in the .rogra)* he establishe' a )oral i).erati-e or Phoeni5,
?e!t, he establishe a legal basis *or the program. +hoeni!, /olby sai, was esigne -to single out 3ey
personnel *or primary attention.- .he -3ey people- were guilty o* -crimes against national security- an were
subCect to Cuicial proceeings in military courts an to -aministrati#e etention uner emergency powers-
similar to those use in 8alaya, Kenya, an the +hilippines. ,e cite the preamble to 8inistry o* (nterior /ircular
&E&, which sai, #Go-ern)ent .olic+ is to co).letel+ eli)inate the V!I b+ ca.turing as )an+ as .ossible*
%hile the lenient rehabilitation .olic+ ai)s at releasing as )an+ as .ossible,# ,e i not mention that the
circular was not unerstoo or properly applie. ?or i he mention the e!istence o* +ro#ince (nterrogation
/enters, or that the /(% asset -- the eputy chie* *or security -- manage the a**airs o* the +ro#ince 0ecurity
/ommittee, or that -manatory sentencing- was an o**icial policy that meant two years in .an ,iep, /hi ,oa,
.hu Duc, or /on 0on +rison. .he laws were on the boo3s@ i it matter that they were not en*orceB
/olby then proceee to abstract *act *rom *orm. /iting Directi#e 0DD o* 8arch 19G9, he escribe the +F" as
part o* the ?ational +olice. ,owe#er, in orer to protect an ongoing co#ert action, he neglecte to mention, as
/olonel +appy :rie#es e!plaine, that -.he +F" were suppose to #oluntarily enter the police, pro#ince by
pro#ince, man by man. 9ut none o* them e#er i.- 1N2
8eanwhile, in early 19&0, ?ational +olice /hie* .ran Van ,ai ga#e Aiel +olice /hie* ?guyen Van Dai o#ersight
o* the +F". -.o be a <Aorce,<- writes /olonel Dai, -( must accept +F" in the 0upport Di#ision, which originally
consiste o* the Aiel an 8arine police *orces.- 9ut, Dai as, he only monitore the +F", while 8aCor )ang
actually commane them uner the super#ision o* .uc3er :ougleman. -( i not ha#e any maCor problems
between ?+AA an +F",- Dai continues. -=nly mysel* an the %merican +F" a#isers ha a
misunerstaning, an the PR" a'-isers accuse' )e o ha-ing 6anti(A)erican6 s.irit,# 1D2
151
%ccoring to +appy :rie#es, the trouble between Dai an :ougleman e#elope when Dai inspecte a
company o* +F" in ( /orps, -an *oun they were short D00 tons o* plasti5ue .... .hey couln<t account *or a
number o* 8-si!teens an pistols either,- :rie#es re#eale. -( sai, <Dai, where i they goB< ,e sai, </olonel,
there<s only one place they coul go.<
#This again is the .roble) o the !o).an+,# Grie-es sighe', #No accountabilit+ out o Saigon,#
=r in 6ashington. %s reporte at the hearings, the !IA un'e' the PR" in 2939 at a cost o )ore than i-e
)illion 'ollars* an'* !olb+ sai'* #.lans are in .rogress or the transition o the PR" to ull GVN un'ing
an' su..ort,# In 29:I the !IA un'e' the PR" at an increase' cost o )ore than si5 )illion 'ollars,
,a#ing e*ine +hoeni! as moral, -popular,- an legal, /olby too3 5uestions *rom the senators, some o* whom
use the opportunity to promote themsel#es. =thers trie to get at the truth. Aor e!ample, .ennessee 0enator
%lbert :ore as3e /olby to e!plain -the i**erence between the Vietcong terror e**orts against the political
in*rastructure o* the 0aigon go#ernment, on the one han, an the counter-terror program o* the 1:V?2 against
the political in*rastructure o* their opposition, the ?)A.- 1E2
Do'ging the =uestion* !olb+ sai'* #There is no longer a counter(terror eort,# One ha' e5iste' a e%
+ears earlier* or about #si5 )onths to a +ear*# but* he sai'* he ha' sto..e' it because the+ 'i' #so)e
unortunate things,# %*ter some #erbal Cousting, :ore as3e /olby, -6hat were the goals o* the +hoeni!
program when it was, by your terms, a counter-terror programB- 1G2
/=)9H: -... to capture, rally or 3ill members o* the enemy apparatus.-
:=F;: -%s ( unerstan your answer, the goals are the same. Hou use ientically the same wors -- capture,
rally or 3ill. ( o not 5uite get either a istinction or a i**erence....- 1L2
/=)9H: -.he i**erence ... was that at the time there were these special groups which were not inclue in the
normal go#ernment structure .... 0ince that time, this has been more an more integrate into the normal
go#ernment structure, an corresponingly conucte uner the go#ernment<s rules o* beha#ior.- 192
6as it reallyB (n her article -.he /(%<s ,ire Killers,- :eorgie %nne :eyer tells how -1i2n the absence o* an
%merican or 0outh Vietnamese ieology, it was sai in the early ays, why not borrow the most wor3able tenets
o* the enemy<s. %*ter all,- she 5uotes Aran3 0cotton as saying, -they stole the atomic bomb secrets an all *rom
us.- %n so, :eyer writes, -0cotton an a *ew other %mericans ... starte a counter-guerrilla mo#ement in
northern Juang ?gai +ro#ince .... .error an assassination were inclue in their bag o* tric3s. %t one point,
"0(0 printe E0,000 lea*lets showing sinister blac3 eyes. .hese were le*t on boies a*ter assassination or e#en
-- <our terrorists< are play*ul -- naile to oors to ma3e people thin3 they were mar3e *or *uture e**orts.
-9ut,- :eyer goes on, -whereas 0cotton<s original counter-guerrillas were both assassins in the night an
goowill organi4ers o* the people, the +F"s are almost e!clusi#ely assassins in the night.- .heir emphasis -o*
late,- she writes, -has been ... to murer, 3inap, terrori4e or otherwise *orceably eliminate the ci#ilian leaership
o* the other sie.- (n one #illage -a V/ ta! collector will be assassinate in his be in the night. (n another,
wante posters will be put up *or a V/ leaer, o**ering a rewar to try to persuae his *riens to turn him in. .he
+F" may also rop own *rom helicopters an terrori4e whole #illages, in the hope that they will be *rightene to
eal with the V/ in the *uture.- Aurthermore, -the +F"s are e!cellent torturers. ... Torture has no% co)e to be
so in'iscri)inatel+ use' that the V! %arn their )en to be%are o an+ release' .risoner i he has not
been torture',#
#So)eti)es %e ha-e to &ill one sus.ect to get another to tal&*# Ge+er =uotes a PR" a'-iser as sa+ing,
Another PR" a'-iser tol' her that #he ate su..er %ith his PR"s on the hearts an' li-ers o their slain
ene)ies,# Another one sai'* #I6-e been 'oing this or EE +ears all o-er the %orl',# He cite' Eg+.t %hen
Nasser %as co)ing to .o%er an' the !ongo #%hen %e %ere tr+ing to get ri' o Tsho)be,# $rites Ge+er
about the PR" a'-iser: #His Hob* li&e that o )an+ A)ericans in South Vietna)* %as terror,# An' she
calls A)erican PR" a'-isers #reall+ the lea'ers*# >2I? a -ie% that contraste' %ith !olb+6s clai) that
A)ericans %ere li)ite' to #a'-ice an' assistance,#
%s *or the instructors who taught Arancis Feitemeyer how to manage +F", /olby sai, -162e ha#e some rather
irect instructions to our people as to their beha#ior in Vietnam.- 1112 /olby was re*erring to an =ctober 1E,
19G9, memo sent to the +hoeni! sta** -an *orware *or inclusion in the training o* +hung ,oang a#isers in
Vietnam an at Aort ,olabir.- .he memo state that -".0. personnel are uner the same legal an moral
constraints with respect to operations uner the +hung ,oang program as with respect to military operations
against enemy units in the *iel.-
152
The inal %or' on Phoeni5 .olic+ %as containe' in MA!V Directi-e @E@(C3* issue' on Ma+ 2B* 29:I,
?oting the -unlaw*ul status o* members o* the V/(,- 8%/V Directi#e E2E-NG cites -the esirability o* obtaining
these targette ini#iuals ali#e an o* using intelligent an law*ul methos o* interrogation to obtain the truth.- (t
says that Phoeni5 a'-isers %ere #s.eciicall+ unauthori7e' to engage in assassination# an that i* they
were to -come in contact with acti#ities conucte by Vietnamese $ne#er %mericans' which o not meet the
stanars o* lan war*are,- they were -1n2ot to participate *urther- but were -e!pecte to ma3e their obCections o*
this 3in o* beha#ior 3nown to the Vietnamese conucting them- an -e!pecte to report the circumstances to
the ne!t higher ".0. authority.- The 'irecti-e closes b+ sa+ing that #i an in'i-i'ual in's the .olice t+.e
acti-ities o the Phoeni5 .rogra) re.ugnant to hi)* on his a..lication* he can be reassigne' ro) the
.rogra) %ithout .reHu'ice,#
(n response to the article by :eyer, which *ocuse attention on the +F" an the issue o* terror, an in e*ense
o* 6illiam /olby, his patron, >ohn Vann 1i2 sai, -1.2here is always a tenency to report e!tremes .... 9ut when
those e!ceptions ... are use by people who are in basic isagreement with the policy in Vietnam as a means o*
critici4ing the e**ort, they are ta3en out o* conte!t. .hey in no way re*lect anything that is normal.- 11N2
Kentuc3y 0enator 0herman /ooper as3e Vann, -(s the +hoeni! organi4ation a counter-terror organi4ationB-
11D2
Vann replie, -.he counter-terrorist organi4ation bore an bears no resemblance at all to ... +hoeni!.- 11E2
/==+;F: -(s the ".0. in#ol#e in any way in carrying out what can be calle a -terrorist- acti#ityB- 11G2
V%??: -6ell, the answer #ery shortly, sir, is no, we o not.- 11&2
/ompare Vann<s statement with that mae by /harlie Hothers, the /(%<s chie* o* operations in ( /orps in 19&0:
-0ure we got in#ol#e in assassinations. .hat<s what +F" were set up *or -- assassination. (<m sure the wor
ne#er appeare in any outlines or policy irecti#es, but what else o you call a targete 3illB- 11L2
777
%ccoring to .ully %campora, +hoeni! was a two-tiere program, with the +F" wor3ing against terrorists on the
tactical le#el an the /(= operating abo#e that on strategic a**airs. .his aspect o* +hoeni! was aresse by
?ew >ersey 0enator /li**or /ase when he as3e 6illiam /olby i* +hoeni! might be use -by ambitious
politicians against their political opponents, not the Viet /ong at all.- 1192
/=)9H: -... it is our impression that this is not being use substantially *or internal political purposes .... ( ha#e
hear the +resient an +rime 8inister on many occasions gi#e strong irections that the *ocus is on the
Vietcong ... an that it is not to be use *or other purposes.- 1202
+ic3ing up on this line o* 5uestioning, /ommittee /hairman 6illiam Aulbright as3e /olby: -... where is 8r. D4u,
the man who ran secon in the last electionB-
6hen /olby sai, -8r. D4u is in /hi ,oa Cail in 0aigon,- Aulbright as3e him to -reconcile that with your
statement o* the #ery obCecti#e #iew o* the +rime 8inister.- /olby replie that .ruong Dinh D4u -was not
arreste uner the +hoeni! program.- D4u was arreste uner %rticle D, which mae it a crime to propose the
*ormation o* a coalition go#ernment with the /ommunists. 1212
A")9F(:,.: -9ut you say they are gi#ing instructions to be so care*ul not to use the program *or political
purposes, when .hieu himsel* has put a man in prison *or no other crime that we 3now o* than that he ran
secon to him in the elections.- 1222
%t that point 0enator /ase came to /olby<s rescue, saying, -( thin3 that Cust, perhaps, suggests this is a pri#ilege
reser#e *or higher o**icials.- 12N2
9ut the point ha been mae: (* +hoeni! were to be Cuge by the beha#ior, not the state policies, o* .hieu<s
aministration, then it was an instrument o* political repression. 8oreo#er, as inicate in a letter *rom .ran
?goc /hau to 0enator Aulbright, political repression in 0outh Vietnam was carrie out with the tacit appro#al o*
the ".0. go#ernment. (n his letter to Aulbright $which was inserte into the recor o* the hearings', /hau claime
that his contacts with his brother ha been authori4e by, among others, 6illiam /olby, ;# 9umgartner, .om
Donohue, 0tu 8eth#en, >ohn =<Feilly, :oron >orgenson, an >ohn Vann, who instructe /hau not to in*orm
.hieu o* his contacts with ,ien.
153
!hau %rote* #Present .olitical .ersecution o )e is conse=uence o co)bine' action ta&en b+ ",S,
oicials an' !IA an' Vietna)ese oicials in an atte).t to sabotage Vietna)ese an' !o))unist 'irect
tal&s or Peace Settle)ent,# >EA?
In /ebruar+ 29:I !hau %as sentence' to t%ent+ +ears in Hail, In Ma+ 29:I* %rites Proessor Hu+* #the
Su.re)e !ourt ren'ere' a Hu'g)ent stating that !hau6s arrest an' con'e)nation %ere unconstitutional,
Des.ite this Hu'g)ent* Thieu reuse' to ree !hau,# >E@?
6hat happene to /hau an D4u pro#e that state policy in 0outh Vietnam was ignore in reality. )i3ewise,
attempts to portray +hoeni! as legal an moral were transparent public relations gimmic3s meant to buy time
while .hieu consoliate power be*ore the cease-*ire. To ensure Thieu6s internal securit+* !IA oicers %ere
%illing to betra+ their assets* an' this ca.acit+ or treacher+ an' 'eceit is %hat reall+ 'eine' A)erican
.olic+ in regar' to Phoeni5* the PR"* an' the %ar in general, $hat the Senate conclu'e'* ho%e-er* %as
onl+ that 'ia)etricall+ o..ose' -ie%s on Phoeni5 e5iste', .he o**icial line a#ance by 6illiam /olby
portraye +hoeni! as imper*ectly e!ecute -- but legal, moral, an popular. .he other #iew, articulate by
0enator Aulbright, was that +hoeni! was -a program *or the assassination o* ci#ilian leaers.- 9ut that was not
pro#en.
-.he 0enate Aoreign Felations /ommittee may ha#e been con*use by last wee3<s testimony on =peration
+hoeni!,- obser#e .om 9uc3ley. -.he problem,- he e!plaine, -is one o* e*inition.- 12G2
"nable to 'eci'e %hich 'einition %as correct* the .ress ten'e' to characteri7e Phoeni5 as an absur'it+,
In a /ebruar+ 2B* 29:I* article in The Ne% For& Ti)es* 8a)es Sterba sai' that #the .rogra) a..ears
)ore notorious or ineicienc+* corru.tion an' bungling than or terror ,,,, I so)eone 'eci'e' to )a&e a
)o-ie about Phoeni5 ,,, the lea' %oul' be )ore a Go)er P+le than a 8ohn $a+ne,#
Pla+ing on the notion that the Vietna)ese* too* %ere too corru.t an' too stu.i' to be e-il* To) 0uc&le+
%rote that the PR" #%ere =uic&er to ta&e the )one+* get 'run&* an' go o on their o%n e5tortion an'
robber+ o.erations than the+ %ere to s%ee. out into the 'angerous boon'oc&s# -- harly a escription o*
what >im 6ar calle -the *inest *ighting *orce in Vietnam.- 9ut *or 9uc3ley an 0terba there %as no )oti-e
behin' the )a'ness, Phoeni5 %as a co)e'+ o errors* 'o.e+ 'isguises* an' )ista&en i'entities, There
%as nothing tragic in their 'e.ictions1 e-en the .eo.le 'irecting the sho% %ere caricatures subHect to
ri'icule,
0o it was that +hoeni! began sin3ing in a morass o* contraictions which seeme to re*lect the intensely human,
moral ambiguity o* the Vietnam 6ar itsel*. ;#en the ea-en ebate between /olby an Aulbright moc3e
A)erica6s babbling* hilarious schi7o.hrenia. 6hom to belie#eB
T%ent+ +ears later the acts s.ea& or the)sel-es, 6hen Aulbright as3e /olby i* cash incenti#es were
o**ere to Vietnamese *or neutrali4ations, /olby sai no. 0i! months later the 'e.ut+ 'irector o the 8oint
!hies o Sta* General /ran& !la+* sent a )e)o ;8!SM(C9A(:I< to Deense Secretar+ Mel-in 4air'*
noting that General Abra)s ha' reco))en'e' #an incenti-e .rogra) to oster greater neutrali7ation
achie-e)ent,#
=ne o* the more signi*icant +hoeni! ocuments, /lay<s memo enumerate the De*ense Department<s maCor
concerns regaring +hoeni!: the national ientity an registration program, in*ormation support o* +hoeni!,
inae5uacy o* prison space, sur#eillance o* release V/(, +hung ,oang leaership, an e!change o*
intelligence. .hese si! concerns, notably, eri#e *rom a sur#ey conucte by Fobert Komer in >une 19&0.
"pon arri#ing in .ur3ey as ".0. ambassaor, Komer ha been ogge by emonstrators charging him with war
crimes. /onse5uently, he resigne his post e#en be*ore his nomination was con*irme by the 0enate. 0ee3ing
#inication, he hire on with F%?D, returne to 0aigon, an wrote a scathing report calle -.he +hung ,oang
Aiasco.- (n it Komer says, -1%2s the military war wins own an the con*lict assumes a more politico-sub#ersi#e
character, a much more sophisticate an intensi#e e**ort to estroy the V/( becomes well nigh inispensable to
a satis*actory outcome.-
.he *ormer champion o* 5uotas rails against -*a3ery,- charging that -hal* the 3ills are *alsely liste as V/( Cust to
meet +hung ,oang goals.- ,e cites instances where #%e )a+ ha-e as )an+ as 2I or 2E 'ossiers on the
sa)e )an*# an he complains that -each agency still 3eeps its own *iles.- 0pecial 9ranch is -grossly
o#ersta**e with poor 5uality results,- the Aiel +olice are -a *lop as the action arm o* +hung ,oang,- an as *or
the +F", Komer writes that -e#erywhere their e**ecti#eness is apparently eclining greatly.-
Komer is especially critical o* the Vietnamese. (n ((( /orps -*ully hal* the pro#ince chie*s on<t really support
+hung ,oang,- he writes, an in (( /orps )u )an -gi#es only lip ser#ice.- Komer names )ieutenant /olonel .hiep
154
$who replace )oi ?guyen .an, who too3 comman o* /hi ,oa +rison' as -the senior *ull-time +hung ,oang
o**icer,- then as contemptuously that .hiep<s -incompetent boss /olonel 0ong is apparently being 3ic3e
upstairs. %s ( put it bluntly to .hieu an Khiem,- Komer says, -there are GE generals in FV?%A: how come only a
)./ to run +hung ,oangB-
9asically, Komer<s anger stemme *rom .hieu<s ecision to trans*er the /entral +hung ,oang +ermanent =**ice
*rom the prime minister<s o**ice to the ?ational +olice Directorate as a separate bloc. ?oting that -the +hung
,oang bloc is completely separate *rom the 3ey 0pecial 9ranch bloc,- Komer argues that the /entral +huong
,oang +ermanent /ommittee ha been -owngrae. - ,e calls the trans*er -a case where one o* the most
crucial o* all current :V? priority missions is gi#en to one o* the wea3est an least e**ecti#e :V? agencies, the
?ational +olice.-
(n a 8ay N, 19&0, telegram to the secretary o* state, %mbassaor ;llsworth 9un3er e!plaine that +hung ,oang
was being trans*erre *rom +rime 8inister Khiem<s o**ice to the ?ational +olice to -mo#e it towar
Vietnami4ation- an impro#e its o#erall operations. ?oting that the -"0 a#isory position on this 5uestion ha
been establishe through coorination between 8%/V//=FD0, =0% an ;mbassy,- 9un3er conclues by
stating his belie* that the -most important contribution ?ational +olice can ma3e to *uture Vietnam lies in
#igorous an proper e!ecution o* +hung ,oang +rogram against Viet /ong (n*rastructure.- /ase close.
%s compensation *or the trans*er, Komer propose getting -the best young, har ri#ing maCor general to be
*oun -- +hong or 8inh o* /8D an ma3e him 8inister or Vice-8inister o* (nterior to gi#e him status.- Other
reor)s Go)er suggests: to #increase re%ar' )one+*# to #go ater the i-e best 'ossiers*# an' to
concentrate eorts #in eight .ro-inces >%here? %ell o-er hal the esti)ate' V!I are concentrate',# .he
pro#inces were Juang ?am, Juang .in, an Juang ?gai in ( /orps@ 9inh Dinh in (( /orps@ an Kien ,oa, Vinh
)ong, Vinh 9inh, an Dinh .uong $where Komer *oun the -only ... +hung ,oang program worthy o* the name-'
in (V /orps.
0ummari4ing, Komer writes, -Aor better or worse, /(% prouce ... the only e!perience hans who were really
goo at the game. ... (* ( couln<t thin3 o* a better solution, (< trans*er operational control o#er the whole
business to =0% 1o**ice o* special assistant, co#er esignation *or the /(%2.-
9ut 9un3er, in his 8ay N, 19&0 telegram, ha alreay ni!e that iea. -(ntegration into 0pecial +olice woul
complicate important public in*ormation aspects o* program,- he sai, -an prouce com&lications to "0
a#isory element. 6hen V/( reuce to manageable le#el,- he sai, turning +hoeni! o#er to the 0pecial 9ranch
-coul be re#iewe.- (n any e#ent, the -V/ turn to protracte war reemphasi4es necessity o* +hung ,oang e**ort
against in*rastructure uring coming year ... an is o* higher priority in Vietnam toay than ci#il law en*orcement
as contribution to Vietnami4ation.-
.hree years into the program the +hoeni! brain trust was bac3 on s5uare one, wonering, as ;#an +ar3er ha
recommene, i* it shoul *ocus its e**orts not on legions o* low-le#el V/(, but on the big *ish an, as +ar3er ha
also obser#e, i* /(% 0pecial 9ranch a#isers were not alreay oing the Cob. ,a#ing come *ull circle, Komer
*inally reali4e that the -0pecial 9ranch an its ".0. a#isers seem to run an almost completely separate
operation ... usually when ( as3e why no *ingerprints in ossiers, ( was tol they were o#er in the 0pecial
9ranch o**ice in the +(/.-
Komer was right. +hoeni! was a *iasco, but not Cust because the /(% ha ecie to hie behin it *or -public
in*ormation- purposes. .he notion that reporting *ormats an 5uotas as -management tools- coul supplant a
thousan years o* culture an *orty years o* /ommunist political e#elopment at the #illage le#el was simply a
*alse premise. Hes, +hoeni! was a *iasco -- it ha become unmanageable, an it encourage the most
outrageous abuses -- but because it ha become -o* higher priority ... than ci#il law en*orcement,- it was a *iasco
with tragic, not comic, conse5uences.
9y 19&0 an armistice was ine#itable, an +hoeni! ha become the #ehicle by which %merica was going to
trans*er responsibility *or internal security to the Vietnamese. %s a result, :eneral %brams as3e, -.hat it be
mae clear to all "0 an FV? agencies contributing to the +hung ,oang/+hoeni! program that the obCecti#e o*
neutrali4ing the in*rastructure is e5ual in priority to the obCecti#es o* tactical operations.- %s a way o* going a*ter
strategic V/( targets -- the big *ish running /=0V? -- an as a way o* protecting +hoeni! *rom penetration by
enemy agents, Abra)s also as&e' that #consultation be initiate' %ith the Attorne+ General ,,, to secure a
tea) o t%o or three /0I counter(es.ionage e5.erts to be sent to the RVN or the s.eciic .ur.ose o
.ro-i'ing reco))en'ations or the neutrali7ation o i).ortant national le-el )e)bers o the >V!I?,# >E:?
8eanwhile, in 6ashington :eneral /lay a#ocate increase attention on the D(=//s, -the cutting ege o*
+hoeni!,- because -the istrict an #illage le#el in*rastructure remains the 3ey element in the enemy plan to
sub#ert the :o#ernment ... an continues to prouce the maCor threat against :V? e**orts to consoliate
paci*ication gains mae in the past 1L months.- /lay also note that -+hung ,oang leaership is being
155
impro#e by recogni4ing an e!paning the prominence o* the role o* the 0pecial +olice in the *unctioning o* the
D(=//.- 12L2
9ut in orer to mount an attac3 against the V/(, the ".0. %rmy neee to gain access to 0pecial 9ranch *iles in
the D(=//s. 0o in Aebruary 19&0 a thir 0tanar =perating +roceure manual was issue with instructions on
how to use the ultimate +hoeni! -management tool,- the V/( -target *oler.- %s state in the +hung ,oang
%#iser ,anboo3, -preparation o* target *olers is the *ounation *rom which success*ul operations can be run
an sentencing be assure by +ro#ince 0ecurity /ommittees.- 1292
.arget *olers also ser#e a public in*ormation *unction, by allowing 6illiam /olby to say that -our *irst step was
to ma3e sure that the intelligence we gathere on the V/( was accurate, an *or this we set up stanars an
proceures by which to wee out the *alse *rom the correct in*ormation.- 1N02
.arget *olers were speci*ically esigne to help +hoeni! a#isers *ocus on high-le#el V/(. Di#ie in two, a
target *oler containe a biographical ata on the le*t sie an operational in*ormation on the right, in which the
suspect<s habits, contacts, scheule, an mous operani were recore, along with capture ocuments an
other e#ience. .he *oler was the responsibility o* the 0pecial 9ranch case hanler in the D(=//, although a
source on the suspect might be hanle by another agency. ;ach 0pecial 9ranch case hanler was re5uire to
maintain ten +eople<s (ntelligence =rgani4ation $+(=' cells -- each consisting o* three agents -- in each hamlet in
his area o* operations. %s state in the thir 0tanar =perating +roceure manual, the trac&ing o a V!I
sus.ect began %hen an inor)ant re.orte' so)eone )a&ing #sus.icious utterances# or #s.rea'ing
alse ru)ors,# %s more an more sources in*orme on a suspect, he or she grauate *rom blac3list D to / to
9, then *inally to blac3list % -- most wante -- at which point the V/( suspect was targete *or neutrali4ation an
an operation mounte. .he *oler was sent to the +(/ while the suspect was being interrogate an to the
+ro#ince 0ecurity /ommittee to assure proper sentencing.
(n orer to help 0pecial 9ranch case hanlers gather the precise e#ience a security committee neee *or
5uic3 con#ictions, training programs were starte in each corps, where the case hanlers were taught how to
maintain target *olers, a hunre thousan copies o* which the +hoeni! Directorate prepare an istribute in
%ugust 19&0. .o assure proper target *oler maintenance, the %rmy also assigne a counterintelligence-traine
enliste man to each D(=//. (n 19&0, 1LE o* these counterintelligence specialists grauate *rom the +hoeni!
/oorinators =rientation /ourse. .hey acte as liaison among the +(/, D(=//, an +(=//. (n aition, a thir
o**icer was ae to each +(=// sta** to coorinate with /hieu ,oi an Aiel +olice, an in an e**ort to upgrae
the status o* +hoeni! coorinators #is-a-#is the /(%<s 0pecial 9ranch a#isers, region slots were *ille by *ull
colonels, with maCors in +(=//s an captains in D(=//s. ,owe#er, cooperation between pro#ince +hoeni!
coorinators an /(% pro#ince o**icers rarely occurre.
A sur-e+ o each cor.s in No-e)ber 29:I .ro'uce' these results: I !or.s re.orte' #that certain
)e)ber agencies in the DlO!!s ha-e a %ealth o &no%le'ge an' inor)ation %hich ha' hithertoore
ne-er been ta..e',# II !or.s re.orte' that #.roessional Healousies an' e-en 'istrust a)ong agencies
continue to i).air .rogress,# III !or.s re.orte' that #su..ort co)es ro) onl+ one or t%o o the
agencies re.resente'* %hile others ten' to ignore results,# IV !or.s re.orte' that #each GVN
intelligence agenc+ closel+ guar's its inor)ation* thus )a&ing 'ossier construction 'iicult,# >C2?
The .roble)* not e5.licitl+ state'* %as that !IA oicers* e5tracte' ro) Phoeni5 b+ Te' Shac&le+ an'
hi''en a%a+ in e)bass+ houses* sa% onl+ liabilities in sharing their sources %ith #a)ateurish# Phoeni5
coor'inators,
0ai ; 9ray: -.hey ha their relationship with the +(/. 8any o* them either participate in or obser#e or
were close at han uring the interrogations. 0o they ha *irsthan output *rom it. Very *ew o* them, howe#er,
e#er went an put that in the +(=// or in the D(=// ... which they were re5uire to o by the proceures ....
6hat they really i,- he complaine, -was go out an get their own organi4ation, the +F", an run their own
separate operations. (t wasn<t a 0pecial 9ranch operation. (t belonge to the pro#ince o**icer. 0o i* he thought he
ha some intelligence that coul be acte upon, the ".0. tenency was to act on it unilaterally. .hey might in#ite
a *ew 0pecial 9ranch people to go along, but the 0pecial 9ranch might not accept the in#itation. .hen i* they
caught someboy, they brought him bac3 an turne him o#er to the 0pecial 9ranch. .hey were so caught up in
the mythology themsel#es, they< say, -,eyI (<m running a +hoeni! operation.<- 1N22
,ere ; 9ray chose to e*ine +hoeni! in its narrow organi4ational sense, as a i#ision o* /=FD0 with its own
0=+, o**ices, an employees. 9ut inso*ar as +hoeni! is a symbol *or the attac3 against the V/( an inso*ar as
the +(/s an +F" were the *ounation stones upon which ?elson 9ric3ham built (/;O, the pro#ince o**icers
were in *act running +hoeni! operations.
$hat is i).ortant to re)e)ber is that in or'er to achie-e internal securit+ in South Vietna)* A)erica6s
%ar )anagers ha' to create an' .rolong an #e)ergenc+# %hich Hustiie' rule b+ secret 'ecree an' the
156
i).osition o a )ilitar+ 'ictatorshi., An' in or'er to gain the su..ort o the A)erican .ublic in this
-enture* it %as necessar+ or A)erica6s inor)ation )anagers to 'isguise the )ilitar+ 'ictatorshi. ((
%hich su..orte' itsel through corru.tion an' .olitical re.ression (( as a bastion o !hristian an'
'e)ocratic -alues besiege' b+ 'e)onic !o))unists,
In this conte5t* Phoeni5 is the )as& or the terror o the PI!s an' the PR"* an' or the !IA6s atte).ts at
the .olitical le-el #to eli)inate the o..osition to us an' to control the Vietna)ese through our clients,#
1NN2 +hoeni! in the conceptual sense is all the programs it coorinate, as well as the -public in*ormation
aspects- that conceale its purpose. %ll other e*initions are merely -intellectual Cargon.-
-.he point,- ; 8urphy remine us, -is that it was use in Vietnam, it was use in the "nite 0tates, an it still
is use in the "nite 0tates.-
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. #I )a'e the biggest i).act o the %ar %hen I .ulle' 8ohn out o III !or.s an' sent hi) to IV !or.s
because*# !olb+ sai' to )e* #that %as going to be the )aHor area o the .aciication battle, He 'i' a
s.ectacular Hob,# A co).ulsi-e liar an' a'ulterer* Vann co))itte' statutor+ ra.e in 29@9. ,owe#er, his
wi*e lie on his behal*, an a*ter rehearsing *or ays an going *orty-eight hours without sleep, Vann passe a lie
etector test an was e!onerate. )i3e many senior %merican o**icers in Vietnam, Vann ha se#eral mistresses
in Vietnam. 1122
!HAPTER EC: Dissension
0oon a*ter the 0enate hearings conclue in mi-8arch 19&0, the +hoeni! contro#ersy was again obscure by
a larger e#ent. =n %pril N0, 19&0, ten ays a*ter he ha propose withrawing 1E0,000 %merican troops by the
en o* the year, Fichar ?i!on announce that " .0. an 0outh Vietnamese *orces ha in#ae /amboia.
% e#iation *rom the ?i!on Doctrine, the /amboian in#asion was the culmination o* twel#e years o* co#ert
actions against the go#ernment o* +rince ?oroom 0ihanou3. .he *inal phase began on 8arch 12, 19&0, while
0ihanou3 was abroa, an his prime minister, )on ?ol, uner instructions *rom the /(%, orere all ?orth
Vietnamese out o* /amboia within se#enty-two hours. .hat same ay Deputy +rime 8inister 0iri3 8ata3
cancele a trae treaty between /amboia an the +ro#isional Fe#olutionary :o#ernment. Aour ays later the
".0. merchant ship /olumbia ;agle, which was ostensibly carrying munitions *or " .0. %ir Aorce units in
.hailan, was commaneere by two /(% o**icers, who steere it into the port o* 0ihanou3#ille. %rme with guns
an ammunition *rom the /olumbia ;agle, an bac3e by the Khmer Kampuchea Krom $/amboian e!iles
traine by the /(% in 0outh Vietnam' an the Khmer 0erai $/amboians uner 0on ?goc .hanh, traine by the
/(% in .hailan', )on ?ot<s *orces sei4e control o* the go#ernment an mo#e against the Khmer Fouge
$/amboian /ommunists' an the Vietnamese who supporte +rince 0ihanou3.
.he /(% ha been planning the operation since %ugust 19G9, when the murer o* .hai Khac /huyen ha
brought about an en to Detachment 9-E&. .he /(% plan calle *or the Khmer 0erai to attac3 Khmer Fouge
positions *rom their base in .hailan, while )on ?o1 sei4e +hnom +enh, using eserters *rom 0ihanou3<s
palace guar, bac3e by Khmer Kampuchea Krom $KKK' *orces *rom 0outh Vietnam. 9ut the plan 5uic3ly got o**
trac3. 0tanley Karnow notes: -/amboia was con#ulse by anarchy in late 8arch 19&0. Fi#al /amboian gangs
were hac3ing each other to pieces, in some instances celebrating their prowess by eating the hearts an li#ers
o* their #ictims. /amboian #igilantes organi4e by the police an other o**icials were murering local
Vietnamese, incluing women an in*ants.- 112
6hat Karnow escribes is +hoeni! *easting on +hnom +enh. %ie by the /(%, the /amboian secret police *e
blac3lists o* targete Vietnamese to the Khmer 0erai an Khmer Kampuchea Krom. .he Vietnamese woman
who translate the -.ruth %bout +hoeni!- article recalle what happene. -.hese were not V/ being 3ille,- she
sai. -( remember that. .hese were mass 3illings o* Vietnamese merchants an Vietnamese people in
/amboia. =h, yeah. =h, yeahI ( remember because a *rien o* mine tol me. ,e was one hunre percent
Vietnamese, but he in<t succee in Vietnam, so when he was young, he became a /amboian citi4en an
ser#e in the /amboian go#ernment. .here were many many Vietnamese people who went to /amboia to
settle. .hey were leaers o* the economy an the go#ernment. 9ut the Vietnamese were not lo#e by the
/amboians -- li3e the /hinese in Vietnam -- an there was a mass e!ecution o* all those Vietnamese. .hey cut
o** their heas an threw them in the ri#er.- 122
157
=n %pril D the /ommunists counterattac3e, an by late %pril the *orces o* )on ?ol were *altering. %s planne,
?o1 as3e 6ashington *or help, an soon 0outh Vietnamese planes were *lying supplies to +hnom +enh.
,astening to support his besiege client, ?i!on -encourage :eneral %brams to propose inter#ention by
%merican combat units as well. %brams broaene the targets to inclue sanctuaries in the Aish ,oo3 borer
region *urther north, where he also claime to ha#e locate the legenary /ommunist hea- 5uarters, /=0V?.-
1N2
.he ultimate mission o* +hoeni!, o* course, ha always been to neutrali4e what >ohn Vann at the 0enate
hearings calle the -brains- o* the insurgency@ an inso*ar as /=0V? was the locus o* the V/(, the /amboian
in#asion was a massi#e attac3 against the V/(. (nee, the +hoeni! Directorate contribute irectly to this last
esperate attempt to win the war, primarily as a result o* the personal relationship >ohn 8ason share with his
comrae *rom 6orl 6ar (( :eneral /reighton %brams. .he bon o* trust these two men enCoye enable them
to brige the bureaucratic abyss that o*ten separates the /(% an the military.
%s important as the relationship between 8ason an %brams, howe#er, was the relationship between 8ason
an )ieutenant /olonel .homas + . 8c:re#ey, who in >uly 19G9 became the irectorate<s operations chie*,
replacing )ieutenant /olonel %l 6eihas. %n engaging an immensely li3able man, 8c:re#ey was a grauate
o* 6est +oint $where he roome with Fichar 0ecor' who in 19GD was sent to the >oint ".0. 8ilitary %#isory
:roup :"08%:' in 9ang3o3 as an a#iser to .hai intelligence. (n 9ang3o3 8c:re#ey met wee3ly with the
8%: commaner, :eneral Fichar 0tilwell, with the /(% station chie*, Fe >ant4en, an with >ohn 8ason, who
was statione in ,awaii but mae *re5uent trips to 9ang3o3. (n e**ect, 8c:re#ey was wor3ing as the military<s
liaison to the /(% in 0outheast %sia, establishing coorinate intelligence operations in /amboia, )aos, an
0outh Vietnam, in which capacity he #isite 0outh Vietnam at one-month inter#als, was introuce to the senior
0pecial 9ranch, 800, an +F" o**icials, an became intimately aware o* their operations.
(n 19GG 8c:re#ey returne to the "nite 0tates to become chie* o* the 10Lth 8ilitary (ntelligence :roup in
9oston, where he super#ise operations throughout ?ew ;nglan. .hen, in 19G&, at the re5uest o* the acting
chie* o* sta** *or intelligence, :eneral /hester >ohnson, 8c:re#ey returne to 9ang3o3 to *acilitate a trilateral
agreement among the "nite 0tates, .hai- lan, an 0outh Vietnam. %s a result o* this agreement, .hai
intelligence began running Coint operations in /amboia an )aos $where 0ecor was managing the air war *or
the Vientiane station chie*, .e 0hac3ley' with the Vietnamese /(= an the /(%.
(n >uly 19G9, 8c:re#ey was assigne to be the 8%/V intelligence chie* in (( /orps. 6hen >ohn 8ason learne
that 8c:re#ey ha arri#e in 0aigon, 8ason immeiately arrange *or him to be reassigne to the +hoeni!
Directorate. (n turn, 8c:re#ey ha a number o* his *ormer aies in .hailan trans*erre to the irectorate, an
a*ter a perio o* orientation in respect to +hoeni! operations in the pro#inces, he an his team began utili4ing
their contacts in .hailan in preparation *or the /amboian in#asion. 8c:re#ey obtaine in*ormation on /=0V?
through his sources in .hai intelligence an through the han*ul o* penetrations the irectorate ha insie
/=0V?. .hese penetrations e!iste at se#eral le#els, but the most signi*icant penetration was /=0V?<s eputy
*inance irector, who alerte 8c:re#ey when the *inance irector was going on #acation, enabling 8c:re#ey to
mount a blac3 propagana campaign in which he sai the *inance irector was running o** with embe44le
*uns.
(n Aebruary 19&0 )ieutenant /olonel /ao 8inh .hiep was trans*erre *rom his Cob as chie* o* the /ombine
(ntelligence /enter to become 8c:re#ey<s counterpart in the +hung ,oang =**ice. %t this point :eneral %brams
as3e >ohn 8ason to intensi*y +hoeni! operations in the borer pro#inces in preparation *or the in#asion. .his
was one primarily through +F" teams that searche *or in*iltration routes an supply caches. 8eanwhile,
8c:re#ey was reaing reports *rom the 0pecial =perations :roup, which, uner /olonel 0te#e /a#anaugh in
liaison with /(% o**icer >oe 8oran, was mounting its own operations against /=0V?. 8c:re#ey also rea
reports submitte *rom 0pecial Aorces % camps an *rom the %rmy 0ecurity %gency $%0%', which was
attempting to locate /=0V? through its raio transmissions. 9ut the best intelligence on /=0V? came *rom
.hai units in /amboia. .o obtain this in*ormation, 8c:re#ey an /ao 8inh .hiep, in the company o* a team o*
Vietnamese /(= o**icers, were *lown by the /(% to 9ang3o3, to the military sie o* the airport, where they met in
the security center with /olonel 0ophon an /olonel +anay *rom .hai intelligence.
0ai 8c:re#ey: -(n %pril we pro#ie 1to :eneral %brams2 a picture o* what /=0V? loo3e li3e an where the
3ey people were.- 1D2
=n 8ay 11, 19&0, ?ewswee3 reporte that -near the town o* 8imot, /=0V?<s rein*orce concrete bun3ers are
belie#e to sprea 1E to 20 *eet beneath the Cungle<s sur*ace an to house some E,000 men.- "pon arri#ing in
8imot, howe#er, -%merican troops *oun only a scattering o* empty huts, their occupants ha#ing *le wee3s
be*ore in anticipation o* the assault.-
%s Karnow 5uips, -.he ri#e against /=0V? ... turne out to be 5ui!otic.- 1E2
158
-Jui!otic,- yes, but only in the sense that the V/( was not hea5uartere in a particular set o* unergroun
bun3ers in 8imot. .he in#asion e*lecte attention *rom the /(%-engineere coup an bloobath in +hnom
+enh, it enable )on ?ol to install a pro-%merican go#ernment in /amboia, an it allowe "nion =il o*
/ali*ornia to secure concessions *or all onshore an much o**shore /amboian oil.
777
.he +hoeni! Directorate<s participation in the /amboian in#asion -- i* the program is #iewe as a bell cur#e-
was certainly its clima!. (t was not, howe#er, the e!tent o* the irectorate<s role in operations against the V/(.
=perations chie* .om 8c:re#ey manage, *rom his o**ice in 0aigon, se#eral actions against high-le#el V/( in
0outh Vietnam. ,e cites as an e!ample the time the +lei3u +ro#ince +hoeni! o**icer got in*ormation o* an
impening V/( regional meeting near a tea plantation in (( /orps. 8c:re#ey as3e the %rmy 0ecurity %gency to
pinpoint the location o* the meeting, an it oblige him by intercepting an trac3ing V/( raio communications.
8c:re#ey then sent in a 0;%) team that capture se#eral high-ran3ing V/(.
(n conCunction with the /(% station, the +hoeni! Directorate also mounte penetrations o*, an ran operations
against, high-le#el V/( through special teams that ne#er appeare on any o* its rosters. %merican soliers
assigne to this highly compartmentali4e aspect o* +hoeni! were enliste men traine in the "nite 0tates by
the /(%, then sent to Vietnam, where they were brie*e by /(%, 0=:, an 8%/V intelligence o**icers at the ,o
?goc .au 0pecial Aorces camp on such matters as liaison proceures with the Vietnamese, the role o* hunter-
3iller teams, how to screen etainees, istrict an pro#ince chie* responsibilities, where input woul come *rom,
an where resources were a#ailable. 8embers o* these special teams were gi#en a sterile unit co#er, usually as
part o* an %rmy 0ecurity %gency raio research unit, an were assigne only at corps an i#ision le#el. 6hile
they were out on anti V/( operations, their aily acti#ity reports were *alsi*ie to show that they ha been present
at high-le#el brie*ings. 0ai 8c:re#ey: -.he teams were in place when ( got there.-
.he team in 9ien ,oa, *or e!ample, was assigne *or aministrati#e purposes to the 1&Eth Faio Fesearch "nit,
which was hea5uartere on the 9ien 9oa military base. .he team itsel*, howe#er, was locate in a- sa*e house
ne!t to an ol train station in 9ien ,oa /ity. .he team was compose o* ten enliste men i#ie into *i#e two-
man teams uner the region +hoeni! coorinator. .he team<s top priority was collecting tactical military
intelligence in support o* the 9ien ,oa military base, but it also conucte currency in#estigations an an attac3
against the V/(.
Fegaring this latter *unction, the special team in 9ien ,oa reporte to the /(%<s special unit $which inclue
women analysts' at the embassy anne!. .hese /(% analysts rea +hoeni! reports on a aily basis, assesse
them *or potential intelligence recruitment leas $+(F)s', then ecie how a particular V/( coul be
approache in orer to be e#elope as a penetration agent. 1i2 :enerally, V/( were tol they coul wor3 *or the
/(%, or they coul appear to ha#e been 3ille by their own people. .he program was basically a system o*
ienti*ication an control within the V/(, so :V? o**icials coul assume positions o* power a*ter the impening
cease-*ire.
0pecial teams li3e the one in 9ien ,oa operate abo#e the +hoeni! pro#ince organi4ation, so there were
occasional accients. Aor e!ample, in one case a V/( was remo#e *rom the blac3list an approache as a
+(F). ,owe#er, the +hoeni! team in the istrict got to him *irst an 3ille him. .he +hoeni! a#iser was Cust
oing his Cob, an oing it well, but it ruine the recruitment, which ha ta3en three months to e#elop.
%nother case in which the 9ien ,oa special team was in#ol#e concerne a #illage chie* who was supposely
loyal to the :V?. ,e was a *ormer Vietminh, a southern Vietnamese who ha not gone north. % strong
nationalist, he hate %mericans@ but he also saw the ?orth Vietnamese trying to control the 0outh, an he hate
the ?orth too, an that was his moti#ation to wor3 with the /(%. 9ut it was a sha3y moti#e, an when a team o*
?V% agents came an mae him *eel com*ortable with their presence, he became a ouble agent.
.he chie* was also the Vietcong ta! collector, in which capacity he went aroun with the V/ political o**icer, who
ga#e him access to unit care. %t that point he was also wor3ing *or the /(%, an when it ga#e him a polygraph
test, he *aile. .hen a :V? team got ambushe en route to meet him, so he was terminate with e!treme
preCuice, which meant along with his entire *amily, in such a way that it was mae to appear that he was ta3en
out by the Vietcong. .he Cob was one by the Vietnamese ranger team assigne to 9ien ,oa special team.
=ther times the %mericans i the terminations themsel#es, ma3ing sure to 3ill e#eryone so there woul be no
witnesses an using brass catchers so there woul be no incriminating e#ience. =ther times the special team
sent in 0;%)s.
777
159
8a3e no mista3e about it: %mericans who were in#ol#e in +hoeni! su**ere wouns that were not Cust physical.
8any returne to the "nite 0tates emotionally wrec3e, *ear*ul o* being prosecute *or war crimes. 8any
began to oubt the reasons they were gi#en *or *ighting the war.
9ac3 home in the "nite 0tates in 19&0, many people were reaching the same conclusion, although belately
because *acts about the co#ert operations that *uele the war were slow to emerge. Aor e!ample, not until he
was release *rom prison a*ter the war i .ran ?goc /hau re#eal that -a systematic campaign o* #ili*ication by
use o* *orge ocuments was carrie out uring the mi-19E0s to Custi*y Diem<s re*usal to negotiate with ,anoi in
preparation *or the unhel uni*ying elections o* 19EG.- %ccoring to /hau, the *orging was one by ".0. an
9ritish intelligence agencies, which helpe gather -authentic- ocuments that permitte plausible *ounations to
be lai *or the *orgeries. .hese were istribute to #arious political groups as well as to writers an artists who
use the *alse ocuments to carry out the propagana campaign. 1G2
Aorge ocuments use to Custi*y an conceal illegal acti#ities o*ten appear in the *orm o* capture ocuments
similar to the type escribe by /hau. %s two aies to the 0enate Aoreign Felations /ommittee reporte about
the /amboian in#asion, -.here seems to be capture ocuments to pro#e any point or to support,
retrospecti#ely, almost any conclusion.- 1&2
6hen use against an ini#iual, *orge ocuments are calle a com promise an iscreitation operation.
%long with recruitment in place, e*ection, capture, an 3illing, the compromise an iscreitation operation was
a stanar proceure employe by +hoeni! personnel. (ts purpose was to create issension among the V/(, to
ma3e them suspect that one o* their own ha betraye them. /ompromise an iscreitation were
accomplishe by conucting whisper campaigns an by planting *orge ocuments or incriminating e#ience,
usually to re*lect ishonesty, immorality, or gree.
Aorge letters are a /(% specialty. 6rites *ormer /(% o**icer +hilip %gee:
( woul say our most success*ul operation in ;cuaor was the *raming o* %ntonio Alores 9enite4, a
3ey member o* the /ommunist re#olutionary mo#ement. 9y bugging Alores< phone, we *oun out a
lot o* what he was oing. ,is wi*e was a blabbermouth. ,e mae a secret trip to ,a#ana an we
ecie to o a Cob on him when he lane bac3 in ;cuaor. 6ith another o**icer, ( wor3e all one
wee3en to compose a -report- *rom Alores to the /ubans. (t was a masterpiece. .he report implie
that Alores< group ha alreay recei#e *uns *rom /uba an was now as3ing *or more money in
orer to launch guerrilla operations in ;cuaor. 8y Juito station chie*, 6arren Dean, appro#e the
report -- in *act, he lo#e it so much he Cust ha to get into the act. 0o he roppe the report on the
*loor an wal3e on it awhile to ma3e it loo3 poc3et-worn. .hen he *ole it an stu**e it into a
toothpaste tube -- *rom which he ha spent three hours care*ully s5uee4ing out all the toothpaste.
,e was li3e a 3i with a new toy. 0o then ( too3 the tube out to the minister o* the treasury, who ga#e
it to his customs inspector. 6hen Alores came through customs, the inspector pretene to go
rummaging through one o* his suitcases. 6hat he really i, o* course, was slip the toothpaste tube
into the bag an then preten to *in it there. 6hen he opene the tube, he o* course -isco#ere-
the report. Alores was arreste an there was a tremenous scanal. .his was one o* a series o*
sensational e#ents that we ha a han in uring the *irst si! months o* 19GN. 9y late >uly o* that
year, the climate o* anti-communist *ear was so great that the military sei4e a prete!t an too3 o#er
the go#ernment, Caile all the /ommunists it coul *in an outlawe the /ommunist +arty. 1L2
)i3ewise, accoring to Donal Aree in Death in 6ashington, the catalyst *or the 19&N coup in /hile was a
*orge ocument -- etailing a le*tist plot to start a reign o* terror -- which was -isco#ere- by the enemies o*
+resient 0al#aor %llene :ossens. .he result was a #iolent military coup, which the o**icers $who ha set it in
motion through isin*ormation in the press' bac3 an watche *rom a sa*e istance.
/ompromise an iscreitation operations are a trie-an-true metho use in %merica, too. Aor e!ample, /(%
o**icer ,owar ,unt *orge 0tate Department ocuments showing that +resient >ohn Kenney orere the
assassination o* ?go Dinh Diem. %n the A9( iscreite, through the use o* *orge ocuments, 8artin )uther
King, Daniel ;llsberg, an >ean 0eberg. %mong others.
6hen genuine, howe#er, capture ocuments pro#ie #aluable insights into the enemy<s plans an strategies.
(nee, sai >ac3 *rom the Vietnam .as3 Aorce, -/olby pro#e +hoeni! e**ecti#eness through capture
ocuments.-
Aor e!ample, in its 19&0 ;n o* Hear Feport, the +hoeni! Directorate 5uote capture ocuments signe by the
eputy secretary o* /=0V? as saying that +hoeni! an the accelerate paci*ication campaign -were the most
angerous an e**ecti#e measures use by the :V? against the insurgency.- %nother capture ocument,
5uote in the report, state that -personnel o* the +hung ,oang intelligence organi4ation are the most
angerous enemies o* the Fe#olution in suburban an rural areas. >uging by in*ormation *rom capture
160
ocuments, interrogations o* capture personnel an ,oi /hanh ebrie*ings,- the irectorate conclue that
-+hung ,oang is an e**ecti#e program.- 192
/apture ocuments, when genuine, also ser#e as something o* a ouble-ege swor, re#ealing ".0. plans
an strategies, incluing those pertaining to +hoeni!, that might otherwise remain secret. /onsier, *or e!ample,
a circular title -=n the ;stablishment o* the ;nemy +hung ,oang (ntelligence =rgani4ation in Villages.- (ssue
by the Vietcong 0ecurity 0er#ice in Fegion G on 8arch 29, 19&0, capture on 8ay 1E, 19&0, an cite as
Document 0E-NNDD-&0 by the /ombine Document ;!ploitation /enter $/D;/', it escribes how the V/(
#iewe an planne to combat +hoeni!.
%s state in the circular, -the most wic3e maneu#ers- o* +hoeni! -ha#e been to see3 out e#ery means by which
to terrori4e re#olutionary *amilies an *orce the people to isclose the location o* our agents an Coin the
+eople<s 0el*-De*ense Aorce. .hey also sprea *alse rumors ... an ma3e lo#e with our cares wi#es an
aughters. .heir main purpose is to Ceopari4e the prestige o* the re#olutionary *amilies, create issension
between them an the people, an estroy the people<s con*ience in the re#olution. (n aition, they also try to
bribe poor an miserable re#olutionary *amilies into wor3ing *or them.-
+hoeni! agents are escribe as -#illage or hamlet aministrati#e personnel, policemen an lanowners,- who
set up the +eople<s (ntelligence =rgani4ation an wor3 with -paci*ication personnel an intelligence agents- to
organi4e -*amily care, issue (D cars, an classi*y the people.- +hoeni! agents were sai to ha#e mae a list o*
the care to be eliminate when the cease-*ire too3 place. -.heir prescribe criteria are to 3ill *i#e care in each
#illage in orer to change the balance between enemy an *rienly *orces in the #illage.-
%ccoring to the circular, the primary tas3 o* :V? #illage chie*s is to -assign +hoeni! intelligence organi4ation
an security assistants to e#elop an ta3e charge o* the +0DA 1an2 select a number o* tyrants in this *orce to
acti#ate <in#isible< arme teams which are compose o* three to si! well traine members each. .hese teams
are to assassinate our 3ey care, as in Vinh )ong +ro#ince.-
6hat the circular is escribing is the culmination o* Falph >ohnson<s /ontre /oup process, in which
counterterrorists were e!tracte *rom +eople<s 0el*-De*ense Aorces by Vung .au-traine #illage chie*s uner the
aegis o* the +hung ,oang program.
9y 19&0 political war*are was also being manage through +hoeni!. .he 19&0 ;n o* Hear Feport cites an
e!perimental program in which -%rme +ropagana .eams o* se#en men were place uner the operational
control o* the D(=//s. =n a ay to ay basis, the D(=// pro#ie targeting in*ormation on speci*ic V/( or V/(
*amilies to the %+. 1which2 woul then contact them in an e**ort to inuce them to rally.- Falliers were
interrogate immeiately, -thereby achie#ing a snow-ball e**ect ... in the targeting subse5uent neutrali4ation
process.- De*ectors were ubbe -+hoeni! Feturnees.- 1102
9y 19&0 +hoeni! was also sponsoring inoctrination courses. (n 8ay +hung ,oang agents in Dien 9an istrict
organi4e the -+eople<s .raining /ourse to Denounce /ommunist /rimes.- .his training course-its name
e#o3ing memories o* Diem<s enunciation campaign -- was attene by 2L0 local resients.
.he problem was that /ontre /oup ha no corresponing ieology . Falph >ohnson coul turn the enemy<s
tactics against him, but not his belie*s. =n this point the capture circular reas, -1%2s a result o* the #ictories o*
the Fe#olution, the enemy has been *orce to accept serious *ailures an to e-escalate the war. (n the *ace o*
the situation, the ".0. imperialists ha#e been *orce into withrawing their troops. .his *act has cause great
con*usion an issension within the enemy ran3s. .he people ha#e e#elope great hatre *or the enemy ... (n
aition, there is issension among the +hoeni! intelligence members, paci*ication personnel, policemen, an
espionage agents ue to internal con*lict.-
Aanning this issension was the ability o* the V/( to penetrate (=//s. % capture Vietcong ocument, ate
>uly 1, 19&0, an issue by the Dien 9an District 0ecurity 0er#ice $%n ?inh', instructs its agents to penetrate all
+hung ,oang ,anh Juan $intelligence operations coorination centers', to establish blac3lists o* personnel
$especially 0pecial 9ranch an +0DA', an report on their acti#ities *or elimination.
Da ?ang /ity an Juang ?am +ro#ince were particularly well penetrate. % /ombine Document ;!ploitation
/enter $/D;/' report ate ?o#ember 2N, 19&0, cites three messages -pertaining to +hoeni! an the +0DA
committee in Danang /ity, an the location an acti#ities o* the :V? intelligence ser#ice in Danang /ity-@ a
blan3 release slip *rom the Dien 9an D(=// -copie by an unienti*ie ini#iual-@ an an unate note
regaring a +hung ,oang meeting at the Juang ?am +(=// at ,oi %n.
%ccoring to another capture ocument pro#ie by the /ombine Document ;!ploitation /enter on =ctober
21, 19&0, a member o* the Da ?ang military interrogation center escape a*ter the 800 ha isco#ere he was
161
a ouble agent. 0till another capture ocument notes that -an agent o* the +hung ,oang organi4ation in the
2n +recinct, Da ?ang /ity,- who was the son o* the secretary o* the V?JDD $Vietnamese Kuomintang' in Vinh
+huoc Village, -pro#ie etaile in*ormation on a +hung ,oang training course he attene on 1E >une 19&0
an the assignment o* the trainees upon completion o* the course- -- meaning the V/( in Da ?ang 3new e#ery
mo#e +hoeni! was ma3ing.
777
?elson 9ric3ham #iewe Vietnam as a war that woul be -won or lost on the basis o* intelligence,- an he
create +hoeni! as the #anguar in that battle. "n*ortunately the +hoeni! *ront line unra#ele *aster than the
V/(<s@ issension between the %mericans an Vietnamese, an the /(% an the military , oome the program
to *ailure. %n while the insurgents hel tight, mistrust o* ".0. go#ernment policy in 0outheast %sia, born uring
.et 19GL an brought to a boil by the /amboian in#asion, began to unra#el %merican society.
(mmeiately *ollowing the /amboian in#asion, massi#e antiwar emonstrations erupte across the country. (n
=hio :o#ernor >ames Fhoes reacte #iolently, #owing to -eraicate- the protesters. =n 8ay D, 19&0, the =hio
?ational :uar respone to his e!hortations, *iring into a crow o* emonstrators at Kent 0tate /ollege, 3illing
*our people.
.he spectacle o* %merican soliers 3illing %merican citi4ens ha a chilling e**ect on many people, many o* whom
suenly reali4e that issent was as angerous in the "nite 0tates as it was in 0outh Vietnam. .o many
%mericans, the unerlying tragey o* the Vietnam 6ar, symboli4e by +hoeni!, was *inally *elt at home. ?i!on
himsel* articulate those murerous impulses when he tol his sta**, -Don<t worry about ecisi#eness. ,a#ing
rawn the swor, stic3 it in har. ,it <em in the gut. ?o e*ensi#eness.- 1112
?i!on bac3e his wors with actions. ,e orere one o* his aies, a *ormer %rmy intelligence specialist an
presient o* the Houng %mericans *or Areeom, .om ,uston, to e#ise a plan to sur#eil, compromise, an
iscreit his omestic critics. .he ,uston +lan was calle e#ience o* a -:estapo mentality- by 0enator 0am
;r#in o* ?orth /arolina. 1122
6hat ;r#in meant by the -:estapo mentality- was +hoeni! in its conceptual sense -- the use o* terror to sti*le
issent. Fe*lecting ?i!on<s -:estapo mentality,- o**ensi#e counterintelligence operations were irecte against
issenters in %merica: blac3s, le*tists, paci*ists, the Vietnam Veterans %gainst the 6ar $VV%6', an %merican
(nians. .he most *amous e!ample may ha#e been mounte by the /(%<s omestic operations branch against
the 9lac3 )iberation 8o#ement@ as in /hile, it pro#o3e a #iolent reaction by security *orces an ser#e to Custi*y
repression.
/olston 6estbroo3, accoring to 8ae 9russell in a >uly 19&D article in . .he Fealist, was a /(% psywar e!pert.
%n a#iser to the Korean /(% an )on ?ol in /amboia, 6estbroo3 *rom 19GG until 19G9 reportely wor3e
$unerco#er as an employee o* +aci*ic %rchitects an ;ngineers' as an a#iser to the Vietnamese +olice
0pecial 9ranch. (n 19&0 6estbroo3 allegely returne to the "nite 0tates an was gotten a Cob at the
"ni#ersity o* /ali*ornia at 9er3eley. %ccoring to 9russell, 6estbroo3<s control o**icer was 6illiam ,errmann,
who was connecte to the 0tan*or Fesearch (nstitute, F%?D /orporation, an ,oo#er /enter on Violence. (n
his capacity as an a#iser to :o#ernor Fonal Feagan, ,errmann put together a paci*ication plan *or /ali*ornia
at the "/)% /enter *or 0tuy an +re#ention o* Violence. %s part o* this paci*ication plan 6estbroo3, a blac3
man, was assigne the tas3 o* *orming a blac3 cultural association at the Vaca#ille 8eical Aacility. %lthough
ostensibly *ostering blac3 prie, 6estbroo3 was in truth conucting an e!perimental beha#ior moi*ication
program. 6estbroo3<s Cob, claims 9russell, was to program unstable persons, rawn *rom /ali*ornia prisons, to
assassinate blac3 community leaers. ,is most success*ul client was Donal DeAree4e, chie* o* the
0ymbionese )iberation %rmy $0)%'. (t was 6est- broo3 who esigne the 0)%<s logo $a se#en-heae cobra',
who ga#e DeAree4e his %*rican name $/in5ue', an who set /in5ue an his gang on their +hoeni! *light to
cremation, care o* the )os %ngeles 06%. .eam, the A9(, an ".0. .reasury agents.
777
(n 19&1 ?i!on was to irect his omestic a**airs o**icer, >ohn ;rhlichman, to *orm a special 6hite ,ouse internal
security unit calle the +lumbers. /hosen to hea the +lumbers were certi*ie psychopath :oron )iy an
-*alse ocument preparation- e!pert ,owar ,unt. (n charge o* -controls- was ;gil Krogh, who once sai,
-%nyone who opposes us, we<ll estroy. %s a matter o* *act, anyone who oesn<t support us, we<ll estroy.- 11N2
>ust as .hieu<s omestic political opponents were targets on +hoeni! blac3lists in Vietnam, so the +lumbers<
-enemies list- inclue critics o* ?i!on -- people li3e :regory +ec3, >oe ?amath, an 0tanley Karnow. %n Cust
as illegal methos were use to iscreit an compromise -neutralists- in Vietnam, so, too, the +lumbers turne
to crime in their attac3 against -anyone who oesn<t support us.- %long with ,unt an se#eral other go#ernment
162
o**icials, Krogh $a e#out 8ormon' was to be con#icte o* brea3ing into the home o* Daniel ;llsberg<s
psychiatrist.
=**ensi#e counterintelligence operations irecte against the antiwar mo#ement were mounte by the +lumbers@
the /(% through its =peration /haos@ the A9( through its /=(?.;)+F=0 uner 6illiam /. 0ulli#an, whose
*a#orite tric3 was issuing Ka*3aes5ue -secret- subpoenas@ the ?ational 0ecurity %gency, which use satellites to
spy on issenters@ an the De*ense (ntelligence %gency, ser#icing the >oint /hie*s an wor3ing with the %rmy
chie* o* sta** *or intelligence, :eneral 6illiam Harborough, through =peration 0hamroc3, hea5uartere at Aort
,olabir. 0hamroc3<s main targets were *ormer military intelligence personnel li3e ; 8urphy an special
operations #eterans li3e ;lton 8an4ione, both o* whom, by then, were members o* the Vietnam Veterans
%gainst the 6ar. %llegely as part o* 0hamroc3, the 111th 8ilitary (ntelligence :roup $8(:' in 8emphis 3ept
8artin )uther King, >r., uner twenty-*our-hour-a-ay sur#eillance an reportely watche an too3 photos while
King<s assassin mo#e into position, too3 aim, *ire, an wal3e away. %s a result, some VV%6 members
conten that the murers o* King, an other less notable #ictims, were the wor3 o* a omestic-#ariety +hoeni! hit
team. 0ome say it still e!ists.
9e that as it may, it is a *act that uring the Vietnam 6ar the go#ernment sought to neutrali4e its omestic
opponents, using illegal means, in the name o* national security ..he *ear o* sur#eillance being as e**ecti#e as
sur#eillance itsel*, the result was that many %mericans re*raine *rom writing letters to their representati#es or
otherwise participating in the emocratic process, 3nowing that to o so was to ris3 wiretaps on their phones,
A9( agents< reaing their mail, being blac3maile *or past iniscretions, mae #ictims o* #icious rumor
campaigns, losing their Cobs, or worse.
8oreo#er, the suppression o* issent in %merica was champione by the same people who a#ocate war in
Vietnam. %n when it became apparent that %merica ha been e*eate in Vietnam, these reactionaries -- li3e
the :ermans a*ter 6orl 6ar ( -- #ente their bitterness an anger on the isparate groups that *orme the
antiwar mo#ement. "sing +hoeni! -o**ensi#e counterintelligence- tactics, the security *orces in %merica
splintere the antiwar mo#ement into single-issue groups, which were isolate an suppresse uring the
bac3lash o* the Feagan era. .oay the threat o* terrorism alone remains, poune into the national
consciousness, at the be5uest o* big business, by abiing meia.
(nee, without the complicity o* the meia, the go#ernment coul not ha#e implemente +hoeni!, in either
Vietnam or %merica. % *ull isclosure o* the +ro#ince (nterrogation /enters an the +ro#incial Feconnaissance
"nits woul ha#e resulte in its emise. 9ut the relationship between the meia an the go#ernment is
symbiotic, not a#ersarial. .he e!tent to which this practice e!iste was re#eale in 19&E, when 6illiam /olby
in*orme a congressional committee that more than *i#e hunre /(% o**icers were operating uner co#er as
corporate e!ecuti#es an that *orty /(% o**icers were posing as Cournalists. /ase in point: reactionary columnist
an .V tal3-show host 6illiam 9uc3ley, >r., the millionaire creator o* the Houng %mericans *or Areeom an
cohort o* ,owar ,unt<s in 8e!ico in the 19E0<s.
6hen it comes to the /(% an the press, one han washes the other. (n orer to ha#e access to in*orme
o**icials, reporters *re5uently suppress or istort stories. (n return, o**icials lea3 stories to reporters to whom they
owe *a#ors. %t its most incestuous, reporters an go#ernment o**icials are actually relate -- *or e!ample, Delta
+F" commaner /harles )emoyne an his ?ew Hor3 .imes reporter brother, >ames. )i3ewise, i* ; )ansale
ha not ha >oseph %lsop to print his blac3 propagana in the "nite 0tates, there probably woul ha#e been
no Vietnam 6ar.
(n a emocratic society the meia ought to in#estigate an report obCecti#ely on the go#ernment, which is uner
no obligation to in*orm the public o* its acti#ities an which, when it oes, puts a positi#e -spin- on the news. %s
part o* the eal, when those acti#ities are conucte in secret, illegally, reporters ten to loo3 away rather than
Ceopari4e pro*itable relationships. .he price o* success is compromise o* principles. .his is in#ariably the case@
the public is always the last to 3now, an what it oes learn are at best hal*-truths, s5uee4e into *i#e-hunre-
wor columns or thirty-secon .V bites, themsel#es easily ignore or *orgotten.
0o it was with +hoeni!.
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. +(F)s were pro#ie with incenti#es *rom the blac3 mar3et, incluing narcotics that /(% contractors brought in
*rom .hailan, )aos, an /amboia.
163
!HAPTER EA: Transgressions
(n the introuction to this boo3, ;lton 8an4ione escribe the counterterror campaign he Coine in 19GD. ,e tol
how as a ".0. ?a#y 0;%) wor3ing in a hunter-3iller team, he bro3e own *rom the strain o* ha#ing to 3ill not Cust
enemy soliers but their *amilies, supporters, an innocent bystaners as well. (n 0eptember 19GD 8an4ione<s
crisis o* *aith compelle him to go %6=) in Arance. ,is military recors show he was ne#er e#en in 0outh
Vietnam.
.he tragey o* the Vietnam 6ar is that with the arri#al o* regular %merican units in 19GE, the attac3 on the
elusi#e an illusory V/( became e#eryone<s Cob, not Cust that o* elite units. %n once the license to 3ill was
grante carte blanche to all %merican soliers, a corresponing moral turpitue sprea li3e an in*ectious isease
through their ran3s. .he e**ects were e#ient in *ragmentation grenaes thrown into o**icers< tents, cripple
Vietnamese orphans selling #ials o* heroin to aicte :(s, /on*eerate *lags un*urle in honor o* 8artin )uther
King<s assassination, companies re*using to go out on patrol, an thousans o* eserters *leeing to /anaa,
Arance, an 0ween.
.he problem was one o* using means which were antithetical to the esire en, o* enying ue process in
orer to create a emocracy, o* using terror an repression to *oster *reeom. 6hen put into practice by soliers
taught to thin3 in con#entional military an moral terms, /ontre /oup en genere transgressions on a massi#e
scale. ,owe#er, *or those pressing the attac3 on the V/(, the bloobath was constructi#e, *or iniscriminate air
rais an artillery barrages obscure the shaow war being *ought in urban bac3 alleys an anonymous rural
hamlets. .he military shiel allowe a /(% o**icer to sit behin a steel oor in a room in the ".0. ;mbassy,
insulate *rom human concern, s3imming the +hoeni! blac3list, selecting targets *or assassination, istilling
power *rom tragey. %s the pla5ue on .e 0hac3ley<s es3 says, -)ittle mins are tame an subue by
mis*ortune -- but great mins rise abo#e it.-
=thers, meanwhile, sought to pre#ent the -negligent cruelties- they witnesse. 6illiam :rie#es, *or one, is prou
o* the *act that his Aiel +olice were able to protect ci#ilians *rom marauing Vietnamese Fanger units. %n as
Doug 8c/ollum recounte, on one occasion they e#en hel their own against a ".0. %rmy unit.
.he military an the police, 8c/ollum e!plaine, i#ie Vietnam into areas o* responsibility .(n white areas,
consiere sa*e, an gray areas, consiere up *or grabs, the police ha Curisiction, but in re areas,
consiere war 4ones, the military coul o whate#er it wante. (t was in re areas that -the military
shenanigans ( reporte- too3 place, 8c/ollum recalle. 112
8c/ollum tol how, in 19GL, in a Coint operation with elements o* the ".0. Aourth Di#ision, he an his Aiel
+olice platoon entere a -re- 8ontagnar #illage in search o* V/. 9ut -there were only women an chilren an
ol men. .hat was generally the case,- he sai. 6hat happene ne!t was no aberration either. % military
intelligence captain calle in arme personnel carriers an loae the women an chilren in them. ;#eryone
was ta3en out to a *iel, se#eral miles *rom the #illage. .he arme personnel carriers *orme a semicircle with
their bac3s towar the people. 0oliers manne the machine guns, an the people, 3nowing what was about to
happen, starte crying. .he *rantic Aiel +olice platoon leaer as3e 8c/ollum, -6hat are they oingB-
8c/ollum in turn as3e the captain, -6ho<s oing thisB-
-,igher hea5uarters,- he was tol.
-6ell then, you<ll ha#e to 3ill my Aiel +olice an me,- 8c/ollum sai, eploying his *orces in a line in *ront o*
8ontagnars. -0o the military ro#e away,- he tol me, sha3ing his hea. -.hey Cust le*t e#eryone there. %n the
ne!t morning, when ( tol the police chie* what happene, the only thing he sai was, <6ell, now you<#e got to
transport e#eryone bac3 to the #illage.< .hat was what he was upset about.-
%bout the massacring o* ci#ilians by ".0. in*antry troops, Doug 8c/ollum state, -.here wasn<t too much o* that.
(t was mostly raising s3irts an chopping o** *ingers.- ,owe#er, as more an more soliers succumbe to anger
an *rustration, more an more incients occurre.
777
.he 8y )ai massacre was *irst reporte in 8arch 19G9, one *ull year a*ter the e#ent. (n %pril 19G9, because o*
congressional 5ueries, the case was gi#en to the %rmy inspector general, an in %ugust %rmy /hie* o* 0ta**
6illiam 6estmorelan turne the case o#er to the %rmy<s /riminal (n#estigation Di#ision $/(D'. (n ?o#ember
19G9 0eymour ,ersh bro3e the story, telling how E0D Vietnamese ci#ilians were massacre by members o* a
".0. in*antry company attache to a special battalion calle .as3 Aorce 9ar3er.
164
.en ays a*ter ,ersh bro3e the story, 6estmorelan orere :eneral 6illiam +eers to conuct an o**icial
in5uiry. ;#an +ar3er contene to me that +eers got the Cob because he was not a 6est +oint grauate. 122
,owe#er, +eers<s close ties to the /(% may also ha#e been a *actor. (n 6orl 6ar ((, +eers ha commane
=00 Detachment 101, in which capacity he ha been ;#an +ar3er<s boss. (n the early 19E0<s he ha been the
/(%<s chie* o* training an its station chie* in .aiwan, an as 0%/0% in 19GG +eers ha wor3e with the /(% in
*ormulating paci*ication policy. ,a#ing ha se#eral commans in Vietnam, he was well aware o* how the war
was being conucte. 9ut the most conclusi#e e#ience lin3ing +eers to the /(% is the report he submitte in
8arch 19&0, which was not mae a#ailable to the public until 19&D an which care*ully a#oie implicating the
/(%.
.he per*unctory trials that *ollowe the +eers in5uiry amounte to slaps on the wrist *or the e*enants an
*uele rumors o* a co#er-up. =* the thirty people name in the report, charges were brought against si!teen, *our
were trie, an one was con#icte. 6illiam /alley<s sentence was 5uic3ly reuce, an in conser#ati#e 5uarters
he was #enerate as a hero an scapegoat. )i3ewise, the men in /alley<s platoon were e!cuse as #ictims o*
V/ terror an goo soliers acting uner orers. =* nearly two thousan %mericans sur#eye by .ime
maga4ine, GE percent enie being upset.
Het, i* most %mericans were willing to accept the massacre as necessary to ensure their security , why the
co#er-upB 6hy was the massacre portraye as an isolate incientB
=n %ugust 2E, 19&0, an article appeare in .he ?ew Hor3 .imes hinting that the /(%, through +hoeni!, was
responsible *or 8y )ai. .he story line was a#ance on =ctober 1D, when e*ense attorneys *or Da#i 8itchell --
a sergeant accuse an later cleare o* machine-gunning scores o* Vietnamese in a rainage itch in 8y )ai --
citing +hoeni! as the /(%<s -systematic program o* assassination,- name ;#an +ar3er as the /(% o**icer who
-signe ocuments, certain blac3lists,- o* Vietnamese to be assassinate in 8y )ai. 1N2 6hen we spo3e, +ar3er
enie the charge.
% e*ense re5uest to subpoena +ar3er was enie, as was a re5uest to #iew the 8y )ai blac3list. =utsie the
courtroom /(% lawyer >ohn :reaney insiste that the agency was -absolutely not- in#ol#e in 8y )ai. 6hen
as3e i* the /(% ha e#er operate in 8y )ai, :reaney replie, -( on<t 3now.-
9ut as has been establishe in this boo3, the /(% ha one o* its largest contingents in Juang ?gai +ro#ince.
;specially acti#e were its /ensus :rie#ance care, irecte by the 0on .inh District FD /are intelligence
chie*, ,o ?goc ,ui, whose V?JDD cares were in 8y )ai on the ay prior to the massacre. % /atholic *rom
?orth Vietnam, ,ui reportely calle the massacre -a small matter.- 1D2
.o unerstan why the massacre occurre, it helps to 3now that in 8arch 19GL coron an search operations o*
the type .as3 Aorce 9ar3er conucte in 8y )ai were how FD /are intelligence o**icers contacte their secret
agents. .he +eers report oes not mention that, or that in 8arch 19GL the *orty-one FD teams operating in
Juang ?gai were channeling in*ormation on V/( through ,ui to the /(%<s paramilitary a#iser, who share it
with the pro#ince +hoeni! coorinator.
.he +hoeni! coorinator in Juang ?gai +ro#ince at the time o* the 8y )ai massacre was Fobert 9. Famsel1, a
se#enteen-year #eteran o* the %rmy /(D who subse5uently wor3e *or ten years as a pri#ate in#estigator in
Aloria. Famsell was hire by the /(% in 19G&. ,e was traine in the "nite 0tates an sent to Vietnam on
Aebruary D, 19GL, as the 0pecial 9ranch a#iser in Juang ?gai +ro#ince. Famsell, who appeare incognito
be*ore the +eers panel, tol newsmen that he wor3e *or the %gency *or (nternational De#elopment.
(n /o#er-up, 0eymour ,ersh tells how in Aebruary 19GL Famsell began -rouning up resients o* Juang ?gai
/ity whose names appeare on +hoeni! blac3lists.- 1E2 ;!plaine Famsell: -%*ter .et we 3new who many o*
these people were, but we let them continue to *unction because we were controlling them. .hey le us to the
V/ security o**icer *or the istrict. 6e wipe them out a*ter .et an then went ahea an pic3e up the small
*ish.- 1G2 .he people who were -wipe out,- ,ersh e!plains, were -put to eath by the +hoeni! 0pecial +olice.-
1&22
Famsell -simply eliminate e#eryone who was on those lists,- sai :eral 0tout, an %rmy intelligence o**icer
who *e Famsell names. -(t was recrimination.- 1i2 1L2 Fecrimination *or .et, at a minimum.
"n*ortunately, accoring to Fanolph )ane -- the Juang ?gai +ro#ince 8%/V intelligence a#iser -- Famsell<s
#ictims -were not Vietcong.- 192 .his *act is corroborate by >e**rey 0tein, a corporal wor3ing unerco#er *or the
E2Eth 8(:, running agent nets in Juang ?am an southern .hua .hien pro#inces. %ccoring to 0tein, the
V?JDD was a Vietnamese militarist party that ha a -worl *ascist allegiance an wante to o#erthrow the
Vietnamese go#ernment *rom the rightI .he people they were naming as /ommunists were le*t-wing 9uhists,
an that in*ormation was going to the +hoeni! program. 6e were being use to assassinate their political ri#als.-
1102
165
.hrough the 0on .inh D(=//, +hoeni! /oorinator Famsell passe /ensus :rie#ance-generate intelligence
to .as3 Aorce 9ar3er, estimating -the DLth 9attalion at a strength o* DE0 men.- .he +eers report, howe#er, sai
that D0 V/ at most were in 8y )ai on the ay prior to 8arch 1G an that they ha le*t be*ore .as3 Aorce 9ar3er
arri#e on the scene. 1112
Famsell tol the +eers panel, -Very *ran3ly, anyone that was in that area was consiere a V/0 1Vietcong
suspect2, because they couln<t sur#i#e in that area unless they were sympathi4ers.- 1122
=n the basis o* Famsell<s in*ormation, .as3 Aorce 9ar3er<s intelligence o**icer, /aptain Kotouc, tol )ieutenant
/olonel Aran3 9ar3er that -only V/ an acti#e V/ sympathi4ers were li#ing 1in 8y )ai an 8y Khe2.- 9ut, Kotouc
sai, because lea*lets were to be roppe, -ci#ilians woul be out o* the hamlets ... by 0&00 hours.- 11N2
+hoeni! /oorinator Famsell then pro#ie Kotouc with a blac3list o* V/( suspects in 8y )ai, along with the
luicrous notion that all -sympathi4ers- woul be gone *rom the hamlet by early morning, lea#ing DE0 har-core
V/ guerrillas behin. Het -the lin3 between Famsell an the poor intelligence *or the 1G 8arch operation was
ne#er e!plore by the +eers +anel.- 11D2
%s in any large-scale +hoeni! operation, two o* .as3 Aorce 9ar3er<s companies corone o** the hamlet while a
thir one -- /alley<s -- mo#e in, clearing the way *or Kotouc an 0pecial 9ranch o**icers who were -brought to
the *iel to ienti*y V/ *rom among the etaine inhabitants.- 11E2
%s ,ersh notes parenthetically, -0hortly a*ter the 8y )ai D operation, the number o* V/( on the +hoeni! blac3list
was sharply reuce.- 11G2
(n an unsigne, unate memo on +hoeni! supplie by >ac3, the genesis o* the blac3list is escribe as *ollows:
.here ha been a reluctance to e!ploit a#ailable sources o* in*ormation in the hamlet, #illage an
istrict. (t was, there*ore, suggeste that e**ecti#e /oron an 0earch operations must rely on all
locally a#ailable intelligence in orer to epri#e the Viet /ong o* a sanctuary among the population.
(t was in this conte!t that care*ully prepare blac3lists were mae a#ailable. .he blac3lists were
*urnishe to assist the %llie operational units in searching *or speci*ically ienti*ie people an in
screening capti#es or local personnel hel *or 5uestioning. .he in*ormation *or the blac3lists was
pre- pare by the +olice 0pecial 9ranch 1ii2 in conCunction with intelligence collecte *rom the
+ro#ince (nterrogation /enters.
Kotouc was charge by the +eers panel with concealing e#ience an *alsi*ying reports, with ha#ing -authori4e
the 3illing o* at least one V/ suspect by members o* the ?ational +olice,- an with ha#ing -committe the
o**ense o* maiming by cutting o** the *inger o* a V/ suspect.- 11&2
.he /(%, #ia +hoeni!, not only perpetrate the 8y )ai massacre but also conceale the crime. .he +eers panel
note that -a /ensus :rie#ance /areman o* 0on 8y Village submitte a written report to the /ensus
:rie#ance chie*, Juang ?gai, on 1L 8arch 19GL,- inicating that -a *ierce battle with V/ an local guerrillas-
ha resulte in D2& ci#ilian an guerrilla eaths, 2& in 8y )ai an D00 in the nearby hamlets o* .huan Hen an
9inh DongI- 11L2 .he appearance o* this report coincie with the release by Fobert .hompson o* a -capture-
ocument, which ha been -mislai- *or nineteen months, inicating that the /uc ?ghien /uu ha assassinate
2,&DL ci#ilians in ,ue uring .et.
.he only person name as ha#ing recei#e the /ensus :rie#ance report is )ieutenant /olonel 6illiam :uinn,
who testi*ie in 8ay 19G9 that he -coul not recall who speci*ically ha gi#en it to him.- (n December 19G9
:uinn, when shown a copy o* the /ensus :rie#ance report, -re*use *urther to testi*y an accoringly, it was not
possible to ascertain whether the 1L 8arch /ensus :rie#ance report was in *act the one which he recalle
ha#ing recei#e.- 1192 6ith that the matter o* the /ensus :rie#ance report was roppe.
.he 8y )ai co#er-up was assiste by the 0on .inh District a#iser, 8aCor Da#i :a#in, who lost a report written
on %pril 11 by .ran ?goc .an, the 0on .inh istrict chie*. .an<s report name the E0D people 3ille at 8y )ai,
an .an sai that -he iscusse 1the report2 with :a#in- but that -:a#in enies this.- 0hortly therea*ter 8aCor
:a#in became )ieutenant /olonel :a#in. 1202
.he ;le#enth 9rigae commaner ismisse .an<s charges as -baseless propagana.- 1212 9ar3er<s a*teraction
report liste no ci#ilian eaths. /i#ilian eaths in 0outh Vietnam *rom 19GE until 19&N are estimate at 1.E
million@ none is reporte in ".0. military a*teraction reports.
166
.he +eers panel cite -e#ience that at least at the Juang ?gai +ro#ince an 0on .inh District le#els, an
possibly at 2n %FV? Di#ision, the 0enior ".0. military a#isors aie in suppressing in*ormation concerning
the massacre.- 1222
.as3 Aorce 9ar3er commaner )ieutenant /olonel 9ar3er was 3ille in a helicopter crash on >une 1N, 19GL,
while tra#eling bac3 to 8y )ai as part o* an in#estigation orere by the Juang ?gai +ro#ince chie*, /olonel
Khien. Khien is escribe <<as a big time croo3- an a V?JDD politico who -ha a *amily in ,ue- an was a*rai
the V/ -were going to ma3e another ,ue out o* Juang ?gai.- +ro#ince /hie* Khien an the eputy pro#ince
senior a#iser, )ieutenant /olonel :uinn, both -belie#e that the only way to win the war was to 3ill all Viet /ong
an Viet /ong sympathi4ers.- 12N2
.he last piece in the 8y )ai pu44le concerne Fobert ,aeberle an >ay Foberts, %rmy reporters assigne to
.as3 Aorce 9ar3er. %*ter the massacre Foberts -prepare an article *or the brigae newspapers which omitte
all mention o* war crimes he ha obser#e an ga#e a *alse an misleaing account o* the .as3 Aorce 9ar3er
operation.- Foberts was charge by the +eers panel with ha#ing mae no attempt to stop war crimes he
witnesse an *or *ailing to report the 3illings o* noncombatants. ,aeberle was cite by the panel *or withholing
photographic e#ience o* war crimes an *or *ailing to report war crimes he ha witnesse at 8y )ai.
%s >e** 0tein sai, -.he *irst thing you learn in the %rmy is not competence, you learn corruption. %n you learn
<to get along, go along.<- 12D2
"n*ortunately not e#eryone learns to get along. =n 0eptember N, 19LL, Fobert .<0ou#as was apparently shot in
the hea by his girl *rien, a*ter an argument o#er a bottle o* #o3a. .he two were homeless, li#ing out o* a #an
they ha par3e uner a brige in +ittsburgh. .<0ou#as was a Vietnam #eteran an a participant in the 8y )ai
massacre.
.<0ou#as<s attorney, :eorge Da#is, tra#ele to Da ?ang in 19&0 to in#estigate the massacre an while there
was assigne as an aie a Vietnamese colonel who sai that the massacre was a +hoeni! operation an that
the purpose o* +hoeni! was -to terrori4e the ci#ilian population into submission.-
Da#is tol me: -6hen ( tol the people in the 6ar Department what ( 3new an that ( woul attempt to obtain all
recors on the program in orer to e*en my client, they agree to rop the charges.- 12E2
(nee, the 8y )ai massacre was a result o* +hoeni!, the -Cerry-built- counterterror program that pro#ie an
outlet *or the represse *ears an anger o* the psyche-up men o* .as3 Aorce 9ar3er. "ner the ageis o*
neutrali4ing the in*rastructure, ol men, women, an chilren became the enemy. +hoeni! mae it as easy to
shoot a Vietnamese chil as it was to shoot a sparrow in a tree. .he ammunition was *aulty intelligence pro#ie
by secret agents harboring gruges in #iolation o* the agreement that /ensus :rie#ance intelligence woul not
be pro#ie to the police. .he trigger was the blac3list.
%s ; 8urphy sai, -+hoeni! was *ar worse than the things attribute to it.- (nee, the range o* transgressions
generate by +hoeni! was all- encompassing but was most e#ient in its post-apprehension aspect. %ccoring
to >e** 0tein, the /(% -woul irect the +F" teams to go out an ta3e care o* a particular target ... either capture
or assassination, or 3inapping. Kinapping was a common thing that they li3e to o. .hey really li3e the
whole >ohn 6ayne bit -- to go in an capture someone at night .... .hey< put him in one o* these bins these
garbage collection type bins -- an the helicopter woul pic3 up the bin an *ly him o** to a regional interrogation
center.
-( thin3 it<s common 3nowlege what goes on at the interrogation center ,- 0tein writes. -(t was common
3nowlege that when someone was pic3e up their li#es were about at an en because the %mericans most
li3ely *elt that, i* they were to turn someone li3e that bac3 into the countrysie it woul Cust be multiplying ?)A
*ollowers.- 12G2
9art =sborn $whose agent net 0tein inherite' is more speci*ic. -( ne#er 3new in the course o* all those
operations any etainee to li#e through his interrogation,- =sborn testi*ie be*ore /ongress in 19&1. -.hey all
ie. .here was ne#er any reasonable establishment o* the *act that anyone o* those ini#iuals was, in *act,
cooperating with the V/, but they all ie an the maCority were either torture to eath or things li3e thrown out
o* helicopters.- 12&2
=ne o* >ohn ,art<s original (/;O charges was to e#elop a means o* containing within the :V?<s Cuicial system
the e!plosion o* ci#ilian etainees. 9ut as ?elson 9ric3ham e!plaine, no one wante to get the name o* the
>ailer o* Vietnam, an no agency e#er accepte responsibility. 0o another outcome o* +hoeni! was a prison
system *ille to o#er*lowing.
167
(t was not until %pril 19&0, when ten Vietnamese stuents put themsel#es on isplay in a room in the 0aigon
/ollege o* %griculture, that treatment o* political prisoners gaine the attention o* the press. .he stuents ha
been trie an con#icte by a military *iel court. 0ome were in shoc3 an being *e intra#enously. 0ome ha
ha bamboo splinters sho#e uner their *ingernails. =ne was ea* *rom ha#ing ha soapy water poure in his
ears an his ears poune. .he women stuents ha been rape as well as torture. .he culprits, claims Don
)uce in his boo3 ,ostages o* 6ar, were 0aigon<s Airst District police, who use *alse ocuments an signatures
to pro#e guilt, an use torture an rugs to e!tract con*essions.
.he case o* the stuents prompte two congressmen to in#estigate conitions at /on 0on +rison in >uly 19&0.
(nitially, Fo )anreth a#ise station chie* 0hac31ey not to allow the congressmen to #isit, but 0hac31ey saw
enial as a tacit amission o* /(% responsibility. 0o )anreth passe the buc3 to 9u44 >ohnson at the /entral
+aci*ication an De#elopment council. .hin3ing there was nothing to hie, >ohnson got the green light *rom
:eneral Khiem. ,e then arrange *or /ongressmen %ugustus ,aw3ins an 6illiam %nerson an their aie
.om ,ar3ins to *ly to /on 0on accompanie by +ublic 0a*ety a#iser Aran3 6alton. %cting as interpreter *or the
elegation was Don )uce, a *ormer irector o* the (nternational Volunteer 0er#ice who ha been li#ing in
Vietnam since 19E9. +rison re*orm a#ocate )uce ha gaine the trust o* many Vietnamese nationalists, one o*
whom tol him where the notorious tiger cages $tiny cells reser#e *or har-core V/( uner the super#ision o*
?guyen 8inh /hau, -the Fe*ormer-' were locate at /on 0on +rison.
"pon arri#ing at /on 0on, )uce an his entourage were greete by the prison waren, /olonel ?guyen Van Ve.
,ar3ins presente Ve with a list o* si! prisoners the congressmen wishe to #isit in /amp Aour. 6hile insie this
section o* the prison, )uce locate the oor to the tiger cages hien behin a woopile at the ege o* a
#egetable garen. Ve an 6alton proteste this eparture *rom the guie tour, their e!clamations prompting a
guar insie the tiger cage section to open the oor, re#ealing its contents. .he congressmen entere an saw
stone compartments *i#e *eet wie, nine *eet long, an si! *eet high. %ccess to the tiger cages was gaine by
climbing steps to a catwal3, then loo3ing own between iron grates. Arom three to *i#e men were shac3le to the
*loor in each cage. %ll were beaten, some mutilate. .heir legs were withere, an they scuttle li3e crabs
across the *loor, begging *or *oo, water, an mercy. 0ome crie. =thers tol o* ha#ing lime buc3ets, which sat
reay abo#e each cage, emptie upon them.
Ve enie e#erything. .he lime was *or whitewashing the walls, he e!plaine, an the prisoners were e#il people
who eser#e punishment because they woul not salute the *lag. Despite the *act that /ongress *une the
:V?<s Directorate o* /orrections, 6alton accuse the congressmen o* inter*ering in Vietnamese a**airs.
/ongressman ,aw3ins e!presse the hope that %merican +=6s were being better treate in ,anoi.
.he e!tent o* the tiger cage *lap was a brie* article in .he ?ew Hor3 .imes that was repuiate by ".0.
authorities. (n 0aigon the secret police cornere )uce<s lanlay an the ".0. ;mbassy accuse )uce o* being a
Vietcong agent. Fo )anreth approache 9u44 >ohnson with the iea o* circulating e#ience o* )uce<s allege
homose!uality, but >ohnson ni!e the iea. 6hen )uce began writing articles *or .in 0ang, all issues were
promptly con*iscate an his press car was re#o3e. Ainally, )uce was e!pelle *rom Vietnam in 8ay 19&1,
a*ter his apartment ha been ransac3e by secret policemen searching *or his recors. Aortunately )uce ha
maile his notes an ocuments to the "nite 0tates, an he later compile them in ,ostages o* 6ar.
8ichael Drosnin, in the 8ay N0, 19&E, issue o* ?ew .imes, 5uotes +hoeni! legal a#iser Fobert :oul as
saying, -( on<t 3now *or sure, but ( guess /olby was co#ering up *or /on 0on too. ?othing really was change
a*ter all that publicity ... the inmates who were ta3en out o* the .iger /ages were simply trans*erre to
something calle <cow cages,< which were e#en worse. .hose were barbe wire cells in another part o* the
camp. .he inmates were shac3le insie them *or months an le*t paraly4e. ( saw loas o* spiery little guy --
-they couln<t stan an they couln<t wal3, but ha to mo#e aroun on little wooen pallets.- 12L2 %ccoring to
:oul, -(t was a well 3nown smir3ing secret in certain o**icial circles that with all the publicity about the .iger
/ages, no one e#er *oun out about the cow cages.- 1292
%e :oul: -.he responsibility *or all this is on the %mericans who pushe the program. 6e *inally mae
some paper re*orms, but it in<t ma3e any i**erence. .he +ro#ince 0ecurity /ommittees i whate#er the hell
they wante an the pressure our <neutrali4ation< 5uotas put on them meant they ha to sentence so many
people a month regarless. %n :o, i* you e#er saw those prisons.- 1N02
(n ,ostages o* 6ar Don )uce re*ers to the :V? as a -+rison Fegime- an calls +hoeni! a -microcosm- o* the
omnipotent an per#erse ".0. in*luence on Vietnamese society .,e blames the program *or the eterioration o*
#alues that permitte torture, political repression, an assassination. -6hile *ew %mericans are irectly in#ol#e
in the program,- )uce writes, -+hoeni! was create, organi4e, an *une by the /(%. .he istrict an
pro#incial interrogation centers were constructe with %merican *uns, an pro#ie with %merican a#isers.
Juotas were set by %mericans. .he national system o* ienti*ying suspects was e#ise by %mericans an
unerwritten by the ".0. (n*ormers are pai with ".0. *uns. %merican ta! ollars ha#e co#ere the e!pansion o*
the police an paramilitary units who arrest suspects.- 1N12
168
.hus, )uce writes, -the ".0. must share responsibility *or the nature o* the 0aigon go#ernment itsel*. (t is a
go#ernment o* limite scope whose #ery essence is ictate by %merican policy, not Vietnamese reality.- 1N22
9ut the /(% absol#e itsel* o* responsibility, saying that abuses occurre in the absence o* ".0. a#isers an
that o#ersight was impossible. ,owe#er, i* the /(% ha accepte responsibility, it woul ha#e nulli*ie the
plausible enial it ha so care*ully culti#ate. )i3e +hoeni!, the prison system was intentionally -Cerry-built,-
enabling saists to *all through the gaping holes in the sa*ety net.
6rites )uce: -%buses o* Custice are not acciental but an integral part o* the +hoeni! program.- Aor e!ample,
-.he wiesprea use o* torture uring interrogation can be e!plaine by the amissibility o* con*ession as
e#ience in court ... an by the *act that local o**icials are uner pressure *rom 0aigon to sentence a speci*ic
number o* high le#el V/( o**icials each month.- ,e as that -+hoeni! was name a*ter the all seeing mythical
bir which selecti#ely snatches its prey -- but the techni5ues o* this operation are anything but selecti#e. Aor
many Vietnamese, the +hung ,oang program is a constant menace to their li#es.- 1NN2
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. (n %ugust 19GG the /(%<s paramilitary a#iser in Juang ?gai, Fee ,arrison, unwittingly sent "0%(D employee
Dwight =wen into an ambush outsie .u ?ghia. .he guerrillas who 3ille young =wen were *rom the Aorty-
eighth V/ 9attalion.
ii. (n >une 19LL Juang ?gai 0pecial 9ranch chie* Kieu participate in a Vatican ceremony which ele#ate
/atholics 3ille in Vietnam to the status o* martyrs.
!HAPTER E@: Da Nang
>erry 9ishop ser#e in the Da ?ang /ity +hoeni! program *rom >uly 19GL until 8arch 19&0. %n F=./ an Aort
,olabir grauate, he arri#e in Vietnam with thirty other lieutenants in %ugust 19G& an was assigne to the
,uong .huy D(=// near ,ue. 0hortly therea*ter, in >uly 19GL, he was trans*erre to Da ?ang, where he
became 8aCor Foger 8ac3in<s eputy in the Da ?ang /ity (ntelligence an =perations /oorination /enter.
)i3e many young men who woun up wor3ing *or the /(%, 9ishop *elt constraine by the military an pre*erre
the company o* *reewheeling agency o**icers li3e Fuy ;ners, who ha marrie +V.<s 1i2 sister an ha *orme
the Da ?ang /ity +F" as a means o* pro#iing his in-laws with ra*t e*erments an steay employment.
6or3ing unerco#er in the /(% motor pool, the Da ?ang /ity +F" speciali4e in eep-penetration operations
into the Cungle area in the istricts outsie Da ?ang where the %FV? *eare to go. 0ai 9ishop: -6e relie on
the +F" an the ".0. 0pecial Aorces 8obile Feaction $8i3e' Aorces, 1ii2 because the Fegional an +opular
Aorces coul not be truste. %lso, it was har to con#ince the Vietnamese to run operations which is why ha#ing
the +F" was so important.-
.he Da ?ang /ity +F" were the subCect o* much contro#ersy. .hey were the only +F " team assigne to a city
in all Vietnam an i not ha#e the approbation o* /aptain +ham Van )iem, the Juang ?am +F" chie*, or o*
8aCor ?guyen Van )ang, the national +F" commaner, who mae his li#ing selling -+F"-ships- an resente
the *act that +V. ha gotten his Cob *or *ree. (n *act, when 9ishop arri#e in Da ?ang in >uly, his boss, Foger
8ac3in, was embroile in a ispute with +olice /hie* ?guyen 8inh .an o#er the mere presence o* the +F" in
Da ?ang. %n while ;ners was home on lea#e, )iem trans*erre +V. to Juang ?gai +ro#ince. 6hen ;ners
returne to Da ?ang, he brought +V. bac3 an assigne him an his +F" to the newly create (=// as the
action arm o* +hoeni! in Da ?ang. .an was trans*erre to the newly create /entral +hung ,oang +ermanent
=**ice in 0aigon, an the contro#ersy o#er the Da ?ang /ity +F" simmere.
8eanwhile, 9ishop steppe in as eputy +hoeni! coorinator in Da ?ang /ity, in which capacity he coorinate
the #arious Vietnamese intelligence agencies in Da ?ang. .he city, incientally, was strictly o** limits to ".0.
troops li#ing in nearby military bases. %part *rom +hoeni! personnel, only a *ew military policemen, /(D
in#estigators, 0=: spoo3s, an /=FD0 a#isers were permitte within the city proper.
9ishop<s top priority was collecting ata on V/( in*iltrators li#ing in the shantytowns on the outs3irts o* the city
.,e i this by reaing translate 0pecial 9ranch reports pro#ie by Dic3 )e*or, the senior /(% 0pecial
9ranch a#iser hea5uartere at the Da ?ang (nterrogation /enter with his Vietnamese counterpart, )ieutenant
/olonel .ien, an the +(/ chie*, 8aCor 8ao. )e*or use 9ishop to interrogate high-le#el V/( prisoners, whom
9ishop woul isolate an humiliate in orer to ma3e them lose *ace with the other prisoners, on the theory that
brea3ing a man<s spirit was the 5uic3est way to get him to tal3. (n har cases 9ishop aministere rugs to
169
isorient his prisoners, then o**ere a return to sanity in e!change *or in*ormation. 9usiness was bris3. .he Da
?ang +(/ hel *i#e hunre prisoners, most supplie by the +F", which i their interrogations there. .he +(/,
1iii2 in 9ishop<s wors, was the -cornerstone- o* anti-V/( operations in Da ?ang, while +hoeni! was -Cust
coorination.-
+hoeni! operations in Da ?ang, li3e those escribe by 0helby Foberts in 0aigon, consiste mainly o* the
?ational +olice coroning o** neighbor- hoos where V/( acti#ity was suspecte, then searching homes an
chec3ing (Ds. .he city was ringe by police chec3points which 9ishop, carrying photographs o* V/( suspects,
regularly #isite in the company o* 0pecial 9ranch personnel. 9ishop also wor3e closely with the +ublic 0a*ety
a#iser to the Da ?ang Aiel +olice, which 9ishop escribe as -mobile riot cops riing aroun in truc3s with
truncheons an shiels,- en*orcing the 10:00 +.8. cur*ew, arresting suspects, putting them in /=?;O garbage
containers an hauling them o** to prison. 9ishop calle +hoeni! operations in Da ?ang -an e!ample o* big
brother police state tactics.-
%s +hoeni! coorinator 9ishop also wor3e with the 800, an out*it he li3ene to the :estapo an sai inclue
-the 3in o* people who torture people to eath.- 6hile the police ha Da ?ang /ity as their beat, the 800
operate primarily in the istricts outsie town. ;ach o* Da ?ang<s three istricts ha its own (=// an +hoeni!
coorinator. .he .hir District (=// -- locate across the bay in a rural area -- was a#ise by an %rmy
lieutenant, but neither he nor the other two D(=// a#isers, one o* whom haile *rom the Aoo an Drug
%ministration, were intelligence o**icers. .hey a#erage twenty-two or twenty-three years ol an were unable
to spea3 Vietnamese.
%nother part o* 9ishop<s Cob was wor3ing with the 8ilitary +olice reco#ering property -- mostly Ceeps an truc3s --
stolen *rom the ".0. %rmy, an he o*ten met with %rmy an 8arine commaners to obtain helicopters *or Coint
operations. %t times these operations ha nothing to o with the V/(. -6e ha problems with eserters, mostly
blac3s near the 8arine air base, hiing out in the shantytown across the bay,- 9ishop e!plaine. -.hey were
trying to ma3e nooles an stay unergroun, but they were hea#ily arme an, at times, wor3e with the V/.
0o we ha coron an search operations to roun them up. %*ter the 8+s starte ta3ing casualties, though, we
use %merican military units, airborne rangers pro#ie by :eneral )am, an the ?ung 8i3e Aorce *rom 0pecial
Aorces.-
9ishop also ran operations against the local Koreans, who -ha their own sa*e houses an their own blac3-
mar3et ealings.- .he Koreans -were selling weapons to the ?V% through intermeiaries an were shipping
home ".0. %rmy truc3s, which is what *inally brought the 8+s an +olice /hie* Duong .hiep together. 9ut the
Koreans were too tough -- they all ha blac3 belts in 3arate -- *or the police to hanle by themsel#es.- 0o 9ishop
use the Da ?ang /ity +F" to rai the sa*e house where the eals were being one. -6e con*iscate their
#ehicles, which they i not ta3e lying own. .hey were so pisse o**,- 9ishop recalle, -that they later tosse a
grenae in my Ceep.-
Despite his trouble with the Koreans, 9ishop an the other %mericans in Da ?ang *re5uente the Korean social
club, which was locate ne!t oor to the /(%<s embassy house on :ia )ong 0treet. (t was a *a#orite spot *or
%mericans because the Vietnamese ha outlawe ance halls. =n the other han, the Vietnamese maintaine a
number o* opium ens in Da ?ang. -.he Vietnamese in<t gi#e a amn about rugs,- 9ishop e!plaine, -so we
le*t them alone. .hat was +ublic 0a*ety<s problem.-
(n late 19GL Foger 8ac3in le*t Vietnam, an >erry 9ishop assume comman o* the Da ?ang /ity (=//, an in
early 19G9 Dic3 )e*or be5ueathe the ( /orps +hoeni! program to /olonel Fosnor, the +hoeni! region
coorinator. %s part o* the 8%/V ta3eo#er, Fosnor was *orce to mo#e +hoeni! region hea5uarters out o* the
/(% compoun into the mayor<s o**ice. %n shortly therea*ter Fosnor was himsel* replace by /olonel Daniel
Fenneisen, a /hinese linguist brought in *rom .aiwan to assuage the Vietnamese. 6ith Fenneisen<s appro#al,
9ishop built a new (=// -o** the harbor roa three bloc3s *rom the water.- +romote to captain in early 19G9,
9ishop became Fenneisen<s eputy an liaison to )ieutenant /olonel .hiep.
.he /(%<s pullout *rom +hoeni! ha a big impact on 9ishop. -+re#iously,- he e!plaine, -( woul see )e*or *or
coorination@ ( woul go to the +(/, get the hot in*ormation, an bring it into the Da ?ang /ity (=//, which was
important, because the 0pecial 9ranch wouln<t share its in*ormation with the Vietnamese police or the military.
9ut once )e*or was gone, we ha no more access. .he new people coming in were lost.- +hoeni!, sai
9ishop, -became a mechanism to coorinate the Vietnamese, while the /(% began running its own parallel
operation .... .he problem,- 9ishop e!plaine, -is that the /(% sees itsel* as *irst. Hou<re suppose to gi#e your
agents an your in*ormation to them, an then they ta3e o#er operational control. 0o e#eryone trie to 3eep
something *or themsel#es.- 9ishop, *or e!ample, ran his own secret agent, whom he ha recruite *rom the local
/hieu ,oi center.
?ot only ha 9ishop lost access to 0pecial 9ranch in*ormation, but he ha also lost his maCor source o* *uning,
an he ha to *in a way to in#ol#e the Vietnamese more irectly in the program. ,is response was to gi#e +V.
170
money *rom the (ntelligence /ontingency Aun, which +V. use to throw a party *or the top-ran3ing Vietnamese
o**icials e#ery two or three wee3s. +V. woul hire a ban an in#ite high-ran3ing o**icers *rom the mayor<s
o**ice, the 800, the ?ational +olice, an 0pecial 9ranch, an e#eryone woul ma3e small tal3 an share
in*ormation. (t was an in*ormal way o* oing things which, 9ishop pointe out, re*lecte Vietnamese sensibilities.
-.he people in the #illages,- 9ishop pointe out, -ha no concept o* communism. .hey couln<t unerstan why
we were a*ter the V/(, an they in<t ta3e sies. .hey< help the guerrillas at night an the :V? uring ay.- (n
9ishop<s opinion, -6e were helping the wrong sie. .he :V? ha no real sense o* nationality, no real
connection to people. .hey were traine by the Arench to aminister *or the 0aigon regime. .hose who wor3e
with /hieu ,oi an FD unerstoo communism somewhat, but the :V? ha no ieology. >ust negati#e #alues.-
=#er time the parties organi4e by +V. e#ol#e into *ormal +hung ,oang meetings hel in the mayor<s o**ice.
+V. acte as translator $%mericans wore heasets' an *acilitator, setting the agena an ma3ing sure
e#eryone showe up. .he +hung ,oang /ommittee in Da ?ang consiste o* the mayor an his sta** an reps
*rom the 800, 0pecial 9ranch, ?ational +olice, /ensus :rie#ance, FD /are, an /hieu ,oi-nine to ten people
in all. .hey ha ne#er gotten together in one spot be*ore, but *rom then on the +hung ,oang /ommittee was the
center o* power in Da ?ang, e#en though it was split into opposing camps, one le by .hiep, the other by 8ayor
?guyen Duc Khoi, .hiep<s business ri#al.
9ishop was aligne with .hiep, an in orer to strengthen .hiep<s han, he persuae /olonel Fenneisen to
persuae :eneral /ushman, the %merican military commaner in ( /orps, to ante up a helicopter, which 9ishop
an .hiep then use to #isit each o* ( /orps<s *i#e +(=//s on a circuit-rier basis.
.he 0pecial 9ranch representati#e on the +hung ,oang /ommittee reporte $but always on ate in*ormation'
to 8ayor Khoi -- a *ormer 800 o**icer who ha at one time been Diem<s security chie*. %s the agency with the
closest ties to the ci#ilian population, the 0pecial 9ranch ha the best political intelligence an thus was a threat
to the ( /orps commaner, :eneral )am. Aor that reason, when :eneral Khiem ha become prime minister in
early 19G9, he appointe his con*iential agent, )ieutenant /olonel .hiep $an 800 o**icer *rom 0aigon' police
chie* in Da ?ang, with cogni4ance o#er the 0pecial 9ranch. .hiep reporte to :eneral )am an was able to post
an 800 o**icer in the region +(/. ,owe#er, +(/ chie* 8ao -- in *act, a /ommunist ouble agent -- isolate the
800 o**icer, lea#ing +hung ,oang /ommittee meetings as the only means by which .hiep coul 3eep tabs on
the 0pecial 9ranch.
.he /(%<s region o**icer in charge in 19G9, Foger 8c/arthy, an his eputy, 6alter 0nowen, retreate *rom
sight, lea#ing Fenneisen an 9ishop to *en *or themsel#es. 9ut 8%/V was not pro#iing su**icient *uns to
maintain either the Da ?ang +F" or e!isting agent nets, an so 9ishop began issuing special passes to the
0pecial Aorces team in Da ?ang in e!change *or capture weapons, which he trae to the %ir Aorce *or o**ice
supplies, which he ga#e to .hiep *or his +hung ,oang hea5uarters. 6hen 9ishop learne, through +V., that
the ?a#y /i#ic %ction center was in possession o* stolen Ceeps, he con*iscate the Ceeps, painte them green
an white at the +F" motor pool, *orge legal papers, an ga#e them to .hiep. =ne o* 9ishop<s con*rontations
with the local 8+s occurre when 8arine in#estigators trie to reco#er the stolen #ehicles but *oun they now
belonge to .hiep an the ?ational +olice. .ension between the Da ?ang +hoeni! contingent an 8arine
in#estigators mounte because, accoring to 9ishop, -+eople got corrupte by +hoeni!.-
6ith the loss o* /(% *uning, the +hoeni! program in Da ?ang su**ere other setbac3s. .he Da ?ang /ity +F"
were suenly on their own. +V. , the inispensable lin3 between the %mericans an Vietnamese, began to
worry, so 9ishop was *orce to ta3e action. -6e hear through +V. what really went on,- 9ishop sai. 9ut in
orer to 3eep +V. as an asset an carry out the attac3 against the V/(, it was necessary to maintain the +F" in
Da ?ang. -=ur +F" were ;nglish-spea3ing an coul translate ocuments an act as interpreters *or us,-
9ishop e!plaine. -6e couln<t get along without them.- Knowing that the Da ?ang +hoeni! program was on the
#erge o* collapse, 9ishop wrote a letter to +rime 8inister Khiem, as3ing that the +F" be retaine as ra*t-
e!empt employees o* the Da ?ang /ity +hung .,oang program, wor3ing as auto mechanics in the motor pool,
pai through the 8%/V (ntelligence /ontingency Aun.
.he letter was not well recei#e by +F" commaner )ang in 0aigon. ?or was the E2Eth 8(: thrille at the
prospect o* shelling out money *or a program that was coming uner increasing criticism. -.he +F" were hate
by e#eryone,- 9ishop e!plaine. -.hey were consiere worse than the 800 :estapo.-
/olonel Fenneisen i not want to get in#ol#e either, -9ut we neee interpreters,- 9ishop sai, -an the letter
was signe by .hiep, an .hiep arrange *or +V. to meet with /olonel +ham Van /ao at the +hung ,oang
=**ice in 0aigon. /ao wrote a letter to the irector general o* the ?ational +olice, who appro#e it, as i
:eneral )am a*ter proing *rom Fenneisen. %n so on the conition that they be irecte only against the V/(,
the +F" were allowe to stay in Da ?ang.-
171
.he establishment o* the Da ?ang +F" as an o**icial arm o* the city<s +hung ,oang program coincie with the
trans*er o* +F" national hea5uarters to the ?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter in 0aigon, an the trans*er o*
+F " logistical support was trans*erre to /olonel Dai an the ?ational +olice. 6hile the +F" ha been pai
irectly by the /(% be*ore, as o* 19G9, *uns were channele through intermeiaries -- usually +hoeni! -- while
uni*orms an e5uipment came through the Aiel +olice.
,a#ing pro*ane the sacre chain o* comman with his letter to Khiem, 9ishop soon *oun himsel* in hot water.
-% re-haire guy *rom 0aigon, a young 3i, came up to Da ?ang an replace me at the Da ?ang /ity (=//
with a maCor *rom the .hir 8arine %mphibious Aorce,- 9ishop recalle. -( was 3ic3e upstairs an became
Fenneisen<s *ull-time eputy, an the maCor-responing to :eneral /ushman, who was upset because #ehicles
3ept isappearing -- ecie to get ri o* all renegae #ehicles in the +F" motor pool. .he last ( hear, the
steering wheel *ell o** his Ceep while he was ri#ing aroun the city.-
>erry 9ishop le*t Vietnam in 8arch 19&0 an returne to college, baly isillusione. /olonel Fenneisen was
trans*erre to 0aigon as operations chie* at the +hoeni! Directorate. % new ( /orps +hoeni! coorinator settle
into the Cob. (n Juang ?am +ro#ince, the +hoeni! a#iser was )ieutenant 9ill /owey@ /aptain Hoonchul 8o was
the Korean liaison@ an the +F", uner 8aCor )iem, were a#ise by 0pecial Aorces 0ergeant +atry )oomis.
.he Da ?ang /ity +F" continue to be a#ise by +V.. 8aCor .hompson ran the Da ?ang /ity (=//, an the
Da?ang +(/ was a#ise by Vance Vincent.
777
.he 5uestion this boo3 has trie to answer is, was +hoeni! a legal, moral, an popular program that
occasionally engenere abuses or was it an instrument o* unspea3able e#il -- a mani*estation o* e#erything
wic3e an cruelB /onsier the case o* 6illiam >. .aylor. % *ormer 8arine /orps in#estigator an #eteran o*
three tours in Vietnam, .aylor now owns his own etecti#e agency, one o* the *oremost in the country. ,e
ser#e as chie* in#estigator an consultant in the Karen 0il3woo, .hree 8ile (slan, an :reensboro murer
cases. ,e was also in#ol#e in the in#estigations into the 8y )ai massacre, the %tlanta missing an murere
chilren case, an the =rlano )etelier assassination. % man who has been shot an stabbe in the course o*
his wor3, .aylor is tough as nails, but when we met in the *all o* 19LG, it was in an attorney<s o**ice, in the
presence o* a witness@ *or what he ha to say lent creence to all the horror stories e#er tol about +hoeni!.
9ill .aylor enliste in the 8arines in 19GN. ,e i his *irst tour in Vietnam in 19GG as a member o* a unit
guaring a mountaintop raio relay station that monitore enemy an allie raio tra**ic in the #alley below.
6hen the post was attac3e an o#errun by an ?V% unit, .aylor was nominate *or a 0il#er 0tar *or his gallantry
in action.
.aylor returne to Vietnam in 19GL as an in#estigator with the 8arine /orps /riminal (n#estigation Di#ision
$/(D'. ,is uties in#ol#e in#estigating robberies, arsons, murers, rapes, *raggings, race riots, an other
serious crimes committe by %merican military personnel. .aylor transporte angerous prisoners, acte as a
courier *or classi*ie messages, an maintaine a networ3 o* in*ormers in Da ?ang. (n 19G9 .aylor returne to
Da ?ang as a /(D in#estigator with the .hir 8arine %mphibious Aorce. ,e resie at the +aris ,otel an
wor3e, hal* a mile away, with a team o* 8arines in the %rmy<s /(D hea5uarters. .aylor<s super#isor was
8aster 0ergeant +eter Koslows3i.
-+ete li3e me.- .aylor laughe. -,e was always ma at me, but he li3e me.-
(t was through Koslows3i that .aylor *irst hear about +hoeni!. -Koslows3i sai +hoeni! was a great
organi4ation an that it woul right a lot o* wrongs o#er there,- .aylor recalle. -&e said it $as necessary7
sometimes7 to cut throats and that it $as also important7 for psychological reasons7 that sometimes it
.e made to loo0 li0e the -ommunists had done it8 (hat included terrorist acti,ities in 4a *ang and
Saigon7 $hich $ere %hoeni" pro9ects8" ;!pressing his own isgust with such a policy, .aylor sai, -( was
young an in<t unerstan political realities. .hat<s what Koslows3i sai. 6ell, now that (<m mature, (
unerstan them less.-
.aylor<s account o* +hoeni! is set in Da ?ang in >uly 19&0. .he incient occurre on a 0unay morning. %s was
his habit, .aylor was rummaging through the garbage cans in the alley behin the 6hite ;lephant restaurant
near the Da ?ang ,otel, loaing the bac3 o* his Ceep with iscare *ruit, #egetables, an brea, which he ga#e
to Vietnamese members o* his in*ormer networ3 who were ha#ing a har time ma3ing ens meet. 0ome o* these
people wor3e at /amp ,orn@ others, *or the mayor o* Da ?ang. 8ost he ha 3nown since 19GL.
6hile po3ing aroun in the trash, .aylor saw a ".0. %rmy intelligence o**icer, accompanie by a Korean
intelligence o**icer, pass by in a Ceep. .aylor ha been in#estigating the %merican *or se#eral months, so he
5uic3ly roppe what he was oing an *ollowe them. .aylor ha opene the case when a number o* his
Vietnamese sources began complaining to him that an %merican military o**icer, in cahoots with the Koreans,
172
was murering Vietnamese ci#ilians *or the /(%. .he %merican o**icer was regularly seen at the Da ?ang
(nterrogation /enter, assaulting women prisoners an *orcing them to per*orm per#erse acts. ,e ha a
reputation as a saist who enCoye torturing an 3illing prisoners. % psychopath with no compunctions about
3illing people or causing them pain, he was the ieal contract 3iller.
.hat the /(% shoul recruit such a man was not unusual. .aylor himsel* ha in#estigate a racial incient in
which *our blac3s threw grenaes into the Da ?ang enliste men<s club while a mo#ie was being shown. =ne o*
the blac3s tol .aylor that a /(% -talent scout- ha o**ere to get him an his comraes o** the hoo3 i* they
woul agree to per*orm hits *or the /(% on a contract basis, not Cust in Vietnam but in other countries as well.
.aylor<s principal source was a Vietnamese woman who 3new where the %merican assassin li#e. .ogether
they watche the house, an when the man emerge, .aylor recogni4e him immeiately. .he man was the Da
?ang +hoeni! a#iser, in which capacity he perioically appeare at the /(D compoun resse in the uni*orm
o* a ".0. %rmy intelligence o**icer.
-.he guy was cra4y,- .aylor e!plaine. -,e was my height, slightly taller. ,e ha ar3 hair an a runner<s buil.
,e ha three or *our names an eyes you< ne#er *orget -- li3e he was acting at throwing a tantrum. )i3e >im in
.a!i. ,e was angry all the time,- .aylor continue. -6hen he wal3e through a crow o* Vietnamese, he Cust
pushe people asie. .he *irst time ( saw him, as a matter o* *act, was outsie Koslows3i<s o**ice. % Vietnamese
sentry bloc3e his way, so he slamme the guy up against the guarhouse. Fight then an there ( 3new that
someay we were going to *ight.
-,e in<t loo3 or act li3e a military o**icer,- .aylor ae. -.hat<s why ( starte watching him.-
=#er the ne!t *ew months .aylor compile a comprehensi#e ossier on the man, with more than a hunre
pages o* notes an twenty rolls o* *ilm, incluing pictures o* the Koreans an %merican ci#ilians with whom he
met. 6hen Koslows3i isco#ere what .aylor was oing, he trie to issuae him. 9ut .aylor persiste. ,e
continue to sur#eil the +hoeni! agent, noting that much o* his contact with other %mericans occurre at the
?a#al /laims (n#estigation builing, a -gorgeous mansion- that ser#e as a -/(% *ront.- Known to >erry 9ishop
as the /i#ic %ction center, it was the place where Vietnamese went to collect inemnities when their relati#es
were accientally 3ille in ".0. military operations or by ".0. military #ehicles. %lthough there were only si!
claims aCusters, the builing ha o4ens o* spacious rooms an ouble as a beer hall on 0aturay nights.
.aylor an his colleagues woul party there with the intelligence crow, local %merican construction wor3ers,
an reporters *rom the Da ?ang +ress /lub. %t these parties .aylor watche while the +hoeni! agent met an
too3 instructions *rom ci#ilians wor3ing unerco#er with the Da ?ang +ress /lub.
0ensing he was on to something unusual, .aylor wrote to ). 8enel Fi#ers, a congressman in 0outh /arolina.
-% *ew wee3s later,- he note, -Koslows3i hinte that maybe ( shouln<t be writing to politicians.-
.aylor began to *eel uncom*ortable. .hin3ing there was an in*ormer in Fi#ers<s o**ice, he began mailing copies o*
his reports an photographs to a *rien in Aloria, who conceale the e#ience in his house. 6hat the e#ience
suggeste was that +hoeni! murers in Da ?ang were irecte not at the V/( but at pri#ate businessmen on the
wrong sie o* contractual isputes. (n one case ocumente by .aylor, +epsi was trying to mo#e in on /o3e, so
the /o3e istributor use his in*luence to ha#e his ri#al<s name put on the +hoeni! hit list.
.aylor<s in#estigation clima!e that 0unay morning outsie the 6hite ;lephant restaurant. ,e *ollowe the
+hoeni! a#iser an his Korean accomplice as they ro#e in smaller an smaller circles aroun the northwest
section o* Da ?ang. 0atis*ie they weren<t being taile, the two par3e their Ceep, then proceee on *oot own
a series o* bac3 alleys until they reache an open-air ca*e pac3e with upper-mile-class Vietnamese,
incluing women an chilren. .aylor arri#e on the scene as the two assassins pulle han grenaes *rom a
brie*case, hi3e up the bamboo s3irting aroun the ca*e, rolle the grenaes insie, turne, an bris3ly wal3e
away.
.aylor watche in horror as the ca*e e!ploe. -( saw nothing but boy parts come blasting out. ( ro#e aroun
the burning builing an the boies, hoping to cut them o** be*ore they reache their Ceep. 9ut they got to it
be*ore ( i, an they starte to ri#e away. .hey passe irectly in *ront o* me,- .aylor recalle, -so ( ramme
my Ceep into theirs, 3noc3ing it o** the roa.
-%*ter the initial shoc3,- he continue, -they reache *or their weapons, but ( got to them *irst. ( wante to blow
them away, but instea ( use my airweight 0mith an 6esson to isable them. .hen ( too3 their weapons an
hancu**e them to the roll bar in the bac3 o* my Ceep. ( ro#e them bac3 to the /(D builing an proceee to
rag them into Koslows3i<s o**ice. ( got them own on the *loor an tol 03i they< 3ille se#eral people. ( sai
that (< watche the whole thing an that there were witnesses. (n *act, the crow woul ha#e torn them apart i* (
han<t brought them bac3 *ast.
173
-8eanwhile, the %merican was screaming, so ( steppe on him. (< ta3en the cu**s o** the Korean, who was
trying to 3arate-chop e#erything in sight, so ( cu**e him again. .hen 03i tol me to go bac3 to my o**ice to write
up my report. 03i sai he< hanle it. ,e was ma at me.-
(t was soon apparent why Koslows3i was upset.
-6hile ( was in my o**ice across the courtyar, in another wing o* the /(D builing,- .aylor sai, -one o* the other
/(D agents came in an as3e me i* ( ha a eath wish. <?o,< ( replie, <( ha#e a sense o* uty.<
-<6ell,<- he sai, -<nothing<s gonna get one.<- 9y this time reports escribing the incient as an act o* Vietcong
terrorism were streaming into the o**ice. Aourteen people ha been 3ille@ about thirty ha been inCure.
-.hen,- .aylor sai, -a secon /(D agent came in an sai, <03i<s letting them goI< ( charge bac3 to the main
builing an saw the %merican +hoeni! agent wal3ing own the hall, so ( starte bouncing him o** the walls. %t
this point Koslows3i starte screaming at me to let him go. % Vietnamese guar came running insie, *rantic,
because there was a lynch mob o* Koreans *rom the +hoeni! tas3 *orce *orming outsie. =ne o* the /(D guys
grabbe me, an the +hoeni! agent screame that ( was a ea man. .hen he too3 his blooy hea an le*t.
-( really in<t care.- .aylor sighe. -0anctioning o* enemy spies is one thing, but mass murer ... ( tol 03i, <(* it<s
the last thing ( o, (<m going to get those guys.<-
0hortly therea*ter Koslows3i recei#e a phone call an in*orme .aylor that -*or his own sa*ety- he was being
restricte to his room in the +aris ,otel. .wo marines were poste outsie his oor an stoo guar o#er him
through the night. .he *ollowing morning .aylor was ta3en uner custoy to the .hir 8+ 9attalion an put in a
room in the prisoner o* war camp. ?ow a capti#e himsel*, he sat there *or two ays in utter isolation. 6hen the
Koreans learne o* his whereabouts, an wor got out that they were planning an attac3, he was choppere to a
8arine base on ,ill N& near Dai )oc on Foute 1D. .aylor staye there *or two more ays, while arrangements
were mae *or his trans*er bac3 to the 0tates. ;#entually he was *lown bac3 to Da ?ang an *rom there to /am
Fanh, Ho3ohama, %nchorage, an 0eattle. (n 0eattle he was relie#e o* his gun an escorte by ci#ilians posing
as personal security -- one was isguise as a ?a#y chaplain -- to =rlano, Aloria.
-6hen ( got to =rlano, where my *amily was waiting,- .aylor recalle, -there was still mu on my boots. ( ha
*i#e ays< growth o* bear, an ( was *ilthy. ( cleane up, contacte 8arine hea5uarters, an was tol to stan
own. ?othing happene *or about *orty-*i#e ays, at which time ( was orere to /amp )eCeune, where ( was
ebrie*e by a bunch o* military intelligence o**icers. ( was tol not to tell anyone about what ha happene.
.hey sai ( coul go to Cail i* ( i.-
%n so 9ill .aylor<s account o* +hoeni! came to an en. %lmost. 6ithin a month o* his return to the 0tates, his
*rien<s house was bro3en into an the incriminating e#ience stolen. (n a preictable postscript .aylor<s ser#ice
recors were altere@ inclue in the portion concerning his meical history were un*lattering psychological
pro*iles eri#e *rom sessions he ne#er attene. ,e ne#er got the 0il#er 0tar either. Het espite his losing
battle with the system, 9ill .aylor still belie#es in right an wrong. ,e is prou o* ha#ing brought the +hoeni!
assassins in *or Custice $ne#er ispense', *or ha#ing torn the mas3s o** their *aces, an *or putting them out o*
business temporarily in Da ?ang.
?or has the +hoeni! contro#ersy ene *or .aylor. ,e has seen the *ingerprints o* the -ol +hoeni! boys- at the
scene o* a number o* murers he has in#estigate, incluing those o* %merican Cournalist )ina Ara4ier an
=rlano )etelier. .he -ol +hoeni! boys- .aylor re*erre to are a han*ul o* /uban contract agents the /(% hire
a*ter the 9ay o* +igs *iasco to assassinate Aiel /astro. 0ome ser#e in Vietnam in +hoeni!, an a *ew operate
as hire 3illers an rug ealers in 8iami an /entral %merica toay. .aylor inclue the /(% case o**icers who
manage these assassins in his e*inition o* the -ol +hoeni! boys.-
QQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. .he /(%<s unilateral Vietnamese asset +V. was in charge o* +F" an +hoeni! operations in Da ?ang.
ii. .he +F" an 0pecial Aorces 8i3e Aorces were truste because they were uner /(% control, with no o**icial
Vietnamese in#ol#ement.
174
iii. 9ishop note that the %merican sergeant in charge o* +(/ aministration sol *oo an clothing on the blac3
mar3et an ha to be relie#e. .he Da ?ang /ity (=// an the three istrict (=//s ha their own interrogation
an etention *acilities.
!HAPTER E3: Re-isions
9y 19&1, as the war subsie an the emphasis shi*te to police operations, it was *inally unerstoo, as
:eneral /lay ha sai in %ugust 19G9, -that the obCecti#e o* neutrali4ations o* the in*rastructure is e5ual in
priority to the obCecti#e o* tactical operations.- 112
9righter than e#er, the spotlight shone on the +hoeni! Directorate, which boaste in its 19&0 ;n o* Hear
Feport: -.he egree o* success o* the FV? counter-insurgency e**ort is irectly relate to the success in
accomplishing this neutrali4ation obCecti#e.- ?oting that -.his conce&t 1author<s emphasis2 will recei#e e#en more
emphasis in 19&1- an that -.he +hung ,oang program has been gi#en the highest priority in the :V?<s
paci*ication e**ort,- the report says: -Aull participation o* all agencies will be maintaine until V/( strength is
greatly reuce@ then it will be *easible to trans*er complete responsibility *or V/( neutrali4ations to the 0pecial
+olice.- 122
Despite the optimism, there were problems. .he pening cease-*ire, a3a the stab in the bac3, meant that Cust as
the coup e grace was about to be eli#ere to the V/(, 6ashington politicians were preparing to grant it legal
status, a e#elopment which woul enable its agents, the irectorate warne, -to increase their acti#ity in
controlle an conteste areas an, with their anonymity, be *ree to proselyti4e, terrori4e an propagani4e in
the :V? controlle rural an urban areas.- /iting capture ocuments that re#eale plans *or /ommunist
sub#ersion a*ter the truce, the irectorate sai, -(t is imperati#e that the +hung ,oang or a similar anti V/( e**ort
be continue, particularly uring an in-place cease*ire. - 8oreo#er, because the politicians were hastening to
withraw %merican troops, the irectorate suggeste -1c2are*ul an stuie consieration ... to ensure that the
+hung ,oang +rogram is not a#ersely a**ecte by the premature withrawal o* a#isory personnel.- 1N2
%part *rom the cease-*ire an the rawown, what the irectorate *eare most was the inability o* the
Vietnamese to manage the attac3 on the V/(. .he pressure began to mount on December N, 19&0, when .he
?ew Hor3 .imes 5uote Fobert .hompson as saying that capture ocuments inicate that hunres o* 0outh
Vietnamese policemen were Vietcong agents, that there were as many as thirty thousan /ommunist agents in
the :V?, an that +hoeni! was not oing the Cob an was itsel* in*iltrate by /ommunists. .hompson<s charge
was substantiate when, in 19&0, a /(% counterintelligence in#estigation re#eale that Da ?ang<s +(/ chie* was
a /ommunist ouble agent who ha 3ille his capture comraes uring the .et o**ensi#e in orer to maintain
his co#er.
%s a result o* these problems, it was suggeste that *urther re#isions in the +hoeni! program be mae. =ne o*
the *irst steps was to hire two pri#ate companies-0outheast %sia /omputer %ssociates $manage by /(% o**icer
>im 0mith' an the /omputer 0cience /orporation $uner /(% o**icer >oe )angbien' -- to a#ise the two
hunre-o Vietnamese technicians who were scheule to ta3e o#er the 8%/V an /=FD0 computers. .he
Vietnamese were *ole into 9ig 8ac3, an the +hung ,oang 8anagement (n*ormation 0ystem $+,8(0' was
Coine with the ?ational +olice /riminal (n*ormation 0ystem, which trac3e the V/( members *rom their
ienti*ication through their capture, legal processing, etention, an $when it happene', release.
+ersonnel changes esigne to strengthen ?ational +olice /omman support o* +hoeni! began at the top with
the promotion o* /olonel ,ai to brigaier general in 0eptember 19&0. 1i2 Ai#e months later twenty-*i#e thousan
%FV? o**icers an enliste men an ten thousan FD /are were trans*erre to the ?ational +olice. .hree
policemen were sent to each #illage ha#ing at least *i#e hunre resients, an in urban areas two cops were
assigne *or each thousan people. Aiel +olice platoons were sent to the istricts, an twenty-si! hunre
aitional special policemen were hire into the *orce. 1D2
%s a way o* aressing what :eneral /lay calle -the critical shortage o* 5uali*ie 0pecial +olice case o**icers, -
the irectorate *ocuse greater attention on the case o**icer training courses an seminars at the regional +hung
,oang schools, emphasi4ing the use o* target *olers.
Fegaring %merican personnel, +hoeni! inspection teams were gi#en the authority to remo#e unsatis*actory
Vietnamese, an more than two hunre senior enliste men scheule to return to the "nite 0tates as part o*
the rawown were trans*erre instea to +hoeni! as eputy D(=// a#isers, mostly in the Delta. 9ecause
these men coul spea3 Vietnamese an were counterintelligence e!perts, >ac3 calle this a win*all. .hese
counterintelligence specialists maintaine target *olers, re#iewe agent reports, +(/ reports, an /hieu ,oi
ebrie*ings, an liaisone among +(/s, +(=//s, an /hieu ,oi centers.
175
0eptember 19&0 also mar3e the creation o* the +hoeni! /areer +rogram an the 8ilitary %ssistance 0ecurity
%#isory $8%0%' course at Aort 9ragg, clima!ing a process begun in 19E0, when the ".0. %rmy ha establishe
its +sywar Di#ision at Aort Filey. Fe5uirements *or 8%0% training inclue an -outstaning- recor an
Vietnamese-language -ability an aptitue.- +rior ser#ice in Vietnam was -esirable,- an military intelligence
o**icers were gi#en top priority .Aiel-grae o**icers were promise entry into the /omman an :eneral 0ta**
/ollege. =ther ran3s were promise, among other things, pre*erence o* ne!t assignment@ ci#il schooling upon
completion o* the tour@ an in#itation to Coin the %rmy<s Aoreign %rea 0pecialist program@ an, while in Vietnam,
*i#e #acations an a special thirty-ay lea#e, incluing a roun-trip tic3et anywhere in the *ree worl.
-.he only ba sie to that,- sai Doug Dillar, -is that it in<t wor3. 6hen ( came *rom the 6ar /ollege to ta3e
o#er as chie* o* 8ilitary (ntelligence 9ranch, we were getting a lot o* complaints *rom the youngsters saying,
<Hou<re not li#ing up to your promise. ( wante to go to Aort 9ragg an you<re sening me to Aort )ewis.< (t was
part o* the turmoil o* the rawown, that all these Cobs were not going to e!ist when these 3is starte coming
out o* Vietnam. ( immeiately i e#erything ( coul to change that program an not ma3e any commitment to
those youngsters.- 1E2
(n >uly 19&0 the +hoeni! /oorinators< =rientation /ourse was rename the +hung ,oang %#isory 0chool an
mo#e *rom 0eminary /amp to the Dri*twoo 0er#ice /lub on the Vung .au %ir 9ase. /lasses began in %ugust
an were taught by /(% instructors an a team o* intelligence o**icers assigne to )ieutenant /olonel /. >.
Aul*or. %s the ?ational +olice assume greater responsibility *or +hoeni!, more +ublic 0a*ety a#isers began to
recei#e +hung ,oang training an were *ole into the program as +(/ an +hoeni! tas3 *orce a#isers.
%nother e#elopment in 19&0 was the proli*eration o* +hoeni! tas3 *orces. Aor e!ample, in 0eptember 19&0 in
Juang .in +ro#ince, a +hoeni! tas3 *orce compose o* 1L0 *iel policemen, G0 +F", an N0 arme
propaganists was organi4e an use as a pri#ate army by the +hoeni! coorinator in .am Ky. /alle ,iep
Dong, the *orce was bro3en own into platoons that operate inepenently an in combine operations with
".0. or %FV? *orces. .he Juang .in pro#ince chie* wrote ,iep Dong<s operational orers, which were cosigne
by the local ".0. an %FV? commaners. (n one ,iep Dong operation, 2D Fegional Aorce companies, 99
+opular Aorce platoons, an the entire 19Gth an Eth %FV? regiments were committe. =* the operation<s 1N2
obCecti#es, 11G were V/( targets, 99 o* which were neutrali4e.
(n aition, the .erritorial Aorces an +eople<s 0el*-De*ense Aorces pro#ie -intelligence an reconnaissance
units- to the *orce. -(n my hamlet,- sai a resient o* Juang .in +ro#ince 5uote in ,ostages o* 6ar, -the
+hoeni! men come at night an rap on our oors. .hey are resse in the blac3 paCamas o* the )iberation
soliers an tell people they are with the )iberation army. 9ut they are really the secret police. (* the people
welcome them with Coy, these policemen 3ill them or ta3e them away as Viet /ong. 9ut i* they are V/ soliers
an we say anything goo about the 0aigon go#ernment, we are ta3en o** as rice bearers or soliers *or the
Aront.- 1G2
%ll in all, L,191 V/( were 3ille in 19&0-more than any year be*ore or a*ter@ &,&DE V/( rallie an G,D0E were
Caile, *or a total o* 22,ND1 V/( neutrali4e, all class % an 9. %ppro!imately D0 percent o* all V/( 3ills were
creite to .erritorial Aorces. .he Aiel +olice were still -uneremploye,- accoring to the 19&0 ;n o* Hear
Feport, an -/oorination o* the +F" with the D(=//s was somewhat less than ieal in some areas. .he +F",
in some cases Custi*iably critical o* the security in the D(=//s an +(=//s, generally i not contribute
intelligence regularly to the D(=// but instea reacte to intelligence they ha gathere on their own.- +F"
matters, howe#er, were not within the irectorate<s bailiwic3 but were -aresse by the a#isory elements at
the 0aigon le#el.- 1&2
(n $ %ystems $nalysis Vie" of the Vietnam War, .homas .hayer reports that the +F" in 19&0 were -per man ...
at least ten times as e**ecti#e as any other anti-V/( action *orce.-L ,e also writes: -.he +F" are being
incorporate into the 0pecial 9ranch- an that -,ope*ully 1sic2 they will ser#e as a nucleus aroun which an
impro#e police *orce may be built.- 192 ,owe#er, in 8arch 19&2 6illiam :rie#es tol :eneral %brams, -.o
ate ... not a single application has been recei#e *rom a member o* the +F " *or enrollment in the ?ational
+olice.- 1102
.hayer is *ar more critical o* +hoeni! than the re#isionist irectorate. %ccoring to .hayer, -Fesults through %pril
19&1 inicate that +hoeni! is still a *ragmente e**ort, lac3ing central irection, control an priority. 8ost
neutrali4ations still in#ol#e low le#el, relati#ely unimportant wor3ers gaine as a sie bene*it *rom military
operations .... =nly 2S o* all V/( neutrali4e were speci*ically targete an 3ille by +hoeni! *orces, an there
ha#e been #ery *ew reports o* such assassinations *rom the *iel.- ,e *aults the Cuicial system *or being unable
to -process the 2E00 or so suspecte V/( capture each month,- an citing a -constant bac3log- o* etainees,
he obser#es: -0igni*icant numbers o* allege V/( wait G months be*ore going to trial.- 1112
8eanwhile, the issues o* incenti#es an internal security were ominating +hoeni! planning. Fegaring internal
security, :eneral Aran3 /lay, the eputy irector o* the >oint /hie*s o* 0ta**, blame the /(% *or the -critical
176
shortage o* 5uali*ie 0pecial +olice case o**icers.-I2 /olby, mean- while, in a December 12, 19&0, presentation
to De*ense 0ecretary 8el#in )air $title -(nternal 0ecurity in 0outh Vietnam-+hoeni!-', complaine about the
-continuing preominance o* military leaership in the program.- /olby then mae twenty-se#en
recommenations *or -impro#ing :V? internal security in general an +hung ,oang in particular.- /hie* among
his recommenations were that an A9( o**icer be sent to 0aigon an that an incenti#e program be implemente.
.he re5uest *or A9( assistance was initially mae by :eneral %brams in the summer o* 19&0 -*or the speci*ic
purpose o* pro#iing recommenations *or the neutrali4ation o* important national le#el members o* the 1V/(2.-
11N2 (t *ell to /olby to get the ball rolling. ,e assigne >ac3, the assistant *or concepts an strategy on the
Vietnam .as3 Aorce, as action o**icer on the matter. -+eople in 6ashington, D./., wante /olby<s scalp,- >ac3
e!plaine. -.hings weren<t mo#ing, +hoeni! being one. 6hat there was was tension between the /(% an the
+entagon. %n so the A9( was calle in.-
=n Aebruary D, 19&0, through :eneral Arit4 Kramer, >ac3 met with A9( (nternal 0ecurity Di#ision chie* 6illiam /.
0ulli#an, who tol him -that any re5uest *or A9( assistance woul ha#e to come *rom the 6hite ,ouse as a
irecti#e signe by Kissinger.- 0ulli#an sai he woul call Kissinger -on a 5uiet- basis an apprise him o* the
re5uest. .he problem, sai >ac3, was that -0enior people were #ery sensiti#e about the A9( screwing aroun in
the embassy- an that %(D %ssistant Director Fobert ?ooter thought that the tas3 being assigne to the A9( was
a police *unction rightly belonging to %(D.
.o clear the way *or the A9(, /olby bac3-channele instructions to his *rien an /(% colleague 9yron ;ngel, the
chie* o* +ublic 0a*ety. ;ngel passe those instructions along to his Vietnam es3 o**icer, >ohn 8anopoli. 6hen
>ac3 met with 8anopoli on Aebruary L, the latter sai that %(D ha change its min an ha no obCections to
the A9( #isit. .hat ay >ac3 ra*te a -tal3ing paper- *or :eneral Karhohs, which the Vietnam .as3 Aorce chie*
use to brie* De*ense 0ecretary )air the ne!t ay. >ac3 calle 0ulli#an -to clear the action,- an on Aebruary 12
6arren ?utter signe the necessary letter o* transmittal, which )air sent to the 6hite ,ouse *or appro#al. =n
Aebruary 2N, A9( Director >. ;gar ,oo#er recei#e the irecti#e, signe by ?ational 0ecurity %#iser ,enry
Kissinger.
=n 8arch N0 >ac3 recei#e a copy o* a 6hite ,ouse memo irecting the A9( to sen two people .DH to
Vietnam. ,oo#er appro#e it an sent ,arol /hil, the A9(<s legal a#iser at the .o3yo ;mbassy, to 0aigon *or
*our or *i#e ays on a -iagnostic- basis, to see i* an in#estigation was warrante. -(t was a per*unctory e!ecution
o* a 6hite ,ouse irecti#e.- >ac3 chuc3le. -.here was not enough time to o a thorough re#iew.-
,arol /hil writes:
;arly one morning ( recei#e a telephone call *rom A9( Director >. ;gar ,oo#er. 1,e2 wante me to
go immeiately to 0aigon to tal3 with all the people concerne to help him reach a conclusion as to
whether there was anything that the A9( coul constructi#ely o in 0outh Vietnam .... >ohn 8ason
turne out to be the ini#iual in 0aigon who was esignate to assist me in my contacts an
pro#ie in*ormation an bac3groun that ( re5uire.
"ntil ( lane in 0aigon, ( ha no iea whate#er as to what the +hoeni! program was. (n *act, e#en
a*ter the *irst two or three ays, what they were oing an what they ha accomplishe were #ery
con*using to me. "pon return to .o3yo, ( *urnishe a etaile report to 8r. ,oo#er ... 1an2 my
recommenations were in summary: 1' ?o in*ormation ha been presente to me to emonstrate
that operations o* the +hoeni! +rogram ha any irect relation to A9( internal security
responsibilities@ 2' .here was much con*usion an inconsistency inherent in the program, which ha
e#elope o#er a consierable perio o* time, ma3ing it impractical *or the A9( to come in at this late
stage@ an N' ( recommene against the A9( becoming .in#ol#e in insurgency problems or other
local problems in Vietnam. 11D2
>ohn 8ason<s military eputy, /olonel /hester 8c/oi, has a i**erent recollection. %ccoring to 8c/oi, in an
inter#iew with the author, /hil was there to obtain in*ormation on Vietnamese supporters o* %merican antiwar
groups@ the A9( wante current intelligence, but the /(% woul not share what it ha. 8ason presente -the
/(%<s perspecti#e, not the /=FD0 perspecti#e,- 8c/oi claime. 11E2 /iting the separate charters o* the /(%
an A9(, -8ason lecture /hil on cogni4ance, arguing that o#erseas intelligence is the /(%<s Cob.
-+hoeni! was a creature o* the embassy,- 8c/oi sai. -.he *ootwor3 was one by uni*orms, but the tone was
set by the /(% -- by .e 0hac3ley an >ohn 8ason.- 1ii2
/olby enie any shenanigans. -( Cust wante A9( ieas on how to impro#e +hoeni!,- he sai to me. 11L2 Het
while seeming to a#ance the process, /olby actually blunte it. =n %pril N0, 19&1, ,oo#er reporte to /olby
that A9( ser#ices were not re5uire in 0aigon. >ac3 terminate the action on 8ay 2D. -/olby sent a letter 3illing
177
it,- he sai. (nstea o* the A9(<s a#ising the irectorate, the (nternal 0ecurity 9ureau o* the ?ational +olice was
e!pane *rom *orty to si! hunre personnel.
777
Aor a #iew o* +hoeni! in the *iel, we turn to a December 19&0 report by the ((( /orps D;+/=FD0, Fichar
Aun3houser. %t the time, accoring to Aun3houser, the V/( were lying low, concentrating on recruiting new
cares, penetrating the :V? , an bumping o** the occasional :V? o**icial. .he ((( /orps commaner, :eneral
Do /ao .ri, ha appro#e -a combine ".0.-:V? +hung ,oang .as3 Aorce- to inspect (=//s an -get the
horses galloping in the same irection.- :eneral .ri $who was 3ille when his helicopter was shot own on
Aebruary 2N, 19&1' ha appro#e the tas3 *orce as part o* a -crash V/( program- that -.hieu 3ic3e o** ...
himsel* at a special secret meeting at Vung .au on N1 =ctober.- 1192
Aun3houser reporte that +(=//s were being integrate into police operation centers, that the V/( was stronger
in urban than rural areas, an that -the leaership o* the police traces itsel* bac3 to the 8inistry o* (nterior which
reportely ma3es assignments a*ter the proper payo** is mae.- ,e eeme 5uotas -reunant, i**icult to attain
an in *act not susceptible to accurate measurement,- the problem being that neutrali4ation *igures were in*late
to meet goals. ,e sai that most Vietnamese police o**icers were too busy to e#ote time to +hoeni! but that
targeting o* the V/( ha impro#e with the assignment o* senior noncommissione o**icers as eputy D(=//
a#isers in thirty-*i#e o* ((( /orps<s *i*ty-three istricts. -/oorination with +(/s ranges *rom goo to *air,- he
reporte, -but a#isors o*ten conucte supplementary interrogations.- .o be success*ul, Aun3houser note,
anti-V/( operations re5uire -the sensiti#e an instant use o* in*ormers an total secrecy.-
-6e staye on our own sie o* the *ence,- sai the ((( /orps senior +ublic 0a*ety a#iser 6alt 9urmester. -%n
the Vietnamese *elt the same way .... +eople in<t come to the police *or help, because the only places attac3e
by the V/ were go#ernment installations.- 9urmester ae that the ?ational +olice merely supplie +hoeni!
with e5uipment an that +hoeni! itsel* acte more as a resource center than an action agency. 1202
(n *act, the attac3 against the V/( in the early 19&0<s was carrie out primarily by the /(% through the +F". %s
reporte by Aun3houser, -.he increase in +F" e**ecti#eness throughout the region has been spectacular, an is
ue primarily to the strong leaership o* the Fegion +F" commaner an his ".0. a#iser.- .hat +F" a#iser
was Fuy ;ners.
(n 19GE, with only nine cares $one o* whom was +V.', Fuy ;ners ha *orme ((( /orps<s original
counterterror team in .an "yen. (n 19&0 he returne to 9ien ,oa, at .e 0hac3ley<s re5uest, to manage the
region<s paramilitary *orces. -=ur main Cob was to 3eep roc3ets *rom raining on 0aigon,- ;ners sai to me,
although he also manage the attac3 on the V/(.21 ,owe#er, he ae, -.here were simply too many party
committee structures. .o unscramble this, we centrali4e in 9ien ,oa. 6e got access to high-le#el guys in the
/hieu ,oi center, the +(/, or the hospital -- anyone we coul get our hans on. 6e< ta3e him aroun, watch
him *or two wee3s, an try to win him o#er.
-0am %ams was ma3ing a case that the commaner o* V/ military subsection twenty-two, .u .hanh, ha
recruite *our hunre *i*ty penetrations in ,au ?ghia,- ;ners sai, then tol how he pro#e %ams wrong. .he
process began when -=ur )ong %n o**icer an a e*ector *rom /=0V? were going past the mar3et one ay.-
Juite by accient, the e*ector spotte .u .hanh<s secretary. 0he was grabbe an ta3en to the embassy
house, where, uring interrogation, it was learne that she was in lo#e with .u .hanh<s son an that .u .hanh<s
*amily ha establishe legal resience uner aliases in ,au ?ghia a*ter the /amboian in#asion. ,owe#er,
because .u .hanh ha *orbien his son to see his secretary , the woman ecie to e*ect. 9lesse with a
photographic memory an eager to e!act re#enge, she supplie the /(% with .u .hanh<s ienti*ication number,
along with the real names an aresses o* another two hunre V/( in .u .hanh<s networ3.
,a#ing manage the Vietnam es3 in 19G2 an 19GN, ((( /orps /(% region o**icer in charge Donal :regg
unerstoo the importance o* the secretary<s in*ormation. ,e immeiately *ocuse e#eryone in the region on .u
.hanh<s networ3, which was iagramme on a wall map to show where his eputies an *amily members li#e.
;ners an :regg then ispatche 0pecial 9ranch sur#eillance teams to ta3e pictures o* the suspects@
meanwhile, they trie to place a penetration agent insie the apparatus.
-6e trie to recruit a istrict care *rom ,au ?ghia,- ;ners recalle. -.u .hanh<s secretary 3new he ha a girl
*rien, so we got her to narrate on a tape cassette a plea *or him to wor3 with us. .he girl *rien brought the tape
to the cemetery where her mother was burie, an they e!change it there. ?e!t we sent a three-man +F"
team *rom ,au ?ghia to ma3e a pitch, to get the guy to e*ect. 9ut they came bac3 empty-hane. .hen we got
win that the ne!t night the V/ ha come in *or the tape recorer, so we ran a counterintelligence operation on
the +F" an *oun out that the .+F" commaner was a V/ penetration agent. 0o we change commaners@
8r. ?ha became the +F" commaner.-
178
(t was as a result o* this *ailure that :regg ga#e up on penetrations. -0hac3ley was intereste in penetrations,-
he recalle, -an the #ehicle *or oing that was the 0pecial 9ranch wor3ing closely with +(/ a#isers.- :regg
ae emphatically, -.his is not +hoeni!.- %s *or the nature o* +hoeni! operations in ((( /orps, he sai, -.he
+(=//s an D(=//s ha a guy asleep at the es3.- 1222
%s :regg e!plaine it, -9ecause .hree /orps ha har-core V/ units in hea#ily mine areas, ( ecie (
couln<t penetrate. 0o ( woun up trying to ta3e apart the remaining elements o* the V/( by putting together a
chart o* it *rom ralliers, prisoners, et cetera. ( tol %FV? (< ta3e all the +=6s they couln<t hanle. 6e< get
battere people an treat them well. (n return we< get in*ormation on caches, supply umps, ri#er crossings, et
cetera. 6e< get them to point out the location on the map. .hen Aeli! Forigue4 woul ta3e them up in a light
obser#ation helicopter to point out the hiing places on the groun. % +F" team woul *ollow with the Airst %ir
/a# an 1+hoeni! Fegion /oorinator2 >ohnny >ohnson. Aeli! woul locate the bun3er by rawing *ire@ then he<
mar3 it with smo3e. .he Airst %ir /a# woul pro#ie two or three ,ueys *or *ire support an two more with the
+F". .hen they< go in.- 6hen bigger operations were mounte, the Airst %ir /a#alry pro#ie troops.
-0o we went a*ter .u .hanh uring .et o* 19&1,- Fuy ;ners went on. -6e misse him by a step but *oun his
hiing place an brought twenty-three people hiing there to the +(/. .he +(/ chie* in Fegion .hree, /olonel
0inh, i the interrogations. 6e brought guys in *rom /on 0on to *lesh out the reports, an we ha guys
analy4ing reports, mar3ing photographs, putting the pictures together on the wall, an then photographing that.
%s a result, we learne the names o* ninety-si! people in the organi4ation, only two o* whom ha access to
%FV? or the police. =ne was the pro#ince chie*<s #alet@ the other was in the ,au ?ghia police. 9ut instea o*
*our hunre *i*ty, li3e %ams sai, it was only two.
-(n the process o* going a*ter this organi4ation,- ;ners continue, -we got all o* 1((( /orps /ommaner2 :eneral
,ollingsworth<s assets, an together we too3 photos o* the houses where they li#e ... then too3 the photos .
bac3 to the helicopter where we ha the twenty-three people plus the woman *rom )ong %n. .he twenty-three
people were hooe, an they circle the *aces o* the V/(. Aeli! Forigue4 was the guy oing this. Aeli! also
got the choppers *rom ,ollingsworth.-
)i3e :regg, ;ners claime this was not a +hoeni! operation. -+hoeni! was Cust a recor-3eeping thing,-
;ners sai. -?o organi4ation is going to share intelligence because you in<t 3now who was a ouble.- (n
other wors, by 19&1 the /(% was carrying the attac3 against the V/(, while +hoeni! was merely 3eeping score.
+hoeni! as e*ine in o**icial reporting also i**ere *rom +hoeni! in *act. 6hile the irectorate was promoting
+hung ,oang as a Vietnamese program, the commaner in chie*, +aci*ic, was saying, -.he :V? has not been
able to secure the cooperation o* o**icials at hamlet, #illage an istrict le#el that is re5uire *or a success*ul
+hung ,oang-+hoeni! program.- 12N2 )i3ewise, +aci*ication %ttitue %nalysis 0ystem results re#eale that
+hoeni! was penetrate by the V/( an that most Vietnamese consiere +hoeni! a ".0. program, pre*erre a
mous #i#eni, an ha -a gruging amiration *or the V/( struggle.- 12D2
-( reporte to this guy in the station, who ( only 3new by the name :eorge,- ; 9ray sai to me. -( tol him,
<Hour *low o* in*ormation is through guys li3e >oe 0artiano an Da#e 6est. 9ut what oes 8inh Van Dang tell
Da#e 6estB< ( sai, <.hey 3now he<s there *or you@ they tell him what you want to hear. ,ow woul you li3e
something in conte!tB 0omething that wasn<t tol to an %merican o**icialB< %n ( ha a goo recor o* oing that,
so ( was reassigne to become special assistant to the irector, >ohn 8ason.-
"n*ortunately, 9ray<s reports i not show success an were rounly ignore. %s he e!plaine it, -( ha a #iew
that was i**erent *rom the o**icial reports. 9ut this put the /(% in the position o* ha#ing to ecie, (s he right or
notB 0ometimes they< go with me, but more o*ten not. .hey *re5uently in<t want to use material ( generate --
they in<t want to report it to 6ashington -- because it mae them loo3 ba.-
777
Aor another insie #iew o* +hoeni! in 19&1, we turn to /olonel /hester 8c/oi, who in Aebruary 19&1 replace
/olonel >ames ?ewman as eputy to >ohn 8ason. % #eteran o* *our years an ten separate assignments in
Vietnam, 8c/oi chronicle the program<s maCor e#elopments in letters to his wi*e, Dorothy. =n Aebruary 1L
he writes:
Hesteray a*ternoon ... with two other %mericans ... *rom the 0aigon /ity %#isory :roup, ( ro#e
*irst to Gth +olice +recinct =**ice an then on to the &th. =ur purpose was to inspect the wor3 in
progress to eliminate the enemy agents an shaow go#ernment apparatus in these critical areas.
.he net result was an acute sense o* istressI .his was ue irectly to the inae5uate Cob the
%merican a#isers were oing in both precincts. ,ere, in a situation where the enemy are harcore
179
ol timers, we are employing callow young lieutenants to gi#e a#ice to Vietnamese ?ational
+olicemen who ha#e been on the Cob *or as many as 1& years. ?aturally our people are *ar o#er their
heas an *in that they are rarely listene to by those whom, in theory, they are to gi#e operational
assistance. =ne o* the o**icers, a captain, 3nows what shoul be one. ,e is *amiliar with his uties
an oes 3now a great eal about the precinct-population, si4e, state o* the .economy, ethnic
brea3own, enemy strength, recent V/ acti#ity , who their supporters are, the true ientity o* the V/
leaers, etc. ,is only i**iculty is that he hasn<t won the con*ience o* the ?ational +olice chie* yet.
(n the &th +recinct the situation is so unsatis*actory that it is sic3ening. .here a la4y young pun3 is
absolutely without any in*luence an, unless there is a ramatic impro#ement in his e**orts, there is
little hope there e#er will be. .his member o* the -+epsi :eneration- 3nows almost nothing o* the
area *or which he is supposely accountable. (n response to 5uestions relating to the enemy ... he
ha no answers. ,e complaine that the /hie* o* the 0pecial +olice woul spen no time with him,
an that he, our lieutenant, was ne#er approache *or a#ice. 0mall woner.
6hat are our a#isory personnel li3eB 6ell, they range *rom being as useless as the clo in the &th
+recinct to some who ha#e spent years in the /ounter-(ntelligence /orps. 8ost o* these are maCors
or chie* warrant o**icers@ they 3now their trae an they manage to establish e**ecti#e relationships
with the ?ational +olice an +ro#ince 02s early on. =ur best people aren<t in 0aigon because the
nee is greater out in the remote borer areas where the Vietnamese ump their us. .hey
naturally concentrate their most competent searchers *or the V/( here in the nation<s capital@ a*ter
all, they on<t want to ha#e the +rime 8inister or the +resient unhappy with the program.
(n an %pril 2 letter, 8c/oi iscusses the .hu Duc training center, where two thousan %FV? o**icers were to
be sent *or +hoeni! training in preparation *or assignment as #illage police chie*s:
.he *rustrations o* wor3ing with some o* these little bastars are *ormiable. .hey absolutely cannot
o anything re5uiring any initiati#e -- or perhaps the term shoul be -will not.- .he school is *or their
case o**icers, yet they rely almost e!clusi#ely on the e**orts o* one o* our personnel to raw up the
program o* instruction, the lesson plans, an the scheules. .he course is to commence on the 19th
an they<#e in#ite the +rime 8inister to atten the opening ceremony@ yet the builing nees
repairs an there is little or nothing a#ailable in the way o* *urnishings. .here are only *our o* the
re5uire 10 instructors an *ew o* the other personnel on han -- an no steps are being ta3en to
correct the situation. 9y this time, i* they were 6esterners, they woul be in a state o* emotional
collapse@ but the Vietnamese *ace the situation with per*ect e5uanimity -- in *act, 8onay the Eth is a
holiay an they all are ta3ing the ay o**. 6hat are they waiting *orB 6ell, %merican *uning *or one
thing. .hey 3now that we will e#entually come through with about se#en million piasters $U2E,000'
an they see no reason to get e!cite until our money starts to *low.
(n an %pril 1D letter 8c/oi announces the trans*er o* power on %pril 2E *rom >ohn 8ason to the thir an *inal
+hoeni! irector, >ohn .ilton. 1iii2 % grauate o* :eorge 6ashington "ni#ersity, .ilton ha ser#e most o* his
career in /entral an 0outh %merica, where he ser#e as operations o**icer in two countries. ,e also ser#e as
chie* o* station in two other )atin %merican countries, incluing 9oli#ia, where he mounte the success*ul
manhunt an capture o* /he :ue#ara. /olonel +aul /oughlin, chie* o* operations at the +hoeni! Directorate
throughout 19&1, claime that a photo ta3en o* /he<s sprea-eagle corpse -- which was lea3e to the press
an epicte the re#olutionary as a cruci*ie /hrist *igure -- was the reason why .ilton was e!ile *rom his area
o* e!pertise to 0outheast %sia. 12E2 .all an thin, gaunt an gangly, .ilton, accoring to 8c/oi, was li3e 8ason
inso*ar as they both hel .e 0hac3ley -in awe.- 1i#2
.ilton ser#e as +hoeni! irector *rom 8ay 19&1 till %ugust 19&N. Arom %ugust 19&2 till %ugust 19&N, he also
ser#e as eputy chie* o* station an senior a#iser to the 0pecial 9ranch in Vietnam. "ner .ilton, +hoeni!
was reunite with its *oster parent, the 0pecial 9ranch.
.ilton consiere himsel* a hans-on manager who wor3e closely with his region an pro#ince o**icers on
operational matters. ,e inspecte D(=//s, e#aluate the military o**icers poste to the irectorate, attene
/entral +hung ,oang /ommittee meetings, an occasionally #isite the +hung ,oang =**ice. (n return, the
+hung ,oang chie*, /olonel )y .rong 0ong, was *re5uently in .ilton<s o**ice an house. 0ong, .ilton note, was
replace by /olonel ?guyen Van :iau.
.ilton e*ine +hoeni! as basically committees an cite this as one o* the program<s *aults -- because
committees are o3ay in setting broa policy, but a single agency in charge o* the program woul ha#e been
more. e**ecti#e. ,is other gripes were that %mericans were trying to organi4e a country that wasn<t a country,
that +hoeni! a#isers were too epenent on their interpreters, an that most in*ormants were wor3ing *or both
sies. .ilton escribe +hoeni! as a 0pecial Aorces program run out o* Aort 9ragg, an he trie har to conceal
180
the role o* his parent agency. +rior to an inter#iew with reporter 8ichael +ar3s, .ilton tol 8c/oi not to re#eal
that .ilton was with the /(%. -,e was #ery cherry about that,- 8c/oi note.
=n 8ay N0, 19&1, on orers *rom +resient .hieu, /olonel )y .rong 0ong assume comman o* the +hung
,oang bloc, an the program began going ownhill. %lways late, o*ten not appearing at wor3 at all, 0ong busie
himsel* pic3ing up orer blan3s *or 0ears or 8ontgomery 6ar, snatching pens an pencils *rom people<s es3s,
an as3ing /olonel 8c/oi to buy him boo4e at the +O. % political appointee, 0ong ha the Cob o* pre#enting
+hung ,oang personnel *rom isrupting .hieu<s in*luence in the pro#inces.
8orale problems began to a**ect the irectorate. (n a >une 2 letter 8c/oi writes that more an more +hoeni!
a#isers were re5uesting early releases, which were being grante as a means o* scaling own ".0.
in#ol#ement. =therwise, /=FD0 was not *illing #acancies. 8c/oi mentions how one captain assigne to the
irectorate as3e *or release a*ter *i#e wee3s an how most o* the others were baly isa**ecte. 8c/oi notes
that more an more enliste men were turning to rugs an that more an more ?/=s were *ining solace in
the bottle. -=ur strength here in the Directorate is scheule to *all steaily while our wor3 loa s3y-roc3ets,- he
says, aing that he spent one thir o* his time responing to *lag notes *rom 6illiam /olby, whom he calle -a
monumental *igure.-
(n a >uly N letter, 8c/oi notes that /olby ha gone home to testi*y once again be*ore /ongress about +hoeni!.
/olby was to remain in 6ashington as e!ecuti#e irector-comptrol1er o* the /(% until his appointment as
irector in %ugust 19&N. /olby<s Cob at /=FD0 was ta3en o#er by :eorge >acobson, an /=FD0, too, began
its escent into obli#ion. -=ur supply an *uning o**icer,- 8c/oi once wrote, -theori4es that only the %mericans
*eel strongly about the necessity o* rouning up the political care o* the V/.- (nee, with the ineluctable
withrawal o* %merican -a#isers,- Vietnamese etermination steaily eteriorate, an the war e**ort staggere
to its ishonorable conclusion.
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. (n December 19&0 ,ai was reassigne as commaner o* the OOOO(V /orps .actical Mone, an as Komer
suggeste, 8aCor :eneral .ran .hanh +hong became ?ational +olice chie*.
ii. Aew members o* the irectorate hel 8ason in high esteem. 6alter Kolon e scribe him as -uplistic in an o*
his ealings. ,e woul be honey smooth to a man<s *ace, then #itriolic as soon as he le*t the room.- 11G2 >ames
,unt sai, -( was ne#er 5uite sure i* he was being cle#er or straight*orwar.- 11&2 ;#eryone agrees that his
loyalty was to .e 0hac3ley an the /(% station.
iii. 6hen ( inter#iewe .ilton in 19LG, he was *orthcoming an help*ul. %*ter ( presente him with a maga4ine
article that was critical o* +hoeni! $an which ha been maile to me by ?elson 9ric3ham', .ilton as3e not to
be 5uote.
i#. (n 19&1 :eorge Arench replace 9ob Dunwooie as /(% liaison to 0=:, 9ob 6all was bac3 as senior
a#iser to the 0pecial 9ranch, an .ully %campora ha returne as a#iser to .ran 0i .an, chie* o* the
metropolitan police an, accoring to %campora, -to .hieu what )oan ha been to Ky.- 12G2
!HAPTER E:: 4egalities
(n his aptly title master<s thesis *or %merican "ni#ersity, Falph >ohnson poses the 5uestion: -.he +hoeni!
+rogram: +lanne %ssassination or )egitimate /on*lict 8anagementB- 112
.he answer is that +hoeni! was both. (nso*ar as the ri*le shot concept was the essence o* the attac3 against the
V/(, +hoeni! was -planne assassination.- %t the same time, in the sense that the 3ey to the Vietnam 6ar was
the political control o* people, +hoeni! was also con*lict management. .he 5uestion is i*, uner the aegis o*
con*lict management, e#erything *rom ambush an assassination to e!tortion, massacre, tiger cages, terror, an
torture was legitimate an Custi*iableB (nee, by 19&1 the legality o* +hoeni! was being 5uestione not Cust by
antiwar acti#ists but by the ,ouse 0ubcommittee on Aoreign =perations an :o#ernment (n*ormation, co-
chaire by 6illiam 8oorehea an =gen Fei.
%s usual, it was a whistle-blower who pro#ie /ongress with its ammunition. (n late 19&0 9art =sborn
approache an aie on /ongressman 8oorehea<s sta** with a copy o* the training manual he ha been issue
181
at Aort ,olabir. 0ai the aie, 6illiam +hillips: -(t showe that +hoeni! policy was not something manu*acture
out in *iel but was sanctione by the ".0. go#ernment. .his was the issue: that it is policy. 0o we re5ueste,
through the %nny<s congressional liaison o**icer, a copy o* the ,olabir training manual, an they sent us a
saniti4e copy. .hey ha renumbere the pages.- 122
.his stab at isguising policy prompte /ongressman +ete 8c/los3ey to #isit the +hoeni! Directorate in %pril
19&1, in preparation *or hearings on +hoeni! to be hel that summer. ,is #isit was recalle by +hoeni! training
chie* >ames ,unt: -/olby was out o* town, >a3e 1:eorge >acobson2 was in charge, an 8ason was there. %n
Cust as ( was getting up to go to the plat*orm to gi#e my brie*ing, 8ason whispere into my ear, <6e gotta tal3 to
them, but the less we say, the better.< 6ell, the *irst 5uestion 8c/los3ey as3e was i* anyone in the program
wor3e *or the /(%. %n 8ason enie it. ,e enie any /(% in#ol#ement. >a3e, too.-
,unt recalle that 8c/los3ey, 8ason, an >acobson immeiately went into e!ecuti#e session. ,e i not 3now
what happene there. 9ut it bothere him that 8ason -blatantly lie.- ,unt ae parenthetically, -+hoeni! ha
been uner the /(%@ then 8%/V supposely too3 it o#er. 9ut we in<t really unerstan it, an that bothere
us. .here was always a suspicion. 8y impression was that >ohn 8ason wor3e *or /olby through >a3e, but he
also ha a close relationship with the chie* o* station -- a pro*essional relationship, bac3-channeling messages.-
%lso bothere by the lies, 8c/los3ey returne to 6ashington an charge that planne assassinations uner
+hoeni! enie ue process an that +hoeni! -#iolate se#eral treaties an laws.- 1N2 .he legal basis *or
8c/los3ey<s charge was %rticle N o* the :ene#a /on#entions, which prohibits -me passing o* sentences an the
carrying out o* e!ecutions without pre#ious Cugment pronounce by a regularly constitute court, a**oring all
the Cuicial guarantees which are recogni4e as inispensable by ci#ili4e peoples.- (t also prohibits mutilation,
cruel treatment, an torture.
,a#ing agree to the con#entions, the "nite 0tates go#ernment was well aware o* the substance o* %rticle N.
.he problem was a letter written on December &, 19&0, by (mer Fimestea, the %merican ambassaor to the
(nternational /ommittee o* the Fe /ross $(/F/'. (n his letter Fimestea says, -6ith respect to 0outh
Vietnamese ci#ilians capture by ".0. *orces an trans*erre by them to the authorities o* the FV? , the ".0.
:o#ernment recogni4es that it has a resiual responsibility to wor3 with the :V? to see that an such ci#ilians
are treate in accorance with the re5uirements o* %rticle N o* the /on#entions.-
.o the consternation o* the war managers, Fimestea<s letter meant that the ".0. go#ernment coul no longer
ismiss the problem o* ci#ilian etainees -- corralle in ro#es by the +hoeni! ragnet -- as an internal matter o*
the :V?. Fimestea reasone that the ".0. go#ernment, by *uning +hoeni! an the :V? Directorate o*
/orrections, automatically assume -resiual responsibility.- %n the truth o* the matter was, without ". 0. ai
there ne#er woul ha#e been a +hung ,oang bloc or Directorate o* /orrections.
(n response to Fimestea<s letter, which implie that " .0. war managers were war criminals, the Vietnam .as3
Aorce began coorinating with 0tate Department an +entagon lawyers in an attempt to pro#e that +hoeni! i
not #iolate %rticle N. %t the same time, the /=FD0 Fesearch an %nalysis sta** an the ".0. ;mbassy in 0aigon
began a re#iew o* +hoeni! proceures, an 6illiam /olby marche o** to *ace his critics in 6ashington.
,owe#er, as was so o*ten the case, when /olby an the +hoeni! contro#ersy lane in <%merica, a larger e#ent
grabbe the healines. =n >une 1N, 19&1, .he ?ew Hor3 .imes began printing lengthy e!cerpts *rom the
+entagon +apers -- a painsta3ingly eite stac3 o* ocuments that, e#en by name, e*lecte attention away
*rom the /(% an +hoeni!. /onse5uently, little public attention was pai when the .imes, on >uly 1E, 19&1,
reporte: -+re#iously classi*ie in*ormation rea into the recor o* a ,ouse :o#ernment =perations sub-
committee toay isclose that 2G,LDN non-military Vietcong insurgents an sympathi4ers were neutrali4e in 1D
months through =peration +hoeni!.-
0o it was again, *our ays later, when, in regar to those 2G,LDN non-military insurgents, /ongressman Fei
as3e 6illiam /olby, - %re you certain that we 3now a member o* the V/( *rom a loyal member o* the 0outh
Vietnamese citi4enryB- 1D2 /olby replie no but assure /ongress an the %merican public that +hoeni! i
abie by the :ene#a /on#entions.
Fea into the hearing transcript on >uly 19 was a memo tie -.he :ene#a /on#ention an the +hoeni!
+rogram.- +repare by the Vietnam .as3 Aorce, it argue that the :ene#a /on#entions a**ore no protection
to ci#ilian etainees because -nationals o* a co-belligerent state are not protecte persons while the state o*
which they are nationals has iplomatic representation in the state in whose hans they are.- (t asserte that
%rticle N -applies only to sentencing *or crimes an oes not prohibit a state *rom interning ci#ilians or subCecting
them to emergency etention when such measures are necessary *or the security or sa*ety o* the state. -
03irting the issue o* e!ecutions carrie out -without pre#ious Cugment pronounce by a regularly constitute
court,- it asserte that because %n .ri 1aministrati#e etention2 proceures in#ol#e -no criminal sentence,-
they were -not #iolati#e o* %rticle N.-
182
(n other wors, the "nite 0tates ha the right to intern Vietnamese ci#ilians because they, unli3e soliers, were
not -protecte persons- uner the :ene#a /on#entions. )i3ewise, the :V? coul place citi4ens in emergency
etention to ensure its internal security, without #iolating the :ene#a /on#entions, as long as those citi4ens
were not sentence but merely etaine. Fegaring ue process, /ongressman Fei as3e /olby i* ci#ilian
etainees ha a right to counsel. /olby replie no.
?oting that there were o*ten cases o* mista3en ientity, Fei as3e, -,ow can you possibly put that together
with a 5uota *or sentencingB-
Fespone /olby: -.here is aitional pressure in the assignment o* public prosecutors to the +ro#ince 0ecurity
/ommittee.- 1E2
9ut, /ongressman +ete 8c/los3ey as3e /olby, -.he aministrati#e etention applies to those against whom
there is insu**icient e#ience to con#ict, isn<t that rightB-
/olby agree.
0o 8c/los3ey in5uire, -(* %rticle N ... re5uires a trial by court, how are we wor3ing with the :V? to see that
these ci#ilians are recei#ing the proper attention uner the :ene#a /on#entionB-
Fe*erring to the #arious re*orms an re#isions, /olby answere, -6e are trying to put in the stanars o* ue
process ... an we ha#e achie#e a number o* them.- 1G2
9ut, 8c/los3ey blurte, -the e*enant in*orme against, or ienti*ie, has no right to appear in his own
e*ense, no right to counsel, no right to con*ront his accusers, no right to see his ossier@ is that correctB- 1&2
-.hat is correct,- /olby sai, proucing statistics to show that only har-core /ommunist o**eners generally ha
their sentences e!tene in e*initely by the /entral 0ecurity /ommittee, while many category /s were
release. 1L2
-.hat brings me to the real problem with the +hoeni! program that ( saw while ( was there,- 8c/los3ey
countere. -(* the e#ience is insu**icient to con#ict a man, an also insu**icient to show a reasonable probability
that he may be a threat to security, then he may stilt be sent to the +(/.- 192
Fegaring #eri*ication, =gen Fei as3e /olby: -Do you state categorically that +hoeni! has ne#er perpetrate
the premeitate 3illing o* a ci#ilian in a noncombat situationB-
/olby, i**erentiating between concept an organi4ation, replie: -+hoeni! as a program has ne#er one that.
(ni#iual members o* it ... may ha#e one it. 9ut as a program it is not esigne to o that.- 1102
Fegaring %mericans in#ol#e in +hoeni!, Fei as3e /olby, -Do they per*orm any actual arrests or 3illings, or
o they merely select the ini#iuals who are to be place on the list who are subCect to 3illing or capturing an
subse5uent sentencingB-
/olby replie, -.hey certainly o not arrest, because they ha#e no right to arrest.- 9ut, he ae, -%merican
units may capture people in the course o* a rai on a istrict V/ hea5uarters base,- an -=ccasionally a police
a#isor may go out with a police unit to capture someboy 1but2 he woul not be the man who reache out an
grabbe the *ellow.- 1112
Fei sai, -( ha#e here a list 1signe by the /(%<s 0pecial 9ranch a#iser in 9inh Dinh +ro#ince2 ... o* V/ care
roune up ... a*ter that area was secure by =peration +ershing in Aebruary 19G&. (t is o* some interest that on
this list, NN o* the G1 names were women an some persons were as young as 11 an 12.- 1122
/olby: ( thin3 that is an e!ample o* e!actly the situation that this program is esigne to eliminate.- 11N2 ,e then
submitte written responses to 5uestions on e#ery aspect o* +hoeni!, *rom +(/s to +F" an re*ugees,
e!plaining why con*lict management in wartime re5uire the suspension o* habeas corpus an ue process.
=n %ugust N,19&1, /ongressman Fei, re*erring speci*ically to +hoeni!, o**ere an amenment to the Aoreign
%ssistance %ct which woul ha#e barre assistance to any nation or program that employe assassination or
torture. (n o**ering the amenment, Fei e!presse his *eeling that some acti#ities o* +hoeni! were -#iolati#e at
the time they too3 place o* the :ene#a /on#entions.- 0ai Fei: -%t least as shoc3ing as the assassinations,
torture, an rumhea incarcerations o* ci#ilians uner the +hoeni! program is the *act that in many cases the
intelligence is so ba that innocent people are mae #ictims.- (n ma3ing his case, Fei obser#e that /olby ha
183
replie no when as3e, -%re you certain we 3now a member o* the V/( *rom a loyal member o* the 0outh
Vietnamese citi4enryB- Fei as3e rhetorically, -6ho 3nows how many innocent people ha#e been
assassinate or torture in the name o* the +hoeni! programB- 11D2
(n any e#ent, congressional hearings are not trials, an 6illiam /olby was not charge with wrongoing. 9ut
neither was he belie#e, *or whereas the 0enate hearings o* 19&0 ha allowe him to e*ine +hoeni! in term
that supporte his ieological preconceptions, the ,ouse allowe people to re*ute /olby by citing *or the recor
speci*ic instances o* abuse.
Aor e!ample, espite /olby<s claim that stanars o* ue process were being put in place, /=FD0 o**icial .e
>ac5ueney testi*ie that -arrest without warrant or reason- was a maCor complaint o* the people o* Da ?ang. -(
ha#e personally witnesse poor urban people literally 5ua3ing with *ear when ( 5uestione them about the
acti#ity o* the secret police in the past election campaign. =ne poor *isherman in Danang, animate an tal3ati#e
in complaining about economic conitions, clamme up in near terror when 5uerie about the police, responing
that <he must thin3 about his *amily.< %*ter many personal inter#iews in Vietnam on this subCect, ( came to the
conclusion that no single entity, incluing the *eare an hate Vietcong, is more *eare an hate than the
0outh Vietnamese secret police.- 11E2
>ac5ueney sai, -(n e#ery pro#ince in Vietnam there is a +ro#ince (nterrogation /enter -- a +(/ -- with a
reputation *or using torture to interrogate people accuse o* Vietcong a**iliations. .hese +(/s ha#e a /(%
counterpart relationship with the %(D police a#isor. ?ot in all cases howe#er. 4ast +ear the senior AID .olice
a'-isor o Danang !it+ A'-isor+ Grou. tol' )e he reuse'* ater one -isit* to e-er set oot in a PI!
again* because 6%ar cri)es are going on in there,6 ... %nother *rien, himsel* a +hoeni! a#isor, was
ultimately remo#e *rom his position when he re*use to compile in*ormation on ini#iuals who woul, he *elt,
ine#itably be <targete< howe#er wea3 the e#ience might be.- 11G2
Fe*erring to /olby<s testimony about %mericans< not being the ones -who reache out an grabbe the *ellow,-
>ac5ueney sai, -( 3now o* %mericans that ha#e actually battere own the oor -- so help me -- in going a*ter
people.- 11&2
%lso contraicting /olby was 8ichael "hl, who ser#e in Vietnam in 19GL with the ;le#enth 9rigae<s Airst
8ilitary (ntelligence .eam $8(.'. %s a *irst lieutenant "hl aministere the team an super#ise its counter-
intelligence section. ,e sai, - %mbassaor /olby ga#e the impression that +hoeni! targette speci*ic high le#el
V/( whose ientity ha been establishe by at least three unrelate intelligence sources .... /olby thus woul
ha#e us belie#e that the #ast maCority o* these people were target te accoring to the rules that he outline.-
9ut, "hl ae, -(t was my e!perience that the maCority o* people classi*ie as V/ were <capture< as a result o*
sweeping tactical operations. (n e**ect, a huge ragnet was cast out in our area o* operations an whate#er
loo3e goo in the catch, regarless o* e#ience, was classi*ie as V/(.- 11L2
"hl testi*ie that he was tol by a superior o**icer -that the only Custi*ication *or 8( people to be on a patrol was
*or the hunting own o* V/(. Arom that point on, any <boy count< resulting *rom an 8( patrol were automatically
liste as V/(. .o my 3nowlege,- sai "hl, -all those 3ille by the 1st 8(. on such patrols, were classi*ie as
V/( only a*ter their eaths. .here was ne#er any e#ience to Custi*y such a classi*ication .... ?ot only was there
no ue process ... but *ully all the etainees were brutali4e an many were literally torture.- ,e ae that - %ll
/Ds 1ci#ilian etainees2 ... were liste as V/(- an that e#en though /olby enie that %mericans actually
e!ercise power o* arrest o#er Vietnamese ci#ilians, -(n Duc +ho, where the 11th 9rigae base camp was
locate, we coul arrest an etain at will any Vietnamese ci#ilian we esire, without so much as a whisper o*
coorination with %FV? or :V? authorities.- 1192
%s *or the accuracy o* in*ormation *rom -pai sources who coul easily ha#e been either pro#ocateurs or
opportunists with a score to settle,- "hl sai, -.he un#eri*ie an in *act un#eri*iable in*ormation, ne#ertheless
was use regularly as input to artillery stri3es, harassment an interiction *ire, 9-E2s an other air stri3es, o*ten
on populate areas.- 1202
9art =sborn agree: -( ha no way ... o* establishing the basis o* which my agents reporte to me suspecte
V/( .... .here was no cross-chec3@ there was no in#estigation@ there was no secon opinion. .here was no
#eri*ication an there was no iscrimination.- =sborn ae, -( ne#er 3new o* an ini#iual to be etaine as a
V/ suspect who e#er li#e through an interrogation in a year an a hal*, an that inclue 5uite a number o*
ini#iuals.- 1212 -.hey all ieB- /ongressman Fei as3e increulously.
-.hey all ie,- =sborn replie. -.here was ne#er any reasonable establishment o* the *act that any one o* those
ini#iuals was, in *act, cooperating with the V/, but they all ie an the maCority were either torture to eath
or things li3e thrown out o* helicopters.-
184
%t the en o* the hearings Fepresentati#es 8c/los3ey, >ohn /onyers, 9en Fosenthal, an 9ella %b4ug state
their belie* that -.he people o* these "nite 0tates ... ha#e eliberately impose on the Vietnamese people a
system o* Custice which amittely enies ue process o* law .... (n so oing, we appear to ha#e #iolate the
19D9 :ene#a /on#ention *or the protection o* ci#ilian peoples at the same time we are e!erting e#ery e**ort
a#ailable to us to solicit the ?orth Vietnamese to pro#ie :ene#a /on#ention protections to our own prisoners o*
war.
-0ome o* us who ha#e #isite Vietnam,- they ae, -share a real *ear that the +hoeni! program is an
instrument o* terror@ that torture is a regularly accepte part o* interrogation ... an that the top ".0. o**icials
responsible *or the program at best ha#e a lac3 o* unerstaning o* its abuses.- .hey conclue -that ".0.
ci#ilian an military personnel ha#e participate *or o#er three years in the eliberate enial o* ue process o*
law to thousans o* people hel in secret interrogation centers built with ".0. ollars,- an they suggeste that
-/ongress owes a uty to act swi*tly an ecisi#ely to see that the practices in#ol#e are terminate *orthwith.-
1222
777
6as 6illiam /olby really unawareB 6hen /ongressman Fei as3e i* any +hoeni! a#isers ha -resigne on
the grouns that they coul not morally be satis*ie that they were ienti*ying the right ini#iuals,- /olby sai he
coul not recall any who ha resigne -*or that reason.- 12N2 Het, consiering his close contact with :eorge
>acobson, >ohn .ilton, >ohn Vann, an 6ilbur 6ilson, is it li3ely that /olby was unaware o* the case o* 0i
.owle, who on %ugust 1, 19&1 $while the hearings were in progress' re5ueste release *rom +hoeni! *or e!actly
that reasonB
% grauate o* Hale "ni#ersity, )ieutenant 0i .owle in >une 19G9 was assigne to the 11Gth 8(: in
6ashington, D./. %s chie* o* a counterintelligence team .owle assigne an re#iewe cases $incluing an
in#estigation into ; 8urphy<s antiwar acti#ities' an conucte o**ensi#e counterintelligence operations in the
nation<s capital. =ne tas3 was isrupting antiwar emonstrations by builing bon*ires an inciting people to riot,
so the capital police coul be calle in to bash heas. During this perio .owle was rate by his commaner as
-one o* the most eicate, pro*essionally competent an outstaning Cunior o**icers ( ha#e ha the pri#ilege to
ser#e with anywhere.- 12D2
9ut 0i .owle i not want to go to Vietnam, an upon recei#ing orers to hea o#erseas in >anuary 19&1, he
re5ueste release *rom acti#e uty, citing in his application his -complete abhorrence *or the Vietnam 6ar an
the continue ".0. presence there.- .owle tile *or release uner %rmy Fegulation GNE-100@ but his re5uest was
enie, an his counterintelligence creentials were withrawn. .owle was sent to Vietnam in 8arch 19&1 as
me +hung ,oang coorinator in Vung )iem istrict in Vinh )ong +ro#ince.
During his stint as a +hoeni! a#iser, .owle spent most o* his time -si*ting through the D(=//<s target *olers
loo3ing *or aliases.- 12E2 % sergeant assigne to the D(=// manage *uns obtaine *rom the /(% *or in*ormers
an +F" an acte as liaison with the Vinh )ong +(/ an +(=//. .owle li#e in a #illa with *i#e or si! other
people in the /=FD0 istrict team. 9ehin the #illa were the +F" 5uarters. 0ai .owle: -6e turne up the raio
when we hear the screams o* the people being interrogate .... ( in<t 3now what the +F" were oing ninety
percent o* the time,- he e!plaine. -.hey were irecte by pro#ince.-
.o clear operations against the V/(, .owle ha to get permission *rom the pro#ince o**icer in charge, .om
%hearne. Fegaring operations, .owle sai, -( went a*ter an a#erage o* eight to ten V/( per wee3. .he 0pecial
9ranch people ne!t oor ... woul come up with the names, which ( woul chec3. .hen the +F" went out. .hey
went out e#ery night an always 3ille one or two people. 9ut #eri*ying whether or not they were V/( was
impossible. .hey woul tell you who they ha 3ille, an it was always a name on the list, but how coul ( 3nowB
6e ha charts on the wall, an we< cross o** the name, an that was it.-
(n e**ect, .owle was 3eeping score -- until the ay the istrict chie* too3 him *or a rie in a helicopter. %s they
were *lying o#er a #illage, they spotte , an ol man an a girl wal3ing han in han own the main street. .he
istrict chie* sai to the oor gunner, -Kill them.-
.he gunner as3e .owle, -0houl (B-
.owle sai no.
-.hat was the beginning o* the en,- he reporte. -%hearne calle me on the carpet. ,e tol me the pro#ince
chie* was angry because ( ha cause the istrict chie* to lose *ace.-
185
.here were other reasons why .owle i not enCoy wor3ing in +hoeni!. %ccoring to .owle, %hearne $who was
ta3en hostage while ser#ing as /(% station chie* in .eheran in 19&9' an the pro#ince senior a#iser, /olonel D.
Duncan >oy, initiate a bounty program in the pro#ince, in which cash pri4es were o**ere to the Vietnamese as
an incenti#e. %hearne an >oy e#en arrange a contest between the +hoeni! a#isers to see who coul rac3 up
the biggest boy count. Disguste, the a#isers got together an ecie not to participate.
.hat was in >une 19&1. % *ew ays later >ohn Vann arri#e in his pri#ate helicopter. -,e *lew right into the
D(=//,- .owle recalle. -,e was #ery critical. ,e as3e where the boies an weapons were, then sent me into
a *uneral in progress. ,e ha me open the cas3et to ienti*y the boy. ( hate Vann,- .owle sai. -,e was really
into boy counts.-
=n another occasion, while .owle was eating his inner in the /=FD0 #illa, the istrict chie* storme into the
room with the +F" team an umpe a irty bag on the table. ;le#en blooy ears spille out. .he istrict chie*
tol .owle to gi#e the ears to >oy as proo* o* si! V/( neutrali4e. -(t mae me sic3,- .owle sai. -( couln<t go on
with the meal.
-%*ter the ear thing,- .owle e!plaine, -( went to Vinh )ong an Coine up with the air rescue team on one o* its
missions. ( was promote to captain while ( was there an recei#e a message *rom the istrict senior a#iser
saying, <Don<t come bac3.< 0o ( went to see a *rien in the Cuge a#ocate general<s o**ice in /an .ho, an he
reporte the incient to :eneral /ushman. .he general went own in a chopper an hane >oy a letter o*
repriman. %*ter that ( 3new ( coul ne#er go bac3, so ( ha one o* my *riens in Vung )iem bring my bags up to
/an .ho.-
/aptain 0i .owle was o**icially remo#e as the Vung )iem +hoeni! coorinator on >uly 20, 19&1. 6hile
awaiting reassignment, he wor3e at the /ombine Document ;!ploitation /enter, reaing reports on ?V % in-
*iltration along the ,o /hi 8inh .rail an gi#ing brie*ings to senior 8%/V o**icers. .hen, on %ugust 1, he
recei#e orers reassigning him to Kien +hong +ro#ince. -(t was the pro#erbial one-way tic3et to /amboia.- ,e
sighe. -.he last two guys sent out there as +hoeni! coorinators were 3ille by their own +F". 0o ( went bac3
to see the maCor running +hoeni! aministration in /an .ho 1>ames Damron2, an he sai he woul not reassign
me. 0o *rom there ( went to the >%: 1Cuge a#ocate general2 o**ice, where my *rien an ( ra*te a letter to the
+hoeni! Directorate in 0aigon.-
(n his letter to .ilton, .owle sai that -6ar crimes as esignate by the :ene#a /on#entions were not
uncommon- in +hoeni! an that he -ha e!presse my negati#e *eelings on the program to the pro#ince +hung
,oang /oorinator an ha gi#en much thought to applying *or release uner 8%/V E2E-NG.- ,e then
re5ueste -immeiate release- *rom +hoeni!.
.he ne!t ay 8aCor Damron, with the appro#al o* the (V /orps +hoeni! a#iser, )ieutenant /olonel ;*ram ;.
6aller, reassigne .owle to the .uyen 9inh D(=// -- the same D(=// where the pre#ious two -triple si!ers-
ha been 3ille in action. Damron note that :eneral /ushman was aware o* the mo#e, as was the >%:.
8eanwhile, .owle<s re5uest *or release was in the pipeline. 0o, ta3ing two wee3s< #acation, he hi at a *rien<s
house in /an .ho until %ugust 10, when the new /=FD0 chie* o* sta**, :eneral Aran3 0mith, appro#e his
release. $+ostscript: Fe*erring to -the case that appalle us all,- 6ilbur 6ilson wrote to :eorge >acobson, at the
re5uest o* >ohn .ilton, suggesting: - % recors chec3 in 0aigon be*ore an o**icer or enliste man is assigne to a
+hung ,oang position in Vietnam coul reuce chances o* assignment o* unsuitable personnel.-'
6hile 6illiam /olby was assuring /ongress that no +hoeni! a#iser ha resigne on moral grouns, or through
8%/V E2E-NG, an that incenti#e programs were not policy, >ohn .ilton was organi4ing, with the ?ational +olice
/omman, a ,igh Value Fewars +rogram $,VF+'. (n e!plaining the program to his wi*e, /olonel 8c/oi
writes, - % #ery substantial rewar is place on highly place V/ political leaers, as much as UL,000 at the rate
on the blac3mar3et or twice that amount on the o**icial rate o* e!change. =ur iea is to inuce the lower-grae
V/( to turn their bosses in *or the bounty money.- 0aly, says 8c/oi, -our original proposal ... was watere
own by the bleeing hearts, who thin3 placing a price on your enemy<s hea is e!cessi#ely cruelI .his espite
/olby<s support.-
% con*erence o* police an /=FD0 personnel, incluing .ilton, was scheule *or >uly 2N, to select a list o* V/(
whose names were to be passe own to +hoeni! o**icers in *our pilot pro#inces $9inh Dinh, Juang ?am, 9ien
,oa, an Vinh 9inh' crucial to .hieu<s election in =ctober. 0electe V/( were to be istrict ran3 or higher,
angerous, an con*irme with enough e#ience to con#ict. +ro#ince chie*s, in their role as +hoeni! committee
chairmen, were to select ossiers an coorinate with the +(=//. .he list was to be appro#e by the region<s
military commaner, an as state in (nterior 8inistry Directi#e 122N, the -+hung ,oang 9loc o* the ?ational
+olice /omman, acting *or the /entral +hung ,oang /ommittee, will re#iew an ma3e *inal selection o* the
V/( to be place on the rewars list an will be submitte to the 8aCor :eneral /ommaner o* the ?ational
+olice, Vice /hairman concurrently 0ecretary :eneral o* the /entral +hung ,oang /ommittee *or *inal
appro#al.-
186
.he ,VF+, which was to be e!pane into all pro#inces an aministere by +hoeni! a#isers, was tentati#ely
appro#e on >uly N1 by >osiah 9ennett, irector o* the Vietnam 6or3ing :roup@ ,enry 0i4er at the 0aigon
;mbassy<s (nternal "nit@ the 0tate Department<s Vietnam es3 o**icer, )ars ,yle@ 8%/V@ an the >oint ".0.
+ublic %**airs =**ice $>"0+%='. ,ow e#er, the con*erence to select ,VF+ targets was ine*initely postpone as
a result o* Decree 10D2. +romulgate in secret by :eneral Khiem on %ugust 2, 19&1, its pro#isions 3nown only
to the /entral 0ecurity /ommittee, the ecree grante V/( suspects the right to an attorney an the right to
appear in person at their trials. %s a result, -public action- on the ,VF+ was e*erre until a*ter the election.
=n =ctober N, 19&1, .hieu was reelecte with nearly 90 percent o* the #ote. .he ne!t ay .he ?ew Hor3 .imes
reporte that more than twenty thousan innocent ci#ilians ha been 3ille uner the +hoeni! program an that
a congressional subcommittee ha critici4e the +entagon *or not in#estigating war crimes. % *ew ays later the
,igh Values Fewar +rogram was scrappe by %mbassaor 9un3er, an plans to phase out %merican
in#ol#ement in +hoeni! were begun in earnest.
.he process ha begun on %ugust 11, 19&1, when :age 8c%*ee, a legal a#iser to 6illiam /olby, submitte his
en o* tour report. /iting reports that the V/( was actually growing in number, 8c%*ee writes, -.here is oubt
that the +hung ,oang +rogram is achie#ing its esire goal o* eliminating the in*rastructure. (t can be argue
that its resources an energy are actually being i#erte to other unesirable acti#ities that are ... counter-
proucti#e in the conte!t o* supporting a #iable an responsi#e go#ernment which will pro#ie an e**ecti#e
alternati#e to the insurgent go#ernment.- ,e as that -some i* not the maCority o* the war results *rom the social
grie#ances o* the part o* the population, separate an istinct *rom the military aggression o* the ?orth,- an that
-?o really responsi#e go#ernment shoul e#er nee such a program at all.-
8c%*ee notes that %n .ri -lac3s a legislati#e base, there being no speci*ic statute enacte by the ?ational
%ssembly which empowers the ;!ecuti#e in time o* war or emergency to aministrati#ely etain.- ,e cites the
legislature<s opposition to +ro#ince 0ecurity /ommittees, which, he as, -were generally ac3nowlege to be
e!tra-constitutional i* not unconstitutional.- ,e reCects as -irrele#ant- the argument that no resiual responsibility
*or ci#ilian etainees e!ists, citing ?uremberg an Vietnam, in which .el*or .aylor says that i* the :V? i not
abie by the :ene#a /on#entions, -then the original captor power 1the "nite 0tates2 must ta3e e**ecti#e steps
to correct the situation, or shall re5uest the return o* the prisoners.- 12G2
8c%*ee emphasi4es that +ro#ince 0ecurity /ommittees were not -regularly constitute courts- an that support
*or them was -a eparture *rom the stanars- o* %rticle N. -Arom a strictly legal stanpoint,- he conclues, the
Fimestea letter re5uire that the "nite 0tates either eman the elimination o* security committees or ta3e
steps to insure that no prisoners capture by ".0. *orces were sentence by them. -?ot only are we now in the
i**icult position o* ha#ing supporte these committees in the past,- he writes, -but many Vietnamese now thin3
that 0ecurity /ommittees are as %merican as apple pie an baseball. .he +hung ,oang program itsel* has
always been associate with the %mericans an o* course the /(%. (* the ".0. ecies ... to recommen the
elimination o* these /ommittees, it might be use*ul *or the Vietnamese ... to blame it all on the ".0. 0o with the
+hung ,oang program in general. (* it *aes into an is totally absorbe by the 0pecial +olice, it might help the
Vietnamese to eliminate the ba a*tertaste by blaming the entire program on their misguie bene*actors.- .he
only alternati#e, 8c%*ee suggests, was -to *orce the :V? to ma3e necessary impro#ements.-
9ut the ".0. go#ernment woul not go along with 8c%*ee<s recommenations that the 0talinist security
committees -shoul ie,- that trials be mae public, or that -.he 3ill 5uota be eliminate as the ultimate misuse
o* the boy count.- (nstea, it stalle until the problem coul be sloughe o** on the :V?. .he De*ense
Department enie any -resiual responsibility- whatsoe#er, an the 0aigon ;mbassy minimi4e the problem,
saying that only -between 1E00 an 2E00 ini#iuals out o* a V/( correction population o* about 1&,000 are the
subCect o* that responsibility.- 12&2
.he *inal wor on ". 0. policy regaring ci#ilian etainees was state on ?o#ember 12, 19&1, in 0tate
Department telegram 220&&D, which irecte the 0aigon ;mbassy to wor3 with the Directorate o* +olitical
0ecurity to guarantee -humanitarian treatment o* etainees- an to ensure that %n .ri was implemente -in
terms o* *unamental concepts o* ue process an to impro#e conitions o* internment.- .his, espite 0tate
Department attorney Fobert 0tarr<s amission that -6e cannot Custi*y secrecy o* proceural re- *orms in /ircular
10D2,- which *aile to pro#ie *or Cuicial re#iew, -meaning*ul- appeal, -*ree choice- o* an attorney, or the right to
cross-e!amine witnesses. ?oting that con*essions alone were enough to con#ict a suspecte V/(, 0tarr urge
that -there shoul be a re5uirement o* corroborating e#ience. - ,e cautione 9un3er that %n .ri -is subCect to
attac3 on grouns it oes not simply pro#ie *or emergency etention, but in#ol#es actual *inings o* guilt or
innocence an sentencing o* persons,- an he suggeste that 9un3er wor3 to implement -new legislation
establishing a clear an etaile basis *or program.-
6hat 0tarr en#isione was legislation trans*erring security committee responsibilities to regularly constitute
courts. 9ut that ne#er happene. "ntil the *all o* 0aigon, only the /(%-a#ise Directorate o* +olitical 0ecurity
coul re#erse +ro#ince 0ecurity /ommittee recommenations to e!ten etention. (n ?o#ember the :V? i
187
withraw *rom security committees the power to recommen %n .ri etention against /ommunist o**eners
whose sentences ha e!pire, V/( suspects who were release be*ore trial *or lac3 o* e#ience, an V/(
suspects who were re*erre an ha been ac5uitte. "nless -new *actors- were speci*ie. (n December +rime
8inister Khiem announce a parole an conitional release program -to release selecte prisoners an also
pro#ie a system *or post-release sur#eillance.-
=n December 1N, 19&1, Fobert 0tarr reporte to 6illiam ,. 0ulli#an: -.hese re*orms are another welcome step
in the right irection but *all short o* e**ecti#ely ealing with the unerlying problems.- 12L2 .he ne!t ay the
6ashington +ost printe an article by +eter =snos healine ".0. +)%? A%()0 .= 6(+; =". V/ /%DF;.
.he year 19&1 close without a resolution o* %n .ri or +hoeni!.
!HAPTER EB: Technicalities
(n early =ctober 19&1 )ieutenant /olonel /onnie =<0hea arri#e at the +hoeni! Directorate an was assigne
by >ohn .ilton as liaison o**icer to /olonel 0ong at the +hung ,oang bloc o**ice in the ?ational +olice
(nterrogation /enter. ,is Cob, he tol me, -was to tell .ilton what 0ong was thin3ing.- 112
% #eteran intelligence o**icer who ha ser#e in Vietnam in 19GG an 19G&, =<0hea escribe the irectorate in
late 19&1 as -0leepy ,ollow .... .here were ongoing iscussions between ".0. an Vietnamese police o**icials,-
he recalle, <<as to how to get the program trans*erre. .ilton an 1operations chie* +aul2 /oughlin were oing
their +,F;;O 1+hung ,oang ree!amination2 report, an coming own *rom 6ashington was a propose list o*
things we shoul bac3 away *rom. .hey were going to turn the ossiers o#er, to the Vietnamese, an the 0pecial
9ranch was apprehensi#e@ they in<t want to turn their *iles o#er to anyboy .... .he other big thing was +,8(0
1+hung ,oang 8anagement (n*ormation 0ystem2, but it was not reay to be use yet by the Vietnamese.-
/oauthore by the /=FD0 Fesearch an %nalysis Di#ision, +,F;;O, accoring to +hoeni! operations chie*
+aul /oughlin, -came *rom >ohn .ilton,- who initially wante to call it +hung ,oang FepriseI -(t in#ol#e *our
months o* epth research an inclue slies an graphs,- e!plaine /oughlin, -an basically outline how to
trans*er +hoeni! to the Vietnamese an how to eal with lessening assets 1in 19&2 the irectorate ha at most
*i*teen sta**ers2. 9ut it also aresse what acti#ities ".0. *orces shoul be in#ol#e in, an to what egree@ the
whole iea o* Fe#olutionary De#elopment support an /=FD0, which was the program<s %chilles< heel,
because e#eryone was answering to a i**erent master .... Detention was not a +,F;;O issue,- /oughlin
ae, -but military Custice an the moral aspects o* the program were, as were our concerns o#er Vietnamese
loyalty. %*ter all o* these things were consiere together, we ecie not to let the program ie on the #ine, but
Cust to let the ea areas go.- =therwise, /oughlin note, -=ur concern in the irectorate was that people in the
*iel got what they neee -- Ceeps, communications e5uipment, et cetera -- which we learne about through
reports.-
,e ae that -reports on operations ran up through another channel -- through 0pecial 9ranch.- %s *or the
relationship between the 0pecial 9ranch an +hoeni!, /oughlin obser#e that the irectorate was -#ery
compartmente,- that a reser#e o**icer on sta** might ha#e wor3e *or the /(%, an that /hester 8c/oi<s
replacement as eputy irector, /olonel ,erb %llen, -was not in the 3now- an -was selecte *or that reason.-
/oughlin asserte that the :reen 9eret murer trial -change the whole thing- an that employees o* the
De*ense (n#estigati#e 0er#ice starte arri#ing, running agents, an oing bac3groun in#estigations *or +hoeni!
in 19&2.
% i**erent perspecti#e on +,F;;O was pro#ie by /oughlin<s eputy, )ieutenant /olonel :eorge ,uman, a
#eteran intelligence o**icer who was also a *rien o* >ohn .ilton<s. -/oughlin was not an intelligence o**icer,-
,uman e!plaine, -an, as a result, was not truste by .ilton. 0o ( brie*e +,F;;O to >a3e 1:eorge >acobson2
an :eneral Aorrester .... 9asically, it e!plaine why +hoeni! in<t wor3. +eople in the agency were loo3ing *or
a way to bac3 out, an +,F;;O was it. 6e too3 all the ata compile *rom all +hoeni! centers, put it all
together, an showe that the program was *ailing because it was too big an because the military ha no
unerstaning o* it. .hey ha no unerstaning o* intelligence. .hey woul roun up V/( suspects, an they
resorte to boy counts. 9ut intelligence isn<t preicate on boy counts.- 1N2
Despite blaming the military *or the *ailure o* +hoeni!, ,uman e!plaine that -0hac3ley, then +olgar to .ilton
was the real chain o* comman- an that -9ob 6all 1then senior a#iser to the 0pecial 9ranch2 o#ersaw
+hoeni!.-
(nee, as the ".0. military prepare to lea#e Vietnam, the /(% neee to *in a new way o* managing the
attac3 against the V/( without appearing to o so. (n other wors, the concept o* an attac3 against the V/( was
still consiere #ital@ what was sought was a new organi4ation. .he process began when :eneral %brams
suggeste in =ctober that -responsibility *or the *ull anti V/( mission shoul be assigne to the ?ational +olice
188
/omman on a time-phase basis commencing 19&2- 1D2 an that +hung ,oang committees an centers be
eacti#ate as a way o* -increasing the emphasis on the anti-V/( responsibilities o* istrict an pro#ince chie*s.-
.hese recommenations were stuie in 6ashington by a wor3ing group compose o* >osiah 9ennett $0tate',
>ohn %rthur $%(D', :eorge /ar#er $/(%', >ohn 8anopoli $+ublic 0a*ety', :eneral Karhohs $(0%', the >oint /hie*s
o* 0ta**, an 0%/ 0%. %*ter each agency ha consiere the proposals, 9ennett shot a telegram $19G0G0' bac3
to 0aigon inicating tentati#e appro#al, although, in e*erence to the /(%, -with the 0pecial 9ranch collating
intelligence an maintaining ossiers on the V/(, an with positi#e action responsibilities assigne to the +F",
?+AA an other elements as re5uire.- % *ew wee3s later %mbassaor 9un3er sent a telegram $1&NE&' to
0ecretary o* 0tate 6illiam Fogers saying that Fobert .hompson an the :V? ha also appro#e o* the plan.
.he wor3ing group then prepare to sen a team, heae by the Vietnam .as3 Aorce<s action o**icer >ac3, to
0aigon to etermine which -3ey people- coul be reassigne to +hoeni!. 6hen the team arri#e in 0aigon in
mi-?o#ember, accoring to >ac3, -.ilton got the o3ay *rom /ar#er to gi#e me the +hoeni! in*ormation.-
Despite its tentati#e appro#al o* the plan to phase out +hoeni! an turn the management o* the attac3 against
the V/( o#er to the ?ational +olice /omman $?+/', the /(% ha no such intentions. (n *act, in =ctober 19&1
orers went out to all pro#ince 0pecial 9ranch a#isers to begin *orming 0pecial (ntelligence Aorce "nits $0(A"'.
;ight-man teams compose o* *our #olunteers each *rom the 0pecial +olice an Aiel +olice, the 0(A" were
targete speci*ically at high-le#el V/(, as substitutes *or the +F". .hey were also a sign that the /(% planne to
manage the attac3 on the V/( through the 0pecial 9ranch, while 3eeping +hoeni! intact as a way o* e*lecting
attention an accountability.
Aor +hu Hen +ro#ince +(/ a#iser Fob 0immons -- who wor3e uner co#er o* the /=FD0 +aci*ication
0ecurity /oorination Di#ision but who ne#er e#en met the /=FD0 pro#ince senior a#iser-+hoeni! in 19&2
was merely a library o* *iles to cross-chec3 in*ormation, not the /(%<s partner in the attac3 on the V/(. -6e woul
go to +hoeni!,- 0immons tol me, -an they< show us a *ile, an we< use the *ile to buil a case. %n e#ery
report we generate, we sent to the +(=//. 9ut 0pecial 9ranch ha its own *iles. %n i* at the +(/ we got
someone who cooperate, we woul withhol his *ile -- i* he was going to be ouble -- because we 3new the
+(=// was penetrate.- 1E2 Aurthermore, accoring to 0immons, the +hu Hen +ro#ince o**icer in charge
concentrate on unilateral operations an political reporting, because he consiere $as ha Foc3y 0tone'
0pecial 9ranch liaison too e!pose to be secure.
%s 6illiam /olby e!plaine it, -/=FD0 people were 3ept out o* the station. %n e#en though 0pecial 9ranch
coorinate through the pro#ince senior a#iser, the station ha a clear chain o* comman in intelligence
matters.- 1G2
(nee, +hoeni! was a #aluable resource, an it allowe the /(% to say that it ha no o**icers in the istricts. 9ut
the /(% was not about to turn o#er its 0pecial 9ranch *iles to the ?ational +olice /omman $?+/' or submit its
agents to ?+/ authority. %n when those proposals returne to /ar#er<s es3 *or *inal appro#al, there they ie.
(n December 19&1 /ar#er wrote a wor3ing paper entitle -Auture ".0. Fole in the +hung ,oang +rogram.- (ts
state purpose was -to ensure that the :V? +hung ,oang +rogram continues to recei#e e**ecti#e ".0. a#isory
support uring upcoming 1L-2D month perio with an option *or continuance i* re5uire.-
"sing *amiliar terms, /ar#er e*ines +hoeni! as: a' -the intelligence e**ort against the higher le#els o* the V/(
who possess in*ormation ... on enemy plans an intentions@ b' the intelligence e**ort irecte against the lowest
le#el o* the V/( 1who2 per*orm an essentially political *unction o* relating the /ommunist party mechanism to the
population@ an c' an action e**ort to neutrali4e the targets in $a' an $b '.- ,e also notes that, on ?o#ember 2&,
19&1, :eneral Khiem change his min an sai that -+hung ,oang /enters an /ommittees will be retaine,-
that the /entral +hung ,oang /ommittee woul be upgrae an chaire by Khiem himsel*, that the +hoeni!
program -will be continue ine*initely,- an that -inclue ... will be a rewars program *une by the :V?.-
=ne month a*ter 9un3er ha 3ille the ,igh Value Fewars +rogram, it was born anew as a :V? program, as
part o* +hung ,oang.
.he main reason *or not scrapping +hoeni!, /ar#er writes, was the -crucial- nee to estroy the V/(. ,owe#er,
he suggests that the ties +hoeni! an +hung ,oang a#iser be roppe, an he warns against withrawing
a#isers in pro#inces where the V/( presence was hea#y. -.he minimum sta**ing le#el appears to be about thirty
positions which woul pro#ie co#erage o* the program at national, regional an a *ew 3ey pro#incial echelons,-
/ar#er writes, aing, -+lans shoul be rawn up to ha#e the normal ".0. a#isory structure absorb anti-V/(
a#isory uties beyon the transitional perio o* the rawown. - ,e en#isione the complete withrawal o*
+hoeni! a#isers by the en o* 19&2, but only in a way that woul pro#ie the "nite 0tates with -a capability to
monitor not only the :V? program but also to e#elop some semblance o* an inepenent estimati#e
capability.- .hat Cob woul *all, a*ter 19&N, to the E00th 8ilitary (ntelligence :roup as well as the /(%.
%s e#er, the /(% got its way. =n December 2L,19&1, 0tate Department o**icer )ars ,yle, in response to
/ar#er<s paper, wrote -that +hung ,oang shoul be hanle by the 0pecial 9ranch within the ?ational +olice
189
/omman ... that +hung ,oang /ommittees shoul continue in e!istence,- an that pro#ince an istrict chie*s
shoul assume responsibility -beginning with the most secure areas where there are *ew FV?%A main *orces.
+erhaps ".0. military a#isors will continue to be neee as long as FV?%A retains action responsibilities *or
+hung ,oang, but as action is trans*erre to the 0pecial 9ranch, the a#isory role shoul be ta3en o#er by the
0pecial 9ranch a#isor, the /(% man- $author<s emphasis'.
.his is the -reprise- >ohn .ilton imagine: the return o* the 0pecial 9ranch to prominence in anti-V/( operations.
9y 19&2 it was policy, as articulate by 9ob 6all: -( was really pushing 0pecial 9ranch to support +hoeni!
uring the ;aster o**ensi#e, while the V/ were o#errunning ,ue. 1.he ?ational +olice commaner 8aCor
:eneral2 +hong ha the chie* o* police in ,ue on the phone. ( tol him what to o, an he relaye the
message ....6here the 0pecial 9ranch contribute,- 6all sai, -was in ,ue in %pril 19&2@ there was success.- 1&2
%s soon as the ?orth Vietnamese %rmy $?V %' attac3e, the V/( in ,ue were to begin sabotage an terror
attac3s within the city, irect ?V% artillery *ire, an guie assault columns. ,owe#er, reports Fobert /onon, the
+hoeni! coorinator on the scene, -9e*ore the enemy agents coul be acti#ate, about 1000 o* them who ha
been long ienti*ie by the +(=// were arreste. =ur intelligence inicate that the ?V % commaners were
blin in ,ue, ue to this timely +hung ,oang operation.- 1L2
-+hoeni!,- 9ob 6all insiste, -represente the strategy that coul ha#e won the war.- 9ut, he lamente, -.e
0hac3ley stuc3 to the traitional route o* only collecting intelligence an ga#e +hoeni! away. - Femo#ing the
0pecial 9ranch in 19G9, 6all contene, -3ic3e the teeth out o* the pro gram.
-.he 0pecial 9ranch was up to the Cob,- 6all ae. -8au ha institute a training program in 19&0, but Khiem
pre#ente them *rom getting goo-5uality people because 8au ha emonstrate the operational capabilities
necessary to pull o** a coup. ?ot that he was close to trying it, but when .hieu liste the possibilities, 8au was at
the top: ,e was smart, charismatic, courageous, col-blooe, politically mine, an he ha access to the
agency an troops who coul pull it o**.-
% /atholic an central Vietnamese with /an )ao connections, 8au was goo at his Cob. 9ut he was a consultant
to +%T;, an he ha gi#en the /(% access to the accounting recors o* the 0pecial 9ranch, an he ha
organi4e his own political party, the ?ationalist 0tuents, all o* which combine to ma3e him a liability. 0o a*ter
.hieu ha won reelection in =ctober 19&1, 8au was replace as chie* o* the 0pecial 9ranch by 9rigaier
:eneral ,uynh .hoi .ay@ /olonel 0ong was replace as the chie* o* +hoeni! by ?guyen Van :iau@ an :eneral
+hong 1i2 was replace as the irector general o* the ?ational +olice by /(= chie* ?guyen Khac 9inh, e#en
though, accoring to .om +olgar, it was a mista3e to ha#e one man in both positions. +olgar ae that Fo
)anreth an +hil +otter negotiate the trans*er o* +hoeni! an the +F" to the :V? with :enerals 9inh an
Dang Van Juang. 192
8eanwhile, the /(% was istancing itsel* *rom the +F". ((( /orps a#iser Fuy ;ners note that +F" national
commaner 8aCor ?guyen Van )ang was *ire *or selling positions an sha3ing own his region commaners
an that -by the time 19&2 rolls aroun, ,o /hau .uan 1*ormer commaner o* the ;ighth %irborne 9attalion at
.an 0on ?hut' ha ta3en o#er in 0aigon.- 1102
8ichael Drosnin 5uotes ,o /hau .uan as saying, -.he main mission o* +F" was assassination. ( recei#e
orers *rom the +hoeni! o**ice, the Vietnamese an %mericans there, to assassinate high-le#el V/(. 6e wor3e
closely with 0aigon with the /(% *rom the ;mbassy, an in the pro#inces with the /(% at the consulates, to
ecie who to 3ill.- 6rites Drosnin: -.uan o**ere to name names o* high-le#el %mericans who irectly orere
assassination stri3es, but then he bac3e o**. <( ha#e enough e!perience in this pro*ession to be a*rai,< he
e!plaine. <( 3now the /(%. ( might be 3ille< - $?ew .imes, 19&E'. 1112 1ii2
(n 19&2 the +F" were a#ise in ( /orps by +atry )oomis, in (( /orps by >ac3 ,arrell an 9ob :ilaro, in (((
/orps by Fuy ;ners an Aeli! Forigue4, an in (V /orps by >ohn 8orrison an :ary 8ao!.
777
+hoeni! operations in the *iel in 19&2 #arie *rom region to region. Fuy ;ners tol me he ha the V/( on the
run in ((( /orps. %n in (V /orps, where the +F" were most acti#e, success was reporte against the V/(. 9ut in
( /orps an (( /orps, where the ?V % concentrate its attac3s in 19&2, the situation was much harer to hanle.
Juang .ri *ell in %pril, an in early 8ay the ?V% capture Juang ?gai /ity, which it hel until 0eptember. (n
9inh Dinh +ro#ince, *orty thousan Koreans re*use to *ight, se#eral thousan unpai %FV? soliers threw
own their ri*les an ran away, an the ?V % sei4e three istrict capitals. 6ith the %FV? an .erritorial Aorces
in retreat, .hieu turne to +hoeni!.
190
(n 8ay 19&2, writes 8ichael Klare, -.hieu eclare martial law an launche a sa#age attac3 on the remaining
poc3ets o* neutralism in the big cities. :o#ernment *orces reportely corone o** entire istricts in ,ue, Danang
an 0aigon an arreste e#eryone on the police blac3lists. .he reputable Aar ;astern ;conomic Fe#iew
reporte on >uly L, 19&2, that E0,000 people ha been arreste throughout Vietnam uring the *irst two months
o* the o**ensi#e, an .ime maga4ine reporte on 10 >uly that arrests were continuing at a rate o* 1D,000 per
month.- 1122
Aor an eyewitness account o* +hoeni! operations in (( /orps in 19&2, we turn *irst to )ieutenant /olonel /onnie
=<0hea, who in >anuary 19&2 was trans*erre *rom 0aigon to +hoeni! hea5uarters in ?ha .rang, as eputy to
(( /orps +hoeni! /oorinator /olonel )ew 8illett.
-.he problem with the program,- accoring to =<0hea, -was that people were being rotate out, but
replacements were not being mae. %n as the intelligence o**icers went home, the +hoeni! guy too3 o#er that
Cob, but not the re#erse. (t was a one-way street, an +hoeni! *ell to the waysie.
-8illett was trying to 3eep +hoeni! people oing their +hoeni! Cob,- =<0hea continue, -an he spent a lot o*
time going aroun to the pro#ince chie*s, trying to 3eep them *ocuse on the V/(. 9ut it was har uring the
spring o**ensi#e. 0o 8illett an 1Fegion (( +hung ,oang chie*2 Dam went aroun trying to 3eep the organi4ation
in place, telling the +hoeni! coorinators that i* they ha to o 0-two wor3, not to *orget their anti V/( Cob. .hat
was number one. =ur other Cob was ma3ing oursel#es #isible with /olonel Dam, so the Vietnamese woul not
get the sense that we were pulling out. 6e 3ept a high pro*ile. 6e were missing a couple o* pro#ince guys, an
an aw*ul lot o* D(=//s were missing a#isers. .he istrict senior a#isers were not ta3ing o#er but were trying
to get the Vietnamese to ta3e o#er. 0o we spent a lot o* time touring an helping the +hung ,oang /ommittees
an D(=//s collect intelligence an prepare operational plans.
-.hirly,- =<0hea sai, -8illett was an operator, trying to conuct as many missions as possible himsel*.- 8illett<s
biggest success was -turning- the 8ontagnar battalion that ha le the attac3 on ,ue uring .et o* 19GL.
Ai*ty-two years ol in 19&2, 8eal o* ,onor winner )ew 8illett -- who in 19G1 ha helpe create the Vietnamese
rangers an later i li3ewise in )aos -- was 3nown as a wil man who participate in ambushes an rais
against V/( camps with /onnie =<0hea an some o* the more aggressi#e +hoeni! coorinators.
%ccoring to 8illett, -+hoeni! was coorinate at corps le#el by the /(%, an ( ha to bac3-channel to get
aroun them.- 11N2
%ccoring to =<0hea, -.he +hoeni! program ha gotten to the point where the region o**ice was a manager<s
o**ice. 8illett was trying to coorinate pro#inces an istricts, an where we i run operations, it was in a
pro#ince where the +(=// was not oing much. 6e as senior o**icers i not theoretically coorinate with the
/(%<s pro#ince o**icer in charge@ that was the Cob o* the maCor at the +(=//.-
=ne such maCor at a +(=// in 19&2 was 0tan Aulcher, the +hoeni! coorinator in 9inh Dinh +ro#ince. -0tan
ha ta3en o#er all the programs,- =<0hea note. -,e was running the whole show. ,e 3ept ta3ing on e#erything,
incluing the +F", which was true in many cases.-
.he son o* an %ir Aorce o**icer, 0tan Aulcher was brought "p in #arious military posts aroun the worl, but he
brans as -hypocritical- the close society into which he was born. -.he military sees itsel* as the con5ueror o*
the worl- -- Aulcher sighe, -but the military is socialism in its purest *orm. +eople in the military lea a li*e o*
pri#ilege in which the state meets each an e#eryone o* their nees.- 11D2
,a#ing ser#e in the special security unit at /an .ho %ir 9ase in 19GL -- where he le a unit o* *orty ri*lemen
against the V/( -- Aulcher *ully unerstoo the realities o* Vietnam. ,e tol me o* the 8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice
3illing a >esuit priest who a#ocate lan re*orm, o* :V? o**icials traing with the ?ational )iberation Aront while
trying to estroy religious sects, an o* the tremenous ".0. cartels -- F8K-9F(, 0ealan, ,oliay (nns, +an
%m, 9echtel, an Vinnell -- that prospere *rom the war.
-.he military has the political power an the means o* prouction,- Aulcher e!plaine, -an so it enCoys all the
bene*its o* society .... 6ell, it was the same thing in Vietnam, where the ".0. military an a small number o*
politicians supporte the Vietnamese /atholic establishment against the masses .... :reey %mericans,- Aulcher
contene, -were the cause o* the war. .he supply sie economists -- these are the emergent groups uring
Vietnam.-
During a tour in )onon *rom 19GL to 19&1, in which he saw 9ritish businessmen traing with the ?orth
Vietnamese, Aulcher learne there are -no permanent allies.- During his tour in +hoeni!, he became totally
isenchante. -6hen ( arri#e in 0aigon,- he recalle, -an %ir %merica plane was waiting an too3 me to ?ha
191
.rang. .hat night ( tal3e with 8illett. .he ne!t ay ( got in a chopper an went to Jui ?hon, the capital city o*
9inh Dinh +ro#ince, where ( met the 0-two, :ary ,ac3er, who too3 me to my 5uarters in a hotel by the ocean.-
,ac3er then too3 Aulcher to meet the pro#ince senior a#iser, -a young political appointee who li#e in a
beauti*ul house on the ocean. 6hen ( wal3e into the room, he was staning there with his arms aroun two
Vietnamese girls. .he tops o* their ao ais were own, an he was cupping their breasts.-
?e!t, Aulcher met )arry >ac3son, the /(% pro#ince o**icer in 9inh Dinh. >ac3son ha -about twenty contract
wor3ers, "0(0 types who thought they were 0pecial Aorces. .hey all ha Vietnamese girl *riens an important
as. .hey were all somewhat erange an i nothing but play #olleyball all ay.- Aulcher escribe the
/=FD0 a#isory team as -a sie#e.-
%s the 9inh Dinh +ro#ince +hoeni! coorinator, 0tan Aulcher super#ise nearly a thousan ".0. technicians
an Vietnamese nationals, incluing a 0pecial Aorces sergeant who ran 9inh Dinh<s +F". .he +F" a#iser
reporte both to the /(% an to Aulcher. -,is Vietnamese wi*e ha been cut open,- Aulcher sai. -,e was a
angerous man who went out by himsel* an 3ille V/ le*t an right.- Aulcher mistruste the +F" because they
i not ta3e orers an because they playe him against the /(%.
Aulcher<s Vietnamese counterpart was 800 8aCor ?guyen Van Vinh. -.he Vietnamese with the 800,- Aulcher
contene, -were the worst. .hey 3ept trac3 o* what the %mericans were oing, they ha *riens in the V/(, an
they woul eal with +hoeni! be*ore the police.- .he ?ational +olice ha its own a#iser, -a *ormer cop *rom
Virginia who ran the Aiel +olice.- .he +(/ -was terribly isgusting,- an there was an interrogation center
behin the +ro#ince =perations /enter, Aulcher sai, -right behin the pro#ince senior a#iser<s house. =ur
barrac3s were ne!t oor.-
8r. Vinh was pai by Aulcher, who also ha an interpreter an se#en other Vietnamese on his +hoeni! sta**. -(
coul in*luence each one,- he state, noting that with no replacements coming in, the a#isory #acuum was
easily *ille by an aggressi#e person such as he. -%s more an more %mericans le*t,- Aulcher e!plaine, -more
Vietnamese came uner my control. .hey neee consoliation. .he structure was so corrupt, with e#eryone
power grabbing, that inepenent units couln<t o a Cob. %n that meant ae Cobs *or me.-
Aor e!ample, Aulcher inherite 9inh Dinh<s /i#ic %ction program -- incluing the *i*ty-nine-man FD teams --
which ha been getting one million ollars annually in ".0. ai. -.hen the well rie up, an *uns were cut o**,-
Aulcher e!plaine, -which cause much bitterness. )i3e the contras or, be*ore them, the /ubans. ;#eryone was
turning against the go#ernment.- %s the pro#ince psywar o**icer, Aulcher also controlle the Jui ?hon .V
station, where he spent one ay a wee3 wor3ing with the actors an sta**, organi4ing paraes, proucing
broacasts an puppet shows, printing lea*lets, an istributing raios tune in to the :V? station. %ccoring to
Aulcher, the embittere Vietnamese psywar o**icer abscone with the .V money an sol the raios on the
blac3 mar3et.
Aulcher also manage the /hieu ,oi program. During the spring o**ensi#e, he recalle, -6e ga#e them ri*les
an sent them up to the *ront lines .... ( sat on top o* a 3noll an watche while they threw own their guns an
ran away.-
.erritorial security was a Cob that in#ol#e -chec3ing #illages e#ery two wee3s *or a ay or so. .he .erritorial
Aorces,- he pointe out, -were a motley crew, mostly ol men an women an little 3is.- Aulcher also liaisone
with the Korean 6hite ,orse Di#ision, -which woul steal anything it coul get its hans on.- %ccoring to
Aulcher %mericans were in#ol#e with the Koreans in rug ealing, an he sai that the Koreans were -saistic
an corrupt.-
(n e!plaining the meaning o* +hoeni!, 0tan Aulcher sai, -Hou can<t unerstan it by creating a web. .here were
se#eral lines o* communication, which s3ippe echelons, an ( coul go to whate#er sie -- military or +hoeni! --
that ( wante to .... +hoeni! was more o* a political program, li3e what the :ermans ha on the eastern *ront --
:estapo/00, but hal* asse.- Aor that reason, Aulcher e!plaine, -.he regular military in<t li3e +hoeni!, an
the pro#ince senior a#isers 1+0%s2 hate it, too.
-.wice a wee3 (< brie* the +0% at the .=/ 1tactical operations center2. ;ach member o* the pro#ince team
woul brie* through his eputy ..he operations o**icer was the main guy, then the :-two, then +hoeni!, +F" an
the /(% rep. .he +ro#ince +hung ,oang /ommittee met twice a month, at which point the 800 woul e!ercise
whate#er in*luence it ha with the pro#ince chie*, who< say, <6e nee *i*ty V/( this wee3.< .hen the 0pecial
9ranch woul go out an get ol laies an little 3is an ta3e them to the +(/. .hey< sen us on special
operations missions into the hamlets, an the #illage chie*s woul ta3e the ol an maime an gi#e them to us
as V/(. <(* you on<t gi#e me rice, you<re V/(.< (t was per#erte.
-.he %FV? supplie us with cars on e#eryone they in<t li3e,- Aulcher went on, -but we coul ne#er *in them.
=n night operations uring cur*ew hours, we< seal o** the e!its an go a*ter a speci*ic guy. 6e< be running
192
through houses, one guy li*ting up a lamp, another guy holing pictures o* the suspect an ta3ing *ingerprints.
9ut e#eryone ha the same name, so we< search *or weapons, maps, ocuments. (t was Cust impossible- --
Aulcher sighe -- -so a*ter two months ( starte to *in ways to let people go-to get their names o** the list. H="
see, 9inh Dinh ha something li3e thirty-se#en political parties, an no one coul say who was V/. 9y 19&2
most istrict chie*s were ?)A, an e#en though they were appointe by 0aigon, most were *rom the ?orth an
were 3ept o** hit lists ue to *rienships.-
6hat *inally con#ince Aulcher to wor3 against +hoeni! was the -isappearing- o* thirty thousan ci#ilians in the
a*termath o* the spring o**ensi#e. Foc3ing bac3 an *orth in his chair, his hea burie in his hans, sobbing,
Aulcher escribe what happene: -.wo ?V% regiments hit 9inh Dinh in the north, mainly at ,oi %n. 6e went
through a pass in the #alley to meet them, but a whole %FV? regiment was estroye. Aour hunre were 3ille
an si!teen hunre escape own ,ighway .hirty-one. ( coul see the %FV? soliers running away an the
?V% soliers running a*ter them, shooting them in the bac3 o* their heas with pistols so as not to waste
ammunition .... ( coul see our helicopters being shot own ....6e calle in close air support an long-range
artillery an stoppe them at +hu 8i. .here were pitche battles. .he ?V% attac3e on two riges. .hen 1((
/orps /ommaner >ohn2 Vann was 3ille up in Kontum, an 10pecial Aorces /olonel 8ichael2 ,ealy too3 o#er.
,ealy came in with his 0hermanes5ue tactics in %ugust. -
.he isappearance o* the thirty thousan occurre o#er a two-month perio beginning in >une, Aulcher sai,
-mainly through rounups li3e in the "3raine. .he 800 was putting people in camps aroun )ane Aiel outsie
Jui ?hon' or in the +(/. ;#eryone was turning against the :V?, an anyone born in 9inh Dinh was consiere
V/. There %ere M+ 4ais b+ the score -- *rom aerial bombarments an artillery +hoeni! coorinate it. 8e an
>ac3son an *our or *i#e o* his contractors. .he ?ational +olice ha lists o* people. =ut o* the thirty thousan,
the 0pecial 9ranch was intereste in particular in about a hunre. .he 800 put e#eryone else in camps, an
the Vietnamese %ir Aorce loae them up, *lew away, an came bac3 empty. .hey umpe whole *amilies into
the :ul* o* .on3in. .his was not happening elsewhere.-
,ow coul this happenB -Hou<re a shaow,- Aulcher e!plaine, his *ace contorte with anguish. -Hou<re a
bureaucrat. Hou only thin3 things, so you on<t in#estigate.-
8ter the isappearances, Aulcher complaine to a 0tate Department o**icer. %s a result, two things happene.
Airst, in aition to his Cob as pro#ince +hoeni! coorinator' Aulcher was mae senior a#iser in the three
istricts -- ,oi %n, ,oi ?an, an 9inh Khe -- that the ?V% ha sei4e. ?e!t, an attempt was mae on his li*e.
->ac3son was unhappy with the +F",- Aulcher e!plaine. -,e couln<t pay them anymore' so they mo#e in
with 9inh Khe istrict team. ( was scheule to go up there to pay them 1*rom the (ntelligence /ontingency
Aun2, but a 6est +ointer, 8aCor +elton, the +hoeni! guy *rom +hu /at, went instea. %n the +F" shot him in
the helicopter right a*ter it lane. +eltbn was 3ille, an the +hu /at istrict senior a#iser, /olonel Fose, was
woune. .he incient was blame on the V/, but 8r. Vinh an ( went to the laning 4one an *oun 0weish K
rouns $which only the +F" use' in the chopper. Airst ( went to 1the +0%2, then 8illett at ?ha .rang, then ,ealy
in +lei3u. 9ut nothing e#er happene.-
(n e!plaining how such tensions might occur, /onnie =<0hea $who replace )ew 8illett as (( /orps +hoeni!
coorinator in %ugust 19&2' points to the inclusion o* 3ey military leaers as well as ci#ilians in the e*inition o*
V/(. -Vann put pressure on to get these guys,- =<0hea e!plaine, -but 0pecial 9ranch woul not gi#e their
names *or security reasons .... %n as a result ... military a#isers starte going a*ter the commo-liaison lin3s --
those V/( that were more military than political. %n when you got #ery strong personalities li3e 0tan Aulcher in
there, that situation became e!plosi#e, 0tan wante access, an his solution,- =<0hea sai, -was to *orce it bac3
up to Vann or ,ealy, who woul say, <( can<t *orce them to open up *iles.< 0o it was 3ept at the local le#el, where
it went bac3 an *orth between 0tan an >ac3son. %n ( ha to go own there an try to meiate between them.
9ut we Cust ha to accept that this was not the perio o* time to be arguing with the /(% that to run an e**ecti#e
+(=//, we ha to ha#e their ossiers. .he time to o that was *our years prior. 9ut 0tan was insisting ... that he
was going to get at them. 6ell, the /(% woul gi#e other stu** -- Fe#olutionary De#elopment or /ensus
:rie#ance -- but not 0pecial 9ranch.-
6hen as3e why he an 8illett coul not e!ert in*luence, =<0hea replie, -.his is why +hoeni! was not as
e**ecti#e as it shoul ha#e been.-
777
(n 8arch 19&2 %mbassaor 9un3er sent a telegram $0D0G11M' to the 0tate Department saying, -6e 5uestion
whether the "0: shoul concee *ailure o* an %n .ri system to meet test o* %rticle N.- 9ecause he thought that
%n .ri probably i #iolate the :ene#a /on#entions, 9un3er as3e that a ecision be put o** until completion o*
a stuy written by /=FD0 legal a#iser Fay 8eyers. (n the stuy, entitle -%n .ri =bser#ations an
Fecommenations,- 8eyers suggeste, among other things, opening %n .ri hearings to the public. =n %pril 11,
193
>ohn .ilton a#ise against oing that, saying it woul -result in the compromise o* sources .... "ner ;!ecuti#e
=rer 10DG0,- .ilton wrote, -the %merican public is not allowe to atten ".0. aministrati#e security
proceeings nor are transcripts o* the proceeings releasable to the public. (t is i**icult to Custi*y why a nation
which is seriously threatene by internal sub#ersion shoul institute a proceure that is not e#en allowe in a
nation which has no such threat.- 11E2
.ilton<s recommenation on this point was accepte.
8eyers also note that -the great maCority o* the Vietnamese people are completely ignorant o* the purposes,
proceures an results o* either +hung ,oang or %n .ri.- .ilton retorte that that was -a subCecti#e statement ...
an coul cause a reaer with little bac3groun ... to reach the erroneous conclusion that the programs are
pretty much o* a *ailure.- .ilton recommene that -many- be substitute *or -great maCority.- 11G2 .hat
suggestion, too, was implemente.
=n %pril 12, the /=FD0 +ublic 0a*ety Directorate ae its two cents, calling %n .ri -a rela!ation o* the FV?<s
right o* sel*-e*ense an ... a gratuity.- .he embassy recommene -that etentions base on a charge o*
belonging to or supporting the V/( 1a crime o* status2 be eliminate on a pro#ince by pro#ince basis o#er a
perio o* years to eliminate graually the whole %n .ri structure instea o* institutionali4ing it by trans*erring
Curisiction o#er V/( *rom the pro#ince security committees to the courts.- 11&2 ,owe#er, .ilton a#ise against
the pro#ince-by-pro#ince phase-out, an his position, again, was accepte.
Aace with intractable /(% internal security consierations, the embassy ecie to e*er re*orm o* %n .ri
ine*initely. 9ut it i not want to appear to be sanctioning summary e!ecutions either, so embassy political
o**icer 0te#en 6inship emphasi4e that -the mission recogni4es this to be a serious problem, particularly when
e!cessi#e legalism or consieration o* public relations are 1sic2 introuce tempting the police to neutrali4e by
3illing instea o* arrest an prosecution.- 11L2 (t was suggeste that the computer system at the ?ational (entity
an Fecors /enter -be supporte an that some pro#ision be mae *or the re#iew o* cases where V/(
suspects were release by the +ro#ince 0ecurity /ommittees.- .he iea was to set up a central control that
woul pre#ent abuses at the local le#el an woul allow the :V? to mar3et pre#enti#e etention as a -substitute
*or 3illing people.-
.he result was that %n .ri was to be re*orme into a system not o* -sentencing- but o* ine*inite -etention- with
perioic re#iew by the /entral 0ecurity /ommittee. (t was to apply only to /ommunists. .his system was to be a
-temporary- measure, which -o**ers possibilities *or a#oiing possible criticism uner the terms o* the :ene#a
/on#ention.- %rticle 19 o* Decree )aw 00D o* 19GG was amene to -preclue charges that the system #iolates
%rticle & $2' o* the FV? /onstitution,- an 9un3er put the ".0. seal o* appro#al on %n .ri.
6hile the subCect o* %n .ri was being ebate in 0aigon, (V /orps /ommaner .ruong in /an .ho authori4e,
on %pril 21, 19&2, a -special- AG +hung ,oang campaign esigne to neutrali4e the V/( by mo#ing against
suspects with only one a#erse report on the recor. % response to the ;aster o**ensi#e, the AG campaign was
starte in /hau Doc +ro#ince on the initiati#e o* the pro#ince chie*, who was concerne with reports that ?V %
units were being guie an assiste by the V/(. 8ore than a thousan V/( suspects were 5uic3ly roune up.
Alying as it i in the *ace o* %n .ri re*orms, AG was the cause o* some concern. -8ission is aware o* potential
pit*alls in special +hung ,oang campaign an possibilities o* a#erse publicity i* campaign use *or mass roun-
ups o* suspects,- wrote %mbassaor 9un3er. 1192
777
% hunre twenty-*i#e +hoeni! a#isers were le*t in Vietnam in =ctober 19&2, when a tentati#e agreement was
reache calling *or the *ormation o* a ?ational /ouncil *or Feconciliation an /oncor compose o*
representati#es *rom the :V?, ?)A, an .hir Aorce neutralists. =n =ctober 2D, +resient .hieu presente
si!ty-nine amenments to the agreement an, stating that the V/( -must be wipe out 5uic3ly an mercilessly,-
orere a new wa#e o* arrests. =n ?o#ember 2E, 19&2, three wee3s a*ter Fichar ?i!on was reelecte, .hieu
signe Decree )aw 020, -/oncerning ?ational 0ecurity an +ublic =rer.- (ssue in secret, 020 moi*ie %n .ri
to the e!tent, %mbassaor 9un3er wrote, -that these powers are no longer limite to wartime an may be
applie *ollowing a cease*ire an the en o* an o**icially eclare state o* war. .he e#ient purpose o* the law is
to pro#ie *or an e!tension o* %n .ri proceures in preparation *or a cease*ire con*rontation with the
/ommunists.- 1202
9roaening %n .ri to inclue people eeme angerous to -public orer,- 9un3er wrote, -means that #irtually
any person arreste in 0outh Vietnam can now be hel on criminal instea o* political charges.-
194
.he -public orer- pro#ision was inclue in Decree )aw 020 precisely because the cease-*ire agreement
prohibite the incarceration o* political prisoners. %ccoring to Decree )aw 020, /ommunist o**eners alreay in
Cail uner the %n .ri )aws woul also ha#e their sentences automatically e!tene. )i3ewise, +ro#ince 0ecurity
/ommittees were irecte to e!ten automatically the etention o* categories % an 9 V/( until the en o* the
-present emergency,- which i not en with the cease-*ire.
%s a result o* Decree )aw 020, thousans o* Vietnamese remaine incarcerate until %pril 19&E. =n December
1L, 19&2, ?ewswee3 estimate that there were *orty-*i#e thousan -o**icial- prisoners in Vietnamese prisons an
another hunre thousan in etention camps. %mnesty (nternational reporte at least two hunre thousan
political prisoners, an other obser#ers cite higher estimates. .he " .0. ;mbassy ienti*ie on its computer
tapes *ewer than ten thousan political prisoners an calle the criticism un*oune in light o* %n .ri re*orms. (n
0aigon, three thousan people were arreste in one night. .he cost o* ha#ing an enemy<s name place on a
+hoeni! hit list, now easier than e#er, than3s to Decree 020, was reuce to si! ollars.
(n December 19&2 cease-*ire tal3s collapse, an ?i!on bombe ,anoi. .hieu calle *or a return to the
enunciation o* /ommunists campaign o* 19EG an orere his security o**icers to target neutralists in the
?ational /ouncil o* Feconciliation an /oncor. 6ith Decree )aw 020 sa*ely in place, +rime 8inister Khiem
cancele the AG campaign an orere a return to the three-source rule. -,owe#er,- wrote 9un3er, -there is
some e#ience that the ?ational +olice o not regar the orer as terminating the accelerate +hung ,oang
campaign.- 1212
9y 19&N 0outh Vietnam ha come *ull circle. =nly the names ha change. ;mpowere by secret ecrees
written by /(% o**icers, security *orces now arreste issients *or #iolating the -public orer- instea o* the
-national security.- (n 8arch 19&2 +rime 8inister Khiem etermine that -it is important not to get hung up on
the term +hung ,oang .... .he problem that the +hung ,oang structure was erecte to aress will still
remain ...with or without the term.- 1222 (n a report on +hoeni!, -+hung ,oang ;**ecti#eness During %ugust an
0eptember 19&2,- >ohn .ilton crosse out the wors -<+hung ,oang- an inserte in their place the term -%nti
.errorist,- e!plicitly heraling the moern era o* low-intensity war*are.
(n ?ha .rang in December 19&2, /onnie =<0hea trans*erre the recors an e5uipment in the region +hung
,oang o**ice to the +ublic 0a*ety a#iser, -who in<t want them. .hen ( turne o** the lights,- he sai, -loc3e
the oor, wal3e across the street to the /=FD0 builing, an turne in the 3ey.-
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. +hong was 3ille with *i#e boyguars an a#isers 6illiam 9ailey an )uther 8c)enon in a plane that
e!ploe on the groun on December 1, 19&2, in .uy ,oa, the capital o* +hu Hen +ro#ince.
ii. ?ew .imes is an ;nglish-language #ersion o* ?o#e Vremya, which is publishe in 8oscow an istribute in
#arious countries.
!HAPTER E9: Phoeni5 in /la)es
%*ter the cease-*ire agreements were signe in +aris on >anuary 2&, 19&N, the arme *orces an go#ernment o*
0outh Vietnam were e!pecte to stan on their own. .o meet the challenge, :eneral Khiem signe /ircular 19N,
creating political struggle committees in e#ery pro#ince, city, istrict, an #illage. +olitical struggle committees
were escribe by Ken Juinn, a 0tate Department o**icer in /hau Doc +ro#ince, in a Aebruary 2D, 19&N, memo,
as the -principal #ehicle *or organi4ing anti-/ommunist emonstrations- an *or .combating -the /ommunist plot
*or a :eneral "prising.- ;ach struggle committee<s subcommittee *or security an intelligence was gi#en
Curisiction o#er the e!isting +hung ,oang /ommittee. 9ut, obser#e Juinn, -unless more speci*ic instructions
are *orthcoming, e#en those #illage o**icials who unerstan why they are part o* the committee will not
unerstan what they are suppose to o.-
.o ensure that go#ernment o**icials *ollowe the party line, the :V? through its Juyet .am campaign put an
o**icer in each #illage as its special political war*are care. % member o* .hieu<s Dan /hu party, the care put in
place agents who organi4e networ3s in the hamlets to spy on local :V? o**icials as well as /ommunists an
issients.
=n the %merican sie o* the *ence, uner the terms o* the cease-*ire agreements, 8%/V was replace by a
De*ense %ttachP =**ice $D%=' in the ".0. ;mbassy. .he D%= consiste o* some *our hunre ci#ilian De*ense
195
Department employees, *i*ty military o**icers, an twenty-*i#e hunre contract wor3ers. /olonel Doug Dillar,
who in 19&N commane the E00th 8ilitary (ntelligence :roup an manage all ". 0. military intelligence
acti#ities in 0outheast %sia, recalle -.he Ai#e ,unreth 8(:, uner =peration Aast +ass, recei#e primary
responsibility *or intelligence support to the embassy in 0aigon uring the remainer o* the .0. presence. .he
other ser#ices bowe out, but the %rmy, #ia :eneral %le!aner ,aig, agree to pro#ie the people.- 112
%ccoring to Dillar, <<as part o* the in-country structure, there was a pro#ince obser#er in each pro#ince as
liaison with the 800 an 0pecial 9ranch, in coorination with +hoeni! uner the ".0. ;mbassy. 9ut they in<t
wor3 at pro#ince, really. .hey wor3e as liaison with the 0outh Vietnamese %rmy, ?a#y, %ir Aorce, an :eneral
0ta**, because ".0. ?a#y an %ir Aorce intelligence ha phase own an only the Ai#e ,unreth pro#ie
support a*ter the rawown.
-.here were se#eral pro#ince obser#ers on the Ai#e ,unreth<s payroll,- Dillar continue, -in a ci#ilian
capacity.- 8any o* them ha ser#e in Vietnam be*ore, as liaison o**icers or +hoeni! coorinators. 9ut, Dillar
ae, their *unction was o*ten so tightly controlle by pro#ince 0tate Department representati#es, who were
-#ery Cealous o* their prerogati#es ... an in<t want that billet *ille ..., that they contribute #ery little an the
program ne#er got o** the groun.-
=ther pro#ince obser#ers were oing more than merely training an reporting on 0outh Vietnamese units.
%ccoring to +F" a#iser >ac3 ,arrell, his counterpart, .ran %hn .ho, went to wor3 *or +ro#ince =bser#er
Da#i =rr $*ormerly the /(%<s paramilitary a#iser in 9inh Dinh +ro#ince' in 19&N as a principal agent organi4ing
stay-behin nets. (n -Arom the %shes- >e** 0tein writes that -the prime mission o* intelligence agencies is to set-
up stay behin operations in the e#ent a truce oes actually go into e**ect.- 122 ?oting that the *ocus was on
political reporting, 0tein goes on: -%merican case o**icers are meeting *re5uently with their agents now an
e#eloping alternati#e means o* communication so that when the o**icers are remo#e to such areas as
9ang3o3 or +hnom +enh or e#en .o3yo or the "nite 0tates, they can maintain communication with their
agents an irect them towar political personnel, the V/(. 0o that ... the operations woul be able to continue
ine*initely -- whether there was one %merican in Vietnam or not.-
%s ci#ilians, pro#ince obser#ers were o*ten isguise as employees o* pri#ate companies, li3e the /omputer
0cience /orporation, on contract to the +entagon. (n a ?o#ember 19&2 article in .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, Ao!
9utter*iel wrote that <<as many as 10,000 %merican ci#ilian a#isers an technicians, most o* them uner D=D
1De*ense Department2 contract, will stay on in Vietnam a*ter the cease*ire.- %mong those staying behin through
a loophole in %rticle E o* the cease-*ire agreements were a number o* +ublic 0a*ety a#isers *rom >apan, (srael,
.aiwan, an %ustralia, as well as *rom %merica. (n *act, the last two %rmy o**icers at the +hoeni! Directorate --
/olonel Fichar /arey an )ieutenant /olonel Keith =gen -- complete their tours as +ublic 0a*ety a#isers.
=ther people, li3e ; 9ray, hire on with the 0tate Department<s Feconstruction an Fesettlement Directorate
or as part o* 0%AA= $the special assistant *or *iel operations', which replace /=FD0 an was manage by
:eorge >acobson.
0e#eral hunre /(% o**icers also remaine in Vietnam beyon the cease- *ire. %mong them was :eorge
Arench, who as the o**icer in charge o* propagana broacasts into ?orth Vietnam manage the /on .e (slan
comple! near ,ue until 19&D. Aran3 0nepp continue to interrogate prisoners at the ?ational (nterrogation
/enter. Fobert .hompson returne as an a#iser to the ?ational +olice, an .e 0erong returne as an a#iser
to the >oint :eneral 0ta**.
.he allie strategy was simple. Aor the *irst hal* o* 19&N ,enry Kissinger relie on massi#e 9-E2 rais into
/amboia as a way o* turning ,anoi<s attention away *rom 0outh Vietnam. 9ut then /ongress cut o** *uns *or
*urther bombing, an Kissinger an .hieu again turne to +hoeni! an a renewe roun o* political repression.
=n 8ay 1E, 19&N, 0tate Department o**icer Aran3 6isner sent a memo *rom /an .ho to 6ashington, subCect
-+hoeni! :oes "nergroun.- -%*ter a two month respite, the +hoeni! program is 5uietly coming bac3 to li*e,-
6isner notes, aing, -+hoeni! acti#ities ha#e been generally restraine since the cease*ire, partly because
they #iolate article 10 o* the +aris agreement, an partly because the wor3ing le#el *orces ... lac3e the 4eal to
pursue their ris3y business- $author<s emphasis'.
-Aor a time 1elete2 trie to continue the program uner co#er o* changing the names o* the targets *rom V/( to
<isturbers o* omestic tran5uility,<- 6isner continues. ?oting that that prete!t ha been roppe, he writes:
-0aigon ha instructe all pro#ince +hung ,oang $+hoeni!' /ommittees to ouble the number o* monthly
operations against V/( without the *an*are an publicity that it use to recei#e. .he :V? has assigne it high
priority.-
Aurther bolstering the attac3 against the V/( an the .hir Aorce was +rime 8inisterial Decree 090 o* 8ay 12,
19&N, which authori4e etention *or up to two years an en*orce resience in their homes, con*iscation o* their
196
property, an/or banishment *rom prohibite areas o* persons eeme angerous to ?ational 0ecurity or +ublic
=rer. +ro#ince security committees e!amine cases, which were re#iewe by the /entral 0ecurity /ommittee
in 0aigon. .he prime minister issue the *inal ecision.
=n 8ay 19, 19&N, Decree 09N moi*ie Decree 090 to the e!tent that the irector o* military Custice was gi#en a
seat on the /entral 0ecurity /ommittee, which then inclue the minister o* the interior@ prosecutor general o*
the 0aigon /ourt o* %ppeals@ irector general o* the ?ational +olice@ irector o* military Custice@ irector o*
political security an his chie* o* statistics an recors@ the chie* o* the +enitentiary Directorate@ an their
%merican counterparts.
(n >une 19&N 0tate Department o**icer Dean 9rown in*orme the 0tate Department that the ( /orps 0pecial
9ranch liaison o**icer ha reporte that Da ?ang 8ayor )e .ri .in ha -orere the cessation o* all o#ert +hung
,oang $+hoeni!' acti#ities. ?o more *iles an corresponence will be maintaine,- he ae, -an most
in*ormation will be passe by wor o* mouth. <0ecurity 0uspects< will still be pursue, but 5uietly. )iaison o**icer
was tol that this action was ta3en because o* the possibility o* (//0 $(nternational /ommission o* /ontrol an
0uper#ision' inspection *or cease*ire #iolations.- 1N2
(n >uly 19&N, with the cessation o* bombing in /amboia, .hieu, in #iolation o* the cease-*ire agreements,
orere se#eral large search an estroy operations along the borer. .he ?orth Vietnamese counterattac3e,
o#er-running %FV? outposts in Juang Duc +ro#ince on ?o#ember G. Declaring that the war ha begun anew,
.hieu re5ueste %merican military ai. 9ut the #ery ne!t ay /ongress passe the 6ar +owers %ct, restricting
the +resient<s ability to initiate hostilities against *oreign countries. /ongress began cutting bac3 ai, an the
0outh Vietnamese economy began to *i44le. 8ore an more the Vietnamese turne to corruption an rug
ealing to maintain the stanar o* li#ing they ha 3nown uner %merican patronage. %ccoring to /(% o**icer
9ruce )awlor, the isease was contagious.
% Vietnamese linguist, 9ruce )awlor in early 19&2 was assigne to the counterintelligence section o* the /(%<s
Da ?ang region o**ice. )awlor wor3e at that Cob through the ;aster o**ensi#e, uring which time he e#elope a
*rienship with +atty )oomis. (n the summer o* 19&2, when )oomis was mae the region +F" a#iser, )awlor
replace him as the Juang ?am pro#ince o**icer in charge. 9y then the +F" ha been rename 0pecial
Feconnaissance "nits an, )awlor recalle, -ha become an aCunct uty o* the 0pecial 9ranch a#iser in each
pro#ince.- 1D2 .he /(% *unnele +F" salaries in ( /orps through the 0pecial 9ranch to the region +F"
commaner, 8aCor Vinh, who then ole it out to the pro#ince +F" chie*s.
%s Fob 0immons ha one in Juang ?gai, )awlor an )oomis create in Juang ?am, with 0pecial 9ranch
/aptain )am 8inh 0on, a 0pecial (ntelligence Aorce "nit. -)am recogni4e that his own people coul not run
paramilitary operations in rural #illages,- )awlor e!plaine. -0o we traine a unit o* 0pecial 9ranch guys -- taught
them in*antry *ormations -- so when the +F" came uner the operational control o* 0pecial 9ranch in the
pro#ince a*ter the cease-*ire,- )am coul utili4e them *or paramilitary *unctions immeiately.
+rior to the cease-*ire, )awlor<s -easy, stripe pants- Cob as 0pecial .9ranch a#iser amounte to coorinating
with /aptain )am an getting reports *rom the ,oi %n +ro#ince (nterrogation /enter. ,e ha no ealings with
the ".0. military or the pro#ince senior a#iser an -rarely acte on +hoeni! in*ormation -- Cust +F" an
unilateral sources. .here was little 0pecial 9ranch input, because no one tal3e to anyone.-
%ccoring to )awlor, as the ;aster o**ensi#e taile o**, the ?orth Vietnamese concentrate on repairing their
in*iltration routes in preparation *or the ne!t o**ensi#e. .hen came the cease-*ire, at which point each #illage an
hamlet ienti*ie itsel* as either :V? or V/-controlle, an, )awlor recalle, -all o* a suen there was a lot o*
business. 9ecause as soon as someone put a V/ *lag on their roo*, they<re gone. ?ot in the sense that they
were 3ille, but we coul pic3 them up an interrogate them. %n we basically were *looe.-
(t was also a*ter the cease-*ire, accoring to )awlor, that the -country club set- too3 o#er. .om Alores $a protege
o* .om +olgar<s' replace %l 0eal as ( /orps region o**icer in charge. Alores brought in his own eputy an chie*
o* operations, an the entire /(% contingent mo#e into the Da ?ang /onsulate uner 0tate Department co#er.
)awlor escribe Alores as -a #ery senior o**icer on his last tour- whose obCecti#e -was to li#e well, not roc3 the
boat, an ta3e a#antage o* the amenities that were reaily a#ailable.- .hat attitue was pre#alent. Aor e!ample,
)awlor says, the +ublic 0a*ety a#iser -was one o* the guys who use to set up the 1Aiel +olice2 sha3eowns o*
merchants .... ,e came out o* that war wealthier than you or ( will e#er be. 9ut you can<t pro#e it.- 8oreo#er,
when )awlor brought the matter to the attention o* his bosses, he was tol, -Don<t bother me,- or as3e, -6hat
o you want me to oB-
;#en some pro#ince obser#ers were Cust along *or the rie. -.he 0pecial 9ranch liaison in ,ue became the .hua
.hien pro#ince obser#er,- )awlor recalle. -,e ha been a retire cop, an he li3e the goo li*e. 9ut he ha no
197
enthusiasm. ,e thought it was a Co3e. ,e wante to stay o#er there when his contract was up, so he became the
pro#ince obser#er. ,e liaise.-
/ontributing to the ecline in morale a*ter the cease-*ire was the *act that the 0pecial (ntelligence Aorce "nits
were isbane an the +F" were place uner the ?ational +olice /omman within the 0pecial 9ranch. -.his
cause many problems,- )awlor e!plaine. -6e starte seeing more ghost soliers, more e!tortion, more
protection money. 6e couln<t pay them at all, so we lost control.- .he +F" ha the same mission, an they
maintaine their intelligence agents in *iel, -but because the /(% a#iser was no longer a participant, there
were less operations an more e!cuses *or not going.- (nstea, )awlor trie to maintain control by pro#iing
-gee whi4- gagets li3e ",-1 ?ight ,aw3 helicopters with miniguns an spotlights an by being able to get
woune +F" into the hospital in Da ?ang.
-+hoeni! coorination,- accoring to )awlor, -was ea. .here was nothing le*t. .he Vietnamese ga#e it lip
ser#ice, but there was no coorination with the 0pecial +olice. 6hen the 800 an 0pecial 9ranch got together,
they trie to ta3e away rather than share in*ormation.- %n once the 0pecial 9ranch ha begun paying +F"
teams at pro#ince le#el, -8aCor Vinh got concerne. ?ow he has to answer to 0aigon. ,e has to gi#e them a cut.
.hat resulte in Vinh cheating someboy out o* his cut, an that *racture what ha been a uni*ie unit.-
Vinh began putting the s5uee4e on the Juang ?am +F" chie*, +han Van )iem, who in turn began changing
money *or the V/. ;#entually one o* the Juang ?am +F" team, a man name Juyen, came to )awlor an
sai, -(t<s getting out o* han.- ;#er the iealist, )awlor in#estigate. ,e wal3e into the ,oi %n +(/ an saw a
woman -- who 3new about )iem<s irty ealings -- stretche o#er a table. 0he ha been rape an murere.
0ai )awlor: -%ll o* a suen 8r. Vinh wants me to go on a mission with him, an other +F" guys are telling me,
<Don<t go.<-
0o it was that the +F" program e#ol#e into a criminal enterprise, li3e Aran3enstein<s monster, beyon the
control o* its creators.
777
6ith the cease-*ire an the en o* %merican subsii4ation o* +hoeni!, +V. an the Da ?ang +hoeni!
/ommittee ha mo#e into the Da ?ang police station. .hroughout 19&N +V. i#ie his time oing +hoeni!
an rug in#estigations 1i2 -- manage by the %ir %merica ispatcher at the Da ?ang %ir 9ase-*or the /(%. %s
+V. isco#ere, the maCor rug ealers were the Vietnamese police o**icer in charge o* narcotics in#estigation
in Da ?ang an his %merican +ublic 0a*ety a#iser.
.he last straw *or 9ruce )awlor occurre Cust be*ore the en o* his tour in ?o#ember 19&N. ,a#ing wor3e in Da
?ang<s counterintelligence o**ice, )awlor 3new that an ?V% spy ring still e!iste in the area an that the 0pecial
9ranch ha merely sacri*ice a number o* low-le#el care in 19&1 instea o* actually *lushing out the most
important spies. %ccoring to )awlor, -(t was a great eception operation. .he high-le#el people continue to
operate.- (n *act, one o* the agents was the girl*rien o* .om Alores<s operations chie*. 6hen )awlor reporte
this to Alores, Alores i nothing but accuse )awlor o* ha#ing -gone nati#e.- )awlor slippe a copy o* his report
to the station<s security chie* in 0aigon. .he operations o**icer was sent home, a new operations chie* arri#e,
an 9ruce )awlor ran a*oul o* the 0aigon station. 0ecurity teams #isite his o**ice, con*iscate his *urniture, an
presente him with a tic3et bac3 home.
-%*ter that ( became isillusione,- )awlor con*esse. ,e complete his tour an returne to )angley
hea5uarters, where .e 0hac3ley -- then chie* o* the Aar ;ast Di#ision -- o**ere to accept his resignation.
)awlor was embittere. -.he agency betraye us,- he sai. -.o go a*ter the V/(, we ha to belie#e it was o3ay.
9ut we were too young to unerstan what happens when iealism crac3s up against reality. 6e ris3e our li#es
to get in*ormation on the V/(, in*ormation we were tol the +resient was going to rea. .hen guys who in<t
care ga#e it to superiors more intereste in boo4e an broas.-
$+ostscript: (n 19LD, when he ran *or state attorney general in Vermont, )awlor<s opponents unco#ere his
participation in +hoeni! operations an accuse him o* ha#ing committe war crimes. ,e lost the election. 6hen
6illiam /olby hear about the smear campaign, he o**ere his support. )awlor was summone to )angley an
inter#iewe by Fuy ;ners, then chie* o* the 0pecial =perations Di#ision. Despite his willingness to return to
the *ol an go to wor3 *or the /(% in /entral %merica, etails o* the Da ?ang incient sur*ace uring the
inter#iew, an )awlor was not calle bac3.'
777
198
9y the en o* 19&N the cease-*ire, li3e paci*ication, was a thing o* the past. .he /hieu ,oi rate plummete an,
with rastic cuts in ".0. ai, :V? o**icials who ha epene on %merican ai to maintain their pri#ate empires
sought their own separate peace with the encroaching /ommunists. %FV? morale eteriorate as paychec3s
were i#erte into commaners< poc3ets. "npai .erritorial 0ecurity *orces an arme propagana teams
re#erte to their pre-+hoeni! ways, li3e the /i#il :uar o* ol, spening most o* their time guaring /hieu ,oi
centers an the homes an o**ices o* go#ernment o**icials.
%t the time ; 9ray was wor3ing *or the /omputer 0cience /orporation, which ha contracte with the
Directorate o* +olitical 0ecurity to stuy the -aministrati#e an Cuicial aspects o* the %n .ri )aws.- 0ai 9ray,
who was inter#iewing Vietcong prisoners at /on 0on: -( wrote a lot about how people, i* they weren<t V/ when
they were sent to /on 0on, were V/ when they came out. (t was a great training center ... the people they
recruite were mae into someboy.- 1G2
9ray tol o* one V/( who ha been chaine to the *loor in solitary con*inement *or re*using to salute the *lag.
,e tol 9ray, -(<m not 0outh Vietnamese. (<m a V/ solier, an it woul be a breach o* iscipline *or me to
salute the *lag o* my enemy. (<ll ne#er say yes.- 9ray pointe out: -,e 3new what he was an what he belie#e
in, an he was an e!ample to the rest o* the camp.- +unishing him *or stic3ing to his principles, 9ray asserte,
-was goo *or the morale o* all the other prisoners. (t was a matter o* principle to the V/, but it was Cust a power
struggle, li3e between a parent an a chil, *or the 0outh Vietnamese. .hat<s what it was all about. ?one o* the
propagana mattere. .he V/ ha principles. .he :V? was corrupt.-
(n 19&D, writes +ro*essor ,uy, -/orruption, alreay establishe as a principle o* go#ernment by .hieu, Khiem
an Vien, now was e#ouring the social tissue as a growing cancer.- 1&2 "n*ortunately, the battle against
corruption opene the way *or the *inal /ommunist o**ensi#e.
.he push *or genuine re*orm, as the only way to win the political struggle, came *rom the /atholics an began
a*ter .hieu ha #isite the Vatican an the pope amonishe him *or pac3ing the Cails with political prisoners.
/oncerne that a .hir Aorce coalition o* 9uhists an /ommunists woul e!clue them *rom any position o*
power in a post .hieu Vietnam, the /atholics use anticorruption as a prete!t to mobili4e public opinion against
.hieu in >uly 19&D. .he mo#ement was le, ironically, by Aather .ran ,uu .hanh, author o* the Vietnamese
#ersion o* personalism, 1ii2 which ha brought the ?go regime #ia the /an )ao party to power in 19ED.
%t the same time that opposition was builing against .hieu, hearings to impeach +resient Fichar ?i!on were
getting uner way in the ".0. /ongress. .he issues were similar. %s a result o* the 6atergate incient,
/ongress was concerne that ?i!on was using intelligence an security *orces to suppress his political
opponents. .here was also the matter o* his ha#ing accepte illegal campaign contributions an the bombing o*
/amboia an )aos. )i3ewise, on >uly 1&, 19&D, /ongressman =tis +i3e con#ene hearings *or the purpose o*
in#estigating the /(%<s role in the 6atergate brea3-in, the isin*ormation campaign to compromise an iscreit
Daniel ;llsberg, an other illegal acti#ities the /(% was conucting worlwie.
9ac3 in 0aigon, the /atholics, arme with ocuments showing .hieu<s o#erseas real estate holings, mounte
massi#e emonstrations in >uly@ by %ugust the capital was in turmoil. =n %ugust 1L, 19&D, the ay ?i!on
announce his plans to resign, Da#i 0hipler wrote an article *or .he ?ew Hor3 .imes healine 0%(:=?
+=)(/; A(:,. 0"9V;F0(=? 9". %)0= /"F9 +=)(.(/%) D(00;?.. 0ai 0hipler, -1.2hose caught in the
web o* arrest, torture an imprisonment inclue not only /ommunists ... but non- /ommunist issients ...
apolitical peasants ... an writers who ha#e simply oppose "nite 0tates policy an calle *or peace.- 0hipler
calle the wa#e o* political repression -a silent hien war that runs its course out o* the public #iew.-
+hoeni! ha gone unergroun, but the boies it corralle were impossible to hie -- espite the e**orts o*
%mbassaor :raham 8artin, who on >uly 2E, 19&D, tol the 0enate Aoreign Felations /ommittee that -we *oun
no one in prison- who coul be regare as a political prisoner an that charges that there were two hunre
thousan political prisoners were part o* a /ommunist propagana campaign -eliberately esigne to *orce the
%merican /ongress to limit economic ai.-
Fe*uting 8artin<s assertions was Da#i 0hipler, who cite one instance a*ter another o* per#erse torture o*
women an men -- mostly teachers, stuents, an union wor3ers -- in 0aigon<s Airst +recinct hea5uarters.
0hipler inter#iewe .ran .uan ?ham, Caile in 19&1 $while running *or the ?ational %ssembly' by police who
cite his anti-%merican articles as e#ience that he was a /ommunist. ?ham wrote about the /(%<s in#ol#ement
in 8y )ai an the harm*ul e**ects o* e*oliants. 0hipler tol o* another writer -hel *or three years a*ter he ha
written newspaper an maga4ine articles arguing that Vietnamese culture must be preser#e against
%mericani4ation.- %n 0hipler wrote about a woman arreste in 0aigon, ta3en to the Kien /huong +(/ twenty-
two miles away, an #iciously, saistically torture *or absolutely no reason whatsoe#er, other than *or the
pleasure o* the torturers.
199
6rote 0hipler: -1D2issients who are *ree to spea3 out say they are mere ornaments, that whene#er they begin
to accrue political power the police arrest the lesser *igures aroun them, brea3 up their meetings an lea#e
them isolate.- .he leaers themsel#es were targete *or assassination.
(n his *ollow-up article on %ugust 20, .= 0%(:=?, %)) D(00;?.;F0 %F; A=;0, %)) A=;0 %F; F;D0,
0hipler e!plaine that :V? security *orces belie#e that only /ommunists oppose .hieu. ,e 5uote .hieu as
saying that -the 19.E million 0outh Vietnamese people shoul be mole into a monolithic bloc, moti#ate by a
single anti-/ommunist ieal.- 0hipler then tol how security *orces saw /ommunists -- to whom they attribute
superhuman powers o* e#iousness an persuasion -- e#erywhere. %n not only were all issenters
/ommunists, but accoring to a +F" o**icer wor3ing with the 0pecial 9ranch, -all issients are opportunists.-
(n reality, soaring in*lation -- resulting *rom a lac3 o* ".0. ai -- ha mae mere sur#i#al the single ieal uniting
the Vietnamese people. ;#en /(%-supporte 0pecial 9ranch o**icers were *eeling the pinch an in orer to ma3e
ens meet were pac3ing the Cails with -opportunists- who they hel *or ransom. 0hipler escribe a #isit he
mae to see a group o* -opportunists- hel *or ransom in the /hi ,oa Cail. .he -mo#ie room- where they were
being hel was eighteen by twenty-*our *eet, imly lit by a single bulb, *ull o* mos5uitoes, an the stench o* urine
an *eces on the *loor was so ba that the prisoners -- all o* whom were shac3le by one leg to an iron bar
running the length o* the wall -- couln<t breathe. Ariens an relati#es o* prisoners, an -V/(- suspects, were
re5uire to report to the 0pecial 9ranch, then e!torte. (nee, by 19&D there was no mile groun in Vietnam
-- Cust the rising bloo pressure o* a boy politic about to su**er a massi#e coronary thrombosis.
%t the same time that the *inancial supports were being 3ic3e out *rom uner the .hieu regime in 0aigon,
"0%(D<s =**ice o* +ublic 0a*ety was put on the chopping bloc3. .he process ha begun in 19G9, when +ublic
0a*ety a#iser Dan 8itrione was capture an 3ille in "ruguay by guerrillas who claime he was an unerco#er
/(% o**icer teaching torture techni5ues to the secret police. % 19&0 mo#ie title 0tate o* 0iege, which ramati4e
the 8itrione episoe an showe (nternational +olice %caemy $(+%' grauates torturing political prisoners,
brought attention to the practices o* the (+ %. /onse5uently, accoring to Doug 8c/ollum, the 0tate Department
-e#elope animosity towar +ublic 0a*ety people,- an many contracts, incluing 8c/ollum<s, were not
renewe. 1L2
/harges that the (+% taught torture an political repression gaine creence in %ugust 19&D, when columnist
>ac3 %nerson printe e!cerpts *rom se#eral stuent papers written at the acaemy. 6rote one stuent *rom
0outh Vietnam: -9ase on e!perience, we are con#ince there is Cust one sure way to sa#e time an suppress
stubborn criminal suspects -- that is the proper use o* threats an *orce.-
=n =ctober 2, 19&D, 0enator >ames %boure43 inserte into the /ongressional Fecor the wors o* ?ational
+oliceman )e Van %n. 0ai )e: -Despite the *act that brutal interrogation is strongly critici4e by moralists, its
importance must not be enie i* we want to ha#e orer an security in aily li*e.- 192
(n 19&2 senior Aiel +olice a#iser 6illiam :rie#es was scheule *or reassignment to 9ang3o3. -9ut,- he tol
me, -the ambassaor wouln<t let me in because the /(% hel a gruge.- (nstea, :rie#es was sent to
6ashington as eputy to +ublic 0a*ety chie* 9yron ;ngel. 0ai :rie#es: -( lost all respect *or 9yron ;ngel. ,e<
been too long in /(%. ,e was always as3ing me to ha#e so-an-so bring things bac3 *rom ,ong Kong, an he
was rue to congressmen.- 9ut the worst thing, accoring to :rie#es, was ;ngel<s attempt to -rewrite history.-
1102
%n history was rewritten. .he (+ % was abolishe but, li3e a +hoeni!, was reborn in the guise o* a new
organi4ation calle the )aw ;n*orcement %ssistance %ministration.
Despite its ability to regenerate an sur#i#e, the /(% was ta3ing its lumps in 19&D, too. Fichar ,elms was
accuse an later con#icte on perCury charges a*ter 6illiam /olby amitte that the agency ha spent eight
million ollars to -estabili4e- %llene<s regime in /hile. /olby himsel* was uner attac3, not only *or allege
+hoeni!-relate war crimes but *or ha#ing censore >ohn 8ar3s<s boo3 .he /ult o* (ntelligence an *or trying to
bloc3 publication o* +hilip %gee<s /(% Diary.
%gee in particular was espise by his /(% colleagues *or saying, in an inter#iew with +layboy maga4ine, that
there was -a strong possibility that the /(% station in /hile helpe supply the assassination lists.- Agee
asserte' that the !IA #trains an' e=ui.s saboteurs an' bo)b s=ua's# an' that the !IA ha'
#assassinate' thousan's o .eo.le ,,,, $hen the histor+ o the !IA6s su..ort o torturers gets %ritten*#
Agee .re'icte'* #it6ll be the all(ti)e horror stor+, >22?
#Thousan's o .olice)en all o-er the %orl'*# Agee sai'* #are sha'o%ing .eo.le or the !IA %ithout
&no%ing it, The+ thin& the+6re %or&ing or their o%n .olice 'e.art)ents %hen* in act* their chie )a+ be
a !IA agent %ho6s sen'ing the) out on !IA Hobs an' turning the inor)ation o-er to his !IA control,#
200
0ome o* those people were 0pecial 9ranch o**icers in Vietnam. Aor e!ample, in %ugust 19&D, /olonel 9en
,amilton prepare a report title -Fesults o* /ommunist (n*rastructure ?eutrali4ation ;**orts 8ae by +hoeni!
/ommittees- *or /olonel Doug Dillar at E00th 8(: hea5uarters. .he report cite the number o* neutrali4ations
*rom Aebruary 10 through 8ay N1, 19&D. .he source o* the in*ormation was a -*rienly Aoreign (ntelligence
agency,- meaning the ?ational +hoeni! /ommittee uner /olonel ?guyen Van :iau, who signe the report an
sent it to the Directorate o* +olitical 0ecurity. ?oting that the *igures were probably -in*late,- ,amilton sent the
report to the /(%, the De*ense (ntelligence %gency, an the acting chie* o* sta** *or intelligence at the +entagon.
%ccoring to the report, ( /orps tallie N9 percent o* its yearly 5uota *rom Aebruary till 8ay. (n (( /orps 9inh
.huan +ro#ince rac3e up ED percent o* its yearly goal, with N9 con#ictions, D& 3ille, an 29 rallie. (n ((( /orps
+huoc )ong +ro#ince tallie N V/( 3ille an 2 rallie, an in (V /orps, 1G9 V/( were 3ille in /huong .hien
+ro#ince.
(n 0eptember 19&D 6illiam /olby was as3e by a panel o* citi4ens why 6atergate burglar an /(% o**icer
>ames 8c/or<s personnel recors ha been burne by /(% o**icer )ee +ennington immeiately a*ter the brea3-
in an why the /(% ha estroye tapes o* Fichar ,elms instructing ?i!on an >ohn ;rhlichman how to
respon to congressional in5uiries. .hey as3e /olby to e*en /(% *inancing o* the ?ational 0tuent
%ssociation, an he respone by citing +oint E o* the ?ational 0ecurity %ct, which allows the /(% to per*orm
-*unctions an uties relate to intelligence a**ecting the national security as the ?ational 0ecurity /ouncil may
*rom time to time irect.-
0enator >ames %boure43 as3e /olby, -9ut you o unerta3e acti#ities o#erseas that woul be crimes in this
countryB-
Feplie /olby: -=* course. ;spionage is a crime in this country.- 1122
%9="F;MK: -=ther than espionageB-
/=)9H: -=* course.- %e /olby: -( thin3 ... the use o* an atomic bomb is Custi*ie in the interest o* national
security, an ( thin3 going own *rom there is 5uite a realm o* things you can o in the reasonable e*ense o* the
country.-
%s3e >ohn 8ar3s: -9ut in peacetimeB-
777
=n >anuary G, 19&E, the ?V% o#erran +huoc )ong +ro#ince.
% *ew ays later "+( reporter Fobert Kaylor reporte that the "nite 0tates was still in#ol#e with -the ill-*ame
+hoeni! program,- that the program ha been rename the -0pecial +olice (n#estigati#e 0er#ice $0+(0'- an
was being conucte by *ourteen thousan special troops whose operations are monitore on a part-time basis
by /(% operati#es in 0aigon an in pro#incial capitals throughout the country. %ccoring to Kaylor, -.he ".0.
also pro#ies ata processing *acilities *or 0+(0 through a contractor, /omputer 0cience 0er#ices (nc.,- which
-runs intelligence reports through its machines to classi*y an collate them an then turns the material o#er to
0+(0.- 11N2
6rites Kaylor: -%ccoring to sources here, about 100 %merican personnel are now in#ol#e in monitoring the
program. .hey sai that o#erall responsibility *or watching it rests with a ".0. %ir Aorce o**icer on etache uty
with the %merican ;mbassy in 0aigon.-
6hen %mbassaor 8artin rea Kaylor<s article, he immeiately sent a telegram to 6ashington calling Kaylor<s
article -Cournalistic *iction- an assure the 0tate Department that, as regare +hoeni!, -?o element o* the ".0.
:o#ernment is in#ol#e in any way with any program in Vietnam o* any such escription.- 11D2 %s *or the 0pecial
+olice, -.he ".0. :o#ernment has no relationships to this organi4ation whatsoe#er.- %ccoring to 8artin, -.here
is no ".0. %ir Aorce o**icer on etache uty,- an as *or the /omputer 0cience /orporation $/0/', it merely
contracte with the ?ational +olice -in logistics an personnel.- 0ai 8artin: -%t the present time, /0/ ... is
unin#ol#e in any counter-insurgency or other operational matters.-
=n 8arch 10, 19&E, the ?V% o#erran 9an 8e .huot. (n esperation, .e 0erong rew up a plan to abanon the
/entral ,ighlans an withraw all %FV? *orces to cities along the coast. .he 0outh Vietnamese agree,
opening the *loogates to the ?V %. ,ue *ell on 8arch 2E. /hu )ai an Juang ?gai /ity *ell on the same ay,
ami attac3s by the 0outh Vietnamese against /(% o**icers who abanone their recors an agents. 6ithin
hours all that remaine in ( /orps was Da ?ang. (( /orps was going own Cust as *ast. Kontum an +lei3u ha
*allen two wee3s earlier, an thirteen pro#ince capitals were to be gone by %pril. .he .hir ?V% Di#ision was
heaing towar Jui ?hon, an a million re*ugees were *leeing towar ?ha .rang.
201
(n Da ?ang the scene was one o* *ire, murer, looting, an rape. %FV? soliers ha sei4e the airport control
tower, an planes meant to e#acuate them were *ro4en on the groun. /(% helicopters were *errying %mericans
out o* the city , abanoning their Vietnamese assets. .housans o* panic3e people mo#e to the water*ront,
pile onto piers an barges, i#e into the water, trie to swim to boats. ,unres o* boies were later washe
up on the shore. .he /(% contingent Coine the e!ous, *leeing their 5uarters while their ?ung guars *ire shots
at their heels. %t 8arble 8ountain airstrip the consul general was beaten into unconsciousness by %FV?
soliers. 9y 8arch 29 Da ?ang was e*enseless an being shelle. 9y the thirtieth 0pecial 9ranch an 8ilitary
0ecurity 0er#ice o**icers were being roune up an shot by ?V% security o**icers.
=n 8arch 29 +V. *oun himsel* strane in Da ?ang, on the #erge o* a harrowing e!perience. -.he ranger an
airborne generals le*t, saying they ha to go to a meeting,- he recalle. -6e were tol to wait *or orers, but they
in<t come. %*ter that there was no coorination.- 11E2 :rowing impatient, +V. an eight members o* his +F"
team mae their way with +olice /hie* ?guyen to police hea5uarters. 9ut -.hey were all gone.- Knowing they
ha been abanone, +V. an his comraes ecie to stic3 together an *ight their way out. .a3ing charge,
+V. le the group to the water*ront, where, by *orce o* arms, they commaneere a boat an set o** own the
ri#er into the bay. .hat night they were pic3e up by a ".0. ?a#y #essel crowe with re*ugees. =n %pril 2 the
ship isembar3e its human cargo at /am Fanh 9ay. +V. an his crew began wal3ing south own Foute 1 but
were stoppe at gunpoint at an %FV? chec3point@ no one was being allowe to lea#e the city .)uc3ily, though,
+V. was recogni4e by an %FV? commaner, who put them on a truc3 going to ?ha .rang. 0e#eral hours later
they arri#e there only to *in that the %merican ;mbassy ha been abanone the ay be*ore. ?ha .rang
woul be bypasse by the ?V % on its way to /am Fanh.
6ith cities in (( /orps *alling li3e ominoes, +V. le his group to the home o* another *rien, /olonel +ham, the
Khanh ,oa pro#ince chie*. %*ter cur*ew /olonel +ham loae his own *amily along with +V.<s +F" team in the
bac3 o* a truc3, ro#e them to the oc3, an put them on a ship boun *or Vung .au. +V. coul thin3 o* nothing
else but getting to 0aigon an arranging sa*e passage *or his *amily out o* Vietnam. "pon arri#ing o** the coast
o* Vung .au, howe#er, +V. an his companions were in*orme that all tra**ic to 0aigon, both by ri#er an by
roa, ha been cut. (n 6ashington the /(%<s Aar ;ast Di#ision chie* .e 0hac3ley ha orere the city seale
o** *rom re*ugees. ,is heart sin3ing as *ast as Vietnam, +V. saile o** towar +hu Juoc (slan.
0till holing hopes *or a negotiate settlement, the war managers met one last time in 0aigon to plan the city<s
e*ense. 6hile e#acuation plans were rawn up on a contingency basis, the %merican brain trust rew a
8aginot )ine e!tening *rom .ay ?inh to +han Fang an tol its Vietnamese clients to e*en it to the eath.
9ehin the scenes %ir 8arshal Ky presse *or a coup <etat, an :eneral )oan -- then a special assistant to
:eneral Vien -- warne station chie* +olgar that unless -high-ris3- Vietnamese were e#acuate as promise,
%merican hostages woul be ta3en. .o a#ert such a catastrophe, an e#acuation team uner 0tate Department
o**icer Dean 9rown was *orme in 6ashington. %mong those chosen to select which Vietnamese were to be
sa#e were )ionel Fosenblatt, Aran3 6isner, ;# 9umgartner, /raig >ohnstone, Ken Juinn, an Aran3 0cotton.
9ill >ohnson, the /(%<s 0aigon base chie*, got the Cob o* setting up /(% stay-behin nets.
=n %pril D, 19&E, /ongress was ebating how much money to gi#e 0aigon *or its e*ense, while in 0aigon,
Valium an scotch were selling at a premium in the besiege ".0. ;mbassy. 8etropolitan +olice /hie* . ran 0i
.an slappe a twenty-*our-hour cur*ew on the city. +anic began to sprea. .he war reache 0aigon *our ays
later when a 0outh Vietnamese %ir Aorce pilot roppe three bombs on the +resiential +alace. (nsie, .hieu
consulte with *ortune-tellers. .ran Van Don an :eneral Khiem, who ha resigne as prime minister,
nominate :eneral Duong Van -9ig- 8inh as .hieu<s replacement.
=n %pril 12 ,enry Kissinger orere the e#acuation o* +hnom +enh, /amboia. %s the %merican contingent
boare helicopters an *lew to sa*ety, 0ira3 8ata3 crie that he ha been betraye. Ai#e ays later, when
Khmer Fouge troops rolle into the city , he was arreste an summarily e!ecute. 8eanwhile, si! ?V%
regiments were poise north o* /an .ho in the Delta, an numerous others were heaing south towar 0aigon.
Knowing the country was oome, .uc3er :ougleman wrote a letter to a *rien on %pril 1N, spelling out his plans
to rescue his *amily. +oste *rom 9ang3o3, where he manage %ssociate /onsultants )imite, :ougleman<s
letter tol how he planne his -e!traction *rom +hu Juoc (slan to .rat near /hantaburi on the southernmost
part o* the .hai east coast.- :ougleman commente on the -totally unepenable- %FV? an its -cruel
perpetrations on ci#ilian re*ugees- an note that -.hieu has 3ille 0V?.- ,e close the letter with -/<est la
*uc3ing #ie.-
9eing stuc3 on +hu Juoc (slan was a *rustrating e!perience *or +V. , an as soon as they coul, +V. an his
+F" comraes boare a boat heaing *or 0aigon. (mmeiately *our Vietnamese marines arme with 8-1G<s
commaneere the boat an stole e#eryone<s money an watches. -9ut they in<t 3now we were police or that
we were arme,- +V. tol me with a glint in. his eye. -( tol my men to wait till ar3. 6hen the marines were
eating, ( organi4e an assault. 6e got control.- % *ew hours later +V. arri#e in 0aigon.
202
+han Fang *ell on the si!teenth. =n 0aturay, the nineteenth, the /(% began *lying selecte Vietnamese out on
unauthori4e blac3 *lights. =stensibly these were -high-ris3- assets *rom the #arious security programs who
were unable to obtain the necessary e!it #isas *rom the 8inistry o* the (nterior. 8ore o*ten they were girl *riens
o* their /(% case o**icers. =n the twentieth the /(% began burning its *iles. =n the twenty-*irst, Ouan )oc *ell, an
the e#acuation rate was accelerate. Ai*teen hunre people were *lown out that ay.
,a#ing *inally set *oot in 0aigon, +V. reporte to /olonel ,ai, who only a *ew wee3s be*ore ha ta3en o#er
comman o* the +F" an who propose to +V. that he an his +F" team pro#ie security *or the /(%. ,a#ing
been unable to *in a single /(% o**icer to #ouch *or him in 0aigon, +V. re*use. (nstea, he began ma3ing
arrangements to sa#e his *amily. =n the twentieth +V. gathere his wi*e an chilren together in a house he
owne near .an 0on ?hut airport. ,e #isite his brother at the /holon branch o* the .hanh .hien ban3 an
arrange to ha#e his sa#ings trans*erre to< a branch o**ice in :ia Dinh +ro#ince. -/ommunist political care
were e#en then mo#ing e#eryone out o* the city,- he sai. .hieu resigne on the twenty-*irst an turne the
go#ernment o#er to Vice +resient ,uong. .hat ay +V. pile his *amily into a Ceep an ro#e them to .an 0on
?hut airport, where they were gi#en sanctuary by a police colonel-a close *rien o* Ky<s -- whose house was
insie the gates.
(nsie .an 0on ?hut, +V. contacte his ol *rien *rom Da ?ang, +olice /aptain ?guyen 8inh .an. %*ter the
*lap o#er the Da ?ang /ity +F", +V. ha use his in*luence to get .an a Cob in the 0aigon +hoeni! o**ice.
6hen /olonel ?guyen Van :iau assume comman o* +hoeni! a*ter the cease-*ire, he reassigne .an to the
immigration o**ice insie .an 0on ?hut. =n the twenty-*irst .an tol +V. that it was time to go. +V. hane his
sister his li*e<s sa#ings-*i#e hunre thousan in piasters -- an as3e her to change it in /holon. 0he returne
with two hunre %merican ollars. =n the twenty-secon .an brought +V. into the o**ice o* the 0outh
Vietnamese %ir Aorce captain in charge o* *lights to /lar3 %ir Aorce base in the +hilippines. Aor two hunre
%merican ollars the captain put +V.<s name on mani*est. %t 9:00 +.8. on the twenty-secon, while the ?V%
rolle towar 9ien ,oa an Vung .au, +V. an his *amily an ?guyen 8inh .an an his *amily bae aieu to
their homelan.
=n the same ay +V. le*t 0aigon, )ionel Fosenblatt an /raig >ohnstone arri#e, set up shop in the Fegent
,otel, an arrange sa*e passage out o* Vietnam *or a number o* their *riens. 9y the time the two le*t on the
twenty-*i*th $the same ay that .hieu an Khiem *le to .aiwan', they ha smuggle out anywhere *rom three to
two hunre high-ran3ing police an +F" o**icers.
=n %pril 2E, while ".0. 8arines e!change ri*le *ire with 0outh Vietnamese paratroopers, +resient ,uong
o**ere to *ree the two hunre thousan political prisoners the ".0. ;mbassy claime ha ne#er e!iste. .he
/ommunists laughe in his *ace. =n the twenty-se#enth the roa between .ay ?inh an 0aigon was cut,
roc3ets began *alling in 0aigon, an ,uong turne the go#ernment o#er to 9ig 8inh. .hat night /(= chie*
:eneral 9inh bae aieu to Vietnam. 9y the twenty-eighth there was *ighting in the streets o* 0aigon. ".0.
helicopter gunships roame the smo3e-*ille s3ies while 0aigon base chie* 9ill >ohnson pai a *inal #isit to his
colleagues in the 0pecial 9ranch an /(=. ,e suggeste that they get out o* town *ast. %ccoring to Aran3
0nepp, *our hunre 0pecial 9ranch an *our hunre /(= o**icers were le*t behin, along with -*iles ienti*ying
e*ectors, collaborators, prisoners, anyone who ha helpe us or seeme li3ely to.<< 11G2 0nepp says the /(%
abanone -countless counter-terrorist agents -- perhaps numbering as high as N0,000 -- specially traine to
operate with the +hoeni! program.- 11&2
=n 6illiam /olby<s orers, " .0. helicopters began *lying %mericans to ships o**shore on the twenty-eighth@ the
*ollowing ay the ?V% hit .an 0on ?hut. 6ith the army in *ull retreat an no policemen le*t to en*orce the cur*ew,
rioting an looting bro3e out in 0aigon. +anic sprea through the %merican community while the one man with
the most to lose, .uc3er :ougleman, ecie to go own with the ship. +erhaps he was ha#ing a rin3 on the
#erana o* the /ontinental ,otel when 0aigon, li3e the +hoeni! in *lames, ga#e up its ghost.
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. +hoeni! a#isers began participating in rug in#estigations between %ugust an =ctober 19&1. .om .hayer
wrote that -reports *rom *iel a#isers inicate that the Coint "0/:V? program to ry up 0outh Vietnam<s rug
tra**ic may ha#e ae to +hung ,oang<s chronic problems. +hoeni! assets are being use to *erret out rug
ealers,- he sai, aing, -.heir attention has in many pro#inces been turne partially away *rom anti-V/(
e**orts. 6hile both problems are essentially police matters, they apparently cannot be hanle concurrently. .he
number o* pro#ince a#isors who mentione this in their >uly reports unerscores the lac3 o* epth o* the +hung
,oang organi4ation.- 1E2
ii. 0ee /hapter 1: .he /an )ao party -- the /an )ao ?ham Vi -- translates as the -+ersonal )abor party.-
203
EPI4OG"E
(n the opinion o* 0tan Aulcher $who in 19&2 was the 9inh Dinh +ro#ince +hoeni! coorinator an whose
e!periences are recounte in /hapter 2, -+hoeni! was a creation o* the ol-boy networ3, a group o* guys at
highest le#el -- /olby an that crow -- who thought they were )awrence o* %rabia.- 112
(nee, the +hoeni! program in 0outh Vietnam was set up by %mericans on %merican assumptions, in support
o* %merican policies. "n*ortunately %merica<s allies in 0outh Vietnam were people whose prosperity epene
on %merican patronage an who there*ore implemente a policy they 3new coul not be applie to their culture.
(n the process the e*inition o* the Vietcong in*rastructure was misinterprete to mean any Vietnamese citi4en,
an +hoeni! was broaene *rom a ri*le shot attac3 against the -organi4ational hierarchy- into a shotgun metho
o* population control.
(t happene, Aulcher sai rue*ully, because -any policy can *in supporting intelligence,- meaning -the +hoeni!
Directorate use computers to s3ew the statistical e#aluation o* the V/(. Dea Vietnamese became V/(, an
they luc3e out the other *i#e percent o* the time, getting real V/( in ambushes.- %s Aulcher e!plaine it, -.he
Vietnamese lie to us@ we lie to the irectorate@ an the irectorate mae it into ocumente *act .... (t was a
war that became istorte through our ability to create *iction. 9ut really, there were only economic reasons *or
our supporting the *ascists in Vietnam, Cust li3e we i in (ran.-
+ro*essor ,uy agrees, asserting that %merica -betraye the ieals o* *reeom an emocracy in Vietnam.-
Aurthermore, writes ,uy, -%merican politicians ha#e not yet change their policy. 6hat happene later in (ran
was a repetition o* what happene in 0outh Vietnam. %lmost the same people applie the same policy with the
same principles an the same spirit. (t is ama4ing that some people are still wonering why the same result
occurre.- 122
-(t<s the problem o* supporting personalities rather than emocratic institutions,- Aulcher e!plaine, noting that in
Vietnam the issue was not the Vietcong #ersus the %rmy o* 0outh Vietnam, but lan re*orm an go#ernment
corruption. -.he Vietnamese were #ictims o* our corruption,- Aulcher sai emphatically. -6e smothere them
with money. (t<s the same thing you see in /entral %merica toay. Hou can<t ta3e a 0al#aoran colonel in a
patron army without the corruption he brings along.
-6ith consoliation we coul ha#e ha control,- Aulcher conclue, -an +hoeni! was the culmination o* the
attempt to solii*y control.- 9ut the warlors an corrupt politicians we supporte in Vietnam re*use to sacri*ice
e#en a tiny share o* their empires *or the greater goo o* Vietnam, an thus were incapable o* countering what
was a homogeneous, nationalist- inspire insurgency.
(n any e#ent, e*eat in Vietnam i not repress the impulses that powere %merica to thir worl inter#ention in
the *irst place@ it simply ro#e them elsewhere. ?owhere is this more e#ient than in ;l 0al#aor, where
)ieutenant /olonel 0tan Aulcher ser#e *rom 19&D till 19&& as an intelligence a#iser with the " .0. 8ilitary
:roup. (n ;l 0al#aor Aulcher saw the same -ol boys- who ha run the war in 0outh Vietnam. =nly in ;l
0al#aor, because o* the #ast reuction in the /(% <s paramilitary *orces instigate by the /arter aministration,
these o**icials e**ecte their policies through pro!ies *rom allie countries. Aor e!ample, Aulcher watche while
(sraeli agents taught ;l 0al#aor<s maCor lanowners how to organi4e criminals into #igilante eath s5uas,
which, using intelligence *rom 0al#aor<s military an security *orces, murere labor leaers an other
opponents o* the oligarchy. )i3ewise, Aulcher watche while .aiwanese military o**icers taught Kuomintang
political war*are techni5ues at ;l 0al#aor<s /omman an :eneral 0ta** /ollege: +hoeni!-relate subCects
such as population control through psychological war*are, the e#elopment an control o* agents pro#ocateurs,
the e#elopment o* political cares within the o**icer corps, an the placement o* military o**icers in the ci#ilian
security *orces. ,e also saw political prisoners put in insane asylums -- *acilities he escribe as being -li3e
,ogarth<s paintings.-
6hile other %mericans smuggle weapons an *uns to the eath s5uas, Aulcher, who was outrage by what
he saw, organi4e at his home a stuy group o* young military o**icers who supporte lan re*orm,
nationali4ation o* the ban3s, an ci#ilian control o* the military. (n 19&9 these same re*ormist o**icers stage a
success*ul but short-li#e coup, as a result o* which the 0al#aoran ?ational 0ecurity %gency $%?0;0%)',
which ha been *orme by the /(% in 19G2, was isbane an reorgani4e as the ?ational (ntelligence %gency
$%?('.
.his reorgani4ation i not put an en to the eath s5uas. (nstea, the lanowners an *ascist military o**icers
mo#e to 8iami an :uatemala, where they *orme a political *ront calle %rena, to which they channele *uns
*or the purpose o* eliminating the re*ormers. /hosen to hea %rena was 8aCor Foberto < %ubuisson, a *ormer
member o* %?0;0%) who trans*erre its *iles to general sta** hea5uarters, where they were use to compile
204
blac3lists. =perating out o* :uatemala, D< %ubuisson<s eath s5uas murere %rchbishop =scar Fomero an
;l 0al#aor<s attorney general in early 19L0. (n December o* that year si! members o* ;l 0al#aor<s e!ecuti#e
council were 3inappe, torture, an 3ille by a eath s5ua, an the eath s5uas began a rampage which
inclue the murers in >anuary 19L1 o* >ose Fool*o Viera, the hea o* the lan istribution program, along
with Viera<s %merican a#isers, 8ichael ,ammer an 8ar3 +earlman.
%t this time, accoring to 0al#aoran %rmy o**icer Ficaro /astro, 1N2 eath s5ua super#ision passe to
Department E, the ci#il a**airs branch o* the 0al#aoran general sta**. -Department E suenly starte
coorinating e#erything,- sai /astro, a 6est +oint grauate with a master<s egree in engineering. Aorme in
the mi-19&0<s by the /(%, Department E, /astro e!plaine, became -the political intelligence apparatus within
the general sta**.- %lthough it was esigne as an in#estigati#e, not an operating, agency, Department E ha -a
large paramilitary *orce o* people resse in ci#ilian clothes,- an because it targete ci#ilians, -.hey can 3noc3
someone o** all by themsel#es, or capture them.-
6hen military as oppose to political targets were in#ol#e, Department 2, the intelligence branch o* the general
sta**, woul sen in*ormation gathere *rom its in*ormant nets to Department N $operations', which then
ispatche a eath s5ua o* its own. 6hether the people to be 3ille were guerrillas or ci#ilians, /astro
e!plaine, -the rich people -- the leaing citi4ens o* the community -- traitionally ha#e a great eal o* input.
6hate#er bothers them, i* they<#e got someone who Cust came into their ranch or their *arm an they consier
them a ba in*luence, they Cust sen a messenger to the commaner.-
(n 8arch 19L1 /astro himsel* began leaing eath s5ua operations. "sing a mous operani per*ecte in
Vietnam, orers were always #erbal an the soliers in the eath s5uas shuc3e their uni*orms an resse as
le*t-wing guerrillas. -9asically,- sai /astro, -you come in a*ter patrolling or whate#er ... an then you<re tol that
at a certain hour you will ha#e to go get up the troops an go o something .... .hey alreay 3now what the
mission is. .hey happen Cust about e#ery night, or they use to.
-?ormally,- /astro ae, -you eliminate e#eryone .... 6e usually go in with ... an in*ormant who is pan o* the
patrol an who has turne these people in. 6hen you turn someboy in,- /astro note, -part o* your obligation
is to show us where they are an ienti*y them. 6e woul go in an 3noc3 on people<s houses. .hey< come out
o* their houses an we< always tell them we were the )e*t an we<re here because you on<t want to cooperate
with us or whate#er. %n then they were eliminate, always with machetes.-
(n late 19L1, with the go#ernment o* ;l 0al#aor bac3 in the hans o* the *ascist military , the eath s5uas were
mo#e uner the 0al#aoran security *orces, which generally operate in urban areas an pretene to be
an/or use the ser#ices o* right-wing #igilantes. /astro tol o* eath s5uas within the treasury police 1i2 3illing
teachers an o* eath s5uas within the ?ational :uar 3illing mayors an nuns -- all with the appro#al o* the
general sta**.
/astro also wor3e as translator to a series o* /(% a#isers at general sta** hea5uarters. =ne course he
translate was on interrogation. (t was taught by a /(% o**icer who suggeste electric shoc3 an presente
architectural plans *or a +(/-li3e prison to be built at the ca#alry regiment hea- 5uarters. -(t was going to
become a secret Cail,- recalle /astro, who was enliste by Department E to begin engineering wor3.
%ccoring to /astro, the /(% interrogation instructor also a#ise the general sta** on mounting eath s5ua
operations in *oreign countries, especially ,onuras, an was complicit in these operations inso*ar as he
pro#ie ;l 0al#aor<s 0ecret 0er#ice with *iles an photos o* 0al#aorans in the "nite 0tates.
777
%s in Vietnam, the proli*eration o* political assassinations in ;l 0al#aor ha a ripple e**ect, which ene in the
massacring o* innocent ci#ilians. /astro tol how in ?o#ember 19L1 a number o* ci#ilians were 3ille *ollowing a
sweep by the ".0.-traine %tlacatl 9attalion. 0ai /astro: -1.2here were 2D women an chilren capture, an
they were assassinate right smac3 in *ront o* me -- Cust one by one, in col bloo.- /ounterterror-style, the
mutilate corpses were le*t behin as a warning to le*tist guerrillas.
(n December 19L1 /astro met 8aCor +inea o* Department E, who was operating in 8ora4an +ro#ince. -.hey
ha two towns o* about three hunre people each,- /astro recalle, -an they were interrogating them to see
what they 3new. 0ince ( ha translate in the class an 3new something about interrogations, he sai they might
want me to help. .he 8aCor tol me that a*ter the interrogation, they were going to 3ill them all.- 0ai /astro: -(
later *oun out, they i go in an 3ill them a*ter all.-
205
(n %ugust 19L2 /astro tra#ele to 6ashington on behal* o* a group o* young 0al#aoran o**icers concerne
about corruption an emorali4ation within the army ran3 an *ile. /astro tol a /(% o**icer in 6ashington about
the eath s5uas. .he /(% o**icer sai, -6e 3now all that.- ?othing was one.
.his hans-o** policy re*lecte a maturation in the thin3ing o* the /(%. (n the a*termath o* Vietnam the /(% set up
a special section to stuy terrorism an thir worl instability. .he -terrorism account- was gi#en to D(=//
creator 9ob 6all by (/;O<s *irst irector, ;#an +ar3er, who was then eputy irector o* the /(% <s paramilitary
0pecial =perations Di#ision $0=D'. (n analy4ing the problem o* terrorism, 6all brought in Aoreign (ntelligence
e!perts, who etermine that the /(% coul not reasonably e!pect to penetrate terrorist groups -- li3e the V/( or
the +alestine )iberation =rgani4ation -- which were -homogeneous. - %s a result o* this etermination, the /(%
then separate its antiterrorist acti#ities *rom its counterinsurgency acti#ities, which it rename -low-intensity
war*are.-
9y 19L0 paramilitary e!pert Fuy ;ners was chie* o* the 0pecial =perations Di#ision, an ;ners in turn
passe the -terrorism account- to *ormer senior +F" a#iser 6illiam 9uc3ley, who create a military sta**e
antiterrorism unit in 19L1 uner the +entagon<s >oint 0pecial =perations /omman.
8eanwhile, ;l 0al#aor ha emerge as the per*ect place to test the /(% <s new theory o* low-intensity war*are.
(n 8arch 19LN Vice +resient :eorge 9ush<s national security a#iser, *ormer ((( /orps region o**icer in charge
Donal :regg, wrote to +resient Fonal Feagan<s national security a#iser, Fobert 8acAarlane, saying, -Fuy
;ners ... went to ;l 0al#aor in 19L1 to o a sur#ey an e#elop plans *or e**ecti#e anti-guerrilla operations. ,e
came bac3 an enorse the attache plan.- 1E2 .he +in3 +lan, written by *ormer +F" a#iser Aeli! Forigue4,
was to launch mobile air stri3es with -minimum ".0. participation- at le*tist rebels. Forigue4 sai the plan woul
-9e ieal *or the paci*ication e**ort in ;l 0al#aor an :uatemala.- 1G2
0hortly a*ter proposing the +in3 +lan, :regg introuce Forigue4 to :eorge 9ush 1ii2 an =li#er ?orth.
Forigue4 was sent to ;l 0al#aor, where, as an a#iser to Department E, he organi4e a -high-bir, low-bir-
+in3 .eam, leaing the missions himsel* an using the same techni5ues he ha e#elope while ser#ing as
:regg<s eputy in charge o* the +F" in Vietnam. %s in Vietnam, ci#ilian security ser#ices Coine with Department
E $ci#il a**airs' an Department 2 $intelligence' to pro#ie Department N $operations' with in*ormation on the
location o* guerrillas, whose hieouts were bombe by ".0. warplanes, then ra#age in +hoeni!-style coron
an search operations in which +F"-type teams hunte enemy cares in their homes. Forigue4 playe the
role o* coorinator. %t the time /olonel %ol*o 9lanon commane Departments 2 an E.
%ccoring to reporter Dennis Vol3man, 9lanon was a#ise by a /uban-%merican *rom the consular section o*
the %merican ;mbassy, who met regularly with ".0. military a#isers to Departments 2 an E in 0an 0al#aor.
1&2
:eneral +aul :orman, who commane ".0. *orces in /entral %merica in the mi-19L0<s, e*ine this new type
o* counterinsurgency operation as -a *orm o* war*are repugnant to %mericans, a con*lict which in#ol#es
innocents, in which non-combatant casualties may be an e!plicit obCect.- 1L2
:orman coul ha#e been alluing to =peration +hoeni!, launche by the 0al#aoran %rmy in >anuary 19LG. %s
reporte in the 9oston :lobe, =peration +hoeni! began with the military ropping wa#es o* &E0-poun bombs
o#er :ua4apa #olcano, -a e*iant symbol o* persistence by a *ew thousan rebels against go#ernment *orces
that outnumber them 10 to one an are bac3e by the purse an arsenal o* the ".0.- 192 ?e!t came planes with
lea*lets an bullhorns o**ering the rebels rewars *or their ri*les an sa*e passage to re*ugee camps. 8eanwhile,
thirty-*i#e hunre troops swept the #olcano in a tightening circle, burning crops, estroying hieouts,
interrogating ci#ilian etainees, an hunting enemy cares.
.he 0al#aoran o**icer in charge o* =peration +hoeni! sai, -6e ha#e three goals. :et ri o* the iea that
:ua4apa belongs to the terrorists@ to .reacti#ate ile lan@ an to con#ince the masa $the people' we are
i**erent *rom the reality they<#e been tol.- %n, he ae, -9y remo#ing the masa *rom :ua4apa, o**icials hope
to isrupt the rebels< #ital networ3 o* rural support.-
(n a +ublic 9roacasting 0ystem ocumentary title ;nough /rying o* .ears, =peration +hoeni! was escribe
as wiping out entire #illages.
777
(n the wa3e o* Vietnam, the /(% not only e*ine antiterrorism apart *rom counterinsurgency but also separate
counterterrorism $e*ine as -bol an swi*t action to uno what terrorists ha#e recently one-' *rom
antiterrorism, which is the broa spectrum an inclues psywar campaigns against countries the "nite 0tates
206
brans as -terrorist.- .he best e!ample is ?icaragua, where the /(% mine harbors an inserte insurgents,
calle contras, who systematically torture an massacre ci#ilians an assassinate go#ernment o**icials.
6hen in 19LN tales o* contra atrocities began reaching congressional ears, /(% Director 6illiam /asey sent /(%
o**icer >ohn Kir3patric3 $an alias' to contra hea5uarters in ,onuras to clean up their act. (n =ctober 19LN
*ormer :reen 9eret Kir3patric3 returne to 6ashington, where he copie a ".0. 0pecial Aorces manual issue
at Aort 9ragg in 19GL. ,e then returne to .egucigalpa, ,onuras, where the manual was printe in 0panish. (t
was title .ayacan: +sychological =perations in :uerrilla 6ar*are.
Kir3patric3 was an oler man who resse entirely in blac3 in orer -to inspire a cult o* eath among the *ighting
men,- writes >ames Dic3ey in 6ith the /ontras. -Kir3patric3 thought he 3new 5uite a bit about his en o* a
paramilitary operation: the psychology o* it .... ,e 3new about those special circumstances when an
assassination might be una#oiable, e#en appropriate. ,e 3new *rom stuying the methos o* the /ommunists
e#erywhere, an *rom his own e!perience in Vietnam an *rom what he learne *rom the +hoeni! program
there, how you coul ma3e e#en an acciental 3illing wor3 in your *a#or. 9ut he also 3new what 8y )ai coul o,
an the way one massacre coul estroy your creibility.- 1102
Dic3ey escribes .ayacan as -a little boo3 with a co#er in the blue an white o* the ?icaraguan *lag. .he graphic
moti* was rows o* heas with large holes through them. .argets. (t loo3e as i* they were targets *or snipers. 9ut
the iea was to target their mins.- 1112
(nee, .ayacan was base entirely on Aran3 0cot ton<s moti#ational inoctrination principles. .he goal was to
organi4e the contras into arme propagana teams that woul persuae the people to stage a general uprising.
%s state in .ayacan, this was to be one through psychological operations, by reaching beyon the -territorial
limits o* con#entional war*are, to penetrate the political entity itsel*: the <political animal< that %ristotle e*ine.-
Aor once his min has been reache, the -political animal has been e*eate, without necessarily recei#ing
bullets.-
/entral to the /(%<s octrine o* psychological operations is the -compulsion o* people with arms,- the notion o*
-implicit terror,- that -the people are internally <aware< that the weapons can be use against them. - .here are
also times, .ayacan as, when -e!plicit terror- is re5uire to compel the people to change their mins. "sing a
mous operani per*ecte by the Vietcong, .ayacan instructs its arme propagana teams to gather the
#illagers together, cut all communication with the outsie worl, then esecrate symbols o* the go#ernment while
being courteous to the people so as to get the names o* go#ernment in*ormants an o**icials, who are then
brought be*ore a people<s tribunal. )astly, the team<s political care gi#es a prepare speech e!plaining that
*orce is necessary to gi#e the people power o#er the go#ernment an that the ensuing e!ecution is being one
to protect the people an is an act o* emocracy.
.ayacan speci*ically calls *or -neutrali4ing- Cuges, police o**icials, an state security o**icials. (t also says that
-pro*essional criminals shoul be hire to carry out speci*ic, selecti#e Cobs.-
6hat .ayacan represents, o* course, is Falph >ohnson<s octrine o* /ontre /oup ha#ing come *ull circle,
emerging *rom the +hoeni! program in Vietnam as the +hoeni! concept o* -e!plicit terrorism- isguise as
antiterrorism.
(t is instructi#e to hear how people respone to .ayacan. /ontra e*ector ;gar /hamorro, who lea3e the
manual to the %merican press in 19LD, use language li*te *rom Fobert Komer when he sai .ayacan author
>ohn Kir3patric3 -in<t want us to use a shotgun approach@ he wante us to select our targets.- 1122
0enator 0am ?unn o* :eorgia sai the wor -neutrali4e- coul be interprete by reasonable people to mean
-assassination.- 11N2
-(t oes not mean assassination,- 6illiam /olby sai on the =ctober 2L, 19LD, Da#i 9rin3ley 0how@ -it means
ta3e the person out o* action.- 11D2 Fonal Feagan agree an sai that -neutrali4e- meant -remo#e *rom o**ice.-
6hen as3e how that coul be one without #iolence, Feagan sai, -Hou Cust say to the *ellow that<s sitting
there in the o**ice, you<re not in the o**ice anymore.- 11E2
Duane /larrige, the /(% o**icer in charge o* operations against ?icaragua at the time .ayacan was printe,
ac3nowlege that -ci#ilians an 0aninista o**icials in the pro#inces, as well as heas o* cooperati#es, nurses,
octors an Cuges,- ha been 3ille by the contras. 9ut, he ae, -.hese e#ents on<t constitute
assassinations because as *ar as we are concerne assassinations are only those o* heas o* state.- 11G2
777
207
;en +astora was not a hea o* state@ he was the hea o* the southern branch o* the contras -- until 8ay N1,
19LD, when an attempt was mae on his li*e at )a +enca, /osta Fica, where he was preparing to announce his
withrawal *rom the contra *orce. 6hen as3e whom he blame *or the attempt on his li*e, +astora respone,
-6e now belie#e the orer came +astora replie, -( coul get 3ille *or saying this, but it woul ha#e to be Vice-
+resient :eorge 9ush.- 11&2
(s +astora<s accusation totally outrageousB +erhaps not when one consiers that in 8ay 19LD, in ;l 0al#aor,
Aeli! Forigue4 was *acilitating the contra resupply e**ort *or =li#er ?orth. =r that the person initially chosen by
?orth to resupply the contras was *ormer 0=: commaner >ohn 0inglaub, who in oing so wor3e with 0olier
o* Aortune publisher Fobert 9rown, creator in 19&D o* +hoeni! %ssociates. =r that one mercenary group
operating in ?icaragua actually calle itsel* the +hoeni! 9attalion.
.here is another isturbing connection in the )a +enca bombing. =n the night be*ore the bomb went o**, =li#er
?orth<s liaison to the contras, Fob =wen, was meeting in 0an >ose, /osta Fica, with the /(% station chie*, >oe
Aernane4. Fob =wen is the brother o* Dwight =wen, who was 3ille in an ambush by the same Vietcong out*it
that was supplie by the #illagers o* 8y )ai.
/onsier also that .om +olgar, *ormer 0aigon station chie*, was chie* in#estigator *or the 0enate 0elect
/ommittee probing the (ran-contra a**air. (n the Aebruary 19LG issue o* )egal .imes, Donal :regg is 5uote as
saying that +olgar -wante to assure me that 1the hearings2 woul not be a repeat o* the +i3e an /hurch
in#estigations. - 6hen :eorge 9ush was irector o* central intelligence in 19&G, :regg was his representati#e
be*ore the congressional committees that were in#estigating the /(%<s role in criminal acti#ities, incluing the
attempte assassinations o* *oreign leaers. %t the time :regg presente the committees with an ultimatum:
9ac3 o** or *ace martial law. +olgar, it seems, li3ewise eraile another roun o* e!ecuti#e-legislati#e
brin3manship.
(n 19LE .om +olgar was a consultant on :eorge 9ush<s .as3 Aorce on /ombating .errorism, along with =li#er
?orth an >ohn +oine!ter.
6hat these -ol +hoeni! boys- all ha#e in common is that they pro*it *rom antiterrorism by selling weapons an
supplies to repressi#e go#ernments an insurgent groups li3e the contras. .heir legacy is a trail o* ashes across
the thir worl.
%n where can +hoeni! be *oun toayB 6here#er go#ernments o* the le*t or the right use military an security
*orces to en*orce their ieologies uner the aegis o* antiterrorism. )oo3 *or +hoeni! where#er police chec3-
points ring maCor cities, where#er paramilitary police units patrol in armore cars, an where#er military *orces
are conucting counterinsurgent operations. )oo3 *or +hoeni! where#er emergency ecrees are use to
suspen ue process, where#er issients are interne ine*initely in etention camps, an where#er issients
are roune up an eporte. )oo3 *or +hoeni! where#er security *orces use in*ormants to ienti*y issients,
where#er security *orces 3eep *iles an computeri4e blac3lists on issients, where#er security *orces conuct
secret in#estigations an sur#eillance on issients, where#er security *orces, or thugs in their hire, harass an
murer issients, an where#er such acti#ities go unreporte by the press.
9ut most o* all, loo3 *or +hoeni! in the imaginations o* ieologues obsesse with security, who see3 to impose
their way o* thin3ing on e#eryone else.
QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
Notes:
i. "ner /olonel ?icolas /arran4a, who, accoring to the /enter *or ?ational 0ecurity 0tuies, was recruite by
the /(% in the late 19&0<s at a cost o* ninety thousan ollars a year. 1D2
ii. (n 19LN 9ush Courneye to ;l 0al#aor an arrange to ha#e the most prominent eath s5ua leaers sent to
iplomatic posts abroa. 9y 19L& nine o* ele#en were bac3.
APPENDIX
%enum 1: +syops /omic 9oo3: -+hung ,oang /ampaign-
208
.he cartoon boo3 title :ia inh ong 9a #a /hien Dich +hung ,oang $8r, 9a<s Aamily an the +hoeni!
=peration' reas as *ollows:
/aption 2. 0ummary: 8r. 9a an his *amily are presently li#ing in +hong .hanh #illage. .his #illage is actually
part o* the nationalist territory but is still in*iltrate by a number o* /ommunist elements@ there*ore, +hoeni!
leaers ha#e ta3en military action against them. .hey recei#e enthusiastic cooperation *rom the #illagers. %s a
result o* this, an through accurate in*ormation pro#ie by local people, many /ommunist cares ha#e been
arreste. .hese circumstances help you *ollow the story o* 8r. 9a<s *amily.
209
/aption N. .he cruel /ommunists 3ill innocent people againI
/aption D. Aollowing is the news: -.his morning at nine %.8., a )ambretta was blown up by a /ommunist mine
*i#e 3ilometers outsie +hung ,iep #illage. .wo chilren were 3ille, three women woune. .he /ommunists
continue to terrori4e peopleI-
210
/aption E .-,ello, sister .uI-
-6hy are you so lateB-
-,ello, brother an sister. ( am sorry ( am late. ( le*t early this morning, but we ha to stop at the brige because
it was estroye by a /ommunist bomb. 6e ha to wait *or the brige to be repaire by a military engineering
unit.-
/aption G. -8r. 9a, you are as3e to pay *arm ta! to to the )iberation ArontI-
211
/aption &. -.his year the crop is poor, but the /ommunists still collect ta!es. (t is a miserable situation. ( ha#e
hear there is much security in +hung +hu #illage. .here ta!es are not collecte by the /ommunists any more
than3s to the +hoeni! operation. ( woner why such an operation has not come to our #illageB- -+erhaps
because noboy pro#ies them with in*ormationI .his a*ternoon the +hoeni! operation agents poste a notice at
the intersection. ( will go an see it tomorrow.-
/aption L. -6hat is new, my *riensB-
-.here are two angerous /ommunist cares hiing in our #illage.-
212
/aption 9. ,ere are the two /ommunist cares sought by the +hoeni! =peration. .he wante poster says:
-Dear compatriots, (* you 3now the hiing place o* the two abo#e name /ommunist cares, please noti*y the
national police or the arme *orces. Hou will be reware, an your name will be 3ept secret.-
/aption 10. .he raio broacast says, -/ompatriots, please help your go#ernment by pro#iing in*ormation
inicating the hiing place o* two /ommunists, 9a )uong an ,ai :on. Hou will be reware, an your name will
be 3ept secret.-
-Di you hear that on the raioB-
-( 3new it alreay. (t is e!actly the same as it has been poste on the wall at the intersection o* the #illage.-
213
/aption 11. -0ee, there are so many lea*letsI-
/aption 12. -,oney, what o they say in those lea*letsB-
.hey are the same as those wall posters, as well as the announcements on the raio yesteray. .he two
/ommunists 9a )uong an Fai :on are presently hiing in our #illage in orer to collect ta!es. ( am etermine
to report to the +hoeni! =peration /ommittee because ( 3now their hiing place.-
214
/aption 1N. -6here are you going so earlyB-
-( am going to the istrict hea5uarters to report about what happene last night.-
/aption 1D. -Dear 0ir, the two /ommunists you want are hiing in my #illage. .hey are hiing in the house
number L0/2 by my #illage bounaries. .hey only go out at night. (* you succee in arresting them, please 3eep
my name secretI-
-.han3 you, 8r. 9a, your name will be 3ept secret.- $.he +hoeni! =peration pro#ies security an prosperity to
the people.'
215
/aption 1E. -6hy are so many soliers entering our #illageB-
-+erhaps they are conucting a military operation against the /ommunists in hiing.-
/aption 1G. -.he two /ommunists are #ery angerous. 6e can only ha#e peace an security when they are
capture.-
216
/aption 1&. -)aies, o you 3now that the two /ommunists are captureB Arom now on our #illage will be
secure. .here will be no more assassinations or ta! collectors. .he +hoeni! operation is #ery e**ecti#eI-
/aption 1L. -8r. 9a, since the two /ommunists are capture, our #illage is at peace. .oo ba they are in CailI (*
they returne to our sie be*orehan, it coul ha#e been better *or themI-
-.hey are obstinate inee. ,a they returne li3e 8r. .hanh *rom )ong Dien #illage, they certainly woul ha#e
enCoye the go#ernment<s clemency. 8r. .hanh is now reunite with his *amily.-
217
/aption 19. -8r. 9a, you ha#e some mail.-
-( woner who sens you this mailB-
-6ait an seeI-
/aption 20. -6hat oes the letter sayB-
-Dear 8r. 9a, 0ince you ha#e helpe the go#ernment by pro#iing in*ormation an unermining the local
structures o* the /ommunists, you will be reware accoringly. Hou are in#ite to atten the coming meeting o*
the +hoeni! =peration /ommittee to recei#e your awar. 0incerely yours.-
218
/aption 21. +oster says: -8r. ?guyen Van .hanh, *ormer guerrilla at )ong Dien #illage, :ia Fai District, 9ac
)ieu +ro#ince, has returne to the national sie. ,e there*ore is allowe to be reunite with his *amily.-
G4OSSARF
%%
%ir %merica: subsiiary airline o* the /entral (ntelligence %gency which was acti#e in
%sia uring the Vietnam 6ar
%gro#ille
$Khu .ru 8at': garrison community into which rural Vietnamese were *orce*ully relocate
in orer to isolate them *rom the Vietcong.
%(D
%gency *or (nternational De#elopment: branch o* the ".0. 0tate Department responsible
*or a#ising the go#ernment o* Vietnam, incluing the ?ational +olice
%(K %i-in-Kin: nonmonetary ai
%n ?inh .he Vietcong<s internal security an propagana ser#ice
%+/
%ccelerate paci*ication campaign: paci*ication program begun ?o#ember 19GL to
increase the number o* #illages rate -secure- uner the ,amlet ;#aluation 0ystem
%+.
%rme propagana team: platoon-si4e unit compose o* soliers with both a combat an
psychological-war*are mission
%FV? %rmy o* the Fepublic o* Vietnam
%0%
%rmy 0ecurity %gency: branch o* the ?ational 0ecurity %gency wor3ing with the ".0.
%rmy to locate the Vietcong through its raio communications
9iet Kich /ommano
/are ?ucleus o* traine personnel aroun which a larger organi4ation can be built
/%+
/ombine %ction +atrol: platoon-si4e unit compose o* ".0. 8arines an Vietnamese
.erritorial Aorces
/%0 /ontrolle %merican source: an employee o* the /(%
/D /i#ilian etainee: Vietnamese ci#ilian etaine by ".0. or Vietnamese military *orces
/D;/
/ombine Document ;!ploitation /enter: *orme =ctober 19GG to support allie military
operations primarily through the translation o* capture enemy ocuments
/:
/ensus :rie#ance: /(% co#en action program esigne to obtain in*ormation on the V/(
through static agents in #illages, or mobile agents in arme propagana teams
/(
/ounterintelligence: that aspect o* intelligence e#ote to estroying the e**ecti#eness o*
enemy intelligence acti#ities
/(/V
/ombine (ntelligence /enter, Vietnam: create in 19GE to coorinate ".0. an 0outh
Vietnamese intelligence operations
/(D
/riminal (n#estigation Di#ision: branch o* the ".0. %rmy charge with in#estigating
crimes committe by %merican soliers
/(D: /i#ilian (rregular De*ense :roup: ".0. 0pecial Aorces-traine #illage an tribal security
219
an reaction *orces
/(?/+%/
/ommaner in /hie*, +aci*ic: the ".0. military hea5uarters in ,awaii to which the
commaner o* 8%/V reporte
/(=
/entral (ntelligence =rgani4ation: *orme in 19G1 to coorinate 0outh Vietnamese
*oreign an omestic intelligence operations
/(0
/ombine (ntelligence 0ta**: *orme in ?o#ember 19GG to manage the attac3 against the
V/( in 0aigon an its en#irons
/8D/
/apital 8ilitary District /omman: *orme in >une 19GL to coorinate military an
paci*ication operations in 0aigon an its en#irons
/8;/
/ombine 8ateriel ;!ploitation /enter: *orme in 19GE to coorinate intelligence gaine
*rom the analysis o* capture enemy materiel
/=FD0
/i#il =perations an Fe#olutionary De#elopment 0upport: organi4ation establishe in
8ay 19G& uner 8%/V, esigne to coorinate ".0. military an ci#ilian operations an
a#isory programs in 0outh Vietnam
/=0V?
/entral =**ice o* 0outh Vietnam: mobile hea5uarters o* the 0outh Vietnamese
insurgency, create in 19G2
/+D/
/entral +aci*ication an De#elopment /ouncil: *orme in 19GL by 6illiam /olby, who
was then chie* o* /=FD0, as a liaison sta** to the o**ice o* the prime minister o* 0outh
Vietnam
/+,+=
/entral +hung ,oang +ermanent =**ice: *orme in >uly 19GL to manage the 0outh
Vietnamese attac3 against the V/(
/0/
/ombine 0ecurity /ommittee: *orme in 19GD to protect ".0. go#ernment personnel
an *acilities in 0aigon an its en#irons
/.
/ounterterrorist: mercenary solier employe by the /(% to 3ill, capture, an/or terrori4e
the V/(
/. (V
/ong .ac (V $also 3nown as /ounterterror (V': Coint ".0.-0outh Vietnamese program
begun in December 19GG, esigne to eliminate the V/( in 0aigon an its en#irons
/.0/
/ombine .actical 0creening /enter: *orme by the ".0. %rmy in 19G& to istinguish
prisoners o* war *rom ci#ilian etainees
/uc ?ghien /uu /entral Fesearch %gency: ?orth Vietnamese intelligence ser#ice
D%=
De*ense %ttachP =**ice: ".0. military hea5uarters that replace 8%/V in 19&N a*ter the
cease-*ire
D/( Director o* /entral (ntelligence: ".0. o**icial in charge o* managing the a**airs o* the /(%
D;+/=FD0
Deputy to the 8%/V commaner *or /i#il =perations an Fe#olutionary De#elopment
0upport
D:?+
Director :eneral o* the ?ational +olice: Vietnamese o**icial in charge o* the 0outh
Vietnamese police
D(=//
District (ntelligence an =perations /oorination /enter: o**ice o* the +hoeni! a#iser in
each o* 0outh Vietnam<s 2E0 istricts
D8M
Demilitari4e 4one: stretch o* lan along the se#enteenth parallel, create in 19ED to
separate ?orth an 0outh Vietnam
D0% District senior a#iser: senior /=FD0 o**icial in each o* 0outh Vietnam<s 2E0 istricts
A(
Aoreign (ntelligence: branch o* the /(% charge with inserting agents within *oreign
go#ernments
Aree Aire Mone:
%rea in 0outh Vietnam where ".0. military personnel ha the authority to 3ill anyone they
targete
:%8=
:roup aministrati#e mobile organi4ation: Arench-a#ise an -out*itte combat unit
compose o* 0outh Vietnamese soliers
:/8%
/omposite airborne commano group: Arench-a#ise an -out*itte antiguerrilla unit
compose mostly o* 8ontagnars
:V? :o#ernment o* Vietnam
,;0
,amlet ;#aluation 0ystem: computer system e#elope by the ".0. De*ense
Department in 19G& to measure trens in paci*ication
,(+
,amlet (n*ormant program: /(%-*une program manage by /(% o**icers in liaison with
the 0pecial 9ranch o* the 0outh Vietnamese ?ational +olice in which secret agents were
pai to ienti*y V/( in hamlets
hooch: Dwelling occupie by rural Vietnamese
,op .ac: +aci*ication (ntensi#e /apital %rea program, begun >uly 19GD to bring security to 0aigon
220
an its en#irons
,VF+
,igh Values Fewars +rogram: bounty program propose by the +hoeni! Directorate in
>uly 19&1 to inuce low- le#el V/( to turn in high-le#el V/(
(/;O
(ntelligence coorination an e!ploitation: original
name o* the +hoeni! program, *orme in >une 19G&
(=// (ntelligence =perations an /oorination /enter
(+%
(nternational +olice %caemy: school in the "nite 0tates where the %gency *or
(nternational De#elopment through its =**ice o* +ublic 0a*ety traine policemen *rom
*oreign countries *rom 19GN to 19&D
(0%
(nternational 0ecurity %**airs: o**ice within the ".0. De*ense Department responsible *or
super#ising security assistance programs such as +hoeni! in *oreign countries, e!cluing
?%.=
>%: >uge %#ocate :eneral: chie* prosecuting general within the ".0. arme *orces
>:0 >oint :eneral 0ta**: comman organi4ation o* the Fepublic o* Vietnam %rme Aorces
>( +ersonnel branch o* the >:0 or 8%/V
>2 (ntelligence branch o* the >:0 or 8%/V
>N =perations branch o* the >:0 or 8%/V
>D )ogistics branch o* the >:0 or 8%/V
>"0+%=
>oint " .0. +ublic %**airs =**ice: *orme in 8ay 19GE uner the o**ice o* the ".0.
(n*ormation %gency in 0outh Vietnam, to manage 8%/V psychological war*are
operations an public relations
KKK Khmer Kampuchea Krom: /amboian e!iles traine by the /(% in 0outh Vietnam
K8.
Kuomintang: o**icial ruling party o* the Fepublic o* /hina $.aiwan', *orme by Dr. 0un
Hat-sen in 1911
))D9 )uc )uong Duc 9iet: 0outh Vietnamese 0pecial Aorces
)FF+
)ong-range reconnaissance patrol: small team o* " .0. soliers sent to gather behin-
the-lines intelligence on enemy troops
)0. )aning 0hip .ransport: na#al #essel in which troops are o*ten 5uartere
8%/V
8ilitary %ssistance /omman, Vietnam: arri#e in 0aigon in Aebruary 19G2 as a uni*ie
comman uner the /ommaner in /hie*, +aci*ic, managing the ".0. military e**ort in
0outh Vietnam
8%%:
8ilitary %ssistance an %#isory :roup: arri#e in 0outh Vietnam in ?o#ember 19EE to
pro#ie support an training to the Fepublic o* Vietnam %rme Aorces. (ts *unction was
absorbe by 8%/V in 19GD.
8%0%
8ilitary %ssistance 0ecurity %#iser: ".0. military o**icer who manages a security
assistance program in a *oreign country
8%.
8obile a#isory team: team o* ".0. military personnel assigne to /=FD0, charge with
training an supporting the .erritorial 0ecurity Aorces o* 0outh Vietnam in a pro#ince or
istrict
8i3e Aorces:
8obile stri3e *orce commans: corps-le#el units uner the comman o* the Eth 0pecial
Aorces
8=(
8inistry o* the (nterior: branch o* the :V? with authority o#er paci*ication, incluing
+hung ,oang
800
8ilitary 0ecurity 0er#ice: counterintelligence branch o* the Fepublic o* Vietnam %rme
Aorces
80":
8ichigan 0tate "ni#ersity :roup: employees o* 8ichigan 0tate "ni#ersity contracte in
19ED to pro#ie technical assistance to the :V?
?(/
?ational (nterrogation /enter: /(% *acility built in 19GD insie /(= hea5uarters in the
na#al shipyar in 0aigon
?)A
?ational )iberation Aront: *orme in 19G0 by the #arious insurgent groups in 0outh
Vietnam
?+/
?ational +olice /omman: organi4e in >une 19&1 to incorporate +hung ,oang within
the e!isting ?ational +olice structure
?+/(0
?ational +olice /riminal (n*ormation 0ystem: computer system esigne to trac3
ienti*ie V/(
?+AA ?ational +olice Aiel Aorce: paramilitary branch o* the ?ational +olice
?+(%00
?ational +olice (n*rastructure %nalysis 0ub-0ection: ata ban3 containing biographical
in*ormation on the V/(, use to plan countermeasures
221
?+(/
?ational +olice (nterrogation /enter: locate at ?ational +olice hea5uarters on Vo .anh
0treet in 0aigon
?V% ?orth Vietnamese %rmy
=/=
=**ice o* /i#il =perations: *orme in 0aigon in ?o#ember 19GG to manage ".0.
paci*ication programs in 0outh Vietnam
=0% =**ice o* the 0pecial %ssistant: coe name *or the /(% station in 0aigon
+%T; +aci*ic %rchitects an ;ngineers: pri#ate company that i construction wor3 *or the :V?
+%%0
+aci*ication %ttitue %nalysis 0ystem: computer system esigne to assess the political
e**ects o* /=FD0 paci*ication programs
+%. +eople<s action team: /(% #ersion o* the stanar Vietcong arme propagana team
+/=/
+hoeni! /oorinators =rientation /ourse: begun ?o#ember 19GL at Vung .au<s
0eminary /amp to train +hoeni! coorinators
+,8(0
+hung ,oang 8anagement (n*ormation 0ystem: computer system containing
biographical an organi4ational ata on the V/(, create >anuary 19G9
+,F;;O
+hung ,oang ree!amination: stuy begun in 19&1, esigne to criti5ue the +hoeni!
program
+hung ,oang:
.he mythological Vietnamese bir o* conCugal lo#e that appears in times o* peace,
picture holing a *lute an representing #irtue, grace, an harmony. %lso the name
gi#en to the 0outh Vietnamese #ersion o* +hoeni!
+(/ +ro#ince (nterrogation /enter
+(//
+ro#ince (ntelligence /oorination /ommittee: establishe by ecree in ?o#ember 19GD
to ser#e as the senior intelligence agency in each pro#ince, but ne#er put into e**ect
+(=//
+ro#ince (ntelligence an =perations /oorination /enter: hea5uarters o* the +hoeni!
a#iser in each o* 0outh Vietnam<s *orty-*our pro#inces
+(F)
+otential intelligence recruitment lea: V/( remo#e *rom the +hoeni! blac3list an
approache to become an agent o* the /(%
+8
+aramilitary: branch o* the /(% that obtains intelligence through uncon#entional war*are
operations
+=(/
+ro#ince o**icer in charge: senior /(% o**icer in a pro#ince, super#ising both police liaison
an paramilitary operations
++
+olitical an +sychological: branch o* the /(% that manages blac3 propagana an
political liaison acti#ities
+F:
+ro#isional Fe#olutionary :o#ernment: *orme in >une 19G9 by the ?)A to negotiate the
reuni*ication o* ?orth an 0outh Vietnam
+F+
+eople<s Fe#olutionary party: create in >anuary 19G2 as the southern branch o* the
Vietnamese /ommunist party
+F"
+ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits: mercenary *orces uner the control o* the /(% in 0outh
Vietnam
+0%
+ro#ince senior a#iser: senior /=FD0 o**icial in each o* 0outh Vietnam<s *orty-*our
pro#inces
+0/
+ro#ince 0ecurity /ommittee: nonCuicial boy charge with the isposition o* capture
V/(
+0D +ublic 0a*ety Di#ision: branch o* /=FD0 responsible *or a#ising the ?ational +olice
+0/D +aci*ication 0ecurity /oorination Di#ision: /(% component o* /=FD0
+0DA +eople<s sel*-e*ense *orces: 0outh Vietnamese ci#ilian militia
psyops +sychological operations
psywar +sychological war*are
+.0D
+ost traumatic stress isorer: stress that continues a*ter the traumatic e#ent that
cause it
FD
Fe#olutionary De#elopment: /(% program to buil support *or the :V? in the pro#inces
o* 0outh Vietnam
FD/
Fe#olutionary e#elopment care: 0outh Vietnamese traine by the /(% at Vung .au to
persuae the citi4ens o* 0outh Vietnam to support the central go#ernment
FD//=
Fe#olutionary De#elopment /are, =perations: /(% o**icer in charge o* paramilitary
operations in a pro#ince
F/D/+
Fe#olutionary De#elopment /are, +lans: /(% o**icer in charge o* liaison with the
0pecial 9ranch in a pro#ince
222
FA/+A
Fegional Aorces an +opular Aorces: a ?ational :uar uner the control o* istrict an
pro#ince chie*s
F8K/9F>
Faymon 8orrison Knuson, 9rown Foot >organsen: pri#ate company that i
construction wor3 *or the :V?
F=(/ Fegion o**icer in charge: senior /(% o**icer in each o* the *our corps an 0aigon
FV?%A Fepublic o* Vietnam %rme Aorces
02
0ector intelligence a#iser: senior 8%/V intelligence a#iser to the 0outh Vietnamese
*orces in a pro#ince
0%/0%
0pecial %ssistant $to the chairman o* the >oint /hie*s o* 0ta**' *or /ounterinsurgency an
0pecial %cti#ities: o**ice within the >oint /hie*s with responsibility *or +hoeni! policy
0%F/
0pecial airmobile resource control: metho o* intericting V/( attempting to resupply
arme Vietcong guerrillas
0%V%
0pecial %ssistant *or Vietnamese %**airs: o**ice in the /(% reporting irectly to the
Director o* /entral (ntelligence on e#elopments in 0outh Vietnam
0/%: 0aigon /apital %#isory :roup
0;%) 0ea-%ir-)an: the ".0. ?a#y<s 0pecial Aorces
0;0
0pecial ;!ploitation 0er#ice: *orme in %pril 19GD as the >:0 counterpart to 0=:,
rename 0trategic .echnical Directorate in 0eptember 19L&
0(D;
0creening, interrogation, an etention o* the enemy: (/;O program begun in
0eptember 19G& to resol#e the problem o* separating genuine V/( *rom innocent ci#ilian
etainees
0(A"
0pecial (ntelligence Aorce "nits: small units *orme in 19&1 to replace +F", compose
o* 0pecial 9ranch an Aiel +olice
08(%.
0pecial 8ilitary (ntelligence %#isory .eam: *orme in 19GE to mount sophisticate
operations against the V/(
088
0aigon 8ilitary 8ission: /(% o**ice *orme in 19ED to help the 0outh Vietnamese conuct
psychological war*are against the Vietminh
0natch an snu** Kinap an 3ill
0=:
0pecial =perations :roup: Coint /(%-military organi4ation *orme in 19GD to conuct
operations outsie 0outh Vietnam in support o* 8%/V, but uner the control o* 0%/0%
0+
0pecial +olice: term use in re*erence to the /(%-a#ise an -*une 0pecial 9ranch o*
0outh Vietnamese ?ational +olice
.rung-oi biet 3ich
?ham ou:
people<s commano team, *orme by Aran3 0cotton in 19GD
"0%FV
"nite 0tates %rmy Fepublic o* Vietnam: create >uly 19GE at )ong 9inh to control all
logistical an aministrati#e units o* the ".0. %rmy in Vietnam
"0(0
"nite 0tates (n*ormation 0er#ice: branch o* the ".0. go#ernment responsible *or
conucting psychological operations o#erseas
.DH .emporary uty
.F%/
.arget Fesearch an %nalysis 0ection: create in >anuary 19GE to e#elop targets *or
0trategic %ir /omman 9-2Es in support o* 8%/V
V9(
Vietnamese 9ureau o* (n#estigation: precursor organi4ation to the 0pecial 9ranch, also
3nown as the /ong %n
V/ Vietcong: Vietnamese /ommunist
V/(
Vietcong in*rastructure: all /ommunist party members an ?)A o**icers, plus Vietcong
an ?V% saboteurs an terrorists
V/0 Vietcong suspect: Viemamese ci#ilian suspecte o* being V/(
V(0
Vietnamese (n*ormation 0er#ice: branch o* the :V? responsible *or conucting
psychological operations in 0outh Vietnam
V?JDD Vietnam Juoc Dan Dang: Vietnamese branch o* the Kuomintang
V?.A Vietnam .as3 Aorce: o**ice within (0% responsible *or Vietnam
NOTES
!HAPTER 2: Inrastructure
223
1. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0- $,earings be*ore the /ommittee on Aoreign Felations, ".0. 0enate, Aebruary
1&-20 an 8arch N, 1D, 1&, 19, 19&0', p. &2N.
2. 0tanley Karnow, Vietnam: % ,istory $?ew Hor3: Vi3ing, 19L2', p. G0.
N. Karnow, p. &G.
D. Karnow, p. L2.
E. Karnow, p. L&.
G. Da#i :alula, /ounter-(nsurgency 6ar*are: .heory an +ractice $?ew Hor3: +raeger, 19GD' p. L0
&. Fobert 0later, -.he ,istory, =rgani4ation an 8ous =perani o* the Viet /ong (n*rastructure- $De*ense (ntelligence
0chool, 8arch 19&0', p. N.
L. Fichar ,arris 0mith, =00: .he 0ecret ,istory o* %merica<s Airst /entral (ntelligence %gency $9er3eley: "ni#ersity
o* /ali*ornia +ress, 19&2', p. ND&.
9. ?guyen ?goc ,uy, "nerstaning Vietnam $.he D +/ (n*ormation 0er#ice, the ?etherlans, 19L2', p. LE.
10. (nter#iew with >ac3.
11. ;war )ansale, (n the 8ist o* 6ars $?ew Hor3: ,arper T Fow, 19&2', pp. &0- &2.
12. )ansale, p. &2.
1N. Ke#in :enerous, Vietnam: .he 0ecret 6ar $?ew Hor3: 9ison 9oo3s, 19LE', p. 9D.
1D. :enerous, p. GG.
(0. )ansale, p.211.
1G. ,uy, p. LE.
1&. >. >. Maslo**, -=rigins o* the (nsurgency in 0outh Vietnam 19ED-19G0- $Fan 8emoranum F8-E1GN', p. L.
1L. ?oam /homs3y, /ounter-Fe#olutionary Violence: 9loobaths in Aact an +ropagana $% 6arner 8oular
+ublication, 19&N, "0%', p. E&-1L.
19. ,uy, p. LE.
20. )ansale, p. ND0.
21. )ansale, p. NDN.
22. )ansale, p. NDD.
!HAPTER E: Internal Securit+
1. :raham :reene, .he Juiet %merican $?ew Hor3: Vi3ing, 19EG', p. L.
2. >e**rey Face, 6ar /omes to )ong %n $9er3eley: "ni#ersity o* /ali*ornia +ress, 19&2', p. 19.
N. Face, p. G&.
D. Face, p. E2.
E. Falph >ohnson, +hoeni!/+hung ,oang: % 0tuy o* 6artime (ntelligence 8anagement $6ashington D./.: %merican
"ni#ersity, 19LE', pp. N&-NL.
224
G. )ansale, pp. L2-LL.
&. (nter#iew with /lye 9auer.
L. Don 0chrane, -Aather ,oa<s )ittle 6ar, - .he 0aturay ;#ening +ost, Aebruary 1&, 19G2, p. &G.
9. 0chrane, p. &G.
10. (nter#iew with 9ernar Hoh.
11. 0later, pp. NL-N9.
12. 0later, p. EG.
1N. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. GD.
1D. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. &2.
1E. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0,- p. &2D.
1G. Karnow, p. D10.
1&. Face, p. 19G.
1L. (nter#iew with 6illiam /olby.
19. Karnow, p. 2LD.
!HAPTER C: !o-ert Action
1. (nter#iew with 0tu 8eth#en.
2. Falph >ohnson, +hoeni!/+hung ,oang: +lanne %ssassination or )egitimate /on*lict 8anagementI $6ashington
D./.: %merican "ni#ersity, 19L2', p. E.
N. 8eth#en inter#iew.
D. Falph >ohnson, +hoeni!/+hung ,oang: % 0tuy o* 6artime (ntelligence 8anagement $6ashington D./.: %merican
"ni#ersity, 19LE', p. DD1.
E. 8eth#en inter#iew.
G. Face, pp. 2N9-2D0.
&. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 2DE.
L. -%llege %ssassination +lots (n#ol#ing Aoreign )eaers- $9Dth /ongress, 1st 0ession, 0enate Feport ?o.9D-DGE:
/hurch 0elect /ommittee, 0enate 0elect /ommittee on :o#ernment =perations with Fespect to (ntelligence 1".0.
:.+.=., 19&E2, p. 2&L.
9. -%llege %ssassination +lots, - p. 1N9.
10. -%llege %ssassination +lots, - p. NNG.
11. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. &22.
12. (nter#iew with Aran3 0cot ton, >uly 19LG.
1N. ?go Vinh )ong, -.he /(% an the Vietnam Debacle- in "ncloa3ing the /(%, e. ,owar Ara4ier $?ew Hor3: .he
Aree +ress, 19&L', p. &2.
225
1D. 0cotton inter#iew.
1E. 0cotton inter#iew.
1G. Karnow, p. 2L1.
1&. ,uy, p. 9&.
1L. ,uy, p. 101.
19. ,uy, p. 110.
20. 0cotton inter#iew.
21. (nter#iew with 6alter 8ac3em.
!HAPTER A: Re-olutionar+ De-elo.)ent
1. 0cotton inter#iew.
2. +eer De0il#a, 0ub Fosa $?ew Hor3: ?ew Hor3 .imes 9oo3s, 19&L', p. 2D9.
N. De0il#a, p. 2D&.
D. De0il#a, p. 2DE.
E. De0il#a, p. 2E0.
G. )ansale, p. &E.
&. 0eymour ,ersh, /o#er-"p $?ew Hor3: Fanom ,ouse, 19&2', p. LE.
L. (nter#iew with .om Donohue.
9. ,uy, p. 12N.
10. 9uy, p. 12N.
11. 0cotton inter#iew.
12. 6illiam %. ?ighswonger, Fural +aci*ication in Vietnam $?ew Hor3: +raeger, 19GG', p. 29L.
!HAPTER @: PI!s
1, :alula, p. 11&.
2. 0later, p. 21.
N. :alula, p. 12D.
D. 0cotton inter#iew.
E. >ohn 8ar3s, .he 0earch *or the 8anchurian /aniate $?ew Hor3: ?ew Hor3 .imes 9oo3s, 19&9', p. 1&L.
G. 8ar3s, p. 1&9.
&. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. D00.
L. 8aCor :eneral >oseph 8c/hristian, .he Fole o* 8ilitary (ntelligence 19GE-19G& $6ashington D./.: Department o*
the %rmy, 19&D', p. 1D.
226
9. 8c/hristian, p. &1.
10. 8c/hristian, p. E0.
11. 8c/hristian, p. 2G.
!HAPTER 3: /iel' Police
1. (nter#iew with 6illiam :rie#es.
2. )etter to the author *rom ?guyen Van Dai.
N. (nter#iew with Douglas 8c/ollum.
!HAPTER :: S.ecial 0ranch
1. (nter#iew with ?elson ,enry 9ric3ham.
2. (nter#iew with .om Donohue.
N. 6arren 8ilberg, -.he Auture %pplicability o* the +hoeni! +rogram- $Fesearch 0tuy, Feport V1LNE-&D, %ir
/omman an 0ta** /ollege, %ir "ni#ersity, 8a!well %ir Aorce 9ase, 8ay 19&D', pp. NN-ND.
D. :alula, p. 120.
E. .he ,eral .ribune, =ctober 21, 19GE.
G. %nthony ,erbert, 0olier $?ew Hor3: 9olt Finehart T 6inston, 19&N', pp. 10E-10G.
&. 9erbert, p. 10G.
L. 8ilberg, p. E0.
9. 8ilberg, p. ND.
10. :alula, p. 110.
11. (nter#iew with >ames 6ar.
12. (nter#iew with 0am Dra3ulich.
!HAPTER B: Attac& on the V!I
1. .he +entagon +apers $6ashington D./.: ".0. Department o* De*ense, 19&1',
Vol. V, p. EL.
2. 9ric3ham inter#iew.
N. .he +entagon +apers, Vol. V, pp. 120-122.
D. ?elson 9ric3ham, -%ttac3 on the V/(- $0aigon: ?o#ember 19GG', p. 1.
E. 9ric3ham, -%ttac3,- p. 1.
G. 9ric3ham, -%ttac3,- p. D.
&. 9ric3ham, - %ttac3,- p. D.
L. 8c/hristian, p. &2.
9. 8c/hristian, p. &2.
227
10. 8c/hristian, p. &D.
11. (nter#iew with .ulius %campora.
12. (nter#iew with Dang Van 8inh.
1N. (nter#iew with )awrence .racy.
1D. 8c/hristian, p. &L.
1E. (nter#iew with Fobert 6all.
!HAPTER 9: I!EX
1. 9ric3ham inter#iew.
2. ?elson 9ric3ham, - % +roposal *or the /oorination an 8anagement o* (ntelligence +rograms an %ttac3 on the
V/ (n*rastructure an )ocal (rregular Aorces $0aigon: >une 19G&', p. 1.
N. 9ric3ham, -+roposal, - p. N.
D. 9ric3ham, -+roposal, - p. D.
E. (nter#iew with ;#an >. +ar3er, >r.
G. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 1&D.
&. 8c/hristian, p. &G.
L. (nter#iew with ;war 9ray.
9. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 110.
10. 6ar inter#iew.
!HAPTER 2I: Action Progra)s
1. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 19G.
2. +ar3er inter#iew.
N. %campora inter#iew.
D. %t 0antoli, ;#erything 6e ,a $?ew Hor3: 9allantine 9oo3s, 19LD', p. 202.
E. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 200.
G. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 200.
&. 9ric3ham inter#iew.
L. (nter#iew with Fobert 9rewer.
9. 6ar inter#iew.
10. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 19L.
11. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 19&.
12. -+roCect .a3e-=**- $0aigon@ ".0. 8ilitary %ssistance /omman, Vietnam, ?o#ember 19G&' p. N.
228
1N. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. N91.
1D. )etter to the author *rom Fanolph 9er3eley.
1E. 8ilberg, p. G0.
1G. 8ilberg, p. G1.
1&. (nter#iew with Fobert 0later.
1L. 8ilberg, p. G1.
19. .ran Van .ruong, % Vietcong 8emoir $?ew Hor3: ,arcourt 9race >o#ano#ich, 19LE', p. 10L.
20. .ruong, p. 110.
21. -+roCect .a3e-=**, - p. N.
!HAPTER 22: PR"
1. 0cot ton inter#iew.
2. Donohue inter#iew.
N. 6ar inter#iew.
D. Faymon 9onner, 6alt4ing with a Dictator $?ew Hor3: Fanom ,ouse, 19L&' p. &E.
E. (nter#iew with Fobert +eartt.
G. .he +entagon +apers, Vol. V, p. 120.
&. :rie#es inter#iew.
L. 8c/ollum inter#iew.
9. Da#i 6elch, -+aci*ication in Vietnam, - Famparts, =ctober 19G&, p. N9.
10. 8ilberg, p. N9.
11. (nter#iew with >ohn 6ilbur.
12. +ar3er inter#iew.
1N. 9ric3ham inter#iew.
1D. 0antoli, pp. 20N-20D.
1E. 0antoli, p. 20D.
1G. 0antoli, p. 20E.
1&. 0antoli, pp. 21&-21L.
1L. (nter#iew with )ouis )apham.
!HAPTER 2E: Tet
1. 9ric3ham inter#iew.
229
2. %campora inter#iew.
N. )apham inter#iew.
D. )apham inter#iew.
E. (nter#iew with Fen4 ,oe3sema.
G. 6ilbur inter#iew.
&. (nter#iew with ,owar 0tone.
L. Karnow, p. E1D.
9. (nter#iew with .om 8c/oy.
10. (nter#iew with 6arren 8ilberg.
11. Karnow, p. E2N.
12. (nter#iew with Fuy ;ners.
1N. Karnow, p. EN2.
1D. .he +entagon +apers, 0enator :ra#el eition $9oston: 9eacon +ress, 19&1', Vol. (V, p. E&L.
1E. 0later, p. DL.
1G. 9uy, p. 129.
1&. (nter#iew with Fobert (nman.
1L. )etter to the author *rom )ionel Fosenblatt.
19. (nter#iew with :eorge Arench.
20. 0later, p. i!.
21. 9ray inter#iew.
22. 9uy, p. 1N0.
2N. 9uy, p. 1NG.
2D. 9uy, p. 1N0.
2E. -0tatus o* +hoeni!/+hung 9oang *or +erio >anuary->une 19GL- $0aigon, 8%/ /=FD0, +hoeni! Aact 0heet,
%ugust 10, 19GL, )./ )emire'.
2G. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 2&E.
2&. >ohn /oo3, .he %#isor $+hilaelphia, +a.: Dorrance, 19&N', p. 19E.
2L. 6all inter#iew.
!HAPTER 2C: Paralla5 Vie%s
1. 9rewer inter#iew.
2. 8ilberg inter#iew.
230
N. 8an4ione inter#iew.
!HAPTER 2A: Phoeni5 in /light
1. 8ilberg inter#iew.
2. 8ilberg, p. G2.
N. 8ilberg, p. DD.
D. 8ilberg, p. E0.
E. 8ilberg, p. E1.
G. 8ilberg, p. EN.
&. 8ilberg, p. E&.
L. (nter#iew with Douglas Dillar.
9. )etter to the author *rom 9ruce +almer.
10. 6ar inter#iew.
11. 0antoli, p. 20D.
12. 8c/hristian, p. 100.
!HAPTER 2@: Mo'us Vi-en'i
1. Dillar inter#iew.
2. 0later, p. EG.
N. (nter#iew with >ac3.
D. (nter#iew with 9rian 6illson.
E. Dinh .uong %n, -.he .ruth %bout +hoeni!- $0aigon, .in 0ang, 19&0-&1'.
G. %n, -.ruth.-
&. %n, -.ruth.-
L. %n, -.ruth.-
9. %n, -.ruth.-
10. %n, -.ruth.-
11. %n, -.ruth.-
12. %n, -.ruth.-
1N. 8ilberg inter#iew.
1D. %n, -.ruth.-
1E. %n, -.ruth.-
231
1G. %n, -.ruth.-
1&. Dillar inter#iew.
1L. %n, -.ruth.-
19. %n, -.ruth.-
20. .ruong, p. 11N.
21. .ruong, p. 11&.
22. .ruong, p. 11&.
2N. Aran3 0nepp, Decent (nter#al $?ew Hor3: Fanom ,ouse, 19&L', p. N1.
2D. 0nepp, p. NL.
!HAPTER 23: A'-isers
1. Dillar inter#iew.
2. 6ar inter#iew.
N. )etter to the author *rom :eorge De!ter.
D. 8ilberg, p. DG.
E. (nter#iew with ,enry 8c6ae.
G. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. 2GE.
&. 9ray inter#iew.
L. .ruong, p. 1NG.
!HAPTER 2:: Accelerate' Paciication
1. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. &1G.
2. .homas .hayer, % 0ystems %nalysis o* the Vietnam 6ar 19GE-19&2, Vol. 10: +aci*ication an /i#il %**airs
$6ashington D./.: =**ice o* the %ssistant 0ecretary o* De*ense, 19&E', pp. D0-DN.
N. +eartt inter#iew.
D. 6ilbur inter#iew.
E. 6illiam /olby, ,onorable 8en $?ew Hor3: 0imon T 0chuster, 19&L', pp. 2G0-2GN.
G. ,uy, p. 1D1.
&. /oo3, p. 11N.
L. Face, p. 2N9.
9. Face, p. 2N9.
10. Face, p. 2D0.
11. 8c/oy inter#iew.
232
12. )etter to the author *rom Aran3 6alton.
1N. /olby, pp. 20&-20L.
1D. Dillar inter#iew.
1E. (nter#iew with Fichar 9raish.
1G. (nter#iew with 6alter Kolon.
1&. /oo3, p. 20L.
1L. Face, p. 2NL.
19. 9ric3ham an 6ar inter#iews.
20. /olby, p. 2G9.
21. >ac3 inter#iew.
!HAPTER 2B: Transitions
1. 9ray inter#iew.
2. 9ric3ham inter#iew.
N. (nter#iew with 0helby Foberts.
D. >ohn 9erry, .hose :allant 8en on .rial in Vietnam $?o#ato, /ali*.: +resiio +ress, 19LD', p. EG.
E. 8c6ae inter#iew.
G. Dillar inter#iew.
&. (nter#iew with Falph 8c:ehee.
L. Falph 8c:ehee, Dealy Deceits $?ew Hor3: 0herian 05uare +ress, 19LN' p. 1D1.
9. 8c:ehee, p. 1D2.
10. 8c:ehee, p. 1D2.
11. -,earing on the ?omination o* 6illiam /olby- $/ommittee on %rme 0er#ices, ".0. 0enate, >uly 2, 20, 2E, 19&N',
p. EG.
12. .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, ?o#ember 10, 19LD.
1N. .he 9oston :lobe, ?o#ember 1D, 19LD, p. 10.
1D. .he 9oston :lobe, ?o#ember 1D, 19LD, p. 10.
1E. .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, ?o#ember, 21, 19LD, p. 92.
1G. -,earing on the ?omination o* 6illiam /olby,- p. E&.
1&. 8c:ehee, pp. 12&-12L.
1L. 8c:ehee, p. 12L.
19. 8c:ehee, p. LD.
233
20. 8c:ehee, pp. L2-LN.
21. 8c:ehee, p. 1DE.
22. /olby inter#iew.
2N. /olby, p. 2GG.
2D. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. N&0.
2E. )apham inter#iew.
2G. (nter#iew with .e 0hac3ley.
2&. -+hoeni! Feorgani4ation- $0aigon, 8%//=FD0, Aebruary G, 19G9', cite in >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. N&0.
2L. +ar3er inter#iew.
29. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. N&2.
N0. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. N0D.
!HAPTER 29: Ps+o.s
1. -+hung ,oang/+hoeni! 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport- $0aigon, 8%//=FD0, Aebruary 2L, 19&0', p. D-N.
2. 0cott 9rec3enrige, .he /(% an the "0 (ntelligence 0ystem $9ouler, /olo.: 6est#iew +ress, 19LE', p. 1&0.
N. 6illiam .urley, Aar ;ast %sian ;conomic Fe#iew, 8ay 2, 19LE.
D. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 9-G.
E. %n, -.ruth.-
G. 6ar inter#iew.
&. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 9-G-1.
L. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 9-N-1.
9. -+hung ,oang Fesults Due Directly to +syops- $0aigon, 8%//=FD0, +hoeni! Directorate, December G, 19&0'.
10. /oo3, p. 1L2.
11. >ohnson, % 0tuy@ p. NEE.
12. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 9-10-N.
1N. %n, -.ruth.-
1D. -+hung ,oang Fesults Due Directly to +syops.-
1E. -+hung 9oang/phoeni! +rogram- $6ashington D./.: .he >oint /hie*s o* 0ta**, 8emoranum *or the 0ecretary o*
De*ense, >/08-N9D-&0, %ugust 1E, 19&0, *rom 8aCor :eneral Aran3 9. /lay, Deputy Director, >oint 0ta**'.
1G. -+hung ,oang Fesults Due Directly to +syops.-
1&. >oseph .reaster, -.he +hoeni! 8urers, - +enthouse, December 19&E, p. 1D&.
1L. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 9-(-2.
234
19. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 9-2-1-G.
20. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 9-2-1-G.
21. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 9-l-l to 9-(-N.
22. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. D-&.
2N. .reaster, p. 1D&.
2D. /olby, p. 2G9.
2E. >ohnson, % 0tuy, pp. N0D-N0E.
2G. -0pecial /ollection +rogram 9(: 8%/K- $0aigon, 8%//=FD0, 8%/>212-2
Aact 0heet, December L, 19&0'.
2&. Dillar inter#iew.
2L. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, pp. L an /.
29. 19G9 ;n o* Hear Feport, pp. L an /.
N0. -.rac3ing o* %rreste (ni#iuals- $0aigon, /=FD0 +ublic 0a*ety Aact 0heet, ). 8. Fosen, ?o#ember 2&, 19&0'.
N1. -?ational +olice Feeployment /oncept- $0aigon, /=FD0 +ublic 0a*ety Aact 0heet, ). 8. Fosen, December L,
19&0'.
!HAPTER EI: Reor)s
1. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. D0G.
2. 8inistry o* (nterior /ircular &E&, -/lassi*ication an Fehabilitation o* =**eners, - 0aigon, 8arch 21, 19G9.
N. >ohnson, % 0tuy, p. D0G.
D. 8inistry o* (nterior /ircular 2212, -(mpro#ements o* the 8ethos o* Fesol#ing the 0tatus o* =**eners,- 0aigon,
%ugust 20, 19G9.
E. (nter#iew with )ien >ohnson.
G. (nter#iew with ,arry >ohnson.
&. (nter#iew with )ien >ohnson.
L. (nter#iew with .om +olgar.
9. 9ray inter#iew.
10. Kamow, pp. DD0-DD1.
11. >ohnson, % 0tuy, pp. N&D-N&E.
12. ;ners inter#iew.
1N. /ite in -.he +hoeni!/+hung 9oang an +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits $+F"' +rograms, - unate
8emoranum *or the 0ecretary o* De*ense, *rom :eneral %brams.
1D. -.he +hoeni!/+hung 9oang an +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits $+F"' +rograms.-
1E. -.he +hoeni!/+hung 9oang an +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits $+F"' +rograms.-
235
1G. -.he +hoeni!/+hung ,oang an +ro#incial Feconnaissance "nits $+F"' +rograms.-
1&. (nter#iew with >ac3.
1L. (nter#iew with 8ichael 8c/ann.
19. (nter#iew with Are Dic3.
!HAPTER E2: Deca+
1. 9uy, p. 1N9.
2. ,uy, p. 1DG.
N. )ansate, p. NDN.
D. 0nepp, p. 1En.
E. 0cotton inter#iew.
G. -9earing on the ?omination o* 6illiam /olby,- p. EL.
&. 8c:ehee inter#iew.
L. 8c:ehee, pp. 1EN-1ED.
9. 8c:ehee, p. 1ED.
10. 8c:ehee, p. 1ED.
11. 8c:ehee, p. 1EN.
12. 8ichael 8aclear, .he .en .housan Day 6ar $?ew Hor3: 0t. 8artin<s +ress, 19L1', p. 2G1.
1N. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam- $Aoreign =perations an :o#ernment (n*ormation 0ubcommittee,
/ommittee on :o#ernment =perations, >uly 1E, 1G, 19, 21 an %ugust 2, 19&1', p. 10E.
1D. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 10E.
1E. 8aclear, p. 2GN.
1G. 0nepp, p. 12.
1&. (nter#iew with ; 8urphy.
1L. ;rwin Knoll, -.he 8ysterious +roCect +hoeni!,- .he +rogressi#e, Aebruary 19&0.
19. Knoll.
20. :eorgie %nne :eyer, -.he /(%<s ,ire Killers, - .rue, Aebruary 19&0.
!HAPTER EE: Hearings
1. .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, Aebruary 1&, 19&0.
2. 0tate Department .elegram 02DN91 *rom /layton 8c8anaway to 6illiam 0ulli#an, 0ubCect: -0enate ,earings, -
Aebruary 1&, 19&0.
N. :rie#es inter#iew.
D. )etter to the author *rom ?guyen Van Dai.
236
E. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 200.
G. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 201.
&. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 201.
L. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 201.
9. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 201.
10. :eyer.
11. /olby inter#iew.
12. ?eil 0heehan, -%n %merican 0olier in Vietnam, +art (((: %n %ll-Foun 8an,- .he ?ew Hor3er, >une 20, 19LL, pp.
ED-EE.
1N. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 212.
1D. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 11L.
1E. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 119.
1G. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 120.
1&. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 120.
1L. 8ichael Drosnin, -+hoeni!: .he /(%<s 9iggest %ssassination +rogram- $?ew .imes, %ugust 22, 19&E', p. 19.
19. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 20E.
20. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 20E-20G.
21. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 20G.
22. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 20G.
2N. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 20&.
2D. -Vietnam +olicy an +rospects 19&0, - p. 10D.
2E. 9uy, p. 1D1.
2G. .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, Aebruary 22, 19&0.
2&. -+hung ,oang/phoeni! +rogram- $6ashington D./. : .he >oint /hie*s o* 0ta**, %ugust 1E, 19&0, 8emoranum *or
the 0ecretary o* De*ense *rom 8aCor :eneral Aran3 9. /lay, Deputy Director, >oint 0ta**' $herea*ter calle the /lay
memo', p. 2.
2L. /lay memo, p. L.
29. +hung ,oang %#iser ,anboo3 $0aigon, 8%//=FD0, ?o#ember 20, 19&0', p. 10.
N0. /olby, p. 2GL.
N1. >ohnson, % 0tuy, pp. ND1-ND2.
N2. 9ray inter#iew.
NN. 8urphy inter#iew.
237
!HAPTER EC: Dissension
1. Karnow, p, G0G.
2. (nter#iew with )ucy ?hiem 9ong ?guyen.
N. Kamow, p. G0L.
D. (nter#iew with .homas +. 8c:re#ey.
E. Karnow, p. G10.
G. /homs3y, p. E&-2G.
&. 0enate /ommittee on Aoreign Felations: /amboia, 8ay 19&0 0ta** Feport, p. E.
L. (nter#iew with +hilip %gee in +layboy, 8arch 19&E, p. G0.
9. -+hung ,oang 19&0 ;n o* Hear Feport- $0aigon, 8%//=FD0, +hung ,oang Directorate, 8ay 11, 19&1', p. DN.
10. 19&0 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 1N.
11. Karnow, p. G11.
12. Karnow, p. G12.
1N. Karnow, p. GND.
!HAPTER EA: Transgressions
1. 8c/ollum inter#iew.
2. +ar3er inter#iew.
N. -/alley De*ense %s3s Disclosure o* .op-0ecret Data on 0ong 8y,- .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, %ugust 2E, 19&0.
D. 6all inter#iew.
E. ,ersh, p. L&.
G. ,ersh, p. LL.
&. 9ersh, p. LL.
L. ,ersh, p. LL.
9. ,ersh, p. LL.
10. 8yra 8ac+herson, )ong .ime +assing $?ew Hor3: 0ignet, 19LD', p. G2E.
11. >oseph :olstein, .he 8y )ai 8assacre an (ts /o#er-up $?ew Hor3: .he Aree +ress, 19&G', p. 2EG.
12. ,ersh, p. 9N.
1N. ,ersh, p. 9N.
1D. ,ersh, p. 9E.
1E. :olstein, p. 1DE.
238
1G. ,ersh, p. 9E.
1&. :olstein, p. NN9.
1L. :olstein, p. 2&0.
19. :olstein, p. 2&&.
20. :olstein, p. 2&L.
21. :olstein, p. 2LL.
22. :olstein, p. N1N.
2N. ,ersh, pp. 1LL-1L9.
2D. 8ac+herson, p. G2E.
2E. (nter#iew with :eorge Da#is.
2G. >e**rey 0tein an 8ichael .. Klare, -Arom the %shes: +hoeni!,- /ommonweal, %pril 20, 19&E, p. 1E9.
2&. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. EN.
2L. Drosnin, p. 2D.
29. Drosnin, p. 2D.
N0. Drosnin, p. 2N.
N1. Don )uce, ,ostages o* 6ar $(nochina Fesource /enter, 19&N' p. 2G.
N2. )uce, p. 2&.
NN. )uce, p. 2D.
!HAPTER E@: Da Nang
1. (nter#iew with Daniel >erry 9ishop.
2. (nter#iew with 9ill .aylor.
!HAPTER E3: Re-isions
1. /lay memo, p. 2.
2. 19&0 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. #.
N. 19&0 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. E1.
D. -?ational +olice Feeployment /oncept.-
E. Dillar inter#iew.
G. )uce, p. N0.
&. 19&0 ;n o* Hear Feport, p. 19.
L. .hayer, p. L2.
239
9. .hayer, p. 99.
10. :rie#es inter#iew.
11. .hayer, p. 9E.
12. /lay memo, p. L.
1N. /lay memo, p. N.
1D. )etter to the author *rom ,arol /hil.
1E. (nter#iew with /hester 8c/oi.
1G. Kolon inter#iew.
1&. (nter#iew with >ames 9unt.
1L. /olby inter#iew.
19. -Fesponse to %mbassaor /olby<s /hec3 )ist- $to 6illiam 0ulli#an, Deputy %ssistant 0ecretary o* 0tate, *rom
Fichar Aun3houser, =**ice o* the Deputy *or /=FD0, (( Aiel Aorce Vietnam, December 1, 19&0'.
20. (nter#iew with 6alt 9urmester.
21. ;ners inter#iew.
22. (nter#iew with Donal :regg.
2N. /lay memo, p. &.
2D. -(nternal 0ecurity in 0outh Vietnam-+hoeni!,- December 12, 19&0.
2E. (nter#iew with +aul /oughlin.
2G. %campora inter#iew.
!HAPTER E:: 4egalities
1. >ohnson, +lanne %ssassination.
2. (nter#iew with 6illiam +hillips.
N. .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, %pril 1&, 19&1, p. E.
D. -" .0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 20G.
E. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 192.
G. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 19D.
&. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 19E.
L. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 19E.
9. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 19&.
10. -" .0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 20G.
11.. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 20&.
240
12. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 20L.
1N. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 20L.
1D. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 2N&.
1E. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 2E1.
1G. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 2E1.
1&. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 2E2.
1L. -" .0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 2LN.
19. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. N1N.
20. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. N1D.
21. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. N1E.
22. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. N21.
2N. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam- %itional Views o* 9on. +aul ?. 8c/los3ey, >r. $/oncurre in by 9on.
9enCamin 0. Fosenthal, 9on. >ohn /onyers, >r., an 9on. 9ella 0. %b4ug', pp. 10E-10&.
2D. -".0. %ssistance +rograms in Vietnam,- p. 191.
2E. (nter#iew with 0i .owle.
2G. .owle inter#iew.
2&. 6. :age 8c%*ee, -;n o* .our Feport- $0aigon, /=FD0 ++T+, %ugust 11, 19&1', p. E.
2L. -;n o* .our Feport: 6. :age 8c%*ee, /omments o* Fe#iewing =**icer- $0aigon, /=FD0 ++T+, unate, signe
by ?orman ). 0weet, Director, +lans, +olicy an +rograms', p. 2.
29. -%n .ri Fe*orms-0aigon 191D0- $/able to 6illiam ,. 0ulli#an *rom ".0. 0tate Department )egal %#iser Fobert (.
0tarr, December 1N, 19&1'.
!HAPTER EB: Technicalities
1. (nter#iew with /ornelius >. =<0hea, >r.
2. /oughlin inter#iew.
N. (nter#iew with :eorge ,uman.
D. -Fecommene Feorgani4ation o* the +hung ,oang +rogram- $0tate Department .elegram 19G0G0 *rom 0ecretary
o* 0tate 6illiam Fogers to %mbassaor ;llsworth 9un3er in 0aigon, in response to /=8"08%/V 129L1G'.
E. (nter#iew with Fob 0immons.
G. /olby inter#iew.
&. 6all inter#iew.
L. -.he ;#olution o* %merican 8ilitary (ntelligence- $.he ".0. %rmy (ntelligence /enter an 0chool, At. ,uachuca,
%ri4ona, 8ay 19&N', p. 11&.
9. (nter#iew with .om +olgar.
241
10. ;ners inter#iew.
11. Drosnin, p. 21.
12. 8ichael .. Klare, -=peration +hoeni! an the Aailure o* +aci*ication in 0outh Vietnam- $)iberation, 8ay 19&N', p.
2E.
1N. (nter#iew with )ew 8illett.
1D. (nter#iew with 0tan Aulcher.
1E. -%n .ri =bser#ations an Fecommenations- $0aigon, 8%//=FD0, +hoeni! Directorate, *rom >ohn .ilton to the
Director, /=FD0 ++T+, %pril 11, 19&2', p. 1.
1G. -%n .ri =bser#ations an Fecommenations.-
1&. -%n .ri Fe*orm- $Department o* 0tate .elegram 0291& *rom %mbassaor 9un3er in 0aigon to 0ecretary o* 0tate
6illiam Fogers in 6ashington, 8arch 19&2', p. 1.
1L. -%n .ri- $Dra*t %irgram *rom 0aigon embassy political o**icer 0te#en 6inship to the Department o* 0tate on %pril
2&, 19&2', p. 2.
19. -0pecial +hung 9oang /ampaign in the Delta- $0tate Department .elegram 2&11D9M, %pril 19&2, %mbassaor
;llsworth 9un3er'.
20. -+resiential Decree )aw on %ministrati#e Detention an %n .ri +roceeings- $0tate Department .elegram
0E0EEGM, >anuary 19&N, %mbassaor ;llsworth 9un3er'.
21. -+hung ,oang 0pecial /ampaign $AG' ;ns- $0tate Department .elegram 0E1NNDM, >anuary 19&N, %mbassaor
;llsworth 9un3er', p. N.
22. -+hung 9oang +rogram- $Department o* 0tate .elegram 0ED22L *rom 0ecretary o* 0tate 6illiam Fogers to the
0aigon embassy, 8arch 19&2', p. 2.
!HAPTER E9: Phoeni5 in /la)es
1. Dillar inter#iew.
2. 0tein an Klare, -Arom the %shes,- p. 1E9.
N. -/ease*ire an +olitical 0itrep 8F 1, O +lus 1N&, >une 1D- $Department o* 0tate .elegram 1D1DNEM *rom /harles
6hitehouse, >une 19&N'.
D. (nter#iew with 9ruce )awlor.
E. .hayer, p. 10N.
G. 9ray inter#iew.
&. ,uy, p. 1EE.
L. 8c/ollum inter#iew.
9. Are 9ran*man, -0outh Vietnam<s +olice an +rison 0ystem- in "ncloa3ing the /(%, e. 9owar Ara4ier $?ew Hor3:
.he Aree +ress, 19&L', p. 10N.
10. :rie#es inter#iew.
11. (nter#iew with +hilip %gee in +layboy, 8arch 19&E, pp. DL-G0.
12. -8aster o* Deceit- $?%/)%<s -)atin %merica an ;mpire Feport,- December 10, 19&D', pp. 1N-1E.
242
1N. Fobert Kaylor, "+( 9ang3o3, >anuary L, 19&E.
1D. -+hoeni! +rogram-%nother Aalse "+( Feport- $Department o* 0tate .elegram 111N1&M *rom %mbassaor :raham
8artin to the 0ecretary o* 0tate, >anuary 19&N'.
1E. +V. inter#iew.
1G. 0nepp, p. DEG.
1&. 0nepp, p. EG&.
EPI4OG"E
1. Aulcher inter#iew.
2. ,uy, pp. 1GL-1&0.
N. %llan ?airn, -/on*essions o* a Death 05ua =**icer, - .he +rogressi#e, 8arch 19LG, pp. 2G-N0.
D. >ay +eter4ell, -.he /(% an +olitical Violence in ;l 0al#aor, - Airst +rinciples, Vol. 10, ?o. 2, ?o#ember/December
19LD, pp. 1-2.
E. -:eorge 9ush<s (ran-/ontra %lbatross, - ".0. ?ews T 6orl Feport, >anuary 1L, 19LL, p. 2N.
G. -:eorge 9ush<s (ran-/ontra %lbatross.-
&. Dennis Vol3man, -0al#aoran Death 05uas: % /(% /onnectionB,- .he /hristian 0cience 8onitor, 8ay L, 19LD.
L. .he 9oston :lobe, >uly 10, 19LD.
9. +amela /onstable, -;l 0al#aor .argets Febels< Volcano 0tronghol,- .he 9oston :lobe, >anuary 19LE.
10. >ames Dic3ey, 6ith the /ontras $?ew Hor3: 0imon T 0chuster, 19LE', pp. 2ED-2EG.
11. Dic3ey, pp. 2ED-2E&.
12. .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, ?o#ember 2, 19LD.
1N. -%ies: /(% /hie*s Din<t =3ay :uie,- .he 9oston :lobe, =ctober 2D, 19LD, p. &.
1D. -/(% 8anual 0ai 9ase on =l (eas,- .he 9oston :lobe, =ctober 29, 19LD, p. N.
1E. -Feagan ?ow 0ays 8anual 6as 8istranslate,W .he ?ew Hor3 .imes, ?o#ember D, 19LD, p. 21.
1G. Dic3ey, p. 2E&.
1&. 9eth 9aw3ins, -+astora: ?orth 6as 9ehin 9ombing,- .he .ico .imes, 0an >ose, /osta Fica, 8ay 1E, 19L&.
243

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