Article I.

National Territory
Magalona v. Ermita

Facts:
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines
was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with
the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified
by the Philippines in February 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties
this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a archipelagic waters
which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage
by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty
and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo
de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Issue:
Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire,
or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to
acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of
sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the
old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the
Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But
under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our
maritime are increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.



Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA
9522:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial
sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as our
internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these
waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international
law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime
of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law,
since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones in short, they are
not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island
group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would
already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the
natural contour of the archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through
effective occupation.

NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we
exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the
right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by Article 77
of the UNCLOS.

Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Key
Facts:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which
were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation
issued by General MacArthur that all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control had the
effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of
the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such
authority.
During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and
jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive
Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.
Issues:
1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts during a de facto government are good and valid.
2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to annul and void thereby all judgments
and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation.
3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing
prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may
continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were
reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
Held:
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law
(Vol. 2, p. 444): The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy
while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right
to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly
from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the
writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The
municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in
force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts
of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at
his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.
According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has
been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of
sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an
invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts
done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so
done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the
various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal
law, remain good.
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a
political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a
belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur
on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the
governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not
have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. NO. The phrase processes of any other government is broad and may refer not only to
the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional,
processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in
the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above
indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments
during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after
the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be
presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
MacArthur, in using the phrase processes of any other government in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is
suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the
invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues
the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined,
unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War states that in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated
but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. And Taylor in this connection says:
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to
substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and
judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and
institution so far as military necessity will permit. Undoubtedly, this practice has been
adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily
deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government
established by the occupant of transient character.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that
the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As
Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles a state or other governmental
entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and
duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous
to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the
external force, and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole
fibre and content.
In re Letter of Associate Justice Puno
Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated
Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in
the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of
the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized
and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "An
Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was
then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy
minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about
reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was
created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her
legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being
the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he
now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to
the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's
request. A motion for consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were
affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such
reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the
date of his last appointment.
Issue:
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that
would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No.
33.
Held:
The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was
created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government
of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete
overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or
political system, usually effected with violence. A government as a result of people's
revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries
like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres.
Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the
present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: