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Chapter 8: Due Process of Law

Due Process: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Due process continues to be dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application. It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Justice Frankfurter: the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
Due Process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part of the
government, whether committed by the legislature, executive, or the
judiciary.

PERSON

The due process clause protects all persons, natural as well as artificial.
Natural persons include both the citizen and the alien. Villegas v. Hiu Chong:
the Supreme Court annulled a city ordinance requiring aliens to obtain a
work permit from the mayor as a pre-condition for employment, holding that
while it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens
within its territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
Artificial persons like corporation and partnerships are also covered by the
protection but only insofar as their property is concerned. Reason: both are
creatures of law and the life and liberty of persons are derived from it.
Deprivation: to take away forcibly, to prevent from possessing, enjoying or
using something. It connotes a denial to right of life, liberty or property.

LIFE

Understood as the integrity of the physical person.
It is not permissible for the government to deprive the individual of any part
of his body, and this is true even if it be as punishment for a crime.

LIBERTY

Mabini: liberty is the freedom to do right and never wrong.
Liberty is not an unbridled license; it is liberty regulated by law. A person is
free to act but he may exercise his rights only in such manner as not to injure
the rights of others. The individual as a creature of society should be
prepared to surrender part of his freedom for the benefit of the greater
number in recognition of the time honored principle salus populi est
suprema lex

PROPERTY

Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the
subject of contract. It includes all things - real, personal, tangible, intangible
- that are within the commerce of man.
One cannot have a vested right to a public office because this is not regarded
as property.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property. The
inquiry is whether or not the law is being enforced in accordance with the
prescribed manner but whether or not; to begin with, it is a proper exercise of
police power.
To be proper, the law must have a proper governmental objective (interest of
the public instead of particular persons)

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Which hears before it condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.
Requisites of Procedural Due Process in Judicial Proceedings:
o There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter.
o Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the
proceeding.

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in personam: acquired by the court when the defendant
voluntarily appears in court or through the service of
summons upon him.
in rem or quasi in-rem: jurisdiction is derived from the
power it may exercise over the property. Notice by
publication is sufficient in these cases. The reason is, the
property is presumed to be in the possession of the owner.
The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard.
o Notice to a party is essential to enable it to adduce its own evidence
submitted by the other party.
Due process is not violated where a person is not heard
because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be
heard.
APPEAL: the right to appeal is not essential to the right to
a hearing. Except when guaranteed by the Constitution,
appeal may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its
discretion.
If the law permits appeal and it is denied, it is a denial of due process.
Under Article VIII, Sec 5 (2):
1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher.
5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

Requisites of procedural due process:

1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. The decision must have something to support itself.
4. The evidence must be substantial.
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties of the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reason for the decision rendered.

Chapter 9: Equal Protection

Equal Protection: requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Substantive
equality is not enough but it needs to e applied similarly to all.
Persons Protected: available to all persons, natural and juridical; however
artificial persons are entitled to the protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.
By constitutional reservation, certain rights are enjoyable by citizens, such as the
right to vote, hold public office, exploit natural resources, and operate public
utilities. Aliens are comprehended in the guaranty (but with limits).

Classification:

What the law contemplates is equality among equals. The legislature is
allowed to classify subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable,
the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating
the equal protection clause.
Classification: defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
Requirements for the classification:

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1. It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only.
4. It must apply equally to all members of the class.

Chapter 10: Searches and Seizure

Scope of protection: available to all persons including aliens, whether
accused of a crime of not. Artificial persons are likewise entitled to the
guaranty although they may be required to open their books of accounts for
examination by the State in the exercise of the police power or the power of
taxation. As a rule, their premises cannot be searched nor may their papers
and effects be seized except by virtue of a valid warrant.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is personal and may be
invoked only by the person entitled to it. The right to be left alone extends
not only to the privacy of ones home but also to his office or business
establishment, including the papers and effects that may be found there.

Requisites of a Valid Warrant:

1. It must be based upon probable cause.
a. Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious
man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.
b. Consists a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently string in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing
accused to be committing the offense or to be guilty of the offense.
c. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff: Probable cause is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
d. The rule of probable cause is it needs to refer to only one specific offense as
expressly provided in Rule 126, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge.
a. Derived from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and therefore may not
be limited, much less withdrawn by the legislature.
b. The word judge is interpreted in its generic sense and includes judges of all
level.
3. The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
a. Rule 126, Section 4
b. The evidence offered by the complainant and his witness should be based on
their own personal knowledge and not based on mere information of belief.
c. Hearsay is not allowed.
d. The affidavits, to be considered, should be drawn in such a manner that the
affiant could be charged with perjury if the allegations contained therein are
found to be untrue.
4. It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons of things to
be seized.
a. The constitution requires that the place to be searched or the persons or things
to be seized be described with such particularity as to enable the person
serving the warrant to identify them.
b. The person sought to be seized should be identified by name. If the warrant is
issued without a name or against any person, it is unquestionably void.
c. Thus the name John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is
unknown is insufficient and illegal but it will satisfy the constitutional
requirement if there is some description personae that will enable the officer to
identify the accused.

Properties Subject to Seizure:
Under Rule 26, Section 2, the following are subject to search and seizure:

1. Property subject of the offense
2. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense
3. Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Return of the goods, although illegally seized, may not be ordered by the court.

Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence


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Articles illegally seized are not admissible as evidence. It is a constitutionally
affirmed rule in Article III, Section 3(2) which provides that such evidence shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Warrantless Searches and Seizures:

There are instances when a search or seizure may be validly made notwithstanding
noncompliance with the requisites mentioned above. The following circumstances
are:

1. When a person has in fact just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense in his presence;
2. When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested committed it;
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may be made only within the
permissible area of search, or the place within the immediate control of the person
being arrested.

Chapter 11: Liberty of Abode and Travel

Caunca v Salazar: Whether or not a maid has the right to transfer to another residence
even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced by an employment agency, which
was then detaining her, for her transportation from the province. The SC ruled that the
petitioners liberty to abode and travel was sustained and her detention was declared
unconstitutional.

Sec 6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law.

Purpose: to further emphasize the individuals liberty as safeguarded in general terms
by the due process clause. It includes the following

4. right to choose ones residence
5. to leave it whenever he pleases
6. to travel wherever he wills

Section 6 is a specific safeguard of these rights and is intended to underline their
importance in a free society.

Limitations: According to Section 6, liberty of abode and travel can be limited upon
lawful order of the court and the right to travel by the requirements of national
security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.

Rubi v Provincial Board:

Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat
and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro
and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had
been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation
under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low
culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board,
extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on
which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped
from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in
prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province,
alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating
the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the
validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: With the prior approval
of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary
in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board, was challenged.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is constitutional.
HELD: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
this section of the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term
non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but
that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it
was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more
directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other
hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect
of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature,
the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the
sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public
interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate
exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration
of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests,
for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the
people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the
development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general
prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the
exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and
stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go
back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there
exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

Villavicencio v Lukban:

Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao.
Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality
in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's
Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond
the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao
specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of
the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the
case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should
be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3)
they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present.

Ruling: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of
400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court.
Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines
could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries
of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could
calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the
official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus
to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the
party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person
before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the
mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the
same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach
of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing

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her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ
of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Salonga v Hermoso:

Salonga filed a mandamus proceeding to compel Hermoso of the Travel Processing
Center to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel to Salonga. This is not however the
first time that Salonga filed such a complaint and this issue is considered moot and
academic. The Soc-Gen, in his reply, has already indicated that the certificate was
indeed issued and that there should be no cause of action. The issuance of the
certificate is in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to
Travel. The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance
facilitate the erosion of human rights. The Travel Processing Center should exercise
the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising
their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance
this is to avoid such similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire the
Courts effort and time.

Manotoc v CA

Facts: Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-
Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage
house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for
appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was
granted. However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested
the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a
memorandum to this effect was issued.

There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which
was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against
the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with
estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country
stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and
opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the
judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and
the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither
the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty,
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.

Ruling: NO. The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the
country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel,
duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not
able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other
person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.

Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial
court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by
the provision on right to travel.

Service Exporters Case

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also

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being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of
Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court
that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists
bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of
police power.

Ruling: [Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should
be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is
satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.
Right to travel may be impaired in the interest of national security, public health or
public order, as may be provided by law.

An order temporarily suspending the deployment of overseas workers is constitutional
for having been issued in the interest of the safety of OFWs, as provided by the Labor
Code. The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair
the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of
"public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to afford protection
to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority
vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply
because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute.

Marcos v Manglapuz

Facts:The petitioner are Ferdinand E. Marcos and his immediate family, while Raul
Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the respondent. The call is about the request
of Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling: Petition was dismissed. President did not arbitrarily or with grave of
discretion in determining that return of former president Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to returned to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, it must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated power of the
president which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
president to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

Chapter 12: Freedom of Religion

Religion: defined as any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc,
often involving a code of ethics and a philosophy. In Aglipay v Ruiz, religion

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is defined as: a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator.

Aglipay v Ruiz:

Facts: The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he
would order the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event
was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the
petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested
Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the
President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued already and sold
though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was
sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

Ruling: No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the
commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052,
which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the
discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be
advantageous to the Government. Of course, the phrase advantageous to the
Government does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar,
the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular
church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of
issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event
considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result
attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it
showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus
was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads
Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937. In considering
these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the
issuing of the stamps is constitutional.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Religion in the Constitution:

Article III, Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Article II, Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Article VI, Section 28. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

Article VI, Section 29. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

Section XIV, Section 4 (2). No educational institution shall be established
exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the
enrollment in any school. The provisions of this sub section shall not apply to schools
established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless
otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.

Section XIV, Section 3 (3). At the option expressed in writing by the parents or
guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public
elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated
or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards
belong, without additional cost to the Government.


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Separation of Church and State:

Rationale: to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and this avoid
encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of
their respective jurisdictions.

The doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering
in purely ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely
secular matters.

Everson V. Board of Education: the establishment clause simply means that the state
cannot setup a church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer
one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance; that no tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution
whatever may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion,
that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group or vice-versa.

There will be no violation of the establishment clause if:

1. The statute has a secular legislative purpose
2. Its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion
3. It does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.

Garces v Estenzo:

Facts: Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc
City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council
with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay
assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the
feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic
parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as
the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to return custody of the image to the council on the
pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its
acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest
and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed
an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image
contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly
constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to
participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of
church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or
church.

Issue: Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's
image with private funds in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.

Ruling: Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City,
"reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the
feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing
for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of
a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through
the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any
sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax
money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden
image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring
the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion
or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the
fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in
the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or
illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and
display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the
barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural
communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the
masses.


10
(1) Intramural Disputes: outside the jurisdiction of the secular authorities. These
are questions that may be resolved by the religious authorities only. Whatever
dogma that is adopted by the religious group cannot be binding to the State if
it is in contravention of its valid laws.

Fonacier v CA:

Gonzales v Archbishop of Manila:

Religious Profession and Worship: two-fold: freedom to believe and freedom to act
on ones belief.

(1) Freedom to Believe: Religion is a matter of faith. Everyone has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he
believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on ones Belief: Where the individual externalizes his beliefs in
acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to
the authority of the State. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent
religious practices inimical to society.

American Bible Society v Manila:

Facts: American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious,
missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through
its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. City of Manila is a
municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila

American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel
portions throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine
dialects. City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was
violating several Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit and license,
thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license fees covering the
period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953

To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its
permit and license fees under protest. American Bible filed a complaint, questioning
the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a
refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to
pay any license fee or sales tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles

City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality
of the Ordinances in question. Trial Court dismissed the complaint. American Bible
Society appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and
sale of bibles?

Ruling: No, under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person
or entity engaged in any of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3
must obtain a Mayors permit and license from the City Treasurer. American Bible
Societys business is not among those enumerated. However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the
Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned,
except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to
license or tax said business, trade or occupation. 2 provisions of law that may have
bearing on this case:
i. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax and fix the license
fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
ii. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in
general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except
those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some
other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall
be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For
purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be
classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2)
semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4)

11
miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for
each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the
same establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to
secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of
tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license
tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance

The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax
or license fee that a retail dealer has to pay per annum. As held in Murdock vs.
Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms
provided for in the Bill of Rights is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which
this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory
measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way
apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of
activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and
religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly
recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.

Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the
power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources
necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this
form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a
full purse
Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue
Code, Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of
whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any
activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall
be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed.

The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a
little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American
Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it
would impair American Bible Societys free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance

Facts: Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate
Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill
remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of
the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate
Bill.

Issue: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

Ruling: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to
the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to
the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were
several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the
HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino
concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

The test to determine which shall prevail as between religious freedom and the powers
of the Sate is the test of reasonableness.

Gerona v Secretary of Education:


12
Facts: Petitioners belong to the Jehovas Witness whose children were expelled from
their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, and recite the pledge
during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265
which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote
the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children.
This was denied. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from
implementing said DO No. 8. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and
contrary to the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional?

Ruling: DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts
to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of
the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and
cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee
and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our
system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance.
Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or
sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be
confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations
and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious
groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and
cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely
no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school
regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were
they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose
not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public
education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing
more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it.
Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they
forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of
freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious
ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of
loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the
legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance
of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8,
does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and
exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance
of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and
that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners
were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were
attending.

Ebralinag v Superintendent of Schools of Cebu

Facts: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 and
DECS Department Order No. 8 which stipulated compulsory flag ceremonies in all
educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they
believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as
an image or idol representing the State. They allege that the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which
the Constitution protects against official control. In requiring school pupils to
participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing

13
a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing
a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or
participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation. In 1989, the
DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private
schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag
and recite the patriotic pledge. Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to
persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the
Buenavista Elementary School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement
promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the
end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag. However, things took a
turn for the worst. In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F.
Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to follow
their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they
forfeited their right to attend public schools." 43 students were subsequently expelled
after refusing to sing. The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who
were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug
as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his
predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of
Jehovah's Witnesses. The petitioning students filed on account of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents in violating their due process and their right
to education. They alleged for the nullity of the expulsion or dropping from the rolls
of petitioners from their respective schools, prohibiting respondents from further
barring the petitioners from their classes, and compelling the respondent and all
persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their
respective schools. They also prayed for a TRO. On November 27, 1990, the Court
issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until
further orders from this Court. The OSG commented on the defense of the expulsion
orders and claimed that the flag salute was devoid of any religious significance and
the State had compelling interests to expel the children.

Issue: Whether school children who are members of Jehovah's Witnesses may be
expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing or singing
the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.

Ruling: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first
is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare. Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through the observance of the flag ceremony. The sole justification for a prior
restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave
and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the
State has a right and a duty to prevent. We are not persuaded that by exempting the
Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting
the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion
of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a
nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. Expelling or banning
the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this
Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of
the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities. Furthermore,
let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, assuming that such
unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion, is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means. Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from
the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens,
under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to
"protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such
education accessible to all. We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the
Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect
for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others.

14
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a
right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court
in Non vs. Dames II, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free
exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions
that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they
quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see
how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger
of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate
public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.

German v Barangan:

Facts: German et al went to JP Laurel St to pray and worship in St Luke Chapel. But
they were barred by General Barangan and his underlings from entering the church
because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacanang. And considering that
Germans group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who
was wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not
really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the
Malacanang.

Issue: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke
is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion?

Ruling: In the case at bar, German et al are not denied or restrained of their freedom
of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had
attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear manifestation by
Barangan et al that they allow the German et al to practice their religious belief but
not in the manner that German et al impress. Such manner impresses clear and
present danger to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even at the
expense of curtailing ones freedom to worship.

Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando - It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been
unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious
freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among
human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court
will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress
-and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace
and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without that
faith, mans very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.
J. Teehankee - The right to freely exercise ones religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of
our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and
speech and peaceable assembly along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that
on the judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights.
No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been
so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.
Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on
the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

J. Makasiar With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and
respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the
security of persons within the premises of Malacaang and the adjacent areas, as the
respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public
disturbance or violence.

Religious Tests

The constitutional provision against religious tests is aimed against
clandestine attempts on the part of the civil government to prevent a person
from exercising his civil or political rights because of his religious beliefs.
In re Summers: a person was denied admission to the bar because of his
inability to take in good faith an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois
which contained a provision requiring service in the militia in times of war.
People v Zosa: Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not
allowed in the Philippines because of Section 4, Article IIThe state is the
protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the people to defend the
State and in the fulfillment of this duty, the State may call all citizens to
render military or civil service.

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