Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152542 July 8, 2004
MONFORT HERMANOS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, as represented by MA.
ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO B. MONFORT III, MA. LUISA MONFORT ASCALON, ILDEFONSO B. MONFORT, ALFREDO B.
MONFORT, CARLOS M. RODRIGUEZ, EMILY FRANCISCA R. DOLIQUEZ, ENCARNACION CECILIA R.
PAYLADO, JOSE MARTIN M. RODRIGUEZ and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 155472 July 8, 2004
ANTONIO B. MONFORT III, MA. LUISA MONFORT ASCALON, ILDEFONSO B. MONFORT, ALFREDO B.
MONFORT, CARLOS M. RODRIGUEZ, EMILY FRANCISCA R. DOLIQUEZ, ENCARNACION CECILIA R.
PAYLADO, JOSE MARTIN M. RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MONFORT HERMANOS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, as
represented by MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, and RAMON H. MONFORT, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals in the
complaints for forcible entry and replevin filed by Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development
Corporation (Corporation) and Ramon H. Monfort against the children, nephews, and nieces of its
original incorporators (collectively known as "the group of Antonio Monfort III").
The petition in G.R. No. 152542, assails the October 5, 2001 Decision
1
of the Special Tenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53652, which ruled that Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra has no legal
capacity to represent the Corporation in the forcible entry case docketed as Civil Case No. 534-C, before
the Municipal Trial Court of Cadiz City. On the other hand, the petition in G.R. No. 155472, seeks to set
aside the June 7, 2002 Decision
2
rendered by the Special Former Thirteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49251, where it refused to address, on jurisdictional considerations, the issue
of Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra's capacity to file a complaint for replevin on behalf of the Corporation in
Civil Case No. 506-C before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60.
Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation, a domestic private corporation, is the
registered owner of a farm, fishpond and sugar cane plantation known as Haciendas San Antonio II,
Marapara, Pinanoag and Tinampa-an, all situated in Cadiz City.
3
It also owns one unit of motor vehicle
and two units of tractors.
4
The same allowed Ramon H. Monfort, its Executive Vice President, to breed
and maintain fighting cocks in his personal capacity at Hacienda San Antonio.
5

In 1997, the group of Antonio Monfort III, through force and intimidation, allegedly took possession of
the 4 Haciendas, the produce thereon and the motor vehicle and tractors, as well as the fighting cocks of
Ramon H. Monfort.
In G.R. No. 155472:
On April 10, 1997, the Corporation, represented by its President, Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra, and Ramon
H. Monfort, in his personal capacity, filed against the group of Antonio Monfort III, a complaint
6
for
delivery of motor vehicle, tractors and 378 fighting cocks, with prayer for injunction and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 506-C, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60.
The group of Antonio Monfort III filed a motion to dismiss contending, inter alia, that Ma. Antonia M.
Salvatierra has no capacity to sue on behalf of the Corporation because the March 31, 1997 Board
Resolution
7
authorizing Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra and/or Ramon H. Monfort to represent the
Corporation is void as the purported Members of the Board who passed the same were not validly
elected officers of the Corporation.
On May 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
8
The group of Antonio Monfort III filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed on June 7, 2002.
9
The
Special Former Thirteenth Division of the appellate court did not resolve the validity of the March 31,
1997 Board Resolution and the election of the officers who signed it, ratiocinating that the
determination of said question is within the competence of the trial court.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the group of Antonio Monfort III was denied.
10
Hence, they
instituted a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 155472.
In G.R. No. 152542:
On April 21, 1997, Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra filed on behalf of the Corporation a complaint for forcible
entry, preliminary mandatory injunction with temporary restraining order and damages against the
group of Antonio Monfort III, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cadiz City.
11
It contended that
the latter through force and intimidation, unlawfully took possession of the 4 Haciendas and deprived
the Corporation of the produce thereon.
In their answer,
12
the group of Antonio Monfort III alleged that they are possessing and controlling the
Haciendas and harvesting the produce therein on behalf of the corporation and not for themselves.
They likewise raised the affirmative defense of lack of legal capacity of Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra to sue
on behalf of the Corporation.
On February 18, 1998, the MTC of Cadiz City rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.
13
On appeal,
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, reversed the Decision of the MTCC and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
14

Aggrieved, the group of Antonio Monfort III filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On
October 5, 2001, the Special Tenth Division set aside the judgment of the RTC and dismissed the
complaint for forcible entry for lack of capacity of Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra to represent the
Corporation.
15
The motion for reconsideration filed by the latter was denied by the appellate court.
16

Unfazed, the Corporation filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 152542 which
was consolidated with G.R. No. 155472 per Resolution dated January 21, 2004.
17

The focal issue in these consolidated petitions is whether or not Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra has the legal
capacity to sue on behalf of the Corporation.
The group of Antonio Monfort III claims that the March 31, 1997 Board Resolution authorizing Ma.
Antonia M. Salvatierra and/or Ramon H. Monfort to represent the Corporation is void because the
purported Members of the Board who passed the same were not validly elected officers of the
Corporation.
A corporation has no power except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those
that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its
board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been observed that the
power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that
exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents,
can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a
specific act of the board of directors.
18

Corollary thereto, corporations are required under Section 26 of the Corporation Code to submit to the
SEC within thirty (30) days after the election the names, nationalities and residences of the elected
directors, trustees and officers of the Corporation. In order to keep stockholders and the public
transacting business with domestic corporations properly informed of their organizational operational
status, the SEC issued the following rules:
x x x x x x x x x
2. A General Information Sheet shall be filed with this Commission within thirty (30) days following the
date of the annual stockholders' meeting. No extension of said period shall be allowed, except for very
justifiable reasons stated in writing by the President, Secretary, Treasurer or other officers, upon which
the Commission may grant an extension for not more than ten (10) days.
2.A. Should a director, trustee or officer die, resign or in any manner, cease to hold office, the
corporation shall report such fact to the Commission with fifteen (15) days after such death, resignation
or cessation of office.
3. If for any justifiable reason, the annual meeting has to be postponed, the company should notify the
Commission in writing of such postponement.
The General Information Sheet shall state, among others, the names of the elected directors and
officers, together with their corresponding position title (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the six signatories to the March 31, 1997 Board Resolution authorizing Ma. Antonia
M. Salvatierra and/or Ramon H. Monfort to represent the Corporation, were: Ma. Antonia M.
Salvatierra, President; Ramon H. Monfort, Executive Vice President; Directors Paul M. Monfort, Yvete M.
Benedicto and Jaqueline M. Yusay; and Ester S. Monfort, Secretary.
19
However, the names of the last
four (4) signatories to the said Board Resolution do not appear in the 1996 General Information Sheet
submitted by the Corporation with the SEC. Under said General Information Sheet the composition of
the Board is as follows:
1. Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra (Chairman);
2. Ramon H. Monfort (Member);
3. Antonio H. Monfort, Jr., (Member);
4. Joaquin H. Monfort (Member);
5. Francisco H. Monfort (Member) and
6. Jesus Antonio H. Monfort (Member).
20

There is thus a doubt as to whether Paul M. Monfort, Yvete M. Benedicto, Jaqueline M. Yusay and Ester
S. Monfort, were indeed duly elected Members of the Board legally constituted to bring suit in behalf of
the Corporation.
21

In Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
22
the Court was confronted with the similar issue
of capacity to sue of the officers of the corporation who filed a complaint for damages. In the said case,
we sustained the dismissal of the complaint because it was not established that the Members of the
Board who authorized the filing of the complaint were the lawfully elected officers of the corporation.
Thus
The only issue in this case is whether or not the filing of the case for damages against private
respondent was authorized by a duly constituted Board of Directors of the petitioner corporation.
Petitioner, through the first set of officers, viz., Mario Zavalla, Oscar Gan, Lionel Pengson, Jose Ma. Silva,
Aderito Yujuico and Rodolfo Millare, presented the Minutes of the meeting of its Board of Directors held
on April 1, 1982, as proof that the filing of the case against private respondent was authorized by the
Board. On the other hand, the second set of officers, viz., Saturnino G. Belen, Jr., Alberto C. Nograles and
Jose L.R. Reyes, presented a Resolution dated July 30, 1986, to show that Premium did not authorize the
filing in its behalf of any suit against the private respondent International Corporate Bank.
Later on, petitioner submitted its Articles of Incorporation dated November 6, 1979 with the following
as Directors: Mario C. Zavalla, Pedro C. Celso, Oscar B. Gan, Lionel Pengson, and Jose Ma. Silva.
However, it appears from the general information sheet and the Certification issued by the SEC on
August 19, 1986 that as of March 4, 1981, the officers and members of the board of directors of the
Premium Marble Resources, Inc. were:
Alberto C. Nograles President/Director
Fernando D. Hilario Vice President/Director
Augusto I. Galace Treasurer
Jose L.R. Reyes Secretary/Director
Pido E. Aguilar Director
Saturnino G. Belen, Jr. Chairman of the Board.
While the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board on April 1, 1982 states that the newly elected officers for
the year 1982 were Oscar Gan, Mario Zavalla, Aderito Yujuico and Rodolfo Millare, petitioner failed to
show proof that this election was reported to the SEC. In fact, the last entry in their General Information
Sheet with the SEC, as of 1986 appears to be the set of officers elected in March 1981.
We agree with the finding of public respondent Court of Appeals, that "in the absence of any board
resolution from its board of directors the [sic] authority to act for and in behalf of the corporation, the
present action must necessarily fail. The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is
lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. Thus, the issue of authority and
the invalidity of plaintiff-appellant's subscription which is still pending, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Securities & Exchange Commission."
By the express mandate of the Corporation Code (Section 26), all corporations duly organized pursuant
thereto are required to submit within the period therein stated (30 days) to the Securities and Exchange
Commission the names, nationalities and residences of the directors, trustees and officers elected.
Sec. 26 of the Corporation Code provides, thus:
"Sec. 26. Report of election of directors, trustees and officers. Within thirty (30) days after the election
of the directors, trustees and officers of the corporation, the secretary, or any other officer of the
corporation, shall submit to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the names, nationalities and
residences of the directors, trustees and officers elected. xxx"
Evidently, the objective sought to be achieved by Section 26 is to give the public information, under
sanction of oath of responsible officers, of the nature of business, financial condition and operational
status of the company together with information on its key officers or managers so that those dealing
with it and those who intend to do business with it may know or have the means of knowing facts
concerning the corporation's financial resources and business responsibility.
The claim, therefore, of petitioners as represented by Atty. Dumadag, that Zaballa, et al., are the
incumbent officers of Premium has not been fully substantiated. In the absence of an authority from the
board of directors, no person, not even the officers of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation.
In the case at bar, the fact that four of the six Members of the Board listed in the 1996 General
Information Sheet
23
are already dead
24
at the time the March 31, 1997 Board Resolution was issued,
does not automatically make the four signatories (i.e., Paul M. Monfort, Yvete M. Benedicto, Jaqueline
M. Yusay and Ester S. Monfort) to the said Board Resolution (whose name do not appear in the 1996
General Information Sheet) as among the incumbent Members of the Board. This is because it was not
established that they were duly elected to replace the said deceased Board Members.
To correct the alleged error in the General Information Sheet, the retained accountant of the
Corporation informed the SEC in its November 11, 1998 letter that the non-inclusion of the lawfully
elected directors in the 1996 General Information Sheet was attributable to its oversight and not the
fault of the Corporation.
25
This belated attempt, however, did not erase the doubt as to whether an
election was indeed held. As previously stated, a corporation is mandated to inform the SEC of the
names and the change in the composition of its officers and board of directors within 30 days after
election if one was held, or 15 days after the death, resignation or cessation of office of any of its
director, trustee or officer if any of them died, resigned or in any manner, ceased to hold office. This, the
Corporation failed to do. The alleged election of the directors and officers who signed the March 31,
1997 Board Resolution was held on October 16, 1996, but the SEC was informed thereof more than two
years later, or on November 11, 1998. The 4 Directors appearing in the 1996 General Information Sheet
died between the years 1984 1987,
26
but the records do not show if such demise was reported to the
SEC.
What further militates against the purported election of those who signed the March 31, 1997 Board
Resolution was the belated submission of the alleged Minutes of the October 16, 1996 meeting where
the questioned officers were elected. The issue of legal capacity of Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra was
raised before the lower court by the group of Antonio Monfort III as early as 1997, but the Minutes of
said October 16, 1996 meeting was presented by the Corporation only in its September 29, 1999
Comment before the Court of Appeals.
27
Moreover, the Corporation failed to prove that the same
October 16, 1996 Minutes was submitted to the SEC. In fact, the 1997 General Information Sheet
28

submitted by the Corporation does not reflect the names of the 4 Directors claimed to be elected on
October 16, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, we find that Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra failed to prove that four of those
who authorized her to represent the Corporation were the lawfully elected Members of the Board of the
Corporation. As such, they cannot confer valid authority for her to sue on behalf of the corporation.
The Court notes that the complaint in Civil Case No. 506-C, for replevin before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental, Branch 60, has 2 causes of action, i.e., unlawful detention of the Corporation's motor
vehicle and tractors, and the unlawful detention of the of 387 fighting cocks of Ramon H. Monfort. Since
Ramon sought redress of the latter cause of action in his personal capacity, the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of capacity to sue on behalf of the corporation should be limited only to the
corporation's cause of action for delivery of motor vehicle and tractors. In view, however, of the demise
of Ramon on June 25, 1999,
29
substitution by his heirs is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in G.R. No. 152542 is DENIED. The October 5,
2001 Decision of the Special Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53652, which set
aside the August 14, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60 in Civil
Case No. 822, is AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 155472, the petition is GRANTED and the June 7, 2002 Decision rendered by the Special
Former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49251, dismissing the petition filed
by the group of Antonio Monfort III, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 822 before the Municipal Trial Court of Cadiz
City is DISMISSED. In Civil Case No. 506-C with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60,
the action for delivery of personal property filed by Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development
Corporation is likewise DISMISSED. With respect to the action filed by Ramon H. Monfort for the delivery
of 387 fighting cocks, the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, is ordered to effect the
corresponding substitution of parties.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23145 November 29, 1968
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-
appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.
Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust
Company of New York, United States of America, of the estate of the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins,
who died in New York City on March 27, 1960, to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines the stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,
to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors, the lower court, then presided by the Honorable
Arsenio Santos, now retired, issued on May 18, 1964, an order of this tenor: "After considering the
motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as well as the opposition filed by the
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost for all purposes in connection with the
administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates
covering the 33,002 shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,
(2) orders said certificates cancelled, and (3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or
to the Probate Division of this Court."
1

From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary administrator, the County
Trust Company of New York, but by the Philippine corporation, the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The
appeal cannot possibly prosper. The challenged order represents a response and expresses a policy, to
paraphrase Frankfurter, arising out of a specific problem, addressed to the attainment of specific ends
by the use of specific remedies, with full and ample support from legal doctrines of weight and
significance.
The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Idonah Slade
Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates covering
33,002 shares of appellant, the certificates being in the possession of the County Trust Company of New
York, which as noted, is the domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased.
2
Then came this
portion of the appellant's brief: "On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary
administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed
ancillary administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A
dispute arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question. On
January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County
Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of
Court. The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the order, and on February 11, 1964, the
ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the certificate or certificates of
stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated,
Inc., be declared [or] considered as lost."
3

It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is immaterial" as far as
it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question; appellant
opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator because the said stock certificates are in existence,
they are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company, in New
York, U.S.A...."
4

It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be declared or
considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe certain requirements of
its by-laws before new stock certificates could be issued. Hence, its appeal.
As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The challenged order constitutes
an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated by the wilful conduct of the
domiciliary administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a court decree. How, then, can this order be
stigmatized as illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called for by the realities of
the situation. What cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful defiance, if it had not actually
reached it, cannot without undue loss of judicial prestige, be condoned or tolerated. For the law is not
so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such a solution, the more so as deeper
reflection would make clear its being buttressed by indisputable principles and supported by the
strongest policy considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor of the judiciary no
less than that of the country. Through this challenged order, there is thus dispelled the atmosphere of
contingent frustration brought about by the persistence of the domiciliary administrator to hold on to
the stock certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower
court by entering its appearance through counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a petition for relief from a
previous order of March 15, 1963.
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to what was
decreed. For without it, what it had been decided would be set at naught and nullified. Unless such a
blatant disregard by the domiciliary administrator, with residence abroad, of what was previously
ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have entailed, insofar as this matter was
concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete paralysis of judicial authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee ancillary
administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims
of local creditors.
5
As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court made clear, it is a "general rule universally
recognized" that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a
decedent found within the state or country where it was granted," the corollary being "that an
administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or
country."
6

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set
forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate.
When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign
country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's
last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the
ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex
proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last
domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual
debts or to be distributed among his heirs."
7

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right
to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant]
Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine
corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of
stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue
8
finds application. "In the
instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled
[here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not
dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather conclusive fashion for the legality
of the challenged order, how does appellant, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. propose to carry the extremely
heavy burden of persuasion of precisely demonstrating the contrary? It would assign as the basic error
allegedly committed by the lower court its "considering as lost the stock certificates covering 33,002
shares of Benguet belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, ..."
9
More specifically, appellant
would stress that the "lower court could not "consider as lost" the stock certificates in question when,
as a matter of fact, his Honor the trial Judge knew, and does know, and it is admitted by the appellee,
that the said stock certificates are in existence and are today in the possession of the domiciliary
administrator in New York."
10

There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court. That certainly does not suffice
to call for the reversal of the appealed order. Since there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the
domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by
the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or
arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof.
Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his
responsibility fulfilled.
Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend on the
uncontrolled discretion of the party or entity, in this case domiciled abroad, which thus far has shown
the utmost persistence in refusing to yield obedience. Certainly, appellant would not be heard to
contend in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be treated as a mere scrap of paper, the court
issuing it being powerless to remedy its flagrant disregard.
It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower court did not correspond
exactly with the facts. To be more blunt, the quality of truth may be lacking in such a conclusion arrived
at. It is to be remembered however, again to borrow from Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may
rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important part in its development."
11

Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state fictions "were devices to advance
the ends of justice, [even if] clumsy and at times offensive."
12
Some of them have persisted even to the
present, that eminent jurist, noting "the quasi contract, the adopted child, the constructive trust, all of
flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of "as if" today."
13
He likewise noted "a class of fictions of
another order, the fiction which is a working tool of thought, but which at times hides itself from view
till reflection and analysis have brought it to the light."
14

What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that fictions as such played in the
law. There should be then on the part of the appellant a further refinement in the catholicity of its
condemnation of such judicial technique. If ever an occasion did call for the employment of a legal
fiction to put an end to the anomalous situation of a valid judicial order being disregarded with apparent
impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that this particular alleged error does not carry
persuasion.
3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention by its invoking one
of the provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost,
stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would stress that in the event of a contest or the pendency of an
action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed,
the issuance of a new certificate or certificates would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the
ownership [thereof]."
15

Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-law. It is
admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in question.
Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far as it is concerned, "it is
immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..." Even if such were not the
case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming
that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command of a court decree, the latter is to
be followed.
It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution overrides a statute, to which,
however, the judiciary must yield deference, when appropriately invoked and deemed applicable. It
would be most highly unorthodox, however, if a corporate by-law would be accorded such a high estate
in the jural order that a court must not only take note of it but yield to its alleged controlling force.
The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled unless the appealed order
be set aside for its inconsistency with one of its by-laws does not impress us. Its obedience to a lawful
court order certainly constitutes a valid defense, assuming that such apprehension of a possible court
action against it could possibly materialize. Thus far, nothing in the circumstances as they have
developed gives substance to such a fear. Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to appellant do
not suffice to nullify the lawful exercise of judicial authority.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with implications at
war with the basic postulates of corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being created by operation of
law...."
16
It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will. As Berle so aptly stated:
"Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial person, owing its existence through creation by
a sovereign power."
17
As a matter of fact, the statutory language employed owes much to Chief Justice
Marshall, who in the Dartmouth College decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."
18

The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A corporation is not in fact and in
reality a person, but the law treats it as though it were a person by process of fiction, or by regarding it
as an artificial person distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.... It owes its existence to
law. It is an artificial person created by law for certain specific purposes, the extent of whose existence,
powers and liberties is fixed by its charter."
19
Dean Pound's terse summary, a juristic person, resulting
from an association of human beings granted legal personality by the state, puts the matter neatly.
20

There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to quote from
Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state recognition and
concession."
21
A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence
until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore
that it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator. More than that, it
cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the
judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of persuasive
authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary than the other two
coordinate branches. It institutes the appropriate court action to enforce its right. Correlatively, it is not
immune from judicial control in those instances, where a duty under the law as ascertained in an
appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to confer upon it not
autonomy which may be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to argue that it may,
when so minded, overrule the state, the source of its very existence; it is to contend that what any of its
governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored at will. So extravagant a claim cannot
possibly merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs,
22
it was shown that in a guardianship
proceedings then pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans Administration filed a motion for
the refund of a certain sum of money paid to the minor under guardianship, alleging that the lower
court had previously granted its petition to consider the deceased father as not entitled to guerilla
benefits according to a determination arrived at by its main office in the United States. The motion was
denied. In seeking a reconsideration of such order, the Administrator relied on an American federal
statute making his decisions "final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact" precluding any other
American official to examine the matter anew, "except a judge or judges of the United States court."
23

Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator appealed.
In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus: "We are of the opinion that the
appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions
of the U.S. Veterans' Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims property submitted to him
for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a
judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which
must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including
the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions where the Veterans' Administrator
seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention
has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in
actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of
judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator."
It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and conclusive,
determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if through the absence of
any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within our jurisdiction, the force and effectivity
of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine
of a situation more offensive to the dignity of the bench or the honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which appellant Benguet
Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept the validity of the order
complained of; it seeks its reversal. Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does not succeed. The
deplorable consequences attendant on appellant prevailing attest to the necessity of negative response
from us. That is what appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed. It is always easy to
conjure extreme and even oppressive possibilities. That is not decisive. It does not settle the issue. What
carries weight and conviction is the result arrived at, the just solution obtained, grounded in the
soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by its correspondence with what a sense of realism
requires. For through the appealed order, the imperative requirement of justice according to law is
satisfied and national dignity and honor maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the Court of First
Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant Benguet Consolidated,
Inc.
Makalintal, Zaldivar and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-20214 March 17, 1923
G. C. ARNOLD, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WILLITS & PATTERSON, LTD., defendant-appellee.
Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for appellant.
Ross and Lawrence for appellee.
STATEMENT
For a number of years prior to the times alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff was in the employ of the
International Banking Corporation of Manila, and it is conceded that he is a competent and experienced
business man. July 31, 1916, C. D. Willits and I. L. Patterson were partners doing business in San
Francisco, California, under the name of Willits & Patterson. The plaintiff was then in San Francisco, and
as a result of negotiations the plaintiff and the firm entered into a written contract, known in the record
as Exhibit A, by which the plaintiff was employed as the agent of the firm in the Philippine Islands for
certain purposes for the period of five years at a minimum salary of $200 per month and travelling
expenses. The plaintiff returned to Manila and entered on the discharge of his duties under the contract.
As a result of plaintiff's employment and the world war conditions, the business of the firm in the
Philippines very rapidly increased and grew beyond the fondest hopes of either party. A dispute arose
between the plaintiff and the firm as to the construction of Exhibit A as to the amount which plaintiff
should receive for his services. Meanwhile Patterson retired from the firm and Willits became the sole
owner of its assets. For convenience of operation and to serve his own purpose, Willits organized a
corporation under the laws of California with its principal office at San Francisco, in and by which he
subscribed for, and became the exclusive owner of all the capital stock except a few shares for
organization purposes only, and the name of the firm was used as the name of the corporation. A short
time after that Willits came to Manila and organized a corporation here known as Willits & Patterson,
Ltd., in and to which he again subscribed for all of the capital stock except the nominal shares necessary
to qualify the directors. In legal effect, the San Francisco corporation took over and acquired all of the
assets and liabilities of the Manila corporation. At the time that Willits was in Manila and while to all
intents and purposes he was the sole owner of the stock of corporations, there was a conference
between him and the plaintiff over the disputed construction of Exhibit A. As a result of which another
instrument, known in the record as Exhibit B, was prepared in the form of a letter which the plaintiff
addressed to Willits at Manila on November 10, 1919, the purpose of which was to more clearly define
and specify the compensation which the plaintiff was to receive for his services. Willits received and
confirmed this letter by signing the name of Willits & Patterson, By C.d. Willits. At the time both
corporations were legally organized, and there is nothing in the corporate minutes to show that Exhibit
B was ever formally ratified or approved by either corporation. After its organization, the Manila
corporation employed a regular accountant whose duty it was to audit the accounts of the company and
render financial statements both for the use of the local banks and the local and parent corporations at
San Francisco. From time to time and in the ordinary course of business such statements of account
were prepared by the accountant and duly forwarded to the home office, and among other things was a
statement of July 31, 1921, showing that there was due and owing the plaintiff under Exhibit B the sum
of P106,277.50. A short time previous to that date, the San Francisco corporation became involved in
financial trouble, and all of its assets were turned over to a "creditors' committee." When this statement
was received, the "creditors' committee" immediately protested its allowance. An attempt was made
without success to adjust the matter on a friendly basis and without litigation. January 10, 1922, the
plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant the sum of P106,277.50 with legal interest
and costs, and written instruments known in the record as Exhibits A and B were attached to, and made
a part of, the complaint.
For answer, the defendant admits the formal parts of the complaint, the execution of Exhibit A and
denies each and every other allegation, except as specifically admitted, and alleges that what is known
as Exhibit B was signed by Willits without the authority of the defendant corporation or the firm of
Willits & Patterson, and that it is not an agreement which was ever entered into with the plaintiff by the
defendant or the firm, and, as a separate defense and counterclaim, it alleges that on the 30th of June,
1920, there was a balance due and owing the plaintiff from the defendant under the contract Exhibit A
of the sum of P8,741.05. That his salary from June 30, 1920, to July 31, 1921, under Exhibit A was $400
per month, or a total of P10,400. That about July 6, 1921, the plaintiff wrongfully took P30,000 from the
assets of the firm, and that he is now indebted to the firm in the sum of P10,858.95, with interest and
costs, from which it prays judgement.
The plaintiff admits that he withdrew the P30,000, but alleges that it was with the consent and authority
of the defendant, and denies all other new matter in the answer.
Upon such issues a trial was had, and the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant as
prayed for in its counterclaim, from which the plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court erred in
not holding that the contract between the parties is that which is embodied in Exhibits A and B, and that
the defendant assumed all partnership obligations, and in failing to render judgment for the plaintiff, as
prayed for, and in dismissing his complaint, and denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

JOHNS, J.:
In their respective briefs opposing counsel agree that the important questions involved are "what was
the contract under which the plaintiff rendered services for five years ending July 31, 1921," and "what
is due the plaintiff under that contract." Plaintiff contends that his services were performed under
Exhibits A and B, and that the defendant assumed all of the obligations of the original partnership under
Exhibit A, and is now seeking to deny its liability under, and repudiate, Exhibit B. The defendant admits
that Exhibit A was the original contract between Arnold and the firm of Willits & Patterson by which he
came to the Philippine Islands, and that it was therein agreed that he was to be employed for a period of
five years as the agent of Willits & Patterson in the Philippine Islands to operate a certain oil mill, and to
do such other business as might be deemed advisable for which he was to receive, first, the travelling
expenses of his wife and self from San Francisco to Manila, second, the minimum salary of $200 per
month, third, a brokerage of 1 per cent upon all purchases and sales of merchandise, except for the
account of the coconut oil mill, fourth, one-half of the profits on any transaction in the name of the firm
or himself not provided for in the agreement. That the agreement also provided that if it be found that
the business was operated at a loss, Arnold should receive a monthly salary of $400 during such period.
That the business was operated at a loss from June 30, 1920, to July 31, 1921, and that for such reason,
he was entitled to nothing more than a salary of $400 per month, or for that period P10,400. Adding this
amount to the P8,741.05, which the defendant admits he owed Arnold on June 30, 1920, makes a total
of P19,141.05, leaving a balance due the defendant as set out in the counterclaim. In other words, that
the plaintiff's compensation was measured by, and limited to, the above specified provisions in the
contract Exhibit A, and that the defendant corporation is not bound by the terms or provisions of Exhibit
B, which is as follows:
WILLITS & PATTERSON, LTD.
MANILA, P. I., Nov. 10, 1919.
CHAS. D. WILLITS, Esq.,
Present.
DEAR MR. WILLITS: My understanding of the intent of my agreement with Willits & Patterson is as
under:
Commissions. Willits & Patterson, San Francisco, pay me a commission of one per cent on all purchases
made for them in the Philippines or sales made to them by Manila and one per cent on all sales made
for them in the Philippines, or purchases made from them by Manila. If such purchases or sales are on
an f. o. b. basis the commission is on the f. o. b. price; if on a c. i. f. basis the commission is computed on
the c. i. f. price
These commissions are credited to me in San Francisco.
I do not participate in any profits on business transacted between Willits & Patterson, San Francisco, and
Willits & Patterson, Ltd., Manila.
Profits. On all business transacted between Willits & Patterson, Ltd. and others than Willits & Patterson,
San Francisco, half the profits are to be credited to my account and half to the Profit & Loss account of
Willits & Patterson, Ltd., Manila.
On all other business, such as the Cooperative Coconut Products Co. account, or any other business we
may undertake as agents or managers, half the profits are to be credited to my account and half to the
Profit & Loss account of Willits & Patterson, Ltd., Manila.
Where Willits & Patterson, San Francisco, or Willits & Patterson, Ltd., Manila, have their own funds
invested in the capital stock or a corporation, I of course do not participate in the earnings of such stock,
any more than Willits & Patterson would participate in the earnings of stock held by me on my account.
If the foregoing conforms to your understanding of our agreement, please confirm below.
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.) G. C. ARNOLD
Confirmed:
WILLITS & PATTERSON
By (Sgd.) CHAS. D. WILLITS
There is no dispute about any of the following facts: That at the inception C.D. Willits and I. L. Patterson
constituted the firm of Willits & Patterson doing business in the City of San Francisco; that later
Patterson retired from the firm, and Willits acquired all of his interests and thereafter continued the
business under the name and style of Willits & Patterson; that the original contract Exhibit A was made
between the plaintiff and the old firm at San Francisco on July 31, 1916, to cover a period of five years
from that date; that plaintiff entered upon the discharged of his duties and continued his services in the
Philippine Islands to someone for the period of five years; that on November 10, 1919, and as a result of
conferences between Willits and the plaintiff, Exhibit B was addressed and signed in the manner and
form above stated in the City of Manila. A short time prior to that date Willits organized a corporation in
San Francisco, in the State of California, which took over and acquired all of the assets of the firm's
business in California then being conducted under the name and style of Willits & Patterson; that he
subscribed for all of the capital stock of the corporation, and that in truth and in fact he was the owner
of all of its capital stock. After this was done he caused a new corporation to be organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands with principal office at Manila, which took over and acquired all the
business and assets of the firm of Willits & Patterson in the Philippine Islands, in and to which, in legal
effect, he subscribed for all of its capital stock, and was the owner of all of its stock. After both
corporations were organized the above letter was drafted and signed. The plaintiff contends that the
signing of Exhibit B in the manner and under the conditions in which it was signed, and through the
subsequent acts and conduct of the parties, was ratified and, in legal effect, became and is now binding
upon the defendant.
It will be noted that Exhibit B was executed in Manila, and that at the time it was signed by Willits, he
was to all intents and purposes the legal owner of all the stock in both corporations. It also appears from
the evidence that the parent corporation at San Francisco took over and acquired all of the assets and
liabilities of the local corporation at Manila. That after it was organized the Manila corporation kept
separate records and account books of its own, and that from time to time financial statements were
made and forwarded to the home office, from which it conclusively appears that plaintiff was basing his
claim for services upon Exhibit A, as it was modified by Exhibit B. That at no time after Exhibit B was
signed was there ever any dispute between plaintiff and Willits as to the compensation for plaintiff's
services. That is to say, as between the plaintiff and Willits, Exhibit B was approved, followed and at all
times in force and effect, after it was signed November 10, 1919. It appears from an analysis of Exhibit B
that it was for the mutual interest of both parties. From a small beginning, the business was then in a
very flourishing conditions and growing fast, and the profits were very large and were running into big
money.
Among other things, Exhibit A provided: "(a) That the net profits from said coconut oil business shall be
divided in equal shares between the said parties hereto; (b) that Arnold should receive a brokerage of 1
per cent from all purchases and sales of merchandise, except for the account of the coconut mills; (c)
that the net profits from all other business should be divided in equal half shares between the parties
hereto."
Under the above provisions, the plaintiff might well contend that he was entitled to one-half of all the
profits and a brokerage of 1 per cent from all purchases and sales, except those for the account of the
coconut oil mills, which under the volume of business then existing would run into a very large sum of
money. It was for such reason and after personal conferences between them, and to settle all disputed
questions, that Exhibit B was prepared and signed.
The record recites that "the defendant admits that from July 31, 1916 to July 31, 1921, the plaintiff
faithfully performed all the duties incumbent upon him under his contract of employment, it being
understood, however, that this admission does not include an admission that the plaintiff placed a
proper interpretation upon his right to remuneration under said contract of employment."
It being admitted that the plaintiff worked "under his contract of employment" for the period of five
years, the question naturally arises, for whom was he working? His contract was made with the original
firm of Willits & Patterson, and that firm was dissolved and it ceased to exist, and all of its assets were
merged in, and taken over by, the parent corporation at San Francisco. In the very nature of things, after
the corporation was formed, the plaintiff could not and did not continue to work for the firm, and, yet,
he continued his employment for the full period of five years. For whom did he work after the
partnership was merged in the corporation and ceased to exist?
It is very apparent that, under the conditions then existing, the signing of Exhibit B was for the mutual
interests of both parties, and that if the contract Exhibit A was to be enforced according to its terms,
that Arnold might well contend for a much larger sum of money for his services. In truth and in fact
Willits and both corporations recognized his employment and accepted the benefits of his services. He
continued his employment and rendered his services after the corporation were organized and Exhibit B
was signed just the same as he did before, and both corporations recognized and accepted his services.
Although the plaintiff was president of the local corporation, the testimony is conclusive that both of
them were what is known as a one man corporation, and Willits, as the owner of all of the stock, was
the force and dominant power which controlled them. After Exhibit B was signed it was recognized by
Willits that the plaintiff's services were to be performed and measured by its term and provisions, and
there never was any dispute between plaintiff and Willits upon that question.
The controversy first arose after the corporation was in financial trouble and the appointment of what is
known in the record as a "creditors' committee." There is no claim or pretense that there was any fraud
or collusion between plaintiff and Willits, and it is very apparent that Exhibit B was to the mutual
interest of both parties. It is elementary law that if Exhibit B is a binding contract between the plaintiff
and Willits and the corporations, it is equally binding upon the creditors' committee. It would not have
any higher or better legal right than the corporation itself, and could not make any defense which it
could not make. It is very significant that the claim or defense which is now interposed by the creditors'
committee was never made or asserted at any previous time by the defendant, and that it never was
made by Willits, and it is very apparent that if he had remained in control of the corporation, it would
never have made the defense which is now made by the creditors' committee. The record is conclusive
that at the time he signed Exhibit B, Willits was, in legal effect, the owner and holder of all the stock in
both corporations, and that he approved it in their interest, and to protect them from the plaintiff
having and making a much larger claim under Exhibit A. As a matter of fact, it appears from the
statement of Mr. Larkin, the accountant, in the record that if plaintiff's cause of action was now founded
upon Exhibit A, he would have a claim for more than P160,000.
Thompson on Corporations, 2d ed., vol. I, section 10, says:
The proposition that a corporation has an existence separate and distinct from its membership has its
limitations. It must be noted that this separate existence is for particular purposes. It must also be
remembered that there can be no corporate existence without persons to compose it; there can be no
association without associates. This separate existence is to a certain extent a legal fiction. Whenever
necessary for the interests of the public or for the protection or enforcement of the rights of the
membership, courts will disregard this legal fiction and operate upon both the corporation and the
persons composing it.
In the same section, the author quotes from a decision in 49 Ohio State, 137
1
; 15 L. R. A., 145, in which
the Supreme Court of Ohio says:
"So long as a proper use is made of the fiction that a corporation is an entity apart from its shareholders,
it is harmless, and, because convenient, should not be called in question; but where it is urged to an end
subversive of its policy, or such is the issue, the fiction must be ignored, and the question determined
whether the act in question, though done by shareholders, that is to say, by the persons uniting in
one body, was done simply as individuals, and with respect to their individual interest as
shareholders, or was done ostensibly as such, but, as a matter of fact, to control the corporation, and
affect the transaction of its business, in the same manner as if the act had been clothed with all the
formalities of a corporate act. This must be so, because, the stockholders having a dual capacity, and
capable of acting in either, and a possible interest to conceal their character when acting in their
corporate capacity, the absence of the formal evidence of the character of the act cannot preclude
judicial inquiry on the subject. If it were otherwise, then in that department of the law fraud would
enjoy an immunity awarded to it in no other."
Where the stock of a corporation is owned by one person whereby the corporation functions only for
the benefit of such individual owner, the corporation and the individual should be deemed to be the
same. (U. S. Gypsum Co. vs. Mackay Wall Plaster Co., 199 Pac., 249.)
Ruling Case Law, vol. 7, section 663, says:
While of course a corporation cannot ratify a contract which is strictly ultra vires, and which it in the first
instance could not have made, it may by ratification render binding on it a contract, entered into on its
behalf by its officers or agents without authority. As a general rule such ratification need not be
manifested by any voted or formal resolution of the corporation or be authenticated by the corporate
seal; no higher degree of evidence is requisite in establishing ratification on the part of a corporation,
than is requisite in showing an antecedent authorization.
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 666. The assent or approval of a corporation to acts done on its account may be inferred in the
same manner that the absent of a natural person may be, and it is well settled that where a corporation
with full knowledge of the unauthorized act of its officer or agents acquiesces in and consents to such
acts, it thereby ratifies them, especially where the acquiescence results in prejudice to a third person.
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 669. So, when, in the usual course of business of a corporation, an officer has been allowed in his
official capacity to manage its affair, his authority to represent the corporation may be inferred from the
manner in which he has been permitted by the directors to transact its business.
SEC. 656. In accordance with a well-known rule of the law of agency, notice to corporate officers or
agents within the scope or apparent scope of their authority is attributed to the corporation.
SEC. 667. As a general rule, if a corporation with knowledge of its agents unauthorized act received and
enjoys the benefits thereof, it impliedly ratifies the unauthorized act if it is one capable of ratification by
parol.
In its article on corporations, Corpus Juris, in section 2241 says:
Ratification by a corporation of a transaction not previously authorized is more easily inferred where the
corporation receives and retains property under it, and as a general rule where a corporation, through
its proper officers or board, takes and retains the benefits of the unauthorized act or contract of an
officer or agent, with full knowledge of all the material facts, it thereby ratifies and becomes bound by
such act of contract, together with all the liabilities and burdens resulting therefrom, and in some
jurisdiction this rule is, in effect, declared by statute. Thus the corporation is liable on the ground of
ratification where, with knowledge of the facts, it accepts the benefit of services rendered under an
unauthorized contract of employment . . . .
Applying the law to the facts.
Mr. Larkin, an experienced accountant, was employed by the local corporation, and from time to time
and in the ordinary course of business made and prepared financial statements showing its assets and
liabilities, true copies of which were sent to the home office in San Francisco. It appears upon their face
that plaintiff's compensation was made and founded on Exhibit B, and that such statements were made
and prepared by the accountant on the assumption that Exhibit B was in full force and effect as between
the plaintiff and the defendant. In the course of business in the early part of 1920, plaintiff, as manager
of the defendant, sold 500 tons of oil for future delivery at P740 per ton. Due to break in the market,
plaintiff was able to purchase the oil at P380 per ton or a profit of P180,000.
It appears from Exhibit B under the heading of "Profits" that:
On all the business transacted between Willits & Patterson, Ltd. and others than Willits & Patterson, San
Francisco, half the profit are to be credited to may account and half to the Profit & Loss account Willits
& Patterson, Ltd., Manila.
The purchasers paid P105,000 on the contracts and gave their notes for P75,000, and it was agreed that
all of the oil purchased should be held as security for the full payment of the purchase price. As a result,
the defendant itself received the P105,000 in cash, P75,000 in notes, and still holds the 500 tons of oil as
security for the balance of the purchase price. This transaction was shown in the semi-annual financial
statement for the period ending December 31, 1920. That is to say, the business was transacted by and
through the plaintiff, and the defendant received and accepted all of the profits on the deal, and the
statement which was rendered gave him a credit for P90,737.88, or half the profit as provided in the
contract Exhibit B, with interest.
Although the previous financial statements show upon their face that the account of plaintiff was credit
with several small items on the same basis, it was not until the 23d of March, 1921, that any objection
was ever made by anyone, and objection was made for the first time by the creditors' committee in a
cable of that date.
As we analyze the facts Exhibit B was, in legal effect, ratified and approved and is now binding upon the
defendant corporation, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover for his services on that writing as it
modified the original contract Exhibit A.
It appears from the statement prepared by accountant Larkin founded upon Exhibit B that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover P106,277.50. It is very apparent that his statement was based upon the assumption
that there was a net profit of P180,000 on the 500 tons of oil, of which the plaintiff was entitled to one-
half.
In the absence of any other proof, we have the right to assume that the 500 tons of oil was worth the
amount which the defendant paid for them at the time of the purchase or P380 per ton, and the record
shows that the defendant took and now has the possession of all of the oil secure the payment of the
price at which it was sold. Hence, the profit on the deal to the defendant at the time of the sale would
amount to the difference between what the defendant paid for the oil and the amount which it received
for the oil at the time it sold the oil. It appears that at the time of the sale the defendant only received
P105,000 in cash, and that it took and accepted the promissory notes of Cruz & Tan Chong Say, the
purchasers, for P75,000 more which have been collected and may never be. Hence, it must follow that
the amount evidence by the notes cannot now be deemed or treated as profits on the deal and cannot
be until such times as the notes are paid.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and a money judgment will be entered here in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P68,527.50, with thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 10th day of January, 1922. In addition thereto, judgment will be rendered against the
defendant in substance and to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner of an undivided one-half interest
in the promissory notes for P75,000 which were executed by Cruz & Tan Chong Say, as a part of the
purchase price of the oil, and that he is entitled to have and receive one-half of all the proceeds from
the notes or either of them, and that also he have judgment against the defendant for costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 141735 June 8, 2005
SAPPARI K. SAWADJAAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and AL-AMANAH
INVESTMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of the Decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals of 30 March 1999 affirming Resolutions No. 94-4483 and No. 95-2754 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) dated 11 August 1994 and 11 April 1995, respectively, which in turn affirmed
Resolution No. 2309 of the Board of Directors of the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the
Philippines (AIIBP) dated 13 December 1993, finding petitioner guilty of Dishonesty in the Performance
of Official Duties and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and dismissing him from
the service, and its Resolution
2
of 15 December 1999 dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The records show that petitioner Sappari K. Sawadjaan was among the first employees of the Philippine
Amanah Bank (PAB) when it was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 264 on 02 August 1973. He
rose through the ranks, working his way up from his initial designation as security guard, to settling
clerk, bookkeeper, credit investigator, project analyst, appraiser/ inspector, and eventually, loans
analyst.
3

In February 1988, while still designated as appraiser/investigator, Sawadjaan was assigned to inspect the
properties offered as collaterals by Compressed Air Machineries and Equipment Corporation (CAMEC)
for a credit line of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). The properties consisted of two parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. N-130671 and No. C-52576. On the basis of his
Inspection and Appraisal Report,
4
the PAB granted the loan application. When the loan matured on 17
May 1989, CAMEC requested an extension of 180 days, but was granted only 120 days to repay the
loan.
5

In the meantime, Sawadjaan was promoted to Loans Analyst I on 01 July 1989.
6

In January 1990, Congress passed Republic Act 6848 creating the AIIBP and repealing P.D. No. 264
(which created the PAB). All assets, liabilities and capital accounts of the PAB were transferred to the
AIIBP,
7
and the existing personnel of the PAB were to continue to discharge their functions unless
discharged.
8
In the ensuing reorganization, Sawadjaan was among the personnel retained by the AIIBP.
When CAMEC failed to pay despite the given extension, the bank, now referred to as the AIIBP,
discovered that TCT No. N-130671 was spurious, the property described therein non-existent, and that
the property covered by TCT No. C-52576 had a prior existing mortgage in favor of one Divina Pablico.
On 08 June 1993, the Board of Directors of the AIIBP created an Investigating Committee to look into the
CAMEC transaction, which had cost the bank Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in losses.
9
The
subsequent events, as found and decided upon by the Court of Appeals,
10
are as follows:
On 18 June 1993, petitioner received a memorandum from Islamic Bank [AIIBP] Chairman Roberto F. De
Ocampo charging him with Dishonesty in the Performance of Official Duties and/or Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service and preventively suspending him.
In his memorandum dated 8 September 1993, petitioner informed the Investigating Committee that he
could not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Committee because of its alleged partiality. For his
failure to appear before the hearing set on 17 September 1993, after the hearing of 13 September 1993
was postponed due to the Manifestation of even date filed by petitioner, the Investigating Committee
declared petitioner in default and the prosecution was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
On 08 December 1993, the Investigating Committee rendered a decision, the pertinent portions of
which reads as follows:
In view of respondent SAWADJAANS abject failure to perform his duties and assigned tasks as
appraiser/inspector, which resulted to the prejudice and substantial damage to the Bank, respondent
should be held liable therefore. At this juncture, however, the Investigating Committee is of the
considered opinion that he could not be held liable for the administrative offense of dishonesty
considering the fact that no evidence was adduced to show that he profited or benefited from being
remiss in the performance of his duties. The record is bereft of any evidence which would show that he
received any amount in consideration for his non-performance of his official duties.
This notwithstanding, respondent cannot escape liability. As adverted to earlier, his failure to perform
his official duties resulted to the prejudice and substantial damage to the Islamic Bank for which he
should be held liable for the administrative offense of CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF
THE SERVICE.
Premises considered, the Investigating Committee recommends that respondent SAPPARI SAWADJAAN
be meted the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY SUSPENSION from office in accordance with
the Civil Service Commissions Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989.
On 13 December 1993, the Board of Directors of the Islamic Bank [AIIBP] adopted Resolution No. 2309
finding petitioner guilty of Dishonesty in the Performance of Official Duties and/or Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service and imposing the penalty of Dismissal from the Service.
On reconsideration, the Board of Directors of the Islamic Bank [AIIBP] adopted the Resolution No. 2332
on 20 February 1994 reducing the penalty imposed on petitioner from dismissal to suspension for a
period of six (6) months and one (1) day.
On 29 March 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB).
On 11 August 1994, the CSC adopted Resolution No. 94-4483 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and
affirming Resolution No. 2309 dated 13 December 1993 of the Board of Directors of Islamic Bank.
On 11 April 1995, the CSC adopted Resolution No. 95-2574 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 16 June 1995, the instant petition was filed with the Honorable Supreme Court on the following
assignment of errors:
I. Public respondent Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines has committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it initiated and conducted administrative
investigation without a validly promulgated rules of procedure in the adjudication of administrative
cases at the Islamic Bank.
II. Public respondent Civil Service Commission has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it prematurely and falsely assumed jurisdiction of the case not appealed to it,
but to the Merit System Protection Board.
III. Both the Islamic Bank and the Civil Service Commission erred in finding petitioner Sawadjaan of
having deliberately reporting false information and therefore guilty of Dishonesty and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and penalized with dismissal from the service.
On 04 July 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc referred this petition to this Honorable Court
pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which took effect on 01 June 1995.
We do not find merit [in] the petition.
Anent the first assignment of error, a reading of the records would reveal that petitioner raises for the
first time the alleged failure of the Islamic Bank [AIIBP] to promulgate rules of procedure governing the
adjudication and disposition of administrative cases involving its personnel. It is a rule that issues not
properly brought and ventilated below may not be raised for the first time on appeal, save in
exceptional circumstances (Casolita, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 257) none of which, however,
obtain in this case. Granting arguendo that the issue is of such exceptional character that the Court may
take cognizance of the same, still, it must fail. Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6848 (1990) provides:
Section 26. Powers of the Board. The Board of Directors shall have the broadest powers to manage the
Islamic Bank, x x x The Board shall adopt policy guidelines necessary to carry out effectively the
provisions of this Charter as well as internal rules and regulations necessary for the conduct of its Islamic
banking business and all matters related to personnel organization, office functions and salary
administration. (Italics ours)
On the other hand, Item No. 2 of Executive Order No. 26 (1992) entitled "Prescribing Procedure and
Sanctions to Ensure Speedy Disposition of Administrative Cases" directs, "all administrative agencies" to
"adopt and include in their respective Rules of Procedure" provisions designed to abbreviate
administrative proceedings.
The above two (2) provisions relied upon by petitioner does not require the Islamic Bank [AIIBP] to
promulgate rules of procedure before administrative discipline may be imposed upon its employees.
The internal rules of procedures ordained to be adopted by the Board refers to that necessary for the
conduct of its Islamic banking business and all matters related to "personnel organization, office
functions and salary administration." On the contrary, Section 26 of RA 6848 gives the Board of Directors
of the Islamic Bank the "broadest powers to manage the Islamic Bank." This grant of broad powers
would be an idle ceremony if it would be powerless to discipline its employees.
The second assignment of error must likewise fail. The issue is raised for the first time via this petition
for certiorari. Petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC. Although he could have raised
the alleged lack of jurisdiction in his Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 94-4483 of the CSC,
he did not do so. By filing the Motion for Reconsideration, he is estopped from denying the CSCs
jurisdiction over him, as it is settled rule that a party who asks for an affirmative relief cannot later on
impugn the action of the tribunal as without jurisdiction after an adverse result was meted to him.
Although jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to at any stage of the
proceedings even on appeal, this particular rule, however, means that jurisdictional issues in a case can
be raised only during the proceedings in said case and during the appeal of said case (Aragon v. Court of
Appeals, 270 SCRA 603). The case at bar is a petition [for] certiorari and not an appeal.
But even on the merits the argument must falter. Item No. 1 of CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated 29
June 1993, provides:
Decisions in administrative cases involving officials and employees of the civil service appealable to the
Commission pursuant to Section 47 of Book V of the Code (i.e., Administrative Code of 1987) including
personnel actions such as contested appointments shall now be appealed directly to the Commission
and not to the MSPB.
In Rubenecia v. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 640, 651, it was categorically held:
. . . The functions of the MSPB relating to the determination of administrative disciplinary cases were, in
other words, re-allocated to the Commission itself.
Be that as it may, "(i)t is hornbook doctrine that in order `(t)o ascertain whether a court (in this case,
administrative agency) has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into.
Furthermore, `the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held
to exist."(Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, 757) From the provision of law abovecited, the Civil
Service Commission clearly has jurisdiction over the Administrative Case against petitioner.
Anent the third assignment of error, we likewise do not find merit in petitioners proposition that he
should not be liable, as in the first place, he was not qualified to perform the functions of
appraiser/investigator because he lacked the necessary training and expertise, and therefore, should not
have been found dishonest by the Board of Directors of Islamic Bank [AIIBP] and the CSC. Petitioner
himself admits that the position of appraiser/inspector is "one of the most serious [and] sensitive job in
the banking operations." He should have been aware that accepting such a designation, he is obliged to
perform the task at hand by the exercise of more than ordinary prudence. As appraiser/investigator, he
is expected, among others, to check the authenticity of the documents presented by the borrower by
comparing them with the originals on file with the proper government office. He should have made it
sure that the technical descriptions in the location plan on file with the Bureau of Lands of Marikina, jibe
with that indicated in the TCT of the collateral offered by CAMEC, and that the mortgage in favor of the
Islamic Bank was duly annotated at the back of the copy of the TCT kept by the Register of Deeds of
Marikina. This, petitioner failed to do, for which he must be held liable. That he did not profit from his
false report is of no moment. Neither the fact that it was not deliberate or willful, detracts from the
nature of the act as dishonest. What is apparent is he stated something to be a fact, when he really was
not sure that it was so.
Wherefore, above premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED, and the assailed Resolutions
of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.
On 24 March 1999, Sawadjaans counsel notified the court a quo of his change of address,
11
but
apparently neglected to notify his client of this fact. Thus, on 23 July 1999, Sawadjaan, by himself, filed a
Motion for New Trial
12
in the Court of Appeals based on the following grounds: fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence and newly discovered evidence. He claimed that he had recently discovered
that at the time his employment was terminated, the AIIBP had not yet adopted its corporate by-laws.
He attached a Certification
13
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it was only on 27
May 1992 that the AIIBP submitted its draft by-laws to the SEC, and that its registration was being held
in abeyance pending certain corrections being made thereon. Sawadjaan argued that since the AIIBP
failed to file its by-laws within 60 days from the passage of Rep. Act No. 6848, as required by Sec. 51 of
the said law, the bank and its stockholders had "already forfeited its franchise or charter, including its
license to exist and operate as a corporation,"
14
and thus no longer have "the legal standing and
personality to initiate an administrative case."
Sawadjaans counsel subsequently adopted his motion, but requested that it be treated as a motion for
reconsideration.
15
This motion was denied by the court a quo in its Resolution of 15 December 1999.
16

Still disheartened, Sawadjaan filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
challenging the above Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the court a
quo erred: i) in ignoring the facts and evidences that the alleged Islamic Bank has no valid by-laws; ii) in
ignoring the facts and evidences that the Islamic Bank lost its juridical personality as a corporation on 16
April 1990; iii) in ignoring the facts and evidences that the alleged Islamic Bank and its alleged Board of
Directors have no jurisdiction to act in the manner they did in the absence of a valid by-laws; iv) in not
correcting the acts of the Civil Service Commission who erroneously rendered the assailed Resolutions
No. 94-4483 and No. 95-2754 as a result of fraud, falsification and/or misrepresentations committed by
Farouk A. Carpizo and his group, including Roberto F. de Ocampo; v) in affirming an unconscionably
harsh and/or excessive penalty; and vi) in failing to consider newly discovered evidence and reverse its
decision accordingly.
Subsequently, petitioner Sawadjaan filed an "Ex-parte Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time
to File a Reply (to the Comments of Respondent Al-Amanah Investment Bank of the Philippines),
17
Reply
(to Respondents Consolidated Comment,)
18
and Reply (to the Alleged Comments of Respondent Al-
Amanah Islamic Bank of the Philippines)."
19
On 13 October 2000, he informed this Court that he had
terminated his lawyers services, and, by himself, prepared and filed the following: 1) Motion for New
Trial;
20
2) Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and/or Having Waived their Rights to Interpose
Objection to Petitioners Motion for New Trial;
21
3) Ex-Parte Urgent Motions to Punish Attorneys Amado
D. Valdez, Elpidio J. Vega, Alda G. Reyes, Dominador R. Isidoro, Jr., and Odilon A. Diaz for Being in
Contempt of Court & to Inhibit them from Appearing in this Case Until they Can Present Valid Evidence
of Legal Authority;
22
4) Opposition/Reply (to Respondent AIIBPs Alleged Comment);
23
5) Ex-Parte Urgent
Motion to Punish Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda for Contempt of Court and the Issuance of a Commitment
Order/Warrant for His Arrest;
24
6) Reply/Opposition (To the Formal Notice of Withdrawal of
Undersigned Counsel as Legal Counsel for the Respondent Islamic Bank with Opposition to Petitioners
Motion to Punish Undersigned Counsel for Contempt of Court for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest);
25

7) Memorandum for Petitioner;
26
8) Opposition to SolGens Motion for Clarification with Motion for
Default and/or Waiver of Respondents to File their Memorandum;
27
9) Motion for Contempt of Court
and Inhibition/Disqualification with Opposition to OGCCs Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum;
28
10) Motion for Enforcement (In Defense of the Rule of Law);
29
11) Motion and
Opposition (Motion to Punish OGCCs Attorneys Amado D. Valdez, Efren B. Gonzales, Alda G. Reyes,
Odilon A. Diaz and Dominador R. Isidoro, Jr., for Contempt of Court and the Issuance of a Warrant for
their Arrest; and Opposition to their Alleged "Manifestation and Motion" Dated February 5, 2002);
30
12)
Motion for Reconsideration of Item (a) of Resolution dated 5 February 2002 with Supplemental Motion
for Contempt of Court;
31
13) Motion for Reconsideration of Portion of Resolution Dated 12 March
2002;
32
14) Ex-Parte Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Memorandum (To: CSC and
AIIBPs Memorandum);
33
15) Reply Memorandum (To: CSCs Memorandum) With Ex-Parte Urgent
Motion for Additional Extension of time to File Reply Memorandum (To: AIIBPs Memorandum);
34
and
16) Reply Memorandum (To: OGCCs Memorandum for Respondent AIIBP).
35

Petitioners efforts are unavailing, and we deny his petition for its procedural and substantive flaws.
The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is
appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment
is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave
abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision.
36

The records show that petitioners counsel received the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his
motion for reconsideration on 27 December 1999. The fifteen day reglamentary period to appeal under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court therefore lapsed on 11 January 2000. On 23 February 2000, over a month
after receipt of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed his petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal,
37
and though there are instances
38
where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be
resorted to despite the availability of an appeal,
39
we find no special reasons for making out an
exception in this case.
Even if we were to overlook this fact in the broader interests of justice and treat this as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65,
40
the petition would nevertheless be dismissed for failure of the
petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners recurrent argument, tenuous at its very best, is
premised on the fact that since respondent AIIBP failed to file its by-laws within the designated 60 days
from the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6848, all proceedings initiated by AIIBP and all actions resulting
therefrom are a patent nullity. Or, in his words, the AIIBP and its officers and Board of Directors,
. . . [H]ave no legal authority nor jurisdiction to manage much less operate the Islamic Bank, file
administrative charges and investigate petitioner in the manner they did and allegedly passed Board
Resolution No. 2309 on December 13, 1993 which is null and void for lack of an (sic) authorized and valid
by-laws. The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION was therefore affirming, erroneously, a null and void
"Resolution No. 2309 dated December 13, 1993 of the Board of Directors of Al-Amanah Islamic
Investment Bank of the Philippines" in CSC Resolution No. 94-4483 dated August 11, 1994. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 95-2754 dated April 11, 1995. Both
acts/resolutions of the CSC are erroneous, resulting from fraud, falsifications and misrepresentations of
the alleged Chairman and CEO Roberto F. de Ocampo and the alleged Director Farouk A. Carpizo and his
group at the alleged Islamic Bank.
41

Nowhere in petitioners voluminous pleadings is there a showing that the court a quo committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction reversible by a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner already raised the question of AIIBPs corporate existence and lack of jurisdiction in his
Motion for New Trial/Motion for Reconsideration of 27 May 1997 and was denied by the Court of
Appeals. Despite the volume of pleadings he has submitted thus far, he has added nothing substantial to
his arguments.
The AIIBP was created by Rep. Act No. 6848. It has a main office where it conducts business, has
shareholders, corporate officers, a board of directors, assets, and personnel. It is, in fact, here
represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, "the principal law office of
government-owned corporations, one of which is respondent bank."
42
At the very least, by its failure to
submit its by-laws on time, the AIIBP may be considered a de facto corporation
43
whose right to exercise
corporate powers may not be inquired into collaterally in any private suit to which such corporations
may be a party.
44

Moreover, a corporation which has failed to file its by-laws within the prescribed period does not ipso
facto lose its powers as such. The SEC Rules on Suspension/Revocation of the Certificate of Registration
of Corporations,
45
details the procedures and remedies that may be availed of before an order of
revocation can be issued. There is no showing that such a procedure has been initiated in this case.
In any case, petitioners argument is irrelevant because this case is not a corporate controversy, but a
labor dispute; and it is an employers basic right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a
measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest.
46
Regardless of whether AIIBP is a
corporation, a partnership, a sole proprietorship, or a sari-sari store, it is an undisputed fact that AIIBP is
the petitioners employer. AIIBP chose to retain his services during its reorganization, controlled the
means and methods by which his work was to be performed, paid his wages, and, eventually,
terminated his services.
47

And though he has had ample opportunity to do so, the petitioner has not alleged that he is anything
other than an employee of AIIBP. He has neither claimed, nor shown, that he is a stockholder or an
officer of the corporation. Having accepted employment from AIIBP, and rendered his services to the
said bank, received his salary, and accepted the promotion given him, it is now too late in the day for
petitioner to question its existence and its power to terminate his services. One who assumes an
obligation to an ostensible corporation as such, cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that
there was in fact no corporation.
48
1avvphi1
Even if we were to consider the facts behind petitioner Sawadjaans dismissal from service, we would be
hard pressed to find error in the decision of the AIIBP.
As appraiser/investigator, the petitioner was expected to conduct an ocular inspection of the properties
offered by CAMEC as collaterals and check the copies of the certificates of title against those on file with
the Registry of Deeds. Not only did he fail to conduct these routine checks, but he also deliberately
misrepresented in his appraisal report that after reviewing the documents and conducting a site
inspection, he found the CAMEC loan application to be in order. Despite the number of pleadings he has
filed, he has failed to offer an alternative explanation for his actions.
When he was informed of the charges against him and directed to appear and present his side on the
matter, the petitioner sent instead a memorandum questioning the fairness and impartiality of the
members of the investigating committee and refusing to recognize their jurisdiction over him.
Nevertheless, the investigating committee rescheduled the hearing to give the petitioner another
chance, but he still refused to appear before it.
Thereafter, witnesses were presented, and a decision was rendered finding him guilty of dishonesty and
dismissing him from service. He sought a reconsideration of this decision and the same committee
whose impartiality he questioned reduced their recommended penalty to suspension for six months and
one day. The board of directors, however, opted to dismiss him from service.
On appeal to the CSC, the Commission found that Sawadjaans failure to perform his official duties
greatly prejudiced the AIIBP, for which he should be held accountable. It held that:
. . . (I)t is crystal clear that respondent SAPPARI SAWADJAAN was remiss in the performance of his duties
as appraiser/inspector. Had respondent performed his duties as appraiser/inspector, he could have
easily noticed that the property located at Balintawak, Caloocan City covered by TCT No. C-52576 and
which is one of the properties offered as collateral by CAMEC is encumbered to Divina Pablico. Had
respondent reflected such fact in his appraisal/inspection report on said property the ISLAMIC BANK
would not have approved CAMECs loan of P500,000.00 in 1987 and CAMECs P5 Million loan in 1988,
respondent knowing fully well the Banks policy of not accepting encumbered properties as collateral.
Respondent SAWADJAANs reprehensible act is further aggravated when he failed to check and verify
from the Registry of Deeds of Marikina the authenticity of the property located at Mayamot, Antipolo,
Rizal covered by TCT No. N-130671 and which is one of the properties offered as collateral by CAMEC for
its P5 Million loan in 1988. If he only visited and verified with the Register of Deeds of Marikina the
authenticity of TCT No. N-130671 he could have easily discovered that TCT No. N-130671 is fake and the
property described therein non-existent.
. . .
This notwithstanding, respondent cannot escape liability. As adverted to earlier, his failure to perform
his official duties resulted to the prejudice and substantial damage to the ISLAMIC BANK for which he
should be held liable for the administrative offense of CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF
THE SERVICE.
49

From the foregoing, we find that the CSC and the court a quo committed no grave abuse of discretion
when they sustained Sawadjaans dismissal from service. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words,
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
50
The records show that the
respondents did none of these; they acted in accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 March 1999
affirming Resolutions No. 94-4483 and No. 95-2754 of the Civil Service Commission, and its Resolution of
15 December 1999 are hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14311 January 31, 1963
MANILA SANITARIUM & HOSPITAL and/or H.L. DYER, petitioner,
vs.
FAUSTO GABUCO and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Romeo J. Durez for petitioner.
Angel S. Dakita, Jr. for respondent Fausto Gabuco.
Pablo B. Cabrera for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
PAREDES, J.:
On December 19, 1956, respondent Fausto Gabuco instituted with the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations, a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against the petitioner (Case No. 1143 ULP), alleging
1. That the complainant being an employee of the respondents, together with some of his co-employees
proposed to respondents, through a petition in writing dated August 2, 1956 the return of the privileges
they usually enjoyed, i.e., (1) rental subsidies, (2) child allowance, (3) educational grant, and (4)
transportation allowance;
2. That on August 14, 1956, the complainant in company with his other co-employees in respondent
hospital convoked a meeting and organized a union in which he was elected President; and
3. That upon respondents' learning complainant's organization of union, they dismissed Fausto Gabuco
on September 30, 1956, in order to discourage union membership.
On December 26, 1956, the herein petitioners filed their Answer, specifically denying the charges and
averred that Fausto Gabuco was removed because (1) his job was longer necessary and (2) he was given
the equity separation allowance.
Under date of April 15, 1957, the Hospital presented a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the CIR did
not have jurisdiction over the case, since the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital was not established for
profit or gain, and that aside from being operated for charitable purposes it is also in the nature of an
educational institution, for it educates and trains nurses. On June 11, 1957, the following order was
issued: "The grounds ..., having been found, after due hearing, to be not indubitable, said motion is
hereby denied without prejudice to the issues therein raised being disposed of in the decision of the
merits after all evidence is submitted." The parties presented evidence in support of their respective
contentions. After making definite findings, that Fausto Gabuco had organized the Hospital Employees
Union on August 14, 1956, and that respondents therein had learned of it, the trial court, anent the
cause of the dismissal of Gabuco, held:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, This Court is of the opinion and so holds that respondents are guilty of unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 4 (a), 1 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act by discriminately
discharging Fausto Gabuco on September 30, 1956 for union activities. Hence, respondents are hereby
ordered to reinstate fully and immediately Fausto Gabuco with back wages from October 1, 1956 until
reinstated without prejudice to seniority or other rights privileges he enjoyed before his separation.
The respondents shall cease and desist from such unfair labor practice.
Respondents presented a Motion for Reconsideration, on the ground that the judgment was contrary to
law and jurisprudence and facts and evidence submitted during the hearing. In same Motion,
respondents informed the court that they would be submitting their arguments in support of the motion
within ten (10) days from July 31, 1958. On August 8, 1958, respondents presented a "Motion for
Extension of Time" to file their memorandum, which was denied on August 11, 1958, on the ground that
the Court en banc has adopted a no-extension policy. Under date of August 13, 1958, respondents
presented their Memorandum, assailing the decision on various grounds. On August 18, 1958,
complainant Gabuco, now respondent, presented a Motion to Dismiss the Motion for Reconsideration,
alleging in support thereof that the memorandum had been filed one (1) day late. The above motion
was opposed by respondents, claiming substantial compliance with the law. On August 21, 1958, the
Court en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration. Judge Tabigne dissented.
The Manila Sanitarium and Hospital brought to this Court the decision and the resolutions denying its
motion for extension and dismissing its Motion for Reconsideration, on a Writ of Certiorari, claiming,
that the CIR acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, and
committed substantial errors of law in:
1. Taking cognizance of the case subject of this petition and finding petitioner Manila Sanitarium &
Hospital, to be an institution operated for profit or gain;
2. Finding the herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practices;
3. Ordering the herein petitioners to reinstate immediately Respondent Fausto Gabuco with back wages
from October 1, 1956 until fully reinstated; and
4. In not giving due course to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The conclusions reached by the respondent court on the question of jurisdiction has no factual and legal
basis. The grounds upon which the respondent court had predicated said conclusions on the nature,
character and activities of the petitioner, are set forth in the appealed decision, as follows
.... This Court cannot subscribe to the contention of respondents because the Manila Sanitarium and
Hospital is being operated not on charity but on practically business basis by charging medical and
hospital fees and does not main a free ward: whereas, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines has always been
operating on charity-aims from private as well as government entities, and the voluntary contributions
of private individuals.
In other words, respondent hospital is operated, just like any other private hospital, for profit and gain.
While the yardstick used in the Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana Araos case for determining
whether or not an institution or concern is operated for profit or gain is the charitable end of the same,
the instant case does not fall under that norm considering that unlike the Boy Scouts it engages in
charging medical and hospital fees without even as much as maintaining a free ward.
The evidence of record, mainly documentary, definitely proves that the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital
is a non-profit, non-industrial establishment. The Articles of Incorporation of the Philippine Union
Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists, a religious corporation, (Exhs. A-B), to which the
hospital is a subsidiary, provides the following
THIRD: That the general and principal purpose and object for which this corporation is formed is to
teach the people of all nations the commandments of God and the everlasting Gospel of Jesus Christ,
and the subsidiary purposes and objects for which this corporation is formed are: to issue notes, to
grant annuities, to acquire, possess, and hold title to real, personal and mixed estates, including public
or private lands for agricultural development and other purposes, water rights, mining rights, and forest
rights, either in trust or otherwise, by gift, bequest, device, or purchase, and to have the power to sell
and convey the same by such instrument or conveyance as may be suitable; to establish and operate
sanitariums, hospitals, clinics, publishing houses, and book and periodical agencies; ....
As such religious corporation, the Seventh Day Adventists expressly declared that it is not for personal
profit or gain to any individual, but that all its property and effects must be used and expended in
carrying into effect the aims and objects of its existence. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as early
as March 11, 1956, an August 15, 1958, had declared that "upon investigation conducted by a
representative of this office, it was ascertained that the Manila Sanitarium & Hospital where they
(Pharmacists) are employed, is a religious and charitable institution not conducted for private gain"
(Annex O, of Petition; Appendix C). The Operating Policy of the Seventh Day Adventists, (Article II),
states that the object of the Hospital is "to advance through medical missionary work, the cause and
Kingdom of Jesus Christ .. it being understood that no dividends or profits shall ever be declared to any
constituency, boards or to any of its working force" (Annex A-1 of the petition). W.J. Hackett, Minister
and President of the Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists, Potenciano
Romulo, Secretary of the same religious denomination and Dr. Rey Jutry, Chief Medical Staff and
Member of the Board of Management of the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital, testified in unison that the
hospital was not operated for private gain or profit. Their testimony has not been contradicted by
respondent Fausto Gabuco.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
With respect to its management, the respondent Court commented that this medical institution is
operated in the fashion of an ordinary private hospital, imposing medical and hospital fees. This must be
conceded; for it is one way of obtaining maximum efficiency in its service. The mere charging of medical
and hospital fees for those who can afford to pay, did not make the institution established for profit or
gain. It had to meet expenses for operation and maintenance, in order to carry its lofty purposes to
serve suffering humanity (U.S.T. Hospital Employees v. Santo Tomas Hospital, G.R. No. L-6988, May 24,
1954; San Beda v. CIR & N.L.U., No. L-7649, Oct. 29, 1955; Quezon Institute, et al. v. Velasco; Quezon
Institute, et al. v. Paraiso, L-7742 & L-7743; Univ. of San Agustin v. CIR, et al., No. L-12222, May 28,
1958). The petitioner hospital is not only established and run for religious purposes but it is also
educational in the sense that it trains and educates nurses and charitable and benevolent because it
offers free medical assistance to indigents. The fact that in the hospital, there is no separate place
distinctly marked with the words "Free Ward," does not necessarily prove that the hospital was not
giving free medical assistance for not admitting charity patients therein. Dr. Jutry testified that there
was no such thing as "pay ward" and "free ward" in said hospital, as it was an institution organized on a
non-profit basis, to help people as much as possible medically; that the hospital charged medical fees to
patients who could afford to pay; partial medical fees to some; and free to many; so that the more fees
it collected, the more free services it could render; that indigent patients who were admitted as charity
cases occupied the same ward with paying patients; their treatment, facilities and accommodations
were the same. The hospital for the years 1952 to 1958 (7 years), had appropriated and actually spent
around P890,855.65 for free service (Appendix B).
Respondent court declared that petitioner hospital was a business concern because there is nothing in
the evidence which showed that it incurred losses in the operation. The criterion advanced by the
respondent court in determining whether or not an establishment is organized for profit or gain, is
fallacious. The mere fact that an industrial or commercial enterprise had incurred losses, does not follow
as a consequence that it is not for profit or for gain, although it is established for such purpose; much in
the same way that if a charitable institution gains on its operations, that it has become a business
enterprise established for profit or gain. It has not been shown that the petitioner-hospital, a non-stock
corporation, ever declared dividends to its members or that its property, effects or profit was used for
personal or individual gain, and not for the purpose or carrying out the objectives of the hospital itself.
In the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos, L-10091, Jan. 29, 1958, we have held:
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, there is every reason to believe that our labor legislation
from Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, down through the Eight-
Hour Labor Law, to the Industrial Peace Act, was intended by the Legislature to apply only to industrial
employment and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupation for
purposes of profit and gain, and their industrial employees, but not to organizations and entities which
are organized, operated, and maintained not for profit or gain, but for elevated and lofty, purposes,
such as, charity, social service, education and instruction, hospital and medical service, the
encouragement and promotion of character, patriotism and kindred virtues in the youth of the nation,
etc. (See also University of San Agustin v. CIR, et al., supra.)
it appearing that the petitioner Manila Sanitarium and Hospital is a purely charitable and educational
institution, not established or operated for profit or gain, the same is not governed by the said Act, and
the respondent Court has acted without jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of discretion and
substantial error of law when it took cognizance of the case, subject of the petition..
Because of the conclusions reached, consideration of the other issues involved herein is deemed
unnecessary.
The decision sought to be reviewed is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs, reserving to the
respondent herein, Fausto Gabuco, the right to file the appropriate action, in the proper Court.
G.R. No. L-12719 May 31, 1962
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
THE CLUB FILIPINO, INC. DE CEBU, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
V. Jaime and L. E. Petilla for respondent.
PAREDES, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, reversing the decision of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the "Club Filipino, Inc. de Cebu",
the sum of P12,068.84 as fixed and percentage taxes, surcharge and compromise penalty, allegedly due
from it as a keeper of bar and restaurant.
As found by the Court of Tax Appeals, the "Club Filipino, Inc. de Cebu," (Club, for short), is a civic
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines with an original authorized capital stock of
P22,000.00, which was subsequently increased to P200,000.00, among others, to it "proporcionar,
operar, y mantener un campo de golf, tenis, gimnesio (gymnasiums), juego de bolos (bowling alleys),
mesas de billar y pool, y toda clase de juegos no prohibidos por leyes generales y ordenanzas generales;
y desarollar y cultivar deportes de toda clase y denominacion cualquiera para el recreo y entrenamiento
saludable de sus miembros y accionistas" (sec. 2, Escritura de Incorporacion del Club Filipino, Inc. Exh.
A). Neither in the articles or by-laws is there a provision relative to dividends and their distribution,
although it is covenanted that upon its dissolution, the Club's remaining assets, after paying debts, shall
be donated to a charitable Philippine Institution in Cebu (Art. 27, Estatutos del Club, Exh. A-a.).
The Club owns and operates a club house, a bowling alley, a golf course (on a lot leased from the
government), and a bar-restaurant where it sells wines and liquors, soft drinks, meals and short orders
to its members and their guests. The bar-restaurant was a necessary incident to the operation of the
club and its golf-course. The club is operated mainly with funds derived from membership fees and
dues. Whatever profits it had, were used to defray its overhead expenses and to improve its golf-course.
In 1951. as a result of a capital surplus, arising from the re-valuation of its real properties, the value or
price of which increased, the Club declared stock dividends; but no actual cash dividends were
distributed to the stockholders. In 1952, a BIR agent discovered that the Club has never paid percentage
tax on the gross receipts of its bar and restaurant, although it secured B-4, B-9(a) and B-7 licenses. In a
letter dated December 22, 1852, the Collector of Internal Revenue assessed against and demanded from
the Club, the following sums:
As percentage tax on its gross receipts
during the tax years 1946 to 1951 P9,599.07
Surcharge therein 2,399.77
As fixed tax for the years 1946 to 1952 70.00
Compromise penalty 500.00
The Club wrote the Collector, requesting for the cancellation of the assessment. The request having
been denied, the Club filed the instant petition for review.
The dominant issues involved in this case are twofold:
1. Whether the respondent Club is liable for the payment of the sum of 12,068.84, as fixed and
percentage taxes and surcharges prescribed in sections 182, 183 and 191 of the Tax Code, under which
the assessment was made, in connection with the operation of its bar and restaurant, during the periods
mentioned above; and
2. Whether it is liable for the payment of the sum of P500.00 as compromise penalty.
Section 182, of the Tax Code states, "Unless otherwise provided, every person engaging in a business on
which the percentage tax is imposed shall pay in full a fixed annual tax of ten pesos for each calendar
year or fraction thereof in which such person shall engage in said business." Section 183 provides in
general that "the percentage taxes on business shall be payable at the end of each calendar quarter in
the amount lawfully due on the business transacted during each quarter; etc." And section 191, same
Tax Code, provides "Percentage tax . . . Keepers of restaurants, refreshment parlors and other eating
places shall pay a tax three per centum, and keepers of bar and cafes where wines or liquors are served
five per centum of their gross receipts . . .". It has been held that the liability for fixed and percentage
taxes, as provided by these sections, does not ipso facto attach by mere reason of the operation of a bar
and restaurant. For the liability to attach, the operator thereof must be engaged in the business as a
barkeeper and restaurateur. The plain and ordinary meaning of business is restricted to activities or
affairs where profit is the purpose or livelihood is the motive, and the term business when used without
qualification, should be construed in its plain and ordinary meaning, restricted to activities for profit or
livelihood (The Coll. of Int. Rev. v. Manila Lodge No. 761 of the BPOE [Manila Elks Club] & Court of Tax
Appeals, G.R. No. L-11176, June 29, 1959, giving full definitions of the word "business"; Coll. of Int. Rev.
v. Sweeney, et al. [International Club of Iloilo, Inc.], G.R. No. L-12178, Aug. 21, 1959, the facts of which
are similar to the ones at bar; Manila Polo Club v. B. L. Meer, etc., No. L-10854, Jan. 27, 1960).
Having found as a fact that the Club was organized to develop and cultivate sports of all class and
denomination, for the healthful recreation and entertainment of its stockholders and members; that
upon its dissolution, its remaining assets, after paying debts, shall be donated to a charitable Philippine
Institution in Cebu; that it is operated mainly with funds derived from membership fees and dues; that
the Club's bar and restaurant catered only to its members and their guests; that there was in fact no
cash dividend distribution to its stockholders and that whatever was derived on retail from its bar and
restaurant was used to defray its overall overhead expenses and to improve its golf-course (cost-plus-
expenses-basis), it stands to reason that the Club is not engaged in the business of an operator of bar
and restaurant (same authorities, cited above).
It is conceded that the Club derived profit from the operation of its bar and restaurant, but such fact
does not necessarily convert it into a profit-making enterprise. The bar and restaurant are necessary
adjuncts of the Club to foster its purposes and the profits derived therefrom are necessarily incidental to
the primary object of developing and cultivating sports for the healthful recreation and entertainment of
the stockholders and members. That a Club makes some profit, does not make it a profit-making Club.
As has been remarked a club should always strive, whenever possible, to have surplus (Jesus Sacred
Heart College v. Collector of Int. Rev., G.R. No. L-6807, May 24, 1954; Collector of Int. Rev. v. Sinco
Educational Corp., G.R. No. L-9276, Oct. 23, 1956).1wph1.t
It is claimed that unlike the two cases just cited (supra), which are non-stock, the appellee Club is a stock
corporation. This is unmeritorious. The facts that the capital stock of the respondent Club is divided into
shares, does not detract from the finding of the trial court that it is not engaged in the business of
operator of bar and restaurant. What is determinative of whether or not the Club is engaged in such
business is its object or purpose, as stated in its articles and by-laws. It is a familiar rule that the actual
purpose is not controlled by the corporate form or by the commercial aspect of the business
prosecuted, but may be shown by extrinsic evidence, including the by-laws and the method of
operation. From the extrinsic evidence adduced, the Tax Court concluded that the Club is not engaged in
the business as a barkeeper and restaurateur.
Moreover, for a stock corporation to exist, two requisites must be complied with, to wit: (1) a capital
stock divided into shares and (2) an authority to distribute to the holders of such shares, dividends or
allotments of the surplus profits on the basis of the shares held (sec. 3, Act No. 1459). In the case at bar,
nowhere in its articles of incorporation or by-laws could be found an authority for the distribution of its
dividends or surplus profits. Strictly speaking, it cannot, therefore, be considered a stock corporation,
within the contemplation of the corporation law.
A tax is a burden, and, as such, it should not be deemed imposed upon fraternal, civic, non-profit,
nonstock organizations, unless the intent to the contrary is manifest and patent" (Collector v. BPOE Elks
Club, et al., supra), which is not the case in the present appeal.
Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent Club is not engaged in the business as an operator of a
bar and restaurant, and therefore, not liable for fixed and percentage taxes, it follows that it is not liable
for any penalty, much less of a compromise penalty.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed without costs.
G.R. No. 115054-66 September 12, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE MENIL, JR., accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On appeal is the joint decision
1
dated 16 August 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch
30, in Criminal Case Nos. 2948, 2956, 3000, 3001, 3013, 3020, 3021, 3022, 3026, 3028, 3052, 3053,
3054, and 3058, convicting accused-appellant Vicente "Boy" Menil, Jr. of one (1) count of large scale
swindling and thirteen (13) counts of estafa.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Vicente Menil, Jr. and his wife, Adrian B. Menil, were the proprietors of a business operating under the
name ABM Appliance and Upholstery with offices at the Denso Building, Capitol Road, Surigao City. On
July 15, 1989, they, through ushers and sales executives, began soliciting investments from the general
public in Surigao City and its neighboring towns. They assured would-be investors that their money
would be multiplied ten-fold after fifteen (15) calendar days. In other words, if a person invested
P100.00, they claimed that after fifteen (15) calendar days the investor would get the amount of
P1,000.00 in return. Each investor may invest a maximum amount of P1000.00 for which they were
reportedly assured a return of P10,000.00. With respect to their ushers and sales executives, they were
given a 10% commission from the total amounts they remitted to the business.
The people who invested in the business were issued coupons which merely indicated the date of entry,
the due date of the investment, the amount given, the amount to be received, the name and address of
the investor and the name of the sales executive. Sales executives appointed by accused-appellant were
given these coupons which they, in turn, gave to the people they solicited from as proof of their
investment. The sales executives likewise wrote down on a piece of yellow pad paper the details of the
investments they received during a particular day. These sales executives were required to remit the
investments they collected daily at the offices of ABM Appliance and Upholstery by presenting the
money and the yellow pad containing the names of the investors. A representative of ABM Appliance
and Upholstery then received the money and signed the yellow pad paper. The sales executives were
then immediately given their 10% commission from the amount remitted. When the investments
matured, a lump sum representing the total return of the investments were given to the sales
executives who were given the task of distributing them to the investors they dealt with.
Initially, the operation started with a few investors who invested small amounts. On the day of the start
of the operations, for example, less than P200.00 were invested at their offices. Gradually, the amounts
invested and the number of depositors increased. On June 30, 1989 alone, the business was able to
attract more than 200 investors and the total amount of investments they received was more than
P40,000.00. Because of the small amounts initially involved, accused-appellant and his wife were able to
pay the returns on the investments as they fell due.
Sometime during the first week of August, 1989, accused-appellant and his wife, apparently to clothe
their operations with legitimacy, caused the incorporation of their business, under the name ABM
Development Center, Inc. with the Securities and Exchange Commission. As registered under S.E.C. Reg.
No. 167274,
2
the ABM Development Center, Inc. was a non-stock corporation with twelve (12)
incorporators and trustees, including accused-appellant Vicente Menil, Jr. and his wife, Adriana B. Menil.
Adriana B. Menil was likewise appointed as the treasurer of the non-stock corporation. The corporation
had a total capitalization of P12,000.00 and its purposes, as stated in its Articles of Incorporation,
3
are as
follows:
"1. To assist in the total development of community members morally, physically, educationally and
economically and socially towards their present and future progress;
2. To operate, coordinate and/or organize community development centers;
3. To make or coordinate in the making of studies and researches;
4. To solicit, receive, channel and/or distribute donations, economic aids, grants, investments in money
or in kind;
5. To help train community members in newly acquired knowledge, modern trends and techniques;
6. To promote brotherhood, fellowship and unity among ourselves; and
7. To negotiate, represent, and deal with government and other agencies for the benefit and in behalf of
the members as well as for the community."
On August 15, 1989, accused-appellant and his wife held a meeting with the sales executives and ushers
of the ABM Development Center, Inc. at the Provincial Convention Center. At this meeting, accused-
appellant informed the sales executives that the business of ABM Development Center, Inc. was
proceeding normally and that investments were coming in. He advised the sales executives however
that beginning that date, all investments accepted by the business would only have returns of 1:7 which
investors will receive after fifteen (15) working days, excluding weekends and holidays. As such, if a
person gave P100.00, his investment will mature only after fifteen (15) working days and he will receive
only P700.00. This change of policy was contained in a Memorandum dated August 24, 1989.
4

After this August 15, 1989 meeting, the sales executives continued accepting investments from the
general public and the offices of accused-appellant kept on accepting the remittances of the sales
executives. By this time, daily investments amounting to millions of pesos were pouring into the offices
of ABM Development Center, Inc. and payments of the returns became delayed. Allegedly due to the
delay in the counting of the money for release to investors, the payments which were set for release on
August 28, 1989 were completely paid only on September 18, 1989.
On September 19, 1989, the ABM Development Center, Inc. stopped releasing payments. The sales
investors went to the offices of ABM Development Center, Inc. to inquire about the release of payments
but there was no one around to address their complaints. The whereabouts of accused-appellant and
his wife was also unknown.
On October 10, 1989, accused-appellant and his wife made an announcement over the radio that
payments were forthcoming and that the investors should have no cause for alarm. They also repeated
their announcement on television. Despite these assurances and despite repeated demands made by
the investors, accused-appellant released no further payments and neither did he refund any
investment remitted to him. Accused-appellant and his wife went into hiding in Davao City but
eventually they were arrested by police authorities led by a certain Colonel Panchito.
Consequently, a case for large scale swindling was filed by the City Prosecutor of Surigao City against the
accused-appellant and his wife. Additionally, twenty cases for estafa were filed against accused-
appellant and his wife by the Provincial Prosecutors Office. Of these twenty (20) cases, seven (7) were
provisionally dismissed on October 21, 1991 for failure to prosecute.
In Criminal Case No. 2948, the information
5
charging accused-appellant and his wife with the crime of
large scale swindling was filed on December 14, 1989. The information in this case reads as follows:
"That in or about the month of August, 1989, and/or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the city
of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud thousands of investors using as instruments innocent and defrauded
sales executives and/or ushers, in the following manner, to wit: the above-named accused, pretending
to possess credit, property and a secret formula in their pyramiding business scheme, enticed the
general public to invest with ABM Development Center, Incorporated, thru false manifestations and
representations that the amount they would invest would earn seven hundred percent (700%) after
fifteen (15) working days from date of investment, by which enticing offer, the general public was
persuaded to invest large sums of money thru the innocent sales executives and/or ushers, amounting
to more than ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, which were duly
remitted to and received by the accused, doing business under the name and style ABM Development
Center, Incorporated, which was the front of their illegal transactions, but the accused once in the
possession of the amounts invested and far from complying with their aforesaid obligation, with deceit
aforethought, misapplied, misappropriated, converted and absconded the amounts received as
investments to their own personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands made for the
payment of the benefits of the investments and/or the return of the amounts invested, said accused
failed and refused, and still fail and refuse to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the investors in such
sums as may be proven and such other damages as may be allowed by law.
Contrary to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1689."
In Criminal Case No. 2956, accused appellant and his wife were charged with violation of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. The information in this case reads as follows:
"That from July 26, 1989 to September 13, 1989, at Placer, Surigao del Norte, Philippines, xxx, the
above-named accused xxx with deliberate criminal intent to defraud the general public by pretending to
have a huge amount as sinking fund but later on was found out to be a pyramiding scam, accused
Vicente Menil, Jr., being the Manager, and his wife accused Adriana B. Menil, being the Treasurer of
their association known as ABM Development Center, Inc., xxx operating on funds solicited from the
general public in the form of investments with the enticing return of 10 times then later reduced to 7
times the investment after due date and having successfully solicited thru their sales executive, Zohar
Mondaya, the total amount of P610,046.00, did then and there xxx misappropriate xxx the said amount
xxx remitted to them subject to the condition that xxx after the lapse of 15 working days from
remittance, said investment would be returned in seven folds to the investors, but xxx repeated
demands made xxx said accused failed and refused to pay or give as agreed upon by them xxx to the
damage and prejudice of the investors in the said amount P610,046.00 xxx resulting to more financial
difficulties of the general public and therefore constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the
stability of the nation.
Contrary to Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code."
6

Similarly worded informations were filed against the accused-appellant and his wife in Criminal Case
Nos. 3000, 3001, 3013, 3020, 3021, 3022, 3026, 3028, 3052, 3053, 3054, and 3058. These informations
likewise charged accused-appellant and his wife with violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
and differed only in the amount allegedly swindled, the names of the complainants and the sales
executives, and the time and place where the alleged swindling occurred.
Accused-appellant and his wife, upon being arraigned on April 4, 1990, pleaded not guilty to all the
charges leveled against them.
7

In the case for large scale swindling and in the thirteen (13) cases for estafa, a pre-trial was conducted.
The pre-trial order
8
in Criminal Case No. 2948, for large scale swindling, shows the following stipulations:
1. That the accused Vicente Menil, Jr. and Adriana Menil are the General Manager and Treasurer,
respectively of the ABM Appliances and Upholstery with Assurances and Privileges which later on
changed to ABM Development Center;
2. That the ABM Development Center was operating business in Surigao City, particularly at the Capitol
Road; that it was duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and was duly issued a
Mayors Permit to operate the same;
3. That the ABM Appliances and Upholstery with Assurances and Privileges, and later ABM Development
Center were merged into one, under one sanitary permit to operate as one entity;
4. That on August 24, 1989, Vicente Menil, Jr., the General Manager, issued a Memorandum to all
investors thereof regarding the decrease of the proceeds of the investment from one thousand percent
to 700% so that the P10.00 investment will get only the proceeds of P70.00; and,
5. That what remain to be proved in the trial on the merits will be limited only to the names of the sales
executives/investors and amounts of investment.
For the thirteen estafa cases, the following facts were stipulated:
1. That the accused operated the ABM Appliance and Upholstery with Assurance Privileges and ABM
Development Center, Inc., the latter being duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
2. That accused Vicente Menil, as General Manager, and Adriana Menil, as Treasurer, operating through
the sales executives who solicited/received investments from the general public and remitted to the
corporation;
3. That the listed sales executives and the amounts claimed remitted and received are qualifiedly
admitted; and
4. That the operation of ABM stopped on September 18, 1989.
9

Thereafter, trial on the merits in the fourteen (14) cases commenced.
During the trial of the case, accused Adrian B. Menil, the wife of accused-appellant, died of tuberculosis
on November 5, 1992 and accordingly, the trial court dismissed the cases as against her in an Order
dated November 12, 1992.
10

In all the fourteen (14) cases before the trial court, the documentary evidence for the prosecution was
similar, consisting mainly of the investment records containing a listing of remittances made by the sales
executives/ushers of ABM Appliance and Upholstery and ABM Development Center, Inc. Likewise, the
testimonial evidence for the prosecution consisted mainly of the testimonies of the sales
executives/ushers of ABM Appliance and Upholstery and ABM Development Center, Inc., who testified
on the mode of operations, the respective amounts which they solicited from the public, and the places
where they solicited
11

In Criminal Case No. 2948, for violation of P.D. 1689, due to the large number of witnesses listed in the
complaint and information (91 in all), the prosecution and defense agreed to limit the number of
witnesses to only four (4) sales executives.
These witnesses, namely Felicitas Gotostos, Gloria Apale, Wlfredo Lisandra and Nena Cagna-an,
uniformly declared that they were sales executives and investors appointed by accused-appellant
Vicente Menil, Jr. to solicit investments from people in Surigao City. Witness Felicitas Gatostos claimed
that she remitted a total of P257,180.00. Gloria Apale turned over investments totalling P1,397,619.00
while Nena Cagna-an claimed to have remitted a total of P94,120.00. Finally, witness Wilfredo Lisondra
allegedly turned over investments totaling P1,124,358.00. These amounts were listed on sheets of paper
which were marked and acknowledged received by representatives of the ABM office. These four
investments were included in a Summary of Total Investments presented by the prosecution containing
the names of 1,124 sales executives and/or investors who all in all remitted a total amount of
P45,494,936.00.
For the thirteen (13) estafa cases, the prosecution presented the thirteen complainants who were sales
executives and/or investors of ABM assigned to the different barangays and municipalities in Surigao del
Norte where ABM collected investments. They all testified on the modus operandi employed by
accused-appellant in conducting his "investment business" and they identified documents which
showed the names of the investors they solicited from and the amounts which they remitted to ABM
and which remained unpaid. Following is a summary of the amounts that these witnesses claim as
having been duly received by ABM for investment purposes and which remained unpaid to date:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. WITNESS PLACE AMOUNT
2956 Zohar Mandaya Placer, Surigao del Norte P610,046.00
3000 Cedronio Cagampang Bacuag, Surigao del Norte 136,670.00
3001 Joseph Lacsamana Brgy. del Rosario, Tubod,
Surigao del Norte
P203,850.00
3013 Domingo T. Tejada Brgy. Anislagan, Placer,
Surigao del Norte
P 29,070.00
3020 Rosiefe M. Laid Brgy. Sta Cruz, Placer,
Surigao del Norte
P114,620.00
3021 Gamaliela Mordeno Brgy. Roxas, Mainit,
Surigao del Norte
447,960.00
3022 Rebecca Mosca Brgy. Poblacion, Mainit,
Surigao del Norte
P275,280.00
3026 Patora Decalit Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Placer,
Surigao del Norte
222,120.00
3028 Francisca Tado Tubod, Surigao del Norte P399,650.00
3052 Porferia Etac Brgy. Bad-as, Placer,
Surigao del Norte
172,910.00
3053 Leodegaria Paquero Brgy. Marga, Tubod,
Surigao del Norte
148,278.00
3054 Felomina Calamba Tubod, Surigao del Norte P320,000.00
3058 Merlina Silva Brgy. Bad-as, Placer, 500,129.00
Accused Vicente Menil, Jr. put up a common defense in all the cases filed against him.
He testified that his investment business started on June 15, 1989 in Surigao City.
12
He insists that his
investment business was legitimate as his corporation was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. He pointed out that under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Articles of Incorporation of ABM
Development Center, Inc., he was authorized to solicit and receive investments in money and in kind. He
also presented a Mayors Permit which he claimed authorized him to run the business.
13

In answer to a question as to how his business operates, the accused-appellant described it as a "rolling
system" which paid off dividends in the ratio of one is to ten initially and then one is to seven beginning
August 15, 1989.
14
He claimed to have paid off these investments as they matured beginning June 30,
1989 and that he was able to pay off all investments received by his office which matured on August 28,
1989 and earlier.
15
He stated however, that because of the large amounts involved, he was able to pay
off the investments maturing on August 28, 1989 only on September 18, 1989 as the counting of the
money alone took two or three days to finish.
16

He alleged that he stopped giving payments after September 18, 1989 due to circumstances beyond his
control. He claimed that on September 19, 1989, he and his wife were fetched by a certain Lt. Arab and
were brought to the PC Headquarters where a certain Col. Macatangcop questioned them as to the
delay in the payment of investments. He was then mauled by a certain Lt. Arab and two sons of Col.
Macatangcop when he refused to issue to them a check for P500,000.00. He was released by Col.
Macatangcop only after he issued a check for P250,000.00 and after he promised that he will not submit
himself to a medical examination.
17

After his experience with Col. Macatangcop, he proceeded back to his office to rest and to plan his next
course of action. He then went to the Provincial Hospital in order to have his injuries checked. He was
able to secure a medical certificate attesting to the injuries that he sustained.
18
While at the hospital, he
heard rumors that he was being hunted by the military and so he transferred to the Miranda Clinic.
Thereafter, he went to Toril, Davao City where he was arrested by a certain Col. Panchito.
19

He stated that while in Davao City, a certain Sgt. Patino ransacked his belongings and took away his
attache case containing P50,000.00 in cash, several pieces of jewelry, watches, a camera, and an
undisclosed amount in British pounds and American dollars. All in all, he claimed that he lost a total of
half a million pesos.
20
He further stated that he left around P3,000,000.00 inside a steel cabinet in his
office which had been taken into the custody of the city sheriff. When he checked the contents with the
sheriffs office, he stated that the steel cabinet had been forcibly opened and the money was now
missing.
21

He further alleged that he had money in the Surigao City Banks amounting to half a million pesos but he
gradually withdrew this amount to pay off his obligations. At this point, he could no longer pay off all his
financial obligations as he had no more money and because he was detained at the Surigao City jail.
22

On August 16, 1993, the trial court rendered a joint decision
23
finding accused-appellant guilty of one
count of large scale swindling and thirteen (13) counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the joint
decision provides, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused Vicente Menil, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa, defined and penalized in Article 315, first paragraph and Sections 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, in all the above-entitled thirteen (13) provincial cases and one (1) city case, and,
accordingly, hereby sentences him, the following penalties:
Crim. Case No. 2948:
The qualified penalty provided for in second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1689, for
Large Scale Swindling, and metes out an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify all the
listed investors in Exhibits "PP-1" to "PP-2", in the total sum of P45,494,936.00, Exhibit "PP"; to suffer
the accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 2956:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-5" to "A-188", in the amount of P624,726.00; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3000:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A" to "A-27", the sum of P136,670.00; to suffer the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3001:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-83", the sum of P203,850.00; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3013:
An indeterminate penalty of Two (2) years, Four (4) Months of prision correccional , as the minimum, to
Eight (8) years of prision mayor, as the maximum; to indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to
"A-8" the sum of P29,070.00; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3020:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-126" the sum of P114,620.00; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3021:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-126" the sum of P447,960.00; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3022:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-64" the sum of P275,280.00; to suffer the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3026:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-28" the sum of P222,120.00; to suffer the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3028:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-74" the sum of P399,650.00; to suffer the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3052:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-26" the sum of P172,910.00; to suffer the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3053:
An indeterminate penalty of Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months of prision correccional, as the minimum,
to Eight (8) years of prision mayor; to indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-17" the sum
of P36,970.00; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3054:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-198" the sum of P920,883.00; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
Crim. Case No. 3058:
An indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor to Twenty Years of reclusion temporal; to
indemnify the investors listed in Exhibits "A-1" to "A-150" the sum of P500,129.00; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs;
Without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.
Pursuant to Article 70, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be served first and, thereafter, the
simultaneous service of the penalties imposed in the thirteen (13) provincial cases. Provided, however,
that the maximum period shall in no case exceed Forty (40) Years, after applying the three-fold rule
length of time, corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed, which is reclusion perpetua,
computed at Thirty (30) years.
The accuseds preventive detention shall be credited in his favor, pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED."
24

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors
25
:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS PURELY CIVIL THE LIABILITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS/ INVESTORS.
II.
THE COURT A QUO MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR LARGE SCALE
SWINDLING UNDER P.D. 1869 IN CRIM. CASE NO. 2948 AND ESTAFA IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 2956-3058,
RESPECTIVELY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
We affirm the conviction of accused-appellant.
In convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of Large Scale Swindling punishable under P.D. 1689 in
Criminal Case No. 2948 and estafa in the thirteen other criminal cases filed against accused-appellant,
the trial court made reference to Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. Under this provision,
swindling or estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud is committed by "using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or by other
similar deceits." The elements of estafa under this penal provision are: (1) the accused defrauded
another by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to
the offended party or third party.
26

In the case at bench, it is not disputed that the accused-appellant failed to pay the expected returns of
the investments and/or solicitations of the private complainants. Accused-appellant himself admits that
he was not able to pay the returns on the investments due August 29, 1989 onwards. Neither did he
return the amount of their investments. Thus:
"Q: Okay. All right, you know this Crim. Case No. 3053, one Leodegarda Paquero claims that she had
invested the amount of P36,970.00 duly acknowledged as to have been received by the ABM. Can you
tell, Mr. Menil, what happened to this investment made by the said Leodegarda Paquero?
Court:
What municipality is that?
Pros. Calang:
Tubod, Barangay Marga, your Honor please.
Atty. Canoy:
I would like to request counsel to pinpoint your honor please, the amount?
Pros. Calang:
On pages 31-45 inclusive, on record.
Q: What happened to her investment of P36,970.00?
A: It was included in the damage when the business was closed.
Q: Meaning to say, not paid?
A: Not paid, sir.
Q: Even the total amount of investment was not returned?
A: Yes, it was not returned, sir.
Q: In Crim. Case No. 3000, one Cedronio Cagampang claims that he had invested to the ABM
Development Center, Inc. as usher as well as investor in the amount of P136,670.00 turned over and
received by the ABM Development Center, Incorporated. Kindly tell this Honorable Court what
happened to this investment?
A: This one which was not yet due or arrived to its due date, so this was not paid.
Atty. Canoy:
Your honor, please, I think there is no need to present the same because it is admitted, your Honor, that
all monies invested and which became due after August 28 were not received.
Court:
Yes, that is why there is that manifestation. So we will save time the same is true with the other cases
where it was shown that the money were invested and due after August 28."
27

What needs to be determined therefore is whether or not the element of defraudation by means of
deceit has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken
of another.
28
It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise,
and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or
by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which
another is cheated.
29
On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether
by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury.
30

With these legal doctrines in mind, we hold that the testimonial and documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution, as well as the admissions made by accused-appellant, sufficiently prove that
accused-appellant employed fraud and deceit upon gullible people to induce them to invest in his
"business." The inducement consisted of accused-appellants assurance that money invested in his
"business" would have returns of 1000%, later reduced to 700%, after 15 days. Lured by the false
promise of quick financial gains on their investments, the unsuspecting people of Surigao del Norte
readily turned over their hard-earned money to the coffers of ABM.
It has been held that where one states that the future profits or income of an enterprise shall be a
certain sum, but he actually knows that there will be none, or that they will be substantially less than he
represents, the statements constitute an actionable fraud where the hearer believes him and relies on
the statement to his injury.
31
In the case at bench, it is abundantly clear that ultimately, the profits
which accused-appellant promised to his investors would not be realized. Accused-appellant admitted
during his testimony that the money he used to pay off maturing investments were taken from the
remittances received by ABM Development Center, Inc. Thus:
Q: As far as you can recall as of June 30, 1989, how much investments were already made or received by
your office?
A: More than forty thousand pesos.
Q: Your first due date was June 30, 1989, you said, the returns is estimated to be more than one
thousand pesos?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where do you get this one thousand pesos for the investment due on June 30, 1989 is it not that you
get it from the investment of the previous days?
A: That is the amount that Im going to use. But I also have my own funds.
Q: How much was your funds as of June 30, 1989?
A: Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos.
Q: The investments that were due on July 1, 1989, the money that you are to pay for these returns were
taken from the previous days, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The same is true with the investments due on July 2, you get all the money to pay from the
investments made in the previous days, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the same thing is followed on the days after?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Your last due date was August 28?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Again the returns for these date were taken from the previous days, from the investments of the
people from the previous dates?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x
Q: On August 29, were there still investments?
A: There was still investment on that date, sir, but as far as I know there were so many releases on that
day. I paid up to September 18. But on September 19, there was already an incident that happened.
Q: The returns you made of investments on September 18, when was that investment made?
A: From the previous investments.
Q: My question is: Those amounts you paid on September 18, when was were those amounts
invested, do you agree that it was also fifteen days before?
A: Every due date we completely paid it. Every due date, we paid completely before going to the next
day. Due date, for example, it was delayed because it was delayed in counting money. For example, the
one hundred thousand pesos, it takes time in counting that one hundred thousand pesos.
Q: Are we to understand from you, Mr. Witness, that the returns of the investments due on August 28
were already paid on August 28?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the money that you used in paying these returns were also taken from the previous days, from
the investments of the people?
A: Yes, sir.
32

In other words, accused-appellant merely paid the returns of maturing investments from the
remittances of succeeding investors. What accused-appellant actually offered to the public was a "Ponzi
Scheme," an unsustainable investment program that offers extravagantly high returns and pays these
returns to early investors out of the capital contributed by later investors. In People vs. Balasa
33
, we had
occasion to describe the workings of the "Ponzi Scheme" as follows:
"Named after Charles Ponzi who promoted the scheme in the 1920s, the original scheme involved the
issuance of bonds which offered 50% interest in 45 days or a 100% profit if held for 90 days. Basically,
Ponzi used the money he received from later investors to pay extravagant rates of return to early
investors, thereby inducing more investors to place their money with him in the false hope of realizing
this same extravagant rate of return themselves. This was the very scheme practiced by the Panata
Foundation.
However, the Ponzi scheme works only as long as there is an ever-increasing number of new investors
joining the scheme. To pay off the 50% bonds Ponzi had to come up with one-and-a-half times increase
with each round. To pay 100% profit, he had to double the number of investors at each stage, and this is
the reason why a Ponzi scheme is a scheme and not an investment strategy. The progression it depends
upon is unsustainable. The pattern of increase in the number of participants in the system explains how
it is able to succeed in the short run and, at the same time, why it must fail in the long run. This game is
difficult to sustain over a long period of time because to continue paying the promised profits to early
investors, the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors. The idea behind this type of swindle
is that the conman collects his money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds
before anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily, these schemes only last weeks, or months at most."
That there was no profit forthcoming can likewise be deduced from the fact that accused-appellant was
not engaged nor authorized to engage in any lucrative business to finance its operation. On this point,
accused-appellant points out that under the Articles of Incorporation of ABM Development Center, Inc.,
he was authorized to "make or coordinate in the making of studies and researches" and "to solicit,
receive, channel and/or distribute donations, economic aids, grants, investments in money or in kind."
Likewise, he presented a Mayors Permit that he claimed authorized him to engage in the investment
business.
There is no merit in these contentions of accused-appellant. As proven by the prosecution, the
incorporation of the ABM Development Center, Inc. on August 21, 1989 was undertaken by accused-
appellant only to give a semblance of legitimacy to its illegal operations. Accused-appellant started
receiving investments from the public as early as July 15, 1989 and yet it was only after he was warned
by a representative of the Department of Trade and Industry that his operation was illegal that he went
about with the business of incorporating his moneymaking scheme.
34
Moreover, as borne out by the
Articles of Incorporation, the ABM Development Center, Inc. was incorporated as a non-stock
corporation. As a non-stock corporation, ABM Development Center, Inc. may only be formed or
organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, fraternal, literary, scientific, social,
civic, or other similar purposes.
35
It may not engage in undertakings, such as the investment business,
where profit is the main or underlying purpose. Although the non-stock corporation may obtain profits
as an incident to its operation, such profits are not to be distributed among its members but must be
used for the furtherance of its purposes.
36
In the same vein, the Mayors Permit issued to accused-
appellant shows that he was only permitted to "act as dealer of appliances and upholstery." The permit
did not give accused-appellant authority to engage in the investment business.
Finally, the fact that accused-appellant could not present any specific business plan or cite any
donations or bequests which he received to finance his money-making scheme clearly shows that the
investment scheme which he foisted on the unsuspecting public was fraudulent. It must be noted that
according to the Articles of Incorporation of ABM Development Center, Inc., its paid-up capital was only
P11,000.00 and yet it was able to transact business in terms of millions of pesos. It must likewise be
stressed that accused-appellant refused to answer when asked about the specifics of his business and
about how he would be able to fulfill his obligation of paying the promised exorbitant rates of return.
In his defense, accused-appellant points to the fact that several investors were paid the corresponding
returns on their investments. This fact, accused-appellant argues, negates any perceived false pretense
or deceit on his part and as such, his liability, if any should only be civil in nature.
There is no merit in this argument. As previously explained, the payment of returns to early investors is
an integral part of the illegal Ponzi scheme foisted by accused-appellant on the unsuspecting public. The
fact that early investors were paid the returns on their investments induced more people to participate
in the illegal scheme with the hope of realizing the same extravagant rate of return. In fact, after word
of these payments spread like wildfire, the amount of investments received by accused-appellant
ballooned from thousands of pesos to several millions of pesos.
The prosecution having proved the two elements of damage and deceit in all the cases filed against
accused-appellant, the trial court thus committed no error in finding accused-appellant guilty of one
count of large scale swindling and thirteen (13) counts of estafa. The Court notes, however, that the
penalties imposed by the trial court are erroneous.
In Criminal Case No. 2948, accused-appellant was charged with violation of P.D. 1689 and sentenced to
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Section 1 of the said law provides, as follows:
"Sec.1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles
315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if
the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of
rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayons," or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos."
P.D. No. 1689 thus penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the amount
involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law as
"consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme." If the offenders are not members of a syndicate, they shall
nevertheless be held liable for the acts prohibited by the law but they shall be penalized by reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is more than one hundred thousand pesos.
In the instant case, there was no showing by the prosecution that a syndicate perpetrated the Ponzi
scheme. While the prosecution proved that a non-stock corporation with eleven (11) incorporators,
including accused-appellant and his wife, was involved in the illegal scheme, there was no showing that
these incorporators collaborated, confederated, and mutually helped one another in directing the
corporations activities. In fact, the evidence for the prosecution shows that it was only accused-
appellant and his wife who had knowledge of and who perpetrated the illegal scheme.
As such, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant under the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. 1689 considering that the amount swindled by accused-appellant totals
P45,494,936.00. The trial court erred, however, in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Given the
absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty imposed under the said
paragraph, reclusion temporal, should have been imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant, in Criminal Case No. 2948, should have been sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
The trial court likewise erred in its application of the provisions of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
and of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the imposition of the proper penalties for the thirteen (13)
estafa cases.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period (or imprisonment ranging from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 8 years), if the amount of the
fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period (6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years), adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
37

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense.
38
The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.
39

In computing the penalty for estafa, the fact that the amounts involved exceed P22,000.00 should not
be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead the matter should be
taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full
indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law is in accord with the rule that penal laws should
be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for estafa is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional in its minimum to medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months while the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because
the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.
40
The
maximum penalty should not exceed twenty years.
Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed against accused-appellant, the applicable periods of
imprisonment should, respectively, be as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 2956, where the amount swindled is P624,726.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3000, where the amount involved is P136,670.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to nineteen (19) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3001, where the amount involved is P203,850.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3013, where the amount involved is P29,070.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3020, where the amount involved is P114,620.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3021, where the amount involved is P447,960.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3022, where the amount involved is P275,280.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3026, where the amount involved is P222,120.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3028, where the amount involved is P399,650.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3052, where the amount involved is P172,910.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3053, where the amount involved is P36,970.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3054, where the amount involved is P920,883.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3058, where the amount involved is P500,129.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The amounts ordered reimbursed to the respective complainants and investors listed in the
documentary exhibits of the prosecution are hereby affirmed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
following modifications:
In Criminal Case No. 2948, where the total amount of the fraud is P45,494,936.00, accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 2956, where the amount swindled is P624,726.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3000, where the amount involved is P136,670.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to nineteen (19) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3001, where the amount involved is P203,850.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3013, where the amount involved is P29,070.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3020, where the amount involved is P114,620.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3021, where the amount involved is P447,960.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3022, where the amount involved is P275,280.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3026, where the amount involved is P222,120.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3028, where the amount involved is P399,650.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3052, where the amount involved is P172,910.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3053, where the amount involved is P36,970.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3054, where the amount involved is P920,883.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 3058, where the amount involved is P500,129.00, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The amounts ordered reimbursed to the respective complainants and investors listed in the
documentary exhibits of the prosecution are hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165443 April 16, 2009
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO CLEMENTE, JR., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Seeking the reversal of the Decision
1
dated 1 June 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62331
and the reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November 2000 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in SEC Case No. 04-98-5954, petitioner Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. (Calatagan) filed this
Rule 45 petition against respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr. (Clemente).
The key facts are undisputed.
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of Calatagan, indicating in his application for
membership his mailing address at "Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box 240, MCC," complete residential
address, office and residence telephone numbers, as well as the company (Phimco) with which he was
connected, Calatagan issued to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990 after paying
P120,000.00 for the share.
2

Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet expenses for general operations, as well as
costs for upkeep and improvement of the grounds and facilities. The provision on monthly dues is
incorporated in Calatagans Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at the back of
each certificate of stock.
3
As reproduced in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock No. A-01295, the
provision reads:
5. The owners of shares of stock shall be subject to the payment of monthly dues in an amount as may
be prescribed in the by-laws or by the Board of Directors which shall in no case be less that [sic] P50.00
to meet the expenses for the general operations of the club, and the maintenance and improvement of
its premises and facilities, in addition to such fees as may be charged for the actual use of the facilities x
x x
When Clemente became a member the monthly charge stood at P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for his
monthly dues on 21 March 1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then he ceased paying
the dues. At that point, his balance amounted to P400.00.
4

Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial step to collect Clementes back accounts by sending a
demand letter dated 21 September 1992. It was followed by a second letter dated 22 October 1992.
Both letters were sent to Clementes mailing address as indicated in his membership application but
were sent back to sender with the postal note that the address had been closed.
5

Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having failed to pay his monthly dues for more than sixty
(60) days, specifically P5,600.00 as of 31 October 1992. Calatagan also included Clementes name in the
list of delinquent members posted on the clubs bulletin board. On 1 December 1992, Calatagans board
of directors adopted a resolution authorizing the foreclosure of shares of delinquent members, including
Clementes; and the public auction of these shares.
On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final letter to Clemente, this time signed by its
Corporate Secretary, Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains a warning that unless Clemente
settles his outstanding dues, his share would be included among the delinquent shares to be sold at
public auction on 15 January 1993. Again, this letter was sent to Clementes mailing address that had
already been closed.
6

On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted on the Clubs bulletin board, as well as on the
clubs premises. The auction sale took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993, and Clementes share sold
for P64,000.
7
According to the Certificate of Sale issued by Calatagan after the sale, Clementes share
was purchased by a Nestor A. Virata.
8
At the time of the sale, Clementes accrued monthly dues
amounted to P5,200.00.
9
A notice of foreclosure of Clementes share was published in the 26 May 1993
issue of the Business World.
10

Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in November of 1997.
11
He filed a claim with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration of his shareholding in Calatagan with damages.
On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a decision dismissing Clementes complaint. Citing Section 69
of the Corporation Code which provides that the sale of shares at an auction sale can only be questioned
within six (6) months from the date of sale, the SEC concluded that Clementes claim, filed four (4) years
after the sale, had already prescribed. The SEC further held that Calatagan had complied with all the
requirements for a valid sale of the subject share, Clemente having failed to inform Calatagan that the
address he had earlier supplied was no longer his address. Clemente, the SEC ruled, had acted in bad
faith in assuming as he claimed that his non-payment of monthly dues would merely render his share
"inactive."
Clemente filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 1 June 2004, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reversing the SEC. The appellate court restored Clementes one share with a
directive to Calatagan to issue in his a new share, and awarded to Clemente a total of P400,000.00 in
damages, less the unpaid monthly dues of P5,200.00.
In rejecting the SECs finding that the action had prescribed, the Court of Appeals cited the SECs own
ruling in SEC Case No. 4160, Caram v. Valley Golf Country Club, Inc., that Section 69 of the Corporation
Code specifically refers to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, and not to any other debt of
stockholders. With the insinuation that Section 69 does not apply to unpaid membership dues in non-
stock corporations, the appellate court employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code as the proper rule of
prescription. The provision sets the prescription period of actions to recover movables at eight (8) years.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that since that Calatagans first two demand letters had been
returned to it as sender with the notation about the closure of the mailing address, it very well knew
that its third and final demand letter also sent to the same mailing address would not be received by
Clemente. It noted the by-law requirement that within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the
sale at auction of a members share of stock for indebtedness, the Corporate Secretary shall notify the
owner thereof and advise the Membership Committee of such fact. Finally, the Court of Appeals
ratiocinated that "a person who is in danger of the imminent loss of his property has the right to be
notified and be given the chance to prevent the loss."
12

Hence, the present appeal.
Calatagan maintains that the action of Clemente had prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of the
Corporation Code, and that the requisite notices under both the law and the by-laws had been rendered
to Clemente.
Section 69 of the Code provides that an action to recover delinquent stock sold must be commenced by
the filing of a complaint within six (6) months from the date of sale. As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, Section 69 is part of Title VIII of the Code entitled "Stocks and Stockholders" and refers
specifically to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, the sale of which is governed by the immediately
preceding Section 68.
The Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagans and the SECs reliance on Section 69 by citing another
SEC ruling in the case of Caram v. Valley Golf. In connection with Section 69, Calatagan raises a
peripheral point made in the SECs Caram ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as take-off Section 6 of the
Corporation Code which refers to "such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles
of incorporation," pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of Valley Golf does not "impose any lien,
liability or restriction on the Golf Share *of Caram+," but only its (Valley Golfs) By-Laws does. Here,
Calatagan stresses that its own Articles of Incorporation does provide that the monthly dues assessed on
owners of shares of the corporation, along with all other obligations of the shareholders to the club,
"shall constitute a first lien on the shares and in the event of delinquency such shares may be ordered
sold by the Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other
obligations of the shareholders."
13
With its illative but incomprehensible logic, Calatagan concludes that
the prescriptive period under Section 69 should also apply to the sale of Clementes share as the lien
that Calatagan perceives to be a restriction is stated in the articles of incorporation and not only in the
by-laws.
We remain unconvinced.
There are fundamental differences that defy equivalence or even analogy between the sale of
delinquent stock under Section 68 and the sale that occurred in this case. At the root of the sale of
delinquent stock is the non-payment of the subscription price for the share of stock itself. The
stockholder or subscriber has yet to fully pay for the value of the share or shares subscribed. In this case,
Clemente had already fully paid for the share in Calatagan and no longer had any outstanding obligation
to deprive him of full title to his share. Perhaps the analogy could have been made if Clemente had not
yet fully paid for his share and the non-stock corporation, pursuant to an article or by-law provision
designed to address that situation, decided to sell such share as a consequence. But that is not the case
here, and there is no purpose for us to apply Section 69 to the case at bar.
Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clementes suit is barred by Article 1146 of the Civil Code which
establishes four (4) years as the prescriptive period for actions based upon injury to the rights of the
plaintiff on the hypothesis that the suit is purely for damages. As a second alternative still, Calatagan
posits that Clementes action is governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which sets five (5) years as the
period of prescription for all other actions whose prescriptive periods are not fixed in the Civil Code or in
any other law. Neither article is applicable but Article 1140 of the Civil Code which provides that an
action to recover movables shall prescribe in eight (8) years. Calatagans action is for the recovery of a
share of stock, plus damages.
Calatagans advertence to the fact that the constitution of a lien on the members share by virtue of the
explicit provisions in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is relevant but ultimately of no help to its
cause. Calatagans Articles of Incorporation states that the "dues, together with all other obligations of
members to the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares, second only to any lien in favor of the
national or local government, and in the event of delinquency such shares may be ordered sold by the
Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other obligations of the
stockholders."
14
In turn, there are several provisions in the By-laws that govern the payment of dues, the
lapse into delinquency of the member, and the constitution and execution on the lien. We quote these
provisions:
ARTICLE XII MEMBERS ACCOUNT
SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members, Posting of Delinquent Members The Treasurer shall bill al members
monthly. As soon as possible after the end of every month, a statement showing the account of bill of a
member for said month will be prepared and sent to him. If the bill of any member remains unpaid by
the 20th of the month following that in which the bill was incurred, the Treasurer shall notify him that if
his bill is not paid in full by the end of the succeeding month his name will be posted as delinquent the
following day at the Clubhouse bulletin board. While posted, a member, the immediate members of his
family, and his guests, may not avail of the facilities of the Club.
(b) Members on the delinquent list for more than 60 days shall be reported to the Board and their
shares or the shares of the juridical entities they represent shall thereafter be ordered sold by the Board
at auction to satisfy the claims of the Club as provided for in Section 32 hereon. A member may pay his
overdue account at any time before the auction sale.
Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of Share at Auction- The club shall have a first lien on every share of stock
to secure debts of the members to the Club. This lien shall be annotated on the certificates of stock and
may be enforced by the Club in the following manner:
(a) Within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a members share of stock for
indebtedness under Section 31(b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof, and shall advise
the Membership Committee of such fact.
(b) The Membership Committee shall then notify all applicants on the Waiting List and all registered
stockholders of the availability of a share of stock for sale at auction at a specified date, time and place,
and shall post a notice to that effect in the Club bulletin board for at least ten (10) days prior to the
auction sale.
(c) On the date and hour fixed, the Membership Committee shall proceed with the auction by viva voce
bidding and award the sale of the share of stock to the highest bidder.
(d) The purchase price shall be paid by the winning bidder to the Club within twenty-four (24) hours
after the bidding. The winning bidder or the representative in the case of a juridical entity shall become
a Regular Member upon payment of the purchase price and issuance of a new stock certificate in his
name or in the name of the juridical entity he represents. The proceeds of the sale shall be paid by the
Club to the selling stockholder after deducting his obligations to the Club.
(e) If no bids be received or if the winning bidder fails to pay the amount of this bid within twenty-four
(24) hours after the bidding, the auction procedures may be repeated from time to time at the
discretion of the Membership Committee until the share of stock be sold.
(f) If the proceeds from the sale of the share of stock are not sufficient to pay in full the indebtedness of
the member, the member shall continue to be obligated to the Club for the unpaid balance. If the
member whose share of stock is sold fails or refuse to surrender the stock certificate for cancellation,
cancellation shall be effected in the books of the Club based on a record of the proceedings. Such
cancellation shall render the unsurrendered stock certificate null and void and notice to this effect shall
be duly published.
It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a clear and comprehensive procedure to govern the
payment of monthly dues, the declaration of a member as delinquent, and the constitution of a lien on
the shares and its eventual public sale to answer for the members debts. Under Section 91 of the
Corporation Code, membership in a non-stock corporation "shall be terminated in the manner and for
the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." The By-law provisions are elaborate
in explaining the manner and the causes for the termination of membership in Calatagan, through the
execution on the lien of the share. The Court is satisfied that the By-Laws, as written, affords due
protection to the member by assuring that the member should be notified by the Secretary of the
looming execution sale that would terminate membership in the club. In addition, the By-Laws
guarantees that after the execution sale, the proceeds of the sale would be returned to the former
member after deducting the outstanding obligations. If followed to the letter, the termination of
membership under this procedure outlined in the By-Laws would accord with substantial justice.
Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law provisions when it sold Clementes share? The
appellate courts finding on this point warrants our approving citation, thus:
In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sent the third and final demand letter to Clemente on
December 7, 1992. The letter states that if the amount of delinquency is not paid, the share will be
included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public auction. This letter was signed by Atty.
Benjamin Tanedo, Jr., Calatagan Golfs Corporate Secretary. It was again sent to Clementes mailing
address Phimco Industries Inc., P.O. Box 240, MCC Makati. As expected, it was returned because the
post office box had been closed.
Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to "give or cause to be given, all notices required
by law or by these By-Laws. .. and keep a record of the addresses of all stockholders. As quoted above,
Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further provides that "within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the
sale at auction of a members share of stock for indebtedness under Section 31 (b) hereof, the Secretary
shall notify the owner thereof and shall advise the Membership Committee of such fact.," The records
do not disclose what report the Corporate Secretary transmitted to the Membership Committee to
comply with Section 32(a). Obviously, the reason for this mandatory requirement is to give the
Membership Committee the opportunity to find out, before the share is sold, if proper notice has been
made to the shareholder member.
We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is knowledgeable on the law and on the
standards of good faith and fairness that the law requires. As custodian of corporate records, he should
also have known that the first two letters sent to Clemente were returned because the P.O. Box had
been closed. Thus, we are surprised given his knowledge of the law and of corporate records that he
would send the third and final letter Clementes last chance before his share is sold and his
membership lost to the same P.O. Box that had been closed.
Calatagan argues that it "exercised due diligence before the foreclosure sale" and "sent several notices
to Clementes specified mailing address." We do not agree; we cannot label as due diligence Calatagans
act of sending the December 7, 1992 letter to Clementes mailing address knowing fully well that the
P.O. Box had been closed. Due diligence or good faith imposes upon the Corporate Secretary the chief
repository of all corporate records the obligation to check Clementes other address which, under the
By-Laws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on file. One obvious purpose of giving the Corporate
Secretary the duty to keep the addresses of members on file is specifically for matters of this kind, when
the member cannot be reached through his or her mailing address. Significantly, the Corporate
Secretary does not have to do the actual verification of other addressees on record; a mere clerk can do
the very simple task of checking the files as in fact clerks actually undertake these tasks. In fact, one
telephone call to Clementes phone numbers on file would have alerted him of his impending loss.
Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the spirit and letter
of its own by-laws. The by-law provisions was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the delinquent
member of the impending sale, and not just to provide an intricate faade that would facilitate
Calatagans sale of the share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagans part is palpable. As found by the
Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that Clementes postal box to which it sent its previous
letters had already been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to the same postal box. What
for? Just for the exercise, it appears, as it had known very well that the letter would never actually reach
Clemente.1avvphi1
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address along
with his residence and office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagans By-Laws requires
that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely through the members mailing address. Clemente
cites our aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals
15

that "[a] simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x x could have prevented this present
controversy." That memorable observation is quite apt in this case.
Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss of
Clementes privilege to play golf at its golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in significant
pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that could be thrown Clementes way was his
failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold Calatagan would cost
Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he deserve answerability for failing to notify the club of the
closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing as he did that Calatagan was in possession of his home
address as well as residence and office telephone numbers, he had every reason to assume that the club
would not be at a loss should it need to contact him. In addition, according to Clemente, he was not
even aware of the closure of the postal box, the maintenance of which was not his responsibility but his
employer Phimcos.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code,
16
under the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did apply,
enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one
another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its
members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith extends even
to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform
certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter of dehumanization.
We turn to the matter of damages. The award of actual damages is of course warranted since Clemente
has sustained pecuniary injury by reason of Calatagans wrongful violation of its own By-Laws. It would
not be feasible to deliver Clementes original Certificate of Stock because it had already been cancelled
and a new one issued in its place in the name of the purchases at the auction who was not impleaded in
this case. However, the Court of Appeals instead directed that Calatagan to issue to Clemente a new
certificate of stock. That sufficiently redresses the actual damages sustained by Clemente. After all, the
certificate of stock is simply the evidence of the share.
The Court of Appeals also awarded Clemente P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. We agree that the award of such damages is warranted.
The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for violation of Article 32 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery
of damages from any private individual "who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs" the right "against deprivation of property without due process of laws."
The plain letter of the provision squarely entitles Clemente to damages from Calatagan. Even without
Article 32 itself, Calatagan will still be bound to pay moral and exemplary damages to Clemente. The
latter was able to duly prove that he had sustained mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded
feelings by reason of Calatagans acts, thereby entitling him to moral damages under Article 2217 of the
Civil Code. Moreover, it is evident that Calatagans bad faith as exhibited in the
course of its corporate actions warrants correction for the public good, thereby justifying exemplary
damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178158 December 4, 2009
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
Respondents.
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD, Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 180428
LUIS SISON, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
Prologue
This case is an anatomy of a P6.185 billion
1
pillage of the public coffers that ranks among one of the
most brazen and hideous in the history of this country. This case answers the questions why our
Government perennially runs out of funds to provide basic services to our people, why the great masses
of the Filipino people wallow in poverty, and why a very select few amass unimaginable wealth at the
expense of the Filipino people.
On 1 May 2007, the 30-year old franchise of Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) under
Presidential Decree No. 1113 (PD 1113), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1894 (PD 1894),
expired. During the 13th Congress, PNCC sought to extend its franchise. PNCC won approval from the
House of Representatives, which passed House Bill No. 5749
2
renewing PNCCs franchise for another 25
years. However, PNCC failed to secure approval from the Senate, dooming the extension of PNCCs
franchise. Led by Senator Franklin M. Drilon, the Senate opposed PNCCs plea for extension of its
franchise.
3
Senator Drilons privilege speech
4
explains why the Senate chose not to renew PNCCs
franchise:
I repeat, Mr. President. PNCC has agreed in a compromise agreement dated 17 August 2006 to transfer
to Radstock Securities Limited P17,676,063,922, no small money, Mr. President, my dear colleagues,
P17.6 billion.
What does it consist of? It consists of the following: 19 pieces of real estate properties with an appraised
value of P5,993,689,000. Do we know what is the bulk of this? An almost 13-hectare property right here
in the Financial Center. As we leave the Senate, as we go out of this Hall, as we drive thru past the GSIS,
we will see on the right a vacant lot, that is PNCC property. As we turn right on Diosdado Macapagal, we
see on our right new buildings, these are all PNCC properties. That is 12.9 hectares of valuable asset
right in this Financial Center that is worth P5,993,689.000.
What else, Mr. President? The 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC with a par value of
P2,300,000,000-- I repeat, 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC worth P2,300 billion-- was
assigned to Radstock.
In addition, Mr. President and my dear colleagues, please hold on to your seats because part of the
agreement is 50% of PNCCs 6% share in the gross toll revenue of the Manila North Tollways Corporation
for 27 years, from 2008 to 2035, is being assigned to Radstock. How much is this worth? It is worth
P9,382,374,922. I repeat, P9,382,374,922.
x x x x
Mr. President, P17,676,000,000, however, was made to appear in the agreement to be only worth
P6,196,156,488. How was this achieved? How was an aggregate amount of P17,676,000,000 made to
appear to be only P6,196,156,488? First, the 19 pieces of real estate worth P5,993,689,000 were only
assigned a value of P4,195,000,000 or only 70% of their appraised value.
Second, the PNCC shares of stock with a par value of P2.3 billion were marked to market and therefore
were valued only at P713 million.
Third, the share of the toll revenue assigned was given a net present value of only P1,287,000,000
because of a 15% discounted rate that was applied.
In other words, Mr. President, the toll collection of P9,382,374,922 for 27 years was given a net present
value of only P1,287,000,000 so that it is made to appear that the compromise agreement is only worth
P6,196,000,000.
Mr. President, my dear colleagues, this agreement will substantially wipe out all the assets of PNCC. It
will be left with nothing else except, probably, the collection for the next 25 years or so from the North
Luzon Expressway. This agreement brought PNCC to the cleaners and literally cleaned the PNCC of all its
assets. They brought PNCC to the cleaners and cleaned it to the tune of P17,676,000,000.
x x x x
Mr. President, are we not entitled, as members of the Committee, to know who is Radstock Securities
Limited?
Radstock Securities Limited was allegedly incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It has
no known board of directors, except for its recently appointed attorney-in-fact, Mr. Carlos Dominguez.
Mr. President, are the members of the Committee not entitled to know why 20 years after the account
to Marubeni Corporation, which gave rise to the compromise agreement 20 years after the obligation
was allegedly incurred, PNCC suddenly recognized this obligation in its books when in fact this obligation
was not found in its books for 20 years?
In other words, Mr. President, for 20 years, the financial statements of PNCC did not show any
obligation to Marubeni, much less, to Radstock. Why suddenly on October 20, 2000, P10 billion in
obligation was recognized? Why was it recognized?
During the hearing on December 18, Mr. President, we asked this question to the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) trustee, Atty. Raymundo Francisco, and he was asked: "What is the basis of your
recommendation to recognize this?" He said: "I based my recommendation on a legal opinion of Feria
and Feria." I asked him: "Who knew of this opinion?" He said: "Only me and the chairman of PNCC, Atty.
Renato Valdecantos." I asked him: "Did you share this opinion with the members of the board who
recognized the obligation of P10 billion?" He said: "No." "Can you produce this opinion now?" He said: "I
have no copy."
Mysteriously, Mr. President, an obligation of P10 billion based on a legal opinion which, even Mr. Arthur
Aguilar, the chairman of PNCC, is not aware of, none of the members of the PNCC board on October 20,
2000 who recognized this obligation had seen this opinion. It is mysterious.
Mr. President, are the members of our Committee not entitled to know why Radstock Securities Limited
is given preference over all other creditors notwithstanding the fact that this is an unsecured obligation?
There is no mortgage to secure this obligation.
More importantly, Mr. President, equally recognized is the obligation of PNCC to the Philippine
government to the tune of P36 billion. PNCC owes the Philippine government P36 billion recognized in
its books, apart from P3 billion in taxes. Why in the face of all of these is Radstock given preference?
Why is it that Radstock is given preference to claim P17.676 billion of the assets of PNCC and give it
superior status over the claim of the Philippine government, of the Filipino people to the extent of P36
billion and taxes in the amount of P3 billion? Why, Mr. President? Why is Radstock given preference not
only over the Philippine government claims of P39 billion but also over other creditors including a
certain best merchant banker in Asia, which has already a final and executory judgment against PNCC for
about P300 million? Why, Mr. President? Are we not entitled to know why the compromise agreement
assigned P17.676 billion to Radstock? Why was it executed?
5
(Emphasis supplied)
Aside from Senator Drilon, Senator Sergio S. Osmea III also saw irregularities in the transactions
involving the Marubeni loans, thus:
SEN. OSMEA. Ah okay. Good.
Now, I'd like to point out to the Committee that it seems that this was a politically driven deal like
IMPSA. Because the acceptance of the 10 billion or 13 billion debt came in October 2000 and the
Radstock assignment was January 10, 2001. Now, why would Marubeni sell for $2 million three months
after there was a recognition that it was owed P10 billion. Can you explain that, Mr. Dominguez?
MR. DOMINGUEZ. Your Honor, I am not aware of the decision making process of Marubeni. But my
understanding was, the Japanese culture is not a litigious one and they didn't want to get into a, you
know, a court situation here in the Philippines having a lot of other interest, et cetera.
SEN. OSMEA. Well, but that is beside the point, Mr. Dominguez. All I am asking is does it stand to
reason that after you get an acceptance by a debtor that he owes you 10 billion, you sell your note for
100 million.
Now, if that had happened a year before, maybe I would have understood why he sold for such a low
amount. But right after, it seems that this was part of an orchestrated deal wherein with certain
powerful interest would be able to say, "Yes, we will push through. We'll fix the courts. We'll fix the
board. We'll fix the APT. And we will be able to do it, just give us 55 percent of whatever is recovered,"
am I correct?
MR. DOMINGUEZ. As I said, Your Honor, I am not familiar with the decision making process of Marubeni.
But my understanding was, as I said, they didn't want to get into a
SEN. OSMEA. All right.
MR. DOMINGUEZ. ...litigious situation.
6

x x x x
SEN. OSMEA. All of these financial things can be arranged. They can hire a local bank, Filipino, to be
trustee for the real estate. So ...
SEN. DRILON. Well, then, thats a dummy relationship.
SEN. OSMEA. In any case, to me the main point here is that a third party, Radstock, whoever owns it,
bought Marubenis right for $2 million or P100 million. Then, they are able to go through all these legal
machinations and get awarded with the consent of PNCC of 6 billion. Thats a 100 million to 6 billion.
Now, Mr. Aguilar, you have been in the business for such a long time. I mean, this hedge funds whether
its Radstock or New Bridge or Texas Pacific Group or Carlyle or Avenue Capital, they look at their
returns. So if Avenue Capital buys something for $2 million and you give him $4 million in one year, its a
100 percent return. Theyll walk away and dance to their stockholders. So here in this particular case, if
you know that Radstock only bought it for $2 million, I would have gotten board approval and say,
"Okay, lets settle this for $4 million." And Radstock would have jumped up and down. So what looks to
me is that this was already a scheme. Marubeni wrote it off already. Marubeni wrote everything off.
They just got a $2 million and they probably have no more residual rights or maybe theres a clause
there, a secret clause, that says, "I want 20 percent of whatever youre able to eventually collect." So $2
million. But whatever it is, Marubeni practically wrote it off. Radstocks liability now or exposure is only
$2 million plus all the lawyer fees, under-the-table, etcetera. All right. Okay. So its pretty obvious to me
that if anybody were using his brain, I would have gone up to Radstock and say, "Heres $4 million.
Heres P200 million. Okay." They would have walked away. But evidently, the "ninongs" of Radstock
See, I dont care who owns Radstock. I want to know who is the ninong here who stands to make a lot of
money by being able to get to courts, the government agencies, OGCC, or whoever else has been
involved in this, to agree to 6 billion or whatever it was. Thats a lot of money. And believe me, Radstock
will probably get one or two billion and four billion will go into somebody elses pocket. Or Radstock will
turn around, sell that claim for P4 billion and let the new guy just collect the payments over the years.
x x x x
7

SEN. OSMEA. x x x I just wanted to know is CDCP Mining a 100 percent subsidiary of PNCC?
MR. AGUILAR. Hindi ho. Ah, no.
SEN. OSMEA. If theyre not a 100 percent, why would they sign jointly and severally? I just want to plug
the loopholes.
MR. AGUILAR. I think it was if I may just speculate. It was just common ownership at that time.
SEN. OSMEA. Al right. Now Also, the ...
MR. AGUILAR. Ah, 13 percent daw, Your Honor.
SEN. OSMEA. Huh?
MR. AGUILAR. Thirteen percent ho.
SEN. OSMEA. Whats 13 percent?
MR. AGUILAR. We owned ...
x x x x
SEN. OSMEA. x x x CDCP Mining, how many percent of the equity of CDCP Mining was owned by PNCC,
formerly CDCP?
MS. PASETES. Thirteen percent.
SEN. OSMEA. Thirteen. And as a 13 percent owner, they agreed to sign jointly and severally?
MS. PASETES. Yes.
SEN. OSMEA. One-three? So poor PNCC and CDCP got taken to the cleaners here. They sign for a 100
percent and they only own 13 percent.
x x x x
8
(Emphasis supplied)
I.
The Case
Before this Court are the consolidated petitions for review
9
filed by Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation (STRADEC) and Luis Sison (Sison), with a motion for intervention filed by Asiavest Merchant
Bankers Berhad (Asiavest), challenging the validity of the Compromise Agreement between PNCC and
Radstock. The Court of Appeals approved the Compromise Agreement in its Decision of 25 January
2007
10
in CA-G.R. CV No. 87971.
II.
The Antecedents
PNCC was incorporated in 1966 for a term of fifty years under the Corporation Code with the name
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
11
PD 1113, issued on 31 March 1977,
granted CDCP a 30-year franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and
South Luzon Tollways. PD 1894, issued on 22 December 1983, amended PD 1113 to include in CDCPs
franchise the Metro Manila Expressway, which would "serve as an additional artery in the
transportation of trade and commerce in the Metro Manila area."
Sometime between 1978 and 1981, Basay Mining Corporation (Basay Mining), an affiliate of CDCP,
obtained loans from Marubeni Corporation of Japan (Marubeni) amounting to 5,460,000,000 yen and
US$5 million. A CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans, committing CDCP to pay solidarily
for the full amount of the 5,460,000,000 yen loan and to the extent of P20 million for the US$5 million
loan. However, there was no CDCP Board Resolution authorizing the issuance of the letters of
guarantee. Later, Basay Mining changed its name to CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining). CDCP
Mining secured the Marubeni loans when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still privately owned and
managed.
Subsequently in 1983, CDCP changed its corporate name to PNCC to reflect the extent of the
Government's equity investment in the company, which arose when government financial institutions
converted their loans to PNCC into equity following PNCCs inability to pay the loans.
12
Various
government financial institutions held a total of seventy-seven point forty-eight percent (77.48%) of
PNCCs voting equity, most of which were later transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) under
Administrative Orders No. 14 and 64, series of 1987 and 1988, respectively.
13
Also, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government holds some 13.82% of PNCCs voting equity under a writ of
sequestration and through the voluntary surrender of certain PNCC shares. In fine, the Government
owns 90.3% of the equity of PNCC and only 9.70% of PNCCs voting equity is under private ownership.
14

Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid. On 20 October 2000, during the
short-lived Estrada Administration, the PNCC Board of Directors
15
(PNCC Board) passed Board Resolution
No. BD-092-2000 admitting PNCCs liability to Marubeni for P10,743,103,388 as of 30 September 1999.
PNCC Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 reads as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. BD-092-2000
RESOLVED, That the Board recognizes, acknowledges and confirms PNCCs obligations as of September
30, 1999 with the following entities, exclusive of the interests and other charges that may subsequently
accrue and still become due therein, to wit:
a). the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P36,023,784,751.00; and
b). Marubeni Corporation in the amount of P10,743,103,388.00. (Emphasis supplied)
This was the first PNCC Board Resolution admitting PNCCs liability for the Marubeni loans. Previously,
for two decades the PNCC Board consistently refused to admit any liability for the Marubeni loans.
Less than two months later, or on 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board passed Board Resolution No. BD-
099-2000 amending Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000. PNCC Board Resolution No. BD-099-2000 reads
as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. BD-099-2000
RESOLVED, That the Board hereby amends its Resolution No. BD-092-2000 dated October 20, 2000 so as
to read as follows:
RESOLVED, That the Board recognizes, acknowledges and confirms its obligations as of September 30,
1999 with the following entities, exclusive of the interests and other charges that may subsequently
accrue and still due thereon, subject to the final determination by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the
amount of obligation involved, and subject further to the declaration of the legality of said obligations
by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), to wit:
a). the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P36,023,784,751.00; and
b). Marubeni Corporation in the amount of P10,743,103,388.00. (Emphasis supplied)
In January 2001, barely three months after the PNCC Board first admitted liability for the Marubeni
loans, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock for US$2 million or less than P100 million. In
short, Radstock paid Marubeni less than 10% of the P10.743 billion admitted amount. Radstock
immediately sent a notice and demand letter to PNCC.
On 15 January 2001, Radstock filed an action for collection and damages against PNCC before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (trial court). In its order of 23 January 2001, the
trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against PNCC. The trial court ordered PNCCs bank
accounts garnished and several of its real properties attached. On 14 February 2001, PNCC moved to set
aside the 23 January 2001 Order and to discharge the writ of attachment. PNCC also filed a motion to
dismiss the case. The trial court denied both motions. PNCC filed motions for reconsideration, which the
trial court also denied. PNCC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 66654, assailing the denial of the motion to dismiss. On 30 August 2002, the Court of
Appeals denied PNCCs petition. PNCC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
also denied in its 22 January 2003 Resolution. PNCC filed a petition for review before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 156887.
Meanwhile, on 19 June 2001, at the start of the Arroyo Administration, the PNCC Board, under a new
President and Chairman, revoked Board Resolution No. BD-099-2000.
The trial court continued to hear the main case. On 10 December 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of
Radstock, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendant is directed to pay the total amount of Thirteen Billion One Hundred Fifty One Million Nine
Hundred Fifty Six thousand Five Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos (P13,151,956,528.00) with interest from
October 15, 2001 plus Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
16

PNCC appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 87971.
On 19 March 2003, this Court issued a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 156887 forbidding the
trial court from implementing the writ of preliminary attachment and ordering the suspension of the
proceedings before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In its 3 October 2005 Decision, this Court
ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED and insofar as the Motion to Set Aside the Order and/or
Discharge the Writ of Attachment is concerned, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on August 30, 2002
and its Resolution of January 22, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66654 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
attachments over the properties by the writ of preliminary attachment are hereby ordered LIFTED
effective upon the finality of this Decision. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED in all other respects. The Temporary Restraining Order is DISSOLVED immediately and the
Court of Appeals is directed to PROCEED forthwith with the appeal filed by PNCC.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
17

On 17 August 2006, PNCC and Radstock entered into the Compromise Agreement where they agreed to
reduce PNCCs liability to Radstock, supposedly from P17,040,843,968, to P6,185,000,000. PNCC and
Radstock submitted the Compromise Agreement to this Court for approval. In a Resolution dated 4
December 2006 in G.R. No. 156887, this Court referred the Compromise Agreement to the Commission
on Audit (COA) for comment. The COA recommended approval of the Compromise Agreement. In a
Resolution dated 22 November 2006, this Court noted the Compromise Agreement and referred it to
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87971. In its 25 January 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals
approved the Compromise Agreement.
STRADEC moved for reconsideration of the 25 January 2007 Decision. STRADEC alleged that it has a
claim against PNCC as a bidder of the National Governments shares, receivables, securities and interests
in PNCC. The matter is subject of a complaint filed by STRADEC against PNCC and the Privatization and
Management Office (PMO) for the issuance of a Notice of Award of Sale to Dong-A Consortium of which
STRADEC is a partner. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-882, is pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 146 (RTC Branch 146).
The Court of Appeals treated STRADECs motion for reconsideration as a motion for intervention and
denied it in its 31 May 2007 Resolution. STRADEC filed a petition for review before this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 178158.
Rodolfo Cuenca (Cuenca), a stockholder and former PNCC President and Board Chairman, filed an
intervention before the Court of Appeals. Cuenca alleged that PNCC had no obligation to pay Radstock.
The Court of Appeals also denied Cuencas motion for intervention in its Resolution of 31 May 2007.
Cuenca did not appeal the denial of his motion.
On 2 July 2007, this Court issued an order directing PNCC and Radstock, their officers, agents,
representatives, and other persons under their control, to maintain the status quo ante.
Meanwhile, on 20 February 2007, Sison, also a stockholder and former PNCC President and Board
Chairman, filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement before the
Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97982.
Asiavest, a judgment creditor of PNCC, filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File the
Attached Opposition and Motion-in-Intervention before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97982.
In a Resolution dated 12 June 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed Sisons petition on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction to annul a final and executory judgment also rendered by the Court of Appeals. In the
same resolution, the Court of Appeals also denied Asiavests urgent motion.
Asiavest filed its Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File the Attached Opposition and Motion-
in-Intervention in G.R. No. 178158.
18

Sison filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 5 November 2007 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
Sisons motion.
On 26 November 2007, Sison filed a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 180428.
In a Resolution dated 18 February 2008, this Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 178158 and 180428.
On 13 January 2009, the Court held oral arguments on the following issues:
1. Does the Compromise Agreement violate public policy?
2. Does the subject matter involve an assumption by the government of a private entitys obligation in
violation of the law and/or the Constitution? Is the PNCC Board Resolution of 20 October 2000 defective
or illegal?
3. Is the Compromise Agreement viable in the light of the non-renewal of PNCCs franchise by Congress
and its inclusion of all or substantially all of PNCCs assets?
4. Is the Decision of the Court of Appeals annullable even if final and executory on grounds of fraud and
violation of public policy and the Constitution?
III.
Propriety of Actions
The Court of Appeals denied STRADECs motion for intervention on the ground that the motion was filed
only after the Court of Appeals and the trial court had promulgated their respective decisions.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties.
The rule is not absolute. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make
the powers of the Court completely available for justice.
19
It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims, overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing of the claims.
20
This
Court has ruled:
[A]llowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure
whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is
not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Thus, interventions
have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the
right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for
review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where
the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing (310 Phil. 722 (1995)], the
motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave
injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
21

In Collado v. Court of Appeals,
22
this Court reiterated that exceptions to Section 2, Rule 12 could be
made in the interest of substantial justice. Citing Mago v. Court of Appeals,
23
the Court stated:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the
proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgments is already submitted for
decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x
x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure,
the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available
for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
Concededly, STRADEC has no legal interest in the subject matter of the Compromise Agreement. Section
1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
STRADECs interest is dependent on the outcome of Civil Case No. 05-882. Unless STRADEC can show
that RTC Branch 146 had already decided in its favor, its legal interest is simply contingent and
expectant.
However, Asiavest has a direct and material interest in the approval or disapproval of the Compromise
Agreement. Asiavest is a judgment creditor of PNCC in G.R. No. 110263 and a court has already issued a
writ of execution in its favor. Asiavests interest is actual and material, direct and immediate
characterized by either gain or loss from the judgment that this Court may render.
24
Considering that the
Compromise Agreement involves the disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of PNCC, Asiavest,
as PNCCs judgment creditor, will be greatly prejudiced if the Compromise Agreement is eventually
upheld.
Sison has legal standing to challenge the Compromise Agreement. Although there was no allegation that
Sison filed the case as a derivative suit in the name of PNCC, it could be fairly deduced that Sison was
assailing the Compromise Agreement as a stockholder of PNCC. In such a situation, a stockholder of
PNCC can sue on behalf of PNCC to annul the Compromise Agreement.
A derivative action is a suit by a stockholder to enforce a corporate cause of action.
25
Under the
Corporation Code, where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of
directors or trustees.
26
However, an individual stockholder may file a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation to protect or vindicate corporate rights whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to
sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold control of the corporation.
27
In such actions, the corporation is
the real party-in-interest while the suing stockholder, on behalf of the corporation, is only a nominal
party.
28

In this case, the PNCC Board cannot conceivably be expected to attack the validity of the Compromise
Agreement since the PNCC Board itself approved the Compromise Agreement. In fact, the PNCC Board
steadfastly defends the Compromise Agreement for allegedly being advantageous to PNCC.
Besides, the circumstances in this case are peculiar. Sison, as former PNCC President and Chairman of
the PNCC Board, was responsible for the approval of the Board Resolution issued on 19 June 2001
revoking the previous Board Resolution admitting PNCCs liability for the Marubeni loans.
29
Such
revocation, however, came after Radstock had filed an action for collection and damages against PNCC
on 15 January 2001. Then, when the trial court rendered its decision on 10 December 2002 in favor of
Radstock, Sison was no longer the PNCC President and Chairman, although he remains a stockholder of
PNCC.
When the case was on appeal before the Court of Appeals, there was no need for Sison to avail of any
remedy, until PNCC and Radstock entered into the Compromise Agreement, which disposed of all or
substantially all of PNCCs assets. Sison came to know of the Compromise Agreement only in December
2006. PNCC and Radstock submitted the Compromise Agreement to the Court of Appeals for approval
on 10 January 2007. The Court of Appeals approved the Compromise Agreement on 25 January 2007. To
require Sison at this stage to exhaust all the remedies within the corporation will render such remedies
useless as the Compromise Agreement had already been approved by the Court of Appeals. PNCCs
assets are in danger of being dissipated in favor of a private foreign corporation. Thus, Sison had no
recourse but to avail of an extraordinary remedy to protect PNCCs assets.
Besides, in the interest of substantial justice and for compelling reasons, such as the nature and
importance of the issues raised in this case,
30
this Court must take cognizance of Sisons action. This
Court should exercise its prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules, because after all, the power
of this Court to suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice requires is well recognized.
31
In
Solicitor General v. The Metropolitan Manila Authority,
32
this Court held:
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent
power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the
interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic
adherence to such rules. x x x
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. x x x Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require.
IV.
The PNCC Board Acted in Bad Faith and with Gross Negligence
in Directing the Affairs of PNCC
In this jurisdiction, the members of the board of directors have a three-fold duty: duty of obedience,
duty of diligence, and duty of loyalty.
33
Accordingly, the members of the board of directors (1) shall
direct the affairs of the corporation only in accordance with the purposes for which it was organized;
34

(2) shall not willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or
act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the affairs of the corporation;
35
and (3) shall not
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees.
36

In the present case, the PNCC Board blatantly violated its duty of diligence as it miserably failed to act in
good faith in handling the affairs of PNCC.
First. For almost two decades, the PNCC Board had consistently refused to admit liability for the
Marubeni loans because of the absence of a PNCC Board resolution authorizing the issuance of the
letters of guarantee.
There is no dispute that between 1978 and 1980, Marubeni Corporation extended two loans to Basay
Mining (later renamed CDCP Mining): (1) US$5 million to finance the purchase of copper concentrates
by Basay Mining; and (2) Y5.46 billion to finance the completion of the expansion project of Basay
Mining including working capital.
There is also no dispute that it was only on 20 October 2000 when the PNCC Board approved a
resolution expressly admitting PNCCs liability for the Marubeni loans. This was the first Board
Resolution admitting liability for the Marubeni loans, for PNCC never admitted liability for these debts in
the past. Even Radstock admitted that PNCCs 1994 Financial Statements did not reflect the Marubeni
loans.
37
Also, former PNCC Chairman Arthur Aguilar stated during the Senate hearings that "the
Marubeni claim was never in the balance sheet x x x nor was it in a contingent account."
38
Miriam M.
Pasetes, SVP Finance of PNCC, and Atty. Herman R. Cimafranca of the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel, confirmed this fact, thus:
SEN. DRILON. x x x And so, PNCC itself did not recognize this as an obligation but the board suddenly
recognized it as an obligation. It was on that basis that the case was filed, is that correct? In fact, the
case hinges on they knew that this claim has prescribed but because of that board resolution which
recognized the obligation they filed their complaint, is that correct?
MR. CIMAFRANCA. Apparently, it's like that, Senator, because the filing of the case came after the
acknowledgement.
SEN. DRILON. Yes. In fact, the filing of the case came three months after the acknowledgement.
MR. CIMAFRANCA. Yes. And that made it difficult to handle on our part.
SEN. DRILON. That is correct. So, that it was an obligation which was not recognized in the financial
statements of PNCC but revived in the financial statements because it has prescribed but revived by
the board effectively. That's the theory, at least, of the plaintiff. Is that correct? Who can answer that?
Ms. Pasetes, yes.
MS. PASETES. It is not an obligation of PNCC that is why it is not reflected in the financial statements.
39

(Emphasis supplied)
In short, after two decades of consistently refuting its liability for the Marubeni loans, the PNCC Board
suddenly and inexplicably reversed itself by admitting in October 2000 liability for the Marubeni loans.
Just three months after the PNCC Board recognized the Marubeni loans, Radstock acquired Marubeni's
receivable and filed the present collection case.
Second. The PNCC Board admitted liability for the Marubeni loans despite PNCCs total liabilities far
exceeding its assets. There is no dispute that the Marubeni loans, once recognized, would wipe out the
assets of PNCC, "virtually emptying the coffers of the PNCC."
40
While PNCC insists that it remains
financially viable, the figures in the COA Audit Reports tell otherwise.
41
For 2006 and 2005, "the
Corporation has incurred negative gross margin of P84.531 Million and P80.180 Million, respectively,
and net losses that had accumulated in a deficit of P14.823 Billion as of 31 December 2006."
42
The COA
even opined that "unless [PNCC] Management addresses the issue on net losses in its financial
rehabilitation plan, x x x the Corporation may not be able to continue its operations as a going
concern."
Notably, during the oral arguments before this Court, the Government Corporate Counsel admitted the
PNCCs huge negative net worth, thus:
JUSTICE CARPIO
x x x what is the net worth now of PNCC? Negative what? Negative 6 Billion at least[?]
ATTY. AGRA
Yes, your Honor.
43
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the PNCC Boards admission of liability for the Marubeni loans, given PNCCs huge negative net
worth of at least P6 billion as admitted by PNCCs counsel, or P14.823 billion based on the 2006 COA
Audit Report, would leave PNCC an empty shell, without any assets to pay its biggest creditor, the
National Government with an admitted receivable of P36 billion from PNCC.
Third. In a debilitating self-inflicted injury, the PNCC Board revived what appeared to have been a dead
claim by abandoning one of PNCCs strong defenses, which is the prescription of the action to collect the
Marubeni loans.
Settled is the rule that actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.
44
Under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, an action upon a written contract, such as a loan contract, must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues. The prescription of such an action is interrupted when
the action is filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, or
when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
45

In this case, Basay Mining obtained the Marubeni loans sometime between 1978 and 1981. While
Radstock claims that numerous demand letters were sent to PNCC, based on the records, the
extrajudicial demands to pay the loans appear to have been made only in 1984 and 1986. Meanwhile,
the written acknowledgment of the debt, in the form of Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000, was issued
only on 20 October 2000.
Thus, more than ten years would have already lapsed between Marubenis extrajudicial demands in
1984 and 1986 and the acknowledgment by the PNCC Board of the Marubeni loans in 2000. However,
the PNCC Board suddenly passed Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 expressly admitting liability for the
Marubeni loans. In short, the PNCC Board admitted liability for the Marubeni loans despite the fact that
the same might no longer be judicially collectible. Although the legal advantage was obviously on its
side, the PNCC Board threw in the towel even before the fight could begin. During the Senate hearings,
the matter of prescription was discussed, thus:
SEN. DRILON. ... the prescription period is 10 years and there were no payments the last demands
were made, when? The last demands for payment?
MS. OGAN. It was made January 2001 prior to the filing of the case.
SEN. DRILON. Yes, all right. Before that, when was the last demand made? By the time they filed the
complaint more than 10 years already lapsed.
MS. OGAN. On record, Mr. Chairman, we have demands starting from - - a series of demands which
started from May 23, 1984, letter from Marubeni to PNCC, demand payment. And we also have the
letter of September 3, 1986, letter of Marubeni to then PNCC Chair Mr. Jaime. We have the June 24,
1986 letter from Marubeni to the PNCC Chairman. Also the March 4, 1988 letter...
SEN. DRILON. The March 4, 1988 letter is not a demand letter.
MS. OGAN. It is exactly addressed to the Asset Privatization Trust.
SEN. DRILON. It is not a demand letter? Okay.
MS. OGAN. And we have also...
SEN. DRILON. Anyway...
THE CHAIRMAN. Please answer when you are asked, Ms. Ogan. We want to put it on the record whether
it is "yes" or "no".
MS. OGAN. Yes, sir.
SEN. DRILON. So, even assuming that all of those were demand letters, the 10 years prescription set in
and it should have prescribed in 1998, whatever is the date, or before the case was filed in 2001.
MR. CIMAFRANCA. The 10-year period for if the contract is written, it's 10 years and it should have
prescribed in 10 years and we did raise that in our answer, in our motion to dismiss.
SEN. DRILON. I know. You raised this in your motion to dismiss and you raised this in your answer. Now,
we are not saying that you were negligent in not raising that. What we are just putting on the record
that indeed there is basis to argue that these claims have prescribed.
Now, the reason why there was a colorable basis on the complaint filed in 2001 was that somehow the
board of PNCC recognized the obligation in a special board meeting on October 20, 2000. Hindi ba
ganoon 'yon?
MS. OGAN. Yes, that is correct.
SEN. DRILON. Why did the PNCC recognize this obligation in 2000 when it was very clear that at that
point more than 10 years have lapsed since the last demand letter?
MR. AGUILAR. May I volunteer an answer?
SEN. DRILON. Please.
MR. AGUILAR. I looked into that, Mr. Chairman, Your Honor. It was as a result of and I go to the folder
letter "N." In our own demand research it was not period, Your Honor, that Punongbayan in the big
folder, sir, letter "N" it was the period where PMO was selling PNCC and Punongbayan and Araullo Law
Office came out with an investment brochure that indicated liabilities both to national government and
to Marubeni/Radstock. So, PMO said, "For good order, can you PNCC board confirm that by board
resolution?" That's the tone of the letter.
SEN. DRILON. Confirm what? Confirm the liabilities that are contained in the Punongbayan investment
prospectus both to the national government and to PNCC. That is the reason at least from the record,
Your Honor, how the PNCC board got to deliberate on the Marubeni.
THE CHAIRMAN. What paragraph? Second to the last paragraph?
MR. AGUILAR. Yes. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Ito po 'yong that"s to our recollection, in the records, that was
the reason.
SEN. DRILON. Is that the only reason why ...
MR. AGUILAR. From just the records, Mr. Chairman, and then interviews with people who are still
around.
SEN. DRILON. You mean, you acknowledged a prescribed obligation because of this paragraph?
MR. AGUILAR. I dont know what legal advice we were following at that time, Mr. Chairman.
46
(Emphasis
supplied)
Besides prescription, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) originally believed that
PNCC had another formidable legal weapon against Radstock, that is, the lack of authority of Alfredo
Asuncion, then Executive Vice-President of PNCC, to sign the letter of guarantee on behalf of CDCP.
During the Senate hearings, the following exchange reveals the OGCCs original opinion:
THE CHAIRMAN. What was the opinion of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel?
MS. OGAN. The opinion of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel is that PNCC should exhaust
all means to resist the case using all defenses available to a guarantee and a surety that there is a valid
ground for PNCC's refusal to honor or make good the alleged guarantee obligation. It appearing that
from the documents submitted to the OGCC that there is no board authority in favor or authorizing Mr.
Asuncion, then EVP, to sign or execute the letter of guarantee in behalf of CDCP and that said letter of
guarantee is not legally binding upon or enforceable against CDCP as principals, your Honors.
47

x x x x
SEN. DRILON. Now that we have read this, what was the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel,
Mr. Cimafranca?
MR. CIMAFRANCA. Yes, Senator, we did issue an opinion upon the request of PNCC and our opinion was
that there was no valid obligation, no valid guarantee. And we incorporated that in our pleadings in
court.
48
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, PNCC had strong defenses against the collection suit filed by Radstock, as originally opined by
the OGCC. It is quite puzzling, therefore, that the PNCC Board, which had solid grounds to refute the
legitimacy of the Marubeni loans, admitted its liability and entered into a Compromise Agreement that
is manifestly and grossly prejudicial to PNCC.
Fourth. The basis for the admission of liability for the Marubeni loans, which was an opinion of the Feria
Law Office, was not even shown to the PNCC Board.
Atty. Raymundo Francisco, the APT trustee overseeing the proposed privatization of PNCC at the time,
was responsible for recommending to the PNCC Board the admission of PNCCs liability for the Marubeni
loans. Atty. Francisco based his recommendation solely on a mere alleged opinion of the Feria Law
Office. Atty. Francisco did not bother to show this "Feria opinion" to the members of the PNCC Board,
except to Atty. Renato Valdecantos, who as the then PNCC Chairman did not also show the "Feria
opinion" to the other PNCC Board members. During the Senate hearings, Atty. Francisco could not
produce a copy of the "Feria opinion." The Senators grilled Atty. Francisco on his recommendation to
recognize PNCCs liability for the Marubeni loans, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. x x x You were the one who wrote this letter or rather this memorandum dated 17
October 2000 to Atty. Valdecantos. Can you tell us the background why you wrote the letter
acknowledging a debt which is non-existent?
MR. FRANCISCO. I was appointed as the trustee in charge of the privatization of the PNCC at that time,
sir. And I was tasked to do a study and engage the services of financial advisors as well as legal advisors
to do a legal audit and financial study on the position of PNCC. I bidded out these engagements, the
financial advisership went to Punongbayan and Araullo. The legal audit went to the Feria Law Offices.
THE CHAIRMAN. Spell it. Boy Feria?
MR. FRANCISCO. Feria-- Feria.
THE CHAIRMAN. Lugto?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes. Yes, Your Honor. And this was the findings of the Feria Law Office that the
Marubeni account was a legal obligation.
So, I presented this to our board. Based on the findings of the legal audit conducted by the Ferial Law
Offices, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. Why did you not ask the government corporate counsel? Why did you have to ask for
the opinion of an outside counsel?
MR. FRANCISCO. That was the that was the mandate given to us, sir, that we have to engage the ...
THE CHAIRMAN. Mandate given by whom?
MR. FRANCISCO. That is what we usually do, sir, in the APT.
THE CHAIRMAN. Ah, you get outside counsel?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, we...
THE CHAIRMAN. Not necessarily the government corporate counsel?
MR. FRANCISCO. No, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. So, on the basis of the opinion of outside counsel, private, you proceeded to, in effect,
recognize an obligation which is not even entered in the books of the PNCC? You probably resuscitated a
non-existing obligation anymore?
MR. FRANCISCO. Sir, I just based my recommendation on the professional findings of the law office that
we engaged, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. Did you not ask for the opinion of the government corporate counsel?
MR. FRANCISCO. No, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. Why?
MR. FRANCISCO. I felt that the engagements of the law office was sufficient, anyway we were going to
raise it to the Committee on Privatization for their approval or disapproval, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. The COP?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thats a cabinet level?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir. And we did that, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. Now... So you sent your memo to Atty. Renato B. Valdecantos, who unfortunately is
not here but I think we have to get his response to this. And as part of the minutes of special meeting
with the board of directors on October 20, 2000, the board resolved in its Board Resolution No. 092-
2000, the board resolved to recognize, acknowledge and confirm PNCCs obligations as of September 30,
1999, etcetera, etcetera. (A), or rather (B), Marubeni Corporation in the amount of P10,740,000.
Now, we asked to be here because the franchise of PNCC is hanging in a balance because of the on the
questions on this acknowledgement. So we want to be educated.
Now, the paper trail starts with your letter. So, thats it thats my kuwan, Frank.
Yes, Senator Drilon.
SEN. DRILON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, Atty. Francisco, you have a copy of the minutes of October 20, 2000?
MR. FRANCISCO. Im sorry, sir, we dont have a copy.
SEN. DRILON. May we ask the corporate secretary of PNCC to provide us with a copy?
Okay naman andiyan siya.
(Ms. Ogan handing the document to Mr. Francisco.)
You have familiarized yourselves with the minutes, Atty. Francisco?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.
SEN. DRILON. Now, mention is made of a memorandum here on line 8, page 3 of this boards minutes. It
says, "Director Francisco has prepared a memorandum requesting confirmation, acknowledgement, and
ratification of this indebtedness of PNCC to the national government which was determined by Bureau
of Treasury as of September 30, 1999 is 36,023,784,751. And with respect to PNCCs obligation to
Marubeni, this has been determined to be in the total amount of 10,743,103,388, also as of September
30, 1999; that there is need to ratify this because there has already been a representation made with
respect to the review of the financial records of PNCC by Punongbayan and Araullo, which have been
included as part of the package of APTs disposition to the national governments interest in PNCC."
You recall having made this representation as found in the minutes, I assume, Atty. Francisco?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir. But Id like to be refreshed on the memorandum, sir, because I dont have a
copy.
SEN. DRILON. Yes, this memorandum was cited earlier by Senator Arroyo, and maybe the secretary can
give him a copy? Give him a copy?
MS. OGAN. (Handing the document to Mr. Francisco.)
MR. FRANCISCO. Your Honor, I have here a memorandum to the PNCC board through Atty. Valdecantos,
which says that in the last paragraph, if I may read? "May we request therefore, that a board
resolution be adopted, acknowledging and confirming the aforementioned PNCC obligations with the
national government and Marubeni as borne out by the due diligence audit."
SEN. DRILON. This is the memorandum referred to in these minutes. This memorandum dated 17
October 2000 is the memorandum referred to in the minutes.
MR. FRANCISCO. I would assume, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. DRILON. Right.
Now, the Punongbayan representative who was here yesterday, Mr...
THE CHAIRMAN. Navarro.
SEN. DRILON. ... Navarro denied that he made this recommendation.
THE CHAIRMAN. He asked for opinion, legal opinion.
SEN. DRILON. He said that they never made this representation and the transcript will bear us out. They
said that they never made this representation that the account of Marubeni should be recognized.
MR. FRANCISCO. Mr. Chairman, in the memorandum, I only mentioned here the acknowledgement and
confirmation of the PNCC obligations. I was not asking for a ratification. I never mentioned ratification in
the memorandum. I just based my memo based on the due diligence audit of the Feria Law Offices.
SEN. DRILON. Can you say that again? You never asked for a ratification...
MR. FRANCISCO. No. I never mentioned in my memorandum that I was asking for a ratification. I was
just in my memo it says, "acknowledging and confirming the PNCC obligation." This was what ...
SEN. DRILON. Isnt it the same as ratification? I mean, whats the difference?
MR. FRANCISCO. I well, my memorandum was meant really just to confirm the findings of the legal
audit as ...
SEN. DRILON. In your mind as a lawyer, Atty. Francisco, theres a difference between ratification and
whats your term? -- acknowledgment and confirmation?
MR. FRANCISCO. Well, I guess theres no difference, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. DRILON. Right.
Anyway, just of record, the Punongbayan representatives here yesterday said that they never made
such representation.
In any case, now youre saying its the Feria Law Office who rendered that opinion? Can we you know,
yesterday we were asking for a copy of this opinion but we were never furnished one. The ... no less
than the Chairman of this Committee was asking for a copy.
THE CHAIRMAN. Well, copy of the opinion...
MS. OGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we were never furnished a copy of this opinion because its opinion
rendered for the Asset Privatization Trust which is its client, not the PNCC, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. All right. The question is whether but you see, this is a memorandum of Atty.
Francisco to the Chairman of the Asset Privatization Trust. You say now that you were never furnished a
copy because thats supposed to be with the Asset ...
MS. OGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. ... but yet the action of or rather the opinion of the Feria Law Offices was in effect
adopted by the board of directors of PNCC in its minutes of October 20, 2000 where you are the
corporate secretary, Ms. Ogan.
MS. OGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. So, what I am saying is that this opinion or rather the opinion of the Feria Law Offices of
which you dont have a copy?
MS. OGAN. Yes, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. And the reason being that, it does not concern the PNCC because thats an opinion
rendered for APT and not for the PNCC.
MS. OGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that was what we were told although we made several requests to the
APT, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, since it was for the APT and not for the PNCC, I ask the question why did
PNCC adopt it? That was not for the consumption of PNCC. It was for the consumption of the Asset
Privatization Trust. And that is what Atty. Francisco says and its confirmed by you saying that this was a
memo you dont have a copy because this was sought for by APT and the Feria Law Offices just
provided an opinion provided the APT with an opinion. So, as corporate secretary, the board of
directors of PNCC adopted it, recognized the Marubeni Corporation.
You read the minutes of the October 20, 2000 meeting of the board of directors on Item V. The
resolution speaks of .. so, go ahead.
MS. OGAN. I gave my copies. Yes, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. In effect the Feria Law Offices opinion was for the consumption of the APT.
MS. OGAN. That was what we were told, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. And you were not even provided with a copy.
THE CHAIRMAN. Yet you adopted it.
MS. OGAN. Yes, sir.
SEN DRILON. Considering you were the corporate secretary.
THE CHAIRMAN. She was the corporate secretary.
SEN. DRILON. She was just recording the minutes.
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, she was recording.
Now, we are asking you now why it was taken up?
MS. OGAN. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, this was mentioned in the memorandum of Atty. Francisco,
memorandum to the board.
SEN. DRILON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Francisco represented APT in the board of PNCC. And is that correct,
Mr. Francisco?
THE CHAIRMAN. Youre an ex-officio member.
SEN. DRILON. Yes.
MR. FRANCISCO. Ex-officio member only, sir, as trustee in charge of the privatization of PNCC.
SEN. DRILON. With the permission of Mr. Chair, may I ask a question...
THE CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, Senator Drilon.
SEN. DRILON. Atty. Francisco, you sat in the PNCC board as APT representative, you are a lawyer, there
was a legal opinion of Feria, Feria, Lugto, Lao Law Offices which you cited in your memorandum. Did you
discuss first, did you give a copy of this opinion to PNCC?
MR. FRANCISCO. I gave a copy of this opinion, sir, to our chairman who was also a member of the board
of PNCC, Mr. Valdecantos, sir.
SEN. DRILON. And because he was...
MR. FRANCISCO. Because he was my immediate boss in the APT.
SEN. DRILON. Apparently, [it] just ended up in the personal possession of Mr. Valdecantos because the
corporate secretary, Glenda Ogan, who is supposed to be the custodian of the records of the board
never saw a copy of this.
MR. FRANCISCO. Well, sir, my the copy that I gave was to Mr. Valdecantos because he was the one
sitting in the PNCC board, sir.
SEN. DRILON. No, you sit in the board.
MR. FRANCISCO. I was just an ex-officio member. And all my reports were coursed through our
Chairman, Mr. Valdecantos, sir.
SEN. DRILON. Now, did you ever tell the board that there is a legal position taken or at least from the
documents it is possible that the claim has prescribed?
MR. FRANCISCO. I took this up in the board meeting of the PNCC at that time and I told them about this
matter, sir.
SEN. DRILON. No, you told them that the claim could have, under the law, could have prescribed?
MR. FRANCISCO. No, sir.
SEN. DRILON. Why? You mean, you didnt tell the board that it is possible that this liability is no longer a
valid liability because it has prescribed?
MR. FRANCISCO. I did not dwell into the findings anymore, sir, because I found the professional opinion
of the Feria Law Office to be sufficient.
49
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Franciscos act of recommending to the PNCC Board the acknowledgment of the Marubeni loans
based only on an opinion of a private law firm, without consulting the OGCC and without showing this
opinion to the members of the PNCC Board except to Atty. Valdecantos, reflects how shockingly little his
concern was for PNCC, contrary to his claim that "he only had the interest of PNCC at heart." In fact, if
what was involved was his own money, Atty. Francisco would have preferred not just two, but at least
three different opinions on how to deal with the matter, and he would have maintained his non-liability.
SEN. OSMEA. x x x
All right. And lastly, just to clear our minds, there has always been this finger-pointing, of course,
whenever this is typical Filipino. When they're caught in a bind, they always point a finger, they
pretend they don't know. And it just amazes me that you have been appointed trustees, meaning,
representatives of the Filipino people, that's what you were at APT, right? You were not Erap's
representatives, you were representative of the Filipino people and you were tasked to conserve the
assets that that had been confiscated from various cronies of the previous administration. And here, you
are asked to recognize the P10 billion debt and you point only to one law firm. If you have cancer, don't
you to a second opinion, a second doctor or a third doctor? This is just a question. I am just asking you
for your opinion if you would take the advice of the first doctor who tells you that he's got to open you
up.
MR. FRANCISCO. I would go to three or more doctors, sir.
SEN. OSMEA. Three or more. Yeah, that's right. And in this case the APT did not do so.
MR. FRANCISCO. We relied on the findings of the
SEN. OSMEA. If these were your money, would you have gone also to obtain a second, third opinion
from other law firms. Kung pera mo itong 10 billion na ito. Siguro you're not gonna give it up that easily
ano, 'di ba?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.
SEN. OSMEA. You'll probably keep it in court for the next 20 years.
x x x x
50
(Emphasis supplied)
This is a clear admission by Atty. Francisco of bad faith in directing the affairs of PNCC - that he would
not have recognized the Marubeni loans if his own funds were involved or if he were the owner of
PNCC.
The PNCC Board admitted liability for the P10.743 billion Marubeni loans without seeing, reading or
discussing the "Feria opinion" which was the sole basis for its admission of liability. Such act surely goes
against ordinary human nature, and amounts to gross negligence and utter bad faith, even bordering on
fraud, on the part of the PNCC Board in directing the affairs of the corporation. Owing loyalty to PNCC
and its stockholders, the PNCC Board should have exercised utmost care and diligence in admitting a
gargantuan debt of P10.743 billion that would certainly force PNCC into insolvency, a debt that previous
PNCC Boards in the last two decades consistently refused to admit.
Instead, the PNCC Board admitted PNCCs liability for the Marubeni loans relying solely on a mere
opinion of a private law office, which opinion the PNCC Board members never saw, except for Atty.
Valdecantos and Atty. Francisco. The PNCC Board knew that PNCC, as a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC), must rely "exclusively" on the opinion of the OGCC. Section 1 of
Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated 27 August 1998 issued by the President states:
SECTION 1. All legal matters pertaining to government-owned or controlled corporations, their
subsidiaries, other corporate off-springs and government acquired asset corporations (GOCCs) shall be
exclusively referred to and handled by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).
(Emphasis supplied)
The PNCC Board acted in bad faith in relying on the opinion of a private lawyer knowing that PNCC is
required to rely "exclusively" on the OGCCs opinion. Worse, the PNCC Board, in admitting liability for
P10.743 billion, relied on the recommendation of a private lawyer whose opinion the PNCC Board
members have not even seen.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Sison explained to the Court that the intention of APT was for the PNCC
Board merely to disclose the claim of Marubeni as part of APT's full disclosure policy to prospective
buyers of PNCC. Atty. Sison stated that it was not the intention of APT for the PNCC Board to admit
liability for the Marubeni loans, thus:
x x x It was the Asset Privatization Trust A-P-T that was tasked to sell the company. The A-P-T, for
purposes of disclosure statements, tasked the Feria Law Office to handle the documentation and the
study of all legal issues that had to be resolved or clarified for the information of prospective bidders
and or buyers. In the performance of its assigned task the Feria Law Office came upon the Marubeni
claim and mentioned that the APTC and/or PNCC must disclose that there is a claim by Marubeni against
PNCC for purposes of satisfying the requirements of full disclosure. This seemingly innocent statement
or requirement made by the Feria Law Office was then taken by two officials of the Asset Privatization
Trust and with malice aforethought turned it into the basis for a multi-billion peso debt by the now
government owned and/or controlled PNCC. x x x.
51
(Emphasis supplied)
While the PNCC Board passed Board Resolution No. BD-099-2000 amending Board Resolution No. BD-
092-2000, such amendment merely added conditions for the recognition of the Marubeni loans, namely,
subjecting the recognition to a final determination by COA of the amount involved and to the
declaration by OGCC of the legality of PNCCs liability. However, the PNCC Board reiterated and stood
firm that it "recognizes, acknowledges and confirms its obligations" for the Marubeni loans. Apparently,
Board Resolution No. BD-099-2000 was a futile attempt to "revoke" Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000.
Atty. Alfredo Laya, Jr., a former PNCC Director, spoke on his protests against Board Resolution No. BD-
092-2000 at the Senate hearings, thus:
MR. LAYA. Mr. Chairman, if I can
THE CHAIRMAN. Were you also at the board?
MR. LAYA. At that time, yes, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. Okay, go ahead.
MR. LAYA. That's why if maybe this can help clarify the sequence. There was this meeting on October
20. This matter of the Marubeni liability or account was also discussed. Mr. Macasaet, if I may try to
refresh. And there was some discussion, sir, and in fact, they were saying even at that stage that there
should be a COA or an OGCC audit. Now, that was during the discussion of October 20. Later on, the
minutes came out. The practice, then, sir, was for the minutes to come out at the start of the meeting of
the subsequent. So the minutes of October 20 came out on November 22 and then we were going over
it. And that is in the subsequent minutes of the meeting
THE CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt. You were taking up in your November 22 meeting the October 20
minutes?
MR. LAYA. Yes, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. This minutes that we have?
MR. LAYA. Yes, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.
MR. LAYA. Now, in the November 22 meeting, we noticed this resolution already for confirmation of the
board proceedings of October 20. So immediately we made actually, protest would be a better term
for that we protested the wording of the resolution and that's why we came up with this resolution
amending the October 20 resolution.
SEN. DRILON. So you are saying, Mr. Laya, that the minutes of October 20 did not accurately reflect the
decisions that you made on October 20 because you were saying that this recognition should be subject
to OGCC and COA? You seem to imply and we want to make it and I want to get that for the record.
You seem to imply that there was no decision to recognize the obligation during that meeting because
you wanted it to subject it to COA and OGCC, is that correct?
MR. LAYA. Yes, your Honor.
SEN. DRILON. So how did...
MR. LAYA. That's my understanding of the proceedings at that time, that's why in the subsequent
November 22 meeting, we raised this point about obtaining a COA and OGCC opinion.
SEN. DRILON. Yes. But you know, the November 22 meeting repeated the wording of the resolution
previously adopted only now you are saying subject to final determination which is completely of
different import from what you are saying was your understanding of the decision arrived at on October
20.
MR. LAYA. Yes, sir. Because our thinking then...
SEN. DRILON. What do you mean, yes, sir?
MR. LAYA. It's just a claim under discussion but then the way it is translated, as the minutes of October
20 were not really verbatim.
SEN. DRILON. So, you never intended to recognize the obligation.
MR. LAYA. I think so, sir. That was our personally, that was my position.
SEN. DRILON. How did it happen, Corporate Secretary Ogan, that the minutes did not reflect what the
board
THE CHAIRMAN. Ms. Pasetes
MS. PASETES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. you are the chief financial officer of PNCC.
MS. PASETES. Your Honor, before that November 22 board meeting, management headed by Mr.
Rolando Macasaet, myself and Atty. Ogan had a discussion about the recognition of the obligations of 10
billion of Marubeni and 36 billion of the national government on whether to recognize this as an
obligation in our books or recognize it as an obligation in the pro forma financial statement to be used
for the privatization of PNCC because recognizing both obligations in the books of PNCC would defeat
our going concern status and that is where the position of the president then, Mr. Macasaet, stemmed
from and he went back to the board and moved to reconsider the position of October 20, 2000, Mr.
Chair.
52
(Emphasis supplied)
In other words, despite Atty. Layas objections to PNCCs admitting liability for the Marubeni loans, the
PNCC Board still admitted the same and merely imposed additional conditions to temper somehow the
devastating effects of Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000.
The act of the PNCC Board in issuing Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 expressly admitting liability for
the Marubeni loans demonstrates the PNCC Boards gross and willful disregard of the requisite care and
diligence in managing the affairs of PNCC, amounting to bad faith and resulting in grave and irreparable
injury to PNCC and its stockholders. This reckless and treacherous move on the part of the PNCC Board
clearly constitutes a serious breach of its fiduciary duty to PNCC and its stockholders, rendering the
members of the PNCC Board liable under Section 31 of the Corporation Code, which provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. -- Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly
vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in
conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages
resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty, any interest
adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has been reposed in him in confidence, as to
which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be liable as a trustee for
the corporation and must account for the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the
corporation.
Soon after the short-lived Estrada Administration, the PNCC Board revoked its previous admission of
liability for the Marubeni loans. During the oral arguments, Atty. Sison narrated to the Court:
x x x After President Estrada was ousted, I was appointed as President and Chairman of PNCC in April of
2001, this particular board resolution was brought to my attention and I immediately put the matter
before the board. I had no problem in convincing them to reverse the recognition as it was illegal and
had no basis in fact. The vote to overturn that resolution was unanimous. Strange to say that some who
voted to overturn the recognition were part of the old board that approved it. Stranger still, Renato
Valdecantos who was still a member of the Board voted in favor of reversing the resolution he himself
instigated and pushed. Some of the board members who voted to recognize the obligation of Marubeni
even came to me privately and said "pinilit lang kami." x x x.
53
(Emphasis supplied)
In approving PNCC Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000, the PNCC Board caused undue
injury to the Government and gave unwarranted benefits to Radstock, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence of the PNCC Board. Such acts are declared under
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as "corrupt practices xxx and xxx
unlawful." Being unlawful and criminal acts, these PNCC Board Resolutions are void ab initio and cannot
be implemented or in any way given effect by the Executive or Judicial branch of the Government.
Not content with forcing PNCC to commit corporate suicide with the admission of liability for the
Marubeni loans under Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000, the PNCC Board drove the
last nail on PNCCs coffin when the PNCC Board entered into the manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
Compromise Agreement with Radstock. This time, the OGCC, headed by Agnes DST Devanadera,
reversed itself and recommended approval of the Compromise Agreement to the PNCC Board. As Atty.
Sison explained to the Court during the oral arguments:
x x x While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, Radstock in a rare display of extreme
generosity, conveniently convinced the Board of PNCC to enter into a compromise agreement for the
amount of the judgment rendered by the RTC or P6.5 Billion Pesos. This time the OGCC, under the
leadership of now Solicitor General Agnes Devanadera, approved the compromise agreement
abandoning the previous OGCC position that PNCC had a meritorious case and would be hard press to
lose the case. What is strange is that although the compromise agreement we seek to stop ostensibly is
for P6.5 Billion only, truth and in fact, the agreement agrees to convey to Radstock all or substantially all
of the assets of PNCC worth P18 Billion Pesos. There are three items that are undervalued here, the real
estate that was turned over as a result of the controversial agreement, the toll revenues that were being
assigned and the value of the new shares of PNCC the difference is about P12 Billion Pesos. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
V.
The Compromise Agreement is Void
for Being Contrary to the Constitution,
Existing Laws, and Public Policy
For a better understanding of the present case, the pertinent terms and conditions of the Compromise
Agreement between PNCC and Radstock are quoted below:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Agreement made and entered into this 17th day of August 2006, in Mandaluyong City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, by and between:
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, a government acquired asset corporation,
created and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal office address at
EDSA corner Reliance Street, Mandaluyong City, Philippines, duly represented herein by its Chairman
ARTHUR N. AGUILAR, pursuant to a Board Resolution attached herewith as Annex "A" and made an
integral part hereof, hereinafter referred to as PNCC;
- and -
RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED, a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, with
office address at Suite 1402 1 Duddell Street, Central Hongkong duly-represented herein by its Director,
CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, pursuant to a Board Resolution attached herewith as Annex "B" and made an
integral part hereof, hereinafter referred to as RADSTOCK.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, on January 15, 2001, RADSTOCK, as assignee of Marubeni Corporation, filed a complaint for
sum of money and damages with application for a writ of preliminary attachment with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Mandaluyong City, docketed as Civil Case No. MC-01-1398, to collect on PNCCs guarantees
on the unpaid loan obligations of CDCP Mining Corporation as provided under an Advance Payment
Agreement and Loan Agreement;
WHEREAS, on December 10, 2002, the RTC of Mandaluyong rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff
RADSTOCK directing PNCC to pay the total amount of Thirteen Billion One Hundred Fifty One Million
Nine Hundred Fifty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-Eight Pesos (P13,151,956,528.00) with interest
from October 15, 2001 plus Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as attorney's fees.
WHEREAS, PNCC had elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 66654) on Certiorari and
thereafter, to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 156887) which Courts have consistently ruled that the RTC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied PNCCs Motion to Dismiss which sets forth
similar or substantially the same grounds or defenses as those raised in PNCC's Answer;
WHEREAS, the case has remained pending for almost six (6) years even after the main action was
appealed to the Court of Appeals;
WHEREAS, on the basis of the RTC Decision dated December 10, 2002, the current value of the judgment
debt against PNCC stands at P17,040,843,968.00 as of July 31, 2006 (the "Judgment Debt");
WHEREAS, RADSTOCK is willing to settle the case at the reduced Compromise Amount of Six Billion One
Hundred Ninety-Six Million Pesos (P6,196,000,000.00) which may be paid by PNCC, either in cash or in
kind to avoid the trouble and inconvenience of further litigation as a gesture of goodwill and
cooperation;
WHEREAS, it is an established legal policy or principle that litigants in civil cases should be encouraged to
compromise or amicably settle their claims not only to avoid litigation but also to put an end to one
already commenced (Articles 2028 and 2029, Civil Code);
WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement has been approved by the respective Board of Directors of both
PNCC and RADSTOCK, subject to the approval of the Honorable Court;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and the mutual covenants,
stipulations and agreements herein contained, PNCC and RADSTOCK have agreed to amicably settle the
above captioned Radstock case under the following terms and conditions:
1. RADSTOCK agrees to receive and accept from PNCC in full and complete settlement of the Judgment
Debt, the reduced amount of Six Billion, One Hundred Ninety-Six Million Pesos (P6,196,000,000.00) (the
"Compromise Amount").
2. This Compromise Amount shall be paid by PNCC to RADSTOCK in the following manner:
a. PNCC shall assign to a third party assignee to be designated by RADSTOCK all its rights and interests to
the following real properties provided the assignee shall be duly qualified to own real properties in the
Philippines;
(1) PNCCs rights over that parcel of land located in Pasay City with a total area of One Hundred Twenty-
Nine Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Eight (129,548) square meters, more or less, and which is covered by
and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34997 of the Registry of Deeds for
Pasay City. The transfer value is P3,817,779,000.00.
PNCCs rights and interests in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34997 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay
City is defined and delineated by Administrative Order No. 397, Series of 1998, and RADSTOCK is fully
aware and recognizes that PNCC has an undertaking to cede at least 2 hectares of this property to its
creditor, the Philippine National Bank; and that furthermore, the Government Service Insurance System
has also a current and existing claim in the nature of boundary conflicts, which undertaking and claim
will not result in the diminution of area or value of the property. Radstock recognizes and acknowledges
the rights and interests of GSIS over the said property.
(2) T-452587 (T-23646) - Paraaque (5,123 sq. m.) subject to the clarification of the Privatization and
Management Office (PMO) claims thereon. The transfer value is P45,000,900.00.
(3) T-49499 (529715 including T-68146-G (S-29716) (1,9747-A)-Paraaque (107 sq. m.) (54 sq. m.)
subject to the clarification of the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) claims thereon. The
transfer value is P1,409,100.00.
(4) 5-29716-Paraaque (27,762 sq. m.) subject to the clarification of the Privatization and Management
Office (PMO) claims thereon. The transfer value is P242,917,500.00.
(5) P-169 - Tagaytay (49,107 sq. m.). The transfer value is P13,749,400.00.
(6) P-170 - Tagaytay (49,100 sq. m.). The transfer value is P13,749,400.00.
(7) N-3320 - Town and Country Estate, Antipolo (10,000 sq. m.). The transfer value is P16,800,000.00.
(8) N-7424 - Antipolo (840 sq. m.). The transfer value is P940,800.00.
(9) N-7425 - Antipolo (850 sq. m.). The transfer value is P952,000.00.
(10) N-7426 - Antipolo (958 sq. m.). The transfer value is P1,073,100.00.
(11) T-485276 - Antipolo (741 sq. m.). The transfer value is P830,200.00.
(12) T-485277 - Antipolo (680 sq. m.). The transfer value is P761,600.00.
(13) T-485278 - Antipolo (701 sq. m.). The transfer value is P785,400.00.
(14) T-131500 - Bulacan (CDCP Farms Corp.) (4,945 sq, m.). The transfer value is P6,475,000.00.
(15) T-131501 - Bulacan (678 sq. m.). The transfer value is P887,600.00.
(16) T-26,154 (M) - Bocaue, Bulacan (2,841 sq. m.). The transfer value is P3,779,300.00.
(17) T-29,308 (M) - Bocaue, Bulacan (733 sq. m.). The transfer value is P974,400.00.
(18) T-29,309 (M) Bocaue, Bulacan (1,141 sq. m.). The transfer value is P1,517,600.00.
(19) T-260578 (R. Bengzon) Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan (20,000 sq. m.). The transfer value is
P25,200,000.00.
The transfer values of the foregoing properties are based on 70% of the appraised value of the
respective properties.
b. PNCC shall issue to RADSTOCK or its assignee common shares of the capital stock of PNCC issued at
par value which shall comprise 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC after the conversion to
equity of the debt exposure of the Privatization Management Office (PMO) and the National
Development Company (NDC) and other government agencies and creditors such that the total
government holdings shall not fall below 70% voting equity subject to the approval of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and ratification of PNCCs stockholders, if necessary. The assigned value of
the shares issued to RADSTOCK is P713 Million based on the approximate last trading price of PNCC
shares in the Philippine Stock Exchange as the date of this agreement, based further on current
generally accepted accounting standards which stipulates the valuation of shares to be based on the
lower of cost or market value.
Subject to the procurement of any and all necessary approvals from the relevant governmental
authorities, PNCC shall deliver to RADSTOCK an instrument evidencing an undertaking of the
Privatization and Management Office (PMO) to give RADSTOCK or its assignee the right to match any
offer to buy the shares of the capital stock and debts of PNCC held by PMO, in the event the same
shares and debt are offered for privatization.
c. PNCC shall assign to RADSTOCK or its assignee 50% of the PNCC's 6% share in the gross toll revenue of
the Manila North Tollways Corporation (MNTC), with a Net Present Value of P1.287 Billion computed in
the manner outlined in Annex "C" herein attached as an integral part hereof, that shall be due and
owing to PNCC pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement between PNCC and First Philippine
Infrastructure Development Corp. dated August 29, 1995 and other related existing agreements,
commencing in 2008. It shall be understood that as a result of this assignment, PNCC shall charge and
withhold the amounts, if any, pertaining to taxes due on the amounts assigned.
Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall pay Radstock the reduced amount of P6,185,000,000.00
in full settlement of PNCCs guarantee of CDCP Minings debt allegedly totaling P17,040,843,968.00 as of
31 July 2006. To satisfy its reduced obligation, PNCC undertakes to (1) "assign to a third party assignee
to be designated by Radstock all its rights and interests" to the listed real properties therein; (2) issue to
Radstock or its assignee common shares of the capital stock of PNCC issued at par value which shall
comprise 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC; and (3) assign to Radstock or its assignee 50% of
PNCCs 6% share, for the next 27 years (2008-2035), in the gross toll revenues of the Manila North
Tollways Corporation.
A. The PNCC Board has no power to compromise
the P6.185 billion amount.
Does the PNCC Board have the power to compromise the P6.185 billion "reduced" amount? The answer
is in the negative.1avvphi1
The Dissenting Opinion asserts that PNCC has the power, citing Section 36(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1445 (PD 1445), otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, enacted in 1978.
Section 36 states:
SECTION 36. Power to Compromise Claims. (1) When the interest of the government so requires, the
Commission may compromise or release in whole or in part, any claim or settled liability to any
government agency not exceeding ten thousand pesos and with the written approval of the Prime
Minister, it may likewise compromise or release any similar claim or liability not exceeding one hundred
thousand pesos, the application for relief therefrom shall be submitted, through the Commission and
the Prime Minister, with their recommendations, to the National Assembly.
(2) The respective governing bodies of government-owned or controlled corporations, and self-
governing boards, commissions or agencies of the government shall have the exclusive power to
compromise or release any similar claim or liability when expressly authorized by their charters and if in
their judgment, the interest of their respective corporations or agencies so requires. When the charters
do not so provide, the power to compromise shall be exercised by the Commission in accordance with
the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
The Dissenting Opinion asserts that since PNCC is incorporated under the Corporation Code, the PNCC
Board has all the powers granted to the governing boards of corporations incorporated under the
Corporation Code, which includes the power to compromise claims or liabilities.
Section 36 of PD 1445, enacted on 11 June 1978, has been superseded by a later law -- Section 20(1),
Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987,
which provides:
Section 20. Power to Compromise Claims. - (1) When the interest of the Government so requires, the
Commission may compromise or release in whole or in part, any settled claim or liability to any
government agency not exceeding ten thousand pesos arising out of any matter or case before it or
within its jurisdiction, and with the written approval of the President, it may likewise compromise or
release any similar claim or liability not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos. In case the claim or
liability exceeds one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief therefrom shall be submitted,
through the Commission and the President, with their recommendations, to the Congress[.] x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Under this provision,
54
the authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding P100,000.00
involving a government agency, as in this case where the liability amounts to P6.185 billion, is vested not
in COA but exclusively in Congress. Congress alone has the power to compromise the P6.185 billion
purported liability of PNCC. Without congressional approval, the Compromise Agreement between
PNCC and Radstock involving P6.185 billion is void for being contrary to Section 20(1), Chapter IV,
Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.
PNCC is a "government agency" because Section 2 on Introductory Provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that
Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein. (Boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 applies to
PNCC, which indisputably is a government owned or controlled corporation.
In the same vein, the COAs stamp of approval on the Compromise Agreement is void for violating
Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Clearly, the
Dissenting Opinions reliance on the COAs finding that the terms and conditions of the Compromise
Agreement are "fair and above board" is patently erroneous.
Citing Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC,
55
the Dissenting
Opinion views that congressional approval is not required for the validity of the Compromise Agreement
because the liability of PNCC is not yet "settled."
In Benedicto, the PCGG filed in the Sandiganbayan a civil case to recover from the defendants (including
Roberto S. Benedicto) their ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other properties. The PCGG
executed a compromise agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto ceding to the latter a substantial part of
his ill-gotten assets and the State granting him immunity from further prosecution. The Court held that
prior congressional approval is not required for the PCGG to enter into a compromise agreement with
persons against whom it has filed actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
In Benedicto, the Court found that the governments claim against Benedicto was not yet settled unlike
here where the PNCC Board expressly admitted the liability of PNCC for the Marubeni loans. In
Benedicto, the ownership of the alleged ill-gotten assets was still being litigated in the Sandiganbayan
and no party ever admitted any liability, unlike here where the PNCC Board had already admitted
through a formal Board Resolution PNCCs liability for the Marubeni loans. PNCCs express admission of
liability for the Marubeni loans is essentially the premise of the execution of the Compromise
Agreement. In short, Radstocks claim against PNCC is settled by virtue of PNCCs express admission of
liability for the Marubeni loans. The Compromise Agreement merely reduced this settled liability from
P17 billion to P6.185 billion.
The provision of the Revised Administrative Code on the power to settle claims or liabilities was
precisely enacted to prevent government agencies from admitting liabilities against the government,
then compromising such "settled" liabilities. The present case is exactly what the law seeks to prevent, a
compromise agreement on a creditors claim settled through admission by a government agency
without the approval of Congress for amounts exceeding P100,000.00. What makes the application of
the law even more necessary is that the PNCC Boards twin moves are manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government. First, the PNCC admitted solidary liability for a staggering P10.743
billion private debt incurred by a private corporation which PNCC does not even control. Second, the
PNCC Board agreed to pay Radstock P6.185 billion as a compromise settlement ahead of all other
creditors, including the Government which is the biggest creditor.
The Dissenting Opinion further argues that since the PNCC is incorporated under the Corporation Code,
it has the power, through its Board of Directors, to compromise just like any other private corporation
organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, the Dissenting Opinion states:
Not being a government corporation created by special law, PNCC does not owe its creation to some
charter or special law, but to the Corporation Code. Its powers are enumerated in the Corporation Code
and its articles of incorporation. As an autonomous entity, it undoubtedly has the power to compromise,
and to enter into a settlement through its Board of Directors, just like any other private corporation
organized under the Corporation Code. To maintain otherwise is to ignore the character of PNCC as a
corporate entity organized under the Corporation Code, by which it was vested with a personality and
identity distinct and separate from those of its stockholders or members. (Boldfacing and underlining
supplied)
The Dissenting Opinion is woefully wide off the mark. The PNCC is not "just like any other private
corporation" precisely because it is not a private corporation but indisputably a government owned
corporation. Neither is PNCC "an autonomous entity" considering that PNCC is under the Department of
Trade and Industry, over which the President exercises control. To claim that PNCC is an "autonomous
entity" is to say that it is a lost command in the Executive branch, a concept that violates the President's
constitutional power of control over the entire Executive branch of government.
56

The government nominees in the PNCC Board, who practically compose the entire PNCC Board, are
public officers subject to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, accountable to the Government and
the Filipino people. To hold that a corporation incorporated under the Corporation Code, despite its
being 90.3% owned by the Government, is "an autonomous entity" that could solely through its Board of
Directors compromise, and transfer ownership of, substantially all its assets to a private third party
without the approval required under the Administrative Code of 1987,
57
is to invite the plunder of all
such government owned corporations.
The Dissenting Opinions claim that PNCC is an autonomous entity just like any other private corporation
is inconsistent with its assertion that Section 36(2) of the Government Auditing Code is the governing
law in determining PNCC's power to compromise. Section 36(2) of the Government Auditing Code
expressly states that it applies to the governing bodies of "government-owned or controlled
corporations." The phrase "government-owned or controlled corporations" refers to both those created
by special charter as well as those incorporated under the Corporation Code. Section 2, Article IX-D of
the Constitution provides:
SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c)
other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition
of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate,
the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary
and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and,
for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers
pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses
of government funds and properties. (Emphasis supplied)
In explaining the extent of the jurisdiction of COA over government owned or controlled corporations,
this Court declared in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit:
58

The COA's audit jurisdiction extends not only to government "agencies or instrumentalities," but also to
"government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" as well as "other government-
owned or controlled corporations" without original charters.
x x x x
Petitioner forgets that the constitutional criterion on the exercise of COA's audit jurisdiction depends on
the government's ownership or control of a corporation. The nature of the corporation, whether it is
private, quasi-public, or public is immaterial.
The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over "government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters," as well as "government-owned or controlled corporations" without
original charters. GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA pre-audit, while GOCCs without
original charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original charters refer to corporations
created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by the government. The nature or
purpose of the corporation is not material in determining COA's audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner
of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or special law.
Clearly, the COAs audit jurisdiction extends to government owned or controlled corporations
incorporated under the Corporation Code. Thus, the COA must apply the Government Auditing Code in
the audit and examination of the accounts of such government owned or controlled corporations even
though incorporated under the Corporation Code. This means that Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B,
Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 on the power to compromise, which superseded
Section 36 of the Government Auditing Code, applies to the present case in determining PNCCs power
to compromise. In fact, the COA has been regularly auditing PNCC on a post-audit basis in accordance
with Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the Government Auditing Code, and COA rules and
regulations.
B. PNCCs toll fees are public funds.
PD 1113 granted PNCC a 30-year franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the North
and South Luzon Expressways. Section 1 of PD 1113
59
provides:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, there is hereby granted to the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), a corporation duly organized and
registered under the laws of the Philippines, hereinafter called the GRANTEE, for a period of thirty (30)
years from May 1, 1977 the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain toll
facilities covering the expressways from Balintawak (Station 9 + 563) to Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan
and from Nichols, Pasay City (Station 10 + 540) to Lucena, Quezon, hereinafter referred to collectively as
North Luzon Expressway, respectively.
The franchise herein granted shall include the right to collect toll fees at such rates as may be fixed
and/or authorized by the Toll Regulatory Board hereinafter referred to as the Board created under
Presidential Decree No. 1112 for the use of the expressways above-mentioned. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of PD 1894,
60
which amended PD 1113 to include in PNCCs franchise the Metro Manila
expressway, also provides:
Section 2. The term of the franchise provided under Presidential Decree No. 1113 for the North Luzon
Expressway and the South Luzon Expressway which is thirty (30) years from 1 May 1977 shall remain the
same; provided that, the franchise granted for the Metro Manila Expressway and all extensions linkages,
stretches and diversions that may be constructed after the date of approval of this decree shall likewise
have a term of thirty (30) years commencing from the date of completion of the project. (Emphasis
supplied)
Based on these provisions, the franchise of the PNCC expired on 1 May 2007 or thirty years from 1 May
1977.
PNCC, however, claims that under PD 1894, the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) shall have a term of 30
years from the date of its completion in 2005. PNCC argues that the proviso in Section 2 of PD 1894 gave
"toll road projects completed within the franchise period and after the approval of PD No. 1894 on 12
December 1983 their own thirty-year term commencing from the date of the completion of the said
project, notwithstanding the expiry of the said franchise."
This contention is untenable.
The proviso in Section 2 of PD 1894 refers to the franchise granted for the Metro Manila Expressway and
all extensions linkages, stretches and diversions constructed after the approval of PD 1894. It does not
pertain to the NLEX because the term of the NLEX franchise, "which is 30 years from 1 May 1977, shall
remain the same," as expressly provided in the first sentence of the same Section 2 of PD 1894. To
construe that the NLEX franchise had a new term of 30 years starting from 2005 glaringly conflicts with
the plain, clear and unequivocal language of the first sentence of Section 2 of PD 1894. That would be
clearly absurd.
There is no dispute that Congress did not renew PNCCs franchise after its expiry on 1 May 2007.
However, PNCC asserts that it "remains a viable corporate entity even after the expiration of its
franchise under Presidential Decree No. 1113." PNCC points out that the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB)
granted PNCC a "Tollway Operation Certificate" (TOC) which conferred on PNCC the authority to operate
and maintain toll facilities, which includes the power to collect toll fees. PNCC further posits that the toll
fees are private funds because they represent "the consideration given to tollway operators in exchange
for costs they incurred or will incur in constructing, operating and maintaining the tollways."
This contention is devoid of merit.
With the expiration of PNCCs franchise, the assets and facilities of PNCC were automatically turned
over, by operation of law, to the government at no cost. Sections 2(e) and 9 of PD 1113 and Section 5 of
PD 1894 provide:
Section 2 [of PD 1113]. In consideration of this franchise, the GRANTEE shall:
(e) Turn over the toll facilities and all equipment directly related thereto to the government upon
expiration of the franchise period without cost.
Section 9 [of PD 1113]. For the purposes of this franchise, the Government, shall turn over to the
GRANTEE (PNCC) not later than April 30, 1977 all physical assets and facilities including all equipment
and appurtenances directly related to the operations of the North and South Toll Expressways: Provided,
That, the extensions of such Expressways shall also be turned over to GRANTEE upon completion of their
construction or of functional sections thereof: Provided, However, That upon termination of the
franchise period, said physical assets and facilities including improvements thereon, together with
equipment and appurtenances directly related to their operations, shall be turned over to the
Government without any cost or obligation on the part of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 [of PD No. 1894]. In consideration of this franchise, the GRANTEE shall:
(a) Construct, operate and maintain at its own expense the Expressways; and
(b) Turn over, without cost, the toll facilities and all equipment, directly related thereto to the
Government upon expiration of the franchise period. (Emphasis supplied)
The TRB does not have the power to give back to PNCC the toll assets and facilities which were
automatically turned over to the Government, by operation of law, upon the expiration of the franchise
of the PNCC on 1 May 2007. Whatever power the TRB may have to grant authority to operate a toll
facility or to issue a "Tollway Operation Certificate," such power does not obviously include the
authority to transfer back to PNCC ownership of National Government assets, like the toll assets and
facilities, which have become National Government property upon the expiry of PNCCs franchise. Such
act by the TRB would repeal Section 5 of PD 1894 which automatically vested in the National
Government ownership of PNCCs toll assets and facilities upon the expiry of PNCCs franchise. The TRB
obviously has no power to repeal a law. Further, PD 1113, as amended by PD 1894, granting the
franchise to PNCC, is a later law that must necessarily prevail over PD 1112 creating the TRB. Hence, the
provisions of PD 1113, as amended by PD 1894, are controlling.
The governments ownership of PNCC's toll assets and facilities inevitably results in the governments
ownership of the toll fees and the net income derived from these toll assets and facilities. Thus, the toll
fees form part of the National Governments General Fund, which includes public moneys of every sort
and other resources pertaining to any agency of the government.
61
Even Radstocks counsel admits that
the toll fees are public funds, to wit:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. Now, when the franchise of PNCC expired on May 7, 2007, under the terms of the franchise under
PD 1896, all the assets, toll way assets, equipment, etcetera of PNCC became owned by government at
no cost, correct, under the franchise?
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. So this is now owned by the national government. [A]ny income from these assets of the national
government is national government income, correct?
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
62

x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
x x x My question is very simple x x x Is the income from these assets of the national government
(interrupted)
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
63

x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, its the government *that+ decides whether it goes to the general fund or another fund. *W+hat is
that other fund? Is there another fund where revenues of the government go?
DEAN AGABIN:
Its the same fund, Your Honor, except that (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So it goes to the general fund?
DEAN AGABIN:
Except that it can be categorized as a private fund in a commercial sense, and it can be categorized as a
public fund in a Public Law sense.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. So we agree that, okay, it goes to the general fund. I agree with you, but you are saying it is
categorized still as a private funds?
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But its part of the general fund. Now, if it is part of the general fund, who has the authority to spend
that money?
DEAN AGABIN:
Well, the National Government itself.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Who in the National Government, the Executive, Judiciary or Legislative?
DEAN AGABIN:
Well, the funds are usually appropriated by the Congress.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
x x x you mean to say there are exceptions that money from the general fund can be spent by the
Executive without going t[hrough] Congress, or xxx is [that] the absolute rule?
DEAN AGABIN:
Well, in so far as the general fund is concerned, that is the absolute rule set aside by the National
Government.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
x x x you are saying this is general fund money - the collection from the assets[?]
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes.
64
(Emphasis supplied)
Forming part of the General Fund, the toll fees can only be disposed of in accordance with the
fundamental principles governing financial transactions and operations of any government agency, to
wit: (1) no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law, as expressly mandated by Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution; and (2) government funds or
property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes, as expressly mandated by Section 4(2) of PD
1445 or the Government Auditing Code.
65

Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.
The power to appropriate money from the General Funds of the Government belongs exclusively to the
Legislature. Any act in violation of this iron-clad rule is unconstitutional.
Reinforcing this Constitutional mandate, Sections 84 and 85 of PD 1445 require that before a
government agency can enter into a contract involving the expenditure of government funds, there
must be an appropriation law for such expenditure, thus:
Section 84. Disbursement of government funds.
1. Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an
appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.
x x x x
Section 85. Appropriation before entering into contract.
1. No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an
appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover
the proposed expenditure.
x x x x
Section 86 of PD 1445, on the other hand, requires that the proper accounting official must certify that
funds have been appropriated for the purpose.
66
Section 87 of PD 1445 provides that any contract
entered into contrary to the requirements of Sections 85 and 86 shall be void, thus:
Section 87. Void contract and liability of officer. Any contract entered into contrary to the requirements
of the two immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the officer or officers entering into the
contract shall be liable to the government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the
same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution, as implanted in Sections 84 and 85 of the
Government Auditing Code, a law must first be enacted by Congress appropriating P6.185 billion as
compromise money before payment to Radstock can be made.
67
Otherwise, such payment violates a
prohibitory law and thus void under Article 5 of the Civil Code which states that "[a]cts executed against
the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
their validity."
Indisputably, without an appropriation law, PNCC cannot lawfully pay P6.185 billion to Radstock. Any
contract allowing such payment, like the Compromise Agreement, "shall be void" as provided in Section
87 of the Government Auditing Code. In Comelec v. Quijano-Padilla,
68
this Court ruled:
Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them
not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to
act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. In
Osmea vs. Commission on Audit, this Court held:
The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further provides that no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor and the
proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the
obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and the amount necessary to cover
the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure on account thereof. Any
contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be VOID.
Clearly then, the contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was void from the very beginning
since the agreed cost for the project (P,368,920.00) was way beyond the appropriated amount
(P,419,180.00) as certified by the City Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly declared void and
unenforceable in COA's 2nd Indorsement, dated September 4, 1986. The COA declared and we agree,
that:
The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) is explicit and mandatory.
Fund availability is, as it has always been, an indispensable prerequisite to the execution of any
government contract involving the expenditure of public funds by all government agencies at all levels.
Such contracts are not to be considered as final or binding unless such a certification as to funds
availability is issued (Letter of Instruction No. 767, s. 1978). Antecedent of advance appropriation is thus
essential to government liability on contracts (Zobel vs. City of Manila, 47 Phil. 169). This contract being
violative of the legal requirements aforequoted, the same contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null
and void by virtue of Sec. 87.
Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio. This is to say that the
proposed contract is without force and effect from the very beginning or from its incipiency, as if it had
never been entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either by lapse of time or ratification.
(Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, Radstocks counsel admits that an appropriation law is needed before PNCC can use toll
fees to pay Radstock, thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, I agree with you. Now, you are saying that money can be paid out of the general fund only
through an appropriation by Congress, correct? Thats what you are saying.
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
I agree with you also. Okay, now, can PNCC xxx use this money to pay Radstock without Congressional
approval?
DEAN AGABIN:
Well, I believe that that may not be necessary. Your Honor, because earlier, the government had already
decreed that PNCC should be properly paid for the reclamation works which it had done. And so
(interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
No. I am talking of the funds.
DEAN AGABIN:
And so it is like a foreign obligation.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Counsel, I'm talking of the general funds, collection from the toll fees. Okay. You said, they go to the
general fund. You also said, money from the general fund can be spent only if there is an appropriation
law by Congress.
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
There is no law.
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, except that, Your Honor, this fund has not yet gone to the general fund.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
No. Its being collected everyday. As of May 7, 2007, national government owned those assets already.
All those x x x collections that would have gone to PNCC are now national government owned. It goes to
the general fund. And any body who uses that without appropriation from Congress commits
malversation, I tell you.
DEAN AGABIN:
That is correct, Your Honor, as long as it has already gone into the general fund.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Oh, you mean to say that its still being held now by the agent, PNCC. It has not been remitted to the
National Government?
DEAN AGABIN:
Well, if PNCC (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But if (interrupted)
DEAN AGABIN:
If this is the share that properly belongs to PNCC as a private entity (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, no. I am saying that You just agreed that all those collections now will go to the National
Government forming part of the general fund. If, somehow, PNCC is holding this money in the
meantime, it holds xxx it in trust, correct? Because you said, it goes to the general fund, National
Government. So it must be holding this in trust for the National Government.
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. Can the person holding in trust use it to pay his private debt?
DEAN AGABIN:
No, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Cannot be.
DEAN AGABIN:
But I assume that there must be some portion of the collections which properly pertain to PNCC.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
If there is some portion that xxx may be [for] operating expenses of PNCC. But that is not
DEAN AGABIN:
Even profit, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yeah, but that is not the six percent. Out of the six percent, that goes now to PNCC, thats entirely
national government. But the National Government and the PNCC can agree on service fees for
collecting, to pay toll collectors.
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But those are expenses. We are talking of the net income. It goes to the general fund. And its only
Congress that can authorize that expenditure. Not even the Court of Appeals can give its stamp of
approval that it goes to Radstock, correct?
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
69
(Emphasis supplied)
Without an appropriation law, the use of the toll fees to pay Radstock would constitute malversation of
public funds. Even counsel for Radstock expressly admits that the use of the toll fees to pay Radstock
constitutes malversation of public funds, thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
x x x As of May 7, 2007, [the] national government owned those assets already. All those x x x collections
that would have gone to PNCC are now national government owned. It goes to the general fund. And
any body who uses that without appropriation from Congress commits malversation, I tell you.
DEAN AGABIN:
That is correct, Your Honor, as long as it has already gone into the general fund.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Oh, you mean to say that its still being held now by the agent, PNCC. It has not been remitted to the
National Government?
DEAN AGABIN:
Well, if PNCC (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But if (interrupted)
DEAN AGABIN:
If this is the share that properly belongs to PNCC as a private entity (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, no. I am saying that You just agreed that all those collections now will go to the National
Government forming part of the general fund. If, somehow, PNCC is holding this money in the
meantime, it holds x x x it in trust, correct? Because you said, it goes to the general fund, National
Government. So it must be holding this in trust for the National Government.
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
70
(Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, funds held in trust by PNCC for the National Government cannot be used by PNCC to pay
a private debt of CDCP Mining to Radstock, otherwise the PNCC Board will be liable for malversation
of public funds.
In addition, to pay Radstock P6.185 billion violates the fundamental public policy, expressly articulated
in Section 4(2) of the Government Auditing Code,
71
that government funds or property shall be spent or
used solely for pubic purposes, thus:
Section 4. Fundamental Principles. x x x (2) Government funds or property shall be spent or used solely
for public purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question that the subject of the Compromise Agreement is CDCP Minings private debt to
Marubeni, which Marubeni subsequently assigned to Radstock. Counsel for Radstock admits that
Radstock holds a private debt of CDCP Mining, thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So your client is holding a private debt of CDCP Mining, correct?
DEAN AGABIN:
Correct, Your Honor.
72
(Emphasis supplied)
CDCP Mining obtained the Marubeni loans when CDCP Mining and PNCC (then CDCP) were still privately
owned and managed corporations. The Government became the majority stockholder of PNCC only
because government financial institutions converted their loans to PNCC into equity when PNCC failed
to pay the loans. However, CDCP Mining have always remained a majority privately owned corporation
with PNCC owning only 13% of its equity as admitted by former PNCC Chairman Arthur N. Aguilar and
PNCC SVP Finance Miriam M. Pasetes during the Senate hearings, thus:
SEN. OSMEA. x x x I just wanted to know is CDCP Mining a 100 percent subsidiary of PNCC?
MR. AGUILAR. Hindi ho. Ah, no.
SEN. OSMEA. If theyre not a 100 percent, why would they sign jointly and severally? I just want to plug
the loopholes.
MR. AGUILAR. I think it was if I may just speculate. It was just common ownership at that time.
SEN. OSMEA. Al right. Now Also, the ...
MR. AGUILAR. Ah, 13 percent daw, your Honor.
SEN. OSMEA. Huh?
MR. AGUILAR. Thirteen percent ho.
SEN. OSMEA. Whats 13 percent?
MR. AGUILAR. We owned ...
MS. PASETES. Thirteen percent of ...
SEN. OSMEA. PNCC owned ...
MS. PASETES. (Mike off) CDCP ...
SEN. DRILON. Use the microphone, please.
MS. PASETES. Sorry. Your Honor, the ownership of CDCP of CDCP Basay Mining ...
SEN. OSMEA. No, no, the ownership of CDCP. CDCP Mining, how many percent of the equity of CDCP
Mining was owned by PNCC, formerly CDCP?
MS. PASETES. Thirteen percent.
SEN. OSMEA. Thirteen. And as a 13 percent owner, they agreed to sign jointly and severally?
MS. PASETES. Yes.
SEN. OSMEA. One-three?
So poor PNCC and CDCP got taken to the cleaners here. They sign for a 100 percent and they only own
13 percent.
x x x x
73
(Emphasis supplied)
PNCC cannot use public funds, like toll fees that indisputably form part of the General Fund, to pay a
private debt of CDCP Mining to Radstock. Such payment cannot qualify as expenditure for a public
purpose. The toll fees are merely held in trust by PNCC for the National Government, which is the owner
of the toll fees.
Considering that there is no appropriation law passed by Congress for the P6.185 billion compromise
amount, the Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to law, specifically Section 29(1), Article
VI of the Constitution and Section 87 of PD 1445. And since the payment of the P6.185 billion pertains to
CDCP Minings private debt to Radstock, the Compromise Agreement is also void for being contrary to
the fundamental public policy that government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public
purposes, as provided in Section 4(2) of the Government Auditing Code.
C. Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines.
Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Its office address is at Suite
14021 Duddell Street, Central Hongkong. As a foreign corporation, with unknown owners whose
nationalities are also unknown, Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines pursuant to
Section 7, in relation to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. These provisions state:
Section. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
not to exceed one hundred thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead,
or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
x x x x
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
The OGCC admits that Radstock cannot own lands in the Philippines. However, the OGCC claims that
Radstock can own the rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines, thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Under the law, a foreigner cannot own land, correct?
ATTY. AGRA:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Can a foreigner who xxx cannot own land assign the right of ownership to the land?
ATTY. AGRA:
Again, Your Honor, at that particular time, it will be PNCC, not through Radstock, that chain of events
should be, theres a qualified nominee (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, xxx you said, Radstock will assign the right of ownership to the qualified assignee[.] So my question
is, can a foreigner own the right to ownership of a land when it cannot own the land itself?
ATTY. AGRA:
The foreigner cannot own the land, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But you are saying it can own the right of ownership to the land, because you are saying, the right of
ownership will be assigned by Radstock.
ATTY. AGRA:
The rights over the properties, Your Honors, if theres a valid assignment made to a qualified party, then
the assignment will be made.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Who makes the assignment?
ATTY. AGRA:
It will be Radstock, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, if Radstock makes the assignment, it must own its rights, otherwise, it cannot assign it, correct?
ATTY. AGRA:
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, once approved, yes, Your Honors.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, you are saying that Radstock can own the rights to ownership of the land?
ATTY. AGRA:
Yes, Your Honors.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes?
ATTY. AGRA:
The premise, Your Honor, you mentioned a while ago was, if this Court approves said compromise
(interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, no. Whether there is such a compromise agreement - - Its an academic question I am asking you,
can a foreigner assign rights to ownership of a land in the Philippines?
ATTY. AGRA:
Under the Compromise Agreement, Your Honors, these rights should be respected.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, it can?
ATTY. AGRA:
It can. Your Honor. But again, this right must, cannot be perfected or cannot be, could not take effect.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But if it cannot - - Its not perfected, how can it assign?
ATTY. AGRA:
Not directly, Your Honors. Again, there must be a qualified nominee assigned by Radstock.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Its very clear, its an indirect way of selling property that is prohibited by law, is it not?
ATTY. AGRA:
Again, Your Honor, know, believe this is a Compromise Agreement. This is a dacion en pago.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, dacion en pago is an exception to the constitutional prohibition.
ATTY. AGRA:
No, Your Honor. PNCC, will still hold on to the property, absent a valid assignment of properties.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But what rights will PNCC have over that land when it has already signed the compromise? It is just
waiting for instruction xxx from Radstock what to do with it? So, its a trustee of somebody, because it
does not, it cannot, *it+ has no dominion over it anymore? Its just holding it for Radstock. So, PNCC
becomes a dummy, at that point, of Radstock, correct?
ATTY. AGRA:
No, Your Honor, I believe it (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yeah, but it does not own the land, but it still holding the land in favor of the other party to the
Compromise Agreement
ATTY. AGRA:
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, that will happen.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. May I (interrupted)
ATTY. AGRA:
Again, Your Honor, if the compromise agreement ended with a statement that Radstock will be the
owner of the property (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yeah. Unfortunately, it says, to a qualified assignee.
ATTY. AGRA:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
And at this point, when it is signed and execut[ed] and approved, PNCC has no dominion over that land
anymore. Who has dominion over it?
ATTY. AGRA:
Pending the assignment to a qualified party, Your Honor, PNCC will hold on to the property.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Hold on, but who x x x can exercise acts of dominion, to sell it, to lease it?
ATTY. AGRA:
Again, Your Honor, without the valid assignment to a qualified nominee, the compromise agreement in
so far as the transfer of these properties will not become effective. It is subject to such condition. Your
Honor.
74
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no dispute that Radstock is disqualified to own lands in the Philippines. Consequently, Radstock
is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines. Contrary to the OGCCs
claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of any land in the Philippines because Radstock
cannot lawfully own the land itself. Otherwise, there will be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution,
which prohibits a foreign private corporation from owning land in the Philippines. In addition, Radstock
cannot transfer the rights to ownership of land in the Philippines if it cannot own the land itself. It is
basic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not own at the time the
ownership, or the rights to the ownership, are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer.
75

The third party assignee under the Compromise Agreement who will be designated by Radstock can only
acquire rights duplicating those which its assignor (Radstock) is entitled by law to exercise.
76
Thus, the
assignee can acquire ownership of the land only if its assignor, Radstock, owns the land. Clearly, the
assignment by PNCC of the real properties to a nominee to be designated by Radstock is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition against a private foreign corporation owning lands in the
Philippines. Such circumvention renders the Compromise Agreement void.
D. Public bidding is required for
the disposal of government properties.
Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,
77
the disposition
of government lands to private parties requires public bidding.
78
COA Circular No. 89-926, issued on 27
January 1989, sets forth the guidelines on the disposal of property and other assets of the government.
Part V of the COA Circular provides:
V. MODE OF DISPOSAL/DIVESTMENT: -
This Commission recognizes the following modes of disposal/divestment of assets and property of
national government agencies, local government units and government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, aside from other such modes as may be provided for by law.
1. Public Auction
Conformably to existing state policy, the divestment or disposal of government property as
contemplated herein shall be undertaken primarily thru public auction. Such mode of divestment or
disposal shall observe and adhere to established mechanics and procedures in public bidding, viz:
a. adequate publicity and notification so as to attract the greatest number of interested parties; (vide,
Sec. 79, P.D. 1445)
b. sufficient time frame between publication and date of auction;
c. opportunity afforded to interested parties to inspect the property or assets to be disposed of;
d. confidentiality of sealed proposals;
e. bond and other prequalification requirements to guarantee performance; and
f. fair evaluation of tenders and proper notification of award.
It is understood that the Government reserves the right to reject any or all of the tenders. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall dispose of substantial parcels of land, by way of dacion
en pago, in favor of Radstock. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,
79
PNCC argues that a dacion en pago is an
exception to the requirement of a public bidding.
PNCCs reliance on Uy is misplaced. There is nothing in Uy declaring that public bidding is dispensed with
in a dacion en pago transaction. The Court explained the transaction in Uy as follows:
We do not see any infirmity in either the MOA or the SSA executed between PIEDRAS and respondent
banks. By virtue of its shareholdings in OPMC, PIEDRAS was entitled to subscribe to 3,749,906,250 class
"A" and 2,499,937,500 class "B" OPMC shares. Admittedly, it was financially sound for PIEDRAS to
exercise its pre-emptive rights as an existing shareholder of OPMC lest its proportionate shareholdings
be diluted to its detriment. However, PIEDRAS lacked the necessary funds to pay for the additional
subscription. Thus, it resorted to contract loans from respondent banks to finance the payment of its
additional subscription. The mode of payment agreed upon by the parties was that the payment would
be made in the form of part of the shares subscribed to by PIEDRAS. The OPMC shares therefore were
agreed upon by the parties to be equivalent payment for the amount advanced by respondent banks.
We see the wisdom in the conditions of the loan transaction. In order to save PIEDRAS and/or the
government from the trouble of selling the shares in order to raise funds to pay off the loans, an easier
and more direct way was devised in the form of the dacion en pago agreements.
Moreover, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that neither PIEDRAS nor the government sustained any
loss in these transactions. In fact, after deducting the shares to be given to respondent banks as
payment for the shares, PIEDRAS stood to gain about 1,540,781,554 class "A" and 710,550,000 class "B"
OPMC shares virtually for free. Indeed, the question that must be asked is whether or not PIEDRAS, in
the exercise of its pre-emptive rights, would have been able to acquire any of these shares at all if it did
not enter into the financing agreements with the respondent banks.
80

Suffice it to state that in Uy, neither PIEDRAS
81
nor the government suffered any loss in the dacion en
pago transactions, unlike here where the government stands to lose at least P6.185 billion worth of
assets.
Besides, a dacion en pago is in essence a form of sale, which basically involves a disposition of a
property. In Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Philippine Acetylene, Co., Inc.,
82
the Court defined dacion en pago in
this wise:
Dacion en pago, according to Manresa, is the transmission of the ownership of a thing by the debtor to
the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of obligation. In dacion en pago, as a special
mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of
payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that
is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged
against the debtor's debt.As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, consent, object
certain, and cause or consideration must be present. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in
dacion en pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while
the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case, common consent is an essential prerequisite,
be it sale or innovation to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.
83
(Emphasis
supplied)
E. PNCC must follow rules on preference of credit.
Radstock is only one of the creditors of PNCC. Asiavest is PNCCs judgment creditor. In its Board
Resolution No. BD-092-2000, PNCC admitted not only its debt to Marubeni but also its debt to the
National Government
84
in the amount of P36 billion.
85
During the Senate hearings, PNCC admitted that
it owed the Government P36 billion, thus:
SEN. OSMEA. All right. Now, second question is, the management of PNCC also recognize the
obligation to the national government of 36 billion. It is part of the board resolution.
MS. OGAN. Yes, sir, it is part of the October 20 board resolution.
SEN. OSMEA. All right. So if you owe the national government 36 billion and you owe Marubeni 10
billion, you know, I would just declare bankruptcy and let an orderly disposition of assets be done. What
happened in this case to the claim, the 36 billion claim of the national government? How was that
disposed of by the PNCC? Mas malaki ang utang ninyo sa national government, 36 billion. Ang gagawin
ninyo, babayaran lahat ang utang ninyo sa Marubeni without any assets left to satisfy your obligations to
the national government. There should have been, at least, a pari passu payment of all your obligations,
'di ba?
MS. PASETES. Mr. Chairman...
SEN. OSMEA. Yes.
MS. PASETES. PNCC still carries in its books an equity account called equity adjustments arising from
transfer of obligations to national government - - 5.4 billion - - in addition to shares held by government
amounting to 1.2 billion.
SEN. OSMEA. What is the 36 billion?
THE CHAIRMAN. Ms. Pasetes...
SEN. OSMEA. Wait, wait, wait.
THE CHAIRMAN. Baka ampaw yun eh.
SEN. OSMEA. Teka muna. What is the 36 billion that appear in the resolution of the board in
September 2000 (sic)? This is the same resolution that recognizes, acknowledges and confirms PNCC's
obligations to Marubeni. And subparagraph (a) says "Government of the Philippines, in the amount of
36,023,784,000 and change. And then (b) Marubeni Corporation in the amount of 10,743,000,000. So,
therefore, in the same resolution, you acknowledged that had something like P46.7 billion in obligations.
Why did PNCC settle the 10 billion and did not protect the national government's 36 billion? And then,
number two, why is it now in your books, the 36 billion is now down to five? If you use that ratio, then
Marubeni should be down to one.
MS. PASETES. Sir, the amount of 36 billion is principal plus interest and penalties.
SEN. OSMEA. And what about Marubeni? Is that just principal only?
MS. PASETES. Principal and interest.
SEN. OSMEA. So, I mean, you know, it's equal treatment. Ten point seven billion is principal plus
penalties plus interest, hindi ba?
MS. PASETES. Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
SEN. OSMEA. All right. So now, what you are saying is that you gonna pay Marubeni 6 billion and
change and the national government is only recognizing 5 billion. I don't think that's protecting the
interest of the national government at all.
86

In giving priority and preference to Radstock, the Compromise Agreement is certainly in fraud of PNCCs
other creditors, including the National Government, and violates the provisions of the Civil Code on
concurrence and preference of credits.
This Court has held that while the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or substantially all of the
assets of a corporation, the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the assignor corporation.
87

Assuming that PNCC may transfer all or substantially all its assets, to allow PNCC to do so without the
consent of its creditors or without requiring Radstock to assume PNCCs debts will defraud the other
PNCC creditors
88
since the assignment will place PNCCs assets beyond the reach of its other creditors.
89

As this Court held in Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation:
90

While the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or substantially all the properties and assets of a
corporation, the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the assignor. The only way the transfer
can proceed without prejudice to the creditors is to hold the assignee liable for the obligations of the
assignor. The acquisition by the assignee of all or substantially all of the assets of the assignor
necessarily includes the assumption of the assignor's liabilities, unless the creditors who did not consent
to the transfer choose to rescind the transfer on the ground of fraud. To allow an assignor to transfer all
its business, properties and assets without the consent of its creditors and without requiring the
assignee to assume the assignor's obligations will defraud the creditors. The assignment will place the
assignor's assets beyond the reach of its creditors. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, the law, specifically Article 1387
91
of the Civil Code, presumes that there is fraud of creditors when
property is alienated by the debtor after judgment has been rendered against him, thus:
Alienations by onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against whom some
judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. The decision
or attachment need not refer to the property alienated, and need not have been obtained by the party
seeking rescission. (Emphasis supplied)
As stated earlier, Asiavest is a judgment creditor of PNCC in G.R. No. 110263 and a court has already
issued a writ of execution in its favor. Thus, when PNCC entered into the Compromise Agreement
conveying several prime lots in favor of Radstock, by way of dacion en pago, there is a legal presumption
that such conveyance is fraudulent under Article 1387 of the Civil Code.
92
This presumption is
strengthened by the fact that the conveyance has virtually left PNCCs other creditors, including the
biggest creditor the National Government - with no other asset to garnish or levy.
Notably, the presumption of fraud or intention to defraud creditors is not just limited to the two
instances set forth in the first and second paragraphs of Article 1387 of the Civil Code. Under the third
paragraph of the same article, "the design to defraud creditors may be proved in any other manner
recognized by the law of evidence." In Oria v. Mcmicking,
93
this Court considered the following instances
as badges of fraud:
1. The fact that the consideration of the conveyance is fictitious or is inadequate.
2. A transfer made by a debtor after suit has begun and while it is pending against him.
3. A sale upon credit by an insolvent debtor.
4. Evidence of large indebtedness or complete insolvency.
5. The transfer of all or nearly all of his property by a debtor, especially when he is insolvent or greatly
embarrassed financially.
6. The fact that the transfer is made between father and son, when there are present other of the above
circumstances.
7. The failure of the vendee to take exclusive possession of all the property. (Emphasis supplied)
Among the circumstances indicating fraud is a transfer of all or nearly all of the debtors assets,
especially when the debtor is greatly embarrassed financially. Accordingly, neither a declaration of
insolvency nor the institution of insolvency proceedings is a condition sine qua non for a transfer of all
or nearly all of a debtors assets to be regarded in fraud of creditors. It is sufficient that a debtor is
greatly embarrassed financially.
In this case, PNCCs huge negative net worth - at least P6 billion as expressly admitted by PNCCs counsel
during the oral arguments, or P14 billion based on the 2006 COA Audit Report - necessarily translates to
an extremely embarrassing financial situation. With its huge negative net worth arising from unpaid
billions of pesos in debt, PNCC cannot claim that it is financially stable. As a consequence, the
Compromise Agreement stipulating a transfer in favor of Radstock of substantially all of PNCCs assets
constitutes fraud. To legitimize the Compromise Agreement just because there is still no judicial
declaration of PNCCs insolvency will work fraud on PNCCs other creditors, the biggest creditor of which
is the National Government. To insist that PNCC is very much liquid, given its admitted huge negative
net worth, is nothing but denial of the truth. The toll fees that PNCC collects belong to the National
Government. Obviously, PNCC cannot claim it is liquid based on its collection of such toll fees, because
PNCC merely holds such toll fees in trust for the National Government. PNCC does not own the toll fees,
and such toll fees do not form part of PNCCs assets.
PNCC owes the National Government P36 billion, a substantial part of which constitutes taxes and fees,
thus:
SEN. ROXAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PNCC Chairman, could you describe for us the composition of your debt of about five billion there
are in thousands, so this looks like five and half billion. Current portion of long-term debt, about five
billion. What is this made of?
MS. PASETES. The five billion is composed of what is owed the Bureau of Treasury and the Toll
Regulatory Board for concession fees thats almost three billion and another 2.4 billion owed
Philippine National Bank.
SEN. ROXAS. So, how much is the Bureau of Treasury?
MS. PASETES. Three billion.
SEN. ROXAS. Three Why do you owe the Bureau of Treasury three billion?
MS. PASETES. That represents the concession fees due Toll Regulatory Board principal plus interest, Your
Honor.
x x x x
94
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, PNCCs 2006 Audit Report by COA states as follows:
TAX MATTERS
The Company was assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of its deficiencies in various taxes.
However, no provision for any liability has been made yet in the Companys financial statements.
1980 deficiency income tax, deficiency contractors tax and deficiency documentary stamp tax
assessments by the BIR totaling P212.523 Million.
x x x x
Deficiency business tax of P64 Million due the Belgian Consortium, PNCCs partner in its LRT Project.
1992 deficiency income tax, deficiency value-added tax and deficiency expanded withholding tax of
P1.04 Billion which was reduced to P709 Million after the Companys written protest.
x x x x
2002 deficiency internal revenue taxes totaling P72.916 Million.
x x x x.
95
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, PNCC owes the National Government substantial taxes and fees amounting to billions of pesos.
The P36 billion debt to the National Government was acknowledged by the PNCC Board in the same
board resolution that recognized the Marubeni loans. Since PNCC is clearly insolvent with a huge
negative net worth, the government enjoys preference over Radstock in the satisfaction of PNCCs
liability arising from taxes and duties, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code on concurrence and
preference of credits. Articles 2241,
96
2242
97
and 2243
98
of the Civil Code expressly mandate that taxes
and fees due the National Government "shall be preferred" and "shall first be satisfied" over claims like
those arising from the Marubeni loans which "shall enjoy no preference" under Article 2244.
99

However, in flagrant violation of the Civil Code, the PNCC Board favored Radstock over the National
Government in the order of credits. This would strip PNCC of its assets leaving virtually nothing for the
National Government. This action of the PNCC Board is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
National Government and amounts to fraud.
During the Senate hearings, Senator Osmea pointed out that in the Board Resolution of 20 October
2000, PNCC acknowledged its obligations to the National Government amounting to P36,023,784,000
and to Marubeni amounting to P10,743,000,000. Yet, Senator Osmea noted that in the PNCC books at
the time of the hearing, the P36 billion obligation to the National Government was reduced to P5 billion.
PNCCs Miriam M. Pasetes could not properly explain this discrepancy, except by stating that the P36
billion includes the principal plus interest and penalties, thus:
SEN. OSMEA. Teka muna. What is the 36 billion that appear in the resolution of the board in
September 2000 (sic)? This is the same resolution that recognizes, acknowledges and confirms PNCC's
obligations to Marubeni. And subparagraph (a) says "Government of the Philippines, in the amount of
36,023,784,000 and change. And then (b) Marubeni Corporation in the amount of 10,743,000,000. So,
therefore, in the same resolution, you acknowledged that had something like P46.7 billion in obligations.
Why did PNCC settle the 10 billion and did not protect the national government's 36 billion? And then,
number two, why is it now in your books, the 36 billion is now down to five? If you use that ratio, then
Marubeni should be down to one.
MS. PASETES. Sir, the amount of 36 billion is principal plus interest and penalties.
SEN. OSMEA. And what about Marubeni? Is that just principal only?
MS. PASETES. Principal and interest.
SEN. OSMEA. So, I mean, you know, it's equal treatment. Ten point seven billion is principal plus
penalties plus interest, hindi ba?
MS. PASETES. Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
SEN. OSMEA. All right. So now, what you are saying is that you gonna pay Marubeni 6 billion and
change and the national government is only recognizing 5 billion. I don't think that's protecting the
interest of the national government at all.
100

PNCC failed to explain satisfactorily why in its books the obligation to the National Government was
reduced when no payment to the National Government appeared to have been made. PNCC failed to
justify why it made it appear that the obligation to the National Government was less than the
obligation to Marubeni. It is another obvious ploy to justify the preferential treatment given to Radstock
to the great prejudice of the National Government.
VI.
Supreme Court is Not Legitimizer of Violations of Laws
During the oral arguments, counsels for Radstock and PNCC admitted that the Compromise Agreement
violates the Constitution and existing laws. However, they rely on this Court to approve the Compromise
Agreement to shield their clients from possible criminal acts arising from violation of the Constitution
and existing laws. In their view, once this Court approves the Compromise Agreement, their clients are
home free from prosecution, and can enjoy the P6.185 billion loot. The following exchanges during the
oral arguments reveal this view:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
If there is no agreement, they better remit all of that to the National Government. They cannot just hold
that. They are holding that [in] trust, as you said, x x x you agree, for the National Government.
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, thats why, they are asking the Honorable Court to approve the compromise agreement.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
We cannot approve that if the power to authorize the expenditure [belongs] to Congress. How can we
usurp x x x the power of Congress to authorize that expenditure[?] Its only Congress that can
authorize the expenditure of funds from the general funds.
DEAN AGABIN:
But, Your Honor, if the Honorable Court would approve of this compromise agreement, I believe that
this would be binding on Congress.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Ignore the Constitutional provision that money shall be paid out of the National Treasury only
pursuant to an appropriation by law. You want us to ignore that[?]
DEAN AGABIN:
Not really, Your Honor, but I suppose that Congress would have no choice, because this is a final
judgment of the Honorable Court.
101

x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, if Radstock makes the assignment, it must own its rights, otherwise, it cannot assign it, correct?
ATTY. AGRA:
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, once approved, yes, Your Honors.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, you are saying that Radstock can own the rights to ownership of the land?
ATTY. AGRA:
Yes, Your Honors.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes?
ATTY. AGRA:
The premise, Your Honor, you mentioned a while ago was, if this Court approves said compromise
(interrupted).
102
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court is not, and should never be, a rubber stamp for litigants hankering to pocket public funds for
their selfish private gain. This Court is the ultimate guardian of the public interest, the last bulwark
against those who seek to plunder the public coffers. This Court cannot, and must never, bring itself
down to the level of legitimizer of violations of the Constitution, existing laws or public policy.
Conclusion
In sum, the acts of the PNCC Board in (1) issuing Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000
expressly admitting liability for the Marubeni loans, and (2) entering into the Compromise Agreement,
constitute evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, amounting to fraud, in the management
of PNCCs affairs. Being public officers, the government nominees in the PNCC Board must answer not
only to PNCC and its stockholders, but also to the Filipino people for grossly mishandling PNCCs
finances.
Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, the Compromise Agreement is "inexistent and void from the
beginning," and "cannot be ratified," thus:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy;
x x x
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The Compromise Agreement is indisputably contrary to the Constitution, existing laws and public policy.
Under Article 1409, the Compromise Agreement is expressly declared void and "cannot be ratified." No
court, not even this Court, can ratify or approve the Compromise Agreement. This Court must perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, existing laws, and fundamental public policy. This Court
must not shirk in declaring the Compromise Agreement inexistent and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 180428. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 25 January
2007 and the Resolutions dated 12 June 2007 and 5 November 2007 of the Court of Appeals. We
DECLARE (1) PNCC Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000 admitting liability for the
Marubeni loans VOID AB INITIO for causing undue injury to the Government and giving unwarranted
benefits to a private party, constituting a corrupt practice and unlawful act under Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and (2) the Compromise Agreement between the Philippine
National Construction Corporation and Radstock Securities Limited INEXISTENT AND VOID AB INITIO for
being contrary to Section 29(1), Article VI and Sections 3 and 7, Article XII of the Constitution; Section
20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; Sections 4(2), 79, 84(1),
and 85 of the Government Auditing Code; and Articles 2241, 2242, 2243 and 2244 of the Civil Code.
We GRANT the intervention of Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad in G.R. No. 178158 but DECLARE that
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation has no legal standing to sue.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124293 January 31, 2005
J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, its Chairman and Members; ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST; and PHILYARDS HOLDINGS, INC., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PUNO, J.:
For resolution before this Court are two motions filed by the petitioner, J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc. for
reconsideration of our Resolution dated September 24, 2003 and to elevate this case to the Court En
Banc. The petitioner questions the Resolution which reversed our Decision of November 20, 2000, which
in turn reversed and set aside a Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 1995.
I. Facts
The undisputed facts of the case, as set forth in our Resolution of September 24, 2003, are as follows:
On January 27, 1997, the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government
corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. of Kobe,
Japan (KAWASAKI) for the construction, operation and management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc.
(SNS) which subsequently became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO).
Under the JVA, the NIDC and KAWASAKI will contribute P330 million for the capitalization of PHILSECO in
the proportion of 60%-40% respectively. One of its salient features is the grant to the parties of the right
of first refusal should either of them decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint venture, viz:
1.4 Neither party shall sell, transfer or assign all or any part of its interest in SNS [PHILSECO] to any third
party without giving the other under the same terms the right of first refusal. This provision shall not
apply if the transferee is a corporation owned or controlled by the GOVERNMENT or by a KAWASAKI
affiliate.
On November 25, 1986, NIDC transferred all its rights, title and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Such interests were subsequently transferred to the National Government
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14. On December 8, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 50 establishing the Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT) to take title to, and possession of, conserve, manage and dispose of non-performing assets of the
National Government. Thereafter, on February 27, 1987, a trust agreement was entered into between
the National Government and the APT wherein the latter was named the trustee of the National
Government's share in PHILSECO. In 1989, as a result of a quasi-reorganization of PHILSECO to settle its
huge obligations to PNB, the National Government's shareholdings in PHILSECO increased to 97.41%
thereby reducing KAWASAKI's shareholdings to 2.59%.
In the interest of the national economy and the government, the COP and the APT deemed it best to sell
the National Government's share in PHILSECO to private entities. After a series of negotiations between
the APT and KAWASAKI, they agreed that the latter's right of first refusal under the JVA be "exchanged"
for the right to top by five percent (5%) the highest bid for the said shares. They further agreed that
KAWASAKI would be entitled to name a company in which it was a stockholder, which could exercise the
right to top. On September 7, 1990, KAWASAKI informed APT that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI)
1
would
exercise its right to top.
At the pre-bidding conference held on September 18, 1993, interested bidders were given copies of the
JVA between NIDC and KAWASAKI, and of the Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) drafted for the
National Government's 87.6% equity share in PHILSECO. The provisions of the ASBR were explained to
the interested bidders who were notified that the bidding would be held on December 2, 1993. A
portion of the ASBR reads:
1.0 The subject of this Asset Privatization Trust (APT) sale through public bidding is the National
Government's equity in PHILSECO consisting of 896,869,942 shares of stock (representing 87.67% of
PHILSECO's outstanding capital stock), which will be sold as a whole block in accordance with the rules
herein enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx
2.0 The highest bid, as well as the buyer, shall be subject to the final approval of both the APT Board of
Trustees and the Committee on Privatization (COP).
2.1 APT reserves the right in its sole discretion, to reject any or all bids.
3.0 This public bidding shall be on an Indicative Price Bidding basis. The Indicative price set for the
National Government's 87.67% equity in PHILSECO is PESOS: ONE BILLION THREE HUNDRED MILLION
(P1,300,000,000.00).
xxx xxx xxx
6.0 The highest qualified bid will be submitted to the APT Board of Trustees at its regular meeting
following the bidding, for the purpose of determining whether or not it should be endorsed by the APT
Board of Trustees to the COP, and the latter approves the same. The APT shall advise Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Inc. and/or its nominee, [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc., that the highest bid is acceptable to the
National Government. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. shall then have
a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of receipt of such advice from APT within which to
exercise their "Option to Top the Highest Bid" by offering a bid equivalent to the highest bid plus five
(5%) percent thereof.
6.1 Should Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. exercise their "Option to
Top the Highest Bid," they shall so notify the APT about such exercise of their option and deposit with
APT the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the highest bid plus five percent (5%) thereof within
the thirty (30)-day period mentioned in paragraph 6.0 above. APT will then serve notice upon Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. declaring them as the preferred bidder and they
shall have a period of ninety (90) days from the receipt of the APT's notice within which to pay the
balance of their bid price.
6.2 Should Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. fail to exercise their
"Option to Top the Highest Bid" within the thirty (30)-day period, APT will declare the highest bidder as
the winning bidder.
xxx xxx xxx
12.0 The bidder shall be solely responsible for examining with appropriate care these rules, the official
bid forms, including any addenda or amendments thereto issued during the bidding period. The bidder
shall likewise be responsible for informing itself with respect to any and all conditions concerning the
PHILSECO Shares which may, in any manner, affect the bidder's proposal. Failure on the part of the
bidder to so examine and inform itself shall be its sole risk and no relief for error or omission will be
given by APT or COP. . . .
At the public bidding on the said date, petitioner J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc.
2
submitted a bid of Two
Billion and Thirty Million Pesos (P2,030,000,000.00) with an acknowledgment of
KAWASAKI/[PHILYARDS'] right to top, viz:
4. I/We understand that the Committee on Privatization (COP) has up to thirty (30) days to act on APT's
recommendation based on the result of this bidding. Should the COP approve the highest bid, APT shall
advise Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or its nominee, [PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. that the highest
bid is acceptable to the National Government. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. and/or [PHILYARDS]
Holdings, Inc. shall then have a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of receipt of such advice
from APT within which to exercise their "Option to Top the Highest Bid" by offering a bid equivalent to
the highest bid plus five (5%) percent thereof.
As petitioner was declared the highest bidder, the COP approved the sale on December 3, 1993 "subject
to the right of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc./[PHILYARDS] Holdings, Inc. to top JGSMI's bid by 5% as
specified in the bidding rules."
On December 29, 1993, petitioner informed APT that it was protesting the offer of PHI to top its bid on
the grounds that: (a) the KAWASAKI/PHI consortium composed of KAWASAKI, [PHILYARDS], Mitsui,
Keppel, SM Group, ICTSI and Insular Life violated the ASBR because the last four (4) companies were the
losing bidders thereby circumventing the law and prejudicing the weak winning bidder; (b) only
KAWASAKI could exercise the right to top; (c) giving the same option to top to PHI constituted
unwarranted benefit to a third party; (d) no right of first refusal can be exercised in a public bidding or
auction sale; and (e) the JG Summit consortium was not estopped from questioning the proceedings.
On February 2, 1994, petitioner was notified that PHI had fully paid the balance of the purchase price of
the subject bidding. On February 7, 1994, the APT notified petitioner that PHI had exercised its option to
top the highest bid and that the COP had approved the same on January 6, 1994. On February 24, 1994,
the APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase Agreement. Consequently, petitioner filed with this Court a
Petition for Mandamus under G.R. No. 114057. On May 11, 1994, said petition was referred to the Court
of Appeals. On July 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit. It ruled that the
petition for mandamus was not the proper remedy to question the constitutionality or legality of the
right of first refusal and the right to top that was exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI, and that the matter must
be brought "by the proper party in the proper forum at the proper time and threshed out in a full blown
trial." The Court of Appeals further ruled that the right of first refusal and the right to top are prima facie
legal and that the petitioner, "by participating in the public bidding, with full knowledge of the right to
top granted to KAWASAKI/*PHILYARDS+ isestopped from questioning the validity of the award given to
[PHILYARDS] after the latter exercised the right to top and had paid in full the purchase price of the
subject shares, pursuant to the ASBR." Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision
which was denied on March 15, 1996. Petitioner thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court.
On November 20, 2000, this Court rendered x x x [a] Decision ruling among others that the Court of
Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition on the sole ground of the impropriety of the special civil
action of mandamus because the petition was also one of certiorari. It further ruled that a shipyard like
PHILSECO is a public utility whose capitalization must be sixty percent (60%) Filipino-owned.
Consequently, the right to top granted to KAWASAKI under the Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR)
drafted for the sale of the 87.67% equity of the National Government in PHILSECO is illegal not only
because it violates the rules on competitive bidding but more so, because it allows foreign
corporations to own more than 40% equity in the shipyard. It also held that "although the petitioner had
the opportunity to examine the ASBR before it participated in the bidding, it cannot be estopped from
questioning the unconstitutional, illegal and inequitable provisions thereof." Thus, this Court voided the
transfer of the national government's 87.67% share in PHILSECO to Philyard[s] Holdings, Inc., and upheld
the right of JG Summit, as the highest bidder, to take title to the said shares, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered to pay to APT its
bid price of Two Billion Thirty Million Pesos (P2,030,000,000.00), less its bid deposit plus interests upon
the finality of this Decision. In turn, APT is ordered to:
(a) accept the said amount of P2,030,000,000.00 less bid deposit and interests from petitioner;
(b) execute a Stock Purchase Agreement with petitioner;
(c) cause the issuance in favor of petitioner of the certificates of stocks representing 87.6% of
PHILSECO's total capitalization;
(d) return to private respondent PHGI the amount of Two Billion One Hundred Thirty-One Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,131,500,000.00); and
(e) cause the cancellation of the stock certificates issued to PHI.
SO ORDERED.
In separate Motions for Reconsideration, respondents submit[ted] three basic issues for x x x resolution:
(1) Whether PHILSECO is a public utility; (2) Whether under the 1977 JVA, KAWASAKI can exercise its
right of first refusal only up to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO; and (3) Whether the right to
top granted to KAWASAKI violates the principles of competitive bidding.
3
(citations omitted)
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2003, this Court ruled in favor of the respondents. On the first
issue, we held that Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO) is not a public utility, as
by nature, a shipyard is not a public utility
4
and that no law declares a shipyard to be a public utility.
5
On
the second issue, we found nothing in the 1977 Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) which prevents Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI) from acquiring more than 40% of PHILSECOs total
capitalization.
6
On the final issue, we held that the right to top granted to KAWASAKI in exchange for its
right of first refusal did not violate the principles of competitive bidding.
7

On October 20, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
8
and a Motion to Elevate This
Case to the Court En Banc.
9
Public respondents Committee on Privatization (COP) and Asset Privatization
Trust (APT), and private respondent Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHILYARDS) filed their Comments on J.G.
Summit Holdings, Inc.s (JG Summits) Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Elevate This Case to
the Court En Banc on January 29, 2004 and February 3, 2004, respectively.
II. Issues
Based on the foregoing, the relevant issues to resolve to end this litigation are the following:
1. Whether there are sufficient bases to elevate the case at bar to the Court en banc.
2. Whether the motion for reconsideration raises any new matter or cogent reason to warrant a
reconsideration of this Courts Resolution of September 24, 2003.
Motion to Elevate this Case to the
Court En Banc
The petitioner prays for the elevation of the case to the Court en banc on the following grounds:
1. The main issue of the propriety of the bidding process involved in the present case has been confused
with the policy issue of the supposed fate of the shipping industry which has never been an issue that is
determinative of this case.
10

2. The present case may be considered under the Supreme Court Resolution dated February 23, 1984
which included among en banc cases those involving a novel question of law and those where a doctrine
or principle laid down by the Court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed.
11

3. There was clear executive interference in the judicial functions of the Court when the Honorable Jose
Isidro Camacho, Secretary of Finance, forwarded to Chief Justice Davide, a memorandum dated
November 5, 2001, attaching a copy of the Foreign Chambers Report dated October 17, 2001, which
matter was placed in the agenda of the Court and noted by it in a formal resolution dated November 28,
2001.
12

Opposing J.G. Summits motion to elevate the case en banc, PHILYARDS points out the petitioners
inconsistency in previously opposing PHILYARDS Motion to Refer the Case to the Court En Banc.
PHILYARDS contends that J.G. Summit should now be estopped from asking that the case be referred to
the Court en banc. PHILYARDS further contends that the Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate
court to which decisions or resolutions of its divisions may be appealed citing Supreme Court Circular
No. 2-89 dated February 7, 1989.
13
PHILYARDS also alleges that there is no novel question of law
involved in the present case as the assailed Resolution was based on well-settled jurisprudence.
Likewise, PHILYARDS stresses that the Resolution was merely an outcome of the motions for
reconsideration filed by it and the COP and APT and is "consistent with the inherent power of courts to
amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. (Rule
135, sec. 5)"
14
Private respondent belittles the petitioners allegations regarding the change in ponente
and the alleged executive interference as shown by former Secretary of Finance Jose Isidro Camachos
memorandum dated November 5, 2001 arguing that these do not justify a referral of the present case to
the Court en banc.
In insisting that its Motion to Elevate This Case to the Court En Banc should be granted, J.G. Summit
further argued that: its Opposition to the Office of the Solicitor Generals Motion to Refer is different
from its own Motion to Elevate; different grounds are invoked by the two motions; there was
unwarranted "executive interference"; and the change in ponente is merely noted in asserting that this
case should be decided by the Court en banc.
15

We find no merit in petitioners contention that the propriety of the bidding process involved in the
present case has been confused with the policy issue of the fate of the shipping industry which,
petitioner maintains, has never been an issue that is determinative of this case. The Courts Resolution
of September 24, 2003 reveals a clear and definitive ruling on the propriety of the bidding process. In
discussing whether the right to top granted to KAWASAKI in exchange for its right of first refusal violates
the principles of competitive bidding, we made an exhaustive discourse on the rules and principles of
public bidding and whether they were complied with in the case at bar.
16
This Court categorically ruled
on the petitioners argument that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, is a public utility which should maintain a
60%-40% Filipino-foreign equity ratio, as it was a pivotal issue. In doing so, we recognized the impact of
our ruling on the shipbuilding industry which was beyond avoidance.
17

We reject petitioners argument that the present case may be considered under the Supreme Court
Resolution dated February 23, 1984 which included among en banc cases those involving a novel
question of law and those where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed. The case was resolved based on basic principles of the right of first refusal
in commercial law and estoppel in civil law. Contractual obligations arising from rights of first refusal are
not new in this jurisdiction and have been recognized in numerous cases.
18
Estoppel is too known a civil
law concept to require an elongated discussion. Fundamental principles on public bidding were likewise
used to resolve the issues raised by the petitioner. To be sure, petitioner leans on the right to top in a
public bidding in arguing that the case at bar involves a novel issue. We are not swayed. The right to top
was merely a condition or a reservation made in the bidding rules which was fully disclosed to all bidding
parties. In Bureau Veritas, represented by Theodor H. Hunermann v. Office of the President, et al.,
19

we dealt with this conditionality, viz:
x x x It must be stressed, as held in the case of A.C. Esguerra & Sons v. Aytona, et al., (L-18751, 28 April
1962, 4 SCRA 1245), that in an "invitation to bid, there is a condition imposed upon the bidders to the
effect that the bidding shall be subject to the right of the government to reject any and all bids subject
to its discretion. In the case at bar, the government has made its choice and unless an unfairness or
injustice is shown, the losing bidders have no cause to complain nor right to dispute that choice. This
is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction and elsewhere."
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is vested in the Government agencies
entrusted with that function. The discretion given to the authorities on this matter is of such wide
latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a
fraudulent award (Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil. 486 [1960]). x x x The exercise of this discretion is a
policy decision that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation.
This task can best be discharged by the Government agencies concerned, not by the Courts. The role of
the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its
constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion
exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision-making.
It is only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion that the Courts will set aside the award of a
contract made by a government entity. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power (Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 65935, 30
September 1988, 166 SCRA 155). The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as to act at all in
contemplation of law, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility (Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., et al[.], L-40867, 26 July 1988, 163 SCRA
489).
The facts in this case do not indicate any such grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents when they awarded the CISS contract to Respondent SGS. In the "Invitation to Prequalify
and Bid" (Annex "C," supra), the CISS Committee made an express reservation of the right of the
Government to "reject any or all bids or any part thereof or waive any defects contained thereon and
accept an offer most advantageous to the Government." It is a well-settled rule that where such
reservation is made in an Invitation to Bid, the highest or lowest bidder, as the case may be, is not
entitled to an award as a matter of right (C & C Commercial Corp. v. Menor, L-28360, 27 January 1983,
120 SCRA 112). Even the lowest Bid or any Bid may be rejected or, in the exercise of sound discretion,
the award may be made to another than the lowest bidder (A.C. Esguerra & Sons v. Aytona, supra, citing
43 Am. Jur., 788). (emphases supplied)1awphi1.nt
Like the condition in the Bureau Veritas case, the right to top was a condition imposed by the
government in the bidding rules which was made known to all parties. It was a condition imposed on all
bidders equally, based on the APTs exercise of its discretion in deciding on how best to privatize the
governments shares in PHILSECO. It was not a whimsical or arbitrary condition plucked from the ether
and inserted in the bidding rules but a condition which the APT approved as the best way the
government could comply with its contractual obligations to KAWASAKI under the JVA and its mandate
of getting the most advantageous deal for the government. The right to top had its history in the mutual
right of first refusal in the JVA and was reached by agreement of the government and KAWASAKI.
Further, there is no "executive interference" in the functions of this Court by the mere filing of a
memorandum by Secretary of Finance Jose Isidro Camacho. The memorandum was merely "noted" to
acknowledge its filing. It had no further legal significance. Notably too, the assailed Resolution dated
September 24, 2003 was decided unanimously by the Special First Division in favor of the
respondents.
Again, we emphasize that a decision or resolution of a Division is that of the Supreme Court
20
and the
Court en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be
appealed.
21

For all the foregoing reasons, we find no basis to elevate this case to the Court en banc.
Motion for Reconsideration
Three principal arguments were raised in the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. First, that a fair
resolution of the case should be based on contract law, not on policy considerations; the contracts do
not authorize the right to top to be derived from the right of first refusal.
22
Second, that neither the right
of first refusal nor the right to top can be legally exercised by the consortium which is not the proper
party granted such right under either the JVA or the Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR).
23
Third, that the
maintenance of the 60%-40% relationship between the National Investment and Development
Corporation (NIDC) and KAWASAKI arises from contract and from the Constitution because PHILSECO is
a landholding corporation and need not be a public utility to be bound by the 60%-40% constitutional
limitation.
24

On the other hand, private respondent PHILYARDS asserts that J.G. Summit has not been able to show
compelling reasons to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision of the Court.
25
PHILYARDS denies that
the Decision is based mainly on policy considerations and points out that it is premised on principles
governing obligations and contracts and corporate law such as the rule requiring respect for contractual
stipulations, upholding rights of first refusal, and recognizing the assignable nature of contracts rights.
26

Also, the ruling that shipyards are not public utilities relies on established case law and fundamental
rules of statutory construction. PHILYARDS stresses that KAWASAKIs right of first refusal or even the
right to top is not limited to the 40% equity of the latter.
27
On the landholding issue raised by J.G.
Summit, PHILYARDS emphasizes that this is a non-issue and even involves a question of fact. Even
assuming that this Court can take cognizance of such question of fact even without the benefit of a trial,
PHILYARDS opines that landholding by PHILSECO at the time of the bidding is irrelevant because what is
essential is that ultimately a qualified entity would eventually hold PHILSECOs real estate properties.
28

Further, given the assignable nature of the right of first refusal, any applicable nationality restrictions,
including landholding limitations, would not affect the right of first refusal itself, but only the manner of
its exercise.
29
Also, PHILYARDS argues that if this Court takes cognizance of J.G. Summits allegations of
fact regarding PHILSECOs landholding, it must also recognize PHILYARDS assertions that PHILSECOs
landholdings were sold to another corporation.
30
As regards the right of first refusal, private respondent
explains that KAWASAKIs reduced shareholdings (from 40% to 2.59%) did not translate to a deprivation
or loss of its contractually granted right of first refusal.
31
Also, the bidding was valid because PHILYARDS
exercised the right to top and it was of no moment that losing bidders later joined PHILYARDS in raising
the purchase price.
32

In cadence with the private respondent PHILYARDS, public respondents COP and APT contend:
1. The conversion of the right of first refusal into a right to top by 5% does not violate any provision in
the JVA between NIDC and KAWASAKI.
2. PHILSECO is not a public utility and therefore not governed by the constitutional restriction on foreign
ownership.
3. The petitioner is legally estopped from assailing the validity of the proceedings of the public bidding
as it voluntarily submitted itself to the terms of the ASBR which included the provision on the right to
top.
4. The right to top was exercised by PHILYARDS as the nominee of KAWASAKI and the fact that
PHILYARDS formed a consortium to raise the required amount to exercise the right to top the highest
bid by 5% does not violate the JVA or the ASBR.
5. The 60%-40% Filipino-foreign constitutional requirement for the acquisition of lands does not apply to
PHILSECO because as admitted by petitioner itself, PHILSECO no longer owns real property.
6. Petitioners motion to elevate the case to the Court en banc is baseless and would only delay the
termination of this case.
33

In a Consolidated Comment dated March 8, 2004, J.G. Summit countered the arguments of the public
and private respondents in this wise:
1. The award by the APT of 87.67% shares of PHILSECO to PHILYARDS with losing bidders through the
exercise of a right to top, which is contrary to law and the constitution is null and void for being violative
of substantive due process and the abuse of right provision in the Civil Code.
a. The bidders*+ right to top was actually exercised by losing bidders.
b. The right to top or the right of first refusal cannot co-exist with a genuine competitive bidding.
c. The benefits derived from the right to top were unwarranted.
2. The landholding issue has been a legitimate issue since the start of this case but is shamelessly
ignored by the respondents.
a. The landholding issue is not a non-issue.
b. The landholding issue does not pose questions of fact.
c. That PHILSECO owned land at the time that the right of first refusal was agreed upon and at the time
of the bidding are most relevant.
d. Whether a shipyard is a public utility is not the core issue in this case.
3. Fraud and bad faith attend the alleged conversion of an inexistent right of first refusal to the right to
top.
a. The history behind the birth of the right to top shows fraud and bad faith.
b. The right of first refusal was, indeed, "effectively useless."
4. Petitioner is not legally estopped to challenge the right to top in this case.
a. Estoppel is unavailing as it would stamp validity to an act that is prohibited by law or against public
policy.
b. Deception was patent; the right to top was an attractive nuisance.
c. The 10% bid deposit was placed in escrow.
J.G. Summits insistence that the right to top cannot be sourced from the right of first refusal is not new
and we have already ruled on the issue in our Resolution of September 24, 2003. We upheld the mutual
right of first refusal in the JVA.
34
We also ruled that nothing in the JVA prevents KAWASAKI from
acquiring more than 40% of PHILSECOs total capitalization.
35
Likewise, nothing in the JVA or ASBR bars
the conversion of the right of first refusal to the right to top. In sum, nothing new and of significance in
the petitioners pleading warrants a reconsideration of our ruling.
Likewise, we already disposed of the argument that neither the right of first refusal nor the right to top
can legally be exercised by the consortium which is not the proper party granted such right under either
the JVA or the ASBR. Thus, we held:
The fact that the losing bidder, Keppel Consortium (composed of Keppel, SM Group, Insular Life
Assurance, Mitsui and ICTSI), has joined PHILYARDS in the latter's effort to raise P2.131 billion necessary
in exercising the right to top is not contrary to law, public policy or public morals. There is nothing in the
ASBR that bars the losing bidders from joining either the winning bidder (should the right to top is not
exercised) or KAWASAKI/PHI (should it exercise its right to top as it did), to raise the purchase price. The
petitioner did not allege, nor was it shown by competent evidence, that the participation of the losing
bidders in the public bidding was done with fraudulent intent. Absent any proof of fraud, the formation
by [PHILYARDS] of a consortium is legitimate in a free enterprise system. The appellate court is thus
correct in holding the petitioner estopped from questioning the validity of the transfer of the National
Government's shares in PHILSECO to respondent.
36

Further, we see no inherent illegality on PHILYARDS act in seeking funding from parties who were losing
bidders. This is a purely commercial decision over which the State should not interfere absent any legal
infirmity. It is emphasized that the case at bar involves the disposition of shares in a corporation which
the government sought to privatize. As such, the persons with whom PHILYARDS desired to enter into
business with in order to raise funds to purchase the shares are basically its business. This is in contrast
to a case involving a contract for the operation of or construction of a government infrastructure where
the identity of the buyer/bidder or financier constitutes an important consideration. In such cases, the
government would have to take utmost precaution to protect public interest by ensuring that the
parties with which it is contracting have the ability to satisfactorily construct or operate the
infrastructure.
On the landholding issue, J.G. Summit submits that since PHILSECO is a landholding company, KAWASAKI
could exercise its right of first refusal only up to 40% of the shares of PHILSECO due to the constitutional
prohibition on landholding by corporations with more than 40% foreign-owned equity. It further argues
that since KAWASAKI already held at least 40% equity in PHILSECO, the right of first refusal was inutile
and as such, could not subsequently be converted into the right to top.
37
Petitioner also asserts that, at
present, PHILSECO continues to violate the constitutional provision on landholdings as its shares are
more than 40% foreign-owned.
38
PHILYARDS admits that it may have previously held land but had
already divested such landholdings.
39
It contends, however, that even if PHILSECO owned land, this
would not affect the right of first refusal but only the exercise thereof. If the land is retained, the right of
first refusal, being a property right, could be assigned to a qualified party. In the alternative, the land
could be divested before the exercise of the right of first refusal. In the case at bar, respondents assert
that since the right of first refusal was validly converted into a right to top, which was exercised not by
KAWASAKI, but by PHILYARDS which is a Filipino corporation (i.e., 60% of its shares are owned by
Filipinos), then there is no violation of the Constitution.
40
At first, it would seem that questions of fact
beyond cognizance by this Court were involved in the issue. However, the records show that PHILYARDS
admits it had owned land up until the time of the bidding.
41
Hence, the only issue is whether
KAWASAKI had a valid right of first refusal over PHILSECO shares under the JVA considering that
PHILSECO owned land until the time of the bidding and KAWASAKI already held 40% of PHILSECOs
equity.
We uphold the validity of the mutual rights of first refusal under the JVA between KAWASAKI and NIDC.
First of all, the right of first refusal is a property right of PHILSECO shareholders, KAWASAKI and NIDC,
under the terms of their JVA. This right allows them to purchase the shares of their co-shareholder
before they are offered to a third party. The agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant this right
to each other, by itself, does not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Constitution limiting
land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino corporations. As PHILYARDS correctly puts it, if PHILSECO still
owns land, the right of first refusal can be validly assigned to a qualified Filipino entity in order to
maintain the 60%-40% ratio. This transfer, by itself, does not amount to a violation of the Anti-Dummy
Laws, absent proof of any fraudulent intent. The transfer could be made either to a nominee or such
other party which the holder of the right of first refusal feels it can comfortably do business with.
Alternatively, PHILSECO may divest of its landholdings, in which case KAWASAKI, in exercising its right of
first refusal, can exceed 40% of PHILSECOs equity. In fact, it can even be said that if the foreign
shareholdings of a landholding corporation exceeds 40%, it is not the foreign stockholders ownership
of the shares which is adversely affected but the capacity of the corporation to own land that is, the
corporation becomes disqualified to own land. This finds support under the basic corporate law principle
that the corporation and its stockholders are separate juridical entities. In this vein, the right of first
refusal over shares pertains to the shareholders whereas the capacity to own land pertains to the
corporation. Hence, the fact that PHILSECO owns land cannot deprive stockholders of their right of first
refusal. No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a landholding corporation even if the
latter will exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning
land. This is the clear import of the following provisions in the Constitution:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
42
(emphases supplied)
The petitioner further argues that "an option to buy land is void in itself (Philippine Banking Corporation
v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 [1967]). The right of first refusal granted to KAWASAKI, a Japanese corporation, is
similarly void. Hence, the right to top, sourced from the right of first refusal, is also void."
43
Contrary to
the contention of petitioner, the case of Lui She did not that say "an option to buy land is void in itself,"
for we ruled as follows:
x x x To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the
right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds:
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes.
Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and
share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which
the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests
himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus
abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make
up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the
disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in
an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within this pace of one year, with
the result that Justina Santos'[s] ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. If this can
be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, is indeed in grave peril.
44
(emphases supplied; Citations omitted)
In Lui She, the option to buy was invalidated because it amounted to a virtual transfer of ownership as
the owner could not sell or dispose of his properties. The contract in Lui She prohibited the owner of the
land from selling, donating, mortgaging, or encumbering the property during the 50-year period of the
option to buy. This is not so in the case at bar where the mutual right of first refusal in favor of NIDC and
KAWASAKI does not amount to a virtual transfer of land to a non-Filipino. In fact, the case at bar
involves a right of first refusal over shares of stock while the Lui She case involves an option to buy the
land itself. As discussed earlier, there is a distinction between the shareholders ownership of shares
and the corporations ownership of land arising from the separate juridical personalities of the
corporation and its shareholders.
We note that in its Motion for Reconsideration, J.G. Summit alleges that PHILSECO continues to violate
the Constitution as its foreign equity is above 40% and yet owns long-term leasehold rights which are
real rights.
45
It cites Article 415 of the Civil Code which includes in the definition of immovable property,
"contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property."
46
Any
existing landholding, however, is denied by PHILYARDS citing its recent financial statements.
47
First,
these are questions of fact, the veracity of which would require introduction of evidence. The Court
needs to validate these factual allegations based on competent and reliable evidence. As such, the Court
cannot resolve the questions they pose. Second, J.G. Summit misreads the provisions of the Constitution
cited in its own pleadings, to wit:
29.2 Petitioner has consistently pointed out in the past that private respondent is not a 60%-40%
corporation, and this violates the Constitution x x x The violation continues to this day because under
the law, it continues to own real property
xxx xxx xxx
32. To review the constitutional provisions involved, Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (the
JVA was signed in 1977), provided:
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
32.1 This provision is the same as Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
32.2 Under the Public Land Act, corporations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain are
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipino citizens (Sec. 22, Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended). (emphases supplied)
As correctly observed by the public respondents, the prohibition in the Constitution applies only to
ownership of land.
48
It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of
the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation where the ownership of immovable
property such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land
49
would be limited to Filipinos and
Filipino corporations only.
III.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH
FINALITY and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. The Motion to Elevate This Case to the Court En
Banc is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DOJ OPINION NO. 018, s. 1989
January 19, 1989

The Chairman
Securities and Exchange Commission
SEC Bldg. EDSA Greenhills
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

M a d a m :
This refers to the query of that Office on whether or not it may give due course to the application for
incorporation of Far Southeast Gold Resources, Inc. ("FSEGRI") to engage in mining activities in the
Philippines in the light of this Department's Opinion No. 84, s. 1988 applying the so-called "grandfather
rule" in interpreting the constitutional provision regarding the nationality requirement for corporations
qualified to acquire lands in the Philippines.
It appears that FSEGRI's capital consists of 10,000 common shares which are categorized into Class "A"
and Class "B" shares; that the Class "A" shares, which constitutes 60% of its equity, can only be held by
Filipinos, while the "Class B" shares, which constitute the remaining 40% can be owned by both Filipinos
and foreigners; and that 25% of the authorized capital stock of the FSEGRI has been subscribed as
follows: 40% Galactic Resources Ltd., a Canadian corporation, while the remaining 60% is held by
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, which in turn has alien stockholding to the extent of 17% of its
total capital.
It further appears that on February 28, 1967 the SEC promulgated rules and regulations on the
implementation of the constitutional and statutory requirements that the controlling interests of
enterprises engaged in the exploitation of the natural resources should be held by citizens of the
Philippines or by corporations or by associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, and which provide for the following rule in the determination of citizenship of corporations
with alien equity, to wit:
"Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding
to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality. Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in
the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital stock or capital respectively, of
which belong to a Filipino citizens, all of the said shares shall be recorded as owned by Filipinos. But if
less than 60%, or, say, only 50% of the capital stock or capital of the corporation or partnership,
respectively belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be counted as owned by Filipinos and
the other 50,000 shares shall be recorded as belonging to aliens."
Said rule was substantially reiterated on September 7, 1972 and approved by the then Secretary of
Commerce and Industry on September 12, 1972; and this rule has been followed up to this time as basis
for determining the nationality of corporate stockholders.
With due respect, it is believed that said query should be resolved by that Office by applying its
aforecited rule.
Opinion No. 84, s. 1988 cited in your query is not meant to overrule the aforesaid SEC rule. There is
nothing in said Opinion that precludes the application of the said SEC rule in appropriate cases. It is quite
clear from said SEC rule that the "Grandfather Rule", which was evolved and applied by the SEC in
several cases, will not apply in cases where the 60-40 Filipino-alien equity ownership in a particular
natural resource corporation is not in doubt.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) SEDFREY A. ORDOEZ
Secretary of Justice