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CivilSocietyandPoliticalTheory

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StudiesinContemporaryGermanSocialThought(partiallist)
ThomasMcCarthy,GeneralEditor
TheodorW.Adorno,Prisms
SeylaBenhabibandFredDallmayr,editors,TheCommunicativeEthicsControversy
RichardJ.Bernstein,editor,HabermasandModernity
ErnstBloch,NaturalLawandHumanDignity
ErnstBloch,ThePrincipleofHope
ErnstBloch,TheUtopianFunctionofArtandLiterature:SelectedEssays
HansBlumenberg,TheGenesisoftheCopernicanWorld
HansBlumenberg,TheLegitimacyoftheModernAge
HansBlumenberg,WorkonMyth
SusanBuckMorss,TheDialecticsofSeeing:WalterBenjaminandtheArcadesProject
CraigCalhoun,editor,HabermasandthePublicSphere
JeanCohenandAndrewArato,CivilSocietyandPoliticalTheory
HelmutDubiel,TheoryandPolitics:StudiesintheDevelopmentofCriticalTheory
JohnForester,editor,CriticalTheoryandPublicLife
DavidFrisby,FragmentsofModernity:TheoriesofModernityintheWorkofSimmel,KracauerandBenjamin
JrgenHabermas,OntheLogicoftheSocialSciences
JrgenHabermas,MoralConsciousnessandCommunicativeAction
JrgenHabermas,TheNewConservatism:CulturalCriticismandtheHistorians'Debate
JrgenHabermas,ThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity:TwelveLectures
JrgenHabermas,PhilosophicalPoliticalProfiles
JrgenHabermas,PostmetaphysicalThinking:PhilosophicalEssays
JrgenHabermas,TheStructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere:AnInquiryintoaCategoryofBourgeoisSociety
AxelHonneth,TheCritiqueofPower:ReflectiveStagesinaCriticalSocialTheory
AxelHonnethandHansJoas,editors,CommunicativeAction:EssaysonJrgenHabermas's
TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction
ReinhartKoselleck,CritiqueandCrisis:EnlightenmentandthePathogenesisofModernSociety
ReinhartKoselleck,FuturesPast:OntheSemanticsofHistoricalTime
HarryLiebersohn,FateandUtopiainGermanSociology,18871923
GuyOakes,WeberandRickert:ConceptFormationintheCulturalSciences
ClausOffe,ContradictionsoftheWelfareState
ClausOffe,DisorganizedCapitalism:ContemporaryTransformationsofWorkandPolitics
JoachimRitter,HegelandtheFrenchRevolution:EssaysonthePhilosophyofRight
AlfredSchmidt,HistoryandStructure:AnEssayonHegelianMarxistandStructuralistTheoriesofHistory
DennisSchmidt,TheUbiquityoftheFinite:Hegel,Heidegger,andtheEntitlementsofPhilosophy
CarlSchmitt,TheCrisisofParliamentaryDemocracy
CarlSchmitt,PoliticalRomanticism
CarlSchmitt,PoliticalTheology:FourChaptersontheConceptofSovereignty
GarySmith,editor,OnWalterBenjamin:CriticalEssaysandRecollections
MichaelTheunissen,TheOther:StudiesintheSocialOntologyofHusserl,Heidegger,Sartre,andBuber
ErnstTugendhat,SelfConsciousnessandSelfDetermination
MarkWarren,NietzscheandPoliticalThought
AlbrechtWellmer,ThePersistenceofModernity:EssaysonAesthetics,EthicsandPostmodernism
ThomasE.Wren,editor,TheMoralDomain:EssaysintheOngoingDiscussionbetweenPhilosophyandtheSocialSciences
LambertZuidervaart,Adorno'sAestheticTheory:TheRedemptionofIllusion

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CivilSocietyandPoliticalTheory
JeanL.CohenandAndrewArato

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ToJulianandRachel
Fourthprinting,1997
FirstMITPresspaperbackedition,1994
1992MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformorbyanyelectronicormechanicalmeans(includinginformationstorageandretrieval)without
permissioninwritingfromthepublisher.
ThisbookwassetinNewBaskervilleatMITPressandwasprintedandboundintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Cohen,JeanL.
Civilsocietyandpoliticaltheory/JeanL.CohenandAndrewArato
p.cm.(StudiesincontemporaryGermansocialthought)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0262031779(H),0262531216(P)
1.Civilsociety.2.CivilsocietyHistory.I.Arato,Andrew.
II.Title.III.Series.
JC336.C651990
306.2dc209046723
CIP

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CONTENTS
Preface vii
Acknowledgments xix
Introduction 1
I
TheDiscourseofCivilSociety

1
TheContemporaryRevivalofCivilSociety
29
2
ConceptualHistoryandTheoreticalSynthesis
83
3
TheoreticalDevelopmentintheTwentiethCentury
117
II
TheDiscontentsofCivilSociety

4
TheNormativeCritique:HannahArendt
177
5
TheHistoricistCritique:CarlSchmitt,ReinhartKoselleck,andJrgen
Habermas
201
6
TheGenealogicalCritique:MichelFoucault
255
7
TheSystemsTheoreticCritique:NiklasLuhmann
299
III
TheReconstructionofCivilSociety

8
DiscourseEthicsandCivilSociety
345
9
SocialTheoryandCivilSociety
421
10
SocialMovementsandCivilSociety
492
11
CivilDisobedienceandCivilSociety
564
Notes 605
Index 745

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PREFACE
Thisbookismeantasacontributiontodemocratictheory.Unlikeotherapproachestothetopic,however,oursdoesnotfocusdirectlyonpoliticalinstitutions.Noris
itrestrictedtothedomainofnormafivepoliticalphilosophy,althoughbothinstitutionsandphilosophyhavetheirplaceinthetext.Ourgoal,rather,istwofold:to
demonstratetherelevanceoftheconceptofcivilsocietytomodernpoliticaltheoryandtodevelopatleasttheframeworkofatheoryofcivilsocietyadequateto
contemporaryconditions.Intheprocesswehopetofillaratherglaringlacunainrecentworkinthefieldofdemocratictheory.Everytheoryofdemocracy
presupposesamodelofsociety,yetnoonehasaddressedthequestionofwhichtypeofcivilsocietyismostappropriatetoamoderndemocraticpolity.
1
Toputit
anotherway,therelationbetweennormativemodelsofdemocracyorprojectsofdemocratizationandthestructure,institutions,anddynamicsofcivilsocietyhas
remainedopaque,inpartbecausethereisnosufficientlycomplextheoryofcivilsocietyavailabletoustoday.Thetaskofthisbookistobegintheconstructionofsuch
atheory.
Theconceptofcivilsociety,inavarietyofusesanddefinitions,hasbecomequitefashionabletoday,thankstostrugglesagainstcommunistandmilitarydictatorshipsin
manypartsoftheworld.Yetithasanambiguousstatusunderliberaldemocracies.Tosome,itseemstoindicatewhattheWesthasalreadyachieved,andthusitis
withoutanyapparentcriticalpotentialforexaminingthedysfunctionsandinjusticesofourtypeofsociety.Toothers,theconceptbelongstoearlymodernformsof
politicalphilosophythat

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havebecomeirrelevanttotoday'scomplexsocieties.Itisourthesis,however,thattheconceptofcivilsocietyindicatesaterrainintheWestthatisendangeredbythe
logicofadministrativeandeconomicmechanismsbutisalsotheprimarylocusforthepotentialexpansionofdemocracyunder"reallyexisting"liberaldemocratic
regimes.Inadvancingthisthesis,weshalldemonstratethemodernityandnormative/criticalrelevanceoftheconceptofcivilsocietytoalltypesofcontemporary
societies.
Therearegoodargumentsforeachofthesethreepositions,andweshalladdressthemindetail.Weshalltrytoshowthatthefirsttwosetsofargumentsdrawtheir
strengthfrominadequateversionsoftheconceptthathavebeenunreflectivelyrevivedinthediscussionsofarinLatinAmerica,EasternEurope,andtheWest.One
commonambiguityconcernstherelationbetweentheterms"civil"and"bourgeois"society,adistinctionthatcannotevenbemadeinGerman(brgerliche
Gesellschaft)orinsomeEastEuropeanlanguages.Thisisnotsimplyaterminologicalproblem,fortheprogramof"civilsocietyvs.thestate,"challengingstatist
dictatorshipsthatpenetrateandcontrolboththeeconomyandthevariousdomainsofindependentsociallife,seemstostandfortheautonomyofboththecivilandthe
bourgeois.Tobesure,thedemocraticmovementsintheEastrelyonthestrengthsofnewautonomousformsofdiscourse,associations,andsolidarity,i.e.,onthe
elementsofcivilsociety.Buttheyhavenotsufficientlydifferentiatedbetweenthetaskofestablishingviablemarketeconomies(whateverformofownershipreplaces
statepropertyandcontrol),ontheonehand,andtheprojectofstrengtheningcivilsocietyvisvisthestateandtheliberatedmarketforces,ontheother.Yet,aswe
knowfromthehistoryoftheWest,thespontaneousforcesofthecapitalistmarketeconomycanrepresentasgreatadangertosocialsolidarity,socialjustice,and
evenautonomyastheadministrativepowerofthemodernstate.Ourpointisthatonlyaconceptofcivilsocietythatisproperlydifferentiatedfromtheeconomy(and
thereforefrom''bourgeoissociety")couldbecomethecenterofacriticalpoliticalandsocialtheoryinsocietieswherethemarketeconomyhasalreadydeveloped,or
isintheprocessofdeveloping,itsownautonomouslogic.Otherwise,aftersuccessfultransitionsfromdictatorshiptodemocracy,theundifferentiated

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versionoftheconceptembeddedintheslogan"societyvs.thestate"wouldloseitscriticalpotential.Thus,onlyareconstructioninvolvingathreepartmodel
distinguishingcivilsocietyfrombothstateandeconomyhasachancebothtounderwritethedramaticoppositionalroleofthisconceptunderauthoritarianregimesand
torenewitscriticalpotentialunderliberaldemocracies.
Letusstartwithaworkingdefinition.Weunderstand"civilsociety"
2
asasphereofsocialinteractionbetweeneconomyandstate,composedabovealloftheintimate
sphere(especiallythefamily),thesphereofassociations(especiallyvoluntaryassociations),socialmovements,andformsofpubliccommunication.Moderncivil
societyiscreatedthroughformsofselfconstitutionandselfmobilization.Itisinstitutionalizedandgeneralizedthroughlaws,andespeciallysubjectiverights,that
stabilizesocialdifferentiation.Whiletheselfcreativeandinstitutionalizeddimensions
3
canexistseparately,inthelongtermbothindependentactionand
institutionalizationarenecessaryforthereproductionofcivilsociety.
Itwouldbemisleadingtoidentifycivilsocietywithallofsociallifeoutsidetheadministrativestateandeconomicprocessesinthenarrowsense.First,itisnecessary
andmeaningfultodistinguishcivilsocietyfrombothapoliticalsocietyofparties,politicalorganizations,andpoliticalpublics(inparticular,parliaments)andan
economicsocietycomposedoforganizationsofproductionanddistribution,usuallyfirms,cooperatives,partnerships,andsoon.Politicalandeconomicsociety
generallyarisefromcivilsociety,sharesomeofitsformsoforganizationandcommunication,andareinstitutionalizedthroughrights(politicalrightsandpropertyrights
especially)continuouswiththefabricofrightsthatsecuremoderncivilsociety.Buttheactorsofpoliticalandeconomicsocietyaredirectlyinvolvedwithstatepower
andeconomicproduction,whichtheyseektocontrolandmanage.Theycannotaffordtosubordinatestrategicandinstrumentalcriteriatothepatternsofnormative
integrationandopenendedcommunicationcharacteristicofcivilsociety.Eventhepublicsphereofpoliticalsocietyrootedinparliamentsinvolvesimportantformaland
temporalconstraintsonprocessesofcommunication.Thepoliticalroleofcivilsocietyinturnisnotdirectlyrelatedtothecontrolor

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conquestofpowerbuttothegenerationofinfluencethroughthelifeofdemocraticassociationsandunconstraineddiscussionintheculturalpublicsphere.Sucha
politicalroleisinevitablydiffuseandinefficient.Thusthemediatingroleofpoliticalsocietybetweencivilsocietyandstateisindispensable,butsoistherootednessof
politicalsocietyincivilsociety.Inprinciple,similarconsiderationspertaintotherelationshipbetweencivilandeconomicsociety,evenifhistorically,undercapitalism,
economicsocietyhasbeenmoresuccessfullyinsulatedfromtheinfluenceofcivilsocietythanpoliticalsocietyhasbeen,despitetheclaimsofelitetheoriesof
democracy.Nevertheless,thelegalizationoftradeunions,collectivebargaining,codetermination,andsoonwitnesstheinfluenceofciviloneconomicsocietyand
allowthelattertoplayamediatingrolebetweencivilsocietyandthemarketsystem.
Second,thedifferentiationofcivilsocietyfrombotheconomicandpoliticalsocietyseemstosuggestthatthecategoryshouldsomehowincludeandrefertoallthe
phenomenaofsocietythatarenotdirectlylinkedtothestateandtheeconomy.Butthisisthecaseonlytotheextentthatwefocusonrelationsofconscious
association,ofselforganizationandorganizedcommunication.Civilsocietyinfactrepresentsonlyadimensionofthesociologicalworldofnorms,roles,practices,
relationships,competencies,andformsofdependenceoraparticularangleoflookingatthisworldfromthepointofviewofconsciousassociationbuildingand
associationallife.Awaytoaccountforthislimitationinthescopeoftheconceptistodistinguishitfromasocioculturallifeworld,whichasthewidercategoryof"the
social"includescivilsociety.Accordingly,civilsocietyreferstothestructuresofsocialization,association,andorganizedformsofcommunicationofthelifeworldtothe
extentthattheseareinstitutionalizedorareintheprocessofbeinginstitutionalized.
Finally,wewanttostressthatunderliberaldemocracies,itwouldbeamistaketoseecivilsocietyinoppositiontotheeconomyandstatebydefinition.Ournotionsof
economicandpoliticalsociety(whichadmittedlycomplicateourthreepartmodel)refertomediatingspheresthroughwhichcivilsocietycangaininfluenceover
politicaladministrativeandeconomicprocesses.Anantagonisticrelationofcivilsociety,oritsactors,totheeconomyorthestate

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arisesonlywhenthesemediationsfailorwhentheinstitutionsofeconomicandpoliticalsocietyservetoinsulatedecisionmakinganddecisionmakersfromthe
influenceofsocialorganizations,initiatives,andformsofpublicdiscussion.
TheStructureofThisBook
WeshallarguethatwhatisatstakeinthedebatesanimatingpoliticalandsocialtheoryinbothEastandWest
4
isnotsimplythedefenseofsocietyagainstthestateor
theeconomybutwhichversionofcivilsocietyistoprevail.Thereis,however,anotherissueunderlyingthesedebates.MaxWeber'sdisillusionedinsistencethatwe
modernsarelivinginanageofdisenchantmentappearstobemoretruenowthaneverbefore.Secularpoliticalutopiasseemtohavegonethewayofthegreat
mobilizingreligiousworldviewsofthepreviousage.Thedemiseofthemostimportantradicaldemocraticandsocialistutopiaofourtime,Marxism,hasalreadyled
thinkerstoproclaimtheendofhistoryandtheworldwidetriumphofaratheruninspiredversionofliberalism.Nowthattherevolutionaryrhetoricofcommunismhasat
last(anddeservedly)beendiscredited,thequestionconfrontingpoliticaltheoristsiswhetherutopianthoughtandcorrespondingradicalpoliticalprojectsare
conceivableatall.Orarethemobilizingidealsembeddedinearlierutopiasconsignedtothedustbinofthehistoryofideas?
Thegreatidealsgeneratedintheageofdemocraticrevolutionsliberty,politicalandsocialequality,solidarity,andjusticewereeachembeddedintotalisticand
mutuallyexclusiveutopias:anarchism,libertarianism,radicaldemocracy,Marxism.Soberreflectiononthehistoryofthepastcenturyandahalfshoulddissuade
responsiblepersonsfromseekingtoreviveanyoneoftheseutopiasintheiroriginalform.However,asocietywithoutactionorientingnorms,asocietywithoutpolitical
projects,isequallyundesirable,forthecivilprivatismor"realism"thatwouldresultwouldreallybejustanothernameforegoism,andthecorrespondingpolitical
culturewouldlacksufficientmotivationtomaintain,muchlessexpand,existingrights,democraticinstitutions,socialsolidarity,orjustice.

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Itisourthesisthattherevivalofthediscourseofcivilsocietyprovidessomehopeinthisregard.Forthisdiscourserevealsthatcollectiveactorsandsympathetic
theoristsarestillorientedbytheutopianidealsofmodernitytheideasofbasicrights,liberty,equality,democracy,solidarity,andjusticeevenifthefundamentalist,
revolutionaryrhetoricwithinwhichtheseidealshadoncebeenarticulatedisonthewane.Indeed,civilsocietyitselfhasemergedasanewkindofutopia,onewecall
"selflimiting,"autopiathatincludesarangeofcomplementaryformsofdemocracyandacomplexsetofcivil,social,andpoliticalrightsthatmustbecompatiblewith
themoderndifferentiationofsociety.Itisthisutopianidealthatplaysafundamental,ifregulative,roleintheconstructionofourbookasawhole,aswellasinits
individualparts.
PartsIandIIanalyzethemajortheoriesandcriticismsoftheconceptofcivilsocietythathaveemergedinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies.Intheintroductionwe
presentanoverviewofthetheoreticalimportanceoftheproblemofcivilsocietybysituatingitintermsofthreecentraldebatesincontemporarypoliticaltheory:
betweeneliteandparticipatorydemocracy,betweenliberalismandcommunitarianism,andbetweencriticsanddefendersofthewelfarestate.Forthemostpart,this
discussiondrawsonAmericansources.Ourintentionhereisnottoprovethattheconceptofcivilsocietycanresolvealltherelevantdebatesandantinomiesbutrather
toshowthatitopensupnewandunexpectedpossibilitiesforsynthesisineachcase.
Butwhichconcept?Bracketingtheworkingdefinitionjustprovided,chapter1introducestheconceptofcivilsocietyinadeliberatelynonsystematicmanner,by
reproducingitsheterogeneouscurrentusagebyintellectualsinorclosetoanumberofsocialandpoliticalmovements.Sinceourinterestisinpolitics,webelievewe
mustfirstlearnfromcontemporarydiscoursesinordertocontributesomethingtothem.Westartourexaminationofthepoliticalmotivationsrelevanttoourtaskwitha
presentationoffouridealtypicaldiscourses:Polish(thedemocraticopposition),French(the"secondleft"),German(therealistGreens)andLatinAmerican(thenew
democraticleft).Ineachcase,theconceptandcategoriesofcivilsocietyhavebecomecentraltoeffortstoarticulatenormativeprojectsforliberalizationand
democratization.Wedonotassume

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thatthediscourseswereproducearefullyrepresentativeofwhatisavailable,andevenlessthattheyinthemselvescanprovideorsubstituteforapoliticalanalysisof
thefourcontexts.OnlyintheEasternEuropeancasedowereturntoanalyzing,thistimeonthebasisofavarietyofprimaryandsecondarysources,thefateofthe
intellectualprojectinthefaceofcomplexconstraints.Wecompletethispartofouranalysisbycomparingandcontrastingthefourdifferentdiscoursesofcivilsociety,
andonlythendoweraisethequestionofwhetheraunifiedconceptionofcivilsocietywithacriticalthrustcanbedevelopedfromintellectualcontextsrelatedto
contemporaryformsofaction.Thechaptershowshowtheseheterogeneousandunsystematicattemptsdiffer,whattheyhaveincommon,andwhyitmakessenseto
linkthemtogether.
Therevivalofconceptsofcivilsocietynotwithstanding,itcouldbearguedthattwentiethcenturydevelopmentsrenderkeydimensionsoftheconceptirrelevant.The
normsofcivilsocietyindividualrights,privacy,voluntaryassociation,formallegality,plurality,publicity,freeenterprisewere,ofcourse,institutionalized
heterogeneouslyandinacontradictorymannerinWesternsocieties.Thelogicofcapitalistprivatepropertyandthemarketoftenconflictswithpluralityandfree
associationthatofbureaucratization,withparliamentarywillformation.Theprinciplesofarepresentative,inclusive,politicalprocessoflegislationcontrolledby
societyconflictswithnewformsofexclusionanddominationinsociety,intheeconomy,andinthestate.Moreover,givenstructuralchangesoverthelastcentury,any
attempttoequate"state"with"thepolitical"or"civilsociety''with"theprivate"seemsanachronistic.Ifthisisso,canacategoryofearlymodernpoliticalphilosophy
haveanycontinuingrelevancetothecontemporaryworld?
Inchapter2,wepresentashortconceptualhistoryofearlymodernversionsofcivilsocietyandatheoreticalanalysisofHegel'smasterfulsynthesis.Thesesteps
belongtowhatwetaketobethenecessaryprolegomenonforatheoryofcivilsocietyonthelevelofthehistoryoftheory.Indeednoonecouldseriouslycontest
Hegel'spositionasthemostimportantnineteenthcenturypredecessorofandinspirationtotwentiethcenturyanalysesofcivilsociety.Thecategorialrichnessofthe
conceptofcivilsocietycanberecoveredonlythroughananalysisofHegel'sframework,whichgathered

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intoitselfallavailableinterpretationsoftheconcept.Wecannot,ofcourse,pretendtoexaminetheevolutionofHegel'spoliticalphilosophy,thewholebodyofhis
relevantwork,oreventhefullrangeofsecondaryliteraturedealingwiththemostimportanttextforus,ThePhilosophyofRight.Nevertheless,theHegeliantheoryis
crucialbecauseitreconstructscivilsocietyintermsofthethreelevelsoflegality,pluralityandassociation,andpublicityandbecauseHegelseesthelinkbetweencivil
societyandstateintermsofmediationandinterpenetration.Aschapter1shows,nocontemporarydiscourseofcivilsocietyhasmanagedtoaddevenasingle
fundamentalcategorytolegality,privacy,plurality,association,publicity,andmediation,exceptthatofsocialmovements,andthemostsophisticated
contemporaryauthorsMichnik,O'Donnell,andCardoso,forexampleworkwithalloftheselevels.
Hegel'sownambiguitiesconcerningcivilsociety,andperhapsevenhisrecurringstatisminfaceofthealienationofthesystemofneeds,canbetracedtohisinclusionof
theeconomyasoneofthelevelsofcivilsociety.TheimportanceofGramsciandParsonsforourframeworkistheirdemonstrationthatthebasicHegelianconception
canbeimprovedbyintroducingathreepartmodeldifferentiatingcivilsocietyfrombotheconomyandstate.Weargueinchapter3,however,thatbothGramsci'sand
Parsons'sanalysessufferfromthefactthattheyintroducethesethreedomainsintermsofoverlymonisticandfunctionalisticformsoftheory.InGramsci'scase,thisled
toadeepambivalencetowardmoderncivilsocietyanditsfutureinafreesocialistsociety.InParsons'scase,ontheotherhand,theflatcombinationofnormativeand
functionalistapproachesleavesuswithanexplicitlyapologetictheoryofthecontemporaryAmericanversionofcivilsociety.Wewishtomakethereadersensitiveto
thedangersofbothversionsoffunctionalism.
Together,thefirstthreechaptersshowthattheconceptofcivilsocietycontinuestoinformmajorparadigmsofcontemporarysocialandpoliticaltheory.Chapter3in
particularshowsthatthetheoreticalaimsofHegel'ssynthesisarebetterservedifweabandonhisownstatistbiasandifwedifferentiatecivilsocietyfromthesystemof
needsmoresharplythanhedid.GramsciandParsonsthuspointbeyondeconomismandstatismwithinthetermsofHegelianpoliticalphilosophy.

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Twentiethcenturyusagesoftheconceptofcivilsocietyarenotwithouttheircritics.Indeed,manyhavearguedthattheconceptofcivilsocietyisanachronistic,
normativelysuspect,orboth.Accordingly,inpartII,wereproduceandassessfourfundamentaltypesofcriticismtowhichwebelieveallcurrentlyavailable
conceptionsofcivilsocietyaremoreorlessvulnerable.Tobesure,therewouldbeotherwaysofschematizingcriticalapproaches,andothercriticstoincludeno
analysiscanavoidselectivity.Wehavechosentodividecriticalperspectivesaccordingtofourmodels:thenormative(chapter4),thehistoricist(chapter5),the
genealogical(chapter6),andthesystemstheoretic(chapter7).Withtheexceptionofthehistoricistmodel,wherewerefertothreeauthors,eachapproachistypified
byasingletheorist.Weusethisproceduretoproduceascoherentacaseforeachperspectiveaspossible.Forthesamereasonwebringtobearourowncriticisms
immanentlyineachinstance,leavingourownpositionuntillater.Asweproceed,though,wenotethatseveralofthecriticshavereconstructedonedimensionofthe
classicalconceptofcivilsocietyasinheritedfromHegelevenastheybattledagainsttheconceptionasawhole.Inaddition,eachcritichashelpedtoweakenthecase
ofatleastoneoftheothers.ThiswasthecaseforArendt'snotionofthepublicsphereasagenuinelypoliticalconcept(vs.Schmitt),forHabermas'srediscoveryofthe
bifurcationofthepublicinamodelofmediation(vs.Arendt),forFoucault'sgenealogyofmodernpowerrelations(vs.allfunctionalistmodels),andforLuhmann's
notionofdifferentiation(vs.SchmittandHabermas).
PartIIIismoresystematicandlessexpositorythanthefirsttwoparts.Keepinginmindthedifficultiesthathaveemergedfromcontemporarypoliticaldiscussionsand
fromthefourtypesofcriticismoftheconceptofcivilsociety,wehaveproducedfourtheoreticalstudies.Thesearemeanttorespondtothemostimportantobjections
leftoverfromthecriticalconfrontationofthecriticswitheachother,tooutlineareconstructedtheoryofcivilsociety,andtoreconnectthistheorytopoliticsthrough
analysesofsocialmovementsandcivildisobedience.
Chapter8startstoworkoutthenormativefoundationsofatheoryofcivilsociety,usingthediscourseethicsdevelopedbyHabermasandhiscolleagues.The
presentationofthediscourseethicshasadoublefunction.First,itrespondstothenormativeand

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genealogicalcriticsbyshowinghowaconvincingjustificationforcivilsocietycanbeprovidedtoday.Second,itshowsthattheprojectoftheinstitutionalizationof
discoursesispossibleonlyonthegroundofmoderncivilsociety.Itisinthiscontextthatwehopetogiveamorecomprehensivesolutiontotheantinomyof
rightsorientedliberalismandcommunitarianismdiscussedintheintroduction,takingintoaccounttheclaimsofparticipatorydemocratictheoryaswell.Thethesisof
chapter8isthattheplausibilityofrightsanddemocracydependsontheirconceptualandnormativeinterrelationdespitetheapparentlyantitheticalcharacterofthetwo
theoreticalparadigmsinwhicheachisarticulatedanddefended.
Becauseeverynormativetheoryofdemocracy,andeveryliberaltheory,impliesamodelofsociety,itisincumbentonpoliticaltheoriststoaddthedimensionofsocial
structuralanalysistonormafivepoliticalphilosophy.Ofcourse,thosewhoareconvincedoftheuniversalityofhermeneuticmethodologywouldneeddonomoreto
demonstratethevalidityofcontemporarytheoreticalusesoftheconceptofcivilsocietythanreconstructthecontemporarydiscoursesofcivilsocietyinanormatively
coherenttheory.Onsuchaview,thefactthattheconceptofcivilsocietyinformstheselfunderstandingofsocialmovementsisenoughtoshowthatitremainsan
adequatebasisforthesymbolicorientationofcollectiveaction.Butthe"discourseofcivilsociety,"includingeventhebestphilosophicalreformulationofit,couldbe
merelyideological.Whatevertheintentionsofsocialactors,thefunctionalrequirementsofmoderneconomicandpoliticalsystemsmaymakeprojectsbasedonthe
conceptirrelevant,correspondingidentitiesunstable,interpretationsonesided.Giventhechallengestotheverymodelofdifferentiationthatisattheheartofthe
discourseofcivilsociety,itisessentialtoprovideasystematicreconstructionofitsstructuralpresuppositions.Withoutasocialscientificanalysisofthestructureand
dynamicsofmodernsociety,wehavenowayofevaluatingthegeneralityofagivenidentityortheglobalconstraintsoperatingbehindthebackofsocialactors.
Inaddition,therelationbetweencivilsociety,theeconomy,andthestaterequireselaboration.Thisisthegoalofchapter9,whichstartsbymappingoutthethreepart
modelofcivilsocietyintro

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ducedbyGramsciintermsoftheHabermasiandistinctionbetweenthelifeworldandtheeconomicandpoliticalsubsystems.Wethenattempttodemonstratethe
modernityofthisconstruct.Chapter9mustbereadasasympatheticrevisionoftheHabermasianframework.Ourmainadditionistointegratetheconceptofcivil
societyintotheoverallmodel,makingthenecessaryadjustments.Convincedthatthetheoryofcommunicativeactionrepresentsthemostadvancedcontoursofcritical
socialtheorytoday,wetrytounfoldtheimplicationsofthewholeconceptiononthelevelofpoliticaltheory.Indeed,ourreconstructionofcivilsocietyshouldbeseen
alsoasapolitical"translation"ofHabermasiancriticaltheory,onethathasbeenguidedbythedramaticstrugglesofourtimeundertheaegisofhisownvaluesand
ours:freedomandsolidarity.Weargue,againstLuhmann,thatamodelofdifferentiationandmodernizationcannotdowithoutanultimatelyculturalsubstratum,where
therationalizationofnormativeactioncoordinationoccurs.Wealsoshowthatourmodelhastheadvantageofbeingabletoaccommodatethenegativephenomena
associatedwithmoderncivilsocietyinthegenealogicalcriticism,andmuchmore.Wediscussthecontradictoryinstitutionalizationofthenormsofcivilsocietywhile
insistingbothontheutopianimplicationsofthemodelandonitsalternativeformsofdevelopment.Chapter9concludesbyoutliningaproposal,basedonthethree
partmodel,forthereflexivecontinuationofboththewelfarestateandthedemocraticrevolution.
Thelasttwochaptersformulatethispoliticsbyreferringtosocialmovementsandtooneoftheirkeyformsofcontestation:civildisobedience.Wedonotwishtoimply
thatthepoliticsofcivilsocietycanonlytaketheformofsocialmovements.Normalinstitutionalformsofpoliticalparticipationvoting,becomingactiveinpolitical
parties,forminginterestorlobbygroupsarepartofthispolitics.Buttheutopiandimensionofradicalpoliticscanbefoundonlyonthelevelofcollectiveaction.Thus,
inchapter10,weaddresstherelationbetweencollectiveactionandcivilsocietyfromaslightlydifferentpointofviewthanthatofchapter1.Insteadoffocusingonthe
discourseofactivists,wetakeupthemajortheoreticalparadigmsthathaveevolvedsincethe1960sinordertoanalyzesocialmovementsandshowthattheyeach
pre

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suppose(insomecasesimplicitly,inothersexplicitly)theconceptofcivilsociety.Moreover,wedemonstratethatcivilsociety,beyondallfunctionalistandpluralist
models,shouldbeseennotonlypassively,asanetworkofinstitutions,butalsoactively,asthecontextandproductofselfconstitutingcollectiveactors.Wethentry
todemonstratethatourtripartitestructuralmodelisthebestframeworkwithwhichtoapproach"new"andoldformsofcollectiveaction.
Weconcludebyreflectingonthequestionofwhatisandwhatshouldandcouldbetherelationshipsamongsocietalplurality,individualautonomy,socialmovements,
andaliberal,democraticpoliticalsystem.Socialmovementsarenotalwaysinternallydemocratic,andtheyoftenengageinactionthatviolatesthedemocratic
proceduresorlawsgeneratedbyanonethelesslegitimatepoliticalorder.Whatmodeofpoliticalvoice,action,andrepresentationislegitimateforsocialactorsinboth
societyandstate?Whatistheproperlocusofpoliticalactivityandhowshouldboundarylinesbetweenpublicandprivatebedrawn?Howcanthedangerof
permanentmobilizationbeavoided?Ourdiscussionofcivildisobedienceinchapter11respondstothesequestions.Aboveall,ourargumentoncivildisobedience
seekstodemonstratethatsocialmovementsandcitizeninitiativesarecapableofinfluencingpolicyandmoldingpoliticalculturewithoutentryintothefieldofpower
politicsandwithoutnecessarilyendangeringliberalordemocraticinstitutions.Thus(implicitlyreturningtothefirstdebateinourintroduction),weprovidefora
frameworkofdemocratizationinthecontextsofelitedemocracies,withoutfallingintothetrapsoffundamentalisttheoriesofparticipation.Wealsotakeuponcemore
thedebatebetweenrightsorientedliberalsandparticipatorydemocrats,thistimefromtheperspectiveoftheappropriateformsofnoninstitutionalizedpoliticsofcivil
society.Wehopetoprovide,ifnotthesolutiontotheantinomiesofcontemporarypoliticalandsocialtheory,thenatleasttoawaytobeginrethinkingthem.

Pagexix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Eachchapterofthisbookwasextensivelydiscussedbytheauthorsbeforedraftswerewritten.Thepreface,introduction,andchapters6,8,10,and11areprimarily
theworkofJeanL.Cohenchapters1,2,3,and7areprimarilytheworkofAndrewAratochapters4,5,and9arecollaborativeefforts.
Wereceivedsupportforthisproject,individuallyandjointly,frommorepeopleandinstitutionsthanwecanmentionhere.Westartwithourseparate
acknowledgments.
JeanL.CohenwouldliketothanktheRussellSageFoundationfortheintellectualandinstitutionalsupportreceivedtherewhileIwasaPostDoctoralFellowin
Residencein198687.IwouldalsoliketothanktheDepartmentofPoliticalScienceatColumbiaUniversityforaleaveofabsencethatenabledmetocarryonthis
research.SpecialthankstotheCouncilsforResearchintheHumanitiesandSocialSciencesofColumbiaUniversityforsummerfellowshipsin1987and1988that
enabledmetoconductresearchabroad.Thecoledeshautestudesensciencessociales,andinparticularClaudeLefortandPierreRosanvallon,deservespecial
mentionforallowingmetoworkasDirecteurd'tudesassociinpoliticalandsocialtheoryin1989.WhileinParis,Ipresentedseverallecturesbasedonthebook
andreceivedveryhelpfulcriticisms.MydeepestthankstoJrgenHabermasforsponsoringatwomonthresearchfellowshipattheMaxPlanckInstitutfr
SozialwissenschafteninStarnbergin1981thereIwasabletofamiliarizemyselfwithhisrecentwork,whichhashadthegreatestinfluenceonmythinkingandonthis
book.Iwouldliketothank

Pagexx
theAmericanCouncilofLearnedSocietiesforfundingmytraveltoDubrovnik,Yugoslavia,in1984and1985,topresentlecturesattheCourseonPhilosophyand
SocialScience.There,too,Iairedmyideasonsocialmovements,discourseethics,andcivilsocietyandreceivedinvaluablefeedback.Finally,thanksareduetothe
ViennaInstitutfrdieWissenchaftenvomMenschen,andinparticulartoKrzysztofMichalskiandCorneliaKlinger,whoinvitedmetolectureattheirsummerschool
programinCortona,Italy,in1989and1990.ThereIgaveseminarsonthethemeofcivilsocietytoaninterestinggroupofgraduatestudentsfromtheUnitedStates,
EasternEurope,andtheSovietUnion,andIprofitedgreatlybytheirresponses.
AndrewAratowouldliketothanktheAlexandervonHumboldtStiftungforitssupportin19801981,andtheMaxPlanckInstitutfrSozialwissenschaftenin
Starnbergforprovidingaworkbaseduringthistime.IverymuchappreciatethehelpIreceivedfromProfessorHabermas,thendirectoroftheinstitute,andhis
colleaguesingettingtoknowtheframeworkoftheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,whichisoftenutilizedinthisbook.Iwouldfurtherliketothankcolleaguesatthe
InstituteofSociologyoftheHungarianAcademyofScience,fortheirinterestinmyworkoncivilsocietyandforthemanyinterestingdiscussionswehaveshared.I
oweagreatdebttotheGraduateFacultyseminarsoftheNewSchoolforSocialResearchatwhichIhadachancetodiscusstopicsfromthisbookinparticular,the
democracyseminar,thestaffseminarinsociology,andthephilosophycolloquium.ConferencesattheCardozoLawSchoolonHegelandLuhmannhaveprovided
excellentopportunitiestorefinemyideas.Iwish,finally,tothankallmystudentswhohavesoactivelyparticipatedincoursesrelatedtotheproblemsofcivilsociety.
Manyfriendsandcolleagueshavegivenususefulcritiquesofdraftsofthemanuscriptandinterestingsuggestionsinthecourseofconversations.Wewouldliketo
mention,inparticular,KenBaynes,RobertBellah,SeylaBenhabib,GyrgyBence,LszlBruszt,JosCasanova,CorneliusCastoriadis,JuanCorradi,Drucilla
Cornell,FerencFehr,CarlosForeman,AlessandroFerrara,JeffreyGoldfarb,ClausGuenter,JrgenHabermas,ElemrHankiss,AgnesHeller,DickHoward,
GeorgeKateb,JnosKis,GyrgyMrkus,

Pagexxi
MariaMrkus,AlbertoMelucci,SigridMeuschel,ClausOffe,GuillermoO'Donnell,AlessandroPizzorno,CarlaPasquinelli,UlrichPreuss,ZbigniewPelczynski,
PierreRosenvallon,BernhardtSchlink,PhillippeSchmitter,AlfredStepan,IvanSzelnyi,MihlyVajda,JeffreyWeintraub,andAlbrechtWellmer.
Weoweaspecialwordofthankstoourserieseditor,ThomasMcCarthy,aswellastooureditoratMITPress,LarryCohen.Withouttheirhelpthisbookwould
certainlynothavebeenpossible.
Wededicatethebooktoourchildren,JulianCohenAratoandRachelArato.

Page1
INTRODUCTION
Weareonthethresholdofyetanothergreattransformationoftheselfunderstandingofmodernsocieties.Therehavebeenmanyattemptsfromvariouspointsofview
tolabelthisprocess:theambiguousterms"postindustrial"and"postmodern"societyreflectthevantagepointsofeconomicandculturalconcerns.Ourinterestisin
politics.Butfromthisstandpoint,thechangesoccurringinpoliticalcultureandsocialconflictsarepoorlycharacterizedbytermswhoseprefiximplies"after"or
"beyond."Tobesure,foravarietyofempiricalandtheoreticalreasonstheoldhegemonicparadigmshavedisintegrated,ashavethecertaintiesandguaranteesthat
wentwiththem.Indeedweareinthemidstofaremarkablerevivalofpoliticalandsocialthoughtthathasbeengoingonforthelasttwodecades.
OneresponsetothecollapseofthetwodominantparadigmsofthepreviousperiodpluralismandneoMarxismhasbeentheattempttorevivepoliticaltheoryby
"bringingthestatebackin."Whilethisapproachhasledtointerestingtheoreticalandempiricalanalyses,itsstatecenteredperspectivehasobscuredanimportant
dimensionofwhatisnewinthepoliticaldebatesandinthestakesofsocialcontestation.
1
Thefocusonthestateisausefulantidotetothereductionistfunctionalismof
manyneoMarxianandpluralistparadigmsthatwouldmakethepoliticalsystemanextension,reflex,orfunctionalorganofeconomic(class)orsocial(group)
structuresofselectivityanddomination.Inthisrespectthetheoreticalmoveservedthecauseofamoredifferentiatedanalysis.Butwithrespecttoallthatisnonstate,
thenewparadigmcontinuesthe

Page2
reductionisttendencyofMarxismandneoMarxismbyidentifyingclassrelationsandinterestsasthekeytocontemporaryformsofcollectiveaction.Moreover,the
legal,associational,cultural,andpublicspheresofsocietyhavenotheoreticalplaceinthisanalysis.Ittherebylosessightofagreatdealofinterestingandnormatively
instructiveformsofsocialconflicttoday.
Thecurrent''discourseofcivilsociety,"ontheotherhand,focusespreciselyonnew,generallynonclassbasedformsofcollectiveactionorientedandlinkedtothe
legal,associational,andpublicinstitutionsofsociety.Thesearedifferentiatednotonlyfromthestatebutalsofromthecapitalistmarketeconomy.Althoughwecannot
leavethestateandtheeconomyoutofconsiderationifwearetounderstandthedramaticchangesoccurringinLatinAmericaandEasternEuropeinparticular,the
conceptofcivilsocietyisindispensableifwearetounderstandthestakesofthese"transitionstodemocracy"aswellastheselfunderstandingoftherelevantactors.It
isalsoindispensabletoanyanalysisthatseekstograsptheimportofsuchchangesfortheWest,aswellasindigenouscontemporaryformsandstakesofconflict.In
ordertodiscover,afterthedemiseofMarxism,ifnotacommonnormativeprojectbetweenthe"transitions"andradicalsocialinitiativesunderestablishedliberal
democracies,thenatleasttheconditionsofpossibilityoffruitfuldialoguebetweenthem,wemustinquireintothemeaningandpossibleshapesoftheconceptofcivil
society.
Admittedly,ourinclinationistopositacommonnormativeproject,andinthissensewearepostMarxist.Inotherwords,welocatethepluralistcoreofourproject
withintheuniversalistichorizonofcriticaltheoryratherthanwithintherelativisticoneofdeconstruction.Atissueisnotonlyanarbitrarytheoreticalchoice.Wearetruly
impressedbytheimportanceinEastEuropeandLatinAmerica,aswellasintheadvancedcapitalistdemocracies,ofthestruggleforrightsandtheirexpansion,ofthe
establishmentofgrassrootsassociationsandinitiativesandtheeverrenewedconstructionofinstitutionsandforumsofcriticalpublics.Nointerpretationcandothese
aspirationsjusticewithoutrecognizingbothcommonorientationsthattranscendgeographyandevensocialpoliticalsystemsandacommonnormativefabriclinking
rights,associations,andpublicstogether.Webelievethatcivilsociety,in

Page3
factthemajorcategoryofmanyoftherelevantactorsandtheiradvocatesfromRussiatoChile,andfromFrancetoPoland,isthebesthermeneutickeytothesetwo
complexesofcommonality.
Thusweareconvincedthattherecentreemergenceofthe"discourseofcivilsociety"isattheheartofaseachangeincontemporarypoliticalculture.
2
Despitethe
proliferationofthis"discourse"andoftheconceptitself,however,noonehasdevelopedasystematictheoryofcivilsociety.Thisbookisanefforttobegindoingjust
that.Nevertheless,systematictheorycannotbebuiltdirectlyoutoftheselfunderstandingofactors,whomayverymuchneedtheresultsofamoredistancedand
criticalexaminationofthepossibilitiesandconstraintsofaction.Suchtheorymustbeinternallyrelatedtothedevelopmentofrelevanttheoreticaldebates.Atfirstsight
thebuildingofatheoryofcivilsocietyseemstobehamperedbythefactthatthestakesofcontemporarydebatesinpoliticaltheoryseemtobelocatedaround
differentaxesthanthenineteenthcenturycoupletofsocietyandstate.Itisourbelief,however,thattheproblemofcivilsocietyanditsdemocratizationislatently
presentinthesediscussionsandthatitconstitutesthetheoreticalterrainonwhichtheirinternalantinomiesmightberesolved.
Threedebatesofthelast1520yearsseemtotowerabovealltherest.Thefirstcontinuesanoldercontroversywithinthefieldofdemocratictheorybetween
defendersofelitevs.participatorymodelsofdemocracy.
3
Thesecond,forthemostpartrestrictedtotheAngloAmericanworld,isbetweenwhathascometobe
called"rightsorientedliberalism"and"communitarianism."Whileitcoverssomeofthesamegroundasthefirstcontroversy,thetermsoftheseconddiscussionare
quitedistinctfor,unlikethefirst,itoccurswithinthefieldofnormativepoliticalphilosophyratherthanbetweenempiricistsandnormativists.
4
Thethirddebate,pitting
neoconservativeadvocatesofthefreemarketagainstdefendersofthewelfarestate,hasanimateddiscussiononbothsidesoftheAtlantic.
5
Itscontextis,ofcourse,
thenotoriouscrisisofthewelfarestatethatintrudedonpoliticalconsciousnessinthemid1970s.Thesedebatesareinterrelated,and,asalreadyindicated,thereare
overlaps.Nevertheless,eachofthemhasculminatedinadistinctsetofantinomiesleadingtoakindofstandoffandincreas

Page4
ingsterility.Whatnooneseemstohaverealized,however,isthattherelativelyunsystematicandheterogeneousdiscourseoftherevivalofcivilsocietycanbebrought
tobearonthesedebatesandindeedcanprovideawayoutoftheantinomiesthatplaguethem.Accordingly,weshallbrieflysummarizethesedebatesinthis
introductionandshowhowourbookprovidesanewparadigmforthinkingabouttheissuestheyraise.
DebatesinContemporaryPoliticalTheory
EliteVs.ParticipatoryDemocracy
ItwouldnotbeanexaggerationtosaythatthedebatebetweeneliteandparticipatorymodelsofdemocracyhasbeengoingaroundincircleseversinceSchumpeter
threwdownthegauntlettothenormativistsin1942.
6
Schumpeter'sclaimthat"thedemocraticmethodisthatinstitutionalarrangementforarrivingatpoliticaldecisions
inwhichindividualsacquirethepowertodecideviaacompetitivestruggleforthepeople'svote"
7
hasformedthecoreoftheelitemodelofdemocracyeversince.
Democracyisdefinednotasakindofsocietyorasasetofmoralendsorevenasaprincipleoflegitimacybutratherasamethodforchoosingpoliticalleadersand
organizinggovernments.Theelitemodelofdemocracyclaimstoberealistic,descriptive,empiricallyaccurate,andtheonlymodelthatisappropriatetomodernsocial
conditions.
Farfromindulginginutopianillusionsaboutthepossibilityofeitherconjuringawaythephenomenonofpowerorthegapbetweenrulersandruled,thisapproach
assumesthatnosociety,andcertainlynomodernone,couldfunctionwithoutboth.A"realistic"appraisalofdemocraticsocietiesmustgrantthatthemotorofthe
politicalsystemispowerjustasthemotoroftheeconomyisprofit.Thestruggletoacquireandusepowerisattheheartofthepolitical.Whatdistinguishesdemocratic
fromnondemocraticsocietiesisthusthewayinwhichpowerisacquiredanddecisionsarearrivedat:Solongassomecoresetofcivilrightsisrespectedandregularly
contestedelectionsareheldonthebasisofauniversalfranchise,solongasalternationinpowerisacceptedbyelitesandoccurssmoothlywithoutviolenceor
institutional

Page5
discontinuity,solongasdecisionmakinginvolvescompromisesamongelitesand(passive)acceptancebythepopulation,apolitycanbeconsidereddemocratic.The
mainconcernhereisobviouslywiththeabilityofagovernmenttoproducedecisions,tohavethemaccepted,andtoensureorderlytransitions,i.e.,stability.
Theelitemodelofdemocracypridesitselfonprovidinganoperationalizableandempiricallydescriptiveaccountofthepracticesofpolitiesconsideredtobe
democratic.Thereisnopretenseherethatvoterseithersetthepoliticalagendaormakepoliticaldecisionstheyneithergenerateissuesnorchoosepolicies.Rather,
leaders(politicalparties)aggregateinterestsanddecidewhicharetobecomepoliticallysalient.
8
Moreover,theyselectissuesandstructurepublicopinion.Thetrue
functionofthevoteissimplytochooseamongthebidsforpowerbypoliticalelitesandtoacceptleadership.Thevotersareconsumers,thepartiesareentrepreneurs
offeringalternativepackagesorpersonnelitistheywhocreatedemand,bowingtoconsumersovereigntyonlywithregardtotheyes/nodecisionbythevotersabout
whoamongthepreselectedcandidateswillbetheir"representatives"(usingthelattertermverylooselyindeed).
9
Inshort,theempiricaltheoriesofdemocracy(elite,
pluralist,corporatist,andrationalchoicemodels)tendquiteopenlytoreducethenormativemeaningofthetermtoasetofminimumsmodeledonaconceptionof
bargaining,competition,access,andaccountabilityderivedmorefromthemarketthanfromearliermodelsofcitizenship.
Competitivenessinacquiringpoliticalpowerandinmakingpolicydecisionsis,ofcourse,thecoreofthismodelofdemocracy.Thecompetitiveelementisdeemedto
bethesourceofcreativity,productivity,responsibility,andresponsiveness.Theultimatesanctionofthevote,togetherwiththenecessityonthepartofelitesto
competeforit,willsupposedlykeepthingsfair,encourageauthoritiestoberesponsivetoamultiplicityofdemandsandaccountabletothecitizenry,andfostertheir
willingnesstocompromisewithoneanother.Tobesure,thismodelofdemocracyrestsoncertainpreconditionsthatitsupposedlyshouldbeabletoreproduce:high
qualityleadershipwithatolerancefordifferencesofopinion,arestrictedrangeofpoliticaldecision,
10
andanelitepoliticalculturebasedondemocraticself
control.
11
Thesepre

Page6
conditionsarepredicatedinturnonthefactofsocialpluralismorcleavage,whichthedemocraticmethodinstitutionalizesintononviolentcompetitionforofficeand
influence.Afinalprecondition,deemedindispensableforastablepoliticalsystemtobeabletomakedecisions,isthatitmustbeshieldedfromtoomuchparticipation
bythepopulation:Citizensmust,asitwere,acceptthedivisionoflaborbetweenthemselvesandthepoliticianstheyelect.
12
Accordingly,thismodelofdemocracy
arguesthatthesecretballot,civilrights,alternation,regularelections,andpartycompetitionarecentraltoeverymodernconceptionofdemocracyifdemocracyisto
haveanyplaceatallincomplexmodernsocieties.
Wefindthislaststatementtobequiteconvincing,sofarasitgoes.Butthenormativistcritiqueoftheelitemodelofdemocracyisalsoconvincing.Itisespecially
compellingagainsttheelitemodel'stendencytoextolapathy,civilprivatism,andthenecessitytoshieldthepoliticalsystemfrom"excess"demandsofthepopulationas
democraticprinciples,themeaningofthisexcesstobedeterminedbytheelitesalone.
13
Thenormativistscorrectlypointoutthatwhatmakesforstabilityand
continuityinapolityisnotidenticalwithwhatmakesitdemocratic.Fromthestandpointofparticipationtheory,theelitemodelofdemocracyisbothtoobroadand
toonarrow.Todefineapolityasdemocraticifitperiodicallyholdscontestedelectionsandguaranteescivilrights,regardlessofwhatsortsofpublicinstitutionsor
privatearrangementsexist,istoextenddemocraticlegitimacytoanenormouslywiderangeofsocietieswhilesimultaneouslyshieldingthemfromcriticalscrutiny.
14
At
thesametimetheconceptofdemocracyatplayhereistoonarrow,foritisdefinedbyproceduresthathavelittletodowiththeproceduresandpresuppositionsof
freeagreementanddiscursivewillformation.
15
Indeedtheparticipationtheoristsarguethatthe"realistic"modelhasdenudedtheconceptofdemocracyofsomanyof
itselementsthatithaslostanyconnectionwithitspastmeaning.
16
Whatisleftifonedropstheideasofselfdetermination,participation,politicalequality,discursive
processesofpoliticalwillformationamongpeers,andtheinfluenceofautonomouspublicopinionondecisionmaking?Inshort,thepriceoftheelitemodel'srealismis
thelossofwhathasalwaysbeentakentobethecoreoftheconceptofdemocracy,namely,thecitizenshipprinciple.

Page7
Moreover,byrestrictingtheconceptofdemocracytoamethodofleaderselectionandtoproceduresregulatingthecompetitionandpolicymakingofelites,this
modelsacrificestheveryprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyonwhichitisneverthelessparasitic.Itlosesallcriteriafordistinguishingbetweenformalisticritual,
systematicdistortion,choreographedconsent,manipulatedpublicopinion,andtherealthing.
17
Theparticipatorymodelofdemocracymaintainsthatwhatmakesforgoodleadersalsomakesforgoodcitizensactiveparticipationinrulingandbeingruled(i.e.,in
theexerciseofpower)andalsoinpublicwillandopinionformation.Democracyinthissensewouldallowallcitizens,andnotonlyelites,toacquireademocratic
politicalculture.Foritisthroughpoliticalexperiencethatonedevelopsaconceptionofcivicvirtue,learnstotoleratediversity,totemperfundamentalismandegoism,
andtobecomeableandwillingtocompromise.
18
Hencetheinsistencethatwithoutpublicspacesfortheactiveparticipationofthecitizenryinrulingandbeingruled,
withoutadecisivenarrowingofthegapbetweenrulersandruled,tothepointofitsabolition,politiesaredemocraticinnameonly.
19
Forthemostpart,however,whenitcomestoconceptualizingalternatives,participationtheoristsofferinstitutionalmodelsthataremeanttosubstituteforratherthan
complementtheallegedlyundemocratic(and/orbourgeois)formsofrepresentativegovernmentthatexisttoday.
20
Whetherthetheoristharkensbacktoanidealized
modeloftheGreekpolis,totherepublicantraditionofthelatemedievalcitystate,ortothenewformsofdemocracygeneratedwithinthemilieusoftheworkers'
movement(councilcommunism,revolutionarysyndicalism),ineachcasethealternativeispresentedasthesingleorganizationalprincipleforsocietyasawhole.
Accordingly,theunderlyingthrustofthesemodelsisthededifferentiationofsociety,thestate,andtheeconomy.Smallwonderthatparticipationistsinturnareaccused
bytheiropponentsofutopianismand/orantimodernism.
21
Tosumup,thisdebateleavesuswiththefollowingantinomy:Contemporarydemocratictheoryinvolveseithersomeratherundemocraticadjustmentstothe
"exigenciesofcomplexindustrialsocieties"coupledwithanabandonmentofthenormativecoreof

Page8
theveryconceptofdemocracy,oritprofferssomewhathollownormativevisionsthatcannotbereconciledwiththeinstitutionalrequirementsofmodernsociety.
22
RightsOrientedLiberalismVs.Communitarianism
Thedebatebetweenpoliticalliberalsandcommunitariansreproducessomeoftheargumentsdescribedabovebutonadifferentterrain.Inonerespect,bothsidesin
thisdebatechallengetheelite/pluralistmodelofdemocracy.
23
Bothrejecttheantinormative,empiricist,utilitarianstraininthismodelandbothseektodevelopa
convincingnormativetheoryofdemocraticlegitimacyorjustice.Thedisputeisoverhowtoformulatesuchatheory.Despitethisshiftinemphasis,however,this
debatealsoculminatesinasetofantinomicpositionsfromwhichitseemsunabletoextricateitself.
Atthecenterofthecontroversyaretwointerrelatedissues,oneepistemological,theotherpolitical.Thefirstrevolvesaroundthequestionofwhetheritispossibleto
articulateaformal,universalistic(deontological)conceptionofjusticewithoutpresupposingasubstantive(historicallyandculturallyspecific)conceptofthe
good.
24
Thesecondrevolvesaroundthequestionofhowfreedomcanberealizedinthemodernworld.Atissuehereiswhethertheideaoffreedomshouldbe
explicatedprimarilyfromthestandpointofindividualrightsorofthecommunity'ssharednorms.
25
Eachsidecomesupwithadifferent,indeedopposed,setof
responsesastowhatconstitutesthelegitimatingprinciplesofaconstitutionaldemocracy.Intheprocess,however,theveryconceptionofliberaldemocracy
disintegratesintoitscomponentparts.
Liberaltheoristsseetherespectforindividualrightsandtheprincipleofpoliticalneutralityasthestandardforlegitimacyinconstitutionaldemocracies.Thecore
premiseofrightsorientedliberalismisthatindividualsquaindividualshavemoralrightsthatserveasconstraintsongovernmentandonothersconstraintsthatare
underthecontroloftherightsholder.Theyhavetheserightsnotonthegroundsofsomesocialconvention,aggregatecommonutility,tradition,ordispensationfrom
God,butbyvirtueoftheirhavingsome"property"(moralautonomy,humandignity)thatconstitutesthemasbearersofrights.
26
Theliberalseesindi

Page9
vidualautonomy,moralegalitarianism,anduniversalismasinherentintheideaofmoralrights.
27
Assuch,rightsconstitutetheheartofaconceptionofjusticethat
makesplausibletheclaimtolegitimacyofanymodernpolity.Lawandpoliticaldecisionsarebindingtothedegreetowhichtheyrespectindividualrights.
28
Thecommunitariancritiqueoftherightsthesisfocusesonitsindividualistpresuppositionsanduniversalistclaims.Withrespecttothefirst,communitariansarguethat
theliberalidealsofmoralautonomyandindividualselfdevelopmentarebasedonanatomistic,abstract,andultimatelyincoherentconceptoftheselfasthesubjectof
rights.
29
Thisallegedlyleadstoafocusonnonpoliticalformsoffreedom(negativeliberty)andanimpoverishedconceptionofpoliticalidentity,agency,andethicallife.
Accordingly,thecommunitariansinvokeasetofempiricalandnormativeargumentsagainsttheseassumptions.First,theyarguethatindividualsaresituatedwithinan
historicalandsocialcontexttheyaresocializedintocommunitiesthroughwhichtheyderivetheirindividualandcollectiveidentity,language,worldconcepts,moral
categories,etc.Hencetheempiricalprimacyofthesocialovertheindividualisassertedagainsttheallegedpriorityoftheasocialindividualtosociety.Second,onthe
normativelevel,communitarianschargethatliberalsfailtoseethatcommunitiesareindependentsourcesofvalueandthattherearecommunaldutiesandvirtues
(loyalty,civicvirtue)distinctfromdutiestoothersquatheirabstracthumanity.Indeed,dutiesofloyaltyandmembershipareandmustbeprimary.
Asfarasuniversalismgoes,communitariansclaimthatwhattheliberalseesasuniversalnormsgroundedintheuniversalcharacterofhumanity(dignityormoral
autonomy)areinfactparticularnormsembeddedinsharedunderstandingsofspecificcommunities.Theindividualcannothaveafirmbasisformoraljudgmentwithout
gettingitfromacommunitytowhichoneiscommitted.Thestrongestclaimisthattherearenodutiespertainingtoabstractmanbutonlytomembers:Theproperbasis
ofmoraltheoryisthecommunityanditsgood,nottheindividualandherrights.Indeed,individualshaverightstothedegreetowhichtheseflowfromthecommon
good.Accordingly,theideaofmoralrightsisanemptyuniversalismthatmistakenlyabstractsfromtheonlyrealbasisof

Page10
moralclaims,thecommunity.Onlyonthebasisofasharedconceptionofthegoodlife,onlywithintheframeworkofasubstantiveethicalpoliticalcommunity(witha
specificpoliticalculture)canweleadmeaningfulmorallivesandenjoytruefreedom.
Forthosecommunitarianswhoseethemselvesasdemocrats,
30
theconceptoffreedomthushastodonotwiththeideaofmoralrightsbutwiththespecificwayin
whichagentscometodecidewhattheywantandoughttodo.Takentogether,theempiricalandnormativecriticismsoftherightsthesisimplythatfreedommusthave
itsoriginallocusnotintheisolatedindividualbutinthesocietythatisthemediumofindividuation:inthestructures,institutions,practicesofthelargersocialwhole.
Civicvirtueratherthannegativeliberty,thepublicgoodasdistinctfromtheright,democraticparticipationunlikeindividualrights(andtheconcomitantadversarial
politicalculture),involveacommunalpracticeofcitizenshipthatshouldpervadetheinstitutionsofsocietyonalllevelsandbecomehabitualizedinthecharacter,
customs,moralsentimentsofeachcitizen.Byimplication,andonthestrongestversionoftheseclaims,asocietyinwhichclaimsofindividualrightsproliferatecannot
beasolidarycommunitybutmustbealienated,anomic,privatized,competitiveandlackinginmoralsubstance.
Thisdebatealsoleadstoanapparentlyunresolvableantinomy.Ontheoneside,theliberaltraditionitself,withitsfocusonindividualrightsanditsillusionsaboutthe
possibilityofpoliticalneutrality,appearsasthesourceofegoistic,disintegrativetendenciesinmodernsocietyandhenceasthemainimpedimenttoachievinga
democraticsocietypredicatedoncivicvirtue.Theothersidecounterswiththecontentionthatmodernsocietiesarepreciselynotcommunitiesintegratedarounda
singleconceptionofthegoodlife.Moderncivilsocietiesarecharacterizedbyapluralityofformsoflifetheyarestructurallydifferentiatedandsociallyheterogeneous.
Thus,tobeabletoleadamorallife,individualautonomyandindividualrightsmustbesecured.Onthisview,itisdemocracy,withitsemphasisonconsensus,orat
leastonmajorityrule,thatisdangeroustoliberty,unlesssuitablyrestrictedbyconstitutionallyguaranteedbasicrightsthatalonecanrenderthemlegitimateintheeyes
ofminorities.

Page11
TheDefenseofWelfareStateVs.NeoconservativeAntistatism
Thedebatebetweendefendersofthewelfarestateanditsneolaissezfairecriticshasalsobeengoingaroundincircles,albeitforashortertimethanthecontroversy
plaguingdemocratictheory.
31
Argumentsforthewelfarestatehavebeenmadeonbotheconomicandpoliticalgrounds.
32
AccordingtoKeynesianeconomicdoctrine,
welfarestatepoliciesservetostimulatetheforcesofeconomicgrowthandtopreventdeeprecessionsbyencouraginginvestmentandstabilizingdemand.Fiscaland
monetaryincentivesforinvestorscoupledwithsocialinsurance,transferpayments,andpublicservicesforworkerscompensateforthedysfunctions,uncertainties,and
risksofthemarketmechanismandcontributetooverallstability.Highgrowthrates,fullemployment,andlowinflationshouldbetheresultofthispolicy.
Thepoliticalaspectsofthewelfarestatewouldalsoincreasestabilityandproductivity.Ontheoneside,legalentitlementstostateservicesandtransferpayments
simultaneouslyaidthosewhofeelthenegativeeffectsofthemarketsystemwhileremovingpotentiallyexplosiveneedsorissuesfromthearenaofindustrialconflict.On
theotherside,therecognitionoftheformalroleoflaborunionsincollectivebargainingandintheformationofpublicpolicy"balances"theasymmetricalpowerrelation
betweenlaborandcapitalandmitigatesclassconflict.
33
Theoverallincreaseinsocialjusticewouldleadtofewerstrikes,greaterproductivity,andanoverallconsensus
ofcapitalandlaborthattheyhaveamutualinterestinthesuccessofthepoliticaleconomicsystem:Growthandproductivityserveeveryone.Thewelfarestatewould
finallydeliverontheclaimofliberalcapitalistsocietiestobeegalitarianandjust,bysupportingtheworstoffandbycreatingthepreconditionsforatrueequalityof
opportunity,whichintheeyesofdefendersofthewelfarestateistheonlycontextinwhichcivilandpoliticalrightscanfunctioninauniversalisticmanner.Insteadof
beingconcernedbytheanomalousstatusofthesocalledsocialrights,foratheoristsuchasT.H.Marshalltheserepresentthehighestandmostfundamentaltypeof
citizenrights.
34
Certainlytheremarkablegrowthrates,relativestability,andincreaseinthestandardoflivinginpostwarWesterncapitalist

Page12
economieshave,untilrecently,madetheargumentsforstateinterventionconvincingtoallbutaveryfew.Inanewcontextofmorelimitedpossibilitiesforgrowth,
neoconservativedefendersofareturnto''laissezfaire"criticizeboththeeconomicandpoliticalclaimsofthewelfarestatemodel.Unfortunatelyforthelatter,their
argumentsalsocarryweight.Indeed,itwasnotdifficultforthesecriticstopointtothehighratesofunemploymentandinflationandlowgrowthratesthathaveplagued
Westerncapitalisteconomiessincethe1970sasproofthatstatebureaucraticregulationoftheeconomyiscounterproductive.Theycanalsopointtosuccessesin
thesedomainswheretheirownpolicieshavebeenapplied.
Ontheeconomicfront,threeclaimsaremadeagainstthepoliciesofwelfarestates:thattheyleadtoadisincentivetoinvestandadisincentivetowork,andthatthey
constituteaseriousthreattotheviabilityoftheindependentmiddleclass.
35
Theburdenimposedbytheregulatoryandfiscalpoliciesoncapitaltogetherwiththe
powerofunionstoextracthighwagesallegedlycontributetodeclininggrowthratesand,inacontextofseverecompetition,leadtotheperceptionthatinvestmentin
homemarketswillbeunprofitable.
36
Thedisincentivetoworkisattributedtoextensivesocialsecurityandunemploymentprovisionsthatallowworkerstoavoid
undesirablejobsandtoescapethenormalpressureofmarketforces.Thequantityofavailableworkersshrinksaswholesectorsoftheworkingclassareturnedinto
welfarestateclients,whiletheworkethicdeclinesasworkersbecomesimultaneouslymoredemandingandlesswillingtospendeffortontheirwork.Finally,the
independentmiddleclassfindsitselfsqueezedbyhighratesoftaxationandinflation.Theemergenceofthe"newmiddleclass"ofcivilserviceprofessionalsandhigher
levelbureaucratsonlyexacerbatestheseproblemsbecausethesestratahaveaninterestinreproducingandexpandingtheclientpopulationonwhichtheirjobs
depend.Welfarestateeconomicpoliciesarethusantinomicinmorethanonerespect:Policiesmeanttostimulatedemandundermineinvestment,policiesmeantto
provideeconomicsecurityforworkersunderminethewillingnesstowork,thepolicyoftemperingtheundesirablesideeffectsderivingfromunregulatedmarketforces
createsevengreatereconomicproblemsintheformofavastlyexpanded,expensive,unproductivestatesector.

Page13
Onthepoliticalfront,neoconservativesarguethattheverymechanismsintroducedbywelfarestatestoresolveconflictsandcreategreaterequalityofopportunity,
namelylegalentitlementsandtheexpandedstatesector,haveledtonewconflictsandhaveviolatedtherightsandlibertyofsomeforthesakeofothers.Byimpinging
uponthecorerightofliberalmarketsystems,namely,privateproperty,stateinterventionandregulationundermineboththelibertyofentrepreneursandtheincentive
toachieveonthepartoftheworkingpopulation.Farfromincreasingsocialjusticeorequalityofopportunity,welfareunderminesthepreconditionsforbothofthese.
Inshort,itrewardsfailureratherthansuccess.Inthenameofequality,moreover,stateinterventionintheeverydaylivesofitsclientsposesaseverethreattoliberty,
privacy,andautonomy.
Inaddition,thesemechanismshaveallegedlygeneratedasetofrisingexpectationsandincreasingdemandsthatleadtoanoverallsituationofungovernability.
37
Indeed,theveryinstitutionsofwelfarestatemassdemocracythatpromisedtochannelpoliticalconflictintoacceptableandharmlessforms(theendofideology)and
tointegrateworkersespeciallyintothepoliticalandeconomicsystemoflatecapitalism(deradicalization)i.e.,thecompetitive(catchall)partysystembasedon
universalsuffrage,interestgrouppolitics,collectivebargaining,andextensivesocialrightsleadtoadangerousoverloadofthepoliticalsystemandacrisisof
authority.
38
Inshort,therightsexplosionthatsoirritatesdemocraticcommunitariansisevenmorealarmingtoneoconservativecriticsof"statism."Byplacing
obligationsuponitselfthatitcannotpossiblyfulfill,
39
thestatecreatesrisingyetunsatisfiableexpectations,becomesoverexpandedandweakatthesametime,and
suffersfromadangerouslossofauthority.Indeed,onthisview,thereisacentralpoliticalcontradictioninherentinthewelfarestate:Inorderfortheperformance
capacityofthestatetobeenhancedvisvisthenumberofdemands,theveryfreedoms,modesofparticipation,andsetsofrightsassociatedwithitwouldhavetobe
curtailed.
40
Theneolaissezfaireeconomicandpoliticalalternatives,however,donotescapethefateofbecomingmerelyoneoftheuntenablesidesofanantinomicstructure.
"Supplyside"economistsseekto

Page14
dismantlethewelfarestateinordertoeliminatethe"disincentive"toinvest,buttodosowouldbetoabolishpreciselythose"buffers"thatstabilizedemand.
41
Ifthe
socioeconomicsupportsforworkersandthepoorareterminatedinthenameofrefurbishingtheworkethic,thecompulsionofthemarketwillcertainlyreturn,butso
willthegrossinjustices,dissatisfaction,instability,andclassconfrontationsthatcharacterizedthecapitalisteconomiespriortowelfarestatepolicies.
Ofcourse,theattackonthewelfarestateispredicatedontheideathatthereisanunlimitedgrowthpotentialformarketablegoodsandservicesthatwouldbe
unleashedoncethestateispushedbackintoitsproper,minimalterrain.Privatizationandderegulationwouldallegedlyrestorecompetitionandendtheinflationof
politicaldemands.However,thepoliticalpresuppositionsforsuchapolicyconflictwithitsgoalsofsocialpeaceandsocialjustice.Necessarilyrepressivepolicies
regardingtherighttoassociateandeffortstoabolishsocialrightsrangingfromsocialsecuritytounemploymentcompensation,nottomentionwelfare,arescarcely
conducivetoconsensus.Whilethe"freedomthreatening"dimensionsofstateintervention,namelytheregulationofproprietors,thesupervisionandcontrolofclients,
andthespiralingcycleofdependency,wouldend,sowouldallofthegainsinsocialjustice,equality,andrights.Moreover,effortstorestorestateauthoritybylimiting
itsscopeandbyshieldingitfrompopulardemandswouldnotreducestateactivismbutwouldsimplyshiftitfromthepoliticaltotheadministrativeterrain.For,ifone
reducestheabilityofdemocraticinstitutionssuchasthepartysystem,elections,andparliamentstoprovideforthearticulationofpoliticalconflict,alternativechannels,
suchastheneocorporatistarrangementsproliferatinginWesternEurope,willdevelop.Whilethesearrangementssuccessfullyshieldthestatefromexcessdemands,
theyhardlyindicateashiftfromstatetomarketregulation.Thustheneolaissezfairealternativetothe"crisis"ofthewelfarestateisasinternallycontradictoryasthe
illnessitpurportstocure.
Weareaccordinglyleftwiththefollowingantinomy:Eitherwechoosemoresocialengineering,morepaternalismandleveling,inshort,morestatism,inthenameof
egalitarianismandsocialrights,orweoptforthefreemarketand/ortherefurbishingofauthori

Page15
tariansocialandpoliticalformsoforganizationandrelinquishthedemocratic,egalitariancomponentsofourpoliticalcultureinordertoblockfurtherbureaucratization
ofeverydaylife.Itseemsthatliberaldemocraticmarketsocietiescannotcoexistwith,norcantheyexistwithout,thewelfarestate.
RevivaloftheConceptofCivilSociety
TheearlymodernconceptofcivilsocietywasrevivedfirstandforemostinthestrugglesofthedemocraticoppositionsinEasternEuropeagainstauthoritariansocialist
partystates.Despitedifferenteconomicandgeopoliticalcontexts,itdoesnotseemterriblyproblematictoapplytheconceptalsotothe"transitionsfromauthoritarian
rule"inSouthernEuropeandLatinAmerica,aboveallbecauseofthecommontasksharedwiththeoppositionsoftheEasttoconstitutenewandstabledemocracies.
ButwhyshouldsuchaconceptbeparticularlyrelevanttotheWest?IsnottherevivalofthediscourseofcivilsocietyintheEastandtheSouthsimplypartofaproject
toattainwhattheadvancedcapitalistdemocraciesalreadyhave:civilsocietyguaranteedbytheruleoflaw,civilrights,parliamentarydemocracy,andamarket
economy?CouldonenotarguethatstrugglesinthenameofcreatingcivilandpoliticalsocietyespeciallyintheEastareakindofrepeatofthegreatdemocratic
movementsoftheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturiesthatcreatedatypeofdualitybetweenstateandcivilsocietywhichremainsthebasisforWesterndemocraticand
liberalinstitutions?Andisn'tthisanadmissionthattheelitetheorists,theneoconservatives,oratbesttheliberalsarerightafterall?Putthisway,therevivalofthe
discourseofcivilsocietyappearstobejustthat,arevival,withlittlepoliticalortheoreticalimportforWesternliberaldemocracies.Andifthisisso,whywouldacivil
societyorientedperspectiveprovideawayoutoftheantinomiesplaguingWesternpoliticalandsocialthought?
SeveralinterrelatedissuesthathaveemergedinthecurrentrevivalgobeyondthemodelofthehistoricaloriginsofcivilsocietyintheWestandthereforehave
importantlessonstoofferestablishedliberaldemocracies.Theseincludetheconceptionofselflimitation,theideaofcivilsocietyascomprisedofsocialmovementsas
wellas

Page16
asetofinstitutions,theorientationtocivilsocietyasanewterrainofdemocratization,
42
theinfluenceofcivilonpoliticalandeconomicsociety,andfinallyan
understandingthattheliberationofcivilsocietyisnotnecessarilyidenticalwiththecreationofbourgeoissocietybutratherinvolvesachoicebetweenapluralityof
typesofcivilsociety.Allthesenotionspointbeyondarestrictionofthetheoryofcivilsocietymerelytotheconstituentphaseofnewdemocracies.
Theideaofselflimitation,alltoooftenconfusedwiththestrategicconstraintsonemancipatorymovements,isactuallybasedonlearningintheserviceofdemocratic
principle.Thepostrevolutionaryorselflimiting"revolutions"oftheEastarenolongermotivatedbyfundamentalistprojectsofsuppressingbureaucracy,economic
rationality,orsocialdivision.Movementsrootedincivilsocietyhavelearnedfromtherevolutionarytraditionthatthesefundamentalistprojectsleadtothebreakdown
ofsocietalsteeringandproductivityandthesuppressionofsocialplurality,allofwhicharethenreconstitutedbytheforcesoforderonlybydramaticallyauthoritarian
means.Suchanoutcomeleadstothecollapseoftheformsofselforganizationthatinmanycaseswerethemajorcarriersoftherevolutionaryprocess:revolutionary
societies,councils,movements.Paradoxically,theselflimitationofjustsuchactorsallowsthecontinuationoftheirsocialroleandinfluencebeyondtheconstituentand
intotheconstitutedphase.
Thiscontinuationofaroleofcivilsocietybeyondthephaseoftransitioncanbecoupledwithdomestication,demobilization,andrelativeatomization.Thatwouldmean
convergencewithsocietyastheWesternelitepluralistsseeit.Butinthepostauthoritariansettingsactorswhohaverejectedfundamentalismandraisedcivilsocietyto
anormativeprincipleshowthatwedohaveachoice.Whilethetotaldemocratizationofstateandeconomycannotbetheirgoal,civilsocietyitself,asTocquevillewas
firsttorealize,isanimportantterrainofdemocratization,ofdemocraticinstitutionbuilding.AndifEastEuropeanoppositionalsweredriventothisalternativeatfirst
onlybyblockagesinthesphereofstateorganization,thereiscertainlyagoodchancethattheideaofthefurtherdemocratizationofcivilsocietywillgainemphasisin
thefaceoftheinevitabledisappointments,visibleaboveallinHungary,(East)

Page17
Germany,andCzechoslovakia,withtheemergenceofthetypicalpracticesofWesterndemocracies.Thus,theactorsofthenewpoliticalsocietieswoulddowell,if
theyvaluetheirlongtermlegitimacy,topromotedemocraticinstitutionbuildingincivilsociety,evenifthisseemstoincreasethenumberofsocialdemandsonthem.
Theideaofthedemocratizationofcivilsociety,unlikethatofitsmererevival,isextremelypertinenttoexistingWesternsocieties.Indeed,thetendencytosee
extrainstitutionalmovementsandinitiativesinadditiontosettledinstitutionsasintegralpartsofcivilsocietyisfoundearlierinWesternthaninEasternexperience,to
whichitisrapidlybeingextendedprimarilybynewandoldmovementsandinitiatives.ItisquitepossiblethatsomeoftheemergingEasternconstitutionswillembody
newsensitivitytoanactivecivilsociety,asensitivitythatshouldinturninfluenceWesternconstitutionaldevelopments.Thesepotentialnormativegainswillconfirm,in
theEastaswellastheWest,theideathattherecanbeverydifferenttypesofcivilsociety:moreorlessinstitutionalized,moreorlessdemocratic,moreorlessactive.
DiscussionsinthemilieuofSolidarityinPolandraisedthesechoicesexplicitlyasearlyas1980,alongwiththechoiceofpoliticalvs.antipoliticalmodelsofcivilsociety.
InthecurrentwaveofeconomicliberalisminPoland,Czechoslovakia,andHungary,anotherquestioninevitablyarisesconcerningtheconnectionbetweeneconomy
andcivilsocietyandthechoicebetweenaneconomic,individualisticsocietyandacivilsocietybasedonsolidarity,protectednotonlyagainstthebureaucraticstate
butalsoagainsttheselfregulatingmarketeconomy.Thisdebate,too,willbedirectlyrelevantinWesterncontexts,asitalreadyhasbeeninLatinAmerica,and
converselyWesterncontroversiesaroundthewelfarestateandthe"newsocialmovements"shouldhavemuchintellectualmaterialtoofferEasternradicaldemocrats
hopingtoprotecttheresourceofsolidaritywithoutpaternalism.
Theaimofourbookistofurtherdevelopandsystematicallyjustifytheideaofcivilsociety,reconceivedinpartaroundanotionofselflimitingdemocratizing
movementsseekingtoexpandandprotectspacesforbothnegativelibertyandpositivefreedomandtorecreateegalitarianformsofsolidaritywithoutimpairingeco

Page18
nomicselfregulation.Beforeturningtothistask,wewouldliketoconcludethisintroductionbyillustratingtheimportant,andperhapsdecisive,contributionofour
theoryofcivilsocietytothethreetheoreticalantinomiesmentionedabove.
43
CivilSocietyandContemporaryPoliticalTheory
Itmightseemthatourpositionisalreadyanticipatedbyoneofthesixtheoreticaltraditionsinvolvedinthedebatesdepictedabove,namelythepluralistversionofthe
elitedemocratictraditionofpoliticaltheory.
44
Indeed,thepluralists'additiontotheelitemodelofdemocracyispreciselyaconceptionofa"thirdrealm"differentiated
fromtheeconomyandthestate(whatwecall"civilsociety").
45
Onthepluralistanalysis,ahighlyarticulatedcivilsocietywithcrosscuttingcleavages,overlapping
membershipsofgroups,andsocialmobilityisthepresuppositionforastabledemocraticpolity,aguaranteeagainstpermanentdominationbyanyonegroupand
againsttheemergenceoffundamentalistmassmovementsandantidemocraticideologies.
46
Moreover,acivilsocietysoconstitutedisconsideredtobecapableof
acquiringinfluenceoverthepoliticalsystemthroughthearticulationofintereststhatare"aggregated"bypoliticalpartiesandlegislaturesandbroughttobearonpolitical
decisionmaking,itselfunderstoodalongthelinesoftheelitemodelofdemocracy.
Althoughweusemanyofthetermsofthisanalysisinourworkoncivilsociety,ourapproachdiffersinseveralkeyrespectsfromthatofthepluralists.First,wedonot
accepttheviewthatthe"civicculture"mostappropriatetoamoderncivilsocietyisonebasedoncivilprivatismandpoliticalapathy.Asiswellknown,thepluralists
valueinvolvementinone'sfamily,privateclubs,voluntaryassociations,andthelikeasactivitiesthatdeflectfrompoliticalparticipationoractivismonthepartof
citizens.
47
Itisthiswhichallegedlymakesforastabledemocraticpolity.Moreover,itmakesnodifferencetothismodelwhattheinternalstructureoftheinstitutions
andorganizationsofcivilsocietyis.
48
Indeed,intheirhastetoreplace"utopian(participatorydemocratic)principles"withrealism,thepluraliststendtoconsider
attemptstoapplytheegalitariannormsofcivilsocietytosocialinstitutionsasnaive.
49

Page19
Wedonotsharethisview.Instead,webuilduponthethesisofoneofthemostimportantpredecessorsofthepluralistapproach,AlexisdeTocqueville,whoargued
thatwithoutactiveparticipationonthepartofcitizensinegalitarianinstitutionsandcivilassociations,aswellasinpoliticallyrelevantorganizations,therewillbeno
waytomaintainthedemocraticcharacterofthepoliticalcultureorofsocialandpoliticalinstitutions.Preciselybecausemoderncivilsocietyisbasedonegalitarian
principlesanduniversalinclusion,experienceinarticulatingthepoliticalwillandincollectivedecisionmakingiscrucialtothereproductionofdemocracy.
This,ofcourse,isthepointthatisalwaysmadebyparticipationtheorists.Ourapproachdiffersfromtheirsinarguingformore,notless,structuraldifferentiation.We
takeseriouslythenormativeprinciplesdefendedbyradicaldemocrats,butwelocatethegenesisofdemocraticlegitimacyandthechancesfordirectparticipationnot
insomeidealized,dedifferentiatedpolitybutwithinahighlydifferentiatedmodelofcivilsocietyitself.Thisshiftsthecoreproblematicofdemocratictheoryawayfrom
descriptiveand/orspeculativemodelstotheissueoftherelationandchannelsofinfluencebetweencivilandpoliticalsocietyandbetweenbothandthestate,onthe
oneside,andtotheinstitutionalmakeupandinternalarticulationofcivilsocietyitself,ontheother.Moreover,webelievethatthedemocratizationofcivilsocietythe
family,associationallife,andthepublicspherenecessarilyhelpsopenuptheframeworkofpoliticalpartiesandrepresentativeinstitutions.
50
Indeed,theseconcernsopenthewaytoadynamicconceptionofcivilsociety,onethatavoidstheapologeticthrustofmostpluralistanalyses.Farfromviewingsocial
movementsasantitheticaltoeitherthedemocraticpoliticalsystemortoaproperlyorganizedsocialsphere(thepluralists'view),weconsiderthemtobeakeyfeature
ofavital,modern,civilsocietyandanimportantformofcitizenparticipationinpubliclife.Yetwedonotseesocialmovementsasprefiguringaformofcitizen
participationthatwillorevenoughttosubstitutefortheinstitutionalarrangementsofrepresentativedemocracy(theradicaldemocraticposition).Inourview,social
movementsfortheexpansionofrights,forthedefenseoftheautonomyofcivilsociety,andforitsfurtherdemocratizationare

Page20
whatkeepademocraticpoliticalculturealive.Amongotherthings,movementsbringnewissuesandvaluesintothepublicsphereandcontributetoreproducingthe
consensusthattheelite/pluralistmodelofdemocracypresupposesbutneverbotherstoaccountfor.
51
Movementscanandshouldsupplementandshouldnotaimto
replacecompetitivepartysystems.Ourconceptionofcivilsocietythusretainsthenormativecoreofdemocratictheorywhileremainingcompatiblewiththestructural
presuppositionsofmodernity.Finally,whilewealsodifferentiatetheeconomyfromcivilsociety,wedifferfromthepluralistsinthatwedonotsealofftheborders
betweenthemonthebasisofanallegedlysacrosanctfreedomofcontractorpropertyright.Nordoweseekto"reembed"theeconomyinsociety.Instead,onour
analysis,theprinciplesofcivilsocietycanbebroughttobearoneconomicinstitutionswithinwhatwecalleconomicsociety.Thequestionhere,asinthecaseofthe
polity,iswhatchannelsandreceptorsofinfluencedo,can,andoughttoexist.
52
Indeed,weareabletoposesuchquestionsonthebasisofourmodelwithoutrisking
thechargesofutopianismorantimodernismsofrequentlyanddeservedlyleveledagainstworkerbasedversionsofradicaldemocracy.
Itisalsoourthesisthatthetensionsbetweenrightsorientedliberalismand,atleast,democraticallyorientedcommunitarianismcanbeconsiderablydiminishedifnot
entirelyovercomeonthebasisofanewtheoryofcivilsociety.Whiletheideaofrightsandofademocraticpoliticalcommunityderivefromdistincttraditionsin
politicalphilosophy,todaytheybelongtothesamepoliticalculture.Theyneednotbeconstruedasantithetical,althoughonanempiricalleveltherightsofanindividual
mayconflictwithmajorityruleand"thepublicinterest,"necessitatingabalancingbetweenthetwosides.
53
Norisitnecessarytoviewtheseasbasedontwoconflicting
setsofprinciplesorpresuppositions,suchthatonecouldaccommodatethefirstsetonlyinsofarasitisinstrumentaltotheachievementorpreservationoftheother.On
thecontrary,wecontendthatwhatisbestinrightsorientedliberalismanddemocraticallyorientedcommunitarianismconstitutestwomutuallyreinforcingandpartly
overlappingsetsofprinciples.Twostepsarenecessarytoarguethisthesisandtotranscendtherelevantantinomies.First,onemustshowthatthereisaphilosophical

Page21
frameworkthatcanprovideapoliticalethicabletoredeemthenormativeclaimsofbothrightsorientedliberalismandradicaldemocracy.Second,onemustrevisethe
conceptionofcivilsocietyastheprivatesphere,sharedbyboththeoreticalparadigms,inordertograsptheinstitutionalimplicationsofsuchanethic.
Wealsodefendtheprinciplesofuniversalityandautonomytowhichtherightsthesisiswed,butwedenythatthiscommitsuseithertotheliberalnotionofneutralityor
toanindividualistontology.Thecommunitariansareright:Muchofliberaltheory,especiallythecontracttraditionfromHobbestoRawls,hasreliedoneitheroneor
bothoftheseprinciples.
54
However,theHabermasiantheoryofdiscourseethics,onwhichwerely,providesawaytodevelopconceptionsofuniversalityand
autonomythatarefreeofsuchpresuppositions.Onthistheory,universalitydoesnotmeanneutralitywithrespecttoapluralityofvaluesorformsoflifebutrather
refers,inthefirstinstance,tothemetanormsofsymmetricreciprocity
55
thataretoactasregulativeprinciplesguidingdiscursiveprocessesofconflictresolutionand,in
thesecondinstance,tothosenormsorprinciplestowhichallthosewhoarepotentiallyaffectedcanagree.Theprocedureofuniversalizationdefendedhereinvolves
anactualratherthanahypotheticaldialogue.Itdoesnotrequirethatoneabstractfromone'sconcretesituation,needinterpretations,orinterestsinordertoengagein
anunbiasedmoraltestingofprinciples.Instead,itrequiresthatthesebefreelyarticulated.Italsorequiresthatallthosepotentiallyaffectedbyinstitutionalizednorms
(lawsorpolicies)beopentoamultiplicityofperspectives.Accordingly,universalityisaregulativeprincipleofadiscursiveprocessinandthroughwhichparticipants
reasontogetheraboutwhichvalues,principles,needinterpretationsmeritbeinginstitutionalizedascommonnorms.
56
Thus,theatomisticdisembodiedindividual
allegedlypresupposedbyprocedural(deontological)ethicsismostemphaticallynotthebasisofthisapproach.Assumingthatindividualandcollectiveidentitiesare
acquiredthroughcomplexprocessesofsocializationthatinvolvebothinternalizingsocialnormsortraditions,anddevelopingreflectiveandcriticalcapacitiesvisvis
norms,principles,andtraditions,thistheoryhasatitscoreanintersubjective,interactiveconceptionofbothindividualityandautonomy.Itisthusableto

Page22
accommodatethecommunitarianinsightsintothesocialcoreofhumannaturewithoutabandoningtheideasofeitheruniversalityormoralrights.Indeed,discourse
ethicsprovidesaphilosophicalbasisfordemocraticlegitimacythatpresupposesvalidrights,evenifnotalloftheserightsarederivablefromit.
57
Whileitisofcourseindividualswhohaverights,theconceptofrightsdoesnothavetorestonphilosophicalormethodologicalindividualism,nor,forthatmatter,on
theideaofnegativelibertyalone.Althoughmostliberalandcommunitariantheoristshaveassumedthatsuchaconceptionoffreedomandofindividualismis
presupposedbytheveryconceptofrights,webelievethatonlysomerightsinvolveprimarilynegativelibertywhilenonerequiresaphilosophicallyatomisticconception
ofindividuality.Itisherethatarevisedconceptionofcivilsociety,togetherwithanewtheoryofrights,mustenterintotheanalysis.Foreverytheoryofrights,every
theoryofdemocracy,impliesamodelofsociety.Unfortunately,communitariansandliberalsalsoagreethatthesocietalanalogueoftherightsthesisisacivilsociety
construedastheprivatesphere,composedofanagglomerationofautonomousbutegoistic,exclusivelyselfregarding,competitive,possessiveindividualswhose
negativelibertyitisthepolity'stasktoprotect.Itistheirassessmentsandnottheiranalysisofthisformofsocietythatdiverge.
Butthisisonlyonepossibleversionofcivilsocietyandcertainlynottheonlyonethatcanbe''derived"fromtherightsthesis.Onlyifoneconstruespropertytobenot
simplyakeyrightbutthecoreoftheconceptionofrightsonly,thatis,ifoneplacesthephilosophyofpossessiveindividualismattheheartofone'sconceptionofcivil
societyandthenreducesciviltobourgeoissocietydoestherightsthesiscometobedefinedinthisway.
58
If,however,onedevelopsamorecomplexmodelofcivil
society,recognizingthatithaspublicandassociationalcomponentsaswellasindividual,privateones,andif,inaddition,oneseesthattheideaofmoralautonomy
doesnotpresupposepossessiveindividualism,
59
thentherightsthesisbeginstolookabitdifferent.Inshort,rightsdonotonlysecurenegativeliberty,theautonomyof
private,disconnectedindividuals.Theyalsosecuretheautonomous(freedfromstatecontrol)communicativeinteractionofindividualswithoneanotherinthepublic
andprivatespheresofcivilsociety,aswellasanew

Page23
relationofindividualstothepublicandthepoliticalspheresofsocietyandstate(including,ofcourse,citizenshiprights).Moralrightsarethusnotbydefinitionapolitical
orantipolitical,nordotheyconstituteanexclusivelyprivatedomainwithrespecttowhichthestatemustlimititself.Onthecontrary,therightstocommunication,
assembly,andassociation,amongothers,constitutethepublicandassociationalspheresofcivilsocietyasspheresofpositivefreedomwithinwhichagentscan
collectivelydebateissuesofcommonconcern,actinconcert,assertnewrights,andexerciseinfluenceonpolitical(andpotentiallyeconomic)society.Democraticas
wellasliberalprincipleshavetheirlocushere.Accordingly,someformofdifferentiationofcivilsociety,thestate,andtheeconomyisthebasisforbothmodern
democraticandliberalinstitutions.Thelatterpresupposeneitheratomisticnorcommunalbutratherassociatedselves.Moreover,onthisconceptiontheradical
oppositionbetweenthephilosophicalfoundationsandsocietalpresuppositionsofrightsorientedliberalismanddemocraticallyorientedcommunitarianismdissolves.
Thisconceptionofcivilsocietydoesnot,ofcourse,solvethequestionoftherelationbetweennegativeandpositiveliberty,butitdoesplacethisissuewithina
commonsocietalandphilosophicalterrain.Itisonthisterrainthatwelearnhowtocompromise,takereflectivedistancefromourownperspectivesoastoentertain
others,learntovaluedifference,recognizeorcreateanewwhatwehaveincommon,andcometoseewhichdimensionsofourtraditionsareworthpreservingand
whichoughttobeabandonedorchanged.
Thisbringsustotheheartofourdifferenceswiththeneoconservativemodelofcivilsociety.Theneoconservativeslogan,"societyagainstthestate,"isoftenbasedon
amodelinwhichcivilsocietyisequivalenttomarketorbourgeoissociety.Anotherversionofthisapproachdoes,however,recognizetheimportanceofthecultural
dimensionofcivilsociety.Wehaveseriousobjectionseventothissecondversion,whosestrategiesforunburdeningthestateareaimedinpartattheinstitutions
involvedintheformationandtransmissionofculturalvalues(art,religion,science)andinsocialization(families,schools).Animportantcomponentofthe
neoconservativethesisof"ungovernability"istheargumentthattheexcessivematerialdemandsplacedbycitizensonthestateare

Page24
duenotonlytowelfareinstitutionsthemselvesbutalsotoourmodernistpolitical,moral,andaestheticculture.Thelatterallegedlyweakensbothtraditionalvaluesand
theagenciesofsocialcontrol(suchasthefamily)thattemperedhedonisminthepast.
60
Inthisview,weneedtoresacralizeourpoliticalculture,revivefaltering
traditionalvaluessuchasselfrestraint,discipline,andrespectforauthorityandachievement,andshoreup"nonpolitical"principlesoforder(family,property,religion,
schools),sothatacultureofselfrelianceandselfrestraintreplacesthecultureofdependencyandcritique.
61
Theculturalpoliticsofneoconservatismthataccompanies
thepoliciesofderegulationandprivatizationarethusbasedonthedefenseorrecreationofatraditionalistandauthoritarianlifeworld.
62
Ourconceptionofcivilsocietypointstoadifferentassessment.First,wetrytoshowthattheresourcesformeaning,authority,andsocialintegrationareundermined
notbyculturalorpoliticalmodernity(basedontheprinciplesofcriticalreflection,discursiveconflictresolution,equality,autonomy,participation,andjustice)but,
rather,bytheexpansionofanincreasinglyilliberalcorporateeconomyaswellasbytheoverextensionoftheadministrativeapparatusoftheinterventioniststateinto
thesocialrealm.Theuseofeconomicandpoliticalpowertoshoreup(orworse,recreate)the"traditional"hierarchical,patriarchal,orexclusionarycharacterofmany
oftheinstitutionsofcivilsocietyis,onourview,whatfostersdependency.Weagreethatcertainfeaturesofthewelfarestate
63
fragmentcollectivities,destroy
horizontalsolidarities,isolateandrenderprivateindividualsdependentonstateapparatuses.Unrestrainedcapitalistexpansion,however,hasthesamedestructive
consequences.Butappealstofamily,tradition,religion,orcommunitycouldfosterthedestructivefundamentalismoffalsecommunitiessoeasilymanipulatedfrom
above,unlesstheachievementsofliberalism(theprincipleofrights),democracy(theprinciplesofparticipationanddiscourse),andjustice(apreconditionfor
solidarity)arefirstdefendedandthensupplementedwithnewdemocraticandegalitarianformsofassociationwithincivilsociety.
Moreover,tooptforthepreservationoftraditions,ifaccompaniedbyadenialoftheuniversalisttraditionofculturalandpolitical

Page25
modernity,impliesfundamentalism.Accordingly,thequestionthatflowsfromourmodelbecomes:Whichtraditions,whichfamilyform,whichcommunity,which
solidaritiesaretobedefendedagainstdisruptiveintervention?Evenifculturalmodernityitselfisjustonetraditionamongmany,itsuniversalthrustisthereflexive,
nonauthoritarianrelationtowardtraditionanorientationthatcanbeappliedtoitselfandthatimpliesautonomy(allegedlycherishedbytheneoconservative)rather
thanheteronomy.Indeed,traditionsthathavebecomeproblematiccanbepreservedonlyontheterrainofculturalmodernity,i.e.,throughargumentsthatinvoke
principles.Suchdiscussiondoesnotmeantheabolitionoftradition,solidarity,ormeaningrather,itistheonlyacceptableprocedureforadjudicatingbetween
competingtraditions,needs,orintereststhatareinconflict.Accordingly,ourmodelpointstowardthefurthermodernizationofthecultureandinstitutionsofcivil
societyastheonlywaytoarriveatautonomy,selfreliance,andsolidarityamongpeersallegedlydesiredbytheneoconservativecriticsofthewelfarestate.
64
Ourconceptionofcivilsocietyseekstodemystifytheotherstrainwithinneoconservatism,namely,thattheonlyalternativetothepaternalism,socialengineering,and
thebureaucratizationofourlivestypicalofwelfarestatesystemsistoshiftsteeringbacktothemagicofthemarketplace(andofcoursetorenouncedistributivejustice
andegalitarianism).This"solution"isnotonlypoliticallyuntenableandnormativelyundesirableitisalsobasedonthefallaciousassumptionthatnootheroptionsexist.
Ourframework,however,allowsinprincipleforathirdapproach,onethatdoesnotseektocorrecttheeconomicorstatepenetrationofsocietybyshiftingbackand
forthbetweenthesetwosteeringmechanisms.Instead,thetaskistoguaranteetheautonomyofthemodernstateandeconomywhilesimultaneouslyprotectingcivil
societyfromdestructivepenetrationandfunctionalizationbytheimperativesofthesetwospheres.Fornow,ofcourse,wehaveonlysomeoftheelementsofatheory
thatcanthematizeboththedifferentiationofcivilsocietyfromstateandeconomyanditsreflexiveinfluenceoverthemthroughtheinstitutionsofpoliticalandeconomic
society.Butwebelievethatourconceptionhasthebestprospectsforfuturetheoreticalprogressandforintegratingthediverseconceptual

Page26
strategiesthatarecurrentlyavailable.Theprojectitimplieswouldavoidcorrectingtheresultsofstatepaternalismbyanotherformofcolonizationofsociety,thistime
byanunregulatedmarketeconomy.Itwouldseektoaccomplishtheworkofsocialpolicybymoredecentralizedandautonomouscivilsocietybasedprogramsthan
intraditionalwelfarestatesandtheworkofeconomicregulationbynonbureaucratic,lessintrusiveformsoflegislation,"reflexivelaw,"focusingonproceduresandnot
results.
65
InourviewthissyntheticprojectshouldbedescribednotonlybyHabermas'sterm,"thereflexivecontinuationofthewelfarestate,"butalsobythe
complementaryideaofthe"reflexivecontinuationofthedemocraticrevolution."TheformerarisesinthecontextofWesternwelfarestates,thelatterinthatofthe
democratizationofauthoritarianregimes.Thetwoideascanandshouldbecombined.Thusfar,therecentrevivalanddevelopmentoftheconceptofcivilsocietyhas
involvedlearningfromtheexperienceofthe''transitionstodemocracy."Theideaofthereflexivecontinuationofthewelfarestateandofliberaldemocracyshould,
however,openthewayforenrichingtheintellectualresourcesofdemocratsintheEastbywhathasbeenlearnedinadoublecritiqueofalreadyestablishedwelfare
statesandoftheirneoconservativediscontents.AtheoryofcivilsocietyinformedbysuchideasshouldalsoinformtheprojectsofallthoseintheWestwhoseekthe
furtherdemocratizationofliberaldemocracies.

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I
THEDISCOURSEOFCIVILSOCIETY

Page29
1
TheContemporaryRevivalofCivilSociety
Phrasesinvolvingtheresurrection,reemergence,rebirth,reconstruction,orrenaissanceofcivilsocietyareheardrepeatedlytoday.Theseterms,indicatingthe
continuityofanemergingpoliticalparadigmwithessentialtrendsofearlymodernity,aremisleadinginoneimportantrespect:Theyrefernotonlytosomethingmodern
butalsotosomethingsignificantlynew.AsimplechronologyderivedinpartfromKarlPolnyimight,inanextremelypreliminaryway,indicatewhatisatstake.
AccordingtoPolnyi,duringmostofthenineteenthcentury,forcesrepresentingthecapitalistselfregulatingmarketeconomywereontheoffensive,claimingan
identitywiththeliberalsocietythatwasintheprocessofemancipatingitselffromtheabsolutistandpaternalisticstate.Polnyi,however,rightlystressedthatinthelate
nineteenthcenturyandthroughmuchofthetwentiethcenturyareversalhadtakenplace.Now,elitesrepresentingthelogicandgoalsofthemodernstatewere
successfullyclaimingtoexpresstheinterestsofaheterogeneoussetofsocialgroupsandtendenciesresistingandchallengingthedestructivetrendsofcapitalistmarket
society.NotevenPolnyi,however,foresawthatthestatistphasewouldalsohaveitslimits.Foraperiodofmorethanadecadeandahalfnow,citizeninitiatives,
associations,andmovementshaveincreasinglyorientedthemselvestowardthedefenseandexpansionofavariouslydescribedsocietalrealm,theformsandprojects
ofwhichareclearlydistinguishedfromstatism.
Twocrucialambiguitiesremainfromtheorientation"societyagainstthestate."First,whileincreasinglysignificantgroupingsof

Page30
collectiveactorsrejectanyrepresentationoftheirprogramintermsofcommunitarianism,otherscontinuetodefendanidealizedGemeinschaftorpremodernnetwork
ofcommunities,traditionalsolidarities,andcollectivesagainstmodernityitself.Second,therearevariousneoconservative,neoliberal,andlibertarianinitiatives(rarely
movements,butwithsignificantforcebehindthem)thatidentify"society"withmarketeconomy.Bothofthesetrendsareregressiveversionsofantistatism.Thefirst
wishestoretreatbehindthemodernstate,thuseliminatinganessentialpreconditionofmodernityitselfthesecondwishestorepeatthealreadyfailedexperimentwith
thefullyselfregulatedmarketeconomyofclassicalcapitalism.Thereisnochanceofthefirsttrendregisteringeventemporarysuccesses,althoughitwillcontinueto
havearolewithinmostsocialmovements.Thesecondtrend,whereversuccessful,threatenstotransformhistoryintooscillationbetweeneconomicliberalismand
paternaliststatism.
Webelievetherearetodayimportantelementsofathirdprojectforretrievingthecategoryofcivilsocietyfromthetraditionofclassicalpoliticaltheory.Theseinvolve
attemptstothematizeaprogramthatseekstorepresentthevaluesandinterestsofsocialautonomyinfaceofboththemodernstateandthecapitalisteconomy,
withoutfallingintoanewtraditionalism.Beyondtheantinomiesofstateandmarket,publicandprivate,GesellschaftandGemeinschaft,and,asweshallshow,
reformandrevolution,theideaofthedefenseandthedemocratizationofcivilsocietyisthebestwaytocharacterizethereallynew,commonstrandofcontemporary
formsofselforganizationandselfconstitution.
Problemsofselfreflectionandselfunderstandingwithinthemovementsandtheinitiativesthemselvessometimespreventthemfromclearlyrecognizingtheirown
differencewithcommunalismorlibertarianism.Atbestthedifferencerepresentsastakethatmustbeinternallycontested.Behindthemanyambiguitiesofmeaningtied
upwiththeconceptofcivilsocietystandsuchconflicts.Incompanywithmanyparticipants,ourbooktakesaclearstandintheseconflictsonbehalfofamoderncivil
societycapableofpreservingitsautonomyandformsofsolidarityinfaceofthemoderneconomyaswellasthestate.
Suchaprojectemergesfromcontextsofsocialandpoliticalconflictsthemselves.Inthischapterwepresenttheideabyexam

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iningseveraldiscoursesthathaverevivedthecategoryofcivilsociety(albeitindifferentversions)inordertocriticallyinterpretthepoliticalcontextsofEastandWest,
NorthandSouth.Withoutaimingatacompletepresentationofallrelatedviewswithineachcontext,wedeliberatelystressperspectivesineachthatcanbecompared
withthoseintheothercontexts.Weshallattempttoidentifythecommonstrands,thealternativemodels,thesignificantdifferencesaswellastheconceptualunclarities
intheseformsofinterpretationandselfinterpretation.Therestofthisbookwill,wehope,contributetothefurtherdevelopmentofthediscourseofcivilsocietyand
therebybenefittheactorsandinterpreterswepresentinthischapter.
ThePolishDemocraticOpposition
TheoppositionofcivilsocietyandstatemadeitsmostdramaticreturninEastEurope,particularlyintheideologyofthePolishoppositionfrom1976totheadventof
earlySolidarityandbeyond.Thejuxtapositionsarewellknown:societyagainstthestate,nationagainststate,socialorderagainstpoliticalsystem,paysrel
againstpayslgalorofficiel,publiclifeagainstthestate,privatelifeagainstpublicpower,etc.Theideawasalwaystheprotectionand/orselforganizationof
sociallifeinthefaceofthetotalitarianorauthoritarianstate.AdamMichnikprovidedthetheoreticalelaborationofthisconceptionundertheheadingof"new
evolutionism."
1
Healsodiscoveredthehistoricalconditionsofitspossibility:thefailureofapotentiallytotalrevolutionfrombelow(Hungaryin1956),andthedemise
ofaprocessofreformfromabove(Czechoslovakiain1968).
2
Michnikdrewtwolessonsfromthesedefeats.First,thetransformationoftheSoviettypesystemof
EastCentralEuropewaspossibleonlywithinlimitswhosethresholdswerethealliancesystem(threatenedinHungaryin1956)andtheconfirmationofthecontrolof
stateinstitutionsbyaSoviettypeCommunistparty(challengedindifferentformsbothinHungaryandinCzechoslovakiain1968).Second,neitherrevolutionfrom
belownorreformfromabovewouldworkasthestrategyforachievingwhatwasinfactpossible.
Thepointofviewofcivilsocietyinthiscontextaimsatatwofoldreorientation.First,thejuxtapositionofsocietyagainstthestate

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indicatesnotonlythebattlelinesbutalsoashiftconcerningthetargetofdemocratization,fromthewholesocialsystemtosocietyoutsideofstateinstitutionsproper.
Thus,whiletheconceptionsurelyimpliesapushingbackofthestateadministrativeformsofpenetrationfromvariousdimensionsofsociallife,ithas,nevertheless,the
ideaofselflimitationbuiltintoitfromthestart:Theleadingroleofthepartyinthe(albeitshrinking)statespherewillnotbechallenged.
Second,theconceptionalsoindicatesthattheagentorthesubjectofthetransformationmustbeanindependentorratheraselforganizingsocietyaimingnotatsocial
revolutionbutatstructuralreformachievedasaresultoforganizedpressurefrombelow.Thesetwoaspectsarebroughttogetherbytheterm"selflimitingrevolution"
coinedbyJacekKuronintheperiodofSolidarity.Atthattime,thenewconceptiontrulycameintoitsown,showingitsformidablepowersinpromotingtheself
understandingofnewtypesofsocialactors.Nevertheless,itshouldbenotedthatthe"newevolutionism"orthe''selflimitingrevolution"representedbothastrategic
andanormativebreakwiththerevolutionarytraditionwhoselogicwasunderstoodtobeundemocraticandinconsistentwiththeselforganizationofsociety.
3
All
majorrevolutionsfromtheFrenchtotheRussianandtheChinesenotonlydemobilizedthesocialforcesonwhichtheyoriginallydependedbutalsoestablished
dictatorialconditionsthatweremeanttoblockthereemergenceofsuchforcesattheirveryrootforaslongaspossible.Theprojectof"selflimitingrevolution"has,of
course,theoppositegoal:theconstructionfrombelowofahighlyarticulated,organized,autonomous,andmobilizablecivilsociety.
Leavingasidefornowtheoveralltheoreticalcogencyoftheconception,wemustnotesomeseriousambiguitiesinitselaborationinthemilieuofthePolishdemocratic
opposition.
4
Aretheterms"society"and"civilsociety"thesame?Afterall,theybothrefertoapluralityofformsofindependentgroups(associations,institutions,
collectives,interestrepresentations)aswellasformsofindependentpublicopinionandcommunication.Putanotherway,howcancivilsocietybeboththeagentof
socialtransformationanditsresult?Onecould,ofcourse,trytoresolvethedifficultybydistinguishingbetweensocietyandcivilsociety.Thelatterwouldrepresenta

Page33
versionoftheformer,institutionalizedbylegalmechanismsorrights,asintheGdanskandsubsequentagreementsofAugustandSeptember1980.
5
Buttheambiguity
wouldremain,because"rights"inanauthoritarianstatesocialistsetting(lackofindependentcourtslackofaclear,unambiguouslegalcodelackofanorganizedlegal
profession)areeasilyrevocablenotonlyinprinciplebutalsoinapoliticalpracticethatdependsonconstantdemonstrationofthisrevocability.Moreover,institutional
continuitycanapparentlybeachievedbypublicenlightenmentandselforganizationevenwithoutrights,aswitnessedbythedurabilityandgrowthofautonomous
formsofcultureinthetwelveyearperiodafter1976.
6
Anothersetofconceptualdifficultiesrevolvesaroundtheinterpretationofthenotionofsociety,ofsocialselforganizationinasupposedlytotalitariansetting.Hereone
view(Michnik)stressedtheobliterationofallsocialsolidaritiesandtheresultingsocialatomization,exceptforcarefullydefinedinstitutionalcomplexes(thechurch)or
historicalperiods(1956,197071,andafter1976).Anotherposition,moreconsistentwiththetheoryofthenewevolutionism,insistedonthefailureoftotalitarianism,
whateveritsintentions,totrulyatomizesociety,ortocompletelydisorganizefamilies,facetofacegroups,andculturalnetworks.
7
Thisposition,however,wouldhave
requiredtheworkingoutofaparadigmtoreplacethetotalitarianismthesisasthetheoreticalframeworkofthe"newevolutionism,"somethingneveractuallyattempted.
Moreseriousinprincipleisthelackofclarityregardingthetypeofcivilsocietythatistobeconstructedorreconstructed.Theconceptualconfusionderivesaboveall
fromacommonunwillingnesstotakeanopenlycriticalattitudetowardtheliberalmodelofcivilsociety,despiteparticipationinasolidaristicworkers'movementthat
is,inmanyrespects,incompatiblewiththismodel.Inthe1980smoreandmorepeople(e.g.,Krol,Spievak,theeditorsofRespublica)cametochampionaversionof
theliberalmodel,basedoneconomicindividualismandfreedomsofpropertyandenterpriseasthecentralrights.EvenwithinthemilieuofthoseclosetoSolidarityin
itsfirstgreatperiod(198081),thereweredisagreementsoverthevariousconceptionsofcivilsociety.Culturalmodels(Wojcicki)werecounterposedtopolitical
conceptions(theCommitteefortheDefenseofWorkers,orKOR),ontheone

Page34
hand,whilethelevelofdemocracyneededinpopularmovementsandinstitutionswashotlydebated,ontheother.Whereasitwasgenerallyrecognizedthatthenew
civilsocietywastobepluralistic,
8
theneedforasingle,allencompassingorganizationtorespondtotheinterestofthispluralitywastemporarilyaccepted.
9
Butonce
suchanorganizationemergedandmanagedtosurviveinthefaceof"totalitarian"power,coulditsunitaryandallencompassingtendencybeeasilydisposedof?
Formulatingadualisticcivilsocietyandstateframeworkprovedevenmoredifficult,especiallyinpracticalpolitics.Wascivilsociety,asrepresentedbySolidarity,to
beentirelyapolitical,disinterestedin"power,"orwasittobeexpandedasaselfgoverningrepublicmakingastateintheoldsensemoreorlesssuperfluous?
Sometimesaspectsofeachconceptionaretobefoundeveninthesameauthor.
10
Wouldaselfcoordinatingsystemofsocietynotnegatetheideaofselflimitationif
thepartystatewereleftonlyasarepresentativeofSovietpower,inchargeofmilitary,police,andforeignpolicyandpartiallyconvertedintoanexpertbureaucracy?
11
If,ontheotherhand,thedualisticconceptionrequiresinstitutionalmechanismsofcompromisebetweensocietalorganizationsandpartystateinstitutions,doesthe
ideaofbuildingahybridsystembasedonanewtypeofsocietynexttoanunreformedpartystatemakesense?Andifareformofofficialinstitutions,especiallythe
partyitself,mustbehopedforandevenpromoted,ifpartypragmatistscouldbelookeduponaspartnersevenifnotallies,couldthemuchinsisteduponindependent
identityofthesocialmovementbemaintained?
12
Whatwouldbethepointofthisifonmanyissuespartypragmatistsandsectorsofthemovementareclosertoone
anotherthanpotentiallydifferentelementsoftheantistateopposition?Itisinsufficienttoreplythatonlyanorganizedsociety,consciousofitsidentity,iscapableof
compromise,forjustthisunitytendedtodemobilizepotentialpartnersintheparty.Thedeepidentityproblemsoftherulingpartycouldhardlybesolvedinthefaceof
anorganizedsocietysuccessfullyreclaimingalllegitimacy.Withoutanewpartyidentity,partypragmatistslostallfreedomofaction.Andforthepartyleadership,
withoutlegitimacy,theonlyfreedomofactionleftwastheexerciseofrawsovereignpower.
13
Manyofthedifficultiestoucheduponherepointedtowardthefailuretorebuildcivilsocietyoratleastastableversionofit.Yetthe

Page35
failureitselfproducedanewsetofsocialrelationsthatcouldagainbereinterpretedintermsofanewmodelofoppositionbetweenstateandsociety.Thusinthe
contextofthefailureof"normalization,"theoriginal"newevolutionist"conceptionremainedthebasicformoforientationfortheoristactivistssuchasMichnik.
Undoubtedlythefactthatitwasnowtheturnofthemartiallawstatetopractice(reluctant)selflimitationreinvigoratedtheideathatanindependentsocietycould
somehowbedefended."Independentcivilsociety"wasnot,accordingtoMichnik,annihilated."InsteadofresemblingaCommunistsystemaftervictorious
pacification,thissituationresemblesademocracyafteramilitarycoupd'tat."
14
Despitethereappearanceofmartialmetaphorssuchas"adramaticwrestlingmatchbetweenthetotalitarianpowerandasocietysearchingforawaytoattain
autonomy"and"thestationarywarbetweenanorganizedcivilsocietyandthepowerapparatus,"
15
thenewsituationwasneverthelessonethatindicatedthecoming
intoitsownoftheculturalmodelofindependentsociety.Themajorindependentactivitieswerepublishing,lecturing,discussing,andteaching.Forseveralyears,the
hopeseemstohavebeenthebuildingofthemoralbasesofdemocraticstructuresandpractices,i.e.,ademocraticpoliticalculture.Whilethearmystateseemed
powerlessagainstthesetrends,itwasrathersuccessfulinmarginalizingitsmajorpoliticalopponent:undergroundSolidarity.Thelatter,however,linkedtothe
mechanismsofindependentculture,continuedtosurviveandplayarole.
Nevertheless,inthiscontext,thedemocraticoppositionmovingwithintheparadigmofcivilsocietyhadtofacethequestionofhowandwhenthesurvivalandeventhe
dramaticexpansionofanindependentculture,moreandmorepluralizedideologically,couldbeafoundationforthereemergenceofabovegroundpolitical
organizationscapableofmakingeffectivedemands.Theregime'sinabilitytodealwiththesameeconomiccrisisthatwasusedin198081tohelperodetheresistance
ofthepopulationprovidednewopportunitiesfortheopposition.Thestrategytorestoretheregime'slegitimacythrougharelativelyfreereferendum,andtherebyto
recoverfreedomofactiontoimposeanausterityprogram,failedin1987inthefaceofanonlypartiallyorganizedopposition.Inthiscontextandthatofthestrike
movementsduringthespringandsummerof1988,itbecameclearthattheregimeneeded

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partnerstobeabletoinitiatesignificantpolicy,andthatonlyareconstitutedSolidaritycouldcommandsufficientlywideloyaltytobecomeacrediblepartner.
FromthepointofviewofSolidarity'sleadership,giventheeconomiccrisisandtheprospectsofsimultaneouslyweakeningbothregimeandoppositioninacontinuing
processofpolarization,itwouldcertainlyhavebeencounterproductivenottopromoteandutilizereformsfromabove,aslongtheseinvolvedrealgainsin
institutionalizingagenuinecivilsociety.
16
Afterthenegotiated"resolution"ofthesecondstrikewave,theissueseemstohavebeenthefollowing:Couldtheregime
yieldenoughconcessionsthatwouldbeadequatetradeoffsforlegitimizingthedeepausteritymeasuresrequiredforsuccessfuleconomicreform?Whilesuch
concessionsevenminimallyhadtoinvolvelegalizingelementsofcivilsociety,itwasnotatallclearthataversionsufficientlydemocraticforthepopulationandstill
acceptabletoelementsoftheregimecouldbefound.Itwasnotclear,furthermore,whethertheminimumunityofasocietywithdifferentinterestsandincreasingly
differentiatedideologiescouldbemaintainedeveninanemergencysituationinwhichtherewerenolongeranyalternativesotherthanradicalchangeorsocialdecay.
Butcouldradicalchangestillbeconceptualizedwithintheframeworkofopposingcivilsocietytothestate?
16a
TheIdeologyofthe"SecondLeft"inFrance
Itisnotonlyunderauthoritarianregimesthattheproblemofdemocratizationgetsposedintermsofthereconstructionofcivilsociety.Thecategorywasrevivedin
Franceinthemid1970sasaprimereferentfordemocraticprojectsonthepartofsignificantgroupsofintellectualsandavarietyofcollectiveactors.
17
Ofcourseit
washerethatthecritiqueoftotalitarianismandsympathyforEastEuropeandissidencehadthegreatestintellectualimportance.
18
Andhere,too,totalitarianismwas
definedastheabsorptionofindependentsociallifeof"civilsociety"bytheparty/state,involvingthereplacementofallsocialtiesbystatizedrelations.Itseemsclear
thattheFrench"discourse"ofcivilsocietyderivedfromasympatheticunderstandingofdevelopmentsintheEast.Butcoulda

Page37
categorysoderivedbemadeapplicabletoaWesterncapitalistsocietywithamultipartyparliamentarystate?
InFrancethreeargumentshavebeenusedtojustifythistheoreticalmove.First,andmostliketheEast,thepoliticalcultureoftheFrenchleft(andnotonlythe
Communistparty)isseenasdeeplyconnectedtothetotalitarianphenomenon,i.e.,astatistpoliticalculturederivingfromanideaofrevolutionbasedonthefantasyof
asocietywithoutdivisionorconflict.
19
Paradoxically,aleftthatrepresentsinitsveryexistencesocietaldiversity,conflict,andoppositiondeniesjustthese
presuppositionswhilehopingtousethestateastheinstrumentofprogressandastheagentofthecreationofthegoodsocietybeyondconflict.
Second,theactualroleofthecentralized,modernstateinFrenchpoliticallifeistraditionallygreaterthaninmostWesterndemocracies.Withagooddealof
exaggeration,onecouldspeakhereofa"totalitarian"statisttendencysuppressingmanydimensionsofanindependent"civilsociety."
20
Thirdandfinally,recallingthe
thesisofHerbertMarcuse,oritsmoresophisticatedFrenchcounterpartinthewritingsofCorneliusCastoriadisinthe1950sandearly1960s,onemightalsoclaim
againwithsignificantexaggerationthat"capitalismhasbecomemore'totalitarian,'engulfingallspheresofsocialactivityunderthesingledimensionofeconomic
activity."
21
Thelasttwothesesconcerningthestateandcapitalismconvergeinanotherthesisassertingthatallautonomoussocialsolidarityisdestroyedundertheimpactofthe
administrativepenetrationofsocietybythe(capitalist)welfarestate.Ofcourse,thislineofargumentdoesnottheoreticallyassimilateFrancetoaparadigmderived
fromtheanalysisoftheEast.P.RosanvallonandP.Viveretwarnusthateventhethreethesestakentogetherdonotadduptoaconceptionofcapitalistdemocracies
astotalitarianinthesenseofMarcuse.Butthelimitationturnsintoanadvantage:WhereasintheEast,infullytotalitariansociety,nointernaloppositionisallegedly
possible,thetotalitariantrendsofFrenchsocietycanbemetheadonbycountertrendsinvolvingthereconstructionofcivilandpoliticalsociety.
ItisnoteworthythattheFrenchdiscussionhaspreservedathreepartTocquevilliandistinctionamongcivilsociety,politicalsociety,

Page38
andstate.Civilsocietyisdefinedintermsofsocialassociationscuttingacrossclassrelations:neighborhoodgroups,networksofmutualaid,locallybasedstructures
providingcollectiveservice.
22
Moredynamically,civilsocietyisseenasthespaceofsocialexperimentationforthedevelopmentofnewformsoflife,newtypesof
solidarity,andsocialrelationsofcooperationandwork.
23
Politicalsociety,ontheotherhand,isunderstoodasthespaceinwhichtheautonomyofgroupsandthe
articulationofconflictamongthemaredefendedandthediscussionanddebateofcollectivechoicesoccur.
24
Theconceptofpoliticalsocietythusincludesthepublic
sphereasitsmajordimension,but,giventhestressonconflict(andnegotiationandcompromise),itisnotentirelyreducibletoit.
Norarecivilandpoliticalsocietytobereducedtooneanother.Toeliminatepoliticalsocietyintheconception,ortotreatitascivil,istojuxtaposecivilsocietyrigidly
tothestate.Thisalternativeisvariously(andsomewhatconfusingly)describedbyViveretandRosanvallonasachoiceamongliberalism,apoliticalandutopian
anarchism,orcorporatismasalternativestostatism.
25
Withoutpoliticalmediations,however,theintegrityofcivilsocietyinfaceofthestatecannotbeindefinitely
stabilizedthemodelprefiguresanewstatistoutcome.However,todefendandextendonlypoliticalsociety,toseektopoliticizeallcivilstructuresthemselves,leads
toanoverpoliticizeddemocraticorautogestionaire(selfmanagement)utopianismofwhichpoliticalanarchismandcouncilCommunismhavebeentherepresentative
historicalconceptions.Itis,however,doubtfulthattheformsofselforganizationofpoliticalsocietycanbemaintainedwithouttheprotectionanddevelopmentof
independentbutapoliticalformsofsolidarity,interaction,andgrouplife.
TherigidconceptualdivisionofcivilandpoliticalsocietyisdifficulttomaintaininthespecificforminwhichitisusedintheFrenchdiscussion.Solidarityandconflict,as
wellasstructuresofpubliccommunication,aretobefoundonbothsidesofthedivide.Politically,however,thedistinctionmakesgoodsensebecauseitimpliesa
reorientationofdemocraticpoliticsawayfromthestatetosocietywithoutpromotingtheoverpoliticizationofsociety.Thustheexacttranslationoftherevolutionary
traditionintothelanguageofdemocratictheoryisavoided:ViveretandRosanvallonattempt

Page39
tothinkbothdemocratizationandtheselflimitationofdemocracy.Inotherwords,corecomponentsoftheliberalmodelofcivilsocietyasthesphereofprivate,
voluntaryassociationsecuredbyrightsareretainedinamodelthatalsoincludesthe"democratic"dimensionsofpublicityandpoliticalinfluenceofnonprofessional
actors,i.e.,citizens.
26
Thepoint,however,isnotsimplytorecommendamove(typicalofsocialdemocracy)fromrevolutiontodemocraticreformism.Bothpolesoftheoldduality,
revolutionorreform,orientedthemselvesthroughastructureofdemandstothestate
27
andtoasocietyunderstoodintermsofaclassdichotomy.Thereorientationto
civilandpoliticalsocietyrelocatesthelocusofdemocratizationfromthestatetosocietyandunderstandsthelatterintermsofgroups,associations,andpublicspaces
primarily.AsClaudeLefortargued,theactorsthestrategybanksuponarenotclassesbutsocialmovementsconstitutedincivilsociety.
28
Theseattainapoliticalstatus
intheconceptionofViveretandRosanvallonthroughthemediationsmadeavailableinpoliticalsociety:thereconstructionofpoliticalparties(replacingthenolonger
ideologicalcatchallparty)andtherenewalofpublicforumsofdiscussionanddebate(endingthehegemonyoftheestablishedmediaandofpoliticalcommunication
thathasbeenreducedtomeasuringnonpublicopinion,i.e.,polls).
TheconceptionofViveretandRosanvallonwasdesignedtopromotetheselfunderstandingofonedimensionoftheFrenchleft:thesocalled"secondleft"oriented
totheRocardgroupofthe1970sintheSocialistpartyandtotheCFDTlaborunion.Astheoriginalconceptionwasfurtherdeveloped,thereconstructionofcivil
societyreceivedanevenmorecentralroleintermsofthepoliticalhistoryoftheperiodinwhichthewatershedwastheSocialistparty'scomingtopower.Civil
society'sintegrityhadtobepreservednoweveninthefaceofasocialistcontrolledstateandpoliticalsociety.Logically,however,sincepoliticalsocietywas
understoodintermsofmediationbetweencivilsocietyandstate,itsreorganizationpresupposedtherebuildingofmorefundamentalsocialties.Onestrongstrandin
thethentriumphantFrenchsocialismcouldbeeasilyunderstoodtoendangerexactlythislevelthroughitsconnectiontoaKeynesianformofstatism.AsPierre

Page40
Rosanvallonhasforcefullyargued,thewelfarestatedisorganizesaboveallsocialnetworks,associations,andsolidarities,replacingthesebystateadministrative
relations.Notonlyhasthewelfarestateinthecountriesofitshighestdevelopmentprovedtobeanincreasinglyinefficientandineffectivestrategyofsocietalsteering
moreimportantly,itsearliersuccesshasimpliedaveritablecrisisofsolidarityreplacingformsofmutuality,selfhelp,andlateralcooperationbysystemicallyorganized
functions.Thus,thereificationofhumanrelationsinthecontextofsocialstatismfullymatchestheeffectsofthecapitalistmarketeconomyacivilsocietyoriented
programmustthereforerepresentnotonlyathirdwaybetweensocialstatismandneoliberalismbutawayqualitativelydifferentfromtheothertwo,which,despite
theiropposition,areseenasresemblingeachotherintheireffectsonsolidarityrelations.
Whatisextremelyvagueintheanalysisisthenatureofthecivilsocietybasedalternative,beyondthedemandfora"thickercivilsociety"involvingthecreationofnew
networks,newformsofintermediationandassociation,asthesourcesoflocalandfacetofacesolidarity.Evidentlysuchageneralpremiseiscompatiblewithvery
differentformsofcivilsociety.Rosanvallonnotesthefailureofthecommunitarianismofthe1960sand1970sandseekstoavoidacorporatistversionofthereturnto
society.
29
Heis,however,skepticalconcerningtheverypossibilityofatheoreticalanswertotheproblemofreconcilingindividualautonomyandnewspontaneous
formsofsolidarity,i.e.,concerningamodelbeyondstatism,neoliberalism,corporatism,andcommunitarianism.Ingeneral,heconvincinglyassertsacomplementary
relationbetweena(nonregressive)reductionofdemandsonthewelfarestateandthebuildingofnewformsofsociability.Hislistconcerningthelatter,however,is
limited.Henotestheexistenceandimportanceofnewformsofprivatelybasedcollectiveserviceandofundergroundformsofnonmarket,nonstateoriented
structuresofeconomiclife,
30
butheunderstandstheseasonlythefirstandmostprimitiveformsofwhatisrequired.Theneedfornewtypesofsociallygeneratedlegal
structures,neitherstatistnorindividualist,ispowerfullyasserted,butwefindoutlittleaboutthenatureofsuchlaworitsrelationshiptoexistingprivateandpubliclaw.
Theprojectsofbuildingnewsocialnorms,newculturalidentities,and

Page41
anewpublicspherearevaguelypostulated,butwedonotfindoutmuchabouttherelationshipofnewsocialactors(movements)toanyofthese.Moreover,thereis
someseriousambiguityhereabouttherelationofsolidarityandconflictinconstructinganewformofsociability.
Theanalysisismoreconvincinginitstreatmentoftheproblemofcompromise.Rosanvallonpostulatestheneedforcompromise(1)withcapitalistentrepreneurs
(exchangingrationalityandmobilityintheuseofcapitalforselfmanagementandfreetime),(2)withthebureaucraticstate(exchangingreductionofdemandsforthe
recognitionofformsofautonomouscollectiveservices),and(3)withinsocietyitself,involvingtheconstructionofnew,democraticformsofpublicdebate,negotiation,
andinterestaggregation.Itremainsunclear,though,howthetwopostwelfarestate,postKeynesian,postsocialdemocraticprojectsmentioned,regulationbyself
managementandintrasocialregulation,wouldhaveafundamentaleffectcapableofgeneratingtheforcebehindthoseformsofcompromise.Therelationshipofthese
projects,presumablyrepresentingpolitical(selfmanagement)andcivil(intrasocialregulation)society,respectively,ishighlyunclear.Herepoliticalsocietyis
introducednotsomuchasapoliticalrearticulationofcivilsocietybutratherasacompetingmodelaltogether.Butthenotionofpoliticalsocietyoscillatingbetween
publicdiscussionandselfmanagementshowsitsproblematicnature,sincethelatternotionthreatenstoassimilatepoliticalsocietytotheworldofworkor,atbest,to
industrialdemocracy.Correspondingly,theideaofintrasocialregulationoscillatingbetweenindividualisticandsolidaristicconceptionsofcivilsocietythreatensto
surrenderpartofwhathasbeenachieved:thecritiqueofthestatistlogicofindividualism.Whiletheprotectionofindividualrightshasitslegitimateplaceinthe
normativeconceptionofamoderncivilsociety,justasindustrialdemocracycanbereconceivedinawayperhapsanalogoustoademocraticpoliticalsociety,
31
the
momentsthatneedtobestressedinthecontextofthecritiqueofthestaffzingandeconomizationofsociety,asRosanvallonrecognizes,aresolidarityandpublicity.
Unfortunately,itistheiralltoocrucialrelationthatisleftunderdeterminedbythetraditionofFrenchanalysisweassociatewiththeterm"thesecondleft."Itmayvery
wellbethecase

Page42
thattheeventualemergenceofformsofneoliberalisminthismilieucanbetracedamongotherthingstothetheoreticalweaknessoftheoriginalconception,i.e.,tothe
difficultyofformulatingadequateconceptsofcivilandpoliticalsocietyandtheirrelationship.
ATheoryfortheWestGermanGreens
Adirectintellectualrelationshipto''antitotalitarian"orantiauthoritarianstrugglesfordemocracyisnotentirelyindispensableforinterpretingthepoliticsofWestern
democraciesintermsofthecategoryofcivilsociety.AgoodcaseinpointisWestGermany,where,unlikeFrance,theEasterndissidentshavehadonlyaslightand
ambiguousimpact.TherewasalsononeedheretodifferentiateradicalpoliticsfromthatofanauthoritarianmasspartyintheLeninistmold.Tobesure,eveninWest
GermanyonecouldinsistuponsomeimpactofthethoughtoftheFrench"secondleft"(especiallythroughthewritingsofGorz),andonecouldalsostressthestatist
authoritarianandevenrepressivepoliticalcultureoftheGermanSocialDemocraticParty.
32
Nevertheless,inourjudgmenttworelateddevelopments,commontoall
theWesterndemocraciesincludingtheUnitedStates,linktheGermanrediscoveryofcivilsocietytothesomewhatearlieroneinFrance:thecrisisofthewelfarestate,
andtheemergenceofaneoconservativecritiqueof"socialstatism."
Thewelfarestatehasoftenbeenunderstoodnotonlyasamechanismoftherepoliticizationoftheeconomybutalsoasadissolutionofthesharpboundariesbetween
stateandsociety.However,thecrisisofthewelfarestateraisesdoubtsconcerningthecontinuedeffectivenessandlegitimacyofstateinterventionintothecapitalist
economyaswellasintothevariousspheresofcivilsociety:thefamily,schools,culturalinstitutions,etc.Asawholeseriesofradicalleftwritersofthe1970sindicated,
stateinterventioninthecapitalisteconomycreatesinsolublefiscalandadministrativeproblemsinthelongrun,whilepoliticalinterventiononbehalfofthecapitalist
economy(especiallyinthecontextofdecreasingeffectiveness)isnoteasilylegitimatedinthecontextofdemocraticnorms.
33
Theseprojectionsturnedouttobe
devastatinglyaccurate

Page43
andwereinfacttakenupbyconservativeopponentsofthewelfarestateunderheadingssuchasdeclineofproductivity,profitsqueeze,dissolutionoftraditionand
authority,andungovernability.
34
However,theoriginalpoliticalalternativeproposedbysomeofthesameradicalwriters,ademocraticstatismthatwouldexploitthe
repoliticizationofeconomyandsocietybutbreakitslinkwiththeprivateaccumulationofcapital,wasabandonedjustaroundthetimewhenthediagnosisconcerning
theendofthewelfarestateguaranteedprocessesofgrowthwasconfirmed.InGermany,atleast,thereasonforthissurprisingdevelopmentintheselfunderstanding
ofonekeywriter,ClausOffe,wastheemergenceoftwodistinctprogramsofsocietyagainstthestate:thechallengestothewelfarestatebyneoconservativesandby
thenewsocialmovements.Whatthetwotrendshaveincommonaremanyaspectsofaneconomicanalysisofwhatwentwrongwiththewelfarestate.More
importantly,eachchallengewasreadytomovebeyondacritiqueconnectedtoinefficiencyanddysfunctiontodevelopadistinct,normativelybasedcritiqueexploring
thenegativeconsequencesofthewelfarestate,evenatitsmostsuccessful.
Leavingtheeconomicanalysistotheside,
35
thetwoprogramsofcivilsocietyagainstthestatethatemergedoffersharpcontrasts.Theneoconservativeanalysis
stressestheerosionofauthorityasaresultofthepoliticalmanipulationofthenonpoliticalspheresofsociety,leadingtotheintroductionofconflictandcontroversyinto
theverysourcesoflegitimacy.Authoritycanberefurbished,accordingly,onlyifuncontestableeconomic,moral,andcognitivestandardsarerestored.Civilsocietyis
toberestoredinthisprogram,butitsrestorationisunderstoodnotonlyasadefenseagainstthestatebutalso,moreimportantly,againstpolitics.Theneoconservatives
thushaveinmindamodelofdepoliticizedcivilsociety.
36
Inthisinterpretationofneoconservatism,thestressisontheiridentifyingthefreedomofcivilsocietywiththat
ofthemarket.Whatremainsoutsidethemarketmustbereintegratedthroughaconservativeretraditionalizedculturalmodelandlifeworldthatitselfwillhelpto
integratemarketsociety.However,itisalsoevidentthattheirmodelseekstostrengthenthestate,specificallyanauthoritarianversionofit.
37
Theboundariesofstate
andsocietyaretoberedrawnintheirmodelinordertoprovideforasmallerbut

Page44
strongerstatestreamlinedforfewerbutfarmoreeffectiveandauthoritarianformsofaction.Despiteexplicitlyaimingatsuchanoutcome,theneoconservativeshave
managedtochannelandfocusagooddealofantiauthoritarianpoliticalsentimentproducedbythevariousconsequencesofthewelfarestatefordifferentspheresof
life.
Analternativeprogramfortherestorationofcivilsociety,accordingtoClausOffe,mustbeginbyrecognizingthat"socialstatism"or"welfarestatism"didindeedhave
disastrousconsequencesforwholestrata,forformsoflife,forformsofparticipation,solidarity,andautonomy.HerehisanalysisduplicatesthoseofFrench"second
left"criticsofstatism.TheprogramofthenewsocialmovementsforthereconstitutionofcivilsocietythatOffecallsoneofnonstatistsocialism
38
makesno
concessionstoeconomicprivatismortostatistauthoritarianism.Thisprogram
seekstopoliticizetheinstitutionsofcivilsocietyinwaysthatarenotconstrainedbythechannelsofrepresentativebureaucraticpoliticalinstitutions,andtherebyreconstitutesa
civilsocietythatisnolongerdependentuponevermoreregulation,control,andintervention.Inordertoemancipateitselffromthestate,civilsocietyitselfitsinstitutionsof
work,production,distribution,familyrelations,relationswithnature,itsverystandardsofrationalityandprogressmustbepoliticizedthroughpracticesthatbelongtoan
intermediatespherebetween"private"pursuitsandconcerns,ontheoneside,andinstitutional,statesanctionedmodesofpolitics,ontheother.
39
Twonotentirelyconsistentfeaturesofthisconceptionneedtobestressed.Behinditliesadefenseofmodernbutpostmaterialvaluesinheritedfromthenewleftofthe
1960sthatcontrastparticipation,autonomy,andsolidaritywithconsumption,efficiency,andgrowth.Thusthemodelofcivilsocietyhereisthatofaculturallydefined
frameworkofthesocial,tobedistinguishedfromeconomicandpoliticalmodels.Ontheotherside,however,isamodelofacivilsocietyinheritedfromthe
antiauthoritariandimensionoftheMarxiantradition,involvingademocratizationmainlyoftheworldofwork.ThismodelisonethatFrenchwriterstendedtocallthat
ofpoliticalsociety,andOffe'sdefense,unliketheirs,separatesthecaseforpoliticalandcivilsocietyintermsofalternativeandopposedleftandneoconservative
scenarios.Civilsocietyinthesenseof

Page45
RosanvallonandViveretishereidentifiedwiththeprivate,andcorrelativelyanythingnotlefttotheprivateistobepoliticized.Moreover,thenew"political"societyis
understoodbyOffetorepresentamodelofdemocracyalternativetotheinstitutionsofliberaldemocracy,evenifitremainsunclearwhetherwearetoseethetwoas
opposedorpotentiallycomplementary.
TheprogramfortherestorationofcivilsocietythatOfferepresentshas,toagreaterextentthanthatofthewritersoftheFrenchsecondleft,preserveditslinkstothe
classicalMarxianconceptionthatplacespoliticaleconomywithincivilsociety.ThemodelofpoliticizedcivilsocietyrecapitulatesMarx'searlystressonthe
reinterpretationofpoliticaldemocracyandeverydaylife.Evenmoreimportant,OffeoperateswithinthetermsoftheMarxiancritiqueofliberaldemocracy.Inhis
conception,liberaldemocracyrepresentsamediationbetweenstateandcivilsocietythatisinourtimeonthevergeoffailure.Herecivilsociety,however,means
capitalistbourgeoissociety,andliberaldemocracy(aparticularversionof"politicalsociety")isidentifiedalsoasamediatingprinciplebetweentwosupposed
incompatibles,capitalismanddemocracy.
40
FollowingMacpherson,Offepointstothecompetitivepartysystemasthespecificmechanismthataccomplishes
mediationbetweenstateandcivilsociety,reconcilingdemocracyandcapitalismintheprocess.Alongwiththecrisisofthewelfarestate,however,themajor
contemporaryinstitutionofthecompetitivepartysystem,thecatchallparty,hasenteredintocrisis:itnevercould(unlikeitsforerunners)generatecollectiveidentities,
andinazerosumsocietyitcandecreasinglysatisfytheinterestsofitsdiverseconstituencywhenthishappens.
Theconflictbetweendemocraticlegitimacyandnondemocraticeconomicordercanberesolvedinoneoftwo"extrainstitutional"directions,
41
one(representing
governingelites)antidemocratictheother(representingordinarycitizens)radicaldemocratic.Neocorporatismrepresentsthefirsttypeofsolutionforthearticulation
andresolutionofconflictoutsideliberaldemocraticchannels.Withprivateorganizationstakingonpublicfunctions,Offedepictsneocorporatismasahigherdegreeof
fusionbetweenstateandsociety,publicandprivate,thanstateinterventionismitself.
42
ThisideaparallelstheviewofViveretandRosanvallon,according

Page46
towhomneocorporatismmeansthedisappearanceofpoliticalsocietyassuch,i.e.,allmediationsbetweencivilsocietyandstatestabilizingtheirdifferentiation.
Theradicaldemocratic"extrainstitutional"solutionforthefailureofliberaldemocracyhastheoppositeconsequence:redifferentiationratherthanfusion.The
revitalizationofpoliticalsocietyorofapoliticalversionofcivilsocietyintheformofcitizeninitiativesandsocialmovementsrepresentsarenewedmodelforthe
differentiationofstateandsociety.Offevariouslyandsomewhatinconsistentlydepictsthisoptionasaresponseeithertothefailureofthepartysystemortothe
success(butexclusionarytendencies)ofneocorporatism.Ineithercase,however,wecanspeakofthereconstitutionofcivil(orpolitical)societyoutsidean
establishedinstitutionalframeworkthathasthreatenedthedisappearanceofallindependentformsofsociallife.
Thebasesonwhich(political)civilsocietyisreconstituted,ifafusionbetweenthespheresofstateandsocietyhasalreadyoccurred,remainsunclearinthisanalysis.
43
Sincenorevolutionaryruptureisbeingcontemplated,onemustsomehowdiscoverthefoundationsofthenewindependentstructuresintheoldsocietyonthelevel
ofnormsand/ornonstatizedformsofassociation.
44
Offe'smodelofthereconstitutionofcivilsocietyismoreemphaticallymovementcenteredthantheothertwoforms
ofanalysiswehavesofardepicted.Socialmovementsplayamajorroleinallofthem,butonlyinOffe'smodelisthereashiftofemphasistowardmovementpolitics
fromtwodirections:nonpoliticalassociations,institutions,formsoflifeontheonehand,andliberaldemocratic,parliamentarypoliticsontheother.Whiletheissuemay
beoneofstressratherthanomission,therelationshipofapoliticalversionofcivilsocietytoitsnonpoliticalassociationalsubstratumishardlyexplored(thoughwithout
thistheoriginofmovementscannotbethematized),whilethatofthetwoparadigmsofpoliticsisexploredonlyinaninconclusiveway.
AlongwiththerealistfactionoftheGreens,Offe,ofcourse,presupposesinpracticalpoliticsthecomplementarityofpartyandmovementformsoforganization,of
parliamentaryandgrassrootsformsofpolitics.Hisearliercritiqueofliberaldemocracy,however,oscillatedbetweenaconceptionthatassertedanoutrightcontra

Page47
dictionbetweenliberalismanddemocracyandanotherpositingliberaldemocracyasadeficientdemocraticbridgebetweenthewillofcitizensandthestate.Both
versionsstillleavethewayopentothesecrethopeoftheclassicalMarxiantheory:apoliticalsocietyembodyingalleconomicandpoliticalpowersinasingle
institutionalframework.
45
Suchautopiabeyondthedualismofstateandcivilsocietyneedsnobridgebetweenthetwopoles,leastofallaliberaldemocraticone.
Undertheimpactofthenewselflimitationofcontemporarysocialmovements,whichseektolimitbutnotabolishtheexistingversionofthemodernstate,Offeno
longerseemstoholdthisparticularutopianview.Hiscritiqueofmajorityrule
46
allowshimtothematizetherelationshipbetweenthe"extrainstitutional"politicalimpulse
ofthenewsocialmovementsandtheneedforconstitutionalchangewithinthestructureofliberaldemocracy.Sincethiscritiqueisactuallyaimedatthecentralized
formsofmajorityrulerepresentedbytheliberaldemocraticnationstate,Offeproposestosupplementmajorityrulenotsomuchwiththeclassicalliberalformsofthe
protectionofminoritiesaswithvariousfederal,decentralized,quasiaristocratic(inthesenseofselfelectivebodiesofthosemostconcerned),andelsewherealso
functionalrepresentativeforms.Ofcourse,allofthesesupplementaryformsofdemocracywouldhavetorelyonsomeformofmajorityrule.Whatremainsunclear
abouttheanalysisisagaintheproblemoftherelationofthetwopoliticalsocieties,thistimethecentralizedandthesupplementaryones,and,inparticular,howthe
official,institutional,centralizedformistobetransformedoratleastmadereceptivetoandcapableofbeinginfluencedbytheotherforms.Whilethesuggestionto
makemajorityrulereflexiveaboutitsownboundariesthroughareinstitutionalizationofthepouvoirconstituantisimportant,this(stillvagueandpossiblyimpractical)
proposalbypassesthequestionofthestructureofparliamentary,partydemocracy.Weareleftwiththeimpression(alsopresentinsomeoftheotheranalyseswe
havepresented)thatwhileliberaldemocracyisadmittedlydangerousfortheautonomyofapoliticalversionofcivilsociety,becauseofitsdepoliticizingtendencies,
civilsocietycannotinthelongrunbeinstitutionalizedwithoutsomeofthestructuralpossibilitiesthat,intheWestatleast,arecarriedbyliberaldemocracy.

Page48
CivilSocietyintheTransitionfromLatinAmericanDictatorships
Theconceptofcivilsocietyhasalsoemergedunderseveral"bureaucraticauthoritarian"regimesasakeytermintheselfunderstandingofdemocraticactorsaswellas
animportantvariableintheanalysisofthetransitiontodemocracy.
47
Thisdiscussionhasbeentherichest,mostopenended,andmostsyntheticamongtheonessofar
discussed.Wecan,ofcourse,onlytraceformsofdiscoursethatwebelieveindicatethebeginningsofanewpoliticalcultureitisbeyondourcompetencetointegrate
thisdiscourseintothediversepoliticalandsocialcontextsinvolved.Nevertheless,wearestruckbytheremarkableunityofthediscussionandbyitsparallelswith
developmentselsewhere.
ThemainconcernofLatinAmericantheoristsandtheircollaboratorshasbeenthetransitionfromanewtypeofmilitarybureaucraticauthoritarianrule:First,involving
aperiodof"liberalization"(definedastherestorationand/orextensionofindividualandgrouprights)andsecond,astageof"democratization"(understoodintermsof
theestablishmentofacitizenshipprinciplebasedonatleasta"proceduralminimum"ofparticipation).Butthesetransitionsareseenasstronglydependentonthe
"resurrectionofcivilsociety."
48
Here,civilsocietystandsforanetworkofgroupsandassociationsbetween(insomeversions,including)familiesandfacetoface
groupsononesideandoutrightstateorganizationsontheother,mediatingbetweenindividualandstate,privateandpublic.Differentfromclan,clique,cabal,and
clientele,theassociationsofcivilsocietyhavethemselvesapublic,civicqualityrelatedbothto"arecognizedrighttoexist''andtheability"toopenlydeliberate
about...commonaffairsandpubliclyactindefenseofjustifiableinterests."
49
Otherssignificantlyaddthenotionofselfexpressiontothatoftherepresentationof
interests,andtheyproposetoincludemovementsalongwithrecognizedassociationsintheconcept.
50
Itisoftensuggestedthatthe"resurrection"ofcivilsociety
culminatesinthehighlymobilizedandconcentratedformof"massmobilization"and"popularupsurge,"inwhichthevariouslayersandstrataofcivilsocietydevelop,if
temporarily,asinglecollectiveidentity.

Page49
Thecategoryofmassismisleadingherefortworeasons.First,theanalyststellusthatinliberalizedauthoritarianstates,civilsocietytypicallycomesintomotionin
distinctandsuccessivelayers:intellectualgroups,middleclassorganizations,humanrightsorganizations,professionalassociations,movementsofindustrialworkers,
etc.(notnecessarilyinthisorder).
51
Evenincontextsofhighmobilization,intherecenttransitionstodemocracythedifferentgroups,associations,andorganizations
donotcoalesceintoonemass,aswascharacteristicoftheearlier"populisms"thatoftenledtodictatorships.Second,theforumsofresurrectedcivilsocietyare
typically"public"asagainst"mass,"rangingfromintellectualdiscussionsinuniversities,bookstores,cafs,etc.,topopularformsofassociationandassembly,which
togetherrepresentnewcontextsinwhich"theexerciseandlearningofcitizenshipcanflourishindeliberationsaboutissuesofeverydayconcern."
52
Highlevelsof
mobilizationagainstrecentdictatorshipstypicallyusedratherthanbypassedthesepublicforms.Thisisunderstandable,sinceaftertheauthoritarianreductionofpublic
discussiontostatecontrolled,restricted''codesandterms,"therestorationofthissphereachievedhighsignificance,forawhileatleastmakingthesimplifications
involvedinpopulistdiscourselessattractive.Allthesame,thedistinctionsbetweenhigherandlowerlevelsofmobilization,aswellasbetweenunifiedandmore
particularizedcollectiveidentitiesincivilsociety,remainimportant.
Leavingasidesomedifferencesamongtherelevantauthorsconcerningtheverymeaningandtherelativeimportanceoftheconceptofcivilsociety,someimportant
puzzlesandambiguitiescharacterizethewholelineofanalysis.Accordingtoaninterpretationcharacteristicofthemostrepressiveregimes,suchasArgentina,
authoritarianregimesatomize,depoliticize,andprivatizesociety,creatingapurelymanipulatedandcontrolledpublicsphere.
53
Accordingtoanother,insomecontexts
atleast(suchasBrazil),civilsocietyoritsresiduessurviveauthoritarianruleinformsofinterestassociations,autonomousagencies,localgovernment,andchurch
life.
54
Accordingtoathirdlineofinterpretation,the"resurrectionofcivilsociety"thatpushesthedemocratizationprocessforwardispossibleineithercase,withor
withoutsurvivingformsofrecognizedassociation,withorwithout

Page50
memoriesofearliermassmobilization.
55
AsFranciscoWeffortfromBrazilputsit,"wewantacivilsociety,weneedtodefendourselvesfromthemonstrousstatein
frontofus.Thismeansthatifitdoesnotexist,weneedtoinventit.Ifitissmall,weneedtoenlargeit....Inawordwewantcivilsocietybecausewewant
freedom."
56
Inthisinterpretation,whichrecallsargumentsmadeinPoland,thesocialfoundationsforcivilsociety,startingwithfamilyandfriendsandcontinuingwith
thechurch,neverdisappearedinanyofthesoutherndictatorships.
Thestrategyof"inventing"and"enlarging"isfavoredbythefactthatbureaucraticauthoritarianregimesnevermanagetosolvetheirproblemsoflegitimacy.
57
The
constitutionorreconstitutionofelementsofcivilsociety,indirectlypromotedbyreducingbothfearandthecostsofautonomousactivity,becomesameanstoaddress
thesefundamentalproblems.
58
Whilethiseffortfromaboveisalwaysexpectedtostaywithincarefullimits,itcannotamounttoacompletefarceifthegoalof
legitimacyistobeattained,andtheelementsofactualdemocratizationthatareestablishedinthiswayarebydefinitionunpredictableandcannotbekeptwithinany
givenpredefinedlimits.
59
Itisstillunclear,however,whatdifferencethestateofdevelopmentofcivilsocietyunderauthoritarianrulemakesintermsoftheprocessoftransitionorthestability
andcharacteroftheoutcome.Itseemslikelythatthecharacterofamobilizedcivilsocietyitselfisaffectedbythealternativepatterns:morehomogeneouswhereno
previousstructuresexistedorwerepreserved,morepluralisticandstructuredwherecivilsocietydidnothavetobecreatedafterahighdegreeofatomization.And
thisdifferencehasmanypotentialconsequences.
Itmaybehelpfultodistinguish,inrelationtotransitions,processesofinitiation,consolidation,andcompletion.Theexactroleofcivilsocietyintheprocessof
initiatingthetransitionremainsinsomedispute.Thedominantthesisstresses,onthebasisofmuchcomparativedata,thatthebeginningisprimarilyafunctionofinternal
splitsintheauthoritarianregime,althoughallanalystsconcedethatifsuchasplitleadstoan"opening"ortoliberalization,theresurrectionofcivilsocietycannotbe
easilycontainedandwillplayanimportantroleinallsucceedingsteps.
60
However,someinter

Page51
pretersseemtoarguethatwheremobilizationplaysaroleintheendofanauthoritarianregime,thewholeprocessofthe"overthrow"or"selfdissolution"fromthevery
beginningisverymuchafunctionoftheregime'srelationshiptocivilsociety.
61
ThenotionthattheproblemoflegitimationistheAchillesheelofthepost1945
authoritarianregimes
62
seemstoimplythattheinstabilityoftheregimesandtheimpetusforliberalizationshouldbesoughtintherelationshipoftherulerstogroupsand
opinionoutsideofthem.
Thefeaturesofcivilsocietyareasimportanttopotentialrollbacks,inparticularmilitarycoups,astotheprocessofinitiationandacceleration.Whilesomeanalystsfear
overmobilizationasapretextforcoupsandamotivationforreunificationoftherulingelites,thedominantpositionseemstostressthecostsofaconflictwithmobilized
civilsocietyasadeterrenttohardlinersthatreformerscanuse.
63
Onemightaddherethatnotonlythelevelofmobilizationbutthatofstructureformationisimportant
becauseitiseasiertosuppressasocietywithoutdeeporganizationalrootsthanahighlyarticulatedone,eveniftheformerissuperficiallymobilized.
Equallyimportantistheissueofwhetherornotthepressureofcivilsociety,oncemobilized,iscapableofpushingtotheendaprocessoftransitiontodemocratic
politics.Itseemsobviousthatanevolutionarystrategyinvolvesimportantnegotiatingandbargainingprocesseswiththoseauthoritarianrulerswhoareableandwilling
tomoderatetheirrule,whileatalaterstageanytransitiontodemocracymustinvolveorganizationforelections.Itisnotobviousineitherofthesecontexts,however,
howcivicassociations,socialmovements,grassrootsorganizations,orevenmediaofcommunicationcansubstituteforthedifferentiationofapoliticalelement
capableofstrategicconsiderations.Infact,astrategyfrombelowonitsownhasnowheresucceeded.
Asidefromideologiesofreformfromabove,twoformsofdiscourseareavailabletoparticipantsseekingtounderstandtheplaceofpoliticalorganizationsinthe
transitionfromauthoritarianruleoneisdialecticalandtheothermoreanalytical.Accordingtotheformer,sincebureaucraticauthoritarianregimessuppressor
seriouslydeformalltypesofmediationbetweentheprivatesphereandthestate(includingpopularorganizationsaswellasinstitu

Page52
tionsforpoliticalcitizenship),thetaskofdemocratizationisprimarilytoreconstitutethese.
64
Indeed,thedialecticalversionofthediscourseofcivilsocietyoftencomes
toidentifydemocratizationwiththereconstitutionofthesemediations.Inthisversion,thepoliticalactorscapableofinterposingthemselvesbetweensocietyandstate
emergefromtheprocessoforganizingnewsocialassociationsandmovementsastheirorganiccontinuation.Butintheirsearchforlegitimacy,theregimesthemselves
ofteninitiatetheprocessofreconstitutingmediationsbeyondthesemipolitical,stateconstituted"bureaucraticringsorclusters"of"socialinterests"thathavefailedas
effectivereplacementsforsocietalpressuregroups.
65
Asaresult,thoseinoppositionfindthemselveshavingtochoosebetween"theimbecility"ofrefusingdegreesof
socialautonomysimplybecausetheyareofferedorevenacceptedbygovernmentsand"theopportunism"ofacceptinglimitedautonomytooquickly,enteringintoa
predeterminedandcooptinggamewithouttestingtheactualpossibilitiesofdemocratization.
66
Oneoptionbeyondthesetwoseemstobetheattempttoorganizeand
defendthenewsphereofcivilsocietynotasmediationbutasanendinitself,asinitselfpolitical:''Ifpoliticswastohaveanewmeaning,anewsphereoffreedomfor
politicalactionhadtobedeveloped.ForpoliticalBrazil,civilsociety,previouslyeitherignoredorseenasaninertmass,begantosignifythatsphereof
freedom."
67
Fromthispointofview,itisnaturaltotreatevenpoliticalpartiesandassociationsasundifferentiatedpartsoftheheterogeneousfieldofself
organization.
68
InanextremeantipoliticalversioninBrazil,combiningtheviewsof"layanarchismandCatholicsolidaritythought,"partiesaretobemorefearedthan
trustedbecauseoftheirpropensitytoenterthegameofthestate.Totheextentthatselforganizationhadtobecomplementedbypoliciesandlegislativemeasures,
theseweretobeachievedbymovementsofdirectparticipationorganizedaroundsingleissuesofintenseconcerntotheirownconstituencies.
69
Inthefaceofintactauthoritarianpower,however,ahighlevelofmobilizationwithoutmediations,symbolizedbythefigureofcivilsocietyas"thepoliticalcelebrityof
theabertura,"
70
couldhavedemobilizingconsequences.Unabletogobeyondpolarization,civilsocietycandefeatstateinitiativeswithoutgeneratingacompre

Page53
hensivealternativeofitsown.AsinthecasesofbothBrazilandChile,fearoftheregimecaneasilybereplacedbysociety'sfearofitself,fearoftheconsequencesof
itsownimpotentpower.
71
Bothintheoryandinpractice,asecondstrategycomestostresstheneedforanorientationtopoliticalsocietytocompletethetransitionto
democracy.Thisstrategyisintellectuallyanalyticalinthatitdoesnotseetheinstitutionsofpoliticalsocietyparties,electoralmechanisms,formsofbargaining,and
legislaturesaseitherpartsorasorganiccontinuationsoftheprocessesoftheselforganizationofcivilsociety.
72
Whileitseemsmisleadingtoidentifycivilsocietyprimarilywithliberalization,andpoliticalsocietyprimarilywithdemocratization,itiscertainlyrighttoinsistthat"full
democratictransitionmustinvolvepoliticalsociety."
73
Withoutpoliticalsociety,neitherthenecessarynegotiationfortransitionnorthemechanismsofsocietalcontrolof
postauthoritarianstatescanbeestablished.Thishasbeenshownthroughanalysesofelectionsandpoliticalparties.Inthosedictatorshipswhereelectoralmechanisms
weremaintained,evenifgreatlyrestricted,ithasbeenpossibletochannelsocialpressureinthedirectionofsubstantial,ifgradual,politicalchange
("decompression"),
74
eveninthecontextofanintactauthoritarianorderthathasnotbeenweakenedfromtheoutside.ThiswasthecaseinBrazil.Similarly,the
continued,ifrestricted,existenceofpoliticalpartiesrepresentedinseveralcountries,fromBraziltoUruguayand(mostrecently)Chile,thenaturalfocalpointfor
negotiatedtransitions.
75
Indeed,partiesandelectionsrepresentedopportunitiesfortheremobilizationofcivilsocietyinseveralcontextswherephenomenaof
demobilizationoccurredafterfailuresofearlychallengesagainstauthoritarianrule.
76
Whereverithasbeenpossible,theactivationofpoliticalsocietyseemstohave
beenthekeytoavoidingpolarized,zerosum,orevennegativesumconfrontationsbetweenorganizedcivilsocietiesandauthoritarianregimesthathavemaintained
somecontinuitywiththepast.
77
Whateveritsnecessity,theturntopoliticalsocietyhaspotentiallydemobilizingconsequenceswithrespecttocivilsociety,asmanyparticipantsandobservers
havenoted.Inthiscontext,Cardosojustlycallsattentiontothedoublenatureofpoliticalparties:Theirmediatingroleismadepossibleby,butcannotovercome,the
contradictions

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withinthemofmovementandadministration,ofparticipationandelitism,ofdemocraticnormandstrategiccalculation.
78
Attwopoints,however,theelitist,
administrative,andstrategicsidemaydominate:pactsandelections.Oftenpossibleandnecessaryas"undemocratic"halfwaystations,pactsarerightlystressedby
manyasimportantmeansofavoidingviolenceanditsrisksinthetransitiontodemocracy.
79
Itdoesnotseemcompletelyjustified,though,toclaimthat,wheretheyare
possible,pactsbetweenthepartiesoftheoppositionandelementsoftheregimearealsodesirable,especiallywhenitisalittletooquicklyadmittedthattheyareasa
ruleexclusionary,nonpublic,andaimedatdrasticallycurtailingconflictinthepoliticalsystem.Theirviolationofthenormsofdemocracy
80
canhavelongtermnegative
consequencesforapoliticalculture.Withthissaid,itshouldperhapsbeaddedthatpactsinwhichcertaininterestsoftheexistingrulersareguaranteedhavedifferent
possibleconsequencesforcivilsociety,dependingontheirtiming.Comingearlyinaprocessoftransition,pactscansecureelementsofliberalization,makingpossible
thereconstitutionofcivilsociety.Inthiscase,withtheemergenceofnewactorsandtheactivationofpublicspaces,thechancesaregoodthattheinitialpactwill
eventuallybesweptaside.
81
Ifapactcomeslate,however,aftertheresurrectionandpossiblytheupsurgeofcivilsociety,andespeciallyifitguaranteespower
positionstoallcontractingparties,includingsomeoftheopposition,itsveryaiminvolvesanexclusionanddemobilizationthatmaybesuccessfulforalongperiod.
Oftentheconsequenceisarevivalofpopulismratherthanprocessesoffurtherdemocratization.
Theonly"late"pactsthatseemtoavoidthistrajectoryarethoseinwhichoppositionalgroupingsaskfornoconcessionsforthemselvesbutonlyforsocietyasawhole.
Aboveall,pactsthatarrangeelectionsandelectoralrulescanhavethischaracter.Butelections,evenwhentheythemselvesdonotincorporatestronglyexclusionary
rules,canbeambiguousfromthepointofviewofmobilizingcivilsociety.
Severalanalystsaskthepartiallyrhetoricalquestion,Whyshouldrulingelitesagreetoelectionsthatarelikelytoabolishtheirrule?Theanswergivenisthattheseelites
expecttochannelpolitics"awayfromtheebullienceofcivilsociety"andperhapseventowin

Page55
electionsbydividingtheoppositionandbeingrewardedbytheelectorate.
82
Whenelectionsareonlygraduallydecontrolled,asinBrazil,thehopeistoslowdown
therateofchangewhilestillachievingprocedurallegitimacy.Thehopesofvictoryandlegitimacyaregenerallyfrustrated,butnotthoseofdemobilizationand,where
pertinent,gradualism.
83
Themovetoelectoralpartieswiththeirlessintense,moreinclusive,moreabstractformofpoliticalidentificationandtheirlowerdegreeof
directparticipationtendstodevalueandreplacemovementsandassociationswiththeirmoreparticular,butalsomoreintenseandparticipatory,formsoforganization.
Althoughthisdependsonthespecificelectoralrulesenacted,thetendencyofmodernelectionsistoreducethenumberofpoliticalpartiescapableofeffectively
participatinginelections.Inturn,andespeciallyinperiodsofuneasytransition,potentiallysuccessfulpartieswilloftenrestrainmovementsofcivilsocietythatmight
jeopardizetheoutcomeoreventhepossibilityofelections.
84
Themajorparties,moreover,shareacommoninterestinobtainingalargerthanrepresentativeshareof
votesforforcesclosetotheauthoritarianregime,toavoidanoverlygreatvictoryfortheopposition.
85
Thus,itcanbesaidnotonlyoftheprocessesleadingto
unrestrictedelectoralconteststhatenddictatorshipsbutalsooftheelectionsthemselvesthattheyareimplicitnegotiationsbetweenregimesandoppositionalparties
thatprovidespaceandtimeto"redefinetheirrespectiveroles."
86
Andwhiletheweaklegitimacyandtheplebiscitarypossibilitiesofpartiallyrestrictedelectionscan
indeedleadtosocietalmobilizationandtolearningprocessesoutsidetheofficialframework,theliberaldemocraticlegitimacyofopenconfrontationprovidesmuchless
ofachanceforsuchanoutcome.Itispossiblethatwherecivilsocietyisunderdevelopedandpassive,orisintheprocessofcontraction,electionsmightdraw
otherwiseuninvolvedstrataintoorganizedpoliticsinthecontextofahighlymobilizedcivilsociety,thereversemayverywelloccur,withpartiesturningouttobe"not
only,ornotsomuch,agentsofmobilizationasinstrumentsofsocialandpoliticalcontrol."
88
Thereislittledoubtaftertheexperienceofseveralcountriesthatthehighestlevelofamobilizedcivilsocietycannotbemaintainedforlong.
89
Butiscivilsociety
equivalenttosuchmobilization?Isit

Page56
notamarkofitsweaknessthatitcanexistinsomecountriesonlyinthisform?Thereissomeserioustheoreticaluncertaintyconcerningwhatcomesorcancomeafter
demobilization.Thequestioniswhetherthereisanythingleftofa"resurrectedcivilsociety"afterselectiverepression,cooptation,manipulation,internalconflicts,
fatigue,disillusionment,andthechannelingofoppositionintothepartyandelectoralsystemstaketheirtollanddemobilize"thepopularupsurge."
90
Hereone
interpretationstressesdepoliticization,reprivatization,andtheemergenceofpoliticalghettoes,whichtogetherwillendangerdemocraticconsolidationandweakenthe
society'sabilitytoresistrenewedauthoritarianism.Theideathatinsomecountries,notablyChileandUruguay,
91
anoverdevelopedsystemofpartiescontributestoa
dependentandunderdevelopedcivilsocietyismoreconsistentwiththislineofargumentthanisthestressinthecaseofothercountriesonthesurvivalofcivic
associationallifeevenunderauthoritarianism.Ifoneidentifiesdemobilizationwiththeatomizationofcivilsociety,itishardtoseehowonecanspeakofatransitionto
democracyratherthanareturntocyclesofdemocracyanddictatorship,neitherofwhichcanbestabilized,inpartbecauseofthecyclesofpoliticizationand
depoliticizationofcivilsocietywithineachformofrule.Theideaoffinallyleavingthecycle
92
mustthereforepointbeyondthealternativeofafullymobilizedandfully
depoliticizedandprivatizedcivilsociety.
Logically,atleast,thedemobilizationofapopularupsurgeisnotnecessarilytheendofapoliticallyrelevantcivilsociety.Norisitnecessarythateverythinglearnedin
previouscyclesbeforgotten.Inthiscontext,itissignificantthatsomeinterpretersseetheemergenceofanewformofdifferentiationbetweendefactosocietal
pluralismanddemocraticpluralismasachangeinvalues,asthetransformationofthecollectiveidentityofgroupsandinstitutions.
93
Theformertypeofpluralismhas
beenpresentinmostofthesocietiesinquestion,butthelatterhasbeenaproductonlyoftherecentstrugglesagainstauthoritarianregimesthathaveledtothe
replacementoftheimageryoftheviarevolucionariabydemocraticideologies.
94
Afterthefailureofillusoryrevolutionsandtheexperienceofdictatorships,
democracycametobeincreasinglyviewedasanendinitselfratherthanameansforthe

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realizationofsectoralinterests.
95
Butforittobecomeanendalsofornonelitegroups,areorientationtocivilsocietyhadtoandactuallydidoccur."Thediscoveryof
thevalueofdemocracyisinseparable,withintheopposition,fromthediscoveryofcivilsocietyasapoliticalspace."
96
Thequestioninevitablyarises,Whatwillhappen
tothevalueofdemocracyasthespaceofcivilsocietyshrinkstothebenefitofpoliticalsociety?
Actually,oneshoulddistinguishthreepossibilities:(1)acivilsocietythatlosesitsvalueforsocialactorswiththerestorationofdemocracy,aprocessinwhichpolitical
societyhascometoplaythemajorrole(2)anoverpoliticizedcivilsocietythatimplicitly,onbehalfofvariousofitssectors,seekstoabolishsocietalpluralityitself
and/ordevaluesmediationsbetweenitselfandthestateand(3)acivilsocietythathasbecomereflexivetoitselfthroughitsselfthematizationandselfnormatization,
aswellasitsselflimitationvisvispoliticalsociety.
Theselfreflexivemodelofcivilsocietyinvolvesnotonlytheideaoftheselflimitationofcivilsocietybutalsoitsownstrengthening.Thishasconsequencesforboth
civilandpoliticalsociety.Themodelisincompatiblewiththeliberalindividualisticconceptofcivilsocietythatimpliesbothitsfulldepoliticizationanditsdependence
ontheforcesofthemarketeconomy:"thesocialinequalityandthefragilityoftheindividualbeforebusinessandthebureaucracy."Cardosoproposesanalternative
combiningtheradicaldemocraticstressoncollectivesubjectivityandselforganization(without,however,abandoningindividualrights)andareformdemocratic
acceptanceofthenecessityofthestate.This"dualistic"synthesisleadstothestart,admittedlyneedingfurtherdevelopment,ofaproposalforgreatersocial
responsibilityonthepartofthemanagementoffirmsandthebureaucracy,withincreasingpubliccontrolovertheirprocesses.Withoutthis,civilsocietyremains
defenselessand"privateinthestrictsenseoftheword."
97
Thisredefinitionoftherelationshipofstateandcivilsocietyinademocracyyettobecreatedaltersthemodelofpoliticalsocietyaswell,andalongwithitthatof
politicalparties.Theirtasknowbecomesbuilding"movablebridgesonbothsidesoftheantinomy."
98
Theideaisnotwellenoughexplainedintermsofthenotionof
"counteringthewidespreadideathatthepartiesare'inauthentic'

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andincapableofservingasafilterfortheaspirationsoftheelectorate."
99
Whatseemstobeinvolvedinsteadistherejectionofachoicebetweentheelitistandthe
radicaldemocratic,betweenthestrategicandthenormativedemocraticdimensionsoftheambivalenceofmodernparties.Rather,itseemstobethisambivalence
madeconsciousthatcouldallowboththesensitizingofcivilsocietytotheneedforstrategicconsiderationsandtheintroductionofelementsofdemocraticdecision
makingintostateandfirm.
100
Sketchyasitmaybe,Cardoso'soutlineforthedevelopmentofdemocratictheoryhasseveralvirtues.Itisamodelofthegoaloftransitionthatdoesnotlosesightof
thepreconditionsofconsolidatingdemocracyandremobilizinginitsdefense.ItcorrespondswelltotheinstitutionalrequirementsforO'Donnell'snotionofbuildinga
civilsocietybaseddemocraticpoliticalculture.Finally,themodelpointsbeyondrestrictingdemocracytothepoliticalsphere(i.e.,beyondelitedemocracyorelite
pluralism)tothepossibilityofexitingthehistoricalcycleinawaythatallowstheissueof"moredemocracy"toberaisedwithoutbeingasubterfugeforadictatorshipof
theleftorthepretextofthedictatorshipoftheright.
RevisitingEasternEuropeintheLate1980s
Asindicatedabove,therediscoveryofcivilsocietyinPolandwastheproductoftwonegativelearningexperiences:thefailureoftotal,revolutionarychangefrom
below(Hungaryin1956)andofcomprehensivereformfromabove(Czechoslovakiain1968).Polishreformersdecidedthataradicalchangeofsocietywasstill
possibleifathirdroutewasfollowed.Thiswouldhavetwocomponents:Theagentwouldbeorganizedsociety"frombelow,"andthetargetwouldbecivilsociety
ratherthanthestate,withinaprogramofselflimitation.Notethatbyitsownstandardsthenewstrategywasitselfopentothetestofnewlearningexperiences.After
therepressionofSolidarityinDecemberof1981,thequestioninevitablyaroseofwhetherthethirdandseeminglylastroutehadalsobeenprovedimpossiblein
Soviettypesocieties.(Apparentlylastonthebasisofadualisticconceptionthatrigidlyjuxtaposesstateandcivilsociety.)

Page59
WithinPolandthedualisticformulationhasbeensubjectedtostringentcritiquebyJadwigaStaniszkis.Herewewilloutlineandexpandhergenerallineofattack:
1.Thepolarizationofsocietyvs.thestateinPolandisconnectedtoapoliticalhistoryinwhichthreeforeignimperialgovernmentsrepresentedthestate.
2.Polishculturesurvivedtheageofpartitionsbypreservingitsowntraditions,mentalities,practices,systemofeducation,andreligioninisolationfromthestate(s).
3.Thestrategywas,however,alwaysapurelydefensiveoneandisnotsuitedforrealsocialchange.
4.Theposttotalitarianstateismoresubtleandpenetrating,moreinvisibleandcorrupting,thantheopenlyrepressivestatesofthepast.Thustheisolationofstateand
societyisinprinciplenotpossible.
5.Theunityofsocietyisillusoryontheempiricallevel,andapopulistandsolidaristuniformityimposedonsociety(allegedlythecaseduringthesixteenmonthsof
Solidarity)isundesirable.
6.Theunityofthepartystateisalsoillusoryand,fromastrategicpointofview,hardlydesirable.Thenotionofinherentoppositionbetweensocietyandstatemakesit
impossibletoexploitinternalcleavagesandtensionsinstateandparty.Reformistattemptsfromaboveandwithintherulingstructuremustthenbetakenasapriori
illusory,andcompromisecanbeunderstoodonlyasstrategic,i.e.,inprincipleunstable.Partyoppositionsarecontinuallydrivenbackintotheparty.
7.Popularmobilizationandconflictundertheaegisofthedualisticconceptioncanamountonlytoritualizedformsofchannelingoppositiontheywillnotbeableto
produceanysignificantchangeintheexistingsystem.
101
Staniszkiswaswrongaboutthemobilizingpowerofthedichotomousconceptionofsocietyagainstthestate.Indeed,theconceptionwasinmanyrespectsself
realizing:WhileSolidaritywaslegal(19801981),Polishsocietywasatleasttendentiallyorganizedaroundthefaultlinesofthedichotomyofcivilsocietyand(party)
state,despiteconflictswithineachpoleoftheduality.Inretrospect,

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however,oneimplicationofStaniszkis'sanalysiswasfulfilled:Thedichotomousconceptionreinforcedatypeofpolarizationinwhichcompromisesolutionsbecame
impossible,howevermuchdesiredbythesectorofSolidarityledbyLechWalesa.Forcompromiseoneneedspartners,presumablyreformists,andalso(political)
institutionsofmediation.Inacontextofradicalpolarization,activelysoughtbysectorsoftheregimebutfavoredbySolidarity'sideology,neithercouldemerge.The
normativelyandaffectivelysuccessfuldualisticconceptionoftheoriginalprojectoftheselfliberationofcivilsocietywasthuspartoftheconstellationthatledto
strategicfailure.
Inthe1980sthisprojectwas,amazinglyenough,notonlynotabandonedbutextendedtotwoothercountries:HungaryandtheSovietUnion.Tworeasons,aside
fromthatoftheinherentnormativevalidityofthebasicideas,wereresponsible.Onewasgeopolitical:Importantshiftshadoccurredintheinternationaleconomicand
politicalenvironmentsinwhichtheprojecthadoriginallyledtostalemate.Theotherwastheoretical,involvinganexpansionoftheoriginalframeworkbyintroducing
thecategoryofpoliticalsociety.
ThechangeintheinternationalenvironmentfollowedfromthecrisisoftheSovietmodelofeconomicdevelopmentbothontheperipheryandeveninthecenterofthe
imperialsystem.TheSovietUnionhadexhaustedthepossibilitiesofextensivedevelopmentbasedoncontinuousexpansionoftheresourcesofrawmaterialsandlabor
andwasbeingdecisivelychallengedbythethreatofunlimitedtechnologicalmilitarycompetitionwiththeUnitedStates,acompetitiontheSovietUnioncouldnotwin.
102
Asidefromeconomics,thenewsituationwasmarkedbythreenewprocesses:thefailureofnormalizationinPoland,theemergenceofreformismfromabovein
theSovietUnion,andthebeginningofthecrisisofKadaristconsolidationinHungary.
ThereferencetotheSovietUnionalreadyindicatesthat,giventhechangeofenvironment,thestrategyofreformfrombelowaswellasfromabovehasmadea
comeback,despitetheexpectationsofPolishoppositionistsinthelate1970sundertheinfluenceoftheCzechexperienceandtheatmosphereoftheBrezhnevera.
Remarkably,thestrategyofreformfromabove,initiatedbysegmentsoftherulingparty,wasnowcomplementedbyanotherone:the

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reconstructionofindependentcivilsociety.Indeed,itisthiscomplementaritythatwasoftenseenasthemarkofthedifferencebetweenradicalreformandmere
reform.Accordingtothislineofthought,attemptedchangesintheSovieteconomyfailedinthepastbecause(1)theytargetedonlytheeconomy,(2)theydidnotgo
farenougheveninrelationtotheeconomy,and(3)theironlyagentwastherulinginstitutionabove,excludingallforcesfrombelow.
103
Allthesepointsbelong
together.Assumingthatthegoalwasfirstandforemostaneconomicreformthatwent"farenough"towork,elitereformersnowarguedthatthisispossibleonlyif
otherareasoflifeweretransformedandotheractorsthanthepartystateparticipatedintheoverallproject.Ineffect,theclaimisthatcivilsocietyisapartofthe
environmentneededforanewtypeofeconomiccoordinationthatcouldnotbecreatedwithoutmovementsfor,andin,civilsociety.
ThethesisappliednotonlytothesysteminheritedfromtheconservativeBrezhneverabytheGorbachevteam,whereeventheformalabolitionofthecommand
structurewouldrequirethemobilizationofpressureoutsidetherulingapparatus.ItappliedaswelltothereformedKadaristsystem,whosesuccesseswereduemore
topartialprivatizationthantothetransformationofthecommandsystemintooneofinformalbureaucraticcontrols.
104
FromthewritingsofHungarianeconomists,
legalscholars,politicalscientists,andsociologistsitbecomesclearwhycivilsocietywasimplicatedontwolevelsinwhatwassupposedlyrequiredfor"radicalreform."
First,wehavelearnedthattheintroductionofreformsexclusivelyfromabovecannot,becauseofconservativebureaucraticresistance,beformulatedorimplemented
inasufficientlyconsistentmanner.
105
Norissuchaprocessprotectedagainstrollbacksinitiatedbybureaucraticcounterattacksincontextsofevenminorleadership
realignments.Thus,independentactorsareneededformoreconsistentanddeterminedpursuitofeconomicreform.However,sincesocialmovementsarenotlikelyto
betheagentsofeconomicreforms(becauseofthesacrificesinvolved),politicaltradeoffsformovements(unions,formsofindustrialdemocracy,abilitytostrike)and
theinstitutionalizationofcollectiveeconomicactors

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(legalityofinterestrepresentations,newformsofproperty)arenecessary.
106
Second,boththerelevanttradeoffsandtheinstitutionalizationofactorspointtolaws,rights,andassociationsofinterestrepresentation.Thesefeaturesofcivilsociety
arealsoneededtocounterspontaneousreinvasionorrepenetrationoftheeconomy,freedfromtheprerogativesofdirecteconomiccommand,byinformal,extralegal
typesofbureaucraticregulationthatreinforcetheweaknessesoftheinherited''economyofshortage."
107
Lawsandrightsconsistentlyformulatedandmadeentirely
publicareneeded,alongwithindependentcourtsandjudicialprocedures,toprovidepredictabilityandregularityforeconomicactorsandtoprotectthemagainstthe
discretionarypoweroftheexistingapparatusoperatingthroughlegalinconsistenciesandthegapsandloopholeswithinthelaw.
108
Butlawsandrightsalonewouldbe
powerlessagainstadministrationswhosepracticeistobypassallformalregulationthroughtheircontroloftheexecutionandimplementationofthelaws.Theymustbe
backedupbyestablishedinterestassociationsandanopenpublicsphere.Thesearealsoneededtoprovideacounterweightagainstthealreadyestablished,
monopolisticlobbies(themselvesrootedpartlyintheapparatusandpartlyinthemoderatelydecentralizedstructuresofindustry)thatnowcontrolthebargaining
processesinvolvinginvestment,subsidies,taxexemptions,andevenpricesandthatreinforcetheresourceconstrainedandbuiltinwastefulcharacteroftheeconomy
ofshortage.
Whenthereconstitutionofcivilsocietywaspromotedasacomponentofreformfromabove,especiallyintheSovietUnion,itwassupposedtostaywithincarefully
definedlimits.Theonlyinstitutionsofcivilsocietythatweretobereconstitutedwerethosemostrelevanttoeconomicrationalitytheindependentactorswereto
accomplishonlythestrictlynecessarytasks.Butbothaimswereselfcontradictory.EconomiclawsandrightsbecomesuchonlyinthecontextofRechtsstaatlichkeit
(constitutionalism),withfarmoregeneralimplications.Associationsgenuinelycompetenttoexertopeneconomicpressurearealsoableandmotivatedtoaddress
othersocialandpoliticalissues.Apublicspherethatallowcriticismofeconomicwaste,corruption,andresistancetochangecannot

Page63
easilybepreventedfromtakingupotherissues.Allthesedeparturespresupposethereductionoffearinsociety,andthereductionoffearbecomesthestimulusfor
newdepartures.Finally,movementsthatcanbeeasilyrestrainedcannotplayanimportantroleinovercomingresistancetoreform,whilethosethatcanplaysucha
rolecannotbecontrolledandareunpredictable.TheconstantfluctuationintheSovietUnionbetweenmeasuresthatleadforwardandthosethatrevivepastpractices,
betweendemocratizationandauthoritariancentralization,isbestexplainedintheseterms.Theregimewantsradicalreform,itunleashesandevenprodstherevivalof
civilsociety,butitalsowantstopressitsprerogativetodeterminethelimitsofwhatcanandcannotbechanged,includingthestructureanddynamicsofcivilsociety
itself.
Nevertheless,theprocessofsocialmobilizationandthebuildingofatleastsomedimensionsofwhattheactorsthemselvescallcivilsocietycontinuesamidstthe
fluctuation.Thelevelofsocietalselforganizationtodaywouldhavebeenunthinkableacoupleofyearsago.Butitisnotatallclearthattheresultwillberadicalreform
ratherthanhopelesspolarizationandstalemate.
109
Ifthepathologyofreformfromaboveisthatitreplacesaformalcommandsystemwithoneofinformal
bureaucraticregulation,thesteptocivilsocietysuppliesonlythenecessarybutnotthesufficientconditionofitscure.AsthePolesdiscovered,evenanorganizedand
mobilizedcivilsocietycannot,especiallyinthecontextofselflimitation,actdirectlyonanunchangedpartystateandovercometheresistanceofapoliticaleconomic
apparatuswhoselastmajorstrongholdbecomestheunreconstructedbureaucraticeconomy.
ThiswasthelessonthatinspiredthosewhoimportedthePolishprojectofradicalreformintoHungary,especiallyaftermartiallaw.KeyelementsoftheHungarian
opposition
110
reformulatedtheprogramintermsofaradicalminimalismthatneverthelessimpliedthatchangesinsocietymustbecomplementedbynecessary,ifless
radical,changeinthepartystatesphere.Atfirst,thismeantredefiningasrightstheelementsofalreadyconcededopennessanddifferentiationinHungariansocietyand
redefiningthediscretionarystate(Massnahmenstaat)asanauthoritarianRechtsstaatthatisselflimiting,atleastwithrespecttotherightsitgrants.Thesecond
version,developedatthetimeofincreasingcrisisandsome

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successininvolvingintellectualsinoppositionalactivity,proposedtoindependentsocialforcesthattheydemandpluralisminthesphereofprivatelaw(civilsociety)
andafullydevelopedRechtsstaatlichkeitinthesphereofpubliclaw.
111
Finally,in1987,atthetimewhenthefoundationsoftheKadaristsystemwerealready
cracking,adetailedmodelofradicalreformwasproposed.AppearingunderthenameSocialContract,thisinvolvedtherestorationofcivilsocietyinallits
dimensionsandareformofthepoliticalsystemtoincludeelementsofgenuineparliamentarism,aresponsiblegovernment,andareconstructionoftheplaceandroleof
theCommunistpartythatwouldpreservesomeofitsprerogatives,butonlywithinaframeworkofconstitutionallegality.Itisthestructure,ratherthantheexact
formula,thatisimportanttous,foritrepresentedacallfordiscussion,negotiation,andcompromise.ThepartisansoftheSocialContractapproachattemptedto
reconstructthedualisticprojectinheritedfromPolandintermsofamodellinkingtheradicalreconstructionofcivilsocietywithalessradicalbutnevertheless
principledreformofthepoliticalsphere.Theideawasnottoabandonthegoalofparliamentarydemocracybuttocombinetwodifferentratesofchange,oneincivil
societyandoneinthestatesphere,inamutuallyreinforcingway,andtoprovideatthesametimethenecessarychangeof"environment"forinstitutionalizingagenuine
marketeconomy.
TheSocialContractretainedanimportantlinktothePolishpoliticsofthe"newevolutionism"bymaintaining,againstotherapproachesofthetimethatstilladdressed
theregimeoritsreformistelements,
112
thatgroups,associations,andindeedmovementsoutsidetheofficialinstitutionswouldhavetheprimarytaskofpushingthe
reformsthrough.InHungary,though,theideawasparadoxical,giventheabsenceofanythingresemblingthePolishlevelofsocietalselforganization.
113
Oddlyenough,thepoliticalresultsinHungaryturnedouttobemoreradicalthaninPoland.Indeed,aftertheremovalofKadarinMay1988,theHungarian
Communistpartymadeanumberofrapidconcessions:adefactoopenpublicsphere,alawofassociationandrighttostrike,andalawthatallowedtheformationof
parties,thoughnotinitiallyaselectoralorganizations.Moreover,byFebruary1989thepartyconcededtheneedforearlycompetitive

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andunrestrictedelections,andinJune1989itenteredintonegotiationsconcerningelectoralrulesandprocedureswitheightornineprotopartyformationsrepresented
by"theroundtableoftheopposition."
Therearetwowaysofreadingthelogicofthesechanges.Thefirst(F.Kszeg)takesthepointofviewofthefledglingorganizationsofindependentsocietyandpoints
totheinnerdissolutionoftherulingparty(duetoeconomiccrisisaswellasthedestabilizingeffectsoftheSoviethandsoffpolicy)thatmadeittooweaktoresisteven
arelativelysmalldegreeofsocialpressure.Certainlythethesisseemstobeconfirmedbythehistoryofseveralkeyconcessions,whichbeganwithproposalsintending
merelycooptation,continuedwithintensepubliccriticism,andendedwiththeregimebackingdown.
114
Butthisreadingdoesnotleaveenoughroomforan
importantactoroutsidetheopposition,namelythereformgroupingswithintheparty,whichplayedanactiveroleinseveralofthesameconcessions.
Thesecondreading(J.Kis)soughttocorrectthisunderestimationbystressingtheattemptonthepartoftheincreasinglydominantreformistfactiontofindlegitimate,
viablepartnersinsocietyforinstitutingeconomicreformsalongwithnewausterityprograms.Thesearchforpartnersmightitselfhaveledonlytoanattemptedco
optationofthesocialforcesinformation,butthenecessityofviablepartners,giventhedeclineoftheregime'slegitimacy,requiredgenuinelyindependententities
operatinginanopen,competitivepoliticalterrain.
115
Inthisanalysis,thesearchforpartnersledtheregime,oritsdominantfaction,totheopeningofthespaceforthe
emergenceofpoliticalsociety.
Itisinstructivetocomparethissituationtothe19801981periodinPoland.ThenitwasSolidaritythatsoughta"historiccompromise"withtheregime,unsuccessfully,
involvingthecreationofinstitutionsofmediation.
116
Itsownpolaristicconception,andtheregime'sbeliefinthepossibilityof"normalization"andinitspowerstoenact
economicreform,playedmajorrolesinthefailureofcompromise.Perhapsatthattime,asopposedto1988,Solidarity,havingbehinditallofsociety,wassostrong
thattheregimecouldnotallowitanygenuineroleinthemakingofpolicy.By1990importantelementsoftheoldregimesthemselvesbothinHungaryandPolandhad

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acceptedtheideaoffarreachingcompromisewithrelativelyweakeropponents,andthisinvolvedthecreationofinstitutionsofmediationthatrequiredthe
participationofindependentactors.Forthisreason,theyturnedtotheactorsofcivilsociety,activelypromotingtheirtransformationandintheprocessstimulatingthe
emergenceandconsolidationofpoliticalagents(theyhoped)withoutany(orweakened)rootsincivilsociety.Tomakesuchachangeintheexistingpatternof
oppositionalpoliticsworthwhile,competitivepoliticalproceduresleadingtoelectionswereconceded.Giventherisksofelectionsforthesurvivaloftheestablished
regimes,theelitesthatreluctantlyoptedforthisprocesssoughttheirownsurvivalbyintroducingelementsofrestrictionintothecompromise(Poland)orbytakingup
rolesasmembersofthenewpoliticalsocietyinformation(Hungary).
117
Ourinterestisnotinthecorrectnessofsuchcalculationsbutintheeffectsoncivilsocietyoftheturntopoliticalsociety.Fouridealtypesofsignificantchangeoperate
inEastEuropetoday:reform,radicalreformfrombelow(orthe"newevolution"),politicaltransitiontoanewsystem,andwhathasbeenrecentlycalled
"revolution."
118
Eachhasitsactors,itspathologies,anditspotentialformofselfcorrection.Eachtakesupadifferentdimensionoftheproblemofcivilsociety.The
strategyofreform,stilldominantintheSovietUnion,hasasitsagentsmodernizingstateactors.Thepathologyofthispathisthatitreplacesformalbureaucratic
discretionwithitsinformalvariants,whichdonotonthewholeimproveeconomicfunctioningand,asinthecurrentSovietcase,mayactuallyweakenit.Theimagined
correctiveistheturntocivilsociety,whichwouldinvolveinthereformprocesscollectiveactors(groups,associations,movements,andpublics)outsidethestate
sphere.IntheSovietUnion,eventheturntotheelectoralmechanismstypicalofpoliticalsocietybypassedandforawhileevenblockedtheemergenceofindependent
politicalactors,thoughithelpedtheselforganizationandmobilizationofinformalactorsofcivilsociety.Thustheelectionsofearly1989,andthecontradictoryand
inconsistentsessionsoftheCongressofPeoples'Deputies,
119
tendedtoleadnottomediationbuttoaformofmobilizationthatisalreadypolarizingandwillturnout
tobemoresoastheeconomicreformcontinuestostagnate.Intheabsenceofbothviolent

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repressionandparliamentarymediation,theconflictswillmoreandmoretakeplaceinthestreets.
Polarization,aswehaveseeninPoland,isthespecificpathologyoftheturntocivilsocietyanditsactors,inspiteofthedramaticconsequencesofthisturnforsocietal
learningprocessesand,specifically,forthebuildingofademocraticpoliticalculture.LinkedtopolarizationinPolandhasbeenanoverunificationofcivilsocietyin
whichasinglemovementhasbeenthevehicleforheterogeneousandevencompetingsocialinterestsandidentities,somewhatblocking(evenifagainsttheintentionsof
theparticipants)theemergenceofsocietaland,later,politicalpluralism.InanationallydividedsocietysuchastheSovietUnion,asecondformofpolarization
betweencompetingethnicornationalgroups,orbetweendemocraticandnationalmovementshasbeenanevenmorenegativeconsequenceofacivilsociety
orientedstrategy.
120
Inthiscontext,theemergenceofpoliticalgroupingscapableofnegotiation,compromise,andgenuineparliamentarismrepresentsasmallhope
formediation,whichcanworkonlyiftheinstitutionalmeansarefoundtolinkthemtothedeepeninglinesofsocialconflictinvolvingnational,economic,andpolitical
issues.Thequestionishowtheincreasinglymobilizedgroupsofcivilsocietywillbeabletomanagetheirconflictswiththeregimeandeachother.Inthiscontext,there
doesnotseemtobeanalternativetotheruleoflawandmultipartyparliamentarismotherthananincreasinglydestructivepolarizationthat,intheRussiancenterofthe
crumblingimperium,couldeventuallytakeeithertheformofastalematebetweensocietalforcesandastatetheycannotoverthroworaclashbetweendemocraticand
conservativenationalistmovements,orevenacombinationoftheseoutcomes.
121
InPolandandHungary,thesupposedcorrectiveforpolarizationhasalreadybeenpromotedintheformoftheturntopoliticalsociety.Thisimpliesthattheagentsof
theprocessoftransitionwillincreasinglybetheactorsofpoliticalsociety,atleastinitiallyincludingthereformistsintheCommunistparty.Doesthismodelhaveitsown
potentialpathologies,andifitdoes,whatareitscorrectives?
AswehaveseeninthecaseofLatinAmericantransitions,oneofseveralreasonsgovernmentalelitesturntoorrevivepolitical

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societyistohelpdemobilizecivilsociety.Theydothisbothtoprotectthemselvesandthetransitionfromanexcessofeconomicdemandsandtoexcludefromthe
politicalprocessactorsandformsofmobilizationthatcouldleadtotheirownexclusion.Whiletheelitesoftheoldrulingparties,orrathertheirreformistparts,donot
havethesocialsupporttobecomeactorsofcivilsociety(withtheveryquestionableexceptionoftradeunionbureaucracies),theyhopethatbyselfconversioninto
electoralpartieswithsocialdemocraticideologiestheycanbecomeactorsinthenewpoliticalsociety.Thus,clearly,theturntopoliticalsocietyhasasitspathologythe
demobilizationofcivilsocietyandthefailuretoreplaceitsmobilizedformsbyinstitutionalizedones.ThisisaseriousmatterinEasternEurope,whereatomizationand
thedisruptionofsocialties,solidarities,andassociationsfarsurpassedanythingundereventherecentbureaucraticauthoritarianregimes,andwherecivilsociety
seemstoexistforthemomentonlyinamobilizedformwhosecontributiontotherestorationofsocialintegrationhasbeenlimited.Forthisreasonaconstellationthat
bypassesinstitutionbuildingincivilsocietywouldbehighlyunfavorableforthedevelopmentofademocraticpoliticalculture,andconversely,wherethistypeofculture
continuestodevelop,itcouldleadtoseriouslegitimationproblemsfornewpoliticalelites.
Theattemptsbythereformistelementsoftheoldelitestodepoliticizeandevenfragmentcivilsocietyarequiteunderstandable.Forthem,theissueinvolvesnotonly
maintainingtheirfreehandatmakingeconomicpolicybutalsotheirsurvivalasapoliticalforce.Therootofthedifficultygoesdeeper,ofcourse,andmayhavetodo
withbasictendencieslinkedtomodernpoliticalsocietycomposedofpartiesandparliaments.Arisingfromcivilsocietyandpreservingsomeofthemarksoftheir
origin,andhavingresistedthelabel"party,"thenewleadingpartiesofHungary,Poland,andCzechoslovakiahaveneverthelessgivenrisetoexpectationsthatthey
wouldbeabletoresistthe"oligarchic"tendenciesofmodernpoliticalparties.
122
Theyarenevertheless(orasaresult)oftencriticizedforreplacingoneeliteruleby
another,fordisregardingcivilinitiativesandsocialmovementsandevenintensifyingstatecontrolsoverlocalgovernmentandthepublicsphere,andforbypassing
socialconsultationbeforemakingmajoreconomicdeci

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sions.
123
Significantly,attemptstorefutesuchchargesbyreferencetoparliamentarysovereigntyhaveonlyledtonewchargesofparliamentaryabsolutismandeven
theexaggeratedaccusationofmultipartydictatorship.
Evenifanelitedemocracyinwhichpopularparticipationisrestrictedtoperiodicvotesisnottheidealofthemajorelementsofmanyofthepartiesandgroups
involved,thepresentcontextinmanyrespectspointsinthisdirection.Onceagain,therequirementsofeconomictransition,whichsomerigidifyintermsofa
nonsolidaristic,individualistversionofcivil(i.e.,bourgeois)society,areinpartresponsible.
124
InHungaryevenmorethaninPoland,suchtrendsarereinforcedby
conceptionsofparliamentarysovereigntybasedonthesocalledWestminstermodel,whicharepresentinallofthemajorparties.Butwillapopulationusedtosocial
guaranteeseasilyacceptthelegitimacyofdecisionsinvolvingnewausteritymerelyonthebasisofthearrangementsofelites,irrespectiveoftheirformalpossessionof
anelectoralmandate?ThereisampleexperiencefromthehistoryofLatinAmericanpopulismsthatitwillnot,electionornoelection.Thereisadangerthatpopulism,
whichhasstrongrootsinEasternEurope,willbetheresponsetoelitismonthepartofdemobilizedorundeveloped,semiatomized,unsolidaristiccivilsocieties.
SomeComparisonsandSomeProblems
Itwouldbeillegitimatetotryequatingtheprojectsjustsurveyed.Themodelsofcivilsocietythathaveemergedinthesedifferingcontextshaveshownimportant
variations.Indeed,thereareobviousdifficultieswithanysingleinterpretiveframeworkthatseekstointerrogatethemeaningof,andprovideorientationsfor,these
varyingconstellationsofstructureandhistory.Yetatheoreticalframeworkthatcananchorwhatisintheendacommondiscussionacrossboundariesisindispensable.
Afalseunificationwouldprovideonlyillusorysolutions,andwemustthereforeexplorethewholerangeofdiscoursesavailabletoday.Beforedoingso,however,we
shouldatleastjustifyourpresentationofthedifferentprojectsforreconstructingcivilsocietyasasingleset,beyondtheobvious

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useofthesameterminologyindifferentcontexts.Weshalldothisintwosteps.
First,weargueforacommonintellectualbackgroundonthelevelofthecirculationofformsofdiscourse.Inthemilieuofcriticalsocialthought,thereisnoticeable
todayapostMarxistintellectualturn,producingadiscussionofcivilsocietythatistrulyinternational.Second,wepresenttwointellectualpositions,relatedtothecrisis
ofMarxismbutnotreducibletoit,thataresharedbysocialactorsinthefourpoliticalcontexts,asour"casestudies"demonstrate.Theseare(1)critiqueofthestate
and(2)thedesiretogobeyondthealternativeofreformandrevolution,intheclassicalsenseoftheseterms.
ThecrisisofMarxismisaworldwidephenomenontoday,foravarietyoflocalandglobalreasons.Intheadvancedcapitalistcountries,thecontinuinginabilityof
Marxisttheorytoexplaintherelativestabilityandrepeatedreconstructionoftheexistingsystemisonemajorreason.Anotheristhedecisiveendtotheerawhenit
seemedpossible(nottomentiondesirable)fortheworkingclassoranyothersinglesocialstratumorgroupingtoplaytheroleoftheglobalsubjectofsocial
change.InLatinAmerica,thedecisivefactorwasMarxism'sassociationwitharevolutionaryroadthatnotonlyfailedtoproduceanykindofsocialistcommonwealth
butalsodirectlyandinsomecasesdeliberatelycontributedtotheendofliberaldemocracyandtheriseofrightwingdictatorships.Wheresocalledsocialist
revolutionssucceeded,theresultsarehardlysuchastoinspireimitation.TheSovietmodelintheEast,inthehourofitsfall,isnowalmostuniversallyrecognizedas
inefficientanddehumanizing.Thisdevelopment,reflectedintheactionsandintellectualviewsofdissidents,hasdiscreditedinadvancethegoalsofmostWesternand
SouthernCommunistorultraleftgroupingsthathaveinheritedthemantleofMarxism.Significantly,Marxiantheoriesandformsofanalyseshaverepeatedlyfailedin
theirattemptstounderstandthestructureofSoviettypesocietiesandtooutlineplausibleorientationsforactorsseekingtotransformthem.
125
Ithasalwaysbeenpossible,ofcourse,tomovefromMarxismtoanypositionfromliberalismandneoconservatismtoreligiousfundamentalism.Butifonedesiresto
avoidreplacingaMarxist

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dogmatismbyanantiMarxistone,ifonerefusestoexchangeapologeticsforoneformofdominationwiththatforanother,onehastograntthepossibilitythatMarx
didestablishsomecriticalvantagepointsthatcannotbeabandonedaslongascapitalistsocietypersists.Inmanycases,thismeansreinterpretingorreconstructing
someofhismajorconcepts,leadingtotheoreticalprojectsgoingfarbeyondthenormativeandanalyticalimplicationsofanyversionoftheclassicalMarxiantheory,
includingtheneoMarxismsofLukcs,Gramsci,andtheolderFrankfurtschool.Itisthesetheoreticalprojectsthatwewishtodescribeundertheheadingofpost
Marxism.
126
AcommonpositionofallpostMarxisms,inspiteofdifferentterminologies,isarevisionofMarx'sidentificationofcivilandbourgeoissocietyaswellas
hisvariouspoliticalprojectsaimingatthereunificationofstateandsociety.
127
PostMarxistsnotonlyregister,asdidGramsci,
128
thedurabilityofcivilsocietyunder
capitalistdemocraciesandtheconsequentimplausibilityofrevolutionintheclassicalMarxiansense,butmaintainthenormativedesirabilityofthepreservationofcivil
society.YetpostMarxismcanbedistinguishedfromallneoliberalisms(whichintheirownwayalsoidentifycivilandbourgeoissociety)bytheirattemptstothematize
theradicaldemocraticorradicalpluralisttransformationofexistingversionsofcivilsociety.
Wemaintainthattheconceptofcivilsociety,asourvarioussourcessofarhaveusedit,belongstotheintellectualworldandevenpoliticalcultureofpostMarxism
(andperhapsof"postGramscianism").Thecontemporarydiscourseofcivilsocietywasinternationallydisseminated,atleastinitially,bythecirculationofpostMarxist
ideas.Thewidereceptionofsuchaconceptforthefirsttimeinourrecenthistory,allowingforadialoguebetweensocialcriticsEastandWest,NorthandSouth,has
beenpossiblebecauseofsharedproblemsandprojectsamongthosecontexts.
Twosuchproblems/projectscanbefoundinthesourceswehavecitedalready.Firstandforemost,thereisthecritiqueofthestateandthesearchfora"poststatist"
politics.TheinabilityofSoviettyperegimes,LatinAmericandictatorships,andevenwelfarestatestosolveallorsomekeysocialproblems,andtheundesirabilityof
thesolutionsthathaveemerged,isthematizedinalltherelevantsources.Therewasatimewhentheanswertosimilardiagnoseswas

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amorerationalstateadictatorshipoftheproletariat,i.e.,oftheleftratherthantherightor(inthecaseofthewelfarestate)simplymorestate,''nationalizing"more
spheresoflife.Itseemsthatafterourrecentexperienceswithdictatorships,nationalizationsofbigindustries,andtheconsequencesofthepenetrationofsociallifeby
centralbureaucracies,noneoftheoldanswerscancarrytheirearlierweight.Itisincreasinglyimpossibletoregardthestateaseitherapassivesynthesisofaplurality
ofsocialforcesoraneutralinstrumentinthehandsofwhateverclassholdsthesociallydominantpositionormanagestohaveitspartyelectedtogovernmentalpower.
"Bringingthestatebackin"shouldmeanrecognizingthatthemodernstatehasitsownlogicandthatitconstitutesanindependentconstellationofinterests.
129

Contrarytothespiritofthegreatnineteenthcenturyrebellionagainsttheselfregulatingcapitalistmarketeconomy,thestatecannotbeaneutralmediumthroughwhich
societycanactuponitselfinaselfreflectivefashion.
130
Second,thealternativeofreformorrevolutionhasbeendiscreditedbecausebothreformistandrevolutionarypartieshavehadashareinourpresentcrises.Allofour
casestudiesreveal,explicitlyorimplicitly,thesamerenunciationoftheutopiaofrevolution,ofthedreamofasingle,imposedmodelofthegoodsocietythatbreaks
completelywiththepresent,thatisbeyondconflictanddivision.Suchamodelisnotcompatibleeveninprinciplewithanymodernnotionofdemocracy.Atthesame
time,whatthecasestudiesexpressismorethanmerelyincrementalreformattheveryleast,structuralorradicalreformismisimplied.Yeteventhesetermscoinedby
A.Gorz
131
donotexhaustwhatisatstake.Revolutionandreformarebothtodaywidelyunderstoodintermsof(andcondemnedfor)theirstatistlogic,andtheidea
ofsomehowcombiningthem,astheterm"radicalreformism"stillsuggests,nowbecomesunacceptable.Theterm"newevolutionism"istoovaguetoserveasa
replacement,buteither"selflimitingrevolution"or"selflimitingradicalism"seemsappropriate.Theideahere,workedoutbyanalystsasdiverseasJ.Kuron,A.Gorz,
N.Bobbio,andJ.Habermas,isthattheobjectofradicalreconstructionandalsoits(multiple,nonunified)subjectsshiftfromthestatetosociety.Correspondingly,
withregardtotheexistingstructures

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ofstate(and,intheWest,capitalist)economies,anewkindofselflimitationwouldhavetobeandevenoughttobepracticed.Thisideasurvivesinthetwo
temporalitiesofchangereferringtostateandcivilsociety,asproposedbySocialContract,andevenintheturntopoliticalsocietythatimpliesaconsciously
nonrevolutionaryslowingdownoftherateofchangethroughnegotiationsandelections.InaWesternversion,thesameideaisexpressedquitewellbyRosanvallon's
juxtapositionoftherebuildingofcivilsocietywithnecessarycompromisesonthestructuresofthestateandtheeconomy.Civilsocietycanhelpchangethose
structuresbutmustnotabolishallaspectsoftheirautonomousoperation.
Interestinglyenough,itisinthemostantiMarxistofourthreeconstellations,EasternEurope,thattheterm"revolution"ismostoftenusedtoindicatetransitionfrom
authoritarianrule.Itmustbesaid,however,thatthesenseofthetermdiffersfromthoseestablishedbytheFrenchandRussianrevolutions.Thesearchfortheperfect
andtransparentsocietyassociatedwiththeserevolutionsisexplicitlyrejectedasstatestrengtheningandevenunavoidablyterroristic.Someauthorsredefinetheterm
inamoreconservativesense,seekingtopreservestillexisting(orimagined)olderpoliticalculturesortraditionsthreatenedbySovietization,orconservingsomeone
else'stradition(e.g.,classicalliberalism).
132
Others,buildingonthesinglecaseofthedefeatedHungarianRevolutionof1956,seektounderstandthetransitionsinthe
makingasapure"politicalrevolution"leadingtotheestablishmentofanewformofdemocraticsovereignty,anovusordoseclorum.
133
Thefirstoftheselinesof
thought,inpartreturningtothepremodernnotionofrevolutionasanattempttoreestablishapreviousstateofaffairs,tendstomisswhatisgenuinelynewinthe
presentdayprojectsoftransformation.Itcanlendcredencetoviewsreferringto"restoration"or"counterrevolution.''Thesecondmissestheirexplicitlyselflimiting
andevolutionarycharacter.Thishasbeenrepeatedlymanifestedinthesearchforcompromiseandtransitionalsolutionsandthedeliberateacceptanceoftheslowing
downoftherateofchange.Amazinglyenough,giventhenatureofthepreviousregimes,theirsuccessorsseekneitherageneralpersonalexpropriationofthemembers
ofearlierelitesnortheirtotalexclusionfrompoliticalorprofessionalactivity.Indeed,theseoptionsare

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avoidedinareflectiveandconsciousmannereveninthefaceofrepeatedeffortstoconvertpowersofthepastintothoseofthefuture.Theselflimitingrevolution
avoidsthetotaldestructionofitsenemy,whichwouldinevitablymeanputtingitselfintotheplaceofthesovereign,
134
therebydeprivingsocietyofitsselforganization
andselfdefense.
Theterm"selflimitingrevolution"(aswellasitspartialsynonyms,"peaceful"and"velvet"revolution)avoidstheweaknessesofboththeideasof''conservative"and
"popular"revolution.Insteadofretreatingbehindthemodernmeaningof"revolution"orrepeatingitstotalizingthrust,thisideaextendstheselfreflexiveandselfcritical
discourseofmodernitytoitsmostimportantpoliticalconcept,namely,revolution.
135
Wehavealreadynotedthatthemoreorlesscommonpostureofantistatist,selflimitingrevolutionthatwediscoverinourdiversesourcesisnotexpressedintermsof
asinglecategoricalframeworkorasinglemodelforreconstructingcivilsociety.Attimeswefindseveralvariantsareproposedwithinasingleculturalpoliticalcontext,
andofcoursetheprojectsvaryevenmoresignificantlyacrosscontexts.Thecommoncoreofalltheinterpretations,though,istheconceptofcivilsociety,orrather
someofthecomponentsofthisconcept.Allagreethatcivilsocietyrepresentsasphereotherthanandevenopposedtothestate.Allinclude,almostalways
unsystematically,somecombinationofnetworksoflegalprotection,voluntaryassociations,andformsofindependentpublicexpression.Averyfewconceptionsseem
toincludefamiliesandinformalgroups.Someincludemovementsandevenequatecivilsocietywiththepresenceofsocialmovementsothers(suchasthatofthe
PolishwriterWojcicki)excludeandevenfearthispossibilityasaformofunacceptablepoliticization.Inthetextsconcerningthefourpoliticalprojects,however,we
havefoundnocomprehensivetreatmentoftherelationamongthecategoriesofcivilsocietyor,forthatmatter,ofthenexusbetweencivilsocietyasmovementandas
institution.Butthereisnoquestionthatthestressesinthevariouscontextsandtextsareoftenquitedifferent,eveniflittlehasbeenaddedto(orexplicitlysubtracted
from)theclassicallistoflaws,associations,andpublics.
136
Therearetwomajorissuesthatproduceimportantshiftsincategorialframeworks.First,shouldtheeconomybeincludedor

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excludedfromtheconceptofcivilsociety(theHegelianvs.theGramscianmodel)?Andsecond,shouldoneseektodifferentiatecivilandpoliticalsociety(the
Tocquevillianvs.theHegelianmodel)?NeoliberalsandresiduallyneoMarxistwriterstendtoagreeonincludingtheeconomicspherewithincivilsociety,albeitfor
oppositereasons.Theformer,whetherintheWestornowincreasinglyintheEast,reaffirmtheidentityofthecivilandthebourgeois,fearamodelofrightsinwhich
propertyisnotintheprimaryposition,andrejectthepoliticizationofsocietyandtheformationofsocialmovementsthatwoulddemandeconomicredistributionfrom
thestate.Whilelegitimatelyconcernedabouttheconsequencesofthelinkbetweenpopulismandstatism,thisintellectualtendencyforgetsthedestructiveeffectsofthe
selfregulatingmarketontheculturalfabricofsociety,describedsowellbyKarlPolnyi.ThoseinEasternEuropewhoforgetthislessonbecauseoftheirhatredofall
formsofstateinterventionismseekineffecttorejoinEuropenotasitistoday,facingecologicalandsocialproblemsgeneratedbythecapitalisteconomy,butasit
oncewas,invitingtherepetitionofalreadyknowndisasters.
Thesecondapproach,theresiduallyMarxistonetypifiedbyAndrGorzandtoanextentevenbyClausOffe,presupposesthesedestructiveeffectsbutdoesnot
sufficientlyconsiderthedisastrousresultsofeliminatingeconomicrationalityintheprocessofpoliticizingproductionanddistribution.Whileneoliberalsreducecivil
societytoeconomicsociety,neoMarxistseitherreducethefuture(postcapitalist)economytopoliticalsocietyorpropose,inthemannerofutopiansocialists,some
kindofsociallyreembeddedeconomy.InGorz'sFarewelltotheWorkingClass,thesetworecipesarecombined.Inthe(tous,preferable)realistGreenformulaof
Offeandhiscolleagues,aneconomicspherebasedonreciprocity,mutuality,andselfactivity(Eigenarbeit)iscombinedwithamacroeconomicallysteeredbut
neverthelessgenuinemarketeconomy.Inthisformula,economicactivitiesinthesubstantivesenseare(atleastinpart)includedincivilsociety,buteconomyasa
formalprocessisoutsideofit.
137
Whencivilsocietyintheshapeofasocialmovementisintheprocessoforganizingandinstitutionalizingitself,however,fewauthorsargueforitsunityoreven
continuitywitheconomic

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society.Thereisnoquestionofsuchreductionism,forexample,inthewritingsofMichnikandKuron.Instead,theyhaveconsistentlyarguedfortheautonomyoflegal
structures,freeassociations,andgenuinepubliclifeconceivedintermsofthepromiseofasolidaristiccivilsociety.Undoubtedlythefactthataminorchordintheir
argumentistheliberationoftheeconomyfromstatecontrolsplayedamajorrolehere.BeyondtheutopiaofthecompletedemocratizationofproductionthatKuron
stillproposedinthemid1960s,thewritersofthePolishdemocraticoppositionareforcedtofacetheharshrealitythatonlytherestorationofthemarket,beyondany
modelofsocialreembedding,couldmasterthePolishcrisisandproduceaviable,moderneconomy.Evenifindustrialdemocracyplaysaroleintheirproposals,itis
recognizedthatthismustbemadecompatiblewiththeneedsofexpertmanagementoperatinginanenvironmentthatallowsrationalcalculation.Understandably,inthe
EastEuropeancontext,theharmfuleffectsofafullyautonomouscapitalistmarketeconomyonsocialsolidarity,deniedbyneoliberalwriters,wasnotdirectly
thematizedbythemainauthorsofthedemocraticopposition.Nevertheless,theSolidaritymovement,becauseofitssocialnatureaswellasitstiestoaCatholic
syndicalisttradition,hasbeentoanextentsensitivetojustthesedangers.
Significantly,theintellectualandpoliticaljourneymadebyLatinAmericanwriterslikeO'DonnellandCardosoisinmanyrespectssimilartothatofKuronand
Michnik.Aslateas1978,O'Donnellstillused"civilsociety"intheneoMarxiansenseofbourgeoissociety.Themediationshethenproposedbetweencivilsociety
andthestate(nation,pueblo,andcitizenship)correspondedonlytotheunderdevelopedstructureofsocietiesplaguedbycyclesofpopulistunificationand
authoritarianatomization.Undertheimpactofnewformsofselforganizationandstrugglesfordemocracyinthenextdecade,O'DonnellandP.Schmitterfully
changedtheirterminologyandbegantouse"civilsociety"todescribeaspherebetweeneconomyandstate,characterizedaboveallbyassociationsandpublics.The
failureofpopulistauthoritarianefforts,moreover,ledtotherejectionofthereversesubsumption,thatoftheeconomybysocialorpoliticalinstitutions.InCardoso's
subtleanalysis,theroleofindustrialdemocracyseemstobetoestablishvantagepointsofsocialcontrolwithoutimpairingeconomicrationality.

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Onthewhole,inneitherLatinAmericanorEasternEuropehasthe"interface"ofcivilsocietyandmarketeconomybeenadequatelyanalyzed.
138
Suchananalysis,
however,isapreconditionforanyreallyseriousconceptualalternativetothedangersofeconomicliberalismandthefalsepromisesofutopiansocialism.
139
Without
suchanalternative,onecanexpectmorevacillationbetweenmarketandstateasagentsofliberationandrenewedneglectofthedestructiveeffectsofbothonsocial
solidarityandindividualautonomy.
Equallyimportantisthedivisionofopinionontheinterfacebetweencivilsocietyandstate.TheFrenchwriterswehavedescribedtendtoconsidercivilandpolitical
societyastwospheres,thesecondmediatingtherelationsofthefirstwiththestate.Inthisconception,bothcivilandpoliticalsocietymustbereconstructedto
preserveandrenewthefoundationsofassociationallifeandtobeabletomakethoseeffectivevisvisthestate.InmostoftheEastEuropeananalysescomingfrom
thedemocraticopposition,andinatleastsomeLatinAmericanwriters(e.g.,F.Weffort),thecategoryofcivilsocietyincludesandsubsumesthelevelsofitspolitical
mediations.Finally,inyetothermodels,thetwocategories"civil"and"political"appearmoreasalternativesofthetypeofcivilsocietythatisdesirableorpossible.In
thewritingsofClausOffe,forexample,thechoiceseemstobebetweenneoconservative(depoliticized)orradicaldemocratic(political)civilsociety.Intheargument
ofO'DonnellandSchmitter,thereisasuccessionoftemporalphases,withdepoliticizedcivilsocietyrepresentingthenormalphasethatcansurviveevenauthoritarian
rule,whilepoliticalcivilsocietyisonlytheexceptionalphaseofmobilizationorupsurge.Herethecycleoftypesofcivilsocietyrepresentsanotherversionofthe
politicalcycleofauthoritariananddemocraticregimes.Themovefromdemobilizedtomobilizedcivilsocietyimpliestheendoftheauthoritarianregimedemobilized
civilsociety,impliesfirstthestabilizationofdemocracyandonlyeventuallythepossibilityofareturnofdictatorship.EveninsomeEasternEuropeananalyses,achoice
betweenunpoliticalandpoliticalinterpretationshasbeenproposed(inPoland,byCatholicintellectuals)tohighlightthealternativeofantipoliticsinasocietydeeply
tiredofpreviousformsofpoliticization.

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Assumingforthemomentthatthestarkalternativebetweenpoliticalandcivilsocietyisafunctionofeitherundesirablepoliticalpolarization,inwhichthe
neoconservativeshavehadtheinitiative,oranequallyundesirablecycle,wearestillleftwithtwocompetingmodelsthatexpresstheneedtocombineprepolitical
levelsofsociallifewithpoliticalformsthatcanprovideforpubliclifeoutsidetheframeworkofpublicpoliticalauthority,i.e.,thestate.Theseinvolve,ontheonehand,
amodelofcivilsocietythatincludesapoliticalpublicsphereamongitscategoriesand,ontheotherhand,aframeworkwithinwhichcivilandpoliticalsocietyare
clearlydifferentiated.Tosomeextent,thechoiceisaquestionofinheritedintellectualtraditions.TheGermantraditionstemmingfromHegelandMarxrepresenteda
culminationofthedifferentiationoftheclassicaltoposofpoliticalorcitizensocietyintostateanddepoliticizedcivilsociety.Thistraditionhasroomformediations
betweencivilsocietyandstatewithineachdomainbutnotforanindependentdomainbetweenthemwithdistinctinstitutionsanddynamics.Incontrast,theFrench
traditionderivedfromTocquevillenevertotallydissolvedtheoldcategoryofpoliticalsocietybutinsteadestablisheditalongsidecivilsocietyandstate.Finally,and
mostconfusingly,theItaliantraditiongoingbacktoGramsciusesallthreetermsbuttendstoidentifypoliticalsocietywiththestate,echoingthetraditionalpremodern
usage.
Currentpoliticalrequirementsareequallyimportantinthechoicebetweenthetwotypesofcategorization.InbothLatinAmericaandEasternEurope,thejuxtaposition
ofcivilsocietyandstatewasaconceptuallydualisticoutcomeofaperiodofsocietalselforganizationthatledtopolarizationbetweendemocraticandauthoritarian
forces.Independentsocietywasstrongenoughtosurviveandeventochallengethelegitimacyoftheauthoritarianstate.Butitwasnotstrongenoughtocompel
genuinecompromiseortosecureatransitionbeyondauthoritarianrule.Withtheemergenceofrealpossibilitiesofnegotiationandcompromise,andevenagreement,
concerningthedismantlingofauthoritariangovernmentsinfavorofelectoralscenarios,thecategoryofcivilsocietyseemedtomanywriters(Cardoso,Kis,Stepan)to
beunsuitabletodepicttheorganizedsocialforcesenteringintoprocessesofpoliticalexchangewithstateactors.Thisledtothe

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resurrectionofthecategoryofpoliticalsociety(oritsstandins)evenwheretheinfluenceofHegel,Marx,andGramsciwasstrong.Somewritersoffernormative
reasonsfortheshift,insistingthattheturntopoliticalsocietyallowsadesirablepluralizationoftheopposition,whoselocationonthelevelofcivilsocietyissaidto
involvemonolithicunificationwithintheonegreatmovementofsociety.
140
Thus,thechoicebetweenthetwoframeworkscannotrestonintellectualhistory,currentpoliticalrequirements,oreventheircombinationitpresupposesadditional
systematicconsiderationsthatweshalloutlinelaterinthisbook.Fornow,wenoteonlythatachoiceofeitherapproachhasbeeninsufficientlymotivatedthusfar.In
particular,thestructuresandformsofactionthatwouldcorrespondtocivilasdistinctfrompoliticalsocietyhavenotbeensystematicallyanalyzedbythosewho
presupposethesharpdifferentiationofthesetwodomains.Tomaketheircase,defendersofdifferentiationwouldhavetohaverecoursetosomethingliketheold
distinctionsofmovementsandelites,aswellasofinfluenceandpower,tofleshoutthedifferencebetweenthe"civil"andthe"political."Thistheymaynotwishtodo,
however,fortacitnormativeorideologicalreasons.
Indeed,thetwoframeworksseemtohavedifferentrelationstoanalyticalandnormafiveconsiderations.Fromananalyticalpointofview,thedistinctionbetweencivil
andpoliticalsocietyhelpstoavoidthesortofreductionismthatassumesthatpoliticalactivitieswithastrategicdimensionareeasilygeneratedbysocietalassociations
andmovementsoraresomehowunnecessary.Paradoxically,anundifferentiatedconceptofcivilsocietygivesusastarkchoicebetweenthedepoliticizationofsociety
(wherethepoliticalisassignedtothestate)anditsoverpoliticization(wherealldimensionsofcivilsocietyareheldtobepoliticaloraretobepoliticized).The
distinctionbetweenthecivilandthepolitical,ontheotherhand,highlightsthefactthatneitherofthesedomainsisautomaticallyreconstitutedwhentheotheris.Indeed,
therecouldevenbeoppositionandconflictbetweentherequirementsofthetwoprojects.
Fromanormativepointofview,treatingpoliticalsocietyasamediationwithinamanyleveledcivilsocietyhasthepossible

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advantageofestablishingthepriorityofnonstrategicdomainsofsolidarity,association,andcommunication.Differentiatingthecivilandthepoliticalseemstoputthe
domainsonanequalnormativefooting.Whilethislatterapproachdoesnotmakethereconstitutionofcivilsocietyanautomaticfunctionoftheexistenceandactivityof
politicalorganizations,itneverthelesstendstorelievetheactorsofpoliticalsocietyfromthenormativeburdenofhavingtobuildorfortifycivilinstitutionsthatmaylimit
theirownfreedomofaction.Thisisaseriousproblem,becausealthoughtheactorsofcivilsocietyseemtolearnbytheirfailuresthattheycannotachievetheirown
goalswithoutrecoursetopoliticalsociety,thereverseisunfortunatelynotthecase,asthehistoryofelitedemocraciesshows.
141
Itisonlyinthelongrunthatthe
viabilityofademocraticpoliticalsocietymaydependonthedepthofitsrootsinindependent,prepoliticalassociationsandpublics.
Giventhecomplementarynormativeandanalyticaladvantagesofthetwoconceptions,onetreatingpoliticalsocietyasmediationandtheotherstressinganalytical
differentiationofthecivilandthepolitical,weproposetousebothconceptionsandattimestocombinethem.Webelievethatthisisappropriatebecauseour
methodologycombineshermeneuticandanalyticalapproaches.
Theissueoftherelationshipbetweencivilandpoliticalsocietyisconnectedtothequestionofthelocusofdemocratization.Allofourrelevantsourcesviewliberal
democracyasanecessaryconditionforbringingthemodernstateundersocietalcontrol.Theyalsoassumethatliberaldemocracyisincompatiblewithademocratic
pyramidwhosebaseisdirectparticipation.Theyhave,moreover,brokenwiththeolddreamofabolishingthestate.Nevertheless,intheWestthisnewemphasis
tendstobecoupledwithanoldone:awarenessoftheelitistcharacterofcontemporaryliberaldemocracies.Thissetofpositions,togetherwithacertaindeemphasis
(thoughnotabandonment)oftheideaofindustrialdemocracy,hasledmanyauthorsintheWesttoshifttheprojectof"democratizing"elitedemocracyfromthestate
tocivilsociety.
142
IntheprogramoftheGreens,asrepresentedbyOffe,thischangehasalsobeenarticulatedontheorganizationallevel,intheattempttocombine
partybasedwithmovementorientedstrategies.Ingeneral,thosewhoseektodemocratizecivilsocietyunderstandthisdomainascomprisedofmovementsaswellas
institutions.

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ThishasbeenalsotrueofEasternEuropeandLatinAmerica,wheremovementshavetendedtobefarmoreglobalandcomprehensivethanintheWest.Under
dictatorships,though,therewassomethingconstrainedandartificialintheshiftoftheprojectofdemocratizationtocivilsociety:Thesphereofthestate(nottomention
theeconomy)andofpotentialparliamentarymediationwasplacedofflimitsnotbynormativechoicebutbystrategicnecessity.Thelongrangegoalofparliamentary
democracywasasaruleaffirmed,withtheexceptionofthoseappealingtoadifferent(deficientorsuperior,asthecasemaybe)politicalcultureandtradition.When
thecrisisoftheregimesmadethisapossibleshorttermgoal,formanytheprojectofdemocratizationshiftedtopoliticalsociety.Someauthorseventriedtojuxtapose
"liberalization,"orientedtocivilsociety,and"democratization,"whoselocuswastobeprimarilypoliticalsociety.
143
InEasternEurope,theelitetheoretical
understandingofWesternEuropeanliberaldemocracywaseitherforgottenorabandonedinfavorofacivicstextbookversion.Therevivalofeconomicliberalismalso
increasedsuspicionofsocietalorganizationscapableofmakingdemandsonnewpoliticalelitesthatmighttranslateintounacceptableeconomiccosts.Manywhoseek
torestrictdemocratizationattacksocialorganizationssuchasSolidarityforbeingundemocratic.Someholdthatsocietaldemocratizationinhibitsthecreationofatruly
modernstatecapableofeffectivedecisionmaking.
144
Thereare,ofcourse,countervailingtendenciesrootedinthemovementcharacterofthePolishandalso,inpart,theHungarianopposition.Thereisatendencyto
articulate,moreinpracticethanintheory,adualisticstrategythatseesthedifferentformsofdemocracyanddemocratizationincivilandpoliticalsocietyas
complementary,eachindispensableforaprojectof"moredemocracy."Cardoso,inLatinAmerica,hascometheclosesttoarticulatingsuchaprogramexplicitly.
Initially,atleast,thedualismofunionandpartyinwhichthevictoriousSolidaritymovementarticulateditselffavoredasimilarformulation.Evenafterthesplitofthis
movementparty,thetwoneworganizationsthathaveemerged,theliberaldemocraticROAD(CivicMovementDemocraticAction)andtherightwingCenter
Platform,seemtosharethisdualheritage,asdoallthedynamicneworganizationsof

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Hungary(MDF,SzDSZ,Fidesz)andCzechoslovakia(CivicForum,PublicAgainstViolence).Theorganizationalmodelsofthesenewpolitical"parties,"noneof
whichisformallynamedassuch,haveatleastinitiallybroughtthemclosetothedualisticmodelsought,generallyunsuccessfully,bysomeofthenewsocialmovements
oftheWest,especiallytheGreens.
Today'strendneverthelessistoprofessionalizeand"partify"thenewparties.Somestilltalk,though,ofdevelopingmorecomplextiestotheformsofcivilsociety
withintheframeworkofincreasingdifferentiationfromthem.Suchtieswouldpresupposebothaprogrammaticopennessofthepoliticaltothecivilandasufficient
strengtheningofthelattertoallowittofunctionininstitutionalizedforms.Whatisneeded,inotherwords,areprogramsthatnotonlyestablishanongoingprocessof
politicalexchangewithorganizationsandinitiativesoutsidethepartypoliticalspherebutalsostrengthencivilsocietywithrespecttotheneweconomicsocietyin
formation.
145
OnlysuchaprogramcouldoffersomethinggenuinelynewwithrespecttopresentmodelsofWesternpolitics,therebytranscendingthebadchoiceof
eithereconomicliberalismandelitedemocracyordirectdemocraticfundamentalism.
Butevenifsuchanewcivilsocietyorientedstrategywhoserootscanbediscoveredinthevarietiesofpoliticaldiscourseexploredhereweretoemerge,itisnotyet
clearwhyitshouldbepreferredtoarenewedliberalism(verymuchontherise)oraradicalegalitariandemocracy(atthemomentonthedecline).Andifitcouldbe
showntobenormativelypreferabletothoseoptions,itmaywellbethecasethatmorecomplextheoreticalconsiderationswouldshowpreciselywhatisattractive
aboutthepoliticsofcivilsocietyisincompatiblewiththedevelopmentofmodernity.Toexaminetheseissueswithsufficientseriousness,wenowtakeourleaveofthe
discussionsofcontemporaryactorsandturntotheoreticalreconstructionandcritiqueoftheconceptofcivilsociety.

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2
ConceptualHistoryandTheoreticalSynthesis
ASketchofEarlyModernConceptualHistory
Presentdaypoliticalmodelsthatusetheconceptofcivilsocietynotonlycontradictoneanotherbutarealsorelativelypoorincategories.Furthermore,theirlinkstoa
richtraditionofinterpretationarenotclear.Sincethistraditionisnotthematized,thedifferencesbetweenthenewversionsoftheconceptandtheirhistorical
predecessorsarealsoleftunexplored.Thus,atheoreticalschemeinheritedfromthepast(orevenseveralpasts)issimplyassumed,butnotdemonstrated,tobe
adequatetomodernconditions.
Inourview,aconceptualhistoryoftheterm"civilsociety"isanimportantwaytobegintoaddressthesetasks.Suchahistoryshould,firstofall,deepenandextend
therelevantcategoricalframeworksinusetoday.Second,itshouldallowustodistinguishpremodernandmodernlayersintheconcept,indicatingwhatversionshave
becomequestionableandinadequatetoday.Whileconceptualhistorycannotremovethecontradictionsamongcontemporaryusages,itcanhelpusseewhatisat
stakeinthesecontradictionsandwhatoptionshavebecome,atleasthistoricallyspeaking,implausible.Finally,aconceptualhistorycanhelproottheusagesofa
conceptofcivilsocietyinapoliticalculturewhosemotivationalpowerhasnotyetbeenexhausted:thepoliticalcultureoftheageofthedemocraticrevolutions.
Conversely,therevivaloftheconcepttodayhelpsvalidatethisparticularpoliticalculture.

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ThefirstversionoftheconceptofcivilsocietyappearsinAristotleundertheheadingofpolitikekoinonia,politicalsociety/community.ItisthistermtheLatins
translatedassocietascivilis.Theconceptrepresentedthedefinitionofthepolis,understoodasthetelosofthehumanbeingasapoliticalanimal,zoonpolitikon.
Politikekoinoniawasdefinedasapublicethicalpoliticalcommunityoffreeandequalcitizensunderalegallydefinedsystemofrule.Lawitself,however,wasseen
astheexpressionofanethos,acommonsetofnormsandvaluesdefiningnotonlypoliticalproceduresbutalsoasubstantiveformoflifebasedonadeveloped
catalogueofpreferredvirtuesandformsofinteraction.
1
TodaywecansymbolicallyrepresentourdistancefromtheGreeksbypointingtotheabsenceofaseriesof
distinctionsandoppositionsintheconceptofpolitikekoinonia.Firstofall,theAristoteliannotiondidnotallowforourdistinctionbetweenstateandsociety.The
polisoikosdualitymayseemtoindicatethecontrary,buttheoikos,household,wasunderstoodprimarilyasaresidualcategory,thenaturalbackgroundofthepolis.
Politikekoinoniawaslogicallyonlyonekoinoniaamongmany(includingperhapstheoikos,butmoregenerallyallformsofhumanassociationfromoccupational
groupingstogroupingsoffriends,etc.)itwasmoredeeplyunderstoodastheallencompassingsocialsystemwithnothingexceptnaturalrelationsoutsideofit.
2
Thus,
therecouldbenoquestionofthepolisandtheoikosrepresentingtwosystemsof(different)socialorpoliticalrelations.First,theoikoswasnotalegalentity:Itwas
regulatednotbylawbutbythedespoticruleordominationofitshead.Second,thepluralityofhouseholdsrepresentednosystem:Theyrelatedtooneanother(in
theory)onlythroughthepolisindeed,throughtheirheadstheywereinthepolis.Economicrelationsbeyondthehouseholdwereconsideredmerelysupplementary
and,beyondamaximumpoint,pathological.
3
Theresultingconceptofpolitikekoinoniawasparadoxical.Itindicatedonekoinoniaamongmanyand,atthesametime,thewhole,awholewithpartsoutsideitself.
Theparadoxcouldberesolvedbecauseoftheabsenceofaseconddistinction:thatbetweensocietyandcommunity.Koinoniaingeneraldenotedallformsof
associationirrespectiveofthelevelofsolidarity,intimacy,orintensityofinteraction.Inthecaseofpolitikekoinonia,thisallowedforacon

Page85
ceptionthatalreadypresupposedtheexistenceofapluralityofformsofinteraction,association,andgrouplifehence,somethingofourconceptof''society."Yet
pluralityanddifferentiationweredramaticallyintegratedinamodelthatpresupposedasingle,homogeneous,organizedsolidarybodyofcitizenscapableoftotally
unifiedactionclosertoournotionofcommunity,a"communityofsocieties."Intheoryatleast,politikekoinoniawasauniquecollectivity,aunifiedorganizationwith
asinglesetofgoalsthatwerederivablefromthecommonethos.Theparticipationofallcitizens"inrulingandbeingruled"representedarelativelysmallproblemin
theory,giventhisassumptionofasharedsetofgoalsbasedonasingleformoflife.
4
ThereishardlyanydoubtabouttheidealizednatureoftheAristotelianconception.
5
Butwhatisimportantforusisthatitwasthisconceptionthatenteredintothe
traditionofpoliticalphilosophy.WeleavetothesidethefirstRomantranslationsofpolitikekoinoniaassocietascivilis,because,asfaraswecantell,herethe
conceptplayedonlyaminorrole.MoreimportantwerethemedievalLatinadaptationsfollowingthetranslationsofAristotlebyWilliamofMoerbekeandLeonardo
Bruni.WhilesomeoftheearlierutilizationsbyAlbertusMagnusandThomasAquinastendedtorestrictsocietascivilistothemedievalcitystate(astheclosest
availableequivalentoftheancientpolis),
6
suchaprudentuseoftheconceptcouldnotbemaintainedforlong,perhapsbecausetheGreeknotionalsoreferredtothe
overarchinglevelofsovereignty.OnlyinItaly,however,didcitystatesapproachthestatusoffullsovereignty,andevenhereonlyinfactandnotinlaw.Asaresult,
whentheGreekconceptionwasmoregenerallyutilized,thefeudalorderoffragmentedsovereignunits(patrimonialrulers,corporatebodies,towns,etc.)aswellas
medievalkingshipandempire,allcametobedescribedindifferentsourcesassocietascivilissiverespublica.
7
Unnoticed,thisusageintroducedalevelof
pluralizationintotheconceptthatcouldnowhardlybeunifiedundertheideaofanorganized,collectivebody,thenotionofrespublicaChristiananotwithstanding.
Asecondimportantshift,oneofdualization,occurredwhentheconcurrentrevivalofmonarchicalautonomyandpubliclawfavoredtheadaptation(however
implausible)oftheancientideaofrepublic

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(withwhichsocietasciviliswasidentified)totheStndestaatthatbalancedthenewpowersoftheprincewiththatoftheorganized,corporateestatesthatassembled
allthosehavingpowerandstatusinfeudalsociety.Thedualismherewas,however,asOttoBrunnerhastirelesslyinsisted,
8
notbetweenstateandsociety:Civilor
politicalsocietywasunderstoodasatypeofstatedualisticallyorganizedwiththe"prince"ononesideand"land"or"people"or"nation"ontheother,withthelatter
termsdenotingtheprivilegedestates.IfweacceptMarx's1843judgmentthattheoldcorporatesocietywasimmediatelypolitical,thenthehistoryoftheconceptof
civilsocietybeforeabsolutismbelongsatleastinthissensetothefundamentalpatternestablishedbytheGreekprototypeofpolitikekoinonia,despiteenormous
differencesamongthesocialformationsinquestion.
Thedevelopmenttowardabsolutismrepresentsthewatershedbetweentraditionalandmodernmeaningsof"civilsociety."Weseethereasonsforthisintwowell
knownandcomplementarydevelopments.First,thedevelopmentofprincelyauthorityfromtheprimusinterparesofapluralityofpowerholders(classicalfeudalism)
andtheseniorpartnerofadualisticsystemofauthority(Stndestaat)tothemonopolisticholderofthelegitimatemeansofviolencelaidthefoundationsofthemodern
state.Second,thedepoliticizationoftheformerpowerholders,theestatesandcorporatebodies,didnotdestroytheirorganizedandcorporatestatus.Instead,it
producedaveritablesocietyoforders.Tobesure,thetransitiontoadualityofstateandnonpoliticalsocietycouldbeandwasindeedachievedbyother,attimes
complementary,routes:theemergenceofautonomousreligiousbodiestoleratedbyamoresecularstate(NorthAmerica)
9
aswellastheriseofnewformsofprivate
economicactivityoutsidethepoliciesofthemercantilestate(GreatBritain).Inouropinion,however,theshiftfromthecorporateentitiesoftheStndestaattothose
ofthedepoliticizedsocietyoforderswasnotonlyhistoricallypriorbutwasalsomoreimportant,fortheEuropeancontinentatleast.Beforetheabsolutiststatecould
disorganizeandlevelitscorporaterivalsinthenameoftheuniversalstatusofthesubjectofthestate,acountermovementalreadybegantoreorganize"society"against
thestatethroughassociationsandformsofpubliclifethatmayhavedrawnonthe

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resourcesofestateindependence,religiousdissent,andeconomicentrepreneurshipbutthatembodiednewegalitarianandsecularprinciplesoforganization.
10
There
isnodoubt,atleastasfarasweareconcerned,thatthe"society"oftheEnlightenment,constitutinganewformofpubliclife,wastheprototypeoftheearlymodern
conceptofcivilsociety.
Ofcourse,politicalphilosophythatsoughttopreservetheidentificationofcivilandpoliticalsocietydidnotimmediatelyregistertheemergenceofanewformof
societalpublicsphere.Threeorfouralternativesweredeveloped.First,onecouldtrytocontinue,asdidJeanBodin,inspiteofdecisivehistoricalchangesbest
registeredbyhimself,thestndestaatlicheconceptionofrespublicasivesocietascivilissivesocietaspoliticus.Reappliedtotheconstellationofabsolute
monarchyandsocietyoforders,thisconceptionfalsifiedthenewtypeofdualitynowinformation,adualityBodinotherwisedefended.Nevertheless,themodel
persistedintotheGermaneighteenthcentury.
11
Second,onecouldidentifythemodernstateitselfwiththecommonwealthorcivil/politicalsociety.ThiswastheoptionofHobbes,whoofcoursebelievedthat
sovereignpowersuppliedtheonly"social"bondofnaturallyunsocialyetrationalindividuals.
12
InHobbes'stheory,thesocialcontractcreatesastate,notsociety.The
fusionofsocietyisaccomplishedonlybythepowerofthestate.WhileHobbesmerelycameclosetotheGreekviewthatconstruedtheconceptofapoliticalsociety
asanundividedsystemofpower,hesooncametorealizethattheancientconceptreliedonanotionofmoralizedlawrootedinethos,ratherthanpositivelawlimited
onlytoenactmentorcommand.ThusthelaterconstructionintheLeviathanmoreorlessleftoutthewholeconceptofcivilsociety(i.e.,thenormativeideaoffreeand
equalcitizenscomprisingthebodypolitic).Nevertheless,theidentificationofstateandcivilsocietyispreserveddowntoourowndayinsomeAngloAmerican
literature.
Thethirdoptioninvolvedabreakingupoftheoldformulasocietascivilissivepoliticussiverespublicabyretainingtheidentityofpoliticalandcivilsocietybut
distinguishingbothfromthestate.Locke'sspecificationoftheproductofthesocialcontractas"politicalorcivilsociety"
13
seemstocontinueonthepathofthe

Page88
earlyHobbes,representingnobreakwiththetradition.Atfirstsight,hisconceptionevenincludesanapparentidentificationofthebodypoliticwithgovernment.
14

Locke,however,doesclearlyseektodifferentiatebetween"government"and"society."Hedistinguishesbetweensurrenderingpowertosocietyandtothe
government"whomsocietyhathsetupoveritself"
15
andevenmoreemphatically(unlikeHobbes)betweenthe"dissolutionofthesociety"and"thedissolutionofthe
government.''
16
Characteristically,however,inthiscontextLockestaysclosetotheancientconceptwhenhespeaksofthe"onepoliticsociety"intermsof"the
agreementtoincorporateandactasonebody."Thisabilitytobecomeandtoactasonebodyisstillassignedtothelegislativepowerofgovernment.Thedissolution
ofthelegislativepowerisproposedastheendofasociety,butLockeinconsistentlyassignsthepossibilityofprovidingforanewlegislaturetothesamesocietywhen
thelegislatureisdissolved,orevenwhenitactscontrarytoitstrust.
Montesquieu'sconceptionwasmorehistoricallysensitive.Itunitedtheeighteenthcenturynotionoftwocontracts(socialandgovernmental)withtheRomanlaw
distinctionofcivilandpubliclaw(here"politicallaw").
17
Whereaspoliticallawregulatestherelationshipofgovernorsandgoverned,civillawregulatestherelationsof
membersofsocietytooneanother.Accordingly,Montesquieu,followingtheItalianwriterGravina,distinguishesbetweengovernment(l'tatpolitique)andsociety
(l'tatcivile).
18
Montesquieu'sconceptionofsocietyappearsunderashiftingterminology.Inthecontextofmonarchicalgovernment(whichrepresentsthemodern
stateforhim!)itmeant,alternatively,the"intermediatepowers,""thepoliticalcommunities,"or"societiesorcommunities"inheritedfromtheepochofestatedualism.
19
Thus,Montesquieu'santiabsolutiststrategyreliedmoreonasocietyconstitutedbyahierarchictraditionalsociety,onethathewishedtorepoliticize,thanevenLocke's
notionofpoliticalsociety,whichcontainedatleastthenotionofaninitialequalityofstatus.WithregardtotheEnlightenmentconception,Montesquieuanticipated,
howeverinconsistently,thedifferentiation,forpolemicalreasons,ofstateandsociety,whileLockeredefinedthenotionofsocietyitselfintermsoftheideaofformal
equalityderivedfrom

Page89
universalnaturallaw.Despitetheideologicalfeaturesoftheirconceptions(inMontesquieu'scase,stillexpressingtheworldviewofprivilegedbutdepoliticizedorders
inLocke's,thatofanewstatusorderincreasinglybasedonprivateproperty),thesetwophilosophersprovidedimportantconceptualpreparationforthemodern
redefinitionofcivilsociety.Theirconstructionspointedbeyondtheideologicallimitsoftheoriginalpresentations.
ItwasHegelwhosynthesizedmuchoflateeighteenthcenturythoughtonthesubject,ineffectweavingtogetherthesomewhatdivergentstrandsof"national"
development.Itwould,however,beerroneoustocreditHegelalonewithredefiningtheconceptofcivilsociety.
20
Beforeturningtohissynthesisanditsfate,then,we
pausetonotesomeoftheseothercontributors.
(1)TheconceptionwehavereferredtoastheEnlightenmentnotionof"society"(ascontrastedwiththestate)rapidlydevelopedbeyonditsoriginsinLockeand
Montesquieu.Paradoxically,thenewnotionoftencoexistedwiththemoretraditionalidentificationofcivilandpoliticalsocietywiththestate,asinthecaseof
Rousseau(andthenKant).
21
InFrance,thesetwotrendsbothsharedinthegrowingoppositiontobothsocietalpluralism,inthesenseofgrouporcollectiverights
identifiedwithsocialorders,andmonarchicalabsolutism.Thus,onemightsaythat,asthepolemicalconceptionof"societyagainstthestate"wasfashionedinthe
salons,coffeehouses,lodges,andclubsofthetime,
22
boththerhetoricofantiabsolutism(Montesquieu)andoppositiontoprivilege(Voltaire)wereunitedinasingle
conceptionofa(civil)societyopposedtoastatewhosecomponentswereformallyequal,autonomousindividualsasthesolerepositoriesofrights.Thisconception
fullycameintoitsowninaseriesofrevolutionaryconceptionsofnaturallaw.ThomasPaine'sCommonSense,thevariousAmericanbillsofrights,andtheFrench
DeclarationoftheRightsofManandCitizenclearlyjuxtaposeanindividualistic,egalitariansocietytogovernment(evenaconstitutionalstate!),withthesociety
becomingthesolesourceoflegitimateauthority.
23
(2)InEnglandaftertheGloriousRevolution,Locke'sambiguousseparationofsocietyfromgovernmentwasslowlyeroded.Whatcountedas"society"wasnow
organizedasastatethatinvolvedagradualfusionbetweenparliamentaryrepresentationandthe

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executive.
24
Theterm"society"asdistinctfrom"thestate"cametobereservedforhighorpolitesociety,acustodianofmannersandinfluence,butnotofanykindof
politicalproject.Ingeneral,theterm''civilsociety"preserveditstraditionalidentificationwithpoliticalsocietyorthestate.Anewcomponentwasaddedtothis
identificationbythethinkersoftheScottishenlightenmentFerguson,Hume,andSmith,amongotherswhocametounderstandtheessentialfeatureofcivilor
"civilized"society,notinitspoliticalorganizationbutintheorganizationofmaterialcivilization.Hereanewidentification(orreduction)wasalreadybeingprepared:that
ofcivilandeconomicsociety,reversingtheoldAristotelianexclusionoftheeconomicfrompolitikekoinonia.
25
(3)TheFrenchandBritishconceptionshadastronginfluenceinGermany,intheworksofKant,Fichte,andawholeseriesoflesserfigures.Acertainintellectual
conservatism,however,inpoliticalaswellasintellectualhistory,alsoplayedahistoricallyimportantroleinGermanyinpreparingthewayforHegel'stheory.Wehave
inmindthepreservationoftheMontesquieuianstressonintermediatebodiesorpowersinthenotionofaneustndischeGesellschaftinwhichStndeorestates(in
particular,derbrgerlicherStand)wouldbebasedonoccupationalmobilityandmerit,ratherthanbirthandinheritance,aswellasaformofaconstitutionalismthat
representedamodernizationratherthantheabolitionofthedualismoftheStndestaat.
26
Nevertheless,theattempttomodernizethenotionofestateswas
overshadowedbytheinfluenceofKant'sredefinitionofcivilsocietyasbasedonuniversalhumanrightsbeyondallparticularisticlegalandpoliticalorders.InKant's
philosophyofhistory,auniversalcivilsocietybasedontheruleoflawwaspostulatedasthetelosofhumandevelopment.Kantexplicitlyrejected(inthespiritofthe
FrenchRevolution)anycompromisewiththecorporateandestatepowersoftheabsolutistera.
27
Insteadoftheoldconcept,KantandthenFichteputforwardthe
notionofacitizensociety,staatsbrgerlicherGesellschaft,whichtheyinterpretedinthespiritoftheFrenchDeclarationof1789.
28
InFichteespecially,according
toManfredRiedel,twospecificallymodernnotionsappearforthefirsttime:thesharpseparationofstateandsociety,andtheunderstandingofsocietyitselfin
individualistanduniversalistterms.Inmakingthisshift,theyoungFichtemovedfromliberalismtoradicaldemocracy.

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ThetwostrandsoftheGermandiscussionofcivilsocietytheuniversalismofKantandFichteandthepluralismofmoretheconservativelineofthoughtcome
togetherinHegel.ButHegelalsobroughtotherstrandsintohisgreatsynthesis:inparticular,theScottishnotionofcivilizedoreconomicsociety.WhileHegel's
conceptionofcivilsocietymaynotbethefirstmodernone,wedobelievethathisisthefirstmoderntheoryofcivilsociety.Moreover,thetheoreticalinspirationof
Hegel'ssynthesisisinourviewnotyetexhausted.Despitesomeviewstothecontrary(Riedel,Luhmann),weshallarguethatseveralimportanttheoreticaltraditions
thatemergedafterHegel,withorwithoutconsciousreferencetohim,continuedtomovewithinthetermsofanalysisthathehasbroughttogether.Forthisreason,we
wouldliketopresentHegelnotinthecontextofaconceptualhistorythatanalyzesthehermeneuticstructureofourconceptsbutratherasthemostimportant
theoreticalforerunnerofseverallaterapproachesthathavepreservedtheirpotentialtoprovidemoreglobal,intellectualorientationeveninourowntime.
Hegel'sSynthesis
AllstrandsofthehistoryoftheconceptionofcivilsocietysofarpresentedmeetinHegel'sRechtsphilosophie.Heistherepresentativetheoristofcivilsocietybecause
ofthesyntheticcharacterofhisworkand,evenmore,becausehewasbothfirstandmostsuccessfulinunfoldingtheconceptasatheoryofahighlydifferentiatedand
complexsocialorder.
ItisbynowacommonplacethatHegelattemptedtounite,inaschemethatwastobebothprescriptiveanddescriptive,aconceptionofancientethoswithoneofthe
modernfreedomoftheindividual.Butitshouldalsobestressedthatinhisconception,themodernstatedid,could,oratleastshouldalsoreconciledimensionsofthe
ancient,homogeneous,unifiedpoliticalsocietywiththelatemedievalpluralityofautonomoussocialbodies.Theancientrepublicandimensioninhisconception,drawn
fromAristotleandotherclassicalthinkers,wastorestonthetwinpillarsofethicallife(ethosorSittlichkeit)andpublicfreedom.Themedievaldimensiondrawnfrom
MontesquieuandawholeseriesofGermansourcesinvolvedarenewedstressonintermediatebodiesinthefaceofthemodern

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state.
29
Thespecificallymoderncomponentwastorestonthreemajorfeatures.First,HegeltookoverfromthenaturallawtraditionandfromKanttheuniversalist
definitionoftheindividualasthebearerofrightsandtheagentofmoralconscience.Second,hegeneralizedtheEnlightenmentdistinctionbetweenstateandcivil
societyinamannerthatalsoinvolvedtheirinterpenetration.Third,hetookoverfromFergusonandthenewdisciplineofpoliticaleconomythestressoncivilsocietyas
thelocusandcarrierofmaterialcivilization.Astonishingly,hesucceededinbuildingalltheseelementsintoaunifiedframework,albeitonethatwasnotfreeof
antinomies.
OnecontradictionthatpermeatesHegel'sworkisthatbetweensystematicphilosophyandsocialtheory.Thisisexpressedpoliticallyastheantinomyofstatistand
antistatistpositionsrunningthroughboththedoctrineofcivilsocietyandthatofthestate.
30
Hegel'ssocialtheorypresentsmodernsocietybothasaworldofalienation
andasanopenendedsearchforsocialintegration.Hisphilosophicalsystem,conversely,pronouncesthatthisquesthasendedinthemodernstate.Itisneverentirely
clear,though,whetherhemeansapossibleanddesirable,oranotyetexistentbutnecessary,oranalreadyexistingstate.Butevenintheweakestversionofthis
argument,whenheidentifiesthepossibleanddesirableformofthestatewithamodernizingandconstitutionalversionofabureaucraticmonarchy,thestatist
implicationsofHegel'ssystembuildingbecomeclear.Yet,atthesametime,Hegel'srecurringargumentsagainstmonarchicalabsolutismandrevolutionary
republicanismreviveanantistatiststressonintermediarybodieslimitingbureaucraticsovereigntyandprovidingalocusforpublicfreedom.Thistrendinhisthoughtis
compatibleonlywiththerepeatedimplicit(andnowheresystematized)denialthatthesearchforsocialintegrationcanendininstitutionslike"ourmodernstates,"which
canonlyprovidecitizenswith"alimitedpartinthebusinessofthestate."
31
ThecontradictionrunsthroughHegel'sanalysisofcivilsocietyintheformoftwointerrelatedquestions:(1)IsSittlichkeitorethicallifepossibleonlyasinheritedand
unquestionedethostowhichindividualsubjectsmustconforminordertobeconsistentwiththeirveryidentity,orisitpossibletothinkofethicallifeinatruly

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modernform,permittingandevenrequiringitsownquestioningandcriticismaswellasapluralityofnormativelyvaluedformsoflife?(2)Iscivilsocietytobe
conceivedasSittlichkeitorAntisittlichkeitorasadynamiccombinationofboth"moments"?
Thetwoquestionsareofcoursedeeplyrelatedandmayindeedbeultimatelythesame.Toanswerthem,wemustbeginwithsomeofthebasiccategoriesofthe
Rechtsphilosophie.Hegeldifferentiatedobjectivespirit(objektiverGeist),rationallyreconstructedintersubjectivestructuresofmeaning("spirit")embodiedin
institutions("objective"),inthreedimensions:abstractright,morality,andSittlichkeit(ethicallife).Thedifferentiationamongthemisnotsomuchthatofcontents
(thoughthesedogetprogressivelyricheraswemovethroughthethreelevels)butamongthreelevelsofmoralargumentation.Abstractrightrepresentsaformof
argumentonthebasisofdogmaticallyassumedfirstprinciples,asinnaturalrightstheories.Morality,alevelclearlyreferringtoKantianethics,representstheself
reflectionofthesolitarymoralsubjectastheproposedfoundationforauniversalistpracticalargumentation.Finally,Sittlichkeitrepresentsaformofpracticalreason
that,throughselfreflection,istoraisethenormativecontentandlogicofinheritedinstitutionsandtraditionstoauniversallevel.OnlySittlichkeitallowstheexploration
ofnormativequestions(including"rights"and''morality")onthelevelofconcrete,historicallyemergentinstitutionsandpracticesthatrepresent,atleastinHegel'sview
ofthemodernworld,theinstitutionalizationoractualizationoffreedom.
32
Ethicallifeisitselfdifferentiatedinaway(entirelyuniquetoHegel)thatcombinesthetwo
dualitiesofoikos/polisandstate/societyinthethreepartframeworkoffamily,civilsociety,andstate.
33
Civilsociety(brgerlicheGesellschaft)isdefinedvariously,
butmostrevealinglyasethicallifeorsubstance"initsbifurcation(Entzweiung)andappearance(Erscheinung)."
34
Tounderstandthisdefinitionofcivilsociety,wemustexaminethenotionofSittlichkeitmoreclosely.CharlesTaylorissurelyonsolidfoundationsinatleastone
dimensionofHegel'stextwhenheinterpretsthecontentofthisnotion"asthenormsofasociety'spubliclife...sustainedbyouraction,andyetasalreadythere."
35

AccordingtoTaylor,"inSittlichkeitthereisnogapbetweenwhatoughttobeandwhatis,betweenSollenandSein."
36
Hegel'soverall

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schemerepeatedlystressesthetotalidentityofthe(rational)willofthesubjectwithlawsandinstitutions,
37
makinganyclashbetweenparticularanduniversalwill,
subjectandobject,rightandduty,impossibleoratleastirrational.
38
TaylorisonlesssolidgroundwhenheinterpretsMoralittandSittlichkeitmerelyintheformofopposition.ModernethicallifeasHegelunfoldsitisdistinguished
fromallancientethosbecauseitcontainstheothertwoethicaldimensionsrightsanduniversalistmoralityonahigher,i.e.,aninstitutionalized,level.Indeed,
accordingtoHegel,aninstitutionalspaceiscreatedforprivatemoralitythatshouldnotbecome"matterforpositivelegislation."
39
Onthisbasis,Hegelcouldhavegone
ontorecognizethepossibilityofinstitutionalizedconflictbetweentheoryandpractice,normsandactuality,asthegreatestachievementofthemodernworld.Thathe
didnotdosoallowsTaylortointerprethimprimarilyasan"ancient,"entirelyagainstHegel'sownintentions.Ofcourse,Taylorfocusesononlythemainstrandof
Hegel'sconception,nottheantinomicwhole.Hegel'sowndefinitionofSittlichkeitinvolvesagreaterstressonitsproductionandreproductionthroughselfconscious
action.
40
ArethebasesofsuchactiontobefoundinSittlichkeitalone,orinMoralittaswell,oratleast,forthemodernworld,inaformofethicallifethathas
incorporatedmorality,alongwiththetensionbetweenisandought?WhenwesaythatSittlichkeit,asthenormsofasociety'spubliclife,isalreadythere,Hegel's
authoritytakesusonlysofarastoregistertheinstitutionalexistenceofthenormsinquestion,possiblyinformsofdiscourseonly,oraslegitimationsandideologies.
Theiroften"counterfactual"characterisnotedbyHegelhimself,forexample,inthecaseoftheprinciplesandpracticeofpositivelaw.Unfortunately,Hegeldidnot
discoverthatmoderncivilsocietyischaracterizedbytheconflictnotonlyofmoralities(whichheattimesseemedtonote)butalsoofthenormativeconceptionsof
politicsitself.ThushedidnotseethatitwaspossibletoestablishanewformofSittlichkeitcontainingapluralityofformsoflifethiswouldmakeconsensuspossible
onlyonthelevelofprocedures,butevensuchaconsensuscanleadtosomesharedsubstantivepremisesandevenacommonidentity.Hecertainlydoesadmitthe
possibilityofconflictbetweeninstitutionalizednorm,theactualbasisofmoralopposition,andthepractice

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ofinstitutions.Primarilyforthisreason,histhoughtandthesocialworldhedescribesareopentoimmanentcritique.
Becauseoftheinternaldivisionofitsinstitutionalsphere,civilsocietyistheframeworkparexcellencewherethetensionbetweenisandoughtemerges.Ouraimisto
showthatthisdivisionhardlydisappearsinHegel'stheoryeveninthestatesphere,whichissupposedtobetheoneinwhichallantinomiesarereconciled.
41
Although
Hegelperiodicallyimpliesthatnoactuallyexistingstateshouldbeconsideredalreadyrational,heneverthelessholdsthatethical(sittliche)substancedefinedinterms
oftheidentityofrationalselfreflectionandactualizedinstitutionsisthe"wirklicheGeisteinerFamilieundeinesVolks."
42
Theabsenceofcivilsocietyandthe
presenceofthefamilyandthestate,thelatteronlyaspeople,arethenotablefeaturesofthisdefinitionofSittlichkeit.Consistentlyenough,civilsocietyreappearsin
thenextparagraphonlyasan"abstract"and"external"versionofSittlichkeit.
43
Thesectiononthetransitionbetweenthefamilyandcivilsocietyspeaksof''the
disappearanceofethicallife"anditsreemergenceonlyasa"worldofethicalappearance."
44
Hegelgoesontospeakofcivilsociety"asasystemofethicallifelostin
itsextremes."
45
ThuscivilsocietyisalevelofSittlichkeitwheretheoppositionsofought/is,subject/object,right/duty,andevenrational/actualwouldallreappear.Butitwouldnotbe
difficulttoarguethatthislevelofSittlichkeitisitsveryantithesis,aGegenorAntisittlichkeit.
46
MuchofHegel'sdiscussionofcivilsocietyemphasizesthe
disintegrationofthesupposedlynaturalformofethicalliferepresentedbythefamilyinaworldofegotismandalienation.Nevertheless,whenhespeaksoftheethical
rootsofthestate,hespeaksofthefamilyandthecorporation,thelatter"plantedincivilsociety."
47
Hereistherealsenseofseeingcivilsocietyasthe"bifurcationof
ethicallife,"asbothSittlichkeitandAntisittlichkeit,wheretheunityofsubstantialethicallife(accordingtoHegel'sfinaljudgmentoncivilsociety)isattainedonlyin
appearance.
ByfollowingHegel'sunfoldingofthecategoriesofcivilsocietyfromthesystemofneedsandsystemoflawstothepolice(generalauthority)andcorporations,and
evenbeyondtotheestateassemblyandpublicopinion,wegainadepictionofmodernsocietyasadialecticofSittlichkeitandAntisittlichkeit.Onlytheillusionsof
sys

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tembuildingputanendtothismovementinthe(highlyinconsistent)depictionofthestateasfullyrealizedbutnolongernaturallygivenethicallife.
48
WeshouldstoptoconsiderthegreatimportanceofatwosidedunderstandingofHegel'sconceptofcivilsociety.Ifweweretointerpretitonlyasalienation,social
integrationwouldhavetobeconceivedexclusivelyonthelevelsoffamilyandstate.Inrelationtocivilsociety,then,theprescriptiveorcriticaldimensionsofthetheory
wouldcometothefore,butatranscendentversionofcritique
49
wouldhavetotaketheformofromanticcommunalism,withfacetofacerelationsasitsnormative
standard,orofstatism,whoseselflegitimationcouldtakevariousrepublicanornationalistforms.Ifcivilsocietywereinterpretedexclusivelyintermsoftheformsof
socialintegrationthatemergehere,however,thedescriptiveandtendentiallyconformistelementsofthetheorywouldcomeforward,andthenegativeaspectsof
bourgeoiscivilsocietythatHegelwasoneofthefirsttopointoutindetailwouldbelostfromview.TherichnessandpowerofHegel'ssocialtheoryliespreciselyinhis
avoidingbothatranscendentcritiqueofcivilsocietyandanapologyforbourgeoissociety.
ManyinterpretersofHegelseetheintegrationofmodernsocietyasaseriesofmediationsbetweencivilsocietyandthestate.However,thiswayofputtingtheissueis
alreadyahostagetothestatistdimensioninHegel'sthought.IfwearenottoacceptfromtheoutsetthattheonlyimportantlineofthoughtinHegelassumesthestate
(butwhichelementofthestate?)asthehighest,mostcompleteanduniversallevelofsocialintegration,theissueofmediationshouldbeputdifferently.Onamore
abstractlevel,itshouldalreadybeclearthatmediationisbetweenAntisittlichkeitandSittlichkeit.Onamoreconcretelevel,however,itisthedistancebetween
privateandpublicthatistobemediated,ifweunderstandtheformerasthevanishingpointwherethesocialintegrationofthefamilyisdissolvedbeforethe
mediationscharacteristicofcivilsocietybegin.ThusitisourthesisthatthemediationofAntisittlichkeitandSittlichkeitculminatesinanotionofpubliclifethatHegel
onlyinconsistentlyidentifiedwithstateauthority.
50
AfterMarx'searlycritiqueofHegel'sphilosophyofthestate,littlewouldbeleftofthisidentification,exceptforthe
smalldetailoftheroleofstatism,in

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thecritiquesofthecapitalistmarketeconomyinthenextcenturyandahalf,includingthosebyMarx'sownfollowers.
51
InbothHegel'sandMarx'swork,however,
thestatisttrendisinapowerfultensionwithantistatistoptions.
AsanyreaderofHobbesknows,theroadtostatismispreparedbytheidentificationofsocietyoutsidethestatewithegotisticcompetitionandconflict.Suchisalso
theoutcomeofthewellknownMarxianidentificationofcivilandbourgeoissociety.
52
ThetraditionalGermantranslationofsocietascivilisasbrgerliche
Gesellschaftisnottheonlybasisofthistheoreticalmove.Hegelhimselfrepeatedlyidentifiesbrgerlichasbourgeois,
53
andnowheredoesheusetheadjectivalform
intheclassicalsenseofBrgerorcitoyen.WhenhestatesthatindividualsasBrgerofcivilsociety,the"externalstate,"
54
areprivatepersons,
55
heparticipatesina
fundamentalshiftintheconceptofcivilsocietyawayfromtheoriginalmeaningofcitizensociety.Atthesametime,ifthebourgeoisweretobeunderstoodashomo
oeconomicus,thenclearlyitwouldrepresentonlyonedimensionofwhatHegeldefinesasthesubjectofcivilsociety,theconcreteperson.
56
Ofcourse,thelatteris
firstdefinedas"atotalityofneedsandamixtureofnaturalnecessityandarbitrarywill(Willkr)."ButthisisonlyHegel'sstartingpoint:Thesystemofneedsisthefirst
levelofcivilsociety.Astheargumentproceedsthroughthenextlevels"theadministrationoflaw"and"generalauthorityandcorporation"weencounterthe
concretepersonagainundernewheadings:legalperson,clientofgeneralauthority,andassociationmember.
57
Itisonlyonthelevelofthesystemofneeds,the
descriptionofwhichHegelderivesfrompoliticaleconomy,
58
thataradicaldepictionofcivilsocietyasAntisittlichkeitisconsistentlyupheld.Forexample,when
HegeldefinescivilsocietyasasystemofSittlichkeit"splitinitsextremesandlost,''
59
hehasinmindaconditionwhereegoisticindividualismoneextremeis
integratedbymeansofanabstractgenerality(universalinterdependence)theotherextremethatisentirelyforeigntothewillofindividuals.Accordingly,civil
societyas"anachievementofthemodernworld"
60
involvesthecreationofanewtypeofmarketeconomythatintegratesthe"arbitrarywills"ofselfinterested
economicsubjectsbymeansofanobjectiveand"external"processthatachievesauniversalresultunintendedandunantici

Page98
patedbytheparticipants.
61
Thisobjectiveprocesscanbereconstructedbyasciencespecifictothemodernworld,namelypoliticaleconomy,thatHegelregardsas
beingentirelyparalleltothesciencesofnature.
62
Hegel'smodelofintegrationonthelevelofthesystemofneedstakesofffromAdamSmith'sdescriptionoftheselfregulatingmarketasaninvisiblehandlinkingself
interestandpublicwelfare.Buthisargumentsarelesseconomicthansociological,evenifthetremendousprocessofeconomicgrowthimpliedbythemodernmarket
economyunderliesthewholethesis.
63
Heseesthreelevelsofintegrationinthiscontext:needs,work,and"estates."Needsinmodernsocietybecomemoreandmore
abstractintheformofmoney,whichmakeseveryone'sneedscommensurable.Itismonetarizationthatmakesthegeneralrecognitionandsatisfactionofneeds
possible.Hegelalsoseestheundersideoftheprocess:Theabstractionofneedsallowsfortheirtremendousexpansion.Andtheresultofthelimitlessexpansionof
needscanonlybegreatluxuryandextravagancealongsidepermanentwant,i.e.,theinabilityofsometosatisfyevenbasicneeds.
64
Workinmodernsocietymediates
particularityanduniversalitythroughtheprocessofvaluecreation(theparticularworkoftheindividualcreatingproductsthatarecommensurablewiththeproductsof
allothers)andthedivisionoflabor,leadingtothe"dependenceofmenononeanotherandtheirreciprocalrelation."
65
AgainHegelseestheundersideoftheprocess,
thistimein''thedependenceanddistressoftheclass"thatistiedtoformsofincreasinglyonesidedandrestrictedworkthat"entailinabilitytofeelandenjoythe
broaderfreedomsandespeciallytheintellectual(geistigen)benefitsofcivilsociety."
66
Finally,Hegelhasatheoryofstratificationaccordingtowhichthedifferentiated
socialstrataofcivilsocietythathestillcallsStnde(estatesororders)integrateindividualsasmembersof"oneofthemomentsofcivilsociety"withitsownrectitude
andstatushonor(Standesehre).
67
Hegelinsiststhathisestatesaremodern,andthatindividualsbecomepartofthemfreely,throughtheirownachievement,ratherthanascriptively.
68
Nevertheless,itis
clearthathehasonlypartiallydiscoveredthespecificallymodernprincipleofstratification,namelysocioeconomicclass.
69
Theworkingclass,towhich(as

Page99
Avinerishowed)herestrictsthenewtermclass(Klasse),isnotincludedinhisschemeofagricultural,business,anduniversal(i.e.,bureaucratic)estates.
70
Thisisa
seriousomission,especiallybecauseHegelclaimsthathisestatescorrespondtoeconomicdifferentiation.Infact,however,hedidnotdiscoverthespecificallymodern
formofstratificationbasedonsocioeconomicdivisionsofinterestandlinesofconflictbecausehedidnotadequatelydistinguishbetweendifferentiationandintegration.
Thus,histheoreticalinstrumentsfailedhimwhenheconfrontedanincreasinglydifferentiatedclass,thevictimofpovertyandthealienationoflabor,thathetherefore(as
itturnedoutwrongly)consideredonlyasbeingunabletointegrateinto,andunabletocontributetotheintegrationof,civilsociety.
Strictlyspeaking,integrationthroughestatesdoesnotbelongtothelevelofthe"systemofneeds,"whereintegrationisthefunctionofobjective,unwilledprocesses.
ThisisshownbythefactthattheanalysissimplyduplicateswhatHegelelsewhereassignstothefamily(theagriculturalclass
71
),tothecorporation(thebusiness
class
72
),andtothegeneralauthority(theclassofcivilservants
73
).ItisonlywhatHegelconsiderstheundersideofthisprocessoftheemergenceofnew,
nonascriptivestatusgroupsthatbelongstothesocioeconomiclevelofhisanalysis.Accordingly,theworkingclassrepresentsaformofinequalityproducedbycivil
society
74
inwhichtheabsenceofinheritanceandotherwiseunearnedincome,aswellasaspecificformoflife,makesestatemembershipinaccessibleandexposes
individualstothehazardsofeconomiccontingenciesbeyondtheircontrol.
75
Takentogether,need,labor,anddifferentiationachievealevelofuniversalityincivilsocietyonlyatgreatsocialcost.Hegelisacutelyconsciousofthisevenifhedoes
notandcannotnoticethelevelofthecorrespondingpotentialofconflict.Unlikesomepoliticaleconomistsheknew(inparticular,Ricardo),hedidnotreadily
thematizetheproblemofconflictinrelationtotheworkingclass,
76
perhapsbecauseofhisbeliefthatestates(i.e.,newtypesofstatusgroups)aloneconstitutedthe
modernprincipleofstratification.
77
Nevertheless,hedidunderstandthe"systemintegration"ofcivilsocietytobehighlyunstable,thoughhedidnotposethisissuein
termsofactiontheoreticcategories.Evenso,morethanany

Page100
politicaleconomist,heunderstoodthatsocialintegrationmustoccuroutsidethesystemofneedsinorderforthemarketeconomyitselftofunction.Unlikeearly
modernpoliticalphilosophersinthenaturallawtradition,however,hedoesnotconfinethislevelofintegrationtotheexerciseofsovereignpower,tothesphereofthe
state,ortothefamily,anotherpossiblechoice.Itwasinconsciousoppositiontothesetheoreticaloptionsthathedevelopedatheoryofsocialintegrationthat
constitutedoneofthefoundingactsofmodernsociology,oratleastoftheparadigmdevelopedbyDurkheim,Parsons,andHabermas,amongothers.
Hegel'stheoryofsocialintegrationmovesthroughsixsteps:legalframework(Rechtspflege)generalauthority(Polizei)corporationthe(bureaucratic)executivethe
estateassemblyorlegislatureandpublicopinion.Whilethefirstthreeofthesearedevelopedaspartsofthetheoryofcivilsociety,andthesecondthreebelongtothe
theoryofthestate,orratherconstitutionallaw,theargumentturnsouttobeessentiallycontinuous.
78
Weshouldperhapsthinkoftheseastwolinesofargument,even
ifHegel'smovementbackandforthbetweenthemissoconstructedastoavoidtheappearanceofsuchdifferentiation.Itisthisdoubleargumentconcerningsocial
integrationonwhichweshallconcentrate.
Aswehaveshown,thesystemofneedsinHegel'stheoryisitselfintegrated,butinamannerthatis"external"(outsideofwillandconsciousness),incomplete(lessthan
fullyuniversalist),andselfcontradictory.Integrationbeyondthesystemofneedsoperatesaccordingtotwodifferentlogics:thelogicofstateinterventionintosociety,
andthatofthegenerationofsocietalsolidarity,collectiveidentity,andpublicwillwithincivilsocietyitself.Throughmostofthetext,theunfoldingofthetwologicscan
beclearlydifferentiated:Oneseriesuniversalestate,generalauthority,crown,executiveexpressesthelineofstateinterventionanotherestates,corporation,
estateassembly,publicopinionfollowsthatoftheautonomousgenerationofsolidarityandidentity.
Onlyinthe"administrationoflaw"isitdifficulttoseparatethetwolinesofargument.InHegel'sexposition,thislevelrepresentsthepossibilityoftheuniversally(orat
leastgenerally)validresolutionoftheclashofparticularsincivilsociety.TheovercomingofGegensittlichkeitasthedivisionofparticularanduniversalbegins

Page101
here,butinaformthatiscapableofgeneratingonlyalimitedcollectiveidentity.Thelegalpersonidentifieswiththecollectiveonlyintheformofabstractobligations.
Hegelnotonlyrecognizesthenoneconomicpresuppositionsofeconomyinthemodernsense,inthelawofpropertyandcontract,
79
buthealsoseesthattheir
implicationsgofarbeyondtheeconomy.Inparticular,thepublicationofthelegalcodeand,evenmore,thepublicityoflegalproceedingsarechangesofuniversal
significanceandvaliditythatmakepossibletheemergenceofauniversalistsenseofjustice.
80
ThisargumentbecomesfullyintelligibleinthecontextofHegel's
understandingoftheconceptofthepublic(ffentlichkeit)thatgoesbeyondtheRomanlawdichotomyofpublicandprivate.Weshallanalyzethisconceptindetail
below,butherewesimplystressthatHegelseesafunctionalrelationbetweenmodernlawandthesystemofneeds:Eachisnecessaryfortheemergenceand
reproductionoftheother.Healsoinsists,however,thattheinstitutionalizationofsubjectiverightandobjectivelawprotectsthefreedomanddignityofmodern
subjectsinawaythatprivatepersonsratherthanisolatedindividualsbroughttogetherinapublicprocesscanmutuallyrecognize.
81
ToHegel,theinstitutionalizationof
rightaslawrequiresbothstateaction(hestronglyprefersstatutorycodificationtoprecedentbasedadjudication
82
)andautonomousculturalprocesses.Heisneither
alegalpositivistnoranaturallawtheoristnorevenahistoricist.ForHegel,universalrightshavemorethanjustahistoricallyrestrictedvalidityeveniftheyemergein
culturaldevelopmentandcanbeuniversallyrecognizedonlythroughaprocessofeducation(Bildung)thathasbecomepossibleincivilsociety.
83
Universalrightsdonot,however,attainobjectiveexistencewithoutbeingpositedaslaw(gesetztalsGesetz),whichinvolveslegislation,codification,and
administrationbypublicauthority(ffentlicheMacht).Withoutautonomousculturalprocessesthatcreatethem,rightscannotacquirevalidityorrecognition.But
withoutthevariousnecessaryactsofthestateanditsorgans,neithertruedefinitionnorasystematicrelationtootherrightsispossible.
84
Onlythecombinationofthe
twoyieldsobligatoryforce.Hegelwiselyrecognizesthepossiblediscrepancyofthetwomoments,
85
culturalandpolitical,"betweenthecontentofthelawandthe

Page102
principleofrightness."
86
Yetwithintheanalysisoflaw,hecanofferonlysomeformalandproceduralrequirementsthatlegislatorsandjudgesshouldnotviolate,in
particulartherequirementofpublicityandtheformalgeneralityoflaw.Presumablyheexpectsacloserfitbetweentheprincipleofrightandpositivelawregarding
substantivelegalrulesthroughtheabilityoftheotherinstitutionalmediationsofhistheorytocreatelaw.
IntegrationthroughtheState
Hegelcannotmaintainthecomplementaritybetweensocietalandstatiststrategiesofsocialintegrationbeyondhisanalysisoftheadministrationoflaw.Fromthispoint
onintheargument,
87
thetwotypesofstrategiesbecomeidentifiedwithdifferentinstitutionalcomplexes.ThestatisttrendinHegel'sthought,anticipatingMarxand
especiallyMarxism,isclearlyconnectedtothenotionofcivilsocietyasGegensittlichkeit,rootedintheanalysisofthesystemofneeds.
88
Thepathological
consequencesofthesystemofneeds,involvingextremesofwealthandpoverty,wantandluxury,aswellasaseverethreattothehumanityandveryexistenceofthe
classofdirectlabor,callformeasuresthatallowHegeltoanticipatefeaturesofthemodernwelfarestate.
89
Inparticular,astatebureaucracy(theuniversalclass,the
classofcivilservants)iscalledupontodealwiththedysfunctionalconsequencesofthesystemofneeds,intwoforms.
(1)Theuniversalestateiscalleduponasthekeymechanismtodealwiththeantagonismofestates.Heretheanalysissuffersfromalackofreferencetotheclass
Hegelknowstobeboththeproductofthemoderneconomicorderandthemostendangeredbyit.Nevertheless,theassumptionthatestatesproducebothintegration
withinstrataandantagonismbetweenstratadoesrepresentanimportantopeningtoasociologyofconflict.Inthiscontext,Hegelmaintainsthatthestatushonorand
economicconditionoftheestateofcivilserviceimplythatparticularor"privateinterestfindsitssatisfactioninitsworkfortheuniversal."
90
Thesalariedconditionof
theofficial,therequirementforopenaccesstooffices,andthelimitsagainstturningofficesintoprivatepatrimoniesallinhibittheformationofthesortofselfinterested,
closedestatethat

Page103
characterizedmosttraditionalbureaucracies.Theeducationofthepublicservantmakestheideaofpublicserviceconsciousanddeliberate.
91
Thus,accordingto
Hegel,theuniversalestateisinauniquepositiontoresolvetheantagonismofestates.
ThereisnoneedtorepeatMarx'sbrilliant1843critiqueofthepretensionsofHegel'sviewoftheuniversalestate,whichpinpointeditsparticularinterestsandstatus
consciousness.Hegelmanagedtodeludehimselfonthisscorepartlybecauseofthestatiststraininhisthought,andpartlybecausehedidnotseeanyreasonto
considerthesocialantagonismimpliedbytheexistenceofthe"classofdirectlabor."Beingincapableofintraclassintegration,workersinthisviewdonotseemtobe
capableofinterclassconflict.Thedysfunctionalconsequenceoftheplightofthisclassisseenintheexistenceofananomicmass,thePbel,whoseintegrationrequires
measuresthataimatindividuals(i.e.,clients)ratherthanintegratedgroups.Butwiththepooreststratumremovedfromthefieldofanalysis,theideathatthe
bureaucracyrepresentsageneralinterestneedstobereconciledonlywiththeinterestsofthelandedclasses.
92
Hegel'sdiscussionofcivilservantstakesplaceintwosectionsofhisanalysis:thoseonthesystemofneedsofcivilsocietyandtheexecutiveofthestate.Thisis
justifiedbythefactthatthebureaucracyisbothasocialstratumandastateinstitution.
93
ButHegel'stheoreticaldecisiondisguisesthefactthatthisestatediffersfrom
othersintworespects.First,itisconstitutedbythestateandnotbythesocietaldivisionoflabor.Second,inthestatethebureaucracyfindsitsinstitutionalplaceinthe
executiveratherthanintheestateassembly.Thus,Hegel'sargumentconcerningthefortunatedoublemeaningoftheGermantermStnde,
94
referringbothtosocial
ordersandtoadeliberativeassembly,doesnotapply.BycallingthebureaucracyaStand,Hegelmissestheopportunitytodiscoverthesecond,primarilymodern,
formofstratificationwhoseconstitutiveprincipleispoliticalpower.Evenmoreimportantly,hedisguisesthestatistprincipleoftheformofsocialintegrationunder
consideration.
Thewaythebureaucracyistoaccomplishtheintegrationofantagonisticestatesrevealsatleastsomeoftheconsequences.Thestateexecutiveorpoliticalbureaucracy
hastheroleof"subsuming

Page104
theparticularundertheuniversal"byapplyingthelaws.Hegelacceptstheparliamentaryassumptionthatanestateassemblyiscapableofgeneratingapublicand
generalwill.Buthebelievesthatincivilsocietyalltheparticularinterestswillreappear,andthatforthisreasonoutsidethestatesphereproperthebureaucracymust
betheagentofuniversality.Thefactthathefeelscompelledtoadmitthattheauthorityoflocalcommunities(Gemeinden)andcorporationsisneededasa"barrier
againsttheintrusionofsubjectivecapriceintothepowerentrustedtothecivilservant"
95
shows,though,thatHegelisawarethatrealitycanbequitedifferentfromhis
idealizeddepiction.Presentingthebureaucracyasanestateofcivilsocietyisthusnotonlyawayofdisguisingtheactuallevelofstateinterventionheadvocatesbutis
alsoawayofdeflectingtheresponsibilityfordysfunctionalorevenauthoritarianinterventionfromthestatetoasocialgroupandtothesubjectivecapriceofits
members.
(2)Themodelofintegrationthroughstateinterventionisfurtherdevelopedinthetheoryofpoliceorgeneralauthority(PolizeiorallgemeineMacht).Unfortunately,
themodernterm"police"doesnotcoverHegel'smeaninghere.Inaccordancewithearlierabsolutistusage,hemeansmorethanthepreventionofcrimeandtortand
themaintenanceofpublicorder.However,Hegelalsousestheterm"generalauthority"insensesnotcoveredbythesectiononthePolizei.Thus,itmaybebest
simplytolisthisactualusesofthisconcept:surveillance(linkedtocrimeandtort)
96
interventionintheeconomyintheformofpricecontrolsandregulationofmajor
industrialbranches
97
andpublicwelfareintheformofeducation,charity,
98
publicworks,
99
andfoundingofcolonies.
100
Theideabehindlinkingtheseapparentlydiverseareasisnotquitecoherent.ThefunctioningofthesystemofneedsislinkedinHegel'sconceptiontotworather
differentfactors:acentrifugaldysfunctionalitybasedonthesubjectivecapriceandcarelessnessofindividuals,andsystematicallyinducedeffectslargelybasedon
worldwidecompetitionandthedivisionoflabor.Thepolicerepresentstatepenetrationintocivilsocietytoservetheinterestsofjusticeandorderbycompensatingfor
bothofthesephenomenawithouteliminatingtheirbasiccauses,whichlieinthedynamism

Page105
ofthesystemofneeds.Asaresult,thecentrifugalandanomicconsequencesofconflictarediminishedbutnotentirelydoneawaywith."Crimeprevention"andthe
punishmentofcriminalsdonoteliminatecrimebutkeepitwithintolerablelimits.Provisionsforsocialwelfareandpubliceducationdonotabolishconflictand
alienation,buttheycanpreventthedeclineoftheclassoflabortothestatusofarabble(Pbel).Inthesecasesandalsointhecaseofpriceandproductioncontrols,
thegoalHegelespousesiscompensationforthedysfunctionalsideeffectsofthenewtypeofmarketeconomy,acoredimensionofmoderncivilsociety.Thedetailsof
hisanalysisdonotalwaysmakeclearwhetherheisdefendingprecapitalistformsofpaternalistinterventionoranticipatingfeaturesofamodernwelfarestate.The
generalconception,however,involvesreactivecompensationfortheeffectsofagenuinemarketsystemmorethanproactive,statistsubstitutionformarketfunctions.
Thestatistfeatureofthedoctrineofthepolicelieselsewhere.Hegeldoesnotsystematicallydistinguishbetweenstateinterventionintheformofeconomicsteering
(e.g.,pricecontrolsinasystemofmarketprices)andinterventioninnoneconomicspheresoflife(e.g.,surveillance).Whilefromthepointofviewofmarket
dysfunction,eachofthesemeasuresrepresentspostfactocompensation,surveillanceandotherformsofsocialcontrolareproactivefromthepointofviewof
noneconomicformsoflife,substituting,asTocquevillenoted,statizedrelationsforhorizontalsocialties.
101
Asimilarproactivecharactercanbenotedintherolesof
generalauthoritydealingwithtrusteeshipandeducation.
102
Theproblem,ofcourse,isnotthatHegelhopestopreventorphansandthechildrenofthepoorfrom
fallingintopoverty,butthathedefinestheremediesintermsofa"right"ofsocietyasawholeratherthantherightsoftheindividuals,families,andcommunities
concerned.OnceagainHegelreplaceshorizontalsocialinteractionandsolidaritybyverticaltiesbasedonstatepaternalism.Evenifitweretruethatcivilsociety
destroysthefamilytiesthatprotectedindividualsinpremodernsociety,theideaofthegeneralauthority(thestate)"takingovertheroleofthefamilyforthepoor"
103
is
amystificationofmeasuresthatdonotproducebutreplacesocialsolidarity.

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SocialIntegrationthroughCivilSociety
Hegeldoesnotclaimthatonthislevelthestateproducesathoroughgoingunificationofsociety.Moreover,thekindofuniversalityitachieveshereamountstoaform
of"external"impositionandcontrol.
104
Incivilsocietyweencounterthestateonlyintheformofexternality,andthemetaphorofcivilsocietyas"universalfamily"is
entirelymisplacedinthetheoryofthepoliceorgeneralauthority.ThismetaphorbelongsinsteadtothesecondstrandofHegel'sconceptionofsocialintegration,the
solidaristicstrandthatrunsfromthefamilytothecorporation,theestateassembly,andpublicopinion.But,sinceHegel(wrongly)considerstheintegratingroleofthe
familytobenegatedincivilsociety,
105
thecorporationbecomesthestartingpointoftheselfintegrationofcivilsociety.Asinthecaseofthepoliceandtheestates,
onecanlegitimatelyquestionwhetherHegel'stheoryofthecorporationrevivesapremodernformofsociallifeoranticipatesapostliberalformofsocialintegration.
Weshallreturntothisquestion,notinghereonlythatHegelwasbothharshlycriticaloftherevolutionaryandliberalattacksontheoldcorporateentitiesandinfavorof
aformofcorporateorganizationsignificantlydifferentfromthatoftheoldregime.
106
Indeed,heproposedanddefendedaversionofthecorporationthatwasopento
entryandexit,thatwasbasedonnoascriptiveorhereditaryprinciple,thatwasvoluntaryandnotallinclusive,andthatdidnotimplyanysuspensionoftheindividual
rightsofmemberswithrespecttothecorporatebody.Unlikethecaseofamodernunion,however,bothemployersandemployeeswouldbemembersof
corporationsintheeconomicsphere.Moreover,Hegeldoesnotrestrictcorporateorganizationtothatsphere:Learnedbodies,churches,andlocalcouncilsarealso
includedintheconcept.
107
TheprimaryfunctionsofthecorporationinHegel'stheoryaresocializationandeducation.Thebusinessassociationinparticularismeanttocombinevocationaltraining
withtrainingforcitizenship.Thusallofcorporatelife,assumingthealreadymentionedmodernizationofitsstructure,helpstoovercomethegapcivilsocietyproduces
betweenbourgeoisandcitizenbyeducatingindividualstointernalizethecommongoodanddevelopcivic

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virtue.Intheprocess,solidaritiesareexpectedtodevelopthatwouldaffectthemotivationalstructureofindividuals,substitutingcollectiveconcernsandidentifications
foregoisticones.Inthiscontext,Hegel'sproblemwasthesameasRousseau's,namely,howtomovefromtheparticulartothegeneral,givenmodernindividuality.But
hisanswerissignificantlydifferent,becauseHegeldidnotbelievethattherealityofthemodernlargescalestateorofamoderncivilsocietywithadynamicsystemof
needscouldorshouldbeimaginedaway,orthatindividualswhoareentirelyegotisticalinprivatelifecanattainthegeneralinthepoliticalsphere.Inhisview,generality
canbeattainedonlythroughaseriesofstepsthatincorporatesomethingofthepublicspiritinwhatisjuridicallytheprivatesphere.ThecorporationsthatRousseau,his
naturallawphilosophicalforebears,andhisrevolutionaryrepublicansuccessorssoughttobanishfromsociallife,replacetheparticularityinHegel'stheorywitha
limitedformofgeneralityonalevelwhereresocializationisactuallypossible.
WhilethecorporationrepresentsacrucialstepinthedevelopmentofthestrandofHegel'sthoughtthatstressestheselfintegrationofsociety,theantinomyofhis
politicalpositionisneverthelessvisibleinit.LikeMontesquieubeforehimandTocquevilleafterhim,hesoughtanintermediatelevelofpowerbetweenindividualand
statehefearedthepowerlessnessofatomizedsubjectsandsoughttocontrolthepotentialarbitrarinessofthestatebureaucracy.
108
Butatthesametime,inlinewith
hisdoctrineofthestate,hewantstodefendamodelofsocializationthatwillmakethetransitiontoastatecenteredpatriotismplausible.Inthiscontext,Hegel'saimis
toprovideasmoothtransitionbasedineverydaylifefromtheGeistofthecorporationastheschoolhouseofpatriotismtotheGeistofthestatewherepatriotismisto
achieveitsfull"universality."
109
Muchdepends,ofcourse,onwhethertheconceptionofthestateimpliedhereisbasedonapublic,parliamentarygenerationof
identityorabureaucraticmonarchicimpositionofunity.Butsincetheantinomyisnotresolvedonthelevelofthestate,theroleofthecorporationinpoliticaleducation
alsobecomesambiguous.This,inturn,affectsthetherelationofthecorporationtothegeneralauthorityasHeimanshows,Hegelwasneverabletodecidebetweena
medievalistdoctrineinvolving

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corporateindependenceandlegalpersonalityandaRomanlawconceptionstressingstatecontrolandoversight.
110
WhatevertheambiguitiesofHegel'scorporatedoctrine,thedifferentcenterofgravityherewhencomparedtotheconceptofthepolicecannotbeoverlooked.Both
policeandcorporationareattimesidentifiedastheindividual'ssecondfamily.Theyalsosharesomefunctionalassignments,suchaseducation.Furthermore,the
normativejustificationsproducedforeachareequallyconvincing.Thecorporationisasecondfamilysmallanddeterminateenoughinitspurposetoallowgenuine
participationbyitsmembers.Thesemembers,however,includeonlyapartofthepopulationwhileitappearsgeneralwithregardtoitsmembers,thecorporation
inevitablyrepresentsaparticularinterestwithrespecttoothergroupsandthosenot''incorporated."Nevertheless,thecorporationiscapableofcreatinginternal
motivations,anditdoesnotdependonexternalsanctionsguaranteeingcompliance.Ontheotherhand,theregulationofthepoliceisuniversalistandoughtnottoallow
theformationofparticularclustersofinterests.However,theactivityofthepolicedoesrelyonexternalsanction,involvesnoparticipationofthoseconcerned,and
doesnotleadtotheformationofautonomousmotivation.
Asthecomparisonofpoliceandcorporationshows,statisminHegel'sthoughtislinkednotonlytosomekindofpoliticalopportunismbutalsototheideaof
universality,withoutwhichnomodernconceptionofjusticeispossible.Hegelhasgoodreasonsnottomakeadefinitivenormativechoicebetweenpoliceand
corporation,betweenabstractuniversalityandsubstantialparticularity.Thesemomentsaresunderedincivilsociety,anditisHegel'sthesisthattheycanbereunited
onlyinthestate.Itwouldbeonlyonthislevelthatthecorporation,asthesecondethicalrootofthestate(afterthefamily),wouldachieveitsuniversality.
OurreconstructionofHegelchallengesinterpretationssuggestingthattheantinomiesofcivilsocietyareresolvedonthesupposedlyhigherlevelofthestate.Instead,
wewouldarguethatitismorefruitfultointerpretHegel'sthoughtasdualisticorantinomiconbothlevels.Whatwecrudelylabelas"statist"and"solidaristic"trendsin
histhoughtappearintheanalysisofbothcivilsocietyandstate.Accordingly,thedoctrineofthestateitselfcanbeanalyzedin

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termsofthesetwotrends.Thus,itwouldbeamistaketoopposetothestatistdimensionofHegel'sthoughtaquasiliberalconceptionaccordingtowhich
civilsociety,asopposedtothestate,istheonlysourceofgenuinenorms.Suchaviewwouldbeallthelessdefensiblebecauseoftheunavoidableelementof
particularismattachedtotheimportantintermediarybodiesofcivilsociety.Thus,thetransitiontoakeynormofmodernityuniversalitycannotoccurwithoutsome
participationofstateinstitutions.Evenifweweretonotethattheprotectionoftheindividualrightsofmemberscanbewrittenintothechartersofmodern
corporations,theestablishmentofuniversalrightsaspositivelawpresupposes,aswehaveseen,theactivityofthestate.Butwhichdimensionofthestate?The
questionwemustconsideriswhether,inHegel'stheory,theestateassemblyandpublicopinionortheexecutivebureaucracyandpublicadministrationisthelocus
andsourceofthehighestlevelofsocialintegrationandwillformation.
InHegel'sconception,weshouldrecall,thepolicerepresentthepenetrationofthestateintocivilsociety.Analogously,theestatesassemblyrepresentsapenetration
ofcivilsocietyintothestate.However,thecivilsocietyrepresentedinthestatethroughtheestateassemblyisalreadyorganizedtoHegelthepresenceofanatomized
civilsocietyinthestatewouldbemostregrettable.AccordingtothefreebutconvincingtranslationofKnox:
Thecirclesofassociationincivilsocietyarealreadycommunities.Topicturethesecommunitiesasoncemorebreakingupintoamereconglomerationofindividualsassoonthey
enterthefieldofpolitics,i.e.,thefieldofthehighestconcreteuniversality,iseoipsotoholdcivilandpoliticallifeapartfromoneanotherandasitweretohangthelatterinair,
becauseitsbasiscouldthenonlybetheabstractindividualityofcapriceandopinion.
111
Thisconceptiondirectlylinkstheestatesandcorporationsofcivilsocietywiththeassemblyofestates.WhileHegelatfirststressesthelinkofestatestothelegislature,
asindicatedbytheGermantermStnde,themoreimportanttheoreticalfoundationoftheassemblyisinfactthecorporation,theexistenceofwhichistheonlyreal
evidenceprovidedfortheclaimthatorganizationandcommunityarepossibleinanotherwiseatomizedcivilsociety.Thedeputiesof

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civilsocietyare"thedeputiesofthevariouscorporations."
112
Earlier,thisstatementislimitedandexpanded.Atavistically,theagriculturalestate(suddenlymeaning
onlythenobility)istobedirectlypresent,asintheassembliesoftheStndestaat.Thebusinessestate,ontheotherhand,isrepresentedbythedeputiesof
associations,communities,andcorporations(Genossenschaften,Gemeinden,Korporationen),whichareallincorporatedformsofassociation.Hegeldoesnoteven
feeltheneedtoindicateandjustifyhisexclusionfrompoliticallifeoftheoneclass,directlabor,thatissupposedlytotallydisorganized.
113
Moreimportantthanthe
conformistandconservativeelementsinhisthought,however,arehisreasonsforrecommendinghisparticularversionofrepresentativegovernment.Accordingto
Hegel,whencivilsocietyelectsitspoliticaldeputies,it"isnotdispersedintoatomisticunits,collectedtoperformonlyasingleandtemporaryact,andkepttogetherfor
amomentandnolonger."
114
Rather,intheprocessofdeliberatingandchoosingdeputies,theassociationsandassembliesofsociallifeacquireaconnectiontopolitics
inthesameactthatgivespoliticsafoundationinorganizedsociallife.Itispreciselyatthislevel,atthepointwherecivilsocietyandthestateinterpenetrate,thatHegel
rediscoversandintegrates,withoutexplicitlysayingso,theancienttoposofpoliticalsociety.
Theestateassemblyhastheroleofcompletingthejobbegunbythecorporation,butonasocietywidelevelofgeneralitythathe(andespeciallyhisEnglishtranslator)
oftenreferstoas"universality."Thisjobistobringpublicaffairsand,evenmore,publicidentityintoexistence.
115
Againparalleltothedoctrineofthecorporation,the
legislatureisregardedasamediatingorgan,thistimebetweenthegovernment(Regierung)andthepeople,differentiatedasindividualsandassociations.
116
The
formeristhuspreventedfrombecomingtyrannicalandthelatterfrombecomingamereaggregate,amasswithanunorganizedandthereforedangerousopinion.Hegel
ofcoursestressestheroleoftheestateassemblyinlegislationandevenconstitutionmaking,
117
buthismaininterestthroughoutisintheconstitutionoftheagentof
legislationand,evenmore,itspropermedium.Thecategoryofpublicityindicatesthatonlythegenuinerepresentativesofthepublicarelegitimatelyentitledtomakethe
laws.Thelawstheyenactaretobeconsidered

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legitimateonlyiftheproceduresofpublicdeliberationarerigorouslyfollowed.SinceHegelinsistsongenuineandunconstraineddiscussionanddeliberation,he
emphaticallyrejectstheimperativemandate,theprincipleofthetraditionalStndestaat.Theassemblymustbe"alivingbodyinwhichallmembersdeliberatein
commonandreciprocallyinstructandconvinceoneanother."
118
Hegel'svehementinsistenceongenuinepublicityinthelegislature(aswellasthecourts)hasotherimportantgrounds.Hewishestopromoteknowledgeofpublic
businessinsocietyand(howeverinconsistently)tomaketheestateassemblysusceptibletotheinfluenceofpublicopinion.QuitelikeTocqueville,Hegelisambivalent
concerningpublicopinion.Definedas"theformal,subjectivefreedomofindividualstoexpresstheirownjudgments,opinions,andrecommendationsconcerning
generalaffairswhenevercollectivelymanifested,"
119
publicopinionisinternallycontradictoryand"deservesasmuchtoberespectedasdespised(geachtetals
verachtet)."
120
Respectisduebecauseofahiddenstrainofrationalitythatis,however,buriedandinaccessibletopublicopinion'sopinionaboutitselfbecauseofits
concrete,empiricalformofexpression.Interpretingpublicopinionisthustheroleofintellectualandpoliticalelites.
121
Inordertopromotetheformationofpublic
opinion,Hegelsupportsextensivefreedomofpubliccommunication(especiallyspeechandpress),andheworriesonlyslightlyaboutpossibleexcesses.Indeed,he
believesthatthegenuinepublicityoflegislativedebateshasagoodchanceoftransformingpublicopinionandeliminatingitsshallowandarbitrarycomponents,
renderingitharmlessintheprocess.
122
Nevertheless,itisalsoimpliedherethatthedebatesoftheassemblycantransformpublicopinionpreciselytotheextentthatits
essentialcontentandelementsofrationalityareraisedtoahigherlevel.Inthissense,notonlydoesthepoliticalpublicofthelegislaturecontrolpublicopinion(Hegel's
stress),butaprepoliticalpublicsphereplaysanimportantroleinconstitutingpubliclifeinthepoliticalsense.
TheconceptofpublicopiniondevelopedbyHegelisnotfreeoftheantinomiesofhispoliticalthought.Thestatisttrendinthiscontextisexpressedintheconcernto
controlanddisempowerpublicopinioninordertomakeitcompatiblewiththemanagementofthestate.Thesolidaristictrend,ontheotherhand,involvesthe

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raisingofpublicopiniontoahigherlevelofrationalityinaparliamentaryframeworkbetweenstateandsociety,itselfexposedtothecontrolsofpublicity.Fromthefirst
pointofview,publicopinionisultimatelyathreat,andtheproperrelationshiptoitonthepartofpolitical(includingparliamentary)elitesismanipulative.Fromthe
secondpointofview,publicopinionistheconditionofpossibilityofpoliticalpubliclife,andtheproperrelationshiptoitonthepartofeliteswouldhavetobeoneof
publicdialogueinwhichtruthwouldbeanopenquestiontobedecidedbythemoreconvincingargumentsratherthantheaprioripossessionofoneofthesides.The
publicsphereoftheestateassemblyplaysaroleinenlighteningandeducatingpublicopinionpreciselybecausetruthhereisnotknowninadvancebutratheremerges
duringthedebateitself,alongwiththevirtuesthatcanserveasexamplestothelargeraudience.
123
OnetrendinHegel'sthoughtimpliesthatinthosestateswherethe
lifeofthelegislatureisgenuinelypublicthestructureofpublicopinionwillitselfchange:"Whatisnowsupposedtobevalidgainsitsvaliditynolongerthroughforce,
evenlesshabitandcustom,butbyinsightandargument(EinsichtundGrnde)."
124
Atothertimes,however,thedialoguemodelofrationalpoliticaldeliberationis
restrictedtotheparliamentarypublicsphere.Inthesecontexts,thestatisttrendinHegel'sthought,supportedbythefalseanalogybetweenthesearchforscientific
truthandtheattainmentofnormativetruthinpolitics,stopshimfromextendingthemodeltothepublicsphereasawhole.
Atissuehere,aswellasinHegel'spoliticaltheoryasawhole,istheultimatelocusandnatureofpublicfreedom.Weaccepttheinterpretationaccordingtowhich
HegelsoughttodevelopapoliticaldoctrineintermsofawholeseriesofmediationsthatrelativizetheRomanlawdistinctionbetweenprivateandpubliclaw.
125
But
weacceptitwithtworeservations.
First,weseethemediationsastwodistinctseries:civilservants/police/executive/crown,andestates/corporation/estateassembly/publicopinion.Thetwoexpressthe
conflictingtrendsinHegel'sthought.Indeed,theverymannerinwhichtheymediatethespheresregulatedbyprivateandpubliclawissignificantlydifferentineach
case.Thefirstseriesinvolvespubliclawcategoriestakingonbothprivateandpublicroles.Thesecondindicatesprivatelaw

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entitiesdevelopingstructuresofpublicityandtakingonpublicfunctionsrootedinthesestructures.
126
Thissecondpatternisthesameasthemodelinwhich
constitutionalrightsconstitutethepubliclawrightsofprivatesubjects.
127
Oncethesetwopatternsareseparated,however,themeaningofthepublicsphereinHegel
becomesuncertain.Isitsprimaryparadigmthatofpublicauthorityorthatofpubliccommunication?Andifhemaintainsbothparadigms,whatistobetheir
relationship?
Second,wedonotaccepttheimplicitidentificationofstateandpublicpresupposedbytheinterpretation,ortheideathateachsucceedingstepinHegel'sexposition
represents(evenintermsofhisownargument)anunambiguouslyhigherlevelofpubliclifethantheonebefore.ForHegel,undoubtedlythehighestpurposeofpublic
lifeistogeneratearationaluniversalidentitythatheequateswiththepatrioticethosofthestate.Whatremainsuncleariswhetherthegenerationofthisethosis
assignedtoastatespheredominatedbytheexecutiveandlinkedonlytotheprojectionsofthestateintocivilsociety,ortoaspheredominatedbyalegislature
drawingonautonomoussocietalresourcessuchasthecorporationandpublicopinion.Theissuecannotbedecidedifwestresstheproblemofmediatingbetween
privateandpublicrealmsalonemostcategoriesofHegel'stheoryofSittlichkeit,beginningwiththesystemofneeds,providesuchmediations.Butitcanbedecided
ifwelinktheprocessofgeneratingamodern,rationalcollectiveidentitytotheconceptofpublicfreedomthatHegelrepeatedlyusesinthiscontext,thatis,toa
processthatallowstheeffectiveparticipationofindividualsinthefreeshapingofthemeaningofa"we."Obviously,publicfreedomisquiteabitmorethanthekindof
freedomavailabletotheagentsofthesystemofneeds,whocannotparticipateintheformationofanycollectiveidentitywhatsoever.ButHegelalsoregistersserious
doubtsaboutwhetherthemodernstateassuchcanbethelocusofpublicfreedom,doubtsthatruncompletelycontrarytothestatiststraininhisthought.
Weshouldnoteonceagainthat,whileHegelnowheresystematizesaconceptionofthepublicsphere(ffentlichkeit),thecategoriesofpublicauthority,public
freedom,publicspirit,publicopinion,andpublicityplaykeyrolesinhiswork.LetusrecallIlting'sthesisthatthePhilosophyofRightseeksabovealltosynthesizethe
negative

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freedomofmodernliberalismandthepositivefreedomofancientrepublicanthought.Thecategoriesofthepublicsphererepresentimportantwaysinwhich
republicanismcouldbesustainedinHegel'sthoughtafterhissupposedconservativeturn.Butevenherethereisanessentialdifferencewithancientrepublicanism.
InsteadofrestrictingtheformationofpublicfreedomtoasinglesociallevelpoliticalsocietyHegelworksoutamodernrepublicantheoryinwhichawholeseries
oflevelshavekeyrolestoplay,includingthepublicrightsofprivatepersons,thepublicityoflegalprocesses,thepubliclifeofthecorporation,andtheinteraction
betweenpublicopinionandthepublicdeliberationofthelegislature.Notalloftheseprocesseshaveapublicpoliticalpurpose.Yettheyarethestagesoflearning
leadingtotheformationofpublicidentity.Whatiscommontoallofthemisthefreepublicparticipationofthoseconcernedintheformationofdecisions.
128
The
publicpurposeoftheactsofthepolice,attimesidentifiedasgeneral(allgemeine)andevenpublic(ffentliche)power,isbeyonddoubtforHegel.Thesameistrue
oftheactsoftheexecutiveand,inaRechtsstaat,ofthecrownaswell.YetinthesecasesHegelspeaksneitheroftheformationofpublicspiritnoroftheactualization
ofpublicfreedom.Infact,ithasbeennoticedthatHegel'smostexplicitdiscussionofpublicfreedomjuxtaposesthecorporation,belongingtocivilsociety,tothe
modernstate:
Inourmodernstates(modernenStaaten)citizenshaveonlyarestrictedpartinthegeneral(allgemeinen)businessofthestateyetitisessentialtoprovidemenethical
entitieswithactivityofgeneralcharacteroverandabovetheirprivatebusiness.Thisgeneralactivitywhichthemodernstatedoesnotalwaysprovideisfoundinthe
corporation.
129
InthispassageHegelnotonlyregistersthetensionbetweenthemodernstateandpubliclifebutidentifiesadifferentlocusforpublicfreedomthandidclassical
antiquity.Thecorporationsare,inhiswords,"thepillarsofpublicfreedom(ffentlichenFreiheit)."
130
YetforHegelthepublicfreedompossibleinthecorporation,
involvingarelativelyhighlevelofparticipation,cannotbeprimaryinsocietyasawhole.PelczynskiandothersaresurelyrightwhentheyarguethatHegelbelievedthat
hehadprovedthat"the[modern]stateistheactualityofconcretefreedom."
131
Thisargumentissupported,ingeneral,bythegreateruniversalityofthe

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estateassembly,thisveritablecorporationofcorporations,overtheinevitablyparticularisticsocietalassociations.Butitalsodisguisestherealityofthemodernstateas
ahierarchyofoffices,asthemonopolisticpossessorofthemeansofviolence,andasacompulsoryassociation.Byreversingthesociologicallyobvioushierarchyof
themodernstate,makingthelegislatureprimaryandtheexecutivesecondary,Hegelisconstructingalegitimationbothinthesenseofcounterfactuallyjustifyinga
structureofauthorityandinthesenseofestablishingasetofnormativeclaimsopentocritique.Thesecriticalpotentialscomeintoview,forexample,whenthe
assemblyfromwhichthenormativeclaimsofstatearedrawnisdepictedasitspenetrationbycivilsociety.
Hegel,thepeerlesssocialtheoristofhistime,wasclearlyawareofthesociologyofthemodernstate.WearefortunatetohaveatourdisposalIlting'scareful
reconstructionofHegel'sturnfromanearlierconceptionstressingthefreedomofthecitizeninthestatetoonestressingthefreedomofthestate.
132
Theshiftmay
wellhavehadindependentintellectualmotivations,whichwerethenreinforcedbyHegel'sreactiontothereactionaryKarlsbaddecrees.Hegelknewandrejectedboth
absolutistandrevolutionarystatism,assomuchoftheRechtsphilosophiedemonstrates.IsittoofarfetchedtoassumethatareactionaryturninPrussianpoliticsmade
himrealize(asdidTocquevillesoonafter)thatfeaturesoftwosupposedlyaberrantversionsofthemodernstatebelongedtoitsidealtypeinstead?Ifthiswereso,the
shifttoinstitutionsofcivilsocietyasthepillarsofpublicfreedomwouldbelogicalandalsoindispensablefromthepointofviewofstrengtheningthisdimensioninthe
parliamentaryinstitutionsofthestate.Thus,Hegelinhismaturetextnotonlyrestrictedthepossibilityofthecitizen'sfreedominthestatebutalsoexpanded,inIlting's
words,theliberties(Freiheitsrechte)ofcivilsocietyintorightsofparticipation(Teilnehmerrechte).
ThemostobviousobjectiontoourreadingofHegelwouldbethathehimselfdidnotadmitand,forsystematicreasons,wouldhaverejectedtheideaoftwo
unreconciledstrandsinhisthought.Wearenotparticularlyconcernedwiththiscriticism(inanycase,itisrefutedbyIlting'sreconstruction)orwiththesystematicaims
ofHegel'swork.WeareinterestedonlyinrebuildingHegel'sconceptionaroundwhatmaywellbeasubtextualantinomyinhis

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politicalphilosophysothatwecantraceanewtheoryofcivilsocietybacktotheinstitutionallymostelaboratedconceptionfromwhichwecanstilllearn.Thus,amore
seriousobjectiontoourreconstructionwouldinsist,asdidtheyoungMarxin1843,thatthedimensionswebringintospecialreliefrepresentelementsinHegel's
thoughtthatarenotmodern,incontrasttothemodernityofhisconceptionofthesystemofneeds,ontheoneside,andthebureaucracy,ontheother.Inthisreading,
Hegel's"corporation"isanattempttosavemedievalcorporatedoctrinehisestateassembly,theinstitutionsoftheStndestaathisnotionofpublicopinion,theearly
bourgeoispublicsphereandperhapstheveryideaofpublicfreedom,theancientcitystates.Accordingly,ifwearetolookforthemodernityofHegel'ssocial
theory,wewoulddobettertofocusonthecriticalaspectsofhisdepictionofthecapitalisteconomy(Lukcs)orhisanticipationofthewelfarestate(Avineri).
Ofcourse,eachinterpreterfavorabletoHegeltriestointerprethimthroughaspecificconception,andeventoenlisthisalliance.Thetheoryofcivilsocietyweare
tryingtodevelopisnoexceptiontothisrule.Nevertheless,webelieve,inthecontextofbothsubsequentsocialandintellectualhistory,thatthecategorieswestress
werenotmereatavismsinHegel'stimeandhavebecomeevenlesssointhepostliberal(andnowalsothepoststatist)epoch.Inthiscontext,thehistoryofsocial
theoryoffersanimportant,ifhardlyconclusive,proof.WhilethetheoryofthesystemofneedswasfruitfullydevelopedbytheMarxiantradition,andthetheoryof
bureaucracybecameacornerstoneoftheworksofWeberandhisfollowers,theideaofcivilsocietyasthecentralterrainofsocialintegrationandpublicfreedomwas
tobecomejustasfruitfulinalineoftheoreticaldevelopmentthathaditsbeginningsinTocqueville,itscontinuationinDurkheim,inEnglish,French,andAmerican
pluralism,andinGramsci,anditsculminationinParsonsandHabermas.Inouropinion,thistraditionofinterpretationhasshownattheveryleastthatthebasic
categoriesofHegel'sRechtsphilosophiecanbethoroughlytranslatedintomodernterms.IfwearetobelievethetestimonyofsocialactorsEastandWest,Northand
South,suchreconstructedtermsofanalysishavenotyetexhaustedtheircriticalandconstructivepotential.

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3
TheoreticalDevelopmentintheTwentiethCentury
TheuntenabilityoftheHegeliansynthesisandthecollapseofitssystematicassumptionsdonotrepresenttheendofthetheoryofcivilsociety.Subsequenttheorists,
however,tendedtofocusonlyonspecificdimensionsofthemultilayeredHegelianconcept,developingthesetotheexclusionofallothers.Marxstressedthenegative
aspectsofcivilsociety,itsatomisticanddehumanizingfeaturesbutinsodoing,hemanagedtodeepentheanalysisoftheeconomicdimensionsofthesystemofneeds
andwentfarbeyondHegelinanalyzingthesocialconsequencesofcapitalistdevelopment.
1
Tocquevilleremovedtheambiguitiesfromthediscussionofpublicity,
discoveredinvoluntaryassociationsamodernequivalentoftheanachronisticcorporation,anddemonstratedthecompatibilityofcivilsocietyanddemocracy,albeitin
acontext(America)thatheconsideredtobeanuncharacteristicversionofmodernsociety.GramscireversedthereductionisttrendoftheMarxiananalysisby
concentratingonthedimensionofassociationsandculturalintermediationsandbydiscoveringmodernequivalentsofHegel'scorporationsandestates.Finally,
Parsonsfocusedonthedimensionofsocialintegrationintermsofawholeseriesofinstitutionsconstitutiveofwhathecalled"societalcommunity."MorelikeHegel
inhissystematicaspirationsthananyoftheothers,Parsonsattemptedtosynthesizethenormativeclaimsoftraditionwiththoseofmodernity.Hisconcessionsto
ideology,againreminiscentofHegel,werethepricehepaidforthefailedattempt.
Inthischapterourprimaryinterestisintwotwentiethcenturyattemptstodeveloptheoriesofcivilsocietyonthefoundations

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providedbyHegel.Thisseemstousthebeststrategytotesttheviabilityofaformoftheorizingoriginallyattachedtotheproblemsofearlymodernstatesand
industrialsocietyandbasedonamodeofempiricalgeneralizationwhoseplausibilityrestedonsurvivingideologiesandinstitutionsfrompremodernconstellationssuch
ascitystates,Stindestaaten,andsocietiesoforders.
ThecombinationofParsonsandGramsciiseasilyjustified.BothareinfluencedbyHegel,andyetbothcorrecthimbydifferentiatingcivilsocietyfromtheeconomyas
wellasthestate.Theoneovercomesliberal,theotherMarxian,reductionism.Bothareinclinedtointerpretcivilsocietyinfunctionalterms,asthesphereresponsible
forthesocialintegrationofthewhole.Atthesametime,bothareaware,evenifambiguously,ofthenormafiveachievementsofmoderncivilsociety.Thecrucial
differencesbetweenthem,linkedtotheirdifferenttheoreticaltraditionsandpoliticalassumptions,canbefoundinthewaytheycombinenormativeandfunctional
theory.Parsonsidentifiesthenormativelydesirablewiththeactualfunctioningcivilsocietyofthepresent,therebyfallingintoanunconvincingapologyforcontemporary
Americansociety.Gramsci,focusingonthenormativedesirabilityofafuture(socialist)civilsociety,tendstotreatthecivilsocietyofthepresentonlyintermsofits
functionforasystemofdominationhecompletelyrejects.Hiscombinationofanexcessofutopiawithanexcessofrealismdoesnotallowhimtoadoptagenuinely
criticalattitudetotheSovietUnion,thecountryoftherevolutionwherenotonlybourgeoisbutallcivilsocietywassuppressed.Intheend,then,neitherissufficiently
criticalofhisownideologicaltradition,andasaresult,neitherisfullyabletothematizethedualityofmoderncivilsocietyitsliberatingpromiseaswellasitslinksto
heteronomy.
Parsons:
CivilSocietybetweenTraditionandModernity
TheclassicalsociologicaltraditionbroughttocompletionbyTalcottParsonsrarelyusedtheconceptofcivilsociety,foritwasundoubtedlyconsideredaremnantof
presocialscientificdiscourseabouthumanaffairs.AllthemoreremarkableisthereappearanceoftheconceptinParsons'swork.Tobesure,itappearsbothina
newdisguiseandinthecontextofanewmodelofdifferentiation.

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Parsons'sconceptofasocietalcommunitythatisdistinguishedfromtheeconomy,thepolity,andtheculturalsphererepresentsasynthesisoftheliberalconceptof
civilsocietyasdifferentiatedfromthestatewiththestressonsocialintegration,solidarity,andcommunitythattypifiesthesociologicaltraditioninitiatedbyDurkheim
andTnnies.Thissynthesis,inwhichbothindividuationandintegrationarecentral,involves,remarkablyenough,apartialandconsciousreturntotheHegeliantheory
ofcivilsociety.
2
While(unlikeHegelbutsimilarlytoGramsci)Parsonsdifferentiatesthesocietalcommunityfromtheeconomyaswellasthestate,thecontinuities
betweenthetwoconceptionsaremorestrikingthanthedifferences.
ForParsons,asforHegel,modernsocietyisstructuredbynormativeframeworksofplurality(associations)andlegality.Publicityandparticipationarealsopresent,
butasinHegel'swork,theyaredeemphasized.Moreover,Parsons,likeHegel,isreadytopronounceasingleversionofmodernsociety(inhiscase,theUnited
States)asmoreorlessthehighestrealizationofthepotentialsofmodernity.''Thecompletionofthesociety...calledmodern"willtakeplacewhentheintegration
problemsofthissocietyortypeofsocietyareresolved.Finally,Parsonsisconsciousofthedebtthatmodernsocietybearstothehistoricalprojectoftheageof
democraticrevolutions,evenifheconsidersthisprojecttobefullyaccomplished(andhenceannulledasaproject)bythedevelopedWesternsocieties:"Themore
privilegedsocietiesofthelatetwentiethcenturyhavetoanimpressivedegree,whichwouldhavebeenimpossibletopredictacenturyago,successfullyinstitutionalized
themore'liberal'and'progressive'valuesofthattime."
3
Asfarasthesesocietiesareconcerned,thestrugglefordemocratizationis,onthewhole,relegatedtothe
nineteenthcentury.
4
ThislastthesisconcerningtheactualaccomplishmentofthevaluesoftheageofrevolutionsopensParsons'sconceptofmodernsocietytothechargeof"bourgeois
apologetics"leveledatallpost1848usagesofthe"utopia"ofcivilsociety.
5
Parsons,though,isideologicalonlyinthesensethatHegelwas,namely,intheextentto
whichhemixesnormativeinsightwithmystificationsconcerningexistinginstitutions.Yet,andagainlikeHegel,thetheorypointsbeyondideologyinsofarasitlinks
thesenormativeinsights

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tothepotentialitiesofexistingsociety,evenifParsonshimselfdoesnotrecognizethattheseareactualizedonlypartiallyandselectively.
Parsons'sdivisionofthesocialsystemintofourfunctionsorsubsystemsappearsdistinctlyunhistoricalnexttoHegel'sspecificationthatitismoderndevelopmentthat
producesthedifferentiationbetweenstateandcivilsociety.ButParsons,too,insiststhatinearliersocieties,undifferentiatedinstitutionalcomplexescarriedoutmore
thanone,andpossiblyall,ofthemajorsocialfunctions.Forexample,intribalsocieties,kinshipwasthekeysocial,cultural,political,andeconomicinstitutionthe
feudalbondintheHighMiddleAgesorganizedsocial,economic,andpoliticalrelationsandtheabsolutistmercantiliststatewasapoliticalandeconomicentity.The
developmentofmodernityisthusconceivedasthedifferentiationofwhathadbeenimplicitlythereinallsocieties,ininstitutionsthatmayhavehaddimensionslinking
themtoallfunctionsbutwhosecenterofgravitywastiedupwithasinglefunction.Thisteleologicalinterpretationofhistorymaywellinvolveanimpermissible
projectionofmodernWesterncategoriestopremodernandnonWesternsocieties,sothattheuniversalapplicabilityofacategorysuchasdifferentiationistherefore
opentodoubt.
6
Therelevanceofthiscategorytomoderndevelopmentitselfis,nevertheless,highlyplausible.
7
ToParsons,thesocietalcommunityistheintegrativesubsystemofsociety:Itsfunctionistointegrateadifferentiatedsocialsystembyinstitutionalizingculturalvaluesas
normsthataresociallyacceptedandapplied.Thedifferentiationofthesocietalcommunityfromthecultural,economic,andpoliticalsubsystemswasaccomplished,
accordingtoParsons,bythethreemodernrevolutions:theindustrial,thedemocratic,andtheeducational.Eachoftheseisrepresentedasastepin"thesocietal
community'sdeclarationofindependence"fromtheothersubsystems,which,however,alsoacquiretheirdifferentiatedinstitutionsintheprocess.
8
Actually,in
Parsons'sanalysis,thedifferentiationofthesocietalcommunitywasbeguninthemajorEnglishantecedentstothethreerevolutions:(1)thecomingofreligiousplurality
andtoleration,whichdifferentiatedreligionandthestatefromoneanotherwhiletosomedegreefreeingthesocietalcommunityfromareligious

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definitionoffullmembership(2)theestablishmentofpurelyeconomicrelationsthroughamarketeconomyfreedofsocial,ifnotyetpolitical,restraints(3)the
developmentofanaristocraticformofrepresentativegovernmentthatdifferentiatedgovernmentanditsconstituency(primarilythearistocracyandthegentry)and
stabilizedtheirrelationsthroughparliamentaryrepresentationand(4)thedevelopmentofaformoflawthathelpedtocarveoutasocietalspherenotopentoarbitrary
interventionevenbythestateitself.Inpresentingtheseantecedents,Parsonssimplifiesbylinkingstepsinthedifferentiationofeachofthefoursubsystemstoasingle
process,evenifthestephasconsequencesforothersubsystemsaswell.Thus,forexample,thedevelopmentoftheruleoflaw,whichhelinkstotheinstitutionalization
ofthelegalprofessionandthestabilizationofasystemofindependentcourts,isalsothemostimportantpreparationforadifferentiatedsocietalcommunity.
Significantly,Parsonsconsidersthattheprocessofdifferentiationofthesocietalcommunitywouldhavebeenincompletewithoutallthreerevolutions.Inoneversionof
hisargument,theserevolutionsrepresentthedifferentiationoftheintegrativesubsystemfromoneothersubsystemineachcase.
9
Inanotherversion,
10
Parsonsinsists
thateachrevolutionactuallystrengthenedtheothersubsystem:theeconomicinonecase,thebureaucraticadministrativeintheother.Thereisnoinconsistencyhere,
however,becauseParsonsseesdifferentiationasareciprocalandnonzerosumprocessthatinvolvesinstitutionbuildinginalltherelevantspheres.Butthereisone
majorinconsistencyinhisaccount:Thedifferentiationofthesocietalcommunityfromthemarketeconomyisnowhereprovidedforinthedoctrineofthethree
revolutions,inspiteofgeneralclaimstothecontrary.Asaresult,theargumentmustsurrenderitsparallelstructureinparticular,thedramaticprocessinwhichthe
societalcommunitydeclaresindependencefromthestate,vividlyportrayedbyParsons,doesnothaveaparallelintherelationshipofthesocietalcommunitytothe
newtypeofmarketeconomy.WemightsuggestthatParsonsherecameupagainstaproblemhesoughttodeemphasize:theproblemofcapitalismandacenturyof
socialistresponsestoit,symbolizing,asKarlPolnyinoted,society'sselfdefenseagainsttheeconomy.

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InParsons'sconception,thedemocraticrevolution,whosecenterwasFrance,certainlydidleadtoatremendousstrengtheningofthestatepowerthatwasfirstbuiltin
theepochofabsolutism.Nevertheless,fromthepointofviewofthesocietalcommunity,theoriginalcontributionofthisrevolutionwasthecreationofanewtypeof
solidary,nationalcollectivitywhosemembershaveequalclaimtopoliticalrightsinadditiontothecivilrightsalreadyaffirmedinEnglishdevelopment.
11
The
emergenceofthisnewtypeofcollectivityinvolvesareversalofprimacywithrespecttotheabsolutistera:"Thesocietalcommunitywastobedifferentiatedfrom
governmentasitssuperior,legitimatelyentitledtocontrolit."
12
Again,noinconsistencyisinvolvedinaffirmingthesimultaneousstrengtheningofstatepowerandthe
developmentofamoreautonomoussocietycapableofdefendingitselfagainstthispower,becauseParsonsrightlydoesnotconsiderpowertobeazerosumgame.
13
Obviously,Parsonsthoughtoftheindustrial"revolution"asentirelyparalleltothedemocraticone.Thisistrue,however,onlyifwetaketherelationshipofpolity
economytobethethecentralaxisofinterest.Accordingly,theindustrialrevolution,whosecenterwasGreatBritain,completedthetrendofearliercapitalist
developmentbyenormouslyextendingthedivisionofsociallabor(inDurkheim'ssense)andbydifferentiatinganeconomicallydefinedsocietyfromthestate(in
Polnyi'ssense),leadingtothecomplementarygrowthofbothsubsystems(asbothDurkheimandPolnyinoted).
Sofartheparallelbetweenthetworevolutionsworks.Butifwechooseasouraxiseconomysocietalcommunity,asdidPolnyi(onwhomParsonsotherwise
greatlyrelies),theparallelismstops.Insteadofdifferentiationandcomplementaryexpansion,theindustrialrevolutionproducedaneconomicsociety(themarket
economy)thatthreatenedtosubsumeandreduceautonomoussocialnorms,relationships,andinstitutions.WhileonewouldhardlyexpectParsonstobesensitiveto
theMarxiandiscussionsofreificationandcommodification,itisindeedsurprisingthathedoesnotexaminePolnyi'sthesisthataselfregulatingmarketproducesan
"economization"ofsociety,againstwhichaprogramoftheselfdefenseofsocietyemergedinthenineteenthcentury.

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Indeed,thisprogramhadmanyfeaturesparalleltotheeighteenthcenturyliberalconfrontationofsocietyandstatetowhichParsons'sconceptionofthedemocratic
revolutioninpartrefers.
AspectsofPolnyi'sstressonsociety'sselfdefenseagainstthedestructivetrendsofclassicalcapitalismdo,ofcourse,returninthediscussionoffeaturesofthe
twentiethcenturywelfarestateandunionism.
14
But,characteristically,Parsonsconsiderstheissuesolvedwiththedevelopmentofthewelfarestate.Indeed,thelatter
seemsto"transcend"bothcapitalismandsocialism.Uncharacteristically,however,theproblemisnotconsideredinthecontextofthethesisofdifferentiation.One
suspectsthatthisthesiscouldnothavebeenappliedinaconsistentandconvincingfashiontotheeconomysocietalcommunityaxis.
Thethesisoftheeducationalrevolutionaddressesthesameissueonceagain,thoughthistimeinaratherfuturisticperspective.Curiously,itisinthiscontextthatwe
findsomeofParsons'smostcriticalremarkswithrespecttoclassicalcapitalistdevelopment:
Thecapitalistalternativeemphasized,first,freedomfromtheascriptivepast,thenprotectionfromgovernmental"interference."Thesocialistalternativeproposedthemobilization
ofgovernmentalpowertoinstitutefundamentalequality,ignoringalmostcompletelytheexigenciesofeconomicefficiency...Bothfailedtogroundthemselvesinadequate
conceptionsofthesocietalcommunityandoftheconditionsnecessarytomaintainitssolidarity.
15
TheAmericancenterededucationalrevolution,abstractlylocatedontheaxisculturesocietalcommunity,implies,accordingtoParsons,amoreconsistentfreeingof
thesocialstructurefromallascriptivepatternsofstratificationthancouldbeprovidedforbyprivateproperty(capitalism)orgovernmentaloffice(socialism),providing
equalityofopportunity(thoughnotensuringequalityofresults).Evenmoreimportantly,hemaintainsthatthecentralinstitutionalcomplexofthisrevolution,the
university,providesforthedevelopmentofanassociationalpatternofsocialorganizationthatistobedistinguishedfromandcounterposedtothebureaucraticand
individualisticformspromotedbythestateandthemarketeconomy,respectively.Thus,heseestheeducationalrevolution,amazinglyenough,asasolidaristic
correctivenotonlyto

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socialismandcapitalismbutalsotothedemocraticandindustrialrevolutions.Itpromises,inshort,apotentialcompletionofmodernitycapableofsecuringthe
autonomyandintegrationoftheintegrativesubsystem,thesocietalcommunity,aliascivilsociety.
Parsons'sclaimthatthemodernuniversityprovidesanalternativemodeloforganizationtobothmarketandbureaucracywouldbebizarreifitwerenotsimplya
specialcaseofhisgeneralargumentabouttheassociationalcharacterofcontemporaryAmericansociety.Beforeturningtohisideologicalmystificationofaspectsof
thissociety,however,wemusthighlightanotherdeficiencyinhisconception.
WehavealreadynotedthatatleastonestrandofParsons'sconception,apparentlycontradictedbyanother,makestheemergenceofthemodernsocietalcommunity
aresidualresultoftheselfdifferentiationoftheothersubsystemsinthethreerevolutions.Withinapurelyfunctionalistscheme,suchadepictionleadstonointernal
contradictions,butParsonscancontinuetooperatewithinsuchaschemeonlytotheextentthathisevolutionarymodeldeniesitselfthepossibilityofexplainingthe
actualmechanismsofsocialchangeinvolvingactionandconflict.Hecandothisonlyasasociologistasahistorian,herepeatedlyrunsintotheproblemofsocial
movementsandconflicts.Butthefunctionalistsociologistisreadywithhisanswer:Theradicaldemocraticmovement,thesocialists,andthenewleftaredepictedas
thefundamentalistwingsofthethreerevolutions
16
whoseprojectsapparentlyinvolvethesortofshortcircuitingofprocessesofproblemsolvingascribedto"Value
orientedmovements"byNeilSmelser.
17
Parsons,however,forgetsSmelser'sothertypeofmovement,the"normorientedmovement"thatiscapableofpositively
influencingsocialchange.ThisomissionontheleveloftheoryisallthemoreoddgiventhatParsonshimselfdepictedthecivilrightsmovementintheUnitedStatesin
termsofthisparadigm.
18
AsaresultofthetheoreticalshortcircuitinParsons'sapproachtosocialmovements,therearetwoissuesthathecannotevenraise,muchlessresolve:theproblemof
theagenciesinvolvedintheselfconstitutionofthenewtypeofsocietalcommunityhedescribes,andtheproblemoftheresistanceofanincreasinglymodernsocietal
communitytotrendsthreateningitsdifferentiation.Weshalladdresstheseinturn.

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Withregardtothefirstissue,inParsons'sanalysis,agencycanapparentlyonlyshortcircuitsocialchangethatiscausedbyobjectiveprocesses.Inthecaseofthe
othersubsystems,however,thestatemakersandjurists,theentrepreneursandmanagers,theeducatorsandfiduciariesareneverdescribedasfundamentalistsofany
kind.Thus,actionintheserviceofsocialchangeispossible,butonlyonthepartofelitesandforsubsystemsotherthanthesocietalcommunitywhosedifferentiation
doesinthissensebecomeresidual.
Withregardtothesecondissue,withthedemocraticmovement,theworkingclassmovement,andthestudentmovementalldescribedasfundamentalist,wegetthe
impressionthattheirformsofactionaswellastheirgoalsaimedatdedifferentiationineachcase,thatis,theabsorptionofthemoderneconomy,state,andeducational
systemintoasolidaristicsocietalcommunitywhoseownmodernitywouldtherebybeplacedindoubt.Allofthesemovementsdidindeedhavesomeelementsand
ideologiesthatwerefundamentalistinexactlythissense.However,Parsonsfailedtoseethatotherdimensionsoftheverysamemovementsstruggledpreciselyfor
socialautonomyand,therefore,forthedifferentiationofthesocietalcommunity,alongwithitsnormsandinstitutions.Thisissimplytheothersideofhisfailuretotake
intoaccountthetendenciesofthemodernstate,thecapitalisteconomy,andevenmodernsciencetodedifferentiation,thatis,theabsorptionandpenetrationofthe
othersocialspheres.Atheoryofmodernsocietythatfallstoseethesetrendsnecessarilyturnsideologicalandapologetic.
19
Parsons'stheoryofthesocietalcommunityisanexcellentobjectofimmanentcriticismbecausehebothelaboratesthenormativeachievementsofmodernityand
representstheseasiftheywerealreadyinstitutionalized.Indeed,hefacilitatesthejobofthecriticbypointingtointegrationproblemsthatimplicitlythrowmuchdoubt
ontheclaimsofsuccessfulinstitutionalization.TheconceptionofsocietalcommunityrepresentsyetanotheranswertoHobbesandAustin,maintainingtheexistenceof
anormativeorderwithoutthedeusexmachinaofsovereignty.
20
Theconceptitself,bringingtogetherTnnies'swellknownpairingGemeinschaft/Gesellschaft,
consciouslyaimsatthesamekindofsynthesisofancientand

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moderncategoriesasdidHegelinhisdoctrineofcivilsociety.Ifanything,Parsons'smodelseemstoputgreateremphasisthanHegelonelementsthatmodernand
traditionalsocietieshaveincommon.Hedefinesthesocietalcommunityintermsofthetwodimensionsof"normativity"and"collectivity."Theformerisasystemof
legitimateorderproducedbytheinstitutionalizationofculturalvaluesthelatteristheaspectofsocietyasasingle,bounded,organizedentity.Weshouldnotethat
Parsons,likeHegel,isreadytoseethewholeasa"politicallyorganized''collectivityofcollectivities:"Perhapstheprototypeofanassociationisthesocietalcommunity
itself,consideredasacorporatebodyofthecitizensholdingprimarilyconsensualrelationstoitsnormativeorder."
21
Butinthecaseofamodernsociety,equal
emphasisisplacedonthemultiplicityofoftenconflictinggroups,strata,loyalties,androlesthemodernsocietalcommunityisatbesta"collectivityofcollectivities."
Suchanoverarchingcollectivesolidarity,whichissufficienttoproduceacapacity,aswellasmotivations,foreffectivecollectiveaction,
22
ispossiblebecauseof
loyaltytonormsbasedonconsensus.Here,too,Parsonsassumesakindofunificationhardlycharacteristicofmodernsocietieshisnotionthatultimately"Valuesare
mainlylegitimizedinreligiousterms"tendstocommithimtotheviewthatalegitimatesocialorderrestsonsharedsubstantivevalues.But,onceagain,heisreadytotry
tomodernizetheconceptionby(inconsistently)referringtoa"relativeconsensus,"onethatisonly"amatterofdegree,"
23
which,however,couldhardlyplaytherole
ofrepresentingthedecisiveforumthatresolvestheconflictofloyaltiesamongindividuals,andevenwithineachindividual.Amerematterofdegreecannotprovidethat
"highpositioninanystablehierarchyofloyalties"thatParsonsseekstoascribetoloyaltytothesocietalcommunityitself.
24
Iftheoverallcontoursoftheconceptionareopentothechargeofinsufficientlyrepresentingmodernsociety,initsdetailtheargumentiscapableofdealingwiththis
objection.OnceagainthereareuncannysimilaritiestoHegel,thistimeintermsoftheveryarchitectonicofthepresentation:Modernsocietalcommunityisunderstood
aboveallasaframeworkoflawsandassociations.AswehavealreadyarguedwithrespecttoHegel,thereisonenotableabsencethesystemofneedsanda
notablepresencetheciti

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zenshipcomplex.Thelatter,understoodintermsofthreecategoriesofrights,isinfactanoutgrowthofthesystemoflaws.
ForParsons,themostimportantstepintheemergenceofamodernlegalsystemisthetransitionfromlawasaninstrumentofstatepolicytolawasthe"mediating
interface"betweenstateandsocietalcommunity,formallyconstitutiveoftheirdifferentiation.Suchalegalsystemputsthestatein"thedualpositionofdefiningand
enforcingcertainlegallyembodiedrestrictionsonitsownpowers."Thisparadoxcouldbesustainedonthebasesofjudicialindependence,thecorporateintegrityof
thelegalprofession,andespeciallytheopennessoftheboundariesofthelegalsystem"permittingtentativeapproachestoconsensusbeforefull'legalization'ofanorm
anditsenforcement''basedonappealsto"collectivesolidarity,moralstandards,andpracticality."
25
WhileParsonsassignsdefinitepriorityheretothedevelopmentof
thecommonlawwithrespecttocontinentalvariants,quiteevidentlythedevelopmentof"constitutionalism,"thatis,theenforceabilityofconstitutionsevenagainststate
policy,waseverywherestructurallyrelatedtothedifferentiationofamodernsocietalcommunityandthestate.
26
Thecitizenshipcomplex,anoutgrowthofconstitutionalismandtheruleoflaw,representsitsfurtherdevelopmentinthreeareas.(1)Embodyinguniversalnorms,
modernrightsanchorconstitutionsinprincipleshigherthanthetraditionsofparticularsocieties.(2)Representingamovefromobjectivelawtosubjectiveright,modern
citizenshipmakesconstitutionalclaimsactionableonthepartofindividualsandgroups.Asaresult,(3)thecitizenshipcomplexnotonlyfurtherdifferentiatessocietal
communityandstatebutestablishesthepriorityoftheformeroverthelatterinthesenseofbothnormativeprincipleandpoliticalaction.
Parsons'sdefinitionof"society"asthesocialsystemhavingthehighestlevelofselfsufficiencyisresolutelyintermsofpoliticallydelimitedterritorialunits,generally
"nationstates."
27
Thenormativestructuresthatdefinetheidentityofasocietythusareneverfreeofadimensionofparticularism,eveniftheculturalvalueordersin
whichthelegitimacyofnormsisrootedoftentranscendthelimitsofanygivensociety.
28
Themoderncitizenshipcomplex,withitsegalitariantendencytofree
membershipfromallascriptive

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characteristics,isrootedinanimportantattempttobasethenormsofmodernsocietiesinnotonlytranssocietalbutactuallyuniversalvalues,ofwhichthefirstversion
wasthedoctrineofnaturalrights.Constitutionalrightsthusbecomenormativeembodimentsofuniversalprinciplesthatrepresentlimitationsonthepowerofthestate
tiedtotheinterestsofaparticularpoliticallyorganizedsocietyinthenameofsomethinghigher.Thedemocraticrevolution,inParsons'sconception,attemptedtoturn
suchphilosophicalclaimsforthesuperiorityofthesocietalcommunity,"thenation,"intoactualpoliticalprimacy.Thecitizenshipcomplexinthisargumentconsistsof
threesetsofcomponents,civilpoliticalsocial,thatrepresenttheprojectofinstitutionalizationofsuchprimacy.Heconsidersthe"structuraloutline"ofmodern
citizenship"complete,thoughnotyetfullyinstitutionalized."
29
ForParsons,citizenshipinthemodernsensesignifiesequalconditionsofmembershipinthesocietalcommunityratherthaninthestate.
30
Itscivilorlegalcomponent
consistsofequalrightsguaranteeingautonomousformsofactionwithrespecttothestateinotherwords,"negativeliberties."Rightsinvolvingproperty,speech,
religion,association,assembly,andindividualsecurityalongwithsubstantiveandproceduralequalitybeforethelawwerefirstformulatedinthenaturallawtradition
andareenshrinedintheFrenchDeclarationoftheRightsofManaswellastheAmericanBillofRights.InParsons'spresentation,theyrepresenttheprincipleof
constitutionalismreformulatedassubjectiverightsofprivatepersonsassuch,theirfunctionistostabilizethedifferentiationofsocietalcommunityandstate.
31
Politicalrightsarepositiverightsofequalparticipationratherthan"freedoms"or"liberties"theyinvolvebothindirectparticipationinrepresentativegovernmentthrough
thefranchiseandrightstoinfluencepolicy.ItissignificantthatParsons,atleastinthefirststatementofhisposition,includedhereagaintherightsoffreespeechand
assembly.
32
Theoverlapmeansthattherightsofparticipation,especiallywhensostronglylinkedtonegativerights,donotmeandedifferentiation,butratherthe
emergenceofnewmediatingstructures
33
thatindirectlycontributetodifferentiationthroughinterpenetrationaswellasnewformsofintegration.Itisthesestructures
thataresupposedtoestablishtheprimacyofthe

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societalcommunity,goingbeyondtheconstitutionalstate(Rechtsstaat)alreadyestablishedbynegativerights.
Finally,thesocialcomponentsofcitizenship,notcalled"rights"byParsons,consistofthe"resourcesandcapacities"requiredforimplementingrights,for"realistic"
ratherthanmerely"formal"opportunitiesfortheirequalutilization.Atissueare"adequateminimumstandardsof'living,'healthcareandeducation.''AlthoughParsons
mentionsheresomesortof"equalityofconditions,"hisrealconcernistodefendagenuine,asagainstan"empty,"versionofthe"equalityofopportunity."Whetherhe
doesthisinaconvincingmannerisaquestionwemustnowask.
AccordingtoParsons,"Inonesensethe'social'componentofcitizenshipisthemostfundamentalofthethree."
34
Wearenottoldinexactlywhatsensethisistrueof
thistemporallylatestadditiontothecitizenshipcomplex.Inanycase,Parsonselsewherenotesalackofparallelismbetweenthe"citizen"andthewelfare"client."
35

Thefactthathedoesnotspeakofsocialrights,thathedoesnotnoteanoverlapherewithotherpartsofthecitizenshipcomplexasinthecaseofpoliticalandcivil
rights,indicateshisawarenessofafundamentallackofsymmetry.Hedoesmakeagoodcaseonbehalfoftheneedforasocialcomponentofcitizenship.The
theoreticalproblemisonlythatthiscasedoesnotprimarilybelongtotheproblemcomplexofthedifferentiationofsocietalcommunityandstateandthestabilizationof
thisdifferentiation.Whileonecouldarguethattheautonomyofthesocietalcommunitydependsontheresourcesandcapacitiesofitsmembers,thethreattothese
comesnotonlyfromthemodernstatebutalsofromthemoderncapitalisteconomicorder.AndwhileatleastinonecontextParsonsmentionsthe"social"component
ofcitizenshipinrelationtothedifferentiationofeconomyandsocietalcommunity,
36
thediscussiongoesnowherebecauseParsonswantstodenythefunctional
necessityorevenplausibilityofbothrightsandformsofparticipationwithrespecttothemoderneconomicorder.
37
Thisunwillingnessdefinitivelylinksthe"social"
componenttotheroleofclient,onethatclearlydoesnotbelongtoanycitizenshipcomplex.Evenmore,thisroleactuallycontradictstheideaofcitizenship,which
cannotbemadeconsistentwithanyformofpaternalism.
Parsonsis,ingeneralterms,verymuchconcernedwiththedifferentiationofsocietalcommunityfrombotheconomyand

Page130
state,butwhilehearguesforaprincipleoforganizationspecifictothesocietalcommunity,thusestablishingthepatternofdifferentiation,thestructureofmediationhe
providesstabilizesthisdifferentiationonlybetweenthesocietalcommunityandthepolity.WehavealreadynotedthatParsonsconsiderstheprincipleofassociationto
betheformoforganizationofthesocietalcommunity,paralleltobureaucracyinthecaseofthepolityandthemarketinthecaseoftheeconomy.Thedepthstructure
ofassociationsislinkedtothemutualsolidarityofmembers,andthisiswhatdistinguishesthesocietalcommunityfromthedifferentindividualisticpatternsofthe
marketandthebureaucracy.Indeed,togetherwiththethirdtypeofindividualisticpatternrepresentedbythecitizenshipcomplex,thesolidaristicdimensionofthe
societalcommunityisthesecretofthevarioussynthesesstressedbyParsons,betweenmodernityandtradition,individualismandcollectivism,Gesellschaftand
Gemeinschaft.
InParsons'sconception,anassociationrepresentsacorporatebodywhosemembersaresolidarywithoneanother,inthesenseofhavingaconsensualrelationtoa
commonnormativestructure.
38
Parsonsbelievesthatthisconsensus,generallyestablishedbyprestigeandreputation,isthesourceofthe"identity"oftheassociation,
ofitsbecominga"We."Theassociationalprincipleinvolvesnotonlyasolidaristicbasisofidentitybutalsoadifferentdeterminationofcollectiveaction:Herebasic
decisionsemergefromtheorganizationitselfandarenotmerelyappliedbyit,asinthecaseofthebureaucraticprinciple.ToParsons,allorganizedframeworkshave
associationalcomponents,butonlyincaseswherethisisdominant(unlikethemodernfirm,orauthoritariangovernments)canwespeakofanassociation.
39
Inhis
view,thecontemporarytrendinorganizationistowardassociationsratherthanbureaucracies,andhemaintainsthatthistrendemanatingfromthesocietalcommunity
penetratesgovernmentandbusinessfirmsaswell,thoughinthelattercase(concerningwhichParsonsisinconsistent)withoutbecomingprimary.
Theemergenceofconsensusthroughappealstoprestigeandreputation,deliberatelycounterposedtotheacceptanceofvalidargumentation,
40
pointstolessthanfully
modernassociations.Indeed,inseveralcontexts,suchastheroleoftheassociational

Page131
principleinvoting,Parsonsexplicitlyspeaksof"traditionalism"asagainstrationalaction.
41
Nevertheless,forthecontemporarysocietalcommunity,heisinterestedin
workingoutthespecificallymoderntypeofassociation.Eveninrelationtovoting,hemaintainsthatassociationalmobilityandthepossibilityofbelongingtoa
multiplicityofassociationspartiallycounteractthetraditionalistimplicationsofallassociations(withthepossibleexceptionofthefamily).
42
Thesecharacteristicsare
functionsofthefirstspecificallymodernprincipleofassociations:voluntariness,allowingrelativelyeasyentryandexit,basedinthenormativeprincipleofthefreedom
ofassociation.Thesecondsuchprincipleistheequalityofmembers,constitutingahorizontalasagainstahierarchicalpatternoforganization.Thethirdis
proceduralism,inthesensebothofprovidingdefinite,formalrulesforregulatingdiscussionandofvoting.Sincetheframeworkofdiscussionanddeliberationis
understoodasthelocusofconsensusbuildingthroughpersuasion,itispossibletoseethesethreeprinciplesastheapplicationofthegreatmoderntriadofliberty,
equality,andsolidaritytothemodelofassociation.
Again,themodernityofthemodeldependsontheinterpretationoftheterms"consensus,""persuasion,"''solidarity,"and"influence."Parsons,asastudentof
Durkheim,isobviouslyawareofthedifferencebetweentraditionalandmodernsolidarity.Solidarityachievedthroughconsensusisinsomecontextsidentified
specificallywiththeidealtypeofvoluntaryassociation.
43
ButParsonsalsonotestheimportanceofanother,Gemeinschafttypeofsolidarity,"amutualrelationof
diffusesolidarity"basedon"commonbelongingness."
44
Thetwomodelsthusseemtobe(1)theachievementofsolidaritythroughdiscussionanddeliberationamong
individualswhofreelychoosetoparticipateinanassociation,and(2)thegenerationofconsensusamongindividualsonthebasisofapreexisting,diffusesolidaritythat
isnotopentoquestioningorthematization.Unfortunately,thekeyconceptofinfluencetendstosubmergethefirstmodelinthesecond,andthetwoaretreatedalmost
interchangeablyasthebasisofhavinginfluence.
TheconceptofinfluencehasamajorstructuralroleinParsons'stheoryofthedifferentiationofthesocietalcommunity.Alongwithmoney,power,andvalue
commitments,influenceisoneofthe

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fourgeneralizedsymbolicmediaofinterchangethatreplacerelationsofdirectnegotiationor"barter"inthefoursubsystems,regulatingtheirinternalrelationsaswellas
theirexchangeswithoneanother.
45
WhileParsonsislessinsistentthanNiklasLuhmannonthehistoricalprocessesoftheevolutionofmediaregulatedformsof
action,histheorydoesalsoimplythattherealimportanceofthemediaemergesinthemodern,differentiatedsocietiestheyhelptoconstitute.Inrelationtothe
modernityofinfluenceasamedium,thereare,however,threeunresolvedtendenciesinhisthought.First,theanalogywithmoneyandpower,andtheideathat
influenceisfullyexchangeablewiththesemedia,pointstoamodernprincipleofintegrationthatreducescommunicationtotheproductionandreceptionofcodesand
actiontoanadaptationtointerconnectionsestablished"behindthebacksofactors."Thisconceptioncannotgroundthedifferencebetweentheorganizingprincipleof
thesocietalcommunityandthoseoftheeconomyandthepolity,andittreatsintegrationthroughsolidarityasaformofcontrol.
46
Second,theargumentthatinfluence
''mustoperatethroughpersuasion...inthatitsobjectmustbeconvincedthattodecideastheinfluencersuggestsistoactintheinterestofacollectivesystemwith
whichbotharesolidary"
47
pointstoamodelthatisspecificallymodern,yetsignificantlydifferentinprinciplefrommoneyandpower.Thedifferenceisclearlyindicated
bytheideathat,whereasmoneyandpowerworkthroughalteringthesituationsofactors,influence(alongwithvaluecommitment)worksbyoneperson'shavingan
effectonanother'sintentions.
48
Finally,whileParsonsisunabletomakeuphismindabouthowinfluenceasa"generalizedmediumofpersuasion"actuallyworks,
49

hisstressisclearlyonthereputationandprestigeofinfluentialindividualsandnotonthe"intrinsic"validityoftheirargumentation.Herethemodeleasilyslipsintooneof
traditionalintegrationofactionunless,moreconsistentlythanParsons,oneweretospecifythattheultimatefoundationsofanindividual'sreputation,withrespecttothe
givenissues,mustbecapableofdefenseaswellaschallengeintermsofargumentation.WhilethisideaispresentinParsons,
50
itisincompatiblewithanother,namely,
thattheabilityofonepersontoinfluenceanotherisrootedinabackgroundofdiffuse,Gemeinschafttypesolidarity.

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Parsons,ofcourse,fullyassumesthathedoessucceedingroundingthedifferentiationofthemodernsocietalcommunityfromthestateandtheeconomyintermsofhis
categoriesofassociationandinfluence.HethusfacesHegel'sproblemofthematizingtherelevantmediations.Withrespecttothesocietalcommunitystateaxis,these
turnouttobetheclassicalonesthepluralisttraditioninheritedfromHegelandTocqueville:thepublic,thelobbies,thepoliticalparties,andthelegislature,whichare
thechannelsforsocietalinfluenceontheadministrationofthestate.
51
Theireffectiveoperation,accordingtoParsons,presupposesthesystemofmass
communicationsthathepronouncesthe"functionalequivalentofsomefeaturesofGemeinschaftsociety,"againrunningintoalltheambiguitiesthatcharacterizehis
theoryofinfluence.Throughoutthisstrandofhisargument,hepresupposesthatsocialconstituenciescommunicatewithinstancesinthepoliticalsysteminwaysthat
areentirelyundistortedbymoneyandpower,andthatthereisasymmetricalrelationshipofexchangebetween"publicsupport"and"publicinfluence."
SinceParsons'sexplorationoftheproblemofthedifferentiationofsocietalcommunityandeconomyisunsatisfactory,itisnotsurprisingthathedoesnotrealizethathis
theory,unlikeHegel's,needsaseriesofmediationsinthiscontextaswell.
52
Suchmediationsdomakealimitedappearanceinvariousessays.Welearn,forexample,
thattheassociationaltrendalsopenetratestheeconomyintheformofprofessionalassociationsandfiduciaryboards.Inthecaseofthemodernfirm,however,we
alsofindoutthatthemembersoftheassociation(thestockholders)haveapassiverole,whiletheboardisassimilatedtobureaucraticmanagement.
53
Asfaras
workersareconcerned,Parsonsrejectsanymodelofdemocraticparticipationinmanagement,
54
andherestrictstheroleofunions,inthegapbetweenhouseholdand
workplace,tothatofimprovingtheeconomicpositionoftheworkingclass.
55
Parsons'sdiscussionoftherelationofthesocietalcommunitytotheeconomyraisesexistingcapitalistpracticetothelevelofnorm,oratleastoffunctionalnecessity.
Histheoryofthesocietalcommunityasawhole,however,consciously(thoughunsuccessfully)aimsatamodelthatgoesbeyondthealternativesthatmightbe
describedascapitalisteconomismandsocialiststatism.Theastonish

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ingpartofthistheoryistheclaimthatsuchapostcapitalist,postsocialistmodelisnotonlythecounterfactualnormativeconstructionofasocialpoliticalprojectbutis
alreadyactualized,evenifnotyetcompletely,incontemporaryAmericansociety.Onceagain,therationalisthereal,therealistherational:
TheUnitedStates'newtypeofsocietalcommunity,morethananyothersinglefactor,justifiesourassigningittheleadinthelatestphaseofmodernizationWehavesuggested
thatitsynthesizestoahighdegreetheequalityofopportunitystressedinsocialismItpresupposesamarketsystem,astronglegalorderrelativelyindependentofgovernment,
anda"nationstate"emancipatedfromspecificreligiousandethniccontrol....Aboveall,Americansocietyhasgonefurtherthananycomparablelargescalesocietyinits
dissociationfromtheolderascriptiveinequalitiesandtheinstitutionalizationofabasicallyegalitarianpattern....Americansociety...hasinstitutionalizedafarbroaderrangeof
freedomsthanhadanyprevioussociety.
56
TheUnitedStates,inParsons'sview,isnotonlytheproperhomeoftheeducationalrevolutionwithitsemphasisonthe"associationalpattern,"butalsothemost
successfulsynthesisoftheresultsofthedemocraticandindustrialrevolutions.Americanmodelsofrepresentativegovernmentandfederalismyieldthehighestlevelof
differentiationbetweenstateandsocietalcommunity.Thisisthecasebecausethissocietyisthefreestfromascriptiveandpoliticaldefinitionsofmembershipand
(muchlessplausibly)thispoliticalsystemisleastencumberedbysocialrestrictionsonparticipationatanylevel.Representativegovernmentmakesallsocietalmembers
itsproperconstituency,buttheseparationofpowersprovidesthepoliticalsystemproperwithbroadfreedomofaction.Thestructuresofrepresentation,nationaland
federal,adequatelymediate,accordingtoParsons,betweenthestateandthesocietalcommunity.
Parsonsislessable(but,giventheinconsistencyofhisnormativeconception,lesscompelled)toclaimasimilardegreeofdifferentiationbetweenthesocietal
communityandtheeconomy.Hedoesseemtoadmitthatsincethe"socialcomponentofcitizenship"inAmericalagsbehindthatofEuropeanwelfarestates,
57
market
economicrationalityhasagreaterpoweroversociallife.Nevertheless,hemaintainsthatAmericansocietyisalsobeyondtheobsolete,

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failedalternativesofcapitalismandsocialism,whichhedefinesprimarilyintermsofanabsenceofgovernmentalcontrolsontheeconomyversustotalgovernmental
control.
58
Tobefair,Parsons'sanalysisdoescontainthesuggestivenotionthatneithercapitalismnorsocialismisgrounded"inadequateconceptionsofthesocietal
communityandoftheconditionsnecessarytomaintainitssolidarity."However,hisdepictionofAmericaasapostcapitalist,postsocialistsocietyisfocusedprimarily
ontheemergenceofthemixedeconomy,andheisapparentlyunawareofthepossibilitythatmoderninterventionistwelfarestatesarealsocapableofthreateningand
displacingsocialsolidarity.ItmaybethatParsonsassumes,inthiscontextatleast,thatovercomingthedysfunctionaleffectsofcapitalismthroughstateregulationand
redistribution,withinthelimitsofthemarketeconomy,establishessocialcontrolovertheeconomy.Andperhapsheseessuchacontroloperatingthroughthe
secondarymediationofrepresentativegovernment,whichprovidesamoredirectformofcontroloverthestate.However,theasymmetrybetweenthetwoformsof
supposedcontrolisobvious.AnyidentificationofsocialcontrolwithstateregulationimplicitlyviolatesParsons'sownstressonthedifferentiationofthesespheres.And
eventheideathatrepresentativegovernmentisthemediumofsocialcontrolwouldbypass,inanillegitimateway,Parsons'sdepictionoftheinternaldifferentiationof
thepoliticalsystemandhisstressonelitesasprovidingtheactualmechanismofrule.
Tobefair,Parsonsalsoaffirmstheexistenceofstructuralpositionsfromwhosepointofviewananalogouscontroloverstateandeconomycouldbeconceived.
Americansocietyisunderstoodasthemosthospitableterrainpossiblefortheprincipleofassociationism,whichParsonspresentsasthealternativetobothcapitalism
andstatism,symbolizingrespectivelyamoderneconomyandamodernstatefreeofanysocialcontrols.ContinuingthelineofanalysisbeganbyTocqueville,Parsons
rootstheimportanceofapluralisticversionofassociationsdeeplyinAmericanhistory.TheorganizationofAmericanProtestantismhasfavoredbothpluralismand
associationalism,thelatterbytheinternalstructureoforganizationofmanyofthechurches,theformerbythemultiplicityofdenominationsandtherelativelylong
historyoftoleration.

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Butsecularpatternscontributedgreatlytothesetrends,inparticularanexceptionallylonghistoryofvoluntaryassociationsandalater,butevenmoreimportant,
patternofinclusioninAmericansocietyofawholeseriesofethnicgroupsthatwereneverthelessabletopreservetheirindividualidentities.ThestruggleofAmerican
blacksforcivilrights,concerningwhichParsonswroteoneofhisbestessays,representedforhimagreatculminationpreciselyofthepreexistingnormativeand
organizationalpatternsofAmericanhistory.
59
Inthisonecontext,Parsonscouldseethatmovementsincontemporarymodernsocietiesdidnotnecessarilyimplyfundamentalismbutcouldactualizeuniversalist,
normativepotentials(herethepremisesofthedemocraticrevolution)inamannercapableofcreatingandpreservingparticularidentities.Unfortunately,though,he
seemedtoexpectthatassociationalismwouldbegeneralizednotbynewmovementsfollowinginthispatternbutonlythroughthesocialimplicationsofthesocalled
educationalrevolutionanditssupposedlycollegialpatternoforganization.Parsonsdidnot,however,explainhowtheassociationalformsoftheuniversityareto
transformbureaucraticstructuresintherestofsocietyorhowtheseformscanbeprotectedagainstpenetrationbyeconomicwealthandpoliticalpower.Onereason
whythisissuedoesnotcomeup,despiteParsons'sobviousfamiliaritywithcontemporaryuniversities,isthatheidentifiesitwiththeclaimsofsupposed
fundamentalism.Heinsisted,forexample,onseeingonlythefundamentalist,communitariansideoftheNewLeftandthestudentmovement,andnotthesidethat
demandeduniversitydemocracy(andassociationalrights)aswellasautonomyanddifferentiationwithrespecttoeconomicandpoliticalinstitutions.Bydogmatically
rejectingthesemovements,heclosedhimselftoanimportantdiscoursethatisinmanyrespectscontinuouswithhisown.
60
ThisissueisimportantbecauseParsonsfullyrecognizesthat"associationism"todaycannotbedefendedonthenineteenthcenturygroundofsmalltownAmerica,
whichevenTocquevilleconsideredtobesomewhatatavistic.
61
Buthisvariousattemptstoprovideadequatemodernalternativesallfailbecausehenevertakesinto
accountthenegativepotentialsofcontemporaryinstitu

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tions.Whileheisrighttonotice,beyondtheelitetheoryofdemocracy,theelementofsocialcontrolinherentinrepresentativeinstitutions,heiswrongtobypasstheir
oligarchictrendsandtostylizeexistingpoliticalelitesasthe"functionalequivalentofaristocracy"that"democraciesurgentlyneed."
62
Heisrightininsistingonthe
importantnormativeimplicationsofthepluralistictraditionsofAmericansociety,buthisdismissalofthespecificselectivityandasymmetrybuiltintotheexisting
practiceofpluralismisbothunsophisticatedandmisguided.
63
Finally,heisrightinnottakingthemasssocietythesistooseriously,aswellasininsistingonthe
continuedimportanceof"kinshipandfriendship"alongwith"associationalactivitiesandrelationships,"
64
butheiswrongtothinkthatthisremovesthegroundfrom
anotherdistinction,thatbetween"public''and"massculture."Indeed,hisviewsconcerningmasscultureandmassmediacouldhavebeenbasedonfleshingoutthe
insightconcerningtheexistenceoftwotrendsidentifiablewiththisdistinction,onetowardmanipulationandtheothertowarddemocraticcommunication.
65
Instead,
afternotingthepossibilitiesofoverconcentration,manipulation,declineofculturalstandards,andpoliticalapathyaspossibleconsequencesofthemodernmassmedia,
hedismisses,oratleastvastlydeemphasizes,therelevanceofthesetrendstoAmericansociety!Andafterpresentingthesystemofmasscommunicationsasakindof
market,
66
heinconsistentlydeclaresthatthissystemrepresents"afunctionalequivalentofsomefeaturesofGemeinschaftsociety."
67
Givenhisdifficultiesinbasinghistheoryofassociationonspecificallymoderntrends,itisnotsurprisingthatParsonsseeksafunctionalequivalentofGemeinschaft.In
thiscontext,however,hischoiceofthemassmediacanamountonlytoatacitadmissionofdefeat.InParsons'stheory,thisimplicitdefeatappearsinhisthematization
ofintegrationproblemsincontemporaryAmericansociety,thesolutionofwhichwouldcompletemodernityitself.Indeed,weshouldnotethathedoesnotadmitthat
thedifferentiationofthesocietalcommunityanditsassociationalformoforganizationareinanyrespectincomplete.Nordoesheconsidertheculturalvaluesof
modernsocietiestobeinanysensedeficientorcontradictory.Rather,histhesisisthatsuccessfuldifferentiationandreorganizationhaveproducedintegrationgapsor
lagsthat

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havenotyetbeensuccessfullyaddressedbecausenormscapableofgeneratingsufficientlyhighlevelsofmotivation,legitimacy,andsolidarityhavenotbeenadequately
institutionalized.Asaresult,thesocietalcommunityis"thestormcenter"offutureconflictsthatcannotbedealtwiththroughthecontrolofmoneyandpower.Onthe
otherhand,thedemandofnewmovementsforparticipationandcommunity,consideredexclusivelyintheirfundamentalistversionsassignsofintegrationstrains,can
providesolutionsonlyatthecostofmassivededifferentiationandregression.Betweenthesetwoextremes,thedirectioninwhichParsonshimselfwouldlookfora
solutionremainsquiteunclear.
Abstractly,histheorycommitshimtotheviewthatonlythegenerationofnewformsofinfluencecouldleadtoanormativeconsensusthatcouldprovidesymbolic
resourcescapableofintegratingthesocietalcommunity(solidarity)aswellasregulatingitsinterchangeswiththestate(legitimacy)andtheeconomy(motivation).
Unfortunately,becausehistheoryofinfluenceisindeterminate,itishardtoseepossiblesolutionstoproblemsofsocialintegrationthatcouldderivedfromit.The
assimilationofinfluencetomoneyandpowerleads,forexample,tothetechnocraticsolutionofplanningandmanipulatingitssourcesandconditionsofapplication,
presumablythroughthemassmedia.Alternatively,aninterpretationofinfluenceasrootedinprestigeandreputationlinkedtotraditionalsolidarityleadstoa
neoconservativeoptionthatwouldhopetorestoreanauthoritarianandpossiblyreligiousfoundationfornormsthatwouldbeclosedofftoquestioningandcriticism.
Finally,anunderstandingofinfluenceintermsofrationalargumentationasthe"intrinsicmeansofpersuasion"leadstoademocraticalternativethatwouldhavelittle
plausibilityunlessdemocratizationwerecontinuedasanopenendedprocesscarriedon,inpart,bysocialmovements,apossibilitythatParsonsexplicitlyrejects.
Indeed,heseemsunawarethatallthesedifferentoptionsarecompatiblewithoneoranotherofthecontradictorysubstantivevaluecomplexesinheritedbymodern
societies,orthattheirdifferentformsofinstitutionalizationwouldpresupposeunavoidableorganizationalchanges.Aboveall,hedoesnotseethattheyimplythe
projectsofthreealternativeversionsofthemodernsocietalcommunityorcivilsociety,amongwhichsocialactorsmay

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infactchoose.OnesuspectsthatParsonsnevermakesuphismindamongthesealternatives,thatheaffirmsallofthem,orratheracombinationoftheminwhichthe
respectiveweightsareunclear.Thus,heisopentotheobjectionthatthedemocraticelementsinhistheoryimplyonlyalegitimatingwindowdressingforatraditional
modelofcivilsocietythathasbecomeimpossible,orforatechnocraticmodelthatistheculminationofthegenealogyofunfreedom.
Actually,though,thesituationmayhavebeenthereverse.PerhapsthetraditionalandapologeticelementsinParsons'sthoughtinterferewithhisgenuineinsightsinto
thecriticalplaceofcivilsocietyinmodernity.Thisreadingissuggestedbyhislasttwopublishedessays.
68
HereParsonsdemonstratedthathisreconstructionofthe
conceptofcivilsocietydidnotrepresentadeadendandwascapableoffurtherdevelopment.Thecontext,though,wasnotsystemconstructionbutimmanentcritique,
namelyofR.M.Unger'simportantbookLawinModernSociety.Ungeroffersacritiqueofbothformalist,marketorientedandsubstantialist,stateinterventionist
structuresoflawfromthepointofviewoftheendangeredvaluesofsolidarityandmutualrecognition.Inthefaceofoldermodelsofliberalandcontemporarywelfare
statecapitalism,heseekstojustifyathird,communitarianformoforganizationcombiningsubstantivejusticewithamoralitybasedonfacetofacerelations.YetUnger
cannotsavehismodelfromthechargeofprimitivism.Heconcedesthatwhilethewelfarestatehasinasensereturnedtoearlier,bureaucraticformsoflaw,hisown
alternativealsocompletesahistoricalcyclebyreturningtocustomarylaw.Callingthismovementaspiralratherthanacircledoesnotalleviatethedifficulty.
Despitehisownambiguitieswithrespecttoatraditionalorganizationforthesocietalcommunity,Parsonswillhavenothingtodowithcommunitarianism,whichhe
identifiesastheabsolutizationofthedimensionofsocialintegration(inahighlymisleadingway,hespeaksof"theabsolutismoflaw").
69
Butheiswillingtotakeup
Unger'schallengetopushthecritiqueofformallaw(andthusliberalcapitalism)andsubstantiveorpurposivelaw(andthusthewelfarestate)tothepointwherethe
outlinesofathirdoptionbecomevisible.Weshouldnotice,evenifhedidnot,thatthetwo

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criticizedoptionsarenot,asinhisearlierwork,liberalcapitalismandsocialism,withthewelfarestaterepresentingtheirfinalsynthesis.Withoutnoticing,hetookfrom
Unger'scriticaltheorythepremisethatcritiquemustaimbeyondallcontemporaryformations.
70
Thecrucialpoint,fromthepointofviewofhisownconceptionof
civilsocietyasthesocietalcommunityrestingonnormsandassociationsandcounterposedtoboththeeconomyandthepolity,
71
isthatheishereabletoformulatea
twosidedcritiqueofmarketandstateintermsthatavoidallregressiontohistoricallyobsoletestructuresoflawandsociety.
HefindstheArchimedeanpointinUngerhimself,whodistinguishesbetweensubstantiveandproceduralpatternsofthedeformalization(rematerialization)oflaw.
Substantivelawinvolvesinterventionswhosepurposeistobringaboutspecificsocialresultsbenefitingspecificinterestsprocedurallaw("thegreatintermediateand
mediatingcategory"),however,aimsonlyattheequalizationofpartnerswhosenegotiationundercarefullydeterminedproceduresistoreachagreementconcerning
meansandends.Unger'spreference,likethatofmanydefendersofthewelfarestate(suchasT.H.Marshall),isforsubstantivelawheconsidersprocedurallawto
bestillwithinthetraditionofformallawbecauseofitspreservationoftheprincipleoflegalgeneralityonthe"meta"levelofprocedure.ToParsons,ofcourse,this
elementofcontinuitythatpreservesthestatusoflawasalimitationratherthananinstrumentofsovereignpowerisattractive:Thedifferentiationofthesocietal
communityfromthepolitydependsonit.Procedurallaw,moreover,preservesthepossibilityinherentincontractlaw,recognizedneitherbylegalpositivismnorfor
thatmatterbyUnger,thatlawcanbecreatedbysocialentitiesotherthanthestate.
Equallyimportant,Parsonsdiscoveredthelinkofprocedurallawtohisownconceptofassociationalism,contrastedwithboththebureaucracyandthemarket.He
goestoofar,though,andidentifiesallinstitutionsgovernedbyproceduresasthedomainofprocedurallaw,fromcourtsandparliamentstoelectionsandvoluntary
associations.Inthismanner,eventheverycorporatismthatappearstoUngerasadangertothepublicandpositivefeaturesofthelawisrecastbyParsonsasan
instanceofindepen

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dentlawmakingbysociety.Fromasupposedindicationofthedecompositionofautonomouslaw,hethusobtainstheproofofessentialcontinuity.Itisapitythatthis
initiallypromisinganalysishassuchaflatoutcome.
Whatgoeswrong?First,Parsonsvitiateshisownimportantpointconcerningthelinkofprocedurallawandassociationsbyconfusingprocedureandprocedurallaw.
Whileallmannerofinstitutionscanberegulatedbyprocedures,includingundemocraticandhierarchicones,procedurallawinUnger'sprovocativedefinitionisin
effectreflexiveanddealswithprocedures(ofequalization)thathaveotherproceduresastheirobjects.Thus,togiveanexampleaccessibletoneitherUngernor
Parsons,whiletheassociationsparticipatingincorporatistbargainingmayandgenerallyareregulatedbyprocedures,procedurallawwouldtargettheseproceduresto
produceinternaldemocracyandtheprotectionofindividualsandminorities.Again,whilethesecretbargainsofalimitednumberofassociationsmightbearrivedat
underfixedprocedures,procedurallawmightseektomakethisprocesspublicandopentootherinterestedparties.Thus,procedurallawdoesnotmerelyreflectthe
existenceofassociations,asParsonssuggests,butaimsatthedemocratizationoftheirinternallifeaswellastheirinterrelations.
TherearetworeasonsforParsons'sanalyticalerror.First,heidentifiesprocedurallawas"acooperative...frameworkwithinwhich'parties,'whethertheybe
individualsorgroups,canbe'broughttogether'toadjusttheirinterestswitheachotherunderanormativeorder."
72
Thisdefinitioncapturesonlyhalfofwhatismeant
byprocedurallaw,becauseitbringsproceduresundertherulenotofproceduresbutofahighernormativeorderthatisnotfurtherdefined.Ifthatorderwerelegal
norms,thenthedefinitionwouldbegthequestionwithrespecttothetypeoflaw(formal,procedural,orsubstantive)thattheseentail.Butwehavegoodreasonto
thinkthatwhatParsonshasinmindisnotlawatall,butthehighernormative(religiousmoral)orderofsociety.Withthemetalevelthusoccupied,Parsonsapparently
seesnoimportantreasontodistinguishbetweenproceduresthemselvesandtheproceduresthatproduceorregulateprocedures.Inotherwords,hecannotdiscover
themeaningofprocedurallawasaspecifically

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modern,reflexive,andintersubjectiveregulationoftheproductionofnorms,becauseforhimagreementsandperhapslawscanbeproducedonlyasthe
institutionalizationofwhatisalreadythereonahighernormativelevel.
Second,whilehedoesnotnoticethatthroughanimmanentcritiqueofUngerhehasimplicitlybeenbroughttoapositioncriticalofallexistingsocieties,hedefinitely
seekstoescapethisimplicationonamoreconcretelevel.Asalways,heisinarushtopronounceexistingAmericansocietytobetheresolutionofallantinomies,this
timeofliberalcapitalismandthewelfarestate,atleastfromthelegalpointofview.Ifprocedurallawisthesolutionoftheriddle,asheinsightfullynoteswithinUnger's
text,thenthebulkofAmericanlawmustbeprocedurallaw.Thisapologeticclaimcanbesustained,however,onlythroughthemisidentificationofprocedurallawand
procedure.Onceagain,hisdiscoveryofthepotentiallycriticalterrainofcivilsociety,thistimeontheleveloflegaltheory,isvitiatedbyhisapologetictreatmentof
Americansocietyasrepresentingsomekindof"endofhistory."Inthisrespect,ParsonsremainedathroughandthroughHegeliantotheendofhislife.
GramsciandtheIdeaofSocialistCivilSociety
IfParsonscanbesaidtorepresentatwentiethcenturyrehabilitationoftheHegelianideaofSittlichkeitinsocialtheoreticalterms,withinevitablyapologetic
consequencesforcontemporarycivilsocieties,Gramscicanbesaidtoreflectamodernrenewaloftheleftradicalcritiqueofcivilsociety.Thischaracterizationshould
notbetakentoimply,however,thathesimplyfollowstheclassicalMarxiananalysisandcriticismofcivilsociety.AlthoughafollowerofMarx,Gramscigeneratedhis
ownconceptionofcivilsocietydirectlyfromHegel.
73
AndunlikeMarx,heturnednottothesystemofneedsbuttothedoctrineofcorporationsforhisinspiration.
UndoubtedlyawareoftheMarxianuseofthetermbrgerlicheGesellschaft,Gramsci'sinterpretationofHegelwasthusatthesametimeanimplicitcritiqueofthatof
MarxandEngels.AlthoughhedidnotknowMarx'stextthatdenouncedtheconceptofthecorporationassomuchmedievalism,Gramsciwaskeenlyawareofsuch
aninterpre

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tation.Nevertheless,readingHegel'sconceptionprimarilyonanabstractanalyticallevel,hewasconvincedthatthecontentsdrawnfromtheworldoftheoldregime
could,were,andhadtobegivenmodernreplacements.Accordingly,Gramscirecognizedthenewformsofpluralityandassociationspecifictomoderncivilsocietyin
modernchurches,unions,culturalinstitutions,clubs,neighborhoodassociations,andespeciallypoliticalparties.
ThemostdecisivedepartureofGramscifrombothHegelandMarxishishighlyoriginaloptionforathreepartconceptualframework.AgainstHegel'sversion,and
moreconvincingly,Gramscilocatedbothfamilyandpoliticalcultureonthelevelofcivilsociety.UnlikeHegelandMarx,however,hedidnotincludethecapitalist
economyonthislevel.Wecanonlyspeculateaboutthereasonsforthesecondofthesemoves.
74
Gramsciwasessentiallyapoliticalthinkerwhowasinterestedin
theoryforthesakeofpoliticalorientation.Inthisheconfrontedtwogreatand,forhim,decisiveproblems:thefailureofrevolutionintheWestandits(supposed)
successinRussia.Inneithercontextdidtheeconomisticreductionofcivilsocietytothepoliticaleconomy,soprevalentinMarxism,allowtheproblemoftransitionto
agenuinelydemocraticsocietytobeseriouslyposed.IntheWest,thereductionledtothedisappearanceofthedefensive"trenches"oftheexistingsystem:formsof
cultureandassociationthatprotectbourgeoissocietyevenwhentheeconomyisincrisisandthepowerofthestatehascrumbled.
75
Onlythe"methodological"
76

differentiationofcivilsocietyfromboththeeconomyandthestateallowedaseriousthematizationofthegenerationofconsentthroughculturalandsocialhegemonyas
anindependentand,attimes,decisivevariableinthereproductionoftheexistingsystem.
IntheSovietUnion,where"thestatewaseverything"andcivilsocietywas"primordial"and"gelatinous,"thecollapseofthestatedidmakerevolutionpossible.But
giventhefactthatthatthenewrevolutionarypowerconstituteditselfinastatist("statolatry")andeven''Caesarist"or"Bonapartist"and"totalitarian"form,theproject
ofcreatingafreesocietythatcouldabsorbstatepowerwasputindoubt.Theveryconstellationthatmaderevolutionpossiblewasapparentlythegreatestroadblock
fordevelopingafreesociety.Thus,inthiscontextaswell,Gramscicametofocusontheproblem

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ofcivilsocietyasindependentofeconomicdevelopmentandstatepower.
Therewere,ofcourse,otherreasonsforGramsci'sstressoncivilsociety.OnecertainlyhastodowiththepeculiaritiesoftheItaliansituation.Anacuteanalystof
Italianhistoryandsocialstructure,Gramsciwasawareofthefailureofliberalismtoattain"hegemony"aftertheRisorgimento.Inthisassessmenthewasdirectly
influencedbythegreatItalianphilosopherandhistorian,BenedettoCroce.LikeCroce,heattributedthisfailure,inpart,tothepowerofthechurchinItaliancultural
andsociallife.AlthoughthechurchnolongerhaddirectpoliticalpowerintheItalianstate,itspowerwithincivilsocietyremainedimpressive.Indeed,throughits
organizationofeverydaysociallifein"civil"institutionssuchaschurchfunctions,education,neighborhoodfestivals,anditsownpress,theCatholicchurchwasableto
occupymanyofthetrenchesofcivilsocietyandtoconstituteapowerfulbarriertotheformationofliberal,secularbourgeois,hegemonyonthisterrain.Accordingly,
Italiancivilsocietywaspreventedfrombecomingfullymodern.Atthesametime,likemanyotherintellectualsofhisday,andmorespecificallyundertheinfluenceof
GeorgesSorel,GramscibelievedthatItalyandtheWestasawholesufferedfromageneralcrisisofculture.Herelatedthecontemporary''waveofmaterialism"tothe
crisisofauthoritythatresultedfromtherulingclass'sinabilitytoorganizeconsensus(hegemony)andthecorrespondingdetachmentofthemassesfromtheirtraditional
ideologies.(Therulingclasswasthusonlydominant,nothegemonic.)"Thecrisisconsistspreciselyinthefactthattheoldisdyingandthenewcannotbeborn."
77
In
otherwords,themomentforthetriumphofliberalideologyhadbeenmissed,whiletheoldactionorientingworldviewshadbecomeanachronisticandwerebeing
increasinglyunderminedbysocialandstructuraldevelopments.Thus,civilsociety,andespeciallyitsculturalinstitutions,appearedasthecentralterraintobeoccupied
inthestruggleforemancipation.
Gramsci'sconceptionispresentedinanotoriouslyconfusingterminology.
78
Civilsocietyisvariouslydefinedasthecounterpartofthestate(whichissaidtobeeither
identicalwithpoliticalsocietyoritsmainorganizationalform),asapartofthestatealongwithandcounterposedtopoliticalsociety,andasidenticalwiththe

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state.Theideathatrunsthroughalltheseattemptsatadefinitionisthatthereproductionoftheexistingsystemoutsidetheeconomic"base"occursthrougha
combinationoftwopracticeshegemonyanddomination,consentandcoercionthatinturnoperatethroughtwoinstitutionalframeworks:thesocialandpolitical
associationsandculturalinstitutionsofcivilsociety,andthelegal,bureaucratic,police,andmilitaryapparatusofthestateorpoliticalsociety(dependingonthe
terminology).
79
ItmaybehelpfulheretorecallNorbertoBobbio'sinsistencethatGramscibattledtwoformsofreductionism,onereducingthesuperstructuretothe
baseandtheother,culturalprocessestocoercion.WithintheframeworkofclassicalMarxianhistoricalmaterialism,Gramscisoughtsimplytoasserttheindependence
andevenprimacyofthesuperstructure.WewouldgofurtherthanBobbio,arguingthat,againstGramsci'sintentions,thisshiftrenderedthewholedoctrineofbaseand
superstructureirrelevant.
80
Andyet,thisirrelevantdualism,nowintheformofanidealistreversal,couldhavebiasedGramsciattimestotreatthetwodimensions
withinthesupposedsuperstructure,civilsocietyandstate,eitherassomehowoneoratleastasexpressingthesameprincipleandlogic.Oneofhisterminologies,the
oneintegratingbothcivilandpoliticalsocietyinthestate,seemstoexpressthisoption.Nevertheless,whenhewasforcedtoconfronttheconsequencesofreducing
socialintegrationtopoliticalcoercion,hepostulatedthattheoppositionbetweencivilandpoliticalsociety(heremeaningthestate)wasindeedoneoftwodifferent
principles,hegemonyanddomination.
81
Onemightsay,therefore,thatGramscidevelopedhisdoctrineofcivilsocietyintermsoftwo"declarationsofindependence,"
onefromtheeconomyandtheotherfromthestate,andthattheresultingtrichotomousconception,howeverinconsistently,bursttheboundsofhistoricalmaterialism.
Asatheorist,GramscisurelytraveledaroadfromMarxtoHegel,eventhoughhispoliticalprojectremainedaMarxistone.
82
Ofcourse,theHegelofthePhilosophy
ofRightalsoprovedinadequateforhispurposes.NotonlydidhewanttouseatrichotomousconceptiondifferentfromHegel's,onethatcouldnotleadbacktoeither
economismorstatism,
83
butheconsideredthecorporatedoctrine,whichhelocatedastheheartoftheHegeliantheoryof

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civilsociety,tobehopelesslyobsoleteintheforminwhichitwasoriginallydeveloped.GramscinotesthatHegel's"conceptionofassociationcouldnothelpstillbeing
vagueandprimitive,halfwaybetweenthepoliticalandtheeconomicitwasinaccordancewiththehistoricalexperienceofthetime,whichwasverylimitedand
offeredonlyoneperfectedformoforganizationthe'corporative'(apoliticsgrafteddirectlyontheeconomy."
84
Thus,likeMarx,Gramsciisfullyawareofthemodernstate'sdestructionoftheolderformsofcorporatelifethatconstituteda"dualpower"inthelatemedievalworld
(intheStndestaat,thatis).Heisevenaware,likeTocqueville,oftheexistenceofanintermediaryformtheabsolutiststateandthedepoliticizedsocietyof
orders
85
fromwhichthecontentsofHegel'smodelaredrawn.Moreimportantly,however,unlikeMarxorevenTocqueville,Gramscithoroughlyunderstoodthat
theeffortsofJacobinandbureaucraticstatemakerstothecontrary,theoldercorporateformswerecapableofmodernreplacements.Hestressesinparticulartherise
ofmodernunionismandculturalassociations.
86
Andwhilemodernchurches,surrenderingtheirearlierroleinthestate,alsobecameinstitutionsofthenewtypeofcivil
society,modernpoliticalpartiesgraduallyreplacedthemasthemainorganizationalformforintellectuals.
87
Althoughheisclearlyawarethatmodernstatemakersseektoabolishallintermediaryassociations,Gramscidoesnotstresstheobviouspointthattheirreappearance
inmodernformhadtobeatleastpartlytheresultofwhatusedtobecalledthestruggleofsocietyagainstthestate.Instead,hetendstoargue,inamoreorless
functionalistmanner,thatthedemandofthestateforconsent,anditstendencytoorganizeandeducatesuchconsent,isthemajorreasonfortheemergenceand
stabilizationofnewtypesofassociations.
88
Ofcourse,Gramsciviewedtheparticularcontentandformofcivilsocietyastheoutcomeandobjectofaclassstruggle.
Fromthispointofview,theoutcomedependsonwhichsocialgrouphasbeenorisbecominghegemonic.Wherethebourgeoisieishegemonic,civilsocietyis
bourgeoissociety,anditsconstitutionalguarantees(rights)andpoliticalexpression(parliamentaryrepresentation)arewindowdressingforbourgeoisrule.
ItisworthnotingthattheassociationalformsthatreplaceHegel'scorporationscan,forGramsci,turnintokeyvehiclesfor

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socialmovements,evenifGramscidoesnotemphasizethestate/societyoppositioninthiscontext.Indeed,henotonlydiscoveredthemodernreplacementsforthe
corporationbutalsoaddedthedimensionofsocialmovementstotheconceptofcivilsociety,givingitadynamisminadditiontoandindependentofthesystemof
needs.Whatisgivenwithonehandis,however,takenawaywiththeother,forthedynamismofcivilsocietyastheterrainofsocialmovementslastsonlysolongas
theworkingclassisinopposition.Oncecivilsocietybecomessocialist,theraisond'treforsocialmovements,thatis,forclassstruggle,willhavedisappeared.Aswe
shallshow,onetendencyinhisthought,namelythefunctionalistreductionofthepoliticalculture(representativedemocracyandrights)andofassociationalformsof
moderncivilsociety(clubs,interestgroups,bourgeoispoliticalparties)tothereproductionofbourgeoishegemonyand/ortothecreationofsocialisthegemony
(unions,communistparties),locksGramsciintoanoverlyschematizedconceptionthatisatoncetoorealistandtooutopian.
WehavealreadynotedGramsci'sconvictionthattheassociationsandculturalinstitutionsofcivilsocietyinthedevelopedcapitalistcountries,astheinner"trenches"of
theestablishedsystem,haveaddedimmeasurablytothestabilityofthisformofdomination.Atthesametime,henotestheirabolitionundercontemporary
dictatorships.Itisforjustthisaspectoftheirrulethathedubsthem"totalitarian."
89
Thus,Gramsciseemstoregisterfivephasesofrelationbetweenthestateandcivil
society:(1)medievalcorporatismanddualism(theStndestaat)(2)theabsolutistdualismofstateanddepoliticized,privilegedorders(3)theearlymodern
dissolutionoftheoldercorporateformsthat,strictlyspeaking,existsonlyinrevolutionaryterror(4)thedualismofthemodernstateandnewformsofassociationsan
finally(5)thetotalitarianGleichschaltungofmodernassociationsandculturalforms.Whatismostsignificantinthistypologicalreconstructionofthehistoryofcivil
societyisthat"totalitarianism,"asagainstearlierstatistforms,isdepictedasthedissolutionandatomizationofmodernformsofsocialandculturalintegration!Butwhy
andhowareeffectiveformsofsocialintegration,oftheorganizationofconsent,dissolved?Andifitisdissolvedundertotalitarianism,doescivilsocietyhaveasecond
chanceofbeingreconstructed?

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Thesequestionsaredifficulttoresolvebecauseofthreesystematicambiguitiesor"antinomies"inGramsci'sanalysis.Thefirstcomesfromhisapplicationoftheterm
"totalitarianism"toboth"progressive"and"regressive"versionsthesecondcomesfromhisdiscussionofthenormativestatusofcivilsociety,whichsometimesimplies
theconsolidationofasystemofdominationthroughtheorganizationofconsentandatothertimetheweakeningandeveneventualabolitionofdominationandthe
thirdcomesfromhisconceptionofafreesociety,whichalternatesbetweenapluralisticcivilsocietyandaunifiedstatesociety.
90
Allthreeantinomiesarelinkedto
theattempttoworkoutcriticaltheoriesoftwoverydifferentsocieties:SovietRussia(ofwhichGramsciremainedsupportive)andcontemporarycapitalistsocieties
andtheirtotalitarianvariant(towhichhewasunalterablyopposed).
WithoutdisguisinganythingabouttheformofsocialorganizationandrepressivepoliticalpracticesintheSovietUnion,Gramscineverthelesstriestodistinguish
between"regressive"and"progressive"versionsoftotalitarianism,bothofwhichinvolveabolishingtheindependenceoftheinstitutionsofcivilsociety.
Atotalitarianpolicyisaimedprecisely(1)atensuringthatthemembersofaparticularpartyfindinthatpartyallthesatisfactionsthattheyformerlyfoundinamultiplicityof
organizations,i.e.,atbreakingallthethreadsthatbindthesememberstoextraneousculturalorganisms(2)atdestroyingallotherorganizationsoratincorporatingthemintoa
systemofwhichthepartyisthesoleregulator.Thisoccurs(1)whenthegivenpartyisthebearerofanewculturethenonehasaprogressivephase(2)whenthegivenparty
wishestopreventanotherforce,bearerofanewculture,frombecomingitself"totalitarian"thenonehasanobjectivelyregressiveandreactionaryphase.
91
Thepoliciesofthetwototalitarianismswithregardtocivilsocietyaredepictedasbeingexactlythesamebothsuppressculturalmeaning,socialsolidarity,andforms
oforganizationoutsideaunifiedpartystate,thusendingsocialdivisions.Buttheirintentionsaresupposedlycompletelydifferent.Inthiscontext,thedefenseofthe
SovietUnionbyanantifascistmustseembizarre.LeavingasideGramsci'spoliticalcommitments,however,thewholeargumentdoesinfactfollowconsistentlyfrom
hisfunctionalistdepiction(stilltiedtoclassicalMarxism)oftheinstitutionsofcivil

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societyintheadvancedcapitalistcountriesasformsoforganizationofconsentwhoseroleisexclusivelythestabilizationofdominationitssocialintegration,asit
were.Giventhisinterpretation,smashingtheseinstitutionsbysubordinatingthemtoamonolithicpartystatecanberepresentedasatleastpartofthenegativeworkof
socialemancipation.(Weshallreturntothequestionofwhatwassupposedtobethepositivepartofthiswork.)Totalitarianismisregressiveorreactionaryinthis
readingonlywhenitspurposeistoblock"progressive"totalitarianism,ratherthancreateanewculture,inacontextwheretheinnertrenchesofcivilsocietyare
sufficientlyweakenedtoraisetheprospectsoftheirprogressivelymotivatedabolition.Allinall,Gramsciseemstoindicateonlythreepossiblepoliticalpositions:a
conservativedefenseoftheexistingversionofcivilsocietywhosefunctionisthesocialintegrationofcapitalistdominationatotalitarianrevolutionaryabolitionofthis
civilsocietyforthesakeofbuildinganewcultureandatotalitarianrevolutionaryabolitionwhosepurposeistoconservetheexistingstructureofdomination.
ItisalsopossibletodetectinGramscithefoundations(oratleastitstraces)foryetadifferentversionof"progressive"politics,onethatisradicallyreformistrather
thantotalitarianrevolutionary.BobbiodevelopssuchaninterpretationonthebasisofGramsci'sstressonbuildinganewculturalhegemonybythesocialistpartyin
civilsociety.
92
Theobviouscontrastisbetweentheculturalworkofbuildinganewconsensusthatwoulderodetheoldformsofconsentandaprogramof
revolutionaryoverthrowusingviolentmeans.
ItisdifficulttopinpointsuchastrategyinGramscibecauseofhissecond"antinomy":aMarxianfunctionalistconceptionofcivilsocietyasthelocusforproducingthe
hegemonythatwillstabilizebourgeoisdomination,andaconflictingtheoreticalconceptionofaterrainwheretwoalternativestrategiesforhegemonybuildingcontest
oneanother.
93
Inthecontextofthefirstposition,astrategyforbuildingcounterhegemonywouldsimplyintegratetheworkingclassintotheestablishedinstitutional
networkofcivilsociety,whichwouldhavetobetotallyabolishedinordertobreakwiththeexistingsystemofdomination.Inthecontextofthesecond,however,
whichpostulatesthepossibilityofbuildingacultural

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hegemonyincompatiblewiththeexistingsystem,theinstitutionsofcivilsocietywouldthemselveshaveadoublestructure,linkedtobothdominationandemancipation.
Aradicalreformiststrategywouldhavetobuildonthisdualstructure.
InthetermsofthefunctionalistversionofGramsci'stheory,astrategyofhegemonybuildingcouldbe,andmostofthetimeprobablywas,entirelyinstrumental,given
thedifficultiesthetrenchesofbourgeoiscivilsocietyplaceontheroutetodirectrevolutionarytransformation.Theaim,inthisinterpretation,istoerodetheexisting
formsofsocialintegration,tocreatealternativeassociations,andtopreparethesubjectofrevolutionarypolitics.Giventhenegativeassessmentoftheexistingcivil
societyinthisinterpretation,however,theassociationsandformsofacounterhegemonywouldhavetoberegardedinstrumentally:Theindependentpartiesandunions
oftheworkingclasswouldhavethefunctionofproducingdysfunctionwithintheexistingformofsocialintegration,helpingtoproduceacrisisinwhichtheopposing
sidewouldhavetorelyondominationalone.Inthisinterpretation,therefore,arevolutionaryrupture,withforcefacingforce,mustcompletetheinternalworkof
transformation.
94
Moreimportantforourargument,inthiscontextatleast,therewouldbenoreasonwhytheindependentorganizationsinvolvedinbuildinga
counterhegemonyshouldplayanyroleaftertherevolution.Gramscisupportsthisview,especiallywhenheassignsthetaskofconstructinganewsocietyand
civilizationprimarilytothestateandwhenhestatesthatitisessentialthattheoldmechanismsofproducingbourgeoishegemonybeeliminated.Withinthefunctionalist
interpretation,thiswouldofcoursemeantheendofapluralisticsystemofparties,unions,andchurches.
Thealternative,conflicttheoreticalviewofhegemonybuildingincivilsocietyimplies(evenifGramscineverexplicitlydrewsuchaconclusion)apositivenormative
attitudetotheexistingversionofcivilsocietyor,rather,tosomeofitsinstitutionaldimensions.Clearly,aprincipledversionofradicalreformismcouldbebasedon
suchanattitude.Gramsci'sunwillingnessorinabilitytodevelopsuchaconceptionisapparentinthepresenceofamoredevelopedfunctionalistrevolutionaryoptionin
histhought.Indeed,onemightsaythatthemoreexplicitdevelopmentoftheradicalreform

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istoptionwouldhavepresupposedapoliticalchoiceGramscinevermade:athoroughgoingcritiqueoftheSovietUnion'sversionoftotalitarianism.Itwouldnotbe
possibletochooseastrategyofbuildingnewinstitutionsofassociationalandculturallifeasalternativebasesofhegemonyintheexistingsocietyandalsoasthecore
structuresofanewsociety,whileonthewholeacceptingtheruthlesseradicationofthosenewinstitutionsalongwiththeoldunderarevolutionarystatism.
Tosumupsofar,whileGramsciavoidseconomicandpoliticalreductionismbydifferentiatingtheassociationalandculturaldimensionsofcivilsocietyfromthe
economyandthestate,thefunctionalisttrendinhisthoughtcombinedwithhisstrategicpoliticalgoalsandallegiancesleadhimtoconstruetheinstitutionsofcivil
societyinaonedimensionalway.Althoughautonomous,theassociationalforms(typesofpoliticalpartiesandunions),culturalinstitutions,andvaluesofcivilsociety
arepreciselythosemostadequatetoreproducingbourgeoishegemonyandmanufacturingconsentonthepartofallsocialstrata.Theyare,inshort,notdualisticbut
thoroughlybourgeois.Thisversionofcivilsocietymustthereforebedestroyedandreplacedbyalternativeformsofassociation(workers'clubs,thenewproletarian
partyform,orthe"modernprince"),intellectualandculturallife(theideaoftheorganicintellectual),andvaluesthatwouldbehelpcreateaproletarian
counterhegemonythatmighteventuallyreplacetheexistingbourgeoisforms.Yeteventhestrategyofbuildingacounterhegemonyisjustthat,astrategy.Gramscinever
seestheinstitutionsandculturalformsofcounterhegemonyasendsaswellasmeans,becauseheisunwillingtoconcedethat,withinbourgeoiscivilsociety,some
immanentpossibilitiesextendbeyondtheestablishedframeworkofdomination.Thus,initself,thefocusonculturalmeans(theorganizationofconsent)incivilsociety,
asagainstthecoercivemeansofthestate,doesnotimplythataradicalreformistprojecthasreplacedtherevolutionaryone.Wearestilldealingwithatheorythat
seeksthetotalreplacementofoneformofsocietybyanother.
95
Furthermore,Gramsci'sdoctrineofcivilsocietyisneveradvancedintermsthatwouldimplyanuncompromisinghostilitytowardstatism.Thisattitude,too,is
consistentwiththefunctional

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iststraininhisthought.Whileattimesheconceivesofhegemonyasaproductofcivilsociety,justascoercionisaproductofthestate,soinotherformulationsboth
hegemony/consentanddomination/coercionarefunctionsofthestate,theformerpairoperatingontheterrainofcivil,thelatteronthatofpoliticalsociety.Itisthis
secondformulationthatisconsistentwiththefunctionalistreductionofcivilsociety.
96
Accordingtoitslogic,onemustregardhegemonynotasautonomously
producedwithincivilsocietybutasoneoftheformsinwhichstatepowerfunctionseffectively.Theformsoftheestablishmentofcounterhegemonywithintheold
societycanthenbeseenprimarilyasmarkingthewaytoanewstatepowerthatwouldhavetoestablishonanentirelynewbasisthetermsofitsownoperation,
includinganewbasisin"civilization"forconsent.Gramsci'sremarksonthe"civilizing"missionofthestatesupportthisinterpretation.
Gramscistressesthenotionofthestateascivilizingagentintwocontextsinparticular:thehistoricalfailureofItalianunification,leadingtotheRisorgimentoofthe
nineteenthcentury,andtheproblemsofSovietdevelopmentinthetwentiethcentury.Forourpresentpurposes,weareinterestedinhisanalysisoftheSovietcontext,
whichhealsousedforcomparisonswithfascistItaly.LikeotherMarxists,GramscibuiltonMarx'sanalysisofBonapartism("Caesarism")toanalyzethestructural
similaritiesofmoderndictatorships,allofwhichuseamoreorlessautonomousformofstatepowertoorganizeanotherwiseunstablesystemofdomination.Unlike
Trotsky,however,GramscididnotargueforaspecificdifferenceinthecaseoftheallegedlyprogressiveversionofBonapartismthatwouldcomefromtheworking
class,somehowdominantandyetnotruling,onbehalfofwhichstatepowerwouldact.Instead,heexplicatesthedifferenceintermsofbuildinganewcultureor
preservingtheold.Butwhatisthemeaningofthisnewculture?Gramsciofferstwointerpretations,onlyoneofwhichisconsistentwiththethrustofhisowntheory.
First,hearguesthat,foraprogressiveformofstatism,"thepointofreferenceofthenewworldingestation"is"theworldofproductionwork,"i.e.,theorganizationof
"individualandcollectivelife...withaviewtothemaximumyieldoftheproductiveapparatus."
97
Thisargument,inlinewithbothhistoricalmaterialistpremisesand
rathershort

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sightedapologeticsforSovietsociety,isconsistentwiththeacceptanceoftheobliterationoftheexistingversionofcivilsocietyinthenameofa"progressive"agenda.
Indeed,Gramscispeaksinthiscontextoftherepressiveactivityofthestate,itsrationalizationandTaylorizationofsociety,anditsrelianceonpunitivesanctions.
98

Theargument,however,isinconsistentwiththeantieconomisticturninGramsci'ssocialtheory:Ifthebasedoesnotdeterminethesuperstructure,howcanthe
characterofanewcultureandanewsocietybedeterminedsimplybythetransformationoftheeconomicstructure?AndwhileGramscimayhavebelievedthatin
somecontextsthesocialsphereshouldbereducedbytheactionsofthestatetoamerecomplementofeconomictransformation,itisentirelyunclearhowthiswasto
bethesourceofanewculture,especiallyoneleadingtoafreesociety.
Thislastpointbecomesespeciallystrikinginlightofthesecondinterpretation,whichpresupposesGramsci'sownoriginalpositionwithinMarxism.Herethepositive
roleofthestatethatcanjustifyeven"statolatry"issaidtobe"themovementtocreateanewcivilization,anewtypeofmanandevenanewcitizen...thewillto
constructwithinthehuskofpoliticalsocietyacomplexandwellarticulatedcivilsociety,inwhichtheindividualcangovernhimselfwithouthisselfgovernmentcoming
intoconflictwithpoliticalsocietybutratherbecomingitsnormalcontinuation,itsorganiccomplement."
99
Thiscriterionofwhatconstitutestheprogressiveversionof
statismisverydifferentfromthefirst,namely,thecreationofacomplex,wellarticulatedcivilsocietycapableofselfgovernmentasthehallmarkofanewculture.
Giventhetotalitarianobliterationofcivilsociety,however,thethesisishighlyparadoxical.ItmaybethatGramscihadinmindthehistoricalexperienceofmanyearly
modernstatesthatabolishedtheinstitutionsoftraditionalEuropeancorporatesocietyonlytoallowandevenpromotetheemergenceofamodernstructureofcivil
society.Buttheanalogydoesnotquitework.Abolishingtheoldsocietyoforderswasthejointworkofthestateanddemocraticeffortsfrombelowthatalso
maintainedtheirdistancefromstatepower.Thus,itisalmostimpossibletolocatehistoricallyinmostWesternEuropeancountries(exceptperhapsintheReignof
Terror)thatvanishingmomentinwhichtheoldassociationshavedisappeared

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whilethenewoneshavenotyetemerged.Onthecontrary,whentotalitariangovernmentsabolishedcivilsociety,dissolvingalreadymodernratherthantraditional
formsofcultureandassociation,theyspecificallydisallowedtheformationofnewtypesofassociationsindependentfromthemselves,includingeven,andperhaps
especially,theindependentsocialorganizationsandmovementsthathadhelpedoverthrowtheoldregime.Howconvincingwasit,then,toexpectthataformof
statismthatwasmoreuncompromisinglyhostiletocivillifethananyofitspredecessorswouldcreatefromabovea''complex,andwellarticulatedcivilsociety"that
wouldbeabletogovernitselfmoreorlessindependently?Andwhatmightbetheformsofthisnewtypeofcivilsocietythatwouldbecreatedfromabove,asdifferent
fromthemodernoneasthislatterwasfromitstraditionalpredecessor?ThissecondquestionisimportantbecausetheanalogyGramsciseekstoconstructwithpast
statismsfailsifwearetoassumemerelythata"totalitarianism"thatdissolvesamodelofcivilsocietyisprogressiveifitrecreatesfromabovemoreorlessthesame
model,orevenoneofitsvariants.
Gramscidoesarguethatastatolatry"abandonedtoitself"or"conceivedofasperpetual"mustbesubjectedtocriticism.Howstrongthiscriticismshouldbe,andwhat
itspoliticalconsequencesmightbe,hedoesnotsay.Andyetonegetsthestrongimpressionthatheisawareofwhatmusthavebeenadisturbingimplicationofhis
ownthought,namely,thatalefttotalitarianismwouldnotbenormativelydifferentfromoneoftherightifitmadenocontributiontothereconstructionofcivilsociety.
Andofcourseonlyafool(ofwhomthereweremanyinthe1930s,thoughGramsciwasnotone)couldhavethoughtthatStalin'sRussiasatisfiedthenormativecriteria
hereassignedtoprogressivedictatorships.
Inthiscontext,itispossiblethatBobbioisrightinarguingthatGramsciwasatleastonthevergeofrecognizingthatabolishingcivilsocietyisnotthebestwayto
reconstructit,evenifoneseekstocreateanewtypeofcivilsociety.Ifthereactuallywasaradicalreformiststrandinhisthought,itwouldhavebeenbasedonthe
insightthattheinstitutionsthroughwhicharadicalmovementcanbuilditshegemonyarepartandparcelofanymeaningfullyconceivedmodernformofsocialself
governmentand,assuch,havevalueinandofthemselves.Itwouldhavebeenbased,inother

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words,onarecognitionofthedualisticcharacterofatleastsomeofthecoreinstitutionsofmoderncivilsociety.Inshort,Gramsciwouldhavehadtoacknowledge
thatthenormsandorganizationalprinciplesofmoderncivilsocietyfromtheideaofrightstotheprinciplesofautonomousassociationandfree,horizontal
communication(publicity)arenotsimplybourgeoisorfunctionaltothereproductionofcapitalistoranyotherhegemony.Rather,theyconstitutetheconditionthat
makespossibletheselforganization,influence,andvoiceofallgroups,includingtheworkingclass.Accordingly,thetaskofradicalreformwouldbetoexpandsuch
structuresinadirectionthatreducesthechancesoftheirbeingfunctionalizedtothepurposesofeconomicorpoliticalpower.Butsuchastancewouldhaveledtoan
outrightrejectionoftotalitarianrevolution,astepGramsci,unlikemanyofhisheirs,didnotmake.
AsidefromtheundoubtedlydecisivepoliticalreasonswhyGramscididnotmakethismove,whatwehavecalledhisthirdantinomyalsostoodinthewayofhis
reevaluatingtheproblemofcivilsocietyfromanormativepointofview.Thisantinomyisbetweenaconceptionofafreesocietyintermsofapluralistic,democratic
civilsocietyandoneintermsofaunifiedstatesociety.Thefirstofthesemodels,consistentwiththeconflicttheoreticalstraininhisthinking,andespeciallywiththe
conceptionofthedualstructureofexistingcivilsociety,potentiallytempersutopiawithanimageryofpartialinstitutionalcontinuity.Here,utopiaistherealizationof
existingbutblockednormativepossibilities.Thesecondmodel,consistentwithfunctionalism(theonedimensionalcritiqueofbourgeoiscivilsocietyandthecallfor
totalrevolutionaryrupture),suffersfromanexcessofutopianismandpotentiallinkstoauthoritarianism.OnemightsaythatthestraininGramsci'sthoughtinvolvingthe
relentless"unmasking"oftheroleoftheinstitutionsandpoliticalcultureofbourgeoiscivilsocietyinreproducingcapitalistrelationsofdominationhelpedtopreparethe
waytoanauthoritarianpositionvisviscivilsocietyingeneral.
Inourview,itisthissecondstrainthatisdominantinGramsci'sthought.Here,onecannotblamethetimidityofGramsci'scritiqueoftheSovietUnion,because,in
spiteofhisoverallsympathyandreluctancetodrivehiscriticismtoofar,hemayhavehadrealdoubtswhetheragenuinelyfreesocietywouldbecreatedthere.

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Therefore,incontrastwiththetotalitarianprojectinwhichcivilsocietyisabsorbedbythestate,GramscireturnstotheMarxianprogramofabolishingthestate,which
hecalls,withsomevariationontheoriginalformula,"thereabsorptionofpoliticalsocietyintocivilsociety."
100
Marx,inhismostexplicitcritiqueofbrgerliche
Gesellschaft(in"ZurJudenfrage"),wroteonlyofanabsorptionin"society."
101
Thedifferenceappearstobeallthemoresignificantbecause,asGramsciimagines
''thecoerciveelementsofthestatewitheringawaybydegrees,"hepostulatesthecorrespondingemergenceof"evermoreconspicuouselementsofregulatedsociety
(orethicalstateorcivilsociety)."
102
Thus,hisidentificationofthenewformofsocialorganizationthathemostoftencalls"regulatedsociety"withatleastaversionof
civilsocietyisquitedeliberate.
Regulatedsociety,asocietywithoutastate,seemstobedefinedbytwopremises:(1)apremiseofequalityand(2)apremiseofthereplacementoflawbymorality.
Inotherwords,thenewsocietyistobecharacterizedbyaspontaneousacceptanceoflawbyfreeandequalindividualswithoutanycoercionorsanctions
whatsoever.ThisnotioncomesperilouslyclosetotheselfdeludingMarxianutopiaofasocietywithoutinstitutions.
103
Butthetransitiontoregulatedsocietythat
Gramscihasinmindseemsdifferent.Hereferstoaphaseinwhichthestatewillindeedbeanightwatchman,inthesenseofsafeguardingthe"continuallyproliferating
elementsofregulatedsociety"andintheprocessprogressivelyreducing"itsownauthoritarianandforcibleinterventions."
104
Thisprocessissupposedtobeidentical
totheconstruction'withinthehuskofpoliticalsociety"ofacomplex,wellarticulated,selfgoverningcivilsociety.Thus,itishardlyanexaggerationtoarguethat
Gramsci'sreformulationoftheideaoftheroadtosocialismconsistsoftheconstructionofanewtypeofselfgoverningcivilsocietythatwouldgraduallytaketheplace
ofallstatecontroloversociallife,leadingtoawitheringawayofthestateaswellaspoliticalsociety.Nevertheless,andamazinglyenough,hedoesnotbelievethatthe
newtypeofcivilsocietyinformationanditsformsofselfgovernmentwouldenterintoanyconflictwiththestatewhosepowersitistoerodeandreplace.Instead,
civilsocietywouldbecomethe"normalcontinuation"and"organiccomplement"ofwhathecalls"politicalsociety,"namely,thestate.
105

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Therearetwoimagesherethatdonotmix.Ontheonehand,wehaveanotionsomethingliketheemergenceofdualpower:Twoformsofsocialorganizationexist
sidebysideonebasedondemocraticselfgovernmentandsocialsolidarityistoreplaceanotherbasedonadministrativesanctionsandcoercion.Ontheotherhand,
Gramscileavesuswithanotionofastatepowergraduallyconvertingitsformofdominationintoanequallyeffectiveformofsocialcontrolthroughtheinstitutionsof
civilsociety.Thus,theantinomybetweencivilsocietyasaconsolidationornormalizationofdominationandcivilsocietyasagenuinelyalternativeprincipleto
dominationreturnsonceagain.Thistime,thetwonotionsappearasonebecausetheutopianideaofthetotalabsorptionofthestatebycivilsocietywouldlogically
eliminatethedistinctionbetweenastatepoweractingthroughtheinstitutionsofcivilsocietyandaformofselfgovernmentbasedontheseinstitutions.Untilsociety
reachesutopia,however,theambiguitywouldremain,andtheeliminationofconflictfromthemodelcertainlyseemstoimplythatGramsci'ssupposedtransitiontoa
freesocietyisultimatelyonlyastatistauthoritarianismwithahumanface.
Theutopiaofa(modern)civilsocietyabsorbingpoliticalsocietyandthestate,thesupposedtelosthatwouldresolvethemostimportantofGramsci'santinomies,is
incoherentevenonitsown.Firstofall,itremainsunclearwhichabsorbstheotherintherelationshipbetweencivilandpoliticalsociety.Here,thestressinGramsci's
sparsedescriptionsseemstobeon"politicalsociety"asunderstoodbyTocqueville,forexample,aspoliticalorganizationsratherthanthestate(asinGramsci'suseof
theterm).Regulatedsocietyisselfgoverning,evenifits"laws"areenforcedasinternalizedmoralrulesthatdonotneedtoappealtoexternalsanctions.Thishighly
unrealisticpostulatehasauthoritarianimplications,atleastinthemodernworld,thatitsadvocatesrarelyconfront.Evenifwesupposethataperiodofstatisttransition
haseliminatedolderformsofheterogeneityandplurality,Gramsci'sregulatedsocietywouldhavenosocialspaceforanoppositionconsistingofnewminoritiesand
pluralitiesthatmaybewillingtoobeythelawsbutcannotidentifywiththemandmaywishtoorganizethemselvesinordertoreversethem.
106
Withthesphereof
prepoliticalassociationeliminatedorfusedwiththatofpoliticalassociation,suchan

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organizationcouldnottakeplaceinprinciple.Indeed,themodelofmoralratherthanlegalenforcementeliminatesthespaceinwhichsuchanoppositioncouldemerge
atall:autonomousconscience,whichisalwaystosomeextentinconflictwiththelaws.Thepostulateofamorallybasedacceptanceoflawinitselftendsto
presupposesocialhomogeneityandtoexcludepluralisticorganization.
107
Bydefinition,"pluralism"meanssomeconflictoverpolicyandisthereforeincompatiblewith
internalizedacceptanceofthedecisionsofmajorities.Thus,itisnotclearhow,andonwhatnormativeandempiricalbases,individualsandgroupscouldhaverights
againstGramsci'smonolithicregulatedsociety.
TheissuecouldbeaddressedfromthepointofviewofthemodernityofGramsci'sideaofregulatedsociety.Canacivilsocietybeamodernsocietyifstatepoweris
abolishedorabsorbed?Doesnotthedualityofcivilsocietyandstate(ofwhichGramsciisamajoranalyst),nottomentionthedifferentiationbetweencivilsocietyand
theeconomy,constitutethemodernityofbothterms?Itwouldseemthatabolishingthestate,whichisimpossibleinfactbutcertainlyimaginable,wouldleadnottoan
autonomous,plural,civilsocietyinotherwaysresemblingitsmodernforerunnerbuttoarestorationoftraditionalpoliticalcivilsocietywithoutmodernadministration
butalsowithoutamodernstructureofrightsandlibertiescarvingoutautonomousspacesfromtheworldofpolitics.
108
Givenanalreadyestablished,sturdy,andcomplexstructureofcivilsociety,albeitofthebourgeoismodel,Gramsci'sregulatedsocietycanbeestablishedonlythrough
arevolutionarytotalitarianrupture.Mostoftheestablishedinstitutions,includingthoseoftheworkingclass,wouldotherwisemilitateagainstit:Theexistingpluralityof
formsoflife,culture,andassociation,presupposingsocialconflict,needsastructureoflawsandrightslinkedtosanctions.Italsorequiresthemediatingandinterest
aggregatingoutputsofamodernstate.Noradicalreformiststrategywouldinitselfreducethiscomplexity,andindeedtheorganizationandmobilizationofnewsocial
actorswouldaddtotheheterogeneityofinterestsandincreasetheconflictpotentialofsociety.UnfortunatelyforGramsci'sthesis,arevolutionarystatistdestructionof
theexistingversionofcivilsocietywouldhaveevenlessofachanceto

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usherintheregulatedsociety.ThechoiceGramsciactuallyfacedwasnotbetweenradicalreformismandrevolutionarydemocracypreparedbyatotalitarianabolition
ofcivilsociety.
109
Rather,itwasbetweencivilsocietytoutcourtandanauthoritariansystemthatwouldcertainlyattempttoperpetuateitself.Gramscisupplied
importantconceptstothosewhowouldmilitantlychallengelaterversionsofsuchasystem,butthiswassomethingheneitherintendednorevenanticipated.Andthose
whoweretoundertakethechallengecouldpostulatethevalueofanindependentcivilsocietyonlywhentheycompletelydivestedthemselvesoftheradicaldemocratic
utopiaoftheregulatedsocietywhosedeepestrootsinvolved,asMarxknewbutGramsciapparentlyforgot,ahatredformoderncivilsociety.
ExcursusonGramsci'sSuccessors:
Althusser,Anderson,andBobbio
Gramsci'santinomicintellectualpositionallowstwodistinctandopposedroadsforcontinuation.Whiledifferentcombinationsamonghisalternativesarepossible,there
isamorethanelectiveaffinityamonganapologeticattitudetowardtheSovietUnion,afunctionalistreductionismwithregardtotheexistingversionofcivilsociety,and
autopianproject(oranormativecountermodel)ofaunifiedstatesociety.Withanemphasisonthefunctionalistreductionistcomponent,thiscombinationmarksthe
pathofLouisAlthusserandhisfollowers,whoinsistonmaintainingintacttheMarxianprojectofrevolution.Similarly,theinternalrelationisequallystrongamong
critiqueoftheSovietUnion,aconflicttheoreticanddualisticconceptionoftheexistingcivilsociety,andapluralistdemocraticnormativemodelofcivilsociety.This
combinationispursuedbyNorbertoBobbio,whohasrecentlyfocusedoncivilsocietyastheproperframeworkforcontemporaryradicalreformistprojectsof
democratization.
AlthusserentirelydisregardstheversionofGramsci'stheorythatinvolvesanoppositionbetweenstateandcivilsocietyandresolutelyfocusesonthesecondaryversion
inwhichcivilandpoliticalsociety,hegemony,anddominationareallfunctionalaspectsofthestate.
110
Politicalsocietyherebecomesthe"repressivestateapparatus"

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definedintermsofasupposedlyunitarystructureofgovernment,administration,army,police,courts,andprisons."Civilsociety"(hisquotationmarks)inturn
becomesadifferentiatedframework,withthe"ideologicalstateapparatuses"consistingofreligious,educational,family,legal,tradeunion,communications,and
culturalcomponents.Althusserhasnotoriousdifficultiesinshowingthatallthesedomainsbelongtothestate.
111
Hedismisses,inpartrightly,theobjectionthattheir
statusisprivate,asdistinctfromthepublic"repressiveapparatus''ofthestate,assomuchbourgeoislegalismmaskingtheactualfunctionsofinstitutions.Butthis
strategyonlyjustifiesadifferentiationfromtheprivate,economicsphere,notaninclusioninthestructureofthestate.Toarguethattherulingclassholdsstatepower,
theideologyunifyingthevariousinstitutionsinquestion,bywhichthey"massivelyandpredominantlyfunction,"istheideologyoftherulingclass,and"ideological
apparatuses"arethereforestateinstitutionsisbothlogicallyfallaciousandempiricallyquestionable.Itislogicallyfallaciousbecause,evenifthestatewerethe
instrumentoftherulingclass,thetwotermswouldstillnotbeidentical,whichiswhatAlthusser's"syllogism"presupposes.Anditisempiricallyfallaciousbecause,as
weknowfromthehistoryofsocialdemocracyforexample,manynonbourgeoisstrataandgroupscanoccupystatepowerincapitalistsocieties,andbecausethe
institutionstowhichAlthusserrefersarecharacterizedbygreatideologicaldiversity,internally(Catholicvs.Protestantchurches,Christianvs.syndicalistunions,etc.)
andamongoneanother.Despitetheseseeminglyobviousproblems,thisargumenthashadextendedinfluence.
MoreimportantforusisAlthusser'sowninabilitytosticktoaconsistentversionofthisfunctionalistposition.HerightlyrepeatstheGramscianpositionaccordingto
whichnoformofpowercanbestableforlongwithout"hegemonyoverandintheStateIdeologicalApparatuses."
112
Butthisthesisisnotinterpretedaccordingtohis
ownversionoffunctionalismwhenhearguesthatthefunctionoftheapparatusesandtheideologytheysupposedlyproduceistoreproducetheexistingrelationsof
production.
113
Thislatterargumentseparatescivilsocietyfromthestateandfunctionallylinksitsinstitutions,alongwiththoseofthestate,tothereproductionofthe
capitalisteconomy.Oncefreedfromthe

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absurdburdenofhavingtomakecivilsocietyadimensionofthestate,Althussercanpronouncetheideologicalstateapparatuses,i.e.,theinstitutionsofcivilsociety,
as"multiple,distinct,'relativelyautonomous'andcapableofprovidinganobjectivefieldtocontradictions,whichexpress,informsthatmaybelimitedorextreme,the
effectsofclashesbetweenthecapitalistclassstruggleandtheproletarianclassstruggle."
114
Notonlydoesthisargumentimplicitlyshiftbetweenthetwo
functionalisms(statistandcapitalist)availableinGramsciitisalsoonthevergeofrediscoveringtheother,conflicttheoreticandpluralistdemocratic,position
traceableinGramsci'swork.
115
However,sinceheissomuchmoredogmaticandtraditionalinhisrevolutionaryandstatesocialistcommitmentsthanGramsci,
Althusserisevenlessabletotravelthisroadthanhispredecessor.Eveninahighlymodifiedform,thefunctionalistroadchosenbyAlthussercannotleadtoagenuine
reevaluationofthenormativedoublenatureofcivilsociety.
ThebrilliantinterpretationofGramscibyPerryAnderson,whowasonceafollowerofAlthusser,isacaseinpoint?
116
AndersondevastatesAlthusser's
reconstructionofGramscibothtextuallyandpolitically.Politically,hecallsthereconstructiondisastrousbecauseitcannotdistinguishbetweenfascistauthoritarianand
liberaldemocraticversionsofcapitalistsociety:Onlytheformerabsorbsocialinstitutionsofculturalreproductionwithinthestate.
117
Butitisalsotextuallywrongto
theextentthatitfocusesonasecondaryconceptualstrategyinGramsci'swork,disregardingtheprimaryusagethatdifferentiatesstateandcivilsociety.
AndersonarguesthatGramscidevelopedthissecondaryusage,inwhichcivilsocietyisabsorbedinthestate,becauseofdifficultieswithhisprimaryone.Itisnotcivil
societyalonethatwieldsculturallegitimacythestatedoesaswell,inparticularthroughitseducationalandlegalinstitutions(mentionedbyGramsci)andits
parliamentarystructures(omittedbyGramscibutstronglystressedbyAnderson).Gramsci'sanswerwastomakecoercionandhegemonyfunctionsofbothcivil
societyandthestate.Thedifficultiesofthisconception,whichthreatensthedefinitionofthemodernstateasthemonopolistoflegitimateviolence,supposedlyled
Gramscitoincludecivilsocietyinthestateoreventoidentifythetwosphereswithoneanother.
118

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Anderson'sownsolution,whichinasensecombinesthoseofGramsciandAlthusser,istomaintaintheseparationofcivilsocietyandstatebuttoinsistthat,whilethe
institutionsofcivilsocietyproduceonlyculturalhegemonyandconsent,thestructuresofthestatebecauseoftheallimportantroleofparliamentaryinstitutions
produceconsentaswellascoercion.ThisideaassimilatestheAlthusseriannotionofideologicalstateapparatusesbutmaintainstheGramscianstressonthe
productionofideologyoutsidethestateasasecondaryone.Bythisconceptualmove,Andersonineffectovercomesthebadoptionbetweenanoverlyschematic
differentiationbetweenstateandcivilsocietyinthemainversionofGramsci'sargumentsandthecompleteabsenceofdifferentiationinthesecondaryversion.Inthe
process,heinadvertentlycomesclosetotheHegeliannotionofparliamentasaninstitutionofmediationbetweencivilsocietyandstate,astheplacewhere
simultaneouslycivilsocietypenetratesthestateandaunifiedpoliticalwillisformed.Hecomesclosetosuchaviewbut,asweshallsee,notcloseenough.
Thenewargument,infact,doesnotovercomethelimitationsofMarxianfunctionalism.Andersonisquiteclear:Civilsocietyasweknowitbelongsonlytothe
functionalreproductionofcapitalistsociety"the'private'institutionsofcivilsociety"havenoplacein"anysocialformationinwhichtheworkingclassexercises
collectivepower."
119
Withthisassumptioninmind,heisentirelyconsistentinfearingandrejectingthewholeGramscianstrategyoftryingtobuildacounterhegemony
withintheexistingversionofcivilsociety,certainlymoreconsistentthanthosewhohopetousesuchastrategyasaroadtotherevolutionaryestablishmentofaunified
statesociety.Andersonsharesthelatterdreamandthereforerejectsaradicalreformistroadthatimplicitlyassumesthepreservationofkeydimensionsofexistingcivil
society.Becausesuchastrategyispowerlessagainsttheultimateguaranteeoftheexistingsystem,thepossessionofthemeansofviolenceandrepression,itcanserve
onlytointegratetheworkingclassintotheestablishedsociety.
120
Thereferencetoviolenceandrepressionalreadyindicatesashifttothelevelofthe"stateapparatus."Akeyreasonwhythebuildingofcounterhegemonyincivil
societymustfailisthatthemain

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instanceoftheideologicalreproductionoftheexistingsystemisexercisedbyparliament,withinthesphereofthestate.Thisinstance,however,isreinforcedbyitslinks
topotentialviolenceandcannotbesimplybypassedordisplacedbyalternativeinstitutions.Aslongasparliamentaryinstitutionsarenotoverthrown,theirprimacyin
theproductionofconsentcannotbesuccessfullycontested.Such,accordingtoAnderson,istherealanswertoGramsci'spuzzleconcerningthestabilityofliberal
democracies.
ThisanswercannotescapetheantinomybetweenGramsci'stwoviewsofcivilsociety,onemonisticfunctionalistandtheotherdualistandconflicttheoretic.The
problemliesinparliament'speculiarityasamediatinginstitutionintheHegeliansenseinthefactthatitappearsastheinstitutionthroughwhichthestateis
"penetrated"bycivilsociety.BecauseAndersondoesnotfullyrecognizethis,heisambushedbytheconsequencesofhisownargument.Why,heasks,are
parliamentssosuccessfulingeneratingconsent?Whyaretheysorarelyradicallychallengedunderliberaldemocracies?Tohiscredit,Andersonissuspiciousof
doctrinesofculturalmanipulation,ofthegenerationofpassivityintheworkplace,andevenoftheabilityofwelfarestatebenefitstobuyconsent.
121
Parliamentsdo
notrelyonconsentproducedbycultural,social,andeconomicinstitutionsbutgeneratetheirown.Theydosobypresentingindividualswhoareunequalandunfreein
civilsocietywithanimageryofequalitybeforethestateand,bywayoftheirrepresentatives,activeparticipationintheformationofpoliticalwill.Thisimageryinturn
producestheideologicalcode(equality,freedom,etc.)onwhichthesecondaryactivitiesofthegenerationofconsentalldepend.
122
TheideaofparliamentasthecenterofideologicalintegrationbringsAndersonclosetotheAlthusseriandoctrineof"ideologicalstateapparatuses,"
123
whichhefinally
managestomakecoherentbypointingtoaprocessactuallyoriginatinginthestatethatproducestheideologicalunityofthedifferent"apparatuses."
124
ButAnderson
isevenlessabletoremainconsistentlywithinthefunctionalistmodethanAlthusser.Ontheonehand,thegeneralideologicalcodeemanatingfromparliamentissaid
merelytomaskprevailingformsofinequalityandunfreedom.Ontheotherhand,"Thecodeisallthemorepowerfulbecausethejuridicalrightsofcitizenship

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arenotameremirage:Onthecontrary,thecivicfreedomsandsuffragesofbourgeoisdemocracyareatangiblereality,whosecompletionwashistoricallyinpartthe
workofthelabormovementitself,andwhoselosswouldbeamomentousdefeatfortheworkingclass."
125
Andersongoesontodescribetheautonomyof
parliament,whichmakesallsuchbodiesdouble,expressingboththefunctionalneedsoftheculturalreproductionofcapitalandthestillpotenthistoricalachievements
thatexpresstheidealsoftherevolutionarybourgeoisie.
Andersonmayadmiretheseideals,butheimpliesthathedoesnotsharethem.HecertainlyrejectsthequasiGramscianstrategyofusingthemandthespacesthey
provideforbuildinganalternativehegemony.Itisunclear,however,whathewouldputintheirplace,howhewouldabolishthemwithoutpromotingyetanother
"momentousdefeatfortheworkingclass"whosemembersareadmittedlystillattachedtoequalityandlibertyinthesenseofcontemporaryparliamentarism.Anderson
proposesthatthisattachmentcanbebrokenonlyinthepostrevolutionaryexperienceofproletariandemocracy,"inpartiesorcouncils[sic]"where"thereallimitsof
bourgeoisdemocracy"canbelearnedandhistoricallysurpassed.
126
Unfortunately,hetellsuslittleaboutthisalternativedemocracymoreimportantly,histhesis
impliesthatitsprinciplescannotevenbeconvincinglypresentedtothosewhonowexperiencedemocracyintermsoftheestablishedprocedures.Thelinkbetweenthe
twodemocracieswouldthushavetobeinprincipleanantidemocraticone,aratherstrangerecommendationtothosewhopresentlyvaluethebenefitsofliberal
democracies.Oneisaskedtoacceptarevolutionarystrategyonthebasisofafaiththatsomehowitwillleadtoaqualitativelydifferent,yetuntriedandwithinthe
presentsocietyentirelyuntriable,formofdemocracy.
ThatthereisnosuchalternativeformofdemocracyisthebestknownthesisofNorbertoBobbio.AndyetBobbioisaleftsocialisttheoristofdemocratization.
ThoughheisnomerefollowerofGramsci,hisjustlyfamousinterpretationofthePrisonNotebooksisthekeytohisowndistinctivetheoreticalpositiononthe
questionofdemocracy.AccordingtoBobbio,Gramscifoughtatwofrontwaragainstthosewhosoughttoassimilatecivilsociety(andthestate)totheeconomy
(economicdeterminists)andthosewho

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soughttosubordinateittothestateandthecultofforce.Hewantedtotranscendnotonlytheconditionsofbourgeoissocietybutalso"thefalsewayoftranscending
theseconditions."
127
Inthisway,somewhatahistoricallyofcourse,BobbioseekstodistinguishGramscifrombothsocialdemocraticandLeninistpolitics.To
Bobbio,aswehavealreadyargued,Gramsciwasastrategistof"reform,"inthestrongsenseofwantingtotransformnotonlypoliticsandeconomicsbutalso
"customsandculture."Indeed,thewholestresshereisonthebuildingofanalternativeculturalhegemonythatmustprecedetheconquestofpower,involvingnotonly
thepoliticalpartybutalso,andespecially,theactivityofallinstitutionsofcivilsocietyinvolvedintheproductionanddiffusionofculture.
128
Thus,thecenterofthe
radicalstrategyinthisinterpretationisentirelyrelocatedfromthestatetocivilsociety,whereaprotracted"warofposition"fortheconquestofculturalhegemony
wouldbefought.
InhisfamousarticleonGramsci,Bobbioseemedtonoticenoinconsistencybetweenthisradical,civilsocietycenteredstrategyandthegoalofaregulatedsocietyin
whichcivilsocietyabsorbsthestate,
129
noreventhat,onthispoint,Lenin'sviewsofthedistantfuture(thoughobviouslynotSovietreality)coincidedwiththeessence
(thoughnottheterminology)ofGramsci'sposition.Nevertheless,theGramscianvisionofamonolithic,regulatedsocietyinwhichcivilsocietywouldabsorbthestateis
nottobefoundthetheoryofdemocracyanddemocratizationthatBobbiodevelopedinthe1970sandespeciallythe1980s.
130
Onthecontrary,hisworksofthis
periodrejectedinthestrongesttermstheideaofamonolithicdirectdemocracy.Insteadoftheradicalsubstantialistapproach,Bobbioinsiststhatthenormative
proceduralprinciplesofrepresentativedemocracyconstitutethenecessary,thoughadmittedlynotthesufficient,criteriaforanystatetobeconsidereddemocratic.The
realproblemforradicaldemocraticreform,then,istoidentifythereasonswhyliberaldemocracieshavenotsucceededinkeepingtheirpromises,andtoarticulatea
programfortheirfurtherdemocratization.
Accordingly,Bobbiostateswhathetakestobebothanormativeandarealistic(feasible)definitionofdemocracy.Everydemocraticgovernmenthasthreebasic
prerequisites:participation(orcollec

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tiveandgeneralinvolvement,evenifamediatedone,inthetakingofalldecisionsapplyingtothewholecommunity)controlfrombelow(onthebasisoftheprinciple
thatallpowernotsocontrolledtendstobeabused)andfreedomofdissent.
131
Bobbiois,ofcourse,undernoillusionregardingtherealizationofthetheseprinciples
inexistingliberaldemocracies.Hearguesthatthesepromiseshavenotbeenkepteveninstateswheredemocraticinstitutionsarethemostfullyandformally
developed.Here,too,asineverymodernsociety,thereareatleastfourparadoxesofdemocracythatmakeitdifficulttorealizeitsprinciplesadequately:"Ina
nutshell,thesefourenemiesofdemocracywhereIamtakingdemocracytomeantheoptimummethodformakingcollectivedecisionsarethelargescaleof
modernsociallife,theincreasingbureaucratizationofthestateapparatus,thegrowingtechnicalityofthedecisionsitisnecessarytomake,andthetrendofcivilsociety
towardbecomingamasssociety."
132
Insum,wemodernsseemtobedemandingmoreandmoredemocracyunderconditionsthatareincreasinglyunpropitious.Moreover,theseparadoxesseemtobe
exacerbatedinrepresentativeparliamentarysystems.Thephenomenaofpoliticalapathyandparticipationdistortedandmanipulatedbyeliteswithamonopolyon
ideologicalpowerhavemilitatedagainstthepromiseofparticipation.Controlfrombelowisemptiedofsignificanceasthecenterofpowershiftsawayfromthose
institutionsthatcitizenssucceedincontrolling:Thesignificantinstrumentsandcentersofrealpower,suchasthearmy,thebureaucracy,andbigbusiness,arenot
subjecttodemocraticcontrol.Finally,therightofdissentisseverelyrestrictedincapitalistsocietiesinwhichthedominanteconomicsystemneveroffersthepossibility
ofaradicalalternative.
What,then,isthesenseofcallingcontemporaryWesternsocieties"democratic"?Byidentifyingthe(minimum)definingprinciplesofdemocracywiththeclassical
(broken)promisesofdemocracy,Bobbio'sworksinthe1970stendedtomakethisquestionunanswerable.Inthe1980s,heconfrontedtheissuewithaprocedural
turninhisthought,differentiatingminimumdefinitionfromnormafivepromise.Henowdefineddemocracyintermsofaproceduralminimumthatincludes(1)
participationofthelargestpossiblenumberofthoseconcerned,(2)majorityrulein

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decisionmaking,(3)theexistenceofrealalternatives(personsandpolicies)tochoosefrom,and(4)theexistenceofguaranteesoffreechoiceintheformofbasic
rightsofopinion,expression,speech,assembly,andassociation.
133
Moderndemocracyisthusliberaldemocracybydefinition,evenifBobbiobelievesthatthereisalsoabuiltinconflictbetweendemocracyandthosedimensionsof
economicandpoliticalactivitiescallingforastronglylimitedgovernment.
134
Equallyimportant,moderndemocracyisalsoaformofeliteoroligarchic,pluralistic,
particularistic,anddeficientlypublicmassdemocracywhosedemocraticcharacterislimitedtothespaceofpoliticsalone.Thesecharacterizationsamount,inBobbio's
view,toaseriesofbrokenpromiseswithrespecttotheclassicalmodelofdemocracy,eveninitsearlymodern,liberalrestatements,allofwhichinvolveda
relativizationofthedistinctionofrulerandruledalongwithvaryingemphasesonindividualism,universalism,publicity,andaneducatedcitizenry.
135
Despitea
heterogeneoussetofcausesdiminishingthedemocraticcharacterofmodernpolitiesthesurvivalofsecretiveorinvisiblepoliticalpractices,thecapitalistcharacterof
moderneconomies,theelectiveaffinitybetweendemocracyandbureaucracy,theoverloadofdemandproducedbydemocraticpartypolitics,andtheincreasingrole
oftechnicalexpertiseinmodernlifeeventheseviolationsoftheclassicalpromiseofdemocracydonoteliminatetheminimallydemocraticcharacteroftheexisting
liberaldemocracies,whichisprocedurallydefinedbymajorityrule,electoralcompetition,andcivilliberties.
136
Thispoint,however,couldbereversed:The
proceduralminimumapparentlycannotdiminishtheelite,particularistic,nonpublic,anddepoliticizedformofdemocracyinmodernsocieties.
Bobbioiscertainlynotsatisfiedwiththisconclusion.Hestressesthesocializingaspectoftheproceduralminimumofdemocracy,whichpromotesvaluesoftoleration
andnonviolenceinconflictresolutionand,lessconvincingly,thoseofsolidarityandopennesstoradicalculturallearningexperiences.
137
Moreimportantly,hestrongly
believesthatthefurtherdemocratizationofexistingdemocraciesispossible.Thisissueisaddressedonthreelevels:thepossibleplaceofdirectdemocracytheroleof
alternativeformsofrepresentationandthepossibilityofexpandingthespaceofdemocracyfromthestatetocivilsociety.

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Alreadyinthe1970s,Bobbioinsistedthatthereisnofullfledged,realizablealternativetorepresentativedemocracythatwouldsatisfytheclassicalpromiseof
democracybetterthantheexistingmodeldoes.
138
InamannerquitereminiscentofRobertoMichels,Bobbioshowsconvincinglythatneitheroftheindividual
institutionsof"directdemocracy"referenda,localcommitteesorassemblies,thebindingmandatenoreventheircombinationoffersafeasiblereplacementforthe
representativesystem.Referendaaresimplyinfeasibleforalltheissuesthatmustbedebatedandresolvedcollectivelyincomplexmodernsocieties.Theproblemsthat
alocalcommitteeorassemblyiscompetenttodiscussarehardlyidenticaltothoseconfrontinganationalpolity.Bindingmandatesalreadyexistwherestrongparty
systemsareineffect(partydisciplinebeingthefunctionalequivalentforthemandatimperatif),andwheretheyarenotineffect,thequestionremainsastothenature
ofanacceptableauthorityabletorevokeamandate.Finally,analternativemodelof"socialist"democracybasedonthedualstrategyofstructuralreformandthe
wideningofparticipationwouldrunupagainsttwoadditionaldifficulties.First,astructuralreformthatradicallyaffectstheeconomyishardtoimaginewithoutinvoking
violentmeans,whichhaveneverledtoanincreaseofdemocracy.Second,thewideningofdemocraticparticipationinthesphereofeconomicpowercomesup
againstwhatappearstobeapermanentfeatureorcountertrendcommontosocialistaswellascapitaliststates,namely,theremovalofeconomicpowerfromthe
provinceofdemocraticcontrolfrombelow.Whileitisdebatablewhethertheconditionsfavoringautocraticpowerinthisspherearehistoricallydeterminedor
objective,Bobbiomaintained(atleastinthe1970s)thattherearegoodgroundsforsuspectingthattheprogressivewideningofthedemocraticbasewilleventuallyrun
intoaninsuperablebarrierwhenittriestopassthefactorygates.
139
Butshouldrepresentativeanddirectdemocracybeseenasexclusivealternatives?Inthe1980s,Bobbiobegantoseethemaspotentiallycomplementary.First,there
wasapossibilityofmixedorintermediaryformssuchasrepresentationwithbindingmandates.Second,onecouldalsoincludedirectdemocraticformssuchas
referenda,recall,andlocalassembliesintorepresentativedemo

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craticconstitutions.
140
Bobbioremainsskepticaltowardtheintermediaryformshementions,andherejectsanyfurtherextensionofthealreadyabusedimperative
mandate.Moreover,heconsiderstheroleofcomplementarydirectdemocraticdevicesimportantbutnecessarilylimited.Heseesthereferendum,forexample,as
appropriateonlywhenarelativelyfewissuesofuncompromisableprincipleareatstake.Thus,hisownmodelofdemocratizationreliesprimarilyonextendingnew
representativeratherthandirectforms.
Withinthesphereofstateinstitutions,ideasoffunctionaldemocracyhaveoftenbeenproposedasextendingthelogicofdemocracytoalevelthathasbecomemore
importantinmodernsociety(accordingtoEmileDurkheim,themostfamousexponent)thantheterritorialone.Thebestknownproposalforsuchrepresentation
articulatedbytheguildsocialistsandAustroMarxists,amongothersinvolvesanadditionalparliamentarychamberrepresentingprofessionalassociationsoutsideof
thepartysystem.ToBobbio,suchaschemeimpliesapoorandevendangerousalternativetoterritorialrepresentation.Suchrepresentationofinterestgroupswould
simplydeliverparliamenttolobbyingbyspecialinterestsandtothedealstheywouldmake.Totheextentthisisalreadya"degenerative"tendencyoftheexistingforms
ofparliamentarism,itshouldnotbemadeworsebybeingraisedtoaprincipleandaninstitution.WhileBobbiodoesnotbelievethatanythinglikeageneralinterest
emergesincontemporaryparliaments,heneverthelessclaimsthatthepoliticalpartiesthatdominatethesestructuresrepresentasuperiorformofmediationbetween
theindividualandstatethandointerestgroups.Tothenecessarilyrigidpatternoftherepresentationofgroupinterestshecounterposesgeneralvisionsavailablein
politicalmovementsleadingtothepotentiallycreativeandflexiblehandlingofissues.Politicalpartiesthusrepresentthedifferentlyinterpreted,multifacetedinterestsof
citizens,asagainstthenarrowandinflexibleinterestsofgroupmembers.
141
Tochooseapartymeanstochooseageneralframeworkofinterpretationbasedon
politicalopinions.Ontheotherhandwedonotchooseourinterestgroupourrelationtoitisordinarilynotpoliticalbutisdefinedbysharedsocialandeconomic
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Onlyinthispolemicalcontextdowegetsuchaglorifieddescriptionofthelogicofrepresentationthroughthepartysystem.Yettheidealizedpicturedistortswhat
couldhavebecomeamoredifferentiatedanalysisandproposal.Bobbiocouldhavestressedthepossibilityofaformsupplementingratherthanreplacing
representativedemocracyasitisnowofficiallypracticed.Goodargumentsandmodelsareavailableforsuchproposals.Ifneocorporatistbargainingalready
characterizescontemporarypoliticalprocesses,asherepeatedlyadmits,theremaybesomesignificantvirtueinbringingsuchnegotiationsintothelightofthepublic
sphere,therebydiminishingtheircorporatistcharacter,towhichBobbio,inlightofthefascistexperience,isunderstandablyallergic.
142
Moreover,asecond
parliamentarychambercouldtakeonasecondaryroleinrelationtothefirstitcouldbeoverruledonthebasisofaqualifiedmajorityintheterritorialchamber,andits
functionscouldbelimitedtocertaintypesofissues.Allofthisisimportantbecause,asweshallsee,Bobbio'salternativestrategyofdemocratizingcivilsocietymaybe
futileifthechannelsenablingdemocraticassociations,organizations,andmovementstoinfluencethepoliticalsystemarenotincreasedwithrespecttotheordinary
practiceofpartypoliticalelitedemocracy.
Withinageneralprogramofdemocratization,Bobbio'semphasisisontheexpansionofformsofrepresentativedemocracybeyondthesphereofpolitics.Hehopesin
facttoredeemtwo''promises"thatwerenotinherentineithertheclassicalortheliberalmodelofdemocracy:expandingthespaceofdemocraticdecisionmakingand
exploitingthepotentialofpluralism.Inthiscontext,hementionsavarietyofrolesthatcanbedemocratized(inparticular,familial,occupational,educational,andclient
roles)aswelltwomajorinstitutionsthatarenotatpresentorganizeddemocratically:theschooland(inconsistently)theworkplace.Hisjustificationforchoosingthese
istheoneusedbyDurkheimforhistheoryoffunctionalrepresentation,namely,thatitisherethat"mostmembersofmodernsocietyspendthemajorityoftheir
lives."
143
Atissueisnottheinventionorrecreationofnewanddirectformsofdemocracybutthe"infiltration"ofnewspaces,thespacesofcivilsociety,by"quite
traditionalformsofdemocracy,suchasrepresentativedemocracy."

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Interestinglyenough,Bobbio'searlierdoubtsconcerningthedemocratizationofeconomiclifearenotdispelledtheprospectsherearestillpronounceduncertain,as
theyareforthesphereofadministration.Nevertheless,heinsiststhatwhiletheprocessofdemocratizationofcivilsocietyhasonlyjuststarted,considerableprogress
hasalreadybeenmadeinareassuchasschooling,wherehestressestheparticipationofparentsinschoolcouncils,apparentlyarelativelynewexperienceinItaly.On
thebasisofsuchexamples,Bobbiomaintainsthatthenewindexofdemocratizationinthefuturewillbeprovidednot"bythenumberofpeoplewhohavetherightto
vote,butbythenumberofcontextsoutsidepoliticswheretherighttovoteisexercised."
144
ThisconclusionseemsprematureonthebasisoftheempiricalsupportBobbioprovides,buthehasamoretheoreticallineofreasoningtobackitup.Hearguesthat
pluralism,althoughnotdemocraticinorigin,providesbothareasonandanopportunityfordemocratizingcivilsociety.Bobbioinsightfullydemonstratestheoriginsof
modernpluralismanddemocracyintwodifferentpolemicalsituations.Originallyopposednotsomuchtoautocracyastomonocraticformsofpower,pluralismor
polyarchyisinconflictwithmonolithicmodelsofdemocracy,whetherancientormodern.Inotherwords,giventhedominantmodelsofdemocracyintheearly
modernperiod,pluralismwasantidemocratic.AndyetBobbioisright:Pluralism,basedontheheterogeneityofconflictinginterestconstellations,cannotbeeliminated
incomplexsocieties.Asfarasheisconcerned,thisfactrepresentsaviolationofthepromiseofdemocracybecausenondemocraticallyorganizedcentersofpower
bringparticularintereststobearonprocessesofdecisionmakingandalsoremovetheseimportantcentersfromdemocraticcontrols.Yetantipluralist,individualist
formsofresistanceonthepartofdemocracywouldofcoursebefutileundergenuinelymodernconditions.Democracycancounterattackonlybybringingextrastate
andevennonpoliticalcentersofpowerunderitsownlogic.Inthecontextofpluralisticsociety,thepromiseofdemocracycanberedeemedonlythroughtheextension
ofprocessesofdemocratizationthroughthewholefabricofhumanassociation.Andthisrequiresnotafundamentalistprogramofdirectdemocracybutthe
introductionofrepresentativedemocracyintherelevantpolyarchiccentersofsociety.

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Sofartheargumentisconvincing.ButBobbioalsoclaimsthatthegreaterdistributionofpowercharacteristicofpluralismitself"opensthedoortothedemocratization
ofcivilsociety."
145
Oneishardpressedtofindanexplanationinhistextforhowapluralisticorganizationprovidestargetsfordemocratizationandevenfacilitates
suchprocess,althoughhedoesatonepointrefertodissentpromotedorshieldedbypluralisticorganizations.Theclaimis,moreover,implicitlycontradictedbythe
followingassertion:
Theprocessofdemocratizationhasnotevenbeguntoscratchthesurfaceofthetwogreatblocksofdescendingandhierarchicalpowerineverycomplexsociety,bigbusiness
andpublicadministration.Andaslongasthesetwobigblocksholdoutagainstpressuresfrombelow,thedemocratictransformationofsocietycannotbesaidtobecomplete.We
cannotevensaywhetherthistransformationispossible.
146
Itseems,then,thatsomeofthemostimportantcentersofpowergreatlyresisttheirowndemocratization.Itisunfortunatelythecasethatifwemeasure
democratizationbytheextenttowhichasinglesetofproceduralstandardsextendsintodifferentspheresofsociety,theresultswillinevitablybemixed,and
nondemocraticspacesorcentersofpowerarelikelytoremain"sonumerousandsolarge,andtheirimportancesogreat"
147
astoplacethewholeprojectin
significantdoubt.
WithoutwishingtoreplaceBobbio'ssomewhatpessimisticconclusionconcerningdemocratizationbyamoreoptimisticscenario,webelievethatafewcriticalremarks
mayhelpelucidatethereasonswhyhisowncivilsocietycenteredprogramhasreachedanimpasse.First,BobbiodoesnotconsistentlyoperatewiththeGramscian
notionofacivilsocietydifferentiatedfromtheeconomy.
148
Asaresult,hecannotclearlydistinguishsphereswhoseinternallogicfacilitatesradicaldemocratization
fromsphereswhosereproductionisconsistentonlywithsubsidiaryformsofdemocraticparticipation.Hisoverlyproceduraldefinitionofdemocracydoesnotserve
himwellinthiscontext:Itmakeshimdemandtoolittleofelitesinsomespheres(e.g.,politicalparties)andtoomuchofelitesinotherspheres(e.g.,capitalist
managements).
Second,Bobbiodoesnotposethequestionoftheinternalrelationsofdifferentdemocratizedspheres.Asaresult,hisprogno

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sis,accordingtowhichspheresofsocietycanbedemocratizedinanorderthatmoreorlessreversestheirgeneralsocialimportance,seemstoreduceundulythe
stakesofdemocratization.Whatisneededisademonstrationofhowandunderwhatconditionsnewlydemocratizedspherescaninfluencethelessdemocraticspaces
ofsociety.Inthiscontext,hisgeneralpessimismconcerningtheintroductionofnewstructuresintoexistingversionsofpoliticaldemocracydoesnotservehimwell.
Finally,Bobbiodoesnotdistinguishbetweenpluralismasacontextofinstitutionsthatcanandshouldbedemocratizedandthepluralityofcollectiveactorsthatareto
carryouttheworkofdemocratization.Hisremarksonsocialmovementsandcivildisobediencedonotindicatemuchconfidencein"extrainstitutional"actorsasagents
ofdemocratization.
149
Wearethereforeleftwiththesuspicionthatheentrustssuchprocessestotheelitespresentlyensconcedintherelevantpluralisticinstitutions,
includingthepartiesofthepoliticalsystem.Suchapositionwouldbereasonenoughforpessimismtheworkofdemocratizationcannotordinarilybeentrustedtothe
beneficiariesoflessdemocraticorevennondemocraticarrangements.
WedonotsharePerryAnderson'scritiqueoftheleftsocialistappropriationofGramsci.Inourview,itmakeslittlesensetocriticizeBobbioonthegroundthathis
strategycannotleadtoaradicalrupturewiththeinstitutionsofparliamentarydemocracy,sincehespecificallyandrightlyrejectstheideaofrupture.Nordoeshemake
atransitiontosocialismthegoalwithrespecttowhichdemocraticpoliticscanbereducedtoameremeansingeneral,itseemsthattheverymeaningofsocialismis
transformedhereintothatoftheradicalizationofdemocracy.
150
Withallofthis,weareinagreement.
OurcriticismofBobbiohastodowiththeunfinishednatureofhisprogramofdemocratization,whichinpartislinkedtotheundevelopedandevenambiguousnature
ofhisconceptionofcivilsociety.ButeventhiscriticismshouldnotdisguiseourfundamentalagreementwithtwoofthemostimportantfeaturesofBobbio'sconception:
hisdisplacementoftheterrainofdemocratizationfromthestatetocivilsociety,andhisinsistenceonanonfundamentalistprograminwhichformalandrepresentative

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democracyprovidesthegeneralmodelthatshouldbefollowedinthevariousspheresofsociety.Theseachievements,basedonaspecificinterpretationofGramsci,
linkBobbiotothemostimportantstrategiesofemancipationofthe1970sand1980s.Andyetitremainsdoubtfulthathisconceptioncouldprovidesuchinitiatives
withanadequateframeworkoforientationandselfunderstanding.Atissuearenotonlyhisambiguitieswithrespecttotheconceptofcivilsociety,hissomewhattoo
generousconcessionstotheelitetheoryofdemocracy,hisonesidedconceptionofpluralism,andhisdeemphasisofsocialmovementsinfavorofpoliticalparties.
Theseimperfectionscouldbecorrectedwithinthetermsofhistheory.Onadeeperlevel(andthisisadifficultyheshareswiththeformsofdiscoursewithinsocial
movements),itisnotautomaticallyobviousthattheconceptofcivilsocietytakenoverfromHegelandothernineteenthcenturyauthorscanwithonlyafew
correctionssustainaprogramofdemocratizationandyetavoidtheideologicalutilizationwithwhichParsons'stheoryculminates.Bobbioneverconsidersthe
possibilitythatthewholeconceptualstrategymaybeintimatelylinkedtonowobsoletenineteenthcenturyconditionsbeforethe"fusion"ofstateandsocietythateven
initsoriginalutilizationitmayimplynotonlyantistatismbutdepoliticizationaswellthatitmightrepresentonlyasetofinstitutionalmasksfordeeperandmorerefined
authoritarianstrategiesandfinally,thatthemodelofsocialdifferentiationitpresupposesisafalseandunsophisticatedonethatisinadequatetotherealitiesofcomplex
societies.
Inourview,thekindoftheoryBobbioseekstodevelopcannotbeconstructeduntilthesecriticismsareconsideredindetail.Webelievefurtherthattheseveral
paradigmsofthecritiqueofcivilsocietyassociatedwithCarlSchmitt,HannahArendt,ReinhartKoselleck,JrgenHabermas,MichelFoucault,andNiklasLuhmann
willyieldimportantcontributionstoourattemptattheoryconstruction.Itistothesecritiquesthatwenowturn.

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II
THEDISCONTENTSOFCIVILSOCIETY

Page177
4
TheNormativeCritique:
HannahArendt
Oneofthemostchallenging,andcertainlythemostpassionate,critiquesofmoderncivilsocietyhasbeenpresentedbyHannahArendtinawholeseriesofbooksand
essays.
1
Arendt'smain,thoughbarelymentioned,antagonistisHegel.Herattackisconcentratedspecificallyontheconceptof"society"asanintermediaterealm
betweenprivateandpublic,betweenfamilyandpoliticallife."Society"isarealmofmediationswhereprivateinterests,activities,andinstitutionsassumepublicroles,
whilepublicinstitutionstakeonprivate"housekeeping''functions.Thus,toArendt,institutionssuchasHegel'scorporationsandpolicedonotstabilizeandregulatethe
differentiationofpublicandprivatebutratherdissolvethesharplinebetweenthemandthreatentheintegrityandautonomyofboth.UnlikeHegel,Arendtdoesnot
seekasynthesisofmodernsocietyandancientrepublicanism.Instead,sheresolutelydefendsthemodelofclassicalpoliticalsociety,politikekoinonia,alongwithits
sharpseparationfromtheoikosorprivatesphere,againstmodernity,particularlyagainstthemodernstate(bureaucracy)andmodern(mass)society.Hercritiqueisa
normativeonebasedonwhatshetakestobethevaluesofclassicalpubliclife(politicalequality,publicdiscourse,andhonor)andprivatelife(uniqueness,difference,
individuality).UnlikethatoftheyoungMarxin1843,whomsheinmanyrespectsresembles,Arendt'sisnotanimmanentcriticism.Theactualpoliticalreemergence
andreinstitutionalizationofthesevaluesrequiresanalmosttotalrupturewithallexistinginstitutions.Ahistoryofdeclinefromtheemergenceof"society"tomass
society,seenasmoreorless

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inexorable,deprivesmodernityofitsoneadmittedachievement:thedevelopmentandenrichmentoftheprivatesphereasasphereofintimacy.Thus,likeWalter
Benjamin,Arendtconsciouslypracticesaformofredemptivecriticismthat,forthesakeofapossiblefuture,attemptstosavesomevaluedaspectsofthepastfromthe
perceiveddisintegrationoftradition,includingthetraditionofearlymodernity.
2
WeexamineArendt'scritiqueindetailforseveralreasons.First,shewillhelpuscounterbalancetheParsonianconceptionbyprovidingrichinsightsintothedarkside
oftheinstitutionalizationofmoderncivilsociety.Second,theinternalcontradictionsofheranalysiswillhelpusshowthatnotevenArendtwasabletobaseamodern
theoryoffreedomontheabolitionofcivilsocietyshe,too,isforcedtoassume,howeverunwillingly,thenecessityofitspreservation.Third,acomparisonwiththe
earlyworkofReinhartKoselleckandJrgenHabermaswillallowustoshowthatinthemodernworldonecanmakesenseofArendt'snormativelybasedproject,
whichrevolvesaroundtheconceptofthepublicsphere,onlyifitisrelocatedaroundtheintermediarysphereofthesocialthatshesoughttobanish.
TheconceptofthesocialinArendt'sworkcorrespondstotheHegeliantoposofbrgerlicheGesellschaftandis,infact,counterposedtoboththepoliticalsocietyof
theancientsandthecivilsocietyofthemodernliberals.Whilethesetwoconceptualizationsemphasizedthepublicsphereinthecaseoftheancientsandtheprivatein
thecaseofliberalism,"thesocialrealm,"acreationofmodernityoccludedbythesetwopoliticalphilosophies,involvesamixtureandinterpenetrationofthetworealms
andtheirconstitutiveprinciples.
3
Tounderstandthemixture,wemustfirstanalyzeitscomponents.
Arendt'stheoryofthepublicsphere,althoughsystematizedaroundatheoryofaction,isderivedfromherunderstandingofthemodelofancientrepublics.She
conceivesofthepolisas"theorganizationofthepeopleasitarisesoutofspeakingandactingtogether."
4
Actioninturnisunderstoodastheselfdisclosureandeven
selfrenewaloftheactorthroughthemediumofspeech,possibleonlyinpresenceofotherswhoseeandhearandhencearecapableofestablishingtherealityof
subjectiveexpression.
5
Action

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isthereforealwaysinteractionthatbothconfirmsthepluralityofuniqueexperienceandpersonalityandestablishesacommonworld,"relatingandseparating"human
actorsatthesametime.Thiscommonworldisthepublicsphere.
OnestrikingdifficultyofArendt'sconceptionisthatitdescribesbothananthropologicallyconstitutiveconditionofhumanlifeandahistoricallyspecificandunique
constellation:theancientcityrepublic(anditsalleged,butadmittedlyexceptional,modernrevivals).InthisshefollowstheprejudicesoftheGreeks,andshetriesto
escapetheresultingdifficultythroughherconceptionofpower.
Action,orratherinteraction,isconstitutiveofthepublicsphere,
6
butitissupposedlyonlypowerthatcankeepitinexistence.
7
Powerinturnisdefinedasactingin
concert,onthebasesofmakingandkeepingpromises,mutuallybindingoneanother,covenanting.
8
WhileArendt'smodelofactionstressesthestrivingoftheactor
forthefameandeven"immortality"thatcanbeachievedthroughdramaturgicselfpresentationbasedontherhetoricalskill"offindingtherightwordsattheright
moment,"
9
herconceptofpowerpointstoactionorientedtonormativeprinciplesthatderivetheirforcefromthedepthstructureofaformofcommunicationbasedon
mutualrecognitionandsolidarity.
10
Thus,theconceptofactioncanbeunderstoodasageneralanthropologicalconstituentofthe''humancondition,"buttheconcept
ofpower,andalongwithitafullyinstitutionalizedpublicsphere,seemstorequirearepublicanmodelforitsfullactualization.AndArendtdoesinfactlinkpowermore
closelytopoliticalspeechthantoactioninitsprimordial,"rhetorical"sense.
11
ThepublicsphereinArendt'sviewpresupposesapluralityofindividualsunequalbynaturewhoare,however,"constructed"aspoliticallyequal.Accordingtoher,the
meaningofthepolisasisonomia(literally,equalityinrelationtolaw)isthatof"norule,"inthesenseofanabsenceofdifferentiationintorulersandruledwithinthe
citizenbody.
12
Thus,thepublicsphereestablishesamodelofinteractioncharacterizedbynoncoercivediscourseamongcitizenswhoinitiallyholdandfreelyexchange
agenuinepluralityofopinions.
13
Thismodelturnsouttoberatherrestrictive.Basedonherdifferentiationbetweenactionandwork,praxisandpoiesis,

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ArendtattimesgoesalongwithwhatshetakestobetheGreekexclusionoflegislation,decisionbyvoting,andeventhefoundingofcitiesfromtheproperlypublic,
politicalactivities.
14
WhenshemadeherjourneyfromGreecetoRome,however,inOnRevolution,shemadetheactoffoundationthemakingofconstitutionsor
theexerciseoflepouvoirconstituantthepublicpoliticalactivityparexcellence.Yetshekeptanimportantconsistencybetweenthetwopositions,namely,theview
thatpubliclifemustbeseenexclusivelyasanendinitself.Thus,genuinerepublicanconstitutionmakinginthelaterviewoughttohavenootherpurposethanto
institutionalizethepublicsphereitself.
15
Arendtthereforestronglyrejected,ascontrarytotheveryprincipleofpublicity,theideathatactorsbringintotheircommon
deliberationstheinterests,needs,andconcernsoftheirprivatelivesandhouseholds.
Arendtdescribestheallimportantrelationshipofpublicandprivateintermsofdifferentiation,complementarity,andconflict.Shestartsbydifferentiatingprinciples
describedvariouslyintermsofactionvs.laborandwork,constructedrealityvs.naturalreality,uniquenessvs.realdifference,freedomvs.necessity,norulevs.
domination,orequalityvs.inequality.
16
ForArendt,anactualandthoroughgoinginstitutionaldifferentiationisrequiredfortheoperationoftheprinciplesofboth
privateandpublicfortworeasons.First,thecomplementaryroleoftheprivatevisvisthepubliccanbeperformedonlyincontextoftheirseparation.Second,in
eachother'sterrainthetwoprincipleshaveastrongtendencytovitiateandevenabolishoneanother.
Abstractly,thefreedomofpublicliferequirestheconquestofnecessity,thetaskoftheprivateinitseconomiccapacity,asoikos.
17
Thus,theorganizationofthe
householdwassuchastoprovideitsheadwithsufficienttimefortheexerciseofpublicfreedom.ButArendt'sstressisontheconditionsrequiredfortheemergenceof
thecitizenasanindependentsubject,possessingsubstantialandindependentopinions.Theinstitutionalformoftheprivateasproperty(incontrasttomobilewealth)
guaranteesthisindependencebysettingup"external"boundariesamongcitizensandhouseholdsits"interior,"byofferingahidingplacefromthelightofpublicity,is
thepreconditionfornurturingtheuniqueaspectsofpersonalitywithoutwhichlifebecomesentirely"shallow."
18

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Inspiteoftheimportanceofadifferentiatedprivaterealmforthepublic,thelatteralsoinvolvesfearandsuspicionoftheformer.Thisisbasedonthepossible
distractionofthecitizenbyamodelofprivatehappiness,butevenmoreonthetemptationtoimposeonthepolisthedespoticformsofrule,inequality,and
differentiationcharacteristicoftheoikos.
19
WhileinthiscontextArendtspeaksofthe"permanentthreat"oftheprivatetothepublic,elsewhereshemaintainsthatin
theancientworldthegreaterdangerwas"thetendencyofpublicpowertoexpandandtotrespassuponprivateinterests."Thispossibility,"inherentinrepublican
government,"couldbecheckedonlybyinstitutionalizingprivatepropertyandeventuallybythemodernalternative,borninrenewedrepublicanexperimentation,of
framinglawsthatpubliclyguaranteethe"rights"ofprivacy,thatis,thecreationofconstitutionalrights.
20
WhileArendtalwaysmaintainsherstaunchsupportforsuchrights,sheneverthelessarguesthattheydonotsufficientlyprotectthedifferentiationofpublicandprivate
undermodernconditions.Inparticular,neitherthespecificallymodernformsoftheinvasionofthepublicbytheprivatenortheresultingassaultsonprivacyand
intimacybyanewandcorruptformof"public"lifecanbecounteractedbypublicrightsofprivatepersons.Arendtconnectsbothtendenciestoasinglephenomenon:
theriseofthesocial.
Evenifshethusadmitstendencieswithinthepublicandtheprivatetoinvadeoneanother'sdomains,Arendtconsistentlyclaimsthattheancientrepublicsmanagedto
maintainthedifferentiationthatbelongedtotheirownconstitutiveconditions.Theactualinterpenetrationandevenfusionofthetwoisaproductofmodernity,ofthe
riseofthesocialrealmthatconstitutesthetargetofArendt'scritiqueofcivilsociety.Theinterpenetration,inlinewithlatenttendenciesofboththepublicandthe
privatespheres,goesbothways.Thestate(i.e.,themodernterritorialcompulsoryassociation)takesoverfunctionsofmaterialreproduction,or"housekeeping,"while
collectivelife,intheshapeofthenation,takesonthestructureandformsofbehaviorofasuperhumanfamily.Arendt'sformulaforthepoliticalformoftheriseofthe
social,thenationstate,expressesthistwosidedinterpenetration.
21
Theresultofmutualinterpenetrationofpublicandprivateisthedisappearanceofanystableboundariesbetween"tworealms[that]

Page182
...constantlyflowintoeachother."
22
Inthenewtopos,however,anentirelynoveltypeofhybridstructurecomesintobeingthatwillbecomethedynamiccenterof
aprocessleadingtotheeventualdisappearanceofbothpublicandprivate.
TheoriginsofthissocialrealmareanalyzedinquitedifferenttermsinArendt'svariousworks.Atleastthreepointsoforiginaredistinguishableamongthese:theearly
modernpoliticalornationaleconomythedepoliticizedcourtsocietyandtheemergenceofsalonsocietyandthemoderndemocraticrevolution.Ineachcase,therole
oftheearlymodernstate,createdbyabsolutism,iscentral.Thefirstexplanation,whichcomesclosesttotheMarxiantradition,
23
stressestheselforganizationofthe
absolutemonarchy"asatremendousbusinessconcern"thatfailed,accordingtooneversionoftheargument,tofindanadequateclassbasis.
24
Inthisversion,itwas
thestatethatelevatedmattersofmerehousekeepingintothepublicrealm,intheprocessdeformingthatrealmwithconcernsthatwereincompatiblewithitsbasic
principles.
25
Itshouldbenotedthatinthiscontext"thesocial"becomessynonymouswith"politicaleconomy."Itssupposedlyalmostunrestrainableexpansionis
associatedwiththemodernphenomenonofunlimitedeconomicgrowth.HerethesteptoaneconomycenteredneoMarxistargumentisarathersmallone,and
Arendtactuallytakesthisstepwhenshedescribeslimitlesseconomicgrowthastheexpansionoftheprivaterealmatthecostofthepublic.
26
Thesecondtrainofargumentis,inpart,Tocquevillian.ThethesisisthatabsolutismdestroyeditsownclassbasisbydepoliticizingtheStndestaatintheformofa
societyoforderswhosemodelandpreeminentinstitutionwascourtlysociety.
27
Thisargumentstressesconformism,secretmanipulation,andintrigueastheresultsof
"depoliticization"ratherthan"economization."ThemostimportantconsequencewasthattheFrenchnobilitywasreducedtoinsignificance.Inotherwords,this
developmentofthesocialoccurredattheexpenseofpoliticalsociety.
Thesetwoargumentsmayindeedbecompatible,buttheyshareacommonflaw:Bothseemtoimplythat,beforetheprocessofabsolutistdepoliticizationand/or
economization,differentiatedpublicandprivaterealmsexisted,eachoperatingaccordingtoitsownproperlogic.Becauseshereliesonanormativemodelderived

Page183
fromtheancientcityrepublics,however,Arendtexplicitlycontradictsthisimplicitclaim.Rightlyorwrongly,shepositsthelossoftheGreekunderstandingofpoliticsin
themedievalperiodandtheabsenceofapublicrealminthesecularsphereofthefeudalepoch.Sinceshedepictsmedievalcorporatelifeashavingpatternedall
humanactivitiesonthatofthehousehold,itishardlyfeasiblethatshecouldconsidertheStndestaatbasedonitasamodelofpubliclife,inhersenseofthisconcept.
28
Arendt'sthirdlineofargumentation,developedinOnRevolution,proposesamodelthatavoidsthisdifficulty,butintheprocessshethrowsintodoubtthehistorical
relevanceoftheothertwotheses.HereArendtsolvestheproblemofwhatprecedesdepoliticizationbycreditingthe"republican"momentofthemodernrevolutions
withrecreatingtheclassicalmodelofthepublic.Itthenmakessensetoarguethatitwasthefailuretoinstitutionalizethismomentand/ortheemergenceofthe"social"
questionledtothesubsequentdedifferentiationofpublicandprivateandtheirdecline.InthecaseoftheFrenchRevolution,however,theargumentconcerningtherise
ofthesocialisanentirelynewone.AccordingtoArendt,therevolutioninitsradicalphaseopenedthepoliticalrealmtothepoor,tothemultitudedrivenbymaterial
need,intheprocessmakingmatterspublicthatbytheirverynaturebelongedtotheprivaterealmofhousekeepingandcouldbesolvednotbypublicpoliticalbutonly
byadministrativemeans.
29
Thus,onceagain,despitetherepublicanethosoftherevolutionaries,governmentturnedintoadministration.Ofcourse,theturningof
governmentintoadministrationwasanticipatedbythemonarchicabsolutistfoundersofthemodernstate.Recallingherearlierargumentasacounterpoint,Arendtnow
statesthatifintheoldregimeeconomicandfinancialproblemscouldbesaidtohave"intruded"intothepublicsphere,"thepeople"violentlyburstuponit.
30
Andif
"highsociety''imposeditsmoresandmoralstandardsonpolitics,reducingittointrigueandperfidy,thesocietyofthepoor,drivenalsobyitsearlierexclusionfrom
society,transformedpubliclifeintoitsverynegation:brutalityandviolence.
31
Evidently,then,andsomewhatinconsistently,Arendtseesthemercantilisteconomizationofpolitics,theabsolutistdepoliticization

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ofthearistocracy,andtherevolutionarysocializationofpubliclifeassuccessiveandincreasinglydestructiveformsoftheriseofthesocialrealm,whichwillbe
followedbythesuccessiveformsofmasssocietyandtotalitarianism,involvingthecompleteeradicationofbothpublicandprivate.HeranalysisoftheAmerican
Revolution,however,indicatesthattheoveralltrendimpliedbythethesisoftheriseofthesocialdoesnotrequirethestagesjustdepicted.Americanhistoryknows
onlyfailedattemptsatmercantilisteconomizationandevenmoresoatabsolutistdepoliticization.Inparticular,Arendtarguesthatthesocialquestiondidnotburstupon
thepublicpoliticalstageinAmericaandthathere,unlikeallotherrevolutions,theinstitutionalizationofadifferentiatedprivatesphereprotectedbyconstitutionalrights
wasfullysuccessful.
32
AndyetexceptionalismintheserespectsobviouslydidnotpreventtheUnitedStatesfromdevelopingitsownbrandofmasssociety,indeed
formanytheparadigmaticmodel.
Likeotheranalysts,ArendthaddifficultyperceivingtherealityofthemodernstatebehindtheinstitutionsofAmericanfederalismandpluralism.Yetthisrealitydoes
makeanappearancewhenArendtanalyzestheAmericanfailuretofoundlastinginstitutionsofrepublicanfreedom.Thereasonsforthisincludedafailureto
institutionalizesmallscalestructuresofdirectpoliticalparticipationandanincreasingidentificationoffreedomaswellastheaimsofgovernmentwiththenegative
freedomsofprivatelifeprotectedbyconstitutionalrights.Butthesepointsarenotonthesamelevelastheargumentsdealingwiththeriseofthesocialsphereindeed,
theyimplyonlythestrengtheningoftheprivateattheexpenseofthepublic.
NeverthelessArendtmaintainsthattheretreattothevaluesofprivateasagainstpublichappiness,andthereductionoffreedomtocivillibertiesalone,alongwiththe
riseofutilitariancriteriainpoliticsandthedominationofpubliclifebyauniform,homogeneouspublicopinion,correspondalsoinAmerica"withgreatprecisiontothe
invasionofthepublicrealmbysociety."
33
Asforthisinvasion,wegetonlytworelatedreasons,whichdonotadduptoanexplanationontheleveloftherestof
Arendt'sthesis.Tobeginwith,shespeaksof"rapidandconstanteconomicgrowth"equivalenttothe"constantlyincreasingexpansionoftheprivaterealm"

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attheexpenseofthepublic.
34
ThisisasimplifiedversionofaclassicalMarxianthesisthatdoesnotinitselfexplaintheemergenceofthenewstructuraltopos,the
socialrealm.Forthisrealm,Arendt,unlikeTocqueville,
35
isabletodiscoveronlyEuropeanorigins.Accordingtoanentirelyunconvincingtraininherargument,the
immigrantpoorofEurope,confrontingAmericanrichesbasedoneconomicexpansionandtechnologicalinnovation,broughtoverthesocialquestionfromitsoriginally
Europeanhome.WeareledtobelievethatitwasforthisreasonaboveallthattheAmericandreamofthe"foundationoffreedom"wasconvertedintothatofthe
fulfillmentofallmaterialdesires.
36
Thus,immigrationinAmericasupposedlyplayedsomethingliketheroleoftheradicalphaseoftheFrenchrevolutionthatis,it
convertedinadequatelyinstitutedrepublicanstructuresandpracticesintotheruleofapublicopinionwhoseultimateinterestwasinsatisfyingneedspropertothe
privatespheretheneedsofconsumption.
Irrespectiveoftheproblemoforigins,Arendtdepictsthe"hybrid"sphereofthesocialasanextremelydynamiconewithdevastatingconsequencesforbothpublicand
private.Eventothosewho,likeourselves,judgeheranalysistobehighlyonesided,thedepictionyieldsanimpressiveanalysisoftheundersideofthe
institutionalizationofmoderncivilsocietymatchedonlybyMarxbeforeherandFoucaultafterher.
37
ThekeytermsinArendt'sanalysisofthedeformationofthepublicrealmarebureaucracy,welfarestate,publicopinion,andpoliticalcorruption.Wenotethatthefirst
threecorrespondwithsomeprecisiontothecategoriesofHegel'sanalysisofcivilsocietyandstatethatmediatebetweenprivateandpublic:civilservice,"police,"and
publicopinion.Thecategoryofcorruptioninturnleadstoacritiqueofinterestrepresentationinthepartysystemthatisimplicitlyamodernvariantofthefourth
Hegelianmediation,thecorporation.
AccordingtoArendt,bureaucracyisthe"social"formofgovernmentparexcellencebecausethesocialquestionwhichistosayquestionsofcollectivewelfare,can
haveonlyadministrativesolutions.
38
Arendtdoesnot,infact,denytheneedforcivilserviceoradministrationundermodernformsofgovernment.Shearguesonlythat
whenquestionsofwelfarebecomethepredominantor

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evenexclusivequestionsinthelifeofthestate(asintheSozialstaatorwelfarestate),theresultisbureaucracy,inherterminologytheruleoftheadministration,which
canbecomethemosttyrannicalformofall.
39
Bureaucracyisanespeciallyarbitraryformofgovernmentbecauseitinvolvesrulebydecree,withtheholdersof
discretionarypowerbecominganonymousandinvisiblebehindthefacadeofother,apparentlymorepoliticalformsofdeliberationanddecisionmaking.Iftyrannyis
"governmentthatisnotheldtogiveaccountofitself,"thenbureaucracy,asrule"byNobody,"goessofarastohidetheagentswhomightbeheldaccountable.
40

Such,accordingtoArendt,isthecaseinmodernwelfarestates,wheretheideaofdemocracyisconvertedfromthatofpublicparticipationtotheachievement,
throughthemostefficientadministrativemeanspossible,ofthegoalsofpublicwelfare.
41
Theproceduresofpublicparticipationarenot,however,merelydeformedfromabovetheyarealsohollowedoutfromwithin.Thesocialformofpoliticsisthe
corruptionofpolitics:Ittakesthreeformslinkedtostatus,wealth,andneed,respectively.Membersofthedepoliticizedaristocraticordersoftheoldregimecontinued
toacttogetherincourtsocietytoimprovetheirstatus,buttheycouldnotdosointheproperlypoliticalsenseofrelyingonopenspeech.Thus,publicdeliberationand
persuasionwerereplacedbythe"pull,pressureandthetricksofcliques,"theresultbeingmoresandmoralstandardsthatopenthedoortointrigueandperfidy.
42
The
peddlingofinfluencereplacedthegenerationofpower.Thesamepatternoccurredinsalonsociety.Indeed,theeighteenthcenturyRousseauianattackon"society,"
reproducedbyArendt,wasanattackonthehypocrisyofthecourtanditsanalogues,thearistocraticsalons,andthehypocritical,unnaturalpowerofwomen.
43
But
Arendtdoesnotrestrictthenotionofthecorruptionofpoliticstothisobviousexample.Forher,itisaspartofagenuinepubliclifethatpropertyownersemergefrom
aprotectedprivaterealmtopursuepublicaffairs.When,however,propertyisreplacedby"wealth,"andthepursuitofpoliticalgoalsbythedefenseandgenerationof
everexpandingwealth,thecorruptformsofactingtogethergeneratedbyaristocraticsocietybecomethebestmeansalsoforthe"bourgeois"topursueprivategoals
thatcannotbytheirverynaturebevalidatedpublicly.Finally,thepopularresponseto

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thecorruptionofstatusandwealth,thebrutalityofpeopledrivenbyneed,itselfcorruptspoliticsandiscorruptibleby"politicians."Here,too,thepropermediumof
politicalconflictandcompetitionisreplacedbyaprinciplewhollyatvariancewithit:insteadofthesecretinteractionofcliquesandmafias,theviolenceofthoseunable
tousepoliticalspeech.
44
Whattiestheseexamplesofpoliticalcorruptiontogether,inthecontextofthedepoliticizingbureaucraticrulebyNobody,isthequasipoliticalinteractionofpeoplein
theirprivatecapacitywholacktheinstitutionsofapublicspherethatcouldestablishtheircapacitiesascitizens.ItisnonethelesspartofArendt'sthesisthatthe
eighteenthcenturyrevolutionssoughttoestablishpreciselysuchinstitutions.Theirfailurewasnotsimplyaresultoftheinterventionofbureaucracyandprivatewealth
intothepublicsphere,problemsthateventheancientshadtoface,asArendtwellknew.Thecoreofherthesisaboutthespecificallymoderndeclineofrepublican
politicsthereforedependsontheeffectofthesocialontheverystructureofthepublic:thetransformationofpublicspiritintopublicopinion.
Onceagain,Arendtassignsapioneeringroleto"highsociety,"totheabsolutistcourtanditsextensioninthearistocraticsalon.
45
Indeed,itisthisculturaldevelopment,
unliketheproblemsofbureaucracyandpoverty,thatisuniquetomodernityandthusapivotalpointintheanalysis.Itishere,inaspaceneitherprivatenorpolitical,
dominatedbystatusconsciousnessandemptyuniformconventions,thatpubliclifefirstacquired,accordingtoArendt,theformsofinteractioncharacteristicofa
unified,conformist,corrupted,collectiveopinion.Allthosewhosoughttoenter"highsociety"or"society"wereforcedtosubmittothislogic,producingconformity
andassimilation.
46
Courtlyandsalonsociety,characterizedbythebasestpursuitofprivateinterests,intrigue,unnaturalpretentiousness,concernforstatusandstyle,
andcorruption(inthesenseofutterlackofconcernfortherespublica)becamethemodelofbehaviorthatwasemulatedbytherestofsociety.
47
Butwhatisthedynamicofthedramaticextensionofthislogicbeyond"society"inthenarrowsense,thebeginningsofwhichcanbeascribedtotheabsolutist
suppressionofpoliticallymeaningfulspeechandofthepluralityofpoliticalopinionwithinthearistoc

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racy?ToArendt,therevolutionarytransferofthenotionofsovereigntyfromkingtopeopleandtheconcomitantriseofthepoliticsofinterestarethebestsymbolic
representationsoftherelevanttrends.
48
The"compassionate"responsebytheradicalrevolutionariesinFrancetothemultitudedrivenbyneedledthemtosubstitute
willforconsent,unityforplurality,andasingleopinionfortheconflictofopinions,becauseanyaccommodationofconsent,plurality,andconflictseemedto
compromisethemosturgentanddesperatemeasuresrequiredtosolvethe"socialquestion."Themythologicalsovereigntyofthepeople,inthesenseofacollective
willwhoseonlyobjectwasaunifiedgeneralinterest,thusbecamethefoundationofapublicopinionthatcouldonlybethreatenedbyindependentpubliclife,including
thenew,decentralized,andinevitablypluralinstitutionsofthepopularstratathemselves.
49
Andwhilethedictatorialembodimentofthissupposedlygeneralwilldidnot
arisefromanactuallyunifiedoruniformpublicopinion,itwasinapositiontocreatesuchanopinion.
50
WhilethefactofnationalismallowsArendttoextendhercritiqueofsovereigntybeyonddictatorialpopulistregimes,theargumentagaindoesnotworkwellenough
fortheUnitedStates,wherenineteenthcenturycriticssuchasTocquevilleuncoveredapublicopinionofunrivaleduniformityandassimilatingpower.Arendtdoes
recallapartofTocqueville'sargumentcontrastingdemocracyandrepublics.Ademocraticsocietyinvolvesthekindofsociallevelingthatcouldopenupthewaytoa
newkindofplurality,oneofopinion,onlyincontextofcreatinggenuinerepublicaninstitutionsbasedonfreecommunicationevenatthemicropoliticallevel.Thiseffort
havinginlargepartfailed,democracyinAmericacametorevealsomeofthedespoticcharacteristicsfearedbythefounders,withthepublicspirit,basedona
multiplicityofopinions,replacedbyaunifiedandhomogeneouspublicopinion.Arendtinsiststhatthistrendwascheckedpoliticallythroughthesurvivalofsome
republicaninstitutionsonthenationalandstatelevels.Nevertheless,theriseofapoliticsofinterest,commontobothEuropeandAmerica,tendedtocompletethe
destructiveprocess.
Interestasagainst(genuine)opinionispoliticallyrelevantonlywhenbelongingtoagroup,indeedalargegroup.Therepresentationofinterestmoreorlessbindsthe
representativesandinterferes

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withthegenuineexchangeandformationofopinion.Themodernpartysysteminparticular,byfocusingoninterestrepresentation,endsupreplacingparliamentary
discussionbythecompetingcollectiveopinionsofdisciplinedpartyblocks.Thehierarchicandoligarchicstructureofthepartythusbecomesthemodelof
contemporarypolitics.Thewelfarestatemaybedemocraticinrepresentingtheinterestsofthemany,butitisoligarchicinthesenseofdrasticallycurtailing
participationonallbutthehighestlevelsofthestate.
51
TheHegelianattempttomediateprivateandpublicspheresthroughintermediarysocialpoliticalbodiesthus
windsupreducingthespaceforpublicfreedomwithinthestructureofthestate.
Thesituationismadealltheworse,inArendt'sassessment,becausethedeclineofthepublicdoesnotbenefittheprivatethesocialtendstodestroytheprivatesphere
aswell.Inthiscontext,Arendtdistinguishesbetweenprivateproperty,whichconstitutestheoutershelloftheprotectionofprivacy,andwealth.Thelatterisameans
ofdeformingthepublicrealmbutisincapableofprotectingtheprivate.
52
Becauseofitsfluidityandabsenceofstablelocation,wealthissupposedlyunableto
guaranteeasphereinwhichtheindividualisfreefromanyexternalgazeorpenetration.Moreconvincingly,Arendtarguesthat,theobjectofwealthbeingitsown
accumulationandconsumption,itspursuitcommitsindividualstouniformtrends,reflectedbyabehavioralscience,ofnotonlyeconomicproductionanddistribution
butdailylifeaswell.Notonlydoeslaboringactivitybecomemindlessanduniform,butthelifeofthehomeisinvadedbyaprocessofhomogenizationand
commodificationthatdestroysthepossibilityofanyauthenticprivatelife.Inourunlimiteddrivetoconsumption,wefinallyconsumethematerialframeworkofthe
private.
53
Masssociety,thesocietyofjobholdersandconsumers,presupposestheabsorptionoftheimmensevarietyoffamilylifeintoauniform,homogenizedsocial
realmthatbecomesafamilywritlarge.
54
Theprivatesphereresiststhisabsorptionbyaspecificallymoderncreation:intimacy.Onthelevelofasmallcircleofinterpersonalrelations,intimacyinvolvesa
tremendousdeepeningoftheprivatesphere,inthesenseofanintensificationandenrichmentof"subjectiveemotionsandprivatefeelings."
55
Thisformofprivacyis

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structuredintermsofanoppositionnottothepublicbuttothesocial.Despiteitsimmensecontributiontothecultureofmodernity,though,theintimatespheredoes
notrepresentareliablesubstitutefortheprotectiontoprivacyofferedbyproperty.Theintimatespherecannotdefenditselfagainstthemodernpatternof"unnatural
growth"ofthesocial,becausetheintensificationofsubjectivitycannotyieldastableandintersubjectiveorinstitutionalized"world."
56
WithouttracinganyfurthertheArendtianthesisconcerningthedeclineofpublicandprivate,leadingatleastidealtypicallytoafullfledged"masssociety"andto
totalitarianism,weshouldnotethestructureofherviewofmodernsociety.Inthistheory,thecomplexofthesocial,constitutedbymodernbureaucracyandpolitical
economy,confrontstworealmsonwhichthereproductionofauthentichumanlifedepend:thepublicandtheprivate.Theserealmsdoappearinmodernsociety,even
ifinasituationthatthreatenstheirveryexistence.Anyreconstructionofthehumancondition,then,wouldobviouslydependonaneworrenewedinstitutionalizationof
bothpublicandprivate.Arendt'stheoryofthemodernrevolution,understoodbroadly,exploresthechancesofsuchadoublereinstitutionalization.Intheprocess,she
notonlyrevivesthespiritofancientrepublicanismbutisforcedtodosoinwaysthatrequiretakingyetanotherlookatthemoderntoposofadifferentiatedcivil
society.
Inanothercontext,Arendtlinkstheideaofadifferentiationofstateandsociety,alreadyassociatedwith"theriseofthesocial,"totheriseofa"modern"formof
republicanism.Sheexplicitlynotesthattheearlymodern(especiallyLockean)versionofsocialcontracttheoryreferstotwocontractsandtotheoriginoftwo
differentiatedentities:"society"and"legitimategovernment."Weshouldnotbemisled,howeverArendtexplicitlydefendsonlytheprincipleofthefirstcontract,resting
onreciprocity,mutuality,andequalityandrootedinpromisingandmakingcovenants.Moreover,sheinterpretsthefirstcontractintermsofaconstitutionofbodies
politiclocally,regionally,and,ultimately,onafederallevel,leadingtoamultiplicationofpower.Shedoesnot,inotherwords,seethattheprincipleofhorizontal
covenantingestablishesanintermediatespherebetweenthestrictlyprivateandthepolitical

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public,whoseveryprinciplewouldbevoluntaryassociation.
57
Significantly,sheisskepticalregardingthesecondcontract,whoseprinciplesheunderstandsas
submissionandsurrenderofpowerandthecreationofarelationbetweenrulerandruled,onlysupposedly"legitimated"bymereconsent.Indeed,unlikethetradition
ofnaturalrightstowhichsherefers,sheseemstoconsiderthetwocontractsasmutuallyexclusive.
58
Butdoesthemereexistenceofthesecondcontractreallyvitiate
thefirst?Andisthefirstcontractsufficientuntoitselfinfoundingabodypolitic?ThemodelofdifferentiationArendtentertainshereisinfactthatbetweenpolitical
societyandstate,andifonetakesheranalysisasawhole,itisnotentirelyclearwhetherdifferentiationthusunderstoodsustainsorunderminesamodernpolitical
society.Thedilemmasofmodernrepublicanismthatsheisforcedtonotedoindeedleadherbacktoamodelofdifferentiation,ratherthanawayfromit.
Arendt'srevivalofancientrepublicanism,oftheidealofcivilsocietyaspolitikekoinonia,inthecontextsofmodernrevolutionsfromParistoBudapest,isdeservedly
wellknown.Juxtaposingdirectparticipationtorepresentation,andfederalismtounifiedsovereignty,shepresentsuswithamodelofpyramidallyorganized"small
republics,""councils,"or"wards"capableofinstitutionalizingaframeworkofpublicfreedomandestablishingaformofgovernmentatalllevelslinkedtotheparadigm
ofthecommunicativegenerationofpoweraveritable"greatrepublic."
59
Sheisconsciousofthisidea'slinktotheancientmodelofpolitikekoinoniareferringto
colonialAmerica,shespeaksoftheselfconstitutionof"civilbodiespolitic''thatwere"politicalsocieties"opentofederalismbuthostiletothedepoliticizationthat
wouldaccompanyacentralizedstatewithunifiedsovereignty.
60
AsagainstthecontemporaryconstitutedbodiesoftheEuropeanoldregime("dietsandparliaments,
ordersandestates"),theAmericanpoliticalsocietieswerenottiedtoprivilege,birth,oroccupationandoptedfromtheoutsetforstatusinpublicratherthanprivate
law.
61
Thus,ratherthanresemblingthepoliticalsocietiesoftheageofabsolutismoreventheStndestaat,thesmallAmericanrepublicsconsciouslyreturnedtothe
ancientmodelofanincorporatedcitizensociety,agenuinerespublica.Itisemphaticallythisconceptionthatremains

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normativeinArendt'spoliticalproject.Andyet,theveryegalitarianuniversalismthatdifferentiatesthesetwoconceptionsofpoliticalsocietyderivedfromsomething
new,namely,theconstitutiveprinciplesofcivilsociety,asTocquevilleknewwell.
Whileinsistingonthecontinuoushistoryofhermodelofpoliticalsocietyfromtheageofrevolutionstoourownday,Arendtisforcedtoconcedetherepeatedfailure
ofpermanentinstitutionalization.UnlikeTocqueville,though,shedoesnotseemtobeawareofthecontradictionsofwhatsheknowstobeanaristocraticmodelofthe
politicalselfselectionofelitesina"democraticage."
62
Butshedoesnotethreeareasassourcesofthisrepeatedfailure:(1)internallimitsofthehistoricalattemptsto
buildcouncilgovernments(2)thedifficultyofstabilizinganinstitutedorconstitutedpowerinamodelbasedontheactofinstitutingorconstitutingand(3)theclash
betweenrepublicanismandliberalism,betweenmodelsofpublicandprivatehappiness.
Thefirstproblemarearevolvesaroundtheencounterbetweenthecouncilmodelandthemoderneconomyandthemodernstate.Arendtrepeatedlylamentsthatall
councilexperimentsaftertheAmericanrevolutionbecamemiredinthesocialquestion(e.g.,theParisiansocieties)orinimpossibleattemptstodemocratizetheworld
ofwork(e.g.,workerscouncilsfromSt.PetersburgtoBudapest).Arendt'sdismissalofanysortofindustrialdemocracyflowsfromthedogmaticsofherconception,
fromtheautomaticinstitutionaltranslationofherseparationbetweenactionandwork.Hercautionaboutderivingutopianmodelsofworkers'controlfromamonolithic
conceptofdemocracyiswellfounded,ofcourse,althoughitiscertainlywrongtoposethequestionofindustrialdemocracyasanallornothingproposition.
Moreover,hernotionthatrevolutionarycouncilsshouldhavefocusedexclusivelyonthequestionsofestablishingandpreservingthenewpoliticalregimeisquite
unrealistic,evenifoneacceptsherthesisoftheprimacyofthepoliticalratherthanthesocialmomentinmodernrevolutions.Inthiscontext,herhardheadedness
concerningtheconstraintsimpliedbythemodernstateissurprising,ifwelcome.Sheadmitstheneedforamodernadministrationinamodernsocietyandrightly
criticizestheinabilityofthecouncilexperimentstocometotermswiththe"enormousextenttowhich

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thegovernmentmachineryinmodernsocietiesmustindeedperformthefunctionsofadministration."
63
Thus,sheisforcedtoreturntopreciselythemodelof
differentiationthatsherejectedinherdiscussionofthetwocontracts.Unfortunately,however,sheturnsonceagaintoanoverlyrigidversionofthismodel,confusing
differentiationinprinciplewiththatoftheconcernsofactualinstitutions.Asaresult,theirontightdivisionoffunctionsshesuggestsbetweenthepoliticalactionof
councilsandtheadministrativeworkofacivilservicerepresentsnosolutionwhatsoevertothetaskindicated.
Herattempttodealwiththesecondproblemisalsoonlypartiallysuccessful.Arendtisfullyconsciousofthedifficultyorevenselfcontradictioninherentinaproject
aimingattheembodimentoftherevolutionaryspiritinenduringinstitutions.
64
Withouthesitationsherenouncesthepoliticsofanykindofpermanentrevolutionbased
onthecontinuousfunctioningofapouvoirconstituantthatinevitablyproducesitsowntyrannicalopposite.
65
Buthow,then,cantherevolutionaryspiritbeembodied
atall?Theaimofrevolution,accordingtoArendt,mustbethecreationoffoundationsforanewpoliticalorder,anewconstitution.Shemaintainsthatsucha
constitution,asagainstanyliberaloreven"constitutionalist"interpretation,mustestablishpowerratherthanlimitit.Thejuxtapositionismisleading,however,because
theestablishmentofanunlimitedpower,inevitablyreturningustoamodelofpermanentrevolution,couldnotyieldanyinstitutionalizationofstablepoliticalfoundations.
AndindeedArendtattributesthisdimensionofinstitutionalizationtotheruleoflawratherthantheexerciseofpower.
66
Butwhatisthesourceofalawthatcouldlend
stabilitytoaconstitutionifourpositivelawsarefoundedintheconstitutionitself?Howarewetoescapetheviciouscircleinherentinconstitutionallawmakingitself?
Whatisthesourceofthelegitimacyofaconstituentassembly,andifitislegitimate,whatcanjustifyitsselfdissolution?Arendtdoesnotbelievethatanyversionofa
returntotheeighteenthcenturytheoryofanabsolutenaturallaw,priortoandaboveconstitutions,cansupplytheanswertothesequestionstoday.
67
Asaresult,she
hasagreatdealofdifficultyindistinguishingbetweenthesourceoflawandthatofpower,preciselythedilemmathat,inheranalysis,leadstotheradicalinstabilityof

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constitutions.Heronlyanswer,inthespiritofRomanratherthanGreekantiquity,isthattheconstitutionasanactoffoundationcanreplacetheabsolutesourceoflaw
ifitdevelops,asitdidintheUnitedStates,intoatraditionofanewtype.Insuchacontext,theviciouscircleofconstitutionallawwillapplyonlytothefoundational
moment.Subsequently,theconstitutionaltraditionitself,authoritativelyinterpretedbyabodywithoutpower,willsupplythesanctionforalawcapableofstabilizingthe
frameworkoftheexerciseofpower.Butisthemakingofconstitutionalauthorityamatteroftraditioncompatiblewiththepursuitofpublicfreedomasourhighestend?
Canafreedomwhosevehicleispubliccommunicationanddiscoursestopatthelimitsconstitutedbyasupposedlysacredfoundation?Thedeeptensionbetweencivil
religionandpublicfreedomisbuiltintothismodelfromtheoutset,atensiononlyexacerbatedwhentheconceptofpublicfreedomisreplaced,asintheactual
historicaltrend,bythatoftheprivate.
ThethirdreasonforthedifficultyofestablishinginstitutionsofpublicfreedominArendt'sanalysisisrepresentedbytheclashofancientrepublicanandmodernliberal
principles,bythesubversiveimplicationsofthegoalofprivatehappinessforpublicfreedom.Inthiscontext,Arendtfindsthatshecannotgiveaselfcontained
republicananswertothechallengeoftheliberalmodelofcivilsocietybasedontheseparationofavaluedsocietyandastatewithoutnorms.Thiscomesabout
primarilybecausesheholdsthepublicandprivatespherestobe,intheirdifferentiation,constitutiveforoneanother.Shedoesmaintainwithapprovalthatthe"actual
contentofthe[U.S.]constitutionwasbynomeansthesafeguardofcivillibertiesbuttheestablishmentofanentirelynewsystemofpower."
68
Butshealsomakes
repeatedlyclearthat,withoutthesafeguardofcivilliberties,atleastinthemodernworld,publicpoliticallifecannotbemaintained.Sheisleftintheendwiththe
precariouspositionthat,whiletheestablishmentofcivillibertiesrepresentsaveryreal,thoughunfortunatelyalltooexceptional,gaininrevolutions,toogreatafocuson
rightsandtheprivatehappinesstheycansecuretendstodevaluepublichappinessandfreedom.
Arendtiswellawareoftheoriginsofcivilrightsinthemodernsense.Ononeside,themodernsovereignstaterepresentedanentirelynewtypeofthreattoindividual
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themoreorlesscontemporaryerosionofthetraditional,religious,andcorporateformsofprotectionmadeindividualsincreasinglydefenseless.Theparadoxof
"humanrights"fromArendt'spointofviewisthatwhileprotectionisneededinthefaceofthemodernstate,onlywithintheframeworkofastateissuchprotection
plausibleatall.Outsidethebodypolitic,themostfundamentalright,namely,therighttohaverightsbasedontheabilitytoassertanddefendrightspublicly,cannotbe
secure.Thus,modernrightsshouldbeunderstoodascitizenrightsguaranteedbyconstitutions.
69
Thisearlystrainofherargumentseemstomakecivilrightsfunctions
ofapublicspheretobeestablishedinthefaceofthemodernstate.
Arendtsooncametounderstandthatrights,eveniftheycouldbestabilizedonlyasrightsofcitizens,mustbedefendedeveninfaceofacitizenbody,ifneedbe.Given
thetendency,alwayspresent,ofpublicpowertoabsorbprivateinterests,andgiventhemodernerosionofaformofpropertycapableofcarvingoutaprivatespace
ofprotectionforcitizens,civilrightsareneededtostabilizetheprivatesphere.ItisatthispointthatArendtmostclearlyconcedesthefundamentalliberalclaimthatin
amodernsociety,freedomisnotpossibleunlesscivilsocietyandstatearedifferentiatedbymechanismsofcivilrights.
ArendtthenimmediatelymovesfromtheliberalthesistooneinspiredbyMarx.Whilecivilrightscanindeedprotecttheprivatespherefrompenetrationbythemodern
state,theycannotdosointhefaceofthemoderneconomy.
70
Arendtdoesnotinthiscontextconsiderthepossibilitythatanexpandedandreorganizedcatalogueof
rightscouldactuallyhaveananalogousrelationshiptobothstateandeconomy.Whateverhopeshehasconcerningtherestrictionandcontrolofeconomicforcesand
growththereforedependsontheexistenceofapublicrealmredifferentiatedfromthesocialone,independentof"politicaleconomy."Yethere,too,civilrightsmust
playaroletotheextentthatadifferentiatedprivatesphereremainsthesinequanonoftheemergenceofpersonalitiescapableofparticipatinginthepublicsphere
itself.WhateversuccesstheAmericanrevolutionhadinestablishingrepublicaninstitutionsisrelatedtothepreservationofcivilrights,whilethefailureofallothergreat
revolutionsinthisrespectislinkedtotheirsystematicviolationsofrights.
71

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Thus,inArendt'sconception,thedifferentiationofcivillibertyprotectedbyrightsandpublicfreedomsecuredbytheexerciseofpoliticalpowerhelpstoestablish
each.Butatthesametime,theerosionofthelinebetweenthemtendstodestroyboth.Thisrestatementofherconceptionofpublicandprivateintermsofdemocracy
andrightsisnot,however,theendofArendt'sconsiderationoftheproblemofcivilliberties.Shealsomaintainsthat,fromthemomentofitsestablishment,themodel
offreedombasedonrightsremainsathreattothemodelbasedonpower.
AccordingtoArendt'sinterpretation,theU.S.BillofRightssoughtonlytocontrolandlimitrepublicanpowerinsteadoftryingtoreplaceitsaimsbynonpoliticalones,
aswasthecasewiththeFrenchDeclarationoftheRightsofManandCitizen.
72
Andyetevenhere,areversalwastooccurinwhichpublicfreedomcametobe
subordinatedtocivilliberties,thecitizentotheprivateindividual.Atstakearetwodifferentmodelsofhappinessleadingtotwodifferentunderstandingsof
"constitutionalism."InArendt'soveralldiagnosis,theshiftfromthevaluesofpublichappiness,freedom,andcivicspirittoprivatehappinessandthecorresponding
negativemodeloffreedomtendtobeascribedfundamentallytotheriseofsociety.Butsinceheranalysisoftheriseofsociety,especiallyintheAmericancontext,is
neverreallyadequate,sheisalsoattimestemptedtoreversethecausalnexus.Shemaintains,inotherwords,thataliberalcomponentstressingprivatehappiness(the
cultivationandenjoymentofone'sprivateconcerns)asthehighestendoflifetendedfromthebeginningtoundermine,inthephilosophicalselfunderstandingifnotthe
practiceoftheAmericanrevolution,therepublicancomponentlinkedtotheideathatpublichappinessbasedonpoliticalparticipationisthehighestgood.
73
Thus,the
modelArendtdefendsnotonlyfullydifferentiatespublicandprivatebutalsoassertsthemotivationalprimacyofthetheformer.Withprivatehappinessachieving
primacy,freedomwasredefined:Insteadofmeaningthepositivefreedomtoact,itcametomeannegativefreedomfromtheactionofothers.Evenmoredecisively,
theaimofaconstitution"constitutionalism"shiftedfromtheestablishmentofanewformofgenuinelypublicpowertotheprotectionofindividualsfromtheexercise
ofpower.Politicalfreedomcametobeunderstoodnotasafunctionofan

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increaseofpower,butasoneofalimitationofpower.Thisliberalidealofconstitutionalismcametomeanadistrustregardingallformsofpowerandanincreasing
indifferencetowardtheforminwhichpowerwasexercised,solongascivilliberties(themselvesnotpowers)asthebulwarksofprivatehappinesswereprotected.
74

Thisversionofconstitutionalism,however,provedtobequitecompatiblewithabureaucraticformofgovernmentexpressingthelogicofthe"riseofthesocial."Inthe
end,arightscenteredpoliticscouldnotdefendeventheprivatesphereitselfagainstthedestructivetrendsofthemodernstateandsociety.
Arendt'sunderstandingofrightsitselfsuffersfromalackofdifferentiationreflectingherunwillingnesstotakeseriouslytheideaofmediationbetweenprivateand
public.Theambiguousstatusoftherightsofassemblyandassociationinherworkprovesthispoint.Ontheonehand,theserightsareclassedwithnegativeliberties,
thatis,freedomfromunjustifiedrestraint.EvenintheAmericanBillofRights,therightofassemblywas,accordingtoher,only"therighttoassembleinorderto
petition."Whattheindividualgainsfromsucharightis"liberation"ratherthan"freedom"atmost,theabilitytopetitioncollectivelymayleadtosomerestraining
influenceover,butneverparticipationin,agovernment.
75
Ontheotherhand,therightsofassembly,association,andspeecharealsoreferredtoasthemostimportant
trulypoliticalfreedoms,ascontrastedwithapoliticalfreedomssuchasthatofenterprise.
76
Whileshearguesthatthisstatuswasreachedthroughadevelopment
beyondthelimitsoftheBillofRights,forexample,
77
shedoesnotclarifywhetherandhowthissupposeddevelopmentproducedanewstatusforwhatremained
juridicallyaconstitutionalliberty.Inanycase,eventhediscussionadmittingthestatusoftherightofassemblyasapoliticalfreedomculminateswithadeclarationthat
"politicalfreedom,generallyspeaking,meanstheright'tobeaparticipatoringovernment'oritmeansnothing.''
78
Thisdeclarationsetsupstandardsthatcanrarelybe
satisfiedbywhattherightofassemblyactuallyguaranteesinevenitsmostdevelopedversions.
TheissuegoesdeepinArendt'sconceptionofrightsandreflectsherambivalenceconcerningtheultimatefoundationofrights.Indeed,shehastwoconceptions
concerningthecoreofasystemof

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rights.Onelinks"therighttohaverights"toaccesstoapublicsphereinwhichrightscanbeassertedanddefended.
79
Theotherisolatestherighttocarveouta
privatespherelinkedtoprivatepropertyasthebasicmodelofallrights.Accordingly,therightofassemblyisinterpretedineachoftheseways,asadimensionof
politicalparticipationandalsoaspartoftheprivatetobeprotectedfromthepublic.Thefirstconceptionwouldmaketherightsofassemblyandspeechthemost
fundamentalrights.Thesecondconception,however,tendstoassimilatethese"rightsofcommunication"tothemodelofpropertyright,deprivingthemofanyspecial
importanceinthecatalogueofrights.Thisambiguitydoesinfactrevealsomethingaboutthepeculiarlydoublenatureoftherightsofcommunication.But,
characteristicallyenough,whatdoesnotariseatallinArendt'sconceptionisthattherightofassemblyisbothcivilandpolitical,bothprivateandpublic.Inother
words,Arendthasnoroomfortheconceptofarightofjuridicallyprivatepersonswhocantherebyattainpubliclawstatusandevenexerciseanimportantpublic
role,thusmediatingbetweenprivateandpublicspheres.
TheabsenceoftheverypossibilityofmediationbetweenpublicandprivateinArendt'sworkisallthemoreseriouswhentheexerciseoftherightsofassemblyand
associationturnsexplicitlypolitical,inparticularinthecaseofsocialmovements.Indeed,socialmovementscouldhaveplayedaconstitutiveroleinArendt'stheoryin
thecontextofaproblemshecouldnotadequatelydealwith.Sincemovementshaveempiricallydemonstrablelifecycles,shecouldhavecastthemasembodimentsof
revolutionaryspiritthatdonotimplyapermanentrevolution.Indeed,shecouldhaveinterpretedthemasextrainstitutionalinstancesofthegenerationofpowerthatin
thelongrunpresupposeandpromoteratherthaninterferewithinstitutionalization.
80
Arendtis,ofcourse,awareoftheroleofmovementsintheemergenceofcouncil
Yrepublicanexperimentsaboveall,sheexaminestheworkers'movement,which"haswrittenoneofthemostgloriousandprobablymostpromisingchaptersof
recenthistory."
81
Workingoutsidetheeconomicallyorientedlaborunionsandthesociallyoriented"political"parties,themovementoftheindustrialworkingclass
repeatedlyreinventedthegenuinelypoliticalprojectofconstructingnew,

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republicaninstitutions.AccordingtoArendt,thiswaspossiblewhenevertheclassoflabor,notyetadmittedtosociety("classsociety"),suddenlyappearedonthe
publicpoliticalstage.
82
Herargumentisentirelyfictitious,though,sincethemovementsfrom1848to1956towhichshereferscannotberepresentedashavingno
socialandeconomicinterestsanddemands,andevenlessasnotplayingamajorpartintheeconomicreproductionofsociety.AndindeedArendtherselfisforcedto
admitthisimplicitlywhenshearguesthatinterestinworkers'controlofindustry,everpresentinthemovementsunderconsideration,wasamajorreasonforthe
downfallofcouncilexperiments.
83
Arendt'slinkingofthemovementformwithrepublicanexperimentsis,inherownview,relevanttoaphaseofmodernhistoryalreadypast.Withtheemergenceof
"masssociety,"aformof"society"capableofabsorbingallclassesincludingthatoflabor,nomovementcanhopetoclaimastatusthatisexclusivelypolitical,rather
thansocialoreconomic.Nowthelabormovementbecomesapressuregrouplikeanyother.
84
Sinceinterestarticulationandinterestrepresentation(parties)are,at
best,the"politics"ofcivilsociety,theysubstituteforrealpoliticalparticipation,replacingpoliticalsocietyanddiscursiveopinionformationwithbargaininganddeals.
Becauseinterestgroupsandpartypoliticsdestroytheparliamentarypublicspace,theyareinfactinferiortotheadministrativeprocessingofinterestclaims.
85
Howdoesthissquarewiththepersistenceofthemovementforminourtime?Coulditbethatthedespisedterrainofthesocialcouldafterallbecomethesceneof
repoliticizationinthecontextofmovementsthatconstituteanewpublicsphereandtherebymediatebetweentheprivateandthepublic?Arendtcertainlyarguesthat
themovementformitselfdoesnotdisappearalongwiththeclassicalworkers'movement.Indeed,sheassumesthattheirterrainisthesocialrealmbetweenwhatisleft
oftheprivateandthepublic.Adoptingaradicalizedversionofthepluralistcritiqueofmasssocietythatusestotalitarianmovementsasitsparadigm,however,Arendt
isconvincedthatsocialmovementsaccelerateandcompletethesocialrealm'sdestructionofthepublicandtheprivate.Thatis,socialmovementsproperfeedoffand
helptocreateandperpetuatetheatomizationanddepoliticizationcharac

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teristicofmasssociety.Underconditionsofthemodernpartysystemandthedeepdistrustengenderedbyit,Arendtseesfertilesoilfortheemergenceof
extraparliamentaryandextrapartymovements.Themoreglaringthefailuresofthepartysystem,theeasieritisformovementstoariseandtoappealtowide
constituencies.Butintheabsenceofgenuinepublicinstitutions,movementseitherorganizemassesorturnthosetheyorganizeintomasses.Socialmovementsaremass
movements,andmassmovementscarryontheworkofthesocialprinciplebyinvadingandlevelingallhithertoprivatedomainsoflife,includingfamily,education,and
culture.
86
Thus,socialmovementsareprotototalitarian,andthetotalitariancompletionoftheriseofsocietyisnotpossiblewithoutthem.
Giventheirstartingpointinsocietyandtheirmobilizationofsocialneedsandmotivations,movementscannotreinventformsofpubliclife.Thisthesis,wemustnote,
coincideswiththeconceptionofsocialmovementsdominantintheearlypostWorldWarIIparadigmsthatstudiedsocialmovementsunderthenamesofcollective
behaviorandmasssociety.
87
Arendt'sradicaldemocraticpoliticalphilosophydistinguishedherworkfromtheseparadigms.Butbypartiallybuyingintothem,
probablyundertheimpactofherownexperiencewithtotalitarianmovements,shedeprivedherpoliticalphilosophyofanypossiblepolitics.
88
Ifmovementstoday,
becauseoftheinevitablysocialterrainoftheiremergenceandexistence,cannotreinventorextendthepublicsphere,andifrightsorientedcollectiveactionisathreat
totheloveofpublicfreedom,thenitisnotatallclearthatinourepochtheexperimentsoftheworkingclassmovementincreatingpoliticalinstitutionscanhaveany
continuationwhatsoever.IfArendtisrightaboutsocialmovementsassuch,herdreamoftherevivalofrepublicanismshouldbepronouncedfinallydead.

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5
TheHistoricistCritique:
CarlSchmitt,ReinhartKoselleck,andJrgenHabermas
TheOriginsoftheLiberalPublicSphere:
CarlSchmittandReinhartKoselleck
HannahArendtfailedtodemonstratethathernormativeidealofthepublicsphereiscompatiblewithmodernity.Wehavearguedthatthisfailurewasstronglylinkedto
heruncompromisingcritiqueofthesocialsphereofmediation,whichshehadidentifiedasthespecificallymoderndimensionofinstitutionallife.Thus,itisofgreat
importancethatthereisanalternativetraditionofinterpretationfocusingontheproblemofthepublicsphere.TheapproachofJrgenHabermasandhisfollowers
counterposesasociallyrootedformofthepublicspheretotheancientmodelidentifiedwiththestate.
1
Remarkably,thissecondtraditiongoesbacktoCarlSchmitt,
whosoughttodefendaconceptionof"thepolitical"basedonamodelofwaragainstwhathetooktobeanapoliticalconceptionbasedonpublicdiscussion,amodel
thatwastodefinethedeepestimpulsesofbothArendtandHabermas.
2
AccordingtoSchmitt,oneofthebestwaystounderstandmodernliberalismisbyfocusingonits"political"expression,namely,parliamentarism.Theprincipleofthe
latterisopenpublicdiscussionordeliberation.
3
Beyondmerenegotiationandbargaining,whatSchmitthasinmindisamodelofdiscussioninthesenseof
anexchangeofopinionthatisgovernedbythepurposeofpersuadingone'sopponentofthetruthorjusticeofsomething,orallowingoneselftobepersuadedofsomethingas
trueandjust....Todiscussionbelongsharedconvictionsaspremises,thewillingnesstobepersuaded,indepen

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dencefrompartyties,freedomfromselfishinterests....[T]heessenceofparliamentisthereforepublicdeliberationofargumentandcounterargument,publicdebateandpublic
discussion.
4
Thus,acommonpoliticalwillresultsfromtheprocessofthegenuineandopenconfrontationofdifferentopinions.Thisprocessissupposedtobepublicintwosenses:
byreferringtotheworkofanautonomouspublicbodyfreetodeliberatewithoutanyexternalcompulsionimposeduponitsmembers,andbybeinggenuinelyopento
theoutside.Inbothofthesesenses,modernparliamentarismisdefinitivelycontrastedwithitsforerunners,theestateassemblies,whichwerebasedontheimperative
mandateandclosedsessions.Undermodernparliamentarism,insteadofthedirectpressureofconstituenciesoranyformofboundormandatedrepresentation,public
opinionissupposedto"influence"theparliamentarypubliconlythroughargumentationandpersuasionthatpresupposesratherthansuspendstheindependenceofthe
representatives.
SchmittanticipatesandascribestoliberalparliamentarismboththeArendtiandefenseofopinionagainstinterestandtheHabermasianmodelofgenuineargumentation
asdistinctfromstrategicandrhetoricalusesofpoliticalspeech.Unlikebothofthem,however,hetreatsthediscussionmodelasdeeplyapolitical,linkingittothe
fundamentalliberalfaiththatunrestrictedcompetition,whichtakestheformofdiscussionintheintellectualrealm,producesharmony.
5
AccordingtoSchmitt,this
liberalmodeloftheparliamentarypublicsphereistakenoverfrommoralandintellectualdiscourseontheonesideandfromeconomicsontheother.Itturnsa
"politicallyunitedpeople"intoaculturallyinterestedpublicoranindustrialconcernoperatinginamarket,intheprocessdepoliticizinganddemilitarizingthepolitical
sphere,turningthestateintosociety.
6
Schmittiskeenlyawarethatthestateandpoliticsinhissensedonottherebydisappearinliberalsociety.Theprincipledoesnot,neednot,andcannotfullycorrespond
totheactualpractice.Asheputsitinsomewhatobscurelanguage,"thereisheterogeneityofpurposes...butthereisnoheterogeneityofprinciples."
7
Theprincipleof
openpublicdiscussionisactuallyaprincipleoflegitimation,anormativeandevenmetanormativeprinciple.Assuch,its

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immediateimportanceisthatitisthebasisforthevalidityofothernorms.Schmittparticularlystressesthatthenormsoftheindependenceofrepresentatives,their
freedomofspeechandimmunity,andtheopennessofproceedingsallreceivetheirvalidityfromtheprincipleofpublicdiscussionastheonlylegitimatemethodfor
attainingacollectivewill.
8
Eventhetwentiethcenturyclaimthatparliamentisthe"best"methodfortheselectionofelitesdrawsitslegitimacyfromthediscussion
model(orwhatisleftfromitinaframeworkofincreasinglyrhetoricalinteraction),sincethevalidtestingofleadersisidentifiedwithperformanceindebateandwith
havingtheabilitytopersuadeotherssuccessfully.
9
Schmittiswellawarethattheprincipleofpublicitywascapableofoperatingonlyinaworlddifferentfromthatofitsownassumptions,involvingareductionofall
politicstodiscussion.Whilethedeepeststrivingofliberalism,intheoryatleast,wastoreducethestatetosocietyineithertheeconomicortheculturalsense,infact
liberalismpresupposedandcouldnotsurvivewithoutastate,orwithoutthedualisticcoexistenceofstateandsociety.Moreover,andthisistheimportantpoint,
Schmitt,unlikeArendt,realizesthattheprincipleofdiscussionbelongstothelevelofsocietyratherthanthatofthestate.QuiteinthespiritofHegel's
Rechtsphilosophie,parliamentisthusseenasthepenetrationofsocietyintothestate,reproducingineffectthesocietystatedualisminthestatesphereitself,thereby
"mediating"thesplitbetweenthepolesoftheduality.
Schmitt'smodernizedreconstructionoftheHegelianframeworkismuchcruderthanthatofthemasterwhoseconceptionofthe"estateassembly"hecites.
10
In
particular,hedoesnotdistinguishbetweenthesystemofneedsandtheotherlevelsofcivilsociety,nordoesherecognizeanymediationotherthanthatofparliament
betweensocietyandstate.Forhim,allthefundamentalpoliticalpolaritiesoftheepochofconstitutionalmonarchies(princevs.people,governmentvs.popular
representation,administrationvs.selfadministration),underwhichhe(inconsistently)subsumesclassicalliberalism,expressonefundamentaldualism:societyvs.the
state.
11
Thisdualismis,inturn,afunctionofthe"polemical"attitudeofsocialforces(economic,intellectual,andreligious)towardthebureaucraticallyunifiedmilitary
administrativestateinheritedfromtheepochofabsolutism.
12

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Butitwasalsoafunctionofthisstatetoremainindependentandstrongenoughtostandabovetheothersocialforces:tobeastrongenoughthreattomotivatethe
relativizationofotherformsofsocial(economic,confessional,cultural)oppositionandconflictandalsotheresultingselfconstitutionofamoreorlessunified"society."
Atthesametime,thisstatehadtobeselfsufficientenoughtoundertakeandsurvive(andperhapsalsobestrengthenedby)apolicyofnoninterventionandself
neutralizationvisvisthesocietalspheres,allowingthesespheres(economy,culture)tounfoldtheirautonomouslogics.
Thestabilityandtheequilibriumoftheresultingdualityisachievedbythemediationofparliament."Popularrepresentation,parliament,thelawmakingbodyis
conceivedasthestage(Schauplatz)wheresocietyappearsinthefaceofthestate."
13
Onthisstage,stateandsocietyare"integratedinto"oneanother.Intermsof
form,theresultisdualistic,comprisinga"legislativestate"andan"executivestate,"withtheformer,theGesetzgebungsstaat,graduallyachievingprimacyasthe
nineteenthcenturyproceeds.Thisdevelopmentcorrespondstotheideologyofparliamentarismalreadydiscussed,accordingtowhichonlydecisionsachievedthrough
"discussionandtheconflictofopinions''arelegitimate.TheideaonlyapparentlycontradictsSchmitt'snotionthattheprincipleofdiscussionissocialandindeed
apolitical.Themetaphorofastageseemstoindicatethatwhatactuallyoccurshereisamereplayorshow,necessaryforintegratingsocialforcesandlegitimatingthe
realdecisionsthataretakenelsewhereandinanothermanner.
Thepolemicalattitudeofsocietyagainstthestateimpliesthatsuchastateofaffairscannotbeaccepted.Thisisespeciallythecasewhentheideaoftheself
organizationofsocietyisdemocratized.Fordemocraticforcesthatidentifywiththeirparliamentaryrepresentation,theresidualnonparliamentarydecisionmaking
poweroftheexecutive,whichbypassesthepluralityofsocialopinionsinsteadofintegratingthem,mustseemillegitimate.Thegoalofacompletedlegislativestate
cannotbeachieved,though.Whatisatissuehereisnotthatapureparliamentarystatecannotbefoundinreality,anymorethancanotherpurestatetypes.Rather,the
parliamentarystate,unlikeotherforms,representstheidealofthestateastheselforganizationofsociety,astheorganizationofthe

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stateaccordingtothesocietalprincipleofdiscussion.AccordingtoSchmitt,asthisidealnearsrealizationundertheimpactofdemocratization,paradoxicallythe
parliamentaryprincipleofintegrationlosesitsfoundations,andthestateitself,deprivedofanotherprincipleofunity,isthreatenedwithdisintegration.
InSchmitt'sconception,theabilityofthoseoutsideparliamenttoidentifywiththeirrepresentativesrestsonapolemicalattitudetothestatethatguaranteesthe
unificationofasocietyotherwisepotentiallydividedbyconflictsofbothopinionandinterest.Butthisisnotthewholestory.Theformsoftheselfconstitutionandself
protectionofparliamentvisvistheexecutiveactuallyturnouttobeidenticaltothemechanismsdifferentiatingsocietyandstate.Clearly,parliamentarydiscussion
wouldbemeaninglesswithoutthefreedomsofopinionandspeechaswellastheimmunityofrepresentativesthesearepresuppositionsoftheconstitutionofagenuine
publicbody.ButSchmittalsoindicatesthataparliamentarypublicsphereimpliesthefreedomofpubliclifeoutsideofparliament.
14
InterpretingGuizot,heassertsthat
theopennessofparliamentaryprocedureswouldbemeaninglesswithoutgeneralfreedomsofopinion,speech,andthepress.Withoutthesefreedoms,allformsof
socialcontroloverparliament,whicharerequiredfortheparliamentaryrepresentationofsocietyinthefaceofthestate,woulddisappear.SinceSchmitt'smodel
presupposesandrequirestheabilityofprivateindividualstoacquireandcommunicatetheiropinionsfreely,itseemsthatsomeotherfreedoms,suchasthoseof
assemblyandassociationintheirextraparliamentaryforms,alsorepresent"lifeanddeathquestionsforliberalism."
15
ButSchmittpaysnoattentiontothesocial
consequencesoftheselatterfreedoms,whichprovidedforHegelthepossibilityofmediationsotherthanparliamentarybetweenindividualandstate.Finally(and
consistently),Schmittmakesnomentionofanyfundamentalrightsthatcannotbederivedfromtheprincipleofparliamentarypublicity,whatevertheirimportancemay
befortheliberalepoch(e.g.,property).Thisconsistency,however,onlypermitshimthepreposterousformulationthat,withthedeclineofparliamentarism,"thewhole
systemoffreedomofspeech,assembly,andthepress,ofpublicmeetings,parliamentaryimmunities,andprivilegeslosesitsrationale,"whichisbasedonthe

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beliefthat"Justlawsandrightpoliticscanbeachievedthroughnewspaperarticles,speechesatdemonstrations,andparliamentarydebates."
16
Schmitt'sanalysisleadstothisconclusion,irrespectiveofhispoliticalpredilections,becausehisperceptiverecognitionofthesocialfoundationsofthemodelof
discussioniscoupledwithaconceptionassertingmorethantheclaimthattheexistenceofparliamentsinthemodernsensepresupposesthedifferentiationofsociety
andstate.Healsoaffirmstheconverse,namely,thattheunityanddifferentiationofsocietyisstructurallydependent(atleastinthelongterm)ontheexistenceofa
parliamentaryrepresentationinthefaceofthestate,towhichhe,unlikeHegel,reducesthewholeproblemofmediation.Yethenotesinpassingthattherearenot
manypeople"whowanttorenouncetheoldliberalfreedoms,particularlyfreedomofspeechandpress,"evenwhentheirpoliticalefficacyhasbecomedoubtful.
17
In
Schmitt'sentirelypoliticalanalysisandcritiqueofliberalism,however,itisquiteunclearwhy,withtheirpoliticalefficacygone,anyoneshouldclingtothesenorms.
Thereare,tobesure,hintsinhisanalysisthatthesocietystateoppositionandeventheconstitutionofapublicspherearenotidenticaltotheissueofparliamentarism,
indeed,thattheyactuallypredatedithistorically.Hewrites:
publicopinionattainedthisabsolutecharacterfirstintheeighteenthcentury,duringtheEnlightenment.ThelightofthepublicisthelightoftheEnlightenment,aliberationfrom
superstition,fanaticism,andambitiousintrigue.Ineverysystemofenlighteneddespotism,publicopinionplaystheroleofanabsolutecorrective.
18
Thisthesis,relativelyunimportantinSchmitt'sownwork,waspowerfullyexpandedbyahistorianhestronglyinfluenced,ReinhartKoselleck,inhisKritikundKrise
(1959).
19
AccordingtoKoselleck,theabsolutiststateontheEuropeancontinent,formedasaresponsetoreligiouscivilwar,createdthefoundationsforapolitical
dualismbyfreeingitselffromallnormsinlinewiththedoctrineofraisond'tat.
20
Theresultingseparationofpoliticsandmorals,aswellastheincreasingdisinterestof
thestate(anticipatedbyHobbes)incontrollingprivate,individualconscience,createda

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possiblefootholdfortheconstitutionofanewformation,"society,"firstapartfromandlateragainstthestate.Theoldregime,ofcourse,nevercreatedacompletely
monistic,statizedsociety:Theolderestates,nowdepoliticized,preservedtheircorporateexistence.Therewere,moreover,neworganizationalformsofanemerging,
bourgeoisclasscomposedofthebeneficiariesofthefirsttrulynationaleconomicpolicyinEuropeanhistory.Outofthesetwostrata,combiningwithelementsof
intellectualandjudicialelites,camethesocialbasesoftheenlightenment,onepossessingmoney,socialrecognition,andintellectualinfluence,butnotpoliticalpower.
Nevertheless,the"society"oftheenlightenmentwasorganized,withtheprivatesalon,thecaf,theclub,thelibrary,theMasoniclodge,andlaterthesecretsocietyas
itsmajorforms.AccordingtoKoselleck,manyoftheseunpoliticalformsofassemblyandassociationwere,infact,protectedbyofficialsoftheabsolutiststate.
21
In
spiteofsuchprotection,theywouldtakeanantistateturnastheeighteenthcenturyprogressed.
Thesupportofenlightenedstateofficialsisrelativelyeasytoexplain,sincethenewformation"society,"astypifiedbytheMasonicideology,wasegalitarianinitsethos
andopposedtotheprivilegedsocietyofaristocraticandecclesiasticalorders,itselfthemainenemyof"enlightenedabsolutism."Moreover,societywasnotsupposed
tobeathreattothestatebecauseitsselfunderstandingwasmoralratherthanpolitical.Preciselyonthegroundoftheabsolutistunderstandingofpoliticsasraison
d'tat,moralvirtuewasdefinedasfreedomfrompolitics.ThisexpansionoftheHobbesianfreedomofprivate,individualconsciencewas,however,nolonger
compatiblewiththeinternallogicofabsolutistdepoliticization.FollowingSchmitt,Koselleckimpliesthattheunityoftheheterogeneouselementsof"society"couldbe
maintainedonlyinoppositiontothestate.Indeed,ashisanalysisoftheMasonicmovementshows,suchanoppositionwasmadepossiblebythefactthatweaponsof
theestablishedpowerswereutilized,atleastinitially,fortheselforganizationofsociety:Thesecrecyoftheabsolutistregimeandthehierarchicalorganizationofthe
socialorderswerethegluebehindtheideologyoffraternityandsolidarity.
Ofcourse,theenlightenmentbecamebothmorepublicandmoreegalitarianasitbecameabroadmovement.Accordingto

Page208
Koselleck,suchatransformation,leadingtoapolarizationbetweensocietyandstate,wasalreadyimplicitintherigidjuxtapositionofmoralityandpolitics.Thevery
constitutionofa"society"basedonmoralsrepresentedajudgmentoverandarejectionofabsolutistsovereignty,withoutanyvisibleattackonstateinstitutions.The
rejectionofpoliticswasatthesametimetheestablishmentofamoralvantagepointforcriticizingandjudgingpolitics.Themoralpressureemanatingfrom"society,"
creatingawholesystemofvaluesalternativetotheestablishedones,couldnotavoidbeingasourceofinfluenceoveractionandthereforebecominganindirectform
ofpoliticalpower.Moralitywasdirectlyunpolitical,butexactlyforthisreasonitcouldputanamoralstateintoquestionandthusbecome,afterall,political,ifindirectly
so.
22
Theradicalizationoftheprogramofsocietyagainstthestatepostponedtheappearanceofanentirelyunpoliticalprogram.InKoselleck'spresentation,thisprogram
wentthroughthestagesoftakingadistancefrompolitics,critique,judgment,andexecution.Sincetheabsolutiststatecouldnotbeeliminated,selflimitationhadtobe
practiced.Initiallythisselflimitationcontainedacomponentthatwas,becauseoftheoverwhelmingdisparityofpower,merelystrategic.Butitalsohadanormatively
validatedantipoliticalcomponentbasedonprinciples.Thelatter,however,wasselfnegatingtotheextentthatevenanantipoliticalmoralityhaddifficultyreconciling
itselfwithimmoralityintheworldofpolitics.Intheradicalenlightenment,then,themoralsphereconstituteditself,insecret,asanother,alternative,politicalone.The
aimofthispoliticalsocietywasnolongercoexistencewiththestatebutratheritsdissolutionandreplacement.Themethodsofeducation,schooling,propaganda,and
enlightenmentwerenolongeradequateforthenewpurpose,andthisimpliedthatevenstrategicselflimitationhadtobeseenasmerelytemporary.
Inthisway,Koselleckconvincinglyrevivestheideaofanintrinsicconnectionbetweenenlightenmentandthecrisisoftheoldregime,andbetweenthiscrisisandthe
comingrevolution.ItisinthiscontextthatheseekstolocatetheSchmittiantoposoftheemergenceoftheliberalpublicsphere,hererepresentingthepoliticalturnof
societyinoppositiontothestate.PierreBayle'sideaofarepublicofletters,accordingtoKoselleckthemodelforRousseauian

Page209
radicaldemocracy,indicateswhatisatstake.Ontheoneside,this"republic"isstilltobebasedonthecontrastbetweenapowerlessmorallawandanamoralpower.
Ontheother,thiscontrastisinterpretedastheconfrontationofthergnedelacritiquewiththeruleofthestate,indicatingthatcritique,theweaponparexcellenceof
thepublicsphere,hasturnedpolitical.
Thistransformationcarriedrisks.Takingthepointofviewofthestate,Koselleckarguesthattheideaofcritique,turninginwardtosocietyitself,mustfailasameansof
socialintegrationandmustultimatelyleadtoareappearanceintheprivatesphereofthecivilwarsuppressedbyabsolutism.Herethedeeplyapoliticalpotentialofthe
liberalideaofthepublicsphere,asinSchmitt'sdoctrine,showsitself.Atthesametime,aslongasthestateas"enemy"exists,thecritical,polemicalcontestationofits
legitimacyprovidesthecohesionofthe"friend"componentofthepolarity,thealternativepoliticalsociety.Thiscontestationiscarriedoutinthemediumofpublic
criticism.Inthepublicrealm,critiquebecomesthemeansofamplifyingpublicopinion,exposingeverything,destroyingalltaboos,anddeprivingitspoliticalenemies,
organizedaroundthestate,oflegitimacyandmeansofcohesion.
23
Effectivelybuilttocounterthecriticismofweapons,theabsolutiststatefailsagainsttheweaponof
criticism,which,becauseofitssupposedlyunpoliticalnature,disempowersaproperlymilitantpoliticalresponse.
Becauseitisconcernedwiththeriseofthedichotomyofstateandsociety,Koselleck'sanalysisstressesthepoliticaldimensionoftheliberalpublicsphereratherthan
thepotentiallyapoliticalimplicationsthat,inSchmitt'sconception,characterizethetriumphofsocietyoverthebureaucraticmilitarystate.Nevertheless,theseapolitical
potentialitiesappearinKoselleck'spictureinthetendencyoftheagentstohidethepoliticaldimensionoftheiractionsnotonlyfromthestatebutalsofromthemselves.
Paradoxically,itisthisrefusalofpoliticsbypoliticalagentsthatleadsnotonlytothedissolutionoftheabsolutiststatebutalsotoaninabilitytoestablishanewmodel
ofthepolitical.Evenbeforethecollapseoftheoldregime,byinsistingonrecognizingonlyitsownmoralmotivation,critiquefallspreytohypocrisy.
Koselleck'sconceptionofthehypocrisyofenlightenmentantipoliticsadoptsthepointofviewofthestateitself.Thecritique

Page210
ofpowerandtheattempttolimititareunhesitatinglyqualifiedashypocritical,althoughtheauthordoesnotmakeuphismindwhetherheseekstoindictthewillto
powerofcriticalreasonoritsimplicitdrivetowardcivilwar.ThisambiguitycanalsobefoundinSchmitt.WhileKoselleckgoesbeyondSchmittindiscoveringthe
enlightenmentrootsofliberalparliamentarism,inhisownSchmittiananalysisallwegetisananticipationoftheriseanddeclineofthepoliticalpublicsphereinthelogic
thatleadstorevolution.Indeed,itisdifficulttoconnectthisprehistoryinFrance,wherethecollapseoftheoldregimedidnotinitiallyleadtoastableparliamentary
outcome,tothehistoryofparliamentarismasanalyzedbySchmitt.Theconnectioncanbemadeonlywhenonerecognizesthattheenlightenmentdualism,withthe
publicsphereasitscentralmediation,wasnotmerelyastrategyforthedisempoweringofthestatebypoliticallyweakcompetitorswitharelentlesspowerdrive,but
couldalsobeinstitutionalizedasanewpoliticalalternative.
24
KoselleckcomesclosetosuchathesisonlywhenheuncharacteristicallyusesMarxianargumentstobolsteranessentiallySchmittianposition.Forexample,heargues
thatthebourgeoisieconstituteditselfasanewelitepreciselythroughthedualisticfigureofthought.Yetevenheretheargumentisthatthedualisticconception,as
preparationforthetakingofpower,servedonlytoeliminatealldualisms.UnfortunatelyforKoselleck,neitherthenormativeachievementoftheliberalpublicsphere
norevenitspossibleandeventualinstitutionalizationcanbethematizedinsuchanargument.Bothare,however,insisteduponbyJrgenHabermas,inananalysisin
manywaysindebtedto,yetquitedistinctfrom,Koselleck's.
FromaLiterarytoaPoliticalPublicSphere:
JrgenHabermas
TheSchmittianthesisconcerningthefoundationofparliamentarisminthedifferentiationofsocietyandthestatecanbeseenasanarrowversionoftheHegelian
conception.Inparticular,theproblemofmediationisreducedtoasinglecomponent,thepoliticalpublicsphere,whichisinturnpresentedinanormativelyaggressive
fashionentirelydisinterestedinpublicdiscussionasanendinitself.Habermas'sconception,ontheotherhand,

Page211
attemptstogobeyondthisreductionintworespects:first,byrecapturingarichersetofmediationsbetweencivilsocietyandstate,andsecond,byreemphasizingand
revalorizingthenormativeclaimsofthepublicsphere.Habermas'sanalysisalsotakesuptheHegelianprojectofbringingtogetherthenormativeachievementsofboth
theancientsandthemoderns(anddoessomoresuccessfullythatHannahArendt's).
Habermas'soriginaltheoryofthepublicsphere,workedoutintheintellectualmilieuoftheolderFrankfurtschool,representsaspeciesofVerfallsgeschichte,a
historyofdecline.ThissimilaritytoArendt'sconceptiontendstodisguisetheentirelydifferentrelationofthetwoschemestohistory.Aswehaveseen,Arendt'spublic
sphere,modeledonanidealizedconceptionofGreekorAthenianpolitics,isparadoxicallysaidtodeclinewiththeriseofmodernsociety,state,andeconomy,even
thoughsheadmitsthattheoriginalmodelhadlongsincedisappeared.Moreover,Arendtisnotatallinhibitedbyhertheoryofdeclinefrompostulatingtherepeated,
butalwaystemporary,reemergenceofexperimentsinpublicfreedomduringmodernrevolutions.Itisasiffreedomandunfreedommovedintwoseparateandonly
occasionallyconnectedtemporalitiesfreedom,inotherwords,isalways(butalsoonly)possiblewheneverthedialecticofhistorystandsstill.
25
Habermas,onthecontrary,insertstheemergenceanddeclineofanewtypeofpublicsphereintothehistoryofmodernsociety.WhileArendtassociatedonlythe
declineofthepublicwiththeriseofmodernstateandeconomy,inHabermas'sconceptiontherise,contradictoryinstitutionalization,andsubsequentdeclineofthis
sphereareallrelatedtothisevent.Thenewpublicsphereisaccordinglyseenasbourgeois,becauseinitindependentownersofproperty,dividedintheircompetitive,
egoisticeconomicactivitiesthathavegrownvastlybeyondthelimitsofthehousehold,arecapableofgenerating,atleastinprinciple,acollectivewillthroughthe
mediumofrational,unconstrainedcommunication.Butitisalsoliberal,inthatthesetsofrightsdeemednecessarytosecuretheautonomyofthissphere(freedomsof
speech,press,assembly,andcommunication),togetherwiththosedimensionsofindividualautonomythatitpresupposes("privacyrights"),simultaneouslyconstitute
thepublicandprivatedomainsofcivilsocietyandserve

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aslimitstothereachofstatepower.Indeed,thenewpublicsphereisalsodemocraticinprinciple:Theemergenceofanewformofunified,depersonalized,
bureaucraticpublicauthority,themodernstate,istobechecked,supervised,andevencontrollednotonlybytheruleoflawbutalsobyasecondpoliticalpublic
sphere(emergingwithinsocietyandpenetratingthestateintheformofparliaments)thatchallengesraisond'tataswellasarcanaimperii.Thetendencyofthe
modernstatetolevelanddismantleallcorporateandestateorganizationsofaformerlydividedsovereigntyiscounteredbytheemergenceofadifferent,normatively
groundedreasonoperatinginthefullviewofallconcerned,withinnewsocietalinstitutionsthatcometopenetratethedomainofpoliticsitself.
26
Habermas'sdepictionoftheemergenceoftheinstitutionsofanewtypeofpubliclife,polemicallyjuxtaposedtoboththeabsolutiststateandtheprivilegedsocietyof
orders,drawsheavilyonKoselleck'spictureoftheorganizationoftheenlightenment.However,threedimensionsofHabermas'sconceptiondifferfromhis
predecessor's:
First,Habermasbelievesthatthepeculiarlogicofthenewpubliciscontinuouswith,andconstitutesaprojectionof,theformofinteractionofthenewintimatesphere
ofthebourgeoisfamily,aspherethatArendtconsideredtobethemostcharacteristicproductofmodernity.
Second,hedistinguishesnotonlybetweentheliteraryandpoliticalpublicspheresadistinctionplayeddownbyKoselleck,whosuspectshypocrisyinevery
antipoliticalclaimbutalsobetweenthesmallgroupinteractionrepresentedbythesalon,thecaf,thetablesociety,andthelodgeandtheextensionand
generalizationofpublicdiscoursethroughthemediaofcommunication,aboveallthepress.
Finally,Habermasdistinguishesamongatleastthreenationalvariants(English,French,andGerman)oftheinstitutionalizationofthepoliticalpublicsphere,inthe
processshowingthedevelopmentofcommonnormsinthecontextofaheterogeneoussetofpoliticalprojectsdifficulttoreducetoasingleone,especiallytothewill
topoweroftheweak.
WeshallstartwiththesethreepointsandthenturntoamoresystematicanalysisofHabermas'sconception.

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1.Habermas'sdepictionoftheforcefieldbetweenindividualandstate,unlikethatofSchmitt,involvesatleastthreelevelsofmediation:family,literarypublic,and
politicalpublicspheres.TheselevelsarenotidenticaltothecorrespondingHegeliancategories,andthechoicechangesthetheoreticalroleof"mediation."The
categoryoffamilyhasgreatimportanceinthiscontext.InHegel'sscheme,thefamilyisthepreconditionofbourgeoisindividuality,andassuchitispriortoandoutside
civilsocietyforprimarilylogicalreasonsthataresociologicallynonsensicalunderconditionsofmodernity.
27
ForHabermas,theearlymodern,smallscale,bourgeois,
patriarchalfamilyisnotonly(asforHegel)theplaceoforiginofbrgerlicheGesellschaft.Norisitevenwhatitcouldbeinasociologicallyextendedorthodox
Hegelianconception,namely,oneofthelevelsofintegrationofegoisticindividualsintothecultureofthestate.InHabermas'sversion,theintimatesphereofthesmall
scalebourgeoisfamilyalsorepresentstheestablishmentofaprinciplecounterposedtothoseofboththemoderneconomyandthestate.Itisnotthatheneglectsthe
Hegelianideathatthefamilyrepresentsthebackgroundofsocializationthatistheconditionofpossibilityoftheexistenceofindividualsofcivilsocietyrather(and
moreintheArendtiansense),heconvertsthisbackgroundfromapointoforigintoaninstitutionthatcontinuestoparticipateinsociallifeandtowhichindividualscan
continuallyreturnastheirhome.Forthisreason,thefamilypreventsthedissolutionofindividualityonthevariouslevelsofcollectivity.Thus,asinArendt'stheory,it
representsaprivatespherewithoutwhichapublicspherebasedonautonomousindividualswouldnotbepossible.ButwhereasArendtseesthecomplementarityof
privateandpublicaspossibleonlybecauseoftheirradicallydifferentprinciples,conceivedalongthelinesoftheancientdualityofpolisandoikos,Habermasusesthe
Arendtiannotionoftheintimatetogenerateasingleprincipleforboth,onethatisnormativelyadequatetothemodernideal(thoughnotthereality)ofthefamily:
interactionfreeofdominationandofexternalsocialconstraint.Thisideal,leadingtoanewconceptionofhumanity,isfurtheranalyzed
28
intothecomponentsof
voluntariness,emotionalcommunity,andcultivation:"Itappearsthatthefamilyisestablishedandmaintainedvoluntarilybyfreeindividualswithout

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constraintthatitisbasedonthelastingemotionalcommunityofthepartnersthatitguaranteesthedevelopmentofallcapacitiesthatsignifyacultivatedpersonasends
inthemselves.''
29
Itisnothardtorecognizespecificversionsoftheideasofliberty,solidarity,mutualrecognition,andequalityinsuchaconceptionofhumanity.
InlinewiththeclassicalMarxiancritique,Habermasisquicktopointoutthecounterfactualcharacter,andevenmorethelegitimatingfunction,oftheidealhedepicts.
Hestressesitsclashwiththerealeconomicfunctionsofthenewfamilytype,aswellaswithitspatriarchalformsofsubordination,bothofwhichalsopenetratethe
intellectualelaborationofbourgeoisutopias.
30
Allthesame,followingafamousanalysisbyHorkheimerfrom1936,Habermasmaintainsthattheidealisnotmere
ideology.Thenewsolidaristicnormsthatplayaroleinlegitimatingthearrangementsofacompetitiveandnonsolidaryprivateeconomyarealwaysintensionwithwhat
isestablished,promisingathisworldlytranscendenceofallstatesofaffairsincompatiblewithfreedom,solidarity,andcultivation.Thus,thesenormsrepresentboth
ideologyandthefoundationsofthecritiqueofideology.
31
Moreover,thefamily,althoughincapableofeliminatingtheconstraintsoftheeconomicworldorevenof
freeingitselffromitsownpatriarchalheritage,neverthelessdefendstheintimatesubjectiveexperienceandintersubjectivetiesofitsmembers,quahumanbeings,inthe
faceofexternalpowers.Equallyimportant,itisthelivingsourceofexperiencesofpassionateselfexaminationandrationalsearchingformutualunderstandingthatare
capableoffindingotherformsofinstitutionalizationthanthefamilyitself.
32
Habermasarguesforanempiricalconnectionbetweentheprivateworldofthebourgeoisfamilyandtheprimordialformsoftheliterarypublicsphere.Whilethesalon
admittedlyoriginatesinaristocraticsociety,thebourgeoissalonlosesitsrepresentationalandritualisticfunctions:Itsformofcommunicationisnolongerdramaturgical
andrhetoricalitssocialstructurenolongerreflectsthehierarchyofasocietyoforders.
33
Architecturallyandsociallylinkedtotheprivatelivingquartersofthefamily,
thenewsalonextendsandenlargestheoriginalprincipleofintimacybyrevealingthesubjectivityofeachindividualinthepresenceoftheother,thus

Page215
linkingprivacytopublicity.Theidealofseekingunderstandingthroughopenendedreasoningandmutualpersuasion,withoutregardforprestigeandstatus,is
maintained.Somewhatmoredistantly,Habermasseestheinstitutionsofclub,caf,andlodgeasextensionsofthesameprinciple.Hedoesexplicitlynote,however,
theexclusionofwomenfromtheselatterinstitutionsofenlightenment,linkingthisexclusiontothediscussionofpoliticalandeconomicratherthanprimarilyliteraryand
artisticmatters.
34
Yettheconnectionofthefirstinstitutionsofanaudienceforworksofart,andespeciallyofliteraryandreadingcircles,tosalonsdominatedby
womenremainsclose,anditisthroughtheseagenciesthatthereasoningpublicmodeledontheintimatefamilyfirstbeginstoapproachuniversalsignificance.
35
This
connectiontothereceptionofartalsodevelopsadimensionoftheliterarypublicthatispresentinthenewintimatesphereonlyintheformofselfreflectionandself
examination:thecritiqueofallreceivedideasandmeanings.
2.WhileKosellecktendstofocusonthoseenlightenmentinstitutions,fromthelodgetothesecretsociety,thatparadoxicallyseektoestablishtheprincipleofpublicity
bynegatingit,andforwhichcritiqueeventuallybecameameansratherthananendinitself,Habermas'sownstressisoninstitutionswhoseroadtopolitics,slowerand
lesscomplete,impliesneitheracompromiseoffundamentalprinciplesnoramerelyhypocriticalrenunciationofpower.Thepublicsphereinhisconceptioncomesinto
beingnotthroughthepoliticizationofsmallscalefacetofaceintimateinteractionbutthroughtheestablishmentofacriticalaudienceforliteraryworksbymeansof
newspapers,journals,andpublicperformances.Onlythisroadallowstheconversionoftheprinciplesofintimacyintothoseofacriticalpublicity.Butevenonthis
longerroad,theliterarypublicgrowsintopolitics,intoapoliticalpublicspherewithastructuredifferentfromthoseofpoliticalorganizationsdedicatedtothepursuitof
power.Evenifbothroadswereinfactdivorcedfromthemorefeminineworldofthesalon,thepoliticalpublicspheremaintainedsomethingofitsspiritintheideaof
critiqueasanendinitself.
ItisHabermas'sthesisthattheemergenceofapoliticalpublicspherefromthecriticalliteraryonepreservestheprincipleof

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unconstrainedcommunicationoriginallyestablishedintheintimatesphereofthenewfamilytype.UnlikeKoselleck,whopointstoaprojectofacounterpower
hypocriticallyaimingatdestroyingandreplacingestablishedpower,heinsiststhatwhatisatstakeisthetransformationoftheprincipleaccordingtowhichpower,old
ornew,istooperate.
36
Critiqueinthismodelattemptsitsowninstitutionalizationratherthanaconversionintoanewformofpowerthatwouldpotentiallyfeelitself
endangeredbycriticalreason.EveninHabermas'sanalysis,themodernstate,initsoriginallyabsolutistform,representsthechallengemotivatingtheestablishmentofa
veritablecountersociety,asocietyagainstthestate.Butthissociety,evenwhenitturnspolitical,aimsneitherattheutopiandestructionofthestatenoratbecominga
newstate,norevenattheunificationoftheseaimsasintheReignofTerror,butratheratanewformofpoliticaldualisminwhichapoliticalpublicspherewould
controlthepublicauthorityofthemodernstate.
TheargumentgoesagainstthegrainnotonlyofKoselleck'sSchmittiananalysisbutalsooftheMarxianconceptionofthebourgeoisrevolution.Nevertheless,
Habermashopestosavesomethingofthelatterbyinsistingthatthebourgeoisie,whosepowerisbydefinitionprivate,cannotruleandyetcannotacceptaformof
statethatispotentiallyarbitraryanduncontrolled.Afurthercomplication:Thissameclass,unlikethearistocraticopponentsofabsolutism,needsandwantsaformof
unifiedsovereignpowercapableofguaranteeingthepoliticalandlegalpreconditionsofaprivatecapitalistmarketeconomywithinandevenbeyondanational
territorialsetting.Thehistoricalsolutionwastopreservethemodernstatecreatedbyabsolutism,buttoformalizeandrationalizeitsoperationintermsoftheruleof
law,toforceittoestablishformsofselfrestraintasdefinedbyfundamentalrights,andtobringitundersocialscrutinyandcontrolthroughtheestablishmentofthe
politicalpublicsphere,itselfrootedintherightsofcommunicationandfranchise.ItisthesenormativelimitationsthatHabermashasinmindwhenhereferstochanging
theprincipleoftheoperationofpower.
3.Itisnotclearthatthesuggestiveidealtypecansavethethesisofabourgeoisrevolution.InFrance,wherearevolutiondidoccur,

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onethatwashardlybourgeois,
37
thepatternoutlinedbyHabermaswasoriginallyestablishedonlytransitionally,duringtheconstitutionalmonarchy.Moreover,given
theoutcome,itisnotdifficulttoarguethattheformsofpubliclifeHabermasdescribesasextendingKoselleck'sanalysisintotherevolutionaryperiod(journals,
pamphlets,clubs,popularassemblies)representedtheprojectsofcountereliteshopingtoreplacetheexistingelite(and,soonenough,oneanother).Toshowthatan
alternativeprinciplecouldhavebeenestablished,HabermasisforcedtoshifthisemphasisfromKoselleck'sterrainofFrenchpolitics,culminatinginrevolutionand
terror(thecontextofchoiceofconservativeopponentsoftheliberalideaofpolitics),totheEnglishcontextoftheevolutionarytransformationofparliamentary
absolutism.This"model"isinturnusedasthestandardforevaluatingtheconstitutionalmonarchiesoftheearlyliberalepoch.Fromitspointofview,French
developmentsintheperiodofhighabsolutismappearincrediblyretarded.TheyseemtofollowaslowerbutfundamentallyEnglishpathduringmostoftheeighteenth
century,whenpole##icsagainsttheabsolutistregimefromthepointsofviewofthetraditionalestatesandthenewpublicformswerenotalwayseasily
distinguishable.
38
Therevolutionaryperiodenforcedthisdistinctiondramaticallyinaprocessoftremendouslyacceleratedcreationofpublicpoliticalforms(the
transformationoftheestatesassemblyintoamodernparliament,thecreationofjournals,clubs,associations,andassemblies,and,aboveall,theinstitutionofformal
constitutionalguaranteesforallofthese).TherevolutionarydictatorshipandNapoleondestroyedtheinstitutionsofthepoliticalpublicsphere,however,andFrance
paradoxically(andstillinconsistentlyandwithmanyreversals)reenteredthebasicmodelofliberaldevelopmentonlywiththeRestoration.Accordingly,inthis
depictionofFrenchdevelopmentsfromthepointofviewoftheliberalpublicsphere,theacceleratingrevolutionturnsouttobeaparenthesis.Fromthesame
perspective,developmentsintheGermaniesthroughvariousmodelsoftheauthoritarianRechtsstaatappearsimplyasslowerandperhapsneverentirelycompleted
versionsoftheEnglishmodel.
ThechoiceofEnglandtooutlineanactualhistoricalpaththatissomehowadequatefromthepointofviewofthenormativecon

Page218
structoftheliberalpublicspherehelpstodispelthedoubtraisedbySchmittthattheparliamentarystateasaformofselforganizationofsocietybreaksdownatthe
momentofitsrealization.Againstthisobjection,Habermasisabletoshowtheinstitutionalizationofdualismintermsofparliamentandapoliticalpublicsphere.The
samechoice,however,isstillpotentiallyexposedtoKoselleck'scritique,whichmightfocusintheEnglishcontextonthehypocriticallybourgeoisratherthanthe
hypocriticallystatistcharacteroftheliberalpublicsphere.Inotherwords,intheEnglishcasetheprojectforliberalpublicityseemstohavebeenacoverforthewillto
powerofthepropertiedclasses.Thechargeisnotasstrongasitmightatfirstseem,though,becausetheparliamentaryabsolutismthatemergedfromtheGlorious
Revolutionwasalreadyfullycompatiblewiththeeconomicinterestsandpoliticalrepresentationofthepropertiedclasses.Thestruggleforapoliticalpublicsphereand
fortherightsofspeech,press,assembly,association,andthefranchisethatwouldsustainitwasnotrestrictedtotheownersofbourgeoisproperty,nordiditstopwith
thefullpoliticalvictoryoftheirprogramintheNewPoorLaw.Whileitispossibletoarguethattheoutcomeofthesestruggleshelpedmakeparliamentaryrule
legitimateandthusstabilizedbourgeoisdomination,thislegitimacywasneverthelessafunctionofnewformsofprotection,selforganization,andpublicoversight
achievedbysocialstratawhosetraditionalformsoflifewereunderminedbythetransitionfromapaternalistic,moraleconomytotheselfregulatingsystemofliberal
markets.
39
EnglishabsolutismdoesnotendinHabermas'spicturewiththedemotionofthemonarchto"KinginParliament"butwiththenewrelationbetweenpublicsphereand
stateexpressedinthefullpublicityoftheproceedingsofParliament.
40
However,whenpublicity,originallyaweapon,becomesaprinciplelinkedtothenormative
experienceofeveryonecapableofreasoning,itcannotberestrictedeitherinstitutionally(tothepressandtheparties)orsocially(tothemiddleclasses).
41
The
growingpublicthematizationoffundamentalpoliticalquestionsleadstotheorganizationofpoliticalmeetings,clubs,associations,andcommittees
42
thatinturnprovide
formsfortheselforganizationofstratathatarenotformallyincludedinthepoliticalsystemuntiltheendofthe

Page219
century.Democratizationdoesnotinitself,asHabermaselsewhereunfortunatelysuggests,
43
leadtothedeclineofthecriticalcapacitiesofthepublic:Itis,infact,
aftertheFirstReformBill,whenthepartiesmustappealtoasociallymuchmoreheterogeneouselectoralpublicthanbefore,thattheyareforcedtopublicizetheir
electoralprogramsandtodiscussthemintermsofargumentsandprinciplesratherthanslogans,personalities,orevennarrowsectoralinterests.
44
Habermas'slinkingofhisstudyofthedevelopmentoftheliberalbourgeoispublicspheretoaspecifichistoricalpatternofdevelopmentshouldnotleadustoneglect
histheoreticalmodelofthissphere,howeveridealtypicalorevencompositeitmayappear.Thisisallthemoreimportantbecauseheinsiststhatitisthisabstract
model,ratherthananyparticularhistoricalversion,thatattainednormativeandevenutopianstatusformodernsociety.Broadlyspeaking(inthetraditionofHegel),
HabermasnotonlydifferentiatesbetweencivilsocietyandstatebutalsorelativizesthetraditionaldistinctionofprivateandpublicwithwhichtheliberalsandMarx
identifiedthenewpolarity.Hedoesthisbydividingeachsphere,publicandprivate,intotwo:
private: intimatesphere(family) privateeconomy
public: publicsphere publicauthority(state)
Weexpectonespecificroletocorrespondtoeachofthespheres,thoughHabermasmakesthepointclearonlyinthecaseoftheprivatesphere:
45
private: humanbeing("homme") bourgeois
public: [citizen] [subject]
Habermasrecognizesthattherelationshipofthisfourfoldcategorialframeworktotheconceptofcivilsociety,orbrgerlicheGesellschaft,isambiguous.
46
Inthe
narrowsense(thatofMarx),brgerlichesocietyreferstothesphereoftheprivate,bourgeoiseconomy.Whenusedinthissense,thepublicsphereistobe
understoodasamediationbetweensocietyandstate.However,inthebroadersense(thatofHegel),thetermcivilsocietymeansallthespheresofsociety
juxtaposedtothestate.
47
Inthatcase,itwillincludethe

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publicsphereaswellasthedomesticone,andthusitwillhavethreefundamentalroles(ofwhichHabermasstressesonlythefirsttwo):humanbeing,bourgeois,and
citizen.
IfHabermasdoesnotconsistentlyadoptthissecond,moreHegelian,usage,itisbecauseheseemstobesensitivetoafictionalidentificationcriticizedbytheyoung
Marx:thatbetween"l'homme"and"bourgeois."
48
He,too,considersthisidentificationtomaskthebourgeoischaracterofthenewpublicsphereandanideology
thatsubordinatesthesphereofthecitizentotheimperativesoftheprivateeconomy.Asaresult,andinordertoprovideananalyticalcontrasttoliberalideology,
Habermasrefusestomakethecategoryofthepublicspheresimplyaninternalselfdeterminationormediationofcivilsociety.
Hedoesnottherebymanagetofindanadequatelocus,eveninprinciple,fortheactivityofthecitizen.Hisdesiretodifferentiatespheresstopsshortexactlyatthis
category.Heis,however,onhiswaytodoingthiswhenhepointstoasecondfictioninliberalideology:theidentificationofliteraryandpoliticalpublicsasaunified
publicopinion.Unfortunatelyhetendstoregardthisidentificationonlyasthevehiclebywhichthefirstfiction,theidentitybetweenmanandbourgeois,claims
normativesuperiorityoverthecitizen.Thus,heseemsnottoseethenecessityinthiscaseforyetanotheranalyticaldifferentiationofwhatideologymisleadingly
identifies:manandcitizen.Thisomissionseemstoconcedetheliberalpointthatsubordinatesthenormativesourceofthestatusofthecitizeninthemodernworldto
thenormofthenewconceptionofhumanity,evenifnotinitsbourgeoisversion.
ThebasicmodelisattimesdifferentiatedasifHabermaswantedtoavoidbothfictionalidentifications:
49
private: intimate

privateeconomy
public: literary political state
Thisschemecorrespondstothehistoricaldevelopmentofthepoliticalpublicsphere,whichmayhaveemergedfromtheliterarypublicspherebutcanfullyreplaceor
subsumeitonlyatitsperil."Thehumanityoftheliterarypublic,"hesaysobliquelyenough,"servesasamediationfortheeffectivenessofthepoliticalpublic."
50
Onthe
otherside,however,theargumentpresupposesthata

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literaryculturalpublicspherecannotitselfcontrolordirectlyinfluencethemodernstate.Habermasstressesthedifferentiationofthetwopublicsintermsoftwo
audiencesthatdrawondifferentsourcesfortheirmembers,onemainlywomen,theotherexclusivelymen.
51
Allthiswouldseemtopointtoadifferentiationinthe
traditionofTocquevillebetweencivilandpoliticalsociety,correspondingtoHabermas'sowndifferentiationoftwopublics(literaryandpolitical)andtworoles(human
beingandcitizen).Itisjustthisdifferentiation,however,involvingsharperboundariesbetweenpoliticalandprepoliticalpublicspheres,thatHabermaswantstoavoid.
Totheextentthatthetwopublicshaveimportantcontinuitiesandevenformalsimilarities,Habermasisright.Butanothermotiveisatworkhereaswell,onethat
producesacertainoverreaction.InordertopreservethemodernityofhisconceptionasagainstArendt'sstylizationoftheancientnotionofcitizenship,Habermas
wantstobreakdefinitivelywiththeoldmeaningofsocietascivilisthatcontainedthelevelofpoliticalsociety.Insteadofchoosingastrategyofdifferentiation,
however,heabandonsthelatternotion.Inhisconception,allthatisleftofpoliticalsocietyisthepoliticalpublicsphereasaprojectionoftheliterarypublicintoareas
dealingwithquestionsofeconomicpolicy.
HabermasquitedeliberatelyconstructedhismodelofthepublicsphereinthestructuralpositionthatArendtconsideredtheverynegationofpubliclife,the
intermediaryormixedrealmbetweenprivatesphereandstate,whichshecalled"society."
52
ThoughheadmitsthattheideologicalinspirationoftheGreekmodel
continuesintoourowntime,Habermasconsistentlydisputesitsinstitutionalrelevance.UnlikeArendt,hehasnouseforaconceptofpoliticalsociety,admittedlystilla
componentoftheeighteenthcenturyconceptionofsocietcivileorZivilsoziett,thatwouldsomehowpreservewhatisessentialabouttheancientrepublicanideaof
citizenship.ThisideaHabermasunderstandsasmembershipinanincorporated,genuinelypoliticalbody,therespublica,thatcollectivelyactedtoguaranteejustice
andmilitarysecurity.The"political"taskofthebourgeoispublicsphereis,onthecontrary,theregulationofbrgerlicheGesellschaftinthesenseofsecuringthe
exchangeofcommoditiesinthemarket.
54
Thus,Habermasseemstomaketheassumptionofthetasksoftheoikosthefunctionaldefinitionofthenewbourgeoispublicsphere

Page222
thisiswhatArendtconsideredthebasisofthedeclineofpublicityassuch.Butitistheliberalaswellasthebourgeoisdimensionofthemodernpublicspherethatsets
itapartfromtheancientnotionofcitizenship.ContrarytotheGreekmodel,themodernpublicsphereisjuridicallyprivate.Legallyseparatedfromthestate,thissphere
anditsmembershaveapolemical,critical,argumentativerelationtothestateratherthanaparticipatoryone.Theycansupervise,influence,andperhapssomehow
"control"power,buttheycannotthemselvespossessapartofstatepower.
Inspiteofsomeseriousinconsistencies,Habermas'smodelofthepoliticalpublicspheredoesnotreferprimarily,asdoesSchmitt's,totheparliamentarydeliberative
bodyitself,whosemembersdoinfacthavepubliclawstatus.Theimportanceofparliamentarydeliberationsisestablishedonlywiththeirpublicity,andthisiswhat
makesthisformofruleuniquelypermeabletothegazeofapubliccomposedofprivateindividuals.Iftheparliamentarydeputiesarepartofthepoliticalpublicsphere,
thisisbecauseoftheircontinuitywiththesocietyofprivate,reasoningindividualswhocomposethatsphere.ThepointissomewhatlostwhenHabermasarguesthat
publicopinioncametoregarditselfastheonlylegitimatesourceoflaw.
55
Butheinterpretsthisclaimintermsofthecontrastbetweentheruleoflawandrulebymen,
withsocietysupposedlyachievingaconditionbeyondalldominationthroughatransformationoftheformoflaw(generality)andtheformoflawmaking(publicity).
Thus,Habermasarguesthatthepoliticalpublicsphere"putspouvoirassuchupfordebate."
56
Thisargumentseemstoconflictwiththedualisticconceptionaccordingtowhichthepublicsphereistocoexistwiththemodernstate,whoseprincipleofoperation,
butnotwhoseexistence,istobeplacedinquestion.Habermasis,ofcourse,wellawareoftheresistanceof"public"administrationandotherorgansofexecutive
powertotheprincipleofpublicity.
57
Buthefollowstheinternallogicoftheliberalconceptionofthepublicspheretosuchapointthattheonlyformofeffectivesocial
controlofthestatethatseemstobelogicallypossibleisitsabolition.RightlyrejectingtheancientnotionofcitizenshipproposedbyArendt,Habermaswasnotableto
point,atleastwithinthetraditionhereconstructed,toamodern,intermediarymodel.Inshort,theliberalmodeloftheliterarypublicsphere,withitsoverarchingnorms
ofhumanityandcritical

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reason,tends,once"politicized,"topointnottoparticipationwithin,buttotheabolitionof,statepower,indeed,ofpowertoutcourt,anditsreplacementbyaclosed
systemoflegalnorms.
Interestinglyenough,inviewofHabermas'sdeepanalysisofHegel,hedoesnotusethelatter'sconceptionofapluralityofassociationswithintheprivatespherethat
mightpreparetheparticipationofcitizens.InhiscritiqueofTocqueville,too,thereislittleinterestinorsensitivitytotheprepoliticaldimensionofsmallscaleself
organizationrequiredfortheeffectiveanddemocraticlimitationofdemocraticsovereignty.
58
Undoubtedly,theselevelsofanalysisstressingtheneedforintermediate
powersdidnotappeartocomplementhisownanalysisofmediationthroughthepublicsphere.Probablytheyseemedtopointtoirrelevantatavismsortoanticipate
thecorporafistdeformationofpublicityitself.Butitremainsthecasethathisidentificationoftheprepoliticaldimensionofthepublicspherewithaliterarypublic,
althoughessentialasalegitimatingbackground,involvingacertainreductionvisvisHegel'sclassicalmodel,rendersthepoliticalpublicspheremuchtooweakinthe
faceofstatepower.Habermasisawareofthisweaknessbutnotofallthecausesoroftheavailablealternatives.Thus,heisforcedtoregisterratherpassivelythatthe
"person"ofthepoliticalpublicsphereturnsoutafteralltobethe"homme"oftheliteraryextensionoftheintimatesphereheisabletoproposenoconceptofthe
politicaltocounteractthe"characteristicerosionoftheboundariesofthetwopublics"
59
thatwastheveryobjectofSchmitt'ssavagecriticismofliberalideals.
60
Habermasconsidersthedifficultytobeafunctionnotofthenormafiveprojectbutofthecontradictoryinstitutionalizationofthepublicsphere.Itisthusthespecific
formoftheinstitutionalizationofthenewnormof"humanity"thatprovestobepowerlesstoblockthetriumphofthebourgeoisandtheofficial.Fromthiscritical
juxtapositionofnormandinstitution,Habermascannot,however,derivethephilosophicalfoundationsforanalternativeinstitutionalization.Inrelationtothecapitalist
economyandthemodernstate,thevalueofhumanity,unlikethatofcitizenship,isboundtoremaininquestion.
Thecontradictoryinstitutionalizationofthepublicsphereisalreadyapparentatthelevelofitsoriginalmodel,theintimatesphere.Habermasdescribesitintermsofthe
ambivalenceofthe

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family,whichis''therepresentativeofsociety,andyetisinacertainwayemancipationfromsocietyandagainstsociety,heldtogetherbypatriarchaldominationonthe
onesideandhumanintimacyontheother."
61
Moreprecisely,thecompulsionfacedbythebourgeoisfamilyisafunctionofitsspecificroleintheprocessofthe
'valorization"ofcapitalandofthetransmissionoflegalpoliticalconstraintsthroughsocialization.Habermas,stillpresupposingthedoctrineofstateandlawas
superstructure,unfortunatelytreatsthesetwodimensionsasfunctionallyidentical.Inthisconception,patriarchalauthority,expressedinthesubordinationofwomen
andchildren,isatransmissionbeltforeconomicandpoliticalpowersthatthendeformthecomponentsofhumanity:Autonomy,emotionalcommunity,andcultivation
aresubordinatedtomoneythroughtheinstrumentalitiesofpower.
Itisanopenquestionwhethertheidealsoftheliberalbourgeoispublicspherearethemselvesdeformedbypatriarchalauthority,orwhetherthedeformationoccurs
whenthestateandthecapitalisteconomymanagetoimposetheirlogiconthepoliticalpublicsphere.Habermasseemstochoosethesecondoftheseoptions,though
attimeshealsosaysthattheideologyreflectstheambivalence.Thischoicemaybeasignificantmistake,however,sincethenotionsof"homme,"emergingfromthe
femaledominatedsalonsemphasizedbyHabermas,and"citoyen,"forgedinthemaledominatedsecretsocietiesemphasizedbyKoselleck,seemtorepresent
oppositesidesofthesamedeformationinthepoliticalrealm:thepowerlesshumanbeingandtheinhumancitizen.
Thecontradictoryinstitutionalizationofthepublicsphere,andinparticularofitspoliticaldimension,parallelstheambivalenceoftheintimatesphere.Habermas
exploresthecontradictionfromthepointofviewofthebourgeoisfunctionandthenfromthatoftheliberalstructureofthepoliticalpublic.Theformerislinkedtothe
restrictedornarrowconceptofcivilsocietyinheritedfromMarx,representingthemarketorientedinteractionofprivateeconomicsubjectsfreed(intwostagesof
developmentabsolutistandliberal)fromestatehierarchyandstatepaternalism.Inthismaterialistfunctionalisttrainofargument,thetaskofthepoliticalpublicsphere
istomediatebetweencivil,orratherbourgeois,societyand"thestatepowercorrespondingtoitsneeds."Firstand

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foremost,thetaskofthisstateistoworkout,administer,andprotectasystemofprivatelawestablishing,throughthelawsofproperty,contract,employment,and
inheritance,aprivatesphereinthestrictsense.
62
Paradoxically,then,thetaskofstateinterventionistofreecivilsocietyofthisintervention,todifferentiateandmaintainthedifferentiationofstateandcivilsociety.This
paradoxappearsonthelevelofthelawsestablishingthemediatinginstitutionsofthepublicsphere.ThelinkageofstateactionintheRechtsstaatorstategovernedby
lawtogeneralnormsandthepublicityofthemakingandapplicationoflawprovidenotonlyfortheselflimitationofsovereignpowerbutalsofortheillusionofits
disappearance.Thisillusion,inthepresentargument,istracedbacktotheinteractionofsmall,relativelyequalownersofpropertywhoimaginethattherulesofthe
sphereofcompetitionmakeimpossibletheascendancyofoneowneroveranother.Theseagentsdesirenopoliticalruleintheiraffairs,exercisedbyastateorevenby
themselves,yettheyrequirelegislativeprovisionsfortheiractivity.Thepoliticalpublicspherewastobethesolutionofthedifficulty,implyingtheproductionof
measuresrootedexclusivelyinreasonratherthanwill.
Asidefromtheconflictswitharbitrarypower,involvingtheexertionofwillratherthanrationalpersuasionandsurvivingintheresistanceoftheexecutiveandits
administrationtosupervisionbythepublicsphere,thedivisionbetweenwillandreasonintheconceptoflawcouldnotberemovedfromthepoliticalpublicsphere
itself.Ontheonehand,thisinstitutioncouldberegardedasthefoundationoftherationalityoflaw,sinceitlinkslegislaturestotheongoingcriticaldiscussionofa
reasoningpublic.Ontheotherhand,thelawsemergingfromsuchprocessesofcommunicationhadtomaintaintheircoerciveaspectinrelationtothosetowhomthey
wereapplied.
63
Theruleoflawthusturnsouttoinvolvenottheabolitionofruleassuchbuttheinstitutionofrulebythelegislature.Theliberalbourgeoisideaof
abolishingthestate,replacingitastheagencyofrulebyasystemofgaplessnormsvalidatedbythepublicspherealone,turnedouttobeincoherentandimpossibleto
realize.
Formallyspeaking,theliberalideaofthepublicsphererefersnottobourgeoissocietybuttoawiderconceptionofcivilsocietythat

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establishes,onthelevelofconstitutionalrights,notmerelyaneconomicsocietybutthepublicsphereitselffreedfromarbitrarystateintervention.Habermaspresentsa
classicalcatalogueoffundamentalrightstoindicatethecentralityofthedefenseofthepublicsphere(freedomsofspeech,opinion,press,assembly,association,etc.)
andtheintimatesphere(inviolabilityofpersonandresidence,etc.).Constitutionsalsoguaranteetherightsofindividualstoengageinpoliticalactivityinthepublic
sphere(rightsofpetitionandsuffrage,etc.)andeconomicactivityintheprivatesphere(equalitybeforethelaw,rightofproperty,etc.).
64
Finally,byestablishingthe
centralityofthepublicsphereinpoliticalprocesses,constitutionsgobeyondtheleveloftherightsofprivateindividualsinparticular,constitutionalguaranteesofthe
publicityofproceduresaremeanttoestablishthe"influence"ofthepublicoverparliamentarydiscussionsandthe"supervision"bythepublicofthecourts.
AccordingtoHabermas,themodelofcivilsocietyimpliedbythisclassicalversionofconstitutionalism"doesnotcorrespondatalltotherealityofcivilsociety."
65

Therearetworeasonsforthis.First,thenumberofprivateindividualswhopossesstheautonomysecuredbypropertyandthecultivationguaranteedbyeducationis
small.Indeed,asecondminority,thetraditionalclassesrootedinlandownership,thearmy,andtheadministration,stillholdssignificantpower.Second,bourgeois
liberalconstitutionsdonotprovideforthosewhodonotpossesstheresourcesforparticipatingintheliteraryandpoliticalpublicspheres,nordotheyguardagainst
thosewhocangenerateandutilizepowerinsecret.Again,thedimensionofdominationreappears:thatofthepublicsphereoverthoseexcludedfromthepracticeof
rightsandthatofthosecapableofexcludingthemselvesfromthedutiesrequiredoftherestofsociety.
Allthesame,itisnotHabermas'sintentiontointerprettheliberaldimensionofthepublicsphereasmerelyaninstrumentforexclusion."Thebourgeoispublicsphere
standsorfallswiththeprincipleofgeneralaccessibility.Apublicspherefromwhichdefinablepoliticalgroupsareeoipsoexcludedisnotonlyimperfectbutisnot
publicatall."
66
Habermasdoesnotmaintainthatthebourgeoispublicspherewasmeredeception.Thoughithasclass

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interestatitsfoundations,thereisalsosomeoverlapwithgeneralinterests.
67
Leavingasidethisdogmatic,traditionalformulation,thepointseemstobethatthe
boundariesofexclusioncouldnotbefixedbecauseofthenormofpublicityitself.Inotherwords,thisnorm,establishedthroughconstitutionalandlegalguaranteesand
practicedinprocessesofcriticaldiscourse,madetheboundariesofthepublicspherepermeabletothemesandpersonsrepresentingtheinterestsofthoseexcluded.
Thepublicspherewasanideology,butbecauseitcontainedautopianpromise,itwasmorethanmereideology.
68
Thispointisthenreformulatedintwoways.First,
theideaofpublicity,"inprincipleopposedtoalldomination,helpedtofoundapoliticalorderwhosesocialbasesdidnotmakedominationafterallsuperfluous."This
formulationjuxtaposesanidealinkedtoliberationtoinstitutionsestablishinganewformofdomination.Second,theideologyled,onthebasisofthedominationofone
classovertheother,neverthelesstothedevelopmentofinstitutions"Whichcontained,astheirobjectivemeaning,theidealoftheirownabolition."Thissecond
formulationimpliesthatsomethingoftheliberatingidealofpublicitywasindeedinstitutionalizedinthebourgeoispublicsphere.
Thenotionofthecontradictoryinstitutionalizationoftheliberalpublicspherepointstoadirectionconsistentwiththesecondreading.Buttheideathatthecontradiction
istoberesolved,inaccordancewithnormativerequirements,byabolishingthewholeinstitutionalcomplexsupportsthefirst.Infact,severalpointsremainunclearin
theanalysis.First,asweaskedbefore,arethenormativeexpressionsoftheprincipleofpublicityfreeofthecontradictionofitsinstitutionalization?Second,what
wouldbetheformofanoncontradictoryinstitutionalizationofeithertheoriginalidealoritsreconstructedversion?
ThedifficultiesHabermasencountersinansweringthesequestionshavetodowiththeinfluenceofbothMarxianandliberalutopiasonhisconstruction.Heattemptsto
holdthetwostrandstogetherthroughthenotionofimmanentcriticism.Accordingly,heclaimsthatMarxnotonlyunmaskedpublicopinionasfalseconsciousnessbut
didthisinthenameofastaunchlyheldidealofaliberalpublicsphere.
69
Habermas'sargumentcannotsucceed,however,totheextentthattheMarxiancritique
alwaysinvolves

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bothimmanentandtranscendentelements.IfMarxdoesindeedwanttomaintaininaradicalizedversiontheidealofpoliticsbasedondemocraticcommunicationand
decisionmaking,henonethelessrejectstheidealofdifferentiationbetweenpublicandprivate,betweenstateandcivilsociety,thatthispoliticspresupposes.
70
One
obviouslycannotdefendtheidealofaliberalpublicspherewithoutthemodelofdifferentiation,whichhasnormativeimplicationsofitsownexpressedincataloguesof
fundamentalrights.Marx,however,considersdifferentiationtobethesecretofdeformationtotheextentthatadifferentiatedcivilsociety,inthesenseoftheprivate
economy,avoidstherebythepossibilityofpubliccontrolandoversight,aprocessthatinevitablyturnsthemoderncitoyenintotheinstrumentofthebourgeoiswho
disguiseshimselfashomme.Thislineofanalysisaccordinglyleadstotheestablishmentofadedifferentiatedstatesocietybyarevolutionaryclassthathasnointerestin
differentiation.Thestrategypointstoanewnormativemodelofindividualityaswell:Insteadofthefictionalidentityofmanandbourgeois,Marx,accordingto
Habermas,positstherealidentityofmanandcitizen.
71
ThisgoalseemstobeacceptedbyHabermashimself.
72
ThetranscendentfeaturesoftheMarxiancritiquetothecontrary,however,Habermashimselfstaunchlydefendedtheliberalideaofthepublicsphere.Thus,whilehe
didnotrejecttheMarxianprojectofdedifferentiation,heputanother,oneofredifferentiation,byitsside.Thisheachievedthroughanimmanentcritiqueofhisown.
Fromthepointofviewofthemodelofdifferentiation,heimplicitlychargesthebourgeoispublicspherewithbeinginsufficientlydifferentiated.Inparticular,thefictional
identityofbourgeoisandmanexpressestheveryrealpenetrationoftheintimatespherebytheprocessesoftheprivateeconomy.Hence,thetrueaimofthepublicly
controlledstatesocietyeconomyistofreetheintimatespherefromeconomicconstraintandsocialintervention.
73
Thisargument,attributedtoEngels,inHabermas's
versionamountstoaprojecttoestablishanewformofprivateautonomy.
74
WhatHabermasdoesnottellusishowsuchprivateautonomycouldbeinstitutionalizedwithoutrights,thoughitiscertainlypossiblethathesimplypresupposessome
versionoftheclassicalcatalogue.Butifwearetoreturntosuchacatalogueofrights,how

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arewetoavoidreaffirmingthenormativemodelofcomprehensivedifferentiationthattheserightsguaranteethroughtheirveryform?Habermascouldhaveperhaps
counteredthisargumentbyreferringtotheneedforredefiningtheinheritedcataloguesofrights,andespeciallytheirinternalhierarchy.Hisnotion,ascribedtoMarx,
thatautonomyinthenewmodelwouldbebasedonthepublicsphereratherthanprivatepropertypointsinthisdirection.
75
Butherethedangersofanoverallmodel
basedonunificationratherthandifferentiationshowthemselveswhatwouldhavebeenanimportantinsightinthecontextofatheoryofrights,undevelopedhere,
becomesaperilousonewithintheactuallyaffirmedprojectofnonliberaldemocracy:
privateautonomyisaproductofanoriginalautonomy,whichisbroughtaboutbythecollectivityofsocialcitizensexercisingthefunctionsofthepublicsphereexpandedina
socialistmanner.Itisprivateindividualswhoareregardedastheprivateindividualsofthepublic,ratherthanthepublicasthepublicofprivateindividuals.Intheplaceof
theidentityofbourgeoisandhomme...stepstheidentityofcitoyenandhomme.Thefreedomoftheprivateindividualwillbedefinedaccordingtotheroleofhumanbeingsas
socialcitizens(Gesellschaftsbrger)thefreedomofhumanbeingsaspropertyownerswillnolongerdefinetheroleofthecitizenofthestate(Staatsbrger).
76
ItisobviousfromthistextthatHabermasrepresentsaposition,withouttheslightesttraceofcriticism,thatexplicitlybreakswiththebourgeoisliberalidealofthe
publicsphere.Thepointisnotonlythatonefunctionalizationoftheintimatesphereisreplacedbytheprojectofanother.Moregenerally,themodelreplacesbourgeois
dedifferentiation,whichviolatestheconstitutionalnormsoftheliberalpublicsphereinHabermas'sownargument,withaschemeofreversededifferentiationthatwould
beequallyincompatiblewiththesenormsiftheyweremaintainedorreestablished.Althoughacasecouldbemadethattheprojecthereoutlinedcontinuesthe
democraticdimensionofthenormativemodelofthepublicsphere,itmostassuredlybreakswithitsequallyimportantandconstitutiveliberaldimension.That
Habermaswas,in1962atleast,insensitivetosuchanoutcomeisshownbyhistreatmentofthe"liberal"thinkersJ.S.MillandTocqueville.
77

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HabermasiscertainlyrightinusingMarxtocriticizethemodelofthebourgeoispublicsphere,itstensionbetweennormandinstitutionalization.Muchmore
questionableishisobviouspreferenceforMarxoverMillandTocquevilleinthefurtherdevelopmentofthenormativemodel.Arguingfromthepointofviewof
Marxianradicaldemocracy,forexample,hehasnouseforMill'sconcern,consistentlyonthegroundofdifferentiation,todefendprivateautonomyandthefreedomof
minoritiesfromthegreatestdemocraticpower,thepowerofpublicopinion.Inexplicably,hetakesthisidea,inrealityapreconditionfortherationalityofpublic
deliberation,tobeadiminutionofthepublicsphereitself.
78
Moreover,hedoesnotseemtounderstandthattheideaofthepublicastheabolitionofpoliticalpower
involvesarenunciationoftheneedtolimitallpowerthroughtheonlymeanspossible,theestablishmentofcounterpowersandorganizations,andheistherefore
powerlessagainsttheincreasingpowerofthemodernbureaucraticstate.Fromthepointofviewofastrategyofdemocraticdedifferentiation,finally,Habermashasno
sympathyforTocqueville'sstressonvoluntaryassociationsastheintermediarybodiesrequiredforthestabilizationofdifferentiationandtheestablishmentof
democraticmediation.Hedoesnotrealizethatthismodel,requiredforthepreparationofcitizenshiponlevelswhereparticipationisstillpossibleinmodernsocieties,
involvesapotentialrelationshipbetweenhommeandcitoyenthatescapestheinvidiousalternativeofpowerlesshumanbeingandinhumancitizen.Theassociationsof
civilsocietyinTocqueville'stheoryprepareprivateindividualsfortheexerciseofpublicpower,ataskthattheliterarypublicsphereis,onitsown,incapableof
performing.Atthesametime,theseassociationspreservetheconnectionofcitizenstotheprepoliticalsocialnetworksthatserveastheirbackground.
79
Inplaceofthe
Marxianidentityofmanandcitizen,Tocquevillethusproposesadifferentiatedandinterdependentmodelofsocialbeingandcitizen.
Admittedly,MillandTocquevilleareonlypartiallyconcernedwiththededifferentiatingimplicationsofthelinkofmanandbourgeois.Habermasisrighttoappealto
Marxwhenheseekstoexpandprocessesofpubliccriticismandsupervisiontotheeconomicsphere.
80
Itisnotclear,however,whethertheidealproposed

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involvesanabolitionoftheeconomyinthewaythattheliberalutopia(judgedincoherentandimpossiblebyHabermashimself)seekstoabolishpoliticalpoweras
such,replacingitwithpublicdiscussion.Analternativewouldhavebeentoaffirmthedifferentiationoftheeconomicrealmandofitsspecificrolesandtopostulate
newformsofcomplementarityandinterdependencebetweeneconomicactors,privateindividuals,membersofassociations,andparticipantsinthepublicsphere.
Ofcourse,HabermaswouldhaveconsideredirrelevantthecombinationofMarxiancritiqueanddemocraticliberalnormsproposedhereonthebasisofsomestrains
ofhisearlywork,becausehebelievedthatneithertheMarxiannortheliberalutopiaswereadequateguidesforexploringwhatoccurredintheliberalpublicsphere.In
hisanalysis,neitheroptiondepictedhereMarxian,liberal,oreventheircombinationwasactualized.Instead,theliberalbourgeoispublicunderwentachangeof
structureentirelyincompatiblewithitsoriginalnormativeproject.TocquevilleandMarxwouldbothhaveunderstoodthecauseforthisfundamentalchange,namelythe
dramaticexpansionoftheextentandpowerofthemodernadministrativestate,whichhascontinuouslyresistedinvasionbypublicprocessesandprocedures.What
neitherTocquevillenorMarxcouldhaveimaginedwasthat,apartfromthesocialiststatesocietythatonefearedandtheotherferventlydesired,acomprehensive
repoliticizationofsocietycouldoccur,supposedlyremovingthefieldofforceinwhichthebourgeoispublicspherewasconstitutedandapparentlyabolishingthe
differentiationofcivilsocietyandstateforwhichpublicityservedasastabilizingmediation.ItwasCarlSchmittwhowasthefirsttoworkoutacomprehensivetheory
ofthedeclineofthepublicsphereintermsoftheallegedfusionofsocietyandstate.
TheFusionofCivilSocietyandState:
CarlSchmitt
Theshiftofthelocusofgenuinepublicityfromthestate(themodelofantiquity)toanindependentlyorganizedandjuridicallyprivatesocietalspheredoesnotinitself
avoidthethesisoffusionanddecline.Asalreadyindicated,CarlSchmittdevelopedhisinterpretationofparliamentarismaroundthistransmutationofthecon

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ceptofpublicity.Itisthusallthemorestrikingthathewasthefirstimportantthinkertolinktheendoftheliberaleratotherefusionofsocietyandthestateaprocess
thatsupposedlyeliminatedtheonlyspherecapableofsustainingtheclaimsofpublicityundermodernconditions.Accordingly,parliamentarydiscussion,andwithitthe
"wholesystem"oftheprotectionofsocialcommunication,hasbecometodayanemptyformality.
81
Parliamentisnownothingbutanantechambertothereallociof
power:thebureausorcommitteesofinvisiblerulers.
82
TheparliamentarystagehasbeentransformedfromaSchauplatzfor"thefreedeliberationofindependent
representativesseekingunity"intoanarenawherethe"pluralityofdividedyethighlyorganizedsocialforces"meetandclash.
83
Intheprocess,alltheoldclaimsfor
publicityhavecollapsed.
Foracomplexsetofreasons,itisdemocracy,orratherdemocratization,whichSchmitttakestobethefundamentaltendencyofthemodernera,thatisresponsible
forthecrisisofparliamentanditslegitimacy.Tobeginwith,hearguesthatdemocracyandliberalparliamentarismhaveentirelydifferentprinciples.Democracyisa
formofrulerestingonsocial(inmodernity:national)homogeneityand"iftheneedarisestheeliminationanderadicationofheterogeneity."Giventheactualand
structuraldifferencebetweenrulersandruled,democracyispossibleonlywhen,onthegroundofhomogeneity,theruledcan"identify"withtherulers.Startingwiththe
Rousseauianideaaccordingtowhichdemocracyistheactualidentityofthosewhocommandandthosewhoobey,
84
Schmittwindsupreducingthistoastringof
identificationsthatrestonno"palpablereality...somethingactuallyequallegally,politically,sociologically"butonlythe''recognitionofidentity."
85
Moreover,given
sufficientidentification,dictatorship,especiallyifsupportedbypedagogicclaims,iscompatiblewithdemocracyinthisviewindeed,Schmittbelievesthatradical
democracymustleadtodictatorshipbecauseoftheinevitablelackofpreparationofthemassesforselfrule.
Schmittarguesthatliberalismisquitedifferentfromdemocracy.Aboveall,itisadeeplyunpoliticalmodelinthatitrestsondiscussionratherthanidentification,
presupposingacorrespondingpluralityofopinionsratherthantheirhomogeneity.Schmitt

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doesnotconsiderforamomentthepossibilitythatthestructuralconnectionofpublicopinionandparliamentarypublicityestablishesamediumofgenuineifincomplete
identitybetweenrulersandruled.Democracyforhimisbasednotonactualthoughincompleteinstitutionalidentitybutoncompletethoughnecessarilymythological
identification.Thus,thetwoprinciples,liberalparliamentarismanddemocracy,arecontraryandincompatible.
Thereisonehistoricalcontextinwhichliberalismanddemocracyappearedasallies.InSchmitt'sdifficultandimpressionisticlineofargument,whatwasrequiredfor
thisalliancewasthe"identification"oftheextraparliamentary"people"withtheparliamentarypublicasitsrepresentative.Giventheveryrealdifferencesof
parliamentarynotablesandoutsideconstituencies,andofthelatteramongthemselves,theillusionofnecessaryhomogeneityandunitywithinsocietyandofsociety
withparliamentcouldariseonlyinthefaceofanenemy:untamedstatepower.Itisthisfriendfoerelation,ratherthananyHegelianintegratingactivityofthestate,that
achievedthetemporaryunityofsocietyresponsiblefortheillusoryidentityofliberalismanddemocracy.
Theproblem,however,isnotthatthisidentificationisillusorybutthatitistemporary.Althoughtheexistenceofanundemocraticandilliberalstateisnecessaryforthe
allianceofliberalismanddemocracy,bothideologies,albeitfordifferentreasons,pushtowarditsabolitionoritstransformationintoastateastheselforganizationof
society.Themilitaryadministrativestateisunacceptabletoliberalprinciples,fortheserecognizethelegitimacyofdecisionsonlyiftheyhavebeenarrivedatthrough
theapoliticalprincipleofdiscussion.Tobesure,liberalismisskepticaltowardanystateandseeksareduced"nightwatchman"variant.Itdoesnotattempttoabolish
fullyortoreplacethemilitaryadministrativestate.Thelatter,however,insofarasitistheremnantofahierarchicalandauthoritarianera,isfarmoreunacceptableto
democracy.Moreover,oncedemocraticforcesidentifywiththeliberalparliament,they,unlikeliberalforces,cannottoleratethefactthatthestateisnotidenticalwith
thisparliament.
Paradoxically,asthetriumphoftheallianceofliberalismanddemocracynearsitsgoal,withthecreationofastatethatrepresentstheselforganizationofsociety
(throughextensionofthefran

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chise,whichisapreconditionofthealliance),astatetowardwhichapolemicalattitudeisnecessaryandpossibleisnolongerapossibility.Alongwithits(supposed)
disappearance,theconditionsofsocialunityalsodisappear,puttingliberalism,democracy,andthestateitselfintocrisis.
86
Schmittexploresthenatureofthiscrisisby
analyzingtwodevelopmentslinkedtotheprocessofdemocratization:theemergenceofanewtypeofmassbureaucraticparty,andtheadventofstateinterventionism.
Thefirstleadstoafundamentaltransformationoftheinstitutionsandprocessesthattheliberalmodelofdiscussionpresupposed,evenifcounterfactually.Thesecond
representsachangewithevenmoreradicalramifications:the"functionaldedifferentiation"ofsocietyandstate.This"fusion"ofthepoliticalandthesocialeliminatesthe
spaceforapublicdiscursiveformofintermediation,transformingindeeddissolving,asitwerethepublicspacesinbothsocietyandstate.
AccordingtoSchmitt(whoobviouslytakesEnglandashismodel),theliberalpartysystemwasoriginallybasedonfreecompetition,throughthemeansofdiscussion
andpersuasion,forthevotesofaneducatedandindependent(elite)public.Indeed,liberalpartiesweretotakeshapeinthesphereofpublicopinion,thatis,in
parliament.Thisprinciplefounditssociologicalcorrelateinrelativelysmall,collegialpartiesofnotables.Becauseofalackofattachmenttobothfixedinterestsand
organizationalstructures,therepresentativeselectedbypartiesweresupposedlycapableoffreedomofactionanddeliberationinparliamenthencetheassumption
thattheywere,asabody,inthepositiontogenerateaunifiedwillofthestatethroughdiscussionandmutualpersuasion.
87
Democratization,however,hasledtothe
emergenceofanentirelynewtypeofcompetitivepartybasedonmassmembership,sociologicallylinkedtoaspecificconstellationofinterests,andheavily
bureaucratizedwithnumerouspaidfunctionaries.
88
Suchapartydoesnotvalueneutralityvisvisitsmembersandtendstobedeeplyinvolvedinthesocial,
economic,andculturallifeofits"clientele"inallstagesofthehumanlifecycle.Norisittolerantoftheformsofliferepresentedbyitscompetitors.Each"democratic"
partyistendentiallytotalisticinsofarasitseeksfullpossessionofthestateapparatus,whichisseenastheinstrumentforcarryingoutits

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socialgoals.Themultiplicityofsuchpartiesdoeskeepeachoneinchecktogether,theyconstituteapluralisticpartystate(asagainstasinglepartystate),a"labile
coalitionstate."Schmittpointedlymaintainsthatthistypeofstatehasitselfattainedatotalcharacterwithrespecttoitspredecessor,representingineffectafragmented
orparceledouttotalityinwhicheveryorganizedcomplexofpowerseekstoactualizeatotality"initselfandforitself"(insichselbstundfrsichselbst).
Schmitt'sexplanationforthechangingcharacterofpoliticalpartiesinthecontextofpoliticaldemocratizationdiffersfromconservativeandsocialistanalysesofthese
phenomena.Whileconservativesstressedthesupposedlyinevitablebureaucratizationofpolitics,giventheproblemsoforganizinguneducatedandatomized"masses,"
socialistsfocusedonthetendencytocreatenewmechanismsofexclusionanddepoliticizationreconcilingthe"participation"oftheexploitedwiththeimperativesof
maintainingtheexisting,exploitativesocioeconomicsystem.Schmitt,inspiteofhisbizarresetofaffinitieswithstrainswithinconservatismaswellaswithauthoritarian
versionsofMarxism,bypassesbothoftheseexplanations,focusinginsteadontheendofthepolemicalrelationofstateandsocietyundertheimpactofdemocratic
parliamentarism.Theunityofthediversesociologicalformationsofadepoliticizedsocietydependedonthesurvivaloftheauthoritarianstateform.Theemergenceof
thestateastheselforganizationofsocietyandtheweakeningoftheexecutivefragmentsocietyalonglinesofapluralityofinterestsandbeliefs.Politicalappealacross
thesociologicaldividinglinesbecomesimpossible,andpoliticalpartiesmustnoworganizewithinrigidifiedcategories.Furthermore,successfulelectoralappealnow
dependsonsatisfyingsectoraleconomic,cultural,andideologicaldemands.Accordingly,theparliamentaryfieldonceagainmirrorssocietyatlarge.Thistime,
however,thesocietyitmirrorsispluralisticallyorganized,andeachsegmentdemandsspecificperformancesineconomic,social,andculturalpolicy.Justasthestate
becomestheparliamentarystate,parliamentitselfbecomestheexpressionofmutuallyhostilesocietalpluralitiescapableofstrategiccompromisebutnotgenuine
agreement.

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Moreover,compromisecannolongerbeachievedthroughdiscussionofthetruthandjusticeofagivenpolicy,norcanitbeopenlyandpubliclyarrivedat,for
compromiseandopendiscussionviolatetheprinciplesofthenewtypeoftotalizingpoliticalparty.Theparliamentarydiscussionthatdoestakeplaceisanempty
formality,amerefacade,located"inagiganticantechamberinfrontofthebureausorcommitteesofinvisiblerulers....Smallandexclusivecommitteesofpartiesand
partycoalitionsmaketheirdecisionsbehindcloseddoors,andwhatrepresentativesofthebigcapitalistinterestgroupsagreetointhesmallcommitteesismore
importantforthefateofmillionsofpeople,perhaps,thananypoliticaldecision."
89
Schmitt'sconcern,unlikethatofMarxiancriticsofpluralism,isnotthatthesameinterestsalwaysdominatethroughextraparliamentarypressureanddealmaking.
Becausepartycommitteesmustworkthroughanelectedparliament,rulebythemcreatesinconsistentoutcomes,dependingonresultsofelectionsandcoalitionsthat
strengthenoneoranotherfaction.Therealdangerhefearsisnotoligarchybutwhatwaslatercalled"ungovernability,"sinceheisconvincedthatthepluralisticparty
statefragmentsthetwoconceivablesourcesofunity:stateandsociety.
Thisfragmentationisinfactsimultaneousasstateandsocietybecomeone.However,Schmitt'sfusionthesisisnotbasedsimplyontheactualizationoftheprogramof
thestateastheselforganizationofsociety.Indeedthisidea,basedonfacilegeneralizationfromthecaseofWeimar,isnotconvincingdespitethedialecticalvirtuosity
involvedinthereversaloftheHegelianargument.Therealityofthemodernstatedoesnotinfactdisappearwhenthedemocratictransformationofparliamentary
democracyiscomplete.Thisiscertainlynotthecaseinpresidentialsystems,buteveninparliamentarysystemsagrowthofthepoweroftheexecutivehashistorically
accompanieddemocratization.Thisgrowthoftheexecutiveisbothaconditionoftheconstitutionofcivilsocietyandathreattoitsindependenceanddifferentiation.
90

Thus,ifthefusionofstateandsocietyisthepresuppositionforthedeclineoftheparliamentarypublicsphere,thisfusionmusthavefoundationsinadditiontoformal
democratizationprocesses,oneslinkedtotheexpansionratherthantheweakeningofthemodernstate.

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Schmittdoesprovideasecondtrainofargumentforthefusionofstateandsociety,onewhoseconsequencesarefarmoregeneralwithrespecttotherootsof
independentsociallife.Thisargument,focusingonthemutualinterpenetrationofstateandsociety,isdifficulttodisentanglefromtheprimaryemphasisonthe
socializationofthestate,butuponcloserexaminationitturnsoutthatheretheissueisspecificallythatofatwodirectionalfunctionaldedifferentiation.Accordingly,the
nineteenthcenturyliberalstatewasdifferentiatedfromsocietynotonlyinthesenseofbeingindependentofsegmentalconstellationsoffixedsocialinterestsbutalsoin
thesenseofbeingneutralwithrespecttothegreatfunctionalspheresofsocietythataretherebydepoliticized:religion,culture,economics,law,science.
91
Here
Schmitt'smodelisaboveallthatofthelaissezfaireeconomicorderandastatethatintervenesatmosttorestorethedisturbedconditionsofeconomiccompetition.
Fromthispointofview,wegetanalteredcatalogueofliberalfundamentalrightsandfreedoms(personalfreedom,freedomsofexpressionofopinion,ofcontract,of
enterprise,ofproperty)thatdoesnotevenincludethekeyfreedomsofcommunication(assemblyandassociation).
92
Herethefunctionofrightsistomaintain
differentiationanddepoliticization,ratherthantoguaranteethepreconditionsofpubliccommunication.
AccordingtoSchmitt,theliberalmodeloffunctionaldifferentiationisassailedfromtwodirections.Thepostliberalstateisa"totalstatewhichpotentiallyembraces
everydomain."
93
Thisstatementhasadoublemeaning.First,thenewtypeofstateisnolongerneutralwithrespecttothevariousspheresofsocietyandbecomesin
effectaneconomic,welfare,cultural,educational,scientific,even"religious"stateinawordthatSchmittdoesnotseemtouseinthiscontext,itisaSozialstaator
socialstate.
94
Second,thenewtypeofstateintervenesinandpoliticizesallspheresofsociety.Theimplicationhereisthatthesocietystatedistinctionisabolished
withsuchradicalitythattheprivatesphereitself,stabilizedbyrightsmodeledonthatofproperty,ispenetrated,politicized,andabolishedasanindependentsphere.
Whilethemodeloftheriseofpluralistsegmentaldifferentiationseemstomakeonlysomerightstheoneslinkedtocommunicationpoliticallyirrelevant,themodel
offunctionaldedifferentiationactuallysupportsSchmitt'sstatementthatliberalrightsassuchhavebecomeobsolete.

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TherelationshipofthesetwomodelsinSchmitt'sargumentiscomplex.Theonly"explanation"heprovidesforfunctionaldedifferentiationis,onceagain,
democratization,whichforratherunclearreasons"mustdoawaywith...theformsofdepoliticizationcharacteristicoftheliberalnineteenthcentury."
95
Infact,the
argumentagainseemstorestontheextenttowhichtheprogramof"liberaldemocracy"canestablishthestateastheselforganizationofsociety.HereSchmittwould
haveusthinkthattheideaofaSozialstaat,inthesenseofaneconomic,welfare,cultural,etc.,state,andthatofsocietybecomingthestate(zumStaatgewordene
Gesellschaft)arethesame.Butinhisownargumenttheculminationofthestateastheselforganizationofsocietyonlyleadstothefragmentationthatis,the
segmentationalonglinesofinterestandideologyofthesocietythattakesoverthestate.Theoutcome,aswehaveshown,isafragmentedpluralisticpartystate
whosesovereigntyisparceledoutamongtheunits.Schmitt'sneverclarifiedargumentseemstohingeagainonthetypeofthedemocraticmassideologicalpartythat
involvesitselfinallaspectsofthesociallifeofitsmembers.Suchapartywouldpresumablyseekastatemodeledonitself,interveninginsocietyonbehalfofthe
economic,cultural,andotherinterestsitrepresents.UnlessSchmitthasinmindthespecificexamplesoftherelationshipoftheSocialDemocratstotheeconomy,orof
theCatholicCenterpartytoreligion,itisentirelyunclearwhythenewpartysystemshouldleadtoawholesaleprocessoffunctionaldedifferentiationofstateand
society.Indeed,evenMussolini'ssinglepartystatecouldcoexistforatimewithaliberaleconomicorder.
Onceagain,webelieve,thesourceoftheconfusionisSchmitt'sunwillingnesstoconcedethat,whereasinthecaseofsegmentationthesourceliesinsocialcomplexes
seekingtocaptureoratleastparceloutthestate,inthecaseoffunctionaldedifferentiationwearedealingwithapowerfuladministrativebureaucraticstateseekingto
penetratesociety.FromhishighlycommittedWeimarperspective,Schmittsaw"socialdemocratization"butnotstateinterventionismasadynamicforceleadingto
politicalcrisis.Nevertheless,heisawareoftwopossibleoutcomesthatareinlinewiththetwotendencieswewereforcedtoseparateinhisthought.Ofthetwo
versionsofthe"total"stateheoutlines,thefragmented

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pluralistvarietyistheproductofthetendencytowardsegmentationtheauthoritarianvarietyistheproductoffunctionaldedifferentiationdrivenbythelogicofthestate
itself.
96
Schmittseemstohavesomeideathatthetwoversionsofthetotalstateflowfromdifferentmeaningsoftheterm"socialstate"or"statesociety,"oneimplyingthe
primacyofthesocial,theotherthatofthepolitical.Hestatesthatthe"pluralisticpartystatebecomes'total'notoutofstrengthbutweaknessitintervenesinallareasof
lifebecauseitmustsatisfytheclaimsofallthoseinterested."
97
Nevertheless,healsobelievesthatthefragmentedvarietyofthetotalstateisnotsomuchanalternative
outcomeoftherepoliticizationofsocietyasanartificialproduct,bydefinitionalmostalwaysincrisis,aresultofthesurvivalofobsoletelegalandparliamentary
institutions.Inparticular,hebelievesthattheculminationofthetrendagainsttheliberalneutralizationofthestateandthedepoliticizationofsocietyhasalready
producedthefoundationsofanotherauthoritarianformofpowerrestingondemocraticplebiscitarylegitimacy.Indeed,itisanunstatedconsequenceofhisargument
thatsuchanoutcomecouldevenconvergewiththelogicalselfabolitionofthepartysystem,withtheruleofmanypartiesbeingreplacedbythatofasingle,
monopolisticparty.Thus,thetwotendenciestowardfusion,segmentationandfunctionaldedifferentiation,couldconvergeinanewtypeof"democratic''dictatorship.
OnthebasisofhisinterpretationoftheexperienceofWeimar,however,Schmittisconvincedthattheoperationofparliamentarylegality,evenifitisnolongerina
positiontoproducealegislativestate,isneverthelesscapableofcheckmatingtheemergenceofagenuinelypoliticalthatis,authoritarianstateform.
98
Aparliament
guaranteeingthepoliticalrightsofapluralityofpartiesiscapableofcheckmatingdecisionsoftheexecutivethatariseoutsidethegivenconditionsofcoalition
formation.Andonemightaddthatthesurvivaloftheliberalframeworkoflegalprotectionoutsideofparliamentmakesthereplacementofasystemofapluralityof
partiesbythatofasinglepartynearlyimpossible.
99
AccordingtoSchmitt,theallianceofliberalismanddemocracyis(forthepresent)beyondrepair.Theinstrumentofmajorityruleinparliamentlosesitschancesof
popularacceptancewhenhighly

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organizedpoliticalgroupingspredetermineallpossibleoutcomes,establishanirreversibleadvantageofincumbency,andrigidifyagivenstructureofmajoritiesand
minoritiesandevenofcompletepoliticalexclusion.Thus,eachpartneroftheformermarriageofliberalismanddemocracyisnowincrisis:democraticlegitimacyalong
withtheparliamentaryprinciple.Theircrisesproduceathirdone,thatofthestateitself,totheextentthatsolutionsbeyondliberalismandtheexistingformof
democracyaresuccessfullyblockedandthepossibilitiesofdecisionarecontinuallystymied.ToSchmitt,thereseemtobetwochoicesinherentinthissituation:the
continuationofanantipolitical,pluralisticpartystateinpermanentcrisisbutprotectedanddisguisedbyliberalprinciples,orthecreationofagenuinelypolitical,no
longerpluralistic,authoritarianstatelegitimatedbyanew,plebiscitaryversionof"democracy."ItisuselesstodenythatitisthissecondoptionthatSchmittchooses.
Indeed,itwasthischoicethatallowedSchmitttobeenthusiasticaboutItalianFascismandthatmadehisturntoNationalSocialismintellectuallyauthentic,ifnot
inevitable.ForSchmitt,noreturntoaconservative,nonplebiscitaryauthoritarianregimecouldprovideasolutionforthecrisisofthestate,sincesuchanalternative,
byreconstitutingtheirearlierpolemicaladversary,wouldleadtoareconstitutionoftheallianceofliberalismanddemocracyandagainunderminethestate.Likethe
leftistsandrightistsheadmired,Schmittproposedanalternativemarriage:thatofdemocracyandauthoritarianism.
Inanycase,withthecomingofthetotalstate,neitherofthetwooptions(pluralisticorauthoritarian)isconsistentwithadualismofstateandsociety,orwiththe
operationofaparliamentarymediationbetweenthem.WhatdoesnotoccurtoSchmittisthepossibility,soobviousintheAmericancontext,thatthetwoprinciples,
statistandpluralistic,stabilizedinaframeworkofliberalrights,couldcombinetoconstituteanewversionofthestatecivilsocietydualism.Threefeaturesofhis
thoughtwereresponsibleforthismyopia:anunwillingnesstorecognizethecontinuedexistenceofatendentiallyauthoritarianstateinthepluralisticeraaninabilityto
seethewholegamutofreasons,includingespeciallytheeconomicones,forstateinterventionisminsocietyandafailuretonotetheemergenceofyetanothernew
typeofpoliticalparty,the

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catchallparty,basedonamixedconstituency,interestedneitherintotallydominatingnorinparcelingoutthepoliticalsystem,capableofgreaterfluidityinthe
parliamentaryarenaandofmorethanmerelystrategiccompromisewithitsadversaries.
ThedisappearanceofthestateinSchmitt'spictureofliberaldemocracywashardlyinnocent:Hesoughttoreinforceanauthoritarianadministrationthathepresented
asweakened,andtodothishehadtodisguiseitsroleinthecrisisofthepoliticalorderofWeimar.Thepretensethattheauthoritarianelementofthestatewas
moribund,despitethepowerofthearmy,theadministration,andthelegalsystemalliedtotheadministration,nottospeakofthepresidentialprerogativesofthe
constitutionalsystem,helpedhimtoattackthepluralisticpartysystemthatproducednewlinksaswellastensionsbetweendemocracyandliberalism.
TheFusionArgumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel
Givenitsthinlydisguisedauthoritarianintentions,itisallthemorestrikingthatthefusionargumentSchmittworkedoutwasadopted,andindeeddramatically
refurbished,bythewritersoftheFrankfurtschool.Theirattitudetoliberalism,democracy,andauthoritarianismwastheoppositeofSchmitt's,yetthefusionargument
becameforallofthemasignificantfeatureofthe"critiqueoftheauthoritarianstate."
Consistentlyenough,neithertheallianceofliberalismanddemocracy,northesupposeddeclineoftheiradversary,authoritarianexecutivepower,playsaroleinthe
Frankfurtanalyses.Thisstructureoftheargumentisreplacedbyanewone:thegreattransformationofthecapitalisteconomicorderfromliberaltomonopolyand
finallytostateorganizedcapitalism.Theargument,althoughfirstdevelopedinrelationtotheriseofauthoritarianstates,alsoprovedapplicableinthepostwarperiod,
whenliberaldemocracywasreconstructed.
100
Habermas'stheoryofthedeclineofthepublicsphere,howevermuchinfluencedbytheearlierthesesofSchmittand
Arendt,derivesfirstandforemostfromthevariousstrandsoftheFrankfurtschoolanalysisofthe1930s.Indeed,Habermasultimatelymanagedtorecastalmostallof
thesestrandsinanewtheoreticalframework,wheretheybecamequite

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usefulforademocratictheoryorientedtopractice.Butin1962,atthetimeofwritingofStrukturwandelderffentlichkeit,Habermashadnotyetachievedthis
position.Asaresult,unfortunately,helinkedthenotionofthetransformationofthepublicspheretothenegativephilosophyofhistoryofAdornoandHorkheimer,and
consequentlyhewasunabletoseemuchbeyondathesisofdecline,excepttothelimitedextentthathe,unlikehisteachers,stillharboredsomeclassicalMarxian
assumptions.Theapplicationofthetheoryofthepublicspheretocontemporarypoliticshadtowait.
HereweneedonlysummarizeHabermas'smultidimensionalsynthesis.Theargumentiscomposedofsixlevels:
1.Thethesisofstateinterventionisminthecapitalisteconomy.Thisargument,almostentirelymissinginSchmitt,involvessomethingqualitativelydifferentfromthe
expansionofstateadministrationandpoliticalbureaucracyduringtheabsolutistandevenliberalepochsstressedbyMarx,Tocqueville,and,inherownway,Arendt.
Themodernstateintervenesintheliberalcapitalisteconomy,atthepriceofitsliberalcharacter,toprotectthecapitaliststructureendangeredbyendogenouscrisis
tendenciesandprocessesofimpairedselfregulation.Thestateseekstocorrectdisequilibriaproducedbothbyselfregulatingmarketprocessesandbyphenomena
ofimperfect,oligopolisticcompetition(fiscalandmonetaryregulationofthebusinesscycle),tounderwriteprocessesofinvestment,accumulation,andtechnical
innovation,andtosupportaggregatedemandthroughwelfarestateexpenditures.Thisthesis,ratherundevelopedinStrukturwandel,wasfullyintegratedinthe
FrankfurttraditionbyF.Pollockandhiscolleagues(19321941)inrelationto"theauthoritarianstate."ItwaspowerfullyextendedinthewritingsofHabermasand
ClausOffeafter1968intheformofacritiqueofwelfarestatecrisismanagement.
101
2.Thethesisoftheassumptionofpublicpowersbyprivateassociations(newcorporatism).Thisthesis,firstintroducedintoFrankfurtdiscussionbyO.
Kirchheimer,
102
derivesfromSchmitt'scritiqueofWeimarpluralism.InHabermas's1962argument,thecritiqueisextendedtotheprepoliticallevel.Inprocessesof
oligopolisticcompetition,privateorganizationsarecapable,as

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againstliberalcapitalism,offormulatingwhatisineffectpubliceconomicpolicy.
103
Thecollectiveagreementsamongprivateassociationsinparticular,employment
associationsandunionslosetheirprivatelawstatusinfavorofaformofrulecreationthatwaspreviouslyreservedforpubliclawentities.Whileimportantareasof
administrationnowfalltoprivatelawentities,thestateitselfincreasinglyusesprivatelegalcontractualdevicestoregulateitsrelationswithitssocialpartners.This
argument,albeitdeemphasizedbyHabermasinhissubsequentwork,waspowerfullyextendedbyOffeinthe1980s.
104
Itisworthstressing,however,thathedidso
notonlytoindicateacomponentofoverallwelfarestatestructure(inanycase,acomponentnotequallyimportantunderallwelfarestates)but,undertheimpactofthe
neoconservativechallenge,tostressonepotential,albeitinternallyproblematic(andnormativelyunattractive!),avenueforreducingtheadministrativeandlegitimating
burdensoftheinterventioniststate.
3.Thethesisofthedeclineoftheintimatesphereofthefamily.Thisthesis,animportantcomponentofArendt'sanalysiswhoseveryformulationistakenoverby
Habermas("thepolarizationofthesocialandintimatespheres"),wasakeycontributionofHorkheimerandhiscolleaguesinthe1930stosocialtheory.Habermas's
1962analysis,drawingonnewliterature,stressesthedestructionoftheprivateshellofbourgeoispropertyaroundintimacy,causedbythelossofthefamily's
economicfunctionsandthegrowthofclientrelationstoastateinitscapacityofprovidingsocialinsurance.Thefamilyincreasinglylosesitsfunctionsof"education,
defense,caringanddirection,andevenofprovidingtraditionsandorientations...itsconductformingpowerinareasthatcountedasthemostinternalspheresofthe
membersofbourgeoisfamilies."
105
Thedeclineoftheauthorityofthefatheris,fromthispointofview,ambiguous:Thefamilylosesnotonlyitsrepressivebutalsoits
defensivefunctions.Thenewformsofevenmoreintensiveintimacyareseenashopelesslydefensive,inthemannerofArendtprivatelifebecomesmoreandmore
opentothegazeofoutsiders,downtotheverylevelofarchitecture.Thefakeintimacyofpubliccommunication,stressedbybothAdornoandArendt,representsto
Habermasbothaformofthesubsumptionoftheintimatesphereandthedegradationofpublicintomass.
106

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4.Thethesisofthedeclineoftheliterarypublicsphereandtheriseofmassculture.Thiscomplexofargumentsrepresentsthemostsuccessfulandbestknown
dimensionofthetheoryoftheearlyFrankfurtschool,aboveallofAdorno.ThestressinHabermas'sversionisonthegrowthoftheliterarypublicintothesphereof
consumptionandmanipulatedleisure.Thisislinkedtothedeclineoffamilybasedinstitutionsofculturalreceptionandcriticismaswellastotheindustrialcommercial
transformationofthemediaofcommunication.Amarketisnolongerthepreconditionofautonomousartmarketabilitybecomesaprincipleoftheindustrial
productionofart.The"democratization"ofcultureisapseudodemocratizationwhatisdemocratizedisnolongerculture.Thedramaticexpansionoftheliterary
publicsphereissimultaneouswiththedeclineofitscriticalcharacter.
107
Thenewmediafosteramerelypassiveformofparticipation.Thesurvivalofavantgardeart
andcultureonlysplitstheclassicalliterarypublicsphereinto"aminorityofreasoning,nolongerpublic,expertsandthegreatmassofpublicconsumers."
108
Theerosionoftheintimatesphereandofagenuineliterarypublicleadstothelossofthetensionbetweenhommeandbourgeois,abolishingtheprivatefoundationof
autonomywithoutprovidinganewpublicone.HerethethesesofthedeclineofthefamilyandtheriseofmassculturearelinkedtotheclassicalFrankfurtthesisofthe
declineoftheindividual.
5.Thethesisofthetransformationofthepoliticalpublicsphererepresentsaselectiveextensionofargumentsdevelopedinrelationtotheprepoliticaldimensionsof
publicity.Interestinglyenough,statistbureaucraticinterventionintotheeconomy,forArendtthereplacementparexcellenceofegalitarianpublicinteractionby
paternalism,issomewhatdeemphasizedintheanalysis,althoughHabermasdoesmentionthegrowthandincreasingindependenceofanadministrationthatsuccessfully
resisted,evenintheliberalera,thedemandsofpublicity.AllthemoreimportantistheSchmittianargument,stressedalsobyKirchheimer,accordingtowhichthe
assumptionofpublicpowersbyprivateassociationsleadstotheemergenceofcorporatistprocessesofnegotiation,bargaining,andcompromisethatbypasspublic
processesofscrutiny
109
andreduceparliamentarydiscussionanddebatetoaposthocprocessof

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legitimatingdecisionsarrivedatundertheprotectionofanew"arcanum."Nolongerattemptsbyrepresentativestoconvinceoneanother,speechesinparliamentnow
seektomobilizeaplebiscitaryopinionoutsideparliament.AsSchmittargued,representativesboundbypartydisciplinelosetheirindependenceassomething
resemblingtheboundmandateisrevived.HabermasrecognizesthatSchmitt'sconceptionofthetransformationofthepartysystemfromloosecollegialgroupings
boundbycommonopiniontopartiesasrigidsociologicalgroupingsnolongercorrespondstoreality.Thenewtypeof"catchallparty"stressedbyKirchheimer
amongothers,afurtherstageinthe"democratization''and"massification"ofthepoliticalsystem,onlyincreasesdepoliticizationbyfurtherreducingthelevelofpolitical
discourseandargument.
110
Ofcourse,thenewtypeofpartyisnolongerassociatedherewiththeparcelingoutofsovereignpower.Itsmostimportantresult,the
"vanishingofthepoliticalopposition,"touseKirchheimer'sphrase,hastheeffectofreducingpubliccontrolsupontheadministration,asstressedbyMaxWeber,
therebystrengtheningauthoritarianpowerwithoutauthoritarianmeans.
6.HabermasextendedSchmitt'sthesisthattheroleofparliamentassphereofmediationbetweenastrengthenedbureaucracyandprivateassociationsmustdecline.
Equallyimportant,however,washisuseoftheFrankfurtschoolthesisonmassculturetodemystifytheallegedly"democratic"characteroftheplebiscitary
componentsofthenewsituation,stressedbySchmitt.InthetraditionofAdornoandLowenthal,whoemphasizedtheauthoritarianpoliticalpotentialofthenewmass
cultureanditsmedia,Habermaspointstotheplaceofpropagandaincontemporarypoliticaldiscourse.Modernpoliticalmanipulationpresupposestheformsof
commercialadvertisementthatbecomedominantaspricecompetitionceasestobethemechanismcoordinatingoligopolisticgroupingsintheirstruggleformarket
shares.AsAdornoandhiscolleagueswellknew,propagandatheadvertisingandsellingofpoliticalleaders,parties,andpoliciespresupposesalreadyformed,
passive,uncritical,yetmobilizableaudiences.Whileadvertisingassuchturnstoindividualsintheirprivatecapacities,thushelpingtodecomposetheintimatesphere,
theintermediaryformof"publicrelations"turnstoanddeforms

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"publicopinion"through"theengineeringofconsent."
111
Itisthistaskthatbecomescentralforpoliticalpartiesofthecontemporarytype,inparliamentandespecially
intheelectoralprocess.Suchpartiesdonotneedcontinuousmassmembershipasmuchasanapparatuscapableatperiodicintervalsofmobilizingelectoralsupportin
themannerofanadvertisingagency.Althoughthereconstitutionofsomekindofpoliticalpublicsphereinelectoralcampaignsisunavoidable,
112
thepreferredtargets
ofpartiesarethoseindividuals,generallynotmembersofassociationsorhigherstatusgroups,whohavenoaccesstowhataredepictedhereasresidualformsofa
reasoningpublic.Thetargetedvotersareapproachednotthroughenlightenmentbutthroughappealstoconsumeristbehavior,andnotbyagitatorsoreven
"propagandists"oftheoldtypebutbyadvertisingexperts.
113
Tobesuccessful,''theorganizersofelectionsmustnotonlyrecognizethedisappearanceofagenuine
politicalpublicsphere,butfullyconsciouslymusthelpproducethisoutcome."
114
Theresultisnotunderstandingoragreementwithpoliciesbuta"symbolic
identification"withleadersthatismeasurable,andfurtheropenedtomanipulation,throughpopularityindicesand"public"opinionpollsthatreferexclusivelyto
nonpublicandatomizedopinion.Evenifpartiesandgovernmentswereactuallyresponsiveto"nonpublicopinion,"theresultwouldstillbemorelikeenlightened
absolutismthanagenuinedemocraticwillformationbasedonthetransformationofpersonalopinionthroughprocessesofrationaldeliberationintoagenuinepublic
opinion.
115
Habermas'saimonalltheselevelsofanalysisisnotonlytodemonstratethedeformationanddeteriorationoftheprincipleoffreepubliccommunication.Evenmore
importantforusishiscomplementarythesis:thatofthedestructionofthemodelofdifferentiationbetweencivilsocietyandstatethroughafusionoflevels.Ifthe
deformationofmediatinginstitutionsitselfpromotesdedifferentiation,itcanbealsobearguedthatthetendenciestowardfusionofstateandsocietyremovethesocial
spaceinwhichtheliberalpublicspherecouldfunction.Ononelevel,thedifferencebetweenthetwoprocessesisonlyoneofemphasis:Habermasisinterestedinthe
declineandrevivalofthepublicsphere,whichin1962hestillimaginedtobepossiblewithoutamodelthat

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differentiatedbetweenstateandcivilsociety.We,ontheotherhand,areinterestedinreconstructingthedifferentiatedmodel,whichwedonotthinkpossibleor
normativelydesirablewithoutarenewaloftheliberalanddemocraticprojectofthepublicsphere.
Butthereisalsoasystematicdifferencebetweenourtwoapproaches,totheextentthatthemodelofthedeclineofthepublicspherereferstoamuchmorecomplete
processoffusionandeven"onedimensionality"thanthatofthenewrelationofstateandsociety.ThiscanbeseeninthestructureofHabermas'sargument.Hetells
us,rightly,thatthemodeloftherepoliticizationofsocietythroughstateinterventionintheeconomycannot,onitsown,establishafusionargument,sinceprivate
economicactivitycouldbelimitedinimportantwayswithoutsuchinterventionaffectingtheprivatenatureoflargeareasofpersonalinteraction.Butheiswrongto
suggestthatthecasecanbecompletedbyreferringtothecomplementaryassumptionofpublicpowersbyprivateassociations.Evenifthetwoprocessesdoproduce
anintermediaryspheretowhichthedistinctionsofprivateandpublic,societyandstate,nolongerapply,theydonotinthemselvesmakethedistinctiondisappear,as
theterms"statizingsociety"and"socializingthestate"seemtoimply.Inparticular,thespheresofintimacyandpublicityproperarenotdirectlydecomposedbythetwo
processesforthistohappen,areificationandinstrumentalizationofthesetwoultimatelyculturalspheresisnecessary.Ifthetwocomplementaryprocessesleadingto
fusionaretoreachtheirgoal,thereificationofthespacebetweenthem,thatofculture,mustbecomemoreorlesstotal.ThethesisfirstintroducedbySchmittcanbe
savedonlywiththehelpoftheculturaltheoryoftheFrankfurtschool,especiallyintheversionofAdorno.Butthischoicewouldlead,inthecaseofHabermas'sown
thesisaswell,toamanipulatedpublicwhoseagentsareentirelypassiveandwhosepresentdynamiccouldinnowaypointtotherevivalofitsoriginalpromise.
116
Suchaconstellationcouldstillbeopentorevolutionaryruptures,inArendt'ssense.AnditisinfactfairtoaskattheendofHabermas'sbooktowhatextenthehas
escapedtheancientrepublicanmodelofthepublicspherehecriticizedinArendt'swork.Inworkingouttheconsequencesofthefusionargument,hesuddenlytellsus
that"themodelofthebourgeoispublicwasbased

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ontherigidseparationofpublicandprivatespheres,sincethepublicsphereofprivateindividualsorganizedaspublicscountedasprivate."
117
Whilejuridically
correct,thisargumentbreakswithHabermas'searlier,moreHegelian,argumentaccordingtowhichitwaspreciselytherigiddistinctionofpublicandprivatethatwas
relativizedbythevariouslevelsofmediation.
Weshouldnote,moreover,thattheutopiaHabermasderivedfromMarx,involvingthedualityofapublicstatesocietyandtheintimatesphere,alongwiththeprimacy
oftheformer,coincideswithArendt'srepublicanmodel.Habermas'stheoryofdeclinealsopostulatestheemergenceofamixedrealmthatisneitherpublicnor
private,leadingtothecollapseofgenuinepublicity.ForArendt,themodeloftheliberalpublicsphereworkedoutbyHabermas,concernedasitwaswithmediating
betweenstateandsocietythroughregulationofthepreconditionsofthemarketeconomy,alreadywasthismixedsphereandcouldinvolvenogenuinepubliclifeand
action.Theideaofapublicrealmcontrollingandinfluencingthestatewithoutsharinginpowerwouldhaveappearedsenselesstoher.Allthesame,itcouldbeargued
thattheonlyrealdifferencebetweentheiranalysesisthatHabermasgivesArendt'smodelofdeclineahistoricallydistinctstartingpointfromwhichadeclinecouldtake
place.Andindeed,howeverinconsistently,theemergenceofamixedrealmalsoseemedtoHabermastodeprive"thepublicsphereofitsoldbasiswithoutgivingita
newone."
118
Ofcourse,thiswasafunctionnotoftheriseofthemodernstateassuchbutofthepostliberalrelationsofstateandeconomy.Obviously,Habermasand
Arendtshareaninterestinworkingoutanewsuchabasis.Inthiscontext,however,weshouldalsorecallthatHabermasrepeatedlyassertsthatheseeksto
reinstitutionalizetheliberalratherthantheancientmodelofthepublicsphere.
TheidealoftheliberalpublicspherecontainsforHabermasthatofdemocratization.Paradoxically,thehistoricalprocessesofdemocratization,whetherofpoliticsasin
thepartysystemorofcultureasinmassculture,contributedtothedeclineoftheinstitutionsthatSustainedthisideal,inhowevercontradictoryafashion,reducingitto
anabstractprincipleoflegitimation.Thedeclineofliberalinstitutionscould,however,beseenfromtwopointsofview:thatofdifferentiationofstateandcivilsociety
as

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expressedbytheprincipleofrights,andthatofthepublicsphereasexpressedbytheprincipleofrationalcommunication.Itisthereforeambiguoustoarguefora
reinstitutionalizationofliberalprinciplesunlessonespecificallyreferstobothoronlyoneofthese.Habermas'sobviousinclinationwastodefendtheprincipleof
communicationprimarily.Tobesure,theclassicalcataloguesofrightspositedthisprincipleintermsofaseriesofwellknownrights(freedomsofspeech,assembly,
suffrage,etc.).Buttheverymeaningof"rights"inthiscase,asinothers,involvedsomethingmore:Rightsaslibertiesdifferentiatedbetweentheprivatesphereand
publicauthority,andtheyimpliedtheprotectionnotonlyofthemediatingpublicspherefromstatepowerbutalsooftheprivatespherefrombothpublics.
SinceHabermasdoesnotwanttoabandonsuchcatalogues,hearguesfortheirredefinitionandreconstruction.Inthiscontext,hemaintainsnotonlythattheactual
trendofwelfarestatejurisprudenceisinadirectionthattransformsthemerelydefensive,negativestructureofinheritedconstitutionalrightsbutalsothatthis
developmentrepresentswhatisineffecttheonlyimmanenttendencyinoursocietiestowardareinstitutionalizationofthepublicsphere.
119
Notonly,then,doeshe
speakaboutthesurvivaloftheprincipleoftheliberalpublicsphereonthenormativelevel,buthealsoclaimsthatboththeletterandthespiritofconstitutionalnorms
seekingtoregulatethetransitionfromliberalRechtsstaattothewelfarestateanticipatethenewformsofreinstitutionalizationofthisprinciple,therebycontradictingthe
institutionalpracticesofexistingwelfarestates.
120
Itisatthispointthatanargumentthatpreviouslytreatedthemodernpublicandintimatespheresaspassiveobjects
foreconomicandpoliticalprocessesleadingtotheirdisorganizationsuddenlydiscoversthatthenormsoriginatinginthesespheresarepossiblepointsoforientationfor
analternativestrategy.Accordingly,Habermasproposesamodelofreconstruction.Itshouldnotcomeasagreatsurprisethatwegetanewversionoftheantinomy
wefoundinbothHegelandGramsci,involvingtwoopposedorientations,onestatistandoneorientedtowardcivilsociety.
Weshouldnotethattheargumentdealingwithlegaldevelopmentsinthewelfarestatesuddenlybreakswiththegeneraltrend

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ofHabermas'sanalysisthatalignsitwiththenegativephilosophyofhistoryandsocialtheoryofthelateFrankfurtschool,andwiththeschool'slegaltheoryaswell.
HabermasdoesrefertoFranzNeumanninsuggestingthat,withthefusionofstateandsociety,thegeneralityoflegalnormscannotbemaintainedrather,lawand
administrationareincreasinglydedifferentiated.
121
Neumannwouldargue,however,thatwithoutthegeneralityofnormsitwouldbeimpossibletosustaintheprinciple
offundamentalrights,whichwouldbeincoherentwithoutanylimitationsandimpossibleifthelimitationswerenotdefinedaccordingtorigorouslygeneralstandards.
Habermas,ontheotherhand,maintainsthatonlythenegativeanddefensiveaspectsofrightsvisvisthestatearechallengedunderwelfarestate
constitutionalism.
122
Themotivationsofthestateinthiscontextareclear:Withitsinterventionintosociety,selflimitationwithrespecttosocialautonomymayseemobsolete,and,more
important,newjustificationsareneededthatcanvalidatethenewformsofstateactionasjust.Giventhesurvivalofliberalnormsaslegitimations,suchvalidationcan
bedevelopedbyrelyingontheinternallogicofliberalrights.Andgiventhedeclineofthecompetitiveeconomicsysteminthecontextofaninterventionistand
redistributivestate,the"positivefulfillment"ofthenegative,defensiverightsintermsofanactualabilitytopracticethefreedomsofspeech,assembly,andassociation
aswellasthoseofpoliticalparticipationnolongerfollowsmoreorlessautomatically.Thestatemustthereforeprovidethepositiveand,indeed,thematerial
guaranteesforparticipationintermsofnewsocialrights.Fromthepointofviewofliberalrightsthemselves,iftheseare"toremainfaithfultotheiroriginalintentions,"
their"normativeinterpretationmustbechanged."Whilenegativerightsas"liberties''(Freiheitsrechte)arepreservedinwelfarestateconstitutions,theymustnowbe
seenasrightsofparticipation(Teilnehmerrechte),whichwillbeinterpretedintermsofpositivesocialrights(Sozialrechte)tostateactivitiesratherthanformsofself
defenseandselfdifferentiationwithrespecttothestate.
123
Tobesure,thereissleightofhandinvolvedhere.EventheconstitutionsHabermasconsidersthemostadvancedcontain,headmits,negativerights,rightsof
participation,andsocialrights

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alongsideoneanother.ThisraisesthequestionofwhetherHabermashimselfmeanstoaffirmtheneedforbothnegativeandpositiverights,orwhetherheisarguingfor
atransitionfromthefirsttothesecond.Whiletheissueisambiguousinhispresentation,heseemstoconsiderthesurvivalofnegativerightstobeamarkofan
insufficientovercomingofthebourgeois"taxstate"(Steuerstaat)characterofthewelfarestate,theincompletenessofitsrealizationofthegoalofaunifiedstate
societysubordinatingeconomicprocessestoitsdirection.
124
Inlightofthisgoal,evenrightsoftheintimatesphere,nolongerprotectedbytheoutershellofproperty,
needtoberedefined,accordingtohim,asfunctionsoforderivationsfromthepublicprocessesofdemocraticparticipation.
125
Inthiscontext,Habermasseemsto
fullyaffirmW.Abendroth'sclaimthatthesupposedlyauthoritarianimplicationsofsuchamodelactuallyinvolveformostindividualsonlyatransitionfromdependence
ontheprivatepowerofparticularintereststodependenceonprocessesofcollectivecontrol"whosehighestunitofdecisionisthestateitself."Theonlything
Habermasaddstothisclearlystatistandauthoritarianmodelisthedesideratumthatthestateastheunifiedplanningandcontrolorganofallsocialprocessesisitselfto
besubordinatedintheunifiedstatesocietytoprocessesofthe''publicopinionandwillformationofthecitizens."
126
Thisdemocraticstatismisthensupposedtomake
negativerightsofindividualsandgroupssuperfluous.
Habermasdoesalsonoteandaffirmacompetingmodelwithinjurisprudenceorientedtowardthewelfarestate.Inthismodel,thefunctionofmediationbetweensocial
interestsandstatedecisionsdoesnotdisappearinthewelfarestateonlyitspubliccharacterisabandoned.Theprivatepublicorganizationsthatassumethisrole,
arisinginpartfromtheprivatesphere(socialassociationsandorganizations)andinpartfromthepublicsphere(parties),cooperatewiththeadministrationofthestate
andattempttosecure"public"acceptancethroughmanipulative,hierarchicalprocedures.
127
Whatisleftofapoliticalpublicsphereisdominatedbytheseentities,one
ofwhosetasksistoinfluencetheredistributiveactivitiesthatrepresentthepositiveguaranteesbehind"socialrights."Therealbargainingprocessesinwhichthisoccurs
arenotpublic,andthedemandsofpublicityaimedatstateagenciesbypass

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thejuridicallyprivatestructureofthenegotiations.Inthiscontext,Habermasstressesthetrendinwelfarestateconstitutionalismtowardextendingthedemandsof
publicityfromthestatetotherelevantsocialassociationsandpoliticalparties,andtotheprocessesoftheirinteractionwiththestate.Onlysuchlegislationcouldrevive
publicdiscussioninthespherethatreallymatters,bysubstituting"inplaceofthenolongerintactpublicofprivatepersonsinteractingonlyasindividuals,apublicof
organizedprivateindividuals."ItisthistrendthatHabermasconsidersidenticaltotheprojectofestablishingacriticalpublicsphereundercontemporaryconditions,in
deepandnotyetdecidedconflictwiththenowapparentlydominanttrendofthemanipulationofpublicity.
128
Habermasdoesnotseemtorealizethatthispluralisticmodelofthecriticalpublicsphereisinconflictwiththeidealofaunifiedstatesocietyaswell.Undoubtedly,he
identifiedboththeagent(statelegislativeactivity)andtheendresult(afullypublicprocessofdecisionconcerningallsociallyrelevantquestions)ofthetwoprocesses.
Allthesame,theprojectofestablishingaunifiedstatesociety,expressedinthetransitionfromnegativerightsrestrictingthestatetopositiverightsimplyingstate
action,pointstowardamonolithicdemocraticsocietywithasinglecollectiveactor,promotingtheparticipationofindividualsinasingle,unifiedsocietalpublicsphere.
Insuchacontext,minoritiesasgroupsandevenassociationswithparticularinterestsandidentitieswouldnotbeprotectedonlytheirindividualmemberswouldbe
protectedascitizensofthewhole.Evenifsuchamodeldoesnotbecomethemaskofstatistauthoritarianrule,ithasnosafeguardsagainstatotalitariandemocracy.
Incomparison,theprojectofdemocratizingexistingassociationsandpartiesispluralistratherthancollectivist.Whileitsaimistoreestablishthepublicsphere,thisisto
bedoneintermsofestablishingsmallpublicsineachassociation,linkedtogetherintermsofmoregeneraland,again,publicprocessesofinteraction.Evenifstate
legislationistoplayaroleinestablishingthismodel,theoldpolemicalattitudetotheauthoritariandimensionsofstateadministrationwouldinevitablyreturn,andthe
statewouldbepressednotonlytoguaranteethenewpublicsmateriallybuttolimititselfaswell.Unlesswebelievethattheadministrationofthe

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statecouldaltogetherdisappear,thisdoublerelationofpublicstostatewouldhavetobeinstitutionalized,arequirementreflectedpreciselyintheambiguityofthe
overallstructureofrightsfoundinmodernconstitutions.Thenewformsofpublicityobviouslyrequirenotonlymaterialinputsfromthestatebutalsoformsof
protectionfromstateinterference.Thesmallpublicsofassociationsandparties,whichmustbeautonomousevenvisvisthelargerpublicprocessregulatingtheir
interaction,cannotdowithoutbothnegativeandpositiverights.However,thisrequirementreestablishesthetwonormativefoundationsoftheliberalpublicsphere:
differentiationandcommunication.Thepointdoesnotapplyonlytotherightsofcommunication,though.Themembersofdemocratizedassociationsneedthesame
doubleprotection.Tobeabletoparticipateatall,theyneedpositivesupportsandguaranteestobeabletofunctionfreely,theyneednegativerightsandliberties.
129
Habermasundoubtedlybelievedthathistwomodelswerecompetitiveonlytotheextentthattheyaimedatdemocratizingthetwoseparateprocessesleadingtofusion:
"thestatizationofsociety"(stateinterventionism)and"thesocializationofthestate"(neocorporatism).Inassumingultimatefusion,heassumedtheconvergenceofthe
twodemocratizingprocessesaswell.Whathedoesnotrealizeisthathisfirstdemocratizingprocessproducesonlythesocialconditionsnecessaryfortheexerciseof
publicfreedom,intheformof"socialrights,"whichinthemselvesarequitecompatiblewithanenlightenedandpaternalisticabsolutism.Onlythesecondprocess
revitalizestheconstitutiveinteractionofthepublicsphereitself,intheformofgenuine"rightsofparticipation."Thetwoprocessesdonotfullyconverge,andinfactthey
reproducethedifferentiationthatstateinterventionismandcorporatismtogetherendangered.Moreover,theyflowfromtwodistincttheoreticaltraditions:theMarxian
utopiaofstatesociety,andtheTocquevillianprojectofreestablishingtheintermediaryassociationsofcivilandpoliticalsocietyinademocraticform.
Thesecondreasonwhythetwomodelsmayseemtoconvergeisthecommonprocessbywhichtheyaretobeinstituted:welfarestatelegislativeaction.Habermas
doespostulatethesurvivaloftheliberalvalueofpublicity,whichservesasthenormativebackground

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forstateactorsseekinglegitimacyinthecontextofincreasinginterventionism.Butthenormsarenotlinkedtootheractorsontheirbehalf,forthisisnexttoimpossible
inthecontextofthedeformedandmanipulatedpublicsphere.
Logically,atleast,stateactioncanaimatitsownselflimitation.Allthesame,thereisreasontobelievethatmodelsofdifferentiationbasedonrightshaveneverbeen
establishedwithoutactorsoutsideofandevenantagonistictothestate.Themodelofthedeformedpublicsphere,however,impliesasocietywithoutoppositionand
thepassivityofpotentialsocialactors.Habermas'schoicefollowsfromhisanalysis.Theimpliedidentificationofthetwomodelsforrestoringpubliclifeisaresultnot
onlyofhissocialistconvictionsbutalsoofhisdiagnosisofanirreversiblestatistturnintheorganizationofmodernsocieties.Thus,thechoicebetweentwomodelsof
thestatizationofsocietyonepublicdemocraticandonemanipulativedemocraticturnsouttobenochoiceatall.Paradoxically,theanalystwhohasdonemostto
identifythenormafiveidealofthemodernpublicspherewiththedifferentiationofstateandcivilsocietycametotheconclusionthatthisidealcouldbesavedonlyby
acceptingwhathasalreadyoccurred:dedifferentiationandtheabolitionofanindependentcivilsociety.

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6
TheGenealogicalCritique:
MichelFoucault
OnecouldinterpretFoucault'sworkasanothercritiqueofthewelfarestateparalleltothatofArendt,Schmitt,andHabermas,albeitonethatderivesfromadifferent
theoreticaltraditionandusesdifferentmeans.OfgreaterimportanceforusisthefactthatFoucaultpresentsafarmorerelentlesscritiqueofmoderncivilsocietythan
anyofhispredecessorsorcontemporaries.WhileheshareswithArendthersuspicionsregardingthegenesisandfunctionsofthesocial,whilehisgenealogicalaccount
ofmodernpowerrelationshasthesametargetasSchmitt'shistoricistcritique(theliberaldemocraticmodeloflawandthenormativeconceptionofcivilsociety),the
thrustofhisanalysisisneitherantinorprostatist.Itstargetcomprises,rather,thecategoriesofcivilsociety.Thesemovetocenterstageandplaykeypartsinthestory
ofthebirth,growth,anddynamicsofmodernpowerrelations.Tobesure,thecontemporarywelfarestateplaysaroleintheglobalizationanddeepeningofmodern
formsofdomination,butitisneithertheirsourcenorthemainactorinthedrama.
Indeed,whileFoucaultwouldcertainlyagreewithHabermas'saccountofthewaysinwhichthedeformedpublicspherefunctions,aswellaswiththethesisofan
interpenetrationofsocietalandstatepowerrelations,hewouldrejecttheverynotionofdeformitytowhichHabermascounterposedthecontinuedrelevanceofthe
normsofcivilsociety.Inthisrespect,atleast,Foucault'sanalysisparallelsthatofNiklasLuhmann.Botharguethatthenormativeconceptionoflegitimation,law,
publicity,andrightsisanobsoleteremnantofthearistocraticmonarchicsystem.Althoughbothare

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awarethattheseconcepts(alongwithdemocracy)weretakenupbyreformersandrevolutionariesinthelateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturies,theyinsistthat
theyareirrelevanttomoderndecenteredsocieties.However,LuhmannandFoucaultgiveratherdifferentreasonsforthisthesis.Asweshallseeinchapter7,
Luhmannlocateshisexplanationinthemodificationoftheprimaryprincipleofsocietaldifferentiationi.e.,inthereorganizationofthesocialsystemofstratification
intofunctionaldifferentiation.Inmodern,differentiatedsocialsystems,itisnolongerpossibletorepresenttheunityofsocietyrepresentationandthenormative
categoriesofcivilsocietyhavebecomehopelesslyromantic.ForFoucault,however,itisnotfunctionaldifferentiationbuttheemergenceofanewformofstratification
andnewpowerrelationsthatrendersthenormativejuridicalmodelanachronistic.WhiletheproblemofdominationrecedesintothebackgroundinLuhmann'swork,it
iscentraltoFoucault's.Accordingly,andincontradistinctiontoHabermas,Foucault'sversionoftheriseanddevelopmentofmoderncivilsocietyisunambiguously
negativefromthestart.Moreover,sincetheyareconceivedastheproductofmoderntechnologiesofpower,noneofthecategoriesofcivilsocietycanprovidea
referencepointforanyprojectto thestructuresofdominationpervadingoursocieties.Itistothisratheralarmingconceptionofcivilsocietythatwenow
turn.
Marx,Generalized
Inmanyrespects,themostimportanttouchstoneforunderstandingFoucault'scritiqueofcivilsocietyistheworkofKarlMarx,ratherthanthatofhisown
contemporaries.IfMarxwasthepeerlessnineteenthcenturycriticofmoderncivilsociety,
1
surelyMichelFoucaultdeservestoinheritthattitleforthetwentieth.Like
Marx,hispurposeistoanalyzetheformsandtechniquesofamodalityofpowerthatisuniquelymodern.Hisanalysis,againreminiscentofMarx,takesupthecore
categoriesofcivilsocietylaw,rights,autonomy,subjectivity,publicity,plurality,thesocialinordertoshowthat,farfromarticulatingthelimitstodomination,they
areinsteaditssupports.Althoughweintendtoshowthatthis

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analysisisonesided,indeed,thatFoucaultiscaughtupintheverystandpointofthemodalityofpowerthatheanalyzes(strategicreason),itisneverthelessclearthat
notheoryofcivilsocietycanignorehiscontributionifitistoavoidapology.
Despiteimportantdifferences,Foucault'sanalysisofthespecificityofmodernsocietybuildsonacoreinsightofMarx:Modernityinvolvestheemergenceofanewand
pervasiveformofdominationandstratification.ThisisnottosuggestthatFoucaultoperateswithintheMarxistuniverseofdiscourseindeed,thedialectic,economic
determinism,historicalmaterialism,thebase/superstructuremodel,theconcernwithideology,thestrategyofimmanentcritique,andthefocusonclassstruggleareall
absentfromhiswork.
2
Heexplicitlyabandonsthisdiscourseforseveralreasons.First,theMarxianfocusontheeconomyyieldsaninadequateaccountofpower
relationsneithertheforms,thestrategies,northeactualfunctioningofpowercanbelocatedintheeconomyorplacedinasubordinatepositionrelativetoit.
3

Second,thedialecticaltheoryofhistorythatpostulatestheemancipatorypotentialofamacrosubjectcapableoftotalizinglocalresistancesintoarevolutionarypolitical
movementthatcouldendsocietaldominationonceandforallisdeeplymisguidedanddangerouslyutopian.
4
Moreover,totalizingtheoryinanyofitsguisesisbotha
hindrancetoresearchandpoliticallydisadvantageous.AccordingtoFoucault,global,systematizingtheorytendstoglossoverthedetails,localforms,andspecificityof
themechanismsofpower,whileatthesametimeholdingeverythinginitsplaceinsteadoflooseningthefightgripofunitarydiscoursesonourthinking.
5
Foucaultdoes
notrejectMarxismforthesakeofemphasizingthepositiveachievementsofmoderncivilsociety.Onthecontrary,hedoessoinordertoprovideasuperioraccount
ofthenewkindsofpowerrelationsthatpervadesociallifefarmorethoroughlyandextensivelythanMarximaginedpossible.
Foucaultdoesnotusetheterm"civilsociety,"buthedoespresupposethedifferentiationbetweenstateandsocietythat,accordingtoMarx,wasthehallmarkof
modernity.
6
Moreover,likeMarx,hearguesthatthelocusofmodernpowerrelationsissociety,independentofanddistinctfromthesovereignstate.Foucaultdoes
notreducesocietytoitseconomicsubstructure,nordoeshe

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seeclassrelationsastheparadigmaticformofpowerrelationsorstruggleinmodernsociety.Instead,hetakestheMarxianinsightintothe"anatomy"ofcivilsocietya
stepfurther
7
justasMarxdiscoveredpowerrelationsinthefactory,constitutedandconcealedbythejuridicalnicetiesofthelaborcontract,Foucaultuncovers
asymmetricrelationsofpowerintheotherkeyinstitutionsofmodernsociety:hospitals,schools,prisons,asylums,armies,thefamily,andsoon.Indeed,whatMarx
claimsregardingexchangerelationsandcontractlawis,accordingtoFoucault,trueofalljuridicalformsandallthemajorinstitutionsofmodernsociety:Norm,legality,
andrightsgotogetherwithdiscipline,powerrelations,andsubjugation:
Historicallytheprocessbywhichthebourgeoisiebecameinthecourseoftheeighteenthcenturythepoliticallydominantclasswasmaskedbytheestablishmentofanexplicit,
coded,andformallyegalitarianjuridicalframework,madepossiblebytheorganizationofaparliamentary,representativeregime.Butthedevelopmentandgeneralizationof
disciplinarymechanismsconstitutedtheother,darksideoftheseprocesses.Thegeneraljuridicalformthatguaranteedasystemofrightsthatwereegalitarianinprinciplewas
supportedbythesetiny,everyday,physicalmechanisms,byallthosesystemsofmicropowerthatareessentiallynonegalitarian,andasymmetricthatwecallthedisciplines.And
although...therepresentativeregimemakesitpossible...forthewillofalltoformthefundamentalauthorityofsovereignty,thedisciplinesprovide,atthebase,aguaranteeof
thesubmissionofforcesandbodies.Thereal,corporealdisciplinesconstitutedthefoundationoftheformal,juridicalliberties.
8
(Ouremphasis)
Thus,Foucaultalsolooksbehindthejuridicalrelationsofliberaldemocraticregimesandanapparentlyegalitarianmarketsocietytothesystematic(nonaccidental)
formsofdominationwithinsociety.Indeed,acentralconcernofFoucault'sprojectistodisposeonceandforallwithwhathecalls"thejuridicalmodelofpower"that
stilldominatesourthinking,inordertodirectourattention(andresistance)tothesubtleyetpervasiveformofpowertypicalofmodernsocietiesthatescapes
articulationinjuridicalterms.
9
Sincethefateofthecategoriesofcivilsocietyisboundupwiththecontrasthesetsupbetweenthetwomodelsofpower,itiswell
worthlookingintothem.

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AccordingtoFoucault,thejuridicalmodelofpowerandthelegaledificeofourownsocietyareinheritedfromtheancienrgime.TherevitalizationofRomanlaw
beguninthetwelfthcentury,togetherwiththediscoursesofsovereignty,legitimacy,andrights,playedaconstitutiveroleinestablishingtheabsolutepowerand
authorityofthemonarchy.Right,accordingtoFoucault,is,intheWest,theking'sright.Evenwhenthejuridicaldiscourseturnsagainstthemonarch'scontrol(inthe
name,forexample,ofpreservingfeudalrightsorofestablishingindividualrightsagainstthestate),itisalwaysthelimitsofthissovereignpowerthatareputinquestion,
itsprerogativesthatarechallenged.Whetherthejuridicaldiscourseofrightwasaimedatlimitingorassuringtheabsolutecharacteroftheking'spower,itsaimwasto
constitutepowerashisright."Theessentialroleofthetheoryofright,frommedievaltimesonwards,wastofixthelegitimacyofpowerthatisthemajorproblem
aroundwhichthewholetheoryofrightandsovereigntyisorganized."
10
Sovereignty,inshort,isdefinedinjuridicalterms,whilelawconstitutespowerasthelegitimate
rightofsovereignty.
Inpart,ofcourse,thisjuridicalconstructionservedtoeffacethedominationintrinsictopower,makingthelatterappearasthelegitimaterightofthesovereignand
involvingthelegalobligationtoobeyit.Inpart,italsoservedastheinstrumentandjustificationforconstructinglargescaleadministrativemonarchies.Accordingly,the
juridicaldoesarticulatetheforminwhichpowerwasexercisedunderabsolutemonarchies,thatis,therelationshipbetweensovereignandsubject.
11
Indeed,the
juridicalmodelarticulatesaspecificconceptionofthewaysinwhichpowerisexercised:Itisbasedonamodelofpowerthatoperatesthroughthemechanismsoflaw,
tabooandcensorship,limits,obedienceandtransgression.
Whetheroneattributestoittheformoftheprincewhoformulatesrights,ofthefatherwhoforbids,ofthecensorwhoenforcessilence,orofthemasterwhostatesthelaw,inany
caseoneschematizespowerinajuridicalform,andonedefinesitseffectsasobedience.Confrontedbyapowerthatislaw,thesubjectwhoisconstitutedassubjectwho
is"subjected"ishewhoobeys....Alegislativepowerontheoneside,anobedientsubjectontheother.
12

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Inshort,themodelofpowercorrespondingtothejuridicalisrepressive.Accordingly,powerappearstobe"strangelyrestrictive":Itispoorinresources,sparingofits
methods,monotonousinthetacticsitutilizes.Theonlyforceithasistheforceofthenegative,apowertosaynoitpositslimits,itdoesnotproduce.Thispoweris
incapableofdoinganythingexceptpreventingwhatitdominatesfromdoinganythingbutwhatitispermittedtodo.Assuch,sovereignpowerisindeedlimited,insofar
asitinvolvestherightoverlifeanddeathonlyvisvistheexerciseoftherighttokillorrefrainfromkilling,toletliveortotakelife.Itisnoaccidentthatthesymbolof
suchpoweristhesword,forthejuridicopoliticalmodelofpowerwasindeedexercisedasameansofdeduction,asubtractionmechanism,asarighttoappropriatea
portionofwealth,ataxonproducts,goods,services,labor,andbloodleviedonthesubjects.Suchaformofpowersilences,represses,forbids,takes,seizes,butthat
isall.
13
Needlesstosay,itisFoucault'scentralthesisthatthenewtypeofpowerthatbegantodevelopintheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturiesandbecameglobalizedand
perfectedinthenineteenthandtwentiethisincompatiblewiththerelationsofsovereigntyandisineveryaspecttheantithesisofthemechanismofpowerdescribedby
thetheoryofsovereignty.Thenewtypeofdisciplinarypower,oneofthegreatinventionsofbourgeoissociety(sic),
14
isirreducibletotherepresentationoflaw:The
juridicalcannotserveasitssystemofrepresentation.
15
Norcanthemodelofrepressionaccountforthemode,techniques,orexerciseofthisformofpower.
Nevertheless,thismodelcontinuestoholdswaytoday,inpartasanideologyofright,inpartastheorganizingprincipleofthelegalcodesEuropeacquiredinthe
nineteenthcentury.
16
Itremainshegemonicinthefieldofpoliticaltheory,informingboththeliberalandtheradicaldemocraticversionsofcontractarianism.
Indeed,inawayquitereminiscentofMarx(andCarlSchmitt),Foucaultscoffsatliberalpoliticaltheorythatseesintheuniversallegalismsofsociety(informal
equality,rights,andparliamentarydemocracy)limitsimposedbyafreesocietalcommunity(composedofsovereignindividuals)ontheexerciseofpower.The
contractarianillusionthatpowercanbemadevisible,localized,andrestrictedtothepoliticalstatewhoseboundariesareclearly

Page261
delimitedbytherightsofjuridicalsubject,ofcoursehadaroletoplayintheconstructionofthemodelofparliamentarydemocracyinoppositiontotheadministrative,
authoritarian,absolutistmonarchies.Butitremainsprisonerofthejuridicalmodelofpowerfirsterectedbythesemonarchies:Eighteenthcenturycontractariancriticism
ofthemonarchywasnotaimedagainstthejuridicalsystembutratherspokeinthenameofapurerandmorerigorouslegalitytowhichallthemechanismsofpower
wouldconform.''Politicalcriticismavaileditself,therefore,ofallthejuridicalthinkingthathadaccompaniedthedevelopmentofthemonarchy,inordertocondemnthe
latterbutitdidnotchallengetheprinciplewhichheldthatlawhadtobetheveryformofpower,andthatpoweralwayshadtobeexercisedintheformoflaw."
17

NeithertheRousseauian,radicaldemocratictranspositionofsovereigntyfromthekingtothepeoplenortheliberalideaofrightsantecedenttogovernmenttranscends
thejuridicalconceptionofpower,thedoctrineofsovereignty,ortheconcernwithlegitimacybothassumethattheruleoflawandthecodificationofrightsrender
powerlegitimateandcontrollable.Bothdiscusspowerintermsofthestate,sovereignty,consent,contract,andrights,implyingthatpowerisvisible,localizableinone
place,limitable,andtobeexercisedinaccordancewithafundamentallawfulness.
Theveryideaofacontractamongindividualsthatestablisheslegitimatepowerbylimitingitthroughlawandrightsconstruespowerasanoriginalrightofsovereignty
thatisgivenup,whenpoliticalsocietyisestablished,totheartificialsovereign.Thismodelconstruesoppressionasthetransgressionofthelimitsofthetermsofthe
contract.Therighttorebelagainstpowerthathastransgresseditslimits,therebyviolatingtherightsofanother,istherighttoreestablishlegitimate,juridicallybound
power.Accordingly,
therepresentationofpowerhasremainedunderthespellofmonarchy.Inpoliticalthoughtandanalysis,westillhavenotcutofftheheadoftheking.Hencetheimportancethat
thetheoryofpowergivestotheproblemofrightandviolence,lawandillegality,freedomandwill,andespeciallythestateandsovereignty(evenifthelatterisquestionedinsofar
asitispersonifiedinacollectivebeingandnolongerasovereignindividual).Toconceiveofpoweronthebasisoftheseproblemsistoconceiveofitintermsofahistoricalform
thatischaracteristicofoursocieties:the

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juridicalmonarchy.Characteristicyettransitory.Forwhilemanyofitsformshavepersistedtothepresent,ithasgraduallybeenpenetratedbyquitenewmechanismsofpower
thatareprobablyirreducibletotherepresentationoflaw.
18
Foucault'spointis,ofcourse,thatthismodelofpowerisanachronistic.Butwhyisitstillaccepted?Apartfromthehistoricalreasonsmentionedabove,Foucault
mentionsthreeotherrolesthatthejuridicalplaysinmodernsociety.Thefirstisclearlyideological,despiteFoucault'srejectionofthenotionofideology.Forhestates
manytimesthatthediscourseoflawandrightsmaskstheoperationsofpowerbydivertingusfromattendingtothenewlyemergingdiscoursesofthedisciplines
themselves,andbyconcealingthemechanismsofdisciplinarypowerthatoperateoutside,underneath,andthroughthelaw.Itorientsus,inotherwords,toquestions
oflegitimacyandillegitimacyratherthanissuesofstruggleandsubmission,torelationsofsovereigntyratherthandomination:
Thetheoryofsovereignty,andtheorganizationofalegalcodecentereduponit,haveallowedasystemofrighttobesuperimposeduponthemechanismsofdisciplineinsuch
awayastoconcealitsactualprocedures,theelementofdominationinherentinitstechniques,andtoguaranteetoeveryone,byvirtueofthesovereigntyoftheState,theexercise
ofhispropersovereignrights.
19
Inreality,thedisciplineshavetheirowndiscourse,whichisnotthatofnormsbutofnormalization.Thediscourseofrightsconcealsthefarmoreimportantdisciplinary
discursivity.Here,therelationofthediscourseofrighttoactualpowerrelationsisoneofformandcontent.Modernsociety,then,fromthenineteenthcenturyupto
ourownday,hasbeencharacterized,ontheonehand,byalegislation,adiscourse,andanorganizationbasedonpublicright,whoseprincipleofarticulationisthe
socialbodyandthedelegativestatusofeachcitizenand,ontheotherhand,byacloselylinkedgridofdisciplinarycoercionswhosepurposeisinfacttoassurethe
cohesionofthissamesocialbody.Theformeranachronisticyetusefulnormativediscourseofrightandsovereigntydisguisesthenewpowerrelationsofmodernity.
20

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Foucaultdoes,ofcourse,discussanew,moderndevelopmentofthediscourseandorganizationoflawandright.But,asHabermashaspointedout,the
reorganizationofrightthatFoucaultstresseshasnothingtodowithnormativedevelopmentsinternaltolawsincetheeighteenthcenturyorwiththeexplosionofcivil
rightsinourcentury.
21
NotonlydoesFoucaultentirelyneglectthedevelopmentofnormativestructuresinconnectionwiththemodernformationofpower,buthis
discussionof"thejuridical"asintegralto"feudalmonarchic"powermissesthedifferencesbetweentheoldconceptionofprivilegesandthemodernconceptionof
rights.Indeed,heseemstobelievethatthemodernstructuresofrightthatareconstitutiveofthevariousdomainsofcivilsocietyandofthenewrelationbetween
citizensandthepublicsphereareessentiallythesameasunderabsolutistregimes.Apparently,wearetoconcludefromhisanalysisthatconcernwiththeprocedural
principlesofdemocraticlegitimacywithcivil,political,andsocialrightsinshort,withconstitutionalism,isarelicfromtheperiodofabsolutism:
22
Wehaveenteredaphaseofjuridicalregressionincomparisonwiththepreseventeenthcenturysocietiesweareacquaintedwithweshouldnotbedeceivedbyallthe
ConstitutionsframedthroughouttheworldsincetheFrenchRevolution,theCodeswrittenandrevised,awholecontinualandclamorouslegislativeactivity:Theseweretheforms
thatmadeanessentiallynormalizingpoweracceptable.
23
Ifrightservessolelytoestablishthelegitimacyofsovereignpower,simultaneouslyconcealingdomination,thenFoucault'sstrategyseemstobethedemystificationof
formerinordertomakethelattervisible.
Butthediscourseofrightsandthejuridicalconceptionofpowerhaveanotherfunction.Itisnotonlytheideologicalcoverforanewformofdomination,butis
constitutiveofthelatter:"Thesystemofright,thedomainofthelaw,arepermanentagentsoftheserelationsofdomination,thesepolymorphoustechniquesof
subjugation.Rightshouldbeviewed,Ibelieve,notintermsofalegitimacytobeestablished,butintermsofthemethodsofsubjugationthatitinstigates."
24
As
indicatedearlier,thereal,corporealdisciplinesconstitutethefoundationoftheformal,juridicalliberties.

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Indeed,whatthenew,nonanachronistic(nonnormative)developmentofthejuridicaldiscourseandformentailsisits"colonization"bytheproceduresofnormalization,
bytheempiricaldisciplinesfromsociologyandmedicinetopsychology.Individualrights,individualizinglaw,andthepenetrationoftheoldnormativestructureoflaw
bythedisciplinesturnlawitselfintoaneffectivemediumof,andapartnerin,thedisciplining,normalizingtechniquesofdomination,despitetheultimateheterogeneityof
thelevelsofdisciplineandsovereignty.
25
Moreover,itispreciselythesenonnormativedevelopmentswithinlawandlegaldiscoursesthatimplicateitinthemodern
structureofpower.Theuseofmedical,psychological,sociologicalexpertise,ofstatisticaldata,inshort,ofempiricalinformationandnonlegallanguageswithinlegal
discoursetomakeone'scase,isproofthatthedisciplineshavepenetratedthejuridicalstructuresandrenderedthempositive,empirical,functional,andquasi
disciplinarythemselves.Thus,lawdoesnotnecessarilyfadeintothebackgroundinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies,butitnowoperatesmoreandmoreinthe
serviceofnormalizationasthejuridicalinstitutionisincorporatedintoacontinuumofapparatuses(medical,administrative,etc.)whosefunctionsareforthemost
partregulatory.
26
TheideaoftheconstitutiveroleoflawvisvissubjugationisevocativeoftheoldMarxianfunctionalistcritiqueofrightsandjuridicalforms.Here,too,thejuridical
structuresareconstitutiveofthemodernmodalityofpower,andthejuridicalsubjectappearsnotasthelimitto,butastheeffectof,power.Theanalogywiththelabor
contractasthelegalformthatencodes,conceals,andconstitutestheasymmetricpowerrelationsinthesphereofproductionisstrongindeed.However,forFoucault,
themodernformsofpowerdonotcontradictorviolatetheegalitariannormsofcivilsocietybutare,rather,theirfoundation.Thisnormalizingfunctionofan
increasinglypositivistandempiricalconceptionofcolonizedlawisquiteabsentinMarx.Hence,unlikesomeversionsofMarxism,Foucaultarguesthatthenormative
principlesofcivilsocietycannotserveasthereferentforacritiqueofdominationorprovidevalidorientationsforsocialmovementsthatmightseektorealizethem
morefully.Insofarastheyremainnormative,theprinciplesofright,theruleoflaw,legitimacy,etc.,areanachronis

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ticinsofaraslawbecomescolonizedbythedisciplinesand,asitwere,empirical,itservesdomination.Inshort,Foucaultexplicitlyrejectsthepathofimmanent
critique.
ThethirdreasonforthepersistenceofthejuridicalmodelofpowergivenbyFoucaultisquasipsychological.Thecontractmodelconstruespowerasamerelimiton
one'sdesiresorfreedomlegitimatepowerisitselflimitedvisvisrightsandfreedomsthatarereservedtothepeople.Onthismodel,weremainfreetodowhatthe
lawdoesnotproscribe.Powerasapurelimitonfreedomimpliesthatameasureoffreedom(negativeliberty)remainsintact.Indeed,thisisthegeneralformofits
acceptabilityinoursociety.Thus,thesocialpsychologicalexplanationoftheseductivenessofthejuridicalmodelofpowerispredicatedonthefactthat"poweris
tolerableonlyonconditionthatitmaskasubstantialpartofitself.Itssuccessisproportionaltoitsabilitytohideitsownmechanisms.Wouldpowerbeacceptedifit
wereentirelycynical?"
27
Whilethisexplanationsoundssuspiciouslylikeatheoryoflegitimation,Foucaultwouldrejectsuchaninterpretation.Thejuridicalmodelofpowerisnotthelegitimating
discourseofdisciplinarypowerbutadiversionarytacticthediscoursesofthedisciplinesarequitedifferent.Whileweshallshowthat,despitehisdisclaimers,Foucault
needsatheoryoflegitimationandinstatementsliketheoneabovedoesindeedbringtheconceptbackintohisframework,thisishardlythewayhewouldwishtobe
interpreted.Farfromleadingustoanalyzequestionsoflegitimacy,consent,sovereignty,andobedience,hewantstosteerusintheoppositedirection,tomakeuslook
directlyatdomination/subjugationinitsmaterialinstances,initspositiverealformsandtechniques.Indeed,theentirepreoccupationwiththenormativedistinction
betweenlegitimateandillegitimatepower,questionsofjustice,thediscourseofrights,andsoon,mustbeabandonedandreplacedwithareversemodeofanalysis,
onethatstartswiththemicrotechniquesofdominationinthelocaldisparateregionsofsocietyratherthanaconceptionofsovereignpower,thestate,andlegitimacy.
28
Forthis,however,adifferentconceptofpowerisneeded.Ifthejuridicalmodelwasusefulforrepresentingapowercenteredarounddeductionanddeath,itis"utterly
incongruouswiththe

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newmethodsofpowerwhoseoperationisnotensuredbyrightbutbytechnique,notbylawbutbynormalization,notbypunishmentbutbycontrol,methodsthatare
employedonalllevelsandinformsthatgobeyondthestateanditsapparatus."
29
WeareofferedananalysisofthisnewmoderntypeofpowerinDisciplineand
Punish,thenintheseriesofessayscollectedinPower/Knowledge,andfinallyinthefirstvolumeofTheHistoryofSexuality.Unlikethejuridicalmodel,which
conceivesofpowerassomethingthatispossessedbyanindividualoragroup,thatisexchangeableandrecoverable,subjecttolegallimitsanddissolvedby
knowledge,truth,andauthenticdiscourse,thisdisciplinary,normalizingpowerisconceivedofaboveallasarelationofforces:Itisexercised,notexchanged,andit
operatesthroughanintimateassociationwithdiscoursesoftruthandtheproductionoftruth.Accordingly,
Powermustbeanalyzedassomethingwhichcirculates,orratherassomethingwhichonlyfunctionsintheformofachain.Itisneverlocalizedhereorthere,neverinanybody's
hands,neverappropriatedasacommodityorapieceofwealth.Powerisemployedandexercisedthroughanetlikeorganization.Andnotonlydoindividualscirculatebetweenits
threadstheyarealwaysinthepositionofsimultaneouslyundergoingandexercisingthispower.
30
Moreover,farfrombeinglocalizedinonemacroinstitutionsuchasthestate,poweriscoextensivewiththesocialbodytherearenospacesofprimallibertybetween
itsmeshes.Rather,therelationsofpowerareinterwovenwithotherkindsofrelations,includingproduction,kinship,family,knowledgerelations,sexuality,andthe
like.Powerrelationsare,asitwere,theimmediateeffectsofthedivisions,inequalities,anddisequilibriathatoccurinthelatter,and,conversely,theyaretheinternal
conditionsofthesedifferentiations.Whilepowerrelationsaresuigeneris,
31
emergingindispersed,heterogeneous,localizedarenasandexercisedthrougharangeof
"microtechniques,"theycanbeintegratedintomoreglobalstrategiesandserve,forexample,economicorstategoals.
Inshort,Foucaultreplacesthejuridicalconceptionofpowerwithastrategicmodelofahostileasymmetricrelationofforces.
32
Poweriseverywhere,notbecauseit
embraceseverything,butbecauseitcomesfromeverywhere.
33
Inaddition,modernpowerisnotexer

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cisedthroughprohibitionandnegation.Rather,itoperatesthroughamultiplicityoftechnologiesofcontrol,sorting,surveillance,andinterrogationthatare
productiveofnewdiscourses,knowledge,andtruths,ofnewkindsofindividualsorsubjects,ofrequiredbehaviorsandfunctionalresults.Powerrelationsareboth
intentionalandnonsubjective,basedoncalculationandclearlydecipherablelogicandaimsthatarenonethelessanonymous.
34
Finally,therearenorelationsofpower
withoutresistancesformedatthepointwhererelationsofpowerareexercised.
Whilethisconceptioniscertainlymoreprofoundthanthatoftheliberallegalisticmodel,Foucaultisnottheonlyonetoviewpowerinthisway.Onecanfindanot
dissimilarpositivesumconceptionofpowerintheworkofbothTalcottParsonsandNiklasLuhmann.
35
However,Foucaultdoesprovideacompellinganddetailed
analysisofthetwomainformsinwhichthismodelofpowercametobeexercised,aswellasauniquethesisregardingtherelationshipamongknowledge,power,and
truththattheseentail.Disciplinarynormalizingpower,gearedtothesubjugationofbodiesandexercisedthroughan"anatomopoliticsofthehumanbody,"isanalyzed
indepthinDisciplineandPunish.TheHistoryofSexuality,ontheotherhand,focusesonregulatoryproductivebiopower,orientedtothecontrolofpopulations
theirhealth,lifeexpectancy,andlongevityexercisedthrougha"biopoliticsofthepopulation."Whilenotidentical,thesetwoformsofpower,emerginginthe
seventeenthandeighteenthcenturiesrespectively,constitutedthetwopolesaroundwhichtheproductiveorganizationofpoweroverlifewasdeployed.
36
Eachone
developedaspecificrangeoftechniques,typeofdiscursivity,andknowledge,andeachresultedinaspecificproduct:thesoul,thedocilebody,andmaninthefirst
casethedesiringindividualandsexualityinthesecond.
Thenewhumansciencesofcriminology,medicine,psychology,education,sociology,education,etc.,cometogetherwiththenewtechniquesofsurveillance,
examination,sorting,individualizing,andnormalizingtoconstitutediscipline.Itisthroughdisciplines/discipliningthatthebodyisdiminishedasapoliticalforceatthe
leastcostandmaximizedasausefulforce.
37
Theseformsofknowledgeandpowertechniquesalsoconstitutethesoulastheproductofthejudgmentalgazeof
teachers,doctors,educators,

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prisonguards,andsocialworkers.Theeffectofdisciplinarypower/knowledgeisthusmanasknowable,calculable,normal,useful.
Biopoweralsooperatesthroughdiscursivity,producesnewtypesofindividuals,andresultsinknowledgethatislinkedtoaregimeofpower.Thediscursiveexplosion
withregardtosexualitythateruptedintheeighteenthcenturyandconstitutedindividualsasdesiringsubjectsalsomadeuseoftechniquesthatemergedindisparate
settings.Foucaultcitestheconfessionaltechniquesdevelopedwithinmonasteriesandperfectedbypsychologyandthegatheringofstatisticalinformationbythepolice
onthewealth,manpower,productivecapacity,andhealthofthepopulation.Healsodiscussesthecorrespondinghumansciencesespeciallydemography,medicine,
biology,psychiatry,psychology,ethics,pedagogy,andurbanologythatfocusedonbirthanddeathrates,lifeexpectancy,fertility,andpatternsofdietandhabitation
andinstigatedaceaselessdiscussionaboutthedetailsofsexualbehavior.Thesenewformsofknowledgeconstitutethepeopleasapopulationtoberegulatedand
controlledinthenameofincreasingitslife,productivity,wealth,andutility.Theyalsoconstitutetheindividualasadesiringsexualbeingwhosesecretlongingsmustbe
ferretedout,madetospeak,andchanneledintheproper(useful)directionthroughprocessesofselfinterrogationaided,ofcourse,byexperts.Thus,sexstandsatthe
centerofthenewtechniquesoflife.Here,too,whatisatissue"isthetypeofpoweritbroughttobearonthebodyandsex.Inpointoffact,thispowerhadneitherthe
formofthelawnortheeffectsofthetaboo.Onthecontrary,itactedbymultiplicationofsingularsexualities...itextendedthevariousformsofsexuality."
38
Thenew
sexualitiesthatappearinfantilesexuality,theperversions,thehystericalwomanandthathauntthespacesofthehome,theschool,theprison,"allformthecorrelate
ofexactproceduresofpower."
39
Intheprocesssexitselfbecomesconstitutedasaproblemfortruthandthetargetofanimmense(medical/psychological)apparatus
forproducingthetruthaboutourselves.
Theseanalysesoftheformsofmodernpowerrelationsarebothinstructiveandcompelling.Whatisquestionable,however,isthetheoreticalpresuppositionsofthe
genealogicalmethodofanalyzingpoweranditsimplicationsforatheoryofmodernizationand

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ofmoderncivilsociety.Sinceourmaininterestisthelatter,weshallonlybrieflytouchontheformer.
TheGenealogyofModernCivilSociety
ThePhilosophicalandNormativeAmbiguitiesofGenealogy
ThephilosophicalpresuppositionsofwhatFoucaultcallshumanismserveasthemaincontrasttohisowngenealogicalapproach.Theideathatthereisahumansoulor
self,subjectivity,aninnerhumannature(eitherasadesiringsexualbeingorasanautonomoussovereignsubject),oranessenceofmanthatisuniversal,thatcanserve
asthegroundofthebasicvaluesofautonomy,equality,freedom,andlife,andthatdisinterestedknowledgecanexpressandliberateisrejectedbyFoucaultinhis
masterfulcritiqueoftheveryconceptofmaninTheOrderofThings.Boththesubject/objectdualityandfoundationalistassumptionsatthecoreofhumanismleadto
unresolvableantinomies.Butthisisnotall.ThegenealogyofthemodernsoulpresentedinDisciplineandPunishgoesbeyondthephilosophicalcritiquetorevealthat
theverynotionsofsubjectivity,thesoul,theself,autonomy,andnormativity(alwaysinterpretedasnormalization)aretheproductsofdisciplinarypower/knowledge.
40
Accordingly,Foucaultwarnsusagainstthemisconceptionthatknowledgecanexistindependentlyoftheinterestsofpower,oronlywherepowerrelationsare
suspended.Thereis,onthegenealogicalanalysis,noknowledgethatdoesnotpresupposeandatthesametimeconstitutepowerrelations.
41
Thehumansciences,the
disciplines,yieldtheobjectiveknowledgeofman,thesoul,thesubject,andtheindividualrequiredbydisciplinarypower.
Thesameholdstrueforthesubjectsideoftheequationandfordiscursivity.Theideathatintensiveselfinterrogationandspeakingorcommunicatingthetruththatwe
havediscoveredaboutourselvestoothersistheroadtoselfmastery,authenticity,andliberationfromrepressionisasnaiveastheideaofdisinterestedobjective
knowledge.Farfromdissolvingtheeffectsofpower,theauthenticindividualwhospeaksthetruthaboutherself,herdesires,needs,identity,innermostconcerns,isthe
productofconfessionalpowertechniques.Thegenealogicalaccountofsexualityaimstoshow

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thatthehermeneuticsubjectisthehistoricalproductofapower/knowledgeregimethatfunctionsinandthroughdiscourse.Genealogyanalyzesthediscursive
techniquesoftheconstitutionofsubjectselveswhoprobetheirowndepth(throughselfinterrogation)andspeak/confessthetruthsdiscoveredthereby.Theritualsof
confessionaldiscourseinvolvetheactualorvirtualpresenceofapartnerwhostandsastheauthorityprescribingandappreciatingtheconfession,judging,punishingor
forgiving,andconsolingthepersonwhoarticulatesit.
42
Thus,notonlytheobjectifyingdiscoursesofthesocialsciences,butalsothesubjectifyingdiscoursesbyand
aboutourselves,are,onthegenealogicalanalysis,deeplyconnectedtopower.Farfromhavinganaffinitywithfreedom,orwithuniversality,reason,andtruth,theyare
imbuedwithrelationsofpowerandarealwayshistoricallyspecific.Accordingly,Foucaultseeshisgenealogicalinvestigationsaspartofa"politicalhistoryoftruth."
43

Knowledge,truth,reason,andpowerareintertwinedandcontextrelativegenealogicalinvestigationsintofieldsofknowledge,typesofnormativity,formsof
subjectivity,individualandcollectiveidentitiesrevealthetechnologiesofpowerwherebytruth,knowledge,andidentityareproduced.
TheproblemswiththisNietzscheanstancevisvisnorms,reason,andtruthhavebeenpointedoutmanytimes.Weshallmentiononlyafewofthemostfrequent
objectionsthatbearonthenormativedimensionsofourconceptofcivilsociety.
First,thereistheproblemofthenormativeambiguityofFoucault'sgenealogicalaccountofnormativity.Arewetotakethistobeoneamongmanycritiquesofthe
foundationalistmetainterpretationofhumanistvalues,orisitaimedatthesubstantivecoreofthesevaluesthemselves?Ifthelatteristhecase,andtheotheraspectsof
genealogytobeexploredbelowindicatethatitis,thenFoucaultisleftintheparadoxicalpositionofhavingtodenyanynormativestatusforhisowncriticalanalysesor
ofbeingunabletojustifythenormativepoliticalimplicationsofhiswork.
44
Second,ifonetakesFoucaultathiswordregardingthepowerrelatednessoftruth,thentheobviousquestionarises:Whatisthestatusofthe"truths"revealedby
Foucault'sowngenealogicalinvestigations?Whichinterests,whatstrategies,whatformofpowerrelationsdoesFoucaultstandfor?
45

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Third,isn'ttheclaimthatallknowledgeandrationalityitselfderivefromthepracticesofpowerbasedonanundifferentiatedconceptofpower?Areallpowerrelations
thesame?Whatexactlyisthedifferencebetweenpoweranddomination,ifthereisany?
46
TheobfuscationinFoucault'sconceptofpowerlies,accordingto
Habermas,initsconcealedderivationfromtheconceptofthewilltoknowledge.
47
Andthis,inturn,restsonanambiguoususeofthecategory''power."As
Habermaspointsout,Foucault'suseoftheconceptofpowerreproducesthe"transcendentalempiricalambiguity"thatherelentlesslyuncoversinthehumanist
conceptionofman:Ontheonehand,itisuseddescriptivelyintheempiricalanalysesofpowertechnologiesontheother,itisabasicconceptwithinatheoryof
constitution.
48
Thefirstexplainsthefunctionalsocialcontextofthesciencesofmanthesecond,theconditionofpossibilityofscientificdiscourseaboutman.But
doesn'tthegenealogicalapproachthatclaimstodobothoftheseatoncesimplyreplacetheobjectivismofthehumanscienceswitharadicallyhistoricistsubjectivism?
49
Anddoesn'tthetranscendentalempiricalambiguityinhisconceptofpowerleadFoucaulttoovergeneralizeandevenontologizepowerrelations?
50
Moreover,
doesn'ttheequationofreason,knowledge,anddiscoursewiththerationalityofdominationderivefromthisontologizingofpowerandinvolveareductionist,one
sided,strategicinstrumentalconceptionofreasonitself?
51
Afourthobjectiontogenealogicalassumptionsisthattheconceptoftherelativityoftruthtoa(power)regimeisultimatelyincoherent.Ontherelativitythesis,the
transformationfromoneregimetoanothercannotyieldagainintruth,norcantherebeliberatingtransformationswithinaregime.Thereisnosuchthingastruth
independentofitsregime,sinceeachregimeproducesitsowntruth.Butwhat,then,isthemeaningofFoucault'sclaimthatthetruthmanufacturedbypowerisits
mask,disguise,thatis,untruth?
52
Doesoneuntruthsimplycoveroveranother?Oristhediscourseofthedisciplinestruerthanthejuridicaldiscourse?
Fifth,andfinally,doesn'ttheverynotionofpowerrelationsasFoucaultusesit,namely,alwayswiththequalification"inegalitarian,"implydomination,andisn'tthis
conceptmeaninglesswithoutitsopposite,freedom?
53
Moreover,evenifwegranttheideaof

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powerwithouta(global)subject,evenifwerecognizethatthereisalwaysastrategiccontextinwhichpowerrelationsareembeddedandwhichisnotunderthe
controloftheactors,doesitmakesensetospeakofstrategiesofpowerwithoutprojects,orofsocietyintermsofanonymousrelationsofforces?
54
Foucault's
insistencethatpowerrelationsareinegalitarianandintentional,thatthereisnopowerwithoutresistance,impliesatleastthattherearespecificinterestsinvolvedin
exercisingandmaintainingpower,andspecificvictimswhoseinterestslieinoverturningpowerrelations.Butwhoseinterestsareinvolvedinthedevelopmentand
maintenanceofdisciplinaryregulatorymodernpowerrelations?Oncetheseareinplace,howisresistancepossibleinthecarceralcivilsociety,andinthenameof
whatdoesoneresist?Itistimetoturntothesequestions.
TheGenealogicalAccountofModernization
AccordingtoFoucault,thehistoricalprocessesthatconstitutedthesocialsphereinwhichthemodernindividualliveshavedeprivedtheidealoftheautonomous
sovereignsubjectofanyprogressivecontent
55
andhavedenudedsocialinstitutionsofanyautonomoussolidarityorhorizontalrelations.Neithertheconceptofthe
individualnorthenorms,structure,ordynamicsofcivilsocietycanbeunderstoodasagaininfreedomorserveasareferentforemancipatorypolitics.Weshallreturn
tothistheoryofmodernindividualityandsociality,butfirstitisworthlookingbrieflyatthehistorical"genealogy"ofmodernsocietythatisclearlymeanttoreplacethe
materialisttheoryofhistoryanddeprivecriticsofitsreassuringdialectic.
DisciplineandPunish,thefirstbookinwhichFoucaultpresentshistheoryofpower,alsoprovidesthecleareststatementofhisgenealogicaltheoryofmodernization,
thatis,ofthetransformationinvolvedinshapingourcontemporary"carceral,""disciplinary"society.
56
Althoughthebookfocusesonthegenealogyofthemodern
prison,itisclearlymeanttobetakenasexemplaryforawiderangeofhomologouschangesthatcharacterizethetransitionfromthe"classicalage"(theageof
absolutismor,moregenerally,theancienrgime)tomodernsociety(lateeighteenthcenturyto

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thepresent).
57
ForitisFoucault'sthesisthattheasymmetricpowerrelationsandthetechniquesoflearningaboutanddiscipliningbodiesthatwereperfectedinthe
prisonnowpervadeaneverbroaderrangeofcontemporarysocietalinstitutionsandaffecteveryone.Indeed,"thecarceralarchipelagotransportedthistechniquefrom
thepenalinstitutiontotheentiresocialbody."
58
Thus,thegenealogyofthemodernprisonrevealsamodalityofpowerthatisallpervasiveinmoderncivilsociety.
TheinnovationsinFoucault'sgenealogicalaccountofmodernitydonotlieinthespecificepochsoutlinedinthehistoricaltrajectoryhetraces.
59
Theseepochsarequite
standardinmodernizationtheory.Weare,inshort,presentedwithdescriptionsoftwosocietaltypesandatransitionalperiodbetweenthem:traditionalsocietyorthe
"ancienrgime,"composedofthesocietyofordersandtheabsolutiststate
60
(seventeenthtonineteenthcenturies),andmodernsociety,emergingintheeighteenth
centuryanddevelopedthroughoutthetwentieth.ThetransitionalperiodisdealtwithbyanalyzingthetheoriesoftheEnlightenmentandthereformers'discourse
precedingandduringtheFrenchrevolution.
NorisFoucault'sassessmentofthesechangesintermsofareplacementofoneformofdominationwithanotherparticularlyneworshocking,despitethechallengeit
posestostandardliberalaccounts(contractarianorenlightenmenttheories).Indeed,atfirstsight,thesimilaritiesofFoucault'sapproachwithatleastoneimportant
streamwithinsociologicaltheoriesofmodernizationarestriking.
61
TheredthreadofFoucault'stextisthethemeoftheemergenceofthemodernindividualasthe
storyofanewandpervasiveformofdominationevolvingthroughtwointerrelatedprocesses:thedestructionoftraditionalgroupsolidaritiesandthefragmentationor
levelingofpeoples,orders,andcoherentsocialgroupsandtheconsolidationofdisciplinarytechniquesofsurveillanceandcontrolofbodiesthatfabricateanewform
ofindividualitywhoseillusionofsovereigntyisthecounterparttotheabsenceofanyautonomousgrouplifeorgroupidentity,meaningfultraditions,formsof
association,orpowerresources.TheonlyseriousdifferenceonthelevelofcontentbetweenthisversionofmodernizationandthatofTocquevilleorNisbet,for
example,isthatthelatterattributetheleveling,individualizingformofpowerprima

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rilytotheemergenceofthemodernstate,whileFoucaultseesitastheresultofamultiplicityofinstitutionalforcesordevelopmentsinsociety,economy,andpolity.
Forboth(aswellasforMarx),however,moderncivilsocietyisneverthelessthatcolonizedterrainwheresolidarity,association,groupautonomy,andspontaneity
havebeenreplacedbyanewformofsocialcontrol.
Tobesure,Foucaultdoesnotdescribethecontrastbetweentheoldregimeandmodernsocietyinordertoidealizetheintermediarypoliticalbodiesofthe
Stndestaat,whichrepresented,forTocqueville,atleast,thecruciallociofpoliticallifethatlimitedtheadministrativepowerofthestate.
62
Indeed,thereisno
systematicdistinctioninFoucault'sworkbetweenthetypeofpoliticalactionwithintheframeworkofassembliesandthestateactiontypicalofadministrativepower
relations.
63
Itwaspreciselythissortofdistinction,however,thatledTocquevilletoseekmodernequivalentsfortheoldformsofassociation,autonomy,and
counterpowerasearchthatisdoomedtofailureonFoucault'stheory.
64
NordoesFoucaultassignpositivevaluetotheculturaltraditionsortheintegrativefunctionsensuredbytheoldintermediarybodies(asNisbetdid).
65
Onthecontrary,
itistheopportunitiesfordisorderintheintersticesofthesocietyoforders,duringtheabsolutistperiod,forwhichFoucaultseemstobenostalgic.Thus,whatis
pinpointed(andsomewhatidealized)inFoucault'scontrastbetweentraditionalandmodernsocietyisneitherthepoliticallifeofthearistocracynortherichlytextured
andcommunallyintegratedtraditionsofthesocialordersorsemiautonomousregions,buttheincompletecontrol,regulation,organization,anddiscipliningofsocietyin
thepremodernperiodandthespacesforsolidarityandspontaneousrebellionthatthiscreated.Itisthisrelativeabsenceofefficientcontrolthatcontrastssosharply
withtheinexorableorganization,discipline,andsurveillancetechniquesofmodernity.AnditisherethattheoriginalityofFoucault'streatmentlies.
66
Foucault'sthesisisthatthespecificnatureoftheexerciseandmodalityofabsolutistpowerencouragedtheemergenceofpopularrevolts.Thisthesisisdemonstrated
throughananalysisoftheformandmeaningofpunishmentinabsolutistregimes.Ontheonehand,the"supplice"orpublictortureandexecutionofthe

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criminalsymbolizetheabsolutepowerofthesovereigntocodifythelackofpowerofhissubjects.
67
Publicity,visibility,andthelightofappearanceareallthe
exclusiveattributesofthesovereignthemeanstoexpressandrepresenthispersonalpowerandhismonopolizationandcontrolofthepublicspace.Sovereign
power,asindicatedabove,isamixtureofrepressionandjuridicalcontrolthesovereignishewhomakes,andthereforeisabove,thelaw.
68
Thediscourseofrights
hereisthediscourseofthispowerofjurisdictionandimmunity.
69
Thepowerofthesovereignisthepowertosilence,banish,punish,andannihilatethosewho
transgresshislaw.Crimeisseenasanattackonthewillandbodyoftheomnipresentsovereign,thatis,asanactofwarortreason.
70
Punishment,astheceremonyof
sovereignpowerthatmarksthebodyoftheoffender,restoresandreconstitutessovereignty.Itrevealstheforce,terror,andvengeanceofapowerthatispersonaland
arbitrary,thatismadepublicthroughitsperiodicexpenditure,yetandthisisthekeyisdiscontinuousintimeandspace.
Discontinuousintwosenses.First,withintheframeworkofthesocietyoforders,thephenomenaofrightsandimmunities(inFoucault'sterminology,illegalities)
constituteasourceofcounterpowerandautonomousgroupsolidarityfortheprivileged,signifyingthenonpervasivenessandincompletenessofsovereignpower.But
Foucaultisfarmoreinterestedinanothertypeofdiscontinuityor"illegality,"namely,thatoftheleastfavoredstratumthepeople.Thelowerordershadnopositive
privileges,buttheybenefitedfromaspaceoftolerationgained"byforceorcunning"inwhichillegality,orthepossibilityofactingoutsideof,orofignoring,lawand
customwasregularlypracticed:"Roughlyspeaking,onemightsaythat,undertheancienrgime,eachofthedifferentsocialstratahaditsmarginoftoleratedillegality:
thenonapplicationoftherule,thenonobservanceoftheinnumerableedictsorordinanceswereaconditionofthepoliticalandeconomicfunctioningofsociety."
71
This
toleranceofillegalitywasasignnotofsovereignbeneficencebutofthediscontinuityofmonarchicpower.Itwastiedtotherelativelyweakpenetrationofthesocial
bodybythispowerand,correspondingly,totheexistenceofspaceswithinsocietyfortheemergenceofautonomoussolidaritiesandrevolts.

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Indeed,nexttothemonopolyofpublicityandactionbytheonlyrealindividual,thesovereign,therewasanotherformofactionandpublicityavailabletothepeople,
namely,theriotandtherevolt.Thisistheothersideofthesupplice.Thenecessarypresenceofthepeopleatpublicexecutionsprovidedtheoccasionforconstituting
centersofillegalityintheveryexerciseofsovereignvengeance.Thespectator,theguarantorofpunishment,could,inotherwords,turnrebelandchallengepunitive
power.
72
Itishere,inthecarnivallikeinversionofrules,inthemockeryofauthority,andinthetransformationofthecriminalintoahero,
73
thatFoucaultsituatesthe
linkbetweenillegality,thespontaneoussolidarityofawholesegmentofthepopulation(vagrants,thepoor,beggars,etc.),andrevolt.Thisspontaneityofthe
assembledpopulaceistheuncontrolledandunmasteredreferentoftheveryexerciseofsovereignpower.Theirresistancetocentralcontrolisindicativeofstillintact
localautonomy,culturaltraditions,andmoralresourcesforconstitutingcollectiveidentitiesandsolidaritiesopposedtothesovereign'sprojectofmonopolizingpower.
Thesepopularsolidaritieswereglorifiedinthebroadsheetsandpamphletsmeanttodegradethem
74
asspacesforpopularillegalitiesleftopenbythediscontinuous
formofsovereignpower,theybecamethetargetofthenew,modernmodalityofdisciplineandsurveillance.
Foucault'sdescriptionofsovereignpowerisstrikinglysimilartoHabermas'sanalysisofprebourgeoisreprsentativeffentlichkeit.Bothfocusonthepublicdisplay
ofmagnificenceandmight,onthedemonstrativedimensionoftheexcessesofsovereignty,ontheshowofforceasrepresentativeofpower,andonthecodificationof
itsmonopolybythesovereign.Butananalysisoftheothersideof"publicpower"intheoldregime,ofthe"illegalities"andbroadsheetsofthepopularclasses,ofthe
interrelationbetweenrepresentativepublicityandthepublicityavailabletothepeople,isnottobefoundinHabermas'sstudy.Thisisamajoromission.Habermas,
conversely,analyzestwoadditionaldimensionsofpublicitywithinabsolutistsocietythatarestrangelyunderemphasizedinFoucault'saccount:theemerging
administrativeapparatusofthestatecharacterizedbytheterm"publicoffice,"andthedevelopmentofthe"bourgeoispublicsphere"inthecaffs,salons,literaryclubs,
newspapers,andsoon,oftheeighteenthcentury.
75
InHabermas's

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study,aswehaveseen,theseprefigureimportantdimensionsofpublicfreedominmodernsocietyinsofarasthemodernprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyandthe
conceptionofpublicofficeaspublicservice,implyingaccountability,havetheiroriginshere.
Foucaultiscertainlyawareofthestatemakingprocessesundertheoldregime,buthisemphasisisquitedifferentfromHabermas's.
76
Foucaultpointsoutthatitwas
theemergingcentralizedapparatusofpublicadministrationthatbegangathering"useful"informationdemographicdataonbirths,deaths,health,crime,poverty,
welfareandsoononanincreasinglyleveled(fromthestate'spointofview)population,turningthesovereign'ssubjectsintoobjectsofknowledgeandpower.This
knowledgewasintimatelyconnectedwithanewformofdisciplinarypower("biopower")emergingwithintheadministrativeagenciesofthestatealongsidethejuridical
discoursesofsovereigntyandlegitimacy.
Nevertheless,Foucaultinsistsrepeatedlythatthenewtechnologiesofpowercannotbecomprehendedeitherthroughjuridicalconcepts,asarelationbetween
sovereignandsubjects,orintermsoftheoppositionbetweenstateandsociety.Forthestateisnottheirsoleorevenprimarysourcerather,theyemergedslowlyina
widerangeofinstitutions(theconvent,thearmy,theclinic,theschool,thefactory,theprison)alongsidethevisibleplayofsovereigntiesintheabsolutistperiod.These
processesconstituteforFoucaultthebirthofthemodernwithinthewomboftheoldsociety.Accordingly,thereisnoneedtoemphasizethenewformofthestateasa
hierarchyofpublicoffices,nortomentionitscounterpartthenewformsofbourgeoispublicitythatemergewithincivilsociety,withtheirspecificprojectsof
liberalizationanddemocratization.Thepublic,impersonal,ruleboundcharacterofstatebureaucraciesdoesnothingtodiminishorrestrictthereachorscopeof
administrativepoweronthecontrary,itmakesitmoreefficient.Andpresumablytheclaimsmadeforthebourgeoispublicspherearesufficientlydealtwithaspartof
thereformer'sdiscourse.Inourview,thisisanerrorfraughtwithconsequences,foritispreciselythenewformsofpublicity,association,andrightsemergingonthe
terrainofmoderncivilsocietythatwillbecomethekeyweaponsinthehandsofcollectiveactorsseekingtolimitthereachofstateandothersocietalformsof
disciplinarypower.

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Asaconsequenceofthetheoreticaldecisiontorestricttheconceptofsovereigntyasaformofpowertotheoldregime,Foucaultineffectagreeswiththosereformers
whofocusexclusivelyonitsjuridicaldimensions(ontheproperlocusofpowerandonitslegalityandlegitimacy),onlytodeclaretheentirediscoursetobe
anachronistic.Thediscussionofrights,contract,popularsovereignty,andsimilartopicsis,accordingly,nothingmorethanafacileinversionorimputationoftheking's
attributesto"thepeople."Insteadoftherepresentativepublicityoftheking'spower,publicity,asclaimedbyreformersforthepeople,istobetheexpressionoftheir
newlyacquiredsovereigntyandtheirmodeoflimitingstatepower(i.e.,thelaw).Thisdiscourseisepiphenomenal,however,insofarasitoccursabovethereallociof
modernpowerrelations.
77
Thereformers'discussionofpowerintermsofthestate,sovereignty,consent,contract,andrightsimpliesthatpowerisstillpublic,
localizableinoneplace,andlimitable.Theliberaljuridicalconceptofpower,inotherwords,missestheessenceofthenewmodeofdomination.Tofocusonthe
edificeofrightsandpublicityembodiedinconstitutionsandparliaments,tostressthedevelopmentanddemocratizationofthestate,istobedeceivedregardingthe
realdynamicsofpowerinmodernsocieties.
Accordingly,Foucaultarguesthatthediscourseofreforminthetransitionalperiodtheconceptionofatransparentpowerthatfindsitslegallimitinthenotionof
humandignity,thatpunisheshumanelywithaviewtowardrestoringratherthandestroyingtheintegrityofthecriminal,togetherwiththethemesofsovereignty,consent,
andlegitimacyconstitutesautopianmodelofsocietythatisnever,norcouldeverbe,institutionalized.Thisdiscoursehas,nonetheless,certainnotsounintended
consequences.Themostimportantoftheseistheshiftinthe"right"topunishfromthesovereignmonarchto"society."Leniencyofpunishmentisindeedaccomplished,
butwiththecorollarythatcrimeisseennolongerasanattackonthesovereigntyofthemonarch(i.e.,theother)butratherasanattackonsocietyasawhole(us),
turningtheoffenderintoa"publicenemy"ormonsterwhomustberehabilitatedinordertoreemergeasajuridicalandmoralsubject."Thesocietythathas
rediscovereditslawshaslostthecitizenwhoviolatedthem."
78
Inotherwords,oncecrimeisseenastheviolationofsociety'sown

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laws,thesolidaritybetweenthepopularillegalitiesandthecriminalissevered.Indeed,thedestructionofsolidaritybetweentheoffender,therebel,thecriminalwho
refusesthelaw,andthepopulationturnsouttobetherealtargetofthereformers'projects.
79
"Thetrueobjectiveofthereformmovement,eveninitsmostgeneral
formulations,wasnotsomuchtoestablishanewrighttopunishbasedonequitableprinciples,astosetupaneweconomyofthepowertopunish...sothatitcould
bedistributedinhomogeneouscircuitscapableofoperatingeverywhere,inacontinuousway,downtothefinestgrainofthesocialbody."
80
Insertingthepowertopunishmoredeeplywithinthesocialbodycouldaccomplishtwothings:controlofthepopularillegalities,whichhadbecometoocostly,and
developmentofamoreefficienteconomyofpower.Thedimensionofthereformers'projectsthatsuitedthisgoalmostadmirablywas,ofcourse,thediscoveryofthe
advantagesofdisciplinarytechnologies.Bentham'spanopticonspeaksmoreloudlyforFoucaultthanallthetheoriesoflegality,popularsovereignty,rights,and
legitimacy."The'Enlightenment'whichdiscoveredthelibertiesalsoinventedthedisciplines."
81
Thus,ontheoneside,thereformers'discourseoperateswith
representation,visibility,publicity(oftrialandsentencing),andtransparencyofthepowertopunishandofthelawsthatdefinecrimesandpunishmentsappropriateto
them.Ontheotherside,adisciplinarytechnologyisdiscoveredthatinvolvessecret,continuous,andautonomouspunishmentprocessesinshort,apowerthat
operatesontheothersideoflegality,isolatedfromboththesocialbodyandjuridicalpower.Thejuridicalmodelreintegratesthejuridicalsubjectintosocietythe
technologicalpracticecreatesobedientsubjectsanddocilebodies.ForFoucault,then,itisnottoanewformofpublicity,legislation,andlegalitythatwemustlookto
findtheseedofthemoderninthetransitionfromtheoldtothenewregime.Rather,weshouldlooktothenewtechnologiesofpowerdevelopinginsocietalinstitutions
andarticulatedinreformprojects.Thediscoursesworthattendingtoarethoseofthehumansciences,which,togetherwiththenewdisciplinarytechniques,providethe
meansforconstituting,learningabout,andcontrollingthemodernindividual.Thereisoneimportantnewformof"publicity"worthnoting,butitisnotthatofelections,
legislation,

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rights,courts,andthelike.Rather,itisthevisibilityofsubjugated,individuatedindividualsbeforetheeyeofanowinvisiblepoweravisibilityatfirstoftheinmateto
thesupervisorsofclosedinstitutions,butultimatelyofthedeviantbeforesocietyatlarge.
Thegenealogicalapproachto"modernization"thusdiscountsashopelesslynaiveanyinterpretationoftheprinciplesofcivilsocietylegality,rights,plurality,
publicityasabasisfortheemergenceofspaceswithinmodernsocietyfornewformsofautonomousassociationandsolidarity.Foucault'svisionofmodern
disciplinarypowerascompleteandcontinuousandhis(attimesfunctionalist,attimesconstitutive)interpretationofrightsastheanchorsofthispowerkeephimfrom
recognizingthat,liketheimmunitiesinanearlierperiod,moderncivilandpoliticallibertiesalsosecurespacesforautonomy,forassociation,forsolidarities,andforthe
selfconstitutionofgrouplife,newidentities,andthedevelopmentofcounterpowersthesinequanonfortheresistancetobiopowerthatheneverthelessbelievesis
stillpossible.Moreover,Foucault'spositivistattitudeandhisemphasisonthestrategicdimensionofthereformers'projectspredisposehimtoviewthenew
disciplinarytechnologiesasthe"real"innovationnexttowhichthenormativeandsymbolicprinciplesofmoderncivilsocietyappearassecondaryatbestfunctional
to,butultimatelyirrelevantappurtenancesof,disciplinarypower.
82
Theabovenotwithstanding,Foucault'sanalysisoftheemergenceofmodernsocietydoesnotquitenegatethethesisofdifferentiationasakeyelementof
modernization.Indeed,hisdiscussionofthegenesisofthetechnologiesofpowerandtheirglobalizationwithincontemporarysocietypresupposesdifferentiation.Asis
wellknown,Foucaultinsiststhatamultiplicityofprojectsandinterestscametogethertoproduceanewpoliticaleconomyofpunishment,discipline,andcontrol.He
arguesthatEnlightenmentphilosophersandassociatedsocialgroupscontributedtothistransformationbutthat"itwasnottheyaloneinthisoverallprojectofanew
distributionofthepowertopunish,andofanewdistributionofitseffects,manydifferentinterestscametogether."
83
FollowingWeber,Foucaultarguesthatthe
specificdisciplinarytechniqueswerediscoveredindependentlyandlocallyindistinctinstitutionssuchasthemonastery,thearmy,thefactory,

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andtheprison.Ofcourse,multiplicityisnotthesameasdifferentiation:Someofthesearestateinstitutions,othersaresocietal.However,Foucaultdoesdifferentiate
betweenstateandsocietywhenitcomestoidentifyingtheinterestsbehindtheglobalization,ifnotthegenesis,ofthemoderntechniquesofpower.Indeed,despite
disclaimerswithregardtoMarxianclasstheoryandtheoriesofstatepower,thetwosetsofinterestsinvolvedintheglobalizationofdisciplinaryregulatorypowerturn
outtobethoseofthebourgeoisieandtheadministrativestate.Letusconsidereachoftheseinturn.
Withinthemodernizingsocietyoftheoldregime,thereisonemajorsetofinterestsbehindthestruggleagainstthearbitrarymonarchicpowerandthesocietyoforders:
theconcernofthebourgeoisietoabolishpopularillegalities,especiallyvisvispropertyrights.
84
AccordingtoFoucault,itwastheneedtoprotectaccumulationsof
mercantileandindustrialcapitalmorethananythingelsethatnecessitatedasevererepressionofpopularillegality.
85
Thereemergedtheneedforaconstantpolicingconcernedessentiallywiththisillegalityofproperty.Itbecamenecessarytogetridoftheoldeconomyofthepowertopunish,
basedontheconfusedandinadequatemultiplicityofauthorities....Itbecamenecessarytodefineastrategyandtechniquesofpunishmentinwhichaneconomyofcontinuity
andpermanencewouldreplacethatofexpenditureandexcess.
86
Inshort,penalreformwasessentialforacapitalistmarketeconomytoemergeandtofunctionhencethestruggleagainstthe''superpower"ofthesovereign,withits
incalculabilities,andagainstthe"infrapower"ofacquiredprivilegesandtoleratedillegalities.Accordingly,withintheconfusedsetsofinterestsandgoalsinvolvedinthe
transitionfromabsolutismtomodernity,Foucaultstressestheimportanceofthatnew,differentiatedstructure,thecapitalistmarketsystem,anditsspecific
requirements.
Theclassinterestsofthebourgeoisiearealsoatstakeinthedevelopmentoftheseconddimensionofthemodernformofpower:regulatorybiopower.HereFoucault
explicitlyrejectstheneoMarxianthesisthatthesexualityofthemiddleandespeciallylowerclasseshadtoberepressedbecauseitwasincompatiblewith

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ageneralandintensiveworkethic.
87
"Theprimaryconcernwasnotrepressionofthesexoftheclassestobeexploited,butratherthebody,vigor,longevity,
progeniture,anddescentoftheclassesthat'ruled.'"
88
Selfaffirmationandtheneedtodifferentiateitselfasaclassfromtheunhealthylowerordersandthedegenerate
nobilityaretheinterestsatworkintheinvestmentofitsownsexwithatechnologyofpowerandknowledgethatthebourgeoisiehaditselfinvented.Inpart,this
involvedatranspositionofcastemannersofthenobility,basedonblood,tothebourgeoisieintheguiseofbiological,medical,oreugenicpreceptsfocusedonbodily
health,theindefiniteextensionofstrength,vigor,andsoon.Onlylater,inthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury,werethetechniquesofregulatorybiopower
generalizedtotherestofthepopulation.Thatis,onlyaftertheneeddevelopedforastableandcompetentlaborforceandasecuretechnologyofcontrolwasinplace
(throughschooling,thepoliticsofhousing,publichygiene,institutionsofreliefandinsurance,thegeneralmedicalizationofthepopulation),wastheproletariatgranteda
bodyandasexualityandweremiddleclassvaluesimposeduponthem.Thisdoesnotchallengethemainclaim,however,"thatsexualityisoriginally,historically
bourgeois.
89
TheplaceofthestateanditsinterestsissomewhatmoreambiguousinFoucault'sanalysis.Ontheonehand,thecritiqueofthesovereigntymodelwasmeanttosteer
usawayfromthestateasacentrallocusofpowerorthekeyforceincreatingdisciplinarytechniques.Ontheotherhand,mostofthelociinwhichthetechnologiesof
disciplinarypowerdiddevelopwere(inFrance,Foucault'sreferent)stateinstitutions:armies,schools,clinics,prisons,etc.Moreover,Foucaultgrantstheimmense
importanceofthedevelopmentofacentralizedorganizationofthepolice,"themostdirectexpressionofroyalabsolutism."
90
Foritisthestatepolicewhotakeover
thepreviouslyfragmentedfunctionsofsurveillanceofcriminalityandeconomicandpoliticalsupervisionandunifytheseintoasingleadministrativemachine,assuring
continuityofcontrol.Andthisdimensionofstatesovereignty,atleast,endureswiththetransitiontomodernity.WhileFoucaultinsiststhatthestateisnotthesoleorigin
ofdisciplinarypower,hegrantsthat"theorganizationofthepoliceapparatusintheeighteenth

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centurysanctionedageneralizationofthedisciplinesthatbecamecoextensivewiththestateitself."
91
Infact,themajorfunctionofthestateapparatuswastoensure
thatdisciplinereignsoversocietyasawhole.
92
Thisbreadthofdisciplinealongwiththecontinuityofitsexercise,potentialoractual,arespecifictomodern
domination.Whathasbeensaidofthebourgeoisiecanthusalsobesaidofthestate:Thenewlydifferentiated,centralizedadministrativestateapparatusesalsohadan
interestinabolishingtheold,incalculable,andexpensivepersonalformsofpowerandsubstitutingitsnewtechniquesforthem.Thestate,then,asakeyactorin
generalizingdisciplinarypower,doesplayamajorroleinFoucault'saccountofthetransitiontomodernity.
Thestate'sinterestsalsoplayacentralpartintheglobalizationofbiopower.Thebeginningoftheeighteenthcenturysawademographicupswingaccompaniedbyan
increaseinwealthandanendtothegreatravagesofplaguesandstarvationasaresult,thesocietalpreoccupationwithdeathisreplacedbyaconcernwithmanaging
lifeandaccumulatingpeople.Accordingly,thestatebecomesinterestedingatheringinformationaboutandcontrollingthehealth,wealth,manpower,resources,
reproduction,andwelfareofthatnewentity,"thepopulation,"asameanstoincreasingstatepower.Informationgatheringandsupervision,involvingamaximizingof
collectiveandindividualforcesratherthanarepressionofdisorder,was,itnowturnedout,anaturalfunctionforthepolice:
Wemustconsolidateandaugment,throughthewisdomofitsregulations,theinternalpowerofthestateandsincethispowerconsistsnotonlyintheRepublicingeneral,andin
eachofthememberswhoconstituteit,butalsointhefacultiesandtalentsofthosebelongingtoit,itfollowsthatthepolicemustconcernthemselveswiththesemeansandmake
themservethepublicwelfare.Andtheycanonlyobtainthisresultthroughtheknowledgetheyhaveofthosedifferentassets.
93
Thestate'sinterestinthepowerknowledgegeneratedbytheemergingdisciplinesforthepurposeofadministeringandoptimizingthelifeandutilityofthepopulations
underitscontrolisthusparamountintheglobalizationofbiopower.
94
Sexwasattheheartofthispoliticaleconomyofpopulation:"Itwasessentialthatthe

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stateknowwhatwashappeningwithitscitizens'sex,andtheusetheymadeofit,"
95
becausepowerissituatedandexercisedattheleveloflife,thespecies,therace,
andthelargescalephenomenaofpopulation.Indeed,itisthenewconcernonthepartofthestatewithlifeandpopulationthatmarksasociety's"thresholdof
modernity,"accordingtoFoucault.
96
ItseemstobeFoucault'sthesis,moreover,thatbythelatenineteenthcentury,thetwoformsofpowerdisciplineandtheregulationofpopulationsandthetwo
greatinterestsbehindtheirglobalizationcametogether.Thesetechniquescame"torevealtheirpoliticalusefulnessandtolendthemselvestoeconomicprofit....Allof
asudden,theycametobecolonizedandmaintainedbyglobalmechanismsandtheentireStatesystem."
97
Theapogeeofthisdevelopmentis,obviously,the
contemporarywelfarestate.Throughitsregulatorycontrols,thewelfarestateconstitutesthesocialasadistinctobjectdomainofgreat"public"interestwhile
simultaneouslymakinguseofthedisciplinary,confessionaltechniquesalreadyperfectedbysocietaldisciplinesandinstitutionstocontrolit.OnFoucault'saccount,
however,itisnotthelogicoftheeconomyorthestatethatpenetratesandcolonizescivilsociety.Functionalreason,forFoucault,workstheotherwayaround:The
institutionsandpracticesofcivilsocietygeneratethetechnologiesofpowerthatarethentakenupandglobalizedbythestateandthebourgeoisie.
ThisshouldprovideacluetoresolvingtheambiguitywehavenotedconcerningtheplaceofthestateinFoucault'sanalysisofpowerrelations.Becauseheinsistson
thedecentralizationanddeinstitutionalizationofpower,yetidentifiesstateapparatusesaskeylociofdisciplinaryregulatorypower,commentatorshavecomeupwith
diametricallyopposedinterpretationsoftheplaceofthestateinhisoverallanalysis.AxelHonneth,amongothers,accusesFoucaultofignoringthestatealtogetherby
virtueofhisdecentralizedconceptofpower.
98
PeterDewes,however,assertsthat,inanalyzingthevariousdisciplinaryinstitutionsoftheasylum,clinic,andprison,
"Foucaultwishestoshowthatfromthebeginninginterventionandadministrativecontrolhavedefinedthemodernstate."
99
AccordingtoDewes,Foucaultis
concernedtoshowthatinterventioninasocietaldomainbystateagenciesisamore

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fundamentalcharacteristicofmodernsocietiesthananeconomyreleasedfromdirectlypoliticalrelationsofdomination.
100
Foroneinterpreter,thestateplaysnorole
atallinmodernpowerrelationsfortheother,itiseverything.
Foucaultwasquestioneddirectlyaboutthisambiguity.Hisresponseimpliedthatthestate,theeconomy,andsocietyarethreedistinctelementswithinmodernsocial
systems,eachofwhichhasitspowerrelations,disciplinarytechnologies,andmodesoffunctioning.
101
Althoughthestate(governmentaladministration)
102
does
becomeacoordinatingcenterforsocietaldisciplinarypower,althoughitsadministrativeagenciesdopenetratesocialinstitutions,theseneverthelessretainspecific
internalpowerrelationsthathavetheirownconfigurationand"relativeautonomy."
103
Thestate,notquasovereignbutquagovernment,
104
doespenetratesociety,yet
"itwouldbewrongtobelievethatthedisciplinaryfunctionswereconfiscatedandabsorbedonceandforallbyastateapparatus."
105
Inshort,Foucaultmaintainsthat
thestatecannotoccupythewholefieldofpowerrelationsandcanoperateonlyonthebasisofalreadyexistingpowerrelationsconnectingthefamily,knowledge,
technology,thefactory,sexuality,etc.,towhichthestaterelatesasasuperstructure.Thestateisonelocusofdisciplinarytechnologyamongmany.
Wemightnotethat,likethemodalityofpowerhedescribes,Foucault'sgoalistomakevisiblenotthestatebutsociety.Andofcourseheisrightininsistingthatpower
relationsarenotexclusivelylocatedin,nordotheyemanatefrom,anyoneplaceinmodernsociety.Nevertheless,despitetheeleganceofsomeofhisformulations,he
doesnotresolvethedilemmaarticulatedbyhisinterpretersheseems,rather,tovalidatebothantinomicpositions.Butifthestateissimplyonelocusofdisciplinary
poweramongothers,thentheverymeaningofthemodernstateislost,forthetermreferstothedifferentiatedentitythatsucceedsinmonopolizingthe(legitimate)
meansofwarandviolenceand,innonfederalpolities,ofadministrationaswell.Suchan"order"ishardly"one"amongmany.Byusingthethesisofdecentralized
powertodenystatesovereignty,Foucaultreproducesthepositionofthephilosophicalpluralists(althoughforoppositereasons)andopenshimselftoCarlSchmitt's
objectionthatastatethatislikeany

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otherassociationororganizationofpowerinsocietyisnostateatall.If,conversely,thestateisthecoordinatingmechanismofdisciplinarypower,ifsocialinstitutions
arethenecessarysupportsandcomplementsofstateadministration,ifwithinsocietalinstitutionsonefindshomologousformsofdomination,if,inshort,"society"is
equivalenttothefieldwhereadministrativeapparatuseshavetheirplay,thenindeedthestate,oratleastits"logic"ormodusoperandi,iseverywhere.Butthisisa
convincingideaonlywithrespecttothesymbolicmeaningof''totalitarian"regimes.
106
Foucaultisabletoholdbothpositionsbecauseheseesstateandsocietyonlyfromthepointofviewofstrategicpowerrelations.
107
Indeed,state,society,and
economyarepresentedasthreestrategicfieldswithessentiallythesameinternaldynamicsand,asstatedabove,homologoustechnologiesofpower.Modernityisnot
characterizedbyastatethatpenetratessocietyorbysocioeconomicpowersthatpenetrateandcontrolthestate.Rather,itisconstructedintermsofthepenetrationof
eachdistinctrealmbydisciplinarytechnologiesofpowerandstrategicpowerrelations.Whatthismeansisthatstate,economy,andsocietyaredifferentiatedfromone
anothernotintermsofanyspecificrationalityofaction,modeofintegration,orformsofinteractionbutonly,somehow,asseparatesitesofpower.Thisisa
differentiationthatseemstomakenodifference.
108
TheNegativityofCivilSocietyandtheLossoftheSocial
Foucaultpresentsuswithadeeplydisturbinganalysisofthedarksideofmoderncivilsociety.Asindicatedabove,farfromconstitutingan"incrementin
freedom"(Marx),thedevelopmentofthecomponentsofcivilsocietyinmodernityanewformofindividuality,subjectivity,rights,plurality,publicity,legality,and
socialitynowappearsasnothingbutaneffectofpowerrelations.Civilsociety,inshort,isequivalenttoitsnegativity.
Whatislostinthisconceptionisadistinctconceptofthesocial,
109
ThisistherealreasonwhyFoucaultgivesussuchanexceedinglyonedimensionaldiscussionof
rightsanddemocracy.
110
WeneedtolookagainatFoucault'sassessmentofeachofthesekeycomponentsofmoderncivilsocietytomakeourpoint.

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WehavealreadyseenthatforFoucault,thejuridicalsubjectismerelythesupportofdisciplinarypower.Themodernlegalpersonendowedwithrightsisadimension
ofmodernindividualitythat,farfromindicatingautonomy,isfunctionalto,eventheproductof,disciplinarycontrol.Throughobservation,continualsurveillance,
sorting,partitioning,ranking,examining,training,andjudging,disciplinecreatesthematerialcounterpartofthejuridicalsubjectbyinvestingthebodywithpower
relations.
ButFoucault'sgenealogyofthemodernindividualdoesnotrestrictitselftorevealingtheundersideofthe"legalfiction"ofthejuridicalsubjectitextendstoanattack
onmodernselfreflexivesubjectivityassuch.
111
Disciplinarypracticesobjectifythesubjectandcreatesetsofdichotomies,eachsideofwhichisaneffectofpower:
mad/sane,sick/healthy,criminal/goodcitizen,abnormal/normal.WhatHegelsawasthetwokeyachievementsofmoderncivilsocietytheabstractrightofthelegal
personandtheprincipleofsubjectivefreedomofthemoralsubjectwhoseintentionsandwillmustbeconsideredinanyjudgmentofanact
112
becomeinFoucault's
handstheproductsofpowerrelations.Themoralsubjectistheresultofthenormalizingjudgmentthatisexercisedthroughsurveillance,examination,andwiththehelp
oftheobjectifyingsciencesofman:criminology,sociology,medicine,psychology,psychiatry,statistics,demography,etc.Moreover,itisnotthroughthe
"internalization"ofvaluesandnormsthatthe"falseconsciousness"ofthemoralsubjectiscreated,norcanthissubjectbeemancipatedthroughthedevelopmentofa
"true''consciousness.Powerdoesnotstopwhereknowledgeandselfreflectionbegin.Rather,knowledge,truth,subjectivity,andreflectiveconsciousnessarethe
coproducerandproductoftheobjectifyingdisciplines.Theyconstitute,togetherwiththenormalizinggazeoftheguard,thedoctor,andtheteacher,asubject
(subjected)objectofpower/knowledge.
Thesameholdstrue,ofcourse,forthesoulorpsyche.Thesearenottheproductsofanemancipatoryprocessofselfunderstandingbutofa"pastoralpower"whose
techniquesofselfsurveillance,selfinterrogation,confession,andtherebyselfconstitutionandselfdiscipline,initiatedbythechurch,havebecomesecularizedand
generalizedinmoderncultureandsociety.Thus,thepoliticalaxis

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ofindividualizationhasbeenreversedwiththeshiftfromfeudaltomodernsociety.Ascendingindividualizationreflectingthepower,privilege,andstatusofafamilyor
groupisreplacedbyadescendingindividualizationthatincreasesthevisibilityandsingularityofthosesubjugatedbyandsubjectedtodisciplinarytechniques.Inother
words,aspowerbecomesmoreanonymousandmorefunctional,thoseonwhomitisexercisedtendtobemorestronglyindividualizedandmadevisible.
113
The
modernindividualisthecombinedeffectofdisciplinaryandpastoralpoweraselfmonitoringsubjectwhofunctionsashisownsoldierpriest.
Thistheoryofindividualizationhasclearconsequencesforthemeaningandroleofthenewformofpublicityspecifictomoderncivilsociety.Asthedisciplinesbecome
deinstitutionalizedandcirculatefreelyinsociety,
114
"itisthedustofevents,actions,behavior,opinions'everythingthathappens'"thatbecomesvisible,publicto
omnipresentsurveillancebythefacelessgazeofpower.
115
Indeed,liketheprocessofindividualization,relationsofpublicandprivatebecomeinvertedwiththe
developmentofmodernsociety.Insteadofthespectacleofpublicrepresentationofsovereignpower,itisnowthepopulationwhobecomevisibletothe"public"gaze,
whilepowerrecedesintothebackground.Thisis,ofcourse,thepointofthepanopticmetaphor.Theshiftinpublicityfromthepunishmenttothetrialdoesnotmean
thattheprinciplesofdignityandmoralfreedomarerespected,butratherthatjusticenolongertakespublicresponsibilityfortheviolenceboundupwithitspractice.It
alsomeansthatallofsociety,vicariously(throughpublicity)ordirectly,takesontheroleofjudgeandengagesinnormalizingjudgments.Evenaftertheprisonand
punishmenthavebeenopentopublicscrutiny,thepublicremainscomplicitouswithatechnologyofpunishmentthatbydefinitionyieldsvisibilityandcontroltothe
observer.For"disciplinemakespossibletheoperationofarelationalpowerthatsustainsitselfbyitsownmechanismandwhichforthespectacleofpublicevents,
substitutestheuninterruptedplayofcalculatedgazes."
116
Inplaceofthesovereignwhodisplayshispower,wehavethecarceralsocietydisplayingitsdisciplined
subjectstotheanonymousviewer.Thus,iftheindividualproducedbydisciplinarypastoralpowerapproximatesthesoldierpriest,thepublicbefore

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whomtheexerciseofpowerismadevisibleishardlydistinguishablefromthepolice.
117
Accordingly,democratization,orthecontrolbythepublicofadministrativefunctioning,innowaylimitspower,astheliberalwouldhaveit,orgeneratesakindof
powerdifferentfromadministrativecontrol:Itsimplyensuresitsproperfunctioning.Democratic"control"ofthedisciplinarymechanismsthroughpublicityentails
accessibilitytothegreattribunalcommitteesoftheworld.ForFoucault,thissimplymeansthatanyonecancomeandseewithherowneyeshowschools,hospitals,
factories,andprisonsfunction.
118
Modernpublicityprovidesnoalternative,limit,orchallengetodisciplinaryandpastoralpower.
Plurality,thethirdelementinmoderncivilsocietyhailedbyitspartisans,faresnobetterinFoucault'shands.Itissimplyreducedtothemanylociofpowerrelations
andstrategies,andthemultiplicityofatomizedindividualswhoarealreadyproductsofknowledgepowerrelations.Thediscourseoftheseindividuals,their
"consensus,"isasmuchaninstrumentofpowerrelationsasisthediscourseofthemodernsciences:Itnormalizes,andnormatizes,whilemaintainingtheobjectof
powerinsubjectionandasapotentialactoronlyinthepurelystrategicsense.Thus,neitherpublicitynorpluralityconstitutesachecktopower.
Butwhataboutthefinalterminourequation,thesocial?WesaidearlierthatFoucaultlosestheconceptofthesocialinhisanalysisofmodernsociety.Thisisnot,
strictlyspeaking,correct.Rather,hepresentsuswithaconceptofthesocialthatisidenticalwiththenetworkofstrategicpowerrelationsdescribedabove.Asalready
indicated,societyistheterrainofapparatusesandinstitutionswithmultipleformsofsubjugation.ForFoucault,its"normative"dimension,socrucialtoDurkheim'sand
Parsons'sunderstandingofsocialintegration,is,asweknow,simplynormalization.Thesocialbond,farfrombeingamoralcommitmentoranormativeconsensus
constructedthroughthemediumoflanguage,tradition,and/orareflective,discursiverelationtopartsoftradition,isthenetworkofinterwovenandmutuallyreinforcing
strategies.
119
Indeed,Foucaultisabletoviewplurality,publicity,andindividualityinpurelystrategicandfunctionaltermsbecausehisveryconceptofmodernsociety
isthatofastrategicfieldpervadedbyadministra

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tivetechnologies.Thesetechnologieslevel,individualize,andnormalize,buttheyalsorankandsortindividualsandpopulationsinahierarchicalmannerthatpermits
communicationonlythroughathirdelementunequalpowerrelations.Thisisthenewmodeofstratificationthatsubstitutesforhorizontalandautonomoussocial
interaction.
Wehavealreadyseenthatpopularsolidaritieswerethetargetofdisciplinarypower.Themodernsocietythatsucceedsindestroyingthemisone"inwhichthe
principalelementsarenolongerthecommunityandpubliclife,but,ontheonehand,privateindividuals,andontheother,thestate."
120
Suchanimageofmodern
societyprecludesanymeaningofsocialityotherthancoordination"fromabove"(throughadministrativetechniques)and/orstrategicinteraction.Italsodeniesthe
existenceofanyspaceswithinmodernityfortheemergenceofnewformsofsolidarityandassociation.Indeed,sinceFoucaultmaintainsthatdisciplinary/pastoral
powerextendsbeyondtheenclosedinstitutiontobecomecomplete,consistent,andtotal,forthepurposeofefficientandeconomicalproductionofwealth,
knowledge,andusefulindividuals,nothingelseseemstobepossible.Thedisciplinaryorganizationofsocietalspacemultipliescommunicationsandcontacts,butonly
withintheframeofstrategiesandapparatusesthathavealreadyreconnoiteredandcontrolledtheterrain.ReminiscentofMarx'snotionofcooperationwithina
capitalistfactory,Foucault'smodernsocietyispreschematizedbythestrategist'sgaze:"Theclassicalagesawthebirthofthegreatpoliticalandmilitarystrategyby
whichnationsconfrontedeachother'seconomicanddemographicforcesbutitalsosawthebirthofmeticulousmilitaryandpoliticaltacticsbywhichthecontrolof
bodiesandindividualforceswasexercisedwithinstates."
121
Accordingly,moderncivilsocietyiscomposedonlyofindividualizedstrategistsengagedinastruggleof
eachagainstall,pervadedbypowerandpoliticsunderstoodaswarcarriedonbyothermeans.
122
Aswestatedattheoutset,ananalysisofthenegativesideofcivilsocietyandofthespecificallymodernformsofdominationandstratificationisanimportant
componentofanycriticaltheory.Onemight,infact,arguethatthisisallthatFoucaultintendedtodoandthatitisunfairtoaccusehimofpresentingageneralmodelof

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society.Onecould,inshort,claimthathehasanalyzedthelogicandprojectofcontemporaryformsofpowerrelationsthenegativeside,notthewhole,ofcivil
society.Perhaps.YetitremainsthecasethatFoucault'scritiqueisitselfcaughtinthestrategicreasonheexposes.
123
For,onthebasisofhistheoreticalframework,
hecannotpointtoanyothercategoryofaction,anyothermodeofintegrationandinteraction,thatwouldbeabasisforanalyzingthestrugglesagainstdisciplinary
power,orthe"positiveside"ofmodernity,ifthereisone.
Foucaultdoesinsistthat"therearenorelationsofpowerwithoutresistancesthelatterareallthemorerealandeffectivebecausetheyareformedrightatthepoint
whererelationsofpowerareexercised."
124
But,havingequatedlegalityandnormativitywithnormalization,subjectivitywithsubjugation,selfreflection,morality,self
consciousness,andthesoulwiththeproductsofdisciplinarypastoralpower,discourseandtruthwithadministrativestrategiesofcontrol,andthehumanscienceswith
thedisciplinesthatserveor,rather,arepartofpower,Foucaultisleftwithnoconceptualmeansfordescribingresistancesasanythingotherthancounterstrategiesof
power.Weareaccordinglyleftinthedarkregardingthepracticalthrustofthegenealogicalstrategyofanalysis,whichFoucaultneverthelesspositsasaformof
politicalengagement.
Onething,however,isclear:Foucaultisnotapartisanofasimplisticreversalofvalues.Genealogicalanalysesrevealthepowerstrategiesinvolvedinconstitutingnew
objectsandidentities(thehomosexual,thehystericalwoman,thepervert,delinquency,insanity,sexuality)andthepejorativeconnotationsattachedtothem.Butthe
purposeofsuchanalysesisnottoencouragearevaluationinwhichhomosexuality,theperversions,crime,insanity,sexualityareliberated,deemednatural,freedto
speakoutintheirownvoice.Suchastrategywoulddonothingtoquestionthecategorizationinthefirstplaceortounderminetheagenciesandmechanismsthat
perpetuatethegripsofpoweronbodies,pleasures,andformsofknowledge.Instead,genealogyismeanttochallengenotonlythemoralvaluationsofthenormaland
theperverse,forexample,butalsotheverynormalizingtendencyassociatedwiththedemandthatweunderstandourselvesthroughoursexuality,asifthissayswho
weare.

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Perhapsthecriticalthrustofgenealogyissimplytouncoverpowerstrategiesinvolvedinthegenesisofpower/knowledgeregimesinordertodisturbtheunitary,global
formthesetakeandtorevealtheirhistoricalandhencecontingentcharacter.SuchaprojectwouldplaceFoucaultclosetothecriticaltheoryoftheFrankfurtschool.
125
Presumably,thisstrategywouldrevealthebattlelinesandcreatethepossibilityforacounteroffensive.Indeed,onecouldeveninterpretthefocusonthesocietal
genesisandmultiplelociofdominationasanattempttoinvokeacivilsocietyorientedstrategyofresistanceagainstboththelocalpowerstructureswithincivilsociety
andtheirglobalization/colonizationbythestate.
Suchaninterpretation,however,doesnotresolvethedifficultiescreatedbyFoucault'srelentlesscritiqueofpower,forheisstillunabletoarticulate"otherness"orthe
formsofactionthatescapethelogicofinegalitarianstrategicpowerrelations.Ontheoneside,hedisempowerscritique,includinghisown,byananalysisthatequates
discourse,reflection,andtruthwithpowerstrategies.Ontheotherside,hecannotspeakforthevictim,asWalterBenjamindid,orofferanaturalisticnotionofwhatis
repressedbydisciplinarypower,asHerbertMarcusedid,
126
becausethevictimaswellasherpsychearealreadyproductsofpowerandbecauseFoucaulthas
rejectedthe"repressive"thesisregardingpowerrelations.Indeed,ifresistanceisjustthecounterstrategyofthatveryproductofpower,themodernindividual,then
whysupportit?Whyisiteveninteresting?Whatdifferencewoulditmake?
127
Apparently,allthatsuccessfulresistancecanproduceisasubstitutionofonestrategyof
powerforanother.
Thereis,inshort,nobasiswithinFoucault'sworkfordistinguishingresistancefromotherstrategicformsofactionorstrategiesofcontrol.Hecannotappealtothe
normsarticulatedbycollectiveactors,foranyappealtonormseitherreproducesthediscourseofpower(andlockstheresistersintonormalization)orconstitutes
simplyanotherstrategyofpower.Indeed,Foucaultseesthecoordinationofactionthroughnormsas,inessence,strategic.Norcanhefollowthepathtakenby
Habermas,identifyingcommunicativeinteractionasthecoreofanemancipatorypracticethatinvolvesareflectiononandchallengetonorms,institutions,andpractices
in

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thenameofalternative(morejust,moredemocratic,moreliberal)normsandinstitutions,because,forFoucault,communicationisonlyameansoftransmitting
informationand(throughthemakingoftruthclaims)controllinganddisempoweringopponents.Thetheoreticalstrategyofopeningnormstoreflectionisclosedtothe
theoristwhoviewsreflectionasmerestrategy.Inotherwords,onthebasisofFoucault'scategorialframework,itisutterlyunclearwhatgoalsorprinciplesthosewho
resistdisciplinarypowermightinvokethatcouldhaveaclaimonoursolidarity.Theonlycluehegivesusisafewellipticalstatementstotheeffectthat"Therallying
pointforthecounterattackagainstthedeploymentofsexualityoughtnottobesexdesire,butbodiesandpleasures."
128
However,asFoucaulthimselfshowedinthe
secondandthirdvolumesofhishistoryofsexuality,neitherbodiesnortheirpleasuresaremattersofsheerfacticity:Bothareconstructedsymbolically,asobjectsof
knowledgeandidentity,albeitindifferentwaysindifferenttypesofsocieties.Thus,toevokethebodyanditspleasuresasawaytobreakwiththesexdesireregimeis
ambiguous,tosaytheleast.Withoutthisreferent,however,Foucaultisleftwiththesimplefactofresistancetopower,butthissimplefacthasnonormativeweight,for
itwouldalsobepreytothegenealogist'scynicalgazeandberevealedasanotherstrategyforpower.
Butthereisapriorquestiontothatraisedaboveregardingthereasonsforpartisanshipwithresistance.How,onthebasisofFoucault'sanalysis,isresistanceonthe
collectivelevelevenpossible?Suchresistancewouldhavetobeunderstoodeitherasthedefensiveactionofgroupswhoseidentitiesandsolidaritieshavenotyetbeen
penetratedbydisciplinaryapparatuses,orasthecounterstrategiesonlocallevelsofindividualswhoarealreadytheirproductsandhenceareselfmonitoring,purely
strategicactors.Inthefirstcase,wewouldbeseeingpremodernsolidaritiesinapurelydefensivepostureinthesecond,modernrebelswithoutanynorms,institutions,
principles,ordiscoursestoappealto,forthesearealreadymechanismsofcooptation.Thelattercouldonlyappealtoorgesturetowardabstractothernessor
differenceperse.Indeed,itisunclearhow,onthebasisofFoucault'stheory,individualswhowishtoresistcouldcometogethertoformthesolidaryandautonomous
groups,associations,andcollectiveiden

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titiesthatarethesinequanonforcollectiveactioninthefirstplace.Thebodymightputupsomeresistancetothedrill,the"subject"mightshyawayfromsurveillance,
andtheindividualmightstruggleagainstthemanipulationsofbiopower,butevenifFoucaultwerewillingtopostulatetheotherofreasonanddiscourseinitsprimordial
vitality(whichheexplicitlyisunwillingtodo),thiswouldhardlysufficeforanexplanationoftheemergence,solidarity,resources,collectiveidentities,andprojectsof
collectiveactorswhochallengemodernformsofdomination.Foucault'sanalysishasdeprivedthemodernrebelofanyinstitutional,normative,orpersonalresources
forconstitutingherselfintermsotherthanthosemadeavailablebytheforcesthatalreadycontrolher.Thetraditions,solidarities,andspacesforautonomousactionleft
openbytheinefficient,discontinuousmodalityofpowerintheancienrgimefind,inFoucault'swork,nomodernequivalents.Thisisnotbecausehewasintenton
analyzingsomethingelsebut,rather,becausethegenealogicalaccountofmodernpowerrelationsturnstheveryconceptofautonomousvoluntaryassociationintoan
anachronisminthecarceralsociety.Autonomyistheillusionofthephilosophyofthesubject,voluntaryconsentispartofthedeceptivejuridicaldiscourse,
association(inourview,thetrulymoderndimensionofsociality)issimplyimpossibleinasocietyconceivedofasastrategicfieldconstitutedbyakindof
Gleichschaltungofallorganizationsbydisciplinaryadministrativeapparatuses.Wearethusleftwithacritiqueofpowerthatinsiststhatresistanceexistsbutcannot
tellshowitispossible,whatitisfor,orwhyitmeritsoursupport.
Butisn'titobviousthatdisciplinarypowerinmodernsocietyisaimedagainstthenewsolidarities,associations,andmovementsthatemergeontheterrainofmodern
civilsocietyitself?Andisn'titclearthatcollectiveactorsmustarticulatedistinctprojects,newcollectiveidentities,andspeakinthenameofspecificvaluesandnorms
iftheyaretobecomecollectiveactorsandactatall?Moreover,insodoing,theyappealtopreciselythosenewtraditions(ordiscourses),norms,andinstitutions,
stemmingfromthedemocraticrevolutionsoftheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,thatFoucaulthassocleverlydisempowered:freedom,justice,solidarity,
democracy,and,moreconcretely,parliaments,elections,associa

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tions,rights,andsoon.Withoutananalysisofthetwosidednessoftheseinstitutions,
129
nottomentionmodernformsofindividuationandselfreflection,theidea
thatmodernsocialmovementscontinuouslyemergeandchallengedisciplinarypowerwouldbeincomprehensible.CharlesTaylormakesasimilarpointwithrespectto
thetraditionofcivichumanism,themovementsinspiredbyit,andthefreeinstitutionscreatedinitsname.Hecorrectlypointsoutthatcollectivedisciplinescanfunction
intwodifferentways:asstructuresofdomination,andasbasesforequalcollectiveaction.Suchdisciplinescan,ofcourse,undergoachangeinfunction,slidingasit
werefromfoundingegalitarianpoliticsintoservingdomination.ButFoucault'sanalysisofmodernpowerblursovertheseprocesses,revealingonlythenegativesideof
modernity.Hethusservesasa"terriblesimplificateur."
130
Itisourthesisthattheconditionofpossibilityfortheemergenceofmodernsocialmovements,withtheirautonomoussolidarities,newlycreatedidentities,andstrategic
resources,ispreciselythedifferentiatedstructureofmoderncivilsociety:
131
legality,publicity,rights(toassemble,associate,andcommunicatefreefromexternal
regulation),andtheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacy.Indeed,wecontendthatthemodernconceptionoffundamentalrightsisatleastasimportant,inthisregard,as
thetraditionofcivichumanismcitedbyTaylor.Howelsecanoneaccountfortheworkers'movement,civilrightsmovements,thewomen'smovement,theecology
movement,regionaliststrugglesforautonomy,oranymodernsocialmovementor,forthatmatter,theforcesarrayedagainstthem?Unlessoneseesatleastthe
doublenessofrightsandoflegality,onewouldbeforcedtoconcludethatcollectiveactorswhodoappealtorights,andwhoreinterpretthekeynormsofmoderncivil
societywiththeirdemandsformoreautonomy,moredemocracy,forpublicrecognitionasindividualsandasgroupmembersdifferentfromoneanotheryetmeriting
equalconcernandrespect,aresomehowallmistaken,somehowarticulatingirrelevant,anachronisticprinciplesandridiculousprojects.
132
SinceFoucaultrejectsthe
onlyconceivablealternative,theprojectoftotalrevolution,hehasworkedhimselfintoaviciouscircle:Eitherthenormsandprojectsarticulatedbysocialmovements
arestrategiesofcounterpowerandassuchhavenogreater

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normativeclaimthanthoseofotherpowerseekers,ortheysimplyreproducetheexistingdiscoursesofpower.Foracriticaltheorywithapartisanintent,asFoucault's
surelyis,thisisindeedaseriousflaw.
ItistellingthatFoucaultcannotconsistentlymaintainthisstance,atleastwithrespecttonormsandrights.Althoughhereducesnormativitytonormalization,he
nonethelessalwaysspeaksofmodernpowerrelationsasinegalitarian,implyingthategalitarianrelationswouldbepreferable.Healwaysdescribesthelatterwiththe
imageryofaleveledstrategicfieldofpower,butitisobviousthathisentireanalysisisparasiticonthenormofequality,howevermuchhemaydisparagenorms.
Similarly,heinsiststhatrightsshouldbeviewednotintermsoflegitimaciestobeestablishedbutintermsofthemethodsofsubjugationtheyinstigate.
133
Inpart,this
isbecauserightshavebeenreorganizedinourtime,insofarastheyhavebeeninvadedbytheproceduresofnormalizationthatcolonizelaw,thusmakingthelegitimacy
questionirrelevant.
134
Heevennotesthetendency,onthepartofthoseseekingtoresistthedisciplinesandalltheeffectsofpowerandknowledgethatarelinkedto
them,toresurrectthediscourseofrightsandlegitimacy.Butheseesthisasablindalley,for"itisnotthroughrecoursetosovereigntyagainstdisciplinethattheeffects
ofdisciplinarypowercanbelimited."
135
Thenewtwentiethcenturydiscoursesofsocialrightsoperateontheterrainofnormalized,colonizedlaw,whiletheolder
discoursesofcivilandpoliticalrightsareanachronistic.
Nevertheless,evenFoucaultisforcedtoreturntothelanguageofrightswhenhetriestoarticulatestrugglesagainstdisciplinarypower:
Ifonewantstolookforanondisciplinaryformofpoweror,rather,tostruggleagainstdisciplinesanddisciplinarypower,itisnottowardtheancientrightofsovereigntythatone
shouldturn,buttowardthepossibilityofanewformofright,onethatmustindeedbeantidisciplinarianbutatthesametimeliberatedfromtheprincipleofsovereignty.
136
(Our
emphasis)
Thatthisiswhereheleavesthematterisnotsurprising.Foucaultcansaynothingpositiveaboutthis"newformofright"becausehehasdenudedtheverycategoryof
rightsand/orlawofitsmultidi

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mensionality.Certainlylawcanfunctionasamediumofdominationandcontrol,andsomerightsdoseemtodisempowertherightsbearers.Butsurelythisisnotthe
wholestory,oreventhemainpartofit.Aswenotedearlier,Foucaultmissesthenormativeandempoweringdimensionsoflawandrightsbecausehe,likeMarx,
takestheliberalideologyofrightsatfacevalue,onlytorejectit.Onthisaccount,thediscourseofrightsmeansthediscourseofsovereigntycontractlegitimacy
transposedfromthekingtothepeople,andconstruedthistimeasthepolaroppositeofthepolitical,thestate,andpower.Thisformofthediscourseofrightsis,of
course,ideologicalandunacceptable.Butthereisanothermeaningtotheconceptionandeffectofrightsclaims:Inmoderncivilsociety,rightsarenotonlymoral
oughts,theyalsoempower.Rightsdonotonlyindividualize,theyarealsoamediumofcommunication,association,andsolidarity.Theydonotnecessarilydepoliticize
theycanalsoconstituteavitalconnectionbetweenprivateindividualsandthenewpublicandpoliticalspheresinsocietyandstate.Norisitthecasethatquestionsof
justiceandlegitimacyaresomehowanachronisticinmoderndisciplinarysociety:Theseremainimportanttoanysociety,nomatterwhatformpowertakes.
Foucaultisrightinarguingthatmoderncivilsocietyisnotequivalenttoitsprinciplesoffreedom,equality,democracy,justice,rights,autonomy,andsolidarity.Butitis
alsonotequivalenttoitsstrategiesofdominationandcontrol.Dr.Mengeleisnotthetruthofmedicalknowledgeandpracticebutonlytheirperversiontheuseof
mentalinstitutionstopunishpoliticaldissentersisnotthetruthofpsychiatryorpsychoanalysisbutitsabuse.Institutionalizednorms(intheformoflaw,rights,and
customs)donotonlynormalize,theyalsoempowerandprovideastandpointandaspaceforcriticizingandchallengingspecificinstitutionalarrangementsandcreating
newcollectiveandindividualidentities.Indeed,thesymbolicdimensionofdiscoursecannotbereducedtoits''real"functions.Theinstitutionalarticulationofcivil
societyprovidesforamodernformofthesocialthatismorethanandotherthanthedisciplinaryapparatusesanalyzedbyFoucault.Thetwogotogetherbothare
modern,buttheyareneitheridenticalnorofthesamecloth.Onlyananalyticalframeworkbroadenoughtoencom

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passthedarkandlightsidesofmodernitycanaccountfortheconditionsofpossibilityofthenumerousandimportantsocialmovementsor"resistances"thatanimate
anddynamizemoderncivilsociety.AndonlywithinsuchaframeworkcanoneplacethefruitfulyetdangerouslyonesidedworkofFoucaultinitsproperperspective.

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7
TheSystemsTheoreticCritique:
NiklasLuhmann
Weinherittheconceptofcivilsocietyfromtwosources:thehistoryofconceptsandtheories,andtheselfunderstandingofsocialmovements.Theideologistsofsocial
movementsseemtoconfirmthatarichtraditionofinterpretationhasnotbeenexhausted,thatitremainsanadequatebasisforthesymbolicorientationof
contemporarysocialactors.ThisargumentcouldeasilybemobilizedagainstthehistoricistthesesofRiedel,Koselleck,Arendt,andtheearlyHabermas,accordingto
whichtherelevanceoftheearlymodernconceptofcivilsociety,forbetterorworse,istobeconfinedtoitseighteenthandnineteenthcenturyorigins.Indeed,their
ownintenseinteresthelpstonegatetheirclaimsandhasitselfcontributedtotherevivaloftheconcept.Andyetthecaseofthecriticscannotbesoeasilydisposedof,
fortheirclaimthattheveryconceptofcivilsocietyisanachronisticislinkedtoananalysisofcontemporarysocietyasinvolvingafusionofrealmsinparticular,those
ofstateandsocietythatweredifferentiatedintheearlierliberalepoch.Torespondtothemonemustgobeyondtheeffortofhermeneuticrecovery.
Deeplyconvincedofthelimitationsofevenacriticalhermeneutics,
1
webelievethatitisessentialtoexaminetheconceptofcivilsocietyalsoinlightofasocial
scientificallyelaboratedtheorythatattheveryleastincorporatesanobjectivatingperspective.Thelinkbetweenthehistoryofconceptsandtheselfunderstandingof
movementsmaybebasedonaquestionabledoubleprojection:Theverysamecategoriesthatinformtheselfunderstandingofcontemporarysocialactorsmaybe
projectedbackwardbyhistori

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ans,whoareneverfreeofcontemporaryconcerns,andthenprojectedforwardbymovementideologiststoprovethedepthandhistoricityoftheirprojects.
2
While
socialtheoryalsohasinternalizedstructuresofinterpretationandcommitment,onthewholetheseincludepreciselythatobjectificationofmodern,globalsocietal
contextsthatneitherhistoriansnormovementtheoristsarewillingandabletoaccomplish.Thus,identityformingnarrativescanbeconfrontedwithdescriptiveand
explanatorymaterials.
Evenmoreimportant,sincemodernsocialsciencehasadoptedapolemicalattitudetowardthecategoriesoftraditionalpoliticalphilosophy,itisinthiscontextthatwe
findsomeofthebestargumentsagainstcontemporaryapplicationsoftheconceptofcivilsociety.Thus,aconfrontationwiththeresultsofsocialsciencerepresentsan
importanttestforthoseseekingtosaveorrevivetheclassicalconcept.Itisourbeliefthatthistestcanbesustainedonlyiftheconfrontationinvolvesatheoretical
reconstructioninlightofcontemporarydevelopmentsaddressedbysystematicsocialtheory.
Becauseofthenormativelymarkedheritageoftheconcept,itisdifficulttofindsystematicsocialtheoristswhotakeuptheissueofcivilsociety.InMaxWeber'smany
greatworks,forexample,thereishardlyamentionofthetermorofanyobvioussubstitute.TalcottParsonsandNiklasLuhmannrepresentimportantexceptionsto
thistrend.
3
WehavealreadypresentedParsons'sconceptofsocietalcommunityasanattempttotranslatetheHegeliancategoryofcivilsociety,enrichedby
Durkheim'sconceptof"thesocial,"intocontemporaryterms.Luhmann,however,isrighttonotethatthismovebyParsonsinvolvesabreakwiththesystemstheoretic
assumptionsofhisownwork,withoutanygeneraltheoreticaljustification.HereisacluetoLuhmann'ssurprisingpreoccupationwiththeproblemofcivilsociety.
4

Undoubtedly,hisintereststemsfromaconvictionthatsociologistssuchasDurkheim,Parsons(hismajorforerunner),
5
andHabermas(hismostimportantrival)arestill
undertheswayofthismajorconceptof"oldEuropean"practicalphilosophy.Luhmann'sstrategyagainsttheconceptofcivilsocietyanditssocialscientific
precipitatesistoidentifythemwiththetraditionalsocietascivilisandshowtheresultinginadequaciesforthestudyofmodernconditions.
Paradoxically,Luhmann'sownsophisticatedtheoryofdifferentiation,developedinanentirelydifferentcontext,replacesCarl

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Schmitt'snotionoffusionbetweenpreviouslydifferentiatedsphereswithoneofincreasinglycomplexinputoutputrelationsamongthem.Inthisrespect,heishighly
importantforusbecausehepotentiallyresuscitatesoneaspectoftheconceptofcivilsociety.However,heemphaticallyrejectsthenotionthatoneofthedifferentiated
spheresshouldbeunderstoodasanykindofreplacementforcivilsociety,orthesocial,ornormativeintegration.Notevenlaw,thelastsignificantrepositoryofa
"normativestyleofexpectation,"playssucharoleinhistheory.Society,inhisanalysis,standsonlyforthewhole,andinsomeversionsevenfora"worldsociety."
6
Ofcourse,Luhmann"reconstructs"manyoftheearlymodernsubcategoriesofcivilsocietyontheterrainofsystemstheory.Ineachcase,however,thereconstruction
involvesadecisivebreakwithearlymodernintentions:Positivelawisseenasnormlessinitsdeepestfoundations,associationisunderstoodasbureaucratic
organization,andpublicopinionisreducedtothemanipulationofthethemesofcommunication.Itischaracteristicthatdemocracyisidentifiedwiththegeneralsocial
cyberneticfunctionof"meaning,"thatis,withthemaintenanceofreducedcomplexity.Onthebasisofsystemstheory,allthatremainsofthemodernconceptofcivil
societyisthebarefactofdifferentiationitself.
7
Thus,Luhmannisalsoimportantforus,because,onthelevelofsystematicsocialscience,heworksoutahighly
comprehensivechallengetothewholetraditionoftheconceptofcivilsociety.
Luhmann'spreoccupationwiththeproblemofcivilsocietyisindeedsurprising,givenhisowntheoreticalassumptionsandinterests.Hisexercisesinasociological
versionofconceptualhistoryrankwiththebestinthisfield.Accordingtohim,politikekoinonia,translatedas"politicalsociety,"wasfirstusedasaconceptto
describeandelaborateupontheemergenceofanevolutionarystageofhumandevelopment,namely,theconstitutionofpoliticalrulethatsuppressedorgreatly
reducedtheimportanceofarchaic,kinshipbasedassociationsandthepowerofreligionintheimmediaterelationsofsubandsuperordination.
8
Theinstitutionsof
politicalofficeandpoliticalprocedurewerethemeansbywhichthereorderingofsocietywasaccomplished,themajorresultbeing"thepossibilityofresolvingconflicts
throughbindingdecisions."

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Politicalrule,tobesure,meanttheemancipationofhumanbeingsquaindividuals.Butitalsomeanttheirseamlessintegrationintoapoliticallydefinedsocietal
framework.
Luhmannissomewhatunclearonwhythe"selfthematization"ofthisdevelopmentoccurredonlyintheGreekcitystate,inparticularthedemocraticpolisofAthens.
9

Morerevealingthanhisactualexplanationishissomewhatunderemphasizedadditionoftheprincipleofcitizenshipwhenspeakingofthepolisasaversionof
politicallyconstitutedrule.
10
Hedoesnotnoticethatpoliticalruleneedstobeandcanbethematizedassuchonlywhenthewieldersoftheinstrumentsofdomination
(heretheoikospatriarchdespots)constituteapublic.Hisownstressisonthedimensionofdominationratherthanonpublicaction.Theactualruleinanypolitical
societyisthatofapart(intheGreekrepublics,citizens)overthewhole.ToLuhmann,severallogicalparadoxesassociatedwiththeconceptofpolitikekoinoniaare
tobetracedtothisstateofaffairs.Throughitslinguisticformanditsoppositiontotheoikos,politikekoinoniaisunderstandableasonlyonetypeofkoinoniaamong
others.Yetitisalsotheallencompassingsocialsystem,thepolis.Thus,itisawholethatisparadoxicallyconceivedasitsownpart.
11
Or:itisawholethathasparts
outsideitself,inparticulartheoikos.
12
ThelessoniscleartoLuhmann:Thesocietythatthematizeditselfaspoliticalsocietymisunderstooditself.Itwasonlyasocial
systeminwhichanewlydifferentiatedpoliticalsubsystemhadfunctionalprimacy.
13
ForLuhmann,asecond,relateddifficultyoftheclassicalconceptionofpolitikekoinonialiesintheattempttoviewsocietyasaction.Thiswaspossible,accordingto
him,becausethepoliticalsystem,supposedlyorientedtowardright,just,andvirtuousactionwasidentifiedwiththewholeofsociety.Equallyimportantwasthe
understandingofpoliticalsocietyasabody,asacorporateunitycapableofaction.
14
Inthiscontext,therelativelyexceptionalexistenceofdifferentiated,specialized
organizationsandtheirslightimpactonsocietypermittedaconceptionofpoliticalsocietyasawholeasitselfanorganization,anorganizedbody.Ofcourse,theaction
andthegoalsofthissupposedbodywereactuallytheactionsandthegoalsofitsrulingpartonlythispartconstitutedanorganization.

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AccordingtoLuhmann,theconceptsofpolitikekoinoniaand,later,civilsocietyinallitsvariantsthematizedtheintegrationofthisorganizationofrulersandthe
orientationofitsindividualactorsintermsofthenormafivecategoriesofmoralityandlaw(inthelattercase,moralizedlaw).Politicalsocietywasstabilizedthroughthe
institutionalizationof"relativelyuniversal...rulesforinterpersonalrespectandmutualesteem."
15
Inotherwords,the"generalizedmorality"ofpoliticalsocietiesthus
servedasthebasiclegitimationofpoliticalauthority.Nevertheless,Luhmannclaimsthatitwasonlyfunctionally(andnotlogically)necessarytounderstandpolitical
societyinnormativeterms.
16
Perhapswhathehasinmindisthat,althoughthemediumofpowerhasalreadyreplacedordinarylanguagecommunicationasameansof
transferringdecisions,itslackoffulldevelopmentortheabsenceofother"mediaofgeneralizedcommunication"hasmadeacontinuedrelianceonearlierformsof
direct,linguisticmodelsofcommandandobedienceunavoidable.Thelatter,however,cannotoperatewithoutnormativeformsofjustification.Morelikely,thepoint
maybelinkedtohisnotionthatthemediumofpowerrequiresanormativelyconstructedlinguisticcodeforitsoperation.
17
Thebinarycodeofrightandwrong,
allowinginprincipletheschematizationofalldecisionsdoesnotrepresentpowerasitactuallyoperateshence,normativelanguageisactuallynotindispensabletothe
descriptionofpoliticallyorganizedsociety.Norwoulditsactorsneedittoorientthemselveswithinasystemofpower.Butaslongaslawisnotyetmadepositive,this
moralisticlegallanguageisrequiredtorepresenttheoperationofpowerandtheworkingsofpoliticalsocietytoitssocialenvironment,whichisnotyetlinkedtothe
politicalsubsystembyother,functionallyinterchangeable,media.
Thus,inLuhmann'sterminology,theinstitutionalizationofthemediumofpowerallowsanimportantbutincompletereplacementofnormativestylesofexpectationby
cognitiveones.Nevertheless,whileonthelevelofsocialselfreflectionasecularmoralityhasnowtakenonthecentralroleinsocialintegration,inrealitythe
emergenceofpowerasthefirst"symbolicallygeneralizedmediumofcommunication"
18
grantedimmenseimportance,andindeedfunctionalprimacy,forthefirsttime
toasubsystemrelyingona

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cognitiveratherthananormativeattitudetosocialnormsthemselves.Thissubsystemremainslinkedtoastructureofrulesthat,evenifnolongertiedtoimmediate
interaction,iscapableofreducingthecontingencyofactiononlybygeneralizing,universalisticorientationsandmutualexpectationsthatremainnormativeinthesense
ofbeing"counterfactually"maintainedeveninthefaceofempirical"disappointments."Thislinkageisfunctionallynecessary,atleastuntilitisreplacedbyfunctional
equivalents,inordertounburdenthepowersystemofsomeoftheneedsofintegrationandtherebyprotectit(andsociety?)fromitspotentiallyvastoverextensionor
"inflation."
Ancientpracticalphilosophy,ourfirstsourcefortheconceptofcivilsociety,wasinthiscontextthetheoreticalthematizationofboththeprimacyofthepoliticalandthe
moralizationofpolitics.AccordingtoLuhmann,itserrorsinvolvedaconfusionofthepart(politics)withthewhole(society),ofactionwithsystem,ofpower(asa
medium)withmorality(tiedtoordinarylanguageinteraction),andofmoralityasasocialrealitywiththemoralityofthemoralists.
19
Thetheoryofbourgeoissocietyisconvictedofanalogousiffewererrors.BrgerlicheGesellschaftrepresentstoLuhmannonlysuperficiallyarevampingoftheold
societascivilis,inspiteoftheetymologicalderivationofthefirstcategoryfromthesecond.Actually,asthesuggestedalternativeterm,"economicsociety,"indicates,
brgerlicheGesellschaftreferstoatoposthatisnotidenticalwithbutparallelto"politicalsociety."Thetwoalsoturnouttobestructurallydifferent.
20
Again,
Luhmannbeginswiththeselfthematizationofeconomicsociety,whichisclassicallyrepresentedbyMarxiansocialtheory.Hereeconomicsocietyisunderstoodasa
newtypeofsocietyinwhichproduction,andevenmore"ametabolicallyfoundedsystemofneeds,"replacespoliticsasthecentralsocialprocess.
21
Fromadifferent
pointofview,alsocharacteristicofMarxism,bourgeoissocietymeansthatapoliticallydefinedruling''part"(e.g.,Brgerinthesenseofcitoyen)isnowreplacedas
thedominantstratumbytheownersofproperty(Brgerinthesenseofbourgeois).Luhmann'sreservationsconcerningtheMarxian(aswellasbourgeois)theoryof
economicsocietyparallelhiscriticismsofAristotelianpoliticalphilosophyasatheoryofpoliticalsociety.Bothmake

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theunderstandableerroroftakingthepartforthewhole,ofidentifyingasocietalsubsystemwiththewholeofsociety.Theerrorisunderstandablebecauseofthe
dramaticnatureoftheemergenceofeachofthesubsystemsandtheirfunctionalprimacy(foratime)inrelationtotheotherspheresofsociety.
22
Nevertheless,only
thisfunctionalprimacyshouldhavebeenassertedinthecaseoftheeconomy,andnotthereductionofallspheresoflifetoeconomics.Onlythenotionofthefunctional
primacyoftheeconomyiscompatiblewiththeempiricalfactthattheextentandinternalcomplexityofthepoliticalsubsystemcontinuedtogrowinthewholecapitalist
epoch.
23
Forfunctionalprimacyneedonlyimplythattheleadingsubsystemhasthegreatestinternalcomplexityandthatthenewdevelopmentalstageofsocietyis
characterizedbytasksandproblemsthatoriginateprimarilyinthissphere.
Thus,"political"and"economic"societyrepresentnotonlyparallelprocessesofdifferentiation,alongwithparallelformsofselfthematization,butalsosuccessive
evolutionarystages.DifferentlevelsofcomplexityindicateforLuhmannthreestructuraldifferencesbetweentheearlierpoliticalsocietyandthelater,morecomplex,
economicsociety:(1)transformationofthemeaningofprimacy(2)replacementofa(mainlyorpartially)normativebyacognitivestyleofexpectationand(3)lossof
thecapacityforactiononthepartoftheleadingsubsystemasawhole(nottomentionthesocialsystem).Letustakeeachoftheseinturn.
First,indiscussingtherelationoftheeconomictotheothersubsystems,primacycannolongerbeevenapproximatelyrepresentedintermsofauthorityordomination,
butonlybythepreeminenceoftheproblemtheeconomydealswith.ThedifferenceflowsfromLuhmann'sdistinctionbetweenthestructuresofpowerandmoneyas
communicationsmedia,withmoneybeingthemediumaroundwhichthedifferentiatedeconomicsubsystemisorganized.Inthecaseofpower,aselectivedecisionis
madeforsomeoneelsewhoismotivatedtoacceptor"tomake"thisspecificdecisionthroughaparticularcode,andinviewofnegativesanctions.Inthecaseof
money,adecisionismadeforoneself,andtheotherismotivatedtocarryouthisowncomplementarybutgenerallydifferentdecisioninviewofpossiblerewards,or
positivesanctions.
24
Inthefirstcase,decisionsaretransferredinthe

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second,onlyproblemsthatmustbedealtwith.Forthisreason,thelevelofsocialdifferentiationallowedbythefunctionalprimacyoftheeconomicsubsystemisfar
greaterthanthelevelpossiblein"politicalsociety."Thiscapacityisfirstthematizedintermsofthe"falsedichotomy"ofstateandsociety,anissuetowhichweshall
return.
Second,theprimacyoftheeconomicsubsystemnolongerrequiresageneralizedmoralityfortheintegrationofsociety."Itseemsthattheconstancyofmoralityover
time,whichissupportedbyallofsociety,canbereplacedbytheconstancyovertimeofpurelyeconomicopportunities."
25
Whereaspoliticsstillrequired(inthe
epochofitsprimacyonly?)"akindofmoral'cover'orlegitimation,"
26
theeconomicsubsystemrequiresitneither"functionally''nor"logically,"neitheronthelevelofits
representationnorforitsoperation.Thisistruebecausetheemergenceoftheeconomicsubsystemimplies"aswitchfromanormativetoacognitiveattitude.
Expectationsthatarenormativei.e.,counterfactualandincapableofadaptingtochangedconditionsarereplacedbyexpectationsthatcanlearnandadaptto
change."
27
Themoralintegrationofeconomiclifeandtheneedofsocietyingeneralforthistypeofintegrationrecedewiththedifferentiationoftheeconomic
subsystem.Thesocietyinwhichthissubsystemhasbecomeprimarycantherefore(contrarytotheopinionofDurkheimandParsons)graduallydispensewith
normativityorconfineittothesinglesubsystemoflaw,whoseownfoundationsalsobecomecognitive.
Finally,thedisappearanceofageneralizedmoralityasaformofsocialintegrationsignals(andisinpartcausedby)thelossofsociety'scapacityforaction.Withthe
dominanceofthemarketeconomy,itisimpossibletounderstandthesocialwholeasabody."Noonecanclaimtobetheplenipotentiaryrepresentativeofthe
economy."
28
Theeconomicsystemisnotacollectivity.Norcanonesorepresentthesocietyinwhichitisprimary.Anyattempttodiscoverunifiedagencyor
subjectivityrepresentingthissocietyismerelyanillegitimatetranspositionofapartiallygenuinepossibilityofpoliticalsocietyandleadsinevitablytoconceptual
mythology.Equallyimportantisthestimulusgivenineconomicsocietytothedifferentiationoforganizationsfromtherestofsocietyandfrom

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oneanother.Theresultofthisprocessisthatsocietyitselfcannolongerevenappeartofulfilltherequirementsofanorganization,ofanorganizedbody.Apluralityof
theorganizationsinsocietyareintegratednotbymeansofasuperordinateorganizationbutinsteadbytheworkingsofthesystemicmediaofpowerandmoney.Thus
(leavingasidethenotionofinteractionorintersubjectivity),thetransitiontothefunctionalprimacyoftheeconomicsubsystemmeans,forLuhmann,thenecessary
replacementofsocialintegrationbysystemintegration,ofactionasatheoreticalparadigmbysystem.Conceptssuchas"civilsociety"and"societalcommunity"arethe
obvioustheoreticalvictimsofthisshift.Tothisissue,too,weshallreturn.
Luhmannseesasobsoletenotonlytheconceptofpoliticalorcivilsocietybutalsotheonethatreplacedit.Economicsociety,oreventheprimacyoftheeconomic
subsystem,isnowathingofthepast.Thisprimacyhasledtodysfunctionalsideeffectsforitsvarious"environments,"whichmaynothavestrictlyeconomicsolutions.
29
Inoneversionofhisargument,whentheprimacyoftheeconomyisatanend,nosubsystemiscapableofdominatingorevenrepresentingthewhole.Inanearlier
version,thepossiblesubordinationoftheeconomyandofpoliticstoconscious,scientificcontrolorcoordinationisleftopen.Butsuchsubordinationcouldrepresenta
developmentalstageonlyiftheintegrityoftheeconomicsubsystemwerepreserved,asearlierthatofthepoliticalsubsystemwaspreserved,andif,alongwiththis,the
differentiationofsocietywereincreased.Theprimacyatthisstagewouldbelongtothesubsystemofscience
30
andnotthatofpolitics,asinSoviettypesocieties.For
suchasociety,aconceptionofsocietasscientificawouldrepresentanappropriateformoffalseconsciousness,althoughthelevelofreflectioncharacteristicofthe
subsystemofsciencecanalsoleadtoamoreappropriate(i.e.,systemstheoretic)thematizationofthenewformoffunctionalprimacy,thistimeavoidingthefallacious
hypostatizationofparsprototo.
31
Whicheverversionwechoose(andtherecentconceptionofautopoieticsystemsclearlyindicatesthefirst),thethreeconsequencesoftheprimacyoftheeconomic
subsystemwillcontinuetoapplytoLuhmann'sunderstandingofmodernsociety.Forhim,greaterdifferentiation,thedeclineofnormativeintegration,and

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theendofthecapacityofsociety(orevenarepresentativepart)foractionprecludeanyjustifiableconceptionofmodernsociety,orevenoneofitsdifferentiated
subsystems,aspoliticalorcivilsociety.However,fromthepointofviewoftheconceptdevelopedinthisbook,whichisnotlinkedtoanyutopiaofsocietyasaunified
agent,subject,ororganization,itseemsthat,withrespecttothefusionargumentdevelopedbythinkersfromSchmittandArendttoHabermasandOffe,the
Luhmanniantheoryofdifferentiationrefurbishesanimportantaspectoftheconceptthatisunderthreat.Andyet,whileonthemostabstractlevelhedoesofferan
alternativetothefusionthesis,thiscannotbenefitanyconceptionofcivilsociety,atleastinhismodel.Thereasonsforthisseemtobethatheconsidersthestatecivil
societydichotomytobefalse,andhereplacesitbyamodelthatdrawsthelinesofdifferentiationquitedifferently,andthat,eveninanexpandedmodelof
differentiation,heseesnoneedtoincludeaspherewhosefocusissocialintegrationthroughbothnormsandparticipationinassociations.
Theargumentforfusionofstateandsocietyhasalwaysbeenplaguedbyakeycontradiction:Many(especiallytheneoMarxist)proponentsofthisthesisinvokeit
whentheyalternatelydepictthesameepochasthatoftherepoliticizationofeconomyandsocietyandthatofthetransitionofthestatefromfulldependenceonor
"positivesubordination"tothe(capitalist)economyto"relativeautonomy"and"negativesubordination."
32
Thus,theymustassertdedifferentiationanddifferentiation
atthesametime.Thispuzzledisappearsintheearlier,technocraticversionofLuhmann'sargumentaswellasinthelater,liberalversion.Intheonecase,hewould
speakofamovementfromonefunctionalprimacytoanother,fromthatoftheeconomytothatofscientificplanning,expandingthedifferentiationamongspheresor,
rather,subsystems.Intheother,hewouldspeakofincreasingdifferentiation,permittingandpermittedbyincreasinglycomplexsubsystemswhosenetworkofmutual
inputoutputrelationscouldgrowcorrespondinglymoredense,givingtheappearanceoffusion.Ashenotes,theautonomyofthepoliticalsystemnevermeantits
isolation.Eventsintheeconomy,forexample,canhelpconstituteproblemsandmotivationsinpolitics,althoughanautonomouspoliticalsystemwillhavetoproduce
relevantdecisionsaccordingtoitsowncriteria.Thus,

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intersystemiccommunicationisintensified,notreduced."Withtheindependenceofpolitics,itsdependenceonsocietyalsoincreases."
33
Insteadoffusion,Luhmann
providesuswithapersuasivemodelofthegrowthofbothdifferentiationandinterdependence,ofbothsystemicselfclosureandopennesstoothersystems.
"Reciprocaldependenciesandindependenciesamongsubsystemsincreasesimultaneously.Inprinciple,thisispossiblebecausethereisanincreaseofcircumstancesin
whichonecanbedependentandindependent."
34
AccordingtoLuhmann,thewholediscussionconcerningtheseparationofstateandsocietyhasmisunderstoodthisphenomenonofincreasingdifferentiationand
interdependence.Inthespiritofhisthesis,onemightsaythatthefusionargumentamountsonlytoapartiallyfalseselfthematizationofgreaterintersocialcomplexity
characterizingtheevolutionarystagesucceedingthatoftheprimacyoftheeconomicsubsystem.Unfortunatelyforthestandarddichotomousconceptionofthe
oppositionofstateandcivilsociety,however,thiscriticismofthefusionargumentcannotalterLuhmann'sviewthatit,too,representedaformof"falseconsciousness,"
thistimeofthehistoricallynewlevelofdifferentiationcharacteristicofeconomicsociety.
35
Thecritiqueofoneformoffalseconsciousnesscannotrefurbishanearlier
form.
ButwhatisLuhmann'scaseforclaimingthatthedichotomyofstateandsocietyisfalse?First,andleastimportantlyperhaps,hethinksthatthecategoryofthestateis
toodiffuse:Itmeanseverythingfromgovernmenttobureaucracy,fromapartofthepoliticalsystemtoitswhole.
36
Itisnotobvious,however,howthiscriticism
appliestosuchrelativelyrigorousdefinitionsofthestateasMaxWeber's,
37
whichcouldbeandhaveoftenbeenusedinpoliticalsciencetoreformulatetheopposition
ofstateandsociety.PerhapsLuhmannwouldanswerthattheallinclusiveconceptofthestateasapoliticalorganizationthatmonopolizes,throughitsadministrative
staff,thelegitimateuseoftheinstrumentsofviolenceinagiventerritoryviolatestheinternalandorganizationaldifferentiationofthepoliticalsystem,orreducesthe
politicalsystemtomerelyoneofitsaspects.
38
Second,andnextinorderofimportance,Luhmannrejectsthesupposedimplicationofthedichotomythatstateandsociety(or

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civilsociety)eachconsistsofsetsofconcretehumanindividualsseparatedfromoneanotherintermsoftheirwholelives.
39
Whilethisobjectionappliestomany
versions(prevalentespeciallyinmovements)ofthepolemicaljuxtapositionofsocietyandstate,evenacursorystudyofthemoresophisticatedconceptionstreated
hereshoulddisposeofit.ForHegel,forexample,membersof"estates"and"civilservants"aretobefoundinbothcivilsocietyandthestate,albeitindifferent"roles"
and"functional"relationships.Luhmannmightrespond,however,thatdifferentiatedpoliticalrolesshouldbecontrastedwiththemultiplicityofsocialroles,acontrast
thatisstilloccludedbythesplittingofhumanbeingsintomerelytworoles,whetherpublicandprivate,citoyenandbourgeois,orcitizenandman.
ThisargumentisbasedonLuhmann'sfinalandmostimportantobjection.Hepointstoacharacteristicdiffusenessintheconceptofsocietywhenjuxtaposedtothatof
thestate.Assumingthatweknowwhat"state"means(and,atbest,forLuhmannitmeans"politicalsystem"!),theterm"society"isalooseonedescribingitswhole
environment.
40
Whileancientpoliticalsociety,understandingitselfasthewhole,didnotrecognizeitsenvironmentatall,thenotionofthestateexpressesthepointof
viewofthepoliticalsystemwhenitiscapableofseeingitselfaspartofadifferentiatedwhole,adevelopmentthatpresupposesthepoliticalneutralizationofreligious,
cultural,andkinshiprolesandmeaningcomplexes.
41
Thislevelofselfthematizationinturnpresupposes,atleastinthemainversionoftheargument,an
institutionalizationofthefunctionalprimacyoftheeconomic,allowinganewlevelofsocietaldifferentiation.Nevertheless,eventheeconomicsubsystemdoesnot
representthewholesocialenvironmentofthepoliticalsubsystem.Indeed,thedifferentiationofalegalsubsystemallowedthedifferentiationofthe"state"fromreligion
(throughconstitutionallaw)andtheeconomy(throughprivatelaw).
42
Onlyslightlylessimportantforthedifferentiationofthepoliticalsystem,onecouldspeakofan
institutionalizationofthesubsystemsoffamily,science,andcultureorartinthesamehistoricalcontext.Allthesesubsystems,whichcannotbereducedtoasingle
"organization''or"collectivity"or"sphere"or"logic"or,leastofall,"system,"constitutetheinternallydynamicanddifferentiatedsocialenvironment

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ofthepoliticalsystem,whichhasseparateinputoutputrelationswitheach.Moreover,theyhaveinputoutputrelationswitheachother.Theydonotconstituteany
coherententity(forLuhmann,asystem)inrelationtothepoliticalsystem.Thenotionofcivilsocietyisthusdecomposedratherthansavedbythemodelof
differentiation.
43
Butwhichconceptionofcivilsocietyistherebydecomposed?CertainlytheliberalorMarxistdichotomousmodelsdonotstanduptoLuhmann'scriticism.The
Hegeliantheory,ontheotherhand,whileitdoesnotincludeartorscienceorfamily,washighlydifferentiatedinternally.Totheobjectionthatthismodelnomore
differentiatedtheeconomicsubsystemfromlaw,associations,etc.,thandiditsMarxianheir,Gramsci'sresponse,differentiatingeconomyandcivilsociety,mightseem
sufficient.ThepotentialoutcomebecomesclearestinParsons,whodifferentiatestheculturalandeconomicsystemsfromboththepoliticalsystemandthesocietal
community,thelatterunderstoodastheintegrationsubsystemofsociety.Itisthislastsphereofsociety,composedofnormativelegalandassociationalcomponents,
thatweconsiderthemostadvancedreconstructionoftheconceptofcivilsocietywithinacademicsocialscience.LuhmannsharesthisinterpretationofParsonsbut
doeshisbesttoeliminateanysuchasphereinwhateverguisefromthesystemstheoryofsociety.
HereLuhmann'sstrategyistwofold.First,hedrawsthelinedefiningthepolityinsuchawayastoincludewithinitallpoliticallyrelevantassociationsandpublics.
Accordingly,institutionsthatothertheoristsrootedincivilsocietyandthatservedasmediationswiththestatearenowlocatedwithinthepoliticalsystemproper.Inthe
process,however,LuhmannseverstheconnectionoftheseinstitutionswithrationalcommunicationandevenwiththeParsonian"medium"ofinfluencethatis
dependentontheseprocesses.Second,heinterpretsthefunctionoflawandrightsinthedifferentiationofsocietyaspertainingonlytothe(self)limitationofthe
politicalsystem,nottotheinstitutionalizationofanyspecificsphereinneedofprotectionfromadministrativepenetration.Explicitlyrejectingtheideathatrightsmight
alsoprotectagainsteconomictendenciestowarddedifferentiation,heemphasizesthestandardliberalnotionofprotectingprivatespheres

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fromthestate.Thismodeloflawdoesapparentlycreateareservationfornormativity.Unfortunately,withinthetermsofLuhmann'stheory,theboundariesofalegal
subsystemthatisnotstabilizedbyamediumonthemodelofpowerormoneycannotbeeasilymaintainedagainsteitheracognitivestyleofexpectationor,more
concretely,theadministrativesubsystemofthepoliticalsystem.Intherestofthischapter,weshalladdressinmoredetailLuhmann'sanalysesoftherelationsbetween,
first,thepoliticalsystemandcivilsocietyand,second,thelegalsystemandcivilsociety.
1.Thedifferentiationofthepoliticalsystemintoadministration,parties,andpublicsseemstobecommontoParsonsandLuhmann.Actually,Parsons'sconceptionis
quitedifferentfromwhatLuhmannmakesofit.ForParsons,partiesandpublicsasinstitutionscanplayaroleinthe"supportsystem"ofpoliticsbecausetheyare
rootedinthesocietalcommunity.WhatseemstobeanambiguityamongvariousParsoniantextsconcerningtheprimarylocationoftheseinstitutionsinthepolityorthe
societalcommunityis,rather,anexampleofaquasiHegeliantheoreticalmovefocusingonmediation,inthesenseofprovidingbothdifferentiationandthe
interpenetrationneededtostabilizedifferentiation.
44
If,fromthepointofviewofthepoliticalsystem,thefunctionofpublicsandpartiesoperatinginthepublicsphere
istogenerateconsentandloyaltyforbindingdecisions,fromthepointofviewofthesocietalcommunitytheirroleisprimarilysocialintegrationand,secondarily,to
establishelementsofsocialcontroloverthestate.Locatedfirstandforemostinthesocietalcommunity,
45
thepubliciscapableofgeneratingsupportforthepolitical
systemonlytotheextentofbeingabletodrawontheresourcesofsolidaritygeneratedbyautonomousratherthanbureaucraticassociationsincivilsociety.
46
While
Parsonsrecognizesthepossibilityofmanipulationandopinioncreationbythemassmedia,hebelievesthatevenstrongertrendstowardautonomousexpressionand
discussioncounteractthispossibility.
47
InParsons'sconception,theinternaldifferentiationofthepoliticalsystemintoleadership,administrative,integrative,and
legitimatingsubsystems
48
(orgovernment,bureaucracy,legislatureandparties,andthejudiciary)givesthelattertwotheroleofgeneratinglegitimacyandmotivational
commitmentfor

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decisionsproducedandexecutedbythefirsttwo.Buthedoesnotsharewhatheseesastheillusionoftheelitetheoryofdemocracy,namely,thattheseresources
canbegeneratedentirelyfromabove.Nordoesheaccepttheviewoflegalpositivismthatlegislativeenactmentistheonlysourceoflaw,orevenofitsvalidity.The
veryideaofseeingthe"supportsystem"intermsofadoubleinterchangebetweenpolityandsocietalcommunitypresupposesimportanttradeoffs:Politicalpoweris
increasedandexposedtogenuinesocialcontrolthroughthesameinstitutions.
49
Thus,itisfairtoconcludethat,likeHegelbutlessconsistently,Parsonspresentstheinstitutionsofpoliticalassociationandpublicityintermsofadoublelocationthat
bothdifferentiatesandinterconnectsstateandcivilsociety.ToLuhmann,however,thesupposeddoubleroleofpoliticalinstitutionsonwhichParsonsbaseshis
dualistictopologicalconceptionreflectsonlythedifferencebetweentheofficial,textbookversionofpoliticsandtherealityaccessibletosocialscience.Moreover,an
internaldifferentiationofthepoliticalsystemreflectingtermbytermthedifferentiationofitsenvironment(Parsons,Hegel)wouldseriouslyendangertheautonomyof
thissystem.
50
Inordertobeautonomous,thepoliticalsystemmusthavetime,whichinturnpresupposesaninternalstructurethatneednotimmediatelyreacttoinputs
fromitsvariousenvironments.Butthiscouldnotbeavoidedifthestructuresoftheenvironmentwerereproducedwithinthepoliticalsystem,orevendirectlylinkedas
constituenciestothesubsystemsofthepolity."Ifallsubsystemswouldhavetheirlegitimatespokesmeninthepoliticalsystem,politicswouldbecontinuallyconfronted
withanoverproductionofthepossible."
51
ThisisLuhmann'sshorthandfortheSchmittiantoposofadecisionless,ungovernableformofdemocracy.Inhisconception,
however,thisisnotnecessarilytheimplicationofcontemporarypoliticalpartyandparliamentaryinstitutions.Onthecontrary,whentheyfunctionproperly,they
operateneitherintermsofthetraditionalbridgingfunctionbetweensocietyandstatenorintermsofthefusionofthesetwodomains,butasautonomousformswithina
politicalsystemuncoupledfromjustthosetypesofinputsthatleadtoproblemsofgovernability.
Theautonomyofthepoliticalsystemalsodependsonits"acceptance"byitsvariousenvironments.Thisacceptance,however,is

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favoredbythedifferentiationoftheenvironment,whichfragmentsthevariouspossiblesourcesofdemands.Therefore,itcanbeafunctionprimarilyoftheinternal
processesofthepoliticalsystem,andonlysecondarilyofexchangeswiththevariousenvironments.Indeed,theinternaldifferentiationofthepoliticalsystemintopublic,
politics,andadministrationfavorsthecrystallizationofcertainroleswhosefunctionistolinktheenvironmentsinadesirablewaybutalsotolimitthislinkagetoforms
thatareseparatedfromotherrolesandareinternallyfragmented.Thus,theclient,thevoter,andtheparticipantofthepublicaredivorcedfromthefamilymember,the
worker,andtheprofessional,ontheoneside,anddonotadduptoacomprehensivecitizenrole,ontheother.Itisaboveallthisspecializationintoseparatepolitical
rolesthatproducesaformofacceptanceofpoliticaldecisionsthatLuhmannrepeatedlydescribesasquasiautomaticandalmostwithoutmotivation.Thisthesis
requiresaredefinitionofthemeaningsofpublicity,partypolitics,elections,andparliamentaryrepresentation(hereapartofadministration),allofwhichwereonce
linkedtothecategoryofcivilsocietybutarenowplacedwithinthepoliticalsystem.Isthisaredifferentiationwithoutadifference?Luhmann'sredefinitionof
democracyisourfirstsignthatitisnot.
AccordingtoLuhmann(heresquarelyinthetraditionofSchumpeter),anynormativedefinitionofdemocracywhetherbasedonparticipation,representation,or
pluralisticcompetitionshouldbeabandoned.Onereasonisthateachoneseekstomakesenseoftheideaofpopularselfgovernmentorselfrule,whichisinfact
incompatiblewiththelogicofanautonomouspoliticalsystemdifferentiatedfromtheotherspheresofsociety.Moreover,anyschemetoextendparticipationinthe
businessofrule,intermsofeitheradirectroleintheproductionofdecisionsoracontrolandmonitoringofthosewhoactuallydecide,canonlyraiseperpetual
frustrationtoaprinciplebecauseofthescarcityoftimetoparticipateinrelationtothequantityandcomplexityofwhatmustbedecided.
52
Thesecondreasonisevenmorerevealing.Anynormativedefinitionthreatenstoprejudiceone'sownpoliticalsystem(inthiscase,Westernmultipartysystems)against
"functionalequivalents"(inparticular,singlepartyregimesoftheSoviettype).ForLuhmann,

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eventheSchumpeterianresidueofdemocratictheorynamely,theexistenceofcompetitivepartiesandcontestedelectionsrepresentsamerelysecondary
considerationinanalyzingthedemocraticcharacterofasociety.Oneought,instead,toturntomoreabstractmattersanddevelopaconceptofdemocracythatcan
applytoavarietyofsystems,aslongastheyaresufficientlycomplex.
53
Luhmannproducessuchadefinition.Asprocessesofdecisionimplythereductionof
complexity,aselectionofarelativelysmallsegmentfromtherealmofpossibleeventsandtheeliminationoftherest,"democracymeansthemaintenanceofcomplexity
inspiteoftheongoingworkofdecision,themaintenanceagainandagainofasphereofselectivityaswideaspossibleforfutureanddifferentdecisions."
54
Luhmannrealizesthatthisdefinitionassociatesdemocracywithhisdifferentiaspecificaofsocialsystemsassuch,namely,"meaning"itself,understoodasaformof
reductionofcomplexitythatmaintainstheeliminatedoptionswithinthehorizonofpossibilities.
55
Hedoesnotnotice,however,thatthismovetendstowardthe
definitionofallsocietiesasdemocraticatmost,therecanbedifferencesofdegreethatseemtocorrespondprimarilytothelevelofcomplexity.Indeed,Soviettype
singleparty,ideologicallysteeredsocietiesarerepeatedlypronounceddemocratic,indeedasdemocraticasmultipartysystemsaslongasideologyis"preservedfrom
dogmatismandispracticedopportunistically,"whichmeansthecontinualpossibilityofchangingrelationsofpriorityamongahighnumberofcorevalues.
56
Luhmann
doesrecognizethatsinglepartyrulethreatenstorestrictconsequentialsocialcommunicationtoasmallpolitocraticgroupandtoturnotherspheresofsocietyto
secondaryfunctionsofthepoliticalsystemthatinstrumentalizethem.Thistrendisoneofdedifferentiationandiscontrarytotheincreaseofcomplexity.
Characteristicallyforthattime(1968),Luhmannproposesthattherecoveryoftheprimacyofadifferentiatedeconomyrepresents,incontextofasinglepartyregime,
themajordimensionoftheworkofdemocratization.
57
Indeed,heconsidersthefreeingofsocialexpectationsanddemandsaswellas"publicopinion"fromideology
andtheradicalexpansionofelementsofdependentpluralismincompatiblewiththenatureofsuchasystem.
58
Whilerepresentingsomeideallimitonthelevelof

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attainablecomplexity,theserestrictionsarenotsuchastoplaceSoviettypesocietiesoutoftherangethatdefinesthemasdemocratic.Itisinthissense,too,thatthey
arethefunctionalequivalentsoftoday'sliberaldemocracies.ThereaderhasahardtimeavoidingthesuspicionthatthisisthecaseonlybecauseLuhmannhasadopted
themost"disenchanted"and"realistic"viewpossibleofWesternmultipartydemocracies.
59
Luhmann'srealismisinmanyrespectswelcome.Itishelpful,forexample,toseethat,fromthepointofviewofmaintainingstructurallypermissiblecomplexity,the
assimilationofpartyprogramstooneanotherandthesystematiceliminationofmanyintelligentoptionsfrompoliticaldiscussiondiminishtherangeofdemocratic
options.Itisevenmoreimportanttoadmitthetensionbetweentheopenhorizonsofpossibilityforactionandexperienceandtherealisticrecognitionbyindividuals
thattheycanactually"changenothing."
60
Itis,however,bothprematureanddogmatictodefinethisparadoxasdemocracyandtodeclarethegoalofinstitutionalizing
theabilitytochangesomethingasbydefinitionirrelevantandobsolete.Itis,moreover,unconvincingtodismissallreformattemptsbasedontheextensionofpolitically
consequentialcommunicationwithasimplereferencetothescarcityoftime.Oncethisisdone,onegetsthestrongestimpressionthat,inLuhmann'sview,bothSoviet
typesocieties,atleastthosewithreformedeconomies,andWesternmultipartyregimesintheirpresentformsareinprincipleimpervioustoattemptsatstructural
transformationoftheirpoliticalsystems,inthesenseofdemocratization.
61
Thus,inthecaseofWesternsocieties,formsofsocialpoliticalinteractionthatothershave
stronglycriticizedinparticular,apublicsphereassimilatedtomassculture,depoliticizedparties,plebiscitaryelections,andparliamentarytheatricsturnouttobe
elementsofthematureorganizationofagenuinelyautonomous,differentiatedpoliticalsystem.
Luhmann,likeHabermas,presentstheliberalmodelofthepublicsphereashistoricallyconfinedtoasingleepoch,asindicatedbyitslinkagetothepolemical,
enlightenmentnotionof"society"yetanotherversionofthepresystemstheoreticfallacyofparsprototo.Allpublicsancient,liberal,andmodernrepresent,
accordingtoLuhmann,aneutralizationofroledemands

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fromdifferentiatedsocialspheres.Theliberalversioninvolvedthedifferentiationofasphereofsmallcirclesofcommunicationintegratedthroughpublicdiscussion
fromalreadymodern,functionallydifferentiatedsubsystemsofsociety:economics,politics,science,religion,family.Theinternaldifferentiationofthisnewpublic
spherewasanachronisticallysegmentalexternally,itwasadifferentiatedspherewithoutaspecificfunction.Withoutafunction,thenewpublic(apart)could(mis)
understanditselfassociety(thewhole),butonlyforatransitionalmomentbecauseofitsbuiltininstability.Itsrolestructurenotonlywasnotinapositiontocontrol
theotherspheresofsociety,butwascompletelyatthemercyoffunctionalroles,withtheiraccesstomoney,power,etc.
62
AgainstHabermas,Luhmanntherefore
deniesthatastructureofrationalcommunication,inheritedfromafunctionallyundifferentiatedpublic,couldtodayberevived(aspartofaprogramofdemocratization)
withinfunctionallydifferentiatedorganizationsthemselvesnecessarilybasedonthe"parcelizationofconsciousness."Thus,heassertsnotonlythestructural
transformationofthepublicspherebuttheobsolescenceofitsnormativeassumptionsaswell.
Luhmanndoesseektosavesomethingoftheliberalnotion,butonlyinthecontextoftransposingthepublicsphereintothepoliticalsystemasoneofitssubsystems.
Nowneutralizationbecomesthespecificintegrationfunctionofthepoliticalsystemasawholeitsroleistoestablishaformofcommunicationnotdeterminedbythe
nonpoliticalrolesofsociety(familial,commercial,scientific,religious)orevenbypartialpoliticalinterests(partypoliticalorbureaucratic).
63
Thismaysoundlikea
repackagingoftheliberalnorminafunctionalistwrapping,buttherearetwomajordifferences.First,thepurposeofneutralizationisnowtheuncouplingofpolitics,
andinparticulartheprocessesofdecision,fromsociety,notthecreationofanewformofsocialcontroloverthestate.Second,theprocessofneutralizationliesnot
ontheleveloftheopeninteractionofparticipantsbutonthatoftheformationoftheimplicitthemesoftheirvariousformsofpoliticalcommunication.
Indeed,publicopinionisheredefinednotintermsofthe"unattainablepublicity"ofallpoliticalcommunicationbutasthestructuringofevennonpubliccommunication
byinstitutionalized

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themes.Itisthethemes,definedphenomenologicallyas"preunderstandingshardenedduringthecourseofcommunicationintomoreorlessfirmsystemicboundaries
inacommonlyacceptedlifeworld,presupposedinaninarticulatemanner"thatstructurepoliticalcommunication,nottheopinionsarticulatedandexpressed.
64
Public
opinionthusnotonlyreferstobutalsoderivesitsrelativeunityfrominstitutionalizedthemes,thatis,subtextsofcommunication,ratherthanfromthegeneralizationof
articulatedopinions.Thesethemescontributetodecisionmakingbylimitingthearbitrarynatureofwhatispoliticallypossible.Buttheyalsocontributetodemocracyas
definedherebykeepingalivepossibilitiesaccordingtoadifferentlogicthanthatofdecisionmakingitself.Theyarenotpartsofthemechanismofdemocracyinany
otherdefinition,howeverpublicopinion"takesoverthefunctionofasteeringmechanismthat,whilenotdeterminingtheexerciseofruleandthegenerationofopinion,
laysdowntheboundariesofthepossibleatanygiventime."
65
Referringtosuchsubjectsasprioritiesamongvariousvalues,themeaningandperceptionofcrisis,thestatusofvariousindividualswhoplayimportantcommunication
roles,the(relative)newnessofevents,andthedefinitionofsociallyrelevantpainorpainsubstitutes(threat,stress,loss),thekeythemesofpublicopinionareultimately
understoodasrulesthatdetermine,inthecontextofthescarcityoftheresourcesofattention,thattowhichattentioncanandevenmustbepaidatagiventime.These
themesorattentionrulesareseenascontingentandvariable,inlinewiththesteeringrequirementsofcomplexsystems.Theiroriginandlogicofdevelopmentareleftin
somedoubt.Ontheoneside,theinstitutionalizationofthemesissaidtodependonthestructureofthepoliticalsystem,whichregulatespublicopinionwithoutrigidly
determiningit.
66
Thisview,consistentwiththeaimofpresentingthepoliticalsystemasfullyautonomous,seemstoimplymainlythatthestructureofthepoliticalsystem
determineswhichinstitutionalizationofthemesispossible,notwhatisactuallyinstitutionalized.Giventhestatedfunctionofpublicopinion,however,thisultimately
meansthatthestructureofthepoliticalsystemdetermineswhatthemesarepossible,whichinturndetermineswhatdecisionsarepossible.Ineffect,then,thestructure
ofthepoliticalsystemdetermineswhat

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ispoliticallypossible,withpublicopinionrepresentingonlythedependentprocessbywhichthisisaccomplished.
Ontheotherhand,Luhmannalsowantstosuggestthatpublicopinionhasimportantreciprocaleffectsorfeedbacks(Rckwirkungen)onthestructureofthepolitical
system.Butthistakestheparticularformofdevelopingmodesoforganizationandprocessesthatwouldnotbeaffectedbythevariabilityofthemesinparticular,
proceduralismandneutralitytowardvalues.Inotherwords,theresponsetopublicopinionistogenerateandmaintainformsthatallowthepoliticalsystemnotto
respondtopublicopinion.
Sucharevealingwayofspeakingisalsoimportantinthepresentcontext,becauseitimpliesthatshieldingthepoliticalsystemfrompublicityispartofpreservingits
autonomy,asifpublicopinionhad,afterall,somethingtodowiththenonpoliticalenvironmentofthepolitical.AndLuhmanndoesinfactcallitanoverhastyjudgment
thatpublicopinionhasnowbeenreducedtotheinnermediumofthepoliticalsystemwithoutanyoverallsocialfunction,thelanguageonlyoftheinteractionof
politicianswithinapoliticalsystemtotallydifferentiatedfromthesocial,everyday,diffuselifeworld.
67
Inthiscontext,heisforcedtorestateand,ineffect,partially
abandonhishypothesisonneutralization.Ifitisstilltruethatunpoliticalrolesareneutralizedinthepoliticalsystembythepublicsphere,thesameisnottrueforpolitical
communicationoutsidethepoliticalsystem.
68
Butcantherebepoliticalcommunicationatalloutsidethepoliticalsystem,whichisitselfdefinedintermsofspecificcommunicationprocesses?Luhmanninsiststhat
differentiationdoesnotrepresentatearingoutofthesocialfabricofcommunicationandtheestablishmentofselfreferentiallyclosedsubsystems.Thus,the
communicationofpublicopinioncannotbeexclusivelyassignedtothepoliticalsubsystemitsthemeshavearelativelycontextfreecharacterthatcanstructure
communicationincontextswhosenonpoliticalnatureisselfconscious.
69
Butnowneutralizationofnonpoliticalinputscannotbedefinedasthefunctionofthepublic
sphere.Instead,andrathersurprisingly,Luhmannreturnstotheclassicalfunctionof"mediation"(Vermittlung),definedintermsofbothdifferentiationandintegration
betweenpoliticalandunpoliticalcontexts.Thepresentationofmediationis,however,

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astonishinglyimpoverished:Thepossibilityoftransposingthemesfromapoliticaltoanonpoliticalcontextandtheactivationofdifferentrolesofthesameperson,
politicalandnonpolitical,aresaidtohelpstabilizethedifferencebetweenthepoliticalandthenonpolitical.Theaimremainsthedifferentiationandautonomyofthe
politicalsystemmediationaccomplishesthisnotbyneutralizationbutbyforcingtheprocessesofintersystemiccommunicationintonarrowandpoliticallymanageable
channels.
70
Despitetheseefforts,Luhmanndoesnotmanagetopresentaconceptofthepublicspherethatcompletelyshieldsthepoliticalfromthenonpolitical.Hissecond,life
cycle,modeloftheoriginandlogicofpublicopinionisacluetothisfailure.Accordingtothelifecyclemodel,themesthatcanbearticulatedintheir''latentphase"by
anyonebecomepoliticalthemesonlywhentheygetintothehandsofthosewhomakepoliticswithchangingthemes,namely,thepoliticians.Butwhethertheydoso
(andwithwhatforce)dependsontheenergyoftheirgenerallynonpoliticalsuppliersandonthesuccessofthesesuppliersinmakingatheme"popular"and
"fashionable."Afterthishappens,powerholdersarenolongerinapositiontocensorthemes.Now,politicianscancompeteonlyingettingthemesintothedecision
processesoftheadministrationorindelayingthisaslongaspossible.Eitherway,theimportanceofthemestiedtotheirnoveltywilldiminish,andnewoneswilltake
theirplace.
71
ThiswholetrainofargumentindicatesthatLuhmann'slinkageofthemodelofpublicopiniontoaprepoliticalsettingdoesnotrestoretheliberalmeaning
behindwhatisineffecta"liberal"topos,butrathertiesthenonpoliticaldimensionsofpublicitytothemechanismsofcommercial,indeedmanipulated,communication.
Here,too,heisintheSchumpeteriantradition.
Luhmannseemstodenythenecessaryroleofmanipulation,definedincontrasttointeractionasaformofunanswerablecommunication.
72
Butwhenadmittingthe
possibilityofgoingaroundpublicopinionorusingittactically,hisanalysisisfarmoredetailedandconvincingthanthatof"mediation."
73
Technically,onlymethodsof
goingaroundpublicopinionaremanipulativeaccordingtohisdefinition.Moreover,boththeseformsandthoseofinstrumentalizingpublicopinionarepresentedas
waysofregulatingtheinternalprocessesofthepoliticalsystem.Neverthe

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less,thetechniqueshementions,suchastheproductionofpseudocrises,pseudonovelties,orpseudoexpressionsofthewilloftheelectorate,representdirect
utilizationsinthepoliticalsystemofmethodsofmanipulative,commercialadvertisementthat,ineffect,dedifferentiatethepoliticalsystembyturningoneofits
subsystemsintocommercializedentertainment.
74
Undoubtedly,Luhmanndoesnotbelievethatmanipulativemechanismsofeithertypeexhaustthepossibilitiesofpublicopinionformation.Nevertheless,itisprecisely
inthiscontextthathedrawsthefollowingconclusion:"Underthedescribedconditions,intherealmofpoliticswecancountonthemultiplicationofthepossibilitiesof
behaviorandatthesametimeontherestrictionofthepossibilitiesofactiveparticipation."Becauseofthespecializedtechnicalskillsrequiredforthetacticaluseof
publicopinion,whatstartsoutas"managementbyparticipation"invariablywindsupas"participationbymanagement.''
75
ThemodelofdifferentiationandmanipulativelinkagerunsthroughLuhmann'sdiscussionofelectionsandlegislatures,movingtheanalysistotheinteriorofthepolitical
system,whoserelationtoitspublicsubsystemduplicatesthelatter'srelationtothenonpoliticalspheresofsociety.Moreexactly,electoralpoliticsandpoliticalparty
structuresareunderstoodtoconstitutethe"political"subsystemproperofthepoliticalsystem,whilelegislaturesareputwithintheadministrativesubsystem.The
functionoftheformeristobuildpoliticalsupport,toprovideamechanismforrecruitingofficials,andtomanageandabsorbconflictandprotest.Onlythelatteristo
haveanyroleindecisionmaking,whichisunderstoodasaparticularcombination,uncoupling,andreconnectingofactualprocessesofdecisionmakingwiththatofthe
"presentation"ofitsproduction.Byputtingthelegislatureintotherealmofadministration"broadlyunderstood,"Luhmannmakesashiftwithinthepoliticalsystemthat
parallelshisshiftingthepublicintothepoliticalsystem.Ineachcase,hemovesastructureclassicallyunderstoodasanelementofthepublicmediationbetweensociety
andstateclosertotheinteriorofthepoliticalsystemitself,understoodasadministrativedecisionmaking.
ItisstrikingthatintheseshiftsLuhmanncannotfullyeliminatetheelementofpublicnessthatseemstobeattachedtoelectionsandparliaments.Thespecificallypolitical
roleofthevoterislinked

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toparticipationinthepublic
76
uptothepointofactuallyvotingtheworkingoutofthemescapableofconsensusissaidtobeamongthetasksofpartypolitics
77
the
maintenanceoftheimageofpoliticiansisamongthetasksofparliamentandfinally,thepublicpresentationofgroundsandargumentsinparliamentarysessionsissaid
toseriouslyreducethechoiceofrepresentablepositions.
78
Inallthis,moreseemstobeinvolvedthanmerelytheusefulnessofbeingabletorepresenttheprocessof
decisionmakingbytwostories:an"official,"civicstextbookstorythatisimportantforbuildingsupportandshieldingtheactual,nonpublicprocessofdecisionmaking,
anda"realistic"story(Luhmann'sown)thatisimportantfortheselfreflection(oratleasttheproperscientificunderstanding)ofthepoliticalsystem.Characteristically,
thedemocraticfunctionofmaintainingreducedcomplexityintherealmofthepossibleisassignednotonlytothepublicbuttopolitics
79
andparliament
80
aswell,
linkedinparticulartotheinstitutionoftheopposition,whosealternativessurviveevenelectoralorparliamentarydefeat.
Withthissaid,theessentialfunctionofbothpoliticsandlegislatureremains,fromthepointofviewofthesocialsystemasawhole,differentiatingthepoliticalsystem
andensuringitsautonomybyuncouplingpoliticaldecisionmakingfromsocialinputs.Thisproblemissolvednotthroughtotalseparationbutbyprocessesoffiltering
andselectionthatmanagesocietyandbuildpoliticalsupport(a"permanentproblem"withthepassingofpremodernformsoflegitimation)atthesametime.Electoral
proceduresconverttheproblemofsupportfromrelyingonthenonpoliticalrolesofthe(premodern)rulertodrawingonthestrictlydifferentiatedpoliticalrolesof
voters.
81
Intheirrolesasvoters,individualsareguaranteedaccesstothepoliticalsystemindependentlyofothersocialrolesorstatuses(universalsuffrage,equalityof
votes),andtheinfluenceofsocialtiesandpressuresisminimized(secretballot).
82
Indeedtheparticular,atomizedchoiceofthevoter,havingalmostnoconsequences
forotheraspectsoftheindividual'slife,includingotherpoliticallyrelevantroles,involvesnosocialresponsibilityandcannotbethesourceofanysocialconflicts.
83
This
pointhasseveralconsequences,allstrengtheningtheautonomyofthepoliticalsystem.Notbeingopento"social"influence,thevoterisallthemoreexposedto
immanentpolitical

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influence,presumablybythemechanismsofpublicopinion.Inseekingtoinfluencepoliticalprocesses,thevoterhasachoiceofasmalldegreeofinfluenceatminimum
cost(voting)ormoreinfluenceatgreatcost(voluntaryassociations,petitions,letterstonewspapers,etc.).Giventheseparationofeitherformofinfluencefrom
decisionmaking,Luhmannhasnodoubtthatthefirstoptionwillbechosen,althoughthecontinuedpresenceofthesecondcontributestodemocracy,atleastinthe
senseof"everythingispossible,butIcandonothing."Buteventherestrictedandminimizedinfluenceofthevoterroledistinguishestheindividualfromasubject
(Untertan)ofrulewhoreceivesbutneversendspoliticalcommunications,therebycontributingtolegitimationthroughprocedure.
84
Thesituationisanalogousforconflictorientedcollectiveactorswithspecificinterests.Luhmannadherestotheviewthatelectionsarenotsuitedtotheexpressionof
particularinterests.Becausethoseelectedreceivegeneralizedsupportandarenotboundtoanyconstellationofinterests,electoralprocessescannoteasilyproduce
decisionsforconcreteconflicts.Nevertheless,theydoallowthepoliticalsystemnottosuppressconflictsbuttochannelthem,includingevenradicalprotests,intothe
interiorofthepoliticalpartysubsysteminamanageableform.Heretheadvantageofcompetitiveelectionsoversinglepartyuncontestedelectionsshowsitself.
Unfortunately,multipartysystemswithconflictinglistsdonotsolvetheproblemautomaticallybecauseofthetendencytoundifferentiatedprograms.Thecontinuing
dilemmaofpoliticalpartysubsystemsistoavoidbothreproducingtoomuchsocialconflict(whichwouldthreatenthedifferentiationandstabilityofthepoliticalsystem)
andabsorbingtoomuchconflict(whichcouldmeanthereappearanceofunmanageableconflictoutsidethepoliticalsystem).
85
Characteristically,Luhmanntellsusnexttonothingaboutwhathappensinthecontextofbeingcaughtoneitherofthehornsofthedilemmaoftoomuchortoolittle
conflictinthepoliticalsystem.Itwouldappearthatthelegislatureplaysaroleintheresolutionoftoomuchpoliticalconflict.Here,LuhmannrunsintoCarlSchmitt's
thesisofthefragmentationofsovereigntyandthereductionofparliamenttomereshow.ToLuhmann,thethesisisbasedonthe

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falseassumptionthatopensessionsofparliamenteverwereorshouldbeatthecenterofactualdecisionmaking.Parliament,especiallyitsplenarysession,isand
shouldbe"mereshow,"inthesenseofsymbolicallypresentingtheproductionofdecisionsinaccordancewithourofficialscriptofpolitics.Suchashow(withits
importantfunctionsfordemocracy,inLuhmann'ssense)canhaverelativelylargeroomforpluralinterests,openconflict,andtheselfpresentationofpolitical
personalities.
86
Itis,however,theinformalmechanisms,shieldedandveiledbytheformalprocedure,thatarethestuffoftherealisticscriptofdecisionmaking.While
theparliamentaryprocessasawhole,aseventheclassicaltheoryoffreerepresentationrealized,shouldnotmirrorsocialconflicts,theappearanceofthepartysystem,
atleastintheversionanalyzedbySchmitt,threatenstodojustthis.Luhmannimplicitlyacceptsherethedeclineoftheclassicalprincipleofrepresentation,andhe
admitssomedangersfortheautonomyoftheprocessofdecisionmaking.Inhisownterms,thereisadangerofabottleneckbetweenthepoliticalandthe
administrativesubsystemsofpolitics.
87
Modelsofendlessdiscussionorconflictindicateonlytheproblemratherthanthesolutioninthiscontext.Instead,the
separationofdecisionmakingfromformalparliamentaryprocedureimpliedbyrelianceoninformalandevendeviantmechanisms
88
clearsthepotentialbottleneckand
reducestheinfluenceofpoliticstoitspropermeasure.Therealdecisionmakingoccurselsewherethaninparliamentaryprocedure,althoughtheconversionofpolitical
powerintoazerosumgamebytheformalmechanismsofmajorityruleconsiderablysimplifiestheinteractionsandbargainingprocessesofthosewhoactuallydecide.
Thus,theoldthesisconcerningthecrisisofparliamentarismisresolvedbyLuhmanninawaythatpointstosomethingliketheneocorporatistdualitybetweenpublic
andsecret,formalandinformal,parliamentaryandfunctionalistprocessesofinterestaggregation.Heis,however,perceptiveenoughtorealizethattodaythereisa
newthreattoparliamentarism.Acrisisofparliamentarylegitimacycanresultnotonlyfromtoomanysocietalinputsandtoomuchpartyconflict,butalsofromtoo
muchsocialapathyandtoomuchabsorptionofconflict.Themethodofshieldingthemechanismsofdecisionmakingcanbeoverlysuc

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cessfulthenumberoflogicallypossiblesocialalternativeslosesitslinktotheactuallypossibleifthefeelingthat"Icandonothing"becomesgenerallyandpublicly
thematized.
Inthiscontext,Luhmannpassesupthechancetobuildontheoneelementofgenuinedemocraticlegitimacythatappearsinhispresentation.Inhisconception,itis
aboveallthedramaturgicalelementsofelectionsandparliamentsthathavethefunctionof"informing"theuninformed,ofenergizingtheapathetic,ofsymbolizing
democracyasanopenhorizonofpossibilitysomehowpresentandchargedwithmeaning,evenifdetachedfromthepossibilitiesofaction.Butthisargument,ashe
elsewherenotes,threatenstodedifferentiatepolitics,thistimeinrelationtoartormasscultureandentertainment.Thecitizenissaidtoparticipateinpoliticstothe
extentofbeingabletoidentifywithsomeoftheactorsofthedrama,becomingpartofthepublicinthesenseofaudience(Publikum).
89
Itishard,though,tokeep
theshowgoodorevenentertainingwhenpeoplebegintonoticethatthereisnothingatstake.ThistrainofargumentsoonleadsusbacktowardLuhmann'sconceptof
publicopinion,involvingthecompulsiontoproducenoveltyinthefaceofthepredictableobsolescenceoffashionablethemesandeventhemanipulativeuseofthis
opiniontoproducepseudoevents,pseudocrises,andpseudopersonalities.
Atonepoint,however,Luhmannpointstoanothertypeofphenomenon,andimplicitlytoamodelofthepublicelsewheredenouncedasobsolete.Duringplenary
sessionsofparliament,"one'sgrounds,unlikemotivationsandbackers,havetobepubliclypresentedandexposedtothecriticismofopponents.Thisrestrictsthe
choiceofrepresentablepositions."
90
Luhmanndoesnot,andwebelievecannot,telluswherethiscompulsiontodefendpositions"withthehelpofargumentsand
reasonsfordecisions(ArgumentenundEntscheidungsgrnden)"originates.Somecandidatesforapossibleanswer,suchasapoliticalculturewithbuiltin
standardsofrationality,oralifeworldthathasundergonenormativeaswellascognitivelearning,orapublicsphereorganizedaccordingtothepossibilityofrational
discourseratherthanmerelydramaturgicallyorasanorganofmassculture,areinprincipleexcludedfromhistheory.

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OurpointisnottodenytheempiricalimportanceofLuhmann'sdescriptionofthepoliticalsystem,basedontheprimacyofacoreadministrativesystemcapableof
shieldingitsautonomyandinternalselectionprocessesbytheouterringsofpoliticsandpublics.Rather,itistoregisteranuneasyrelationshipbetweenthetwo
scenariosLuhmannassociateswiththepoliticalsystem,the"realistic"oneandthe"official"one.Thelatter,inordertoplayitsrole,cannotconfineitselftoa
dramaturgicalstatus.Buttoeliminateitsdiscursiveorrationalcomponents,whichrepresent,inLuhmann'softstatedopinion,undesirable(societal)restrictionsonthe
freedom,variability,andpragmaticcasebycasenatureofdecisions,wouldputtheprocedurallegitimacyofthepoliticalorderintojeopardy.
91
2.Luhmannisfullyawarethatanoverextensionofthelogicofthepoliticalsystemwouldbeharmfulforthissystemitself.Histheoryoftheautonomyofthepolitical
systemfromsocietalinputsisnotautomaticallyatheoryofthefreedomofthevarioussocialspheresfrompoliticalpenetration.Adifferentiatedpoliticalsystemis
indeedfarmorepowerfulthanitspredecessorsandhasbothgreaterpossibilitiesandgreaterinterestinintervention.LuhmannundoubtedlyacceptsSchumpeter's
insightthatiftherealisticmodelofdemocracyistoworkatall,caremustbetakenthatpoliticalmechanismsnotbeextendedtotoomuchofsociety.
92
Healsoagrees
thatsuchlimitationmustbeprimarilyaselflimitationofthepoliticalsystem.IncontrasttoSchumpeter'sversionoflegalpositivism,however,heclaimsthatthe
mechanismcanbethatoflegalenactment,whichisnecessarilytheproductofpoliticaldecision.Infact,hedevelopsafunctionaltheoryoffundamentalrightsasforms
ofprotectionagainsttheoverextensionofthepolitical.Suchamove,ifjustifiable,couldhelptodiminishqualmssuchasSchumpeter'sthatpositiveenactmentisnotin
itselfsufficienttolimitpoliticalpower.UnlikeParsons,however,Luhmanndoesnotlocateasocietalcenterofnormativeintegrationandassociationallifeasthecoreof
whatistobeprotectedbytheselflimitationofthepoliticalsystem.
ItisinstructivetocomparetheconceptionsoffundamentalrightsinParsonsandLuhmann.Derivedfromequality,oneofthe

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corevaluesofthe"democraticrevolution,"rightsinParsons'stheoryseemtohavemoretodowiththeinternalstructureofthe"societalcommunity"thanwithits
differentiationfrompolity,economy,orculture.FollowingafamousandinfluentialtextofT.H.Marshall,
93
Parsonsdecomposescitizenshipintocivilandpolitical
rightsandtheirsocialprerequisites.
94
Equalparticipationinthesethreecomponentsdefinesfulladmissiontoormembershipinthatis,citizenshipinthemodern,
democraticsocietalcommunity.
95
Ofcourse,Parsonsunderstandsthedemocraticrevolutionandespeciallyitsothercorevalues,libertyandfraternity,intermsofa
largescaleprocessofdifferentiationbetweensocietalcommunityandpolity.Moreover,theprehistoryofthedemocraticrevolution,especiallyEnglishlegal
developments,alreadyinvolvedatransformationoflawfroman''instrumentofgovernment"toa"mediatinginterface"betweenstateandsociety.Inparticular,the
establishmentof"therightsofEnglishmen"(suchashabeascorpus,fairtrial,andprotectionagainstarbitrarysearches)issaidtoplayanimportantroleinthis
development.
96
Thus,whileParsonsneverbroughttogetherthestrandsofhisargumentaboutrights,itisfairtosaythat,asidefromthefundamentalproblemof
inclusiontowhichhelinkshiswholecitizenshipcomplex,hisconceptionstressesbothdifferentiationandintegration,withcivilrightsplayingamoreobviousrolein
differentiationandpoliticalrightsprovidingfornewformsofintegration("mediation")betweenthespheresofstateandsociety(polityandsocietalcommunity).
ItisstrikingthatLuhmannmakesadeterminedattempttoreducethefunctionoffundamentalrightstothesingledimensionofdifferentiation.
97
Hisstark,"realistic"
conceptionofthemodernpoliticalsystemandofpoliticalpoweraspotentially"totalitarian,"aimingatthepoliticizationofallspheresoflife,underliesthisthesis.
98
And
yetthemodernpoliticalsystemisbornofsocialdifferentiation.Itsmodernitypresupposesdifferentiation,anditsperformanceforothersocietalsubsystemsrequires
economyofpowerresources.
99
Theestablishmentandselfestablishmentoflimitstostatepoweristhusapositivesumgame.Whatevertheactualhistoricaloriginsof
basicrights,
100
neitherthestatenorapurelysocialsphereproducesthemalonetheyrepresentgainsintheautonomyofthenonpoliticalandthepowerofthe
political.
101

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Thelogicalparadoxoflegalpositivismwithrespecttorightsthesupposedimpossibilityoftheselflimitationofpoliticalpowerthroughpoliticalenactmentisthus
sociologicallyresolvable.Fundamentalorconstitutionalrightsarenotrootedinanextrapoliticalorextralegalorderbutarepresuppositionsandproductsofthe
differentiationofsociety.Whiletheyarenottheonlyinstitutionsthatstabilizethisdifferentiation,todayatleasttheyareindispensableforthispurpose.
102
Accordingly,thestructureofrightscannotbededucedfromasingleprinciplesuchas"individualfreedom"or"societyagainstthestate."Norcantheybearranged
accordingtoahierarchy.
103
Thereasonisthatfundamentalrightsconsistofseveralcomplexes,eachofwhichregulatestherelationshipofthepoliticalsystemtoone
oranothersubsystemaccordingtodifferentanduniquestructuralrequirements.Tobeginwith,libertiesorfreedoms(Freiheitsrechte)havetodonotwiththe
autonomyoftheindividualinthestrongsense,butwiththeprotectionoftheindividualpersonality(itselfasubsystempresupposedbytheothersubsystems),whichin
turnishighlydependentonthemaintenanceofconditionsforadequateselfpresentation.Thesedependonthefreedomoftheactorfromvisibleandopenconstraint,in
particularfrombindingdecisions,andonabasicconsistencyofselfpresentation,heredefinedastheessenceofdignity.Withinwhatareordinarilyconsidered
freedoms,Luhmanndistinguishesbetweenrightsoffreedomandofdignity,respectivelyrelatedtotheexternalandinternalpreconditionsofthepresentationofthe
self.
104
Asgoodsthatexistpriortothestate,theyarenotproductsofrightsandareonlyprotectedbythemwithrespecttothepoliticalsystem.Rightsoffreedom,
strictlyspeaking,protectthespaceofindividualactionandexpressionfreedomofspeechinallitsformsseemscentralinthiscontext.Luhmannconsidersthe"rightsof
dignity"tobemoredifficulttodefineandtoestablish,andhenotesacertaintendencyinmany(especiallyliberal)legalsystemstosubsumethemunder
Freiheitsrechte.Nevertheless,heconsiderstheminprinciplequitedistinct,tobeconnectedwiththeprotectionofanintimatespherethatshouldbeseparatedfrom
thatofpublicaction.
105
Socalledfreedomofconscienceisthebestcontemporaryillustrationofthisrequirement.
106
Withoutit,theindi

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viduallosestheresponsibilitytoworkoutforherselfaconsistentandconvincingselfpresentation.
Asinthecaseoffreedom,Luhmannconsiderstheprotectionofdignitybyfundamentalrightstoberelevantonlywhenthethreatcomesfromthestate.
107
Yethe
believesthatthefalsedichotomizationofstateandsocietyleadsonlytothemistakenliberalattempttoderiveallfundamentalrightsfromfreedoms.
108
Henevertheless
feelscompelledtonotetheimportanceofFreiheitsrechteinstabilizingtheothercomplexesofrights,relevanttootherspheresofsociety,allofwhichpresupposethe
possibilityofthefreeselfpresentationofindividualpersonality.Thisseemstobethecaseespeciallyforthesocalledfreedomsofcommunication.Letusnote,in
passing,thatLuhmannalsoconsiderstherightsofpersonalitytobelinkedtoatypeofcommunication,namely,selfexpressioninaformrecognizabletoothersasfree
anddignified.
Inthecaseoftherightsofassembly,association,press,andopinion,however,thecontextchangesfrompersonalitytoculture,fromsubjectivitytointersubjectivity
anditspresuppositions.Asbefore,Luhmannconsidersfundamentalrightstoberelevantprotectionsofcommunicationonlyaslongthesearepotentiallythreatenedby
thestate.
109
Heisnotparticularlysuccessfulinconnectinginaclearcutwayasetofcommunicationfunctions(cultureanditsinternalization,thespecificationofthe
needforconsensus,themobilityofcontacts,andthedeterminationofthethemesofpublicopinion)withaseriesofrights(ofreligionandbelief,ofassociationand
assembly,ofthepress,ofart,ofscientificresearchandteaching,andmanyothersinaneclecticlist).Thepointisneverthelessclearenough:Indifferentways,the
modernstateneeds,yetpotentiallythreatens,amanyleveledframeworkofsocietalcommunicationthatcanbestabilized,inpart,throughfundamentalrights.
Thethreatisstatizationandnotpoliticizationassuch.ForLuhmann,thestate/societydichotomyisamisleadingbasisonwhichtoconstruetherightsofcommunication,
becauseitsupposedlyimpliesthepoliticalneutralizationofnonstatespheres.Politicalproblemsandpoliticalpowerarisenotonlyinthepoliticalsystembutalsoin
frameworksofprotectedsocialcommunication.Thissocietalpowershouldbeabsorbedandprocessedbythe

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politicalsystemratherthaneliminatedthroughstatization.Theunburdeningofthestateisessential,evenatthecostofpoliticalthreatsarisingfromothersocialspheres.
110
Asinthecaseofrightsrelevanttopersonality,here,too,Luhmannclaimsapreeminentstatusforrightsofcommunication.Allsocialsystemsandidentities,including
personality,presupposeprocessesofsocialcommunicationandrequiretheirprotectionvisvisadynamicmodernpoliticalsystem.Economicrightsdonotseemto
havethesamefundamentalimportanceinthispresentation.Whiletheythemselvespresupposefreepersonalityandcommunication,thereverseisnotargued(in
contradistinctiontoliberalandneoliberalclaims).Tobesure,Luhmanndoesalsoopposethederivationoftherightofpropertyandthe"freedom"ofprofessionfrom
Freiheitsrechte.
111
Itisnotpersonsbutrolesandfunctionsthatmustbeprotectedinthecaseoftheeconomy.Onceagain,despitethepossibilityofothersocial
spheres(family,religion,science,etc.)inhibitingeconomicprocesses,Luhmannmaintainsthatfundamentalrightsarerelevantonlywhenthestateisthesourceofthe
threat.Whilethemodernstateandadifferentiatedeconomicorderhavelongbeenpresuppositionsforeachother,
112
thestateasthesourceofbindingdecisions
neverthelesshasatendencytointervenedirectlyineconomicprocesses.Rightsofpropertyandthefreedomsofcontractandprofessionprotectthedifferentiationof
economicprocessesandroles.Theyblocksomeinterventionsnotinthenameofjusticeandinjusticebutinordertoprotecttheeconomyfromuncertaintyand
disorganization.
113
Forthisreason,theserightscanbeandaregenerallymadecompatiblewithformsofinterventionthatincreaseinterdependencewithout
dedifferentiationandwithinterventionsthatincreaseeconomicefficiency.
114
Luhmannstandsapartfromtheclassicalliberalandneoliberalnotionofrights,basedonapolemicalrejectionofstateinterventioninsociety,yethestayswithinthis
traditiontotheextentthatherepeatedlyclaimsthatfundamentalrightsbytheirnature,andnotonlyhistorically,representformsofprotectioninthefaceofthestateor,
inotherwords,formsofselflimitationofthestate.Onereasonforthispreferenceliesinhisdefinitionofrightsasformsofselflimitationbymeansoflegalenactment.
Forthelegalpositivist,

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theonlysourceofsuchenactmentisthestate.Inthepresentcontext,however,thispositionleadstotheparadoxicalconsequencethat,althoughtheprimacyofthe
economyhasreplacedthatofthepoliticalsystem,
115
andinprinciplethehighlyprecariouseconomizationofotherspheresofsociety,includingpolitics,isseenasa
genuinedanger,
116
selflimitationintheformofeconomic"constitutionalism"cannotandshouldnotbeintroduced.
117
InLuhmann'sframework,therearenorights
againsttheeconomy.Thisprejudiceleadshimtorelyevenmoreoninterventionsfromthepoliticalsystemtomanagetherisksofahighlydynamiceconomic
subsystem,apositionnotreallycompatiblewithhisintentiontolimitpoliticalinterventiontoactsdesignedtoimproveinternalfunctioning.Indeed,aswenowknow,
politicalinterventionsofthetypehereadilyaffirmedaslateastheearly1970scouldbecomedysfunctionalfromthelongtermeconomicpointofview,intheprocess
producingadditionalnegativesideeffects.
ThispartiallyselfcontradictoryoutcomeisallthemoreparadoxicalbecauseLuhmanncannotconsistentlyrestrictthenotionoffundamentalrightstoselflimitationsof
thestateincontextswherethepoliticalsystemrepresentsthemajorsourceofrisksforothersubsystems.Acaseinpointispoliticalrights,whichforParsons
representedmediatingandintegratingprinciplesprimarily.Eschewingthisinterpretation,Luhmannsaveshisgeneralconceptionbasedondifferentiationbyreversinghis
perspective.Politicalrightssuchassuffrage,thesecretballot,aswellastherightsofpoliticalassociations(parties)andofelectedofficialsrepresentforLuhmann,
howeverparadoxically,formsofprotectionofthepoliticalsubsystemagainstexternal(includingeconomic!)pressures.Theyareultimatelymechanismsofselectivity
uncouplingandinsulatingthehighestinstanceofproducingbindingdecisions,namely,theadministration.
118
WehavealreadyseenthistrainofthoughtinLuhmann's
politicalsociology.Hisstressisonpreservingelectionsasthenarrowestpossiblechannelthroughwhichsocietalconflict,communication,andinfluencecanenterthe
politicalsystemfromoutsideandentertheadministrativesubsystemfromthepublicandpoliticalsubsystemsofthepoliticalsystem.While,incomparisontoSoviet
typesystems,
119
heseemstonotetheroleofpoliticalrightsinprotectingsocietyfromover

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politicizationandthepoliticalsubsystemfromoverbureaucratization,hisemphasisinrelationtotheWesternliberaldemocraciesisentirelyonshieldingthepoliticaland
theadministrative.Indeed,inthiscontexttheprotectionofelectoralandpublicpoliticalprocedurehasitspointonlyinthelegitimationofthedecisionsofan
administration,whicharearrivedatthroughwhollyinternalanduncontrolledprocedures.
120
Luhmann'saffirmationofpoliticalrightsastheselfprotectionofthepoliticalsphereratherthanitsselflimitationwithrespecttoothersocialspheresisnotonly
inconsistentwithhisconceptionasawholebutalsoastatistaspectofhisdoctrineofrights.Thisstressisonlypartiallyexplainedbythelegalpositivistsearchtofind
adequatepoliticalmotivationfortheselflimitationofthepoliticalsystemthroughlegal(includingconstitutional)enactments.Theideathatpoliticalrightsaretheself
protectionofthepoliticalonceagainhelpsLuhmanndemonstratetheinadequacyofamodelofrightsderivedfromtheideaofdefendingsocietyagainstthestate.For
eachcomplexofrights,hehasusedboththeideaofthedifferentiationofthespherestobeprotectedandtheideaof"interdependentindependence"tocriticizethe
rigidlydualisticmodelofsocietyandstate.Differentiationinhismodelofrightsworksinitiallythroughpoliticallegalenactment,itselfaformofinterdependence.Nor
doesdifferentiation,aswehaveseeninthecaseofeconomicrights,excludethepossibilityofnewinterrelationships.Here,however,theseconsiderationsdonotlead
Luhmanntoclaimthecompleteobsolescenceofthestate/societydichotomy.Instead,hearguesforitspreservationthroughgeneralizationinaconceptionofsystems
communicatingwithoneanother.
121
Thisnewmodelisnotdesignedtosavetheconceptionofcivilsociety.Onthecontrary.Luhmannseeksinparticulartodecomposetheideaofasphereinwhich
mutuallyreinforcingandstabilizingnormativestructures,formsofassociation,andpubliccommunicationconfrontthemodernstateandthemoderneconomy.Tobe
sure,hishintthattherightsofpersonalityandofcommunicationrepresenteachother'spresuppositionsonthedeepestlevelcutsthroughhisframeworkofrigid
differentiation.Personalityandcommunicationarepresentedinsomecontexts(evenifvaguely)aseachother'sfoundation,notaslogically

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separatealbeitinterdependentsystems.ButLuhmanndoesnotdevelopthisinsight,althoughitcouldhaveservedasthefoundationforadeepertheoryofrights.For
him,fundamentalrightsdifferentiateandprotectdifferentiatedsystemstheydonothavetheirgroundandjustificationinasingleunifiedframeworkthat,together,they
helptoestablishaswellasdifferentiate.
Anexception,perhaps,isthelegalsystemitself.Whateverelserightshelptodifferentiate,theirabilitytofunctionatallseemstodependonthedifferentiationofa
systemofproceduresinwhichtheycanbeautonomouslyinterpretedandapplied,andperhapsevenenacted.
122
Ifrightsaretodefenddifferentiationfromthe
politicalsystem,itwouldseemthattheythemselvesmustbedifferentiatedfromthissystem.AndLuhmanndoesinfactattempttotreat(increasingly,ashislegal
sociologyisdeveloped)thelegalsystemasadifferentiatedsubsystemofsociety.Rights,whichforhimarelegalinstitutionslikeanyother,albeitwithspecificfunctions,
belongtothissubsystem.SinceLuhmannconsiderslawtobefundamentallylinkedtoanormativestyleofexpectation,wemightassumethatthelegalsubsystemitself
representsadifferentiatedresidueoftheconceptionofcivilsocietyconstructedinpartaroundsharedfundamentalnormativestructures.Inourview,however,and
probablyinhisown,Luhmann'sintendedbreakwiththeconceptofcivilsocietyistooradicaltoallowsuchaninterpretation.Thequestioniswhetherhecanworkout
anadequateandconsistenttheoryofthelegalsystem,asdifferentiatedfromthepolitical,inthecontextofhisradicalcampaignagainstcivilsociety.
ThereevaluationoftheproblemofnormsinLuhmann'slegalsociology,andtherestorationofacentralplacefornormsinhissociologicalanalysis,isstriking,givenhis
previouspolemicagainstthetheoryofnormativeintegrationinDurkheimandParsons.Thispolemicisnowonlypartiallymitigated.Hearguesthatnormsareimportant
inthesocialstructure,buttoconstruethemasidenticaltothatstructureistomisunderstandtheirplace.
123
Norshouldnormandinstitutionbeconsideredsynonymous:
Notallinstitutionsembodynorms,andnotallnormsareinstitutionalized.Finally,itiswrongtoassumethatthenormativeintegrationofsocietyisbasedoncommon
andsharednorms.Inalldifferentiatedsocieties,normsarecontestedandrepresentimportantstakesof

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conflict.
124
Inthistheory,legalnorms,representingonlyasmallportionofnormativephenomena,
125
playacrucialroleinmanagingandstabilizingnormativeconflict
ratherthanexpressing,symbolizing,andreaffirmingnormativeorder.
AccordingtoLuhmann,normsare"counterfactuallystabilizedbehavioralexpectations."
126
Lawsareinstitutionalizednorms,stabilizedintermsofprocedures,
whosestructureofexpectationsisguardedfromandrestoredafterdisappointmentsbysanctions.
127
Thesedefinitionsrestondetailedtheoreticalconsiderationsthat
canonlybeoutlinedhere.Inthecontextofcomplexityandcontingency,socialactioncanbecoordinatedonlythroughstructuresofcomplementaryexpectationsand
mechanismscapableofdealingwithdisappointment.
128
ForLuhmann,"internal"expectationsbyindividualsabouttheactionsofothersgenerallyreplacecoordination
throughactualcommunication,whichisunderstoodasatimeintensiveandthereforescarceresource,onebestreservedforafewopen,unsettledcontexts,generally
conflicts.
129
Expectation,however,asaresponsetothecontingencyoftheother'sactions,isputatriskbythefactthattheotheristhesameastheselfandhasits
ownexpectations.Thisleadspotentiallytodoublecontingency:Eachcanbedisappointedbytheother.Thecoordinationofsocialactionisthereforepossibleonlyif
theexpectationsofexpectationsarestabilized.
130
InLuhmann'slargelysilentsociety,therearetwoandonlytwobasicstylesofexpectation:thecognitivestyle,whichiscapableoflearningandalteringexpectationsin
thefaceofdisappointments,andthenormativestyle,whichinvolvesinabilityor,rather,unwillingnesstolearn.Whatistypicallyconsideredtobeanecessaryyetvery
precariousformforprojectingselfidentityinthecaseoftheindividualpsyche(notlearningasinvolvingimmunereactionsborderingonthepathological)becomes,in
thecaseofnormativeexpectations,asociallystabilizedandguaranteedstructure.
131
Forbothpsychologicalprojectionandsocialnorm,themaingoalistostabilizean
identityrelatedstructureofexpectationratherthantosecureempiricalcompliance.Butwhiletheoriginandoperationofpsychicalprojectioncanbeentirelyinternalto
theindividual,Luhmannisabletopointtogenuinelyexternal,socialmechanismsforstabilizingandreproducingnorms.

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Luhmann'streatmentoftheproblemoforiginsisinadequate.Theonlysocialprocessofnormcreationtowhichhecanpointactualcommunicationandcomingtoan
understandingtocreateoralterrulesanddefinedevianceheconsidersexceptional,characteristiconlyofsmallscalesocialsystems.Indeed,thevalidityofnorms
supposedlydependsontheimpossibilityofactualcommunicationconcerningthem,oratleastconcerningallofthemwithinthesametimehorizon.
132
Thedifferentiationofsocietyinvolvesanincreasingdifferentiationofthenormativeandcognitivestylesofexpectation.Intheirpureform,eachisopentonewrisks:the
riskofahardeningofsocialidentitiesinonecase,thoseofacompletelycontingent,andthereforeunbearable,futureintheother.Themainresponseinmodernsociety
isnotdedifferentiationbutcombinationsinvolving"contraryordering,"asallowedbythereflexivestructureoftheexpectationofexpectations.Inparticular,onecan
cognitivelyexpectanormativeexpectationandnormativelyexpectacognitiveexpectation.
133
Theformercombination,thecognitiveexpectationofthenormative,has
keyimportanceforLuhmann'slegaltheory.
Normsbecomelawsonlyifinstitutionalizedintermsofsanctionsandprocedures.Institutionbuildingplaysacrucialroleinmanagingnormativeconflict.Luhmann
definesinstitutionalizationbythepossibilityofbasingexpectationson"thepresupposedexpectationsofexpectationsonthepartofathirdparty."
134
Differentfrom
externalobservers,thirdpartiesarepotentiallycoexperiencingandcoexpecting,albeitunknownandanonymous,membersofthesamefabricofinteraction.Therole
ofthejudgecrystallizeshistoricallyaroundthefigureofthethirdparty.ForLuhmann,institutions,likenorms,donotdependonactualcommunicationorconsensus.
Actualconsensusbeingscarce,institutionalizationusesiteconomically.Insteadofcreatingorpresupposingconsensus,institutionsinvolveabetteruseofthesmall
amountavailable,distributingittorelevantareas.Fortheirownfunctioning,institutionsonlyneedananticipationofconsensus,withrelevantthirdparties,inthe
expectationofexpectations,apresumptionthatisrarelytested.
135
Whileempiricallythereislittletoobjecttointhisconception,weagainnoteLuhmann'srepeated
inabilitytolinkthemechanismsofrealcommunicationandconsensusbuilding,which

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hecannottotallyneglect,tohisothermechanismsofstabilization,oreventoassignanyotherreasonfortheirexistencethantheimplicitonethatsomeactualconsensus
isneededtomakeplausibletheanticipation,or"successfuloverestimation,"ofconsensus.
Inthecaseoflegalnormsasinstitutions,theactualmechanismsneededtostabilizeexpectationsaresanctionsandprocedures.Theimportanceofsanctionsliesnotin
theirsecondarytaskofmotivatingcompliancebutinthepossibilityofrelieffromdisappointmentthroughasymbolicrestitutionofthenorm.Indevelopedsocieties,
accordingtoLuhmann,sanctionsaretheonlywayofdemonstrating"thepresumedconsensusofthirdparties."Occasionalcoercionthussymbolizesanticipated
consensusandcanthereforereplacefactualconsensusinLuhmann'smodeloflaw.Inthismodel,though,thecontinuousfunctioningoflawisnotbasedprimarilyon
coercion,aninstrumentthatwouldbecomebluntedbyitsveryuse.Thereisaneedtorepresentcontinuitythroughamechanismthatisentirelypresentandyetcanbe
presumedtoexistbeyondthecurrentcommunityofparticipants.Differentiatedproceduresplaythisroleandthushavepriorityintheinstitutionalizationoflaw.
136

Proceduresarebetterthansanctionsforsymbolizingcontinuitybecausetheycanrefocusconcernfrom(increasinglylesslikely)agreementsaboutoutcomestomutual,
ifonlyimplicit,acceptanceofanabstractframeworkfordeterminingpossibleoutcomes.
137
Proceduresarethecentralpresuppositionfortheemergenceofpositivelaw.Notonlyaretheytheonlymechanismavailablefortheoperationofthenewlevelof
reflexivityinvolvedinthe"normativeregulationofthecreationofnorms,"
138
theyarethe(quasi)medium
139
aroundwhichthedifferentiationoflawfromreligion,
morality,andscientifictruthbecomespossible.AccordingtoLuhmann,thecentralpremiseofpositivelawisproductionandalterabilitythroughenactment,thatis,
throughprocedurallycorrectdecision.Thiscanbeputtwowaysonelegal,theotherpoliticalthatindicatereflexivity:Normsregulatethemakingofnorms,and
decisionsregulatethemakingofdecisions.Thenormsthatguidethemakingofnorms,suchastheconstitution,areasetofnormslikeanyother.Soarethedecisions
thatregulatedecisionmaking.Positivelawmeansrejectingthepossibilityofextralegal

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sourcesoflawandevenofahierarchyoflegallevels.Nevertheless,itwouldbeamistaketointerpretthepositivityoflawasmeaningthatnormativelyvaliddecisions
aretheonlysourceoflaw.Norms,evenpotentiallylegalnorms,emergefromallspheresofsociety.Legislationinvolvesaprocessofmakingaselectionfromwhatis
projectedfromelsewhereaspotentiallawandthenvalidatingthatselectionaslaw.Onlywhatpassesthroughtheproceduralfilteroflegislationbecomesvalidlawin
thismodel.
140
Luhmann'streatment,unlikesomeotherversionsoflegalpositivism,leavesroomforsourcesoflawcreationotherthanlegislativeenactment.Whilehethereby
preparesthewayforreconcilinghistoricalandpositivejurisprudence,hedoessoinanundifferentiatedwayatbothpoles.First,hedoesnotdistinguishbetweenactive
andpassivesocietalsourcesoflawcreation.Thisisconnectedwithhisfocusonisolatedsubsystemsandatheoreticallyanchorless,nondescripteverydayliferather
than,inthemannerofParsons,anorganizedsocialsphereinwhichcultureandassociationsintersect.Whilehenotesthatpatternsorinstitutionsinanysphereof
societycanbeturnedintolegalnorms,hedoesnotnotethedifferencebetweensocialnormsandsocialfactsraisedtotheleveloflegalvalidity.Thus,hebypassesthe
questionofwhethernormativeasagainstlegalvaliditycanbeproducedapartfromlegislationandwhether,therefore,thelegislativeprocessinthecaseofvalidnorms
isasourceofahighervalidityoronlyofaformofbindingandpossiblyuniversalization.Mostimportantly,hedoesnotraisethequestionofwhetherornotaspecial
roleisplayed,asasourceofnormsforthelegalsystem,bytheprocessesofnormcreationthroughcomingtoanunderstandingthathehasdescribed.
Second,hisframeworkexpressesuncertainty,similartothatofthetraditionoflegalpositivismtakenasawhole,concerningthelegalasagainstthepoliticalcharacter
ofpositivelaw.Theissueiswhetherornotthemakingandoperationofpositivelawarefunctionsofthepoliticalsubsystem,inawayrecallingtheincorporationof
otherdimensionsandmediationsofcivilsocietyintothissubsystem.Inearlywritingsonthistopic(1967),Luhmanntendedsimplytoaffirmthatthepoliticalsubsystem
supportsandadministersthemechanismsofpositivelaw.
141
Later(1976),withthedifferentiationandautonomyofthelegalsubsystemalready

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affirmed,Luhmannwasstillconstrainedtopointtotheoverlapoftheinstitutionsandeventsofthetwosubsystemsandtonotethedifficultiesforlawmakinginherentin
legislationbyapoliticalbody,theparliament.
142
Indeed,thisoverlapgoessofarthattheinstitutionsofmaking,applying,andexecutinglawturnouttobethethree
branches(legislative,executive,andjudicial)ofthecentral,administrative,decisionmakingsubsystemofpolitics.
143
Thus,hisassertionoftheautonomyofthelegal
systemhassomedifficultyinovercominghisother,earlierdepictionaccordingtowhichpositivelawis''state"lawwhose"destinyisboundupwiththatofthepolitical
systemofsociety."
144
Luhmanndoesspeakofdifferentselectivity
145
and,later,ofdifferentconnections,linkages,andexclusions
146
ofthetwosystems,legalandpolitical,eveninthecase
ofsharedinstitutionsandevents.Onemightargue,althoughhedoesnot,thatlegislativedecisionmakingselectsnormsforlegalization,whereaslegislativeprocedures
endowlawswiththestructureofvalidity.Finally,asinLuhmann'srecentconceptionoflawasanautopoieticsystem,onemightconsiderlawtobenormativelyclosed
whilecognitivelyopen.Thefirstofthesedimensionswouldyieldlegalautonomyandselfreproduction,whilethesecondwouldprovideforopennesstothepolitical
systeminwhichlearningtakesplace.
147
Thereasonwhynoneofthesestrategieswillsucceedinprovidingforthedifferentiationandautonomyofthelegalsystemlies
deepinLuhmann'sconceptionofpositivelawandtheshiftcontainedthereintowardacognitivestyleofexpectation.
Positivelawishereunderstoodasasystemofnormsthatcomesintobeingthroughdecisionandcanbechangedthroughdecision.Wefindintheprocessesoflawpositing
decisionsprimarilyacognitivelearning,determinedbygoals,onehardlystructuredbynorms....Correspondinglythoseaffectedbylawmustconstantlylearnthechangesinthe
law,whetherornottheyaredisappointed.Theywillhavetotakeaprimarilycognitiveattitudetolaw.
148
Whatisinvolvedhereisnotasimpleshiftfromanormativetoacognitivestyleofexpectationbutashifttoacombination("contraryordering")inwhichwecognitively
expectanormativestyleofexpectation.Positivelawcanadoptthisstructurebecauseofthedifferentiationoflegalproceduresandroles.Inthecontextofthe

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generalalterabilityofalllegalnorms,includingconstitutionalones,thenaturalattitudeisthatoflearning.Butpositivelaw,inordertoremainlawatall,mustpreserveits
normativefunctionwithinalterability.Inprinciple,thisispossibleaslongasstructuresarenotproblematizedinthesituationstheystructureandaslongasthese
situationsaredifferentiatedfromothersinwhichthesamestructuresarequestionedandperhapschanged.
149
Itisjudicialprocedureandtheroleofthejudgethat
institutionalizesanormativeattitudetostructureswithinasystemofpositivelaw.Ofcourse,giventheobviousalterabilityoflaw,evenjudgesmust"learnnottolearn."
Whileitisthetaskofthelegislatortoprocessdisappointments,tocorrectexpectations,andtotakeresponsibilityforfailuretolearn,thejudgeisordinarilydetermined
nottolearnfromthelawbreakerandlearnshownottolearninthefaceofinfringednorms.
150
Onemechanismforthisinthecourtroom,paradoxically,isthe
techniqueofconvertingconflictsaboutnormsintoconflictsaboutfacts,normativestakesintocognitiveones.Inthisway,judgesneedneverexposetheirownnormsto
criticalquestioningandneednotlearnfromthosewhohavedisappointedtheirexpectationsbecauseofalternativenormativeexpectations.
151
Canasystemthatcombinesnormativeandcognitiveexpectationsstillbedescribedasprimarilynormative?Luhmanndoesnotaskthisquestion,buthedoesindirectly
answerit.Heintroducestheproblemoflegitimacyasawayofdealingwiththebindingcharacterofthelegalsystemasawhole.Here,too,theissueisthecombination
oflearningandnonlearning,ofcognitiveandnormativeexpectation.Boththosewhomakeandthosewhoareaffectedbydecisionsavoidlearninginthecontextof
legalcontingencyonlyattheirperil.Legitimacyinthiscontextisdefinedbythepossibilityofassuming"thatanythirdpartiesexpectnormativelythatthedirectly
affectedpersonscognitivelypreparethemselvesforwhatthedecisionmakerscommunicateasnormativeexpectations."
152
Anassumptionisacognitiveexpectation.
Legitimacyisacircleofcognitiveexpectationsinwhichonlythirdpartiesjudgesareexpectedtoexpectnormatively,andeventheirnormativeexpectationof
othersisonlythattheywillcognitivelyadapttothejudges'normativeexpectation.NowonderthatLuhmann,almostuniquelyinthesociologicalliterature,considers
physicalforcetobean

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essentiallegitimatingfactor,
153
mostlikelybecauseitisthebasisofthejudges'oftenmistakenbutnotthereforeabandonedexpectationthatpotentiallawbreakerswill
cognitivelyadapt.Thestructureofthelawinthisconceptionrestsonlyonattitudesofcognitiveexpectationandthelearnedfalseconsciousnessofjudges.
Withallthissaid,theideaoflawasanautopoietic,normativelyclosed,andcognitivelyopensystemseemstobemerelyaverbalsolutiontotheproblem,oratbesta
normativedesideratumforthereconstructionoflaw.ItishardtoseehowLuhmannactuallyconjoinsthetwopremisesthat"theremaybepoliticalcontrolof
legislation,butonlythelawcanchangelaw."
154
Evenifitisinsertionintothelegalsystem,withitsowninternalrequirements,thatturnslegislationintolaw,anormative
attitudeofexpectationwouldbesavedonlyasacharacteristicofapurelyintellectualsystemincapableofperformingfunctionsfortherestofsociety,asidefrom
motivatingthefunctionallynecessaryfalseconsciousnessofjudges.Becausehehasneverfoundanintegratingmediumforlawcomparabletomoneyorpower,
Luhmann'sclaimsforboundarymaintaining,selfproductiveautonomysoundratherhollow.Thus,whilethecognitivelyopendimensionoflawwouldremainrootedin
thepoliticalsystem,whichinturnisnotopeneduptothenormativeinputsoflaw,itsnormativelycloseddimensionwouldbesuspendedwithoutsocialfoundations,or
atbestbecomeoneoftheclosedrulesystemsestablishedandinstitutionalizedintheculturalspherealone.Sucharetheconsequencesofabandoningtheconstitutive
linksoflawtoaframeworkofsocietalaction,association,andcommunicationandoftheonesidedacceptanceoftheprivilegedrelationoflawtothepoliticalsystem,
adeficiencybalancedonlypartiallybytheaffirmationoftheheterogeneoussocietalsourcesofnormcreation.
DespiteLuhmann'sselfunderstanding,theideaoflawasanautopoieticsystemmaybeanormativedesideratumborninacontextcharacterizedbyincreasingdoubts
aboutwelfarestateinterventionsintosociety,whichseemstoinvolvealossoflegalformalityandautonomy.Butevenasaprojectofreconstruction,theideaofthe
autonomyoflawfrompoliticsrequiresanindependentinstitutionalcontextonwhichlawcanrely,withoutthedangersofanalternative(e.g.,economic)
instrumentalization.

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ThisinsightcallsnotonlyforanotionofcivilsocietybutalsoforitsreconstructionintermsotherthanthatofasubsystemofsocietyinthemanneroftheParsonian
societalcommunity.ItisinthecontextofsuchareconstructionthatLuhmann'snotionofautopoiesisfirstbecomesserviceableforapostinterventionistmodelofthe
relationsofthepoliticalsystemtotheotherspheresofsociety.

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III
THERECONSTRUCTIONOFCIVILSOCIETY

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8
DiscourseEthicsandCivilSociety
Wehavebeforeustwotheoreticaltopoi:moderncivilsocietyanddiscourseethics.Thefirstevokesthethemeofclassicalliberalism:Theterm"civilsociety"today
callstomindrightstoprivacy,property,publicity(freespeechandassociation),andequalitybeforethelaw.Thesecond,withitsemphasisontheequalparticipation
ofeveryoneconcernedinpublicdiscussionsofcontestedpoliticalnorms,obviouslyreferstotheprinciplesofdemocracy.Thecurrentvogueinpoliticaltheoryis(once
again)toviewliberalismanddemocracyasfundamentallyantithetical.Defendersofthecoretenetsofclassicalliberalismtendtoseedemocracy,withitsemphasison
majorityruleandparticipation,aseitherillusoryor,evenworse,dangeroustoexistingliberties,unlesssuitablycontrolledorrestricted.
1
Advocatesofdirectorradical
democracy,ontheotherhand,havecometostigmatizetheliberaltraditionitselfasthemainimpedimenttoachievingaparticipatorydemocraticsociety.
2

Nevertheless,wecontendthattheplausibilityofeachdependsonitsintimateconceptualandnormativerelationwiththeother.Evenmore,weassumethatthedefense
andexpansionofacquiredlibertiesrestsonthefurtherdemocratizationoftheinstitutionsofmoderncivilsocietyandontheirachievementofgreaterinfluenceoverthe
polity.Weshalldemonstratethisthesisbyexploringtheconceptsofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrightsintheframeworkofthetheoryofdiscourseethicsandby
establishingtheconnectionofbothtoacoherentconceptionofamodern,andpotentiallydemocratic,civilsociety.

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Fortunately,wearenotspeakinginavoid.TheconnectionbetweenthetwoprincipleshasbeenmadebymanycontemporarycollectiveactorsintheWestandinthe
Eastwhohaveputtheprojectofthedefenseand/ordemocratizationofcivilsocietyontheirpoliticalagendas.
3
By"civilsociety,"theseactorshaveinminda
normativemodelofasocietalrealmdifferentfromthestateandtheeconomyandhavingthefollowingcomponents:(1)Plurality:families,informalgroups,and
voluntaryassociationswhosepluralityandautonomyallowforavarietyofformsoflife(2)Publicity:institutionsofcultureandcommunication(3)Privacy:adomain
ofindividualselfdevelopmentandmoralchoiceand(4)Legality:structuresofgenerallawsandbasicrightsneededtodemarcateplurality,privacy,andpublicity
fromatleastthestateand,tendentially,theeconomy.Together,thesestructuressecuretheinstitutionalexistenceofamoderndifferentiatedcivilsociety.
Therediscoveryofthekeycomponentsofcivilsocietybycontemporarycollectiveactors,however,doesnotinitselfimplyitsnormativejustification.Theprojectsof
socialmovementsarehardlyselfvalidating.Furthermore,thenormativeidealsofcivilsocietyarenotwithouttheircritics.Aswehaveseen,HannahArendtand
MichelFoucaulthaveeachmadepowerfulargumentsattackingtheseclaims.
4
ForArendt,thedifferentiationofasocialrealmdistinctfromthestatewasthebeginning
ofafatefuldepoliticizationofsociety,leadingtothecollapseoftheboundarybetweenpublicandprivateandtheemergenceofbothmasssocietyandtotalitarianism.
ForFoucault,theverynormsofcivilsocietyconstitutedonlythevisiblesupportoflessobvioussocialdisciplinesandmicrotechnologiesthatcombineintoanewand
seamlesssystemofbondage.Weshouldremember,too,thattheyoungMarx,theforerunneroftheseviews,producedpowerfulargumentsforequatingcivilwith
bourgeoissocietyandtheseparationofstateandsocietywithpoliticalalienation.
5
Iftheseandothercriticsofthenormsofcivilsocietyaretobeanswered,itmustbe
onthebasisofanew,comprehensive,andjustifiablepracticalpoliticalphilosophy.Itisourcontentionthatdiscourseethics,suitablyreinterpreted,isthebestcandidate
toaccomplishthistask.
Admittedly,thetheoryofdiscourseethicsalsohasitsdifficulties.First,thereissomequestionwhetheritsdomainofapplicationis

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morality,politics,orboth.Second,ithasbeenarguedthatthetheoryhasauthoritarianimplications.Third,itisuncertainwhetherdiscourseethicscanmakegenuine
universalclaimswithoutprescribingaparticularformoflife.Finally,therelationofdiscourseethicstodemocraticandliberalinstitutionshasneverbeensatisfactorily
elaborated.
Wehopetoshowthatitispossibletoarticulateplausibleresponsestoalloftheseissues.Weshalldosoinfivesteps.BeginningwithadiscussionofHabermas'smost
detailedversionofdiscourseethics,wefirstconsidertheproperobjectdomainofthetheory.Wethenarguethat,whensuitablyreinterpreted,discourseethicsavoids
authoritarianimplications.Inordertomakethispoint,wereplace"generalizableinterests"with"rationalcollectiveidentity"asthelegitimatesubstantivereferentof
formaldiscursiveprocedures.Next,wefocusontherelationshipofdiscourseethicstoconcreteformsoflife(Sittlichkeit).Wegoontoarguethatwhilenosingle
modelofthegoodlifefollowsfromdiscourseethics,thisneednotmeananinsolubleinstitutionaldefectforthetheory.Itisinthiscontextthatthecategoryofcivil
societyallowsustobringtogetherapluralityofformsoflifewithapoliticalmodelthatimpliestheinstitutionalizationofdiscourses.Specifically,welinkdiscourseethics
andmoderncivilsocietythroughthecategoriesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrights.Finally,weshalltrytoshowthatourreinterpretationofdiscourseethicshas
theutopianhorizonofwhatweshallcalla"pluralityofdemocracies."
TheObjectDomainofDiscourseEthics
Thebasicframeworkofdiscourseethicsconsistsoftwodimensions.
6
Thefirstspecifiestheconditionsofpossibilityforcomingtolegitimaterationalagreementthe
secondspecifiesthepossiblecontents(onaformallevel)ofsuchanagreement.
7
Alegitimateorrationalprocedureforcomingtoanagreementhasbeendefinedby
Habermasasthemetanormthatprescribestheonlyvalidprocedureforgroundingorjustifyingnormsofaction.
8
Nonormisassumedfromtheoutsettobevalid
onlytheprocedureforvalidatingnormscanmakesuchaclaimlegitimate.AccordingtoHabermas,anormofactionhasvalidityonlyifallthosepossiblyaffectedbyit

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(andbythesideeffectsofitsapplication)would,asparticipantsinapracticaldiscourse,arriveata(rationallymotivated)agreementthatsuchanormshouldcomeinto
orremaininforce.
9
Whatistobeunderstoodasrationallymotivatedagreement,however,hasratherdemandingpreconditions.Inorderthatallthoseaffectedhave
an"effectiveequalityofchancestoassumedialogueroles,"theremustbeamutualandreciprocalrecognition,withoutconstraint,ofeachbyallasautonomous,rational
subjectswhoseclaimswillbeacknowledgedifsupportedbyvalidarguments.
10
But,inorderthatthedialoguebecapableofproducingvalidresults,itmustbeafully
publiccommunicativeprocessunconstrainedbypoliticaloreconomicforce.Itmustalsobepublicintermsofaccess:Anyonecapableofspeechandaction,whois
potentiallyaffectedbythenormsunderdispute,mustbeabletoparticipateinthediscussiononequalterms.Furthermore,theparticipantsmustbecapableofaltering
thelevelofdiscourseinordertobeinapositiontochallengetraditionalnormsthatmaybetacitlypresupposed.
11
Inotherwords,nothingcanorshouldbetaboofor
rationaldiscoursenotthepreservesofpower,wealth,tradition,orauthority.Inshort,theproceduralprinciplesunderlyingthepossibilityofarrivingatarational
consensusonthevalidityofanorminvolvesymmetry,reciprocity,andeflexivity.
12
Thesefeaturesconstitutean"idealspeechsituation,"inwhichthevalidityclaimsimplicitlyraisedinanyactofcommunicationcanbediscursivelyredeemed.Itshould
bestatedattheoutset,however,thatatheoryoflegitimacyshouldnotbeconfusedwithatheoryoforganization.Ifweviewthemuchdisputedconceptof"ideal
speechsituation"asasetofcriteria(metanorms)thatenableonetodistinguishbetweenlegitimateandillegitimatenorms,wecanavoidtheconfusioncausedby
interpretationsthatidentifytheformalrulesofargumentivespeechordiscourseasaconcreteutopia.The"idealspeechsituation"referssolelytotherulesparticipants
wouldhavetofollowiftheyweretostriveforanagreementmotivatedbytheforceofthebetterargumentalone.Iftheseconditionsarenotmetif,forexample,
actorsinadebatedonothaveequalchancestospeakortochallengeassumptionsiftheyaresubjecttoforceormanipulationthenparticipantsarenottakingall
otherargumentsseriouslyasargumentsandhencetheyarenotreallyengaginginargumentativespeech.

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Clearly,notallprocessesofcomingtoanagreementsatisfysuchconditions.Habermas(andKarlOttoApel)repeatedlydistinguishbetween"rational"and"empirical"
consensus.Mostprocessesofconsensusformationare"onlyempirical."
13
Thenormsofdiscoursethatarethesourceofvalidityarenotproducedbyagreements
rather,theyaretheconditionsofpossibilityofvalidagreements.Theresultsofactualagreementscarrynormativevalidityonlytotheextentthattheyareconsistentwith
themetanorms.Ontheotherhand,andsomethinkparadoxically,Habermasinsistsonanactualratherthanavirtualdialoguebecauseonlyanactuallycarriedout
discourseallowsanexchangeofrolesofeachwitheveryactorandhenceagenuineuniversalizationofperspectivethatexcludesnoone.
14
Hetherebydistinguishes
himselffromallapproachesthatassumeagreementtofollowfrommonologicallyattainabletruthaswellasfrommosttraditionsofcontracttheory(whichpostulatea
discursivemodelonlyintermsofamythoforigins).Onlyanactual,practicaldiscoursecooperativelyengagedinbyallparticipantspotentiallyaffectedbythenorm
underdiscussioncanleadtoarationalconsensusonitsvalidity,foronlyundersuchconditionscanweknowthatwe,together,andnotprivately,areconvincedabout
something.Themetanormsofdiscourseethicsarethuspeculiarinthesensethattheirnormativeimplicationsareavailableonlyincontextsofactualdialogue.
Accordingly,HabermashasreformulatedtheKantiancategoricalimperativealonglinescompatiblewiththeproceduralrulesofargument:"Insteadofprescribingtoall
othersasvalidamaximthatIwilltobegenerallaw,Ihavetooffermymaximtoeveryonewiththeaimofdiscursivelytestingitsclaimtouniversalizability.The
emphasisshiftsfromwhateachcanwillwithoutcontradictiontobeagenerallaw,towhatallcanwillinagreementtobeauniversalnorm."
15
Theideaofarationalconsensus,however,involvesmorethantheactualparticipationofeveryaffectedpersonintherelevantdiscussion.Inadditiontoaprocessof
consensualwillformation,ourassertionthatanormislegitimatemeansthatweholdittoberightandnotmerelyconformabletoourcollectivewill.Habermasinsists
thatdiscourseethics,likeallcognitivistethics,assumesthatclaimstonormativevalidityhavecognitivemeaningandcanbehandled,

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withcertainadjustments,likecognitivetruthclaims.
16
Thefactualrecognitionofanormbyacommunitymerelyindicatesthatthenormcouldbevalid.Itsvaliditycan
beascertainedonlyifwemakeuseofa''bridgeprinciple"thatestablishesaconnectionbetweentheprocessofwillformationandthecriteriaforjudgingthe
acceptabilityofaparticularnorm.TheUnparteilichkeitofjudgmentmustcomplementtheUnbeinflussbarkeitofcollectivewillformation.
17
Inelaboratingthissecondaspectofdiscourseethics,Habermasaddressesthedimensionofcontentalludedtoabove.Thisbringsustothesecondaspectofdiscourse
ethics:theformalcontentofagreements.Habermasmaintainsthatinordertobeobjective(unparteilich),rational,andlegitimate,normsofactionuponwhichwe
agreemustexpressageneralizableinterest:
18
Everyvalidnormmustsatisfythefollowingcondition"Allaffectedcanaccepttheconsequencesandthesideeffectsthat
itsgeneralobservancecanbeanticipatedtohaveforthesatisfactionofeveryone'sinterests(andtheseconsequencesarepreferredtothoseofalternativepossibilities
forregulation)."
19
This"principleofuniversalization"requiresactualdiscoursesifthoseaffectedaretobeabletodiscernwhatallcanagreetorecognizeasauniversal
norm.
ThusfarwehavesimplysummarizedHabermas'sformulationofdiscourseethics.Asseveralcriticshaverecentlypointedout,however,thestatusorobjectdomainof
thetheoryisunclear.
20
Ontheonehand,HabermasclearlyconsidersittobeauniversalisticmoraltheoryintheKantiantradition.Ontheotherhand,healsopresents
discourseethicsastheheartofatheoryofdemocraticlegitimacyandthecoreofauniversalistconceptionofhumanrightsthatprovidealternativestotraditionaland
neocontractariantheories.Tomakemattersevenmorecomplicated,Habermashasarguedthat,asaprincipleoflegitimacy,discourseethicscanresolvetheapparent
riftbetweenlegalityandmoralitybyrevealingthepoliticalethicunderlyinglaw.
21
Hispurposeistoaccountforthelinkbetweenmoralityandlegalityinawaythat
unlikeMarxistapproaches,whichseektoabolishthedistinctionbetweenthetwopresupposestheirdifferencebutneverthelessadjustsformallawtomoral
principles.Thefirstquestiontoaddress,then,iswhatexactlyistheobjectdomainofdiscourseethics?Isitatheoryofmorality,oratheoryofpoliticallegitimacy?Can
itbeboth?

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Weintendtodefenddiscourseethicsasapoliticalethicsandasatheoryofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrights.Weholdthatitprovidesastandardwith
whichwecantestthelegitimacyofsociopoliticalnorms.Termssuchas"publicdialogue,""generalinterests,"''allthoseaffected,"and"socialnorms"doinfactevoke
thecategoriesofpoliticalphilosophy.Thetheorybecomesunnecessarilyoverburdenedwhenpresentedasmorethanthis.Indeed,thetwomostsignificantobjections
thathavebeenraisedagainsttheabilityofdiscourseethicstoserveasamoraltheoryfocusonthosedimensionsthatmakeitaplausiblecandidateforatheoryof
democraticlegitimacy,namely,thereformulatedprincipleofuniversalizationandtherequirementofanactualdialogue.
22
Wewanttobracketthequestionofwhich
generaltheoryworksbestintherealmofautonomousmoraljudgment.Webelieveitisnonethelesspossibletodefenddiscourseethicsasapoliticalethicwithout
committingoneselftoaspecificmoralphilosophy.
Thismeansthatweconstruetheprojectofdiscourseethicsasanattempttoemploytheinsightsofdeontologicalethicaltheoryprimarilyagainstlegalpositivismand
legalrealismaswellasagainstsystemstheoryoftheLuhmanntype.Thetask,inshort,istoshowthatthereisanormativeandrationallydefensiblecomponentof
legalityandpoliticsthat,independentofsanctionsorempiricalmotives,accountsfortheobligatorydimensionoflegalnormsandthelegitimacyofasociopolitical
system.
Differentiatingbetweenageneralmoraltheoryandatheoryofpoliticallegitimacy,however,leavesuswithakeyquestion:Howdoesonedrawtheboundarybetween
thetwo?Itisnotsufficienttostatethatmoralityentailstheindividualreflectionsofamoralconsciencewhereasjusticeconcernssocialnormsandrequiresareal
dialogue,forbothmoralityandlegalityrelatetosocietalnorms,andtheissueathandispreciselythereachoflawwithrespecttothesenorms.Norarethoseattempts
convincingthattrytodrawtheboundarybetweenthetwobydesignatingcertainspheresoflifeasprivatebydefinitionandofflimitstolawandothersaspublicand
thusopentolegalnormativeregulation.Inourview,thisapproachcannotwork,forasociety'sunderstandingoftheinstitutionalarrangementsandrelationsthatshould
besetbeyondjusticeandlefttoindividualjudgmentchangesovertime.Moreover,thedesignation"private"withregardtoinstitutionsand

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relationsdoesnotexemptthemfromsatisfyingthedemandsofjusticebut,rather,impliesadifferentformoflegalnormativeregulation.
23
Onecannotreasonfroma
spatialmetaphorordivisionamonginstitutionstodesignatetheboundarybetweenprivateandpublic,betweenwhatshouldbelefttothemoralchoiceorpersonal
judgmentofindividualsandwhatshouldbelegallyregulated.Instead,wemuststartfromtheassumptionthatprivacyattachestotheindividualincertaincapacities(as
anautonomousmoralsubject),regardingcertainchoices(thoseimpingingonidentityneeds),andwithintheframeworkofcertainrelations(friendship,intimacy)that
wemustbereadytoanalyzeandgiveargumentsfor.Indeed,theprivateandeventheintimate"spheres"havealwaysbeenconstitutedandregulatedbylaw,evenif
whatisconstitutedincludesadomainofautonomousjudgmentthatcancomeintoconflictwithlaw.Thus,weinsistonretainingtheanalyticdistinctionbetween
betweenadomainofautonomousmoralreflectionorjudgmentandadomainoflegalnorms,butwerejectanyattempttosetupaonetoonecorrespondence
betweenthisdistinctionandspheresoflifeorsetsofinstitutions.Rather,lawmustbeselflimitingwithrespecttotheautonomousjudgmentofindividuals,providedthat
thisdoesnotentailtheviolationofbasicprinciplesofjustice.Privacyrightsoperatepreciselyinthismanner,althoughjustwhatcontentfallswithintheprotectionofa
righttoprivacyis,ofcourse,opentodebateandrevision.
Fromtheotherside,ourinterpretationofdiscourseethicsasatheoryofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrightspresupposesthesociologicalinsightconcerningthe
positivizationoflawandthecorrespondingseparationbetweenthespheresoflegalityandmorality.Yetourversionofthetheoryrejectstheviewthatthetotal
denormatizationofpoliticsorlawandthedepoliticizationofmoralityaretheinevitableconsequencesofthisprocess.Howcanthisapparentparadoxberesolved?
ItisclearlyHabermas'sview(andours)thatthedevelopmentofautonomousuniversalistmoralityaswellastheemergenceofaformal,differentiatedsystemof
positivelawmustbeseenasimmensehistoricalachievements.Thesedevelopments,moreover,arelinkedtotheemergenceofspecificallymodernconceptionsof
democracyandrights,representingtheconstitutiveconditionsof

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amodernversionofcivilsociety.Thereis,however,anothersidetothisprocess:Theuncouplingofpositivelegalnormsfromthebodyofprivatemoralitybasedon
principlesthataccompaniedtheemergenceofconstitutionalstatesandcapitalistmarketeconomiesentailsapotentialconflictbetweentheloyaltyofthecitizentothe
abstractrulesofthelegalsystem(whicharevalidonlyforthearea"pacified"byaparticularstate)andthe"cosmopolitanismofthehumanbeing"whosepersonal
moralitymakesgeneralclaims.
24
Evenmoreimportant,eversincethedeclineofmodernnaturallawtheoriesandtheriseoflegalpositivism,theclaimthatlawshave
normativecontentbeyondthecorrectnessoftheappropriatelegislativeandlegalprocedures,thattheyarebindingindependentlyofrelevantsanctions,hasbeen
repeatedlydisputed.Thedifferentiationbetweenlegalityandmoralityhasinvolvedboththeseparationofpoliticsfromtheeverydaylifeofcitizensandthe
denormatizationoflegalityitself,atleastaccordingtoagooddealoflegaltheorysincethenineteenthcentury.
25
Moreover,whenlawisunderstoodasthewillorcommandofthesovereign(Hobbes,Austin),andwhenconstitutionsandfundamentalrightsaredeclaredtobeonly
specialinstancesofpositivelaw,theresultsgobeyondtheseparationofmoralityandlaw.Ineffect,legalpositivismannouncesthedenormatizationoflaw,its
transformationintoaclassofempiricalfacts.Obligationisturnedintoprudentbehaviorinthefaceofpossiblesanctions.Evenwithinlegalpositivism(H.L.A.Hart),
suchextremeresultsareoftenrejectedandtheideasoflawascommandandobligationascalculationhavebeendecisivelyrefuted.Nevertheless,itishardtoseehow
aconceptionoflawasasystemwhosepurelylegaltermsneedberelatedonlytooneanotherandsatisfyonlydemandsofconsistency(Kelsen)orvalidityintermsof
a"secondary"legalorder(Hart)canleadtoanythinglikeagenuinepoliticalethicscapableofgroundinglegalorpoliticallegitimacy.Thisisevenhardertoseeinthe
caseoftheviewthatreduceslawtosociologicalpredictionsaboutwhatcourts,legislatures,communities,andpoliticalofficialsorotherholdersofpowerwillwishto
enforcewithsanctions(legalrealismsomeversionsofcriticallegalstudies).
InhisdebatewithWeberandLuhmannconcerningthefoundationoflegalrationaldomination,Habermashasrepeatedly

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pointedtotheimpossibilityofderivingthelegitimacyofamodernlegalsystemasawholesolelyfromtheformalityandsystematicnatureoflegalprocedures.
26
Law
aslegitimateauthorityrestsonextralegalsourcesofjustification.Referencestoconstitutionsastheultimatesourceofauthority,atleastonthepartofformally
democraticstates,impliesthatthelegitimacyoflawisultimatelyparasiticontheprinciplesofdemocracyandbasicrightsembodiedinconstitutionsandinthe
democraticprocessallegedlybehindthedevelopmentofconstitutions.Theprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrightsunderlietheauthorityoflaw.These
principles,however,cannolongerbedefendedassacred,"selfevidenttruths,"astheywerebothintheoriesofnaturallawandinrepublicantheoriesofcivicvirtue.
Thetaskofdiscourseethicsistoprovideacontemporaryequivalentofsuchtheorieswhileavoidingtheirpresuppositions.Thus,theprinciplesofdemocracyitjustifies
mustnotbeseenasgiven,onceandforall,butastheoutcomesofanoriginalandrepeatablecommunicativeprocessthatascertainsthegeneralityofadmissiblenorms
andthediscursiveredeemabilityofthevalidityclaimswithwhichtheyappear.
Weproposetodefinelegalityintermsoftheoldreferencetoformalsanctionsthatpotentiallyinvoketheexecutiveandjudicialpowersofthemodernstateonbehalf
ofvalidnorms.Moralrulescannotcalluponsuchenforcement.Accordingly,discourseethicsasweseeitwouldapplytothelegalandpoliticalsystemasawhole,as
wellastoparticularcomplexesoflegalnormsthatdependbothonsanctionsandontheinterpretationandcomplianceofthoseconcerned.Inthefirstinstance,we
reinterpretdiscourseethicsasaprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyinthesecond,aspartofatheoryofbasicrightsthatcanbeinstitutionalized.Asweshallshow,
thesetwodimensionsofdiscourseethicsimplyaprovinceofautonomousmoraljudgmentthatisbeyonditsreachbutnonethelessisitspresuppositionandmustbe
guaranteedbybasicrights.Letusfirstaddressthislatterissue.
Weareassumingthatdiscourseethicspertainstothesphereoflegalityintwointerdependentyetdistinctdimensions:democraticlegitimacyandbasicrights.Eachof
thesedimensionstouchesonmorality.However,evenifwecansayempiricallywherelegalitybeginsandautonomousjudgmentendsbyreferringtoformal

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sanctions,wehavenotyettouchedonthenormativequestionofwheretheseboundariesoughttobe.Ofcourse,allmoderncivilsocietiesdrawaboundarybetweena
realmofautonomousjudgmentandwhatcanbelegallyregulated,buttheydrawtheseboundariesatdifferentplaces.Incaseofdisputes,theissueisinevitablywhether
theboundariesshouldbedrawnfromthepointofviewoflegalityorindividualjudgment,publicdiscourseorprivatemoralreflection.Inouropinion,insuchcases
discourseethicsmustbeconsideredsuperiortoanymonologicallyattainedmoralstandpoint,atleastinthefirstinstance.Thisissobecauseonlyinanactualdiscussion
witheveryonepotentiallyaffectedbyalegalnormcanwefindoutwhat,ifanything,iscommontousall,whatshouldbethedomainoflegalregulation,whatformsof
politicaldecisionmakingarelegitimate,whatshouldbelefttotheautonomoussubject'spersonaljudgment,andwhatmustbecompromisedwith.Inotherwords,itis
onlyafterdebatableissueshavebeenpubliclydiscussedthatwecandecidewhichmustbeconsidered"private,"thatis,lefttotheautonomousjudgmentofthe
individualtodeterminewithrespecttoapersonalidealofthegoodlife.
27
Discourseethicsthushasadoublestatus:Itsspecificobjectdomaincomprisesinstitutionalizedsocialrelations,thelegalandpoliticalsystemasawhole,andparticular
lawsandrights.Italsoprovidesawaytodecidetheboundaryquestionbetweenautonomousindividualjudgmentandjustice.Tobesure,theboundariesdrawnfrom
thepointofviewofactualdiscursiveprocessesmaynotbeacceptablefromthestandpointofthemoralconvictionsoridentityneedsofindividualsorgroups.A
majoritymightseektolegallyregulateareasofdecisionmakingthathavepreviouslybeenconstruedasprivateandthataminoritydoesnotwanttodelivertosuch
regulation.Conscientiousobjectionandcivildisobediencearelegitimateoptionsfromthemoralpointofview.Theyshouldberespectedaseffortstoacknowledge
publiclydrawnboundarieswhileattemptingtocircumventorchangethemfromthepointofviewofanunusuallyintenseconcern.However,inthesecases,theclaims
ofjusticehavepriorityinthefollowingsense:Onecannotbecompelledtorenounceone'swayoflife,identity,ormoralconvictions,andyetthemoralconsciousness
thatdoesn'twanttobe

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unjustmustbeselflimitinginthatitmustaccepttheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrightsprovidedthattheseareselflimitinginturn.Inotherwords,they
mustprotectthespaceforarticulatingdifference.Thismeansthat,inthecaseofconflictbetweenconceptionsofthegoodlifeandlegality,itshouldnotbedeemed
unethicalfortheindividualtofollowhisorhermoralconscienceorjudgmentandtoactaccordingly.Butonemust,nonetheless,actunderthedictatesofselflimitation.
Withintheframeworkofademocraticconstitutionalpolity,amorallylegitimateviolationoflawpresupposestheacknowledgmentofconstitutionalprinciples,
acceptanceofthedemocraticorder,andasymbolicorientationoftheactiontowardinfluencingpublicopinionanddevelopinganewnormativeconsensus.
28
The
legalresponsetosuchactionoughttobeabletodistinguishitfromcommoncriminalityandthusavoidbeingoverlyharsh.
29
Allprincipledactsofdisobedience,from
individualactsofconsciencetotacticsofsocialmovements,restontheseideas.
Thus,ourinterpretationdoesnotcollapsetheboundarybetweenmoralityandlegality.Onthecontrary,itpreservesarealmofautonomousjudgmentfortheindividual.
Atthesametime,itprotectspositivelawfromthepotentiallyincapacitatinginterferenceofabsolutemoraljudgmentswithouttherebydeliveringitintothehandsoflegal
positivists.Indeed,oncewerestricttherelevanceofdiscourseethicstoquestionsofdemocraticlegitimacyandrights,itleavesroomforavarietyofmoralprinciples,
culturalvalues,andwaysoflife.Withouthavingtojudgetheinternaladequacyofanyofthese,discourseethicsadjudicatesbetweenthemonlyincasesofconflictover
generalsocietalnorms.Thus,theautonomyofconscienceandthepluralityofwaysoflifearerespectedbytheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrights,
eventhoughthelatterbringprinciplestobearonthedomainsoflawandpolitics.Althoughinthiscase,too,processesofdiscursivewillformationdecidetheboundary
between"private"and"public,"theycannotentirelyabolishtheprivate(understoodhereasthedomainofautonomousindividualmoralchoiceorjudgment).
Themetanormsofdiscoursethemselvespresuppose,eveniftheycannotground,theautonomyoftheindividualmoralconscience.

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Ifallpersonsaffectedhavethechancetoassumedialogueroles,ifthedialoguemustbeunconstrained,ifeachindividualcanshiftthelevelofdiscourse,andif
everyonecanarticulatetheirneedinterpretations,thenpracticaldiscoursepresupposesautonomousindividualswiththecapacitynotonlytobeselfreflectiveregarding
theirownvaluesbutalsotochallengeanygivennormfromaprincipledstandpoint.Theprocessesnecessaryfortherequisitesocializationofindividualswouldbe
impossiblewithoutinstitutionalizingmoralautonomyandthemutualrecognitionofdifferencesecuredbyrights.
Thus,theveryrulesthatunderlieargumentandthecooperativesearchforconsensusimplythedistinctionbetweenmoralityandlegality.Byarticulatingthemetanorms
oftheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyandsomekeyrights,discourseethicspresupposesthejustificationfortheautonomyofthemoralsphereand,asitwere,its
ownselflimitation.Thereisyetanotherreasonforthis.Noconsensus,nomatterhowunanimousorlonglasting,canknowitselftobepermanent,forthereisno
automaticcoincidencebetweenthejustandthemoral,betweenwhatisdeemednormativelyrightatanygiventimeforasolidarycommunityandwhatisalways
morallyacceptabletoeachindividual.Evenifthelegalnormhassurvivedthemostidealprocessofdiscursivetesting,itmayyetconflictwiththeparticularvaluesor
identityrequirementsofanindividual.Neithermoralautonomynorindividualidentitycanbesacrificedtothecollectiveidentityorconsensusofagroup,becausethis
wouldviolatetheveryraisond'treofdiscourseethics:toprovideaformalprincipleforthelegitimacyofnormsinasocietythatispluralandcomposedofindividuals
withdistinctanddifferentconceptionsofthegoodlife.Eveninasituationthatcloselyapproximatestherequirementsofsymmetricreciprocity,thereisnobasisfor
assumingeithertheabsenceofdifferenceortheabsenceofchange.Everyconsensusis,afterall,onlyempiricalandmustbeopentochallengeandrevision.
30
From
thestandpointofjustice,wecannotknowthattoday'svaluechangeonthepartofaminorityofindividualsmightnotbecometomorrow'sgeneralwill.Thus,individual
judgment,differingwaysoflife,andexperimentswithnewwaysmustbegrantedautonomyfromthecurrentconsensusonwhatisjust.

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Onemightnonethelessobject,fromthepointofviewofamoralconsciousness,thataseparatetheoryofethicsfortherealmoflawandpoliticsisunnecessary.Asa
moralsubject,Iobeythelawbecauseitisright,andwhenitbecomesmorallywrongtodoso,Iwouldhavetodisobeythelaw,whatevertheconsequencestomyself.
Moralityiscertainlywiderthanlegalityfrombothobjectiveandsubjectivepointsofview.Formallawcannotregulateeverydomainofaction,whereas,fromthe
subjectivepointofview,moralityoughtto.Themoralconsciousnesscouldgrantthenecessityoflawandsanctionsbecausewearenotgods,notalwaysmoral,and
thusneedexternalconstraintincertaincases.Butifthemoralcomponentoflawisequivalenttowhatthemoralreflectionsofanindividualactorcouldarriveat,then
thereisnoneedforaseparateethicaltheoryforpolitics.Whydevelopadiscourseethicsatall?
Thereare,inthemoderncontext,tworeasonswhywecannotmovedirectlyfrommoralitytolegalityorresynthesizethem,asitwere.First,asiswellknown,we
modernsliveinapluralmoraluniversethepluralityofvaluesystems,modesoflife,andidentitieswouldbeviolatediflawsorpoliticaldecisionsweremadefromthe
pointofviewofanyofthem.Everygoodliberalthuscanargueagainstmakinganysinglemoralstandpointabsoluteforthewholeofsociety.Todosowouldlead
eithertosubjugatingindividualdignityandrightstotheconcernsofgeneralwelfareortoviolatingtheintegrityofthosewhodonotsharetheparticularconceptofthe
goodlifethathasbecomedominant.Notallaction,notevenallmoralaction,canoroughttobeinstitutionallyregulated.
Thesecondandmorecompellingreasonwhywecannotequatetheobligatorydimensionofsocial/politicalnormswithwhatmotivateseventhepostconventionalmoral
actoristhatthegenesisoflegality,unlikemorality,canandmustinvolveinprincipleactualdiscourse.Tobesure,Habermashimselftendstoconflatemoralityand
legalitybecauseherightlyseesthatmoraltestinginvolvesaninnerdialoguetowhichtherulesofargumentapply.
31
Itwouldthusseempossible,ifonefollowedthese
rulesandconsideredthepotentialsideeffectsofamaximonallothers,thatonecouldarriveatthesamejudgmentthatanactualdiscoursewouldyield.Thecore
differencebetweenvirtualandactualdialoguewould,nonetheless,remain:Onlyanactualdialogueinwhichallconcernedcan

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participateonequaltermsofmutualrecognitionwouldinvolveareversalofperspectivesandyieldorreaffirmawe,asolidarycollectivity,havingacollectiveidentity
andthecapacityforarticulatingageneralorcommoninterest.AsHannahArendtpointedoutlongago,onlyinapublicspacecanapublicopinionmerge.Evenifone
imaginedanidealmoralsubject,abletoconsiderallthepossibleargumentsofeveryoneinvolved,theoutcomewouldnotautomaticallyconvergewiththepolitical
judgmentofadulyconstitutedpublic,becausetherelevant,emergentcollectiveidentitywouldbemissing.Atbest,anidealized,selfreflectivemoraljudgmentcould
implytoleranceofothersandofdifferentarguments,butitcouldnotyieldorreaffirmthesolidarityofacollectivityoranunderstandingofwhatourcollectiveidentityis
and,flowingfromthis,whatourgeneralinterestsmightbe.This,however,istheobjectdomainofinstitutionalizednorms.Norwouldityieldinsightintoperspectives
entirelydifferentfromourown,andthusthepossibilityofsolidaritywithdifferenceandthelimitsthisimpliesonnormativeregulationwouldbemissing.Indeed,itis
quitepossiblethatajudgmentcouldbemoralandyetnotbejust.Onourinterpretation,discourseethicsimpliesthatthejusticeofjustice,thelegitimacyandnormative
forceoflaw,derivesinprinciplefromdemocraticwillformationandthearticulationofageneralinterestinthenorm.Fromthepointofviewofmorality,alawimposed
byanenlighteneddespotmightbemoralaccordingtoeveryone'spersonalpointofview,anditmightevenarticulateageneralinterest(thecommongood).Yetand
thisisthelimittothestandpointofthemoralconsciousnessevenifitweremoral,evenifitweretocoincidewithwhatacommunitywouldhaveagreeduponasits
interest,itwouldnotbejust,forjusticerequiresthatthoseaffecteddeterminethisforthemselves,inadiscursiveprocessofcollectivewillformation.
Letussummarizetheargumentthusfar.(1)Thedivisionbetweenmoralityandlegalityisamajorandcharacteristicachievementofmodernity.(2)Discourseethics
providesthecoreofanormativetheoryofpoliticallegitimacyandofatheoryofrights,butitcannotserveasamoraltheoryinformingthechoicesofindividualsinall
areasoflife.(3)Weinterpretthemeaningofjusticealongthelinesofaconceptofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrights.Accordingly,

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theobjectdomainofdiscourseethicscomprisesinstitutionalizednormswithlegalsanctionsattached.(4)Discourseethicsgrantsautonomytoothermodesofmoral
reasoning.(5)Basedonthetheoryofcommunicativeaction,discourseethicsisabletoaccountfortheobligatoryaspectofsocialnormsthatisdistinctfromthe
attachedsanctions.(6)Politicalandlegalinstitutionscanbemaderesponsibletomoralinsightwithoutinvolvingthecollapseoflegalityandmorality.Indeed,in
constitutionaldemocracieswithcivilsocieties,theprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrightsalreadyaretheultimatesourceforjustifyingpoliticalnormsand
processes.
TheChargeofAuthoritarianism
Thechargeofauthoritarianism,leveledspecificallyagainstHabermas'sversionofdiscourseethics,contendsthatthefocusonrationalconsensusimpliesaJacobin
Bolsheviksuppressionofindependentwaysoflifeand,hence,ofcivilsociety.Weshallstartbyrefutingthischargeanddevelopingaversionofdiscourseethics
immunetoit.OurnextstepwillbetodenyanintrinsicconnectionbetweendiscourseethicsandanyspecificconcreteethosorSittlichkeit,whiledemonstratingthat
thisdoesnotleaveitmerelyformalisticorempty.Indeed,weshallarguethatdiscourseethicshasanelectiveaffinityforasocietalarrangementthatpermitsaplurality
ofwaysoflifetocoexist.Inthiswaywehopetoshowthat,amongtheversionsofcivilsociety,onlythemodernonesarerelevanttodiscourseethics.
ItseemsthattwoapparentlycontradictorychargeshavebeenmadeagainstHabermas'sdiscourseethics:authoritarianismontheoneside,andexcessiveformalismon
theother.Presumablythetwochargescouldbecombined:Eitherdiscourseethicsissoformalisticastohavenoinstitutionalconsequences,or,ifithas,theyinevitably
haveauthoritarianimplications.Weprefertodealwiththesechargesseparately,sincetheissuesinvolvedarecompletelydifferent.
Thechargeofauthoritarianismhasseveralvariants.ThefirstinvolvesablanketapplicationofHegel'scritiqueofKant,linkingabstractmoralityandterrortodiscourse
ethicsasawhole.Onthis

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level,theobjectionhasbeensuccessfullydispatchedbyAlbrechtWellmer.
32
Morespecificobjectionsdiscoveranauthoritarianpotentialintwoparticularsetsof
distinctionsmadebyHabermas:(1)between''empirical"and"rational"consensus,and(2)between"particular"and"universal"or"general"interests.Accordingto
RobertSpaeman,forexample,withthesedistinctions"theutopiangoalfortheabolitionofdominationservespreciselythelegitimationofthedominationofself
appointedenlighteners."
33
1.ItiscertainlyverywrongtoapplythisobjectiontoHabermas,asifhemerelybelongedtotheromantic,anticapitalistgenerationofMarxistsoftheearlytwentieth
century.Yetthedistinctionbetween"empirical"and"rational"consensus,ifinterpretedascallingfortheabolitionofoneforthesakeoftheother,indeedrecallsthe
classicalJacobinBolshevikcontemptforthemerelyempiricalpeopleorworkingclass.
Habermas,however,hasbeencarefultoavoidthisimplication.Evenafterrejectingthefullapplicabilityofapsychoanalyticmodelofreflectiontoacritiqueofsociety,
heholdsontotheassumptionthat"onlythetechniquesofdiscourse(shouldbeused)toestablishtheconditionsforbeginningpossiblediscourses."
34
Hegoesbeyond
thatmodelbyinsistingthat,inthediscoursewhosefunctionistoestablishorreestablishdiscourse,"therecanbeonlyparticipants,"becausenoonecanhave"a
privilegedaccesstotruth."
35
TheimplicationofHabermas'sargument,inotherwords,isnottoforciblyreplacetheconditionsofonetypeofdiscoursewiththoseof
anotherbuttoestablishnewformssidebysidewiththeoldonesandperhapstorevitalizeexistingformsofpubliclife.Indeed,Habermasexplicitlydeniesaprivileged
discourseofintellectualsorpoliticalorganizationsthatwouldplaya"leadingrole"withrespecttoempiricalprocessesofcommunication.
36
ItisAlbrechtWellmer,however,whogoesthefurthestinanantiauthoritariandirectionbyfranklyannouncingthatactualconsensusnecessarilymeansfactual
consensus.
37
How,then,canwetellwhenanempiricalconsensusisrational?Todoubttherationalityofanempiricalconsensusmeanseithertoproposespecific
counterargumentsortodoubttherationalityoftheparticipants.Thelatter,however,cannotbegraspedwiththehelpofthestructuralconditionsoftheidealspeech
situation.Thedoubt

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remainsanhypothesisthatcanbesustainedonlybycarryingoutanewdiscourseandarrivingatanewagreement:Theparticipantsmustrecognizetheirprevious
unreason.AsAgnesHelleraptlyputsit,thenormsofargument,togetherwiththeinsistenceonarealdialogueopentoall,implyademocraticprocessofwillformation
suchthatthegeneralwillcan,afterall,onlybethewillofall.
38
Evenifaconsensusistheproductofa"rationallyorganizedsociety"thatallowsforbothdiscourseand
dissentinitspublicspaces,wemaynotassumethattherationalityoftheprocedureguaranteestheabsolutetruthorrightnessoftheresult.Thetruthofnormscannot
beestablishedonceandforall.Thecontentofarationalconsensusisnotnecessarilytrueweconsiderittoberationalbecauseofproceduralnorms,truebecauseof
goodgroundsthatweofferinthediscussionandthatareacceptedassuch.
39
Butwecouldbemistakenor,toputitbetter,thekindsofreasonswearewillingto
acceptcanchangeovertime.Atbest,wecanarriveatarationalgroundingoftheconvictionoftruththatwemusttreatastruebutthatnonethelesswe,asreflective
moderns,mustconsidertobefallibleandopentonewarguments.Thus,theideaofarationalconsensusdoesnotmeantheattainmentofabsolutetruth.Thepossibility
ofagreeingonnormsinvolvesthepossibilityofrationaldisagreement!Inshort,arationalempiricalconsensus,theproductofdiscourse,isopentolearningand,of
course,todissent.
2.Ifthedistinctionbetweenrationalandempiricalconsensus(linkedtotheproceduraldimensionsofcollectivewillformation)canthusbeprotectedagainst
authoritarianimplications,thedistinctionbetweenparticularandgeneralinterests(tiedtotheprincipleofuniversalization)exposesHabermasoncemoretothese
charges,thistimewithregardtoissuesofcontentratherthanform.Asalreadyindicated,discourseethicsteststhevalidityofnormsaccordingtowhetherthey
articulategeneralizableinterests.Inbothearlyandrecentformulations,Habermasmaintainsthatdiscourseethicsbringsneedinterpretationsintodiscussionsofnorms,
sothataconstraintfreeconsensuspermitsonlywhatallcanwant.
40
Onlyifnormsexpressgeneralizableinterests,inadditiontobeingtheproductofageneralwillor
agreement,aretheybasedonarationalandtrueconsensus.However,giventhethesisthat,informallydemocratic,capitalist,classbasedsocieties,theresultsof

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empiricaldiscursiveprocessessuppress"generalizableinterests,"Habermashasrepeatedlyresortedtotheconditionallanguageofascription:"wouldagree""were
[they]toenterintoanunconstraineddiscourse,"etc.
41
Thestatushegivestosuchascriptionisonlythatofasocialscientifichypothesisthatrequirestestingand
confirmationinactualprocessesofpracticaldiscussion.Nevertheless,thetheoryisambiguousatthislevel.While''discursivelyredeemablenorms"oruniversalizable
generalinterestsmustbe"bothformedanddiscoveredinprocessesofpracticaldiscourse,"
42
Habermasalsoseemstoimplythat,strictlyspeaking,onlyfromthe
"perspectiveofthethirdperson,sayofthesocialscientist"couldthemodelofgeneralizableinterestsbeappliedcritically.Inearliertexts,Habermashasspokenof
"suppressedgeneralizableinterests"inordertorelatethetheorycriticallytothosesocialsystemsthatpreventtheconditionsnecessaryforpracticaldiscoursefrom
emerging.Theapparentlyobjectivevantagepointhepostulatesforsocialscience(thatofthenonparticipant"monologically"arrivingattruegeneralinterests)seemsto
correspondtotheoldLeninistorLukcsianpointofviewfordistinguishingbetween"real""universal"vs."false""empirical"particularinterests.Theambiguousstatus
oftheconceptofsuppressedgeneralizableintereststhusopensHabermastothechargeofauthoritarianism.
Onewaytoavoidthischargewouldbetoarguethatthemodelofgeneralizableinterestsisnotascentraltodiscourseethicsassomeinterpreters,includingHabermas
himself,havemaintained.Tobesure,Habermasinsiststhatthesatisfactionofinterestsneednotbeazerosumgame,andthatsomeinterestsinallsocietiesare,infact,
generalizable.Yetonecouldarguethatdiscourseethicscouldsurviveanempiricalsituationlargelytothecontrary.Assumingonlyparticularinterests,thediscourse
thatisneededforagreementontherulesoftheircoordinationcouldstillbeseenasanexpressionofthegeneral.Evenastablecompromiseneedsnormative
groundingandrestsonaconsensusastoitsbindingcharacter,whethertraditionalordiscursive.Habermashashadatendencytointerpretpluralityinindividualistic
terms,groupformsofpluralityasparticularistic,andcompromiseasstrategic.
43
Nevertheless,henowinsistsontheneedtodiscursivelymapouttheboundaries
betweengeneralityandplurality,consensusandcompromise,givingallofthesetermsacommunicativefoundation.
44

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Inhismostrecenttextonthetopic,
45
Habermashascorrectedhisearlierformulationinwhichcompromiseappearedtocorrespondtothefailureofcommunicative
action.Hestilldistinguishesbetweentheattemptbyallconcernedtoclarifywhatisacommoninterestandtheeffortofthoseseekingcompromisetostrikeabalance
betweenparticular,conflictinginterests.Buthehascometoseethatbindingcompromisealsorequiresspecificconditions.Participantsinabindingcompromise
assumethatafairbalancecanbeachievedonlyifallconcernedcanparticipateequally."Buttheseprinciplesofcompromiseformationinturnrequireactualpractical
discoursesforjustification."
46
Anonstrategicrelationtothestructureofcompromisethatinvolvesacceptingitsunderlyingnormativityisthesinequanonforstable
compromisestooccur.Therulesofthegamemustbetakenseriously.Ifthestructureofcompromiseitselfhasthecapacitytoobligate,itisthecommonconcernofall.
Thecommunicativefoundationsofcompromiseamongapluralityofparticularinterestscouldbemadestrongerifthetypicalcaseofa"rationalcomingtoan
agreement"wereinterpretedasthatofarationalargumentforapluralityofpointsofview,formsoflife,orintereststhatcouldleadtocompromise.Accordingto
Wellmer,theindexofparticularitythatattachestoallhumansituationsshouldbethoughtofnotasa"possiblelimitationtorationalselfdeterminationand
communication"butas"momentsofsituatedness"tobebroughtintotheconceptofreason."Exactlywhereunificationcannotbeattained,thereatleastallmusthave
thesamerighttogetahearingfortheirargumentsandtoparticipateindecisions."
47
Thus,generalityisattachednottothecontentofinterestsbuttothestructurethat
allowsalltoarticulatetheirparticularinterests,andthisiswhatleadstovalidandbindingcompromise.
Asseductiveasthissolutiontotheproblemsraisedbytheconceptionofgeneralinterestis,itisnotentirelycompelling.Indeed,Habermashasexplicitlyaddresseda
versionofthisargument,thatofErnstTugendhat,andrejectedit.Tugendhatattemptedtoequateargumentationwithprocessesofcollectivewillformationandto
excisethecognitivedimensionfromthetheoryofcommunicativeethics.
48
Onthebasisofthepositionthatevery

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"rationalagreement"isinfactanempiricalone,hearguesthattheissueissolelyoneofelaboratingprinciplesforequal,symmetricparticipationinactsofcollective
choice.Questionsofjustificationarenotrelevanthereactsofcollectivechoiceareactsofwill,notofreason.
Againstthisposition,Habermaspointsoutthatthepriceofexcisingthecognitivedimensionofdiscourseethicsisthatwearenolongerabletodistinguishthedefacto
socialacceptanceofanormfromitsvalidity.
49
Ifwereplacethe"Unparteilichkeit"ofjudgmentwiththe"Unbeinflussbarkeit"ofwillformation,wecannotsaywhy
eventheproductofaunanimouscollectivechoicewouldbebinding,ifnoprinciplebesidesamomentaryagreementunderliesit.Thisistheclassicobjectionagainst
theoriesofdemocraticwillformationandmajorityrule.Amereempiricalconsensusdoesnotinitselfproducelegitimateobligation.Nor,forthatmatter,isitstable.
Moreover,ithasnoauthoritativecharacterifitcanbechangedatwillandifitdependsonlyonourmomentaryagreement.Habermasthusrepeatshisstressonthe
centralityoftheideaofgeneralinteresttodiscourseethics.
TheinsistenceonthecognitivecomponentofnormsisalsomeantasthebasisforareplytotheinevitabledecisionismthatgenerallyaccompaniestheWeberianthesis
ofthewarofthegods,thatis,oftheirreduciblepluralityandevenirreconcilabilityofvaluesinmodernsocieties.Habermasmaintainsthatwecangiverationalgrounds
fortheintersubjectiverecognitionofvalidityclaimswithoutresortingtometaphysicsordogmatism.Thevalidityclaimsofnormsarenot,accordingly,locatedinthe
irrationalvolitionalactsofthecontractingpartiesbutina"rationallymotivatedrecognitionofnorms,whichcanbequestionedatanytime."
50
Thefactofpluralismneed
notmeanthatitisimpossibletoseparate,byarguments,generalizableinterestsfromthosethatareandremainparticular.Yetheinsiststhat"thecognitivecomponent
ofnormsisnotlimitedtothepropositionalcontentofthenormedbehavioralexpectations.Thenormativevalidityclaimisitselfcognitiveinthesenseofthesupposition,
howevercounterfactual,thatitcouldbediscursivelyredeemedthroughthegivingofreasonsandthegainingofinsightthatis,groundedinconsensusofthe
participantsthroughargumentation."
51

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Habermasconfusesseveraldistinctissues.Toinsistthatthecognitivecharacterofageneralinterestyieldsthevalidityofanormconfusesseveralmeaningsoftheterm
"cognitive."Itisonethingtoarguethattheprinciplesofargumentationcanprovideametanormtowhichparticipantscanappealintestingtheoutcomes(norms)ofan
existingempiricalconsensus.Itisquiteanothertolocatethestandardforthevalidityofnormsinaconceptofgeneralinterestthatis,byitsverynature,ascertainable
fromthesocialscientificorobserver'spointofview.Thelatterstrategyrevivesthenaturalisticfallacythatequatestheobjectivegeneralityofinterestswiththe
universalityofnorms.Indeed,Habermasseemstobeconfusingtwomeaningsof"rationality"thathehaselsewherepainstakinglydifferentiated.Therationalprocessof
comingtoanagreementinvolvesprinciplesofargumentationthatarecognitiveinthesensethatwecantestthemindiscourse.Nevertheless,theprocessesofraising
andarguingvalidityclaimswithrespecttotherightnessofanormisdistinctfromtherationalityorcognitivecharacteroftruthclaimsinvolvedinstatementsoffact.To
treatnormativevalidityclaimslikecognitivetruthclaimswouldbetoconfusetheobjectdomainsexploredbypracticalandbytheoreticaldiscourse,respectively.
Practicaldiscoursereferstoaworld(the"socialworld")experiencedandevenreconstructedintheperformativeattitude,thatis,theattitudeofparticipants.Itis
implicatedinadoublehermeneuticandalwaysdependsonthevalidityclaimsmadebytherelevantsocialactors.Theoreticaldiscourse,evenaboutsociety,requires
objectifyingthesocialactorsandtheiractions.Thelanguageofgeneralorgeneralizableinterestsistheoreticalinthissense.Itreplacestheopinionsofparticipants
aboutwhattheyneed,want,anddesirewithanobjectivejudgment(basedonananalysis)abouttheirinterests.Thus,Habermas'sstressonthecriterionofgeneral
interests,inresponsetoTugendhat'srenunciationoftherationalityclaimsembodiedinthemetanormsofargumentation,reliesonthewrongdiscursivetest.The
generalityoftheinterestsdoesnotyieldthevalidityofthenorm.Indeed,theideathatthelegitimacyofanormrestsonthefactthatitreflectsageneralinterestmakes
consensussuperfluous,foritimpliesthatbecausethenormreflectssuchaninterest(howeverthisisascertained),consensusonitsvalidityshould

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follow.Inshort,consensuswouldfollowvalidityratherthantheotherwayaround.
52
Tugendhat'sdenialthatthemetatheoreticalfoundationsofdiscoursehaveanyrelevanceandHabermas'sinsistenceontheconceptofgeneralinterestasastandardfor
testingthevalidityofnormsrepresenttwomistakensolutionstotheproblemofobligation.Theformerinvolvesarbitrarinessthelatter,objectivism.Tohiscredit,
Habermasisawareoftheembarrassmentfacedbyareflectivemodeofjustificationinthecontextofvaluepluralism,posttraditionallaw,andpostconventionalmoral
reasoning.Theviablepartofhisresponseishisinsistencethattheobjectivity(Unparteilichkeit)ofjudgmentisrootedinthestructureofargumentationitselfitisnot
broughtinasavaluefromtheoutsidebecausewehappentochooseit.
53
Althougheveryconsensuscanbeonlyempirical,thisdoesnotmeanthatweareleftwithan
arbitrarycollectivewill.Rationalgroundscanbegivennotforthetruthofvaluesperse,butfortheirincorporationintosociopoliticalnorms.Theprinciplesof
argumentationcanprovideametanorm(symmetricreciprocity)towhichparticipantscanappealintestingtheoutcomes(norms)ofanempiricaldialogue.The
rationalityofaconsensuscanbetestedbyreferringvalidityclaimsbacktothosemetaprinciplesthatalonecanmakeitvalidandobligatory.Thus,theprinciplesof
discoursethatimplyboththeconsiderationofeveryrationalargumentandtherespectofeveryonecapableofarguingallowustoarriveatwhatisnormativelyright.
ThisistheconvincingpartofHabermas'sposition.
Butthisstillleavesuncleartheroleoftheconceptof"generalinterest"andwhatthe"principleofuniversalization"addstotheprinciplesofargumentativeprocedureof
discourseethics.If"generalizableinterests"refersto"raw"needinterpretations,thentheobjectionfirstarticulatedbyHumeandrepeatedbyAgnesHellerthata
discussionaroundinterestsandneedscanonlybeinconclusivewouldbelegitimate.
54
Ontheotherside,wehavealreadyshownthatiftheconceptofgeneralinterest
referstotheobjectiveinterestsofagroup,thenthiscannotbeusedasthecriterionfortherightnessofnormswithoutauthoritarianimplications.
Nevertheless,theconceptofinterestisimportanttoourinterpretationofdiscourseethics.Wesuggestthattheterm"general

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interest"mustgiveway,orratherpriority,totheideaof"commonidentity."Insocietiescharacterizedbyapluralityofvaluesystems,modesoflife,andindividual
identities,discourseethicsprovidesawayofdiscoveringorreaffirmingwhat,ifanything,wewhocomeintocontactwithoneanotherandwhoareaffectedbythe
samepoliticaldecisionsandlawshaveincommon.Asstatedearlier,weaffirmandinpartconstitutethroughdiscoursewhoweare,andunderwhichruleswewishto
livetogether,apartfromourpersonalorparticularidentitiesanddifferencesthatis,whatourcollectiveidentityasmembersofthesamecivilsocietyis.Interpreted
inthisway,thediscoveryofgeneralizableinterestsindiscussionimpliessomethingprior,namelythat,despiteourdifferences,wehavediscovered,reaffirmed,or
createdsomethingincommonthatcorrespondstoageneralsocialidentity(whichisitselfopentochange).Apublicdiscussioncanshowusthat,afterall,wedohave
somethingincommon,thatweareawe,andthatweagreeonorpresupposecertainprinciplesthatconstituteourcollectiveidentity.Thesebecomedimensionsofthe
contentoflegitimatelegalnormsandthefoundationofsocialsolidarity.Thecollectiveidentityofacommunitycanthenprovidetheminimumcriterion,withrespectto
content,ofthelegitimacyofnormsinthenegativesenseasthatwhichcannotbeviolated.
Inhiswritingsonlegitimationproblems,Habermashasexplicitlystatedthattheclaimtolegitimacyisrelatedtothesocialintegrativepreservationofanormatively
determinedsocialidentity."Legitimationsservetomakegoodthisclaim,thatis,toshowhowandwhyexisting(orrecommended)institutionsarefittoemploy
politicalpowerinsuchawaythatthevaluesconstitutivefortheidentityofasocietywillberealized."
55
Socialintegration,socialsolidarity,andcollectiveidentityare
the"societal"(inHabermas'sterms,thelifeworld)referentsofnormativeclaimstopoliticallegitimacyonthepartofpolities.Whilethepoliticaladministrativesystem
cannotcreateidentity(ormeaning),itsclaimtolegitimacyinvolvesthenonviolationofcollectiveidentityandthereinforcementofsocialsolidarityandsocial
integration.
56
Onecouldobjectthatresortingtotheconceptofcollectiveidentitymerelytransposestoanotherleveltheproblemsmentionedearlierinvolvingtheconceptofgeneral
interests.What

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precludesagivencollectiveidentityfrombeingauthoritarian?Whoseinterpretationofgroupidentityistoprevail?Howcoulditbeanythingotherthanparticular,and
whymakeuniversalistclaimsforitsdefense?Theanswerliesinthepeculiaritiesofacollectiveidentitythathas,asacorecomponent,theprinciplesofdemocratic
legitimacyandrights.Theprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyimpliesthattheconditionsofjustificationtheproceduresandpresuppositionsofrationalagreement
themselvesobtainlegitimatingforceandbecomethelegitimatinggrounds(metanorms),replacingsuchmaterialprinciplesofjustificationasnatureorgod.
57
The
principleofdemocraticlegitimacyinvolvesalevelofjustificationthathasbecomereflexiveandaproceduralprinciplethatisuniversalizable.Thismeansthatthe
modernproceduralprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacypresupposesapostconventional,posttraditionalorientationtoourowntraditions,oratleasttothoseaspectsof
ourtraditionandcollectiveidentitythathavebecomeproblematic.Moreover,itimpliesthatonlythoseaspectsofourcollectiveidentityandcommontraditionthatare
compatiblewiththeprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrightscanprovidethecontentofvalidpoliticalnorms.Thefactthatdiscussionanddemocratic
principlesconstituteapartofourtraditionmilitatesagainsttheauthoritarianthrustoftheconceptofcollectiveidentity,becauseitmeansthatwecanacceptasvalid
inputsintosociopoliticalnormsonlythosedimensionsofourpoliticalculturethatdonotviolatethemetanormsofdiscursiveconflictresolution.
Letustrytoclarifyourargumentforreplacing"generalinterest"with"collectiveidentity"asthesubstantivereferentofaprocedurallydefineddiscourseethicsandthen
returntothisissue.Weproposeourinterpretationasanalternativetothreepositionsthatareunacceptablefordifferentreasons.First,thereisHabermas'sown
positionthatmakesgeneralizableintereststhecenterpieceofanewprincipleofuniversalization.Thisnecessarilymakesanobjectivecategoryonethatisopento
analysisfromthethirdpersonpointofviewthecoreofdiscursivewillformation,butithasunavoidableauthoritarianconsequencesthatHabermashimselfdoesnot
want.Second,thereistheoppositepositionthatbypassestheissueofgeneralizableinterestsbyidentifyingallconsensusas

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merelyempiricalandbymakingempiricalagreementitselfthegoalofdiscursiveprocedures.Theresultsofempiricalconsensusthenbecome,bydefinition,justicein
thepoliticalsense.WebelievethatHabermas'sobjectionstothisposition(instabilityandanextremevariabilityofresultsthatcouldleadtomoralskepticismsimilarto
thatoflegalpositivismand,especially,legalrealism)arecorrect.Athirdposition(suchasthatofKarlOttoApel)seekstobypasstheissueofgeneralizableinterests
byinsistingonrational(ratherthanempirical)consensusasanendinitself.Thosewhoengageinargument,accordingtothisinterpretation,mustseektoinstitutionalize
andspreadtheinstitutionalizationofrationaldiscourseinordertoavoidperformativecontradictions.Butthisapproachtendstodevalueallactualorempirical
discourseinthenameofanevervanishingcounterfactual,andthereforeitcannotevenbegintospecifyitsownconditionsofinstitutionalization.
Ourpositioninvolvestwointerrelatedsteps.First,westartwithempiricalnorms,traditions,andconsensusesthatclaimtobedemocratic,butweholdthattheycanbe
evaluated(byparticipants)intermsoftheirpossibledegreeofrationalityanddemocratization,thatis,inlightofthemetanormsprovidedbydiscourseethics.Second,
weremain,nonetheless,awareoftheinstabilityoftheresultsofevenrationallydebatedempiricalconsensus,andweseektoremedythisbyanargumentbasedon
collectiveidentityinthefirstinstance,andongeneralinterestsandsocialsolidarityinthesecond.Wefocusonactualprocessesofpublicdiscoursethatcan,if
rationalizedordemocratized,constituteorreaffirmarational,democraticcollectiveidentityorpoliticalculture.Insuchcontexts,discourseethicsprovidesthe
standardswithwhichtoselectthoseaspectsofourtradition,collectiveidentity,andpoliticalculturethatwewishtomaintainanddevelopandthatcanprovidethe
contentforlegitimatenorms.Processesofpubliccommunicationconstitutetheweofcollectiveaction,certainlybeforeitcanbeasked(formallyspeaking)whatthe
interestsofasocietyorgroupmaybeandbeforetheconditionsofsolidarityofitsmemberswithoneanothercanbeexplored.
Ofcourse,nocollectiveidentityissimplyorexclusivelyselfreflective,norcananycollectiveidentitybeuniversalinallofitsaspects.Theuniversalizableprinciplesof
democraticlegitimacy

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andbasicrightscanbeonlycomponents,notthetotalityofacommonidentity.Theirreproductiononthesymboliclevelpresupposesthediscoveryorreappropriation
ofthetraditions,collectivememories,preexistingpatternsofinteraction,establishedvalues,andrelevantpractices(lifeworld)thatarethesourcesofsolidaritiesthat
cansustaintherationalcoreofapoliticalcollectiveidentity.Fromthepointofviewofadiscursive,postconventionalcollectiveidentity,thisreappropriationmustbe
posttraditional,thatis,criticalinrelationtotradition.Itmustselectouttraditionsofdiscourseandofempiricalsolidaritythatarenotcompatiblewithapostconventional
collectiveidentityandmustestablishahighlycriticalrelationshiptothem.Thelattercannotserveasthecontentofpoliticalnorms.Thus,whileeverycollectiveidentity
isbydefinitionparticular,thosethatareabletohaveacriticalrelationtotheirowntraditionscandevelopcontentthatisnotincompatiblewiththeprinciplesof
discursiveconflictresolution.Whateverwehavebeen,weasmembersofmoderncivilsocietiesnowpartakeinapoliticalculturepredicatedontheprinciplethatwe
oughttoresolveconflictsdiscursively.Inotherwords,wehavemorethanthemeretemporallyboundandlimiteddiscursiveprocedureitselftovalidateourdecisions
andtocompriseourcollectiveidentity(whichotherwisewouldbepaperthin),andwedonothavetorelyonobjectiveinterpretedinterestsforthis"more."Thefree
publicdiscoursethataffirmsouridentityhasitselfatraditionthatgivesthisidentitysubstanceovertime.Thus,thelevelofgeneralitysoughtbyHabermascan,inthe
firstinstance,bederivedfromparticipationindiscourse.Butitcanmoresolidlybebasedondiscoursesaimedatrenewingthetraditionsofdiscoursethatunderliethe
principleofdemocraticlegitimacyinmoderncivilsocieties.
Inourdefinition,commonidentityisnotequivalenttogeneralinterest.Yetonceacommonidentityisestablishedorreaffirmed,itisthenpossibletoarriveatan
understandingofwhatconstitutesthegeneralinterestsofacommunity.Thesewouldentailthoseinstitutionsorarrangementsthatareneededtoreproduce
"materially"(asdistinctfromnormatively)therelevantcollectiveidentityofthecommunity.Herethesocialscientificstandpointhasaplace.Itispossibletoargue,for
example,asHabermasdoes,thatdiffer

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entiatingbetweensystemandlifeworldandreproducingsomekindofmoderneconomyandpoliticalstateareinthegeneralinterestofallthosewhoparticipateina
modernlifeworldandhavethecorrespondingpostconventionalmoralandculturalcollectiveidentitythatitpresupposes.Itispossible,inshort,tospecifythe
necessarystructuralpreconditionsforreproducingacommonidentitywhoseprincipleshavereceiveddiscursivevalidation.Wewouldstillhavetoarguefor
generalizingtheseinterestsbyraisingcognitivevalidityclaimsastotheirtruth.Moreover,wemustbeopentodebateonwhetherspecificinstitutionalarrangementsare
neededforourcommonidentityorwhetheravarietyofinstitutionalarrangementsmightservethispurpose,someofthempossiblybetterthantheexistingones.
Indeed,thereisanimportantdistinctiontobekeptinmindbetweentheinstitutionalrequirements(generalinterests)thatarenecessaryforreproducinga
postconventionalcollectiveidentityandthosethatarecontingent.Neitheraddsuptoawayoflife,andeventheformermayhavefunctionalequivalents.Wemustalso
becarefultoavoidconfusingtheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrightsorjusticewithanyspecificorganizationalarrangement.Withtheseprovisos,we
canaccommodatethecriterionofferedbytheprincipleofuniversalization,namely,thattheinterestsjustifiedbyvalidnormsmustbegeneral.Thisdoesnotinvolve
derivingthelegitimacyofthenormobjectively.
Theconceptofcollectiveidentityalsohelpsresolvetheproblemofthestabilityorauthorityofaconsensus.Evenifonegrantsthatthemetatheoreticalprinciplesof
argumentativediscourseyieldmetanorms,couldonestillmaintainthattheseareappliedonlyinempiricalcontextsandthenaskwhatgivestheseapplicationstheir
stabilityorauthority?Thereisnosinglecorrectapplicationofthemetanorms.Thismeansthatapplicationscanvaryfromdaytoday,fromtraditiontotradition,from
wayoflifetowayoflife.Inshort,onecouldstillmaintainthatnothingreallyfollowsfromthemetanormsafterall.Ouransweristhat"commonidentity"mediates
betweenthemetaprinciplesandinterests(whichcanalsovary)ofagroup,therebyprovidingthestabilityandauthorityoftheapplicationsagreedupon,althoughthey
alsoremainopentochange.Inthecaseofamodernlifeworldandpoliticalordersmakingdemocraticclaims,thegroup'scommonidentityhastwo

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componentsthatallowittoplaythismediatingrole:(1)thepostconventionaluniversaldimension,whichimpliesselfreflectionandanontraditionalattitudeto
problematicnorms(2)thedimensionofaparticulartradition,thesourceofcontent,which,however,involves(amongotherelements)specificmodesof
institutionalizingdiscourses,basicrights,andparticulartraditionsforapplyingmetanorms.Whenquestioned,thesecanbeopeneduptodiscussiononthebasisofthe
formerattitudewithouttherebyburstingtheframeworkofthecommonidentity.
Relyingonthistraditiondoesnottakeusfromoneauthoritarianismtoanother,fromthatofobjectivelyconceivedgeneralintereststothatofahermeneutically
accessibletraditionthatistreatedassacred.Becausethetraditionofdiscourseallows,evenrequires,anontraditionalrelationshiptoitself(attainableonlyingenuine
discursiveprocedures),thepossibilityofrejectingorrenewingitsinstitutionsandconcreteproceduresandevenofcreatingentirelynewonesinthecontextofa
renewedcollectiveidentitybecomesavailable.Theonlyreallygeneralinterestsinmodernsocietyarebasedonthiscollectiveidentity,itselfrootedintraditionsthat
havebecomeselfreflectiveandselfcritical.
Evenmodernsocietiescharacterizedbyvaluepluralismandapluralityofgroupswithdistinctcollectiveidentitieswouldnotbesocietiesiftherewerenoshared
principlesregulatingtheirinteraction,andiftherewerenocommon(political)identitysharedbytheirmembers,howeverdifferentfromoneanothertheymayotherwise
be.Radicalpluralism,thewarofthegodsdiscoveredbyphilosophyandsociologyintheheartofmodernsociety,cannotbesoradicalastoexcludemeaningfulnorma
fivecoordinationandcommonality,howeverminimal,thatisrecognized,atleastimplicitly,byallofusinsofaraswecommunicateandacttogether.
IndistinctionfromDurkheim'smechanicalsolidaritybasedonthehomogeneityofasinglegroupintegratedthroughasinglecollectiveidentity,inmoderncivilsocieties
aminimalor''weak"collectivepoliticalidentitycanbesharedbyapluralityofgroups,eachwithitsownparticularversionof"thegoodlife."Withdiscourseethics
(restrictedtothedomainoflegality)asitsfoundation,suchacollectiveidentityiscapableofexpressingcommonality.Itcanbeasourceofsolidaritypreciselybecause
itcanbeacomponentoftheidentitiesofquitedifferentsocialgroups.

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ThisistherealmeaningofHabermas'sinsistencethattheprincipleofuniversalizationisalsoametanormimplicitinallcommunicativeinteraction.Interpretedinthis
way,thisprinciplecanhavenoauthoritarianimplications.
DiscourseEthicsandtheGoodLife
Ourinterpretationofdiscourseethicsintroducesasubstantivedimensionintothediscussionthathasbearingonthechargesofformalismmentionedabove.Indeed,it
mightbeobjectedthat,giventheproceduralandformalcharacterofdiscourseethics,introducingconsiderationsofidentityviolatesitsstatusasadeontologicaltheory.
Theconceptofidentitydoesseemtoinvolvesubstantiveassumptionsaboutwhatconstitutesthe"goodlife,"implyingjudgmentsonthevalidityofparticularwaysof
life.
58
Thisissueisespeciallypertinenttoourinterpretationofdiscourseethicsasapoliticalprincipleof(democratic)legitimacyandbasicrights,forthestandardsof
legitimacyaswellasthelawsofanypolitycanbeseenaspartofitsoverallconcretewayoflife(asarticulationsofitsethosorSittlichkeit)andhenceasparticular.
Deontologicalethicaltheories,however,dissociatequestionsof"justice"fromevaluativejudgmentsaboutwhatconstitutesthegoodlife.Inthespiritofsuchanethic,
Habermashasdisqualifieddiscourseethicsfromprovidingjudgmentsaboutthevalidityorqualityofaformoflifeorofaparticularlifehistory.
59
Accordingly,rational
consensusaboutthevalidityofanormdoesnotsupplycriteriaforchoosingbetweendifferentformsoflifeorfordevelopingahierarchyofneedinterpretations.
Ontheotherhand,Habermas'sprincipleofuniversalizationclaimstobeabletohandlecontentinsofarasitbringsintoconsiderationtheneedinterpretationsofall
thosewhomightbeaffectedbyanorm.Practicaldiscoursesfindtheircontentgiveninthehorizonofasocialgroup'slifeworldthisiswherenormscomefrominthe
firstplace.Theconceptofcollectiveidentityseemstohaveaplacehere,afterall.Wethusconfrontaparadox:Discourseethicsapparentlyinsistsboththatwejudge
andthatwerefrainfromjudgingformsoflife.
60
Fromthepointofviewofdemocratictheory,thisparadoxseemsdisturbing.Itresolvesintothefollowingproblem:Howcanthe

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claimsofsolidarityofparticularsocialgroupsbereconciledwiththemoregeneraldemandsofjusticebothwithinpluralisticsocietiescomprisedofmanygroupsand
amongsuchsocieties?Twoissuesareinvolvedhere:Thedeontologicalcharacterofdiscourseethicsandtheproblemofmotivation.Ifdiscourseethicsaddresses
needinterpretations,howcanoneexcludejudgmentsconcerningvalues(whichunderlieneedinterpretations)orformsoflifefromitspurview?Arenotthecriticsright
inclaimingthat,withoutsuchjudgments,withouttheintegrationofsubstantiveconcernsintodiscourseethics,itbecomesformalistic,empty,and"lebensweltlich
irrelevant"?Yet,ifdiscourseethicsdoesimplyaspecificwayoflife,ifitpresupposesasetofvaluesandthusa"hiddenconceptofthegood"(CharlesTaylor),how
canitclaimtobeeitheruniversalorneutralwithrespecttocompetingmodelsofthegoodlife?Doesn'titrepresentjustonemoremodelamongmany?
61
Ontheother
hand,themotivationalquestionthatarisesiswhyactorswithconflictingvaluesystemsshouldbewillingtoenterintoadialogueortoentertainthepointsofviewof
othersasvalidorworthhearingatall.Letustakeuptheseissuesinturn.
ExcessiveFormalism
Discourseethics,likeallproceduraltheories,seemsvulnerabletothechargeofexcessiveformalism.
62
Itappearstoexcludeaconcernforthewelfareoffellowhuman
beingsandtobracketconsiderationsthatpertainto"thegood."Questionssuchaswhatconstitutesaharmoniousformofsociallifeorthesuccessfulconductofan
individuallifeareavoided.Inresponsetotheseobjections,Habermas'smostsympatheticcriticshaveintroducedanadditionalprincipleintotheoverallframeworkof
discourseethics.Theypostulateacriterionundertheheadingofanethicsofbenevolence,empathy,intuition,orcaringasanautonomouslegitimatemoralstandpoint
thatcomplementsconsiderationsofjustice.
63
Themainproblemwiththeseapproachesisthattheyinvolveanalternativetothediscourseethicalconceptionofjusticeinwhosenameitcanbesuspendedor
disregarded,ratherthanabridgeprinciplecapableofmediatingbetweenjusticeandthegood.Whatisusuallyassumedhereisanextremelynarrowinterpretationof

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themeaningofjusticeassimplyinvolvingfairorequaltreatmentofpersons.Justice,inshort,isdowngradedtothestatusofaprinciple(equalrights)andthen
supplementedbyasecondprinciple,benevolence,andbotharethoughttobederivablefromahigherprinciple:equalrespectfortheintegrityordignityofeach
person.ButasHabermashascorrectlypointedoutinhisresponsetoasimilarattemptbyLawrenceKohlberg,thisapproachcannotsucceed,inpartbecauseit
equivocatesontheconceptoftheperson.
Equalrespectforeachpersoningeneralasasubjectcapableofautonomousactionmeansequaltreatmenthowever,equalrespectforeachpersonasanindividualsubject
individuatedthroughalifehistorycanmeansomethingratherdifferentfromequaltreatment:insteadofprotectionofthepersonasaselfdeterminingbeing,itcanmeansupport
forthepersonasaselfrealizingbeing.
64
Respectforintegritydoesnotinvolvecaringforanother'swellbeing.Moreover,aprincipleofbenevolencederivedfromtheprincipleofequalrespectrefersonlyto
individualsandnottothecommonwelfareorthesenseofcommunity.Thus,onthenarrowconceptionofjusticeassumedbyHabermas'smostsympatheticcritics,
questionsofthegoodmustappearasexternal.Assuch,justiceexcludessensitivitytotheparticularityofeachindividual,toconsiderationsofthewelfareofthe
community,andtotheconcernsofthe"concreteother."Justicetranslatesintonegativefreedomsandsubjectiverightsofpersons,andthatisall.
Theseinterpretationslosesightoftherichnessofthecommunicativeandintersubjectivepresuppositionsofdiscourseethics.Discourseisareflexiveformof
communicativeinteractionthatinvolvesmorethantheequaltreatmentofthoseaffected.Theanalyticstartingpointofdiscourseethicsisnotaconceptionofsovereign,
disconnected,disembodiedindividualitybutrathertheintersubjectivecommunicativeinfrastructureofeverydaysociallife.Individualsactwithinrelationshipsofmutual
recognitioninwhichtheyacquireandasserttheirindividualityandtheirfreedomintersubjectively.Inthedialogueprocess,everyparticipantarticulateshisorherviews
orneedinterpretationsandtakesonidealrolesinapublic,practicaldiscussion.Thisprovidestheframework

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inwhichtheunderstandingofothers'needinterpretationsismadepossiblethroughmoralinsightandnotonlythroughempathy.Itisherethatthepresenceof
commonalitiesistestedandrespectfordifferenceispotentiallyaffirmed.
Habermasdevelopsthesethemesintworecentessaysinwhichheusestheconceptsofidentityandsolidaritysystematicallyforthefirsttime.
65
Heisabletoshow
thatthereisnoneedforanadditionalethicaltheorytosupplementthetheoryofjusticebecausea"substantive"dimensionhasbeen"formally"presentallalong.Insum,
Habermasinsiststhatthepropercomplementaryconceptforjusticeisnotbenevolence,empathy,intuition,orcaringbutsolidarity,andthatjusticeandsolidaritydo
notrepresenttwodistinctmoralprinciplesbutaretwosidesofthesameprinciple.
Theargumentworksasfollows.Humanbeingsareindividuatedthroughcommunicativeprocessesofsocialization(Vergesellschaftung)inthecontextofaspeech
communityandinanintersubjectivelysharedlifeworld.Theyacquireanindividualidentityonlyasmembersofacollective,andsimultaneously,asitwere,theyacquire
agroupidentity.Thefurtherindividuationproceeds,themorethelifeworldisdifferentiatedandthemoretheindividualisinvolvedinathickandsubtlenetworkof
multipleandreciprocalinterdependencies.Indeed,theextremevulnerabilityofindividualandcollectiveidentitiesderivesfromthefactthat"thepersonformsaninner
coreonlytotheextenttowhichshesimultaneouslyexternalizesherselfincommunicativelyproducedinterpersonalrelationships."
66
Moralitiesaredesignedtoshelter
vulnerableidentities.
Theincreasesinreflexivity,universalism,andindividuationthataccompanythedifferentiationprocessesinvolvedinthemodernizationofthelifeworlddo,ofcourse,
reinforceourawarenessofthechronicvulnerabilityofindividualandcollectiveidentity.
67
Butitispreciselythroughthe"discontinuous"meansofdiscursiveredemption
ofclaimsthatthecontinuityofmeaningandsolidarityismaintainedinsuchsituations.
Becausediscoursesareareflectiveformofunderstandingorientedactionthat,sotospeak,sitontopofthelatter,theircentralperspectiveonmoralcompensationforthedeep
seatedweaknessofvulnerableindividualscanbederivedfromtheverymediumoflinguisticallymedi

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atedinteractionstowhichsocializedindividualsowethatvulnerability.Thepragmaticfeaturesofdiscoursemakepossibleadiscerningwillformationwherebytheinterestsof
eachindividualcanbetakenintoaccountwithoutdestroyingthesocialbondsthatlinkeachindividualwithallothers.
68
Tobesure,bothcollectiveandindividualidentitiesestablishedthroughsocializationprocessesneedtobereaffirmed,sincetheyrequireongoingmutualrecognitionand
arecontinuouslyopentochallengeandchange.Individualscannevermaintaintheiridentityinisolation.Theintegrityoftheindividualcannotbesecuredwithoutthe
integrityoftheintersubjectivelysharedlifeworldthatmakespossibletheirsharedinterpersonalrelationsandrelationsofmutualrecognition.
Habermascallsthis"thedoubleaspectofthemoralphenomenon":Moralprovisionsfortheprotectionofindividualidentitycannotsafeguardtheintegrityofindividual
personswithoutatthesametimesafeguardingthevitallynecessarywebofrelationshipsofmutualrecognitioninwhichindividualscanstabilizetheirfragileidentities
onlymutuallyandsimultaneouslywiththeidentityoftheirgroup.
69
IndeedHabermasinsiststhateveryethicshastwotasks:itmustensuretheinviolabilityofsocialized
individualsbyrequiringequaltreatmentandrespectforthedignityofeach,anditmustprotecttheintersubjectiverelationsofreciprocalrecognitionbyrequiring
solidarityamongindividualsasmembersofacommunityinwhichtheyaresocialized.Solidarityisthusrootedintheexperiencethateachmusttakeresponsibilityfor
theother,becauseasconsociatestheyallshareaninterestintheintegrityoftheircommonlifecontextinshort,acollectiveidentity.Fromtheperspectiveof
communicationtheory,then,concernsforthewelfareofothersandforthegeneralwelfarearecloselyconnectedthroughtheconceptofidentity.Theidentityofthe
groupandofuniqueindividualsisreproducedthroughintactrelationsofmutualrecognition.Thecomplementaryconcepttojustice,then,mustbesolidarityandnot
somevaguenotionofempathyorbenevolence.Theproceduralprinciplesofjustice,understoodinthedeontologicalsenseofrespectforpersonsandequaltreatment
ofdialoguepartners,requiressolidarityasitsothertheyaretwoaspectsofthesamething.
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Tobesure,Habermasdoesnot,aswedo,distinguishbetweenmoralityandtheprinciplesofjustice.Forhim,discourseethicsservesforboth.Yettheabove
discussionclearlyappliesmostappropriatelytotheconcernsofapoliticalprincipleoflegitimacy.Onthisview,justicereferstotheequalfreedomsofuniqueandself
determiningindividualslegitimatenormsarethosethatareacceptedbyallpotentiallyaffectedparticipantsinadiscursiveprocess.Solidaritythusreferstoboththe
concernofconsociates,linkedtogetherinalifeworld,fortheintegrityofasharedcommonidentityaswellasforindividualandevensubgroupidentities.Thus,
legitimatenorms"cannotprotectonewithouttheother:Theycannotprotecttheequalrightsandfreedomsoftheindividualwithoutprotectingthewelfareofone's
fellowmanandofthecommunitytowhichindividualsbelong."
71
Discourseethicsthuspresupposesboththeautonomyandintegrityofindividualsandtheirprior
embeddednessinanintersubjectivewayoflife.Theverycontentofreflectionsonthejusticeofnormsderivesfromsharedoroverlappingformsoflife.Thisisthe
sourceofthehiddenlinkbetweenjusticeandthecommongood.Considerationofinterestsastotheirgeneralizability/compromisabilitythusinvolvesconsiderationof
the"structural"aspectsofthe"goodlife"thatcanbegeneralizedfromthestandpointofcommunicativesocializationandthatarecharacteristicofallwaysoflifethat
is,therequirementsofrespectforandprotectionoftheintegrityofindividualandcollectiveidentities.
72
Thisstructuraldimensionofthegoodinternaltodiscourseethicsprovidesthestandardbywhichtheprincipleofuniversalizationmustoperate,namely,articulatingand
consideringidentityrequirementsofallindividualsandgroupsaffectedbyanorm.Inadditiontoarticulatingstandardsoffairnessandrespectforabstractrightsof
abstractpersons,discoursesreflexivelyreproducethoseintersubjectivecommunicativeaccomplishments(reciprocalrecognition)thatreaffirmandreproducecore
componentsofindividualandgroupidentities."Eventhoseinterpretationsinwhichtheindividualidentifiesneedsthataremostpeculiarlyherownareopentoarevision
processinwhichallparticipate...[andwhich]addsthereciprocityofmutualrecognitiontothesumofindividualvoices."
73
Thestructuralconceptofthegoodthatis

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operativeherecanthusbeformulatedasfollows:Theinstitutionalizationofanynormthatmightcauseirreparabledamagetotheintegrityoftheidentitiesofindividuals
andgroupswhoarewillingtodiscussandabidebytheproceduralprinciplesofsymmetricreciprocityisproscribed.This,ofcourse,isanotherwayofsayingthat
discoursescannotlegislateorjudgeformsoflife.Yetsomethingmoreisinvolvedhere.Sinceneedinterpretationsandidentityconcernsarebroughtintothe
discussion,thedialogueitselfisguidedbytheprinciplesofrespectfortheabstractandsituateddimensionsofpersonality,ontheonehand,andfortheminimum
solidarityrequiredforthemaintenanceofindividualandgroupidentity,ontheother.
Thisconceptofthegoodlaystorestthechargeofemptyformalismwithouttherebyviolatingthedeontologicalstatusofdiscourseethics.Respectfortheabilityof
eachtoformulateacoherentmodelofthegoodlifeandsolidarityamongthosewhohavedifferingwaysoflifeyetshareacommonlifeworld,oroverlappinglifeworlds,
andatleastkeyaspectsofapoliticalcollectiveidentitydonotunfairlyfavoranyparticularmodelofthegood.Yettheyare"lebensweltliche"relevant!Nordothey
amounttoahidden,concreteconceptofthegoodthatunderminesthedeontologicalcharacterofdiscourseethics(Taylor'scharge).Thepracticeofdiscourse
respectsbothindividuationandintersubjectivelysharedwaysoflife.Eachindividualmustbeabletoparticipateinthesolidaryprocessofdialoguethatpresupposes
andpotentiallyreaffirmssolidaritysinceitinvolvesconsideringthepositionoftheotherandopennesstotheother'sidentityneeds.Indeed,thequalityofa
"Zusammenleben"oughttobemeasuredbothbythedegreeofsolidarityandwellbeingitensuresandbyhowfartheinterests(identityrequirements)ofeach
individualareconsideredwithinthecommoninterest.
74
Thisdiscussionofthestructuralaspectsofthegoodinternaltodiscourseethicsrestsnonethelessonadifferentiationbetweentherightandthegood,betweenthe
universal(izable)andtheparticular,betweenmattersofjusticeandmattersinvolvingtheselfrealizationofindividuals,thatis,theirparticularlifehistories,identity
requirements,andformsoflife.Individualneedinterpretationscan,ofcourse,bebroughtintodiscoursessothatwecandiscoverwhichdimensionsofthesecould
becomethecontentofa

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generalizablenorm.Butaftersuchadiscourse,thereremaindimensionsofindividuallifehistories,conceptionsofthegood,formsoflifethatcannotbegeneralizedand
henceremainparticular.Evenifwedrawtheboundarylinebetweentherightandthegoodafterdiscourse,thelatterbydefinitionraiseevaluativeissuesthatescape
thedemandinglogicofdiscourse,becausetheyinvolvedifferencesaboutwhichwecannotreachaconsensusandthatwecannotjudgethroughadiscourse.Those
necessarilyparticularcomponentsofindividualandgroupidentityconstitutethelimittothereachofdiscourseethics.Fromwhathasbeensaidaboveregardingthe
structuresofmutualrecognitionwithinwhichindividualandgroupidentitiesareformed,itisclearthatHabermasbelievesthattheprinciplesofjusticemustnot
violateindeed,mustprotecttheintersubjectivelysharedformoflifefromwhichbothsolidarityandindividualautonomydrawtheirresources.However,sincethe
structuralaspectsofthegoodlifearedistinguishablefromtheconcretetotalitiesofparticularformsoflife(andlifehistories),thequestionremainsastotherelation
betweendiscourseethicswithits"structuralconceptionofthegood"andtheparticularidentityneeds,values,etc.,ofindividualsorgroups.
Totheextentthatsuchissuesdonotimpingeuponmattersofjusticethatis,totheextentthattheyinvolveformsofconductthatweneitherwishtoseegeneralized
beyondaspecificcontextnorseeasconflictingwithanyprincipleofjustice,thesefitthestandardof"thatwhichoughtnottobeviolated"byorevensubjectedto
claimsofjusticethatareinprincipleirrelevant.Whatisinvolvedherearestandardsofaction,values,andcomponentsoftheidentitiesofindividualsorgroupsthat
deserve(mutual)recognitionasadomainofdifference,ofpersonalchoice,distinctfromthedomaintowhichlegalnormsmustapply.Legalrecognitionofsucha
domainthatisbeyondjustice,asitwere,couldtaketheformoffundamentalrightsthatsecuretheautonomyofindividualjudgmentandtheselflimitationoflegal
regulation.Discourseethicsisselflimitingpreciselywithrespecttothisdomainit"refersnegativelytothedamagedlifeinsteadofpointingaffirmativelytothegood
life."
75
Butitisclearthatwhatappearstotheindividualortoagroupastheconstitutivecomponentsofone'sformoflife,ofone'sidentity,cancomeintoconflictwiththe
demandsofjustice.Incasesof

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conflictbetweendemandsforselfrealizationanddemandsforjustice,ourimmediateimpulseistosaythatthoseneedsorcomponentsofidentitiesthatviolatethe
principlesofsymmetricreciprocityandhavebecomecontroversialmustgiveway.Thereremains,however,theoptionofconscientiousobjectionandcivil
disobediencewhentheconceptionofjusticeitselfisunderdispute.
Universality?
Althoughtherequirementsofreciprocalrecognitioncanbetracedbacktotheconditionsofcommunicativeactionandidentifiedasthecommonrootofbothjustice
andsolidarity,thesedutiesdonotreachbeyondtheconcreteworldofaparticulargroupbeitafamily,atribe,acity,orastate.
76
Ifweinterpretdiscourseethics
asanethicofcitizenship,asaprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrights,howcanwemakeuniversalclaimsforit?Don'tethicsandcitizenshipvarywiththe
particularformofthepolitytowhichtheyrelate?Howcanwearriveatthatuniversalstancethatalonewouldbeabletogroundnotonlytolerancebutalsosolidarity
withapluralityofgroupidentities,withoutrevertingtoaKanformalism?
77
Habermas'sansweristhatdiscoursesconstitutemoredemandingformsofcommunication
thaneverydaycommunicativepractice.Theyarereflexive,governedbytheprinciplesofargumentativespeech,andtheyreachbeyondtheparticularityofa
community'smoreswithouttherebybreakingthesocialbond.Theprincipleofsolidaritylosesitsethnocentriccharacterwhenitbecomespartofauniversal
theoryofjusticeandisconstructedinlightoftheideaofdiscursivewillformation.Argumentstranscendparticularlifeworlds."Discoursegeneralizes,abstracts,
stretchesthepresuppositionsofcontextboundcommunicativeactionsbyexpandingtheirrangetoincludecompetentsubjectsbeyondtheprovinciallimitsoftheirown
particularformoflife."
78
Thelimitsofthelifeworldofafamily,tribe,orstatecanbetranscendedinacontextwherediscoursesareinstitutionalizedandthestructural
principleofthegoodisrespected.
79
Moreover,moralargumentationcaninvolveaninvocationofprinciplesthatdifferfromthenormsofacommunity,andthe
communitymustthenrespondwithgoodandconvincingargumentsorelseacquiescetothecompellingargumentoftheone

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whothinksdifferently.Farfromrepressingparticularityor''community,"theuniversalizingthrustofdiscourseethics,byvirtueofitsveryabstractness,istheonlybasis
onwhichtograntlegitimacytodifferenceandtorequiresolidaritywithit."Asinterestsandvalueorientationsbecomemoredifferentiatedinmodernsocieties,the
morallyjustifiednormsthatcontroltheindividual'sscopeofactionintheinterestofthewholebecomeevermoregeneralandabstract."
80
Habermasjustifiesthisclaimtouniversalityinhisanalysisofthepragmaticpresuppositionsofcommunicativeactionthatareformalizedindiscourse.Inouropinion,
however,thisargumentisnotentirelysatisfactory,becauseitimpliesanabstractandhenceincompleteformofuniversalism.Whileitisquiteprobablethatother
culturesbesidesourscouldmakethetransitionsfromnormativetocommunicativeaction,andfromthelattertodiscourse,itisalsocertainthatsuchstepsare
impossibleandirrelevantformanycultures,especiallythosethatarenotmodernandnotselfreflective.Itwouldbepreposterousforustorequirethatsuchaculture
surrenderitsidentityforidealsexternallyimposedonit.Respectforthecollectiveidentityoftheothermustobtaininthesecases,perhapsintheformoftoleration.But
suchrespectcannotbeequatedwiththesolidarityonefeelsforthosewithwhomonehasatleastsomecomponentsofacollectiveidentityorsomeprinciplesin
common.
Letusbeclearhere.Therearetwocontextsinwhichsolidaritybecomesproblematic:withinpluralcivilsocietiesandbetweendifferentsocieties.Themodernconcept
ofsolidaritythatwehaveinminddoesnotrequireempathyorsamenesswiththeotherwithwhomwearesolidary.Thesolidaritycomplementarytodiscourseethics
does,however,involveanabilitytoidentifywiththenonidentical.Inotherwords,itinvolvestheacceptanceoftheotherasanother,asonewhomustbeaccordedthe
samechancetoarticulateidentityneedsandargumentsasonewouldlikeoneself.Discursivesituationswithinasinglesociety,inwhichconflictsovernormsare
adjudicated,establishthepossibilityofsuchsolidarity,becausehereonecanputoneselfintheplaceoftheother,graspwhathisorherneedsandinterestsare,and
discover,constitute,orreaffirmcommonalitiesandacollectiveidentity.Suchprocessesshould

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enrichtheselfunderstandingofalltheactorsinvolved.Ontheotherside,solidaritymakesdiscoursemeaningfulandreaffirmsthelogicofreciprocalrecognitionatits
heart.Inotherwords,wecanhavesolidaritywithotherswithwhomweshareacollectiveidentitywithoutsharingorevennecessarilylikingtheirpersonalneedsand
values(assumingthattheyarenotincompatiblewiththepreconditionsofdiscursiveconflictresolutionorcompromise).Butwedohavetoacceptthesedifferences,to
theextentthattheyareconstitutedindiscourseasprivate.
Theissueofsolidaritybetweencollectivitiesthatdonotshareacommonpoliticalidentityismorecomplex.Theeasiestcaseconcernsinteractionsbetweentwo
societiesthatarerootedindifferentculturaltraditionsbuthavebothinstitutionalizeddiscoursesandtheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrights.Wehave
alreadyseenthatsolidarityreinforcesthecollectivepoliticalidentityofmembersofamoderncivilsociety,integratingthosewhodifferfromeachotheryetshareinthe
politicalcultureofthesocietyatlarge.Thiskindofcollectiveidentityiscapableofassertingawewhilefosteringsolidarityamongthemanygroupidentitiesthat
composeamoderncivilsociety.Itisthisversionofamoderncollectiveidentityandamodernformofsocialsolidaritythatcanbeexpandedinauniversaldirectionto
includesolidaritywiththosewhoarenotmembersofthesamecivilsocietybutwhoaremembersofothercivilsocieties.Forculturesthathavenotinstitutionalized
discourseorrights,wemuststillshowrespectifnotsolidarity.
Thereare,however,twopointsatwhichtheuniversalimplicationsofdiscourseethicsapplytoallcultures.First,whenthedemandsfordemocraticparticipationand
basicrightsareraisedwithinagivenculture,wecannotavoidsolidaritywiththosewhoarticulatethem.Theminimummeaningofhumanrightsisthatthosewhoclaim
themhavethemagainstanystate.Suchrightscanbesecuredonlywithinthecontextofcitizenshipinaparticularpolity.Buttheirreferent(universalhumanrights)
pointsbeyondanygivenpolity.Second,totheextentthatvariousculturesmeetoneanotherinpeaceandpotentialwar(andtodayhardlyanyculturesareexcluded
fromsuchapossibility),discourseethicsimpliesthattheprinciplesofrationaldialogueamongequals

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representtheonlynormativelyacceptableformofconflictresolution.Thisversionofuniversalismis,moreover,theonlybasisonwhichsolidaritywiththosewhoare
trulydifferentisconceivable,sinceitopensthepossibilityofarrivingatcommonnormsorprinciplesandmutualrecognition.
TheHabermasianideathatthosewhoactcommunicativelycan,inprinciple,raisethemselvestothelevelofdiscoursedoesnothavetoimplyauniversalyardstickthat
letsusjudge(andevenless,interferewith)formsofliferadicallydifferentfromourown.Butitdoesgiveusawaytoaddressthetwocasesinwhichradicallydifferent
culturesmeet.Theexistenceofdifferentformsoflifewithinmoderncivilsocietiesallowsustothinkthatinternalizingsucharelationshipofmutualrecognitionand
respectforindividualityanddifferenceisnotinprincipleimpossible.Thiswouldentailneitherthebadfaithofpretendingtoplaceallformsoflifeonanequalfooting
withourown(relativism)noranabstractuniversaliststancethatisincapableofaccordingeachparticularityitsowndignity.
Theuniversalreferent,inthelastinstanceofdiscoursesintheabovesense,is,ofcourse,the"idealspeechcommunity."Theidentitytowhichthisrefersisouridentity
ashumanbeingstheformalconceptofthegooditimpliesissolidaritywithallhumanitycapableofspeech.
81
Thisisaregulative,practicalidealinthedomainofa
politicalethic.Discourseethicsthuspreservestheeighteenthcenturyinsightthatjusticewithoutsolidarityisuntenable.Indeed,thisistheprinciplebehindtheideaof
humanrights.Yetitpresupposesdifference,notsameness,withinthegeneralandbasicallyemptyrubricofhumanity.Thus,wheninterpretedintermsoftheconcepts
ofcollectiveidentityandsolidarity,thestructuralunderstandingofthegoodcanindeedoperateastheothersideofthetheoryofjustice:"Withoutunrestricted
individualfreedomtotakeapositiononnormafivevalidityclaims,theagreementthatisactuallyreachedcouldnotbetrulyuniversalbutwithouttheempathyofeach
personinthesituationforeveryoneelse,whichisderivedfromsolidarity,noresolutioncapableofconsensuscouldbefound."
82
Identitiesarrivedat(orreaffirmed)inadiscursiveprocessofselfconstitutioninvolvingapostconventionaltestingofcandidatesfor

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politicalnormsleaveroomfortransculturalsolidaritiesthathaveuniversalimplicationsinadeepersensethananysupposeduniversalinterest.Inordertofeelsolidarity
withtheother,wemusthavepotentialaccesstoanonviolentformofconflictresolutionwhenweencounteroneanother.Aweconstitutedinpartthroughdiscourse
hasreadyaccesstotheonlypossiblemediumforsuchconflictresolution:crossculturallyrelevantcommunication.Topossessthecapacityforsolidarityatall,wemust
haveaccesstoaculturaltraditionbuttobeabletofeelsolidaritywithanother(withwhomwehavelittleincommon),wemustbeabletocriticizeourownpolitical
tradition.Thetwostepstakentogetherimplythepossibilityofabroadeningofcollectiveidentitiesinauniversaldirectionwithoutbreakingsubstantivelinkstoa
pluralityofdifferenttraditionsand,hence,identities.
ThisdoesnotamounttoasynthesisofKantandAristotle,fortherestrictionswithrespecttovaluejudgmentabouttheworthinessofindividualandgroupidentitiesstill
hold.Discourseethicsdoesnotforceustojudgepastwaysoflifethathaveneverdevelopeddiscursiveformsofgroundingnorms.Butitdoesimplythat,inthecase
ofcontactbetweenpluralities(nationallyorinternationally),theonlyacceptableformofconflictresolutionisdiscourse.Letusrepeat:Insteadofsupplyinga
substantivestandardofthegoodwithwhichtojudgeparticularwaysoflife,thestructuralconceptofthegoodproscribesnormsthatmightcausedamage
totheintegrityofindividualandgroupidentities.Componentsofidentitiesthateitherresistprocessesofdiscursiveconflictresolution,inthecaseofcontested
societalnorms,orviolatethemetanormsofdiscourseethics(thosebasedonformsofdomination,exclusion,inequality,etc.)wouldhavetoeitheryieldtoapolitical
ethicthatprovidesformoralautonomyandsolidaritywithdifference.
Motivation
Thepreviouspointraisestheproblemofmotivation.Asstatedearlier,deontologicalproceduraljudgmentsseemtoofferdemotivatedanswerstodecontextualized
questions.Indeed,themetanormsofdiscourseapplyonlytothedialoguesituationitselfandcanneithermotivateparticipationnorprovidecriteriafor

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applyingresults.Nordoestheprincipleofsolidaritythatistheflipsideofdiscourseethicsprovideareadyanswertothisproblem.Ithasitslimitspreciselyatthepoint
atwhichoneisunwillingtoengageindiscursivecommunicativeprocessesthatinvolvealteringone'sperspectiveandpossiblyevenaspectsofone'swayoflife.Why
shouldanyoneparticipateindiscourse?
Thereareallsortsofpragmaticorstrategicreasonsforparticipatingindialogue.Onemight,forexample,cometotheconclusionthatpeaceful,dialogicformsof
conflictresolutionarebetterthantheuseofforceandviolence,giventheexistingconstellationsofinterestsandbalanceofpower.Buttherewouldbenothingintrinsic
tothedialogueitselfthatwouldautomaticallyyieldobligation.Indeed,dialogueisnotequivalenttodiscourse.
Habermas'sanswertotheproblemofmotivationthatfacesalldeontologicalmoraltheoriesistwofold.First,heinsiststhatthepresuppositionsofdiscoursearereallya
reflectiveformofcommunicativeaction,andthusthereciprocitiesundergirdingthemutualrecognitionofcompetentsubjectsarealreadybuiltintoactionoriented
towardreachinganunderstanding,theactioninwhichargumentationisrooted.Inreplytothestanceoftheradicalskepticwhorefusestoargue,therebyrejectingthe
moralpointofview,Habermasthusinsiststhatonecannotdropoutofthecommunicativepracticeofeverydaylife.Sincethepresuppositionsofcommunicative
interactionareatleastpartlyidenticalwiththepresuppositionsofargumentationassuch,theoptionofoptingoutisreallynooptionatall.
Inreachinganunderstandingaboutsomethingintheworld,subjectsengagedincommunicativeactionorientthemselvestovalidityclaims,including...normativevalidityclaims.
Thisiswhythereisnoformofsocioculturallifethatisnotatleastimplicitlygearedtomaintainingcommunicativeactionbymeansofargument,betheactualformof
argumentationeversorudimentaryandtheinstitutionalizationofdiscursiveconsensusbuildingeversoinchoate.
83
Second,Habermasacknowledgesthefactthatpracticaldiscoursedoesdisengageproblematicactionsandnormsfromthesubstantiveethicsoftheirlivedcontexts,
subjectingthemtohypotheticalreasoning.Hegrantsthatunlessdiscourseethicsis

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undergirdedbythethrustofmotivesandbysociallyacceptedinstitutions,themoralinsightsitofferswillbeineffectiveinpractice.Discoursecannotbyitselfensurethat
theconditionsnecessaryfortheactualparticipationofallconcernedaremet.Discourseethicsisdependentuponaformoflifethat"meetsithalfway."
Therehastobeamodicumofcongruencebetweenmoralityandthepracticesofsocializationandeducation.Thelattermustpromotetherequisiteinternalizationofsuperego
controlandtheabstractnessofegoidentities.Inaddition,theremustbeamodicumoffitbetweenmoralityandsociopoliticalinstitutions.
84
Inotherwords,whatRawlscallsthe"circumstancesofjustice"havetoobtainfordiscourseethicstobecomplementedbytheappropriatemotivationalcomplex.For
Habermas,thismeansthatwhatisrequiredisatleastthebeginningsoftheinstitutionalizationofdiscourses,thearticulationoftheprincipleofbasicrights,therequisite
socializationprocessessuchthatdispositionsandabilitiesnecessaryfortakingpartinmoralargumentationcanbelearned,andmateriallivingconditionsthatarenotso
desperatelyimpoverishedanddegradingastorenderuniversalisticmoralstricturesirrelevant.ItisHabermas'sviewthatinmoderncivilsocietiestheprinciplesofbasic
rightsandpublicdiscourseshavebeen,albeitselectivelyandhaltingly,institutionalizedinthepublicspacesofcivilandpoliticalsociety.Thismeansthatdiscursive
testingofnormativevalidityalreadyispartofourintuitionsaboutthelegitimacyofinstitutions.Thus,thesubjectionofcontroversialnormstodiscoursecanbe
understoodonthemodelofRawl's"reflectiveequilibrium,"asareconstructionofeverydayintuitionsunderlyingtheimpartialjudgmentofsocialandpoliticalinstitutions
inmoderncivilsocieties.
Butevenifparticipationindiscoursesconcerningnormsimplicitlycommitstheparticipanttothemetanormsofsymmetricreciprocity,itremainspossibletomaintainan
overallstrategicrelationshiptoone'sparticipationinspecificdiscourses.Yetparticipationcanhavesocializingeffectsonitsown,andtherelevantprinciplesaresuch
thatweallcancometoembracethem.Itisinsuchaprocessthatdiscursiveconflictresolutioncoulditselfacquirenormafivepower.Whilephronesis(good
judgment)isneces

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saryfortheapplicationoftheprinciplesofdiscourseethics,thenormativelearningthatisnecessarytoresolvethemotivationalproblemfromtheinputsideisin
principlepossibleinsocietieswithmodernizinglifeworlds,sincesuchsocietiesprovideatleastforthepossibilityofinternalizingafewhighlyabstractanduniversal
principlesthatfollowfrompracticalargumentation.Indiscussingthepostconventionallevelofmoralconsciousnessnecessaryfordiscourseethics,Habermasinsists
thatthegapbetweenmoralinsightsandculturallyhabituatedempiricalmotivesneedstobecompensatedfor
byasystemofinternalbehaviorcontrolsthatistriggeredbyprincipledmoraljudgments(convictionsthatformthebasisformotivations).Thissystemmustfunction
autonomously.Itmustbeindependentoftheexternalpressureofanexistingrecognizedlegitimateorder,nomatterhowsmallthatpressuremaybe.Theseconditionsaresatisfied
onlybythecompleteinternalizationofafewhighlyabstractanduniversalprinciplesthat,asdiscourseethicsshows,followlogicallyfromtheprocedureofnormjustification.
85
Beyondthis,nodeontologicaltheorycanorshouldsaymore.Thequestionofthegenerationofempiricalmotivesforparticipationindiscursiveconflictresolutionthen
belongstothedomainsofsocialtheoryorsocialpsychology.
AnInstitutionalDeficit?
Discourseethicsdoesnotprescribeaparticularformoflife.Agreatvarietyofformsmaybecompatiblewithit,yetnomodernformoflife(includingtheonethat
madeithistoricallypossible)canescapeitscriticalpotential.Theconceptof"lifeform"includesthecultural,institutional,andsocializationpatternsofasociety.Sucha
broadconceptcouldeasilyleadtomisjudgmentsabouttheimplicationsofdiscourseethics.Itisthusworthnotingthatthecritiquecanberestrictedtospecificsocial
sphereswithoutleadingtoanevaluationofwholesocialformationsorcivilizations.Interpretingdiscourseethicsasatheoryofjusticecould,nevertheless,implythat,
withoutdeterminingentireformsoflife,theconceptionleadstoaspecificmodelofpoliticalpractice.
86
Itisindeeddifficulttoconceiveofdemocraticlegitimacy
withoutdemocratic

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institutions.Nevertheless,weinsistthatnosinglemodelofdemocraticinstitutionsfollowsfromdiscourseethics.Moreover,noneshouldbederivedfromit,if
democratictheoryistoavoidanauthoritarianturnvisvisexisting(evenifdeficient)patternsofdemocracy.Nevertheless,weshallargueinthissectionandthenext
that(1)discourseethicsdoeshavealinktoaninstitutionallevelofanalysis,and(2)theprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrightsthatitgroundsimplyan
openendedpluralityofdemocraciesandhenceprojectsofdemocratizationthatpresupposebothmoderncivilsocietiesandacriticalrelationtothem.
Thecornerstoneofourargumentisthedistinctionbetweenprinciplesoflegitimation,ontheonehand,andtheinstitutionalization(ororganization)ofdomination(or
rule)ontheother.
87
Habermasusesthisdistinctiontoshowtheshortcomingsofbothrealisticandnormativetheoriesofdemocracy.FromWebertoSchumpeterand
beyond,"realist"theoriesof"elitedemocracy"identifyasdemocraticaprocedure(ofelitecompetition)thathasatbestaminimalconnectiontodemocraticnorms.Itis
notbasedonpresuppositionsofarrivingatafreeagreementorpublicdiscursivewillformationoronanorientationtogeneralinterests.Theproblemoflegitimationis
eitherreducedtotheempiricalquestionofacceptanceoftherulesofsuchproceduresordisregardedaltogether.Conversely,thetheoristsofdirectdemocracy,from
RousseautoArendt,deriveasetofidealizedpracticesfromagenuinedemocraticprincipleoflegitimacy.Yettheirargumentsplaceindoubttheverypossibilityof
genuinedemocracy.
Thestrictseparationoflegitimacyandtheinstitutionalizationofrulepointsbeyondbothofthesealternatives.Nevertheless,itiseasytosupposefromHabermas'sown
trainofthoughtthatheismerelycombiningthetwotypesoftheory,derivinghisstressondemocraticlegitimacyfromthenormativistsandhisacceptanceofempirical
proceduresoforganizationfromtherealists.HerightlyabandonsArendt'sillusionsconcerningthedesirabilityandpossibilityoftheabsenceofruleindemocraticpublic
life.
88
Yet,atthesametime,heseemstoleavebehindasomewhatWeberianimpressionthatdemocraticorganizationismerelyoneformofdominationamongothers.
Theapparentconcessionstotherealistictheoryareduetoacombinationofagnosticismvisvisdemocraticutopiasandpessi

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mismvisvisthecurrentstageofparliamentarydemocracy.Wewouldliketodevelopourownconceptioninrelationtothesetwopostures.Habermasdefines
democracyasallpoliticalordersthatsatisfyaproceduraltypeoflegitimacy,inthesenseoftheproceduresvalidatedbydiscourseethics:"Democraciesare
distinguishedfromothersystemsofdominationbyarationalprincipleoflegitimation."
89
Thereare,inprinciple,manyformsoforganizationthatcanqualifyunderthis
definition.Wearetoldthatachoiceamongthem"dependsonconcretesocialandpoliticalconditions,onscopesofdisposition,oninformation."However,democracy
ontheorganizationallevelshouldbeunderstoodintermsofdemocratization,definedintermsofa"selfcontrolledlearningprocess"thatiscapableofallowingand
evengeneratinginstitutionalchange.
90
Habermasclaimsthat,inthemodernproceduraltypeofdemocraticlegitimacyfirstworkedoutbyRousseau,theformalconditionsofpossibleconsensusformation,
ratherthanultimategrounds,obtainlegitimatingforce.Thismeansthatthelevelofjustificationitselfhasbecomereflexive.Accordingly,anygivenconsensus,including
theoneonorganizationalstructuresforarrivingataconsensus,is,inprinciple,opentolearningandrevision,guidedbythecriteriaarticulatedbydiscourseethicsand
presupposedbyitastheconstitutiveconditionsofdiscourse.Democratizationunderstoodasaselfcontrolledlearningprocessmeanspreciselythis.
Wehavenoquarrelwiththistrainofthought,asfarasitgoes.We,too,thinkofdemocraticlegitimacyaspriortotheinevitablypluralformsofdemocratic
organization.We,too,seedemocratizationasanopenendedprocess.Butwebelievethat,whilerightlydenyingthatanyparticularformoforganization(e.g.,council
democracy)canbederivedfromtheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacy,Habermashasomittedtogivetheminimumconditionsnecessaryfororganizingdemocratic
institutions.Thestatementabouthistoricalpreconditionsinthiscontextsaysmuchtoolittle.Beyondthis,Habermascanonlyreiteratethat"Itisaquestionoffinding
arrangementswhichcouldgroundthepresumptionthatthebasicinstitutionsofthesocietyandthebasicpoliticaldecisionscouldmeetwiththeunforcedagreementof
allthoseinvolved,iftheycouldparticipate,asfreeandequal,indiscursivewillformation."
91
Characteristically,thisstatementdrawsusbackfromthequestionofinstitutions.Habermasisheredescribing,inthesenseofdis

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courseethics,theproceduresthatcanprovidelegitimatinggroundsforacceptinganyarrangementasdemocratic.Weshouldnotice,however,thattherestatementof
discourseethicsisitselfaffectedbyavoidingtheinstitutionalissue.Thereisanoticeableshiftinthepassagefromactualtovirtualdiscourse.A"presumption"that
certaininstitutionsanddecisions"Would"generate"consent"ifthoseinvolved"couldparticipate"requireseitherinterpretingmentalstates,inthesenseofWeber's
conceptofverstehen,orthesocialscientificanalysisofconstellationsofinterests,inthesenseoftheMarxisttradition.Neitherapproachisconsistentwiththedeeper
thrustofdiscourseethicsthatimpliesthattheformationofidentityandtheanalysisofinterestsdependonpubliccommunicationanddialogue.Thus,democratic
legitimacyrequiresattheminimumestablishingactualprocessesofdiscourseontheleveloforganization.Withoutthisminimum,theillusioncouldarisethatwecan
speakaboutdemocraticlegitimacywithoutinsistingonthepresenceofinstitutionshavingsomeinternalrelationship(evenifnotthatofasimplederivationofonefrom
theother)totheproceduresofdiscursivevalidationandjustification.Whiletherequirementsofvaliddiscoursearenotgenerallyorfullysatisfiedbyactual,empirical,
institutionalizeddiscourse,thereisneverthelessanintrinsicconnectionbetweenthecounterfactualnormsandactualprocessesofdiscourse.Wehavearguedthat
discourseisalwaysactualdiscourse,andthenormsofdiscourseareavailableonlytoparticipantsinempirical,institutionalizeddiscourse.
TheideaofinstitutionalizingdiscourseishardlyabsentfromHabermas'soverallconception,anditisusefultoexaminetheplaceofmodernformaldemocracyinthis
context.Theinstitutionalizationofdiscoursereferstotheexistenceofa"generalizedandobligatoryexpectationthatunderdefiniteconditions,adiscoursecanbe
carriedout."
92
Actualhistoricalexamplesofsocialembodimentsofdiscursivenormsareunderstoodtobevariable,contingent,andprecarious.
93
Habermasincludes
threesuchexamples:thebeginningofphilosophyinAthens,theriseofearlymodernexperimentalscience,andthecreationofapoliticalpublicsphereinthe
Enlightenmentandtherevolutionsoftheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies.
94
Hereweareinterestedonlyinthemeaningandfateofthelastexample.

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AccordingtoHabermas,''bourgeois"democracyclaimedtolink"allpoliticallyconsequentialprocessesofdecisiontolegallyguaranteeddiscursivewillformationofthe
citizenpublic."
95
Thisclaimindicatesthattheideaofavalidconsensuspenetratesthestructureofruleitselfin"theformofdemocratization."
96
Thus,atleastforthe
momentofgenesisofmodernparliamentarydemocracy,Habermasrecognizestheinternallinkbetweenlegitimationandrulethatwehavepostulated.Buthehasalso
arguedthat,inthecourseofdevelopment,legitimationandrulebecameuncoupled.Theclaimsofbourgeoisdemocracyhaveremained(orbecome)afiction(however
effectiveforlegitimation,inWeber'ssense).Consequently,adeepsplithasdevelopedbetweenthosewhoareincreasinglycynicalaboutthesubstanceofdemocratic
claimsandnormativetheoristsofdemocracy.
97
Habermashasalwaysbeencriticalnotonlyof"elitism"and"realism"butalsooftheirtwoantagonists:Marxistcritiques
offormaldemocracy,andnormafivetheoriesofdemocracy.Herejectsthecouncilmodelasanalternativetorepresentativedemocracybecauseitisbasedona
categorymistake.Itisworthnoting,however,that,asorganizationalmechanisms,hebynomeansconsidersthedevicesofeitherformofdemocracyincompatible
withthediscursivemodel.Formalmechanisms,suchasmajorityrule,protectionofminorities,orparliamentaryimmunity,arepotentiallyimportantpoliticaldevices
delimitingyetpreservingdiscursiveproceduresinthefaceofmaterialandtemporalscarcitiesandamultitudeofinterestsandidentities.
98
Ontheotherhand,direct
democraticformshaveapotentialforincreasingtheparticipatoryfeaturesofrepresentativedemocracytheyneednotimplyaseriousrestrictionofcomplexity.
99

Nevertheless,withthedevelopmentofmodernity,eachofthesemodelsofdemocracy,representativeanddirect,entersintocrisis.Theextensionofdirectdemocracy
runsintothe"structuralviolence"builtintothoseinstitutionsthatseemtoexcludetheintroductionofgenuineformsofparticipation.Butifonemayproceedtoafull
participatorymodelonlydiscursively,thelatterrunsintotheintractableproblemoffindingthemeansforfirstestablishingdiscoursewhereitisexcludedordeformed.
Habermas'spositionremainssomewhatambiguouswithrespecttoformal,representativedemocracy.Ontheonehand(fromhis

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earlyworktothepresent),hehaspresentedthehistoryofthismodelasaprocessofdeclinevariouslyconceived.Ontheotherhand,heisuncomfortablewithamere
replayoftheneoKandichotomybetweenSollen(legitimacy)andSein(institutions)onthelevelofdemocratictheory.Hewarnsthatanecessarilycounterfactual
ethicaltheoryshouldnotimply"radicallyignoring...thealreadyoperativeideasofjustice,theorientationsofalreadypresentsocialmovements,theexistingforms
offreedom."
100
Whilethetargetofthisremarkistheinterpretationofthepoliticalimplicationsofdiscourseethicsintermsofrevolutionaryrupture,theexactreferents
forthetermsjusticeandfreedomarehardtolocate.Itisalsodifficulttospecifypreciselyhowalreadyexistingsocialmovementsfitintothisclassofterms.Justice
andfreedomseemtorefertotheinstitutionsofdemocraticpoliticsandtoestablishedrights.ButeventhelatestversionofHabermas'stheoryputsintodoubtthe
possibilitythattheincreaseinfreedomandjusticeinthesecontextscanbeamatteroffurtherinstitutionalization.HereHabermasdepictsthegreathistoricalstagesof
stateformationleadingtothedevelopmentofthemoderndemocraticwelfarestateasepochsofjuridification.
101
Ofthese,thenineteenthcenturyRechtsstaatandits
youngercontemporary,thedemocraticconstitutionalstate,areinitiallypresentedasguaranteeingfreedoms(orrights)inthefaceofthemodernstate,whiletheir
commonsuccessor,thetwentiethcenturydemocraticwelfarestate,ispresentedasambiguousfromthepointofviewoffreedom,becauseits"verymeansof
guaranteeingfreedom...endangersthefreedomofthebeneficiaries."
102
Habermashasinmindthenegativefeaturesofthewelfarestatethatinvolvesurveillance,
control,andthebureaucratizationofeverydaylife.Fromthispointofview,however,thenineteenthcenturydemocraticconstitutionalstatebecomesambiguousas
well.WhileHabermasinsiststhattheprinciplesofparticipatoryrightsremain(unliketheveryprinciplesofthewelfarestate)"unambiguouslyfreedomguaranteeing,"
theorganization(institutionalization)oftheserightsisseenasalreadybureaucratic.Thus,"thepossibilityofspontaneousopinionformationanddiscursivewill
formation"areconsiderablyrestricted"throughsegmentationofthevoter'srole,throughcompetitionofleadershipelites,throughverticalopinionformationinbureau

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craticallyencrustedpartyapparatuses,throughautonomizedparliamentarybodies,throughpowerfulcommunicationnetworks,andthelike."
103
Toproceedfromthesideofcontemporarypoliticalinstitutionstolocatethenecessaryminimumfordemocraticlegitimacythusseemsquixotic.Ratherthanappearing
asinstancesofactualdiscourses,theseinstitutionsseemtoreducetheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacytotheircounterfactualstatus.Thestandardsofdiscourse
ethicsseemtoliftthedemocraticveiloffthepoliticalpracticesofmassdemocracies,ratherthanfindinginstitutionalsupportsinthem.
Itmightbeobjectedthatthecivilandpoliticalrightsestablishedoutsidethestatespheredorepresentinstitutionalizationsoffreedomandjustice.Indeed,ifone
proceedsfromthestandpointofcivilsocietyratherthanthatofthepoliticalsystem,awaybeyondthenomyofnormativedevelopmentandinstitutionaldeclineopens
up.
104
Morespecifically,theconceptionofrightscouldleadtoatheoryofcivilsocietyastheminimumframeworkforinstitutionalizingdiscourseethics.
Weclaimedearlierthatboththeprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyandtheprincipleofrightscanbejustifiedbydiscourseethics.Inthefirstplace,itshouldbeclear
thatpublic,democraticdiscoursehasaroletoplayingeneratingandmaintainingrights.Wehavealreadyshownthat,asaprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacy,discourse
ethicsimpliesthatthegenerationoflawandpowermustbereferredbacktothedemocraticparticipationofallconcernedinordertobeconsideredlegitimate.Inthe
caseofbasicrights,totheextentthattheyaretobeinstitutionalized,ourthesisisthattheyrequireenactmentthroughdiscursiveprocessesaswellasopportunitiesfor
participationinpublicdiscourses.Thediscursiveprocessis,inotherwords,duplicatedontheleveloftheconstitutionaloriginofrightsandontheleveloftherenewed
argumentationandparticipationnecessaryfortheirsustenance.Weshallarguethatthisseconddimensiondependsonthechancestoassemble,associate,and
articulatepositionspubliclyontheterrainofcivilsociety.
Atissueistherelationshipbetweenassertingrightsandlegalizingrights.Whilerightsinthemodernsensepresupposethepositivizationoflaw,theycannotbereduced
topositivelaw.Therights

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thatwehavecanbecomeeffectiveandstableonlywhenembodiedinconstitutionsandlegalcodes.Butsuchrightsarenecessarilyparadoxical:Formallythey
representavoluntaryselflimitationofstatepowerthatcouldbeannulledbyalegislativeact(inEngland,forexample,51percentofparliamentcouldabolishany
right).Butrightsdonotsimplyemerge,noraretheysustainedorexpandedasmereactsofpositivelegislation.Whatthestatecouldtakebackonthelegal
constitutionallevel,itoughtnottakebackfromanormativepointofview,anditcannottakebackifcertainsocialhistoricalconditionsarefulfilled.
Discourseethicspointstotheconditionsofpossibilityofthiscannotonthesociologicalsideandtothegroundofthisoughtonthephilosophicalside.First,the
survivalandexpansionofbasicrightsdependverymuchonvitalpoliticalculturesthatallowforandevenpromotethemobilizationofconcernedconstituencieson
behalfofrights.Theclaimsofindividualstoprotectionsbybasicrightswouldbehollowiftheycouldnotbebackedupbypublicdiscussion,assembly,and,inmany
cases,socialmovementspracticingcivildisobedience.Theprincipleofrightsthusrequiresthepossibilityofparticipationinsocietalpublicspaces.Discourseethicshas
obviousrelevancehere,foritimpliesaninstitutionalizationofdiscoursesincivilsocietythatiscrucialforpositinganddefendingrights.
Second,discourseethicsnotonlypointstothesociologicalprocessofcreatingandexpandingrightsbutalsoprovidespartofthebasisforatheoryofrights.Itgives
usargumentsforhavingfundamentalrights,andithelpsusisolatethecentralclustersofrightsamongthem.Indeed,thecoreoftheverymeaningofbasicrightsentails
the"right"toassertrightsonthepartofthecitizenry.This"right"is,ofcourse,neitheraparticularpositiverightnoranegativeliberty,butratherapoliticalprinciple
involvinganewandactiverelationonthepartofcitizenstoapublicspherethatisitselflocatedwithincivilsociety.
105
Webelievethatthemetanormsofdiscourse
ethicscanjustifytheprincipleoftherighttoassertrights,andhencetheideaofrightsitself.
Thisclaimrestsonacrucialsetofdistinctionsthatwecanonlysummarizehere.Whatrelationship,ifany,existsbetweenthemetaprinciplesofdiscourseethicsand
fundamentalrights?There

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arethreepossiblewaysofconceptualizingsucharelationship:(a)fundamentaluniversalrightscouldbepresupposedbydiscourseethics,butthemetanormsofrational
discoursewouldnotbeableontheirowntosupplythe"ground"orprincipleforsuchrights(b)fundamentalrightscouldenterinasthecontentofapossiblerational
consensusor(c)fundamentalrightscouldbeimpliedbythemetaprinciplesofdiscourseethics.Weshallarguethatallthreewaysofrelatingdiscourseethicsandbasic
rightsobtain,dependingonwhichclassesofrightsoneisconsidering.Weshalltakeupeachpositioninturn.
(a)Letusassumethattheprinciplesofconstitutionalismincludetheideathatduringthecourseofwritingandamendingconstitutions,wearriveat(constitutional)rights
bycomingtoagreement.Neverthelesstheideaofrightsinthestrongsensecannotbereducedtoconstitutionallegalpositivity.
106
Theyareinacrucialsensealways
antecedenttopositivelaw,eventopositivehigherlaw(constitutions).Yetweneednotfallbackintonaturalrightsdogmatoaccountfortheantecedentcharacterof
rights.Instead,wecanlinktheideaofrightstothemetaconditionsofdiscourse:Withoutindividualswhoseautonomyisguaranteedbyrights,thedemanding
preconditionsofrationaldiscourse(againstwhichanyempiricalagreementcanbemeasured)cannotinprinciplebemet.Accordingly,rightscanbeinterpretedas
normativerequirementsforparticipationinpracticaldiscoursesaboutsociety.
107
Ifourindividualandcollectiveautonomywerenotsecuredbyrights,our
participationindiscoursescouldnotbeprotectedfromconstraintswhoseabsencecanneverbetakenforgrantedbytheindividual,eveniftheseconstraintsare
arrivedatdemocratically.Civilandpoliticalrightsconstitutethepreconditionsforaninstitutionalizeddiscourseclaimingtobedemocratic.Inotherwords,bothrights
anddemocraticdiscussionpresupposeautonomousindividualsabletoassertmoralnormsorvaluesaspossiblecandidatesforarationalconsensus.Inthissense,the
metaprinciplesofrationaldiscourse"demand"theprincipleofbasicrights.
Thisargumentneedstobeunpacked,however.Weareassumingthatbehindtheideaofbasicrightsisa"substantivemoralprinciple,"theprincipleofautonomy.
108

Ontheoneside,thereisaconceptionofautonomythatflowsdirectlyfromdiscourseethics

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(groundedinthetheoryofuniversalpragmatics).Inthiscontext,autonomymeanstheabilitytotakeondialogueroles,toengagereciprocallyinidealroletaking,to
achievereflexivityvisvistheseroles,andtoarticulateone'sownneeds,interests,andvaluesinordertodeterminetheiruniversalizabilityandarriveatacommon
agreementongeneralnorms.
109
Butthisconceptionofautonomyisnotenoughtoencompasswhatcomestomindwhenonespeaksoftheantecedentcharacterof
basicrightsortheautonomousindividualasthesubjectofbasicrights.Thecommunicationstheoreticconceptionofautonomyestablishesalinkbetweenthe
metaprinciplesofdiscourse(symmetricreciprocity)andaconceptionoftheindividualwhoistoparticipateinsuchadiscourse.Butthisconceptionisnonetheless
parasiticonamorecomplexprincipleofautonomythatisnotderivablefromthemetaprinciplesofrationaldiscourse.Theconceptofautonomywehaveinmindhere
hastwocomponentsthatattachtotheabstractandsituateddimensionsofpersonality,respectively.Thefirstcanbeconstruedastheprincipleofselfdetermination
andindividualchoicealongKanlinesthatispresupposedbytheabstractandgeneralconceptionoftherightsbearingperson.Thesecondreferstotheabilityto
construct,revise,andpursueone'sownlifeplan(Mill,Rawls)thiscomponentattachestotheideaofuniquepersonalityandtothedynamicsofindividualidentity
formation.Oneortheotheraspectofthisdualisticconceptionofautonomyhasalwaysbeeninvokedasthecoreprincipleoflibertyorinviolatepersonalityunderlying
theliberalideaofbasicindividualrights.Itconstitutesamoralprincipleirreducibletothemetanormsofrationaldiscoursethatunderlietheideaofdemocratic
legitimacy,although,asindicatedabove,discourseethicsalwayshasaroletoplayintheprocessofassertingrights.Inourview,thedualisticconceptionofautonomy
comprisesthe"truthcontent"ofliberalargumentsforfundamentalrightsbasedonaconceptionoffreedomasnegativelibertyorthefreeselfdevelopmentofunique,
inviolatepersonalities.
Itisnotnecessary,however,tosaddletheideasofnegativelibertyandinviolatepersonalitywithatomistic,asocialconceptionsoftheindividualortoestablishthe
paradigmofpropertyrightsastheconceptualheartoftherightsthatprotectindividualautonomy.Wehavealreadynotedthefragilityofindividualidentityduetothe
factthatindividuationoccursincomplex,intersubjective,commu

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nicativeprocessesofinteraction.Individualidentitiesarevulnerablebecausetheyareneversetonceandforall.Onedevelopsone'sidentitythroughoutone'slife,and
itisdependentonthedynamicsofmutualrecognitionforitsstabilityandselfesteem.Thus,thesetofrightsthatarticulaterespectforthedignity,uniqueness,and
inviolabilityofsocializedindividuals(liberty,personality,andprivacyrights)areindispensableguaranteesofautonomyinbothoftheabovesenses.Whilewemayneed
someformofpropertyrights(toourhomes,personalpossessions,etc.)inordertobeabletoconcretizeournegativelibertyandtoexpressourpersonality,itisonly
ontheuntenableassumptionofpossessiveindividualismthatnegativeliberty,inviolatepersonality,andpropertyintheeconomicsensebecomeequated.Inshort,
propertyrights,suitablyreduced,maybeoneamongmanysetsofrightswemayneed,buttheyarenottheconceptualcoreoftheideaofautonomy.
Thus,theprinciplesofsymmetricreciprocitycomprisethemetanormsofpracticaldialogue,whilecoreaspectsoftheprincipleofautonomyconstitutethemetanorm
underlyingtheconceptionoftheindividualwhoistoparticipateinsuchadialogue.Accordingly,thereisasenseinwhichanimportantdimensionofrightsinvolves
negativelibertiesandpersonalityrightsthatdonotflowdirectlyfromdiscourseethics.
(b)AsAlbrechtWellmerhasnoted,thedimensionofnegativelibertythatisboundupwithdeterminationsofthetypeandstructureofpropertyrights,andwithmarket
relations,canbelinkedtodiscourseethicsonthesecondmodelmentionedabove,thatis,onthelevelofcontent.Inotherwords,"thedelegationofsteeringfunctions
tothemarketasasphereofnegativefreedomcanbeseenasatleastpotentiallyresultingfromandbeinglimitedbyademocraticprocessofdecisionmaking.
Thiskindoflegitimationofasphereof"strategic"economicactionistheonewhichisbuiltintoHabermas'stheoryofcommunicativeaction."
110
Thesameholdstrue
forwhathavecometobecalled"socialrights"ormattersofredistributivejustice.Here,too,thepreciserangeandvarietyofsocialrightswewanttoaccordone
anotherwouldhavetoenterintoadiscourseonthelevelofcontent,althoughwecouldofcourseagreetoconstruetheseasbasicliberties.Assuch,propertyrights
andsocialrightscanbethecontentofademocraticdiscussion.Theydonotstandasexternallimitstoit.

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(c)Thereisathirdclassofrightsthatmediatesbetweenautonomyanddemocraticlegitimacy:therightsofcommunication(speech,assembly,association,expression,
andallcitizenshiprights).Itisourcontentionthatthisclassofrightsisimpliedbydiscourseethicsthatis,theyhavethestructureofbasicrights(theycanbeconceived
ofasantecedenttoandinviolablebyanydemocraticconsensus),butinsofarastheyaretheconditionsofpossibilityofanyconsensusclaimingtobelegitimate,they
canbereadoffdirectlyfromtheprinciplesofsymmetricreciprocityunderlyingtheideaofdiscourseethicsitself.Thisclassofrightsisconstitutiveofdiscourse.These
rightsenterinneitheraspossiblecontentsofadiscussion(theycouldnotberejectedwithoutviolatingtheproceduralprinciplesofdiscourse)noraslimitstothereach
ofapossiblediscussion,butratherastheconstitutiveprinciplesofdiscussionitself.Needlesstosay,wearguethattheserightsinstitutionalizethepublicspaceswithin
civilsocietyinwhichdemocraticlegitimacyisgenerated.
Wecannowmakesenseofthepossibleoppositionbetweenrightsanddemocracythathauntsliberalanddemocraticpoliticaltheory.Evenifrightsarerequiredfor
theveryconceptionofdemocraticdiscourse,itisnonethelesspossiblefortheretobeconflictbetweendemocraticdecisionsandrightsofcommunicationandbetween
democracyandrightsofautonomy.Aretheseconflictsonthelevelofprinciple,oraretheyconflictsbetweenthewaystwodifferentbutinterdependentprinciplesare
institutionalized?Webelievethatthelatter,nottheformer,isthecase.Thisclaimisbasedonourattempttoreinterpretthecoreideaofbasicrightsintermsoftheidea
ofautonomyandthedemocraticprincipleofthe"righttohaverights."Thisreinterpretationinvolvesthefollowingsteps.First,wesevertheideaofautonomyfromthe
unnecessarybaggageofanthropologicalassumptionsofatomistic,asocialindividuals.Second,wefreeitfromtheideologyofpossessiveindividualisminwhich
propertyappearsastheparadigmofallrightsandofnegativelibertyitself.Certainlythe"communitarian"insightthatindividuationoccursthroughsocializationand
participationintheculture,traditions,andinstitutionsofsocietyandthatindividualandcollectiveidentitiesemergetogetherthroughcomplexprocessesof
communicativeinteractiondoesnothingtodiminishtheclaimsofindividualautonomy,theprincipleofnegativeliberty,orthe

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ideaoffundamentalrights.Third,weexplainakeycomplexofrightsintermsofthemetanormsofdiscourseethicsitself,namelytherightstocommunicationthatare
thesinequanonfortheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacytofindaninstitutionallocus.Fourth,wearguethatcivilandpoliticalsocietyareconstitutedbythesebasic
setsofrightsandprovidefortheirinstitutionalization.Finally,wearguethattheideaoftherighttohaverightsisademocraticpoliticalprincipleinvolvingtheactive
participationofindividualsintheinstitutionalizedpublicspheresofcivilandpoliticalsocietyandalsoinnoninstitutionalizedpublicspheresthatemergeinthemilieuxof
socialmovements.Theassertionofrightsisthusseenasapoliticalact,evenifitsthrustis,inpart,toestablishaterrainofindividualautonomywithrespecttowhich
democraticdecisionmakingmustbeselflimiting.Thesestepsgreatlydiminishthedistancebetweenrightsorientedliberaltheoriesandparticipatorydemocratic
theories.
Empiricaldiscoursecanviolateboththecommunicativepreconditionsofdiscourseanditspreconditionsonthelevelofautonomy.Fromthepointofviewoftheclaims
ofautonomousindividuals,everydiscourseisonlyempiricalandalwaysstandstobecorrected.Thisisthemostobviouscaseandeasiesttohandletheoretically.But
evenfromthepointofviewofanidealrationalcommunication,conflictbetweendemocracyandautonomyisconceivable.Wearenottryingtodenythis.Indeed,we
beganthisdiscussionbyrestrictingtheobjectdomainofdiscourseethicstolegalnormsandtothelegalsystemasawhole,insistingthatarealmofautonomous
judgmentfortheindividualbeyondthepurviewoflawmustberespected.Obviouslyanindividual'sjudgmentcancomeintoconflictwithagivenpoliticalnormeven
whenitisdemocraticallyarrivedat.AsWellmerhaspointedout,thedemandsofcommunicativerationalityinanyspecifichistoricalcontextwillhavesomekindof
publicdefinitionintermsofinstitutions,moralbeliefs,publicopinion,orsocietalnorms,andthesemustbeopentocritiqueandrevisionandmustleaveroomfor
dissent.
111
However,itisamistaketoconstruethisasanoppositionbetweentheprinciplesofrightstoutcourtanddemocracy.
Certainrightsinstitutionalizethepositionsofmoralconscienceandindividualjudgmentasalegitimate,principledstandpointfromwhichonecanchallengeany
empiricalnorm.Therightto

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dissent,therighttobedifferent,therighttoactonone'sjudgment,andprivacyrightsprotectnegativelibertyandinviolatepersonality.Yetwhatisinvolvedhereisnot,
asWellmerbelieves,arighttobeirrational,butratheraright,metapoliticallygrounded,tobeautonomousanddifferent.Freedomofconscienceandtherightto
particularityfollowfromthis,butthesearestillrationalrights.Moralconsciencecanthenexercisetheserightsaccordingtoitsownstandards,rationalorirrational.
Individualautonomywouldbelostinfactifweinsistedonaspecificwayofexercisingfreedomofconscienceorofpursuingone'sparticularconceptionofthegood.
Butitwouldalsobelostifinourownsphereweviolatedtheautonomyofothers.
Theprinciplesofrightsanddemocracy,eachinitsownway,definethelimitingconditionsofwhatthelegitimatecontentofanempiricalconsensusmightbe.Each
providesfordissent,thefirstbydelimitingthereachofsuchaconsensus(towhichthoseinvolvedmustnonethelessagree),thesecondbydelimitingtheprocedural
principlesthroughwhichavalidconsensuscanbereached.Both,inotherwords,provideaprincipledreferencepointfromwhichonecanchallengethelegitimacyof
anempiricalagreement.
Itshouldbeclearfromwhatwehavesaidsofarthatonlysomerightsinvolvenegativelibertyandthattheprincipleofrightsitselfisaprofoundlypoliticalone.
Nonetheless,thereisaboundaryquestionaboutthelimitstothereachofdemocraticdecisionmaking.Thespecificcontentofrights,thenormsagreeduponwithina
dialogue,andthewaysinwhichoneactsoutone'snegativelibertyandidentitygoalswithingenerallyagreeduponconstraints,allimpingeonthisboundaryquestion.
Theconceptsofnegativeliberty,inviolatepersonality,andprivacysetlimitstothereachofdemocraticdecisionmakinginthenameofparticularityandindividual
autonomyanddrawuponafoundationindependentfromthatofconsensusitself.Whiletheboundarylinebetweenbasicautonomyrightsanddemocraticdecision
makingcannotbedrawninadvanceofadiscussionofcontent,itneverthelesshastobedrawninprinciple.Thereisnowayinadvanceofapracticaldiscourseto
settlecontroversiesoverwhatconstitutesissuesofthegoodlifeandwhatbelongstothedomainofgeneralizable"inter

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ests.''
112
Butweinsistthatoncesuchaboundarylineisdrawn,thosemattersthatareparticular(mydeterminationofandpursuitofmylifeplan,myidentity)arethen
offlimitstodemocraticdecisionmakingyetretainamoralworththeycannotbereducedtoerror,egoism,interestcompromise,ormattersoftasteforwhatisat
stakeistheindividual'sidentity,moralautonomy,orwayoflife(asamemberofaparticulargroupwithinalargersocialwholeorsimplyasanindividualwithaunique
identity).Controversialidentityneedscanbebroughtintoageneraldiscussionwhentheyimpingeupongeneralnormsofaction.Thefirstsetofrightsprotectsthis
domain.Onecangainacertainreflexivityregardingone'sprojects,butitwouldbetoomuchtodemandthat,forthesakeofjustice,onegiveupone'sidentity,forthat
wouldsurelynotbejust.Inotherwords,herethestandardof"theleastdisruptiveimpact"onidentityneedsdiscussedintheprevioussectionwithrespecttocollective
identityentersinwithrespecttoindividualidentityandprovidesalimittothedemocraticdeterminationofwhatisjustwithoneproviso:Thosedimensionsof
particularitythatviolateeithertheautonomyofothersorthemetanormsofdiscourse(symmetricreciprocity)havenoclaimtolegitimacy.Inthissense,therightandthe
good,autonomyrightsanddemocraticlegitimacy,mustbemutuallyselflimiting.
Accordingly,thetwosetsofrightsmostfundamentaltotheinstitutionalexistenceofafullydevelopedcivilsocietyarethosethatsecuretheintegrity,autonomy,and
personalityofthepersonandthosehavingtodowithfreecommunication.However,allrights,includingthosesecuringmoralautonomy,requirediscursivevalidation.
Fromthispointofview,itmightappearthattherightsofcommunicationarethemostfundamental,sincetheyareconstitutiveofdiscourseitselfandhenceofthekey
institutionofmoderncivilsociety:thepublicsphere.Thisappearanceisdueinparttothesociologicalprimacyoftherightsofcommunication.
Infact,discourseethicslogicallypresupposesbothclassesofrights.Bybasingrightsnotonanindividualistontology,asclassicalliberalshavedone,butonthetheory
ofcommunicativeinteraction,wehavestrongreasontoemphasizetheclusterofrightsofcommunication.Itwouldcertainlybepossibletoarguethatotherclustersof
rights,suchasthoseofprivacyandsuffrage,arerequired

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tomaintainthiskeycomplex.Therightstoprivacyandautonomywouldbeaffirmedbecauseoftheneedtoproducetheautonomouspersonwithoutwhomrational
discoursewouldbeimpossible.SuchwouldbetheresultofapurelyHabermasiandeductionofrightsfromdiscourseethicsunderstoodasthesumtotalofpractical
philosophy.
113
Inourargument,however,thetwosetsofrightsrepresenttwopillarsofethicallifethatareirreducibletoeachother.Fromonewecanreasontothe
principleofunconstrainedcommunicativeinteractionfromtheother,totheprincipleoftheautonomousanduniqueperson.Botharepreconditionsofactualdiscourse
thatseekstoberational.Thus,botharerequiredaspreconditionsofdemocraticlegitimacy,evenifnotinthesameway.Fromthispointofview,therightsof
communicationpointustothelegitimatedomainofformulatinganddefendingrights.Therightsofpersonalityidentifythesubjectswhohavetherighttohaverights.
Thiscatalogueofrightsconstitutiveofthepublicandintimatespheresofcivilsocietyiscrucialforanyversionofrationalcommunication,inthesenseofdiscourse
ethics.Politicalandsocioeconomicrightsarealsoimportant,iflessdirectlyso.Someversionoftheserepresentsthepreconditionforstabilizingthepublicandprivate
spheresandhenceforinstitutionalizeddiscourseby"mediating"betweenthemandmodernstatesandeconomies.
Habermashasrecentlyarguedthatfundamentalrightsarerealizationsoftheuniversalcontentofnormsthatarenotonlylegitimate,inthesenseofdiscourseethics,but
alsocentraltothemoralsubstance(Sittlichkeit)ofourlegalsystem.
114
IntheWest,therehasinfactbeenadecreasinglyselectiverealizationofthenormsofsuchan
ethicspreciselytotheextentthatherehasbeenanexpansionofrights.
115
Nevertheless,selectivityandonesidednesshavebeentheruleinexercisingandinterpreting
rightsinthemoderncapitalisteconomyandthemodernstate.Dividingrightssomewhatroughlyintoliberties(Freiheitsrechte)andmembershiprights
(Teilhaberrechte),Habermassuggeststhatthelatterareorganizedtodayinsuchawaythatbureaucraciesrestrictactualparticipationandspontaneouspublicwill
formation.
116
Theformerareconstrued,incapitalistsocieties,onthebasisofindividualisticpremises.Foreshortenedinthesetwoways,rightsappearasthe

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prerogativeoftheprivateindividual,severedfromtheprinciplesofsolidarityandcitizenshipthat,onthebasisofcommunicativeinterpretation,theyshouldideally
entail.Thus,onceagainonthelevelofnormsandprinciples,wecanspeakoftheexpansionof"justice"and"freedom,"buttheinstitutionalembodimentispresentedas
eitherprimarilynegativeorhighlyselective.
117
Thereisacrucialdifferencebetweenthesetwooptions.Indeed,Habermashasactuallytakenanimportantstepawayfromathesisofinstitutionaldeclineandtoward
athesisofselectiveinstitutionalization.Hisstressonlegalinstitutions(counterposedtolegalmediathathavesteeringfunctionsandcanbedisconnectedfromthe
normativesubstanceofeverydayinteraction)andonselectiveinstitutionalizationoftheemancipatorypotentialsofmodernitypointsbeyondtheantinomyofnormative
developmentandinstitutionaldecline.Accordingly,wearguethat,evenifrightsandlibertiesareinstitutionalizedselectivelyincontemporarycapitalistmass
democracies(i.e.,iftheyarelimitedtoindividualisticallyconceivedrights),theyarenonethelessinstitutionalized.Moreover,therighttohaverightshascometobe
recognizedasacorecomponentofdemocraticpoliticalculture.AsClaudeLeforthasshown,thesymbolicsignificanceofrightsistheopenpossibilityoffightingfor
thefullerrealization,expansion,reinterpretation,andcreationofnewrights.
118
Evenifthenormativedevelopmentthatrepresentsthepositivesideofmodernityisonly
selectivelyestablishedinstableinstitutions,suchpartialachievementscreatethespaceforsocialmovementstorenewandreestablishtherelevantprinciplesinless
selectiveways.
Habermashasarguedthatsocialmovementsarethedynamicfactorbehindtheexpansionofrights.Thepracticeofmovementscanculminateinthealteration"of
interpretationsgiventopubliclyrecognizedneedsorwants"andthethematizationofthenormativecontentsofeverydaylifeinstitutions,makingthem"accessibleto
communication."Asfarasthepresentisconcerned,though,Habermasmaintainsthat"theconceptof'democratization'isnotadequatetowhatisatissuehere,
because,exceptinsomecases,theinitiativesandmovements...arenotlikelytoenlargethescopeforeffectiveparticipationinpoliticaldecisions."
119
Itisfairtosay
thatHabermas'sstressremainsonthecontributionofsocialmove

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mentstoanewpoliticalcultureornewculturalhegemony,whichisonlyconnectedindirectly,inthelongrun,andinanindeterminatefashiontodemocraticinstitutions.
120
ThereasonforthisforeshortenedassessmentoftheeffectsofsocialmovementsisthatHabermasdoesnotconnecttheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacy(ashe
doestheconceptofbasicrights)toinstitutionsthatactuallyexpressdemocraticprocesses.Thus,hehastolimittheconsequencesofmovementstothetransformation
ofpoliticalcultureaprocessthatcouldaffecttheviabilityofrightsbutnotleadtotheirexpansion.Theparadoxofthispositionisthatthenonselective
institutionalizationofbasicrightsrequiredbydiscourseethicsisinconceivablewithoutthegenerationofnewdemocraticinstitutions,andthisrequiresthecontributionof
socialmovements.Thetransitionfromapurelyindividualistictoacommunicativelyorganizedstructureofrightsisimpossibleonthebasisofademocratizedpolitical
culturealone.Anewdefinitionofrightsneedsnewtypesoflegislativeactivity.Buttheexclusionarymechanismsandselectivityofcontemporaryrepresentativesystems
setkeylimitstotherequisitebroadeningofbasicrights.Quasilegislationthroughcourtscansupplysomeofthemissingelementsforthedemocratizationofrights,but,
withoutademocratizedpoliticalsystem,suchactivismhasseriouslimits.Habermas'sattachmenttothethesisofthedeclineofmassdemocracy,however,opensup
verylittleperspectivefortheinstitutionalizationofdemocraticlegitimacy.Thus,therelationshipofdiscourseethicstoinstitutionalanalysisremainsdeeplyantinomicin
hiswork.
Itwouldbeunfairnottostressthosedimensionsofhissocialtheorythat,insomerespects,pointbeyondtheantinomy.Habermas'srecentdiscussionsofsystemand
lifeworldpointinadirectionthatviewsinstitutionsasdualistic.
121
Insteadoflocatingnormativedevelopmentexclusivelyonthelevelsofpersonalityandculture,while
construingsocialinstitutionstobeonedimensional,therecenttheoreticalconstructionrecognizesthedualisticfeaturesofavarietyofinstitutionsrangingfromlaw,
masscommunications,andthefamilytothepoliticalstructuresofcompromise.Thisapproachmakestherigidjuxtapositionofdemocraticlegitimacyandpseudo
democraticformsofdominationuntenable.Rather,onthismodel,itbecomesclearthatcontemporarydemocraticinstitutionalformsaretwosided,thatthey
internalizethe

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antinomyasasetofdualpossibilitiesofdevelopment,aconclusionthatinanycasefollowsfromtheideaofdemocraticlegitimacyitself.Wehavealreadyarguedas
muchinthecaseofbasicrights.Whatremainsatissueishow,onthelevelofatheoryofdemocraticlegitimacy,discourseethicscanthrowlightonthedual
possibilitiesofexistingdemocraticinstitutions,insteadofemphasizingonlytheirdistancefromthenormativeclaimsofthisformoflegitimacy.Ourreformulationof
democraticlegitimacyseversdiscourseethicsfromaformoflifeandevenfromaspecificsetofpoliticalinstitutionssupposedlyderivablefromit.Itthusbreakswith
anyutopiaofafullytransparentdiscourseasaformoflifeaswellaswiththecorrespondingdisregardofalldimensionsofhumanexistencethatgiveititsindexof
particularity.
122
Butwehavenotyetmovedbeyondaconceptionthatfocusesonthecounterfactualcharacterofthisprinciple.Themostparadoxicalconclusionof
thisanalysiswouldbetodenyanypossibilityofderivinginstitutionalconsequencesfromtheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacywhilediagnosingexistingsocietiesas
entirelyundemocratic.Suchaconceptionwouldamounttoadiscoursetheoreticreformulationofthedialecticofenlightenment.OurpointisnotthatHabermas's
socialtheoryisnothingmorethansuchareformulationthiswastrue(partially)onlyforStrukturwandelderffentlichkeit.Rather,weareproposingthatdiscourse
ethicsneedstoberefinedfurtherifitistoberelatedadequatelytothedualisticsocialtheoryemergingfromTheTheoryofCommunicativeAction.
Atissueisthenotionofrationalconsensus.Wemaintainthatitistheextremeformulationofthisnotionthatleadseithertoanuntenableutopiabasedontheideal
speechsituationortoarestatementoftheneoKantiandualismofSeinandSollenintermsofethicsandinstitutions.Wedonot,however,proposetoreplacerational
consensuswiththeliberaldemocraticnotionofempiricalorfactualconsensus.Theobjectionthatsuchareplacementwouldbeimpotentinthefaceofmanipulatedor
enforcedconsensusiswelltaken.Nevertheless,webelieve,withWellmer,thatallconsensusisempirical.Theparametersofdiscourseethicscanexistonlyin
empiricalcontexts.Rationalityinsuchcontextscanbeonlyamatterofdegree.Furthermore,itisalwaysamatterofaprocessofrationalization,inthesenseofthe
developmentofthepotentialityforthecommunicativecoordinationofaction.Accordingly,any

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doubtastotherationalityofaconsensusmustberegardedasahypothesisthatcanbesustainedonlybycarryingoutanotherdiscourse,culminatingina"more
rational"consensus,inthesensethatparticipantsrecognizetheirpreviousunreason.
123
Withthisreformulation,dowecommitourselvestoanoverlyminimalistinterpretationofdiscourseethics?Wewould,ifweweretoassertwithWellmerthatno
evaluationofthelegitimacyofconcreteinstitutionscanbederivedfromtheprincipleofdiscoursebecause"itcanneverbederivedfromprincipleswhatispossiblein
concretehistoricalsituations."
124
Thisstatementbringsthereformulatedversionofthenotionofconsensusbackintotheantinomicstraightjacketwehavealready
analyzed.ButWellmeralsotellsusthat(1)anegativeprocedureforcriticizingexistinginstitutionscanbebasedonMerleauPonty'sprinciplethat"Wecannotintend
therealizationofsense,onlytheeliminationofnonsense,"
125
and(2)"theprincipleofdiscoursecangiveusadirection...thatdemandstheexpansionoftherealmof
discursiverationalitytillthatlimitwhichwe...canfindonlyinhistoricalpractice."
126
Thus,wemightsayinthespiritofthisconceptionthatamoreminimalstatement
ofdiscourseethicsactuallyopensupthefieldforitsinstitutionalimplications:Wecancriticizeexistinginstitutionsandplannewonesifwetakeintoaccountbothwhat
theprinciplerequiresandwhatispossibleinconcretehistoricalsituations.Notonlythedevelopmentofmoralconsciousnessandegoidentitybut"thehistoryof
institutionsandrevolutions''belongstothehistoryoftheunfoldingofuniversalprinciples.
127
Buthowisconcretehistorytobetakenintoaccount?TheWesternMarxisttraditionfromLukcstoAdornotendedtopostulatearupturewithhistory,implicitly
assumingthatemancipationhasnohistoricalbasis.YetHabermasandWellmerhaveexplicitlyrepostulatedhistoricalcontinuitywithoutusingtheorthodoxMarxist
productivistbasistowhichtheirtheoreticalforebearsobjected.
128
Inthenewargument,emancipationhasnormativepreconditionsthat,accordingtoWellmerand
Habermas,existinformallydemocraticsocietiesintheformoftheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasicrights,whichhavebeenestablishedsincethe
seventeenthoreighteenthcenturies.Buttheimplicationsofthispositioninrelationtoinheritedinstitutionsremainunclear.Indeed,Wellmerfindstwostrandsin
Habermas'sworkthatdonot

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coexistverywellonestressingcontinuity,theotherdiscontinuityonelinkedtoarevisedHegeliantradition,theothertoapoliticallyinterpretedMarxiantradition.
129
TheHegeliantraditionimpliesthetheoryofcivilsociety.ToadheretoitcriticallymeanstoacceptneitherHegel'svisionofthemodernstatenoranunchangingviewof
thecapitalisteconomicsystem.Nonetheless,itdoesmeanthatdifferentiationofasphereofnegativefreedomsalongwiththesteeringmechanismofthemarketcannot
beovercomewithoutthemassiveregressionoftotalitarianism.Thesameistruefortherelatedissueoflegaluniversalismandformalism:IntheHegelianmodel,this
cannotbeovercomeintheformofanallegedlyhigher,substantiveformofsocialfreedom.Preservingtheautonomyoflawisnotpossiblewithoutculturally
differentiatingthesphereoflegalityfrommorality,art,andscienceanddistinguishingallofthesefromeverydaylifepractice.Evenarationallyorganizedsocietyinsuch
arevisedHegelianmodelwouldinvolvecontingency,particularity,andhencethecontinuedexistenceofconflictfilledsocialrelations.Finally,emancipationwould
havethemeaningofrealizingthefullpotentialofalreadyinstitutionalizedstructuresofuniversallawandmorality.
ButWellmerinsiststhatanotherMarxistutopiaisalsopresentinHabermas'swork,involvingacommunicationtheoretictranslationoftheprojectofadirect
democraticrepublicofcouncils:"Asocietyfreeofdominationwouldbeoneinwhichcollectiveprocessesofwillformationhavetakenontheformofdiscursively
achievedassociations,withoutcompulsion."
130
WehavealreadyacceptedWellmer'scriticismoftheuseofthetheoryofcommunicationastheconstitutiveframework
forananticipatedutopiaofthissort,andHabermashimselfhadabandonedsuchaconceptionbythemid1970s.Indeed,themodelcannotpossiblywithstandHegel's
critiqueofarationalistenlightenmentconceptoffreedom.YetWellmerisequallyuncomfortablewiththemodelofcivilsocietyderivedfromHegel,
131
becauseitno
longerseemstoallowaclear,sharpconceptualizationoftheideaofarationalsocietyandthereforeofemancipation.Wewanttocontestthislastidea.
Wellmernotestheinternalrelationshipbetweendiscourseethicsandtheconceptofcivilsocietyand,evenmoreimportant,thelinkbetweencivilsocietyandthe
institutionalizationofdiscoursesin

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politicalpublicspheresandparliaments.Hespeaksofdemocraticlegitimacyasitselfinstitutionalizedcapitalistprivatepropertynowappearsasitslimitationrather
thanasthefetteroftheforcesofproduction.However,theformulationofthispointissomewhatambiguous:Capitalistrelationsofproduction"blockthereal
institutionalcarryingoutofthisorganizationalprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacy."
132
Inthecontextofthismetaphor,theMarxianandHegelianalternativesappearas
restatementsoftheold"revolutionorreform"option,andWellmer,afterallourexperiencewiththeseprocesses,canworkuplittleenthusiasmforeither.Nowonder
thattheHabermasianantinomyofdemocraticlegitimacy(whoseunfoldingisassignedtothedevelopmentofnewidentitiesandpoliticalculture)andpseudo
democraticinstitutionsperiodicallyreturnsinhiswork.
133
Ourownconceptionofcivilsociety,inthetraditionofTocqueville,Gramsci,Parsons,and(asweshallshow)thenewdualisticsocialtheoryofHabermashimself,has
achanceoflinkingupwithdiscourseethicsinawaythatavoidsanultimatelynegativeoutcomeinvolvingthetrilemmaofreform,revolution,orresignation.Byusinga
threepartmodelofeconomy,civilsociety,andstate,weremovethealmostdefinitionalconnection(inHegel,andevenmoreinMarx)betweencapitalisteconomy
andmoderncivilsociety.Byfocusingontheantinomiesoftheinstitutionsandthecontradictoryinstitutionaldevelopmentofcivilsociety,weavoidthemodelofdecline
derivedfromtheolderFrankfurtschool,thewombmetaphorofMarx,andalsoallpluralistapologiesforexistingsocieties.Bylinkingthenotionsofdifferentiationand
democracy,wederiveamodelofthepluralityofdemocraciesthatrestorestheutopianthinkingthatWellmerfearedlostwiththeHegelianmodelwithoutbuyinginto
fundamentalismsthatimplyeitherdedifferentiationorthetotalreplacementofsteeringmechanismsbythecommunicativecoordinationofaction.
DiscourseEthicsandCivilSociety
TheconceptofcivilsocietywedefenddiffersfromHegel'smodelinthreeessentialrespects.First,itpresupposesamoredifferentiatedsocialstructure.Takingour
cuefromGramsciandParsons,we

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postulatethedifferentiationofcivilsocietynotonlyfromthestatebutalsofromtheeconomy.
134
Ourconceptisneitherstatecentered,aswasHegel's,however
ambiguously,noreconomycentered,aswasMarx's.Oursisasocietycenteredmodel.
135
Second,followingTocquevilleandtheearlyHabermas,wemakethe
publicspheresofsocietalcommunicationandvoluntaryassociationthecentralinstitutionsofcivilsociety.Ofcourse,theprivate,understoodasthedomainof
autonomousindividualjudgment,isalsocrucialtoamoderncivilsociety.Third,weconceivetheinstitutionalizationofcivilsocietyasaprocessthatalways(asin
Hegel)involvesastabilizationofsocietalinstitutionsonthebasisofrights("abstractright"),butalsoonethathastheimmanentpossibilityofbecomingmoredemocratic
andwhosenormscallfordemocratization.
Civilsocietyinthehistoricalsenseisthegroundofpossibilityofallmodernpoliticalethics,fromsecularnaturallawtodiscourseethics.Thelatterinparticular(whose
forerunnersreachbacktothenineteenthcentury)wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheinstitutionalizationofdiscourseinthemodernliberalpublicsphere.
However,discourseethicsdiffersfromallothermodernpoliticalethics(naturalrights,utilitarianism,Kantianpoliticalphilosophy,andeventhe
recentneocontractarianismandneoAristotelianism)inthatitspoliticalimplicationscenteronthenormativenecessityandempiricalpossibilityofdemocratizationincivil
society.Thus,itistheonlyethicsthatreconcilestheclaimsofclassicalliberalismwithradicaldemocracy.
Weaccepttheargumentthatdifferentmodelsofdemocraticorganizationarecompatiblewiththediscourseethicalprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacy.This
compatibilityneednotbeviewedonlyintermsofanoppositionbetweendirectandrepresentativedemocracy.Therequirementsoftheprincipleofdemocratic
legitimacymaybefulfilled,inprincipleatleast,byadirectdemocracyofcouncilspyramidallyorganized,aswellasbyarepresentativetypeofdemocracywhose
delegatedauthoritiesarecontrolledbyviablepublicsphereswithgeneralaccessandrealpower.But,onanotheraxis,theprincipleiscompatiblewithafederalist
polityaswellasoneorganizedoncentralistlines.Finally,itmayevenbecompatiblewithspheresoflifethatarenotdiscursivelyordemocratically

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organized,aslongastheneedfornondiscursiveorganizationalprinciplesandtheboundariesbetweenthemanddemocraticorganizationsareestablishedand
confirmedindiscursiveprocesses.Weclaim,though,thatdiscourseethicsisnoteasilymadecompatiblewiththesuppressionofalreadyexistingformsofdemocracy.
Thisclaimimpliesthattotalrevolutionisnotlegitimateindemocraticcontexts.Wedonotmeantherebytodenyeitherthelegitimacyofrevolutionsunder
authoritarianismortherightofexcludedpeopleorgroupstorevoltagainsteven"democratic"conditionsthatexcludethem.
136
Wedomean,however,toquestion
attemptstooverturntheformallydemocraticinstitutionsofcontemporarycivilsocietiesbypeoplewho,inprinciple,haveaccesstothem(withtheunlikelyexceptionof
casesinwhichdiscursiveprocedureshaveallowedeveryoneconcernedadirectaccesstothisdecision).Wetakethispositionbecauseframeworksofrepresentative
democracyprovidetheonlyaccessforlargenumbersofpeopletoglobalprocessesofdemocraticwillformation.AsHannahArendtfranklyadmitted,direct
democracyinvolvingconstanthighlevelsofpoliticalparticipationisinevitablyaristocratic.Thus,newformsofdemocracymeanttoreplacetheoldonescanneverin
principlereplacethemforallpeople.Thisdoesnotdenythatmanyofthosewhoseaccesswaspreviouslyweakwouldnot,withtheintroductionofnewforms,find
moremeaningfullyparticipatoryframeworks.Forthisreason,wearguethatexistingformsofdemocracycanbesupplemented,complemented,ordemocratized
accordingtotherequirementsofdiscourseethics,buttheycannotbereplaced.
Theaffinityofdiscourseethicswithapluralityofformsofdemocracyanditsimplicationthatexistingformsnotbesuppressedlinkustocivilsocietyintwoways.First,
civilsocietyandtheexistingformsofrepresentativedemocracypoliticallyandjuridicallypresupposeoneanother.Second,onlyonthegroundofcivilsocietycanan
institutionalizedpluralityofdemocraciesbeconceived.Letusexaminethesetwoclaimsinturn.
First,politicalsocietyorganizedintheformofrepresentativedemocracyandmoderncivilsocietysharetwokeyinstitutionsthat"mediate"betweenthem:thepublic
sphereandvoluntaryassociations.Theframeworksofpoliticallyrelevantpublicdiscussion(the

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media,politicalclubsandassociations,partycaucuses,etc.)andparliamentarydiscussionanddebatearecontinuous.AsevenMarxnoted,itisinconsistent(evenif
temporarilypossible)foraparliament,formallyabodyofdiscussionanddebate,totrytoeliminateoreventoseverelylimitpoliticaldiscussionorvoluntaryassociation
insociety.
137
Butequallyimportant,existingformsofthepoliticallyrelevantpublicsinsociety,throughtheirbuiltinlogic,mustimplytheeventualestablishmentof
suchapublicspherewithintheinstitutionalnetworkofthestateitself,orratherwithinpoliticalsociety.
138
Furthermore,aplural,dynamiccivilsocietyfindsina
parliamentarystructure(togetherwithotherstructuresofcompromise,includingpoliticalparties)themostplausiblegeneralframeworkinwhichtheconflictsof
membergroupsandindividualscanbepoliticallymediated,rivalinterestscanbeaggregated,andthepossibilityofreachingaconsensuscanbeexplored.
Parliamentarystructuresofinterestaggregationandconflictmediation,ontheotherhand,workwellonlyifthereisamoreorlessopenarticulationoftheseonthe
sociallevel.Inshort,inrepresentativedemocracies,politicalsocietybothpresupposesandmustbeopentotheinfluenceofcivilsociety.
139
Onajuridicallevel,theconceptofrightsindicatesasimilarrelationship.Representativedemocracyandmoderncivilsocietysharerightsascommonpresuppositions:
political,communicationrightsarepresuppositionsofparliamentarydemocracy,whilecommunicationandprivaterightsmakemoderncivilsocietypossible.Political
rightspermitandregulatetheaccessofcitizenstoparliamentary(andlocal)representation,whileprivateandcommunicationrightsguaranteetheautonomyofthe
personsandassociationsofcivilsociety.Thus,communicationrightshaveadoublefunction.Thefreedomsofexpression,association,andsoonextendtheautonomy
ofcivilsociety,butwithoutthemtheparliamentarypublicsphereisalsonotpossible.However,therelationshipofrepresentativedemocracyandcivilsocietyonthe
levelofrightsgoesevendeeper.Rights,asagainstprivileges,immunities,orestatetypeliberties,beginandarereaffirmedwhenassertedbyindividuals,groups,or
movementsinthepublicspacesofcivilsociety.Theycanandmustbeguaranteedbypositivelaw,butasrights,thatis,aslimitsonthestateitself,theyarenot
logically

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derivablefromit.Inthedomainofrights,lawsecuresandstabilizeswhathasbeenachievedbysocialactorsincivilsociety.Positivelawinthiscontext,however,is
civilsocietybeingconstitutedandreconstitutedbyitsownactorsthroughapoliticallegislativeorpoliticaljudicialmediation.
Forseveralreasons,moderncivilsocietycannotbeinstitutionalizedwithoutthepoliticalreaffirmationofrightsthroughpositivelaw.First,thecomplexityofmodern
civilsociety(andprobablyofanypostprimitivesociety)requireslegaljuridicalregulationinallspheresoflife.Eventheprivate,intimatespheresareprotectedassuch
bylegaldispensations.Inotherwords,moralityandSittlichkeitcannotandmustnot,asHegelknew,fullysubstituteforlaw,foranysphereofamodernsociety,or
makelawentirelysuperfluous.Thispointholdsforfundamentalrightsaswell:Socialconflictsovertheseandtheirinterpretationandenforcementrequireahighdegree
oflegalregulation.Second,theverypowerofthemodernstatetointerveneinsocietycannotbecontainedwithoutselfimposedlegallimitsonsuchintervention.The
legalizationoffundamentalrightshasthismeaningofselfimposedlimitsonthestate.Inotherwords,rightsbecomelimitsinthissenseonlythroughbeinglegally
posited.
Itisatthispointthatthereisan"electiveaffinity"betweenfundamentalrightsandthemodernrepresentative,democraticpolitics.Whilehistoricallymanyindividual
rightscouldbelegislatedbyauthoritarianormerelyliberalconstitutionalstates,thecatalogueofrightswehaveindicatedasconstitutiveofmoderncivilsocietycanbe
establishedanddefendedinaconvincingmanneronlybyrepresentativedemocracies.Evenifweexcludepoliticalrightsthattautologicallyimplysuchapolity,manyof
thecommunicationrights(asagainstprivateones)ofourcataloguewouldinthemselvesseverelythreatenallotherpoliticalsystemsthatweknowof.Thus,their
acceptanceoftheserightscanbeonlyatacticalconcession.Differentiatingmoderncivilsocietyfromthestatethroughrightsstronglyimpliesrepresentative
democracy.
Second,wecontendthatmoderncivilsocietynotonlylogicallypresupposesand(historically)facilitatestheemergenceofrepresentativedemocracybutalsomakes
historicallypossiblethedemocratizationofrepresentativedemocracy.Thisisinlinewiththe

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tendencyofdiscourseethicstodefendexistingformsofdemocracywhilesimultaneouslydemandingfurtherdemocratization.Boththecomplexityofandthediversity
withincontemporarycivilsocietiescallfortheposingoftheissueofdemocratizationintermsofavarietyofdifferentiatedprocesses,forms,andloci,dependingonthe
axisofdivisionconsidered.Indeed,moderncivilsocietyistheterrainonwhichaninstitutionalizedpluralityofdemocraciescanemerge.Wecanidentifytwosetsof
distinctionsasmostrelevantinthisregard.Thefirsthastodowiththestructuralpossibilitiesandlimitstodemocratizationspecifictoeachdifferentiatedsphere:
political,economic,andcivilsociety.Thesecondconcernspluralizationofdemocraticformswithineachsphere.
Marxmadethepointlongagothat,ifdemocracyisrestrictedtoonesphere(thestate)whiledespoticformsofruleprevailintheeconomyorincivilassociations,then
thedemocraticformsofthefirstspherebecomeundermined.Ontheotherside,allourhistoricalexperienceafterMarxindicatesthatdifferentiationposeslimitsto
democratization.Theneedforsteeringmechanismsforthestateandtheeconomymustberespectedifweexpectthemtofunctionefficiently.This,asiswellknown,
militatesagainsttotaldemocratizationalongthelinesofdirectparticipatorymodels.Yetitwouldbefallacioustoconcludethatnodemocratizationispossibleinthese
domains.Onthecontrary,onceonetakesintoaccountthedifferentlogicsofthecoordinatingmechanismsofeachsphere,itbecomesevidentthatthereareformsof
democracyadequatetoeach,eveniftheyneedtovaryaccordingtotherelevantstructuralconditions.Thispointisclarifiedifwefocusonthespheresofpoliticaland
economicsociety,astheinstitutionallevelsinwhichthemechanismsofstateandeconomyareanchored.
Representativedemocracyonthelevelofpoliticalsocietyarticulatestheminimumdegreeofdemocraticparticipationrequiredbymoderninterpretationsofthe
citizenshipprinciple.Atthesametime,thelimitsposedtodirectparticipationbytheveryexistenceofastate,whosefunctionsarecoordinatedthroughpowerrelations
andwhichisdefinedbyitsmonopolyonthelegitimateuseofforce,areobvious.Theseparationofpowers,theruleoflaw,andrequirementsofefficientbureaucratic
functioningguidedbytheprincipleofdueprocessprecludethedirectparticipationof

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everyoneinpolicymakingatthestatelevel.Atmost,participantscanworkatthislevelindirectlythroughpartyandparliamentarysupervision,control,andpublicity
inotherwords,throughtheinstitutionsofpoliticalsociety.Furtherdemocratizationofaformallydemocraticpolitymustrespecttheselimits.
Politicalsocietyisnotlimitedtoglobalornationalstructures.Thesecanbecomplementedbylocalandregionalstructuresthatcouldallowformoredirectparticipation
thanisusuallythecasetoday.Inaddition,theproceduresforrevisingconstitutionalprinciplesornormscouldbemademoreopen.Moreover,insomecountries,
structuresoffunctionalrepresentation,albeitinundemocratic,corporatistforms,complementterritoriallybasedrepresentativestructures.Theseare,inprincipleat
least,opentomoredemocracyandparticipation,theolddreamofDurkheimandthephilosophicalpluralists.
140
Whatseemstobemissingeverywhereisthe
institutionalizationoftotalsocialinputbylocalandfunctionalbodiesinglobal,open,publicproceduresthatsharelegitimacywithalreadyestablishedrepresentative
bodies.Therecurringcallforasecondparliamentarychamberbytheguildsocialists,AustroMarxists,andotherdemocraticsocialistsallthewaydowntosome
contemporarysocialmovementspointsinthisdirection.Ofcourse,theexactdevicefordemocratizationinthisareacannotbeatissueinourmoreabstractcontext.
Thenotionoffunctionalrepresentationalreadytouchesonquestionsofeconomicdemocracy.Itisclear,however,that,insofarastheeconomyor,rather,economic
societyisconcerned,therequirementsofefficiencyandmarketrationalitycanbedisregardedinthenameofdemocracyonlyatthecostofboth.Herethelevelsof
representationandparticipationneedtobereconciledwiththesocialneedsofproductionandconsumption.Formsofeconomicdemocracyneednotbeasinclusive
asthoseofthepolity.Yet,asindicatedbytheinstitutionalizationofmechanismsofcollectivebargaining,codetermination,andrepresentativeworkers'councils,
democratizationisnotperseincompatiblewithefficientfunctioning.
Thepluralityofdemocraticformsthatarepossibleanddesirablewithrespecttoeconomicsocietycouldinclude,amongothers,consumerandproducercooperatives,
employerandunionrepre

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sentationwithincorporatebodies,councilswithvariouspowers,grievancecommittees,and,aswenowseeinEasternEurope,newformsofownership.Eachofthese
couldinprinciplebemadecompatiblewithefficiencyrequirementsandwithoneanother(oratleastthelossofefficiencyimpliedbythemcouldbekeptwithin
acceptablelimits).Thefurtherdemocratizationofeconomicsocietywouldinvolveinstitutionalizingthesevariousformsofparticipationuptothepointatwhichefficient
steeringisthreatened,andthiscanbedonewithoutdedifferentiatingtheeconomy,society,andthestate.Theintermediaryrealmsofpoliticalandeconomicsociety
thushaveadoublerole:Theystabilizedifferentiationwhileactingasreceptorstotheinfluenceofcivilsocietyaimedattheeconomyandthepolity.
Itisourcentralthesisthatdemocracycangomuchfurtheronthelevelofcivilsocietythanonthelevelofpoliticaloreconomicsociety,becauseherethecoordinating
mechanismofcommunicativeinteractionhasfundamentalpriority.Leavingasidethesystematicaspectsofthisclaim,towhichweshallreturninthenextchapter,itis
inductivelycertainthatthefunctioningofsocietalassociations,publiccommunication,culturalinstitutions,andfamiliesallowsforpotentiallyhighdegreesofegalitarian,
directparticipationandcollegialdecisionmakinghigherthanispossibleforpoliticalpartiesorlaborunions,forexample.Ofcourse,experimentationwithlevelsof
participationcanonlyoccurwhereawiderangeofassociations,publics,andinformalgroupsalreadyexistsandisguaranteedbyrights.Wheresuchpluralityexists,
smallscaleparticipationmaybecome,asTocquevillehoped,notonlytherealsubstanceofdemocraticlocalgovernmentbutabasisforprocessesofselfeducation
thatcanleadtoademocraticpoliticalculture.Manycontemporarycivilsocietiesarelinkedtowhatare,ineffect,quasioligarchicpoliticalpractices,yetthe
foundationsforplurality,involuntaryassociations,universities,andevenchurches,arewellestablished.Thesestructuresarenotalwaysdemocraticandrarelyinvolve
genuineparticipation,butinthecontextofdemocraticnormstheyareconstanttargetsfordemocratization.
InStrukturwandelderffentlichkeit,Habermasalsoarguedforthedemocratizationofexistingcorporateentitiesasonepossiblesolutiontothedeclineofthepublic
sphere.
141
Webelievethatthe

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principleofdemocraticlegitimacy,whenlinkedtothetheoryofcivilsociety,leadstoarevitalizationandextensionofthiskindofalternative,forthreereasons.First,
participationinmodernsocietiesisultimatelyonlyillusoryifthereisnosmallscaleparticipationinadditiontorepresentativeparliaments.Second,discourseethicsin
thiscontextcannotbeusedtovalidatethesuppressionofexistingpluralitiesinthenameofoneallinclusivediscursiveprocess.Third,thedemocratizationofexisting
pluralitiesismorecompatiblewiththepreservationofmodernstructuresthantheir''totalization"bysomekindofcouncilmodel.Thelatterwouldimplythe
reembeddingofsteeringmechanisms(administrations,markets)indirectlysocialrelations,andthiswouldconflictwiththepresuppositionofamoderncivilsociety,
namely,differentiation.Nevertheless,thelimitstodemocratizationonthelevelofthesteeringmechanismwouldbepartlycompensatedforbythedemocratizationof
societalassociationsthatcanindirectlyinfluencethestateandeconomyaswell.
Thenormsofthepublicsphereincivilsociety,evenifdistorted,reflectaconstantdemandfortheoverseeing,control,anddemocratizationofexistingformsof
association.Originallyaformofsocietygenerateddiscursivecontroloverstatebureaucraticpower,theliberalpublicspherehasdeclinedtotheextentthatprivate
associationshavebeentransformedintolargescaleorganizationswithaquasipoliticalcharacterthatarepartiallyresponsiblefortasksofeconomicandpolitical
steering.Thenormativedemandsofpublicityinthenewsituationinherentlyimplythepublicexposureandthedemocratizationoftheseprivateassociations,evenifto
differingextentsincivil,political,andeconomicsociety.Historically,justsuchdevelopments,alongwiththerenewalofalternative,public,formalorganizations,have
complementedprocessesthatdefendtheliberalpublicsphere.Therenewalofpoliticalpubliclifeisaneverpresentpotentialityofthisaspectoftheoverallprocess.
Beyondthenormsofpublicityitself,twocomponentsofdiscourseethicsmilitateforthepluralityofdemocracies:thecritiqueoftheexclusionofanyonewhoisatall
concerned,andthestressonactualparticipation.Infact,allexistingformsofdemocracyhavebuiltinprocessesofexclusion.Liberalrepresentativedemoc

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racyinthenineteenthcenturymodelexcludedpassivecitizens.Modernrepresentativedemocracydiminishestherelevanceof(ifitdoesnotformallyexclude)those
whoarenotmembersofstrongvoluntaryassociationsorpartyorganizations.Directdemocracyexcludesthosewhodonotseekpublichappinessfirstandforemost
(i.e.,thepoliticallyinactive).Territorialdemocracydiscriminatesagainstproducers,industrialdemocracyagainstconsumers.Federalismcanreducetheimportanceof
largenationalmajoritiesaswellasofdissentingindividualsandgroupswithineachmemberunit.Centralizingdemocracyprovidesnoincentiveforpotentiallyimportant
selfgoverningunits.Whilenocombinationoftheseprincipleswouldexcludeexclusionaltogether,fosteringapluralityofformsofdemocracyoffersthepromiseof
meaningfulparticipationonseverallevelsthatareotherwisereducedinimportance.
Letussumup.Democraticlegitimacyandbasicrightsinterpretedinthesenseofdiscourseethicsstronglyimplyapluralityofdemocraciesforwhichmoderncivil
societyrepresentsaninstitutionalterrainofpotentialityintwoways:(1)Thedifferentiationofstate,society,andeconomyasinstitutionalspheresandofpoliticaland
economicsocietybetweenthemallowsdemocracyanddemocratizationtobedefinedaccordingtothedifferentlogicsofthesespheres.(2)Thestructuresof
pluralityactualandpotentialincivilsocietyitselfallowforthepossibilityofdemocratizingthesocialsphereintermsofparticipationandpublicity.Todaythe
questionofdemocracyhasmigratedbacktothesphereinwhichitfirstemergedthatofcivilsociety.Thefurtherdemocratizationofformallydemocraticpolitiesmust
beposedwithreferencetocivilsocietyandnotsimplytothestateortheeconomy.Discourseethicsaswehaveinterpretedit,togetherwitharevisedtheoryofcivil
society,notonlyallowsforsuchanapproachbut,asanethicsofdemocratization,demandsitaswell.Iftheprincipleofrightsbasedondiscourseethicsimpliesthe
protectionofmoderncivilsociety,theprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyimpliesitsdemocratizationbeyondtheliberaldemocraticmodel.
Thepluralityofdemocraciesasconceivedhereisutopian.Themeaningofthisutopia,however,isopentotwoverydifferentinterpretations.Thefirstwould
presupposecontinuitywiththeexistinginstitutionalframeworkofmoderncivilsociety.Thiswould

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involveaninstitutionalprojectinpartarticulatedonthebasisofaphilosophicalethicsthatwould,ofcourse,requiredynamicagenciesofallkindsforitsrealization.
Wellmerrightlypointsoutthathistoricalprobabilitycannotbederivedfromaphilosophicalethics.However,anexistinginstitutionalframeworkcanmediatebetween
oughtandis,betweenphilosophyandexistingsociety.
Iftheinstitutionalframeworkofcivilsocietyturnsouttobeanachronisticinlightofwhatweknowaboutcontemporarystatesandeconomies,wewouldindeedbe
dealingwithautopiainasecondsenseofapureoughtthatshouldnotbeimposedonarecalcitrantreality.Inthiscase,discourseethicsshouldcertainlybefreedfrom
theuselessweightoftheconceptofthepluralityofdemocracies.Whatisatissue,then,istheviabilityofareformulatedconceptofcivilsocietyinrelationto
contemporaryconditions.Thisreformulationusingthelanguageandargumentsofmodernsocialtheory,whichwefeelstillprovideourbestaccesstocontemporary
societyisournextgoal.

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9
SocialTheoryandCivilSociety
ReconstructingCivilSociety
Perhapsbecauseithasbecomesofashionable,theideaofcivilsocietyisincreasinglyambiguoustoday.Whenarticulatedbysocialactors,thenotionofrebuildingor
defendingcivilsocietycertainlytendstoincreasemobilization.Buttheirimageryisnotreallyadequateasafoundationforcriticalselfreflectionorevenfororientation
inrelationtothemostimportantconstraintsoncollectiveaction.Itisequallyeasyforsuchactorstoslipintofundamentalistposturesortoidentifytheprojectofcivil
societywiththegoalsofeconomicandpartypoliticalelites,therebyrenouncingtheirownautonomyandoriginality.Whatisneededisaconceptionofcivilsocietythat
canreflectonthecoreofnewcollectiveidentitiesandarticulatethetermswithinwhichprojectsbasedonsuchidentitiescancontributetotheemergenceoffreer,more
democraticsocieties.
Eventhebesttheoriesofcivilsocietyinheritedfromthepastcannotaccomplishthesetaskstoday.Thecontemporaryweaknessofprojectsdirectlybasedonthe
conceptionsofHegel,Tocqueville,Gramsci,orParsonsderivesnotonlyfromtheirveryrealinternalantinomies,whichwehaveexplored,butalsofromtheirrelative
vulnerabilityinthefaceofcriticssuchasArendt,Schmitt,theyoungHabermas,andFoucault.Withoutadoubt,thethesesconcerningthedeclineofthepublicsphere
andthetransformationofthesocialintonewformsofmanipulation,control,anddominationcorrespondatleastaswelltotheexperienceofthe

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advancedcapitalistcountriesasdotheoptimisticviewsofthetheoreticaldefendersofcivilsocietywhoseedemocraticpublics,intactsolidarities,andformsof
autonomyeverywhere.ButwhentheviewsofastaunchlyrealisticanalystofexistingsocietylikeLuhmannstarttomatchthoseofthemostradicalcritics,
1
the
defendersofcivilsociety,whoseeyesareoftenclosedtonegativephenomena,starttofallunderthesuspicionofideology.
Tobeusabletoday,thecategoryofcivilsocietymustbereconstructed.Wedefine"reconstruction,"inthenonsystematicsense,as"takingatheoryapartandputtingit
backtogetheragaininanewforminordertoattainmorefullythegoalithassetitself."
2
Thisisthenormalwayof"dealingwithatheorythatneedsrevisioninmany
respectsbutwhosepotentialforstimulationhasstillnotbeenexhausted."
3
Inourreconstructionofthecategoryofcivilsociety,weshallrely,albeitcritically,onthe
secondstepofHabermas'sowntwosteptheoreticalstrategy,namely,thedevelopmentofadualisticsocialtheorythatdifferentiatesandlinkstheequallynecessary
methodologiesdealingwith"lifeworld"and''system."
4
Weproceedinthefollowingsteps.(1)Usingathreepartmodeloflifeworldandpoliticalandeconomicsubsystems,
5
wedeepentheparadigminheritedfromGramsci
andParsons,andwealsodevelopittoreflectthemoreadvancedtheoryofdifferentiationavailableinLuhmann,tohelprelativizeandlimitthefusionargumentof
Schmittandtheothers.(2)InthefaceofLuhmann'ssystemtheoreticobjections,wetrytodemonstratethemodernityofcivilsociety,understoodintermsofa
lifeworldcapableofrationalization.Inparticular,weshowtheroleofnormativelearningandoffundamentalrightsinstabilizingmoderncivilsocieties.(3)Todealwith
thegenealogicalandideologicalattacksoncivilsociety,weusethenotionsofreificationandcolonizationofthelifeworldtoshowthatallthenegativephenomena
stressedbycriticscanbeaccommodatedinourconception,unlikeearlierversionsofthethreepartmodel.Inparticular,wedemonstratethehistoricallinkbetween
onesidedstrugglesofemancipationandtheemergenceofstatesocietyeconomyrelationsburdenedbynewformsofheteronomy,culminatingintheformsof
colonizationcharacteristicofwelfarestates.Nevertheless,(4)weinsist,againstthosewhodoubtthecriticalimplicationsoftheconceptofcivil

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societyandaccuseusof"soullessreformism,"thatthemodelofadifferentiatedcivilsocietyretainsitsutopianpromiseinwelfarestatesaswellasinstatesformerly
governedbystatesocialism,apromisethatpointstothereconstructionanddefenseofpublicityandintimacyinanewmodelofrights.(5)Wetrytoshowthatthe
utopiaofcivilsocietyisnotmerelyanabstract"ought"inrelationtoexistingheteronomousversions.InthefaceofvariousFrankfurttypetheoriesofone
dimensionalityandtotaladministration,weoutlineaconceptionshowingthatthenegativephenomenawehaveinsistedonrepresentonlyonesideofaninstitutional
fabricofthecapitalistdemocracies.Finally,inthelongestsectionofthischapter,wepresentadetailedpoliticalprojectfordemocratizingexistingcivilsocieties,in
termsofthereflexivecontinuationofboththedemocraticrevolutionandthewelfarestate.Webelievethatsuchaprojectwouldalsoallowareorientationofpolitical
strategiesinEasternEuropeawayfromtheprobablyunfeasible(and,inouropinion,undesirable)alternativeoftheWest'spastandpresenttowardamodelbasedon
apossible(and,inouropinion,normativelydesirable)commonfuture.
CivilSociety,Lifeworld,andtheDifferentiationofSociety
Thesuperiorityofathreepartframeworkfortheunderstandingofcivilsocietyisfundamentalforourconception.
6
Thedichotomousmodelofstateandsociety,still
usedbysomeMarxistsandparticularlybyneoliberals,neoconservatives,andpresentdayheirsofutopiansocialism,
7
representsaquintessentiallynineteenthcentury
figureofthought.Bothofitssocialhistoricalfoundationsareincludedintheambiguousterm"liberal":theantiabsolutiststrugglepresupposingandtemporarily
cementingthe"polemical"unityofallsocialforces(Schmitt),andtheemergenceforthefirstandprobablylasttimeinhistoryofan"economicsociety"dominatedbya
selfregulatingmarketmechanism(Polnyi).
AsLuhmannhasshown,theinconsistentideasofanallinclusiveeconomicsocietyandofadichotomybetweenstateandsocietyrepresentcharacteristicformsof
consciousness(forhim,"falseconsciousness")oftheliberalepoch.
8
BothsophisticatedMarxistsandliberals,especiallywhendealingwithpolitics,preferredthe

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dichotomousconceptionofbrgerlicheGesellschafttothepurelyeconomicone.Fromourreview,thereasonseemsobvious.WhetherweacceptPolnyi's
argumentforatendencytowardareductionofallsocialrelations(habitat,status,culture)tomarketeconomiconesorLuhmann'sthesisoftheemergenceofanew
functionalprimacyoftheeconomy,wecannotavoidobservingthatthegrowthofaselfregulatingeconomydidnotnegatebutoccurredalongsidetheemergenceof
theincreasinglydifferentiatedapparatusofthemodernstate.IntermsofPolnyi'sconcepts,thiscanbeexplainedbythepoliticaldemandsinvolvedinmaintainingthe
negatively"utopian"preconditionsofreducingland,labor,andproductiveenterpriseto"fictitious"commodities.
9
Ashesays,unlikethebeginningofplanning,"laissez
fairewasplanned."
10
ForLuhmann,theprimacyoftheeconomyallows,forstructuralreasons,greaterdifferentiationthantheearlierprimacyofthepolitical,andit
furthersthetransformationofadiffusestructureofpoliticalreligioussocialeconomicdominationintoamodernstatethatismorepowerfulthanitspredecessor.
Althoughlessreductionistthantheideaofeconomicsociety,thedichotomousmodelofstateand(economic=civil)societyisstillreductionist.InLuhmann'sterms,the
economyisnevertheonlysocialenvironmentofthestatethedifferentiationoftheeconomyassumesandpromotesthedifferentiationofotherspheres:law,science,
art,andfamily.
11
EveninPolnyi'smoredynamicmodel(whichwasfarmoresensitivetothedangersofourcivilization),theutopiaoftheselfregulatingmarketand
thecreationofa"marketsociety"wasnever,norcouldeverbe,completelysuccessfulinitseffortsatselfclosure,asshownbythe"countermovementofsociety."
Accordingly,the"society"ofthenineteenthcenturycontainedtwoverydistinct"organizingprinciples"indeeppotentialconflict:economicselfregulationandsocietal
selfprotection.
12
Wewouldaddthattheconflictbetweenthetwoprinciples(economicliberalanddemocratic)increasesandbecomesopen,especiallyastheold
enemyofsocietalforces,thebureaucraticauthoritarianstateinitsinheritedform,isabolishedordecisivelyweakened.Thedichotomousmodel,whateveritsrelative
meritsindescribingtheclassicalliberalepoch,couldnotdescribeeithertheforcesbehinditstransformationorthenewstructureofsociety.

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Suchisthematrixoftheoriginsofthethreepartmodelofcivilsocietyeconomystaterelations.Polnyi'sdiscoverywasvitiatedbyhisownultimateidentification
ofstateregulationandeventhestatizationoftheeconomywiththeselfdefenseofsociety.BattlingagainstMarxistandliberalversionsofreductionism,respectively,
GramsciandParsonswerethefirsttoseethatcontemporarysocietyisreproducednotonlythrougheconomicandpoliticalprocesses,oreventheirneworrenewed
fusion,butthroughtheinteractionoflegalstructures,socialassociations,institutionsofcommunication,andculturalforms,allofwhichhaveasignificantdegreeof
autonomy.BothwriterswereinfluencedbyHegel.Bothunderstoodtherevivalofassociationallifenotasthefusionofthelogicsofprivateandpublic,economyand
state,butastherecreationofafabricofsocietalintermediationsolderthantheindustrialandFrenchrevolutions,inanewandposttraditionalform.
ItisdoubtfulthatthemodelsofGramsciorofParsonscouldbesustainedagainstthefusionargumentwehaveseeninSchmitt,inHabermas'sStrukturwandel,and
eveninArendt,whichisthealternativewayofconceivingthe"greattransformation"ofliberalsociety.Gramsciwasnotoriouslyunabletodistinguishclearlybetween
stateandcivilsociety,dominationandhegemony,andhewasable(orwilling)tothematizetheindependentinstitutionsofcivilsocietymostofthetimeonlyintermsof
theirfunctionforreproducingtheexistingstateandeconomy.Inthispicture,civilsocietycouldstillbeseenastheextensionofastateitselfservingthereproductionof
thegiveneconomicorder.Hegemonywouldthusremainthecontinuationofdominationbyothermeans.Parsons,havingmadethesocietalcommunitythenormative
centerofsociety,coulddeclareitsindependence,buthistreatmentofsocietalcommunity,state,andeconomyasentirelyanalogoussubsystems,eachregulatedbya
discretemediumofexchange,impliesthathehasreplacedsubstantivewithmethodologicalreductionism.Forthisreason,amongothers,heistotallyinsensitivetothe
phenomenaofstatizationandeconomizationemphasizedbythefusiontheorists.AsindicatedbyhisonesidedadoptionofPolnyi'sargument,whichallowshimtosee
onlythedifferentiationbutnotthe(transitional)dominanceoftheselfregulatingmarket,heisunabletoconceivethethreattocivilsocietyfromthe

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logicofthelarge,expandingstructuresofthemodernstateandthecapitalisteconomy.Thus,Gramsci'sandParsons'sdifferentformsoffunctionalismhaveopposite,
yetequallyundesirable,consequencesforatheoryofcivilsociety.Theformeryieldsapictureoverlyintegratedinthegivenstructureofdomination,andthelatterleads
toamodelofselfregulationandboundarymaintenancethatisunrealisticallyimmunetoheteronomy.
Weneedatheorycapableofthematizingboththethreatandthepromise.Habermas's"critiqueoffunctionalistreason"
13
providesthebestavailableconceptual
frameworkforreconstructingthethreepartmodelofcivilsociety.Atfirstglance,themethodologicallydualisticdistinctionbetweensystemandlifeworldappearstobe
Habermas'sversionofthestate/civilsocietydualitythathasinformedtheliberalandstandardMarxianmodels.Uponcloserexamination,however,thethesisthattwo
subsystemsaredifferentiatedbothfromeachotherandfromthelifeworldimpliesamodelthatcorrespondsmorecloselytoatripartiteframeworkoftheGramscian
type.Inthistheory,themediaofmoneyandpower,integratingeconomyandstaterespectively,areseenaslessanalogousintheiroperationthanParsonsproposes.
Their"standardsituations"involveafundamentallydifferentstructure:exchangelinkedtogainandultimatelytoa"positivesanction"inthecaseofmoneysuband
superordinationinthecaseofpower,linkedultimatelytoa"negativesanction"exercisedfromahierarchicallydifferentiatedpositionpreservinganelementofdirect
command.Thisdifferenceleadsnotonlytoconditionsofweakersymbolizationinafarmoreheterogeneoussystemofcodes,lessfluidcirculation,lessstable
accumulation,greaterdifficultiesinmeasurement,andgreaterdependenceonorganizationbutalsotoaneedtocompensateforasymmetriesinrulingandbeingruled
bydirectlegitimationlinkedtotraditionoragreement.
14
Thestructureofinstitutionalizationviacivilandpubliclawreflectsthisdifference:Onlythelatterislinkedto
"obligation.''
15
Unlikemoney,furthermore,generatingandevenpreservingpowerpresupposeregenerationintheworldofcommunicativeaction.
16
Yetpower,like
money,islinkedtoareferencetoempiricalmotivations,namelyinterests,andprovidesa"certainautomatism"ininteractionbasedonacapabilityofdramatic
substitutionforordinary

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languagecommunication.Itis,accordingly,institutionalizedastheconstitutivesteeringmediumofthemodernstate,albeitonalowerlevelofformalizationthanmoney.
17
Thus,methodologicaldualismispreservedwithrespecttothe"logic"ofthethreeinstitutionalspheres.Thetwomedia/subsystemsparticipateinthesamefundamental
socialfunction,thatofsystemintegration,whichreferstotheunintendedfunctionalinterdependenciesoftheeffectsofactioncoordinatedwithoutreferencetoactors'
orientationsornorms.
18
Yetmethodologicaldualismleadstoathreepartframework.Thedifferencesandsimilaritiesintheformsofinstitutionalizationofthemodern
stateandthecapitalisteconomy,whiledistinguishingthemfromthelifeworld,aresufficienttoindicatethreedifferentpatternswithina"twostep"theoryofsociety.The
twotypesofdifferentiation,betweenlogicsinonecaseandformsofinstitutionalizationintheother,alsoaffectthemeaningoftheinteractionofthesethreespheres.
Whilethedirectionofinfluenceandthedegreeofinterpenetrationbetweenlifeworldandsysteminvolveissuesofnormativeprinciple,thedegreeoftheinter
penetrationofstateandeconomy(their"doubleinterchange")anditsdirectionalitynowbecome''merely"technicalproblems.
Theconceptofthelifeworld,sociallyintegratedthroughinterpretationsofanormativelysecuredorcommunicativelycreatedconsensus,occupiesatheoreticalspace
similartothatofcivilsocietyinthethreepartmodel.Indeed,HabermasoftenintroducesthelifeworldasatranslationofParsons'snotionofsocietalcommunity,
althoughinawidersynthesisthatsometimesincludescultureandatothertimespersonalityaswell.
19
Withthissaid,itisnotatallselfevident,evenonasuperficial
level,thattheconceptofthelifeworldcanbetranslatedwithoutdistortionintothatofcivilsociety.Onthecontrary,theseconceptsseemtooperateonverydifferent
categoricallevels,especiallyifonethinksofthephenomenologicaltraditionofconceptualizingthelifeworld.
20
Itisourthesisnonethelessthattheconceptofthelifeworld,asHabermasadvancesit,hastwodistinctlevelsthat,ifadequatelydifferentiatedandclarified,willallowus
topinpointtheexactlocusofcivilsocietywithintheoverallframework(figure1).
21
Ontheonehand,thelifeworldreferstothereservoirofimplicitlyknown

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Subsystem: Economy State
Lifeworldinstitution: personality socialintegration culture
Symbolicresource: competence solidarity meaning
Structuralbackground: linguisticculturallifeworld

figure1
traditions,thebackgroundassumptionsthatareembeddedinlanguageandcultureanddrawnuponbyindividualsineverydaylife.Thelinguisticallystructuredstockof
knowledge,thereservoirofunshakenconvictions,andtheformsofsolidarityandcompetencethatareusedandrelieduponaregiventoactorswithoutquestion.
Thus,individualscanneitherstepoutoftheirlifeworldnorbringitintoquestionasawhole.ItisonthislevelespeciallythatHabermasintegratedthedeeperlevelsof
theParsonianconceptofculture,givingit,however,thestructureofinterpenetratinglinguisticmeaningsandresourcesratherthanthatofaboundarymaintainingsystem.
AccordingtoHabermas,thelifeworldhasthreestructuralcomponentsculture,society,andpersonalityandthesecanbedifferentiatedfromoneanother.
22
Tothe
extentthatactorsmutuallyunderstandandagreeontheirsituation,theyshareaculturaltradition.Insofarastheycoordinatetheiractionthroughintersubjectively
recognizednorms,theyactasmembersofasolidarysocialgroup.Asindividualsgrowupwithinaculturaltraditionandparticipateingrouplife,theyinternalizevalue
orientations,acquiregeneralizedactioncompetences,anddevelopindividualandsocialidentities.
23
Reproductionofnotonlytheculturallinguisticbackgroundbut
alsotheseconddimensionofthelifeworldits"institutional"or"sociological"componentsoccursinthemediumofcommunication.
24
Thisinvolvesthereproductive
processesofculturaltransmission,socialintegration,andsocialization.But,andthisisthemainpointforus,thestructuraldifferentiationofthelifeworld,whichispart
ofthe

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modernizationprocess,occursthroughtheemergenceofinstitutionsspecializedinthereproductionoftraditions,solidarities,andidentities.
Habermas'sdiscussionofthestructuralcomponentsofthelifeworldfocusesonreconstructingtheformofthestockofknowledge,therelieduponsolidarities,andthe
abstractcompetencesofpersonalitiesthatourculturemakesavailabletous.Butthisreconstructioninvolvesarangeofinstitutionsthatcanbeequatedneitherwiththe
culturalbackgroundknowledgeonwhichtheydrawnorwiththesteeringmechanismsthatcoordinateactionintheeconomy(money)orinformallyorganized,
bureaucraticallystructuredorganizations(power).
25
Itishere,ontheinstitutionallevelofthelifeworld,thatonecanrootahermeneuticallyaccessible,becausesocially
integrated,conceptofcivilsociety.Thisconceptwouldincludealloftheinstitutionsandassociationalformsthatrequirecommunicativeinteractionfortheir
reproductionandthatrelyprimarilyonprocessesofsocialintegrationforcoordinatingactionwithintheirboundaries.
Identifyingcivilsociety,acategoryofpoliticaltheoryandpoliticalsociology,withthetermsofageneralsociologywouldleadtoanoverlypoliticizedunderstandingof
thesocialstructure.NeitherParsons'ssocietalcommunitynorHabermas'slifeworldisintendedsonarrowly.Ithelps,therefore,torestricttheeffortoftranslatingthese
conceptstopoliticalandeconomicsociologytothestudyofinstitutionsandprocessesthataredirectlyrelevantpoliticallyandeconomicallyandarealsorootedinthe
generalsocialstructure.Habermashimselfhelpsusinthiseffortand,interestinglyenough,intheprocesslinkshisdualisticsocialtheorytohisearlierunderstandingof
publicandprivate.Hepositsthatmoneyandpoliticalpowerrequire,fortheirestablishmentandanchoringasmedia,aninstitutionalizationintheverylifeworldfrom
whichtheyaredifferentiated.Thisisaccomplishedbythemechanismsofcivil(orprivate)andpubliclaw,respectively.
26
Thesemechanismsconstituteandarerooted
intwodistinctcomplexesofinstitutions:theprivateandthepublic.Thus,lookedatfromthepointofviewofthesteeringsystems,thethreepartmodelbecomes
articulatedasafourpartmodelunderstoodintermsoftheredoublingnotonlyofthepublicsphere(asintheStrukturwandel)butoftheprivatesphereaswell.
27

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UnlikethemodelofStrukturwanded,inthepresentcontextthepublicandprivatespheresareseennotasmediationsbutassphereswithinthelifeworldwithwhich
economyandstatecanhaveinputoutputrelationsstructuredexclusivelyintermsofinterchangesofmoneyandpower,whichalsostructurestateeconomyrelations.
Thissystemstheoreticpointofview,whosedeficiencieswilllateroccupyus,hassomeimportantadvantages.Thefirstandmostobviousisthatwecanfollow
Luhmanninreplacingthenotionoffusionwiththatofincreasinglycomplexinputoutputrelations,simultaneouslyincreasingautonomyandinterdependence.Thismay
seemtocarrytheliabilityofbuyingintoaframeworkofdifferentiationinwhichcivilsocietyanditsvariousreplacementsdisappearorareabsorbedbythepolitical
systemanargumentthatinvolves,aswehaveseen,asystemstheoreticrestatementofthefusionthesisbutLuhmann'sowneffortstoworkoutthefunctionofthe
publicsphereandofthelegalsystemalsoleadtoacharacteristicdoubling,insideandoutsidethepoliticalsubsystem.Habermas'sscheme(figure2),whichretains
systemstheoretictermsofexchange,isinfactidenticaltothisoutcomeofLuhmann'spartiallyfailedattempttoeradicatethecategoryofcivilsociety.Unlikethepoint
ofviewofthelifeworld,thisschemedoeswithoutstructuresofintegrationbetweenpublicandprivatespheres.Insteadofdestroyingcivilsocietybyabsorption,here
thedangerisdestructionthroughfragmentation.Weshallreturntothispoint.
Thesecondadvantageofthisframeworkoverdualisticmodelsofstateandcivilsocietyisthatitallowsaclarificationofthestructuralinterrelationsamongcivilsociety,
economy,andstatebyseveringtheideological,onetoonecorrelationofcivilsocietywiththeprivatesphereandofthestatewiththepublicsphere.Thetwosetsof
publicandprivatedichotomies,oneatthelevelofsubsystems(state/economy)andoneatthelevelofcivilsociety(publicsphere/family),allowadistinctionbetween
twomeaningsofprivatizationand"publicization."Asaresult,stateinterventionintotheeconomyisnotautomaticallyequivalenttostatepenetrationoftheprivate
sphere,anymorethaneconomicliberalizationmustlogicallymeantheerosionofpublicandprivatespheres.Conversely,giventhetwomeaningsof"private,"unlike
thecaseof

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Public Private
System politicalsubsystemor"state" economicsubsystem
Lifeworld publicsphere privatesphere
figure2
thedichotomousmodelofstateandsociety,thewithdrawalofthestatehereneednotbetothebenefitoftheexpansionoftheprivateeconomy,andthelimitationof
theprivateeconomyneednotbeseenmerelyastheothersideofthegrowthofstateintervention.
28
Here,too,thereisacorrespondingdisadvantagetothismodel,thoughnottothebenefitofitssimplerdichotomouscompetitor.Fromthestandpointofexchange
relationsbetweenthetwosubsystemsandcivilsociety,theframeworkistoosymmetrical.Itisinthiscontextthatthesystemstheoreticschematizingofthelifeworld
fromthepointofviewofspheresthatcanenterintomonetaryandpowerinputoutputrelationsagainshowsitslimits.Ofthethreeinstitutionaldimensionsofthe
lifeworld,thenotionsofpublicandprivateasusedhereactivateonlythoseofthereproductionofcultureandpersonality.Theinstitutionsofsocialintegration,
institutionalizedgroups,collectives,andassociationsareomittedfromthistreatment,despitetheirobviouspoliticalandeconomicrelevance.Intheirabsence,the
possibilitythatlifeworldinstitutionscaninfluence"theformallyorganizeddomainsofaction"
29
isnotreallythematizedtheideathatcommunicationbetweenlifeworld
andsystemcouldusechannelsotherthanthemediaofmoneyandpowerisnotevenraised.Weshallalsoreturntotheseissues,whichagainreproduceinHabermas's
schemesomeofthelimitationsofLuhmann'smodel.
Thetheoryweadoptrespondstothefusionargumentontwolevels:byreconceptualizingdifferentiationinamannersimilartoLuhmann's,andbydifferentiatingthe
spheres(economy,privatesphere,etc.)traditionallygroupedasthepresumedtargetsofdedifferentiation.Fromtheempiricalpointofview,bothofthesetheoretical
choicescanbeimportantmoreover,inanygivencontext,itispossiblethatneitherversionnoreventheircombinationcaneliminatethepossibilityof
"dedifferentiation."Unlike

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Parsons,wedonotwishtoreplacewhatwasalwaysintendedasan"empiricaldiagnosis"(i.e.,fusion)witha"prioranalyticaldistinction"(i.e.,differentiation).
30
Even
Luhmannconsidersdedifferentiationwiththepoliticalsystemasitscenterasagenuinepossibilityinmodernsocieties.Polnyi'streatmentoftheselfregulatingmarket
hadanalogousconsequenceswithrespecttothedynamismoftheeconomicsystem.Themodelwehaveadoptedisempiricallyopentobothoftheseformsoffusion
ordedifferentiation.
31
Inthetwentiethcentury,themirrorof"totalitarian"politicizationshowstheabsurdityofapplyingthefusionargumentliterallytodemocraticwelfarestates.
32
Asthe
experienceofSoviettypesocietiesindicates,itispossibletocompletelypoliticize"fromabove"forrelativelylongperiodsallfoursphereswehaveisolated:the
economy,therealmsofculture,personality,andassociationallife.Yetourtwolevelconceptionofthelifeworldallowsustosayevenherethatthelinguisticcultural
substratumofcivilsocietywasnotdestroyed,thuspreservingtheconstituentconditions(meanings,solidarities,competences)forlatereffortsatreconstitution.
Thesituationismorecomplexforinterventionismandcorporatismundercapitalistdemocracies.Evenifweconsideredthesetobequasitotalitarian,inthetraditionof
theolderFrankfurtschool,andevenifwethoughtthatthetendenciestowardpoliticizationfromaboveandcorporatismfrombelowfullycomplementedeachother,
wewouldstillhavetoadmitthepossibilityavailableundertotalitarianismnamely,thereconstitutionofcivilsocietyoutsideofofficialinstitutionsonthebasisofthe
culturalpotentialsofthelifeworld.
33
Oncloserexamination,theproblemturnsouttobemoreanartifactofanunacceptableoverextensionofamodeloftotalitarianism
thanderivativefromatwopartmodel.ThisisclearfromtheworkofClausOffe,whohasnotedtwoseparableproblems:maintaining(liberal)democraticbridgesor
mediationsbetweencitizenandstate,
34
andthecompatibilityofdemocracyandcapitalism.
35
Inthiscontext,corporatism,implyingfusionandtheshrinkingof
mediation,andwelfarestateinterventionism,implyingonlythegrowthofcomplexinputoutputrelationswiththeeconomy,donotattackandendangerthesame
societalstructures.Theirfunctionalcomplementarityforthereproductionof"democraticcapitalism"neednotbeseenaspartof

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thesingleprocessoffusion.Corporatismnevereliminatesorreplacesacomprehensivenetworkofvoluntaryassociationsstateinterventionismleavesinplacelarge
competitiveandmarketorientedsectorsofcapitalisteconomies.Thethreattosocialintegrationrepresentedbybothprocessesthefirstdirectly,thesecond
indirectlythroughtheextensionofthemoneymediumisreal.Butsoaretheinstitutionalizedandculturalresourcesofacivilsocietypotentiallycounteringthem:legal
rights,associations,andautonomousinstitutionsofcultureononelevelsharedmeanings,solidaritiesandpersonalcompetencesontheother.
BeyondTraditionalCivilSociety
Atheoryofdifferentiationcannotinitselfreconstructtheconceptofcivilsociety.WehaveseenhowatheorysuchasthatdevelopedbyLuhmanntendstoleadeither
totheabsorptionorthefragmentationofthetopos.AndwhileLuhmanncannotavoidredifferentiatinglegalityandpublicity,heresiststheirrelocationintoasingle
networkofinstitutionallife,which,inhisopinion,waspossibleonlyintheformofatraditional,corporateorganizationofcivilpoliticalsociety.Ontheotherside,while
recognizingtheinternalconnectionofpersonalityandcommunicationundertheconditionsofmodernity,herefusestoconsiderthepossibilitythatthisinternal
connectionhasasubstratum,namely,thelifeworld.Althoughalifeworldlinkedtoactualprocessesofcomingtoanunderstandingappearsinhisconception,itdoesso
onlyunderpremodernconditions,beforetheemergenceofgeneralizedmedia,whentraditionyieldedthefoundationsofaconsensusthatcouldbeimmuneto
discursivethematizationandcouldeliminatetheneedformuchtimeconsumingdiscussion.
36
Whilereconstructingtheconceptofcivilsocietyintermsofthelifeworld
mightbelogicallypossibleinLuhmann'sframework,thesynthesisasawholewouldbeconsignedtotraditionalsociety.Hewouldthuscontestnotthepossibilitybut
themodernityofthemodelofcivilsocietythatwepropose.
Webelievethatourreconstructionrespondstotheproblemofmodernityfarbetterthananyprevioustheoryofcivilsociety.Thedifferentiationbetweenthetwo
dimensionsofthelifeworldnot

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onlyindicatesthelocusofcivilsocietywithinageneralsystematicconceptionbutalsoallowsustodevelop,onallrelevantlevels,theimportantdistinctionbetweena
traditionalandamoderncivilsociety.Toputitanotherway,theanalyticdistinctionsbetweensystemandlifeworldandbetweenthetwolevelsofthelifeworlditself
pointawaybeyondthechoice,insistedonbyLuhmann,betweenatraditional,corporatelyorganized,civilsocietydependentonanethosorSittlichkeitanda
modernframeworkofdifferentiationthathasnoplaceforcivilsocietyevenintheguiseofsocietalcommunityorcommunicativelyreproducedlifeworld.
Tobeginwith,thetwolevelconceptionofthelifeworldallowsustoconceivetheunityofacivilsocietynotonthelevelofinstitution,organization,orevenashared,
fundamentallyunquestionednormativeorder.Theculturallinguisticbackground,thesourceoftheunderlyingunityofthewholelifeworldcomplex,isneitheran
institutionnoranorganizationbutanetworkofresourcesforinstitutionsandorganizations.Moreover,itcanhaveashared,unquestionednormativecontentonlyin
traditionalsociety,andeventhenthisisnotnecessary.Traditionalsocietyisinfactdefinedherenotintermsofacommontraditionbutbyitstraditionalrelationto
traditionsandultimatelytothelifeworlditself.Theideaofthemodernizationofthelifeworld,ontheotherhand,impliestwointerlockingprocesses:adifferentiation,on
thesociologicallevel,ofthestructuralandinstitutionalcomponentsofthelifeworld,andtheirresultinginternalrationalizationandtherationalizationofthecultural
linguisticsubstratumofthelifeworld.
Itisdifficulttoseparatethesetwoprocessesandimpossibletoprioritizethem.Tosomeextent,eachpresupposesandfosterstheother.Thedifferentiationonthe
sociologicallevelprecludesthealreadysomewhatillusivepossibilityoftreatingsocietyasasingleorganizednetworkofinstitutions(ofkinshiporofcivilpolitical
society).Whatisinvolvedisthedifferentiationnotonlyofinstitutionsofsocialization(family,education),socialintegration(groups,collectives,andassociations),and
culturalreproduction(religious,artistic,scientific)butalsooftheconstituentsofthespheresofpersonality,"society,"andculture.Intheprocess,socialinstitutions
graduallybecomeuncoupledfromworldviewsandconcretepersons,thescopeofcontingencyforformingpersonalidentities

Page435
andinterpersonalrelationsisfreedfromtraditionalvaluesandinstitutions,andtherenewalandcreationofcultureisfreedfromthedominanceofsocialinstitutionswith
otherthanculturalpurposestheresultistheemergenceofacriticalandreflectiverelationtotradition.
37
Theprocessofdifferentiationcontinueswithineachinstitutionalcomplex.Inthiscontext,socalledculturalrationalizationrepresentsthebridgetothemodernizationof
thedeeper,linguisticculturalsubstratumofthelifeworld.Therationalizationofcultureinvolvesthedifferentiationoftheculturalspheresintosetsofinstitutionsgrouped
aroundthecognitiveinstrumental,aestheticexpressive,andmoralpracticalvaluesorformsofvalidityfirstcalledtoattentionbyNietzsche,Weber,andtheneo
Kantians.ForHabermas,itisthismodernizationoftheculturalspheresofthelifeworldthatmakespossible(butnotnecessary)thedevelopmentofposttraditional,
communicativelycoordinated,andreflexiveformsofassociation,publicity,solidarity,andidentity.Onlyonsuchanewculturalbasisisthereplacementofatraditional
byaposttraditionalcivilsocietyconceivable.Thisculturalmodernization,asitsresultsfeedbackfromspecializedinstitutionsintoeverydaycommunication,powerfully
fostersthetransformationoftheculturallinguisticassumptionsofthelifeworldandtheirmodeofoperationinrelationtoaction.
38
Amodernized,rationalizedlifeworldinvolvesacommunicativeopeningupofthesacredcoreoftraditions,norms,andauthoritytoprocessesofquestioningandthe
replacementofaconventionallybasednormativeconsensusbyonethatis"communicatively"grounded.Theconceptofcommunicativeactionisthuscentraltothatof
therationalizationofthelifeworldandtoourconceptofaposttraditionalcivilsociety.Communicativeactioninvolvesalinguisticallymediated,intersubjectiveprocess
throughwhichactorsestablishtheirinterpersonalrelations,questionandreinterpretnorms,andcoordinatetheirinteractionbynegotiatingdefinitionsofthesituationand
comingtoanagreement.Byanalyticallydistinguishingthismodelofrationalactionfromtherationalitiesoffourothertypesofaction,Habermasprovidesthetheoretical
toolstoshowthatthedissolutionoftraditionalformsofsolidarityandauthorityneednot,bydefinition,resultintheemergenceofa

Page436
onedimensionalsocietycomposedsolelyofstrategicallyorinstrumentallyactingindividualslackingtheresourcesforautonomoussolidarity.Theactiontheory,in
short,impliesthatagemeinschaftlichecoordinationofsocialaction(normativeactionbasedonunquestionedstandards)canhavemodernreplacements.
39
Inother
words,onthebasisofHabermas'sconceptofcommunicativeaction,theanalysisoftherationalizationofthelifeworld,asdistinctfromthatofeconomyorstate,allows
ustoturntheParsonianconceptof"societalcommunity"(orcivilsociety)awayfromitsstrategicpoleofinterpretation,whileitstraditionalistpoleisputintothe
contextofthepossiblemodernizationoftraditionitself,meaningnotitsabolitionbutanewandreflexiverelation,anontraditionalrelationtotradition.
Aswehavealreadynoted,therationalizationofthelifeworldisalsoapresuppositionandstimulusforthefurthermodernizationofitsstructuralcomponentsand
institutionalspheres.Inparticular,itallowstheemergenceofanewformofvoluntaryassociationwithequalrightsofmembership,freedfromkinship,patriarchal,or
otherascriptiverestrictionsonbelongingandholdingoffice,andrenewingitsformsofsolidarityprimarilyinthefreeinteractionofitspresentmembers.Equally
importantaretheemergenceandstabilizationofpostconventionaltypesofpersonalityandcriticalformsofculture(postauraticart,postconventionalmorality,science),
bothofwhichpresupposeachangedrelationofactiontoitslifeworldbackdropandanabilitytothematizeandcriticizeanyofitscomponents,includingnormative
structures.Whilethestagesofnormativeorientationwerefirstdiscoveredinthecontextofthedevelopmentofpersonality,thepresuppositionsforacquiring
competencesremainrootedinthestructuresofthelifeworldintowhichindividualsmustgrow.
40
Themodernizationofthelifeworldisthusthefoundationforthe
parallelismbetweenindividual,social,andculturalformsofmoralconsciousness.
Mostimportantforatheoryofcivilsocietyisthepenetrationofthemodernstructureofthelifeworldintolegalinstitutionsandlegalpractice,viatheformsofa
differentiatedmorallegalculturalvaluespheregraduallyfreedfromallremnantsofasacredorder.Theresultistheinstitutionalizationofpositivelaw.Luhmann
interpretedthisprocesstomeanthatthefoundationsofpositive

Page437
lawareprimarilycognitiveratherthannormative.Healsodefinedthenormativeattitudeofexpectationasonethatisresistanttolearning,therebyweakeningoneofthe
keyinstitutionalcomponentsofacivilsocietydifferentiatedfromthesuccessorientedspheresofpoliticsandeconomics.WeshouldalsorecallthatLuhmann
understandslegaldevelopmentasatwostepprocessinvolvingthedifferentiationofnormativeandcognitiveattitudesofexpectationandtheirrelinking,without
dedifferentiation,innewreflexivecombinations,expectationsofexpectations.Throughoutthesedevelopmentalsteps,thecounterfactualstructureofexpectationsis
supposedlyembodiedintheunchangingnorms,hardenedagainstlearning.
AsdistinctfromLuhmann'strainofargumentation,theideaofthemodernizationofthelifeworldinvolvesthefoundationofnormativelearningintwosenses,one
documentedbycognitivedevelopmentalpsychology
41
andtheotherbythepossibilityoftransposingitsresultsintoatheoryofsocialevolution.
42
Accordingly,the
wellknownpreconventional,conventional,andpostconventionalstagesofmoralandlegalconsciousnessrepresenttheactualdevelopmentofnormativestructuresnot
onlyinthesenseofthedifferentiationofnormfromfact(includingsanction),whichactuallyexplainsonlytheemergenceoftheconventionalstage,butalsointhe
developmentofformsofargumentationtowhichweresortwhenweseektoreestablish,inthecaseofdisappointedexpectations(Luhmann),thefoundationsof
endangeredintersubjectivity(Habermas).
Atthepreconventionalstage,atwhichactions,motives,andactingsubjectsarestillperceivedonthesameplaneofreality,onlytheconsequencesofactionareevaluatedin
casesofconflict.Attheconventionalstage,motivescanbeassessedindependentlyofconcreteactionconsequencesconformitywithacertainsocialroleorwithanexisting
systemofnormsisthestandard.Atthepostconventionalstage,thesesystemsofnormslosetheirquasinaturalvaliditytheyrequirejustificationfromuniversalpointsofview.
43
Thestageofpostconventionalstructuresofmoralargumentationimplieslearningbothwithrespecttoearlierevolutionarystagesandwithinthisstageitself.Indeed,
postconventionalstructurescan

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besaidtoinstitutionalizeongoingnormativelearning,withoutsurrenderinganormativestyleofexpectation.
Theduplicationofthelegalsphere,inthecontextofpostconventionalstructuresofmoralconsciousnessandargumentation,intermsofthetwolevelsofnormsand
principles(Kohlberg)orofrulesandprinciples(Dworkin)iscrucial.
44
Whilein''easycases"itmaybepossibletoapplynormsdogmaticallyandeventoconvert
normafiveconflictsintocognitivequestions,"hardcases"representeitherdifficultiesofinterpretationordeepnormafiveconflictsthatcannotberesolvedwithout
turningtoahighernormafivelevelofvalidprinciples.
45
Itwouldbefutiletotreatrulesandprinciplesasfundamentallyfunctionsofthesametypesofenactmentand
application(Luhmann)orasmereexamplesofthedistinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondaryrules(H.L.A.Hart).
46
Thereasonisthatturningtoprinciples,in
defenseofrightsordemocraticparticipation,involvesanentirelydifferentandstrucrurallymoredemandingformofargumentation,anormativediscoursethatcannot
bekeptwithintheinstitutionalortimeframeoflegalenactmentandapplication.Insuchcases,itissimplyfalsetosay,asLuhmanndoes,thatthejudge,especiallyof
thehighestcourts(asagainstparliamentarymajorities),maynotlearnfromthelawbreakerthecaseofcivildisobedienceisacounterexample.
47
Ofcourse,such
learningcanoccurandyetavoidacognitivepragmaticturnonlyifthecounterfactualconstituentsofadiscursiveprocedurecontinuetoapply,thatis,iftheconditionsof
empiricaldiscoursearecontinuallycorrectedintermsoftheseprinciples.
48
Thus,itwouldbeamistaketoconsiderthepositivizationoflawtoleadtoaweakeningofnormativestructuresoreventomaintain,asHabermasseemstoattimes,
thatenactmentisforcedtorelyonnormativejustificationsofanewtypeonlyonthelevelofthelegitimationofthelegalsystemasawhole.
49
Nevertheless,thisaspect
ofthelegitimationofthelegalsystemasawholeintermsofnormativestructurescapableofwithstandingthetestofpostconventionalargumentationaboveall,
fundamentalrightsanddemocraticproceduresisanimportantdimensionoftheinstitutionalizationofpositivelaw.Modernpositivelawisinanespeciallyfavorable
positiontoproducethedetailedregulationof

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moderneconomicandadministrativesystems.Thenormsofcivillawtherebybecomedirectconstituentsandregulatorsofeconomicprocesses,whichinturnproduce,
indirectly,muchoftheirownlegalregulation.Thesamecouldprobablybesaidofthedevelopmentofpubliclawasadministrativelawandregulation.AsHabermas
putsit(inrelationtocivillawandthebourgeoiseconomy),lawtherebylosesitsearlierstatusasametainstitution,availablefortheresolutionofconflictandinsuring
againstthepossibilitiesofthebreakdownofintegration.
50
Theduplicationofruleandprinciple,oroflawandconstitutionallaw,ismadepossibleby,andinturn
stabilizes,theemergingsubsystemsofmodernstateandcapitalisteconomy.
Accordingly,thetwooverallprocessesconstitutiveofthemodernizationofsocietyasawholetheemergenceoftheeconomicandadministrativesubsystems,and
therationalizationofthelinguisticculturalandsocietallevelsofthelifeworldpresupposeeachother.Thelifeworldcouldnotbemodernizedwithoutthestrategic
unburdeningofcommunicativeactioncoordinationbythedevelopmentofthetwosubsystems.They,inturn,requireinstitutionalanchoringinalifeworldthatremains
symbolicallystructured,linguisticallycoordinated,andyet,toacertainextentatleast,modernized.Thisneedisnotrestrictedtotheexistenceofmetainstitutionsof
conflictregulation.Thesubjectofprivatelawisneededbyaneconomycoordinatedthroughmonetaryexchange(basedoncontractualrelations)justasasubject
capableofpoliticalobligation(andlatertherightsofcitizens)isneededbyastateadministrationorganizedthroughbureaucraticallystructuredpowerrelations.These
"subjects"canemergeonlyiftherequisitecognitiveandmoralcompetencesandinstitutionalstructuresareavailableinthelifeworld.Suchapreconditioninvolves
changeswithintheinstitutionsofcivilsocietythatareresponsibleforculturalreproduction,socialintegration,andpersonalitydevelopment,intherelationofthese
institutionstooneanother,andintherelationoflifeworldinstitutionstotheirmodernizedlinguisticculturalsubstratum.
Itisimportanttokeepthecomplementarityofthetwodimensionsofmodernizationinmind,ifoneiscommittedtoeither.Communicationcanplayaposttraditional
andpotentiallydemo

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craticroleinsocialintegrationbecause,asLuhmannhasmaintained,otherformsofsocialcoordinationthemediaofmoneyandpower,inparticularrelieve
communicationofmanyofitstimeconstraints.Atthesametime,sincethereisnonaturallimittothe"mediatization"ofthelifeworld,theexpansionofsubsystems
coordinatedbymoneyandpowerrepresentsapossiblereplacementtocommunicativeactioncoordinationinanygivenarea.
51
Thesameprocessesthatareamong
theconstitutiveconditionsofamodernlifeworldalsorepresentthegreatestpotentialthreatstothatlifeworld.
Thiscircumstanceforcesustoredefineourconceptofcivilsocietyastheinstitutionalframeworkofamodernlifeworldstabilizedbyfundamentalrights,whichwill
includewithintheirscopethespheresofthepublicandtheprivate,thistimefromalifeworldpointofview.Theinstitutionoffundamentalrightsrepresentsanessential
componentofthemodernizationofthelifeworldbecausetheirpostconventionalstructureislinkedtolegalprinciplesratherthannormativerulesandalsobecauserights
contributetomodernizationinthesenseofdifferentiation.
Acivilsocietyinformation,beingmoldedbymovementsandothercivicinitiatives(asinEasternEuroperecently),mayforatimehavetodowithoutasettledstructure
ofrights.Wewouldargue,though,thattheindexoftheirsuccessininstitutionalizingcivilsocietyistheestablishmentofrights,notjustonpaperbutasworking
propositions.Thereasonforthisrestsontheundersideofmodernity:thepowerandexpansionofthemediacoordinatedspheresorsubsystemsthatmakethe
structuresofthismodernlifeworldsingularlyprecarious.Inthefaceofthepossiblepenetrationanddistortionoftheinternalprocessesandthereproductionofcultural,
social,andsocializinginstitutions,thesecanbestabilizedonlyonthebasisofthehistoricallynewformofjuridificationrepresentedbyrights.Indeed,onecanactually
mapouttheterrainandevendeterminethetypeofamoderncivilsocietyintermsoftheuniversalandsubjectivefundamentalrightsofthemodernperiod.Ofcourse,
thisterraincanbedefendedonlyinthecontextofanappropriatelymodernformofpoliticalculturethatvaluessocietalselforganizationandpublicity.Thepracticeof
rightsandthecorrespondingformsofsociallearninghelp,inturn,toestablishjustsuchapoliticalculture.

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Focusingontheinstitutionalspheresofcivilsociety,wecanisolatethreecomplexesofrights:thoseconcerningculturalreproduction(freedomsofthought,press,
speech,andcommunication)thoseensuringsocialintegration(freedomofassociationandassembly)andthosesecuringsocialization(protectionofprivacy,intimacy,
andtheinviolabilityoftheperson).Twoothercomplexesofrightsmediatebetweencivilsocietyandeitherthemarketeconomy(rightsofproperty,contract,and
labor)orthemodernbureaucraticstate(politicalrightsofcitizensandwelfarerightsofclients).Theinternalrelationshipsofthesecomplexesofrightsdeterminethe
typeofcivilsocietythatisinstitutionalized.Weshallreturntothisissuewhenweconsiderthenegativedimensionsandtheutopiaofmoderncivilsociety.
Thediscourseofrightshasbeenaccusedofbeingpurelyideologicaland,evenworse,thecarrierofstatistpenetrationandcontrolofpopulations.Theclassical
Marxianobjectionisthatformalrightsaremerelytheideologicalreflexofcapitalistpropertyandexchangerelations.Clearly,however,onlysomerightshavean
individualiststructure,andnotallofthemcanbereducedtopropertyrights.
52
Thetypicalanarchistposition(exemplifiedbyFoucault)isthatrightsaresimplythe
productofthewillofthesovereignstate,articulatedthroughthemediumofpositivelawandfacilitatingthesurveillanceofallaspectsofsociety.
53
Noonecanbindthe
statetorespectitsownlegalityitdoessoonlywhenitsowninterestsleadittodoso.Thiscanbeseen,forexample,inthefocusingofprotestwithinnarrowand
manageablechannels,asinthecaseoftherighttostrike,whichiscoupledwithanobligationtoavoidillegalformsoflaborconflict.
Whilethestateistheagencyofthelegalizationofrights,itisneithertheirsourcenorthebasisoftheirvalidity.Rightsbeginasclaimsassertedbygroupsandindividuals
inthepublicspacesofanemergingcivilsociety.Theycanbeguaranteedbypositivelawbutarenotequivalenttolaworderivablefromitinthedomainofrights,law
securesandstabilizeswhathasbeenachievedautonomouslybysocialactors.Nevertheless,rightsshouldnotbeunderstoodasproductsofazerosumconflict.The
tendenciestodedifferentiationofthemoderneconomy(Polnyi)andthemodernstate(Luhmann)representthreatstothemodernityandthe

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institutionalizationofthesespheres.Iffromtheactors'pointofviewrightstendtobecreatedanddefendedfrombelow,fromthepointofviewofsocialsystemsthey
represent,asLuhmannhasshown,theprincipleofdifferentiation.This,ofcourse,isaprojectofincreasingpower,butitoccursthroughlimitingpowerratherthan
extendingandinflatingit(throughnetworksofsurveillance,forexample).Thisconvergenceofthetwomethodologicalpointsofviewpointstooneofourkeytheses:
Fundamentalrightsmustbeseenastheorganizingprincipleofamoderncivilsociety.
54
TheNegativeDimensionsofCivilSociety
Theformsofculturalmodernityhaveplayedanimportantroleintheemergenceofcivilsocieties.Nevertheless,weshallarguethatthefullpotentialoftheseformshas
neverbeenrealizedanywhere.Onthecontrary,modernizationintheWesthasproceededaccordingtopatternsthathavedistortedtheinstitutionsofcivilsocietyand
thepotentialsofamodernizedlifeworld.Habermasoffersahistoricaltypologythatshowshowtheprocessesofdifferentiationbetweensystemandlifeworldhave
yieldedamodernityburdenedbyitsnegativedimensions.
55
Inourview,thistypologybecomesespeciallyusefulifcriticallyrevisedandreconstructed.
InHabermas'sdiscussion,themainstagesofjuridification(Verrechtlichung)turnouttobeaveritablesetofstatecivilsocietyeconomyrelations.
56
Theanalysis
partiallyparallelsargumentstobefoundinworkssuchasPolnyi'sTheGreatTransformationandNisbet'sInSearchofCommunity,butitavoidsthenaive
expectationsoftheformervisvisthestateandtheinnocenceofthelattervisvisthecapitalistmarketeconomy.Indeed,thehistoricaltypologyrevealsthevirtues
ofathreepartmodelagainstamoresimplistic,polemicalconceptionofsocietyagainstthestate.Itdoesthisbyavoidingtheidentificationofeconomyandsociety,
economicandstatepower,orsocialandstateinterests.Alloftheseidentificationsturnouttoreflecttransitionalhistoricalconstellations.Theautonomyofcivilsociety
inparticulardependsonitsabilitytoprotectitselfagainstbothsubsystems.
Habermasmarksoutfourstagesinthedevelopmentoftherelationbetweenthelifeworldandthemodernstateandeconomy:

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thebourgeoisstatethebourgeoisconstitutionalstate(brgerlicheRechtsstaat)thedemocraticconstitutionalstateandthesocial(welfare)anddemocratic
constitutionalstate.
57
Thefirstisamisleadingtermfortheabsolutiststate,whichisapparentlymisunderstoodinthisanalysis,representingaratherahistorical
projectionoftheHobbesianmodelofpoliticstothisera.
58
Concernedwith"wavesofjuridification,"Habermasdefinestheabsolutiststateintermsofitsestablishment
oflegalordersguaranteeingprivateproperty,security,andequalitybeforethelaw,allintheformofobjectivelawratherthanactionablesubjectiverights.Theaimis
theinstitutionalizationofthenewmedia,withoutanyconcernforthelifeworld,consideredonlyasasourceofastilltraditionalresistance.Atbest,however,this
projectionrepresentsastylizedstartingpointfortheanalysis,focusingondevelopmentaltrendsinwhichthemodernsovereignstateandthecapitalisteconomy
symbioticallysupporteachother'sfreedomofmotionwhiledeprivingthe(traditional)lifeworldofallprotection.EveninEngland,suchwasnotthecaseintheeraof
(parliamentary)absolutism,whichwascharacterizedbymanystructuresofpaternalisticprotectionand"moraleconomy."Themodelisevenlessapplicableto
continentalabsolutismproper,anewhistoricalcreationcombiningtheelementsofapartiallymodernandbureaucraticstatewithasocietyoforders(thedepoliticized
ordersoftheStndestaat).Untiltheprojectsofenlighteneddespotismandespeciallylateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturylegalcodifications,thisdouble
systemwasrootedalsointhestructureoflaw.Whileindeedrightless,asinHabermas'sconception,absolutistlegalsystemsprotectedatraditionallifeworldby
hierarchicallyorderedprivilege.
59
Theproblemwiththiserroneousmodeloftheabsolutiststateisthatitpreparestheevaluationofthenextstagesinamisleadingway.WhileHabermasexpresses
variousdegreesofdoubtaboutthefreedomguaranteeingcharacterofmostofhisstages,heomitsdoingsointhecaseoftheconstitutionalstate.Nordoeshepresent
itsliberalandbureaucraticauthoritarianvariants.Habermasisentirelyrightinstressingthefirstinstitutionalizationofsubjectivecivil(vs.political)rightsorfreedoms
(Freiheitsrechte)asactionableclaims.However,heisnotinagoodpositiontoevaluatethe

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lifeworldthreateningcharacterofthisstage.Havinglocatedunderabsolutismtheestablishmentofthesubsystemsofthemodernstateandeconomy,withallthe
devastatingconsequencesforculturalandsocialrelations,heseestheworkoftheRechtsstaatonlyintermsoflimitingthethreatofoneofthesesubsystems:thestate.
Whatwasactuallyinvolvedwasatradeofffromthepointofviewofthelifeworld:Thelimitationofthestatewasboughtatthecostofestablishinganeconomic
societyforthefirsttimeinhistory.Onlyreformistandrevolutionary("fromabove")oppositiontoboththeabsolutiststateandthesocietyoforderscanexplainthis
outcome.ButtheestablishmentoftheRechtsstaatalongwiththecapitalisteconomyshouldcertainlybedescribedashighlyambiguousfromthepointofviewof
"securingfreedom."Theambiguityisevidentintheparticularmodelofsubjectiverightsthatisestablished,involvingeverywherethecentralityandthemodelcharacter
ofpropertyrights.
Thesamepointismoreorlessvalidfortheotherpathofdevelopmentbeyondabsolutism:therevolutionarypathofdemocraticmovementsleadingtothe
establishment(rapidoreventual)ofthedemocraticconstitutionalstate.Hereawidersetofrights,civilandpolitical,protectthe(modernizing)lifeworldagainstthe
state,limitingitbutalsoattemptingtobringitunderameasureofsocialcontrol.IftheRechtsstaatprotectedonlytheprivateandintimatespheresagainstthemodern
state,thedemocraticconstitutionalstateaddedtheinstitutionalizedprotectionofthepublicsphereaswell.However,hereitshouldalsobesaid,asagainstHabermas,
thatthestrengtheningoftheeconomyattheexpenseofthesocietallifeworldoccurspreciselyinthisphase(andnotinthepreviousabsolutistone),asPolnyihas
convincinglyshown.Thus,protectingthelifeworldorcivilsocietyfromthestateisagainaccomplishedatthecostofstrengtheningtheother,equallythreatening,
subsystem,anoutcomeagaindocumentedbytheprimacyofpropertyrightsinthecatalogueofrights,evenifitislesscentralthanundertheconditionsofthe
predemocraticRechtsstaat.
Inthecaseofthedemocraticconstitutionalstate,Habermasdoesnoteanambiguityinthestructureofjuridificationfromthepointofviewofthelifeworld.Heseeksto
explainthisbythepartiallyfalsecontrastofcivilrights(Freiheitsrechte)andpoliticalrightsunder

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stoodasmembershiprights(Teilhaberrechte).Thelatterareorganizedinsuchawayastorestrict"thepossibilitiesofspontaneousopinionformationanddiscursive
willformation."
60
Therightsthemselves(suffrage,assembly,association,press,etc.)arenottoblame,butrathertheelitedemocratic,bureaucratizedpoliticalparty
andtheculturallymanipulativeformsoftheirorganization.UnlikeLuhmann'snarrowerconceptualizationofpoliticalrights,whichleadtoanautonomouspolitical
system,heretherightsofmembershipintrinsicallypointtoformsofcontroloverpoliticalbureaucracy,torightsofparticipation(Teilnehmerrechte).Asaresult,it
remainsunclearwhyLuhmann'sdescriptionturnsouttoberightafterall,inthatpoliticalrightsare,despitetheirownteleology,organizedbureaucraticallyratherthan
autonomously.Itismisleading,ifnotentirelyincorrect,toexplainthisanomalybypointingtotheestablishmentofrightsinbourgeoisformallaw.Formallawsareinfact
betterfornegativelydemarcatingprivateautonomythanforpositivelyguaranteeinginclusioninthesenseofparticipationinthepublicsphere.
61
Butthisisonlypartof
thestory.Inaddition,wemuststressthat,preciselyunderthisstageofjuridification,acivilsocietyorganizedasaneconomicsocietyiscomparativelyweakinitsability
toutilizethepositivechannelsopenedupbyformal,politicalrights.
62
Civilsocietyandamodernlifeworldwerestrengthenedbythecountermovementtotheselfregulatedmarketspearheadedbythemovementsoftheindustrialworking
classthatestablisheddemocraticwelfarestates.Butthegainisagainambiguous.Thissituationis,inasense,thereverseoftheprevioustwostages:Thesubsystem
broughtundernewformsoflimitationisthatoftheeconomy,andthetradeoffstrengthenstheinterventionistadministrativestate.
63
Again,Habermastriestoindicate
thedifferenceintermsofsocialrightsconceivedonthemodeloffreedomsandonthemodelofmembershiprights(Teilhaberrechte).Laborlegislationunambiguously
protectsthelifeworldagainstuncontrolledeconomicforces,butcomprehensivesetsofwelfarestateentitlements,whiletheymayintendtopromoteautonomyand
rebuildsocialintegration,havetheoppositeeffectbecauseofthebureaucratic,statistmanneroftheirimplementation.Andyet,asT.H.Marshallrecognized(although
withanopposingconclusion),theseratherthanthe

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rightsoflaborrepresenttheclassicalsocial"rights"ofthewelfarestate.Fromanotherpointofview,onehasgoodreasontodoubtwhetherbenefitswhoseexercise
doesnotdependprimarilyonthefreeactivityoftheirbeneficiariesarerightsatall.
64
Thestructureofbenefits,unlikethatofpoliticalrightsofparticipation,hasan
electiveaffinitywithbureaucraticimplementation.ContrarytoMarshall,socialrightsoftheentitlementtypeachievethebenefitsofmembershipforindividualsasclients
ratherthanascitizens.Thus,unliketherightsofwork,intheirpresentformtheystrengthentheadministrativestateandnotcivilsociety.
65
Social"rights"inthesenseofentitlementsarepossibleanddoactuallyexistinsocietieswithoutastructureofrightsatall.Inthiscontext,weshouldaddauthoritarian
statesocialismtoourtypology.Thisisapeculiarformationthatcombinesfeaturesofarevolutionarysuccessortoabsolutismandthestatistresponsetothecapitalist
marketeconomy,yetcannotbeidentifiedwitheitherform.Fromthepointofviewofjuridification,thissociety,inlinewithitsstatesocialistideology,seeksprotection
fromonlyoneofthetwosubsystems,theeconomicone.Inthisrespect,statesocialismisunlikethedemocraticwelfarestate,whoselegalstructurepreservesliberal
anddemocraticlimitationsonthestateaswell.Thelifeworldunderauthoritariansocialismissupposedlyprotectednotbyastructureofrightsbutbyacomprehensive
systemofstatepaternalism.Thus,thepartystatedrapesitselfinthefamilial,associational,andevenmovementcharacterofthelifeworld,whichinfactistotally
unprotectedfromaninterventionismthatcontainsnoselflimitation.Thejuridicalcharacterofthisformationisthatoftheprimacyoftheprerogativestate,inadual
legalstructureinwhichtheeverchangingboundariesofdiscretionaryandnormativepracticearedeterminedbydiscretionitself.
66
Authoritarianstatesocialism,a
formationwithoutrightsorconstitutionalism,isaresponsetotheeconomicthreatstothelifeworld,butittakestheformofsuppressingcivilsocietyalongwith
bourgeoissociety(withwhichcivilsocietyisidentified).Assuch,itrepresentsagreatdangertothemodernityofthelifeworld,tothefunctioningofthepoliticized
economy,andtotherationalityofthepoliticalsystemitself.
Habermasmayhaveomittedstatesocialismfromhistypologybecauseofthedifficultiesoffittingitintoanytheoryofmoderniza

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tionandbecauseofhisunwillingnesstodeclareasParsonsdidthattheSovietmodelconstitutesadeadendofmodernization.Yetthewholediscussionconcerning
thewavesofjuridificationfallsintoatraditionofopenendedmodernizationtheory.ThedifferenceswithParsons'slatetreatmentofthedifferentiationand
modernizationofthe"societalcommunity"areinstructive.First,Habermastreatsthecontemporaryperiodashighlyambiguousfromthepointofviewoftheautonomy
ofthelifeworld(i.e.,thesocietalcommunity/civilsociety),asevidencedbyhiscritiqueofthewelfarestatefromLegitimationCrisisonward.Second,whileParsons
consideredsocialmovementstobetheineffectualfundamentalismsofeachepochcorrespondingtonewstagesinthedevelopmentofthesocietalcommunity,
Habermastreatsboth"bourgeois"emancipationmovementsandworkingclassmovementsasthekeydynamicpromotingrelevantinstitutionaltransformationwhile
defendingthelifeworld.Thesemovementsthusplayamajorroleinrealizingthepotentialsofculturalmodernity.Theambiguityofthelaststageofdevelopment(andin
ourviewofthelastfourstages,includingtheunambiguouslynegativeexperienceofstatesocialism)is,however,anunintendedconsequenceoftheactionsofthe
defendersofsociety(irrespectiveofHabermas'slinkageonlyofthefreedomguaranteeingpartoftheoutcomeswiththeactionofmovements).Wemightsaythatthe
absenceofreflectionineachcaseaboutbothofthelifeworldthreateningsubsystemsleadstoastrengtheningofoneortheotherinthenameofthedefenseofthe
lifeworld.
Thestagemodeljustdescribedindicatesthatthereconstructionofthetheoryofcivilsocietyintermsofthesystem/lifeworlddualityaimstoaccommodatethenegative
sideofcivilsocietyaccentuatedbyFoucaultandothers.However,inthestagemodel,negativedimensionsappearprimarilyasthreatsposedtocivilsocietyfromthe
outside.Habermas'scomplexdiscussionofWeber'sthesesofthe"lossofmeaning"andthe"lossoffreedom"involvedinmodernization(inhisterms,thecultural
impoverishmentandthecolonizationofthelifeworld)indicatethatthesedimensionsaretobefoundwithinmoderncivilsocietyitself.
TheconceptualcontrastbetweenthepotentiallynonselectiveandtheactualselectivepatternsofmodernizationallowsHabermas

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tocombinethediametricallyopposedassessmentsofcontemporarycivilsociety,herestylizedasthepositionsofParsonsandFoucault,asalternativeswithin
modernity.Moreover,ourconceptofcivilsociety,reconstructedonthebasisofHabermas'sconceptofthelifeworld,hastheadvantageofpinpointingthenegative
sideofmodernitywithoutequatingalloftheinstitutionsofcivilsocietywithitsonesideddevelopment.Inshort,theexistingmodelofcivilsocietythathasselectively
institutionalizedthepotentialsofculturalmodernityisonlyoneofitslogicallypossiblepaths.
67
Itisnotcompletelynegative,butthenegativesidemustbeaccounted
for.Inmoreconcreteterms,Habermasmaintainsthattherationalizationofthelifeworldwithrespecttotherealizationofculturalpotentialsembodiedintheaesthetic
andmoral/practicaldomainshasbeenblockedtoasignificantextent.Therationalizationoftheeconomicandadministrativesubsystemsandthepreponderantweight
giventotheirreproductiveimperativeshasproceededattheexpenseoftherationalizationofcivilsociety.Theresultinggapbetweenexpertculturesinvolvedinthe
differentiationofthevaluespheresofscientificknowledge,art,andmoralityandthatofthegeneralpublicleadstotheculturalimpoverishmentofalifeworldwhose
traditionalsubstancehasbeeneroded.However,contrarytotheWeberianthesis,
68
itisnotculturalmodernityitselfbutitsselectiveinstitutionalizationthatresultsin
culturalimpoverishment.
Furthermore,theonesidedinstitutionalizationofthecognitiveinstrumentalpotentialsofculturalrationalization(intheinstitutionofscienceandinthetwosubsystems)
preparesthegroundforapenetrationbythemediaofmoneyandpowerintothespheresofthereproductionofcivilsociety,whichrequireintegrationthrough
communicativeprocesses.Actingsubjectsbecomesubordinatedtotheimperativesofapparatusesthathavebecomeautonomousandsubstitutesforcommunicative
interaction.Butthedistinctionbetweensystemandlifeworld,betweenstate,economy,andcivilsociety,allowsustoshowthatitisnottheemergenceofthe
differentiatedpoliticalandeconomicsubsystemsandtheirinternalcoordinationthroughsystemintegrationthatproducesthe''lossoffreedom,"butrather
thepenetrationofanalreadymodernizedlifeworldbytheirlogic,promptedbytheselectivepatternofinstitutionalization.Habermascalls

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thispenetrationthereificationorcolonizationofthelifeworld,therebybothretainingandrevisingLukcs'skeycategory.
Thediscussionofthenegativesideofaselectivelyrationalized,partlycolonized,andhenceinsufficientlymoderncivilsocietyimpliesthattheexistingversionofcivil
societyisonlyonelogicallypossiblepathofinstitutionalizingthepotentialsofculturalmodernity.Atissueisthefactofdifferentiationandalsotherelationbetween
termsofthesystem/lifeworldmodel.Societalmodernizationalwaysinvolvesthereplacementofsomeaspectofsocialbysystemintegration.
69
Butoneshould
distinguishbetweentheeffectsofthedifferentiationofthesubsystemsoutofatraditionallystructuredlifeworldandthoseresultingfromthepenetrationofsteering
mechanismsintoalifeworldthathasbeguntomodernize.Inthefirstcase,thecostisthedestructionoftraditionalformsoflifeandthedevelopmentofpoliticaland
economicinstitutionspervadedbydomination.Butthegain,inadditiontorelativeeconomicandadministrativeefficiency,istheopeningofthelifeworldto
modernizationandthecreationofpotentialsofapostconventionalcultureofcivilsociety.Inthesecondcase(colonization),thecostistheunderminingofthe
communicativepracticeofanalready(partly)modernizedlifeworldandtheblockingofthefurthermodernizationofcivilsociety.Itisarealquestionwhetheronecan
continuetocountgains(suchasstateguaranteedsecurity)asunambiguousinsuchacontext.Astheinstitutionsspecializedinsocialization,socialintegration,and
culturaltransmissionareincreasinglyfunctionalizedtoservetheimperativesofuncontrolledandeverexpandingsubsystemsandascommunicativecoordinationof
actionintherelevantareasisreplacedbythemediaofmoneyandpower,therewillbemoreandmorepathologicalconsequences.
70
Thiscanbeclarifiedwithrespecttotherelationbetweenthepublicandprivatespheresofcivilsocietyandtheeconomyandstateinwelfarestatesystems.Whenthe
subsystemspenetratetheprivatesphereofthefamilyandsubordinateittotheirimperatives,thentheroleofconsumer(withrespecttoeconomicrequirements)comes
topredominateovertherolesofworkerandautonomoussolidaryfamilymember.Theonesidednessoflifestylesfocusedonconsumerismwasamajorthemeof
culturalcriticismin

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the1960s.Ifsystemimperativespenetratethepublicsphere(withrespecttoadministrativerequirementsofloyalty),thenthecitizenrolebecomesfragmentedand
neutralized,withtheresultthattheburdenofdepoliticizationmustbebornebyanoverinflatedclientrolerootedintheprivatesphere.
Habermasinterpretsthesetransformationsinthepublicandprivatespheresofcivilsocietyandthereifyingandpathologicalsideeffectsthataccompanytheminterms
ofthecolonizationthesis.Heisthusabletoaccountforthenegativedimensionsofmoderncivilsocietywithoutconfusingthenegativesideforthewhole.He
concretizeshisanalysisofthissideofcontemporarydevelopmentsinhisdiscussionofwelfarestatesocialpolicythatinvolvestheadministrativepenetration(through
juridification)ofareasofcivilsocietypreviouslyfreeofsuchformsofinterference.
71
Asnotedabove,themonetarizationandbureaucratizationofthesocialrelations
ofcivilsocietyarehighlyambivalentprocessesthatcreateasetofsocialbenefitsandsecuritiesatthecostofcreatinganewrangeofdependenciesanddestroying
bothexistingsolidaritiesandtheactors'capacitiesforselfhelpandforcommunicativelyresolvingproblems.Forexample,theadministrativehandlingofcareforthe
aged,ofinterfamilialrelations,andofconflictsaroundschoolinginvolvesprocessesofbureaucratizationandindividualizationthatdefinetheclientasastrategic
actorwithspecificprivateintereststhatcanbedealtwithonaonetoonebasis.Butthisinvolvesaviolentandpainfulabstractionofindividualsfromanexistingsocial
situationanddamagetotheirselfesteemandtotheinterpersonalrelationsthatmakeuptherelevantinstitution.Monetarizationoftheseareasoflifealsohasnegative
consequences.Retirementpaymentscannotcompensateforthelossofasenseofpurposeandselfesteemofanelderlyindividualwhohasbeenforcedoutofajob
becauseofage.Finally,the"therapeutization"ofeverydaylifefosteredbysocialserviceagenciescontradictstheverygoaloftherapytoachievetheautonomyand
empowermentofthepatient.Whenadministrativelybasedprofessionalsclaimexpertiseandhavethelegalpowertobackuptheirclaims,acycleofdependencyis
createdbetweenapatientwhohasbecomeaclientandthetherapeuticapparatus.
Thedilemmaineachcaseconsistsofthefactthatwelfarestateinterventioninthenameofservingtheneedsofcivilsocietyfosters

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itsdisintegrationandblocksfurtherrationalization.Foucault'sdescriptionofthetechniquesofsurveillance,individualism,discipline,andcontrolisthusexplicitly
accommodatedinHabermas'sanalysis.
Nevertheless,despiteappearances,HabermasdoesnotjoinintheFoucaultian(or,forthatmatter,theneoconservative)critiqueofthewelfarestate.Forhim,legality,
normativity,publicity,andlegitimacyarenotjustcarriersoforveilsfordisciplinarymechanisms.Eveninthisageofthesupposedendofutopia,Habermaschallenges
usnottolosesightoftheutopianpromiseoftheliberalanddemocraticnormsofcivilsociety,whichforhimdonotreducetoamere"legitimation"ofthecontrarystate
ofaffairs.
TheUtopiaofCivilSociety
Inanagewhentotalizingrevolutionaryutopiashavebeendiscredited,thedualisticmodelofcivilsocietywehavereconstructedavoids"soulless"reformismbyallowing
ustothematizeaselfreflectiveandselflimitingutopiaofcivilsociety.Wecantherebylinktheprojectofradicaldemocracy,reinterpretedintermsofournotionof
"thepluralityofdemocracies,"
72
tosomekeyinstitutionalpremisesofmodernity.
Theslogan"societyagainstthestate"hasoftenbeenunderstoodasafundamentalistcallforgeneralizingparticipatorydemocraticdecisionmaking,asacoordinating
principle,toallspheresofsociallife,includingthestateandtheeconomy.Indeed,theidealoffreevoluntaryassociation,democraticallystructuredand
communicativelycoordinated,hasalwaysinformedtheutopiaofcivil(political)society,fromAristotletotheyoungMarxin1843.Butsucha"democratic"utopia,if
totallygeneralized,threatensthedifferentiationofsocietythatformsthebasisofmodernity.Moreover,fromanormativepointofview,anyprojectofdedifferentiation
iscontradictory,becauseitwouldinvolvesuchanoverburdeningofthedemocraticprocessthatitwoulddiscreditdemocracybyassociatingitwithpolitical
disintegrationorbyopeningittosubversionthroughcovert,unregulatedstrategicaction.
Asopposedtothis,theselflimitingutopiaofradicaldemocracybasedonthedualisticmodelofcivilsocietywouldopenup"the

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utopianhorizonofacivilsociety."ToquoteHabermas:"Therationalizationofthelifeworldallows,ontheonehand,thedifferentiationofindependentsubsystemsand
opensup,ontheotherhand,theutopianhorizonofacivilsocietyinwhichtheformallyorganizedspheresofactionofthebourgeois(economyandstateapparatus)
constitutethefoundationsfortheposttraditionallifeworldofl'homme(privatesphere)andcitoyen(publicsphere)."
73
Thisutopiaisoneofdifferentiationratherthanunification.Ofcourse,theideaofdifferentiationisinitselfnotutopian.Itinvolvesanormativelydesirablemodelofan
alternativesociety,onethatis"regulative"forcriticalthought(andthusa"utopia")onlythroughitslinkwithanotheridea:thecreationofinstitutionscapableoffully
realizingthepotentialsofthecommunicativereproductionofamodernlifeworld.
74
Inparticular,thedevelopmentofpostconventionalstructuresofculturewouldallow
theprojectionofinterconnectedinstitutionsofintimacyandpublicity,whichwouldreplaceunexaminedtraditionalrelationsofdominationwithunconstrainedformsof
solidarityproducedandreproducedthroughfree,voluntaryinteraction.Thissecond,genuinelyutopianideaislinkedtoatheoryofdifferentiationinvolvingprocesses
ofselfreflectionandselflimitation.
Giventheexperienceoftheliberalutopiaoftheselfregulatingmarket,ontheonehand,andofsocialism,withitssyntheticutopiaofarationallyorganized(planned)
societyoffreeproducers(orcreative,workingindividuals),ontheother,itisclearthatutopianthoughtcanbesavedonlyifcriticalselfreflectioncanbebuiltintoit.
Oneelementthetwofailedutopiashaveincommonistheirattempttototalizeasinglemodelofa"rational"society,rootedinoneorbothofthesubsystems,each
linkedtoasinglevalue:negativefreedominonecase,substantiveequalityintheother.Todayweknowthattheveryplausibilityoftheseutopias,andwhatlinkedthem
withthelogicofhistoryitself,layinthedynamismofaneconomycenteredinstrumentalreasoninonecaseandofstatecenteredfunctionalreasonintheother.
75
We
shouldnowbeawareofthenegativeconsequencesofeithertypeofsubsumption.Whileeachoftheseutopiasmadegreaterorlesserconcessionstodemocratic
modelsofsocialorganization,thestressonafullyautono

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mousmarketrationalityoronaformofpowercapableofcoordinatinganonmarketbutneverthelessmoderneconomywasincompatiblewiththereproductionofthe
lifeworldsubstratumofdemocraticcoordinationofaction.Thatthiswasnotafundamentalinternaldilemmaforeithermodelisshownbytheexistenceofauthoritarian
versionsoftheutopiasofbothmarketandplanning.
76
Fromthepointofviewofdemocraticpolitics,bothutopiashadtoanddidbecomesuspectevenbeforethe
disastrousconsequencesweremanifestedinpractice.
Sinceitsemergencearound1919,thetraditionofWesternMarxismhasalwaysbeenawareofthedangersoftheproductivistutopiasofclassicalsocialism:The
alternativesofLukcs,Bloch,andMarcusehadlittletodowithalaboringsociety.Instead,thesethinkersdevelopedsomeoftheinherentteleologiesofthemodern
spheresofaestheticculture(theyoungLukcs,Bloch)andpersonality(thelaterMarcuse)inutopianandtotalizingdirections.TheiraffinitieswithLeninistavant
gardismexplicitforLukcsandBloch,implicitforMarcuseindicate,however,thattheycouldnotreallyfreethemselvesfromtheutopiaofpower.Itcertainly
seemstobethecasethatprimarilyculturalutopias,totheextentthattheyarefundamentalistandrevolutionary,implicitlybasetheirpromiseofsocialtransformationon
thedynamicpotentialofthemediumofpower.WithintheMarxisttradition,onlyAdornoandHorkheimerwereabletoescapethecharmsofpower,attheprice,
however,ofdevelopingautopiaofsolidaritywhosetermscouldnotbelinkedtoanypoliticsorevenexplicitlyarticulated.
77
Admittedly,democraticutopiasdrawingontheresourceofsolidarityandprojectingthevastexpansionofcommunicativeprocessesofwillformationcanalsobe,and
haveoftenbeen,totalizing.Thisfeatureofdemocraticfundamentalism,wheneverpresent,hastendedtomakeanarchistutopiaseithertransparentcoversforprojects
ofpowerorprojectsfortheprimitivistdedifferentiationofsociety.Whiletotalizationledtothedestructionofdemocracyinthecaseofutopiasofmarketandpower,in
earlyversionsoftheutopiaofcommunicationtheresultwasselfdestruction.Thereasonforthisdifferenceisthat,inthecaseoftheutopiaofcommunication,
totalizationrepresentsacontradictioninprinciple.Thelifeworldisdissimilartomoneyandpowerevenits

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associationallyorganizedinstitutionscannoteasilyorspontaneouslyinvadeandsubsumethedifferentiatedsubsystems.Evenmoreimportant,itsownmodernization
dependsonthedifferentiationofmoderneconomyandstatetheirdedifferentiationwoulddeprivecivilsocietyoftimeresourcesfordemocraticdeliberationand
decisionmaking.Thus,thetotalizationofthe(communicative)logicofdemocraticassociationisnotonlyconducivetoshortandlongtermdysfunctionalsideeffects
andpathologiesitisinprincipleselfcontradictory.Itisevident,therefore,thattheselfreflectionofutopianthoughtleadsbothtotheideaofthelimitationofthelogics
ofpowerandmoney,"pullingtheemergencybreak"withrespecttotheirdynamism,andtotheideaoftheselflimitationofradicaldemocracy.Thisdoublesettingof
limitsrequiresdifferentiation.
Thereisyetanotherreasonfortheselflimitationofdemocraticutopianism,andthisisthelink,admittedlycontingent,betweenmanyhistoricalutopiasandtheideaof
revolutionaryrupture.Irrespectiveoftheirprojects,revolutionsinthemodernsensearecarriedout,oratleastwon,byorganizationsofpowerthat,inagenuine
rupturewiththeoldsocietyandintheinevitablechaosandpowervacuumthatfollow,aredriventoincreaseratherthanlimitsovereignpower.
78
Itisthis
constellation,forexample,thatledtothedifferenceinspiritbetweentheAmericanconstitutionandBillofRightsandtheFrenchDeclarationoftheRightsofMan.
79

Whiletheutopiasofpowerhaveanelectiveaffinitywithtotalrupture,theutopiaofdemocraticcommunicationisthreatenedbyrevolutiondespiteitsownrevolutionary
origins.
80
Obviously,theissueofthedesirabilityofrevolutioninagivencontextcannotbedecidedfromthepointofviewofutopianprojectsalone,especiallywhen
theoverthrowofanoppressivesystemisinvolved.Butitisimportanttonotethedangersofrevolutionaryrupturefordemocracy,andalsotonoteanindispensable
preconditionforitslegitimacy:Democracy'sonlypossiblelegitimationliesinaprinciplecontrarytorevolutionarylogic,namely,thelastinginstitutionalizationofanew
poweraccompaniedbylimitstoeventhenewformsofpowerintermsofrights.
81
Evenademocraticrevolutionmustbelimitedbyrights.Suchistheconsequenceoftheutopiaofdifferentiation.Thisisequivalent

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tosayingthatdemocraticrevolutionscanremaindemocraticinthemodernworldonlyiftheyinstitutionalizecivilsociety.Thisisinfactneverpossibleonthebasisof
abolishingevenimperfectmodelsofcivilsociety.Andyettheutopiaofcommunication,thepluralityofdemocracies,cannotsimplybeaprojectofestablishingany
kindofcivilsocietyoranymodelofrights.Theutopiaofcivilsocietythatwehaveinmindisnotidenticaltothemodelsofcivilsocietydiscussedsofar,andthe
structureofrightsimpliedisnotequivalenttoanyfoundintoday'sconstitutions.Thelegitimatingprinciplesofdemocracyandrightsarecompatibleonlywithamodel
ofcivilsocietythatinstitutionalizesdemocraticcommunicationinamultiplicityofpublicsanddefendstheconditionsofindividualautonomybyliberatingtheintimate
spherefromalltraditionalaswellasmodernformsofinequalityandunfreedom.
82
Themodelofrightswerequirewouldputtherightsofcommunication(thepublic
sphere)andtherightsoftheintimate(or"private")sphereintothecenterofthecatalogueofconstitutionalfreedoms.Thesewouldhavepriorityoverallpolitical,
economic,andsocialrights,whichwouldconstituteonlytheirprerequisites.Theestablishmentofsuchacataloguewouldindeedsignifytheinstitutionalizationofanew
modelofcivilsociety.
Weareawareofthelinkinallutopianthoughtbetweenmoralpracticaljustificationandaffectorientedmotivation.Tosome,theutopiaofcivilsocietydevelopedhere
mayappear,becauseofitsremotenessfromsubstantiveculturalobjectivesandconcreteformsoflife,tobedeficientinitsmotivationalability.Butdespiteitslegal
politicalemphasis,theutopiaofcivilsocietyunderstoodintermsofthedifferentiationofamodernlifeworldneednotbreakwithallconceptionsofcultural
transformation.Thereisafundamentallinkinouranalysisbetweenthecolonizationofthelifeworld("lossoffreedom")andtheselectiveinstitutionalizationofthe
potentialsofamodern,differentiatedculture("lossofmeaning").Theprojectofademocraticcivilsociety,itsmodelofdifferentiation,isobviouslyoneofdecolonizing
thelifeworld.Itispreciselycolonization,orthepenetrationofthelifeworldbythelogicsofmoneyandpower,thattodaypromotesapatternofselective,primarily
cognitiveinstrumental,feedbacksofculturalpotentials.Theorganizationofdemocraticinstitutionsandnewtypesofinterpersonal

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relationswithincivilsocietywouldmaketheenrichmentofeverydaycommunicativepracticethroughmoralaswellasaestheticculturalresourcesbothdesirableand
possible.Ofcourse,anewrelationbetweenexpertculturesinthesespheresandeverydaycommunicationwouldhavetobeestablishedforsuchfeedbacktooccuron
asignificantscale.Ifsuccessful,thistransformationwouldaffectthedeepestlevelofthelifeworlditself.Atthesametime,culturaltransformationcouldinthisutopian
modelsheditstotalizingpotentialbyshiftingitscontributiontothemicrolevel,tothelivesofassociationsandgroupsthathavebuilttheideaofselflimitationintotheir
dailypractice.
Tosumup:The"utopianhorizonofcivilsociety"asconceivedhereisbasedonpreservingtheboundariesbetweenthedifferentsubsystemsandthelifeworld(and,as
weshallsee,alsoontheinfluenceofnormativeconsiderations,basedontheimperativesofthereproductionofthelifeworld,overtheformallyorganizedspheresof
action).Lifeworldcontexts,freedfromsystemimperatives,couldthenbeopeneduptoallowforthereplacement,whenrelevant,oftraditionallysecurednormsby
communicativelyachievedonesprocessalreadybegunbutnotbyanymeanscompleted,asthesituationofwomenandchildreninthe"modern"familydemonstrates.
Theselflimitingaspectoftheutopiareferstotherestrictionofthecommunicativecoordinationofactiontotheinstitutionalcoreofcivilsocietyitself,inplaceof
imposingthisorganizingprincipleonallofsocietyandthusdedifferentiatingthesteeringmechanismsandtherebysocietyasawhole.
TheInstitutionalTwoDimensionalityofExistingCivilSociety
Totalizingutopias,especiallythoselinkedtotheideaofrevolutionaryrupture,aimforaconstitutiveratherthanaregulativerelationtopolitics.Therationally
constructedmodelistobeactualizedinpractice.Suchutopiascanrelyentirelyonatranscendentcritiqueofexistingreality,witharevolutionarymovementasakind
ofdeusexmachinaobliteratingexistingstructuresandcreatingentirelynewones.Revolutionaryutopiascanuseversionsofgenuineimmanentcriticism,relyingonthe
contradictionsbetween

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counterfactualnormsandactualinstitutions,onlyinconsistently,sincetheideaofruptureexcludesthenotionthatsomethingisintrinsicallyworthsaving.
83
Fromsucha
pointofview,however,thenormsofasocietybecomenothingbutatransparentsubterfugeforstrategicaction,andthisisanattitudeincompatiblewithimmanent
criticism.
Theproperrelationshipofselflimitingutopiastorealityshouldbearegulativeone.Projectsofreconstructionoughttobeguidedbynormativeprinciplesthat
determineonlythelegitimateproceduresbutnottheactualcontentsofnewinstitutionallife.Aboveall,suchutopiasdonotaimatimposingasingleformoflifebeyond
allconflict.Likeallutopias,theonewehaveinmindhasanelementoftranscendencewithrespecttoexistingreality.Butselflimitingutopianismhasanintrinsicrelation
withimmanentcriticism,sinceitcannotandoughtnotconstructthenewsociety,evenideally,fromitsownsubstance.Thus,theutopiaweadvocatemustcombine,as
Adornoforesaw,transcendentandimmanentformsofsocialcriticism.
Allthemoreserious,then,isAdorno'sownsuspicion,echoedbyMarcuse,thatinboththeWestandtheEast,onedimensionalandtotallyadministeredsocieties,
characterizedbythereificationofallspheresoflife,havebecomedominant.Insuchsocieties,ideologiesinthetruesensedisappear,carryingwiththemtheonly
possibleobjectofimmanentcriticism.
84
Thisradicaljudgment,seeminglyrestingonanimplausibleidentificationofcapitalistliberaldemocracieswithtotalitarian
societies,wasinfactbackedupbythewholetraditionofFrankfurtSchoolanalysesofeconomy,politics,culture,family,andpersonality.
TheutopiaofcivilsocietystartsoutfromtheobviouslyplausiblecounterthesisaccordingtowhichtheWesternliberaldemocracies,unlikeSoviettypesocieties,are
civilsocieties,howeverimperfect.Iftrue,thisclaimwouldvalidatetheselflimitingandregulativestatusofthisutopiaandgiveitapotentiallinktopoliticsbya
refurbishedimmanentcritique.Unliketheonedimensionalitythesis,whichwassupportedbyinterdisciplinaryresearch,theideaoftheimmanentcritiqueofcivilsociety
hasatthistimerelativelylittlecriticalsocialsciencebehindit.Evenworse,someofthemostrigorousmodelsinestablishedsociologyLuhmann'ssystems

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theoryinparticularlendsupporttotheideaoftheendofcivilsocietyaswellastomanyoftheparticularsoftheonedimensionalitythesis,especiallyinpolitical
sociology.
Nevertheless,webelievethatourreconstructedconceptofcivilsocietyallowsustotakethephenomenaofreificationseriouslywithoutforcingustoconstruethe
wholeofexistingsocietyinthisway.Reificationandtheformationofthemediaofmoneyandpower(implicitlyidentifiedbyLukcs)cannowbedistinguished.The
replacementofordinarylanguagebymediainthecoordinationofeverydayinteractionisnotequivalenttothereplacementoftraditionalformsofheteronomyby
modernformsofunfreedomlinkedtotheriseofnew,impersonal,formalsystems.Thedevelopmentofmediasteeredinteractionallowsatremendouswideningofthe
possibilitiesofcommunication,thusconstitutingapositivesumgame,asitwere,involvingthesimultaneousdevelopmentofthemediaandofnew,modernformsof
communicativeactioncoordination.Reificationisthusequivalentneithertotheemergenceofthesubsystemsnortothereplacementoftraditionalstructuresofthe
lifeworldbymodernonesitis,rather,thesubsumptionanderosionofthelatterbymoneyandpower.Fromthistheoreticalpointofview,themodernizationof
lifeworldinstitutionscanbeexploredintermsofadoubleaspect,asreificationandascommunicativerationalization.
Thisdoubleaspectrepresentsthebestpointofviewfromwhichtoexploretheinstitutionaldomainsoffamily,culture,andassociations,aswellasthedomainof
legalitythatissoimportantforthemodernsubsystems.Thoseaspectsofcontemporaryinstitutionsthatcontributetotheautonomyandfurtherrationalizationofcivil
societyconstitutethepositivesidethereifiedstructuresthatpromotecolonization,thenegative.Herewecanonlyindicatetheoutlinesoftheconceptionthatwould
havetobedevelopedforatheoryoftheinstitutionaldynamicsofcontemporarycivilsociety.Ourevidenceisconstitutedatthisstageonlybythetraditionofsocialand
politicaltheorythatseekstocontesttheopposingthesesofonedimensionalityandsystemintegration.Evenfromsuchapreliminarypointofview,webelievethatitis
possibletoclaimthattheinstitutionaldevelopmentsofthemodernfamily,ofpoliticalandculturalpublicspheres,andofassociationsareallsimilarlydualistic.

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1.Withrespecttothefamily,wesupportHabermas'schallengetotheoldFrankfurtthesis(whichheusedtoshare)thattheassumptionofsocializationbytheschools
andthemassmediaandthelossofthepropertybaseofthemiddleclasspatriarchalfamilyentails,alongwiththeabolitionofthefather'sauthority,theendofego
autonomy.Fromthestandpointofthesystem/lifeworlddistinction,thepicturelooksratherdifferent.Thefreeingofthefamilyfrommanyeconomicfunctionsandthe
diversificationoftheagenciesofsocializationcreateapotentialforegalitarianinterfamilialrelationsandliberalizedsocializationprocesses.Therationalitypotentialof
communicativeinteractioninthissphereistherebyreleased.Ofcourse,newtypesofconflictsandevenpathologiesappearwhenthesepotentialsareblockedand
whenthedemandsoftheformallyorganizedsubsystemsinwhichtheadultmustparticipateconflictwiththecapacitiesandexpectationsofthosewhohave
experiencedtheseemancipatorysocializationprocesses.
85
2.Theprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandrepresentationimplythefreediscussionofallinterestswithininstitutionalizedpublicspheres(parliaments)andthe
primacyofthelifeworldwithrespecttothetwosubsystems.AswehaveseeninLuhmann,however,uncouplingthecentralizedpublicspherefromgenuine
participationleadstoascreeningoutofawiderangeofinterestsandissuesfromgeneraldiscussion.Theroleofpoliticalpartiesandtheelectoralprocessisto
aggregatecertainimportantsocialconstellationsofinterestandtolimit,intimeandspace,moregeneralsocietalinputstopoliticstothenarrowestchannelsof
privatized,depoliticizedindividuals.Thepoliticalorganizationsthataretomediatebetweencivilsocietyandpoliticsbecomebureaucraticorganizationsofthepolitical
systemitself,andtheydefuseratherthanactualizedemocraticparticipation.Parliamentsinthisviewspecializeintheshowofdecisionmakingtheyaresmokescreens
fordecisionsmadeoutsideallpubicdiscussion.Finally,thepoliticalpublicsphereismerelytheextensionofacommercializedmasscultureandisequallymanipulated.
Butthisisnotthewholestory.Luhmann,forexample,isneverabletoshowhowelitedemocracycanavoidboththerepoliticizationandrepublicizationofspheres
outsidethepoliticalsystemandthe

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spreadofdysfunctionalformsofapathywithrespecttopolitics.Nordoeshesatisfactorilyexplainwhyelitedemocraciesareforcednotonlytopropagatetheofficial
conceptionoftheclassicaltheoryofdemocracybutalsotostructureimportantpartsofthedramaturgyofpoliticalprocessaccordingly.Hedoesnotconsiderthe
reversalofpowerrelationsmadepossiblebythisdramaturgythatcaneasilybeplayedout''forreal."Theempiricalcaseforthepredominant,almostexclusive,
processofpoliticalcommunicationfilteringdownwardisnotconvincing.Largestructuralshiftssuchasthecreationofwelfarestates,butalsothecurrentneoliberal
turn,seemtorespondtomanygrassrootsinitiatives.Moreover,thebureaucraticcatchallpartyformpresupposedbyelitetheoristsdoesnotseemtoprovide
sufficientcentersofsocialidentification,norisitabletorespondwelltotheemergenceofnewissuesofgreaturgency.Thus,somecountrieshaveexperiencedthe
emergenceofextraparliamentaryoppositionsorpartieswithanewtypeofrelationtomovements.Thesephenomenahaveaffectedthestructureofthepoliticalpublic
sphereaswell.Whilethecentralpoliticalpublicsphere,constitutedbyparliamentsandthemajormedia,remainsrather(butnoteverywhereequally!)closedand
inaccessible,apluralityofalternativepublics,differentiatedbutinterrelated,timeandagainrevivestheprocessesandthequalityofpoliticalcommunication.Withthe
emergenceofnewtypesofpoliticalorganizations,eventhepublicdiscussioninparliamentsandpartyconventionstendstobeaffected,ashasbeenthecaseinWest
Germany.Itseems,therefore,thatalongwiththeelitedemocratic,oligarchictendenciestowardthedryingupofpoliticalpubliclife,weshouldpostulateacontrary,if
weaker,trendofredemocratization,basedonthenewcultural(practical,aesthetic,andcognitive)potentialsofthelifeworld.
3.Norcanoneconstruethedevelopmentofthemassmediaasapurelynegativesignofthecommodificationoradministrativedistortionofcommunication.Thispoint
isespeciallyimportantbecause,inHabermas'searlythesisonthepublicsphere,thefusionargument,implyingtheobliterationofthebridgesbetweenstateandcivil
society,worksonlyiftheculturalsubstanceofmediationis"cornmodified"and"industrialized."Thereislittlereasontodenytheimmenseroleinoursocietiesofatop
tobottom,center

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toperipherymodelofmasscommunications.Yetgeneralizedformsofcommunicationalsodeprovincialize,expand,andcreatenewpublics.Intheareaofgeneral
communications,whatwesaidaboutthedifferentiationandpluralizationofpoliticalpublicsisevenmoretrue.Fromsubculturestogreateducationalinstitutions,from
politicaltoscientificpublics,fromsocialmovementstomicroinstitutions,thespacesforconsequential,criticalcommunicationhaveimmenselyexpandedalongwiththe
growthofthecommercializedandmanipulatedframeworksofpublicrelations,advertising,andindustrialculture.Sincetheprojectofanenlightenedpublicspherewas
firstarticulated,wehavehadneitherasinglehistoryofdecline(theriseofmassculture)noraprocessof"democratization,"buttwosimultaneoushistoriesmade
possiblebydemocratization:oneofthepenetrationofculturethroughmoneyandpower,andanotheroftherenewalofamoreuniversal,inclusive,andpluralistic
publiclifemadepossiblebythemodernizationofthelifeworld.Whilethefirstoftheseprocessesoftenseemstobedominant,thisisnotduetoaninevitabilitylatentin
thetechnicalmeansofcommunication.Thetechnicaldevelopmentoftheelectronicmediadoesnotnecessarilyleadtocentralizationitcaninvolvehorizontal,creative,
autonomousformsofmediapluralism.
86
4.Theproblemofassociations,whichisexcludedfromHabermas'sanalysis,
87
isparalleltothatofculture,towhichitislinkedthroughthestructuresofthepublic
sphere.AsDurkheimandGramscirealized,thehostilityofthemodernstateandeconomytocorporatebodiesandassociationscouldnotblocktheirreemergenceand
modernization.Inthiscontext,thebureaucratizationofassociationsandtheemergenceofpseudopluralistandcorporatistformsofinterestrepresentationand
aggregation,akeydimensionofthefusionargument,cannotbeconsideredtheonlytendencyincontemporaryassociationallife.Theexistenceofanimmensenumber
ofvoluntaryassociationsinallliberaldemocracies,
88
theemergenceofnewonesinthecontextofcorporatistbargaining,andtheirroleincitizeninitiativesandsocial
movements
89
maynotdemonstratethesomewhatonesidedParsonianpointthatoursistheageofassociationandnotbureaucracybutitisclearthatlegitimateleft
criticismsofapluralistthesisthatoccludesthehighly

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differentialaccessofvarioustypesofassociationstothepoliticalsystemshouldnotcloseoureyestothevalidityofthisthesisagainstallclaimsofatomizationand
massificationinoursocieties.Theresilienceofassociationsandtheperiodicrevivaloftheirdynamismcanbeexplainedthroughthemodernizationofthelifeworldand
itsnormativecontributiontothescarceresourceofsolidarity.
5.Finally,thedevelopmentoflegalityuptothecontemporarydemocraticwelfarestateinvolvesboththemodernizationofcivilsocietyanditspenetrationby
administrativeagencies.Itis,moreover,inthedoublenatureoflawitselfthatonemustlocatetheambiguouscharacterofthecontemporaryjuridificationofsociety.
AccordingtoHabermas,asa"medium,"lawfunctionsasanorganizationalmeanstogetherwithmoneyand/orpowertoconstitutethestructureofeconomyand
administrationinsuchawaythattheycanbecoordinatedindependentlyofdirectcommunication.Asan"institution,"ontheotherhand,lawis"asocietalcomponentof
thelifeworld...embeddedinabroaderpolitical,cultural,andsocialcontext...inacontinuumwithmoralnormsandsuperimposedcommunicativelystructured
areasofaction.''
90
Juridificationinthissenseplaysaregulativeratherthanaconstitutiverole,expandingandgivingabindingformto(theethicalprinciplesof)
communicativelycoordinatedareasofaction.Thisempoweringdimensionofatleastsometypesoflegalregulationisfosteredbyjuridificationitself.Foucault'serrorin
thisregard,typicalofallanarchistpostures,istohavefocusedexclusivelyontheroleoflawasmedium,whiledismissingthefreedomsecuring,empowering
institutionalmomentasmereshow.BothdimensionsarepresentinLuhmann,butbydefinitiontheyarealwayspresent,andthusthetensionbetweenthetwooptions
andthepossibilityofchoosingbetweenthemcannotarise.Thedistinctionbetweensystemandlifeworldallowsustocontrastandchoose(insomeareasoflifeat
least)betweentwoformsoflegalregulation,onlyoneofwhichiscompatiblewiththeautonomyoftheinstitutionallifeofcivilsociety.
91
Atfirstsight,lawasinstitutionseemslikeaweakcompetitorforlawasmedium,withthelatterexpressingtheextensionofthepurposiveregulativeactivityofwelfare
stateadministrationsprimarily.Thefactthatthisactivityinterfereswiththereproduction

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ofthelifeworldmayappearasanirrelevantexternality.However,thereductionoflawentirelytoamedium,mostcompleteinthepoliticalinstrumentalizationof
modernlaw,isnotonlyaninefficientformofinterventioninmanylifespheres,includingtheeconomy,butalsoleadstothatweakeningofthenormativeinlawthat
Luhmannatonetimeconsideredtobethefunctionofthepositivizationoflaw.
92
Thisoutcomewouldaffectthebinarycodeofrightwrongthroughwhichlawmust
operateandwouldweakenthelegitimacyofthelegalsystemasawhole.Lawasmedium,despiteitstendencytoreplacelawasinstitution,ispossibleonlyiflawis
alsoaninstitution.Atleastapartialchoiceforlawasinstitutionisnecessaryifthesteeringfunctionsoflawaretobeprotected.
Thechoicebetweenlawasmediumandlawasinstitutiondoesnothelpwithanotherpressingproblem:thelegalregulationofthesubsystemsthemselves.Like
Habermas'sanalysisinTheTheoryofCommunicativeActionoftheotheralternativeswithinthestructuresofexistingcivilsocieties,theideaoflawasinstitutiontells
usonlywhatweshoulddefendagainstcolonization.Hencehisinclination,laterreversed,toseenewsocialmovementsasprimarilydefensivereactionstocolonization,
hardlyconstitutiveofapolitics.Itmayverywellbethattheabsenceoftheconceptofassociation,bothwithintheinstitutionalanalysisofcivilsocietyandwithrespect
tothedynamicsofsocialmovements,ledHabermastorevivetheclassicalbreakdownthesisthatunderstandsmovementsmerelyasreactionstonormative
disintegrationorothertypesofdislocationsaccompanyingmodernization.
93
Ourtaskistoprovethattherecoveryoftheconceptofassociation,whenlinkedtonew
ideasofpublicsandlegalregulation,allowstheformulationofanewpoliticsofcivilsociety.
ThePoliticsofCivilSociety
Wehavereconstructedtheconceptofcivilsocietyintermsofthecategoriesofsystemandlifeworldinordertodevelopapoliticaltheorythatmightcontributeto
contemporarydemocraticprojectsinboththeWestandtheEast.Weareconcerned,tosaytheleast,abouttheemergenceofthree,increasinglydominant,interpreta

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tionsofthereconstructionofcivilsociety:aneoliberalmodelthatidentifiesthecivilwiththebourgeoisanantipoliticalmodelthatrigidlyjuxtaposessocietytothestate
andanantimoderninterpretationthatseekstoabsorbthemoderneconomyinalessdifferentiatedsociety.Theseapproachesallhaveincommonadichotomous
modelofcivilsocietyandstate,albeitindifferentforms.InoppositiontostatesocialismintheEastandthewelfarestateintheWest,theneoliberals,theantipoliticians,
andtheantimodernsvariouslyseektorebuildamarketsociety,asocietyanimatedbyculturalorsocialmovementsyetfreeofinterestgroupandpartypolitics,ora
nondifferentiated,sociallyembeddedeconomy.
Onlyamodelthatdifferentiatescivilsocietyfrombothstateandeconomy,andanalyzesthemediationsamongthem,canavoidsuchmisinterpretationsoftheprojects
ofitsreconstruction.Moreover,webelievethatourparticularinterpretationofsuchathreepartmodelaccommodatesacriticalassessmentofthewelfarestatethat
avoidsbothneoliberalandneoconservativetraps,withoutadoptingtheillusionsofanantipoliticalorantieconomicfundamentalism.
94
Thepoliticalprojectdeveloped
fromthiscritiqueshouldbesignificantnotonlyintheWestbutalsointheEast,wheredemocraticforcesseeking"torejoinEurope"aresuddenlyonthehornsofa
dilemmaconstitutedbythetwomodelsofWesternEurope'spast(economicliberalism)anditspresent(welfarestateinterventionism).
CritiqueoftheWelfareState
Thetraditionalleftcritiqueofthewelfarestate,basedonarejectionof"classcompromise,"isnowirrelevant.Withoutsomemeaningfulnotionofasocialistsociety
achievedthrougharadicalbreakwiththepresentoneandarevolutionaryagencyconstitutedbytheworkingclass,thereisnoreasonwhyworkersandothersshould
nottrytorepresenttheirintereststhroughcompromiseaswellasthroughstrategiesbasedoneconomicandpoliticalpressure.
95
Todayanewerleftistcriticismfocuses
onthedestructivesideeffectsofadministrativeintervention(cuttingacrossclassboundaries)onpersonality,socialsolidarity,culture,andecologyaswellasontherole
ofthecitizen(nowreducedtothatofclient).Weappreciate

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thislineofcriticismandhavedealtwithitbyappropriatingtheperspectivesoftheFrenchsecondleftandtheGerman"realist"Greens
96
andbyexploringthe
"negativeside"ofcivilsocietyasacolonizedlifeworld,asdescribedbyFoucaultandHabermas.
97
Wemuststilladdresstheneoliberal(andneoconservative)criticisms.Thesewereanticipatedandinpartreappropriatedbyleftistcritics,whowereinfactthefirstto
interprettherationalitydeficitsofwelfarestateinterventionismasa"crisisofcrisismanagement."
98
Accordingtothislineofanalysis,interventionistandredistributive
policieshavethefollowingdrawbacks:Theyputunacceptableburdensonpublicfinance,disorganizeadministrationbygeneratingexcessiveandconflictingdemands
onthepartofdifferentconstituencies(includingthebureaucraciesthemselves),andinhibitinvestmentandaccumulationundertheweightoftaxationandregulation
theyreducethemobilityandthemotivationoflaborandcapital,favorincreasesinwagesinexcessofincreasesofproductivity,andmakesustainingcurrentlevelsof
socialspendingdependentonimplausibleandundesirablelevelsofgrowthintheabsenceofsuchgrowth,theyproduceunacceptablelevelsofinflation.Indeed,the
policyofwelfarestatecompensationsdependedforitssuccessonsolidandcontinuousgrowth,butthroughitsveryactivitiesthisstateinterferedwiththepossibilityof
justsuchgrowth.Directlyorindirectly,theformsofeconomicdysfunctionofthewelfarestatenotonlyinterferewiththemechanismsofthecapitalisteconomybutare
harmfultomanyofthestratathatredistributivepoliciesaredesignedtosupport.Thisistruebecausetheexpansionoftheunproductivepublicsectorbecomesadrag
oncapitalaccumulation,whichinturnrestrictsthefiscalresourcesavailableforpublicspending.
Itispossibletoacceptmuchoftheneoconservativedescriptionwithoutbuyingintoitsnormativepremisesorpoliticalconclusions.ClausOffehasarguedconvincingly
thatrightwingdiagnosesretaintheirempiricalvalidityeventhoughitisimpossibleinliberaldemocraciestocreatepoliticalcoalitionstoinstituteradicalversionsofthe
neoliberalmarketorientedscenario,whichinanycasecouldleavemostcapitalistsocieties"inastateofexplodingconflictandanarchy."
99
However,ifwecombine
theleftandrightcritiquesofthewelfarestate,wewouldcertainlycometorealizethatnotonly

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asetofparticularstrategiesassociatedwithafewadvancedcapitalistdemocraciesbutawholemodelofdirectedsocialchangeassociatedwiththeterm"socialism"
hasbecomeobsolete.
100
Habermashasseenthestakesclearly.Hehasarguedthattheestablishmentofthewelfarestaterepresentedbothadefenseofthelifeworldagainstthecapitalist
economyandapenetrationofthelifeworldbytheadministrativestate.Thissecondconsequencewasunintended.Theaimofthewelfarestatewastopromoteand
developsolidarity,nottodisorganizeit.Therootofitsfailureinthisrespectliesinaparticularmodelofdemocracy,oneidentifiedwith"socialism,"implyingthe
possibilityof"society,"globallyspeaking,actinguponitselfthroughthesupposedlyneutralmediumofpoliticalpower.
101
However,globalsocietalactionuponsociety
itselfintheparadoxicalpresence,howeverweak,ofsocietalselfknowledge(basedoninterlockingpublicspheresdrawinguponthecommonbackgroundknowledge
ofthelifeworld)butalsointheinevitableabsenceofaglobalsubjectcapableofcollectiveactionturnedouttobeimpossiblehencethedysfunctionsanddestructive
sideeffectsproducedbywelfarestateintervention.AsLuhmannhasseen,neitherthebodyofcitizensnorthestatecanactforsocietyasawhole.Citizenscan
participateatbestincollectivereflection,butnotcollectiveactionthepoliticalsystemisorganizationallyonlyasubsystemofsociety,oneexposedtointernalconflicts
andtensionsdespiteitsselectivity.Worsestill,thestatethatiscapableofactionisinfact(asLuhmannandothershaveshown)largelyuncoupled,despiteoreven
becauseoftheproceduresofelectoraldemocracy,fromthepublicprocessesofreflectionaboutsociety.Furthermore,asthedoublenessofjuridification
(Verrechtlichung)phenomenademonstrates(theatomization,control,normalization,bureaucratization,disciplining,andsurveillanceofeverydaylife),powerisnota
neutralmediumstatepenetrationsavesthelifeworldandsolidarityfromthemediumofmoneyonlyatthecostoffurther"colonization."
102
Power,asHabermasaptly
putsit,isincapableofcreatingmeaningorsolidarity,ofreplacingtheseresourcesoncetheyaredissipatedbyadministration.
Asitturnsout,theactionofsocietyasawholeonthemoderneconomicsubsystemisalsoastatistillusionthatleadstoserious

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consequences.ConvergingwithLuhmann'sconceptionofautopoieticsystems,wecannowprovideageneralinterpretationofwhatwentwrongwithstateintervention
intotheeconomy,supposedlyonbehalfofthelifeworld.Theintroductionofthemediumofpowerintoeconomicrelationsonawholesalebasis,asweknowfromthe
experienceofstatesocialism,replacesthehardbudgetaryconstraintneededforeconomicselfregulationwithmechanismsofbureaucraticdecisionmakingand
bargaining.
103
Outcomesinsuchasettinghaveasystemlogicthatneverinfactcorrespondseitherwiththeintentionsofactorsorwithaneconomiclogicthatwould
rewardthosewhoareefficient,innovative,andproductiveandpunishthosewhoarenot.
104
Incapitalistwelfarestates,significantinternalandinternational
competitionandtheexistenceofcapitalmarkets,howeverimperfect,continuetokeepbudgetaryconstraintsrelativelyhard.Nevertheless,amongotherfactors,
oligopolistic"markup"pricesetting,the"costplus"principleofstate(especiallymilitary)procurements,stateprotectionof(attimesobsolete)domesticindustries,
stateguaranteesforinstitutionsofcredit,thesofteningofcreditrequirementstostimulateproduction,corporatistbargainingandlobbying,andpoliciesoftaxationand
subsidiesdirectedatmaintainingfullemploymentandsocialservicesdomanagetosoftenthesetoavarying,butattimesconsiderable,extent.
105
Ofcourse,thesourcesandjustificationsofthesephenomenaoughttobedifferentiated.Someofthemaredueprimarilytooligopolisticconcentrationand"imperfect
competition,"ortomilitaryratherthanwelfarespending.Butthewelfarestategreatlyexacerbatesthebudgetsofteningtendenciesofadvancedcapitalism,andithas
hadforalongtimeapopularmandatetodoso.Becauseofsocialpressuresandthepaternalisticideologyofthewelfarestate,itseemstobedifficult,moreover,to
disentangleinterventionsthatsoftenbudgetaryconstraintsfromthosethatdonot.Itisequallydifficulttodifferentiateareasoflifethatshouldberemovedfromthe
influenceofmarketsfromthosewhoseeconomicselfregulationistheguaranteeforcommercialdynamismandtechnicalinnovation.
106
Undertheseconditions,we
haveaparadoxicalsituationinwhichthelifeworldisinsufficientlyprotectedagainstpenetrationbyeconomicrationalitywhileeconomic

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selfregulationdoesnotfunctionadequately.Atthesametime,externalregulationitselffunctionslessandlesswellwiththepassingoftime,asroutinestateintervention
andsupportbecomepredictablebyfirms,whowillnowinvestonlywhenguarantees(taxexemptions,depreciationallowances,etc.)areavailable.
107
Inorderto
promoteinvestment,thevolumeofregulativeinterventionincreasesbeyondthetechnicalrequirementsofeffectivefiscalandmonetarypolicy.Suchacontextproduces
aformofspecificallynoneconomicexpectationthatlinkssuccessnottosensitivitytomarketsignals,tocuttingofcosts,ortoinnovationbuttolobbying,bargaining,
andinvolvementinnetworksofpoliticalpower.
Onamacrolevel,Kornai'sdistinctionbetweenhardandsoftbudgetaryconstraintsindicatestworelationsoftheeconomytoitsenvironment:inone,thisenvironment
refusestocompensateforeconomicfailureintheother,itdoessoforextraeconomicreasons.Forourpurposes,itisevenmoreimportantthatthehardbudgetary
constraintindicatesahighlevelofdifferentiation,basedonastructureofexpectationinwhichsuccessandfailuredependoneconomicformsofcompetitionwithother
economicunits.Thesoftbudgetaryconstraintimpliesalowerlevelofdifferentiationbetweenpoliticsandeconomicsinwhicheconomicunitsrelyonhierarchical
relationstoextraeconomic,politicalinstitutionsandsuccessdependsonthepowertheseunitscangenerateand/oronthedegreeofstatepaternalism.Relyingon
power,one'sownorthestate's,meansthataspecificallyeconomicrationalitywillsuffer,evenifintheWestthedegreeofbudgetarysoftnessthatproduces
phenomenaofshortageisnowherereached.
108
Asopposedtothis,theideaofthehardbudgetaryconstraint,evenifinterpretedintermsofarelativelyhighdegree
ratherthanabsolutehardness,callstoourattentiontheneedtomaintainadifferentiatedeconomywithaconsiderablelevelofselfregulation.
ReflexiveContinuationoftheWelfareStateandLiberalDemocracy
Thecrisisofthewelfarestatepresentsuswithdifficultpoliticalchoices.Althoughweagreewithsomeaspectsofneoconservativeandneoliberaleconomicdiagnoses,
wecannotacceptthestrategy

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ofprivatizationandderegulationortheneoconservativeemphasisontraditionandauthority.Systematicallyspeaking,theserecipescallforthereeconomizationof
societyandthedestructionthroughmonetaryrelations(andattimesthroughpoliticalrepression)ofmanyoftheinstitutionsandculturalpotentialsofamoderncivil
society.Butneithercanweidentifywiththeloyalist(generally,socialdemocratic)defendersofthewelfarestateinEurope,ortheircounterpartsintheUnitedStates,
becauseoftheirinsensitivitytothephenomenaofcolonizationbypowerandtothelongtermeconomicfailureofstateinterventionism.Socialdemocracyhasbeen
historicallyconcernedwithextendingtherealmsoffreedomandsolidarity,butAdamPrzeworskiisrightinarguingthattheKeynesianwelfarestatewastheonly
genuinelypoliticalprojectproducedbysocialdemocraticreformism,theonlysuccessfuldemocraticstrategyoftheleft.Withthatmodelnowincrisis,reformismhas
declinedtoaformofcrisismanagement,abasicallyconservativestrategyunabletothematizeitsownambiguitywithrespecttofreedomandsolidarity.
109
Finally,webelievethatprogramsof"thegreatrefusal,"whetherdirectedagainstthestateinthenameofacivilsocietysuspiciousofallpoliticsoragainstthemodern
economyinthenameofsomekindofsociallyreembeddednonmarketeconomybasedonmutuality,reciprocity,anddirectcooperation,areincompatiblewith
modernityandwiththepresuppositionsofmoderndemocracy,despitetheselfunderstandingofmanyoftheirproponents.
110
Fromthepointofviewofourthreepart
model,greatandjustifiedsensitivitytocolonizationbymoneyand/orpowerhasdrivenmovementfundamentaliststodedifferentiatecivilsocietywithrespecttothe
economyand/orthestate.Theproblemsheregobeyondtheselfunderstandingofmovementactivistsandaffectsometheoriesofcivilsocietyaswell.Thosewho
workwithatwopartstatecivilsocietymodel,forexample,maybeabletoseethedemeritsoffundamentalistoppositiontothestate,buttheyareunabletoseethe
parallelproblemwithrespecttotheeconomy.Hence,toavoidneoconservatism,theywindupadoptingaspeciesofutopiansocialism.
111
Webelievethatfundamentalismrepresentsonlyonesideofthenewsocialmovements.Indeed,theremarkablecharacteristicof

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manycontemporaryradicalmovements,fromtheGreenstoSolidarity,istheirprincipledselflimitation.Moreover,affirmingthenecessityofarenewedreformismthat
reliesoninstitutionalizedpoliticalactors,wehavelongarguedforadualisticpoliticalstrategycombiningdifferentiatedmovementandpartyformsasthebesthopefor
democratizingcivilsociety.
112
Theframeworkintroducedhereallowsustodevelopthispositionbeyonditsearlierversions.
Habermas'sideaofthereflexivecontinuationofthewelfarestate
113
isanimportant,thoughonesidedandstillundeveloped,clueastowhatneedstobedone.The
ideaisimportant,onthemostobviouslevel,becausethewelfarestaterepresentsmanyformsofsocialprotectionthatshouldnotbeabandonedeitherasrealities(in
WesternEurope)orasaspirations(intheUnitedStatesandnowEasternEurope).Itistrue,moreover,thathistoricallythewelfarestatepromoted,withrespecttothe
capitalisteconomy,"ahighlyinnovativecombinationofpowerandselfrestraint"
114
thatservedsolidaritywithoutpromotingdedifferentiation.Thisstrategyfailedin
partbecausethebeliefintheneutralityofpoliticalpowerhampereddevelopmentwhenthetimecamefordefendingsocietyagainstthestateaswell.Theideaofthe
"reflexive"continuationofthewelfarestate,inthenameofitsownvalueofsolidarity,meanstheapplicationofthesameinnovativecombinationofpowerandself
limitationthatthestateonceappliedtothemarketeconomytothewelfarestateitself,thistimefromavantagepointequidistantfromtheadministrativestateandthe
capitalisteconomy."Thepoliticalpublicsphere...winsasimilardistancefromthepoliticalsystemasbeforefromtheeconomic."
115
Theprojectofthemovementoforganizedworkersandnowofothersubjectsshouldbecontinuedinthesenseofbeingredirectedtotheirownearlierachievement,
thewelfarestateitself.Butsuchareflexiveandselflimitingprojectcannotbesuccessfulunlessitiscomplementedbyanotherone:theapplicationofitsresultstothe
democraticrevolutionsthatcreatedmoderncivilsociety.A"reflexivecontinuation"ofliberaldemocracywouldthenmeantheapplicationofthestrategyofselflimiting
democratizationtoliberaldemocracyinthenameofitsownvalue,freedom.Aswehaveseen,liberalanddemocraticmovements,includingthoseactivetoday,wishto
bringthemodernstateundercontrol,butwithout

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seekingtoabolishit.Suchstrategiesarealsodistinguishedbyinnovativecombinationsofpowerandselfrestraint,buttheyfailtoincludesufficientreflectiononthe
sociallydestructiveconsequencesoftheothermediumsteeredsubsystem,theeconomy.Inordertoavoidmererepetitionofearlieroutcomes,liberaldemocracy
todaymustlearntolimititsownbuiltintendencytocontributetotheeconomiccolonizationoftheworld.
Theprogramofthedefenseofthelifeworldwithrespecttobothsubsystemscanbereachedequallywellfromliberaldemocracyasfromsocialdemocracythereisno
need,forexample,forasocialdemocraticdetourwhereamodernwelfarestateisnotyetestablished.
116
Moregenerally,thereisnoneedtoadvanceprojects
againsteitherthecapitalisteconomyortheadministrativestatethatwouldsimplystrengthentheotherwithrespecttothelifeworld.Weshouldinsteadseekinnovative
formsoflimitingbothsubsystems.Ourattitudetorightsshouldreflectsuchanewposture.Itwouldbewrongtothink,forexample,thattheinstitutionsandspecifically
thestructureofrightsofliberaldemocracywillbelessessentialforthenewmodelthanwelfarestateprotectionsorsocialrights.Forthisreason,too,itisimportantto
identifythenewprojectexplicitlyasthecontinuationofliberaldemocracy.Onlythencanweretainsensitivity,withoutpaternalism,totoday'sdemocraticmovementsin
theEastandtheSouthaswellasthenewsocialmovementsintheWest.
DefenseoftheLifeworld
Theformulationofthepoliticalprojectofselfreflexive,selflimitingdemocracyisonlyatitsbeginnings.
117
Butthisisjustpartoftheproblem.Habermas'sown
preliminarystatementisstillweightedmoretowardprotectingthelifeworldthantowardtheequallyimportantprojectofcontrollingandredirectingthepoliticaland
economicsubsystems.Admittedly,hespeaksnotonlyoftheneedtoestablish"thresholdsoflimitation"inandbythelifeworld,inordertolimitpenetrationbythe
mediaofmoneyandpower,butalsooftheneedtocreate"sensors"thatcanindirectlyinfluencetheoperationofthesteeringmediathemselves.
118
Thetwosteps
presupposeeachother.Onlyanadequatelydefended,differentiated,

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andorganizedcivilsocietycanmonitorandinfluencetheoutcomesofsteeringprocesses,butonlyacivilsocietycapableofinfluencingthestateandeconomycanhelp
torestrainorredirecttheexpansivetendenciesofthemedia,whichare,paradoxically,strengthenedratherthanweakenedbyprocessesofdifferentiation.
Nevertheless,thetheoryofsystemandlifeworldinitspresentstatehasdifficultiesformulatingtheprojectofestablishingsensorswithinapparentlyclosed,self
regulating,autopoieticsubsystems.
Letusexaminethetwodimensionsofestablishing''thresholds"or"barriers"ofprotectionand"sensors"ofinfluence.Whatthebarriersmustaboveallprotectisthe
resourceofsolidarity,whichreferstotheabilityofindividualstorespondtoandidentifywithoneanotheronthebasisofmutualityandreciprocity,withoutexchanging
equalquantitiesofsupport,withoutcalculatingindividualadvantages,andaboveallwithoutcompulsion.Solidarityinvolvesawillingnesstosharethefateoftheother,
notastheexemplarofacategorytowhichtheselfbelongsbutasauniqueanddifferentperson.Despitethisorientationto"difference,"theresourceofsolidarity
neverthelesspresupposescommonmembershipinsomeactualoridealgroup,andbeyondthissomecommonnorms,symbols,andmemoriesaswell.Solidary
individualsareconsciouslyrootedinthesameorsignificantlyoverlappinglifeworlds,andthisguaranteesconsensusaboutimportantmatters,eveninamodern
lifeworldwheretheircontentcanbediscussedandchallenged.
Solidarityisnotasteeringresourcelikemoneyorpower.
119
Itcannotaccomplishitsownselfclosureandselfprotection.Evenlessisitabletobringtheothermedia
underitscontrol.Thetaskofprotectingsolidarityfallstotheinterlockinginstitutionsofcivilsociety,associationsandpublics,whichinturnpresupposerightsof
associationandcommunication.
120
Associationsseemtopresupposesolidarity,sinceotherwisetheyaresusceptibleto"freerider"problems,buttheycancomeabout
throughselectiveincentivesorconstraintsaswellasthroughthemotivationofpublicfreedom.
121
Inthelattercaseespecially,theycanbuild,givensufficienttime,a
commonidentityandsolidarity.Thesmallpublicsphereswithinvoluntaryassociationsthatallowfordirectparticipationandtherelativetransparency(ifnotelimination)
ofpowerandmonetary

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relationsarecrucialforpreservingandrenewingthisscarceandprecariousresource.
Thestructuraltransformationofthepublicsphere,thedevelopmentofthecultureindustry,andtheemergenceofcorporatistarrangementsthatbypassthepolitical
publicsphereprecludeanynaiveoptimismregardingassociationandpublicitytoday.Nevertheless,thepossibilityoftherenewalofsolidaritythroughthecontinual
reemergenceofapluralityofassociationsthatarepublicandegalitarianintheirstructureandhighlyresponsivetoothersimilarpublicshasbeendocumentedbythe
pluralisttraditionofpoliticaltheory,albeitfromarestrictivepointofview.Recentresearchonsocialmovementsaimedatdisprovingthepluralistconceptofmass
societyhasconfirmedthisclaimfromanotherstandpoint.
122
Butwhiletheeffectsofreconstitutingthemicrostructuresofpublicityonpreservingsolidarityareclear,it
islessobvioushowtheformulacanimply,asHabermassuggests,indirectinfluenceoverthepolitical,economic,andfunctionalsystemsthatare"selfreferentially
closed"andhence"immunetodirectintervention."Linkingpublicitytoassociations,mostofwhichhavepurposesotherthanfosteringcommunication,becomesa
problempreciselyasthethresholdofprotectionofthelifeworldispassedinthedirectionofinfluencingtheeconomyandthestate.
Itisnotevidenttowhatextentthenewformsofselforganizationcouldbecapableofactionbeyondthesethresholds,evenifoneseekstoconceptualizethisinterms
ofaninfluencefarlessdirectandtotalthantheprojectof(aglobal)societyactingonitselfthroughtheallegedlyneutralmediumofpower.Thenewgrassroots
associationscapableofspreadingenlightenmentlosetheirrootednessinthelifeworldwhentheystepoverthelimittocomplexformalorganizationscapableofreducing
complexity.Inotherwords,thecostofbeingabletoactonthepoliticalandeconomicsystemsseemstobethepenetrationofsocietalselforganizationbythelogicof
bureaucracy,thatis,themediumofpower.Atthesametime,ifsocietalselforganizationresolutelystaysonthelifeworldsideofthethreshold,itishardtoseehowit
candomorethancontributetothedevelopmentof"politicalculture"or"newidentities."
ThequestionishowmovementscanresistRobertoMichels'sironlawofoligarchy.Wouldtheynotthemselvesreproducetheorgani

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zationalstructuresdeterminedbypowerandmoneythemomenttheyattemptedtoinfluencethesubsystemsofstateandeconomy?Canthemovementformsurvive
thestepovertheboundariesofthelifeworld,andinfluencestructurescoordinatedthroughmeansotherthannormativeorcommunicativeinteraction,without
succumbingtothepressureforselfinstrumentalization?Canone,inshort,moveforwardwithoutgivingupthelifeworld/systemdistinction,whichseemstoabandon
themostpowerfulspherestosystemsrationality?Weshallreturntothesequestionsinthenextchapter.
DualisticSolutions?
Thecombinationofassociations,publics,andrights,whensupportedbyapoliticalcultureinwhichindependentinitiativesandmovementsrepresentanever
renewable,legitimate,politicaloption,represents,inouropinion,aneffectivesetofbulwarksaroundcivilsocietywithinwhoselimitsmuchoftheprogramofradical
democracycanbereformulated.Yeteventhiscombinationdoesnotyieldasystemofeffective"sensors"capableofbringingthepoliticalandeconomicsubsystems,
whichareuncoupledfromcivilsocietyinelitedemocraticandcapitalistarrangements,undersocialcontrol.Itwouldbepossibletostylizethisoutcomeintermsofa
processofpoliticalchangeturnedinwardtowardcivilsociety,thelifeworld,andthe"realmoffreedom,"leavingthe"realm(s)ofnecessity"outsidetherangeoffree
organizations.AndrGorzpostulatedinhiswritingsofthelate1970sasolutiontotheproblemofeconomictransformationthatinvolvedthecreationoftwo
socioeconomicrealms.
123
Thefirstwasdefined,followingtheMarxofthethirdvolumeofDasKapital,asarealmofnecessitystructuredbyworkand
employment,tobecoordinatedbystatecentralplanningoftheproductionofnecessities,whichistobeachieved''withthemaximumefficiencyandtheleast
expenditureofeffortandresources,"arealmthatcanbehumanizedonlypartiallythroughworkplace(ratherthanfirmlevel)democracy.
124
Gorz'sprojectisaboveall
toreducethescopeofthissphereandespeciallythetimeresourcescommittedtoit,tothebenefitoftherealmoffreedom,definedbyautonomousactivityand
coordinatedbycooperation,reciprocity,andcreativity.Gorzfurtherinsiststhatthe

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realmofnecessityorheteronomymustbesubordinatedtotherealmoffreedom,althoughheneverevenbeginstotellushowthatispossibleinhisrigiddualistic
model.
125
Gorz'sanalysissuffersfromacontradictionbetweenathreepartframeworkdifferentiatingstate,economy,andcivilsocietyandatwopartonethatidentifiesthe
realmofnecessitywiththestatealone.Ontheoneside,hespeaksoftwotypesofheteronomousactivityintherealmofnecessity,onecorrespondingtothesocial
productionofnecessitiesandtheothertothe(material)administrationofthewholeofsociety.
126
Ontheotherside,thetwobecomesimplydifferentfunctionsofthe
state,inthatheleavesnoroominhisproposalforthemarketcoordinationofsocialproduction,whichhethinksleadsonlytoinequalityandclassdomination.
127

Pervasivestateeconomicorganizationcanbeavoidedinthistwopartframeworkonlyinthedirectionoftherealmoffreedom,acivilsocietycoordinatedbyneither
marketnorstate.Astonishingly,wearenottoldhow"maximumefficiencyandtheleastexpenditureofeffortandresources"canbeattainedwithoutmarketsoperating
inamixedeconomy.
TheproblemwithGorz'soveremphasisofstateownershipandplanningisnotthat"futurestateplanningofsociallynecessaryproductioncouldnotfunctionrationally
withoutworkplacedemocracy."
128
Rather,thepointisthatneitherplanninginthegenuineandthereforenecessarilylimitedeconomicsensenorindustrial(firmlevel
andworkplace)democracycanfunctionrationallywithoutmarkets.Thus,thosewhofollowGorzareleftwithaproblemthatdependsinpartonhowmuchtimeand
activityonewishestoassigntotherealmsofnecessityandfreedom,respectively.Ifoneseekstoavoidareturnoftraditionalsocialiststatism(aboutwhichGorzisless
concerned),onemustproposeavastreductionof(statecontrolled)labortimeandanincreaseofautonomousactivity(incivilsociety).Inthiscase,however,Gorz's
criticismoftheidentificationofcivilsocietywithpremodernautarchiccommunitiescomesintoitsplay.Needlesstosay,thiswouldalsoinvolveaseriousand
unacceptablereductionineconomiccomplexityandefficiency.Butifonetakesthiscriticismseriously,Gorz'sframeworkmakessenseonlyifamuchlargerportionof
economicactivitiesisassignedtotherealmofnecessity,

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wherecriteriaofefficiencymustdominateandthismeans,inthetwopartmodel,recoursetothestateandavastincrease(inWesternsocieties)initsplanningand
coordinatingactivity.Theonlywayoutoftheunattractivechoicebetweenstatismandutopiansocialismis,first,torecognizethatthereisadifferenceinprinciple
betweeneconomicallyefficient,marketorientedproductionanddistributionandthepluralityofsociallyembeddedmaterialactivitiesthatdonothaveastrictly
economiccharacterand,second,toaffirmsomeversionoftheformer,inanewcombinationorinterrelationwithbothstateandcivilsociety.
Toputthisanotherway,theneedforbotheconomicrationalityandsocietalsolidaritycannotbeeffectivelyaddressedinasingleprogramofliberatingcivilsociety
fromthestatebecausetheyareconceptuallytwodifferentissues.Evenmoreimportant,economicrationalityandsocietalsolidarityrepresentcompetingclaims.Thus,
theliberationofeachfromthestatecantakeplaceattheexpenseoftheother:Solidaritycouldbesacrificedtoaprogramofeconomicliberalismeconomicrationality
couldbesacrificedtoautopiaofareembedded,moraleconomy.Oneprogramleadstoanapologyforthecapitalistversionofmodernity,theothertothe
abandonmentofanessentialprerequisiteofmodernityitself.
Analternativeprojectgearedtowardseparatingtherealmoffreedomfromthatofnecessitystartsoutwiththispremise.ClausOffeandhiscolleaguesstartby
recognizingthedefactosplitofthelabormarkettodaybetweenprestigious,wellpaidworkinaformalsectorandlessprestigious,badlypaidwork(thelowerendof
theserviceeconomy)alongwitharangeofservicesandmaterialactivitiesthatare"exchanged"butnotthroughthemediumofmoney.
129
Theythenproposeaform
ofdualizationthatwouldequalizeparticipationaswelltheeconomicandstatusoutcomesinbothmarketorientedandnonmarketorientedformsofproductiveactivity.
UnlikeGorz'smodel,thisapproachreliesontheproductivityofalessregulatedmarketeconomythathasthepotentialofreleasinglabortime,whichinturncouldbe
usedinparttoreplace,onaninformalbutsociallyorganizedbasis,someofthenowunaffordablewelfarestateservices.LikeGorz'smodel,however,thisapproach
offerslittleconcerningtheestablishmentofsomeformsofindirectcontrolovertherealmofnecessityinthis

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case,theproblemisthesteeringmechanismsofthemarketeconomy,whoselogicistodaycertainlyincompatiblewiththeestablishmentandsurvivalofaninformal
"economy"offreeactivity,howeverattractivelyconceived.
130
Offealsomentionsthepossibilityofa"constitutionalization"ofemploymentinthefirsteconomyintermsoftheextensionoflaborrights("industrialcitizenrights").
Interpretingthis"highlyambivalent''strategyintermsofwelfarestateinterventionismandjuridification,hecomesupwiththefollowingdilemma:Eitherthe
hierarchicallyinferior,marketdependentpositionsofworkerswillnotbeaffectedbymerelyformalrights,ortheywillbeaffectedbutatthecostofserious
interferencewiththepropensitytoinvestment.Thus,theworkersloseeitherway,despitetheirnewrights.
131
Thisanalysis,whileundoubtedlyrightasfarasitgoes,
underestimatestherealimportanceofestablishingsuchrights,forthesewouldbecomeallthemoresignificantinframeworksbeyondwelfarestatelegal
instrumentalism,withinnewanddifferentmodelsofpostregulatoryregulation.
TheReturnofMediations
Thecategoryof"rights,"albeitonanabstractlevel,goesbeyondprogramsofdualisticreorganization.Wehavealreadystressedthatrightsarecrucialforestablishing
thresholdsfordefendingthelifeworldagainstthemedia.Thus,formovements,theyrepresentimportanttargetsthatcanbeachievedwithoutselfbureaucratization.
132

Butrightsalsorepresenttheinstitutionalizationofformsofselfreflectionandselflimitation,untilnowprimarilyinandofthepoliticalsubsystem.Evenifwelookat
rightsfromthepointofviewofsocialnormcreationandinstitutionalpressure,itremainsremarkablethattheirlegalenactment,application,andenforcementareleftto
theorgansofthestatewhosedisabilitiesareestablishedbyconstitutionalrights.Themotivationsofstateactorsarenothardtounderstand:Theycouldbeactingunder
pressureorundertheimpactofrecognizingthatapositivesumgameisbeingestablishedinwhichthestatealsogains.Itis,rather,theprocessbywhichrightsworkin
arelativelycontinuousmannerwithoutbeingconstantlyreinstrumentalized(onaretailrather

Page478
thanwholesalebasis)thatisremarkable.Thephenomenonisexplainableonlythroughtheinstitutionalizationofahigherleveloflearningandreflectionwithinstate
institutions.Furthermore,totheextentthatrightsrepresentaregulationofthestatebyinstitutionsofcivilsociety,thisregulationisaformofautoregulation.Rightsare
theexamplesparexcellenceoflawasinstitution,buttheyarealsoexamplesofpostregulatorylegalregulationinamoregeneralsense.
Rights,however,representaformofselfregulationofthepoliticalsystemwhoseconsequenceisonlythestrengtheningofthebarriersdefendingthelifeworld.They
donotinthemselvesgobeyondthefirstphaseoftheprogramof"barriers"and"sensors."Nevertheless,theirparticulardoublestatus,asinstitutionofcivilsocietyand
asselflimitationofthestate,recallstheoriginalmediatingroleofawholeseriesofinstitutionsintheclassicaltheoryofcivilsociety.
Societalselforganization,associations,andthepublicsphereare,ofcourse,thecategoriesofcivilsocietythatwehaveinheritedanddeveloped.Initially,itseemed
fullyacceptableforHabermastolinkthesecategoriestoeachother(and,presumably,tolegalinstitutions)onlyonthehorizontallevel,andeventhenonthebasisofan
explicittheorynotofcivilsocietybutofthedimensionofthelifeworldthatinstitutionalizesstoredupmeanings,solidarities,andcompetences.However,theconceptof
civilsociety,unlikethatoflifeworld,alsoinvolvesverticallinkages,whichcanbeconceivedeitherasmediations,betweenindividualsandgroups,betweengroupsand
socialinstitutions,andbetweensocialinstitutionsandglobalpolitical(andpresumablyeconomic)institutions,or,inthecaseofthelatterset,asananalyticallyseparate
butcomplementarypolitical(andeconomic)society.IntheHegeliansystem,thisroleisplayedbyfamily,corporation,estates,andestateparliamentsinHabermas's
bookonthepublicsphere,itisplayedbythefamily,theliterarypublicsphere,andthepoliticalpublicsphere.InTocqueville'sanalysis,manyofthesemediationsare
locatedontheseparateanalyticallevelofpoliticalsociety,whichinthethreepartmodelmustbelogicallysupplementedbyeconomicsociety.
Whicheverofthetwobasicvariantswechoose,HegelianorTocquevillian,itseemstousthatHabermas'scurrenttheoryof

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systemandlifeworld,whichwewanttodefendonthemostabstractlevel,doesnoteasilyallowforeithermediationsbetweensocietyandthesubsystemsorfor
analyticallyseparatedspheresofpoliticalandeconomicsocietyplayinganalogousroles.Nevertheless,onecanuseHabermas'sanalyticalframeworkinadifferentway
thanhehimselfhasdone.
133
Theabstractcategoriesofsystemandlifeworldindicateonlywheretheweightofcoordinationliesinagiveninstitutionalframework.Cultural,social,and
personalityreproducinginstitutionshavetheircenterofgravityincommunicative/normativeformsofactioncoordination.Nevertheless,itbecomespossibletolocate
strategicdimensionsaswellasformsofadministrationandmonetarizationinlifeworldinstitutions(apointthathasundulydisturbedcriticssuchasAxelHonnethand
NancyFraser)withoutpathologicalconsequences,aslongastheyremainsubordinatedtocommunicativecoordinationandgoaldefinitionandaslongastheyarenot
allowedtodeveloptheirownlogicsthepropermeaningofcolonization.Wheneverpertinent,normativelyspeaking,thisframeworkallowsus(aswellasHabermas)
tospeakofdecolonizationonthebasisoftheimmanentpossibilitieswithinsuchlifeworldinstitutions.Butwegofurther,insistingonthepossibilityofdemocratizing
politicalandeconomicinstitutions.Here,thecenterofgravityofthecoordinatingmechanisms(inamodernsociety)isandmustbeonthelevelofsteering
performancethroughthemediaofmoneyandpower,thatis,throughsystemrationality.Butthatdoesnotprecludethepossibilityofintroducinginstitutionalizedforms
ofcommunicativeactionintostateoreconomicinstitutions.Alltypesofactioncananddooccurinsocietalinstitutionsnoteventhemarketeconomycanbe
understoodexclusivelyintermsofinstrumentalorstrategiccalculations.Thenormativelydesirableprojectofintroducingeconomicdemocracy(involvingdifferent
possibleformsofparticipationonthevariouslevelsofworkshopandfirm)mustbetemperedbythenecessityofkeepingintacttheselfregulationofsteeringsystems.
Butthemereexistence(howeverinadequate)ofparliamentsandofformsofworkshopselfmanagement,codetermination,andcollectivebargainingindicatesthat
publicscanbeconstructedevenwithininstitutionsthatareprimarilysystemsteered.These

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wouldandinsomecasesdoconstitutereceptorsforsocietalinfluencewithinthebellyofthewhale,asitwere.Infigure3,then,institutionsthatmustbecoordinated
communicativelyappearundertheheadingof"civilsociety,"whereasthosethatmustbesteeredbymoneyand/orpowerappearundertheinstitutionallevelofsystem.
Neitherdimensionoughttobeconceivedas"selfreferentiallyclosed,"forbothareopentodemocratization(albeittodifferentextents).
Thisroughdiagramshowsthatthepoliticalissueishowtointroducepublicspacesintostateandeconomicinstitutions(withoutabolishingmechanismsofsteeringor
strategic/instrumentalaction)byestablishingcontinuitywithanetworkofsocietalcommunicationconsistingofpublicspheres,associations,andmovements.Hereone
coulddebate,forexample,thedeterminationofpreferencesamongeconomicandpoliticalchoices,keepinginmindtheneedsarticulatedinsocietalpublics.However,
selflimitationwouldmeanthatthedebateoverhowmuchandwhichformsofdemocratizationaredesirableineconomicandstateinstitutionsmustgrantineachcase
thenecessitiesofsystemmaintenance.SuchisthemeaningofademocratizationthatcomplementsHabermas'sideaofdecolonization.Correspondingly,theelimination
orpureinstrumentalizationofpoliticalandeconomicparticipationconstitutesaformofunfreedomthatisacounterparttothecolonizationofanyinstitution.
134
ReflexiveLawandPostregulatoryRegulation
Theproposaltoextendthetheoryoflifeworldandsysteminthedirectionofinstitutionspenetratingthesubsystems"political"and"economic"society,asitwereis
exclusivelyfromthepointofviewofthelifeworld.Unfortunately,thecompatibilityofsuchaschemewithsystemfunctioningisnottherebyassured,eveniftheviability
ofsteeringperformancesisconceivedasthelimitbeyondwhichdemocratizationoughtnot,andactuallycannot,go.Itmaybethecase,forexample,thatintroducing
democraticprocessesintostateandeconomyeitherwillnotlimittheminanysignificantwayorwilldosoonlyatthecostofseriouslydamagingselfregulation.At
issue,then,isthepossibilityofpostregulatoryregulationfromasystemspointofview.

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Lifeworld
LifeworldInstitutionsCivilSociety
PoliticalandEconomicSociety
(politicalandeconomicinstitutionsofmediation)
PoliticalandEconomicSteeringMechanisms
figure3
Justthisissueisaddressedbylegalscholarswhoseektoextendthetheoryofautopoieticsystemsinasocialcriticaldirection.Whilesympathetictotheideaof
promoting"lawasinstitution,"G.Teubnerconsidersastrategyfocusingonthedefenseofthelifeworldinsufficient.
135
Asthecrisisofthewelfarestateshows,media
steeredsubsystemscanthemselvessufferfromoverregulation,andoverregulationcouldproveharmfultothelegalmediumusedforregulation.Theideaoflawas
institution,guaranteeingtheautonomyofagivensphere,indicatesthenecessarybutnotthesufficientconditionforanew,moresuccessfulformofsubsystem
regulation.Inparticular,Teubnernotesthedangerstothesocialenvironmentofunregulatedpoliticalandeconomicsubsystems,dangersthatcanbedefusedonlyif
theirautonomyischanneledbyaformofselfregulationthatimpliesselflimitation.
136
FollowingLuhmann,thisargumentinsistsontheimpossibilityofsteeringsocietyfromasinglecenterofcontrolwithoutregressivededifferentiation,mainlybecauseof
theabsenceofadequateknowledgeaboutsubsystemsoutsideofthese.
137
Theonlyalternativeistorelyontheselfregulationofsubsystems,orrathertolegally
regulateprocessesofselfregulation.Theaimofthisregulationofselfregulationistopromoteformsofreflexivitythatproduceselflimitationinordertocounterboth
negativesideeffectsandinternalcontradictionsinsteering.
Interestingly,thenewformofindirectlegalregulationthatpromotesreflexivityinsubsystemsissaidtoactualizethereflexivestructureoflawitself.Lawcantake
accountofitsownlimitsinregulatingsubsystemstotheextentthatanew,moreabstract,less

Page482
direct,indeedselflimitingformofregulatorylawguidedbysocialpurposesbutpreservingtheautonomyoftheregulatedsocialspherescomesintobeing.Inthe
formerrespect,reflexivelawislikesubstantive,interventionistlawinthelatterrespect,however,itresemblesformallaw.
Today,theprogramofreflexivelawseemstobejustaprogram,albeitahighlyingeniousone.Itspotentialisindicated,however,byexistinglegalformsandpractices
thatnowseemtorepresentinconsistentelementswithinformal,orespeciallysubstantive,systemsoflaw.Reflexivelawrestorestheruleoflawasopposedtopolitical
discretionbyrelyingonwhatHabermascalls"externalconstitution,"whichrestrictsdirectinterventiontotheenforcementofalimitednumberofpredefinedgeneral
legalprincipleswhenevertheseareviolated.
138
Butreflexivelaw,unlikelawasinstitution,cannotstopwiththisdimension.Insteadofdirectlyinsistingonand
enforcingparticulargoalstobeachievedinaregulatedarea,reflexivelawtriestoestablishnormsofprocedure,organization,membership,andcompetencethatcan
alterdecisionmaking,changetheweightsofdifferentpartiesandmembers,andmakeoverallprocessesofdecisionsensitivetosideeffectsandexternalities.
139

Commontoallofthesedevicesisthedesiretoachieveneweffectsthroughanalterationofprocedures,thatis,throughproceduralratherthanformalorsubstantive
law.
140
AccordingtoTeubner,collectivebargainingandcodeterminationareexamplesofreflexivityinexistinglaborlaw.
141
Hisgoalistogeneralizetheirlessonthrougha
programofintroducingconstitutionalprinciplesintoeconomicandadministrativeinstitutions.Speakinggenerally,thisprogram,derivedfromtheearlierwritingsof
Habermas(amongothersources),correspondstotheprojectofdemocratizationarguedforinthisbook.UnliketheearlyHabermas,though,Teubnergivesanew
sensetodemocratizationinrelationtothesubsystems.Theaimisnottoincreaseparticipationasanendinitself,norshouldtheresultsbejudgedbythisstandard.
Instead,reflexivelawaimsatalevelandaspecifictypeofparticipationthatwouldmakeinstitutions"sensitivetotheoutsideeffectsoftheirinternalattemptsto
maximizeinternalrationality."
142
Itisbecauseofthisselflimitationoftheparticipatoryprojectthatreflexivelawhasachancetomediatetherequirementsoftwotypes
ofrationality,practicalandfunctional.

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Itisimportanttostressthattheestablishmentofsensorsinthesubsystemsintermsofdiscursiveformsmustbecompatiblewithinternalrationality.Inthecaseofthe
economicsystem,forexample,theestablishmentofnewdecisionmakingproceduresmustobservethelimitsofeconomicrationalityprofitability,inparticularby
producingprofitandinvestmentlevelswithintherangeoffunctionallyequivalentorganizationalsolutions.Teubner'sconfidencethatthisispossibleinprincipleisbased
ontheassumptionthat,ifunregulatedandunlimited,thepursuitofinternalrationalityisitselfparadoxicalfromtheorganizations'ownpointofview.Thepursuitof
profit,astheleadersofanorganizationmaydefineit,isoftenincompatiblewithlongterminvestmentandaccumulationgoals.Similarly,inthecaseofthepolitical
system,thefunctionofproducingbindingdecisionsandtheperformanceaspectofgeneratingandpreservingpowerenterintoconflictbecausethealmostunavoidable
tendencytowardoverextendingpoliticaldecisionmakingtendstodissipatepower.Reflexivityleadingtoselflimitationhelpstoreconcilethesetwodimensions.
143
In
summary,then,reflexivelawaimsatestablishingorganizationalstructuresgearedtooptimalbalancingofperformanceandfunctionbytakingintoaccountthe
requirementsoftheexternalenvironment.
144
Thereisacertainasymmetryinthisanalysisbetweenthepoliticalandothersubsystems.Sincethereflexiveselflimitationofallsubsystemsisinsistedon,thepolitical
systemcannotbeanexception.IfTeubnerdoesnotthematizetherelevantfeaturesofconstitutionallawthatmakepossibletheselflimitationofthepoliticalandits
selfregulationintermsofexternalsocialneeds(rights,discursiveformsofprocedure),thismaybebecausetheproblemofthewelfarestate,whichdominatesthe
discussionofreflexivelaw,seemstoputtheprimaryfocusoneconomicregulationandselfregulation.Yetitisanopenquestiontowhatextentexistingproceduresin
politicalsystemsfashionedinliberalorwelfarestateshavealreadyinstitutionalizedtheproperlevelofreflexivity.Thisisimportantbecausepoliticscanpromote
reflexiveselfcontrolintheeconomyonlybyreflexivelycontrollingitself.Thisformulation,however,alreadyindicatestheasymmetrywehaveinmind:Politicalpower
seemstoremainasourceofexternal

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pressureindispensablefortheselfregulationofothersystems,evenifthispoweristobetreatedmore"economically"herethaninsystemsofsubstantivepurposive
law.
145
Theprivilegedpositionofpoliticsisunderstandablebutdoesraisesomequestions.Theproblemisnotthatthepoliticalsystemisasourceofcompulsionbutthatits
specialpositionseemstoimplysomecoordinatingroleforitsdefinitionofthecommonneedsandintereststhataretobeprotectedthroughthevariousformsofself
regulation.Theonlydifferencebetweeninstrumentalistandpostregulatoryregulationwouldthenbethatthepoliticalsysteminthelattercasewouldhavelearnedthat
regulationismoresuccessfulifittriestostimulateselfregulation.Teubnertendstoavoidthisimplicationbydenormatizinganddecenteringhisargument.Henotes,for
example,thatthegeneralizationoftheperspectiveoflawasinstitutiontothatofreflexivelawtendstoleavebehindHabermas'snormativeconcerns,whicharerooted
inthelifeworld.
146
Thelifeworld,moreover,isnotreplacedinTeubner'sargumentasthecentralpointofreferencetherelevantsubsystemsaretobefully
decentralizedandtotallydisconnected.
Thisstrategyisparadoxicalfortworeasons.First,Teubnerseemstoindicatethatselfregulationtakestheformofdecentralizedmoralselfcontrol.
147
Second,ina
"neoHabermasian"vein,heposits(thoughnotconsistentlyforallareasoflaw)thatreflexivityinsubsystemsispossibleonlythroughtheestablishmentofdiscursive
structures.
148
Itseems,however,thatTeubnercanmakenoargumentfromaconsistentsystemstheoreticpointofviewconcerningthesourceoftherelevantmorality
ortheuniversalpotentialofanyofthepartialdiscoursesthatestablishreflexivity.Therequirementofreconcilingfunction,performance,andsideeffectsdoesnotin
itselfleadtoanorganizationalprocedurecompatiblewithuniversalnorms,orevencompatibilityamongthefunctioningsofdifferentsubsystems.Inshort,thereisno
guaranteethatthediscursivestructuresinstitutionalizedinthevarioussubsystemswouldactuallybesensitivetoenvironmentalproblemsthatmightappeartothemorto
expertmanagementasmerenoise.
H.Willke'sformulationoftheprogramofreflexivelaw("relationalprograms")addressesthesedeficienciesbybreakinginpartwiththesystemstheoreticframework.
Whilehenotesthatlaw

Page485
cannotcomeaboutwithout"legislativeguidance,"hisemphasisdisplacesthestateontwolevels.LikeTeubner,heinsiststhatexternalregulation,intheformof
"legislativeselfrestraint,"mustberestrictedtohighlyindirectstimulationofselfregulationthroughtheestablishmentofprocedurescapableofreflexiveselflimitation.
Thestateisthusdependentonusingandactivatingthepowertoprocessinformationandsolvetheproblemsofrelevantactors.Furthermore,moreclearlythan
Teubner,Willkeassertsthatthestate,itselfasubsystem,cannotauthoritativelysetgoalsandpurposesforthevariousformsofselfregulation.Thisproblemis
especiallyseriousfromthepointofviewofcoordinatingtheformsofselfregulationofthedifferentsubsystems,whichisWillke'sprimaryconcern.Heproposesa
modelthatbreaksnotonlywiththatofTeubnerbutwiththewholemonisticparadigmofautopoieticsystems.Drawingthistimeonsomewhatlaterworksof
Habermas(especiallythe1973Legitimationsprobleme),heproposesadiscursiveframeworkoutsideallregulatedsystemsinwhich"representativesofcentrally
affectedinterestsareprocedurallyguidedtowardsfindingtheircommoncause,their'commonsense,'their'generalizableinterests.'"
149
WhereasTeubneridentifiesthe
formsofproceduralselfregulationinsubsystemswiththeestablishmentofdiscursivestructuresandseesnorole(andprobablynotime!)forametasystemic
discursiveprocess,Willkedoesexactlythereverse.Hedoesnotidentifytheempirical"discourses"tobeestablishedwithinthesubsystemsinthecounterfactualterms
ofadiscourseethics,buthopestoinstitutionalizethelatterinacommunicationtheoreticsupplementtothesystemstheoreticframework.
150
Fromalifeworldperspective,thesuperiorityofthisversionofthemodelofreflexivelawisobvious.Thealternativemodel,basedonaconsistenttheoryofautopoietic
systems,musteitherassumeamiraculouscoordinationofregulatedselfregulation
151
orproposethatonesubsystemremainitscentralvantagepoint.Inthelatter
case,however,itbecomesdifficulttothematizethepossibilitythatthissubsystem(politicsorlaw,forexample)oritsmediumcanbeselflimitedinexactlythesame
senseastheregulatedsubsystems.What,forexample,wouldbethesourceofthenecessaryexternalregulation?ThedualisticconceptionthatWillkeimplicitlyadopts
hasthemakingsofamoreconvincingsolution.Thelifeworld,

Page486
becauseofitslowerlevelofcomplexity,canaffectthesubsystemsonlyindirectly,withafarsoftercompulsion.Itssuperiornormativepositioncannotdevelopintoa
superiorcontrolpositionthedangerwithstateregulation.
152
Hereitisworthconsideringthedifferencebetweenthemechanismsofinfluenceandthoseofmoneyandpower.ThedifferencesareobviouseveninParsons,who
triedtotreatinfluenceasamedium.
153
Habermasisrighttoinsistonmakingthisdifferencebetweenstrategicandconsensualsourcesofmotivationadifferencein
principle.
154
Unlikemoneyorpower,influenceactsontheintentionsratherthanthesituationofotheractors,offeringthenormativevalueofadesiredaction(rather
thanapositiveornegativesanction)asitsownreward.Theactorsinthecaseofinfluenceareorientednottosuccessortogeneralconsequencesbuttoreachingan
understandingwithoneanother.Relyingonpersuasioninprinciple,the"intrinsicpersuaders"behindinfluencearearguments(reasonsandjustifications)ratherthan
factsoritemsofinformation.Thetypeofpressureinvolvedisthusonanentirelydifferentlevelthaninthecaseofpower.Thisisthecaseevenwheninfluencecannot
relyonactual,detailedprocessesofordinarylanguagecommunicationbecauseoftimeandspaceconstraints.BothParsonsandHabermascallourattentiontothe
possibilityofgeneralizinginfluenceasamediumoraquasimedium.Habermasisrighttoinsist,however,thatthispossibilitydoesnotleadtoareificationofthe
lifeworld.Stressingthelinkageofinfluencedetachedfromactualargumentationtotheresourcesofpersonalityandculture,heattachesthepotentialforinfluenceto
personsandinstitutionscapableofdisposingtheculturalresourcesofnormative,cognitive,andaestheticargumentation.Somewhatmoreusefulforourpurposesis
Parsons'sinsistenceonhiscentralcategoryofintegrationthroughassociations,accordingtowhichthegeneralizationofinfluenceisbasedonabackgroundofdiffuse
solidaritythatdependsonandatthesametimereinforcestheconstitutionofacollectiveidentity.
155
Influentialpersonscaninfluenceonlythosewithwhomthey
constitutea"We,"inthesenseofpeoplewhobelongtogetherbyvirtueofcommonopinions,norms,orformsofparticipationallpossiblebasesofgroupformation
andsolidarity.Havinginfluenceisthusnot

Page487
restrictedtomembersofculturalelites.Thosewhoarticulatetheopinionsandprojectsofgroupsandassociationscanalsobeinfluential,buttheycaninfluencethrough
argumentsonlythosewhoareopentobeinginfluenced.
OuruseofthecategoryofinfluenceismeanttoindicatethatthetheoryweareoutliningissensitivetotheconcernsofbothTeubnerandWillke.WeagreewithWillke
thattheproblemofsettinggoalsandpurposescannotbesolvedwithinasystemstheoreticframeworkandthatonlytheideaofinstitutionalizingdiscoursecanhelpus
inthiscontext.Thecategoryofinfluencethenindicatesthetypeofpressureinstitutionalizeddiscoursescanexertonsubsystemswithoutdamagingtheirselfregulation.
ButwealsoagreewithTeubner'simplicitargumentthattheideaoftheonecentraldiscursivepublicspherecannotberevivedtosolvetheproblemofcoordination
amongsubsystems.Weagree,moreover,becauseofthescarcityoftimeandinformationamongotherreasons,thatdiscourses,involvingmorerestrictedformsof
participation,mustbeestablishedaspartsoftheselfregulatoryproceduresofthesubsystemsthemselves.Moreover,webelievethat,withoutsuchsensorsinthe
economyandthestate,thediscursiveprocessesoutsideofthemcannotinfluencethesubsystemsatall.Inthissense,thepointofdiscursiveformsinthesubsystemsis
nottoincreaseparticipationpersebuttoconstitutestructuresofsensitivitytotheresultsofparticipation.Itisthereforeimportantthatthepluralityofdemocraciesbe
articulatedintermsofbothtypesofdiscursiveforms,ininstitutionslinkedtothesubsystemsandintheinstitutionsofcivilsociety.
156
AnotherGlancetotheEast
Isourreconstructionofthecategoryofcivilsociety,andthepoliticsofcivilsocietyderivedfromit,relevantonlytolatecapitalistwelfarestates,astheideasofthe
reflexivecontinuationofthewelfarestateandreflexivelawseemtosuggest?Thiswouldbeparadoxicalsincetheworldhistoricalimpetustorevivethecategory,in
theoryandaction,comesfirstandforemostfromthestatesocialistcountries.Indeed,themorecommonsuspicion(ofTimothyGartonAshforexample)isthatthe
politicsofcivilsocietyisirrelevanttothe

Page488
politicsofthecontemporaryWest.Withalittlelackofphronesis,onemightreducethispointtoabsurditybyaddingthat,nowthattheEastisaboutto''Jointhe
West,"thecategoryofcivilsocietyandallpoliticsofselflimitationwillbeeverywhereirrelevant.
157
Ithelpsinthiscontexttodistinguishbetweenconstituentandconstitutedphasesofthecreationoffreeinstitutions,correspondingtoAlainTouraine'sdistinction
betweenhistoricalandsocialmovements.
158
Thereconstitutionofcivilsocietyisahallmarkofthegreattransitionprocesswehavewitnessedfromtheriseof
Solidaritytothepresent,includingtoday'sprojectsofdemocratizationintheSovietUnion.Thedramaticformsofselflimitationandselfdisciplinethatdistinguish
primarilydemocraticfromprimarilynationalmovementsarerootedinlearningexperienceswhoselociarethepublics,associations,andculturalnormsofcivilsociety.
Intheconstitutivephase,theprocessoftransitioncanbecenteredincivilsociety(Poland)orpoliticalsociety(Hungary).Itisimportantnottoseethisasaneither/or
proposition.Asidefromadualisticdefensivephase,notransitioncanbecompletedwithoutatleastapartialturntopoliticalsociety,assignified,forexample,bythe
ubiquityofroundtablenegotiationseverywhereintheEast.Evenaprocessofevidentcollapseoftherulingregimerequiresalternativepoliticalactors,whichcould
comefromthetransformationofmovementsintopoliticalactors(CivicForum)orfromexternalsources(asinthemovementofWestGermangovernmentpartiesinto
theGDR).Butwithouttheparticipationofcivilsociety,whetherinahighlymobilizednoninstitutionalform(asintheGDR)orinamoreinstitutionalizedform(asinthe
caseoftheHungarianreferendumofNovember1989),theprocessmustfallbackonelitedemocratictransitionsfromabove,whichwouldseriouslyendangerthe
legitimacyofthewholeprocess.
159
Thesituationissomewhatdifferentwithrespecttotherelationsbetweeneconomicandcivilsociety.Neoliberalstendtoidentify,evenfortheprocessoftransition,the
liberationoftheeconomicandthecivil.Thisislessharmfulifactorsbehindthedynamismoftheprocessarecivilratherthanpolitical,sincethenecessaryprojectof
liberatingtheeconomyinthiscasemustoccursidebysidewiththeselforganizationofnoneconomicdomains.Thatthisispossible,thatdemocraticactorsare
compatiblewiththeestab

Page489
lishmentofmarkets,isshownbythefirstphaseofPolisheconomicrestructuring.Buttheseactorswillnotbeabletoacceptliberaleconomicpolicyasanythingbut
transitional,sinceafullyautomaticmarketwouldbecomedestructiveforthesocialfabric,forsocialsolidarity.KarlPolnyi'slessonshouldnotbeforgotten,
particularlyinhisnativecountry,andindeedtheactorsofcivilsocietywillcertainlyrelearnit.
Whenpoliticalactorsareincharge,however,thepossibilitypersiststhateliteswillseektolimitthereconstructionofcivilsocietytothedimensionofasuitable
environmentformarketeconomicselfregulation,giventhatthecreationofsuchanenvironmentwillbeaseriousproblemforaperiodwellbeyondthepolitical
transition.Whilethisprogramof"minimalcivilsociety"hasalreadyfailedintheformof"reformdictatorship,"itmayremainanoptionforsometimetocomeinitselite
democraticform.
Itisinthiscontextthatourproposalforreconstructingthepoliticsofcivilsocietyasareflexivecontinuationofboththedemocraticrevolutionandthewelfarestate
becomesimportantforEastandWest,especiallyforactorshopingtosavesomethingof"thespirit"ofthedemocratictransition.
160
Ourfirstthesisisthatthepolitical
cultureneededtosustainthenewdemocraciesandtoavoiddestructivecyclesbetweenauthoritarianismandpopulismcannotbedevelopedwithoutinstitutionalizing
civilsocietyinthewidestpossiblesense.Thisinstitutionalizationbelongstotheconstituentphaseandrequiresconsciousinstitutionbuildingevenwheresocial
mobilizationsplayedamajorroleinthetransitions.
OursecondthesisisderivedfromournormativelybasedanalysisofthepoliticsofcivilsocietyintheWestandreferstothe"constituted"phaseofthenew
democracies.Thecivilsocietyneededtoreproducedemocraticpoliticalculturecanbedevelopedanddefendedonlythroughadoubleprocessoflimitingthe
colonizingtendenciesoftheadministrativestateandmarketeconomyandestablishingnewformsofsocialcontroloverthesesubsystems.Weadmitthenecessityof
firstbuildingdifferentiatedsubsystems:anexpertadministrationandaselfregulatingmarketeconomy.Inthissense,thereisnosubstituteforestablishinganeconomic
systemofhardbudgetaryconstraintsbasedonfreeprices,demonopolization,andabolishingthepaternalisticpatronage

Page490
systemofsubsidiesandbargaining.
161
Butraisingaliberaltransitionalprogramtothestatusofalongtermmodelcanhavenegativeeconomicconsequences,suchas
thedestructionofpotentiallyproductivealongwithinefficientformsofenterprise,andalsodramaticallynegativesocialconsequences.Whileresourceconstrained
economiesoftheSoviettypearefarmoredestructiveoftheenvironmentthanmarketeconomies,radicalmarketorientedstrategiesoffernocurefordevastated
environments.Whilepaternalisminitsstatesocialistformhasledtothecollapseofwelfareandsocialprotections,itwilltakemorethanthemagicofthemarketplace
torestorethelivingminimumformarginalizedsegmentsofthepopulation.Finally,whileonlydemocraticmovementsandactorscantodaylegitimatelyinstitutemarket
economiesthat,initiallyatleast,askforgreatsacrificesfromthosewhohavebeenvictimsofthelastphaseofstatesocialism,theirlegitimacycanbemaintainedonlyif
theirgoalsincludetangibleeconomicimprovementsandpoliticaltradeoffsthatthecombinationofliberaleconomyandelitedemocracycannotprovide.Thosewho
pushthislattercombinationforthelongtermruntheriskofsocialconflictand,asweknowfromLatinAmericanexperience,adestructivecyclebetweenpopulism
andauthoritarianism.
Unfortunately,thecreationofaWesterntypewelfarestateisnotanoptioneither,exceptperhapsforthespecialcaseofEastGermany.Suchastrategycould
reinforceexistingformsofpaternalismandsoftbudgetaryconstraintsintheperiodoftransition(whichcouldbeanextendedoneintheareaofeconomiclife)
moreover,itisunclearonwhatfinancialbasistoday'sbankruptstatesocialistortomorrow'sdependentcapitalisteconomiesmightfinancesucharrangementswhen
theyareincreasinglyunaffordableintheWestitself.Still,wecannotacceptKornai'sclaimthateventhosewhowanttoestablishmixedcapitalisteconomiestoday
mustforanextendedperiodpromoteyesterday'sunregulatedversion.
162
First,thereisnoguaranteethataclassicalliberaleconomicsystemwillleadtoawelfare
stateofthetraditionaltype.Second,itisnotatallcertainthatitwillactuallywork,ineithertheeconomicorthesocialandpoliticalsense,asamodelofdevelopment.
InsteadofcopyingsolutionsfromtheWest'spastorpresent,thenewdemocracieswoulddowelltounderstandthereasonswhyboth

Page491
liberalandwelfarestatemodelsareexperiencingnewproblemstoday.Thisdoesnotmeanthatoneshouldlookforamythicalthirdwaybetweencapitalismand
socialism,WestandEast,inthemannerofeithermarketsocialismorthevariousneopopulisms.Ifthereareanysolutionshere,theylieintheexperienceoftheWest,
pointingnottotheWest'spastorpresentbuttoitsfuture.TojointheWest,inotherwords,shouldnotmeantheWestasitwas,orevenis,butasitshouldandcould
becomeinresponsetopresentchallenges.
Ouranalysisofthepoliticsofcivilsocietyfocuses,howevertentatively,onatleastonepossiblefutureoftheWest.Itscombinationofdifferentiatedsubsystemsanda
welldefendedcivilsociety,inwhichthelatteristohaveprimacy,involvesneithertheeconomiccostsnorthesocialsideeffectsofthemodelsinvolvingsocial
dominationofoneortheothersubsystem,whichhavebeenhithertoprevalentinmodernEuropeanhistory.Itpromisesbotheconomicselfregulationandtheremoval
ofimportantspheresoflifefromtheeconomy,anditposesthequestionofhowthisselfregulationmightberegulatedwithoutstatismandpaternalism.Thepoliticsof
theinfluenceofciviloneconomicandpoliticalsocietymovestotheforehere.Despiteitsprogrammaticnatureandutopianelements,thisproposalmayrepresenta
morerealisticpathofreconstructionintheWestandtheEastthanthewellknownandwelltriedprogramsthathaveshowntheirundersideelsewhereandwillnot
simultaneouslysatisfythecriteriaofefficiencyandpopularacceptanceintoday'smoreorlessmobilizednewdemocracies.

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10
SocialMovementsandCivilSociety
Itisourthesisthatsocialmovementsconstitutethedynamicelementinprocessesthatmightrealizethepositivepotentialsofmoderncivilsocieties.Wealsoholdthat
ourreconstructedtheoryofcivilsocietyisindispensabletoanadequateunderstandingofthelogic,stakes,andpotentialsofcontemporarysocialmovements.As
indicatedinchapter1,thethemeoftheselfdefenseof"societyagainstthestate"(andtheunregulatedcapitalistmarketeconomy)hasbeenraisedbyanumberof
contemporarycollectiveactorsstrugglingforanautonomousanddemocraticcivilsociety.Wehavealsodemonstratedthecontinuingrelevanceofthekeycategories
ofmoderncivilsocietyandthetwodimensionalcharacterofitscoreinstitutions.Whatremainstobeshownare(1)thesystematicrelationbetweenthepotentialsofan
already(albeitincompletely)moderncivilsocietyandtheprojectsofcontemporarycollectiveactorsand(2)theimportanceofourreconstructionofthecategoriesof
civilsocietyintermsofthesystem/lifeworlddistinctionforan(admittedlypartisan)interpretationoftheseprojects.Weaddressthefirstissuebydemonstratingthe
centralityofthekeyfeaturesofmoderncivilsocietytothetwomaintheoreticalparadigmsinthestudyofsocialmovements.Usingtheexampleofthefeminist
movement,wethentrytoshowthatthedualisticstrategyofcontemporarymovementsaimedatpoliticalandsocietaldemocratizationcanbebestunderstoodinlightof
thestructuralanalysisofcontemporarycivilsocietyoutlinedinchapter9.

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NewTheoreticalParadigmsandContemporarySocialMovements
Theterm"newsocialmovements"hasgainedwidecurrencyamongtheoristssympathetictothepeace,feminist,ecology,andlocalautonomymovementsthathave
proliferatedintheWestsincethemid1970s.Butitremainsunclearwhethertherereallyissomethingsignificantlynewaboutthesemovementsandwhatthetheoretical
orpoliticalimportoftheinnovationsis.Indeed,thereislittleagreementamongtheoristsastojustwhatamovementis,whatwouldqualifyasanewtypeofmovement,
andwhatthemeaningofasocialmovementasdistinctfromapoliticalpartyorinterestgroupmightbe.
Wehavetakenupmanyoftheseissueselsewhere.
1
Whatconcernsushereisneitherthedefinitionnorthe"newness"ofsocialmovementsperse,butratherthe
relationbetweencontemporarycollectiveactionandcivilsociety.Weshallapproachthistopicbylookingatthewayitisaddressedinthetwocompetingparadigmsin
thefield:the"resourcemobilization"paradigmandthe"identityoriented''paradigm.
2
Eachapproachinvolvesatheoreticalframeworkthatexcludesthemainfocusof
theother.Weshalltrytoshowthattheapproachesarenotnecessarilyincompatible,inpartbecausebothrelyonkeyfeaturesofmoderncivilsocietytopinpointwhat
isspecifictomodernsocialmovements.Neitherparadigmdirectlyaddressesthetheoreticalimportoftheodysseyofcivilsocietyfortheemergenceandtransformation
ofmodernmovements,butalookattheanalysesdevelopedwithineachperspectiverevealsthecentralityoftheconceptofcivilsocietytoeachofthem.
Ourpresuppositionisthatthecontemporarymovementsareinsomesignificantrespects"new."Whatwehaveinmind,aboveall,isaselfunderstandingthatabandons
revolutionarydreamsinfavorofradicalreformthatisnotnecessarilyandprimarilyorientedtothestate.Weshalllabelas"selflimitingradicalism"projectsforthe
defenseanddemocratizationofcivilsocietythatacceptstructuraldifferentiationandacknowledgetheintegrityofpoliticalandeconomicsystems.Wedonotbelieve
thatitispossibletojustifythisclaimaboutwhatisnewinmovementsonthebasisofaphilosophy

Page494
ofhistorythatlinksthe"trueessence"ofwhatthemovements"reallyare"(howeverheterogeneoustheirpracticesandformsofconsciousness)toanallegedlynew
stageofhistory(postindustrialsociety).Nordoesthetheme"societyagainstthestate,''whichissharedbyallcontemporarymovements(includingsomeontheright),
initselfimplysomethingnewinthesenseofaradicalbreakwiththepast.Onthecontrary,itimpliescontinuitywithwhatisworthpreserving(evenifthisishotly
contested)intheinstitutions,norms,andpoliticalculturesofcontemporarycivilsocieties.Thequestion,then,iswhetherandinwhatwaythisthemehasbeen
connectedtonewidentities,formsoforganization,andscenariosofconflict.
Therearetwopossiblewaystoanswerthesequestions.Oneinvolvesahermeneuticapproachtotheselfunderstandingofcontemporarycollectiveactorsvisvis
theiridentity,goals,targets,andstrategies.
3
Buttheinterrogationoftheidentityofcontemporarymovementsbasedoninterpretationsoftheoreticalformsofself
expressionshouldnotbemethodologicallyabsolutized.Inparticular,confrontingthismethodwithsystematicsocialscienceshouldbequitefruitful.Itwillbeimportant,
forexample,whenjudgingthecontributionofcompetingsocialscientificparadigms,todeterminetheextenttowhicheachiscapableofaccountingfortheexperiences
articulatedbytheoriesforandwithinmovements.Ifwearetoavoidtheobjectivistfallacythatdefines"truth"asthesolepossessionofthesystemofscience,weshall
havetoinsistonlearningnotonlyaboutbutalsofrommovements.Butwemustalsotakecaretoavoidthehermeneuticistfallacy.Thehermeneuticinquirymustbe
complementedbyanapproachthatinvolvestakingthepointofviewoftheobserverratherthanthatoftheparticipants.Thiswillenableustoassessthewaysinwhich
thecontextandtransformationsofcivilsocietyarerelatedtotheappearanceandlogicofcollectiveaction.Here,adifferentanalyticlevelisinvolvedthatof
objectivatingsocialscience.Theoriesofcontemporarymovementsmustthusposethefollowingquestions:Inwhatsocietaltypesdothemovementsoccur?What
continuitiesordiscontinuitiesexistwithrespecttothepast?Whichinstitutionsareatissue?Whatarethegeneralpoliticalstakesoftheconflicts?Andwhatarethe
developmentalpossibilitiesavailabletocollective

Page495
actors?Weshallshowthatthecategoriesofcivilsocietyprovidecluestoanswersinbothparadigms.Theyalsostructurethe"classical"approachtothestudyofsocial
movementsagainstwhichthenewerparadigmsexplicitlydistinguishthemselves.Weshallsummarizethisapproachinordertohighlightthechangesinassessingthe
interrelationbetweencivilsocietyandsocialmovementsthatservesasthestartingpointofbothcontemporaryparadigms.
Theclassicaltheoreticalparadigm,dominantuntiltheearly1970s,wasthesocialpsychologytraditionoftheChicagoschool.
4
Thevariantsthathavereceivedthe
mostattentionandcriticismfromcontemporarytheoristshavebeenmasssocietytheories(Kornhauser,Arendt,etc.)andSmelser'sstructuralfunctionalistmodelof
collectivebehavior.
5
Thereareimportantdifferencesamongtheseversionsofcollectivebehaviortheory,buttheyallsharethefollowingassumptions:
1.Therearetwodistinctkindsofaction:institutionalconventionalandnoninstitutionalcollective.
2.Noninstitutionalcollectiveactionisactionthatisnotguidedbyexistingsocialnormsbutisformedtomeetundefinedorunstructuredsituations.
3.Thesesituationsareunderstoodintermsofabreakdown,duetostructuralchanges,eitherintheorgansofsocialcontrolorintheadequacyofnormative
integration.
4.Theresultingstrains,discontent,frustration,andaggressionleadindividualstoparticipateincollectivebehavior.
5.Noninstitutionalcollectivebehaviorfollowsa"lifecycle,"opentocausalanalysis,thatmovesfromspontaneouscrowdactiontotheformationofpublicsandsocial
movements.
6.Theemergenceandgrowthofmovementswithinthiscycleoccursthroughcrudeprocessesofcommunication:contagion,rumor,circularreaction,diffusion,etc.
Collectivebehaviortheoristshavefocusedonexplainingindividualparticipationinsocialmovements,lookingatgrievancesandvaluesasresponsestorapidsocial
change(strain)andsocialdisorganization.Ofcourse,noteverytheoristinthistraditiondeemscollectivebehaviortobeanabnormalorirrationalresponse

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ofunconnectedindividualstochange.Nevertheless,theyallviewthecrowdasthesimplestatomintheanatomyofcollectivebehavior.Allcollectivebehavior
theoristsstresspsychologicalreactionstobreakdown,crudemodesofcommunication,andvolatilegoals.Thisindicatesanimplicitbiastowardregardingcollective
behaviorasanonrationalorirrationalresponsetochange.Itisthisbias,mostexplicitinthemasssocietyandSmelserianapproaches,thathastriggeredthecriticismof
contemporarytheorists.Itisalsothisbiasthatprecludesanyexaminationoftherelationbetweencollectiveactionandthemodernizationofcivilsociety,forit
presupposesfromtheoutsetthatcollectiveactionderivesfromthebreakdown(normativeandinstitutional)ofcivilsociety.
Theinadequaciesoftheclassicaltraditionbecameobviousinthe1960sand1970swhenlargescalesocialmovementsemergedintheUnitedStatesandEurope.The
developmentofmovementsinpolitiescharacterizedbypluralistsasdemocraticandincivilsocietieswithamultiplicityofvoluntaryassociationsandvitalpublicand
privatespheresbeliedthemasssocietyversionofthecollectivebehaviorparadigm.So,too,didthefactthatactorsintheNewLeft,civilrights,andfeminist
movementshardlyconformedtotheimageofanomic,fragmented,irrationaldeviants.NorwastheSmelserianmodel(structuralstrain/generalizedbelief/short
circuiting)adequatetoexplainthetiming,cognitivecharacter,organizationalforms,conduct,orgoalsofmovementactors.Themovementsofthe1960sand1970s
werenotresponsestoeconomiccrisesornormativebreakdown.Theyinvolvedconcretegoals,clearlyarticulatedgeneralvaluesandinterests,andrational
calculationsofstrategies.Clearly,theyrequiredanewtheoreticalapproach.IntheUnitedStates,theresponsewasthe"resourcemobilization"paradigminWestern
Europe,itwasthe"newsocialmovements"paradigm.
Despitecrucialdifferences,bothparadigmsassumethatsocialmovementsarebasedonconflictsbetweenorganizedgroupswithautonomousassociationsand
sophisticatedformsofcommunication(networks,publics).Botharguethatconflictualcollectiveactionisnormalandthatparticipantsareusuallyrational,well
integratedmembersoforganizations.Inshort,collectiveactioninvolvesformsofassociationandstrategiesspecifictothecontext

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ofamodernpluralistcivilsociety.Thiscontextincludespublicspaces,socialinstitutions(massmedia,thepress),rights(toassociate,tospeak,toassemble),
representativepoliticalinstitutions,andanautonomouslegalsystem,allofwhicharetargetsforsocialmovementsseekingtoinfluencepolicyorinitiatechange.Both
approachesalsodistinguishbetweentwolevelsofcollectiveaction:themanifestdimensionoflargescalemobilizations(strikes,rallies,demonstrations,sitins,
boycotts)andthelessvisible,latentlevelofformsoforganizationandcommunicationamonggroupsthataccountfortheeverydaylifeandcontinuityofactor
participation.Itistheinsistenceoftheseapproachesonthepriororganizationofsocialactorsandontherationalityofcollectiveconflictthatdirectlychallengesthe
classicaltheoriesofsocialmovements,foritimpliesthatcharacteristicspreviouslydeemeduniqueto"conventional"collectiveactionaretruefornonconventionalforms
ofcollectivebehavioraswell.Inotherwords,itiscivilsociety,withitsintermediaryandautonomousassociationssodeartothepluralists,andnottheirnightmare
imageofmasssocietythatformstheterrainonwhichtheanathematizedsocialmovementsappear!
TheResourceMobilizationParadigm
Resourcemobilizationtheoristsbeganbyrejectingtheemphasisonfeelingsandgrievances,theuseofpsychologizingcategories,andthefocusonbreakdown
characteristicofthecollectivebehaviorapproach.Moreover,theymarshaledawealthofempiricalevidencetodisprovethenotionthatunconnectedindividuals,
motivatedbysocialstrain,arethemainactorsinsocialmovements.
6
Mostsignificantfromtheirownpointofview,resourcemobilizationtheoristsdemonstratedthat
sophisticatedorganizationalformsandmodesofcommunicationgoingwellbeyondthecrudemechanismsdescribedintheclassicalliteratureareneededtomobilize
collectiveaction.
Drawingontheworkofeconomists(Olson),politicalscientists(Salisbury),andhistorians(Rud,Hobsbawm,Soboul,Wolff),resourcemobilizationtheoristsstress
such"objective"variablesasorganization,interests,resources,opportunities,andstrategiestoaccountforlargescalemobilizations.Thesevariablesareaddressed

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fromthestandpointofaneoutilitarianlogicimputedtocollectiveactors.The"rationalactor"(individualandgroup),employingstrategicandinstrumentalreasoning,
replacesthecrowdasthecentralreferentfortheanalysisofcollectiveaction.Ofcourse,therearedifferentorientationswithinthisparadigm,rangingfromthestrictly
individualist,utilitarianlogicofthepurerationalactorapproachespioneeredbyOlsontotheorganizationalentrepreneurialapproachofMcCarthyandZaldandthe
politicalprocessmodeloftheTillys,Oberschall,Gamson,Klandermans,andTarrow.
7
Mostofthelattergrouprelaxthestrictindividualistcalculusofinteresttypical
ofOlsonbypositingsolidarygroupswithcollectiveinterestsastheprotagonistsofcollectiveaction.Despitetheirdifferences,allversionsoftheresourcemobilization
approachanalyzecollectiveactionintermsofthelogicofstrategicinteractionandcostbenefitcalculations.
8
Resourcemobilizationtheoristssharethefollowingassumptions:
1.Socialmovementsmustbeunderstoodintermsofaconflicttheoryofcollectiveaction.
2.Thereisnofundamentaldifferencebetweeninstitutionalandnoninstitutionalcollectiveaction.
3.Bothentailconflictsofinterestbuiltintoinstitutionalizedpowerrelations.
4.Collectiveactioninvolvestherationalpursuitofinterestsbygroups.
5.Goalsandgrievancesarepermanentproductsofpowerrelationsandcannotaccountfortheformationofmovements.
6.Movementsformbecauseofchangesinresources,organization,andopportunitiesforcollectiveaction.
7.Successinvolvestherecognitionofthegroupasapoliticalactororincreasedmaterialbenefits.
8.Mobilizationinvolveslargescale,specialpurpose,bureaucratic,formalorganizations.
9
Organizationandrationalityarethecatchwordsofthisapproach.Analysisdoesnotproceedfromahermeneuticrelationtotheideologyorselfunderstandingof
collectiveactors.Ofcourse,fromahermeneuticstandpoint,itmightberetortedthatthepointof

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viewoftheanalysisdoesapproximatethatofamovementorganizerconcernedwiththeimperativesofmobilization,butitisfairertosaythatwhatdominateshereisan
observer'soverviewofthepoliticalenvironmentthatcouldbeusefultoorganizers.
Nevertheless,wefinditstrikingthatreferencesto"stillviableorpartiallyviablecommunities"or"associationalgroupsorganizedforpurposesotherthan
opposition"(Oberschall),totheexistenceof"collectiveinterests"(Tilly),"socialincentives"(Fireman,Gamson),or''conscienceconstituencies"whodonateresources
(McCarthy,Zald)aboundintheliterature,implyingcognizanceofthe"civil"ratherthan"mass"societalbasisofrational,organized,moderncollectiveaction.
10
What
remainsproblematicinthewholeapproachisgivinganadequateaccountoftheorganizationalformsitpresupposes.Suchanaccountwouldrequireexplorationofthe
socialandpoliticalterrainthatformstheconditionofpossibilityfortheemergenceandsuccessofmodernmovements.
CharlesTilly'sreconstructionoftheimpactoftheshiftfromlocaltonationalstructuresofpoweronorganizationalformsandtypesofcollectiveactiontakesan
importantstepinthisdirection.Moreover,hisversionofmodernizationtheorydescribestheemergenceoftheactionrepertoireandthetypesofassociations
presupposedbyresourcemobilizationtheory.Thus,hiscomparativehistoricalanalysisbothsituatesandtranscendshisframework,andmanyofhismostsignificant
findingsregardingnewformsofgrouplifehaveimplicationsforthedevelopmentofkeydimensionsofcivilsocietythatarenotreducibletotheanalyticcategoriesofhis
resourcemobilizationapproach.
11
Nordoesheofferadequatemeanstoaccountforthenewformsoforganizationortheprojectsofthosecontemporarymovements
thatdonotsimplytargettheeconomyorthestateforinclusionandmaterialbenefits.Indeed,thelimittoTilly'scorrectivetotheresourcemobilizationmodelisthatit
allowscivilsociety(differentiatedfromthestateandtheeconomy)toappearastheterrainbutnotthetargetofcollectiveaction.Nonetheless,becauseitmakesthe
strongestcasefortheimportanceofcivilsocietytotheunderstandingofmodernmovements,itisworthexaminingTilly'smodelmoreclosely.
DespitehisexplicitpolemicagainsttheSmelserianandDurkheimianversionsofthe"breakdown"modelofcollective

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behavior,Tillyretainsthethesisthatlargescalestructuralchange("modernization")affectscollectiveaction.
12
Hedisprovesstandardbreakdowntheoriesbyshowing
thatthetimingandpaceofurbanizationandindustrializationdonotgovernthetempoofcollectiveactionandthatitisnotpossibletolinkhardship,anomie,crises,and
conflictdirectly.Buthisanalysisofstructuralchangedoesnotchallengethefactofdifferentiationinthetransitionfrom"community"to"society.''Instead,heshows
howeconomictransformation,urbanization,andstatemakingproducealongtermshiftinthecharacterandpersonnelofcollectiveaction.Theseprocesses(along
withthedevelopmentofthemassmedia)facilitatetheemergenceofnewtypesofmobilizationsandorganizationswhileunderminingothers.WhatisnewinTilly's
versionofmodernizationtheoryisthelinkagebetweenaspecificactionrepertoireandstructuralchangesthathaveanimpactontheeverydaylifeoftherelevant
actors:"Thereorganizationofeverydaylifetransformedthecharacterofconflict...longrunreshapingofsolidarities,ratherthantheimmediateproductionofstress
andstrain,constitutedthemostimportantimpactofstructuralchangeonpoliticalconflict."
13
Throughanalysisofthechangesinthedailyroutinesofpopulationstheirlocusandmodeofwork,thestructureoflifeinneighborhoods,populationshiftsfrom
countrysidetocity,andchangesinthesitesofpowerTillyshowshowtheactionrepertoiresdevelopedbycollectiveactorsinterrelatewiththeirformsofassociation
andwhynewformsemerge.Thelongtermdevelopmentinvolvesthereplacementofcommunalsolidaritiesbyvoluntaryassociations.Thisentailsashiftofcollective
actionawayfromroutineassembliesbycommunalgroupsandlocalmarkets,festivals,andofficiallysanctionedgatheringstowarddeliberatelycalledmeetingsby
formallyorganizedgroups.
14
Themajorformsofcollectiveactionthuschange:Thefoodriots,taxrebellions,andappealstopaternalisticauthoritiestypicalofthe
"eighteenthcenturyactionrepertoire"arereplacedbythedemonstrationsandstrikestypicalofthe"nineteenthcenturyactionrepertoire."
Tilly'sanalyticcategoriesoftypesofcollectiveactioncapturethisoverallshift.Theeighteenthcenturyactionrepertoireinvolves"competitive"and"reactive"claims.
Theformerentailsconflictamongexistingcommunalgroupsonthelocalleveloverresources

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claimedbyrivals."Reactive"collectiveactioninvolvescommunalgroupsthreatenedbyeffortsofstatemakerstogaincontroloverthegeneralpopulationandits
resources.Italsoinvolvesresistancetothegrowthofthenationalmarketandinsistenceonthepriorityoflocalneedsandtraditions.Inthiscase,agroupreactstothe
claimsofanothergroupoveraresourcecurrentlyunderitscontrol.Inbothcases,collectiveactioniscarriedoutbypreexistingsolidarycommunities.Itinvolvesrichly
symbolicandexpressiveaction,admirablydescribedbyTillydespitehisoverallstressonthestrategicrationalityevenofthesetypesofconflicts.
15
"Proactive"collectiveactions,ontheotherhand,assertgroupclaimstopower,privileges,orresourcesthathavenotpreviouslyexisted.Here,attemptstocontrol
ratherthanresistelementsofnationalstructuresleadtotheformationofcomplexspecialpurposeorganizationsinplaceofcommunalgroups.
Thetypesofmobilizationthatcorrespondtothelattertwotypesofclaimsare"defensive"and"offensive,"respectively.Reactivestrugglesinvolvedefensive
mobilizationsinthefaceofathreatfromtheoutside.Clearly,whatisatstakeisthedefenseofatraditional,communallystructuredlifeworldagainst"modernization."
Theoffensivemobilizationstypicalofproactiveclaimantsinvolveapoolingofresourcesforthesakeofrecognitionoralargershareofpower.
Tillycontinuallywarnsagainstviewingcompetitive,reactive,andproactivecollectiveactionsasstagesinanevolutionaryprocess.Moreover,hearguesthatelements
ofanactionrepertoirecanbeusedtomakeavarietyofclaims:Ademonstrationisnotbydefinitionproactiveoroffensive.Nevertheless,hetracesalongtermshift,
withthefirsttwodominatinguntilthemidnineteenthcenturyandthethirddominatingthereafter.Theshiftoccurredbecausethe"bigstructures"woncontroloverthe
resourcesformerlywieldedbyhouseholds,communities,andothersmallgroups.Inaddition,urbanizationandthemassmediareducedthecostsoflargescale
mobilizationforformallyorganizedassociations.Thenewlociofpowerandthenewstructuresofeverydaylifefosteredtheselectionofanewactionrepertoireand
theemergenceofnewassociationalforms.Socialconflictincreasinglytooktheformofproactive,offensivestrugglesforinclusioninthestructuresthat

Page502
controlnationallevelresources.Lastbuthardlyleast,thedevelopmentofmasselectoralpoliticscreatedanenvironmentamenabletovoluntaryassociationandlarge
scalemobilization.
Indeed,Tillyarguesthatthegrowthofelectionsandthebeginningofpopularparticipationinnationalpoliticspromotedthespreadofthedemonstrationasakeyform
ofcollectiveaction,becauseitinvolvedalegalumbrellathatcouldbeextendedtomoreandmoregroupsandtypesofgatherings:"Thegrantoflegalitytoanelectoral
associationoranelectoralassemblyprovidesaclaimtolegalityforassociationsandassembliesthatarenotquiteelectoral,notonlyelectoral,ornotnowelectoral."
16
Therightstoorganize,recruit,speakpublicly,assemble,solicit,publicize,anddemonstrate(thekeyinstitutionalcomponentsofmoderncivilsociety)are,ofcourse,
essentialtoamultipartysystemoperatinginacontextofuniversalsuffrage.Thepresenceofeliteswithastronginterestinabroaddefinitionofacceptablepolitical
activitymakesithard,overtime,forgovernmentstowithholdtheserightsfromothersocialactors.Electoralpoliticsthusoffersanincentivetosocialactorstoselect
thedemonstration,publicmeeting,andstrikeasmodesofcollectiveaction,since"thosegroupsaremoresuccessful,onthewhole,whichcanproducethehighest
multipleofnumbers,commitment,andarticulationofclaims."
17
Thismeansthatcivilsocietyhasbecometheindispensableterrainonwhichsocialactorsassemble,organize,andmobilize,eveniftheirtargetsaretheeconomyand
thestate.Tilly'sworkthuschallengestheconclusionsofFoucault,whoholdsthatallmeansofachievingeffective,autonomoussolidarityhavebeenabolishedbythe
"individualizing"and"normalizing"techniquesusheredinwithmodernformsofpower.Tillydoesshowthatthecommunalsolidaritiesofthefamousintermediarybodies
oftheancienrgime,alongwiththesitesandtypesofcontentiousgatheringsspecifictothestructuresofeverydaylifein"premodern"(eighteenthcentury)conditions,
dideventuallydisappear.Buthispointisthattheywerereplacedbynewformsofsolidarity,association,powerresources,andmodesofconflictontheterrainof
moderncivilsociety.Indeed,Tillyviewstheseformsoforganizationandprotestasmoreautonomousthanthe"spontaneous"gatheringstypicaloftheeighteenth
centuryactionrepertoiresolovinglydescribedbyFoucault!

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Fromourpointofview,Tilly'sworkshowsthatmoderncollectiveactionpresupposesthedevelopmentofautonomoussocialandpoliticalspaceswithinciviland
politicalsocietythatareguaranteedbyrightsandsupportedbythedemocraticpoliticalcultureunderlying"formal"representativepoliticalinstitutions.Buthestresses
primarilythepoliticalopportunitiesandstrategicimplicationsthesehavefortheemergenceofthenineteenthcenturyactionrepertoire.Inshort,helooksonlyatthose
dimensionsoftheseprocessesthatarerelevantforthemobilizationoforganizedgroupscompetingforpower.Tilly'shistoricalworkdoesimplythatthetransformation
ofthelociofpowerandthecorrespondingchangesinformofcollectiveactionpresupposethecreationofnewmeanings,neworganizations,newidentities,anda
socialspace(namely,civilsociety)inwhichthesecanappear.Buttheresourcemobilizationperspectiveheembracesleadshimtotreatthelattermerelyasobvious
preconditionsforeffectivecollectiveaction.Thecombinedpolityandmobilizationmodels
18
focusattentionontheinterplayofrepression/facilitation,power,and
opportunity/threatononeside,andinterests,organization,andthemobilizationofcapacitiesontheother.Itispresupposedthatcollectiveactioninvolvescostsand
bringsbenefitsintheformofcollectivegoods(includinginclusion).Thestruggleisconstruedasbetweenmembersandcontendersforinclusioninthepolity(accessto
power)andthematerialrewardsthiscanbring.Inshort,socialconflictsinandoverinstitutionsofcivilsocietyandtheformofthepoliticalpublicsphereareviewed
fromonlyonesideasdefensiveoroffensivereactionstochangingpowerrelations.
Thereareseveraldrawbackstothisnarrowfocus.First,itpresupposeswhathas,withthetransitionfromthecommunaltotheassociationalbasisofgroupidentity,
becomeproblematicandneedstobeexplained.Inotherwords,Tilly'sownhistoricalworksuggeststhattheconstructionofgroupidentity,therecognitionofshared
interests,andthecreationofsolidaritywithinandbetweengroupscan,withtheemergenceofmoderncivilsociety,nolongerbetreatedasgivens.Theseare
achievementsthathaveincreasinglycometobetreatedassuchbytheactorsinvolvedintheseprocesses.Increasedselfreflectionregardingthesocialconstructionof
identityandrealityinvolveslearningalongnonstrategicdimensions.

Page504
Thesequestionsbecomeevenmorepressingifweconsiderthosecontemporarycollectiveactorsthatdonotsimplytargetthestateortheeconomyforinclusionor
increasedbenefitsandwhoseidentitiescannotbededucedfromthesesubsystems.Inshort,Tilly'sapproachexcludesthepossibilityofanalyzingthe"politicsof
identity"ofcontemporarycollectiveactors.
Second,whileTillyprovidestoolsforanalyzinghowtheinstitutionsofcivilandpoliticalsocietyofferameansforexcludedandrelativelypowerlessgroupstoexert
pressureonthosewithpower(andmoney)inordertogainentryintothepolity,hisfocusonthegoalofinclusionandontheacquisitionofpowerleadshimtoobscure
theimplicationsofthe"politicsofinfluence"aimedatpoliticalsociety.Influence,aswehavealreadyseen,isapeculiar"medium"thatisspecificallysuitedtomodern
civilsocietieswhosepublicspheres,rights,andrepresentativedemocraticinstitutionsare,inprincipleatleast,opentodiscursiveprocessesthatinform,thematize,and
potentiallyaltersocialnormsandpoliticalcultures.Itispossibleforcollectiveactorsincivilsocietytoexerciseinfluenceonactorsinpoliticalsociety,tomakeuseof
publicspeechnotonlytogainpowerormoneybuttorestricttheroleofthemediaofpowerandmoneyinthelifeworldinordertosecureautonomyandtomodernize
(democratizeandliberalize)theinstitutionsandsocialrelationsofcivilsociety.Byimplicitlycollapsing"power"and"influence,"Tillyisblindedtothelogicofcollective
actionthatseekstoapplytheprinciplesofcivilsocietytocivilsocietyitselfandtorealizethemmorefullywithinsocialinstitutions.Itisourthesisthatincontemporary
socialmovements,adualisticpoliticsofidentityandinfluence,aimedatbothcivilsocietyandthepolity(orpoliticalsociety),replacesthemonistlogicofcollective
actionstressedbyTilly.
Moreover,Tillyhasexplicitlyrejectedtheideathatchangesinthetactics(sitdownstrikes,masspicketing,sitins),issues(localautonomy,genderequality,ecology,
righttoadistinctlifestyle),oractors(prevalenceofthenewmiddleclasses)engagedincontemporarycollectiveactionamounttoanewactionrepertoire."Lookedat
closely,however,almostallofthesecasesinpointinvolveformsofactionthatalreadyhavetheirownhistories."
19
Despitesomeinnovation,contemporarycollective
actorscontinue

Page505
tousetheroutinesofmeeting,demonstrating,striking,etc.ToTilly,then,althoughissuesandalignmentshavechanged,thefundamentalfactiscontinuitythemeans
ofactionhaveremainedthesame.Butdotheyhavethesamemeaning?Arethedemonstrations,meetings,etc.,ofthenewmovementsreallyonlyproactiveand
offensive?Clearly,inthecaseofthenewdimensionsofthefeminist,gay,ecology,peace,andlocalautonomymovements,thisisnotso.AndTillyhimselfhasargued
thatnoactionisinitselfproactiveorreactive,offensiveordefensive.Indeed,contemporarymovementscombinefeaturesofbothofTilly'smaintypes.Theyareoften
defensiveandreactivebutdonotprotectpreexistingtraditionalcommunitiesfromoutsideincursions.Rather,theydefendspacesforthecreationofnewidentitiesand
solidaritiesandseektomakesocialrelationswithintheinstitutionsofcivilsocietymoreegalitariananddemocratic.Whiletheyareassociationallyorganized,the
associationsaretreatednotasinterestgroupsbutasendsinthemselves.Noraretheexpandedpublicspaces,literaryandmediabasedcounterpublicspheres,forms
ofdiscursiveconflictresolution,anddemocraticparticipationconstruedsolelyasmeanstotheendofattainingincreasedmaterialbenefitsorinclusionasaninterest
groupintheaccesstoandexerciseofpower.Finally,thenewmovementsalsohavean"offensive"side,notonlyinthesenseofstrugglesforinclusionandpowerinthe
politybutalsoinsofarastheyinvolveeffortstoinfluenceactorsinpoliticalsocietytomakepolicyandinitiatereformsappropriatetonewcollectiveidentifies.
Manyresourcemobilizationtheoristshaverecognizedtheuniqueaspectsofcontemporarymovements.Indeed,theparadigmwasinitiallyelaboratedbytheorists
involvedinordirectlyaffectedbytheNewLeft.Thesetheoristsexplicitlyaddressedinnovationsintheorganizations,mobilizationprocesses,strategies,andtargetsof
themovementsofthe1960sandearly1970s.
20
Accordingtooneofthemostsignificantanalyses,thesemovementswerenewpreciselytotheextentthattheywere
mobilizedby"professionalsocialmovementorganizations"orSMOs(outsideratherthanindigenousleaders),whocarefullycalculatedandsteeredcollectiveactionto
gainmediacoverageandpublicsympathyformovementgoalsandtherebyinfluenceeliteconscienceconstituenciestoprovidefundingandadvocacythatwouldlead
tothefurtherprofessionalization

Page506
(bureaucratization)ofsocialdiscontentandsuccessinthesenseofensuringtherepresentationoftheunrepresentedthroughviableinterestgroups.
21
Clearly,thegoal
ofthistheoryistoaccountforthepossibilityandsuccessofcollectiveactiononthepartofthoseexcludedfromdirectrepresentationwithinthepoliticalsystemby
eitherpartiesorentrenchedinterestgroups.TheanalysisofthisparticularstrategyofinfluenceonthepartofprofessionalSMOsshowsthatcontemporarycollective
actiondoesnotsimplyinvolvedirectpowerstrugglesbetween"contenders"andauthorities.Instead,thedecentralized,public,pluraliststructureofcivilsociety
encourageseffortstoinfluencesectorsofpublicopinion,inthiscasetheopinionofexternal"conscienceconstituencies,"thatis,socialelites.
Thisanalysisisquiteconvincingwithrespecttodisorganizedandpowerlessgroupsthatwouldotherwisebeunrepresented,suchaschildren,thepoor,orconsumers.
AswithTilly,however,theexclusivefocushereonstrategiestoattainpoliticalrepresentationandbenefitsleavesuswithaonesidedunderstandingofthepeculiar
"power"ofinfluenceandobscuresthedistinctionbetweensocialmovementsandinterestgroups.Movementsarereducedtoprofessionalorganizationsthatmobilize
masscollectiveactionsforpoliticalinstrumentalreasons.Onthisanalysis,collectiveactorscouldneitherbemobilizednorbeinfluentialwithoutmoneyandpower,and
attaininginfluenceamountstothesamethingasgainingmoneyandpower(andorganizationalresources).Yetthepoliticsofinfluenceistherecourseparexcellenceof
thosewhoarerelativelypowerless,politicaloutsiders,andthosewithouteconomicclout.Hencetheimportanceof"professionalSMOs."Howeverconvincingthis
logicmaybeintheabstract,inthecaseofMcCarthyandZald'stheoryitturnsoutthatcollapsinginfluenceintothemediaofmoneyandpowerhastheunfortunate
resultthatthedynamicsandlogicofthemostsignificantcontemporarysocialmovementsaremisconstrued.
AsJenkinsandEckert,amongothers,demonstrate,thenewsocialmovementswereindigenouschallengesorganizedbylocalleaderswhoemergedfromthe
"aggrieved"populationsanddrewonautonomousnetworksoflocalassociations,grassrootsgroups,socialclubs,churches(forthecivilrightsmovement),etc.,to

Page507
mobilizecollectiveaction.
22
Theywereorganizedinto"classicalSMOs,"associationsdependentonthevolunteerlaborofdirectbeneficiaries,employinginnovative
tacticsthatregisteredstrikingsuccesseswellbeforeprofessionalizationoccurred.Theirstrategiesaimedatinfluencingpublicopinionandthereby,indirectly,elites,not
inordertogainpatronageor,inthefirstinstance,evenpoliticalpower,buttoconvinceothersofthejusticeoftheircause.
23
Indeed,onceprofessionalSMOsbecame
primary,astheydidinthe1980s,theysignaled(althoughtheydidnotcause,pacePivenandCloward)thedeclineofthecycleofprotestandofthemovement
characterofcollectiveaction.Wearethusconfirmedinourthesisthatautonomous,voluntary,andindigenousassociationswithincivilsocietyusingandexpanding
publicdiscourseandpublicspacesfordiscoursearethedifferentiaspecificaofcontemporarysocialmovements.
Evenwhen"success"isdefinedinthestandardtermsofresourcemobilizationtheory,aspoliticalinclusionofformerlyexcludedgroupsorasincreasedmaterial
benefits,itwouldbeimpossibletounderstandthesuccessesofthecivilrightsmovementifinfluencewereconfusedwithpowerandifthetargetsofinfluencewere
reducedtopotentialpatronsorpoliticaladversaries.Thesitins,boycotts,andfreedomrideswereaimedatinfluencingpublicopinionandtherebythecourts(federal
andSupreme)toenforcefederallawsandtoinvalidate,asunconstitutional,localordinancesinstitutionalizingsegregation.Itwasinfluence,notmoneyorpower,that
wasoperativehere.Tobesure,thestrategyofinfluencewasalsodirectedatpersuadingpoliticalelitesinCongresstopasslegislation.Inthecontextofafavorable
"politicalopportunitystructure,"theseinfluenceorientedstrategiesofcollectiveactionledtothecivilrightsactsof1964and1965andtheinstitutionalizationof
significantgainsduringtheearly1970s.
24
Thesewereallsuccessesofindigenousorganizingandamassmovement.
25
Patronageandprofessionalizationdidindeedoccurinthecivilrightsandothernewmovements,butthisprocessdidnotinitiate,control,quell,orcooptthe
movements.Rather,theyplayedanimportantroleinfollowingupontheirvictories."Asthewomen'sandenvironmentalmovementshavedemonstrated,litigation,
closemonitoringofgovernmentagencies,andprofessionalizedlobby

Page508
ingcanbequiteeffectiveifalliedwithanindigenousmovementandifthereisaclearstatutoryandadministrativebasisforimplementation."
26
Moreover,thedecline
ofthemovementswasduenottocooptationorprofessionalization,assomecriticsofMcCarthyandZaldhaveclaimed,buttomovementsuccessesandtheirinternal
logicofdevelopment,neitherofwhichinvolvedthetransformationofgoalsandtacticsinexchangeforpoliticalincorporation.
27
TheanalysisofJenkinsandEckertmustbetakenasacorrectiveratherthananalternativetotheresourcemobilizationparadigm.Whiletheydemonstratethat
successfulcollectiveactionmustnowinvolvebothindigenousmassmovements(basedonautonomousandlocalassociations)andprofessionalinterestgroups,they
stilldefinesuccessas"bringinganexcludedgroupintothepolity."Althoughtheyexpandthetargetsofinfluencetoincludenotonlypoliticaladversariesorpotential
patronsbutalsopublicopinioningeneral,thereisstillanoverlystrongpoliticalbiastothediscussionthatleadstoaonesidedinterpretationofcontemporary
movements.Accordingly,thedualisticcharacterofcontemporarycollectiveactionisrecognizedonlywithrespecttoorganization(grassrootsassociationsplus
interestgroups)theultimatetargetoftheseorganizationsandofcollectiveactioningeneralremainsmonisticallyconstrued.Fullrecognitionandinclusionwithinthe
polity,andnotthedefenseandtransformationofcivilsociety,isatissueonthisinterpretation.Thegoalofthecivilrightsmovement,however,wasnotonlyacquiring
civilrightsbutalsomodernizingcivilsocietyinthesenseofundoingtraditionalstructuresofdomination,exclusion,andinequalityrootedinsocialinstitutions,norms,
collectiveidentities,andculturalvaluesbasedonracialandclassprejudice.Andthefeministmovement,totakeanotherexample,takesclearaimatpatriarchal
institutionsincivilsocietyandworksforculturalandnormativechangeasmuchasforpoliticalandeconomicpower.Indeed,thepervasiveconcernonthepartofall
contemporarycollectiveactorswithautonomy,identity,discourses,socialnorms,andculturalsignificationsremainsunexplainedbythistheory.
28
Resourcemobilizationtheoryingeneralislimitedbyitsfocusonpowertothematizingthestrategicusesofinfluence.Inotherwords,theapproachfocusesonthe
expansionof"politicalsociety"

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toincludenewactorsortoincreasethepowerofoldones.Certainlythisisanimportantdimensionofcontemporarycollectiveaction,asissuccessdefinedintermsof
inclusioninthepolityandincreasedbenefits.Butthisishardlythewholestory.Acivilsocietyorientedapproachcouldhighlighttwoadditionaldimensionsof
contemporarycollectiveaction:thepoliticsofinfluence(ofcivilonpoliticalsociety)andthepoliticsofidentity(thefocusonautonomy,identity,andthe
democratizationofsocialrelationsoutsidethepolity).
Withtheselimitsinmind,itwouldnonethelessbepossibletoapplysomeofthecoreconceptsoftheresourcemobilizationapproachtocontemporarymovements.
WithinthespiritofTilly'swork,wecouldaskwhetheranewtwentiethcenturyactionrepertoireisinthemaking.Wecouldattempttocorrelatechangesinthe
organizationalforms,targets,andtacticsofcollectiveaction(internalresourcemobilizationconcerns)withchangesinthelocusandtechnologyofpower,resources,
andpoliticalopportunity("external"politymodelissues),alterationsintherelationsamongstate,economy,andsociety,andtransformationsintheexperiencesand
structuresofeverydaylife.Inotherwords,theabstractelementsoftheresourcemobilizationapproachcouldbeusedtodevelopatheoreticalaccountofchanges
recognizedbyeveryoneinaspectsofcontemporarycollectiveactions.Tillyhimselfgrantsthelegitimacyofsuchaninquiry.
29
Thisinquiry,however,wouldneedtotranscendthenarrowframeworkandfocusofresourcemobilizationtheory.Contemporarycollectiveactorsconsciouslystruggle
overthepowertoconstructnewidentities,tocreatedemocraticspaceswithinbothcivilsocietyandthepolityforautonomoussocialaction,andtoreinterpretnorms
andreshapeinstitutions.Itisthereforeincumbentonthetheoristtoviewcivilsocietyasthetargetaswellastheterrainofcollectiveaction,tolookintotheprocesses
bywhichcollectiveactorscreatetheidentitiesandsolidaritiestheydefend,toassesstherelationsbetweensocialadversariesandthestakesoftheirconflicts,to
analyzethepoliticsofinfluenceexercisedbyactorsincivilsocietyonthoseinpoliticalsociety,andtoanalyzethestructuralandculturaldevelopmentsthatcontributeto
theheightenedselfreflectionofactors.

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TheNewSocialMovementsParadigm
Thenewsocialmovementsparadigmpurportstodoallthis.Europeantheoristsofcontemporarymovementsturnedtothedimensionofsocialintegrationincollective
actionwithout,however,reproducingtheDurkheimianthrustofthebreakdownthesisorSmelserianmodelsofcollectivebehavior.Thesetheoristsarealsoawareof
theinadequaciesofMarxistanalysesofsocialmovements,despitetheirsympathywiththosedimensionsofneoMarxismthatstresstheimportanceofconsciousness,
ideology,socialstruggle,andsolidaritytocollectiveaction.These''postMarxist"thinkersarguethattheoriesstressingtheprimacyofstructuralcontradictions,
economicclasses,andcrisesindeterminingcollectiveidentityareinappropriatetocontemporarycollectiveactors.Theyalsomaintainthatonecannotrestcontentwith
applyingneoutilitarian,rationalactormodelstocontemporaryconflict(inthemannerofresourcemobilizationtheory)becausecollectiveactionisnotrestrictedto
politicalexchanges,negotiations,andstrategiccalculationsbetweenadversaries.Today,collectiveactorsfocusprimarilyonissuesofsocialnormsandcollective
identity.Thismeansthatthelogicofcollectiveinteractionentailsmorethanstrategicorinstrumentalrationality.
Itwouldbemisleadingtoimply,however,thatanewparadigmhasbeenformedaroundapureidentitymodelsuchastheoneproposedbyPizzorno.
30
Indeed,this
modelhasseriousdifficultiesandhasbeencriticizedinthemorecomplextheoreticalapproacharticulatedbyAlainTouraineandhisschool.
31
Tourainedefinessocialmovementsasnormativelyorientedinteractionsbetweenadversarieswithconflictinginterpretations
andopposedsocietalmodelsofasharedculturalfield.
32
Yetheexplicitlyrejectsapurelyidentityorientedanalysisofsocialmovements,arguingthatsuchanalyses
tendeithertoreproducetheideologicalselfunderstandingofactorsortoslipintoasocialpsychologicalaccountofinteractionattheexpenseofatrulysociological
analysisofstruggle.Thisisespeciallyriskyinthecaseofcontemporarycollectiveactors.Theirquestsforpersonalandcommunalidentity,theiradvocacyof
expressiveasopposedtostrategicaction,andtheirfocusondirectparticipationinvolvea

Page511
tendencyto"retreattoautonomy"toabandonthefieldofsocialpoliticalstruggleandturninonthemselvesinthefashionofcommunitarianorsectariangroups.Thus,
anexclusivetheoreticalfocusonthecreationofidentitywouldonlyparallelthetendencyofsomecontemporaryactorstoconstruetheirownideologicalrepresentation
ofsocialrelations(direct,democratic,communal)asautopianorganizingprincipleforallofsocietyandtoequatetheirexpressivedevelopmentofidentitywiththe
culturalstakesofthestruggle.AlthoughTourainemaintainsthatculturalorientationcannotbeseparatedfromsocialconflict,heneverthelessinsistsontheobjectivityof
acommonculturalfieldsharedbyopponents.Thevariousinstitutionalpotentialsofthesharedculturalfield,andnotsimplytheparticularidentityofaparticular
group,comprisethestakesofstruggle.Actorsandanalystswhofocusexclusivelyonthedynamicsofidentityformationthereforetendtoveeroffthemapofsocial
movements.
Yet,onemightargue,thesalientfeatureofthenewsocialmovementsisnotthattheyengageinexpressiveactionorasserttheiridentitiesbutthattheyinvolveactors
whohavebecomeawareoftheircapacitytocreateidentitiesandofthepowerrelationsinvolvedinthesocialconstructionofthoseidentities.Contemporaryactorsare
concernednotonlywithaffirmingthecontentofaspecificidentitybutalsowiththeformalelementsinvolvedinidentityformation.Theyhavearticulatedtheformal
principleofanequalchanceforalltoparticipateingroupprocessesthroughwhichidentitiesareformed,andtheyhavebecomeselfreflectiveregardingthesocial
processesofidentityformation.
33
Thisincreasedselfreflectionisalsoappliedtoexistingsocietalnormsandtothestructuresofdominationinvolvedintheir
maintenance.Inotherwords,contemporarycollectiveactorsseethatthecreationofidentityinvolvessocialconflictaroundthereinterpretationofnorms,thecreation
ofnewmeanings,andachallengetothesocialconstructionoftheveryboundariesbetweenpublic,private,andpoliticaldomainsofaction.
Onthisbasis,onemightsaythatcollectiveactorsstrivetocreateagroupidentitywithinageneralsocialidentitywhoseinterpretationtheycontest.However,evena
stressonthenewselfreflectionofsocialmovementsconcerningidentityproblemsdoesnotonits

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ownintroducethedimensionofconflictladensocialrelationsbetweenadversaries.Noteventheselfreflectivedefenseofanexistingornewlycreatedidentityinvolves
ageneralizablepoliticalaim.Thus,whatisneededisanapproachthatlooksatthepoliticalaspectsofconflictandcansaywhyidentityhasbecomeamajorfocus
today.
Nevertheless,analysesfocusingexclusivelyonstrategiesalsotendtoveeroffthemapofsocialmovements.Strategicactionisonlybarelysocialandrelational.Of
course,itinvolvestakingintoaccountothers'likelycalculationswithintherulesofthegame,anditentailsinteractioninthisminimalsense.Butstrategiccalculations
excludeexplicitreferencetoacommonculturalfieldortostructuredsocialrelationsbetweenactors:
Astrategicconceptofchangeentailsthereductionofsocietytorelationsbetweentheactorsandparticularlytopowerrelations,detachedfromanyreferencetoasocial
system....Therearenostakesinthesocialrelationandthereisnofieldotherthantherelationitself.
34
Accordingly,ananalyticalframeworkthatfocusesexclusivelyonstrategicinteractionmissesboththeculturalorientationsandthestructuraldimensionofconflictand
thusbypasseswhatisspecifictosocialmovements.
Touraineseesexclusiveorientationstoidentityandtostrategyasoppositesidesofthesamecoin.Bothlookatsocialconflictsintermsofaresponsetolongterm
change(modernization)ratherthaninrelationaltermsofsocialstructure.
35
Moreover,bothcorrespondtoanimageofcontemporarysocietyasalooseensemble
subjecttoapermanentspiraloftechnologicalinnovationandstructuralchangeledeitherbymanagerialentrepreneurialelitesorbythestate.Fromthisstandpoint,
"society"isstratifiedintermsoftheactors'abilitytoadaptsuccessfullytochange(elites),theirsuccessinsecuringprotectionfromchange(operatives),ortheir
victimizationbychange(marginalizedmasses).
36
Bothofthe"nonsocial"accountsofcollectiveactiontheorizeabouttheconflictbehaviorof"actors"conceivedinoneofthesethreeterms.Thepureidentitymodel
correspondstothedefensivebehaviorofactorswhoresisttheirreductiontothestatusofpowerlessdependentconsumersofchangebywithdrawinginto

Page513
counterculturesorrefusinginnovationsthatthreatenexistingprivilegesortheculturalintegrityofgroups.Conversely,thepurelystrategicanalysiscorrespondstothe
standpointofmanagerialorstateelites,evenwhenitismeanttotakethepartof"ordinarypeople"andoffertheviewfrombelow.
37
Whenthestakeofcollective
actionisconstruedasmembershipinelitesthatcontroldevelopmentalresources,collectiveactionsappearasoffensive,proactivestrugglesofinterestgroups
competingforpowerandprivilegeinareasopenedupbydevelopmentormodernization.Heretheeffortisnottoresistchangebuttoadapttoit.Theproblemwith
thisapproachisthatneitherthedirectionofthechangenorthestructuralrelationsofdominationitinvolvesappearopentocontestationbecauseactorsrelatetoa
changingenvironmentratherthantooneanother.Inshort,thesetheoriesofcollectiveactionarticulateonlythosedimensionsofconflictbehaviorthatcorrespondto
organizationaldevelopmentsorstructuralcrisesofthestateandthepoliticalsystem.
38
Touraine'sownapproachstartsfromahermeneuticrelationtotheselfunderstandingandideologiesofcontemporarymovements.Buthemovesbeyondthislevelof
identityformationtoaccountforthehistoricalandstructuralcontextofsocialconflictandforthenewstakesandfeaturesofstruggleselfreflectionregardingthe
creationofidentityandnorms,emphasisonthedemocratizationofcivilsociety,selflimitation,andafocusonculturalissues.Hisworkmovesontwoanalyticallevels:
theelaborationofatheoryofthestructuralandculturaldimensionsofcontemporarysociety,andanactiontheoreticanalysisoftheconflictladenprocessesofidentity
constructionandtheformationofpoliticalprojectsbycollectiveactors.Inaddition,hefocusesonthesocialdimensionofcollectiveaction,inpartbyrevivingthe
conceptofcivilsociety.Infact,histheoreticalframeworkallowsonetoseewhycivilsocietyisboththelocusandthetargetofcontemporarysocialmovementsand
whythisisthecaseaboveallincountriesthatalreadyhavevitalcivilsocieties.
Inordertoclarifythedifferencebetweenthemodesofconflictbehaviordescribedaboveandtheconceptofasocialmovement,Touraineintroducesananalytical
distinctionbetweenthe"patternofdevelopment"ofasociety(diachronicaxis)anditsmodeof

Page514
functioning(synchronicaxis).Thestate,systemcrises,change,andconflictbehavioropposingelitestomassesaresituatedonthediachronicaxis.Socialrelationsand
the"systemofhistoricalaction"thatis,theconflictladenprocessesbywhichnorms,institutions,andculturalpatternsarecreatedandcontestedbysocialactors
aresituatedonthesynchronicaxis.ThecollectiveactionsinwhichTouraineisinterestedandforwhichhereservestheterm"socialmovement"arestrugglesaround
theinstitutionalpotentialsofculturalpatternsofagivensocietaltype.
Tourainethusreintroducesmanyofthedimensionsofcollectiveactionthatarestressedbycollectivebehaviorists,sincehearguesthatsocialconflictsbetweenactors
mustbeunderstoodinculturalandnormativeterms.ButtherearethreedifferencesbetweenTouraine'sapproachandtheclassicaltradition.First,Tourainerejectsall
versionsofthebreakdownthesisinhismodel,breakdownanddevelopmentgovernconflictbehavioronthediachronicaxisofchange.Second,heseessocial
movementsnotasabnormaloccurrencesbutascreatorsofsociallifethroughtheirproductionandcontestationofsocialpractices,norms,andinstitutions.Third,
unlikeParsons,hedoesnotseetheculturalorientationsofagivensociety(itspatternofknowledge,typeofinvestment,andimageoftherelationofhumanstonature)
asincontestablegivens,seamlesslytransposedintosocialnormsandinstitutions.Instead,hearguesthatthewayasocietyinstitutionalizesitsculturalorientations
involvesbothsocialconflictandsocialrelationsofdomination.Societyitselfisunderstoodas"thechanging,unstable,looselycoherentproductofsocialrelations,
culturalinnovation,andpoliticalprocesses."
39
Unlikethesocietalmodelofstrategicactiontheorists,however,thisfluidviewinvolvesaconceptionofsocietyasaset
ofsystemsofactionorstructuredsocialrelationsamongactors.Consequently,dimensionsofsocialactionignoredbyresourcemobilizationtheorymovetothecenter
ofanalysis.Thefocusturnstofieldsofalterablebutnonethelessstructuredsocialrelationsratherthandevelopment,thestate,orthemarket.Here,civilratherthan
politicalsocietymovestothefore,whiletheculturaldimensionsofcivilsocietyassumemajorimportance.
Themeaningofcollectiveactionisthusredefined.Actionnowreferstothecapacityofhumansocietiestodevelopandaltertheir

Page515
ownorientationsthatis,togeneratetheirnormativityandobjectives.
40
Anactionissocialonlyifitisnormativelyorientedandsituatedinafieldofrelationsthat
includespowerandsharedculturalorientations.Asocialmovementinvolvesadoublereferencetoculturalorientationsandsocialrelations,opposedsocialprojects
andcontestedstructuresofdomination.Therefore,thesocialfieldthatiscontestedbymovementscannotbeconceivedasabattlefieldforwhichamilitarymodelof
action(strategy)isappropriate.
Butwhatisthiscontestedsocialterrainthatisneitherthestatenorthemarketmechanism?Itis,ofcourse,civilsociety.AccordingtoTouraine,civilsocietyisthelocus
ofthe"lightside"ofcollectiveactionofsocialmovements.Indeed,theyriseandfalltogether:Bothrequireacertainautonomyfromthestatetoexist,andbothcan
becrushedbyatotalstate.Yetsocialmovementsdonottargetthestatetheyinvolveconfrontationsbetweensocial,civiladversarieswithinandovertheinstitutionsof
civilsociety.Civilsociety,then,isseeninactiontermsasthedomainofstruggles,publicspaces,andpoliticalprocesses.Itcomprisesthesocialrealminwhichthe
creationofnorms,identities,institutions,andsocialrelationsofdominationandresistancearelocated.
Touraineisawareofthosetheoriesthatimplicitlyorexplicitlydenytherelevanceof"civilsociety"tocontemporarysocialsystems.Indeed,hegrantsthattheincreased
capacityofcontemporarysocietytoactonitselfattheexpenseofabsolutestatepowerandthemetasocialguaranteesofsocialorderalsoopensthewayforenlarging
thestate'sroleinsocialandculturallife.
41
Heneverthelessmaintainsthatincreasedsocietalselfreflectioninvolvestheexpansionofcivilsocietyandthepublicrealm.
Thisdoublevisionreveals,atleastonadescriptivelevel,thenewstakesforcontemporarymovements.Touraine'sideaofthe"expansion"ofcivilsocietyisdirectly
relatedtocontemporarymovementscontestingthecontrolofanincreasingrangeofsocialactivitiesformerlyshieldedfrompublicscrutinybytradition,arigidlydefined
privatesphere,ormetasocialguarantees:
Thepublicspaceffentlichkeitstrictlylimitedinabourgeoissociety,wasextendedtolaborproblemsinanindustrialsocietyandnowspreadsoverallfieldsofexperience...
themainpoliticalproblemstodaydealdirectlywithprivatelife:fecundationandbirth,reproductionandsexu

Page516
ality,illnessanddeath,and,inadifferentway,homeconsumedmassmedia....Thedistancebetweencivilsocietyandthestateisincreasingwhiletheseparationbetweenprivate
andpubliclifeisfadingaway.
42
Theissuesraisedbythefeminist,ecology,peace,andlocalautonomymovementsarethusallconnectedtotheshiftingboundariesbetweenpublic,private,andsocial
lifeandinvolvestrugglesagainstoldandnewformsofdominationintheseareas.
Incountriesthathavealreadysecuredvitalinstitutionsofcivilsocietythroughrights,thenewlyopenedterrainisvulnerabletostatepenetrationandcontrol.Thisiswhy
themodernizingstatethatimposeseconomicregulationsandtheadministrativestatethatintervenesinsocialandculturalorganizationasmuchasitdoesinthe
economicorderhavebecomethetargetsoftherevivedliberalcurrentthatstressestheexpansionofhumanrightsandtheautonomyofsocietyagainstthestate.And
yet,inoneofhismostimportantinsights,Touraineinsiststhat,quasocialmovements,contemporaryconflictsdonothaveastheirstakessimplythedefenseand
autonomyofcivilsocietyagainstthestate.Rather,theissueis,aboveall,whichkindofcivilsocietyistobedefended.Itisnotenoughtosecuretheautonomyoreven
primacyofcivilsocietyagainstthestate,for,astheexampleofliberalcapitalisminEnglandandtheUnitedStatesshows,thismightsimplymeantheprimacyof
socioeconomicoveradministrativeelites.
43
Rather,socialmovementsmuststrivetodefendanddemocratizeallthoseinstitutionsofcivilsocietyinwhich
discrimination,inequality,anddominationhavebecomevisibleandcontested.Ifweremainonthediachronicaxisalone,thentheliberalprojectofdefendingsociety
againstthestatewouldindeedappearanachronisticor,atbest,aholdingactionservingprimarilytheinterestofelitesdominantinnonstateinstitutions.Butifweremain
focusedexclusivelyonthesynchronicaxis,wecanlosesightofthefactthatthemodernstateisalwayscapableofinterveninginthefieldofsocialmovements,
decisivelymodifyingorevenabolishingtheconditionsthatmakesocialmovementsandtheirstrugglepossible.ThedoubleperspectivethatTouraineoffersisthus
crucialforanunderstandingofwhyinthemostcivilofsocieties,intheWest,theautonomyanddemocratizationoftheinstitutionsofcontemporarycivilsocietyremain
attheheartofcontemporarysocialconflicts:

Page517
Butsincewehavehadtheprivilegeoflivingseveralcenturiesinincreasinglycivilsocieties,isnotourdutytoseekthegreatalliancebetweentheliberatingstruggleagainstthe
stateandasocialconflicttopreventthisstrugglefrombeingwagedonlyfortheprofitoftheleadersofcivilsociety?
44
Inshort,itwouldbeagreatmistaketoembraceonlytheliberalprojectofdefendingsocietyagainstthestate,forthiswouldleavetherelationsofdominationand
inequalitywithincivilsocietyintact.
Insteadofpursuingandclarifyingthissuggestivelineofinquiry,however,Touraineturnstoadifferentanalyticallevelandconstructsamodelofourcontemporary
societaltype,whichhecalls"postindustrial"or"programmed,"inordertospecifythestakesforcontemporarymovementsandtogroundtheclaimthattheyare
radicallydiscontinuouswithpreviousmovements.Whilethistheoreticalmodelcanpinpointthenewarenasopentoconflict,ithasthedisadvantagethatitobscuresthe
significanceoftheconceptofcivilsocietythatissocentraltoTouraine'sunderstandingwhileatthesametimeleadingtoaonesidedviewofcontemporarysocial
movements.
Postindustrialsocietyisanallegedlynewsocietaltypecharacterizedbynewlociofpower,newformsofdomination,newmodesofinvestment,anda"selfreflective"
culturalmodel.Power,investment,anddominationarelocatedatthelevelofculturalproductionitself.Innovationsintheproductionofknowledge(media,computers,
databanks)transformourrepresentationofhumannatureandoftheexternalworld."Forthesereasons,researchanddevelopment,informationprocessing,
biomedicalscienceandtechniques,andthemassmediaarethefourmaincomponentsofapostindustrialsociety."
45
Moreandmoredomainsofsociallifeareopened
uptotechnocraticprojectsofcontroloralternativeprojectstomaintaintheautonomyandensuretheinternaldemocraticstructureofthenewlycontestedterrain.In
short,postindustrialsocietyrepresentsitselfascapableofproducingitsownknowledge,normativeguidelines,andsocioculturalforms.Thestakesofsocialconflict
revolvearoundtheinstitutionalizationofthisculturalmodel:autonomous,selfgoverned,egalitarianinstitutionsvs.elitecontrolled,technocraticallymanagedstructures
permeatedbyrelationsofdomination.

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Theincreaseinselfreflectionentailedbythesedevelopmentsgovernsthechangeintheidentityofcollectiveactionsandthekindsofmovementstheydevelop.The
struggleforautonomous,democraticsocialinstitutionsandtheconcernwithparticipatoryformsofassociationonthepartofcontemporarycollectiveactorsaredueto
arecognitionthatboththemeansandtheendsofsocialproductionaresocialproducts.Thisiswhytheyfocusontheculturalandnormativedimensionsofeveryday
lifeandconceivetheirstrugglesintermsofapopulation'srighttochooseitsownkindoflifeandidentity.Thenewdimensionsoftheidentityofcontemporaryactors,
andwhatmakesthemradicallydiscontinuouswithearliermovements,arethusnottheiractionrepertoirebutthelevelofselfreflectionandthechangedlociandstakes
ofstrugglesthatcorrespondtotheemergenceofanewsocietaltype.
46
Thecircularityinthismodeofargumentationisobvious.Contemporarycollectiveactionisnewbecauseitinvolvesstrugglearoundtheareasopenedupby
postindustrialsociety,butpostindustrialsocietyisanewsocietaltypebecauseittriggersnewformsofcollectiveaction.Touraine'stheoreticalmodel,however,isnot
meanttobeneutral.Indeed,hehopestoavoidthecircularityofthetheoreticalargumentbymeansofhispartisanmethodofsociologicalintervention.Hispurposeisto
teaseoutofexistingconflictbehaviorthedimensionofasocialmovement(inourterms,thenewselflimitingcollectiveidentity):
Whatwemustnowdiscoverishow,inourkindsofcountries,defensivereactionsagainstpermanentchangecanbetransformedintosocialconflictsandantitechnocraticaction,
andhowsuchstrugglesextendtheareaofpoliticalactivityandcreatewhatwemightcallanewffentlichkeit....Themajorproblemistomovefromthedefensivetothe
counteroffensive,fromthequestforidentitytocollectiveaction,tocontroltheprocessofchange.
47
Whilethismethoddoesprovidefascinatingdataontheselfinterpretationofcontemporarycollectiveactors,whileitdoesreveal,insomeinstances,theemergenceof
anewselfreflectiveidentity,itdoesnotextricatethetheoryfromitscircularity.
WehavecriticizedelsewherethedogmaticaspectsofTouraine'smethodologyandhiscreationofahierarchyofformsofsocial

Page519
struggletocorrespondtothetheoryofsocialtypes.
48
Wehavealsocriticizedhisinsistenceonradicaldiscontinuitybetweensocietaltypesandsocialmovementsas
antitheticaltotheuseoftheconceptofcivilsociety.By"ourkindofcountries,"Tourainemeanscountriesthathavehad,stillhave,andareanimatedbystrugglesto
preserveandexpandcivilsociety.ButtheideathatcivilsocietyexistedintheWestatleastsincetheseventeenthcenturyimpliesinstitutionalandculturalcontinuitywith
ourownpastanideaatoddswiththethesisofradicallydiscontinuoussocietaltypes,culturalmodels,andsocialmovements.Whilethedistinctionbetween
synchronicanddiachronicaxesrenderstheinnovationsofcontemporarystrugglesvisible,whileitprovidesroomforinstitutionalanalysisofcivilsociety,theimplicit
evolutionarytheoryofsocietaltypesconcealsthecontinuitybetweenpastandpresent.Itthusbecomesimpossibletoaccountforthelearningprocessesonthepartof
collectiveactorswithregardtopastmovements,institutionalforms,andsocietalprojects.Theconceptof"societaltype"istooabstractfortheinstitutionalanalysisof
civilsociety.Moreover,theratherstreamlinedconceptofpostindustrialsocietyforcesonetoconstruethoseaspectsofstrugglethatdonotinvolvethenewself
reflectivecollectiveidentityasregressiveoranachronistic.
Atthesametime,thethesisofthenewlociofdomination,investment,power,andprotestdoesseemtoofferanaccountofthedualcharacterdefensiveand
offensiveofthenewdimensionsincontemporarycollectiveactions.Theformerincludesthedefensivepreoccupationwithidentityandautonomythelatter,a
tendencytotakethecounteroffensiveandengageinstrugglesforthecontrolanddemocratizationofsocialinstitutions.ForTouraine,unlikeTilly,"offensive"action
refersnottoacompetitive,strategicallyorientedbattleforinclusionandpowerinapolitybuttothestruggletoextendthefieldofpoliticalactivityandtodemocratize
newandexistingpublicspacesattheexpenseofstatecontrolandthetechnocraticmodelofsociety.Bothdefensivereactionstopermanentchangeandoffensive
strugglesagainsttechnocraticprojectstomonopolizeandreprivatizethecontrolofsocialinstitutionsandculturalinnovationareelementsofcontemporarycollective
action.Nevertheless,thedistinctionbetweenthesynchronic

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anddiachronicaxesofactiondoeshaveonemajordrawback:ItblindsTourainetoanimportantdimensionofcollectiveaction,namely,thestrugglesonthepartof
socialactorstoensuretheinfluenceofdemocraticinstitutionsinandoverthepoliticalsystemandtheeconomy.Withoutthisdimension,civilsocietywouldremain
vulnerabletopoliticalandeconomicpower,andthefocusofcollectiveactionwouldbereducedtoasingledimension.Touraine'stheoreticalframeworkisnot
complexenoughtoallowhimtoconstructamodelthatintegratesthebestpartsofresourcemobilizationtheory.
Moreover,althoughTouraineoffersanactionsociologyofthenewfeaturesofcontemporarymovements,hedoesnotdevelopatheoryofthetypeofaction
presupposedbythethesisofincreasedselfreflection.Ofcourse,hedoesanalyzetheprocessesofcommunicationengagedinbycontemporarycollectiveactorsas
theyarticulatenewidentitiesandsocietalprojects.ButonlyatheoreticalselfreflectionofcommunicativeactionofthetypeofferedbyHabermascouldarticulatethe
specificityoftheseprocesses,pinpointtheirlimits,andopenthewaytowardunderstandingtherelationsamongalltypesofactionsincollectiveconflicts.Becausethis
levelofanalysisismissinginhistheory,Tourainetakesthefalsestepofexcludingstrategicinteractionfromtheconceptofasocialmovementandfromhisvagueimage
ofcivilsociety.Heiscorrectinassertingthataonesidedfocusonstrategymissesthesocialandnormorienteddimensionsofcontemporarystrugglesthatarecentral
totheemergenceofnewcollectiveidentities.Butheiswrongtorestrictstrategicinteractiontolowerlevelsofconflictortothediachronicaxisofchangebecause,as
resourcemobilizationtheoryclearlydemonstrates,bothsocialmovementsandcivilsocietyinvolvestrategicinteraction.
Habermas'srecentreformulationofthetheoryofcommunicativeactionallowsustoseehowtheparadigmsofcollectiveactiondiscussedabovecanbe
complementary.Hisactiontypologycorrespondsquitewelltothevariouslogicsofcollectiveaction.
49
Theconceptof''teleologicalaction"presupposesanactorwho
choosesbetweenalternativecoursesofaction(means)withaviewtorealizinganend.Thisinvolvesrelationsbetweenanactorandaworldofexistingstatesofaffairs
thatobtainorcanbebrought

Page521
aboutbypurposefulintervention.Thedegreeofrationalityoftheactioncanbeassessedbyathirdpersonwithrespecttosuccessand"truth"thatis,thefitbetween
theactor'sperceptionsandtheactualcase.
50
Teleologicalactionthuscorrespondstotheconceptofrationalactionattheheartofresourcemobilizationtheory.
The"politicalprocessmodel"ofTilly,Tarrow,andothersinvolvesaswitchfromtheoriesofrationalactiontotheoriesofrationalinteraction,correspondingtoan
expansionoftheteleologicalmodeltoastrategiconeinwhichcalculationsofsuccessinvolvetheanticipationofdecisionsonthepartofatleastoneotheractor.This
typeofactionstillpresupposesonlythe"objectiveworld"butnowincludeswithinitdecisionmakingbyothers.Otheractorsaretreatedasexternalfactorstobe
reckonedwith,notassubjectswithwhomonesharesanunderstanding.
ThepureidentitymodelarguesforarationalityofactionspecifictonewsocialmovementsthatfitstheHabermasianconceptofdramaturgicalaction.Thisactiontype
involvesthepurposefulandexpressivefabricationanddisclosureofone'ssubjectivity(feelings,desires,experiences,identity)toasetofotherswhoconstituteapublic.
Here,atleasttwo"worldrelations"arepresupposed:anorientationtothesubjectiveworldoftheactorandonetotheexternalworld.The"presentationofself"entails
anefforttogetone'ssubjectivityandidentityrecognized.Butfromthestandpointoftheactor,normativelyregulatedinterpersonalrelationsareconsideredonlyas
socialfacts.Thus,dramaturgicalactioncantakeonlatentlystrategicqualitiesandbecomecynicalimpressionmanagement.Thedimensionofcollectiveactionthat
encompassestheexpressiveassertionofanidentityis,accordingly,notamatterofspontaneousexpressivenessbutinvolvesastylizedandplannedstagingofone's
identityforthepurposeofgainingrecognitionorinfluence.
Smelser'sconceptofanormativelyorientedsocialmovementcorrespondstotheconceptofnormativeaction.AccordingtoHabermas,theconceptofnormatively
regulatedactionreferstomembersofagroupwhoorienttheiractionstocommon(institutionalized)valuesthathaveageneralbindingforceforinterpersonalrelations.
Eachisentitledtoexpectthatallotherswillcomplywithsharednorms.Thus,inadditiontopresupposingtheexternal

Page522
world,normativeactioninvolvesarelationtoasocialworldandasocialidentitythatis,anormativecontextthatdesignatesthetotalityoflegitimateinterpersonal
relations.Thismeansthatcognitiveandmotivationaldimensionsarerelevanttotheassessmentofthevalidityofnormativeactionandthatlearningcanoccuronbothof
theselevels.Actioncanbeevaluatedintermsofitsconformitywithagivennormnormscanbeassessedintermsofwhetherornottheydeservetoberecognizedon
thebasisofanacceptedstandard.Itshouldbenotedthat,toSmelser,movementsthatdonotactinthenameofanultimatelyvalidorderofnormsbecomeirrational.
Communicativeinteractiontakesthesecondlevelofquestioningofnormsastepfurther.ThisconceptgoesbeyondthelimitsoftheactiontheoryofParsonsand
Smelser.Itreferstothelinguisticallymediated,intersubjectiveprocessbywhichactorsestablishtheirinterpersonalrelationsandcoordinatetheiractions,involving
negotiatingdefinitionsofthesituation(norms)andcomingtoanagreement.Whereasnormativeactionpresupposesaconsensusthatismerelyreproducedwitheach
interpretiveact,communicativeactioninvolvesuncurtailedcommunicationamongactorswhomustfirstcreateaconsensus.Thisinvolvesaselfreflectiverelationto
dimensionsofallthree"worlds"theobjective,thesubjective,andthesocial.Here,anyaspectofourculturallyingrainedknowledgethathasbecomeproblematiccan
bethematizedandtestedthroughaninterrogationofvalidityclaims.Touraine'sconceptofasocialmovementutilizesthisconceptionofcommunicativeaction.
Ifweapplythisabstractanalysisofactiontotheconceptualstrategiesdescribedabove,itbecomesclearthat,althougheachtendstoscreenouttheformsofaction
analyzedbytheothers,theycanallinformthestudyofcollectiveaction.Foritisperfectlyconceivablethataconcretesocialmovementcaninvolvealltheformsof
action.Thisisobviousinthecaseofcontemporarycollectiveactions.Keysectorsofthenewmovements,fromfeminismtoecology,haveaselfreflectiverelationto
theobjective,subjective,andsocialworldsinsofarastheythematizeissuesofpersonalandsocialidentity,defendexistingnorms,contestthesocialinterpretationof
norms,communicativelycreatenewnorms,andpropose

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alternativewaysofrelatingtotheenvironment.Asindicatedabove,allcollectiveactionalsoinvolvesstrategic,instrumental,andnormorientedactivity.Thereisthus
noreasonwhytheanalysisofthevariouslogicsofcollectiveactionshouldbeseenasincompatible,solongastheyarenotconstruedasthesoleformofrationalityof
collectiveactiontotheexclusionofothers.Moreover,onthebasisofthisanalysis,onecanseethatmovementscanstrugglesimultaneouslyforthedefenseand
democratizationofcivilsocietyandforinclusionwithinandtheexpansionofpoliticalsociety.
Whiletheanalysisofactiontypesaccommodatesthevariouslogicsofcollectiveaction,itcanneitherexplainaparticularconfigurationwithinagivenmovementnor
unitethetypesinacoherenttheoreticalframework.Forthis,onemustturntoananalysisofcivilsociety.Touraine'sworkpointsusintherightdirection,buthedoes
notofferatheoryofcivilsociety.Instead,hemakesuseofthecategorywithoutexplainingitsinternalarticulation.Nordoesheexplainwhatmechanismsconnectthe
variousspherestooneanotherandtothestateandtheeconomy.Consequently,thedualisticlogicofcontemporarymovementsismisconstruedasalternatives
addressedtocivilsocietyalone.Theresourcemobilizationapproachsuffersfromtheoppositeblindness,highlightingonlystrategiesaimedatpoliticalandeconomic
structures.Thecompetingparadigmsofthestudyofsocialmovementsthusleaveuswithanunsatisfactorychoice:Eitheroneinterpretsthemovementsintermsofthe
strategiclogicoforganizationinvolvedinpressuringthe"bigstructures"ofstateandeconomy,oroneoptsforastressonidentity,norms,culturalmodels,and
associationalformsarticulatedbythemostinnovativeactorsthemselves,targetingtheinstitutionsofcivilsociety.Whatweneedisatheoreticalframeworkthatcan
accommodatebothapproachesandaccountfortheduallogicofcontemporarymovements.
DualisticSocialTheoryandContemporarySocial
MovementsWebeganwiththeclaimthatthenewsocialmovementsconstruetheculturalmodels,norms,andinstitutionsofcivilsocietyasthemainstakesofsocial
conflict.Clearly,attemptstoinfluenceeconomicstructuresandstatepolicyalsoplayanimportantrolein

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thesemovements.Forexample,ecologistshaveturnedtothestatetorestricteconomicactorsfromplunderingtheenvironment,whilecivilrightsactivistsandfeminists
have,throughvariousorganizationalstrategies,soughttopressurethestatetoenactandenforcelawssecuringtherightsofminoritiesandwomenintheeconomy,civil
society,andthepolity.Somecomponentsofthenewmovementshaveorganizedpoliticalparties(themostfamousexamplebeingtheWestGermanGreens),while
othershavesoughttoworkwithinexistingpartiesortoexertpressureonpoliticalsocietythroughlobbyingefforts,allwithoutrelinquishingtheirlinkswithmovement
activistsandassociationsoutsidethepoliticalsystem.Thus,contemporarymovementshaveadualfaceandadualorganizationallogic.Inchapter9,wereviewedthe
socialtheoreticpresuppositionsofthisclaim,reformulatingthecategoriesofcivilsocietyintermsofthesystem/lifeworlddistinctiondevelopedbyHabermas.Nowwe
wanttomakethelinkbetweendualisticsocialtheoryandsocialmovementsmoreexplicit.Weshallarguethatthereconstructionofthesystem/lifeworlddistinctionin
termsofthecategoriesofcivilandpoliticalsocietyyieldsthetoolsweneedtoaccountforboththedefensiveandoffensiveaspectsofcontemporarymovements.
Habermas'smostsignificantcontributionstothetheoryofcontemporarymovementsarethreethesesthat,takentogether,offerinsightintothestakesofcontemporary
collectiveaction.
51
Thefirststatesthattheemergenceofculturalmodernityofdifferentiatedspheresofscience,art,andmorality,organizedaroundtheirown
internalvalidityclaimscarrieswithitapotentialforincreasedselfreflection(anddecenteredsubjectivity)regardingalldimensionsofactionandworldrelations.This
opensupthepossibilityofaposttraditional,postconventionalrelationtokeydimensionsofsocial,political,andculturallifeandoftheircoordinationthrough
autonomousprocessesofcommunicativeinteraction.Thiswouldformabasisforfurthermodernizationofthelifeworldthroughanincorporationoftheachieved
potentialsofculturalmodernityintoeverydaylife,involvingthereplacementofgemeinschaftlichecoordinationbypotentiallyselfreflectiveforms.
Thesecondthesisinvolvesthe"selectiveinstitutionalization"ofthepotentialsofmodernity(selfreflection,autonomy,freedom,

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equality,meaning).Adualisticmodelofsociety,onethatdistinguishesbetweensystemandlifeworld,liesattheheartofthethesis.Inthismodel,theprocesses
involvedinthemodernizationoftheeconomyandthestatearedistinctfromthoseinvolvedinthe"rationalization"ofthelifeworld.Ontheonehand,wehavethe
developmentofmediasteeredstructuresinwhichstrategicandinstrumentalrationalityareunleashedandexpandedontheother,thedevelopmentofcommunicatively
coordinatedandegalitariancultural,social,andsocializinginstitutionsappropriatetothenewformsofdecenteredsubjectivitymadepossiblebyculturalmodernization.
Societalrationalizationhasbeendominated,however,bytheimperativesofthesubsystemsthatis,therequirementsofcapitalistgrowthandadministrativesteering
havepredominatedoverlifeworldconcerns.The"selectiveinstitutionalization"ofthepotentialsofmodernityhasthusproducedovercomplexityandnewformsof
poweronthesystemsideandtheimpoverishmentandunderdevelopmentoftheinstitutionalpromiseofthelifeworld.The"colonizationofthelifeworld"relatedto
capitalistdevelopmentandtotechnocraticprojectsofadministrativeeliteshasblockedandcontinuestoblockthesepotentials.
Thethirdthesisinsistsonthetwosidedcharacteroftheinstitutionsofourcontemporarylifeworld,thatis,theideathatsocietalrationalizationhasentailedinstitutional
developmentsincivilsocietyinvolvingnotonlydominationbutalsothebasisforemancipation.Thedualistictheoryofsocietythusplacesthecoreelementsofcivil
societylegality,publicity,civilassociations,massculture,thefamilyattheheartofthediscussion.HereisthedimensionofinstitutionalanalysismissinginTouraine's
theoryofsocietaltypes.TheimportantpointforusisthatHabermas'ssketchofdevelopmentswithinanalready(albeitincompletely)moderncivilsociety
providesawaytounderstandthedoublecharacterofcontemporarymovementsandalsotheircontinuitiesordiscontinuitieswiththepast.Theideaofthedouble
characteroftheinstitutionalmakeupofcivilsocietyisarealgainbecauseitgoesbeyondaonesidedstressonalienationordomination(Marx,Foucault)andan
equallyonesidedfocusonintegration(Durkheim,Parsons).Wearetherebyaffordedatheoreticalmeansofavoidingthestarkalternative

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betweenapologeticsandtotalrevolution.Ifmoderncivilsocietiesarenotentirelyreified,ifourinstitutionsarenotthoroughlypervadedbyinegalitarianpowerrelations,
thenitbecomespossibletothinkintermsofthepositivepotentialsofmodernitythatareworthdefendingandexpandingthrougharadicalbutselflimitingpolitics.
Consideredtogetherwiththecolonizationthesis,thisallowsustoexplainwhycivilsocietyisthetargetaswellastheterrainofcontemporarycollectiveaction.
Takentogether,thesethesesrevealthestakesofcontemporarymovementsinthestruggleoverthedetraditionalizationanddemocratizationofsocialrelationsincivil
society.Theredefiningofculturalnorms,individualandcollectiveidentities,appropriatesocialroles,modesofinterpretation,andtheformandcontentofdiscourses
(whichwehavecalledthe"politicsofidentity")ispartofthisproject.However,sinceauthoritarianinstitutionsareoftenreinforcedbyunequalcontrolofmoneyand
power,andsincethecolonizationoftheinstitutionsofcivilsocietybythesemediapreventstheirfurthermodernization,contemporarycollectiveactorsmustalso
addresspoliticalsociety.A"politicsofinclusion"targetspoliticalinstitutionstogainrecognitionfornewpoliticalactorsasmembersofpoliticalsocietyandtoachieve
benefitsforthosewhomthey"represent."A''politicsofinfluence,"aimedatalteringtheuniverseofpoliticaldiscoursetoaccommodatenewneedinterpretations,new
identities,andnewnorms,isalsoindispensable.Onlywithsuchacombinationofeffortscantheadministrativeandeconomiccolonizationofcivilsociety,whichtends
tofreezesocialrelationsofdominationandcreatenewdependencies,berestrictedandcontrolled.Finally,thefurtherdemocratizationofpoliticalandeconomic
institutions(a"politicsofreform")isalsocentraltothisproject.Withoutthiseffort,anygainswithincivilsocietywouldbetenuousindeed.Whilethedemocratizationof
civilsocietyandthedefenseofitsautonomyfromeconomicoradministrative"colonization"canbeseenasthegoalofthenewmovements,thecreationof"sensors"
withinpoliticalandeconomicinstitutions(institutionalreform)andthedemocratizationofpoliticalsociety(thepoliticsofinfluenceandinclusion),whichwouldopen
theseinstitutionstothenewidentitiesandegalitariannormsarticulatedontheterrainofcivilsociety,arethemeanstosecuringthisgoal.
52

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WearenotarguingthatHabermashimselfhasprovidedthesynthetictheoreticalparadigmofsocialmovementsthathisframeworkmakespossible.Whileavailable
movementtheorieshavemuchtolearnfromthatframework,Habermas'sownsocialtheorycouldalsobenefitfromintegratingtheresultsofothercontemporary
analyses.Indeed,hismostrecentdiscussionofthenewsocialmovementsismisleadingbecauseitisbasedonaonesidedinterpretationofthedualisticconceptionof
societythathehimselfintroduced.
Habermas'sapproachtosocialmovementshasevolvedovertime.HisearlieranalysiswasclosetothatofAlainTouraine.
53
LikeTouraine,hesawtheNewLeftand
especiallythestudentmovementaspotentialagentsofsocietaldemocratizationagainsttechnocraticprojectstofunctionalizesocialinstitutionsandtheexistingpublic
sphere.Thesemovementsseemedtoholdapromiseofnew,rationalsocialidentitiesandareviveddemocraticpoliticalculturetotheextentthattheysoughttoexpand
anddemocratizepublicspacesfromtheuniversitytothepolity.
Inmoretheoreticalterms,Habermasascribedtwointerrelatedrolestosocialmovements.First,movementswereseenasthedynamicelementinsociallearning
processesandidentityformation.Drawingonpotentialsembeddedinculturaltraditionsandnewformsofsocialization,socialmovementstransposelatentlyavailable
structuresofrationalityintosocialpracticesothattheycanfindembodimentsinnewidentitiesandnorms.Second,movementswithdemocraticprojectshavethe
potentialtoinitiateprocessesbywhichthepublicspheremightberevivedanddiscoursesinstitutionalized,withinawiderangeofsocialinstitutions.Theseroleswere
onlyveryabstractlysituatedincontemporaryinstitutionaldevelopments,however,becausetheoldFrankfurtSchoolthesisof"onedimensionality"stillhaunted
Habermas'sassessmentofexistingsocial,economic,andpoliticalinstitutions.Thus,whilehe(likeTouraine)criticizedtherevolutionaryrhetoricofthesixties
movementsfordivertingattentionfromtheprojectofdemocratizingpoliticalandsocialinstitutionsinfavoroftheirtotaloverthrow,hecouldprovidenoalternativeto
theirtotalizingcritiqueofmodernsociety.
54
WehavecriticizedtheearlierversionofHabermas'stheoryforits"institutionaldeficit,"thatis,forlocating

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emancipatorypotentialsontheabstractlevelofculturalmodernityandinsocializationprocessesandnotintheinstitutionalarticulationofcivilsociety.
55
Habermasresolvedthisdifficultybyintroducingthedualisticconceptionofsocietyasabasisforanalyzingthetwosidedcharacterofcontemporaryinstitutions.
56
He
interpretstheambivalentpotentialsofoursocialinstitutionsintermsofaclashamongsystemimperativeswithindependentcommunicationstructures.Byimplication,
theseinstitutionsareopentobothdefensivestrugglestoprotectanddemocratizethecommunicativeinfrastructureofeverydaylifeandoffensiveprojectsofradical
institutionalreform.Itisallthemoreironicthatthisrecentworkhasalsoyieldedwhatweconsidertobeanextremelyonesidedinterpretationofthenewsocial
movements,forinthisconception,thesemovementsappearprimarilyasdefensivereactionsagainstthecolonizationofthelifeworld.
57
Habermasmaintainsthatwhatisatstakeinthenewformsofresistanceandconflictisthedefensenotofatraditional(communal,ascriptive,diffuse)sociocultural
lifeworldbutofonethatisalreadypartlymodernized.Healsodistinguishesbetweendefensesofpropertyandstatusacquiredontheterrainofamodernizedlifeworld
and"defensive"actioninvolvingexperimentsinnewformsofcooperationandcommunity.Thelatterformthecoreofthenewconflictpotential.Nevertheless,thenew
movementsareseenonlyasformsofresistanceandretreatseekingtostemthetideoftheformallyorganizedsystemsofactioninfavorofcommunicativestructures.
Althoughtheysignifythecontinuedcapacityofthelifeworldtoresistreification,andthustakeonpositivemeaning,Habermasisskepticaloftheir"emancipatory
potential"andsuspiciousoftheirapparentlyantiinstitutional,defensive,antireformistnature.Inshort,hedoesnotseethenewmovementsascarriersofnew(rational)
socialidentitiesbutasmiredinparticularism.Nordoesheseethemasorientedtowardorcapableoffosteringtheinstitutionalizationofthepositivepotentialsof
modernityoroftranscendinganexpressivepoliticsofwithdrawal.
Nevertheless,Habermasisontosomethingwhenhearguesthatthenewconflictsariseatthe"seambetweensystemandlifeworld"overpreciselythoserolesthat
institutionalizethemediaofmoney

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andpowerandmediatebetweenthepublicandprivatespheresandtheeconomicandadministrativesubsystems.Resistancetothefunctionalizedrolesofemployee
andconsumer,citizenandclient,surelycharacterizesmuchofcontemporarycollectiveaction:
Itisjusttheserolesthatarethetargetsofprotest.Alternativepracticeisdirectedagainstthe...marketdependentmobilizationoflaborpower,againsttheextensionofpressures
ofcompetitionandperformanceallthewaydownintoelementaryschool.Italsotakesaimatthemonetarizationofservices,relationships,andtime,attheconsumeristredefinition
ofprivatespheresoflifeandpersonallifestyles.Furthermoretherelationofclientstopublicserviceagenciesistobeopenedupandreorganizedinaparticipatorymode....
Finally,certainformsofprotestnegatethedefinitionsoftheroleofcitizen.
58
InHabermas'sview,however,themovementchallengestotheserolesarepurelydefensive.Heconstruestheattemptsofcollectiveactorstocomeupwith
counterinstitutionswithinthelifeworldtolimittheinnerdynamicsoftheeconomicandpoliticaladministrativesystemsnotonlyas"reactive"butastendentially
antimoderncommunalistprojectsofdedifferentiationandwithdrawal.
59
Theonlyexceptionheseesisthefeministmovement.Italonehasaduallogicandaclear
emancipatorypotential:anoffensive,universalistsideconcernedwithpoliticalinclusionandequalrights,alongwithadefensive,particularistsidefocusingonidentity,
alternativevalues,andtheoverturningofconcreteformsoflifemarkedbymalemonopoliesandaonesidedlyrationalizedeverydaypractice.
60
Thefirstdimension
linksfeminismtothetraditionofbourgeoissocialistliberationmovementsandtouniversalistmoralprinciples.Thesecondlinksittothenewsocialmovements.As
indicatedabove,however,thenewresistancemovements,includingtheseconddimensionoffeminism,involveexclusivelydefensivereactionstocolonization.Hence
thelabel"particularist"fortheconcernwithidentities,norms,andalternativevalues,andhencethechargeofa''retreat"intoascriptiveorbiologisticcategoriesof
gender.AccordingtoHabermas,theemancipatorydimensionoffeminismthereforeinvolvesnothingnew,whilethenewdimensionoffeminismsuffersfromthesame
drawbacksastheothernewmovements.

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Webelievethatthisanalysisofthenewmovementsingeneralandoffeminisminparticularismisleading.Indeed,Habermas'sinterpretationofwhatisnewinthese
movementsasparticularistanddefensivereactionstothepenetrationofsociallifebythemediaofmoneyandpowerinvolvesarevivaloftheclassicalbreakdown
thesis.
61
This,inturn,derivesfromaonesidedinterpretationofhisowndualisticsocialtheory.Thus,Habermas'sanalysisofmovementsdoesnotdojusticetothe
potentialofhistheory,fortworeasons.Thefirsthastodowiththefailuretotranslatethecategoriesofthelifeworldintoafullfledgedconceptualizationofciviland
politicalsociety.Thesuggestivepassagesonthepublicandprivateinstitutionsofthelifeworldneglecttheonekeydimensionthatwouldhaveenabledhimtoavoidthe
breakdownthesis,namely,thatofassociations.Despitehisacknowledgmentthatcontemporarystrugglesaresituatedaroundthedimensionsofculturalreproduction,
socialintegration,andsocialization,hefailstolinkthesetothepositivesideoftheinstitutionswithincivilandpoliticalsociety.
62
Insteadofrecognizingthatthenew
movementshavearoletoplayinthefurthermodernizationofthesespheres,heperceivesonlytheirdefensivenessvisvistheexpansionofsteeringmechanisms.At
best,heseesthenewmovementsashavingthepotentialtocontributetolearningalongthedimensionsofculturaltransmissionandsocializationbutnottoinstitutional
changewithincivilsociety.
Habermasiswrongtoconcludefromtheirfocusonreinterpretingtraditionsandidentitiesthatwhatisinvolvedinthenewmovementsisonlyanantiinstitutional,
culturalpolitics.Themovementsalsogeneratenewsolidarities,altertheassociationalstructureofcivilsociety,andcreateapluralityofnewpublicspaceswhile
expandingandrevitalizingspacesthatarealreadyinstitutionalized.Thisinvolveschallengingtherolesthatmediatebetweensystemandlifeworld.Theothersideof
contemporarycollectiveaction,however,entailsinstitutionalchangealongthedimensionofsocialintegration.Itinvolvesconflictoversocialrelationsincivilinstitutions
rangingfromthefamilytothepublicspheres.
Habermas'stendencytoviewthesubsystemsas"selfreferentiallyclosed"screensoutfromviewthepossibilityofinstitutionalreforminthesedomainsaswell.His
overlyrigidseparationofthedomains

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ofsystemandlifeworldblindshimtotheoffensivestrategiesofcontemporarymovementsaimedatcreatingordemocratizingreceptorswithinthesubsystems,forit
makessuccesstautologicallyimpossible.Consequently,hisaccountofmovementsdoesnotdojusticetothethesisofinstitutionaldoublenessalludedtoabove,to
whichtheduallogicofthemovementsisaddressed.Heisthusledtoareductiveanalysisoftheecology,citizeninitiative,green,andyouthmovementsandto
misconstruetheduallogicwhenhedoesperceiveit,asinthecaseoffeminism.
Ourreconstructionofthesystem/lifeworlddistinctionalongthelinesofatheoryofcivilsocietycorrectsthesetwoblindspots.Ontheonehand,wetranslatethe
conceptofthelifeworldintotheinstitutionalarticulationofacivilsocietysecuredbyrights.Ontheotherhand,wearguethattherearereceptorsfortheinfluenceof
civilsocietywithinpolitical(andeconomic)societyandthatthesecan,withinlimits,beaddedtoanddemocratized.Consequently,onourversionofthedualistic
conceptionofsociety,theduallogicofallthenewmovementscancomeintoview.Ourapproachenablesustoseethatmovementsoperateonbothsidesofthe
system/lifeworlddivide,andwearethusabletoaccommodatethecontributionsofbothparadigmsofcollectiveaction.
Ourframeworkalsoyieldsamoresyntheticinterpretationofthemeaningof"defensive"and"offensive"collectiveactionthancanbefoundinanyoftheapproaches
discussedabove.Onthisaccount,the"defensive"aspectofthemovementsinvolvespreservinganddevelopingthecommunicativeinfrastructureofthelifeworld.This
formulationcapturesthedualaspectofmovementsdiscussedbyTouraineaswellasHabermas'sinsightthatmovementscanbethecarriersofthepotentialsofcultural
modernity.Thisisthesinequanonforsuccessfuleffortstoredefineidentities,toreinterpretnorms,andtodevelopegalitarian,democraticassociationalforms.The
expressive,normative,andcommunicativemodesofcollectiveactionhavetheirproperplaceherebutthisdimensionofcollectiveactionalsoinvolveseffortstosecure
institutionalchangeswithincivilsocietythatcorrespondtothenewmeanings,identities,andnormsthatarecreated.
The"offensive"aspectofcollectiveactiontargetspoliticalandeconomicsocietytherealmsof"mediation"betweencivilsociety

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andthesubsystemsoftheadministrativestateandtheeconomy.Certainly,thisinvolvesthedevelopmentoforganizationsthatcanexertpressureforinclusionwithin
thesedomainsandextractbenefitsfromthem.Thestrategic/instrumentalmodesofcollectiveactionareindispensableforsuchprojects.Buttheoffensivepoliticsofthe
newmovementsinvolvenotonlystrugglesformoneyorpoliticalrecognitionbutalsoapoliticsofinfluencetargetingpolitical(andperhapseconomic)insidersand(self
limiting)projectsofinstitutionalreform.Howelsearewetounderstandattemptstomakethesubsystemsmorereceptivetonewissuesandconcerns,moreresponsive
totheneedsandselfunderstandingofactorsincivilsociety,andmoreinternallydemocraticthantheyarenow?Inotherwords,thoseelementsofthenewmovements
thattargetpoliticalsociety(andwillonedayperhapstargeteconomicsocietyaswell)articulateaprojectofselflimiting,democraticinstitutionalreformaimedat
broadeninganddemocratizingthestructuresofdiscourseandcompromisethatalreadyexistinthesedomains.
AFeministCritiqueofDualisticSocialTheory
Whilewebelievethatallcontemporarysocialmovementsareamenabletoanalysisintheseterms,wearegoingtofocusonthefeministmovementtomakeourpoint.
SeveralinterestingdiscussionsoftherelevanceofHabermas'sdualisticsocialtheorytothecontemporarywomen'smovementhavealreadyappeared.
63
Inthemost
comprehensivearticleonthesubject,NancyFraserarguesthat,farfromfacilitatinganunderstandingoffeminism,Habermas'sdualisticsocialtheory,andespeciallyhis
distinctionbetweensystemandlifeworld,isnotonly"genderblind"butalso"inimportantrespectsandrocentricandideological."
64
Fraserproposesafarmoreradical
critiqueofdualisticsocialtheorythantheonewehaveadumbratedabove.Becausethiscritiqueaimsattheveryconceptualapparatusofthedualisticsocialtheorythat
wehaveappropriatedandrevised,weshallconsideritinsomedetail.Itinvolvesfivekeyclaims:
1.Frasermaintainsthatthesystem/lifeworlddistinctionleadsonetoconstruethefamilyasasociallyintegratedinstitutionhaving

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onlyanextrinsic,incidentalrelationtomoneyandpower.
65
Toplacethemodernfamilyandtheofficialcapitalisteconomyonoppositesidesofthesystem/lifeworld
divideistooccludethefactthatcontemporaryfamiliesareeconomicsystemsandsitesoflabor,coercion,exchange,exploitation,andviolence.Moreover,this
legitimatesthemoderninstitutionalseparationoffamilyandofficialeconomy,childrearingandpaidwork,andpublicandprivatespheresthathasbeenanathemato
contemporaryfeminism.
66
Habermasisthusallegedlyblindedtothefactthatchildrearingistheunpaidworkofoverseeingproductionoftheappropriatelysocialized
laborpowerthatthefamilyexchangesforwages.
67
2.AslightlydifferentargumentismadewithrespecttoHabermas'sdistinctionbetweennormativelysecured,conventionalformsofsocialintegrationand
communicativelyestablished,selfreflective,postconventionalones.Fraserconcedesthatthisdistinctionprovidescriticalresourcesforanalyzinginterfamilialrelations
byrenderingthe"consensus"onfamilynormsandrolessuspecttothedegreethattheyareprereflectiveorachievedthroughdialoguevitiatedbyunfairness,coercion,
orinequality.Yetsheclaimsthataninsufficientstressisplacedonthefactthatactionscoordinatedbynormativelysecuredconsensusinthepatriarchalnuclearfamily
areactionsregulatedbypower.ThefaulthereliesinHabermas'sapparentrestrictionoftheuseoftheterm"power"tobureaucraticcontexts.Byimplication,power
relationswithinthefamilyareconstruedasbeingtheresultofexternalpressuresuponit(economicpressuresinthecaseofclassicalcapitalismbureaucraticpressures
inthecaseofthewelfarestate).
68
3.Thisapproachhastheimplication,accordingtoFraser,thatmaledominanceisasignoftheinsufficientmodernityofsocialrelations.Thefactthatpatriarchyis
intrinsictoratherthananaccidentalbyproductofcapitalismistherebyobscured.
69
4.AlthoughFraser(somewhatinconsistently)praisesHabermas'sexpansionoftheclassicpublic/privatedistinctionintoafourpartschemeoffamily,publicsphere,
economy,andstate(clearlybasedonthesystem/lifeworlddistinction),shearguesthatthecriticalpotentialofthismodelisblockedbythegenderblindnessofthe
overallapproach.Habermasmisleadinglyconceptualizestherolesaroundwhichtheinterchangerelationsbetweenthefourtermsof

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themodeltakeshape(worker,consumer,client,citizen)ingenderneutralterms.Moreover,hemakesnomentionofthefactthattheserolesarecomplementedbythe
crucialfifthroleofchildrearer.
70
Fraser'spointhereisthatthelinksamongthetwosetsofpublicandprivatespheresareadumbratedasmuchthroughthemediumof
genderasthroughthemediaofmoneyandpower.
71
5.Finally,FraserarguesthatthecolonizationthesisleadsHabermastomisrepresentthecausesandtomisconstruethescopeofthefeministchallengetowelfarestate
capitalism.Accordingtothisthesis,theprivateandpublicspheresofcivilsocietyceasetosubordinatetheeconomicandadministrativesystemstothenormsand
valuesofeverydaylifebutareinsteadincreasinglysubordinatedtotheimperativesofthosesystems.Fraserpointsout,however,thatpatriarchalnormscontinueto
structurethestateregulatedcapitalisteconomyandthestateadministration,asindicatedbythecontinuedsegmentationofthelaborforceandthestructureofsocial
welfaresystems.Thus,thechannelsofinfluencebetweensystemandlifeworldaremultidirectional.Habermas'sanalysisoftheambivalencesofwelfarestatereforms,
however,failstonotethegenderedsubtextofthesedevelopments.Thatwomenareoverwhelminglythenewclientsofpreciselythose"ambivalent"reformsofthe
welfaresystemgoesunnoticed.Thecolonizationthesisforthewelfarestatethuscompoundstheerrorsandlacunaederivingfromtheoriginaltheoretical
conceptualizationofthesystem/lifeworlddivide.Itisbothgenderblindandandrocentric.
Thiscritiqueraisesissuesthatcannotbedisregarded,especiallyifonewantstoarguethatdualisticsocialtheoryaswehavereconstructeditcontributestothe
understandingofcontemporarymovements.ItiscertainlythecasethatHabermashasnotpaidmuchattentiontogender,andthegenderblindnessofthemodeldoes
indeedoccludeimportantfeaturesoftheinstitutionalarrangementshewantstounderstand.Nevertheless,theclaimthatthesystem/lifeworlddistinctionandthe
colonizationthesisareantitheticaltosuchconcernsisunconvincing.Webelievethatthecriticalpotentialofthetheoryanditsrelevanceforfeministmovementscanbe
demonstrated.Infact,mostofthedifficultiescitedbyFraserlienotintheoveralltheoreticalmodelbutinHabermas'sinterpretationofit.
72
Thus,weshallshowthat
thebulkofthevalidpartofhercriticismcanbeaccommodatedinour

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revisedversionofthemodel,whichcaninturnshedlightonsomeoftheformsofdominationandconflictspecifictocontemporaryfeminism.
73
1.Aswehaveseen,Fraserrejectsthesystem/lifeworlddistinction,arguingthatthereisnomeaningfulwaytodifferentiatecategoriallybetweenthespheresofpaidand
unpaidlabor,betweenthefamilyandthe"official"economy.
74
Indeed,shearguesthatthereisnowarrantforassumingthatasystemintegratedorganizationof
childrearingwouldbeanymorepathologicalthanthatofotherwork.Thisresponse,however,missestherealthrustofthedistinctionbetweensystemandsocial
integrationandisitselfunconvincing.
WhileHabermas,inhismoreMarxistmoments,doestrytodistinguishbetweensymbolicandmaterialreproductiveprocesses,theheartofthetheoryrestsonthefar
moreimportantdistinctionbetweenmodesofactioncoordinationandnotonthesubstantiveelementsofactionitself.Theclaim,inshort,whichFraserhasnotatall
disproved,isthatthereisafundamentaldifferencebetweenprocesses(culturalreproduction,socialintegration,socialization),socialrelations,andinstitutionsinwhich
theweightofcoordinationmustbecommunicativeandthosethatcanbe"mediasteered"withoutdistortion,suchasmarketsorbureaucracies.Thisisnotbecause
labororcreative/productiveactivitytakesplaceonlyintheseconddomainbutbecausemeaning,norms,andidentitiescannotbemaintained,reinterpreted,orcreated
throughfunctionalsubstitutesforthecoordinatingaccomplishmentsofcommunicativeinteraction.Theheartofthedifferencebetweenformallyorganizedsetsofsocial
relations(subsystems)andothersliesinthetendencyoftheformertoneutralizethenormativebackgroundofinformal,customary,ormorallyregulatedcontextsof
actionthataretiedtovalidityclaimsandtosubstituteforthesecontextsofinteractionthataregeneratedbypositivelawand"mediasteered."
75
Thelatterare
coordinatedbymediathatoperatethroughlinguisticcodesthesecodes,however,relieveactorsofthenecessityofmutuallyagreeingonthedefinitionofthesituation
involvedineveryrelevantinteraction,therebybypassing(orrenderingimpossible)thereferencetonormativevalidityclaims.Meanings,norms,andidentitiesarenot
createdinsuchcontextsbutareused(orreinforced)forsystemicpurposes.

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Viewingthefamilyasaneconomicsystemwouldthusentaileitherawholesaleembraceofsystemstheory
76
(therebyrenderingitimmunetothekindofnormative
critiqueFraserwantstomake)oramisunderstandingofwhatasystemisinHabermas'stheory:aformallyorganized,mediasteeredsetofsocialrelations.Ifone
intendstochallengethemeanings,norms,andidentifiesthatareconstitutiveofgenderinequality,thenthisisthewrongtacktotake.Thesystemstheoreticapproach
obliteratestheverydimensioninwhichthesearecreatedandreproduced.Althoughfamiliesdoperformeconomicfunctions,althoughtheycanbeandare
functionalizedbytheimperativesoftheeconomicortheadministrativesubsystem,althoughtherearestrategicinteractionswithinthemaswellasexchangesofservices
andlaborformoneyorsupport,andalthoughthesearedistributedalonggenderlines,familiesarenottherebyeconomicsystems.Theyareneitherformallyorganized
normediasteered.Bythesametoken,theycannotbedescribedasadministrativesystemsalthoughtheyarecertainlyimbuedwithpowerrelations.
77
Theworkperformedbywomenwithinthefamilyisunrecognized,unremunerated,anduncompensated,anditthereforedisadvantageswomeneveninthe"official"
labormarket(reinforcingtheimageofdependencyonamale"breadwinner").Neverthelessitisunhelpfultodescribechildrearingasbeingjustliketherestofsocial
labor.Thefactthatitcanandhasbeenpartiallytransferredtodaycarecentersornurseriesandremunerateddoesnotmeanthatitcanbeformallyorganizedinthe
waythatotherworkcanbeorthatitiseitherdesirableorpossibletotransferchildrearinginitsentiretytosystemintegratedinstitutionalsettings.Communicative
coordinationofinteractionremainsattheheartofchildrearingandnurturing,asanyparent,childcareworker,ornurseryschoolteacherknows.Unlessoneis
advocatingthetotalinstitutionalizationofpreschoolchildrenandthetotalcommodificationofchildrearingasthesolealternativetobeingraisedbyfulltimemothers,
thenonemustassumethatchildrencomehomeatsometimeofdayatwhichpointtheyrequireattentionandnurturing.Moreover,nurseries,daycarecenters,and
schoolsarethemselvesinstitutionswithincivilsociety.Theyhavetheireconomicandbureaucraticside,ofcourse,butwhen

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organizationaloreconomicrequirementsoutweighthecommunicativetasksofnurturingandteaching,theysubverttheraisond'treoftheinstitutionsandhave
pathologicalconsequences(unnurturedanduntaughtchildren).
Whileitiscertainlyconceivablethatmorehouseholdtaskscanmigratefromthehometothemarket,surelythereisandoughttobealimittothis.Wedonotagree
withthenotionthatallcreative,productive,orreproductiveactivitiesshouldnecessarilytaketheformofwagelabor.Evenwhentheydo,thisdoesnotmeanthatthe
institutionalframeworksinwhichtheseactivitiesoccurcanbeanalyzedaseconomicsystems.Onlyonthemisleadingassumptionthatall"sociallabor"isequivalentand
thusequallyamenabletoordistortedbysystemintegrationcouldoneconsiderprimarysocializationandnurturinginthesamelightasallotherwork.Only,inshort,if
oneconstruesfamiliessimplyassitesofunpaidsociallynecessarylabortimecouldthedifferencesbetweeninterfamilialrelationsandsocialrelationsofproduction
disappearfromview.ButthissortofassumptionhasbeencriticizedbymanyfeministsforoverextendingthecategoriesoftheMarxiancritiqueofcapitalismtoissues
theywerenotconstructedtoaddress.
78
Ifoneiswillingtograntthatamoderneconomyrequiresthatsomeformsoflaborbecommodifiedandformallyorganized,thecentralquestionforcriticaltheoryisto
howtodistinguishthesortsofactivitiesthatshouldbelefttothemarketmechanismorformallyorganizedfromthosethatshouldnotbe.Therearetwodistinctissues
here.Forexample,feministcritiquesof"surrogacycontracts"challengetheappropriatenessofexchangingbabiesformoney(commodification)andtreatingpregnancy
andchildbirthonthemodelofalaborcontract.Marketizationinsuchcasesdoesseemtodistortthewoman'srelationtoherbody,herself,andherchild,anditisnot
necessarytoexplicatethisintuitiononthebasisofnaturalistoressentialistarguments.
79
Theideaofthecommunicativeinfrastructureofthesocialrelationsofcivil
societysufficestoaccountforthedistortionsthatarisefromdeliveringtheserelationsovertothemarket.Andwhiledaycareandschoolinginvolvepaidlabor
(marketizationofteachers'orchildcareworkers'services),thisdoesnotmeanthattheseactivitiescanoroughttobeformallyorganized.Theydonothavethesame
form,purpose,or

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meaningasotherwagelabor.Thepublicandprivateinstitutionsinwhichchildcareandteachingtakeplacearecorecomponentsofcivilsociety,despitethefactthat
theprofessionalservicesinvolvedareremunerated.Inshort,somecriterionisnecessaryforassessingwhetherornotcommodificationorformalorganizationwould
haveimplicationswithrespecttocertainformsofactivityorinteractionsthatareunacceptableandunnecessaryinamodernsociety.Ourtheoryofcivilsocietyoffersa
goodstartinthisdirection.
Insteadofattemptingtorendertherolesofworkerandchildrearercompatiblebyassimilatingthelattertotheformer,ananalysisthatproceedsfromthe
system/lifeworlddistinctionwouldleadonetochallengethegendersubtextofbothroleswhileinsistingontheirdifference.Modernizationhasalreadyinvolvedthe
migrationofwork(includingeducation)fromthehometothemarket.Butsurelyalargepartofaspecificallyfeministsolutiontothedoubleburdenoftheworking
mother,tothesubordinationandinsecurityattachedtothehomemakerrole,andtolabormarketinequitiesmustentailthedegenderingofthechildrearing,nurturing,
andhomemakerrolesalongwithafightagainstthegendereddivisionoflaborintheworkplace.Wagesforhouseworkandchildcarewouldonlyreinforceits
genderedcharacterandlockwomenevenmorestronglyintolowpaidservicejobs.Thedomestic"divisionoflabor"clearlyentailsapowerrelationbasedinparton
women'seconomicdependencythatdepriveswomenofrealchoiceandofequalvoiceinthedistributionofsuchtasksitbothderivesfromandreinforcestheirinferior
positioninthelabormarket.
80
Itisthisrelationthatmustbechallenged.
Butthisapproachdoesnotrestonthestrainedanalogybetweenfamiliesandeconomicsystemsandbetweenchildrearingandotherproductivelabor.Instead,it
involvesachallengetothepatriarchalnormsthatdefinefamiliesandattachgenderstohouseholdandotherroles.Indeed,theverypossibilityofarticulatingand
challengingthewaysinwhichthemoderncapitalisteconomyandtheequallymodernnuclearfamilyintersect(throughgenderedroles)presupposestheirdifferentiation.
Changesintheidentity,normativeconception,andinternalrolestructureoffamilieswouldnotalterthefactthatinterfamilialrelationsincluding

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childrearingmustbecommunicativelycoordinated.Quitethecontrary.Onecouldnotevencriticizethecontemporaryfamilyasunjust,asdeformedbytheunequal
distributionofmoney,power,andasymmetricgenderrelations,ifonedidnotpresupposeitscommunicativeinfrastructure.
81
2.Thedistinctionbetweenconventionalandpostconventionalorientationscapturesakeydimensionofpowerinexistinggendernorms.Theformsthatmale
dominancetakesinthepatriarchalnuclearfamilyandthewaysinwhichitstructuresjobcategories(andclientrelationsinthewelfarestate)andthecorresponding
genderidentitiesaremoderninthedescriptive,historicalsense.
82
Buttheyareneitherrationalnormoderninthenormativesense,thatis,inthewayHabermasuses
thesewords.Thenormsunderpinningmaledominanceareanexampleoftraditionalismparexcellencethatis,theyarebasedonaconventionalnormative''consensus"
frozenandperpetuatedbyrelationsofpowerandinequalitythatleadtoallsortsofpathologiesinthelifeworld.Thetraditionalistattitudetowarddefactonormsbased
onsuchaconsensusdoesnotmeanthattherelevantnormsarelingeringformsofpremodernstatusinequalities.Itdoesmeanthattheyaresealedofffromcritiqueand
traditionalized,asitwere.Indeed,theyarebasedonaselectivelyrationalizedcivilsociety,anditispreciselytheblockagestoitsfurthermodernizationinthenormative
sensethatHabermas'stheorytriestoarticulate.Moreover,asindicatedinchapter9,thedifferentiationofthesubsystemsofeconomyandstatefromthelifeworldisa
preconditionforreleasingtheculturalpotentialsofmodernityandforfreeingcommunicativeinteractionfromritualisticallyreproducingsacralized,conventionalnorms.
Thelifeworldcannotbeinternallydifferentiated,theinstitutionsofcivilsocietycannotbemodernized,subjectivitycannotbedecentered,androlescannotbe
challengedunlesscommunicativeinteractionisunburdenedfromthetaskofcoordinatingallareasoflife.
3.Nevertheless,thereismoretomaledominancethanevenamodernbrandoftraditionalism,andFraserdoesarealservicebysignalingamissingdimensionin
Habermas'sanalysisofpower,althoughshedoesnotattempttofillthegap.Itismisleadingtorestricttheterm"power"tohierarchicallystructuredrelationsin

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bureaucraticsettingswithoutprovidinganothertermtoarticulateasymmetricsocialrelationsinotherinstitutions.Onewoulddobettertodistinguishamongdifferent
kindsofpoweror,rather,amongvariouscodesofpowerandmodesoftheoperationofpower.Otherwise,oneisleftwithoutthemeanstoconceptualizethe
differentialabilitytoimposenorms,defineidentities,andsilencealternativeinterpretationsoffemininity,masculinity,andneeds.Traditionalismresultsfromthisability
butdoesnotaccountforit.Itisimportantthatweknowhowthevariousformsofpoweroperateintheconstructionofgender,howtheypermeatesocialization
processes,andhowthenormsandidentitiesgeneratedincivilsocietyintersectwithfunctioningofpowerasamediuminbureaucraticsettings.
Thiswouldinvolveananalysisofpowerrelationsthatissupplementalratherthanantitheticaltotheconceptionofpowerasacoordinatingmedium.Wehaveargued
thatformalorganizationisaprecondition(andhenceamarkofidentification)oftheconstructionoftheautonomoussubsystemofpower.
83
Itisanecessary
prerequisiteforpowertofunctionasasteeringmedium(andtobeinstitutionalizedassuch).Butitisneithertheonlymodeinwhichpoweroperatesnoritsonlycode.
Asmanyhavepointedout,powergeneratedoutsideofformalrulesexistswithinorganizationspowerrelationsexistbeforethehistoricalemergenceofthemediumof
power,andpowerrelationsareoperativeincontextsthatarenotformallyorganized.
84
Letusdefinepowergenerallyasthetransferofselectivity(theabilitytodeterminewhatcanbedoneandsaid).Poweroperatesthroughtheconditioningof
expectations(andofexpectationsofexpectations),linkingrelativelypreferredandrelativelyrejectedcombinationsofalternativesofatleasttwopersons.
85
This
transferpresupposesboththeavailabilityofnegativesanctionsandacode(orseveralcodes)ofpower.Manybutnotallcodesofpowerincorporateformsof
inequalitythatdistinguishamongindividualsashigherandlower,superiorandinferior.
Inoneofitsguises,withinformallyorganizedcontexts,poweroperatesasasteeringmediumthatcanthenbeextendedoutwardtofunctionalizerelationsand
institutionsofcivilsocietythatarenotthemselvesformallyorganizedandtherebyachieveadministra

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tivegoals.
86
Assuch,themediumofpoweruncouplesthecoordinationofactionfromconsensusformationinlanguageandneutralizestheresponsibilityof
participantsintheinteraction.
87
Whatcountshereisnotthepresenceofarigidbureaucratichierarchyorstructureofdominationinthesenseofaclearchainof
command
88
buttheformalizationoftheactioncontextsuchthatabstractrulesandimpersonalroles(betheyofficesorfunctions)becomeatleasttheofficialchannel
(oneamongseveral)throughwhichpower(selectionofwhatcanorcannotbesaidordone)flows.Thus,thebinaryschematizationofinteractionsinsetsofformal
codes(especiallylegal/illegal)producesanobjectivatingattitudetowardtheactionsituation,anabstractionfromconcretepersons,andacertainautomaticqualityto
thecontinuationoftheinteraction.
89
Powerdoesnotoperateonlyasasteeringmedium.
90
Thereare,ofcourse,powerrelationswithininstitutionalsettingsthatarenotformallyorganizedandthuslacka
necessaryconditionfortheanchoringofthemediumofpower.Here,too,poweroperatesthrough"binarycodes"thattransferselectivity,expeditecommunication,
andavoidtherisksofdissensussolongastheyarenotchallenged.Butthese"codes"haveadifferentstructurefromthoseattachedtosteeringmediainformally
organizedcontexts.Mostimportant,theydonotfullyreplaceordinarylanguageinitscoordinatingfunctioninstead,theyinvolvesecondorderprocessesofconsensus
formationinlanguage.Nordotheyinvolvedepersonalizedsocialrelations.Habermashasanalyzedprestigeandmoralauthorityinthisway,distinguishingthese
"generalizedformsofcommunication"fromsteeringmedia.Prestigeandmoralauthoritycanmotivateactionorcompliance,butthevalidityclaimsunderlyingthemcan
alsobechallengedandifthesedonotsurvivecritique,theirnormativebasisandtheirpowertomotivatecollapse.Moreover,moralauthorityandprestigeremain
stronglyattachedtoparticularpersonsandcontexts.
91
Itisreasonabletoassumethatthelistof"generalizedformsofcommunication"couldbeexpandedtoincludestatus,authority,andgender.
92
Moreover,inlinewith
Habermas'sdistinctionbetweennormativeandcommunicativeaction,weshoulddistinguishbetweenformsthatallowcommunicativethematizationandquestioningup
toafixedpoint(suchastraditionalauthority)andforms

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thataresoconstructedastoallowinprincipleforunrestrictedthematization,questioning,andevencriticism.Itisalsopossibleforthestructureofageneralizedformof
communicationtochange,forexample,fromtraditionaltodemocraticauthority,fromstatustomerit,orfromoneconceptionofgendertoanother.
Wemaintainthatgenderisageneralizedformofcommunicationor,rather,thecodeofsuchcommunication.Existinggendercodes,evenifhistoricallychanging
andinthissensehardlytraditional,aresoconstructedastostopquestioningatasupposedlyunchallengeablemeaningcomplexthatisdefinedas"natural."Thatpower
operatesthroughgendercodes,reducingthefreeselectivityofsomeandexpandingthatofothers,isthemostimportantandparadigmaticcoreofanytheorythatmight
belabeledfeminist.Genderisnotanothersteeringmediumbutratherthesetofcodesinandthroughwhichpoweroperates.Outsideformalorganizations(whereit
canserveasasecondarycodeofthepowermedium),gendercontinuestodisplaceordinarylanguagecommunicationandfacilitatetheoperationofpower.However,
thecodificationofgenderdoesnotfullyuncoupleinteractionfromthelifeworldcontextofsharedculturalknowledge,validnorms,andresponsiblemotivations.
Gendernormsandidentifiesarebasedultimatelyontheintersubjectiverecognitionofcognitiveandnormativevalidityclaims.Whileconventionalunderstandingsof
genderalsoreducetheexpenditureofinterpretiveenergyandtherisksattendingmutualunderstanding,theirabilitytomotivateactionandcomplianceisstilllinkedto
thealternativesofagreementorfailedconsensus.
93
This"reliefeffect"isnotneutralinrelationtotheintersubjectiverecognitionofnorms,identities,ormeanings.
Ofcourse,thepeculiarpowerofconventionalinterpretationsinthisdomainliesinthefactthatthemeaningsandnormsatstakeareboundupwithidentitiesthatare
transmittedthroughprimarysocializationandreinforcedinsecondarysocializationprocessesthroughoutone'sadultlife.Poweroperatinginthecodeofgenderdelimits
notonlywhatoneunderstandsasnatural/unnatural,natural/cultural,male/female,feminine/masculine,attractive/unattractive,andappropriate/inappropriatesexual
objectsandaims,butalsoconstructsthemeaningofbodiesandoperatesupon

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them.Gendernormsandidentitiesare,inaddition,reinforcedbydirectorindirect,positiveornegativesanctionsthatcan(butneednot)belinkedtounequalaccessto
moneyandpowerintheformofmedia.Theymustthereforebechallengedontwofronts:Theconventionalgendercodesofpowermustbedissolvedbyactorswho
taketheresponsibilityforcreatingnewmeaningsandnewinterpretationsintotheirownhands,whileinequitiesinthedistributionofmoneyandpowermustbe
contested.
4.Itisinthissensethatgenderidentitylinksthepublicandprivatedomainsofcivilsocietytoeachotherandtotheeconomyandthestateadministration.
94
Viewing
genderasageneralizedformofcommunication,apowercodedistinctfrombutreinforcedbythemediaofmoneyandpowergeneratedinthesubsystems,givesusa
richtheoreticalframeworkforarticulatingthepublic/privatedistinctioningenderterms.
ThelargestgapinHabermasworkishisfailuretoconsiderthegenderedcharacterofrolesofworkerandcitizenthatemergedalongwiththedifferentiationofthe
marketeconomyandthemodernstatefromthelifeworld.Feministhistorianshavedocumentedtheparallelconstructionoftherolesofhousewifeandmotherandthe
restrictionofwomentotheseroles(asnurturer),astheflipsideofthetransitionfromthefamilyeconomytothecapitalistmodeofproductionandthereplacementof
autocratic/monarchicwithrepublican/liberalformsofconstitutionalism.
95
Aswagelaborbecamedominant,theroleofwageworkercametobeunderstoodasa
gendered,malerole,whilethefamilywasconstructedtobeaprivatesphere,thedomainofwomen,inwhichno"real"workwasdone.Thesameholdstrueforthe
republicanconceptionofthecitizensoldier,whichbydefinitionexcludedwomen.
96
Itisnoaccidentthatastherolesofmalebreadwinnerandmalecitizencrystalized,
acultofdomesticityemergedtoprovidetheideologicalcomponentsofthenewwifeandmotherrole.Ofcourse,afatherrolealsodeveloped,butthiswasanempty
role,anothernameforthebreadwinner.Thus,asageneralizedmediumofcommunication,genderedpowerrelationshavebeenbuiltintoalloftherolesdevelopedin
(aselectivelyrationalized)modernsociety.
97

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Itshouldbeobviousthatthisreconstructionofthegendersubtextoftheinstitutionalarticulationofmoderncapitalistsocietiesintosetsofpublicandprivaterelations
doesnotunderminethedualisticsocialtheorywehavebeendefending.Rather,itpresupposestheargumentthatthelifeworld"reactsinacharacteristicway"tothe
emergenceoftheeconomicandstatesubsystemsbyinternallydifferentiatingitselfintothepublicandprivatespheresofcivilsociety,intosetsofinstitutionsorientedto
culturaltransmission,socialintegration,socialization,andindividuation.
98
Inouranalysisofcivilsociety,theacquisitionofactionablecivilrights,howeverselectiveand
problematicthesemaybe,institutionalizesthepublicandprivatespheresofcivilsocietyandsubjectstheeconomyandthestatetoitsnorms.Thenormsatissuehere
are,ofcourse,nottheonesFraserhasinmindwhensheappropriatestheconceptionofthemultidirectionalcharacterofinfluenceamongthevariouspublicandprivate
spheresofclassicalcapitalism.Patriarchalgendernormsarehardly"freedomguaranteeing,"andtheyhavejustifiedtheexclusionofwomenfromthoserightsand
normsthatwere.Byimplication,thegendernormsthatshapethekeysocialrolesmediatingamonginstitutionsmustbesubjecttocritiqueandreplacedby
nonpatriarchalidentitiesandroles.
5.Thesameholdstrue,ofcourse,forwelfarestatesystems.Wehavearguedthatthenormsofcivilandpoliticalsocietycontinuetoexertinfluenceontheeconomy
andstatethroughthemediatinginstitutionsofpoliticalandeconomicsociety.The"receptors"forsocietalinfluenceinthesespheresare,however,restrictedinscope
andhighlyselectivewithrespecttowhichnormstheymobilizeorreinforce.Patriarchalgendernormsarecertainlyamongthelatter,andtheystructuretherolesand
policiesputinplacebymanywelfarereforms.Sincethesenorms(alreadybackedupbyinequalitiesinmoneyandpower)constitutewomenasdependents,itisnot
surprisingthattheycomprisethebulkofthosewhobecomeclients.Thekeyquestiontodayisnotwhetherbutwhichlifeworldnormswillbedecisive.
99
Thecolonizationthesishighlightstheproblemsassociatedwiththeoppositedirectionofinterchange:thepenetrationbythemediaofmoneyandpower(andformal
organization)intothecommunicativeinfrastructureofeverydaylife.Thistendstoreify

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anddepletenonrenewableculturalresourcesthatareneededtomaintainandcreatepersonalandcollectiveidentities.Thisincludestheresourcesthatareneededto
createnonpatriarchalnormsinthelifeworldandtodevelopthesolidaryassociationsandactiveparticipationthatwouldhelpthemasserttheirinfluenceonthe
subsystems.
Habermas'ssketchybutextremelysuggestiveanalysisofthenewformsofjuridificationutilizedbywelfarestateshighlightstheambiguitiesinvolvedinthedouble
processofinterchangebetweensystemandlifeworld.Ontheonehand,juridificationinthedomainofthefamilyinvolvestheextensionofbasiclegalprinciplesto
womenandchildrenwhowereformerlydeniedlegalpersonhoodbylawunderthedoctrineofcouverture(inAngloAmericancountriesatleast).Inotherwords,
egalitarianprinciplesreplacepatriarchalnormsintheformofrightsofchildagainstparents,ofwifeagainsthusband,etc.Suchnewrightstendtodismantlethe
positionofthepaterfamiliasinfavorofamoreequaldistributionofcompetencesandentitlementsamongfamilymembers.Thedirectionofinfluencehereclearlyflows
fromcivilsocietytothestate,involvingachoiceofnorms.Itisthesenormsthatarereinforcedincivilsocietybythestateastheendresultoflawmaking.
Ontheotherhand,ifthestructureofjuridificationinvolvesadministrativeandjudicialcontrolsthatdonotmerelysupplementsociallyintegratedcontextswithlegal
institutionsbutreplacethesebytheoperationofthemediumoflaw,asisoftenthecaseunderwelfarelaw,thenemancipationinthefamilyisachievedatthecostofa
newtypeofpossiblebond.
100
Experts(judgesortherapists)becometheadjudicatorsofthenewrightsandtheconflictsaroundthem.Theyintervenewiththeir
juridicaloradministrativemeansintosocialrelationsthatbecomeformalized,dissociated,andreconstructedasindividualizedcasestobehandledadministrativelyor
juridicallylikeanyothersetofadversaryrelations.Formal,individualizing,andhenceuniversalizingjudgmentsthatcannotdealwithcontextualcomplexities
disempowerclientsbypreemptingtheircapacitiestoparticipateactivelyinfindingsolutionstotheirproblems.Itisthusthemediumoflawitselfthatviolatesthe
communicativestructuresofthespherethathasbeenjuridifiedin

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thisway.Thisformofjuridificationgoesbeyondtheexternallegalcodificationofrights.Theadministrativepenetrationofcivilsocietyitentailspreemptsthe
developmentofproceduresforsettlingconflictsthatareappropriatetostructuresofactionorientedbymutualunderstanding.Itblockstheemergenceofdiscursive
processesofwillformationandconsensusorientedproceduresofnegotiationanddecisionmaking.Italsonecessarilyabstractsawayfromthespecificcontext,
conditions,relations,andneedsofeachindividual"case."Itispreciselythedisempoweringeffectsofthissortofdecontextualized,individualizing,andformalistic
decisionmakingthatfeministanalystsofrecentreformsinfamilylawhavedescribedandcriticizedinsomedetail.
101
Debateandconfusionoverthemeaninganddesirabilityofseekingrightsinthisdomainhavepermeatedthefeministdiscussion.Webelievethatthedistinctionbetween
lawasinstitutionandlawasmediumandthecolonizationthesisarehelpfulhere.Atheoryofcivilsocietyconstructedalongtheselinesallowsonetoconceptualizean
importantaspectofwhatitisthatmakesthenew"rights"soambiguous.Onthisapproach,itbecomesclearthattheambivalenceoffeministsvisvis"equalrights"
legislationinthisdomainisbasedonarealdilemma:Theacquisitionofformalequalitythroughmeansandtechniquesthatabstractawayfromparticularcontexts,level
differences,andblockthecreationofegalitariansocialrelationswithincivilsocietyisanambiguousgainindeed.Inacontextnotonlyofsubstantiveinequality(theold
Marxistinsight)butalsoofcontestedandfragileidentities,suchmeanswilleithergeneratenewdependenciesorfostertheresuscitationoftheoldpatriarchalnormsas
adefenceagainstthedisintegrativesideeffectsofstatepenetration.Traditionalpatriarchalformsoflifehavebecomeformallydelegitimatedbythenewrightsfor
womenandchildren,buttheclient/expertrelationsthatproliferateincivilsocietyviathemediumoflawneitherabolishsubstantiveinequalitiesinpowerorvoicenor
facilitatethecreationofnewmeanings,identities,andnorms.Ineffect,thenewverticalrelationsbetweenthelegalsubjectandthejudgeorsocialworkersubstitutefor
thehorizontalcommunicativeinteractionneededtogeneratenewsolidarities,egalitariannorms,andwaysoflifetoreplacetheoldones.Consequently,autonomous
processesof

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collectiveempowermentandthecreationofnonpatriarchalidentitiesincivilsocietyareblocked.
102
Itwouldbeextremelymisleading,however,toassumethatallwelfarestatereformshavethesamestructureorlogic.Surelylegalreformsthatsecurethefreedomof
wageworkerstoorganizeunionsandbargaincollectively,thatprotectthemfrombeingfiredforsuchcollectiveaction,andthatsecureworkerrepresentationon
companyboardsdifferinkindfrommeanstestedgrantstosingleparenthouseholdsandfromsocialservicesthat"instruct"clientsonhowtofunctionproperlyas
childrearersandresponsibleprovidersaccordingtosomepreconceivedmodel.
103
Thedifferencebetweenthesetypesofreformsisnotfullycapturedbyreferenceto
thegenders(or,forthatmatter,totherace)ofthepeopletheytarget.Inadditiontostatingthatwomenaretheobjectsofonetypeofreform,menoftheother,one
oughttobeabletosaywhatitisaboutthereformsthemselvesthatmakesomeenablingandothersdebilitating.
Dualisticsocialtheoryallowsonetodojustthis.Theformersetofreforms,unlikethelatter,donotcreateisolatedclientsofastatebureaucracybutratherempower
individualstoacttogethercollectively,todevelopnewsolidarities,andtoachieveagreaterbalanceofpowerrelationsbecausetheyareaddressedtoanareathatis
alreadyformallyorganized.
104
Suchreformscreate"receptors"intheeconomicsubsystemfortheinfluenceofthenormsandmodesofactionofcivilsocietyby
puttingproceduresfordiscursiveconflictresolutionintoplace,therebyassertingcontrolofthelatterovertheformerwithoutdedifferentiatingthem.Thesecondtypeof
reformdoesthereverse:Itbringsthefullforceofadministrativeagenciesintoareasthatarenotandshouldnotbeformallyorganized.Thisthreatensthe
communicativeinfrastructureandautonomyofcivilsocietyandunderminesthecapacitiesof"beneficiaries"toactforthemselvesortosettleconflictsdiscursively.And
yetonecertainlywouldnotwanttoarguethatjuridification,regulation,ormonetarybenefitsincivilsocietybydefinitionhumiliateordisempowerthosewhomtheyare
meanttobenefit.Thequestionthatarisesisnotwhetherjuridification(thecreationofnewrights)orstateintervention(thegrantingofnewbenefits)shouldoccurincivil
society,butwhichkindoflegalrights,admin

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istrativerelations,ormonetarybenefitsoughttobeestablished.Consideringthatwomenaretheprimetargets/beneficiariesofwelfareinthisdomain,surelysucha
questionisnot"askew"offeministconcerns.
105
Afeministversionofthecritiqueofthewelfarestatemustinvolveitsreflexivecontinuation.
106
Thus,thedecolonizationofcivilsocietyanditsmodernization(inthe
senseofreplacingconventionallyheldpatriarchalnormswithcommunicativelyachievednorms)arebothfeministprojects.So,too,isthedevelopmentofegalitarian
institutionsthatcaninfluencetheadministrativeandeconomicsystems.Thefirstprojectwouldpermitjuridificationonlyinformsthatempoweractorsincivilsociety
withoutsubjectingthemtoadministrativecontrol.Thesecondwoulddissolvemaledominationinbothpublicandprivateinstitutions.Thethirdwouldentailstructural
reformsineconomicandpoliticalsocietytomakethemreceptiveandcomplementarytothenewidentitiesandthenewlydemocratized,egalitarianinstitutionsofcivil
society.
107
DualPolitics:
TheExampleoftheFeministMovement
WearenowinapositiontopresentouralternativetoHabermas'sinterpretationofthedualisticlogicofcontemporaryfeministmovements.Wehavearguedthatthe
primarytargetsofthenewsocialmovementsaretheinstitutionsofcivilsociety.Thesemovementscreatenewassociationsandnewpublics,trytorenderexisting
institutionsmoreegalitarian,enrichandexpandpublicdiscussionincivilsociety,andinfluencetheexistingpublicspacesofpoliticalsociety,potentiallyexpandingthese
andsupplementingthemwithadditionalformsofcitizenparticipation.Inthecaseoffeminism,thefocusonoverturningconcreteformsoflifebasedonmaledominance
andreinterpretinggenderidentitiescomplementsattemptstosecuretheinfluenceofnew,moreegalitariangenderidentitieswithinthepublicspacesofcivilandpolitical
societyandtoattainpoliticalinclusionontheseterms.
108
Giventhedualisticinstitutionalstructureofthepublicandprivatespheresofmoderncivilsociety,thereisnoreasontoviewthefirstorientationasaretreat.To
construethedefensivepoliticsoffeminismsimplyasareactiontocolonization,aimedonlyat

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stemmingthetideoftheformallyorganizedsystemsofaction,isquitemisleading.So,too,isthepejorativetoneofthelabel''particularist"fortheconcernwith
identities,conceptionsofgender,newneedinterpretations,andthelike.Theseoughtnotbetakenasasignofawithdrawalintocommunitiesorganizedaround
naturalisticcategoriesofbiologyandsex.Quitethecontrary.Noraretheysimplyreactive.Rather,theseconcernsfocusonthenormativepresuppositionsand
institutionalarticulationofcivilsociety.Thefeministinterventionconstitutesachallengetotheparticularistsexistnormsandpracticesthatdominateinbothpublicand
privatespheres.Itattemptstoinitiateandinfluencediscoursesonnormsandidentitiesthroughoutsociety.Suchprojectsareuniversalistinsofarastheychallenge
restrictionsandinequalitiesinthecommunicativeprocesses(inpublicandinprivate)thatgeneratenorms,interprettraditions,andconstructidentities.Tobesure,the
contentofnewidentitiesthatemergefromsuchchallengesareparticular.AsTourainehasclearlyshown,noidentity,collectiveorindividual,canbeuniversal.But
someidentitiesinvolveagreaterdegreeofselfreflectionandegoautonomythanothers,anditisthisthatdistinguishesthoseparticulargenderidentitiesthatarebased
onhierarchicalsexistnormsfromthosethatarenot.
Giventheobviouspermeabilityofpoliticalandeconomicinstitutionstosocietalnorms,thereisalsonoreasontoforeclosethepossibilityofthedevelopmentof
egalitariananddemocraticinstitutionscapableofinfluencingandcontrollingthepolityandtheeconomy.Feministmovementscontestthenormsandstructuresofmale
dominancepervadingcivilsociety,buttheyalsochallengethewaysinwhichtheseinformthestructurationofthesubsystemsingeneralandsocialpolicyinparticular.
The"offensive"dimensionoffeministpoliticsdoesindeedtargetthestateandtheeconomy,pressuringforinclusiononequalterms.
109
Itis"emancipatoryand
universalist"asHabermasrightlyargues,butuniversalismandtheegalitarianinclusionofwomenintheworldofworkandpoliticsinvolveachallengetothemale
standardsbehindtheallegedlyneutralstructuresofthesedomains.Oncethe"typicalworker"isnolongerconstruedasthemalebreadwinner,thestructureoflabor
time,thelengthoftheworkingday,thenatureofbenefits,andthe

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worthofjobsmustbesuitablyrevised.Andoncethe"responsiblecitizen"isnolongerconstruedasthemalesoldier,theinclusionofwomeninthepoliticalandstate
spheresmustentailsignificantchangesinthesedomainsaswell.Inshort,theoffensivepoliticsof"inclusion,"ifitisreallytobeuniversalist,entailsinstitutionalreform.
Theduallogicoffeministpoliticsthusinvolvesacommunicative,discursivepoliticsofidentityandinfluencethattargetscivilandpoliticalsocietyandanorganized,
strategicallyrationalpoliticsofinclusionandreformthatisaimedatpoliticalandeconomicinstitutions.
Indeed,almostallmajoranalysesofthefeministmovement(intheUnitedStatesandEurope)haveshowntheexistenceandimportanceofdualisticpolitics.
110
A
brieflookatthetrajectoryoftheAmericanmovementwillmakeourpoint.
Resourcemobilizationandpoliticalopportunitytheoristsarguethatorganization,networks,allies,thepresenceofacycleofprotest,andareformatmosphereare
centraltotheemergenceandsuccessofmovements.Theavailabilityofthesefactorsinthelate1960sandearly1970shasbeenwelldocumentedbyanalystsofthe
"secondwave"offeminism.
111
So,too,hastheimpactonwomenofstructuralchangesthatfacilitatedtheirmassiveentryintothepaidworkforce,theuniversity,and
thepolity.
112
Butneitherstructuralchangenorthegrowthinthemembershipandpoliticalexpertiseofwomen'sorganizationsnortheexistenceofpowerfulallies
sufficedtofurtherwomen'srightsorfeministagendas.
113
Theresources,organization,andleadershipforawomen'smovementhadexistedsincetheturnofthe
centurywhathadbeenmissingwasamassconstituencywillingtosupportdemandsforwomen'srights,thatis,afeministconsciousness.
114
Movementanalystsalsoincludetheemergenceofgroupconsciousness,solidarity,andasenseofunjustdiscriminationamongthepreconditionstocollectivepolitical
action,althoughtheformthatsuchactiontakesvarieswiththestructureofthestateandthepoliticalinstitutions(unions,parties)inthecountry.
115
Inthecaseof
women,attaininggroupconsciousnessinvolvedanexplicitchallengetotraditionalnormsthatidentifiedwomenprimarilyintermsoftherolesofmotherandwifeand
justifiedinequalities,exclusion,anddiscrimination.Inshort,thetraditionalunder

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standingofwomen'splaceandidentityhadtobechanged,andnewidentitiesconstructed,beforechallengestosexdiscriminationcouldappearasalegitimateissue
andwomencouldbemobilizedaroundthem.Indeed,itquicklybecameevidenttokeysectorsofthewomen'smovementthattherewasadeeperproblemunderlying
theotherwiseinexplicableresistancetoequalrights:Sociallyconstructedconventionalgenderidentitiespreservedmaleprivilegeandworkedagainstwomen's
autonomyandwomen'sselfdetermination.Thus,beforeanystandardoffensivepoliticsofreformandinclusioncouldbefruitful,afeministconsciousnessandideology
hadtobedevelopedonthepartofmovementwomenandthencommunicatedtoothersthroughadifferentpoliticsofidentity,oneaimedatthepublicandprivate
spheresofcivilsociety.
116
Hencethefocusonpreciselythoseinstitutionalarrangementsandprocessesinvolvedintheconstructionofgenderidentityandtheslogan
that"thepersonalispolitical."
Itshouldcomeasnosurprise,then,thatthefeministmovementadoptedadualisticstrategytargetingboththestate(andeconomy)andcivilsociety.Norisitsurprising
thatthisdualityfoundorganizationalexpressionintwodistinct,unconnectedbranchesofthemovement.The"older"branch(olderintermsofmedianageofactivists
andalsotemporallyfirst)includedarangeofinterestgroupsfocusingonpoliticalandeconomicinclusionandattemptingtoexerciseinfluencethroughoutthelegaland
politicalsystemtofightdiscriminationandattainequalrights.
117
The"younger"branch,emergingfromtheNewLeftandthecivilrightsmovement,formedintoloosely
connectedautonomousgrassrootsgroupstargetingtheformsofmaledominancewithintheprivateandpublicspheresofcivilsociety.Thesewerethegroupsthat
articulatedthegreatmobilizing"gender"issuesofabortion,contraception,rape,violenceagainstwomen,andthelike.Theirfocusonidentity,selfhelp,consciousness
raising,andproselytizingthroughtheundergroundpress,theirownalternativepublications,andtheuniversitieswasaimedatspreadingfeministconsciousnessand
achievinginstitutionalchangesinsocialrelationsbasedontraditionalist,inegalitariangendernormsincivilsociety.
118
Bytheendofthe1960s,thetwobranchesofthe
movementstartedmovingclosertogether.Political"insiders"tookupmanyoftheissues

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articulatedby"grassroots"feminists,whilethelatterbegantoenterenmasseintothelocalchaptersofthenationalpoliticalorganizations.
119
Bythemid1970s,
"women'smovementorganizationstookupeverypoliticalavenuetochangepolicy.Theyapproachedpoliticalparties,Congress,thecourtsandtheexecutivebranch
theyusedconstitutionalamendment,legislativelobbying,andpoliticalprotest."
120
Atthesametime,theorganizationsthathadoriginallyrestrictedtheiractivityto
standardtacticsofpoliticalpressurebegantotakeupthemethodsofprotestandpersuasioninitiatedbythemoreradicalgroups.
121
Asaresult,despiteits
organizationaldiversity,onemayspeakofthecontemporaryfeministmovementinthesingular,composedofvariousassociationsandorganizationsengagedinawide
rangeofstrategiesyetsharingafeministconsciousness.
122
Therecanbenoquestionthatthedualisticstrategyofthecontemporarywomen'smovementhashadsuccessesinpolitical,cultural,andinstitutionalterms.In1972
alone,theU.S.Congresspassedmorelegislationtofurtherwomen'srightsthenhadtheprevioustenlegislaturescombined.
123
Women'smovementorganizations
helpedtriggerawaveoflegislativeactiononfeministissuesunequaledinU.S.history.
124
Between1970and1980,women'saccesstoandinfluenceonpoliticalelites
increaseddramatically,andmorewomenwereelectedandappointedtopublicofficethaneverbeforeinAmericanhistory.
125
Inaddition,thecourtsbecamean
importantandproductivetargetofthemovementinbothofitsformsandonbothofitsfronts.ThelandmarkdecisioninReedv.Reedin1971initiatedalineofcases
usingtheequalprotectionclauseoftheconstitutiontoknockdownsexuallydiscriminatorystatutesinthelabormarket.ThedecisioninRoev.Wadein1973usedthe
rightofprivacytomakeabortionlegal,therebyregisteringandfurtheringchangesingenderrelationsingeneralandinakeyinstitutionofcivilsociety,thefamily,in
particular.
126
Asmostanalystsstress,however,thesepoliticalandlegalsuccesseshadastheirprerequisiteandpreconditionsuccessintheculturalsenseintheprior
spreadoffeministconsciousness.
127
Thepointhereisnottheobviousonethatamassmovementcanbestrategicallyhelpfultonewgroupsseekingpowerand
influencebut,rather,thatwithoutapoliticsofidentity

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aimedatthenorms,socialrelations,institutionalarrangements,andpracticesconstructedincivilsociety,andwithoutapoliticsofinfluenceaimedatpoliticalsociety,
successinthefirstrespectwouldbeunlikelyandlimited.
128
Thespreadoffeministconsciousnesshasbeendocumented.The1980VirginiaSlimsPollfoundthat64%ofwomenfavoredeffortstochangeandstrengthenthe
statusofwomen,incontrastto40%in1970.
129
Moreover,by198060%ofthepopulationbelievedthatsociety,notnature,taughtwomentopreferhomemakingto
workoutsidethehome.
130
Inaddition,51%preferredamarriageinwhichhusbandandwifesharedhomeresponsibilities,and56%favoredsharedresponsibilityfor
childcare.
131
Thesestatisticsindicateculturalchangesthatgowellbeyondtheacceptanceofequalrightsandinclusionofwomeninthepoliticalpublicsphere,
althoughthelatterisalsoaccepted,atleastinprinciple,bythemajorityofthepopulation.
132
Apoliticsofinfluenceinformedbynewconceptionsofgenderidentitythusmadeitpossibletoturnaccesstopoliticalelitesintothemeasuresnecessarytoachieve
feministgoals.AndwhatwastruefortheUnitedStateshasbeentrueofItaly,Germany,England,andFranceaswell.
133
Tociteoneexample,JaneJensonhasshown
thattheinsertionoftheneedsandinterestsofwomenontothepolicyagendainFrancebecamepossibleonlyafterthewomen'smovementtookasitsfundamentalgoal
thespecificationofanewcollectiveidentity.Shearguesthat"thefundamentalcontributionofthemodernwomen'smovementwasitsabilitytoalterthe'universeof
politicaldiscourse'andthustopressitsgoalsinwaysquitedifferentfromthoseofearliermobilizationsofwomen."
134
AccordingtoJenson,thefeministmovementchangedtheuniverseofpoliticaldiscoursethathadexcludedthembycreatinganewcollectiveidentityforwomenandby
gettingthepoliticalelitestoacceptthisidentity.Jensonalsoshowsthatreformsfromabovethatextendwomen'srightsdonot,intheabsenceofafeministmovement,
entailachangeintheuniverseofpoliticaldiscourseorachangeintheidentityofwomen.AfterWorldWarII,womeninFranceacquiredtherighttovoteandmore
liberalaccesstocontraception,butthetraditionaluniverseofpoliticaldiscoursethatdefinedwomenaswives,asappendagesofmen,andas

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motherswasnotalteredbythesereforms.
135
ItwasnotuntilthefeministmovementsteppedintotheculturalspaceopenedupbytheNewLeftin1968,beganto
applytowomenthemessuchasthecritiqueofeverydaylifeandtherighttoequalityandautonomy,andredefinedwomen'scollectiveidentityinfeministtermsthatthe
traditionaluniverseofpoliticaldiscoursebegantoalterandreformsthatwerefeministinbothintentandimpactoccurred.
ItistellingthatJensonfocusesonthedebatearoundthelegalizationofabortiontodemonstratetheimpactofthewomen'smovementontheuniverseofdiscourse.
Indeedmostanalystsoffeminismagreethatwhatisnewandspecifictothecontemporarywomen'smovementthroughouttheWest,andwhatbroughtwomenintothe
publicarenaenmasse,werethegreatmobilizingthemesofabortion,violenceagainstwomen(rape,wifebattering),sexualcoercion,sexualharassment,and
stereotyping.
136
Feministsdemandedthatthestandardsofjusticebeappliedtoallspheresofcivilsociety,includingthefamily.Afterformalcitizenshiprightshadbeen
grantedtowomen,andalongsideeffortstogainequalpoliticalrights,toendeconomicdiscriminationinpayandopportunity,andtofightsexualdiscriminationinand
segmentationofthelaborforce,everymodernfeministmovementhasmobilizedprimarilyaroundtheseformerly"private,""nonpolitical,""civilsociety"issues.
137
And
everymodernfeministmovementhasexplicitlyattemptedtoreshapetheuniverseofdiscoursesothatwomen'svoicescouldbeheard,women'sconcernsperceived,
women'sidentitiesreconstructed,andthetraditionalconceptionsofwomen'sroles,bodies,andidentities,andthemaledominancesupportedbyit,undermined.Tobe
feministincharacter,newrightsandinstitutionalreformshadtoreflectthechangesingenderidentityandinwomen'saspirations.
Theabortionissueencompassedalloftheseconcerns.Itquicklybecameapparentthatthisissuethrewdownthegauntlettothetraditionaluniverseofdiscourse
becauseitsignifiedafundamentalchangeinthedefinitionandstatusofwomen.
138
Thethemeoffreedomofchoiceandthedemandfor"controloverourownbodies"
expressedmorethanadesireforequalrights.Theysymbolizedademandforautonomyregardingselfformativeprocesses,forselfdetermination,andforbodily
integrity,inshort,for

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therightforwomentodecideforthemselveswhotheywanttobe,includingwhetherandwhentheychoosetobecomemothers.Consideredtogetherwiththe
thematizationofviolenceagainstwomen,thedemandsforlawslegalizingabortionandcriminalizingmaritalviolenceandmaritalrapetargetedasphereofcivilsociety
that,undertheguiseof"privacy,"hadpreviouslybeenremovedfromsuchscrutiny.Ontheoneside,privacyasautonomywasbeingclaimedbyandforwomenon
theother,thenotionthatasocialinstitutioncouldbeprivateinthesenseofbeingimmunetotheprinciplesofjusticewasseriouslychallenged.
139
Challengestothetraditionalidentityandrolesassignedtowomenarticulatedinthedebatesaroundtheabortionissueinfluencedandalteredtheuniverseofpolitical
discourse:"forthefirsttime,womenaloneandoutsideafamilyframeofreferencebecamethesubjectofpoliticaldiscourse...thenewdiscourseonabortionreform
cametosymbolizenothinglessthanachangeinwomen'sstatusandtheirrelationtotheirownbodiesandthestate."
140
Thisdiscourseinvolvedaconceptionof
womenasbothautonomousandgendered(thatis,withtheirownspecificsituation),asbothdifferentandyetworthyofequalconcernandrespect.
141
Thisiswhythe
abortionissuecannotbeconstruedintermsofthepoliticsofinclusionalongthelinesof"bourgeoisemancipationmovements"thatbringtheexcludedintothepolityor
economyonequalterms.Rather,itisanissuetiedtothe"new"dimensionofthefeministmovement,foritposesafundamentalchallengetotraditionalgender
identities,totraditionalconceptionsofthefamily,topatriarchalpower,andtothestandardliberalconceptionofthepublicandprivatespheresofcivilsociety.Itisa
paradigmaticexampleoftheduallogicofthefeministmovement.
CivilSocietyandDualPolitics:
ATheoreticalSummary
Wehavearguedthatthetranslationoftherelevantdimensionsofthelifeworldascivilsocietyallowsonetomakesenseofthedoublepoliticaltaskofthenewsocial
movements:theacquisitionofinfluencebypublics,associations,andorganizationsonpoliticalsociety,andtheinstitutionalizationoftheirgains(newidentities,
autonomousegalitarianassociationalforms,democratizedinstitu

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tions)withinthelifeworld.Wehavetriedtoexplainthedualorganizationallogicofthenewmovementsintheseterms.
Thereis,however,anotherpossibleinterpretationoftheduallogicofcontemporarycollectiveaction.Onecouldattemptanaccountintermsofastage(orlifecycle)
modelinwhichallsocialmovementsmovefromformsofnoninstitutional,massprotestactiontoinstitutionalized,routineinterestgrouporpartypolitics.
142
Theybegin
intheformofbroadyetloosenetworksoflocalassociationsandgrassrootsgroups,withminimaldistinctionsbetween"leaders"andfollowers,membersand
nonmembers.Atthisinitialstage,collectiveactorsmakediffuse,valueladen,nonnegotiabledemandsthatarearticulatedinmassprotestactions.Thistypeofcollective
actionisspecifictotheprocessofidentityformationofnewcollectiveactors.Thefirsttaskofnewmovementsistoformtheverysubjectthatmustbecomethe
collectiveactorwhowillparticipateinpoliticalnegotiationsandexchangesandthenthebearerofgainsandlosses."Thereisacategoryofactionwhichmaybe
observedinsocialconflicts,thatcanbeunderstoodonlyifitisaskedofthemnotwhatgainsandlossestheywillproducefortheactors,butwhethertheywillproduce
solidarityornot.Theseareactionsconnotingaprocessofformationofanidentity."
143
Thus,intheformativeperiodofsocialmovements,expressiveactionanddirect
participationareappropriatetothegoalofarticulatinganewcollectiveidentity,andthepoliticsofinfluencetargetsthepublicsphereforthepurposeofgaining
recognitionofthenewcollectiveactor.
Thesecondstageofsocialmovementactivityinvolvesroutinization,inclusion,andfinallyinstitutionalization.
144
Oncethenewcollectiveactorsucceedsinformingan
identityandgainingpoliticalrecognition,actionshiftsfromtheexpressivetotheinstrumental/strategic.Formalorganizationreplacesloosenetworks,membershiproles
andleadersemerge,andrepresentationreplacesdirectformsofparticipation.Thelogicofcollectiveactionatthisstageisstructuredbythepoliticsofpolitical
inclusionsuccessmeansthatoutsidershavebecomeinsidersinanexpandedpolity.Theshiftintherationalityofcollectiveactionfromtheexpressivetothe
instrumentalandthechangeinorganizationalstructurefromtheinformaltotheformalareunderstoodasa

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learningprocessinvolvinggoalrationaladaptationtopoliticalstructures.Fullinstitutionalizationwouldinvolverecognitionofthe(demobilized)grouprepresentedby
thenewpoliticalinsidersasalegitimatespecialinterestwhoseclaimsbecomesusceptibletonegotiationandpoliticalexchange.Successinvolvesinclusionof
"representatives"innormalpoliticsinvolvingpartycompetition,participationinelections,parliamentaryrepresentation,theformationoflobbyorinterestgroups,and
eventuallytheoccupationofgovernmentpositions.
145
Thestagetheoryaccountsfortheduallogicofmovementpoliticsintermsofalinearmodelofdevelopment.Moreover,itseemstoprovideareassuringanswertothe
Michelsiandilemmathatseemstofaceallmovementsatsomepointthefearthatanymovetowardformalorganization,inclusion,andinstitutionalizationwill
underminemovementgoalsandthreatenthecontinuedexistenceofthemovementformofcollectiveaction.Totheextentthattheseprocessesinvolvecooptation,
deradicalization,professionalization,bureaucratization,andcentralization,"success"ininstitutionaltermsofinclusionsignalstheendofthemovementandthedilutionof
itsaims(thefamousironlawofoligarchy).Since,initsoriginalform,thisdilemmaflowedlogicallyfromtherevolutionaryrhetoricofthelabormovementthathas
subsequentlybeenabandoned,lifecycletheoristscandismissitasutopian,unrealistic,ordangerous.Whenmovementfundamentalistsarticulatesuchfearstoday,in
theabsenceofanyclaimtobeengaginginrevolutionarypolitics,theycanbyaccusedofanunwillingnessoraninabilitytolearn.Inshort,ifthenormaltrajectoryof
collectiveactionisashiftfromexpressivetoinstrumentalaction,adaptationtotheconstraintsofthepoliticalsystem,andpoliticalinclusionandreforminitiatedby
insiders,thentheMichelsiandilemmadisappears.
Whilethestagemodelcertainlycapturesimportantaspectsofthedynamicsofsocialmovementdevelopment,itisunabletoaccountfortheveryfeaturesofthenew
movementsthatwefindmostsignificant.Indeed,ourbriefdiscussionofthetrajectoryoftheAmericanfeministmovementbeliesmanyofitspresuppositions.This
movementhadadualorganizationallogicfromitsinception.Whiletherehasbeenroutinizationandinstitutionalization,thesehaveneitherexcludednorsubstitutedfor
masscollectiveaction,

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grassrootsassociations,autonomousselfhelporganizations,oridentityorientedpolitics.
146
Insteadofconformingtothelinearmodelofdevelopment,thefeminist
movementhasshiftedbackandforthbetweenmassactionandpoliticalpressure,dependingontheavailablepoliticalopportunitiesandtheissueathand.
Norhaslearningonthepartofactivistsentailedaonedirectionalshiftfromexpressivetoinstrumentalrationality.Ourdiscussionoftheorganizationaldevelopmentof
themovementshowsthatlearninghasoccurredonbothsidesandinbothdirectionspoliticalinsiderstookuptheissuesandmethodsofgrassrootsactivistswhile
themanyactivistsjoinedtheformalorganizations.Thisisnottosaythatthetwofacesofthemovementhavemerged,butratherthatthedivisionoflaborbetweenthe
twosegmentsofthemovementshiftsovertime.
Finally,thenotionsthatthetargetofthefeministmovementisprimarilythepoliticalsystem(and,throughit,theeconomy)andthatsuccesscanbeconstruedintermsof
inclusion,reformfromabove,orbenefitsisquitemisleading.Thestruggleoverabortionisonceagainagoodcounterexample.Interestorganizationstargetingthe
courts(intheUnitedStates)orpoliticalpartiesandparliaments(inEurope)werenecessarytoachievemajorchangesinabortionrights.Butchallengestotraditionalist
definitionsofwomen'srole,place,andidentitylieattheheartoftheissue,asproponentsandnewlymobilizedopponentsofabortionrightsbothunderstand.Indeed,
attemptstoalterthenorms,roles,andidentitiesofwomenwithinthepublicandprivatespheresofcivilsocietyhavegeneratedfarmoreresistance(andevencounter
movements)thanclaimsforformalequalityintheworkplaceorforinclusioninthepoliticalpublicsphere.Thesuccessesoftheprolifemovementinmobilizing
constituenciesanddilutingabortionrights,togetherwiththefailuretowinpassageoftheU.S.EqualRightsAmendmentmustbeunderstoodintheseterms.
147
Thus,
legalreformandpoliticalinclusionhardlysufficetodefineorsecuresuccess.Identitypoliticsandgrassrootsmobilizingremainontheagenda.
148
Itisavirtueofthestagemodeltohavecalledattentiontothefactthatsocialmovementstargetbothcivilandpoliticalsociety.Themodelismisleading,however,tothe
extentthatitpresentsthese

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orientationsineither/ortermsanddescribesthenormaltrajectoryofcollectiveactionasalinearmovementfromciviltopoliticalsociety.Therearetworootproblems
withthemodel.First,itworkswithanoverlysimpleconceptionoflearning.Collectiveactorsareassumedtolearnonlyalongthecognitiveinstrumentaldimension.
Thatis,theirlearningisdefinedasagradualrecognitionthatidentityoriented,symbolicpoliticscannothelpthemtoachievetheirgoals,andtheresultofthislearningis
ashifttoadisciplined,hierarchicalorganizationandaninstrumentalstrategicmodelofaction.Thispointofview(whichistypicalofpoliticalparties)tendstodisregard
eventheimportanceofmaintainingidentityandsolidarityforlongtermstrategicaction.Itimpliesnotonlyalackofreflectionconcerningtherootednessoftheactors
ofpoliticalsocietyincivilsocietybutalsothenotionthatsocialmovementscannotsimultaneouslyconcentrateonstrategicrequirementsandidentitybuilding.Thetacit
assumptionofthisapproachisthatidentitiescannotbecomemorerational.Consequently,identitybuildingcannotmovetoalevelofreflectionthatcanincorporatethe
tensionbetweenidentityandstrategy.Thehistoryofmovementsthathaveconsciouslycombinedthepoliticsofidentityandstrategywouldbedismissedbytheclaim
thatintheendsuchcombinationscannotandwillnot''succeed."
Inoppositiontothisview,webelievethattheempiricalevidenceismuchmoreambiguouswithrespecttomovementspastandpresent,andthatthecriterionof
successitselfneedstoberedefined.Forexample,theachievementsandcontinuityofworkingclassmovementshavebeendueinparttotheirabilitytocombine
culturalandpoliticalconcerns.
149
Thenewnessofthenewmovementsinthisrespectliesnotsomuchintheirdualismasintheirmoreemphaticthematizationofthis
dualism.Thus,theirrefusaltoinstrumentalizeculturalpoliticsandidentitybuildingforthesakeofnarrowlyconceivedpoliticalsuccessoughtnottobeconstruedsimply
asafundamentalistunwillingnesstolearn.Rather,onecouldinterprettheresistanceto"selfrationalization"onthepartofmanycontemporarycollectiveactorsasa
resultofinsightintoarangeofproblemsspecifictocontemporarycivilsocietythatcannotberectifiedby"normal"politicalmeans.Ifconventionaltoolsofgovernment
interventionarenotadequatetoproblems

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arisinginsuchareasasgenderandfamilyrelations,socializationandeducationpractices,andbiotechnology,thenautonomouscollectiveactionfocusingon
consciousnessraising,selfhelp,andlocalempowermentdoinvolvelearningafterall.Inareaswhereidentities,conventionalmeanings,institutionalizednorms,lifestyle
patternsofconsumption,andsocializationpracticesmustbealteredtoproducesolutionstosocialproblems,learningalongthemoralpracticaldimensionisrequired.
Aselfreflectivepoliticsofidentityhasitsproperplacehere.
150
Theseconderrorhastodowithacertainpovertyofthemodel'spoliticalconception.Thestagemodeladdsthepoliticsofidentitytothepoliticsofinclusionand
reformarticulatedbytheresourcemobilizationperspective,albeitasatransitorystage.Ifthetwomajorterrainsformovementpoliticsarecivilandpoliticalsociety,
thenthepoliticsofidentityandinclusioncanbeunderstoodanalogously,sincetheydescribetheemergenceoftheactorsineachdomain.Thepoliticsofidentity
constitutestheactorsofcivilsocietythepoliticsofinclusion,afterthenecessarytransformationsintheorganizationandorientationoftheseactors,establishesthemas
membersofpoliticalsociety.Thepoliticsofreform,finally,involvesthestrategicactivityofpoliticalorganizationsandpartiesinthegenerationofstatepolicy.Whatis
missingisaconceptionoftherelationbetweencollectiveactorsincivilsocietyandthoseinpoliticalsociety.Thishappensbecauseinthestagemodeltheformer
effectivelydisappearwiththeemergenceofthelatter.Itisassumedthatcivilsociety,unlikepoliticalsociety,canactonlyonitself.Followinginthefootstepsoftheelite
theoryofdemocracy,themodelthusrupturesthelinkbetweencivilandpoliticalsociety,betweencivilandpoliticalactors.Thereisnoroomforapoliticsofinfluence
bycollectiveactorsincivilsocietyaimedatthoseinpoliticalsociety.Butjustaspoliticalsocietyiscapableofactingonthestateadministration,soaretheactorsof
civilsocietycapableofbringingthediscourseandtheactorsofpoliticalsocietyundertheirinfluence.Thispoliticsofinfluence,forwhichthereisagreatdealof
empiricalevidence(aswehaveshowninthecaseofthewomen'smovement)isthekeyelementmissinginmostparadigmsusedforthestudyofsocialmovements
today.
Withthisconceptioninmind,wecanrevisittheMichelsiandilemmathatthestagemodelturnsintoitspositiveparadigm.For

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us,thetracelesstransformationofmovementsintobureaucraticpoliticalpartiesorlobbiesremainsbothanegativeandanavoidablemodel.Wedorecognizethe
tendencyformovementstoreproducetheorganizationalstructuresdeterminedbypowerandmoneythemomenttheyattempttoactdirectlyonthesubsystemsof
stateadministrationandthemarketeconomy.Webelievethatthemovementformcannotsurvivethestepovertheboundariesofthelifeworld.Movementscannot
influencestructurescoordinatedthroughmeansotherthannormafiveorcommunicativeinteractionwithoutsuccumbingtothepressureforselfinstrumentalization.
Here,thesystem/lifeworlddistinctioncontinuestoprovideboundariesthatcannotbeconjuredawaybymovementactivistsiftheyhopetobeeffective.
Selfbureaucratizationdoesnotfollowfromthepoliticsofinfluence.No"ironlawofoligarchy"attachestotheactivityofmovementsaimedattheintermediate
structuresofpoliticalsocietyorattheformsofthepublicspherethatexistonthislevel.OuranswertotheMichelsiandilemmaistopointtothepotentialandactual
duplicationofactorsincivilandpoliticalsocietyandtothepossibilityofanewtypeofrelationshipbetweenthem.Wedorecognizethetensionsbetweengrassroots
associationsinthelifeworldtargetingcivilsocietyandorganizationscapableofstrategicallyaffectingthestateandeconomicsystems,butonlyatthecostof
bureaucratization(penetrationbythemediumofpower).Webelieveneverthelessthatahigherlevelofselfreflection,rootedinadialoguebetweentheoryandits
movementaddressees,holdsthepossibilityofdiminishingtheseantagonisms.Theprogramofselflimitingradicaldemocracyinvolvesacritiqueofdemocratic
fundamentalismtypicalofcollectiveactorsbasedincivilsocietyandacritiqueofdemocraticelitismtypicalofthosebasedinpoliticalsociety.Thistheoreticalcritique
willbeimpotent,however,unlesscivilactorsmoveforwardtoapoliticscapableofinfluencingpoliticalactorsinsteadofretreatingtotheothersideoffundamentalism,
whichispassivity.
Finally,ourdualisticconceptionoffersacriterionofsuccessformovementsthatdiffersfromthoseofmovementfundamentalistsandpoliticalprofessionals.We
considerthedevelopmentofselfreflectiveandselflimitingactorsabletoinfluencepoliticaldiscus

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siontobehighlydesirable,asarepoliticalpartiesthatmaintainahighdegreeofopennesstocivilsocietywithoutsurrenderingtheprerequisitesofeffectivestrategic
action.Somuchautomaticallyfollowsfromourargument.Butnotionsofsuccessincivilandpoliticalsocietyshouldnotbeassimilatedtoeachother.Inpolitical
society,organizationalselfmaintenanceisadesideratumincivilsociety,itisnot,andtoomuchattentiontoitmayinitselfleadtotransgressionsovertheboundary
betweensystemandlifeworld.
Thesuccessofsocialmovementsonthelevelofcivilsocietyshouldbeconceivednotintermsoftheachievementofcertainsubstantivegoalsortheperpetuationofthe
movement,butratherintermsofthedemocratizationofvalues,norms,andinstitutionsthatarerootedultimatelyinapoliticalculture.Suchadevelopmentcannotmake
agivenorganizationormovementpermanent,butitcansecurethemovementformasanormalcomponentofselfdemocratizingcivilsocieties.Forexample,ifpartof
theachievementofmovementsistheinstitutionalizationofrights,thentheendofasocialmovementeitherbecauseofitsorganizationaltransformationorits
absorptionintonewlycreatedculturalidentitiesdoesnotmeantheendofthecontextofthegenerationandconstitutionofsocialmovements.Therightsachievedby
movementsstabilizetheboundariesbetweenlifeworld,state,andeconomybuttheyarealsothereflectionofnewlyachievedcollectiveidentities,andtheyconstitute
theconditionofpossibilityoftheemergenceofnewinstitutionalarrangements,associations,assemblies,andmovements.Theclassicalrightsachievedbythe
democraticrevolutionsandworkers'movementshavealreadyfunctionedinthiswayvisvisthecivilrightsandothermovements.Theoristshaveyettoformulatethe
newrightsappropriatetothechallengetothestateandeconomybycontemporarymovements.Today,bothprevailingmodelsofrightsonelinkedtothepreeminent
positionofpropertyrights,theotherstructuredaroundamodelofstatesecuredbenefitshaveshowntheirunderside.
151
Nevertheless,institutionalizedrightsare
bothimportantfootholdsandcatalysts(preciselybecauseoftheirinternalcontradictions)forcontemporarystrugglesforrights.Thisisespeciallytrueforinitiativesthat
"reflexivelycontinue"theprogramsofthedemocraticrevolutionandwelfarestatebyestablishingtheprideofplaceofrightsofassociationandcommunication.

Page563
Thisprogramcanbecompletedonlyonthebasisofadualisticstrategyinwhichthepoliticsofidentity,influence,inclusion,andreformallhavemajorrolestoplay.
Fromthepointofviewofatheoryofcivilsociety,thepoliticsofinfluenceisthemostcentralofthese,sinceitistheonlymeansofdisplacingmovementfundamentalism
andblockingtheroadtopoliticalelitism.Withoutit,thepoliticsofcivilsocietyturnsintoanantipolitics.Thus,thepoliticsofinfluencemeritsacloserlookfromthe
pointofviewofpoliticaltheorythisisthetaskofchapter11,oncivildisobedience,oneofthemostimportantmeansthroughwhichsocialmovementscanhopeto
influencemodernsociety.

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11
CivilDisobedienceandCivilSociety
Wehavearguedthatthenewtheoryofcivilsocietyallowsustoreconciletheliberalanddemocratictraditionsofnormativepoliticaltheory.Inchapter8weproposed
thatdiscourseethicsimpliesthecompatibility,indeed,theintimateinterrelation,betweenrightsanddemocracyandthatthisinterrelationisnotmerelyaninstrumental
one.Ourpointwastoshowthatthelegitimacyofmodernconstitutionalregimesthatclaimtobedemocraticandtorespectrightsrestsultimatelyonthesupralegal
normativepresuppositionsofbothdemocraticandliberaltheory,thatis,ontheideasofdemocraticlegitimacyandmoralrights.
1
Therearemanyregimesthatareconsideredliberaldemocraciestheproblemisthattheprevailingmodels(andtheories)ofliberaldemocracyarenot,inouropinion,
sufficientlydemocratic.Fromthepointofviewofthestandardliberalmodeloftheoppositionofcivilsocietyandthestate,democracyisonthewholeconceived
instrumentally,
2
butsuchaviewisincompatiblewithourconception.Instead,weconceiveofcivilsocietyasthelocusofbothdemocraticlegitimacyandrights,
composedofprivatebutalsoofpoliticallyrelevantpublicandsocialspheresinwhichindividualsspeak,assemble,associate,andreasontogetheronmattersofpublic
concernandactinconcertinordertoinfluencepoliticalsocietyand,indirectly,decisionmaking.Thisconceptionburststhedichotomouspublic/privateframeworkof
classicalliberalismandraisesdemocracytothelevelofafundamentalvaluewhilesimultaneouslychallengingallmonisticconceptionsofthepossibleformsandlociof
democracy.

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Why,then,concludeabookoncivilsocietywithadiscussionofcivildisobedience?Wehavemaintainedthatthepoliticsofrevolutionaryfundamentalismisantithetical
totheprojectofdemocratizingmoderncivilsociety.Wehaveprovidednormativeandstructuralargumentstosupportthisthesis.Atthesametime,wehaveargued
forthepossibilityanddesirabilityofradicalinstitutionalreformandhaveinterpretedtheprojectsofthenewsocialmovementsalongtheselines.Nevertheless,itmight
appearthatwehavesacrificedtorealismtheutopiancoreoftheradicaldemocraticproject,namely,thegoalofachievingofgenuinecitizenparticipationinpubliclife.
Realist,elitemodelsofdemocracyleavepoliticstotheprofessionalsinpoliticalsocietyandadvocate"civilprivatism"forthemembersofcivilsociety.Wehopethata
discussionoftheroleofcivildisobediencewithinmoderncivilsocietieswilldispelthisinterpretation.Moreover,inthecontextofthedemiseofMarxism,thiscentury's
mostimportantutopianprojectofemancipation,itisnecessarytoconsidertherelationbetweenourtheoryofcivilsocietyandemancipatoryprojects.Isitpossibleto
conceiveofaradicalpoliticsofcivilsociety?Webelievethatareflectiononcivildisobediencecanprovideananswertothisquestionbyshowingthatthereisindeed
analternativetothechoicebetween"soullessreformism"andrevolutionaryfundamentalism,betweencivilprivatismandthetotalpoliticizationofsociety.
Socialmovementsareanormal,albeitextrainstitutional,dimensionofpoliticalactioninmoderncivilsocieties.Wehaveinterpretedtheirprojectsofselflimiting
radicalismasattemptstoexpandrightsanddemocratizeinstitutions.Thepoliticsofcivilsocietyisthusbothdefensiveandoffensive:Socialmovementsseekto
democratizecivilsociety,toprotectitfromeconomicandpolitical"colonization,"andtoexertinfluenceonpoliticalsociety.Whilethisinvolvesthepoliticsofidentity,
inclusion,reform,andinfluence,thelatteristhemostcentraltoourpresentconcern,sinceitisaimedatmaintainingthelinkbetweencivilandpoliticalsociety.
Ourdiscussionofsocialmovementsraisesanewsetofquestionsfordemocratic(andliberal)theory.Socialmovementsarenotalwaysinternallydemocratic,andthey
tendtobypasstheexisting

Page566
politicalchannelsforexertinginfluence.Indeed,collectiveactorsoftenengageincivildisobedience.
3
Thequestionsbeforeus,then,arethefollowing:Whatclaimsto
legitimacycansocialmovementsthatengageincivildisobediencehavewithina"nearlyjust,""nearlydemocratic"constitutionalregime?
4
Isthereanyjustificationfor
violatinglawsdulypromulgatedbydemocraticlegislaturesorforpoliticalactivitiesthatbypasstheexistingproceduresandinstitutionsforexpressingpolitical
concerns?Donotactsofcivildisobedienceviolatetherightsofthemajoritytomakebindinglaw,
5
therebychallengingbothliberalanddemocraticprinciples?How
canillegalpoliticalaction,whateveritspurpose,bereconciledwiththeprinciplesofaliberalanddemocraticpolity:theruleoflaw,majorityrule,andrespectforthe
rightsofall?Andwhyisitnecessaryfornormativepoliticaltheorytoaddressthequestionofcivildisobedienceatall?
Itisourthesisthatcivildisobedience,properlyunderstood,isakeyformthattheutopiandimensionofpoliticscanassumeinmoderncivilsocieties.Weproceedfrom
theassumptionthatrightsanddemocracy,aswehaveinterpretedthem,involve,inpart,utopianpoliticalprinciples(intheKantiansenseofregulativeprinciples)
underlyingconstitutionaldemocracies.Weshallarguethatcivildisobedience,asaformofnoninstitutionalpoliticalactionspecifictocitizensofmoderncivilsocieties,is
intimatelyrelatedtotheseutopianprinciples.
Thepeculiarityofcollectiveactioninvolvingcivildisobedienceisthatitmovesbetweentheboundariesofinsurrectionandinstitutionalizedpoliticalactivity,between
civilwarandcivilsociety.Bydefinition,civildisobedienceisextrainstitutional:Alegalrighttoengageincivildisobedienceisselfcontradictory.Butitdoesnotthereby
violatetheprinciplesofcivilsociety.Rather,directpoliticalactionintheformofcivildisobediencekeepstheutopianhorizonofademocraticandjustcivilsociety
alive,fortworeasons.First,civildisobedienceisprincipledcollectiveactionthatpresupposesatleastthepartialinstitutionalizationofrightsanddemocracythatis,it
presupposestherightsthatestablishandprotectcivilsocietyaswellasarepresentativepoliticalsystemclaimingdemocraticlegitimacy(inthesenseofrepresenting
andrespondingtocitizens'opinionsandinterests)andprovidingforatleastsomepolitical

Page567
participation.Second,afullydemocraticandjustcivilsocietyis,ofcourse,autopiaintheclassicalsenseitcanneverbefullyrealizedorcompletedbutoperatesasa
regulativeidealthatinformspoliticalprojects.Civilsocietiescanalwaysbecomemorejust,moredemocratic.Collectiveactorstakethisutopiaseriouslyandhopeto
realizeit.Indeed,withoutthiskindofpowerfulmotivation,therewouldbenosocialmovements.Nevertheless,actsofcivildisobedienceareexamplesofselflimiting
radicalismparexcellence.Ontheonehand,civildisobedientsextendtherangeoflegitimate,evenifinitiallyextralegal,citizenactivitythatisacceptedbyagiven
politicalculture.Fewwouldbeshockedtodaybyaworkers'strike,asitin,aboycott,oramassdemonstration.Theseformsofcollectiveactionhavecometobe
considerednormal,yetallofthemwereonceillegalorextralegalandcouldagainbecomeillegalundersomeconditions.Thus,civildisobedienceinitiatesalearning
processthatexpandstherangeandformsofparticipationopentoprivatecitizenswithinamaturepoliticalculture.Moreover,itiswellknownthat,historically,civil
disobediencehasbeenthemotortothecreationandexpansionofbothrightsanddemocratization.Ontheotherhand,civildisobediencedefinestheouterlimitsof
radicalpoliticswithintheoverallframeworkofcivilsocieties.Itacceptsthebasicprinciplesofaconstitutionalgovernment.Atthesametime,weshallarguethatthe
integrityofconstitutionalismhingesontheacceptancebyapoliticalcultureofthenormativeandvaluablecharacterofillegalcollectiveactionintheformofcivil
disobedience.Accordingly,weassesscivildisobediencenotmerelyasatacticbutasanexpressionoflegitimatecitizenaction.Weviewcivildisobedienceasoneof
themeansavailabletoordinarycitizenstoexertinfluenceonmembersofpoliticalsocietyandtoensurethatprofessionalpoliticiansremainresponsivetopublic
opinion.Weshallthustry,onaconceptualandnormativelevel,tovindicatetheclaimthat"Everyconstitutionaldemocracythatissureofitselfconsiderscivil
disobedienceasanormalizedbecausenecessarycomponentofitspoliticalculture."
6
Forthepurposesofthisargument,weconsidertheroleandappropriatenessofcivildisobedienceundersomewhatidealcircumstances,withintheframeworkofa
constitutionaldemocracythatis"nearly"justanddemocratic.
7
Theproblemofcivildisobe

Page568
dienceisindeed,asJohnRawlshasargued,a"crucialtestcaseforanytheoryofthemoralbasisofdemocracy."
8
However,"themoralbasisofdemocracy"doesnot
havethesamemeaningintheliberalasdistinctfromthedemocratictraditionofpoliticalphilosophy.Fortheformer,themoralbasisofdemocracyislocatedinthe
principleofrights,whereasforthelatter,itderivesfromtheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacy.Accordingly,thequestionofcivildisobedienceisposedinsomewhat
differentways.Inthefirstcase,theproblemisaddressedwithintheframeworkofapotentialconflictbetweenthedecisions(laws,policies)oflegitimatelyestablished
democraticauthorityandtheprincipleofindividualrights(orautonomy).Inthesecondcase,theissueisthequalityofdemocraticprocedures.Inotherwords,forthe
democrat,thequestionofcivildisobedienceisposedwithrespecttothedegreeofrepresentativenessandinclusivenessofagivenprocedure,thepossibilitiesfor
participation,ortheproperlocusofsovereignty.Eachapproachtendstoscreenouttheother'spointofview.
Theissuebeforeusconcernstheroleofthetwocounterfactualnormativeandevenutopianconceptionsofrightsanddemocracywithinmoderncivilsocieties
governedbytheprinciplesofconstitutionalism.Indeed,theideaofacivilsocietysecuredbyrightsandanimatedbycitizenparticipationandcollectiveactionthatis
abletoinfluence"representatives"inpoliticalsocietyisitselfautopia,albeitaselflimitingone.Itlinkscontinuitywiththeinstitutionalandculturalachievementsofthe
pasttoradicalchange.Weshallshowhowtheproblematicofcivildisobediencehasbeenaddressedwithintheliberalanddemocratictraditionsofmodernpolitical
theoryinordertoshowthateach,tobeconsistent,mustincludetheperspectiveoftheotherand,furthermore,thatthiscanbedoneonthebasisofourmodelofcivil
society.
9
ContemporaryLiberalDemocraticTheoryandCivilDisobedience
ItshouldcomeasnosurprisethattwoofthemostinfluentialcontemporarytheoristsintheliberaltraditionJohnRawlsandRonaldDworkinhavedevoteda
numberofessaystothequestionofcivildisobedience.
10
Whilesomeoftheseessayswerewrittenin

Page569
responsetopoliticalevents,
11
theyarenonethelessquiterevealingofthestrengthsandlimitsofcontemporaryliberalpoliticaltheory.BothRawlsandDworkin
understandcivildisobedienceasinvolvingactionscontrarytothelawwithinthelimitsoffidelitytothelaw.
12
Bothseektoestablishthelegitimacyandlimitsof
tolerationforcivildisobediencewithina''nearlyjust"(Rawls)constitutionaldemocracy.Moreover,theessaysthattheyhavewrittenonthetopicconstitutethemost
"democratic"momentsintheiroveralltheories.Asweshallsee,here,ifnowhereelse,thecitizenreplacesthelegislator,theexecutive,andthejudgeasthekeypolitical
actorandthefinalcourtofappeal.Yetitisnotquitetruethatforthesetheorists,civildisobedienceconstitutesa"litmustestfordemocracy."
13
Rather,civil
disobedienceineachcaseteststhedegreetowhichconstitutionaldemocraciesareliberal,thatis,thedegreetowhichtheytakerightsseriously.Civildisobedienceby
itsverynatureposesthequestionofthedegreeandkindsoflegitimatecitizenparticipationinpoliticallifeaquestionattheheartofdemocratictheory.However,
neitherRawlsnorDworkinconstruescivildisobedienceasaresponsetoperceiveddeficienciesintheextentorqualityofdemocraticproceduresinthepolity.Ifthe
legislatureconformstotheproceduresandprinciplesofjusticeenshrinedintheconstitution,andifthepoliticalorcivilrightsofthecitizenarenotviolated,thencivil
disobedienceisnottheappropriatewaytoaddressthesekindsofissuesindeed,fortheliberaldemocrattheydonotevenexist.Questionsofdemocracyare
translatedintothelanguageofrights.Itisassumed,moreover,thattheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyiscapableoffullinstitutionalizationwithinthepoliticalsystem
ofrepresentativegovernment,securedbytherightstovote,holdoffice,petition,assemble,speak,andassociate.
14
Instead,civildisobedienceisseenasalegitimateresponseonlytoviolationsofjustice,thatis,totransgressionsbythedulyconstituteddemocraticmajority(inthe
legislature)ofindividualorminorityrights.Ofcourse,theprinciplesofjusticeconstituteforeachtheorist"themoralfoundationsofdemocracy."Yetthesefoundations
turnouttobeaconceptionofthebasiclibertiesinconformitywithwhichconstitutionalregimesanddemocraticproceduresmustbeconstitutedandmustfunction.Itis
assumedthatthe

Page570
citizeninsuchsocietiesowesloyaltytoconstitutionallyestablishedinstitutions.Thedutytoobeyvarieswiththegovernment'srespectforrights,notwiththedegreeof
participationavailabletocitizens.
Inotherwords,theextentofanindividual'sobligationtoobeythelawisformulatedintermsofwhatthecitizenmaylegitimatelydoorrefusetodoincasesofinjustice,
giventheallegianceowedinprincipletoaconstitutionaldemocracy.
15
Eachtheoristconstruesthebasiclibertiesorrightssomewhatdifferently,buttheybothassume
thatthejusticeofaconstitutionalstatecanbeassessedintermsofthedegreetowhichitsecuresthemostextensivebasiclibertycompatiblewiththelibertyofothers
(Rawls)orequalconcernandrespect(Dworkin)and,hence,basicrightsforall.
16
Theissueoflegitimatedissentorcivildisobediencethereforeposestheboundary
questionbetweenstateandcivilsociety,establishingthepointatwhichdemocraticmajoritiesinconstitutionalstatesmustbeselflimiting.Legislationthatviolatesbasic
rightstransgressesitsproperbounds.Rawlsstates:
TheproblemofcivildisobedienceasIshallinterpretitarisesonlywithinamoreorlessjustdemocraticstateforthosecitizenswhorecognizeandacceptthelegitimacyofthe
constitution.Thedifficultyisoneofaconflictofduties.Atwhatpointdoesthedutytocomplywithlawsenactedbyalegislativemajority(orwithexecutiveactssupportedby
suchamajority)ceasetobebindinginviewoftherighttodefendone'slibertiesandthedutytoopposeinjustice?Thisquestioninvolvesthenatureandlimitsofmajorityrule.
17
CivildisobedienceforbothRawlsandDworkinplaystheroleofprotectingindividualrightsagainstthedemocraticpolity.
Themoralfoundationofconstitutionaldemocracyislocated,fortheliberal,intheprincipleofrights.
18
Liberalpoliticaltheoryproceedsfromtheassumptionof
plurality.Itpresupposesamoderncivilsocietycomprisedofgroupsandindividualswithdifferentandevenopposedwaysoflifeandconceptionsofthegood,who
areable,nonetheless,toarriveatasharedconceptionofpoliticaljustice.
19
However,neitherRawlsnorDworkinmaintainstheabsoluteprimacyoftheindividual's
moralconsciencevisvispubliclaw.Indeed,thisisnoteventhecoreproblemofcivildisobedience.Onthecontrary,boththeoristscarefullydistinguishbetween
conscientiousrefusalandcivildisobedienceintermsofthepoliti

Page571
calcharacteroftheformerversustheapoliticalcharacterofthelatter.Rawlsdefinescivildisobedienceas"apublic,nonviolent,conscientiousyetpoliticalactcontrary
tolawusuallydonewiththeaimofbringingaboutachangeinthelaworpoliciesofthegovernment."
20
Civildisobedienceisapoliticalactinthesensethatitisanact
justifiedbymoralprinciplesthatdefineaconceptionofcivilsocietyandthepublicgood.Itisapoliticalactnotonlybecauseitisaddressedtothemajoritythatholds
politicalpowerbutalsobecauseitisguidedandjustifiedbythepoliticalprinciplesofjusticethatregulatetheconstitution."Thecivildisobedientaddressesthesenseof
justiceofthemajorityofthecommunityanddeclaresthatinone'sconsideredopiniontheprinciplesofsocialcooperationamongfreeandequalmenarenotbeing
respected."
21
Whatdistinguishescivildisobediencefromconscientiousrefusalisthatitispublicinthedualsenseofnotbeingconcealedorcovertandofappealingto
thegeneralpoliticalprinciplesofjusticepresumablysharedbyeveryoneinaconstitutionalregime,ratherthantoone'spersonalmorality,religion,orparticularorgroup
interests.
22
Conscientiousrefusal,thatis,arefusaltocomplywithadirectlegalinjunctionoradministrativeorder,canbepublicinthesenseofnotbeingcovert,butit
isbasedonapoliticalreasoninginthatitneitherappealstothesenseofjusticeofthemajoritynoraimsbydefinitionatconvincingothersorcausingchangesinlawor
policy.Indeed,Rawlsinsistsontheprimacyofthepoliticalinsuchcases:Thedegreeoftolerationofconscientiousrefusalmustbeworkedoutfromthestandpointof
apoliticaltheoryofjustice,intermsofwhatisnecessaryforpreservingandstrengtheningjustinstitutions,andnotfromthestandpointofanabsoluterespectbythelaw
forthedictatesofindividualconscience.
23
Thelatterwouldclearlybeuntenableinapluralistcivilsociety.
Ifsocialinstitutionsarebasedonasharedconceptionofjustice,whywouldcivildisobedienceariseatallina"nearlyjust"constitutionaldemocracy?Theanswergiven
bybothRawlsandDworkinis,inthefirstinstance,rathersimple:Legislativemajoritiescanerror,worse,bemisguidedbyprejudiceandthusviolatethemoral
principlesunderlyingtheconstitution.
24
Thereis,however,asignificantdifferenceinthewaythetwotheoristsunderstandthestatusofthesemoralprinciples.Sincethe
rangeandeventhe

Page572
functionoftolerablecivildisobediencevariesaccordingly,itisworthexploringthisdifferenceinsomedetail.
Rawlsdefinesajustconstitutionaldemocracyasonewhoseconstitutionwouldbeagreeduponbyrationaldelegatesinaconstitutionalconventionwhoareguidedby
thetwoprinciplesofjustice.Justlawsandpoliciesarethosethatwouldbeenactedbyrationallegislatorsconstrainedbyajustconstitutionand,again,guidedbythe
twoprinciplesofjustice.Thelatteraretheprinciplesthatwouldbechoseninanoriginalpositionthatisfair.
25
Andindeed,inRawls'sview,thesetwoprinciplesof
justiceconstitutethemoralunderpinningsoftheprincipleofmajorityrule,withoutwhichsuchrulewouldmerelybeaproceduraldeviceenshriningthepowerof
numbers.Moreover,sincenopoliticalprocedurecanguaranteethatenactedlegislationisjust,giventheunavoidableconditionof"imperfectproceduraljustice"
obtainingineventhebestofpolities,itisobviousthatunjustlawsmaybepassedbythosewiththeconstitutionalrighttomakelaw.
26
Someformofthemajority
principleisnecessary,butthemajoritymaybemistakenmoreorlesswillfullyinwhatitlegislates.
27
Thus,whenthemajorityviolatestheconceptionofjusticeshared
bythecommunityatlargeandembodiedintheconstitution,itsetsthestageforjustifiableactsofcivildisobedience.
Rawlsdoesnotmaintainthattheinjusticeofalawissufficientjustificationforsuchaction.Onthecontrary,heinsiststhatweareboundtofollowunjustlawsifthe
injusticedoesnotexceedcertainlimits.Undertheprinciplesofmajorityrule,thereareboundtoberesultsthatminoritiesregardasunjust,butsolongasthesedonot
exceedcertainlimits,thedutytosupportjustinstitutionsincludesadutytoobeyunjustlaws.Nor,forthatmatter,isconformityofthelawwiththetwoprinciplesof
justiceasufficientconditionforpoliticalobligation.Indeed,theconceptofpoliticalobligation,strictlyspeaking,appliesonlytocertaincategoriesofindividuals:those
whohavevoluntarilyacceptedthebenefitsofinstitutionalarrangementsortakenadvantageoftheopportunitiestheyoffertofurthertheirinterests.
28
Fortherest,
Rawlsmaintainsthatthereisa"naturalduty"tocomplywiththelawsandpoliciesofanearlyjustpolity.Naturalduties,moreover,applytouswithoutregardtoour
voluntaryacts:"Eachisboundtotheseinstitutionsindependentof

Page573
hisvoluntaryacts,performativeorotherwise."
29
Rawlsarguesthatthenaturaldutyofjusticemustbeunderstoodastheoutcomeofahypotheticalagreementor
contractand,hence,implieshypotheticalconsent.Heinsists,however,thatnoactofconsent,expressortacit,andnovoluntaryactispresupposedforthedutyof
justiceitappliesunconditionally.ThereasonRawlsgivesforrejectingvoluntaryactionasthebasisofthedutytocomplywithjustinstitutionsisthatthiswouldbe
superfluous:Giventhetwoprinciplesofjusticeandthepriorityofliberty,thefullcomplementofequallibertiesisalreadyguaranteedandnofurtherassurancesare
necessary.Moreover,therecognitionofanaturaldutyofjusticeprovidesstabilityandensuresagainstfreeriding.
30
Civildisobedienceinvolvesaconflictbetweenthenaturaldutytocomplywithlawsenactedbyalegitimatemajorityandtherighttodefendone'slibertiesandto
opposeinjustice.Butwhenisthedutytocomplysuspended?Whatarethelimitsthatcannotbetransgressedbylegislativemajorities?Rawlsmentionstwowaysin
whichsuchinjusticecanarise:Lawsorinstitutionalarrangementscandepartfromthepubliclyacceptedconceptionofjustice,ortheconceptionitselfmaybe
unreasonableorunjust.
31
Hediscussescivildisobedienceonlywithrespecttothefirstpossibility,though,andonlyundersomecircumstances.
32
Thenaturaldutyto
obeyissuspended,andcivildisobedienceisjustifiable,ininstancesofsubstantialandclearinjustice:"Thereisapresumptioninfavorofrestrictingcivildisobedienceto
seriousinfringementsofthefirstprincipleofjustice,theprincipleofequalliberty,andtoblatantviolationsofthesecondpartofthesecondprinciple,theprincipleoffair
equalityofopportunity."
33
AccordingtoRawls,itisusuallyclearwhenpoliticalandcivilrightsarebeingviolated,becausetheyimposestrictrequirementsvisibly
expressedininstitutions.Infractionsofthefirstpartofthesecondprincipleofjustice,oftherequirementthatinequalitiesbetotheadvantageoftheleastwelloff,are
muchmoreimprecisebecausetheyinvolvemattersofeconomicandsocialpolicy,speculativebeliefs,statisticalinformation,etc.Thus,theresolutionofthesemattersis
bestlefttothepoliticalprocess.
Onthisconception,civildisobedienceisaformofpublicspeech,addressedtothemajoritythatholdspoliticalpower,expressingtheprofoundconscientiouspolitical
convictionthat,inone'sconsid

Page574
eredopinion,thepoliticalmajorityhasviolatedtheacceptedconceptionofjusticeandthemoralunderpinningsofsocialcooperation.
34
Itfunctionsasacorrective
andasastabilizingdevice.Itbringswaywardmajoritiestotheirsensesandreturnsthelegislativesystemtothestatusquoante.Onthelevelofpoliticalculture,the
readinesstoengageinjustifiedcivildisobedienceservesasaprophylacticagainstpotentialdeparturesfromjusticeandtherebyintroducesstabilityintoawellordered
society.
35
WhileRawlsthusoffersanimportantjustificationforcivildisobedience,heprovidesarelativelynarrowconceptionofitsrangeandlegitimacy.Heassumesthat
politicalsocietyisresponsivetotheconcernsofcivilsocietyregardingrightsandthatthelattercanexercisesomeinfluenceontheformerthroughcollectiveaction
(understoodasadiscursiveprocessratherthanapowerplay).Thepoliticalthrustofcivildisobedienceandofthecorrespondingformsofcollectiveactionis
restricted,however,toapurelydefensivepostureonthepartofthosewhoserightshavebeenviolated.Moreover,thetypeof"mistake"themajoritycanmakewhen
itenactsanunjustlawisrestrictedtoaviolationofaspectsofthetwoprinciplesofjustice.Rawlsassumesthatacoherentconceptionofjustice,acceptedinprinciple
byallmembersofthepolity,existsandcanbeappealedtowhenthemajorityerrs.Suchmistakesinvolveonlyviolationsofindividualrightsandnot,forexample,
misunderstandingsofpopularwill,inadequaterepresentationsofpublicopinion,orinsufficientpublicconsiderationsoftherelevantissues.Indeed,forRawls,the
conceptionofjusticeis,inaconstitutionaldemocracy,fixed"onceandforall"andthismeansthatthereisnolegitimateextralegalwaytotestorexpandthis
conceptionwithoutchallengingthewholeinstitutionofsociety.Thus,thosewhoserightsarenotviolatedbutwhobelieve,forexample,thattheexistinginstitutionsand
proceduresofthesocietyandpolity,whilejustandpartiallydemocratic,arenotsufficientlyso,arefacedwithadifficultchoiceeithertheyworkthroughthevery
institutionstheydeeminadequateortheyengageinactsconstruableonlyasrevolteithertheyaccepttheprevailingconceptionofjusticeandtheinstitutionsembodying
itortheybecomemilitants.
36
Thisisafairlystaticconceptionofthefunctionofcivildisobedience:Itcancorrectviolationsofexistingrights,itcanstabilizemajority
rule,or,atmost,itcanexpandrightsby

Page575
ensuringthateveryone'srightsarerespected,thattheconceptionofjusticeisappliedequallyandfairlytoall.Questionsabouttheconceptionofjustice,aboutnew
kindsornewinterpretationsofrights,andaboutmoreandnewkindsofparticipationhavenoplacewithinawellorderedpolitytheycanleadonlytoitsreplacement.
Rawls'srestrictionofcivildisobediencetothedefenseofrightsderivesfromtheliberalmodelofcivilsociety,thestate,andtheirinterrelationthathepresupposes.
37

Withinthisframework,civilsocietyisconstruedastheprivatesphereitisthelocusofindividualautonomy,ofaplethoraofgroupswithdistinctwaysoflifeand
conceptionsofthegood,ofvoluntaryassociationsofsuchgroupingswithnopoliticalthrust,andofpublicexpressionsecuredbyrights.Politicallifeissecurelylocated
withinpoliticalsocietyittakesplaceontheterrainofthestateintheformofthelegislature,complementedbytheusualapparatusofelections,parties,interestgroups,
andconstitutionallyarticulatedprocedures.Thesecomprisethesolelegitimateterrainforpoliticalactionandtheonlyformsofpoliticalparticipationopentothecitizen
undernormalcircumstances(whenneitherrightsnorpoliticalneutralityareviolated).Moreover,thepurelydefensivefunctionofcivildisobedienceinRawls'stheory
protectingalreadyacquiredrightsorextendingtheminthenameofclearlyinstitutionalizedprinciplesofjusticerestsonastaticconceptionoftheboundarybetween
publicandprivate,betweenthestateandcivilsociety,andofpoliticalcultureingeneral.
Evenwiththeserestrictions,Rawls'sdiscussionofcivildisobediencetendstoburstthisrigiddualism.Ontheonehand,theformulationofcivildisobedienceaspublic
speechappealingtotheconceptionofjusticeofthepoliticalmajorityinthelegislatureseemstoreducesuchactiontoamodelofmoralsuasionthatsimplyextends
theclassicalliberaldefenseoftherighttoconscienceandthepleafortolerationtoasetofnarrowlycircumscribedcollectiveactions.
38
Ontheotherhand,Rawlsalso
arguesthatcivildisobedienceappealstothesenseofjusticeofthemajorityofthecommunity,thatis,topublicopinionincivilsocietyitself.Thisiswhathehasin
mindwhenhearguesthatthefinalcourtofappealisneitherthelegislaturenortheSupremeCourtnortheexecutive,butthe

Page576
electorateasawhole.
39
Itisinthiscontextthatthecoredemocraticideaofthesovereignpeoplewhohavefinalauthoritymakesitssoleappearanceinhistext.Here,
hearguesthatbothdemocraticlegitimacyandtheideaofrightsprovidethemoralunderpinningofthepurelylegalframeworkofconstitutionaldemocracy.
40
Moreover,Rawlsunderstandslegislationwithintheparliamentarypublicsphereasadiscursiveprocess,aimedatachievingthebestpolicyorlawforthecommunity,
whereinlegislatorsvoteaccordingtopersonaljudgmentandnotaccordingtotheinterestsoftheirparticularconstituencies.Butthisjudgmentisnotsimplyprivateit
oughttobeaconsideredinterpretationoftheprinciplesandpoliticalcultureofthesociety.Byimplication,publicopinionoughttobeabletoinfluencethelegislative
majority.Actorsincivilsocietyoughttobeabletoinfluenceactorsinpoliticalsociety.Rawlsbelievesthatthisisoftenthecase.
41
If,however,itisthesenseofjustice
ofthecommunitytowhichcivildisobedienceappeals,ifthecitizenryisthefinalcourtofappeal,iftheideaofdemocraticlegitimacy,andnotonlytheprincipleof
rights,providesthemoralbasisofconstitutionalism,thentherangeoflegitimate(albeitillegal)collectiveactionwithincivilsocietycannotberestrictedtolawsthat
conflictwiththeconceptionofjusticeofthelegislativemajority,totheviolationoftherightsofaminoritybythatmajority,ortotherightsdimensionofthemoral
underpinningsofdemocracies.
42
Byimplication,civilsocietyitselfwouldhavetobeunderstoodashavinganactive,politicallyrelevantdimension:Collectiveaction
withincivilsociety,yetoutsidetheinstitutionalizedchannelsofthepoliticalsystem,wouldhavetobeseenasnormal.Inotherwords,thepoliticalrelevanceoftherights
tospeech,assembly,andassociationwouldhavetobeaddressedmoreseriouslyassecuringthelegitimacyofcitizenactionaimedatinfluencingpoliticalsocietyand,
indirectly,politicalandlegaldecisions.
43
Rawls,however,retreatsfromtheimplicationsoftheseideas.Henowheretellsuswhatchannelsofinfluencedoorshouldexistbetweenthelegislatureandpublics
withincivilsociety.Nordoesheeverconcedethat,absentaviolationofrights,alegitimatetargetofcivildisobediencemightbethecreationorbroadeningofsuch
channels.Heassumes,moreover,thattheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyarefullyinstitutionalizedbyelections,parliaments,and

Page577
otherconstitutionalforms.
44
Afteraconstitutionalconventionor,rather,afterratificationofaconstitutionthesociety'sconceptionofjusticeisinstitutionalized
onceandforall,andthepeopleceaseundernormalcircumstancestobepoliticalactorsinanyguiseotherthanthatoftheelectorate.Apartfromthis,politicsremains
themonopolyofpoliticalsociety.Armedwiththistheory,Rawlsisapparentlyabletocircumscribetheextrainstitutional"sovereignty"orauthorityof"thepeople"as
expressedinactsofcivildisobediencewithinthenarrowboundsofdefendingtherightsthateveryoneinprinciplealreadyhas.
Butwhatifthesociety'sconceptionofjustice,allegedlyenshrinedintheconstitutionandservingasitsguidetolegislationandthestandardbywhichitslegitimacyisto
betested,isnotclearandselfevident?Whatifthemoralprinciplesarticulatedintheconstitutionthatareattheheartoftheideaoffundamentalrightsareopento
differentinterpretationsand,hence,applications?Indeed,accordingtoDworkin,itisbecauseanyconstitutionfusesmoralandlegalissuesbymakingthevalidityofa
lawdependontheanswertocomplexmoralproblemsthatthequestionofwhatmoralrightscitizenshaveisalwaysopentonewinterpretations.
45
Moreover,evenif
themajoritylefttheconstitutionalone,evenifitwereproperlyinterpretedbyaSupremeCourt,noconstitutioncouldinstitutionalizeallthemoralrightsthatcitizens
have.Therecan,inotherwords,benopointintimeatwhichonecouldsaythatallfundamentalrightshavebeenestablishedandareprotected,becausethevery
meaning,interpretation,andrangeoffundamentalrightsdevelopsovertime.Whataconstitutioncanestablishisarecognitionthatindividualsdohavefundamental
moralrightsagainstthestate.Itcanevenenumeratesomeoftheserightsinbroadterms,butitcannotarticulatealloftheserights,notbecausethelistwouldbelong
butbecauseinterpretationsofrightschangeandnewrightswillbeassertedthatareintunewiththeprincipleofhavingmoralrightsagainstthestatebuthardly
derivablefromthisidea.Thus,acomplexhermeneuticmustbeatworkintheinterpretationofrights,involvingareflectiononconstitutionalprinciples,tradition,
precedent,andcontemporarypoliticalmorality.
DworkinthusoffersamorecomplexanswerthanRawlstothequestionsofwhy,inanearlyjustconstitutionaldemocracythat

Page578
recognizesrights,civildisobediencemightlegitimatelyarise,andwhyitshouldbetreateddifferentlythancriminalactsoroutrightactsofrevolt.Indeed,asweshallsee,
heexpandsliberaltheorytoitsfurthestconceivablelimitsalthough,forreasonsthatwillbecomeevident,thetheoryremainsatthethresholdoftheprincipleof
democraticlegitimacyandisthereforepartial.DworkinagreeswithRawlsthatifthegovernmentenactsalawthatwronglyinvadesone'srightsagainstthegovernment,
onehasamoralrighttobreakthelaw.Thisisnotaseparaterightbutafeatureofhavingrightsagainstgovernment.
46
Dworkintakesasignificantstepbeyond
Rawls'sposition,though,byarguingthatthereisnogeneraldutytoobeythelawinallcases,andcertainlynonewhenmoralrightsareviolated.Indeed,therealissueis
nottheobviouscasejustmentionedbutthesituationinwhichthelawisunclear,sothattherecanbedoubtoveritsvalidity."Whenthelawisuncertain,inthesense
thataplausiblecasecanbemadeonbothsides,thenacitizenwhofollowshisownjudgmentisnotbehavingunfairly."
47
Thisis,ofcourse,averyopendefinitionof
unclearlaw:Lackofclaritydoesnotrefertothewrittentextofthelawbutrathertoasituationinwhichalegalnormiscontested.
IntheUnitedStates,itistheroleoftheSupremeCourttosettleinterpretivequestionsaboutdoubtfullawwithrespecttorights.AsDworkinnotes,however,thecourt
can"changeitsmind."Indeed,anycourtcanoverruleitself.Thus,wecannotassumethat,atanygivenpointintime,theConstitutioniswhattheSupremeCourtsaysit
is.
48
Itcannotbearguedconvincinglythatthecitizensmay,inthecaseofdoubtfullaw,followtheirownjudgmentonlyuntiltheauthoritativeinstitutiondecidesthe
case.Onthecontrary,ifcitizensmustactasifdoubtfullawwerevalidandthehighestcourtwerethefinallocusofjudgment,"thenthechiefvehiclewehavefor
challengingthelawonmoralgroundswouldbelost,andovertimethelawweobeyedwouldcertainlybecomelessfairandjust,andthelibertyofourcitizenswould
certainlybediminished."
49
Ifnoonechallengedapparentlysettledlawinthenameoffundamentalrights,thenwewouldnotbeabletotakecognizanceofchanges
overtimeinthecommunity'smorality.
50
Withoutthepressureofdissent,wewouldincreasethechanceofbeinggovernedbyprinciplesthatoffendtheprincipleswe
share.Indeed,lawisinpart

Page579
developedthroughexperimentationbycitizensandthroughtheadversaryprocess,andcivildisobediencehelpsshapeissuesforadjudication.
51
Becauselawisina
constantprocessofadaptationandrevision,civildisobediencemaybethepacesetterforlongoverduecorrectionsorinnovationswithoutwhichavitalrepubliccould
notmaintainitscitizens'beliefinthecontinuedlegitimacyoflawsinheritedfromthepast.
ThisdiscussionoflegalvalidityiscentraltoDworkin'sdefenseofcivildisobedienceandrequiresfurtherelucidation.AccordingtoDworkin,thevalidityoflaw
dependsonapermanentlyopenendedprocessoftestinginwhichthecourtsplayarolethatincludesconsiderationofmorallyrelevantinterpretationsoftheprinciples
informingtheconstitution.Clearly,whatisatstakeisnotonlytheproceduralcorrectnessofthelegislativeprocessthatgeneratedthelawbutalsotheinterpretationof
moralprinciplesinformingaconstitutionallyarticulatedpoliticalculture.Andjustasjudgesmayreflectontheseprinciples,socanordinarycitizenslawtestingisnotthe
monopolyofjudges.
ThisargumentislinkedtoH.L.A.Hart'sdistinctionbetweentheinternalorparticipant'sperspectiveandtheexternalorobserver'sperspective.Thisdistinction
implicitlycorrespondstothetwolevelsofanalysisregardingthevalidityoflaw:respectforestablishedrulesandproceduralrequirementsandformoralvalidity.
Questionsofproceduralcorrectnesswithinthe''modelofrules"involveonlytheobserver'spointofview.Questionsofvalidityareofteninterpretedinthiswayaswell:
Alawistakentobevalidifbothitscreationanditsapplicationshavebeenjudgedtobeprocedurallycorrectandnottoviolateothervalidrules.Testingvalidityinthis
senserequiresthattestersputthemselvesinthepositionof"objectivelawyers"estimatingthechancesofasuccessfulchallenge.Theywouldagreetosubmit
unconditionallytothesubsequentjudicialdecisionaslongasthisinturnisprocedurallycorrect.
52
Inthismodel,lawsthatarenotoverturnedorrepealedarevalid
laws.Lawsthatarerepealedoroverturnedonthebasisofchangingconstitutionalinterpretation(thoughitisdifficulttodrawtheexactboundaryhere)donot
retroactivelylosetheirearlierstatusaslaw.
Dworkin,thinkingundoubtedlyof"hard"ratherthanroutinecases,isnotsatisfiedwiththismodelofvalidity.Hisunderstanding

Page580
ofvalidityinvolvesbothanobserver'sandaparticipant'sperspective.Therecouldbetestcasesinwhichlawbreakersseethemselvesaspartofanobjectiveprocess
aimedatclarifyingvalidlaw,butinsofarasatestcaseinvolvesaclaimthatmoralprinciples(rights)embeddedintheconstitutionhavebeenviolated,aparticipant's
perspectivealsoentersintotheassessment.AccordingtoDworkin,thissortofinterpretiveactisperformedbothbythecourtsandbythosewhobreakalawinorder
toinitiateatestofitsvalidity.Testcasesinvolvingillegalactionsbycitizenswhobelievethatagivenlawviolatesbasicmoralrightsandisthereforeinvalidarean
integralpartoftheprocessbywhichcourtsassesstheconstitutionality,thatis,thevalidity,oflaw.Inthiswidermodelofthetestcase,theresultofasuccessful
challengeisthatthelawinquestionisdeclaredinvalid,thatis,nonlaw,fromthemomentofitspromulgation,irrespectiveofwhetherthegroundsforoverturninginvolve
procedure,constitutionaladequacy,orhighernormativeprinciple.
Inthismodel,civildisobedienceisinterpretedasatypeoftestcase,whetherthedisobedientsaremotivatedbyapresumptionofinvalidityorbyamoregeneralbelief
intheinjusticeorillegitimacyofthelaworpolicy.Indeed,inthisinterpretation,ifthelawthathasbeenchallengedbycivildisobedientsturnsouttobeinvalid,nolaw
hasbeenbrokenafterall.
Theinterpretationisunsatisfactory,however,becauseitunderestimatesthespecifictensionwithincivildisobediencebetweenthetraumaoflawbreakingbyindividuals
whootherwisepresupposeandrespectthelegalsystemandobediencetohigherlawornormativeprinciple.Twoexamplesdemonstratethispoint.First,perhapsthe
majorityofactsofcivildisobedience,unlikeallactsintentionallyraisingtestcases,involvethebreakingoflawsthatarenotthespecificlawsorpoliciesthecivil
disobedientsseektochallenge.Indeed,theexamplesofcivildisobediencetowhichDworkinreferstheantiVietnamwarmovement(withthepossibleexceptionof
draftresistance),thecivilrightsmovement(withtheexceptionoflunchcountersitins),andtheantinuclearmovementfallintothiscategoryandcanthereforenotbe
understoodastestcasesintheusualsense.Dworkin'sentirediscussionis,infact,addressedtothesesortsofillegalactsandnottostandardtest

Page581
cases.Second,civildisobediencedirectedagainstspecificpolicies,whoselegitimacyDworkinrestrictsbutdoesnotdeny,doesnotchallengetheconstitutionalityof
lawsbutarguesthattheselawsareunwise,immoral,orboth.Thepoliciesinvolvedarenotinvalidandsocanbeabolished(thoughnotretroactively)onlybylegislative
repealorreplacement.Inthesecases,theissueisreallythelegitimacyratherthanthevalidityoflaw.Thislegitimacyischallengedbyactorswhotakeapurely
participatorypointofview,thatis,whoputthemselvesintheplaceofthelegislatureandactuallyenterintoaprocessofcommunicationwiththeirrepresentativesand
theelectorate(orpublic)asawhole.
Webelievethatitmakessensetoseparatecivildisobedienceandtestcases,atleastforanalyticalpurposes.
53
Incivildisobedienceproper,theprimaryviewpointis
participatory,andwhatisinvolvedisaclaimregardingaboveallthelegitimacyoflaw.Inlawtestingproper,whatisatissueisproceduralregularity,bothpriortothe
testandduringthejudicialprocessoftestingitself,aswellastheconsistencyofthesystemoflegalrules.Whateverthemotivationofthetester,atestpresupposesonly
anobserver'spointofview.
Thereare,ofcourse,casesinwhichlawtestingandcivildisobediencecannotbeeasilyseparated,inwhichtheissueisnotsimplycorrectprocedureorlegitimacybut
validityinDworkin'scomplexsense.Thereareobviouslycasesofcivildisobedience,suchasdraftresistanceandsitins,inwhichtheissueofvalidityisnotexcluded
andthosewhodisobeyastatuteusingthetechniquesofcollectiveactionalsohopeforachangeinthevaliditystatusofthelaw.Theremayalsobecasesoflawtesting
inwhichthechallengerisnotreadytoacceptthepredictionoflawyersorthejudgmentofthecourtandthecourtroomactionitselfissupposedtodramatizethe
injusticeandindeedillegitimacyforagentsandconstituenciesoutsidethelegalprocedure.DespitethesemixedcasesandincontrasttoDworkin,webelievethatitis
usefultodistinguishbetweenlawtestingandcivildisobedience.Althoughhedoesnotmakethedistinction,forthepurposesofthisdiscussionwefeeljustifiedto
assumethatheisconcernedwithcivildisobedienceproper.Whilehetendstoemphasizevalidityratherthanlegitimacyandtoassimilatecivildisobediencetothetest
case,hislinkingofcivildisobediencewiththeprocessofthedefenseoffundamentalrights

Page582
(inwhichevenadecisionofthehighestcourtcannotbesaidtobethefinalword)involvesthehighestprinciplesofourlegalorderasawholeandobviouslygoes
beyondthetestcaseasageneralmodel.
Whatwehavehere,then,isajustificationofcivildisobedienceinsituationsotherthanobviousflagrantviolationsofexistingindividualrights.Civildisobediencecanbe
seenasacrucialcomponentofchangewithinaconstitutionaldemocracy.Itisamajorsourceforcreatingrights(thatis,forinstitutionalizingmoralrightsthathavenot
beenpreviouslyinstitutionalized),anditinitiatesalearningprocessthatcontributestothedevelopmentofpoliticalcultureandtoinstitutionalchange.Thereferentof
civildisobedienceispublicopinion,intheprofoundsenseofwhatwetaketobeourpoliticallyrelevantmoralprinciples.Theroleofpoliticallyrelevantcitizenactionis
thusexpandedbeyonddefensivereactionstospecificviolationsofindividualrightstoincludequestionsofwhatprinciples,whichnorms,shouldbelegislatedintolaw.
ForDworkin,suchquestionsmustbetranslatedintothelanguageofrights,buttheactioninvolvedinasserting(andnotonlydefendingexisting)rightsinthismodelis
assuredlypolitical.Dworkinthusoffersadynamicunderstandingoftheroleofcivildisobedienceintheprocessofcreatingrightsandintheenlightenmentofpublic
opinion.
Preciselybecauseactsofcivildisobedienceareinterpretedinthisbroadersenseofpoliticalactiononthepartofcitizensorientedtothedefenseandcreationofrights,
andpreciselybecausetheyinvolvetheexerciseofinfluenceonthepoliticalprocessthroughthepublicspheresofcivilsociety,suchactsneedastrongerjustification
thandoactsofconscientiousobjection.Thelatterinvolvemoralobjectionstospecificlawsandseekindividualexemptionstheformerareaimedatpoliticalinstitutions
andseektocontributetochange.Inaconstitutionaldemocracy,where,afterall,citizenrightstoparticipationaresecuredandmajorityruleisthekeyprinciplefor
legislation,itisincumbentuponthedefendersofcivildisobediencetoshowthatitdoesnotviolatetheprinciplesofmajorityruleandthatitisnotantidemocratic.
Thisbringsustothesecondexplanationofwhy,eveninanearlyjustconstitutionaldemocracy,civildisobedienceisalikelyandimportantdimensionofapolitical
culture.LikeRawls,Dworkin

Page583
interpretsthelegitimacyoftheprincipleofmajorityruleprocedurally:Lawhasabindingcharacterifthecorrectproceduresinarepresentativepoliticalsystemhave
beenfollowed.Thereis,however,onesubstantiveproviso:Therightsoftheminoritymustnotbeviolated.Sinceanymajorityconsensusisalwaysonlyempirical,it
coulderr,asRawlsmaintained.Thisisabuiltinriskofthedemocraticpoliticalprocess.Amajorityconsensuscouldsimplybethecombinedprejudices,personal
aversions,majorityinterests,andrationalizationsofthelegislatureorofpublicopinion.Moreover,"Thebulkofthelawthatpartwhichdefinesandimplementssocial,
economic,andforeignpolicycannotbeneutral.Itmuststate,initsgreatestpart,themajority'sviewofthecommongood."
54
Inacomplex,differentiated,pluralist
civilsociety,theinstitutionofrightsrestrictstherangeandtypeofdecisionsopentolegislativemajorities.Rightsarenottherebyantitheticaltodemocraticprinciples,
fortheinstitutionofrightsrepresentsthemajority'spromisetotheminoritiesthattheirdignityandequalitywillberespectedmore,thesubstantiverestrictionson
majoritydecisionmakingrepresentedbyfundamentalrightsagainstthestatearetheverysourceoflegitimacyoftheprincipleofmajorityrule.
55
Indeed,therights
thesispresupposesthatthereissomethingbehindthelaw,namely,moralprinciples,whichserveasthebasisforthelegitimacyofthelegalsystemasawhole.Forthe
liberal,thissomethingistheprincipleofindividualmoralrights.
Buthowdoweknowwhenrightsareatstake?Howdowedistinguishbetweenactsofcivildisobedienceandactsthatchallengetheprinciplesoftheconstitutional
system.
56
Dworkinanswersthisquestionbydistinguishingtwodifferentkindsofpublicissues:thoseinvolvingpolicydecisionswithrespecttoacollectivegoalofthe
communityasawhole,andthoseinvolvingmattersofprinciple,thatis,decisionsaffectingsomeindividualorgroupright.
57
Thisdistinctionbetweenpolicyand
principleentersintoDworkin'staxonomyoftypesofcivildisobedienceandintohisefforttospecifywhencivildisobedienceislegitimateandwhenitisnot.Ifone
breaksthelawinthenameofthedefenseoftherightsofaminorityagainsttheinterestsorgoalsofthemajority,oneisengagingin'Justicebased"civildisobedience.If
onebreaksthelawnotbecauseofabeliefthatapolicyisimmoralorunjustbutbecauseitseems

Page584
unwise,stupid,ordangerousforthesociety,oneisengagingin"policybased"civildisobedience.
58
Whilebothofthesetypesofcivildisobedienceare"offensive"in
thesenseofbeinginstrumentalandstrategic(thegoalisachangeofpolicyorlaw),wemustfurtherdistinguishbetweentwotypesofstrategies:persuasivestrategies
aimedatforcingthemajoritytolistentocounterargumentsinthehopethatitwillthenchangeitsmind,andnonpersuasivestrategiesaimedatincreasingthecostsof
pursuingapolicyinthehopethatthemajoritywillfindthenewcostunacceptablyhigh.Informandintent,then,civildisobediencecanbediscursive(apoliticsof
influence)ornondiscursive(astrategyofpower).Persuasivestrategiesofcivildisobediencedonotchallengetheprincipleofmajorityruleinanyfundamentalway,
becausethelogicoftheillegalcollectiveactionistogetthemajority'sattentionandmakeitconsiderarguments.Itaimstoinfluencepoliticalsociety.Nonpersuasive
strategies,evenifnonviolent,areinferiorfromamoralstandpoint,buttheycanbeacceptableifonebelievesapolicytobedeeplyunjust.Theydonotradically
underminetheprinciplesofaconstitutionaldemocracy,becausetheveryideaofrightsagainstthestaterestsontheideathatthemajoritymustrespectrightsandcan
beforcedtobejustagainstitswill.
59
Nevertheless,withrespecttopolicybaseddisobedience,whereitisnotamatterofminorityrightsandhencenotamatterof
principlebutofconflictingpreferences,nonpersuasivestrategiesstrikeattheheartofthemajorityprincipleandcannotbejustified.
Thisdistinctionbetweenpersuasiveandnonpersuasivestrategiesisilluminatingandimportant.Butitisnotobviousthatthedistinctionbetweenjusticebasedand
policybaseddisobediencecanbemadeinthewaythatDworkinattempts,thatis,withrespecttosubstantiveareasofdecisionmaking.Eitherthedistinctionbetween
principleandpolicybegsthequestionsincerightsrelatedargumentscanbemadewithrespecttonearlyanypolicyissue,andinsomecasesitispreciselythis
boundarylinethatisatstake
60
oritcanbeheldtoonlyatthepriceofapurelyutilitarianmodelofthedemocraticpoliticalprocessandthecommongood.Thelatter
orientationisthedominantoneinDworkin'swork.Ineffect,Dworkintendstorevivethestandardliberaldistinctionbetweenpoliticsandmorality,placingmajority
rule,majority

Page585
opinions,preferences,thecommoninterest,andmattersofpolicywithinthenormaldemocraticpoliticalprocessandmattersofmoralprincipleorrightsoutsidethis
process.Byimplication,anddespitedisclaimers,rightsanddemocracy,moralsandpolitics,appeartobeinoppositionafterall.Onthisinterpretation,publicopinion
tendstobereducedatbesttoasetofpreferences,atworsttosetsofexternalpreferences,and"normaldemocraticprocesses"andlegislationaredenudedoftheir
normafive,principledcharacterandreducedtointerestaggregation,compromise,andresponsestopressureinshort,totheutilitarianmodelofinterestgroup
pluralism.Bythesametoken,civilsocietyappearsasamoral(nonpolitical)sphereinwhichpoliticallyorientedactiontoinfluencepoliticalsocietyforthesakeof
protectingrightsistheonlyextrainstitutionalpoliticalactionthatisdeemedlegitimate.Itiseasytoseewhyrightsmusttrumpdemocracysodefinedandwhypolicy
decisionsarenotseenasinvolvingmattersofprinciple.
ThismodelofpoliticsvitiatestheveryinsightsintothecreativedimensionsofcivildisobediencethatDworkinarticulatesandreducesitonceagaintoadefensive
strategy.ItalsopreventsDworkinfromrecognizingthathisunderstandingofcivildisobedienceasapoliticsofinfluencechallengesthestandardliberaldichotomyof
publicandprivate:civilsocietyasthesphereofprivacyandindividualautonomy,andthestateorpoliticalsocietyasthedomainofnormalpoliticalaction.Ifcivil
disobedienceinvolvesalearningprocessandhasaroletoplayindevelopingourliberaldemocraticpoliticalcultureandinstitutions,ifthetargetoftherelevant
collectiveactionis,first,publicopinionwithincivilsocietyandthereby,second,thelegislatureorthecourts,
61
thenthedemocraticpoliticalprocessmustinvolvemore
thaninterestaggregation,andpoliticallyrelevantactivityincivilsocietymusthavedimensionsotherthanthepursuitofinterestsandthedefenseofindividualrights.For
thisiswhatapoliticsofinfluence,asdistinctfromastrategyofpower,presupposes.Otherwise,extrainstitutionalattemptstochangepoliticalinstitutions,toinitiate
radicalinstitutionalreformwithinthelimitsoffidelitytoconstitutionalprinciples,andtoinfluencelegislationthroughappealstopublicopinioninthenameofthe
community'smoralitywhenindividualrightsarenotatstakewouldhavetoappearasantidemocraticdemagoguery.

Page586
Dworkin,likeotherliberals,cannotavoidsuchconclusions,becausehelocatesthelegitimacyofconstitutionaldemocracyonlyintheindividualmoralrightsit
preserves.Citizenrightsareincludedamongthecatalogueoffundamentalmoralrights,butliberalsassumethatthey,andwiththemtheprincipleofdemocracyitself,
arefullyinstitutionalizedwiththeuniversalizationoftherighttovoteandholdoffice.
62
Theprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyisthusdissolvedintotheideaof
individualrightsandtheelectoralproceduresthathavebeeninstitutionalizedfortheexerciseofthemajorityprinciple.Ifacertaincategoryofcitizensisdeniedfull
politicalrights,thencivildisobediencewouldbeinorder,butcivildisobedienceforthepurposeoffurtherdemocratizingcivilorpoliticalsociety,tomakethelatter
morerepresentativeoftheviewsofthecitizenry,orexpandingitsinfluenceonthestateiswhollyscreenedoutfromtheliberalposition.ThisisclearfromDworkin's
unconvincingattempttointerpretthecontemporaryactsofcivildisobediencehedefendssolelyintermsofrightsissues.
63
Itisevenclearerfromhistendencyto
interpretcivildisobedienceinsituationsthatcannotberesolvedintoclaimsforindividualrightsasinvolvingpolicyissuesandnonpersuasivestrategiesandhenceas
illegitimate.
64
IndiscussingtheGermanantinuclearprotest,forexample,Dworkininsiststhatmissiledeploymentsanddeterrencestrategiesarecomplexpolicyissues
andthatdiscussioninsuchcircumstancescannotbeilluminatedbyillegalacts.Hechargesthepeacemovementwithengaginginanonpersuasivestrategyaimedat
raisingthepriceofapolicytheyoppose.
65
Theweaknessofthedistinctionbetweenpolicyandprincipleisparticularlyobvioushere,foronecouldeasilyarguethatit
ispreciselythisdistinctionthatwasatstakeintherelevantactsofcivildisobedience.Farfrommakingthepublicatlargepaylessattentiontothecomplexissues
involved,asDworkincharges,thepurposeofthemovementwaspreciselytheopposite:toexpandpublicdiscourseanddebateintoareasformerlylefttothepreserve
ofstatebureaucraciesandraisond'tatandtochallengethestate'smonopolynotoverthemeansofviolencebutoverpoliticsandthemoralissuesinvolvedinthe
legitimateuseofthesemeans.
66
Individualrightswerenotatstake,butdemocraticprincipleswere.Indeed,itishardlyreasonabletointerpretthehumanchainsand
sitdownsasashowofforce,asa

Page587
nonpersuasivepowerplay,ratherthanasasymbolicexerciseaimedatinitiatingadebateby"forcingenoughpeopletolookwhowouldbeashamedtoturnaway."
67

Therewereatleasttwonormativeprinciplesatissueinthiscase:themoralityofaparticularkindofweaponry,andthedemocraticorrepresentativequalityofthe
politicalsocietythatmadethepolicydecision.Thepointhereisnotthatthedistinctionbetweenpolicyissuesandrightsrelatedissuesisuntenablebutthatbothkinds
ofissuescaninvolvemattersofprincipleandthat,ifthisisnotrecognized,onerisksmisconstruingthecharacteroftherespectiveactsofcivildisobedience.
Rightsorientedliberalismcannotdojusticetotheproblemofcivildisobedienceinnearlyjustconstitutionaldemocraciesonthebasisofthenarrowlyconceived
principleoflegitimacywithwhichitoperates.Liberalscallfordecriminalizingactsofcivildisobedienceorientedtowardrights,arguingthatthereisanextrainstitutional
moralbasisforbreakingthelawthat,whenheeded,reaffirmsratherthanunderminesrespectfortheruleoflaw.Whattheydonotrecognize,however,isthatthereis
adoubleextrainstitutionalnormativebasisforthelegitimacyoflawinpolitiesguidedbytheprinciplesofconstitutionalism.Civildisobedienceitself,unlikeanyother
moralright,cannotwithoutcontradictionbemadeintoalegalorconstitutionalright.Therighttoassertrightsisnot,strictlyspeaking,arightatallitdoesnotrefer
backtoaconceptionofmoralitydistinctfrompoliticsbutrefersdirectlytothenormativeprinciplesofpoliticsitself,indeedtoademocraticconceptionofthepolitical.
Disobedienceinthedefenseofindividualrightsdoesfollowfromtheideaoffundamentalrights,butcivildisobedienceproper,especiallyifitinvolvesthecreationof
newrights,followsfromthesecondnormativeunderpinningofconstitutionaldemocracies,theotherbasisofconstitutionalismforgottenbytheliberal,namely,theidea
ofdemocraticlegitimacy.
Wecannowpresentourownworkingdefinition.Civildisobedienceinvolvesillegalacts,usuallyonthepartofcollectiveactors,thatarepublic,principled,and
symbolicincharacter,involveprimarilynonviolentmeansofprotest,andappealtothecapacityforreasonandthesenseofjusticeofthepopulace.Theaimofcivil
disobedienceistopersuadepublicopinionincivilandpolitical

Page588
society(oreconomicsociety)thataparticularlaworpolicyisillegitimateandachangeiswarranted.Collectiveactorsinvolvedincivildisobedienceinvoketheutopian
principlesofconstitutionaldemocracies,appealingtotheideasoffundamentalrightsordemocraticlegitimacy.Civildisobedienceisthusameansforreassertingthe
linkbetweencivilandpoliticalsociety(orcivilandeconomicsociety),whenlegalattemptsatexertingtheinfluenceoftheformeronthelatterhavefailedandother
avenueshavebeenexhausted.
68
Civildisobedienceisthusanillegalformofpoliticalparticipationonthepartofcollectiveactors.Itispoliticalactionwithapoliticalaimthatbydefinitionactivatesthe
publicspheresofcivilsocietyandinvolvesextrainstitutionalcitizenactivity.Itsultimatejustificationinademocraticpolitymustlieindemocracyitselfaswellasinthe
ideaoffundamentalmoralrights.Butweshallneverescapetheviciouscircleifweassumethatdemocracyisthesumtotalofproceduresandinstitutionsarticulatedin
aconstitutionandthatthesecanbetheoreticallygraspedbyautilitarianmodelofpolitics.Inthatcase,therecouldbenodemocraticargumentforcivildisobedience
(otherthantherightsargument)thatwouldnotatthesametimechallengetheprincipleofmajorityrule.Thesolutionliesinadifferentmodelofthedemocraticprocess,
civilsociety,theirnormafiveunderpinnings,andtheirinterrelation.
Andindeed,inhisdebatewithLordDevlin,Dworkindoessketchanonutilitarianmodelofthedemocraticpoliticalprocess.Hemaintainsthatwhenlegislationcannot
beneutral,whenitinvolvesissuesthattouchonthecommunity'smorality,
69
legislatorsmustengageinmoralhermeneuticreflectionsimilartothatofjudges.Thatis,the
attempttodeterminethecommunity'smoralpositiononaspecificissueisnotamatteroftakinganopinionpolloraggregatingpreferences(policy)butratheroneof
discerningthemoralprinciplesinherentinthecollectiveidentitythecommunitywishestopreserve.Thus,"iftherehasbeenapublicdebateinvolvingtheeditorial
columns,speechesofhiscolleagues,thetestimonyofinterestedgroups...thelegislatormustsifttheseargumentsandpositionstryingtodeterminewhichare
prejudicesorrationalizations,whichpresupposegeneralprinciplesortheories."
70
Inshort,thelegislatormustrefusetotakepopularindigna

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tion,intolerance,anddisgustasthemoralconvictionofthecommunity.
IfDworkinwantedtoavoidachargeofmoralelitism,hewouldhavetodealwiththeimplicationsofthiskindofrelationbetweenpublicopinionandlegislationforthe
conceptionofdemocracyandtheprincipleofmajorityrule.Whatisimpliedhereisthatthereismoretothepoliticalprocessthantherepresentationofinterests,more
tolegislationthaninterestcompromise,moretothecommongoodorcommoninterestthanaggregatedpreferences,andmoretothemoralprinciplesunderlying
constitutionalismandmajorityrulethantheprotectionofindividualrights.Theideathatlegislatorsshouldtrytodiscernthecommunity'smoralprinciplesandthatan
informed,andformed,publicopinionoughttobeabletocommunicatetheseprinciplestolegislatorsandhaveaninfluenceonlegislationindicatesthatcivilsocietyhas
apoliticallyrelevantdimension.Indeed,theyindicatethatthereisadimensiontolegislationthatinvolvesinterpretationofthepoliticalcultureorcollectiveidentityofthe
community.Theseareformulatedincivilsociety.Theinfluenceofcivilonpoliticalsocietyinthisrespectisacentraldimensionofdemocracy.Lawsthatinstitutionalize
aspectsofacommunity'smorality(andnopolitycaneverbecompletelyneutralinthisregard)arereducibleneithertopolicydecisionsnortorights.Moreover,the
publicdiscursiveprocessrequiresareflectiverelationshiptothecommunity'scollectiveidentity(traditionsandcommonnorms),asinthecaseofmoralrights.Here,
too,therecanbenosingleauthoritativeinstance,buttheappealbeyondthelegislativebodyis,inthiscase,nottothecourts(assumingthatmattersofindividualrights
arenotatstake)buttopublicopinionitself.Thepublicturnsouttobethefinalcourtofappealtheultimatelocusoflegitimacyofthedecisionsarrivedatinthe
parliamentarypublicsphereistheopiniondevelopedandarticulatedinthepublicspheresofcivilsociety.Liberalsunderstandthatvitalpublicspaceswithincivil
societyguaranteedbyrights(speech,assembly,association)arefundamentaltothedefenseofrights.Buttheyarealsofundamentaltotheprinciplesofdemocracy.
Thisconceptionburststherigiddualismofmoralityandpolitics,ofcivilsocietyconstruedasthenonpoliticalprivatesphereandthestateconstruedasthesole
legitimatelocusof

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politics.Italsoburststheutilitarianconceptionofthedemocraticprocess.Althoughindividualrightstospeak,assemble,andassociatearethepreconditionfor
institutionalizingpublicspaceswithincivilsociety,theiranimatingprincipleisdeeplypolitical:Itistheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyitself.
DemocraticTheoryandCivilDisobedience
Radicaldemocratictheoryproceedsfromtheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyratherthantheideaofindividualrightsagainstthestate.Thistraditionrefusesto
abandontheutopiandemocraticnormsofdirectparticipationbycitizensinpubliclifeinfavorofmore''realistic"elitemodelsofdemocracysupplementedby
cataloguesofindividualrights.Ittakesupthesecondutopianidealofcivilsociety:toarticulateaninstitutionalarrangementthatwouldrealizetheclassicalprinciplesof
citizenshiponmodern,egalitariangrounds,namely,theparticipationofallinrulingandbeingruled.
Thequestionsbeforeusare:Whatrole,ifany,wouldcivildisobediencehaveinanearlydemocraticconstitutionaldemocracy,andwhatwouldconstituteademocratic
argumentforcivildisobedience?Wouldthereevenbeaneedforcivildisobedienceinaradicaldemocraticmodelofcivilsociety?Isn'tthisjustaliberalproblem?
Asinthecaseofliberaltheory,wecanidentifytwogeneralorientationswithintheradicaldemocratictradition:thefirsttendstorejectcivildisobedienceinthe"nearly
democratic"politythesecondjustifiesitonthegroundsofdemocraticnorms.Letuslookateachinturn.
ThemostinfluentialformulationoftheradicaldemocraticidealofparticipatorydemocracyisthatofJeanJacquesRousseau.TheclassicalRousseauiansolutiontothe
problemofthecitizen'smoralobligationtoobeythelawshasthefollowingstructure:Inademocraticsociety,undertheruleoflaw,citizensarenotsubjecttoanalien
willbutobeyonlythemselves.Asaresult,everypersonisbothcitizenandsubject.Theconflictbetweenthecitizen,concernedwiththepublicgood,andtheself,
pursuingprivatehappiness,isinternalized.Thecitizen'smoralobligationtoobeythelaw

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isderivedbothfromtheassumptionofconsentandfromthefactthatthegapbetweenrulerandruledhasbeenabolished.Everycitizenhasbecomealegislator
throughaninstitutionalarrangementthatcreatesanidentitybetweenrulerandruled.Thus,acitizenwhorefusestocomplywiththegeneralwill,withthelaw,iseitherin
errororanegoistandmustbeforcedtobefree.
TherehasalwaysbeenanambiguityintheRousseauianversionofradicaldemocratictheory:Isthegeneralwillbindingbecauseitisjust(becauseitexpressesthe
generalinterestorthecommongood)orbecauseitisthewillofthepeople?Forourpurposes,bothalternativesareproblematic.Weshalldiscussthesecondanswer
becauseitbearsmostcloselyonourquestionandhastheclearestrelationtotheproceduralmodelofdemocraticlegitimacy.TheRousseauianconceptionof
democraticlegitimacyisguidedbytheprinciplethatallpoliticallyconsequentialdecisionmakingmustbelinkedtothediscursivewillformationofthecitizenpublic.
Rousseautranslatesthisprincipledirectlyintothequestionoftheproperorganizationofsovereignty.Eitherademocraticpolityprovidesforthedirectparticipationof
citizensinpoliticaldecisionmakingoritisnotdemocratic.Itisassumedthatthenormsofdemocraticlegitimacycanbefullyinstitutionalizedinawellorganized
politicalcommunity.Theylosetheircounterfactualcharacterinsofarasanidentitybetweenrulerandruled,betweennormandorganization,isposited.
71
TheRousseauianidealofparticipatorydemocracyisconceptualizedinaninstitutionalmodelthatismeanttosubstitutefor(ratherthancomplement)theundemocratic,
bourgeoisinstitutionoftherepresentativeparliament.Indeed,byinsistingonanidentitybetweenrulerandruled,onehasautomaticallyruledoutthedemocratic
potentialofanyversionoftheprincipleofrepresentation(e.g.,acouncilofcouncils),forrepresentationalwaysinvolvesadistancebetweenrepresentativesandthe
represented.Theonlyexceptionisthemysticalidentificationofthegeneralwillwiththepositionsarrivedatbytherepresentatives.Byimplication,thestructural
presuppositionsofparliamentarydemocracytheseparationofstateandcivilsociety,ofpublicandprivate,andtheemphasisonindividualrightsaredeemedthe
sourceofpoliticalalienation.
72
Fromthispointofview,itmakesnodifferencewhether

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thetheoristharkensbacktoanidealizedmodeloftheGreekpolis(Arendt),tothelatemedievalrepublicantradition(Rousseau),ortonewformsofdirectdemocracy
generatedwithinthemilieuoftheworkers'movementandgeneralizedasanorganizationalprincipleforsocietyasawhole(councilcommunism,revolutionary
syndicalism).Ineachcase,itisassumedthatjustoneorganizingprincipleforallsocial,political,andeconomicinstitutionscandeliverthedemocraticutopia.
ItshouldbeclearthattheRousseauianmodelofradicaldemocracy(alongwiththeneoAristotelianandsocialistmodels)hasatelosofdedifferentiation.Ittendsto
fusemoralityandpoliticsinaconceptionofcivicvirtuethatleavesnoroomforchallengestowhathasbeencollectivelyagreedthatstemfromamoralpointofview.
Civilandpoliticalsocietyarealsocollapsed.Disobediencetothegeneralwillortheexistingconsensuswouldbeunjustandantidemocraticbecausethereisnomoral
outsidetocivicvirtueorthecommongood.Inotherwords,inanearlydemocraticconstitutionaldemocracy,wheretheproceduralprincipleofmajorityruleis
groundedinfull,open,nonexclusivediscussionandtheparticipationofallconcernedintherelevantdebates,therewouldbealmostnoplaceorjustificationforactsof
civildisobedience,thatis,forchallengestolawsarrivedatthroughthedemocraticprocessorforactsthatbypassthisprocess.
Theonlyconceivablejustificationforcivildisobedienceinsuchapolitywouldbethatsomeformofexclusionhasbeenintroduced.Onecouldclaimthattheinstitutions
arenotsufficientlydemocratic,thatagroup'svoicehasbeensilenced,thatinsufficientattentionhasbeenpaidtoone'sarguments,andsoon,Buttheclaimthatthe
institutionsofaradicalparticipatorydemocracyarenotdemocraticenoughcouldalwaysbemade.Torecognizethis,however,wouldbetoreintroduceadifference
betweenthelocusoflegitimacyandtheorganizationofsovereignty,betweenrulerandruled,betweenrepresentativeandrepresented,andbetweenpoliticalandcivil
societypreciselythegapthatradicaldemocratsseektoclose.
Arealdemocratwouldhavetogofurtherandrecognizethatdemocracycanneverbefullyinstitutionalized.
73
Therecanbenopointintimeatwhichonecould
relaxandsaythatwehavearrivedata

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perfectproceduralinstitutionalizationoftheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacy.Liketheprincipleofrights,democracymustbeseenasaveritfaire,alearning
process,nomatterwhatinstitutionalarrangementofthepolityhasbeenachieved.Everyempiricalorganizationalformofdemocracyhasitsexclusionarymechanisms:
Modernrepresentativedemocracydiminishestherelevanceofthosewhoarenotmembersofstrongvoluntaryassociationsorpartiesdirectdemocracyexcludes
thosepoliticallyinactivepeoplewhodon'tseekpublichappinessfirstandforemostterritorialdemocracydiscriminatesagainstproducersindustrialdemocracy,
againstconsumers.Federalismincreasestheimportanceofweakmembersofthefederationatthecostofdissentingindividualsandgroupswithineachmemberunit.
Centralizingdemocracyprovidesnoincentiveforpotentiallyimportantselfgoverningunits.Moreover,nocombinationoftheseprincipleswouldexcludeexclusion
altogether.Weargueinsteadforapluralityofdemocraticformsastheidealinstitutionalizationofamoderncivilsociety,butourpointisthatevenifonemovedinthis
direction,onewouldstillhavetodistinguishbetweenthenormativeprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyandthequestionoftheorganizationofsovereignty,sothatthe
formercouldfunctionasamoralstandpointfromwhichtocriticizethelatter.
Thesecondapproachisthatofthetwobestcontemporarytheoristsofdemocraticlegitimacy,HannahArendtandJrgenHabermas.Eachhasrejectedthe
Rousseauianversionofradicaldemocratictheorywithoutrelinquishingitsnormativeideals.
74
Eachhasplacedtheconceptofthepublicsphereatthecenteroftheir
politicaltheory.And,interestinglyenough,eachhaswrittenontheproblemofcivildisobediencewithintheframeworkofademocratictheorythatisfreefrommanyof
thedrawbacksoftheradicaldemocraticapproach.
75
Weshallbrieflysummarizetheirpositionsandshowthattheyofferthepossibilityofasynthesiswithwhatisbest
intheliberaltradition.
Wecanseethetheoreticalandpoliticallimitsoftheliberaltheoriesofcivildisobedienceassoonasweturntotheoristswhoproceednotfromthepointofviewoflaw
orevenrightsbutfromthatofdemocracy.Arendtisthemostexplicitonthispointindeed,hermainargumenthingesonit.Arendt'sclaimisthat,despite

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effortstodistinguishcivildisobediencefromconscientiousobjection,theliberalandprimarilyjuridicalapproachcannotdothisadequately.
76
Whenjuriststrytojustify
thecivildisobedientonmoralandlegalgrounds,theyconstruethecaseintheimageofeithertheconscientiousobjectorortheindividualwhoteststheconstitutionality
ofastatute."Thegreatestfallacyinthepresentdebate[1969]seemstometheassumptionthatwearedealingwithindividuals,whopitthemselvessubjectivelyand
conscientiouslyagainstthelawsandcustomsofthecommunityanassumptionthatissharedbythedefendersanddetractorsofcivildisobedience."
77
Theproblemisthatthesituationofthecivildisobedientcannotbeanalogizedtothatofanyisolatedindividual,forthesimplereasonthatthedisobedientcanfunction
andsurviveonlyasamemberofagroup.
78
Unlikeconscientiousobjectorswhorefusetoacomplywithaspecificstatuethatviolatestheirindividualmoral
consciences,civildisobedientsoftenviolatelawsthatareinthemselvesunobjectionableinordertoprotestotherunjustordinances,policies,orexecutiveorders.In
otherwords,acrucialaspectofthepoliticalnatureofactsofcivildisobedienceindeed,whatmakesthempoliticalforArendtisthattheactordoesnotactalone.
Wearedealingwithcollectiveaction,socialmovements,individualswhoactaspartsofanorganizedminorityboundtogetherbyacommonopinion(overandabove
commoninterest).Moreover,theiractionspringsfromanagreementwithoneanother,anditisthisagreementandnottheindividual'ssubjectivemoralfiberthatgives
credenceandconvictiontotheiropinion.
Whatisatissueisthusnottheindividual'smoralintegrityortherulesofsubjectiveconscience(theintentissuethatmotivatesjuriststodistinguishbetweensuchacts
andcriminality)butthelegitimacyofillegalpoliticalactiononthepartofcitizensactinginconcert.Thus,whilecivildisobediencedoesinvolveaformofspeech,while
itisaddressedtomajoritieswiththepurposeofinfluencingthem,itisalsopoliticalactionwithinthepublicspacesofcivilsocietyaimedatinfluencingactorsinpolitical
society.ItinvolvesmorethanFirstAmendmentprinciplesprotectingthefreedomofspeech.AccordingtoArendt,"Civildisobedienceariseswhenasignificantnumber
ofcitizenshavebecomeconvincedeitherthatthenormalchannelsofchangenolongerfunction,andgrievanceswillnotbe

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heardoractedupon,orthat,onthecontrary,thegovernmentisabouttochangeandhasembarkeduponandpersistsinmodesofactionwhoselegalityand
constitutionalityareopentogravedoubt."
79
Thisdefinitionemphasizesthefactofchange,theadequacyofthechannelsfortheinfluenceofcivilsocietyonpolitical
society(andtherebyonthestate),andtheprinciplesoflegitimacy(constitutionality)thataretoguideandlimitallstateaction.
Arendtalsowantstosituatecivildisobediencebetweencriminalityandoutrightrevolution,but,unliketheliberalorthejurist,sheneitherinsistsonnonviolenceasthe
distinguishingfeatureofcivildisobediencenorstressestheviolationofindividualrights.Indeed,shecitesthewholebodyoflaborlegislationtherighttocollective
bargaining,therighttoorganizeandtostrikeasexamplesofrightsthatwetendtotakeforgrantedtodaybutwereprecededbydecadesofviolentcivil
disobediencechallengingwhatultimatelyprovedtobeobsoletelaws.
80
Thespecificityofcivildisobediencemustthereforebesituatedelsewhere.Themainissue
facingconstitutionaldemocraciesiswhethertheinstitutionsoflibertyareflexibleenoughtosurvivetheonslaughtofchangewithoutcivilwarorrevolution.Therelation
ofcivildisobediencetolawdependsontheanswertothisquestion.Arendt'spointisnottoaffirmviolence,forsheseesviolenceastheoppositeofpoliticalaction,
andcivildisobedienceispoliticalactionparexcellence.Butcollectiveactioniscomplexitisnottheviolentornonviolentcharacterofaconflictthatdistinguishescivil
disobediencefrominsurrectionbutratherthespiritoftheactionandthespiritofthelawstowhichitisaddressed.
ItisArendt'sthesisthatwhilecivildisobedienceistodayaworldwidephenomenon,itisAmericaninoriginandsubstance.Sheclaimsthatnootherlanguageevenhas
awordforit.UnlikeDworkin,however,ArendtdoesnotlocatethespecificityofAmericanconstitutionalismintheprincipleofmoralrightsthatitarticulatesorina
legalisticunderstandingoftheseparationofpowers.Tohermind,theuniquespiritbehindtheAmericanrepublic'speculiarconceptionoflaw,andofconstitutionalism,
istheprincipleofactiveconsentinthesenseofactivesupportandcontinuingparticipationbythepeopleinmattersofpublicinterestandcommonconcern.The
people,moreover,areconceivednotas

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anundifferentiated,unifiedmasswithonewillandoneopinion(Rousseau)butasdulyconstitutedinapluralityoflocal,regional,andnationalbodiespolitic(thefederal
principleoftheseparationofpowers)withinwhichapluralityofdifferentpublicopinionscanbegivenvoice.Arendtarguesthattheauthorityandlegitimacyofthe
Americanconstitutionrestsontheprincipleofthepowerofthepeople:Powergrantedtotheauthoritiesandtogovernmentislimited,delegated,andrevocable.
Arendt'spointhereistoconnectcivildisobediencetothetraditionsofrepublicanpoliticalcultureunderlyingAmericanconstitutionalism:thetraditionofvoluntary
association,thepracticeofestablishingbondsandobligationsthroughmutualpromises,andthetraditionofprivatecitizenscomingtogetherandactinginconcert."Itis
mycontentionthatcivildisobedientsarenothingbutthelatestformofvoluntaryassociation,andthattheyarequiteintunewiththeoldesttraditionsofthecountry."
81

Consent,therighttodissent,andtheartofassociatingtoarticulateaminorityopinionandtherebydiminishthemoralpowerofthemajorityconstitutecivicvirtueina
modernrepublic.AndArendtrightlyseesinthemassdemonstrationsofthelate1960sanimportantexampleofthecontinuationofoldtraditions.Shealsoseesthat
organizedminorities,throughactsofcivildisobedience,canhaveastoundinginfluenceontheopinionofmajorities.Thispoliticalengagementintheheartofcivilsociety
thatiscivildisobedienceisthustheassociationalprincipleinaction.
Arendtneverprovidesuswithatheoryofcivilsocietyadequatetotheconceptionofcivildisobediencethatshedefendsinheressay.LikeotherneoAristotelian
communitarians,sheoperateswithatheoreticallyanachronisticconception.Nevertheless,whenconfrontedwiththephenomenonofcivildisobedienceintheUnited
States,sheisforcedtointroducesomeofthecoredimensionsoftheconceptofcivilsocietythatconflictwithheroveralltheoreticalframework.
82
Themoststriking
instanceisherreferencetotheLockeanmodelofthesocialcontract,theonebestsuitedtotheAmericanprerevolutionaryexperienceofcompacts,covenants,and
agreements.WhileArendthadreferredtotheLockeanmodelbefore,
83
herinterpretationinthisessayisquitenew.ShearguesthatLockeassumedthatcompacts
leadnottogovernmentbutto

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society(societas),avoluntaryassociationamongindividualmemberswhothencontractfortheirgovernmentoncetheyhavemutuallyboundthemselves.
84
Thistime,
however,sheinterpretsthe"horizontal"versionofthesocialcontractasonethatlimitsthepowerofeachindividualmemberbutleavesintactthepowerofsociety.
Thispowercannotreverttotheindividualaslongassocietylasts,butneithercanitbeappropriatedbythegovernmentintotothepowerthatthegovernmenthasis
limitedandheldatthepleasureofsociety.WhatisnewhereisthatArendtusesthehorizontalmodelofcompacting,ofactinginconcert,nottodescribethe
revolutionaryfoundingofnewbodiespoliticbuttoexplainthephenomenonofcivildisobedience,inwhichcollectiveactorsformvoluntaryassociationswithinthe
frameworkofsocialmovementsthatdonotaimatrevolutioninthesenseofreplacingtheexistingformsofpoliticalsocietyorevencreatingnewones.
Arendthasnotchangedherassessmentofmodernsocietyorthemodernpoliticalsystem,inAmericaorelsewhere.Americaisstillforherprimarilyamasssocietyin
whichconsentisentirelyfictitiousandrepresentativegovernmentisincrisis"partlybecauseithaslostinthecourseoftimeallinstitutionsthatpermittedthecitizens'
actualparticipation,andpartlybecauseitisnowgravelyaffectedbythediseasefromwhichthepartysystemsuffers:bureaucratizationandthetwoparties'tendencyto
representnobodyexceptthepartymachines."
85
Indeed,thestandpointfromwhichshecriticizesexistinginstitutionsisanexternal,idealizedmodelofdirect
democracy.Thenormsofdemocraticlegitimacyaretranscendentwithrespecttomodernconstitutionalpoliticalsystems.Hencetheambiguityofherentiredefenseof
civildisobedience.Ontheonehand,sheseemstoprovideconvincingargumentsforthenormalcyofcivildisobediencewhenitcomestodefendingthepolitical
participationofprivatecitizensincivilsocietyandexpandingtheirinfluenceoneconomicandpoliticalsocietyontheotherhand,onthebasisofheroveralltheoretical
framework,sheseemstoseethetraditionofvoluntaryassociationasapotentialsubstitutefor,ratherthanthesocietalpresuppositionof,therepresentativepolitical
institutionsofpoliticalpartiesandparliaments.Afterall,thetraditionofcompactingandassociatingtowhichshereferswas,asshearguedinOnRevolution,onein
which

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politicalinstitutionswerefirstfounded(thecolonialexperience)andthenrecreated(therevolutionaryexperience).ForArendt,theyconstitutedpoliticalspacesfor
directdemocraticparticipation:embryosforthefuturereorganizationofthepoliticalsystemawayfrompartiesandparliamentstowardsomesortofcouncilmodel.
Nevertheless,inheressayoncivildisobedience,Arendtdoesrediscoversomeofthecoredimensionsofmoderncivilsocietyvoluntaryassociationandsocial
movementswhileputtingherfingeronthetypeofextrainstitutionalpoliticalactionandcivicvirtuethatisspecifictoprivatecitizensofamoderndifferentiatedsociety.
Inthisessayatleast,shelocatestheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacynotinthepoliticalsystemorgovernmentbut,implicitlyatleast,incivilsocietyasdifferentiated
fromboth.Moreover,hervantagepointofdemocraticratherthanliberaltheoryallowshertoseeclearlythepoliticalcharacterofcivildisobedienceaswellasits
politicalfunction:Civildisobedienceforthesakeoffurtherdemocratizingcivilsociety,thepolity,andtheeconomyislegitimatepoliticalaction.Arendtwoulddefend
civildisobediencethataimsateitherthedefenseorassertionofminorityrightsorthedemocratizationofpoliticalsocietyand(quiteinconsistently)economic
institutions.
Whiletherecanbenolegaljustificationfortheviolationoflaw,Arendtarguesthatanicheforcivildisobedienceisconceivablewithintheinstitutionsofgovernment.It
isnotcoveredbyFirstAmendmentrightstofreespeech,sinceitinvolvespoliticalaction,butacrucialcomponentofcivildisobedience,oneatthecoreofAmerican
politicalculture,couldbearticulatedasaconstitutionalright,namely,therightofassociation(whichdoesnotexistintheAmericanBillofRights).This,sheconcludes,
wouldbeanamendmentwellworththetrouble.Forifthefreedomofassociation,alongwithcivildisobedience,isadangerousexpedienttoobviateastillmore
formidabledanger,sheargues,citingTocqueville,"itisbytheenjoymentofdangerousfreedomthattheAmericanslearntheartofrenderingthedangersoffreedom
lessformidable."
86
Itisthroughtheartofassociationthatpower(thepowerofthoseactinginconcertandformingapublicopinion)iscreatedanddispersed
throughoutcivilsociety.Or,toputitanotherway,what

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keepslimitedgovernmentlimitedisthewillingnessofcitizenstoassociate,formpublicopinions,actcollectivelyontheirownwithincivilsociety,andtherebyinfluence
government.Byimplication,althoughArendtneverquitespellsthisOut,
87
democraticlegitimacyinaconstitutionaldemocracywouldhavetofinditslocusnotonlyin
afederalmodelofthepolityinwhichauthorityflowsupwardsfromlocalpoliticalbodies,
88
butalsointhepublicopinionofprivate,voluntarilyassociatedcitizenswho
actcollectivelyandarticulatetheirviewsinthepublicspacesofcivilsocietythataredistinguishedfromthoseinpoliticalsociety.
ThisisthecoreofHabermas'sconceptionofthemodernpublicsphereandthebasisonwhichhehaselaboratedhisowntheoryofdemocraticlegitimacy.Habermas's
analysisofthemodernpublicsphereisinfactcomplementarytoArendt'sdiscussionoftheprinciplesofvoluntaryassociation.Itelaboratesupontheothercore
institutionofmoderncivilsocietythatiscentraltoanyunderstandingofthekindsofpoliticalactivityopentotheprivatecitizenwhoisnotaprofessionalpolitician.His
theoryofdemocraticlegitimacy,however,isanimportantstepbeyondArendt'stheoreticalframeworkinthatitsnormativeclaimstranscendthelimitsofaparticular
traditionorpoliticalculture(Arendt'sfocusonAmerica)andprovideprinciplesthatgiveaparticularpractice(thehabitofvoluntaryassociationandofpromising)a
normativeandobligatorycharacter.Itreintroducesacounterfactualnormativestandpointwithrespecttoexistinginstitutionsthatisneithertranscendentnor
anachronistic.Atthesametime,itseesthepublicspheresofcivilsocietynotasapotentialreplacementoralternative,butascomplementary,aprecondition,forthe
representativeanddemocraticinstitutionsofpoliticalsociety.Inthisway,HabermasavoidstheambiguitiesoftheArendtianapproach.
Inchapter8,wediscussedHabermas'sconceptionofthepublicsphereandtheoryofdemocraticlegitimacy.Hereweshallfocusontheirimplicationsforadefenseof
civildisobedienceondemocraticratherthanliberalgrounds.LikeRawlsandDworkin(whomhecites),Habermasassumesthatthemodernconstitutionalstateboth
requiresandiscapableofamoraljustification.He,too,proceedsfromthe"unusuallyhighclaimtolegitimacyofthemodernconstitutionalstate,"fromthefactthatthe
democratic

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constitutionalstate,withitslegitimatingconstitutionalprinciples,reachesbeyondtheirpositivelegalembodiment.
89
ForHabermas,however,thismoraljustification
liesnotintheprincipleofindividualrights,asitdoesforRawlsandespeciallyforDworkin,butintheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyaccordingtowhichonlythose
(constitutional)normscanbejustifiedthatexpressageneralizableinterestandthuscouldrelyontheconsideredagreementofallconcernedanagreementlinkedtoa
procedureofreasonedwillformation.
90
LikeArendt,althoughondifferentgrounds,hearguesthatthedemocraticconstitutionalstaterestsonaconditionaland
qualifiedadherencebyitscitizenstothelaw,becausedemocracyinstitutionalizes''thedistrusttowardafalliblereasonandthecorruptiblenatureofman."
Paradoxically,"itmustprotectandsustainthedistrustofinjusticethatappearsinlegalforms,althoughthatdistrustcannotassumeaninstitutionallysecuredform."
91

Butfallibilityrefersinthiscasenottothepossibilitythatamajoritymightviolateindividualrights(RawlsandDworkin)buttothepossibilitythattheinstitutionalized
majoritymightmakedecisionsinaninsufficientlydemocraticway,evenwhilerespectingprocedurallegality.Habermassituatescivildisobediencebetweenlegitimacy
andlegality.Theplebiscitarypressureofcivildisobedience,itsstatusasanunconventionalmeansforinfluencingtheformationofpoliticalwill,signalsthefactthatthe
democraticconstitutionalstateisnotreducibletoitslegalorder.Therearecounterfactualdemocraticprinciples,uponwhichourpoliticalinstitutionsneverthelessrest,
thatcanbeappealedtowhenthedemocraticcharacterofdecisionmakingthatsuperficiallyseemstorespecttheproceduralprinciplesofmajorityruleischallenged,
andthatcanjustifyactsofcivildisobedienceaimedatfurtherdemocratizingadecisionmakingprocess.
Thus,thefocusofHabermas'sanalysisofcivildisobedienceasapoliticsofinfluenceisitsrelationtothedemocraticprinciplesunderlyingconstitutionalismandthe
processthroughwhichsuchprinciplesarerealized.Insteadofassociatingcivildisobediencewiththeextremecaseofanunjustorderorevenaseriouscrisis,
Habermasassumesittobeanormalresponsetosituationsthatwillariseoverandoveragainbecause"therealizationofexactingconstitutionalprincipleswithuniversal
contentisalongterm

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processwhichhistoricallyhasbeenbynomeanslinear."
92
Indeed,hemaintainsthatcivildisobedienceisoftenthelastchancetocorrecterrorsintheprocessof
realizingdemocraticprinciplesortosetinmotioninnovationsfortheaveragecitizenwhoisnotendowedwithprivilegedopportunitiesforinfluenceinthepolitical
system.
93
LikeDworkin,Habermasremindsusofthefactthattheconstitutionalstatereckonswithahighdemandforrevision,asindicatedbytheproliferationinstitutionsfor
selfcorrection,fromthethreefoldreadingofparliamentarybillstotheprocessofjudicialreview.Thishighdemandforrevisioncomesintoplaywithregardnotonlyto
individualrightsbutalsototheregulativeprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacy.Itderivesfromthepreconditionsformajorityrule,whichincludebutgobeyondrespect
forindividualrights.Amongtheminimalprerequisitesthemajorityprinciplemustmeetifitistomaintainitslegitimatingpoweraretheavoidanceofpermanent
minoritiesandthereversibilityofitsdecisions.Norisitselfevidentwheretheproperlocusofdecisionmakingliesineverycase.Disputesovertheproperdistribution
ofsovereigntyamonglocal,regional,andcentraldeliberativebodiescananddoarise.
94
Sododisagreementsovertheprovinceoftheauthorityofthepoliticalsystem
visvisthatofcivilsociety.ClausOffehasarguedforareflexiveuseofmajorityruleinsuchsituations.
95
Thiswouldinvolveplacingtheobjects,modalities,and
limitsofthemajorityprincipleitselfatthediscretionofthemajoritytheprinciplewouldbeappliedreflexivelytoitself.Althoughthisreflexivityitselfmustbeplacedin
amajoritariandisposition,itmustbeguidedbythefollowingstandard:"Towhatextentdothedecisions,whichtheprocessesofmajorityrulemakepossibleunder
conditionsoflimitedresourcesoftimeandinformation,divergefromtheidealresultsofadiscursivelyachievedagreementorapresumptivelyjustcompromise?"
96
Whenchallengesarisethattouchontheinterestsandconcernsofallcitizens,Habermasstatesthatthecollectivityaswellasindividualcitizensmayassumethe"original
rightsofthesovereign"thedemocraticconstitutionalstatemustrely,inthelastinstance,onthisguardianoflegitimacy.
97
Collectiveactioninvolvingcivildisobedience
forthesakeofdemocratizationmust,however,be

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selflimiting:Theadoptionofextraordinarymeansmustbeappropriatetothesituation.Moreimportantthanameretacticalcommitmenttononviolence,however,isan
identificationwiththeconstitutionalprinciplesofademocraticrepublic.Civildisobedientsavoidanelitistattitudewhentheiractionisbasedontheconvictionthatacts
ofprotesthaveasymboliccharacterandappealtothecapacityforreasonandsenseofjusticeofthemajorityofthepopulation.
98
Thus,civildisobedienceoccursin
theframeworkofademocraticconstitutionalstatethatremainswhollyintact.Whilesuchastateisneutralwithrespecttothepersonalconvictionsofitscitizens,itis
notneutralwithrespecttotheintersubjectivelyrecognizedmoralfoundationsoflegality.Civildisobedienceisbasedonanappealtotheseprinciplesandnotonthe
absolutenatureoftheprivateconvictionsoftheindividual.Theselflimitationofsuchactionaswellasoftheresponsebypoliticalelitesisasignofthematurityofa
politicalculture.
99
Democratictheorythusarrivesatasimilarpointasliberaltheoryregardingthedefinition,nature,andfunctionofcivildisobedienceinaconstitutionaldemocracy.
Liberalsanddemocratsdisagree,though,onthekindsofreasonsthatcanjustifyactsofcivildisobedienceandontheactsthatfitthebill.Thelimitsofliberaland
radicaldemocratictheoryaresymmetric.Ontheirown,eachscreensoutonedimensionoftheutopiaofcivilsociety.Liberalsgrantthelegitimacyofillegalcollective
actiononlyforthedefenseorcreationofindividualrightsdemocratsfocusonthedefenseorexpansionofdemocracy.Aswehaveshown,theliberalideaofmoral
rightsagainstthestatepresupposesabroadermodelofcivilsocietyandofcitizenactionthanliberalsarewillingtorecognize,forthepublicandprivatespacessecured
byrightsarepoliticallyrelevantandthecollectiveactionthatexpandsanddefendsthemisdeeplypolitical.
Ontheotherside,theprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyalsohasextrainstitutionalmoralandpoliticalimplications.First,itpresupposesthatdemocratizationisalways
ontheagendaandthatactsofcivildisobedienceinthenameoffurtherdemocratizationofrepresentativedemocraciestaketheprincipleofrepresentationseriouslyand
arelegitimate.Democratizationinthiscontextmeanskeepingthechannelsofcommunicationandinfluencebetween

Page603
civilandpoliticalsocietyopen.Here,too,onemustpresupposeabroader,moredifferentiatedmodelofcivilsocietythaneitherArendtorHabermasoffers,for
democratsmustrecognizeandgrantwhattheideaofmoralrightssecures,whatliberalsliketocallnegativelibertyorindividualautonomyandthedignityofparticular
interests.Aswearguedinchapter8,thediscourseethicsthatgroundstheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyalsoimpliestheideaoffundamental,individualrights.It
presupposesautonomousindividualsequippedwithpostconventionalmoralcapacities.Whoelsecouldchallengethetaboosandlimitsthatareputupfordiscussion?
Whoelsecouldsaythatatraditionalorpastconsensusisnolongervalid?Whoelsecouldproposenewvaluesthatmightbeinstitutionalizedintopoliticalnormsor
basicrights?Ifparticipatorydemocracyisnottobetraditionalistorauthoritarian,itpresupposesbasicrightsandacorrespondinglydifferentiatedmodelofciviland
politicalsociety.
Twomoralprincipleslendlegitimacytotheproceduralprincipleofmajorityrulewithinthelegislativeprocess:theprinciplesofrightsandofdemocraticlegitimacy.
100

Thesearethetwonormativepolesofconstitutionalism.Thesituationoftheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacywithrespecttotheinstitutionalizedpublicspheresand
thepoliticalsystemisparalleltothatoftheideaofmoralrightswithrespecttothelegalsystem.Justasitisimpossibletoclaimatanypointintimethatallofourmoral
rightshavebeenguaranteedbylaw,soitisinconceivabletomaintainthatanygivensetofpoliticalarrangementshasfullyinstitutionalizedtheprincipleofdemocratic
legitimacy.Institutionalspacesforexpressingandformingpublicopinion,andmechanismsforitsinfluenceonlegislation,mustbeprovidedinanydemocraticsystem.
Yet,liketheideaofmoralrights,theprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacyretaintheirstatusascounterfactualnorms.Thismeansthatbothrightsanddemocracyinvolve
learningprocessesthatallowustothinkthatdemocraticinstitutionscanbecomemoredemocratic.
101
Civildisobedienceorientedtothefurtherdemocratizationofinstitutionswithinaconstitutionaldemocracyvindicatestheprinciplesofmajorityrule.Suchactionseeks
toinfluencemajorityopinionoutsidethelegislatures,withincivilsociety,andbringittobearuponthelegislativeprocess.Itpresupposesthatmajorityrule

Page604
mustbemeasurednotonlyagainstthestandardofindividualrightsbutalsoagainsttheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacy.Italsopresupposesthat,ultimately,the
principlesofrightsandofdemocraticlegitimacyhavetheirlocusfirstandlastinthepublicandprivatespacesofavitalcivilsociety.Civildisobedienceisthusthelitmus
testofbothdemocracyandofliberalism:ofliberalismbecauseitrevealsthepoliticaldimensionsofcivilsocietyandthenormalcyofsocialmovementsofdemocracy
becauseitimpliesrespectforrightsandforamoralstandpointthatispoliticallyrelevantoutsidethedemocraticconsensusandproceduresthathavebeen
institutionalized.Adifferentiated,pluralist,andmoderncivilsocietydemandsapoliticalculturematureenoughtoacceptthepromiseandtherisksofliberaland
democraticcitizenship.Ourhopeisthatwearemovinginthatdirection.

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NOTES
Preface
1.Theexception,ofcourse,isthepluralisttraditionofpoliticaltheory.Seetheintroductionforanassessmentofthisapproach.Recentworksindemocratictheory
includeDavidHeld,ModelsofDemocracy(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1987),RobertDahl,DemocracyandItsCritics(NewHaven:YaleUniversity
Press,1989),andGiovanniSartori,TheTheoryofDemocracyRevisited,2vols.(Chatham,NJ:ChathamHouse,1987).
2.Weareawareofthepitfallsoftryingtodefineatermthatisusedtodayinmanydifferentcontextsandthathasalongandstillevolvingconceptualhistory.
Moreover,webelievethatifonemusthaveadefinition,itwouldbebesttoshowitsdevelopmentthroughthestagesbywhichwehaveattainedit.(Inthetext,our
conceptofcivilsocietyisdevelopedthroughpoliticalhermeneutic,intellectualhistorical,andsystematicconsiderations.)Butwearealsoawareofthedangerofbeing
misunderstoodifwedonotprovideatleastaworkingdefinitioninthebeginning.See,forexample,A.Kuhlmann,"Weststlich.DerBegriff'civilsociety,'"
FrankfurterAllgemeine,January9,1991,wheretheauthorsomewhatartificiallycontraststheviewsoftheEastEuropeansJ.SzackiandM.Szabowiththoseof
the"Americansociologist"A.Arato.Theauthorcontendsthattheformerunderstand"civilsociety"intermsofjuridicalprotectionsoftheprivatespherethatare
inevitablydependentonstatelegislation,whilethelatterconstruesitintermsofextrapoliticalmovementsandformsofpressureonthestateitself.Actually,our
conceptionencompassesbothoftheselevels,andthedifferencesamongtheinterpretersinquestionhavetodoonlywiththeexistenceandroleinEastEuropeofa
civilsocietythatinourviewhasexistedmoreintheformofmovements,protomovements,andindependentinitiativesfrombelowthaninsettledinstitutionsprotected
byrightsandtheruleoflaw.Thedenialoftheroleofcivilsocietiesintheprocessculminatinginthetransitionsof1989reflects(andinsomecasesalsojustifies)some
veryrealoligarchictendenciesinthenewpoliticalsocieties.

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3.Fortheseconcepts,seeCorneliusCastoriadis,TheImaginaryInstitutionofSociety(Cambridge:MITPress,1986).
4.AndincreasinglyintheSouthseechapter1.Foradiscussionofthecurrentdebatesandtherelevanceoftheconceptofcivilsocietytothem,seeourintroduction.
Introduction
1.Ofcourse,KarlPolnyi'sGreatTransformation[1944](Boston:BeaconPress,1957),whichhasbeenamajortouchstoneforourwork,broughtthestate"back
in"inthemid1940s.ButseePeterEvansetal.,eds.,BringingtheStateBackIn(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985).Thefocusonthestate
has,however,occasionedanextremelyinterestingandimportantdebate(andnewresearch)aroundtherelationofwomenandthewelfarestate.Hereanew
dimensionhasbeencapturedthatwasignoredinthepast.SeesuchrecentworkasGretchenRitterandThedaSkocpol,"GenderandtheOriginsofModernSocial
PoliciesinBritainandtheUnitedStates,"ms.LindaGordon,"WhatDoesWelfareRegulate?,"andFrancesFoxPivenandRichardCloward,"WelfareDoesn'tShore
upTraditionalFamilyRoles:AReplytoLindaGordon,''bothinSocialResearch55,no.4(Winter1988):609648CynthiaEpstein,DeceptiveDistinctions:Sex,
GenderandtheSocialOrder(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1988)MimiAbramovitz,RegulatingtheLivesofWomen(Boston:SouthEndPress,1988)
NancyFraser,UnrulyPractices(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1989)andHelgaHernes,WelfareStateandWomanPower:EssaysonState
Feminism(Oslo:NorwegianUniversityPress,1987).
2.Seechapter1.
3.Thisdebatebeganinthemid1950sandreemergedintheaftermathoftheNewLeft.Forachronology,seeJohnF.Manley,"NeoPluralism:AClassAnalysisof
PluralismIandPluralismII,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview77,no.2(June1983):368383.Thelistofparticipantsinthisdebateislong.Letusmentionjusta
fewkeyfiguresandrepresentativeworksoneachside.ElitetheoristsincludeJosephSchumpeter,Capitalism,SocialismandDemocracy(NewYork:Harper&
Row,1942)S.M.Lipset,PoliticalMan(NewYork:Doubleday,1963)RobertDahl,Polyarchy(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1971)WilliamKornhauser,
ThePoliticsofMassSociety(NewYork:FreePress,1959)G.AlmondandS.Verba,TheCivicCulture(Boston:LittleBrown,1963).Participatorydemocrats
includePeterBachrach,TheTheoryofDemocraticElitism:ACritique(Boston:LittleBrown,1967)CarolePateman,ParticipationandDemocraticTheory
(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1970)SheldonWolin,PoliticsandVision(Boston:LittleBrown,1960).Foranoverviewofthedebate,see
QuentinSkinner,"TheEmpiricalTheoristsofDemocracyandTheirCritics:APlagueonBothTheirHouses,"PoliticalTheory1(1973):287306.
4.Thelistofparticipantsinthisdebateisalsotoolongtocitefully.Twoofthebestpresentationsof"rightsorientedliberalism"areJohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice
(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1971),andRonaldDworkin,

Page607
TakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1977).Fortheliberalconceptofneutrality,seeBruceAckerman,SocialJusticeintheLiberal
State(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1980),andCharlesLarmore,PatternsofMoralComplexity(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1987).Thebestandmostoriginal"neocommunitarian"work,predatingbutneverthelessinformingthedebate,isHannahArendt,OnRevolution(NewYork:
Penguin,1963)seealsoSheldonWolin,PoliticsandVision(Boston:LittleBrown,1960),andR.Unger,KnowledgeandPolitics(NewYork:Macmillan,
1975).ContemporaryepistemologicalcriticsofliberalismincludeAlisdairMacIntyre,AfterVirtue(SouthBend:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1984),and
MichaelSandel,LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982).CommunitariandemocratsincludeCharles
Taylor,Hegel(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975)andPhilosophicalPapers,vol.2:PhilosophyandtheHumanSciences(Cambridge,
England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985)MichaelWalzer,SpheresofJustice(NewYork:Basic,1983)andCarolePateman,TheProblemofPolitical
Obligation:ACritiqueofLiberalTheory(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985).AvolumethatbringstogetherbothsidesofthedebateisMichael
Sandel,ed.,LiberalismanditsCritics(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1984).
Thisdebatehasalsogivenstructuretosomeofthemostimportantcontroversieswithinfeministpoliticalandlegaltheory.Whiletherehasalwaysbeenadebate
betweenradical,liberal,andMarxist/socialistfeminists,todaythebattleisdrawnalonglinessimilartothosedepictedabove.Equalrightsorientedliberalfeminists
whoemphasizegenderneutralityarepittedagainstcommunitarianfeministsononesideanddeconstructionistfeministsontheother,bothofwhomemphasize
difference,contextuality,andthelimitsofrightsanalyses,denyingtheverypossibilityofneutralityanduniversalityineitherlaworpolitics.Fortwoexemplary
statementsoftheliberalfeministposition,seeWendyWilliams,"Equality'sRiddle:PregnancyandtheEqualTreatment/SpecialTreatmentDebate,"13N.Y.U.
Rev.LawandSocialChange325(198485),andSusanOkin,Justice,GenderandtheFamily(NewYork:BasicBooks,1989).CarolGilligan,Ina
DifferentVoice(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1982),istheclassicstatementofthecommunitarianfeministposition.Forthedeconstructionistapproach,
seeJoanScott,"DeconstructingEqualityversusDifference:OftheUsesofPoststructuralistTheoryforFeminism,"FeministStudies14,no.1(Spring1988):
3350.ForaneoMarxistapproachtotheproblem,seeCatherineMacKinnon,TowardAFeministTheoryoftheState(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1989).
5.SeeMichelCrozieretal.,eds.,TheCrisisofDemocracy(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1975),andClausOffe,ContradictionsoftheWelfareState
(Cambridge:MITPress,1984).
6.JosephSchumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism,andDemocracy(NewYork:Harper&Row,1942),232302.
7.Ibid.,269.

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8.Themodelofthepoliticalpartyisthecatchallparty.Fortheconcept,seeOttoKirchheimer,"TheTransformationoftheWesternEuropeanPartySystem,"in
FredericS.BurinandKurtL.Shell,eds.,Politics,Law,andSocialChange:SelectedEssaysofOttoKirchheimer(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,
1969),346371.Someelitetheoristswhoarealsopluralistsincludeinterestgroupsasactorsinthepoliticalsystem(seeDahl,Polyarchy).However,theideathat
interestsemergespontaneouslyandautonomouslyincivilsocietyandarethenaggregatedbypoliticalpartieshasbeencriticizednotonlybyMarxistsbutalsoby
theoristsofneocorporatism.Foranexcellentoverviewofthesecriticisms,seeSuzanneBerger,OrganizingInterestsinWesternEurope(Cambridge,England:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1981),123.
9.Onthismodel,societalinterestscannotberepresented.Neitherpublicopinionnorrawindividualinterestsfindrepresentationinthepoliticalsysteminstead,
interestsareaggregatedandgiventheirpoliticalsaliencebyelites.
10.AccordingtoSchumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism,andDemocracy,292293,noteverythinginademocracyissubjecttothedemocraticmethod.Forexample,
judges,federalagencies,andbureaucraciesarebeyondthereachofthismethodbutarenottherebyantidemocratic.Weagreewiththisargumentbutwouldinsistthat
justhowfarorinwhichdomainsdemocraticprinciplesoughttoextendisnotsomethingthatexpertscandecideitis,rather,anormativeandempiricalquestionthat
mustbedecidedupondemocratically,asitwere.(WeshouldnotethatSchumpeter'spointwasaimedagainst"totalitarian"regimes,whichsooverextendthereachof
thepoliticalalthoughhardlythatofdemocracythattheyunderminetheintegrityandefficiencyofpoliticaldecisionmaking.)
11.Ibid.,289295.
12.Justwhatcountsastoomuchparticipationisamatterofdebate.Whiletheelitedemocracyschoolpartiallybuysintothisideaandextolsamixtureofactivismand
apathy(seeAlmondandVerba,TheCivicCulture,andLipset,PoliticalMan),alongwithcivilprivatism,Schumpeterwentthefurthestinthisdirection.Inarguing
againsttheimperativemandate,Schumpeterinsiststhatpeopleshouldacceptthedivisionoflaborbetweenleadersandfollowers,giveupontheideaofinstructing
delegates,andevenceasefrombombardingtheirrepresentativeswithlettersandtelegrams!
13.SeeBachrach,TheoryofDemocraticElitism.
14.Astheoristsofneocorporatismhaveshown,suchpolitiesoftenhavepowerfulsemipublicorganizationsthatarehierarchicallyorganized,engageinbehindthe
scenesdealswithoneanotherandwiththestate,arenotinternallydemocratic,anddonotinteractaccordingtoprinciplesofdemocraticprocedure.Seetheessaysin
P.SchmitterandG.Lehmbruch,eds.,TrendstowardCorporatistIntermediation(London:SagePublications,1979).
15.JrgenHabermas,"LegitimationProblemsintheModernState,"inCommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety(Boston:BeaconPress,1979),186187.
16.Bachrach,TheoryofDemocraticElitism.

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17.Thatis,itlosesastandardwithwhichtojudgewhetherconsent,procedures,andsoonarewhattheyclaimtobe.SeePhillippeC.Schmitter,"DemocraticTheory
andNeocorporatistPractice,"SocialResearch50,no.4(Winter1983):885891.
18.SeeArendt,OnRevolution,andWolin,PoliticsandVision.SeealsoBenjaminBarber,StrongDemocracy(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984).
19.Barber,StrongDemocracy.
20.ThisisnottrueofPateman,ParticipationandDemocraticTheory.
21.ItshouldnotbeforgottenthatclassicaldemocratictheoryrestedonanundifferentiatedconceptionofSittlichkeit,thatis,onanethicallysuperiorconsensus
regardingthegoodtowhichallmustadhereiftheychoosenottoleave.Inamodernworldcharacterizedbyvaluepluralismandthewarofgods,suchaconceptionis
anachronistic.
22.Boththeeliteandtheparticipatorymodelmakethemistakeofcollapsingtheprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyintoorganizationalprinciples.Thefirstdissolves
normativeproceduralismintoproceduresforwinningpower,whilethesecondtriestodeduceorganizationalmodelsfromthedemocraticprincipleoflegitimacy.See
chapter8foradiscussionofthisproblem.SeealsoHabermas,"LegitimationProblems,"186187.
23.Inaway,thisdebateisaresponsetotheutilitariandimensionsoftheeliteandpluralistmodelsofdemocracy.RawlsandDworkinbothchallengeutilitarianism,
arguingthat,withoutaprincipledconceptionofjusticeoratheoryofrights,theutilitarianelitepluralistmodelofdemocracycannotclaimlegitimacy.The
communitarians,ofcourse,challengethemodelintoto,butthefocusoftheireffortsislesstheutilitarianismofthedemocraticelitiststhantherightsfocusof
contemporaryliberalism.
24.Seenote4.
25.Ibid.
26.Whatisnewherevisvistheearlytraditionofliberalism(orelitepluralism,forthatmatter)isthatpropertyisnolongerplacedattheheartoftheconceptionof
rightsitisonerightamongmany,butopento"balancing."RawlsandDworkinare,ofcourse,strongdefendersofthewelfarestate.
27.Therightsthesisispredicatedonthefollowingassumptions:(1)thereisnoauthorityotherthanhumanreasonforjudgingmoralclaims(2)allindividualsmustbe
seenasequalpartnersinthemoraldialoguewhenitcomestoassertinganddefendingrightsclaimsmoralreasonshavetobegiven(3)anytradition,prerogative,or
claimisopentocritique(4)thevaluesthatindividualsdefend,includingrights,arevalidbecausetheycanbearguedforvisvisothermoralsystems.Allvaluesare
valuesforindividuals.Ifsomethingisvaluableforacommunity,itmustbeshowntobeavaluefortheindividualaswell.SeeJanosKis,L'galedignit.Essaisurles
fondementsdesdroitsdel'homme(Paris:Seuil,1989).
28.Hencethepriorityoftherightorjusticeoverthegood.

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29.Thatis,theallegedanthropologicalpremiseoftherightsthesisisoneofisolated,selfsufficient,atomizedindividualsoutsidesociety,fullyendowedwith
instrumentalreasonandautonomy.Theseselvesareindependentoftheirendsandsocialcontext.Such"unencumbered"selvesaredeemedtobetheoriginarylocusof
freedomofchoiceregardingone'sends,formsoflife,projects,etc.Sandel,Taylor,andWalzerallcriticizetheseepistemologicalassumptionsallegedlyunderlying
rightsorientedliberalism.AmyGutman,"CommunitarianCriticsofLiberalism,"PhilosophyandPublicAffairs14,no.4(1985):308322,rejectsthethesisas
fallacious.
30.Thatis,CharlesTaylor,MichaelWalzer,andBenjaminBarber.
31.Sincethe1970s.Fortheleftcritiqueofthewelfarestate,seeOffe,Contradictions,chapters1and6.
32.Foradiscussionofvariousdefensesandcriticismsofthewelfarestate,seeOffe,Contradictions,35206,252302.Hegivesadefinitiononpage194.
33.Ibid.,147.
34.T.H.Marshall,Class,CitizenshipandSocialDevelopment(NewYork:Doubleday,1964).
35.Offe,Contradictions,149154.
36.Investorswillpostponeinvestmentintheexpectationofspecialtaxincentives,orinthehopethattheburdensofcertainregulationswillbelifted.AsClausOffehas
convincinglyargued,whetherornotthereareotherreasonsforthefailuretoinvest,suchastheinherentcrisistendenciesofthecapitalisteconomy,including
overaccumulation,thebusinesscycle,oruncontrolledtechnologicalchange(noneofwhichhasanythingtodowiththewelfarestate),thepointisthatprivateinvestors
havethepowertodefinereality,andhencetheirperceptionscreatethatreality.Whatevertheyperceiveasanintolerableburdenisanintolerableburdenthatwillin
factleadtoadecliningpropensitytoinvest.SeeOffe,Contradictions,151.
37.SeeespeciallyCrozieretal.,eds.,TheCrisisofDemocracy.
38.Huntington,"TheUnitedStates,"inCrozieretal.,eds.,TheCrisisofDemocracy,73.
39.SeeJamesO'Connor,TheFiscalCrisisoftheState(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1973)Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,PartIIandOffe,
Contradictions,3564.
40.Forthereasonsforthisclaim,seeOffe,Contradictions,6776.
41.ClausOffe,DisorganizedCapitalism(Cambridge:MITPress,1985),84.
42.Thisincludesthefamilywithincivilsociety.SeeourdiscussionofHegelinchapter2.
43.Thesediscussionshave,inturn,beenhighlyinstructiveforthedevelopmentofourconception.
44.Seenote8.
45.Althoughtheydonotusetheterm,pluralistsincludevoluntaryassociations,interestgroups,afreepress,andbasicrightswithinthesocietalrealmthatis

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distinctfromtheeconomy.ThemostsophisticatedthreepartmodeltobefoundinpluralisttheoryisthatofTalcottParsons(seechapter3).
46.SeeKornhauser,ThePoliticsofMassSociety.
47.ThisisverymuchcontrarytothespiritofAlexisdeTocqueville,whomthepluralistsfrequentlyciteasoneoftheirmostimportantforerunners.
48.Itisnotamatterofconcernwhetherthenuclearfamilyispatriarchalorwhetherinterestgroupsareinfacthighlybureaucratizedorhierarchicallyorganized.
49.Forananalysisofthesenorms,seechapter8.
50.Inthissense,wedonotagreewithNorbertoBobbio,whoseekstoaddthedemocratizationofcivilsocietytoelitedemocraticstructuresthathetakestobegiven
andunchangeable.Weshalltrytoshowthataninevitablydefensivestrategyofdemocratizingonlycivilsocietymustfailandthatcomplementarystrategiesof
democratizingstate,economy,andcivilsociety,albeittodifferentextents,arepossible.Indeed,thedemocratizationofcivilsocietywouldinitselfopenupthepolitical
terrain.Elitedemocracy,conversely,musteithersuppressthedemocratizingtendenciesofcivilsocietyorbecomecreativelyresponsivetothemandhencechange
itself.SeeNorbertoBobbio,TheFutureofDemocracy(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1987),andourtreatmentofBobbioinchapter3.
51.DespitethedifferencesbetweenelitetheoristslikeSchumpeterandpluralistslikeDahl(whodonotseetheexerciseofinfluencebyinterestgroupsonpolitical
partiesorcongressionalrepresentativesasathreattothedivisionoflaborbetweencitizensandpoliticians),theyallrecognizetheimportancetosmoothfunctioningof
aconsensusregardingthebasicproceduresofthepoliticalsystem.SeealsoDahl,DemocracyandItsCritics,221.
52.Seechapter9.
53.Wediscussthisprobleminchapter8withrespecttotherelationbetweenmoralautonomyandpoliticalnorms,andinchapter11withrespecttothequestionof
civildisobedienceina"nearlyjust,nearlydemocratic"polity.
54.NeitherHobbesnorLockepresupposedtheideaofneutrality,buttheycertainlybasedtheirtheoriesonamethodologicalandontologicalindividualism.Theorists
suchasRawlsandAckerman,ontheotherhand,embracetheprincipleofneutrality,aswellasaversionofmethodologicalindividualism,butdonotpresupposean
individualistontology.
55.Seechapter8.
56.Seechapter8.Itexcludesonlythoseneedinterpretationsandformsoflifethatareincompatiblewiththemetanormsofsymmetricreciprocitythatis,formsof
lifethatdenyequalconcernandrespecttoothers,thatsilence,dominate,denigrate,orotherwisetreatpeopleasmeremeans.
57.Wediscussthispointindetailinchapter8,butwearenotaloneinarguingthatonecandefendtherightsthesiswithoutpresupposingthetheoryofpossessive
individualismoraprivate,individualprocessofuniversalization.Two

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defensesofaliberaltheoryofneutrality,predicatedonadialogicalfoundationforrightsandanonconsequentialistconceptionofneutrality,haverecentlybeen
proposed.Whilewedonotacceptthekindsofpriorconstraintsthesetheoriesseektoimposeondialogueinordertosecureneutrality,whatisofinterestisthat
bothrestontheideaofcommunicativeinteractionastheheartofatheoryofpoliticaljusticeorrights.SeeAckerman,SocialJusticeintheLiberalState,and
Larmore,PatternsofMoralComplexity.
58.Thisisreallyanextremelibertarianratherthanaliberalview.SeeRobertNozick,Anarchy,StateandUtopia(NewYork:BasicBooks,1974).
59.Seechapter8foradifferentconceptionofautonomy.
60.SeeDanielBell,TheCulturalContradictionsofCapitalism(NewYork:BasicBooks,1976).Bellisnot,strictlyspeaking,aneoconservative,sincehedefends
liberaldemocracyaswellassocialismintherealmoftheeconomy.Foranoverviewofneoconservativeculturalassumptions,seePeterSteinfels,TheNeo
Conservatives(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1979).
61.Foranargumentinfavorofresacralizingthepolitical,seeEdwardShils,Tradition(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1981).Forargumentsbewailingour
hedonistcultureandadvocatingarevivedfamilylife,seeChristopherLasch,TheCultureofNarcissism(NewYork:Norton,1979)andHaveninaHeartless
World(NewYork:BasicBooks,1977).Forcriticismsofthemodernistcultureofcritique,seeBell,CulturalContradictionsofCapitalism,andAlvinGouldner,
TheFutureofIntellectualsandtheRiseoftheNewClass(NewYork:Seabury,1979).
62.Aseriesofbookson"mediatingstructures"sponsoredbytheAmericanEnterpriseInstituteoffersacaseinpoint.SeeJohnNeuhausandPeterBerger,To
EmpowerPeopleTheRoleofMediatingStructuresinPublicPolicy(Washington:AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,1978),MichaelNovak,ed.,Democracyand
MediatingStructures(Washington:AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,1990),andNathanGlazer,TheLimitsofSocialPolicy(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,
1988).Foranexcellentdiscussionoftheneoconservativepositionexpressedintheseworks,seeRobertDevigne,"RecastingConservatism,"unpublisheddoctoral
dissertation,ColumbiaUniversity,1990.
63.Surelynotallofthem.Wefailtoseehowsocialsecurity,healthinsurance,jobtrainingprogramsfortheunemployed,unemploymentinsurance,andfamily
supportssuchasdaycareorparentalleavecreatedependencyratherthanautonomy,eveniftheparticularadministrativerequirementsforsuchprogramsasAFDC
(suchasthemaninthehouserule)docreatedependencyandarehumiliating.Buttheseareempiricalquestions.Thetheoreticalissuebehindsuchquestionsisthe
extenttowhichsocialservicesandsocialsupportsaresymbolicallyconstitutedaswelfarefor"failures"orassupportsforallmembersofthecommunity.
64.Thispointcanalsobemadeagainstrecentattemptstofashionapoliticsoutoftheoriesofpostmodernism."Postmodernism"referstotheworkofFrenchthinkers
suchasJacquesDerrida,JacquesLacan,andJeanFranoisLyotard.For

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anexcellentoverview,seePeterDewes,LogicsofDisintegration(London:Verso,1987).yForoneattempttodevelopapoliticsoutofthisgeneralapproach,
seeChantalMouffeandErnestoLaclau,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy:TowardaRadicalDemocraticPolitics(London:Verso,1985).
Postmodernismrestsonafullymodernlifeworldandisanythingbuttraditionalist.Moreover,thecriticalinvestigationsofmodernist"identitary"logicandthe
dualismsofthephilosophyofthesubjectunderlyingitareextremelyinsightful(althoughcriticaltheoristsmadesimilarinvestigationsmanyyearsbefore
postmodernismbecamechic).However,thepoliticalapplicationsofthisorientationarenotverysatisfying,primarilybecausetheytendtofavoronesideofthe
dualismsagainsttheother.Hence,thedefenseofdifferenceagainstequality,particularityagainstuniversality,responsibilityagainstrights,relatednessagainst
autonomy,andconcretethinkingagainstabstractreflection.Inourview,thistendstothrowoutthebabywiththebathwater.Thetask,rather,istoformulatethe
secondsetofprinciplesinwaysthatdonoteliminateorestablishhierarchiesfordifference,plurality,orparticularity.Forexample,weoughttotrytoconceiveof
equalitywithoutinsistingonsameness,universalitywithoutannihilatingmultiplicity,autonomyandrightsonthebasisofaphilosophyofcommunicativeinteraction
ratherthanatomisticindividualism.Moreover,theculturalprinciplesofmodernityarenotinthemselvesresponsiblefortheironesidedapplicationorinterpretation.
Alloftheseprinciplesareopentonewinterpretations.Buttotakethesideofdifference,particularity,andsituatednesspersewouldleaveonewithoutthe
theoreticaltoolsnecessarytoexplainwhyoneoughttotolerate,recognize,orcommunicatewithdifferenceortheother.
65.Foradevelopmentofthisconception,seechapter9.
Chapter1
1.Evenifinanessayistic,notexplicitlytheoreticalstyle.See,inparticular,AdamMichnik,"ANewEvolutionism,"inLettersfromPrisonandOtherEssays
(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985).
2.Thelatterareinprinciplealsopotentiallyunlimitedbecauseofthedramaticinternaldemocratizationoftherulingparty.
3.Michnik,LettersfromPrison,86,88,95.
4.A.Arato,"TheDemocraticTheoryofthePolishOpposition:NormativeIntentionsandStrategicAmbiguities,"WorkingPapersoftheHelenKelloggInstitute
(NotreDame,1984).
5.Michnik,LettersfromPrison,111,124.
6.Ibid.,77.
7.K.Wojcicki,"TheReconstructionofSociety,"Telos,no.47(Spring1981):98104.
8."NottoLuretheWolvesoutoftheWoods:AnInterviewwithJacekKuron,"Telos,no.47(Spring1981):9397.

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9.Thisisdonecriticallybysome,enthusiasticallybyothers.Touraine'sdistinctionbetweenasocialmovement(unified)andamovementforthereconstructionof
(pluralistic)societyhelpstodepicttheambiguityinvolved.SeeA.Touraineetal.,Solidarity.Poland19801981(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1983).
10.Compare,forexample,Michnik,LettersfromPrison,8990,129,and158.
11.SeetheinterviewwithJacekKuroncitedinnote8.
12.Michnik,LettersfromPrison,146147.
13.ForextensiveanalysesoftheproblemsofreconstructingcivilsocietyinthefirstSolidarityperiod,19801981,seeA.Arato"CivilSocietyagainsttheState:
Poland19801981,"Telos,no.47(Spring1981):2347,and"Empirevs.CivilSociety:Poland19811982,"Telos,no.50(Winter19811982):1948.
14.Michnik,LettersfromPrison,81.
15.Ibid.,57,79.
16.TheleadershipofSolidarityenterednegotiationswiththegoalofrelegalizingtheunionmovement.Verymuchinthespiritofthecivilsocietyorientedstrategyof
August1980,itwantedtoavoidallpowersharingarrangementsthatmightleadtoresponsibilitywithoutgenuinepower.ThatSolidarityshouldacceptonethirdofthe
seatsinthelowerhouse,tobefilledbymeansofacontrolledelection,wastheregime'spriceforlegalizingtheunion,whiletheformulaofafreelyelectedupper
chamberwasthecompromisearoundwhichtheopponentsagreed.Theactualresultswerenotanticipatedbyanyoftheparticipants.Amongotherthings,theyimplied
ashiftofSolidarity'sstrategyandpartofitsidentitytowardpoliticalsociety.
17.AmongthemostrelevantauthorsareClaudeLefort,AndrGorz,AlainTouraine,JacquesJuilliard,PierreRosanvallon,andPatrickViveret.Theyareall
intellectualsforwhom1968wasanimportantturningpointinLeftpolitics,fromwhichtheydrewdemocraticandliberalratherthanauthoritarianconsequences.To
variousextents,theywereassociatedwiththeCFDTtradeunionandtheRocardianwingoftheSocialistpartyofthe1970s.Thenotparticularlyfortunateterm
"secondLeft"hasbeenappliedtothistrendbyitsadvocates,whiletheiropponentsreferredtothemattimesasthe"AmericanLeft,"presumablybecauseoftheir
emphasisonthenewsocialmovementsandoncivilsociety.ForahistoryoftheCFDT,seeHervHamonandPatrickRotman,Ladeuximegauche(Paris:Editions
Ramsay,1982).
18.Itmaybeworthaseparatestudytodeterminewhy.Wewouldstressthecontinuedimportanceinthe1970sofanunreconstructedCommunistpartyandthe
generalpresenceofastatistJacobinpoliticalcultureasdistinguishingFrancefromotherWesternEuropeancountries.Obviously,thestruggleovertheheritageofMay
1968alsoplayedanimportantrole,asdidtheeffortsoftheSocialistpartytodefineitselfagainstthedominantlefttraditioninFrance.
19.PierreRosanvallonandPatrickViveret,Pourunenouvelleculturepolitique(Paris:Seuil,1977),2224.

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20.Ibid.,7,129.Thepoint,firstarguedbyTocqueville,wastakenupbypluralistpoliticaltheoryinthe1960stoaccountforFrenchexceptionalismandtheexistence
ofradicalmovementsinFrance.
21.Ibid.,112.
22.PierreRosanvallon,Lacrisedel'tatprovidence,revisededition(Paris:Seuil,1981),117.
23.RosanvallonandViveret,Pourunenouvelleculturepolitique,113ff.
24.Ibid.,103,129.
25.Ibid.,129130.
26.Ibid.,9798.
27.Ibid.,112seealsoClaudeLefort,"PoliticsandHumanRights,"inThePoliticalFormsofModernSociety(Cambridge:MITPress,1986),266.
28.Lefort,"PoliticsandHumanRights."
29.Rosanvallon,Lacrisedel'tatprovidence,120121,136.
30.SeeAndrGorz,FarewelltotheWorkingClass(Boston:SouthEndPress,1982).
31.Seechapter9.
32.ClausOffeandVolkerGransow,"PoliticalCultureandSocialDemocraticAdministration,"inOffe,ContradictionsoftheWelfareState(Cambridge:MIT
Press,1984).
33.Inparticular,JamesO'Connor,JrgenHabermas,andClausOffe.
34.MichelCrozieretal.,eds.,TheCrisisofDemocracy(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1975).
35.SeeOffe,Contradictions,chapters2,6,and8
36.ClausOffe,"TheNewSocialMovements:ChallengingtheBoundariesofInstitutionalPolitics,"SocialResearch52,no.4(1985):819820.
37.Offe,Contradictions,289290.
38.Ibid.,250.
39.Offe,"TheNewSocialMovements,"820.
40.Offe,Contradictions,182183.ThisargumentisolderthantheothertwoalreadyquotedandpreservessomethingofthedemocraticstatismofOffe'searlier
position.Thestateisregardedhereasdemocratictotheextentthatitisbasedonuniversalsuffrageand,curiouslyenough,liberaldemocraticinstitutionssomehow
makeitlessdemocratic.ThispositionisidenticaltothatofCarlSchmitt.AnotherversionofOffe'sargumentthatmakesliberaldemocracythe"bridge"betweencitizen
andstatedoesnothavethisimplication.SeeContradictions,163ff.
41.Thisconflictcouldinprincipleberesolved,assomedistinctlyantidemocraticliberalsthink,byreinforcingtheelitistsideofelitedemocracytoproducea
"restorationofauthority."Givenexistingdemocraticstandardsoflegitimation,however,itisnotatallclearthatsuchasolutionispossiblewithoutthe

Page616
introductionofdictatorshipscapableofeliminating,foratime,anexcessofparliamentaryandextraparliamentarydemands.
42.ClausOffe,DisorganizedCapitalism(Cambridge:MITPress,1985),224226.
43.ThisisrepeatedlyassertedbyOffehimselfsee,e.g.,Contradictions,250.
44.Seechapters9and10.Webelievethatthesignificantoverlapbetweenthecategoriesoflifeworldandcivilsocietysuppliesthekeytothisproblem,especiallyina
threepartmodelofstateeconomycivilsociety.
45.Offe,Contradictions,246.
46.SeeOffe,DisorganizedCapitalism,chap.9.
47.GuillermoO'DonnellandPhilippeSchmitter,eds.,TransitionsfromAuthoritarianRule,4volumes(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins,1986).
48.O'DonnellandSchmitter,''TentativeConclusionsaboutUncertainDemocracies,"inTransitions,vol.4,48ff.
49.Schmitter,"AnIntroductiontoSouthernEuropeanTransitionsfromAuthoritarianRule,"inTransitions,vol.1,67.
50.AlfredStepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics:BrazilandtheSouthernCone(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988),34.
51.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"4952.
52.Ibid.,51,53.
53.Ibid.,48.
54.Schmitter,"IntroductiontoSouthernEuropeanTransitions,"67G.Pasquino,"TheDemiseoftheFirstFascistRegimeandItaly'sTransitiontoDemocracy:
19431948,"andN.Diamandouros,"RegimeChangeandtheProspectsforDemocracyinGreece:19741983,"inTransitions,vol.1,46,58,and154M.A.
Garreton,"ThePoliticalEvolutionoftheChileanMilitaryRegimeandProblemsoftheTransitiontoDemocracy"inTransitions,vol.2,116117O'Donnelland
Schmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"2122.TheSouthernEuropeanexamplesdonot,ofcourse,fitthemodelofbureaucraticauthoritarianismdevelopedby
O'Donnell.
55.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"55.
56.F.Weffort,"WhyDemocracy?,"inAlfredStepan,ed.,DemocratizingBrazil(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1989),349.
57.Thispointisrelevanttotheelitistauthoritariandreamsof"Northern"neoconservativesaswell,manyofwhomwerestrongsupportersofthebureaucratic
authoritarianliberaldictatorshipsofthe"South,"as,forexample,inChile.
58.G.O'Donnell,"TensionsintheBureaucraticAuthoritarianStateandtheProblemofDemocracy,"inD.Collier,ed.,TheNewAuthoritarianisminLatin
America(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1979),313ff.,andF.H.Cardoso,"AssociatedDependentDevelopmentandDemocraticTheory,"inStepan,ed.,
DemocratizingBrazil,312ff.

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59.O'Donnell,"TensionsintheBureaucraticAuthoritarianState,"317.
60.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"48.
61.Diamandouros,"RegimeChangeandProspectsforDemocracyinGreece,"154.Again,theGreekcaseinvolvesasomewhatdifferenttypeofregime.
62.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"15.
63.Inthesamesentence,O'DonnellandSchmitterarguethat"therelativeabsenceofthisupsurgereducesthelikelihoodofcoupinducedregression"and"where
'poweriswiththepeople'or'peopleareinthestreets'thepromotersofsuchcoupsarelikelytohesitatebeforetheprospectofprovokingcivilwar"("Tentative
Conclusions,"55).
64.O'Donnell,"TensionsintheBureaucraticAuthoritarianState,"287ff.Inthisessay,O'Donnellcallsonlytheprivatesphere"civilsociety,"usinganearlierMarxian
terminologythathesoonabandoned.Theanalysisitself,stressingmediationsasthevoiceofanotherwisesilentcivilsociety,alreadybreakswiththeMarxian
conceptualizationofthewholeproblem,turninginanimplicitlyHegeliandirection.
65.Cardoso,"OntheCharacterizationofAuthoritarianRegimesinLatinAmerica,"inCollier,ed.,TheNewAuthoritarianism,37,4344.
66.O'Donnell,"TensionsintheBureaucraticAuthoritarianState,"317.
67.Weffort,"WhyDemocracy?,"329.
68.Cardoso,"AssociatedDependentDevelopmentandDemocraticTheory,"319.Herightlycallsthisareturntoadifferentconception,althoughhemisleadingly
equates"aLatinconceptionofcivilsociety"withpoliticalsociety.
69.Ibid.,313314,andStepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics,5.
70.Stepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics.
71.ThispointwasmadebyJuanCorradiinalecturetotheDemocracySeminarattheGraduateFacultyoftheNewSchoolforSocialResearchinthespringof
1987.
72.Stepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics,35.
73.Comparepages5and6ofStepan'sbook.Bothasatargetofdemocratizationandasanagentforpushingthisprocessforward,civilsocietyisindispensableina
widerviewthatStepanhimselfelsewherepresupposes.Seehis"PathsTowardRedemocratization:TheoreticalandComparativeConsiderations,"inO'Donnelland
Schmitter,eds.,Transitions,vol.3,7879.ComparealsopagesixandxiintheintroductiontoDemocratizingBrazil.
74.B.Lamounier,"AuthoritarianBrazilRevisited:TheImpactofElectionsontheAbertura,"inStepan,ed.,DemocratizingBrazil,55.
75.Stepan,"PathsTowardRedemocratization,"7981O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"3739.
76.Cardoso,"AssociatedDependentDevelopment,"45ff.Lamounier,"AuthoritarianBrazilRevisited,"63.

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77.Stepan,"StatePowerandtheStrengthofCivilSocietyintheSouthernConeofLatinAmerica,"inPeterEvansetal.,eds.,BringingtheStateBackIn
(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985).
78.Cardoso,"AssociatedDependentDevelopment,"319320.AllinterpretersoftheGermanGreenshavenoticedthesameproblem.Seechapter10.
79.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"37ff.
80.Ibid.,42.
81.Ibid.,42,47.
82.Ibid.,5758.
83.Lamounier,"AuthoritarianBrazilRevisited,"55.
84.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"5859.
85.Ibid.,62.
86.Lamounier,"AuthoritarianBrazilRevisited,"69,71.
87.Ibid.,6263.
88.Ibid.,58.
89.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"26,5556.
90.Cf.A.HirschmanShiftingInvolvements(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1982).
91.SeeGarreton,"ThePoliticalEvolutionoftheChileanMilitaryRegime"also,C.G.Gillespie,"Uruguay'sTransitionfromCollegialMilitaryTechnocraticRule,"in
Transitions,vol.2.
92.O'Donnell,"IntroductiontotheLatinAmericanCases,"inTransitions,vol.3,1517.
93.Ibid.
94.NorbertLechner,"Delarvolutionlademocratie(ledbatintellectuelenAmriqueduSud),"Esprit(July1986):113RobertBarros"TheLeftand
Democracy:RecentDebatesinLatinAmerica,"Telos(Summer1986):4970JosCasanova,"NeverAgain,"unpublishedms.
95.Weffort,"WhyDemocracy?,"332333,335337.
96.Ibid.,345.
97.Cardoso,"AssociatedDependentDevelopment,"323324.
98.Ibid.,319.
99.Ibid.,321.
100.Wearereferringheretothedevelopmentofformsofpoliticalandeconomicsocietythatareopentotheinfluenceofcivilsociety.Formanyyears,ourownideas
onthistopichavebeenclosetothemodelworkedoutbyCardoso.See"SocialMovements,CivilSocietyandtheProblemofSovereignty,"PraxisInternational4,
no.5(October1985):266283"CivilSocietyandSocialTheory,"ThesisEleven,no.21(1988):4064"PoliticsandtheReconstructionofCivil

Page619
Society,"inAxelHonnethetal.,eds.ZwischenbetrachtungenimProzessderAujklrung.JrgenHabermaszum60.Geburtstag(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,
1989).Forourpresentconception,seechapters9and10.
101.J.Staniszkis,"OnSomeContradictionsofSocialistSociety,"SovietStudies(April1979):184186Poland'sSelflimitingRevolution(Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress,1984),3667,144145.SeealsothepartiallyoverlappingcriticismbyA.Arato,"TheDemocraticTheoryofthePolishOpposition:Normative
IntentionsandStrategicAmbiguities,"WorkingPapersoftheHelenKelloggInstitute(NotreDame,1984),whichaimsatthereconstructionnot,asStaniszkis,
theabandonmentofthetheoryofcivilsociety.
102.TheSovietUnionwastheultimateguarantoroftheavailabilityofkeymaterialresourcesintheperiphery,despitetheirnoneconomic(irrationalandwasteful)
utilization.Thisguaranteewasmutuallyharmful.Forthebasicmodel,seeJ.Kornai,ContradictionsandDilemmas(Cambridge:MITPress,1986)foranalysesof
thecrisesofthemodel,seeG.Markus,"PlanningtheCrisis:RemarksontheEconomicSystemofSoviettypeSocieties,"PraxisInternational1,no.3(October
1981):240257T.Bauer,"FromCyclestoCrisis?:RecentDevelopmentsinEastEuropeanPlannedEconomiesandtheTheoryofInvestmentCrisis,"inA.Arato
andF.Feher,eds.,CrisisandReform(TransactionBooks,forthcoming).Ontheexhaustionoftheresourceconstraintmodelanditsconsequences,seeJ.Kis,"Forr
avilg,"Beszl,no.26(1989):512.Thefirstimportanttheoreticalarticlethatspokeofthebeginningofa"generaleconomiccrisis"oftheSovietblocwas
publishedin1982byT.Baueritwastranslatedas''TheSecondEconomicReformandOwnershipRelations,"EasternEuropeanEconomics23,nos.12(1984).
103.LectureattheNewSchool,February22,1988,reportedbytheNewYorkTimes,February28,1988.AlsoseeA.Nove,"What'sHappeninginMoscow,"
NationalInterest(Summer,1987).
104.See,aboveall,J.Kornai,"TheHungarianReformProcess:Visions,Hopes,andRealities,"JournalofEconomicLiterature24(December1986):1687
1737.
105.T.Bauer,"Amsodikgazdasgireformsatulajdonviszonyok,"MozgVilg(November1982):1742.
106.Bauersawthisissuemostclearly,atleastin1982.
107.Kornai,"TheHungarianReformProcess."
108.TamsStrkzy,Gazdasgpolitika,Szervezetrendszer,Jogpolitika(Budapest:Kossuthknyvkiad,1987).
109.Worse,thiscouldbeonlyoneoftheseveralunmediatedpolarizationsthatcanoccurwithinSovietsociety,alongwiththosebetweennationalitiesandcenter,as
wellasnationalistanddemocraticforceswithintheRussiancenteritself,andperhapselsewhereaswell.
110.Inparticular,J.KisandtheeditorsofBeszl.SeeKis,"Gondolatokakzeljvrl"(Thoughtsaboutthenearfuture),Beszl,no.3(June1982):727.

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111.J.Kis,"Korltainkrlslehetsgeinkrl"(Aboutourlimitsandpossibilities),inAMonoriTancskozs(anundergroundpublication),1985.
112.Seethecollectivework"Fordulatsreform"(Turningpointandreform)andM.Bihari,"Reformsdemocracia,"bothinMedvetnc,no.2(Budapest,1987):
5129,165225.
113.EveninPoland,wherethenegotiationsofearly1989achievedacompromiseformulawithanastonishingresemblancetothatoftheSocialContract,itcannot
besaidthatthishappenedmerelyasaresultofoverwhelminggrassrootspressure,whichinfacthadledtostalemateearlier.Whilethestrikemovementsof1988
wereimportant,theywerefarweakerthanthoseof1980,andyet(againsttheintentionsoftheSolidarityleadership)theyachievedamuchmorecomprehensive
result.Thisconsistednotonlyina(re)legalizationoftheunionbutalsoinelectionsthatweretoasignificantextentfreelycontested,openingupthewayinJune1989
toa"plebescitary"defeatoftheCommunistparty,anupperhousecontrolledbySolidarity,andacombinedlegislatureinwhichtheoppositioncouldvetoalllegislation
aswellastherulingparty'schoiceofapresidentoftherepublic.Theresultwas,unexpectedlytoallconcerned,theformationofaSolidarityledgovernmental
coalition.
114.SeeL.Bruszt,"OntheRoadtoaConstitutionalState?,"unpublishedms,1989.
115.Kis,"Forravilg,"andalsohis"Avisszaszmllsmegkezddtt,"Beszl,no.27(1989).KisarguesthatinPoland,whereapowerfulsocialorganization
alreadyexisted,itsviabilityasapartnerwasnotsacrificed(despitechallengesfrombelow)evenifitacceptedconstraintsontheprocessesofpoliticalcompetition.In
Hungary,however,wheretheneworganizationscouldbecomegenuinelypopularonlyinthecontextofopenelections,allsuchrestrictionwouldhavejeopardizedthe
potentialpartnersandalsomadethemuselessfromthepointofviewofCommunistreformers.
116.SeeArato,"CivilSocietyagainsttheState"and"Empirevs.CivilSociety."
117.Wewouldcertainlyhesitatetoderivetheactionsofthereformistleadersandtheirgroupfromtheprojectofwiderelitestoconserveorconverttheirexisting
economicpowersintonewownershipandcontrolarrangements.CompareE.Hankiss'sexcellentbook,Keleteurpaialternativk(BudapestKzgazdasgis
jogikiad,1989),300andchap.9.Therelevantconversionforasmallpoliticaleliteisapoliticalone:fromapartystatetoasuccessfulelectoralandevenpresidential
party.ThefailureofthisconversioninHungarydoesnotprovethatitwasnotthemostimportantmotivationoftheleadingreformers,orthatotherformsof
(apparently)moresuccessfuleconomicconversionbelongedtothemotivationoftheleadershipatall.Withinthecontextofthetransition,andtheanticipationofa
differentsetofeconomicrules,largelyunorganizedeconomiceliteshadanopportunitytoundertakedecentralizedeffortsofconversionthatbecameareasonnotto
resistthepatternoftransition,eveniftheycouldhavedoneso.ThesamecriticismsapplytothesomewhatdifferentanalysisofE.Szalai,"ElitesandSystemChangein
Hungary,"PraxisInternational10,nos.12(April

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July1990):7479.Szalaifocusesonasomewhatdifferentelitewithdifferentpoliticalalliancesand,unlikeHankiss,doesnotbelievethatasystemsotransformed
couldpossiblyyieldafunctioningmarketeconomy.Seealsoheressay"Azujelite"(Thenewelite),Beszl,no.27(1989).
118.Insomecases,someofthesearecombined.Manynowusetheterm"revolution"todescribeallexceptthefirstoption,reformfromabove.Whiledefinitionsare
alwayssubjecttohistoricaldrift,webelievethat"revolution"isnotthemostfortunatechoiceinthecaseofPoland,Hungary,andtheSovietUnion,foratleastthree
reasons:(1)thenecessarilyselflimiting,gradualnatureoftheprocessthatallactorshaveinmind,notonlyfordecreasinglyimportantgeopoliticalreasonsbutfor
reasonsofprincipleaswell(2)therejectionbymostrelevantactorsofthestatestrengtheninglogicofmodernrevolutions,firstdiscoveredbyTocquevilleand(3)the
importantcontinuitiesofEastEuropeanmovementswithmovementsintheWestandespeciallytheSouththatseektogobeyondthealternativeofreformand
revolution,atleastinthetraditionalsenseoftheseterms.Thecounterargumentisbasedonasinglemodel:theHungarianrevolutionof1956.Thedifferencesbetween
thedemocraticopposition,withits13yearhistorypriorto1989,andthemovementagainstanunreconstructedStalinistregimeareobvious,eveniftoday,afterother
importantchangeshavebeenachieved,manyofthegoalsof1956areagainontheagenda.(Notall,though.Thereisnotalknow,forexample,ofradicalindustrial
democracy.)The1956uprising,likeallgreatrevolutions,didnothaveaselflimitingcharacterrather,ithadaspectsofacivilwar,preciselywhattoday'smovements
desperatelyseektoavoid.Forthisreason,neitherthe"peacefulrevolution''inEastGermanynorthe"velvetrevolution"inCzechoslovakiashouldbeunderstoodasa
nonviolentversionofthemodelof1956.Interestinglyenough,itisstillanopenquestionwhetherthese"revolutions"representmoreorlessradicalmodelsof
democratizationthanthenonrevolutionaryPolishandHungarianpaths.SeeA.Arato,"Revolution,CivilSocietyandDemocracy,"PraxisInternational10,nos.12
(AprilJuly1990):2438.
119.Wehaveinmindtheremarkableopennessofitsdebates,ontheoneside,and,ontheother,thecontinuedcontroloftheprocess,especiallytheselectionofthe
SupremeSoviet(theactuallegislature)firstbytheconservativeapparatusandlaterbyGorbachev'ssmallgroupofofficials.
120.Weconsidernationalistmobilization,especiallyoftheparticularist,aggressivevariety,tobeapathologyofcivilsociety.InEasternEuropeandtheSovietUnion,
itsoriginsarecomplexand,asidefromthelegitimatenationalandethnicgrievancesofminoritiesandcolonizedpeoples,reflectthefollowingelements:(1)The
insufficientandsuperficialprocessesofmodernizationofcommunistregimes,whichcouldsuppresstraditionalpractices,symbols,andideologiesbutcouldnot
effectivelytransformthem.(2)Theincreasingutilization,withthedeclineofMarxistLeninistformsoflegitimation,ofnationalistandhistoricistformsofself
presentationandselfjustification.(3)Thegrowinginsecurityandeconomicdeclineoftheperiodoftransition,whichmakesthedefenseofmaterialinterests
increasinglyprecarious.Eventhosemostadverselyaffectedby

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thechangesfinditdifficulttoopposethemtotheextentthattheyareprerequisitesfordismantlinghatedregimes.Thereis,asaresult,atendencytomobilize
aroundsymbolicratherthanmaterialissues,identityratherthaninterest.(4)Thefactthatanappealtoaselforganizingcivilsocietyimpliesthegeneralpossibilityof
constructingnewidentities,butonlyforthosecapableofintensiveparticipationinthelifeoforganizationsandassociations.Forthosenotsoinvolved,the
reconstructionofcivilsocietyanditsassociationsseemstobeonlyaprogramofatomization,allthemoreprecariousinthecontextofdecliningstatepaternalism.
Theappealstonationalidentityandnationalistmobilizationcompensatethesestratabythehopeof"illusorycommunity."
121.Whenwritten,ourtextcouldnotanticipateseveralimportantdevelopments.ViableparliamentarymediationshavenowemergedintheSovietUnion,butonlyon
theleveloftherepublics,includingastonishinglyenoughtheRussianFederalSocialistRepublic.Thissituation,reflectingthedevelopmentofamultiplicityofcivil
societies,oneforeachrepublic,doesnotinitselfsolvetheproblemofmediationonthelevelofthewholesocietyoravoidthedangersof(multiple)polarization.It
onlydisplacesittoonebetweenrepublicangovernmentssupportedbytheirowncivilsocietiesandacentralgovernmentwhoseinternalstructuredoesnotprovidefor
sufficientmediations.Worse,thefailureofagreement(hopefullytemporary)concerningeconomicreformbetweencentralandrepublicangovernmentsnow
reproducesthesamestructureofconflictontheeconomiclevelaswell,reinforcingthepoliticalandculturallinesofdivision.Unlessinstitutionsofmediation,involving
genuineconstitutionalismandaparliamentarismthatincorporatesinaconvincingmannerafederalorconfederalstructure,arecreated,thepossibleoutcomesarefew
andallextremelyprecarious.(Noteaddedfall1991.)
122.See,e.g.,Z.Bujak,"WestofCentre,"EastEuropeanReporter4,no.3(Autumn/Winter1990).Thispositionisnotuncontested.InCzechoslovakia,J.Urban
hasforcefullyarguedfortheconversionofCivilForumintoapartyoftheWestEuropeantype.See"TheCrisisofCivilForum,"UncaptiveMinds3,no.4(August
October1990).Thisissuecutsacrossotherideologicaldivides.InHungary,forexample,theSzDSzismorecomfortablewiththe"modern"partyformtheFIDESZ
seemslessso.WithintherulingMDFontheright,bothpositionsseemtoberepresented.
123.LenaKolarskaBobinska,"TheChangingFaceofCivilSocietyinEasternEurope,"unpublishedms.(1990).FortheHungariancase,seeF.Miszlivetz,"The
InjuriesofEastCentralEurope:IstheAutotherapyofCivilSocietyPossible?,"unpublishedms.(1990)fortheCzechcase,seetheinterviewwithLadislavHejdanek
publishedas"DemocracywithoutOppositionIsNonsense,"EastEuropeanReporter4,no.3(Autumn/Winter1990):96.Forageneraltheoreticalassessment,see
Arato''Revolution,CivilSociety,andDemocracy."
124.G.M.Tamashasdefendedthisperspectiveinseveralplaces.See,e.g.,"Glempbiborosintszava,"letsirodalom33,no.36(September1989).Thereare
importantsectorsinallthreeleadingpartiesaswellasmanyeconomistsandeconomicpolicymakerswhoholdthesameposition.

Page623
125.SeetheanalysesofthebestofthesetheoriesinthefollowingarticlesbyA.Arato:"AutoritrerSozialismusunddieFrankfurterSchule,"inA.HonnethandA.
Wellmer,eds.,DieFrankfurterSchuleunddieFolgen(Berlin:deGruyter,1986)"Bahro'sAlternative:fromWesterntoEasternMarxism,"areviewofU.Wolter,
ed.,Bahro:CriticalResponses,Telos,no.48(Summer1981):153168"CriticalSociologyandAuthoritarianStateSocialism,"inD.HeldandJ.Thompson,eds.,
Habermas:CriticalDebates(Cambridge:MITPress,1982)"ImmanentCritiqueandAuthoritarianSocialism,"CanadianJournalofPoliticalandSocialTheory
7,nos.12(WinterSpring1983):146162''TheBudapestSchoolandActuallyExistingSocialism,"TheoryandSociety,no.16(1987)"FacingRussia:
CastoriadisandSovietSociety,"Revueeuropennedessciencessociales37,no.86:269291.
126.SeeA.Arato,"MarxisminEastEurope,"inTomBottomore,ed.,DictionaryofMarxism(Oxford:Blackwell,1983),and"Marxism,"inJ.Eatwelletal.,eds.,
TheNewPalgrave:ADictionaryofEconomics(London:Macmillan,1987).
127.SeeJeanL.Cohen,ClassandCivilSociety.TheLimitsofMarx'sCriticalTheory(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1982).
128.Seechapter3.
129.SeeEvansetal.,eds.,BringingtheStateBackIn.
130.SeeJrgenHabermas,"TheNewObscurity,"inTheNewConservatism(Cambridge:MITPress,1989).
131.SeeAndrGorz,StrategyforLabor(Boston:BeaconPress,1967).
132.G.M.Tamasrepresentsthisperspective,albeitelaboratingitintermsoftheideaofa"bloodlessandlegal"revolutionthatwouldbecombinedeventuallywith
"reform"fromaboveaftertheconstitutionofalegitimateformofpower.Opposinganyideaof"socialrevolution,"hisconceptiondeliberatelyleavesopenthe
possibilitythatpresentdaypowerholderswillconverttheirpowerintoeconomicownership.See"Tjkpcsataeltt"(Landscapebeforebattle),letsirodalom,
August4,1989,andhisspeechtoapublicmeetingoftheSzDSzreportedinSzabadDemokratk,nos.45(1989).
133.ThispositionhasbeenarticulatedbyAgnesHellerandFerencFeheratvariousmeetingsandconferencesbut,toourknowledge,notyetinpublishedform.They
definepoliticalrevolutionasabreakinthestructureofsovereignty,asthereplacementeitherofonesovereignoroneformofsovereigntybyanother.Eventhe
second,moreconvincing,versionisbothtoowideandtoonarrowtodescribethechangesinmostoftheEastEuropeancountries:Toowidebecauseitneglectsthe
continuitiesinthestructureofpoliticalrulethatareonlygraduallyeliminated(inparticular,theruleofoldparliamentsandtherulingpartyinthepouvoirconstituant
andthecontinuedvalidityoftheinheritedlegalsystem)toonarrowbecausethetransformationsimplyawholesalechangeofsystemsandarenotatallrestrictedtothe
sphereofthepolitical.Interestinglyenough,theirdefinitionbestcorrespondstothemostviolentandleastradicalcase,namely,Rumania.

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134.Inabrilliantpaper,whichappearedtoolatetobeincorporatedintoourargument,UlrichPreusshasshownthattheEastEuropeanrevolutionsbreakwithCarl
Schmitt'smodelofsovereignty,whichwasinhisviewestablishedbytheFrenchRevolution,especiallyinitsRousseauianJacobinselfinterpretation("TheInfluenceof
CarlSchmittontheLegalDiscourseoftheFederalRepublicofGermany,"paperpresentedataconferenceonthe"ChallengeofCarlSchmittandDemocratic
Theory,"spring1990,GraduateFaculty,NewSchoolforSocialResearch,NewYork).
135.Admittedly,aratheroldfashioneduseofthetermrevolutionhasnowemergedinsomecountries,suchasHungary.Thiscombineselementsofpremodern
usage(return,restoration)withelementsoftherevolutionarysemanticsfirstinventedbytheJacobinsandtheirallies,inordertocompensateforadeficitofdemocratic
legitimacyrootedincivilsociety.ThemovementwingoftheMDFthat(primarilybutnotexclusively)pushesthisusageisunfortunatelyforcedbythelogicofthe
positiontoinventenemiesaswellastoseekretroactive,extralegalretribution.Fortunately,appealsbasedonrevolutionarysemanticsseemtofindlittleresponseina
contextthatisstill"postrevolutionary"inthesenseofournotionofselflimitation.Wewouldbefoolish,however,todenythepossibledangersinrevolutionary
demagogyastheeconomicsituationworsensbeforeitcanimprove.Walesa'sriseasthechampionofarighthopingto"accelerate"changeisamplewarninginthis
context.
136.Seechapter2.Ofcourse,whathasbeenaddedbysome(includingourselves)isfamiliesandmovements.
137.Forthedistinction,seePolnyi'sgreatessay,"TheEconomyasanInstitutedProcess,"inG.Dalton,ed.,Primitive,ArchaicandModernEconomies.The
EssaysofKarlPolnyi(Boston:BeaconPress,1968).
138.Recently,defendersofcivilsocietyinHungaryhavestressedthepluralityofformsofpropertywithintheprocessofprivatizationasthedimensionthroughwhich
civilsocietycangainafootholdwithintheneweconomicsocietyinformation.SeethelatestessaysinE.Szalai,Gazdasgshatalom(Budapest:AulaKiado,
1990),whichrepresentthebesttreatmentofthisquestionfromthepointofviewofdemocratictheoryaswellasstringenteconomicanalysis.Inourview,property
mayhavearoletoplayforcivilsociety'srelationtoeconomicsocietythatisanalogoustotherolepoliticalpartiesplaywithrespecttopoliticalsociety.Private
propertyaswellaspoliticalorganizationsachieveonlydifferentiationfromcivilsociety,whilegenuinelypluralisticformsofpropertyaswellasdemocraticpartiesare
requiredtogainamediatingfootholdofthecivilintheeconomicandthepolitical.Withoutsuchmediations,civilsocietybecomesbourgeoisandatomized,while
democracybecomeselite.
139.Seechapter6andA.Arato,"CivilSociety,History,andSocialism:ReplytoJohnKeane,"PraxisInternational9,nos.12(AprilJuly1989):133152.
140.ThisisthepointofviewofJ.Kis.Theideaofamultilevelcivilsociety,includingitspolitical"mediations,"couldinprinciplesatisfytheintellectualneedsofa
periodofturningtopoliticsinthemoretraditionalsense.Whileitis

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truethatthepartisansofcivilsocietyoftenstressa"horizontal"model,placingallassociationsandorganizationsonthesamelevel,the"vertical"dimensionofthe
conceptofpoliticalsocietyispresentintheoldHegelianideaofmediation.However,inprincipleatleast,itisjustaspossibleforacivilsocietydividedby
alternativeinterestsandidentitiestobepluralisticallyorganizedasforapoliticalsocietytobecomemonolithic.Tobesure,withcivilsocietytakingonthefunction
ofpoliticalsocietyinthefaceofahostileandmoreorlessunifiedauthoritarianstate,asinPoland,theconstantlypredictedpluralizationofcivilsocietyneverreally
developedbeyonditsbeginnings.Butherethepluralizationofpoliticalsocietyeveninitsparliamentaryformalsoseemstohavebeensurprisinglydelayed.One
mayseethereasonforthisinapoliticalsocietythathasdevelopedasthepoliticalmediationofaunifiedcivilsociety.Ontheotherhand,thepremature
overpluralizationofpoliticalsocietyasinHungary,wheretheprojectoftransitionismoreconsensualthanitwouldseemfromthepoliticalconflictscanhave
theunfortunateconsequenceoffurthercontributingtothedemobilizationofasocietydisgustedbyneedlessaggressionanddemagogyinpolitics.
141.Cf.G.M.Tamas'sattackonindependentsocietalselforganizationinUncaptiveMinds.Suchcallsforanewstatismintheformofparliamentaryabsolutismare
heardinbothoftheleadingHungarianpartiestheopinionofI.Csurkaontheindependenceofthepress,whichhehopestoreplacebypartypoliticalcontrolthrough
defactoparliamentarypower,representsthesamepointofview.Inbothcases,theargumentisbasedonarecognitionthatsocietalorganizationrepresentspower
andtheclaimthattheonlylegitimatepowerisonethatisanoutcomeofnationalelections.
142.ThisdiffersfromthepluralistcorrectionofSchumpeterianelitedemocracyinonecrucialrespect.WhileDahletal.triedtoincludecivilsocietyandits"influence"
onpoliticalsocietywithintheirconceptionofelitedemocracy,theycountedonageneraldemobilizationofcivilsociety,anabsenceofsocialmovements,asyndrome
ofcivilprivatism,consensuswithaminimumdegreeofparticipationwithincivilsociety,andarestrictionofparticipationtoonespecificform,namely,interestgroup
pressure.
143.SeeStepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics,andtheintroductiontoStepan,ed.,DemocratizingBrazil.Thisargumentisinconsistent,sinceevenifthe
institutionalizationofcivilsocietyrepresentedonlytheresultsofliberalization,themovementsofcivilsocietywouldbeimportantintheemergenceofpoliticalsociety
itselfaswellasintheoverallprocessofdemocratization.
144.Tamas,"Tjkpcsataeltt."
145.Inthiscontext,Cardoso'sstressonindustrialdemocracyfindsmanyparallelsinEastEuropeansources,whichhopefurthermoretoinstitutionalizesocial
autonomyaboveallthroughthedevelopmentofagenuinelypluralisticstructureofprivateproperty,includingnotonlyprivateownershipinthenarrowsensebutalso
ownershipbyemployees,nonprofitorganizations,andlocalgovernmentaswellasordinarycitizensparticipatinginnewmutualfunds.Such

Page626
devicesareimportantnotonlyfornormativereasonscomingfromdemocratictheory,butalsoasthebestwaystoachieveanecessaryspeedingupofthe
privatizationanddemonopolizationofEastEuropeaneconomies.SeeSzalai,Gazdasgshatalom.
Chapter2
1.ManfredRiedel,"Gesellschaft,birgerliche,"inO.Brunner,W.Conze,andR.Koselleck,eds.,GeschichtlicheGrundbegriffe,vol.2(Stuttgart:Klett,1975).
2.NiklasLuhmann,"Gesellschaft,"inSoziologischeAufklrung,vol.1(Opladen:WestdeutscherVerlag,1970),138.
3.K.Polnyi,"AristotleDiscoverstheEconomy,"inG.Dalton,ed.,Primitive,ArchaicandModernEconomies.EssaysofKarlPolnyi(Boston:BeaconPress,
1968).
4.Ithardlyneedsemphasistodaythatthepoliswasacommunitywithahighlyrestrictivenotionofcitizenship,excludingforeigners,women,andusuallymanual
workersaswell.
5.M.I.Finley,PoliticsintheAncientWorld(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983).
6.Riedel,"Gesellschaft,brgerliche."
7.O.Brunner,LandundHerrschaft,5thed.(Darmstadt:WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft,1973),pt.2,115.
8.InhisdebatewithGierkeandHintzeinparticular.SeeLandundHerrschaft,156ff.,161ff.
9.G.Jellinek,TheDeclarationoftheRightsofManandCitizen(NewYork:HenryHolt,1901).
10.ReinhartKoselleck,CritiqueandCrisis:EnlightenmentandthePathogenesisofModernSociety(Cambridge:MITPress,1988),originallypublishedas
KritikundKrise(Freiburg:KarlAlberVerlag,1959).
11.Riedel,"Gesellschaft,brgerliche,"740.
12.TalcottParsons,TheStructureofSocialAction(NewYork:FreePress,1949),89ff.
13.JohnLocke,TheSecondTreatiseonGovernment[1690](Indianapolis:Hackett,1980),chap.7.
14.Ibid.,chap.8.
15.Ibid.,chap.4.
16.Ibid.,chap.19.
17.Montesquieu,TheSpiritoftheLaws[1748](NewYork:Harpers,1949),I(3),5.
18.Ibid.,6Nugent'sEnglishtranslationisseriouslymisleading.
19.Ibid.,II(4)V(10,11).

Page627
20.Z.A.Pelczynski,ed.,Hegel'sPoliticalPhilosophy:ProblemsandPerspectives(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1971).
21.ForRousseau,civilsocietyisineffectcitizensocietypoliticalfreedommeansparticipationoffreeandequalmembersinrulingandbeingruled.
22.SeeKoselleck,CritiqueandCrisis.
23.This"society"wasalsocounterposedtothefamily.Thiswasunfortunate,becausetheoppositionwasagenderedonebasedonthelocationofmenaloneincivil
societyandthesequestrationofwomenintheprivatizeddomesticsphere.Thus,whiletheegalitariannormsofthenewcivilsocietywereconceptualizedinopposition
totheprinciplesofhierarchy,status,andcaste,theentireconstructionwasbuiltuponthepreservation,inanewandallpervasiveform,ofagenderedcastesystem.
Unlikeproperty,whichanyonecouldinprincipleacquireandwhich,accordingtoLocke,everyonestartedoutwith(propertyinone'sbody),thesexualqualification
formembershipincivilsocietywasantitheticaltoitsownprinciples.
24.Koselleck,KritikundKrise,46WernerConze,"DieSpannungsfeldvonStaatundGesellschaftimVormrz,"inConze,ed.,StaatundGesellschaftim
deutschenVormrz18151848(Stuttgart:Klett,1962),208.
25.Riedel,"Gesellschaft,brgerliche,"748750.
26.Ibid.,740742W.Conze,"Sozialgeschichte,"inH.U.Wehler,ed.,ModerneDeutscheSozialgeschichte(Knigstein:Athenum,1981).
27.Riedel,"Gesellschaft,brgerliche,"758761.
28.Ibid.,764.
29.G.Heiman,"TheSourcesandSignificanceofHegel'sCorporateDoctrine,"inPelczynski,ed.,Hegel'sPoliticalPhilosophy,111135.
30.Inperhapshisgreatestworkinpoliticaltheory,theyoungMarxpaidgreatattentiontothelinkinHegelbetweenstatismandsystembuildingseehisCritiqueof
Hegel'sPhilosophyofRight(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1970).
31.G.W.F.Hegel,GrundlinienderPhilosophiedesRechts,inWerke,vol.7(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1970hereaftercitedasRechtsphilosophie),par.255
addendum.T.M.Knox'stranslationinHegel'sPhilosophyofRight(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1967hereafterPR)isnotquiteright.
32.PR,par.4,142.
33.Toacertainextent,HegelfollowsAristotleinconstruingthefamily(household)asthenaturalbackgroundofcivilsociety,buthehasinmindafamilyformquite
differentfromthe"extended"householdcharacteristicoftheoikos.Hegelpresupposesthebourgeoisnuclearfamily,denudedofagreatmanyoftheeconomic
functionscharacteristicofearlierforms,whichwerenowbeingtakenoverbythemarket.Accordingly,asextrahouseholdeconomicfunctionsexpanded,theheadsof
householdsrelatedtoeachothernotonlyinthepolitybutintheeconomyaswell.

Page628
34.PR,par.33.
35.CharlesTaylor,Hegel(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),382.
36.Ibid.,376.
37.PR,par.147,151,155.
38.Hecannot,ofcourse,accepttheseidentitiesontraditional,nonreflective,groundsandwarnsagainstamerelyhabitualacceptanceofethos.Astonishinglyenough,
hiscertaintythat,afterreflection,theexistingethoswillturnouttoberationalwasalwaysunshaken.Butwhatif,afterthemostthoroughreflection,theoppositeturned
outtobethecase?Inthisrespect,theincomparablygreatermodernityofKant'sconceptionofpracticalphilosophyisobvious.
39.PR,par.213.
40.PR,par.142.
41.Norisitabsentonthelevelofthefamily.Thetensionbetweenthenormativemodelofthemonogamousbourgeoisfamilyasalovecommunity,presupposinga
formofmutualrecognitionbetweenpeers,andthepatriarchalandhierarchicalstructure,reproducedinlaw,oftheactualbourgeoisfamilyisimplicitinHegel's
discussion.
42.TheactualspiritofafamilyandapeopleseePR,par.156.
43.PR,par.157.
44.PR,par.181.
45.PR,par.184.Indeed,thelevelofSittlichkeitatwhich,inHegel'sview,thereisnotensionbetweenisandought,betweencommongoodandindividualinterest,
betweenrightandduty,isnotthatofthestate,asTaylorthought,butthatofthefamily,the"natural"levelofSittlichkeit.
46.Z.A.Pelczynski,"TheHegelianConceptionoftheState,"inPelczynski,ed.,Hegel'sPoliticalPhilosophy,12.Pelczynski'semphasis,inthisarticleand
elsewhere,isonthereemergenceofpositivesocialintegrationwithincivilsociety.
47.PR,par.255.
48.Butitisalsoduetotheillusionsofsystembuildingthatthefamilyappearsasanatural,immediateformofSittlichkeitonethatisneitherinnorof,butrather
externalandpriorto,civilsociety.Hegel'sidiosyncraticthreepartdivisionofethicalliferequirescomment.Hegelcounterposesthefamilytobothcivilsocietyandthe
state,butitisthefirstoppositionthatconcernsushere.Now,thedifferentiationbetweenthefamilyandcivilsociety,conceivedofasthesystemofneeds,isnot
particularlysurprising,sincetheexclusiveorientationtoindividualselfinterestofactorsinamarketeconomywhoareintegratedthroughimpersonalrelationsdoes
seemquitedistinctfromthemutualityoffeeling(love),thecommonalityofpurpose(children),andthecommunityofinterests(familyproperty)thatarefundamentalto
Hegel'sconceptofthemonogamousfamily.UnliketheMarxianconception,however,Hegel'stheoryofcivilsocietydoesnotstopatthesystemofneeds.Onthe
contrary,Hegel'smostimportantinsightwith

Page629
regardtocivilsocietyishisrecognitionthatitinvolvestheprincipleofvoluntaryassociationand,withit,newformsofsolidarity,egalitarianparticipation,
membership,andethicallife.Itispreciselythefunctionoftheassociationsofcivilsociety(corporations,estates)toprovideacontextinwhichnewformsof
solidarity,collectiveidentity,andcommoninterestcanemerge.Theirmostimportantfunctionistomitigatethecentrifugaltendenciesofthesystemofneeds,bind
individualstogetherinacommonpurpose,andtempertheegoismofselfinterest.ThisiswhyHegelreferstothecorporationasthe"secondfamily"(PR,par.
252).
Why,then,insteadofseeingthefamilyitselfasthevoluntaryassociationparexcellence,doesHegelexcludeitfromcivilsocietyaltogether,whileatthesametime
usingitasthemetaphorforsolidaritythroughouthistext?(Hegelreferstocivilsocietyastheuniversalfamily,thecorporationastheindividual'ssecondfamily[PR,
par.238,239],andthestateasthe"selfconsciousethicalsubstancethatunifiesthefamilyprinciplewiththatofcivilsociety.Thesameunitywhichisinthefamily
asthefeelingofloveis,initsessence,receivinghowever...theformofconsciousuniversality"[EnzyclopdiederPhilosophischenWissenschaften(1830)
(Hamburg:MeinerVerlag,1969),par.595].)
Wecandiscerntworeasonsforthis,onelogical,theotherideological.GiventhesystematicstructureofHegel'stext,ifonereasonslogicallyfromtheexistenceof
thelegalpersonconstitutedbythesystemofabstractrighttheatomizedindividualproprietorthenitdoesseemthatsomethingpriorispresupposed,namely,
thecontextinwhichthepersonisliterallygenerated,andthiscontextcannotbethesystemofneedsitself.Thesubstantialexistenceoftheindividualimpliesa
"naturaluniversal"(thespeciesanditsprocreation),andeveryindividualisfirstsituated,generated,inthecontextofthefamily.Accordingly,Hegelseesthefamily
asthelogicalpresuppositionofcivilsociety.
However,itrequiresanother,ideologicalsteptoconstruethefamilyastheprereflective,naturalformofethicallife.Hegelrecognizesthatthenaturalfactor,the
sexualtie,iselevatedinthemonogamousfamilytoaspiritualsignificancetheunanimityofloveandthetemperoftrustbutitisso,heinsists,inaprereflective
form,asfeeling.Thefamilyisthefirstforminwhichtheunityofindividualsisactualizedasalovecommunity.Throughtheinstitutionofmonogamousmarriage,
however,anindivisiblepersonalbondisconstituted,resultinginmoralattachmentandthecommunityofpersonalandprivateinterests.Inshort,themonogamous
familymergesthewillandinterestsofitsmembers,makingthemutualityandmergingcharacteristicsoflovepermanent.
Butthereisnothingnaturalaboutthemonogamousbourgeoisfamilyformitisahistorical,institutional,andlegalconstruction,asHegelundoubtedlyknew.It
seemsthathecharacterizesitasanaturalcommunitybecauseheassumesthatthereisnoconflictorevendifferenceofinterestsamongfamilymembersdespitethe
physicaldifferenceofsex,which"appearsatthesametimeasadifferenceofintellectualandmoraltype"(EnzyclopdiederPhilosophischenWissenschaften,
par.519).Indeed,thefamilybond,itsunity,isallegedlysoallencompassingthatitformsasinglepersonsuchthattheonepersonrepresentingthefamilyproperty
acquiresanethicalinterest.

Page630
ThatHegelpresupposeswithoutquestionthepatriarchal,bourgeois,monogamousfamilyformisobvioushere.Thelessobvioustheoreticalmotivationunderlying
theexclusionofthefamilyfromcivilsocietyisthedoubleassumptionthattheindividualpresupposedbythesystemofneedscannotbeproducedbyitandthatthe
onlyreallyimportantdynamicofconflicting,antagonisticinterestsistheoneconstitutedbythesystemofneedsbetweeneconomicactors.Accordingly,itcould
appearthatfamilymembershavenoseparateinterestssolongastheyremaininthefamily.Hence,theindissolublebondofthemonogamousfamily.Buttheonly
personwhoneverleavesthefamilyis,ofcourse,thewife.Children,whentheybecomeadults,leavetoentertheirsecondfamily,civilsociety,wheretheyarefree
toactontheirnowseparateinterests.Butnewfamiliesareformed,onceagainremovingwomen,itwouldseem,fromcivilsociety.Ofcourse,Hegeldoesnot
explicitlysaythatonlymenareactorsinthesystemofneedsherefersinsteadtoheadsofhouseholds.Buttheexclusionofthefamilyitselffromcivilsocietyand
theassumptionofaperfectharmonyofinterestswithinitmakessenseonlyifitisassumedthatoneofthetwoadultmembersdoesnothaveseparateinterestsand
neverattainsthestatusoflegalpersonhood,oratleastrelinquishesituponmarriage(whichwasthelegalsituationofmarriedwomenalloverEuropeatthetime).
Itmust,then,bethemaleheadofhouseholdwhoenterscivilsocietyandthroughwhomthepropertyofthefamilyappearsasanindividualinthesystemofneeds.
Theremaybeyetathirdreasonforexcludingthefamily,intheformthatHegeldefends,fromcivilsociety,oneneverthematizedbyHegelbutthatwouldmakea
greatdealofsense.Thepatriarchalfamilyisunlikeanyotherassociationincivilsocietybecauseitallegedlydoesnotreconciledivergentinterestsofpersonswithin
itbutconstitutesanimmediateunityofinterest.Butitalsodivergesfromthetwoprinciplesofintegrationtypicalofamoderncivilsociety:contract(andsystem
integrationtypicalofthemarketmechanism)andvoluntaryassociation.Despitethemetaphorofamarriagecontract,thefamilyisnotacontractualarrangementin
thestandardsense.Itmaybefreely"contracted"into,butitisinpartindissoluble,andanimportantsetofitsmembers,children,donotcontractintoitatall.
Indeed,HegelelsewhereexplicitlyrejectstheKantianconceptionofthefamilyasacontractualrelationship.
Nor,however,isthepatriarchalfamilyavoluntaryassociationlikeanyother,becauseitsinternalstructureandmodeofintegrationconflictwiththebasic
egalitarianandhorizontalmodeofsocialintegrationthatistheprincipleofcoordinationofinteractioninvoluntaryassociations.Apatriarchalfamilyis,instead,
integratedthroughtheprincipleofhierarchyandpreservesagenderedcastestatuspredicatedontheabsenceofequalityandautonomyforitsfemalemembers.In
orderforthefamilytobesituatedwithincivilsociety,asaparticularformofvoluntaryassociation,itwouldhavetorelinquishitspatriarchalformandbecome,at
leastinprinciple,egalitarian.Ofcourse,asfaraschildrenareconcerned,equalityandautonomyformagoalratherthanastartingpoint,butthisdoesnotaffectthe
issue.Thus,thefamilyintheforminwhichHegelconstitutesitmustbeexcludedfromcivilsocietyanddeemedtobeanatural,

Page631
prereflectiveformofethicallifedespiteitspatentlysocial,legal,andculturalconstitution.
Weneverthelessbelievethatitwouldhavebeenbettertoincludethefamilywithincivilsociety,asitsfirstassociation.Thisalternativewouldhavebeenfarsuperior
totheoneHegelchose,fromboththeoreticalandnormativepointsofview.Forthenthefamilycouldhavetakenitsplaceasakeyinstitutionincivilsociety,one
that,ifconceivedofinegalitarianterms,couldhaveprovidedanexperienceofhorizontalsolidarity,collectiveidentity,andequalparticipationtotheautonomous
individualscomprisingitataskdeemedfundamentalfortheotherassociationsofcivilsocietyandfortheultimatedevelopmentofcivicvirtueandresponsibility
withrespecttothepolity.
49.T.W.Adorno,"CulturalCriticismandSociety,"inPrisms(Cambridge:MITPress,1981).
50.Onthehistoricalrootsofthisinconsistency,andontherepublicanstraininHegel'sthought,seeK.H.Ilting,"TheStructureofHegel'sPhilosophyofRight,"in
Pelczynski,ed.,Hegel'sPoliticalPhilosophy,and"Hegel'sPhilosophyoftheStateandMarx'sEarlyCritique,"inZ.A.Pelczynski,ed.,TheStateandCivil
Society:StudiesinHegel'sPoliticalPhilosophy(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984).
51.KarlPolnyi'sGreatTransformation[1944](Boston:BeaconPress,1957)isbothaneloquentanalysisandasymptomofthisstatisttrend.
52.JeanL.Cohen,ClassandCivilSociety:TheLimitsofMarxianCriticalTheory(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1982).
53.See,e.g.,PR,par.190.
54.PR,par.187.
55.PR,par.183.
56.PR,par.182.
57.OnlyforthesystemofneedscanHegelmaintainthatincivilsocietyeveryoneisanendforhimself/herselfandallothersarenothing.SeePR,par.182,add.
58.GeorgLukcs,TheYoungHegel(Cambridge:MITPress,1975)ShlomoAvineri,Hegel'sTheoryoftheModernState(Cambridge,England:Cambridge
UniversityPress,1972).
59.PR,par.184.
60.Ibid.
61.ThisiswhatHabermashascalled"systemintegration"(PR,par.187,199).
62.PR,par.189andadd.
63.PR,par.243.
64.PR,par.195.
65.PR,par.196,198.
66.PR,par.243.SeeAvineri,Hegel'sTheory,108109,149,andelsewhere.

Page632
67.PR,par.207.
68.PR,par.206,207.
69.SeeCohen,ClassandCivilSociety.
70.ThisanticipatesandwouldinfluenceMarx'sformulation,accordingtowhichtheproletariatis"inbutnotof"civilsociety.
71.PR,par.203.
72.PR,par.204.
73.PR,par.205.
74.PR,par.200.
75.PR,par.241.
76.Hedid,however,notetheproblemofconflictmanagementbythepublicauthority(par.236).
77.ThepointisthattherearetwodifferentkindsofintegrationatworkinHegel'sconceptofcivilsociety:systemintegrationandsocialintegration.Seeourchapter3
onParsonsandchapter9onHabermas.
78.Hegel'spoliticalcontradictionbetweenstatismandantistatismisrevealedintheorderofexposition.Whiletheoutlineoftheargumentconcerningthestatein
paragraph273movesfromthelegislaturetotheexecutiveandfinallytothecrownasthehighestlevel,theactualexpositioninparagraphs275320movesfrom
crowntoexecutiveandfinallytothelegislatureitself,culminatinginthedoctrineofpublicopinion.Thelegislatureis,ofcourse,civilsocietyinthestate!
79.PR,par.213,218.
80.PR,par.215,216,224.
81.PR,par.217.
82.PR,par.211.
83.PR,par.209.
84.PR,par.211,216.
85.ThisiscontrarytoTaylor'sinterpretationoftheconceptofSittlichkeit,accordingtowhich"theendsoughtbythehighestethicsisalreadyrealized"(Hegel,383).
86.PR,par.212.
87.Thisistrueevenbeforeintheargument,althoughweshouldrecognizethatpartofthesystemofneedsthesectionontheestateswherethetwologicsare
alreadyvisiblebelongs,atleastinpart,tothelaterdiscussionofsocialratherthansystemintegration.
88.Foradiscussionofthedevelopmentofthismodelofcivilsociety,seeCohen,ClassandCivilSociety.
89.SuchisAvineri'sstressinHegel'sTheoryoftheModernState.
90.PR,par.205.

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91.PR,par.296Avineri,Hegel'sTheoryoftheModernState,107108,158160.
92.WhichisalsonotalwaysaseasyasMarxthoughtin1843.Theauthorofthe18thBrumairecanteachusthislessonaswell.
93.Thus,HegelsurelydoesnotsufferfromtheproblemnotedbyNiklasLuhmann:thattheoristsofthestate/societydichotomyareforced,inapreposterousmanner,
todistributeactualindividualsneatlyononesideortheotherofthesocietaldivide.
94.PR,par.303.
95.PR,par.295.
96.PR,par.234.
97.PR,par.236.
98.PR,par.239.
99.PR,par.245.
100.PR,par.248.
101.TheOldRegimeandtheFrenchRevolution(1856).
102.PR,par.239,240.
103.PR,par.241andalso239.
104.PR,par.249.
105.SeeRechtsphilsosphie,par.238.HadHegel'sprimaryconcernbeendemocratizationratherthanintegration,thenperhapsthefamilyinanegalitarianformcould
havetakenitsplacewithincivilsocietyandservedasanimportantmodelofhorizontal,solidarytiesfortheothervoluntaryassociations.TheproblemisthatHegel
wasreluctanttodrawoutthefullimplicationsofthemodernconceptofvoluntaryassociation.Heknew,ofcourse,thatitdifferedfromtheideaofcommunity,
becauseitpresupposedmemberswhowereindividualswithparticularinterestsaswellascommongroupinterests.Healsoknewthatavoluntaryassociationwas
morethantheliberalmodelofaninterestgroup,becauseitiscapableofgeneratingnewties,solidarities,andevencollectiveidentities.Asvoluntary,theassociation
mustallowforfreeentryandexit.Asanassociation,presumablyofpeers,itshouldaccordequalvoicetoitsmembersandmutualrecognitionasmemberssharinga
collectiveidentity.Onlyinademocratic,egalitarianassociationinwhichentryandexitarebasedonuniversalisticcriteriaandinwhichallhaveequalvoicecouldsocial
integrationbeeffectiveinthewayHegelhopeditwouldbe.Butforthis,fortheselfintegrationofcivilsocietyonafullymodernbasis,therestrictionsHegelplaceson
thenumberandtypesofvoluntaryassociationsincivilsocietywouldhavetobeabandoned.
106.SeeHeiman,''SourcesandSignificanceofHegel'sCorporateDoctrine."
107.T.M.Knox,translator'snotestoHegel'sPhilosophyofRight,360.
108.PR,par.295.
109.PR,par.289.

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110.Heiman,"SourcesandSignificanceofHegel'sCorporateDoctrine,"125ff.
111.PR,par.303seetheEnglishtranslation,198.
112.PR,par.311.
113.Hegelraisesthisissueonlyinhispolemicagainstthedemocratic,i.e.,universal,participationinpoliticsofallmembersofcivilsociety.Inhisownterms,hehasa
goodargumentheretotheextentthathewantstoincludeonlythosealreadyorganized.Itisnotclearwhyhedoesnotrecommend(andevenseemstoexclude)
organizingallmembersofcivilsocietyinassociations,communities,andcorporationssothattheycouldthusparticipateinpoliticsandtheelectionofdeputies.
Furthermore,votingbytheunorganizedfordeputieswhoarethemselvesorganized(asintheEnglishandAmericanpoliticalparties,eveninHegel'sday)wouldnot
havetheconsequencethatHegelfeared:theappearanceofatomizedopiniononthepoliticalstage.Itisanothermatter,asthedebatearoundtheviewsofCarlSchmitt
wastoshow,thattherepresentationofademocraticelectorateintheliberalnineteenthcenturyformcouldbeseenasraisingtheproblemof"indecision"or
"ungovernability."Forthistohappen,onekeycomponentoflegislationasunderstoodbyHegelhadtoloseitspower,namely,rational,publicdiscussionand
deliberation.SeeCarlSchmitt,TheCrisisofParliamentaryDemocracy[1923](Cambridge:MITPress,1985).
114.PR,par.308.
115.PR,par.301.
116.PR,par.302.
117.PR,par.298.
118.PR,par.309.
119.PR,par.316.
120.PR,par.318.
121.WhileHegelrightlycallstoourattentionthevolatilityandmanipulabilityofpublicopinion,heisalsoquiteinsistentthattheessentialtruthsofpoliticsdohavethis
mediumfortheirvehicle.Unfortunately,healsosaysthatinterpretingthesetruthsistheroleofpoliticalleadersandtheorists.Heconsidersthefollowingofpublic
opinion,bothinlifeandinscience,tobetheroadtomediocrity.Andyethefindsunproblematicthepassiveacceptanceoftheviewsofelitesbypublicopinion(PR,
par.318).
122.PR,par.319.
123.PR,par.315.
124.PR,par.316.
125.SeeHeiman,"SourcesandSignificanceofHegel'sCorporateDoctrine,"129135.SomewhatlessclearisIlting'sessentiallysimilarargumentaccordingtowhich
"civilsocietyandthestate"areinHegel"twodifferentspheresofpubliclife''("TheStructureofHegel'sPhilosophyofRight,"107).

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126.SeeJrgenHabermas,TheStructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere[1962](Cambridge:MITPress,1989).
127.SeeJellinek,DeclarationoftheRightsofManandCitizen,23,49.
128.Hegel'scritiqueofJacobinismandrepublicanismrestsonhisalternativetheoryofcivilsociety.Thestarkoppositionbetweenprivateegoismandcivicvirtuein
Jacobinandrepublicanthoughtwaspredicatedonamodelofsocietyasonedividedbyarigidpublic/privatedualismthatallowedforonlyamoralisticovercomingof
particularinterestsandprivateconcerns.Intheabsenceofmediationsbetweenthelevelsoftheindividualandthepoliticalcommunity,theultimatelogicofsuch
moralismwas,inHegel'sview,theTerror.SeetheintroductiontotheKnoxeditionofHegel'sPhilosophyofRight,22.
129.PR,par.255add.,quotedinPelczynski,"PoliticalCommunityandIndividualFreedom,"72,inKnox'stranslation(whichwehavehadtorevise).
130.PR,par.265.
131.QuotedinPelczynski,"PoliticalCommunityandIndividualFreedom,"76.
132."Hegel'sConceptoftheStateandMarx'sEarlyCritique,"100103.
Chapter3
1.ForareconstructionandcritiqueofMarx'sviewsoncivilsociety,seeJeanL.Cohen,ClassandCivilSociety:TheLimitsofMarx'sCriticalTheory(Amherst:
UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1983).
2.TalcottParsons,TheSystemofModernSocieties(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1971),1.
3.Ibid.,115.
4.Ibid.,84.Parsons'sgreatessay"FullCitizenshipfortheNegroAmerican?,"reprintedinPoliticsandSocialStructure(NewYork:FreePress,1969),represents
animportantexceptiontothisthesisoftheclosureofthedemocraticrevolution.ButParsons,becauseofagenerallysuspiciousattitudetowardsocialmovements,
nevertriedtogeneralizethismodel.Ofcourse,hewasalsounawareofmostoftheareasinwhichthedemocraticrevolutioncouldandshouldbecontinued,suchas
women'srights.
5.SeeLotharGall,"LiberalismusundbrgerlicheGesellschaft.ZuCharacterundEntwicklungderliberalenBewegunginDeutschland,"inL.Gall,ed.,Liberalismus,
2ded.(Knigstein:VerlagAntonHain,1980).
6.SeethecritiquesoftwomembersofthePolnyischool:TerenceK.Hopkins,"SociologyandtheSubstantiveViewoftheEconomy,"andHarryW.Pearson,
"ParsonsandSmelserontheEconomy,"inK.Polnyietal.,eds.,TradeandMarketintheEarlyEmpires(NewYork:FreePress,1957).
7.Cf.G.Poggi,TheDevelopmentoftheModernState(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1978),13ff.,whoarguesotherwise,leavingoutofconsideration
Parsons'slinkingofdifferentiationwithintegration,leadingtocomplexitybutnotdedifferentiation.

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8.Parsons,TheSystem,99.TheinconsistencyofParsons'sanalysisispointedoutbyJrgenHabermasinTheoriedeskommunikativenHandelns,vol.2
(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1981),423424andnote131.
9.Parsons,TheSystem,101.
10.Ibid.,87.
11.Parsons,webelievemistakenly,discussessocialrightsaswellinthecontextofthedemocraticrevolution,whosecentrallineofconflictisonthestatesocietal
communityaxis.Thenotionofequalityinherentinsocialrightsinvolvesadefensivereactionontheeconomysocietalcommunityaxisinstead.
12.Parsons,TheSystem,84.CompareHabermas'sthesisonthepublicsphere,discussedbelowinchapter4.
13.Seehisessay"OntheConceptofPoliticalPower,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure.
14.Parsons,TheSystem,106107.
15.Ibid.,97.
16.Ibid.,99100,117118.
17.NeilSmelser,TheoryofCollectiveBehavior(NewYork:FreePress,1963).
18.Smelser'sanalysisofeventhistypeofmovementwashardlyunambiguousorwhollysympathethic.ForParsons'sratherdifferentconception,see"FullCitizenship
fortheNegroAmerican?"
19.Inthecaseofthemodernstate,evenNiklasLuhmann,forexample,seesthistendency.SeehisGrundrechtealsInstitution(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1965).
Hereitisthefunctionoffundamentalrightstostabilizethedifferentiationofsociety.AsLuhmann'sworkdeveloped,thisfunctionwasattributedtoyetanother
subsystem:thesystemoflaw,inwhichrightsarelocatedalongwithallotherinstruments.Whatthisapproachcannotaddress,however,ishowthelegalsystemisto
beprotectedagainstthededifferentiatingtendenciesthreateningthisverysubsystem.Itseemsthatthesystemstheoreticideaofthedifferentiationofsocietycannotbe
sustainedifwestaywithinthelimitsofsystemstheory.Seechapter7.
20.Parsons,TheSystem,12,and"ThePoliticalAspectofSocialStructureandProcess,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure,345
21.Parsons,TheSystem,24forLuhmann'scritiqueofthisconception,seechapter7.
22.Parsons,"OntheConceptofPoliticalPower,"355.
23.Parsons,TheSystem,910.Whathedoesnotseeisthat,foracollectivityofcollectivities,consensuscanonlybeaboutproceduresthatarecompatiblewith
differentsetsofvaluesbutthatdonotthemselvesimplyformsoflife,assubstantivevaluesdo.
24.Ibid.,13.
25.Ibid.,6264.

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26.Ibid.,1819.
27.Ibid.,810."Thecoreofasociety...isthepatternednormativeorderthroughwhichthelifeofapopulationiscollectivelyorganized...[T]heenforcementofa
normativesystemseemsinherentlylinkedtothecontrol...ofsanctionsexercisedbyandagainstapeopleactuallyresidingwithinaterritory"(Parsons,Societies.
EvolutionaryandComparativePerspectives[EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1966]).
28.See"OntheConceptofInfluence,"418,wherehedistinguishesbetweenassociationalbases,inevitablyparticularistic,andnormreference,tendingtoward
universality.
29.Parsons,TheSystem,93.
30."FullCitizenshipfortheNegroAmerican?,"253.ThewholeanalysisofthecitizenshipcomplexrepeatedlydrawsontheworkofT.H.Marshall,Class,
CitizenshipandSocialDevelopment(NewYork:Doubleday,1964).SeealsoTheSystem,2022,8283.
31.Parsons,TheSystem,21seealsoLuhmann,Grundrechte,passim.
32.Cf."FullCitizenshipfortheNegroAmerican?,"260,andTheSystem,21.
33.QuiteintheHegeliansenseofthistermsee"FullCitizenshipfortheNegroAmerican?,"260.Weagreewiththisconceptionofrightsasinstitutionalizinga
differentiatedcivilsocietyaswellasitsinfluenceoverthestate(throughpoliticalsociety),butwebelievethatcertainkindsofsocialrights(suchascollective
bargaining)playthesamerolewithrespecttotheeconomy.
34.Parsons,TheSystem,83.
35.Parsons,"PolityandSociety:SomeGeneralConsiderations,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure,507.
36.Parsons,TheSystem,110.
37.DemocraticparticipationineconomiclifeisindeedrepeatedlyrejectedseeTheSystem,103,and"PolityandSociety,"500502.
38.Parsons,TheSystem,2426.Foranearlieranddifferentdefinitionofsolidaritythatdidnotadequatelydistinguishitfrompower,seeTalcottParsons,Economy
andSociety(NewYork:FreePress,1956),49.
39.Parsons,"ThePoliticalAspectofSocialStructureandProcess,"334,340.
40.Ibid.,336.
41.Parsons,"'Voting'andtheEquilibriumoftheAmericanPoliticalSystem,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure,214,217218.
42.Ibid.,220.
43.Parsons,"PolityandSociety,"503.
44.Parsons,"OntheConceptofInfluence,"416,418.
45.Parsons,TheSystem,14,27seealsothethreeessaysonpower,influence,andvaluecommitmentsinPoliticsandSocialStructure.

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46.SeeParsons,EconomyandSociety,49,wherethisviewismostexplicitlyexpressed.
47.Parsons,TheSystem,14.
48.Parsons,"OntheConceptofInfluence,"410"OntheConceptofValueCommitment,"363.
49.Isitbackedupbyanultimatereferenceto"intrinsicpersuaders,"informationcapableofdeterminingwheretheinterestoftheotherlies?(See"OntheConceptof
Influence,"416.)Thisidea,laterrejected(422423),wouldagainbringinfluenceclosetothemodelofmoneyandpower,whichactinframeworksofobjectifiable
interestsandtherelevantsanctions.Isitbackedupbythepossibilityofjustificationintermsofnormsregardedasbindingon"ego"and''alter"both(417)?Oristhe
ultimatereferencepointthereputationandprestigeofinfluentialpeoplerootedinaGemeinschafttypesolidarity?
50.Parsons,"ThePoliticalAspectofSocialStructureandProcess,"335336.
51.Parsons,"FullCitizenshipfortheNegroAmerican?,"260"'Voting'andtheEquilibriumoftheAmericanPoliticalSystem,"208209"ThePoliticalAspectof
SocialStructureandProcess,"339.
52.TheproblemisavoidedinanillusorywaywhenParsons,relyingonthearchitectonicofhissystem,linkstheeconomytothe"latency"subsystemrepresentedby
householdsratherthantothesocietalcommunityrepresentedbythepublic.(Whyisthefamilynotpartofthesocietalcommunitywhenelsewhereitistreatedasa
paradigmaticformofassociation?)Ofcourse,anentirelyindividualisticaccesstotheeconomyisatendencyoftheideallaissezfairemarket,buttheexistenceof
unions,cooperatives,andprofessionalassociations,whichhebringsinelsewhere,speaksagainstthistrend.
53.Parsons,"ThePoliticalAspectofSocialStructureandProcess,"340.
54.Parsons,PoliticsandSocialStructure,500ff.,512.
55.Parsons,TheSystem,109111.
56.Ibid.,114.
57.Ibid.,93.
58.Ibid.,97,106107.
59.SeeParsons,"FullCitizenshipfortheNegroAmerican?,"285288.Inthiscontextatleast,Parsonsseesthatthemovementformincontemporarysocietiesneed
notmeanonlyfundamentalism,butcanalsomeantheactualizationofuniversalisticnormativepotentials(herethepremisesofthedemocraticrevolution)inamanner
capableofformingparticularidentities.
60.Inthiscontext,G.AlmondandS.VerbagofurtherthanParsonsbutnotfarenough.SeeTheCivicCulture(Boston:LittleBrown,1965).Theexperienceof
fascistandcommunistmassmovementswasclearlyformativeforthewholegenerationofpostwarpluralists.
61.SeeParsons,"TheDistributionofPowerinAmericanSociety,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure.

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62.Parsons,TheSystem,102.
63.SeeParsons,"TheDistributionofPower."
64.Ibid.,198,and"TheMassMediaandtheStructureofAmericanSociety,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure,251.
65.Parsons,"TheMassMedia,"248250.
66.Ibid.,244.
67.Parsons,TheSystem,117.
68.TalcottParsons,"LawasanIntellectualStepchild,"SociologicalInquiry47,nos.34(1977):1157.SeealsohisreviewofR.M.Unger,LawinModern
Society(NewYork:FreePress,1976),inLawandSocietyReview12,no.1(Fall1978):145149.
69.Fromthepointofviewofhissystembuilding,heidentifiesfour"absolutisms"threateningourunderstanding(andperhapsthesurvival)ofmodernlaw:economic
absolutisminMarxandFriedmanpoliticalabsolutisminWebermoralabsolutisminBellahandlegalabsolutisminUnger.Bothwithinhissystematicsandin
relationshiptoUnger'scommunitarianassumptions,itwouldhavebeenbettertospeakinthelastcaseoftheabsolutizationofthedimensionofsocialintegration,which
inturncouldleadtodedifferentiation,thetraditionalizationofthesocietalcommunity,andthedisappearanceoflawinthemodernsense.See"LawasanIntellectual
Stepchild,"1315,16,26,31,33,and44.ThethesesconcerningpoliticalandeconomicabsolutismanticipateHabermas'sconceptionofthecolonizationofthelife
world,whilethoseofmoralandlegalabsolutismanticipateourcritiqueofdemocraticfundamentalism(seechapter8).
70.Indeed,heprotestsagainsttheverypossibilitywhen,forexample,heinsiststhatUngerexaggeratesthedifficultiesoflegalautonomyinpostliberalsocieties(ibid.,
40ff.).
71.HelamentsthatUngerusesonlythedichotomousconceptionofstateandsociety,withoutclearlynotingthatthispositionleaveshimwithoutafootholdtocriticize
botheconomicandpoliticalreductionoflaw,drivinghimtostresstraditionalcomponentsofsocietyagainstmodernity(ibid.,37).
72.Ibid.,42.
73.Foranexcellentcomparisonoftherelevantviewsofthethree,seeNorbertoBobbio,"GramsciandtheConceptofCivilSociety,"inJ.Keane,ed.,CivilSociety
andtheState.NewEuropeanPerspectives(London:Verso,1988).ItisnotimplausibletoarguethatGramsciderivedhisnotionfromtheMarxofThe18th
BrumaireofLouisBonaparte,asdoesPerryAndersonin"TheAntinomiesofAntonioGramsci,"NewLeftReview,no.100(November1976January1977):5
78.ThesomewhatidiosyncraticstatusofthispositioninMarx'soeuvreandGramsci'suseofatransformedversionofHegel'scorporatedoctrinespeakagainstthis
interpretation.Butthegreatinfluenceofthe18thBrumaireonGramsci'sconceptionisundeniable.
74.Weshouldperhapsnotethatdisinterestinorskepticismconcerningthetransformationofexistingeconomicrelationswasobviouslynotoneofthese

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reasons.SeeA.Arato,"CivilSociety,History,andSocialism:ReplytoJohnKeane,"PraxisInternational9,nos.12(AprilJuly1989):133152.
75.AntonioGramsci,PrisonNotebooks(NewYork:InternationalPublishers,1971),235238.
76.Ibid.,160.
77.UndertheinfluenceofSorel(viaCroce),Gramscibelievedthat"thenew"thatneededtobebornwas,ifnotamyth,thenaunifiedworldviewthatcouldprovide
meaningandorientationtocollectiveaction.ForGramsci,thisnewculturewasavailableinthetheoryofMarxism,butithadtobebuiltintopracticethroughthe
organizationofasetofcounterinstitutions,associations,culturalforms,etc.,ontheterrainofcivilsociety.Inotherwords,workingclasshegemonyandasocialistcivil
societyhadtobedevelopedontheterrainofcivilsocietytocounterthedyingliberalandreligiousmodelsofthepastandtoformthemassesintoaclassconscious
collectiveactor.ForadiscussionofthedifferencesbetweenGramsciandCroceoncivilsociety,seeWalterL.Adamson,"GramsciandthePoliticsofCivilSociety,"
PraxisInternational7,nos.34(Winter19871988):322.
78.Anderson,"TheAntinomiesofAntonioGramsci,"seemsthemostreliableguidethroughGramsci'sterminologicalshifts.Analternativeapproach,muchlesswell
motivatedbutneverthelessquiteplausible,isthatofChristineBuciGlucksmanninGramsciandtheState(London:LawrenceandWishart,1980)shearguesthat
Gramscioperatedwithtwoconceptsofthestate:"thestateinthestrictsense"and"theintegralstate,''thelatterincludingcivilandpoliticalsociety,theformer
excludingcivilsociety.WhilethissuggestionwouldcorrespondtoHegel'sdistinctionbetween"politicalstate"and"state,"itwouldnotsolveallterminologicaland
theoreticalproblems.Terminologically,wewouldstillhavenowayofaccountingforthetimesGramsciclaimsanidentitybetweencivilsocietyandstate.Theoretically,
itremainsdifficulttofixtheboundariesof"stateintheintegralsense."Interestingly,inanapparentlylaterinterpretation,BuciGlucksmannseemstooptforahistoricist
solution,accordingtowhichthedifferentiationofcivilsocietyandthestatecorrespondstoliberalcapitalism(orGramsci'sdepictionthereof),whilethenotionofthe
integralstatedepictsstateinterventionistcapitalism.SeeChristineBuciGlucksmann,"HegemonyandConsent:aPoliticalStrategy,"inA.ShowstackSassoon,ed.,
ApproachestoGramsci(London:WritersandReadersCooperativeSociety,1982).Thisargument,likeallconsistentfusionarguments,isopentoAnderson's
objectionthatitcloudsthedifferencebetweenliberaldemocraticandauthoritariancapitalistsystems.
79.Theissueisnotonlyterminological,however.Ifcivilsocietyisunderstoodincontrasttothestate,theninGramsci'sfunctionalschemebothhegemonyand
dominationwouldappearasfunctionsofasystemofreproductionrootedintheeconomicbase.Ifcivilsocietyandpoliticalsocietyareunderstoodasbothbeing
withinthestate,thenhegemonyanddominationwouldbeunderstoodasfunctionsofthestate.ItisthislatterpossibilitythatguidesAlthusser'sinterpretationin
"IdeologyandtheIdeologicalStateApparatuses,"inLeninandPhilosophy(NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1971).

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80.WalterAdamsonrejectsBobbio'sinterpretation,arguingthatGramscididnotassignprimacytothesuperstructurebutratherretainedtheideaoftheprimacyof
theeconomicinthetraditionalMarxistwaywhilealteringitsroleinthetheoryofrevolution.Heinsistsonthis,ofcourse,tocounterthechargeofidealism.However,if
thekeytograspingrevolutionarypossibilitiesbecamethe"essentiallyculturalpoliticalanalysisofhegemonyandcounterhegemonywithinthesuperstructuresofcivil
society"("GramsciandthePoliticsofCivilSociety,"323),thenitishardtoseetheprimacyoftheeconomicatwork.Theirrelevancyofthebase/superstructuremodel
aswellasthematerialist/idealistoppositionisthemoreconvincingconclusion(ibid.,320339).
81.Onemightobjectthat,evenifweaccepttheideathatonthewholeGramscidifferentiatesbetweencivilsocietyandstate,thisneednotimplythatconsentand
coercion,hegemonyanddomination,canbestrictlydifferentiatedalongthesameaxes.Someinterpretersinsistthat,ingeneral,Gramsciinvolvesthestateinthe
generationofhegemony.SeeCarlBoggs,TheTwoRevolutions:AntonioGramsciandtheDilemmasofWesternMarxism(Boston:SouthEndPress,1984),
191192.AndersonrefinesthispointbyclaimingthatGramscirealized(orshouldhave)that,while(legitimate)coercionisabsentfromcivilsociety,thestateand,in
particular,theparliamentencompassbothcoercionandconsent("TheAntinomiesofAntonioGramsci,"3132,41).Inourview,thisideawouldbebestarticulated
bystressingtheHegelianconceptofmediatinginstitutionsbetweencivilsocietyandstate.BothBoggsandAndersonseemtorealizethatGramsci'stheoryof
differentiationistoorigidandhastoofewterms.
82.OurconcerninthischapterisnotwiththedetailsortrajectoryoftheMarxianprojectbutwiththeconceptionofcivilsocietyasdevelopedwithinthatframework,
inthemostopenandleastdogmaticform.Itshouldbekeptinmind,then,thatGramsci'smainconcernwasproletarianrevolutionandthecreationofasocialist
society.Accordingly,hisentireanalysisisframedwithinthegeneralparadigmoftheMarxianclasstheoryandgearedtothestrategicquestionsflowingfromthe
revolutionaryproject,namely,howtodevelopworkingclassconsciousness,asocialistcounterhegemony,and,ultimately,workingclasspower.Indeed,Gramsci's
Marxistorthodoxypreventedthismostinterestingofalltherevisionistsfromdevelopingtheresultsofhisdouble"declarationofindependence"ofcivilsocietyfromthe
economyandthestate.ForwhileGramscidiscoveredboththemodernassociationalformsofcivilsocietyandtheautonomyofitscoordinatingmechanisms(consent),
therebydifferentiatingbetweenwhatisnowcalledsocialandsystemintegration,hepersistedinviewingtheformerasinstrumentaltothelatter.Heinterpretsthe
dynamicsandlogicofsocialintegrationthroughthetheoryofclassstruggleandthegoalofworkingclassrevolutionanapproachthatblindedhimtothedifference
betweenthecommunicativeandstrategiccoordinationofinteraction.Ofcourse,Gramsciunderstoodthatthemarketeconomyandthestateareintegratedthrough
mechanismsorganizedbymoneyandpowerandthatcivilsociety,onthecontrary,iscoordinatedthroughcommunicativemeansofgeneratingconsent.Buthe
understoodcommunicativeinteractioninprimarilystrategicterms.This

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orientationenabledhimtoseetheunderside,asitwere,of"masscommunications"andtopinpointthewaysinwhichdominantoraspiringclassesseekto
manipulateandcreateopinionfavorabletotheirprojects.But,asweshallsee,itlockedhimintoafunctionalistanalysisofcommunicativeinteractionandofcivil
society,posinggreatdifficultiesforhisoveralltheoreticalanalysis.
83.AnotherkeydifferencebetweenGramsciandHegel,linkedtotheformer'santistatism,isthatGramscidenudesthestateoftheethicalsubstanceattributedtoitby
Hegel.Thestate,forGramsci,integratesprimarilyonthebasisofpoweranddominationitsweaponsareaboveallcoercive.Civilsocietybecomestheterrainpar
excellenceofethicallifeitisthelocusofpoliticallegitimacyor,inGramscianlanguage,theplacewherethehegemonysofunctionaltothereproductionofstate
power(aswellasofthepowerofthedominantclass)isgeneratedandsecured.SeeAdamson,"GramsciandthePoliticsofCivilSociety,"322.
84.Gramsci,PrisonNotebooks,259hereisamotivation,visvisHegel,toseparatecivilsocietyfromtheeconomy.TheirrelativefusionwasforGramscia
medievalremnantinHegel,totheextentthatmodernassociationsneednotbeorganizedexclusivelyalongeconomiclines.
85.Ibid.,268cf.AlexisdeTocqueville,TheOldRegimeandtheFrenchRevolution(NewYork:Doubleday,1955).
86.Ibid.,54.
87.Ibid.,245seeBobbio,"GramsciandtheConceptofCivilSociety,"95.
88.Thisisoneofthecontextsinwhichdominationandhegemony,theformsofcontrolcharacteristicofpoliticalandcivilsociety,arebothpresentedasinstrumentsof
thesamestatepower.Clearly,functionalistargumentsconvergewiththeonescharacterizedbyaresidualandinvertedhistoricalmaterialism.
89.Gramsci,PrisonNotebooks,54,265.
90.AdamsonseesthecentralantinomyinGramsciasbeingbetweenconceptionsofcivilsocietyasopenendeddemocraticcompetitionandfreecommunicationand
asthespacewithinwhichoneunitaryandunifiedculturecanbereplacedbyanother("GramsciandthePoliticsofCivilSociety,"331332).Whilewearenot
convincedthatGramsci'sworkcontainsacommunicationmodel,wetakeAdamson'sposingofthisissueasbasicallysound.Wedividetheoneantinomyintotwo,
though:ontheanalyticallevel,betweenfunctionalistandconflictorientedmodelsandonthenormativelevel,betweenunitaryandpluralistutopias.
91.Gramsci,PrisonNotebooks,265.
92.SeeBobbio,"GramsciandtheConceptofCivilSociety,"92.CarlBoggs,too,hopestolocatethefoundationsforsuchpoliticsinGramsci,butheisforcedto
admitambiguitiesandinternalcontradictionsallalongtheway.SeethelasttwochaptersinTheTwoRevolutions.
93.ThefirstisstressedbyAnderson,thesecondbyAdamsonintheircitedarticles.Adamson'spositionissupportedbyJ.Femia,Gramsci'sPoliticalThought

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(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1981).WebelievethatbothpositionsarepresentinGramsci'sworkandthathenevernoticedtheirincompatibility.
94.SeeAnderson,"TheAntinomiesofGramsci,"69andFemia,Gramsci'sPoliticalThought,esp.chap.6.OutsideofItaly,fewhavearguedthatGramsci
replacedarevolutionarystrategyofseizingpowerwithoneofbuildinganalternativestructureofhegemonyandthusanewcivilsociety.However,thosewhoare
interestedintheradicaldemocraticdimensionofhisthoughtarerarelyconsciousofthecontradictionofthisdimension,notonlywiththeLeninismthattheyallseebut
withthedoctrineoftherevolutionaryseizureofpowerunderliberaldemocracies.
95.Moreover,eventhoughGramsciknewthat"bourgeoiscivilsociety,"securedbysetsofrightssuchasfreespeech,assembly,andassociation,wastheconditionof
possibilityfortheemergenceofproletarianformsoforganizationandculturalexpression,forhimthissimplymeantashiftinthebattlefieldfromthestatetosociety,not
thattherewasanythingintheinstitutionalorjuridicalmakeupofexistingversionsofcivilsocietythatwasworthpreserving.
96.Thisistrueonlyifanotherfunctionalism,reducingcivilsocietytoafunctionofthereproductionoftheeconomicbase,isavoided.ItseemstousthatGramsci,
unlikesomeofhisfollowers,neverfellintothisversionofMarxistfunctionalism.
97.Gramsci,PrisonNotebooks,242.
98.Ibid.,247.
99.Ibid.,268.
100.Ibid.,253.OnthispointseeAnneShowstackSassoon,Gramsci'sPolitics(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1987),224225.
101.Indeed,Marxthoughtthattheexistenceofcivilsocietyandofthestateasdifferentiatedentitieswasthecauseof,oridenticalto,politicalalienation.Henever
articulatedaprojectforreconstituting,democratizing,orpreservinganyversionofcivilsociety.SeeCohen,ClassandCivilSociety.
102.Gramsci,PrisonNotebooks,263.
103.ThiscriticismisdevelopedbyCorneliusCastoriadisinseveralimportantworks.See,forexample,TheImaginaryInstitutionofSociety(Cambridge:MIT
Press,1987).
104.Gramsci,PrisonNotebooks,263.
105.Ibid.268.
106.Gramscideliberatelymakesnoconcessionstoliberalismwithrespecttothisquestion.SeePrisonNotebooks,263.
107.ThepostulateisultimatelylinkedtoGramsci'sunderlyingMarxistorthodoxy,for,whilehisthreepartmodelisasheterodoxashisrejectionofhistorical
materialism,heneverabandonstheclasstheory.Thus,hedefendsapluralisticconceptionofcollectiveactionandabroadsystemofclassalliances(andacomplex
modeloftheassociationallifeofcivilsociety)asthestrategytobepursuedenroutetosocialisthegemony,butoncethathegemonyisachieved,he

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picturestheassociations,institutions,andnormsofthenewcivilsocietyasbeingasmonolithic,onedimensional,andfunctionalasthoseofitsbourgeois
predecessor.
108.Withoutanexpertadministrationrelievingasocietyoftimeconstraints,asocietycannotbesimultaneouslymodernanddemocratic.Thus,theideaofabolishing
thestateisincompatiblewithdemocracyforfunctionalreasons.
109.AversionofthisinterpretationcanbefoundinAdamson,"GramsciandthePoliticsofCivilSociety,"331.AdamsonarguesthatthemainantinomyinGramsci's
thoughtisbetween(1)aconceptionofcivilsocietyasthepublicspaceoutsidethestateinwhichorganizationscouldbedemocratizedandtherecouldexistfree
communicationamongamultiplicityofsocialpartiesand(2)atotalizing,unitaryculturalmodelorworldview(MarxismasSittlichkeit).Thelatterwouldsupposedly
solvethecrisisofcultureinawaythatisdistinctlyantipluralisticandwouldreplacethealienationandmeaninglessnessofbourgeoiscivilsocietywitha"coherent,
unitary,nationallydiffusedconceptionoflifeandman,"aphilosophythathasbecomea"culture."Inthissense,asAdamsoncorrectlynotes,thepoliticsofcivilsociety
wouldbeclosed.ButAdamsonseemstohavelittlegroundtoarguethatthecentralcategoryofGramsci'sreconstructionofcivilsocietyisthatofthepublicsphere,
andheerrsinreadingGramsci'sconceptofhegemony,oftheorganizationofconsent,throughthelensofHabermas'sconceptofcommunicativeinteraction(331
333).ForGramsci,communication,culture,andintellectuallifearealwayslinkedtosomestrategicpurposeindeed,itispreciselythenormsofthepublicsphereand
thenotionofcommunicationanddiscussionorientedtorationalargumentthatGramsciexplicitlyrejects.Theconceptofhegemonyisthealternativetothis"bourgeois"
ideologyofneutrality.
110.Althusser,"IdeologyandtheIdeologicalStateApparatuses,"142ff.andnote7.
111.Hedoesnotevenbothertotrytoshowwhatcertainlycannotbeshownthattheyallrepresent"apparatuses"(i.e.,bureaucratic,administrativemechanisms).
112.Althusser,"IdeologyandtheIdeologicalStateApparatuses,"146.
113.Ibid.,148ff.Ofcourse,onecouldabandontheargumentthatcivilsociety'sfunctionistoreproducethepowerofthestate(apointatleastplausibleforpolitical,
legal,andeducationalinstitutions)andarguethatcivilsocietybelongstothestructureofthestate(implausibleforallbuteducationalinstitutions)andthusmaintainthat
itsfunction,togetherwithrepressiveinstitutions,istohelpreproducethewholesystem.Althusserneverattemptsthisempiricallyquestionableconceptualstrategy.
114.Ibid.,149.
115.BuciGlucksmann(GramsciandtheState,66)notesanantinomybetweenconflicttheoreticalandfunctionalistpositionsinAlthusser,whoinfactonlyrarely
leavesthefunctionalistperspective,withoutseemingtonoticeitinGramsci,whosewholeperspectiveischaracterizedbythisdualistictension.

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116.Anderson,"TheAntinomiesofAntonioGramsci,"35ff.
117.Ibid.,3536.AndersondoesnotnoticewhatmighthavebeenAlthusser'smainmotivationforthemove.Inallstatesocialistsocieties,especiallytheSoviet
UnionandChina,socialinstitutionswerefarmoreconsistentlystatizedthanunderfascism,astateofaffairsthatbroughtonsomeofGramsci'shesitantcriticisms.Ifwe
pronouncesocialinstitutionstobepartofthestateapparatusintheWest,too,acriticalvantagepointvisvistheexistingsocialismswouldhavetobesurrendered,
andthepoliticsoftheFrenchCommunistpartyratherthantheEurocommunistpartieswouldbeconfirmed.Anderson'sreferenceinthiscontexttotheChinesecultural
revolutionisincomprehensible.
118.Ibid.,3134.Unfortunately,afterhavingearlierdistinguishedbetweenincludingcivilsocietyinthestateandidentifyingthetwo(veryrareinGramsci),Anderson
seemstogoaheadandidentifythetwooptions.TheharshnessofhiscritiqueofAlthusseristosomeextentlinkedtothisslip.
119.Ibid.,22.Alltheworse,inthegivencontext,Anderson'spointofreferencewastheSovietUnion,whichheviewedasa(deformed?)workers'state.
120.Ibid.,4446.
121.Ibid.,2729.
122.Ibid.,28.
123.Althusser,too,thoughtforamomenttostressparliamentsinthisway,beforesettlingonhisowncandidateforideologicalprimacyunderadvancedcapitalism,
namely,educationalinstitutions.See"IdeologyandtheIdeologicalStateApparatuses,"152155.
124.IntheperiodJanuaryApril1969(!),Althusserwasabletopointonlytotheresistanceofafewisolated,heroicteacherswhoindreadfulconditionsmanagedto
teachagainstthegrainoftheprevailingideology(ibid.,157).
125.Anderson,"TheAntinomiesofAntonioGramsci,"28.
126.Ibid.,71.
127.Bobbio,"GramsciandtheConceptofCivilSociety,"8890.
128.Ibid.,9293.
129.Ibid.,9495.
130.SeeespeciallyWhichSocialism?[1976](Oxford:PolityPress,1987)andTheFutureofDemocracy[1984](Oxford:PolityPress,1987).Evenhere,though,
wedonotfindacriticismofGramsci'sviewsof"regulatedsociety."ThesearesuppliedbyBobbio'sBritisheditor,RichardBellamy,intheintroductiontoWhich
Socialism?
131.Bobbio,WhichSocialism?,43.Seealsopage66foramoredetaileddiscussionoftheprinciplesofmajorityrule,etc.Oddlyenough,inthislatteressay,Bobbio
dropsthenotionofcontrolfrombelowinhisdefinition.
132.Ibid.,99.

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133.Bobbio,TheFutureofDemocracy,2425.Thedefinitionprovidedonpages1920ofthiswork,apparentlystilllaterinorigin,isagainlessprocedural,butit
alsobreakswiththeclassicalmodelofBobbio'searlierwritingsbyfocusingoninterestaggregationandcompromise.Itisnotobvious,however,whythislattermodel
needstobeconnectedtoformallydemocraticinstitutionsatall,andthusitcertainlycannotbeusedtodefinetheseinstitutions.
134.Comparepages2526ofTheFutureofDemocracywithpages114116.
135.Ibid.,2736.Unfortunately,thislistisratherheterogeneous.Pluralismisnotsomuchabrokenpromiseofindividualismasanalternativetheoryandpromiseof
democracy,goingbacktoMontesquieuandespeciallyTocqueville.Andthereneverwasapromiseineithertheclassicalorliberaltraditionsofextendingdemocracy
beyondpolitics.Thisissuecomesuponlyintheworksofthecriticsofthesedemocraticmodels,especiallytheutopians,theMarxists,andtheanarchists.
136.Ibid.,40.
137.Ibid.,4142.
138.Bobbioinsiststhatthesituationisevenworseinexisting"socialist"societies(WhichSocialism?,75).
139.Ibid.,101.
140.Bobbio,TheFutureofDemocracy,5254.
141.Ibid.,5051.
142.Evenwithinterestgroupbargainingformallymadepublic,therealdecisionscouldoccurinsecret,insmokefilledroomsasitwere.Here,asecondchamber
wouldbenodifferentthanthefirst.Butinbothcases,representativesofthepartiesorinterestgroupswouldalsobeforcedtoarticulatetheirpositionsinsuchaway
thattheycouldbepubliclyjustified.Weholdthatthisrequirementaltersconsiderablythepositionsandbargainsthatemerge.Ofcourse,Bobbiomightanswerthat
whiletherepresentativesofthepartywouldhavetojustifytheirviewstothewholesociety,therepresentativesofinterestgroupswouldonlyhavetodosofortheir
owngroups.Butpoliticalpartiesalsoappealtospecificconstituencies,whiletheneedtojustifydecisionstoone'sowninterestgroupcoulditselfrepresentan
importantgainoverpresentarrangementsinmanycountries.
143.Bobbio,TheFutureofDemocracy,5455.
144.Ibid.,56.
145.Ibid.,62.
146.Ibid.,57.
147.Ibid.
148.Seeespeciallyibid.,page105,whereheclearlyreturnstoaMarxianandliberaltwopartmodel.
149.Ibid.,69,77.

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150.Allthatislefthereofsocialisminthetraditionalsenseisahesitantcallforeconomicdemocracyandamoredeterminedargumentforanewsocialcontractthatis
tosolvetheproblemofjusticealongthelinessuggestedbyRawls.SeeTheFutureofDemocracy,chap.6.
Chapter4
1.InparticularinTheOriginsofTotalitarianism[1951],2ded.(NewYork:MeridianBooks,1958hereaftercitedasOT)TheHumanCondition(Chicago:
UniversityofChicagoPress,1958hereafterHC)OnRevolution[1963](NewYork:PenguinBooks,1977hereafterOR)andtheessay"TheCrisisin
Culture"[1960],inBetweenPastandFuture(NewYork:Meridian,1963hereafter"Crisis").
2.JrgenHabermas,"WalterBenjamin:ConsciousnessRaisingorRedemptiveCriticism,"inPhilosophicalPoliticalProfiles(Cambridge:MITPress,1983).
3.ItisnotparticularlyimportantinthepresentcontextthatArendthastwoverydifferentconceptionsofthesocial,thefirstbasedonthatofanaturalandeven
prehumanpropensityforassociation(HC,2324)andthesecond,thedominantview,havingtodowithaspecificallymoderncreationoutofpreexistinginstitutional
components.Whilemostofthetimethetwoconceptionsarereconcilable,attimesastressonthefirstleadstothepeculiarconceptionofthemodernsocialrealmas
theinvasionofpoliticallifebyanaturalprinciple.
4.HC,198.
5.Ibid.,50ff.,176179.
6.Ibid.,198.
7.Ibid.,200.
8.OR,75.
9.HC,26andnote9.
10.ThesetwostressesaredifferentinhermajorworksHCreliesprimarilyontherhetoricaldramaturgicalmodel,whileOR'sstressisonbindingandpromising.
UnlikeHabermas,Arendtneverrealizedthattwodifferentmodelsofactionareatstake.Bothmodelsinvolvemutualrecognition:Thefirstentailsrecognitionofeach
other'suniquepersonalitythesecond,mutualrecognitionasequalmembersofasolidarypoliticalcommunity.Indeed,bothpresupposethenormofequality,albeitin
differentways:Thefirstpresupposesequalityinthesenseofequalconcernandrespectforeachindividual'suniquenessthesecond,equalityinthesenseofequal
membershipandparticipationinthepoliticalcommunity.Arendtneveradequatelydistinguishedbetweenthesemodelsofactionbecauseshelocatedthembothina
singlepublicsphere:theGreekpolis.
11.AccordingtoArendt,thetwoareincreasinglydifferentiatedhistorically,yieldingineffecttwomodalitiesofaction(HC,2627).Onceagain,however,Arendtis
opentotheobjectionthatsheseespowerasaconstitutiveconditionofallformsofstableruleseeOnViolence(NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1969),
41ff.Attimes,thisessaydoesseemtorestrictpowertoonecomponentof

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rule:generatingconsent,orachievinglegitimacybygeneratingconsent(seeHabermas,"HannahArendt:OntheConceptofPower,"inPhilosophicalPolitical
Profiles).Butwhatevertheambiguitiesconcerninghergeneralconceptsofactionandpower,Arendt'stheoryofthepublicsphereisanexplicitlyhistoricalone,
consciouslyrelyingontheancientrepublicsastheoriginalmodelsthatremain,inthisrespectatleast,unsurpassable.
12.ThisisobviouslynotanimpossiblerenderingofAristotle'stakingaturnbetweenrulingandbeingruled.
13.Butsincethepublicsphereiscapableofprocessingonlyopinionratherthanknowledge,andsincetheideaofanirreducibleoriginalpluralityofopinionsexcludes
thepossibilityofpreexistingnormativeconsensus,itisunclearonwhatgroundsindividualscouldbepersuadedinthismodel,whichhasdifficultygoingbeyondtheart
ofrhetoric.Theproblemislinkedtoanotheroneconcerningthegoalsofpubliclifeanddeliberation.
14.HC,194195.
15.Thisgoalhasneverbeenfulfilled,accordingtoArendt,noteveninAmerica.Constitutionalgovernmenthasatbestconfinedthepursuitofobjectivesthatare,in
herview,apoliticalorprepoliticalwithinaframeworkoffundamentalrightsandtheruleoflaw.Itthereforeremainsunclearwhatthepurposeofanalready
institutionalizedpublicspherewouldbe,asidefromthecontinualgenerationofpowerneededtokeepitinexistence.Evenmoreunclearishowthispurposeistobe
fulfilledbyindividualswhodonothaveanygroundsformutualpersuasion.
16.Arendtisnotconsistentwhendescribingtheprivateworldintermsofuniquenessanddifference,sinceinhermodeltheopinionoftheprivaterealmis
homogeneousandunified(HC,3940).Thus,onthismodel,onlythemaleheadofthehousehold,asaproductoftheprivatesphere,isthetruerepresentativeofthe
principleofdifferencevisvisotherheadsofhouseholds.Norissheconsistentindefendingintimacyastheuniqueachievementofthemodern(bourgeois,nuclear)
formofthefamilywhileremainingsilentaboutthenonegalitarian,patriarchalrelationswithinthisformthatconflictwiththeachievementoftrueintimacy.Theproblem
liesinArendt'suncriticaladoptionofthestandardrepublicaninsistenceontheonetooneinstitutionalembodimentoftheprinciplesofprivateandpublic,literally
identifiedasthedomesticvs.thepoliticalsphere.This,togetherwithheranalysisoftheemergenceofsocietyintermsofaneruptionofneeds,interests,and
"householdconcerns"outoftheprivatesphere,hasbeenrightlycriticizedbyfeministtheoristsasagendered,patriarchalsetofdichotomiespredicateduponthe
exclusionofwomenand"their"concerns(nature,life,needs,interests)fromapublicrealmthatwouldbetheterrainonlyofcivilvirtue.SeeJeanElshtain,PublicMan,
PrivateWoman(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1981),andJoanLandes,WomenandthePublicSphereintheAgeoftheFrenchRevolution(Ithaca:
CornellUniversityPress,1988),onthepatriarchalpresuppositionsofrepublicanthought.Ourpointhereistoclaimnotthattheabstractdistinctionsbetweenpublic
andprivate,autonomyandpoliticalfreedom,intimacyandpublicity,areinthem

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selvesobjectionablebutratherthatthemoreconcreteinstitutionalandnormativeinterpretationoftheseinstitutionsadoptedbyArendtfromrepublicanthought
restsonagenderedsubtextandisattheheartofhercontradictoryanalysisofprivacyandthesocialandofheramazingnaivetregardingtheexclusionofinterests
andneedsfromthepurviewofthepublicsphere.
17.HC,3031.
18.Ibid.,6165,71.Eveninthistext,Arendtnotesthe"nonprivative"aspectsofprivacyyetonewouldbehardputtoimagineanyone'suniquepersonality(apart
frompotentialheadsofhouseholds)beingnurturedintheoikos.
19.OT,301.Itisstrikingthat,unlikeHabermas,Arendtneverquestionswhethertheprivatespheremightnotbeorganizedonsomeotherprinciple,i.e.,accordingto
egalitariannorms.Thisisallthemoresurprisingsincethemodernfamilyformisnotbasedonthepresenceof"strangers"servants,domestics,slavesandhence
couldinprinciple(andindeedthisisitsprinciple,ifnotitspractice)beorganizedinanegalitarianway.Nordoessheeverquestionthespecificcontentofthecivic
virtueshesopraisesasthespecificvalueofthepublicsphere.Inrepublicanthought,however,thisalwaystranslatedintotheconceptofthecitizensoldierwhosecore
virtueswerehonor,glory,andpatriotism,thewillingnesstofightandtosacrificeprivateforpublicinterestsandthecommongood.
20.OR,252.
21.HC,2829.Actually,hercritiquebeganwiththatofthemodelofthenationstateinOT.Atthattime,Arendtalreadysawthismodelasoneofthedeclineof
genuinepolitics,inthesenseofrenderingimpossibletheconstructionofequalityundertheruleoflaw.Shedidnot,inthisearlierwork,criticizecivilsocietyintheform
oftheriseofamixedsocialrealmindeed,shesaw,inawayreminiscentoftheyoungMarx,anincreasingdivisionbetweenstateandsocietyastheothersideofthe
absolutiststateorganizingitselfasatremendousbusinessconcern(OT,17).Theabolitionoftheboundarybetweenpublicandprivateisascribedtothespurious
claimsoftotalitarianmovements(OT,336),andthepreparationofatomizationinmasssociety(andundertotalitarianism)isattributedtothebourgeois
instrumentalizationofpolitics,tothedepoliticizationindeed,privatizationofallclassesinbourgeoissociety(OT,275).Theonlyanticipationofthelaterconceptof
thesocialcomeswhenArendtdescribestheroleofsocialconformismforthehithertopariahcasteoftheJews,whogainequalityasparvenusinthecontextof
depoliticization(OT,5256,6465).
22.HC,33.
23.WithintheframeworkofOT,thisexplanationwasinfactpresentedintermsofconceptsbelongingtothistradition,stressingthedepoliticizingconsequencesofthe
separationratherthanthefusionofpublicandprivate.
24.OT,17.
25.HC,2829.

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26.OR,252.
27.''Crisis,"199ff.
28.HC,3435.Itisquiteanotherissuethatthepoliticallifeofthemedievalestatescouldberepresentedintermsofanothermeaningofpublicity,thatofa
"representativepublic."SeeJrgenHabermas,TheStructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere(Cambridge:MITPress,1989),5ff.
29.OR,48,9091.
30.Ibid.,91.
31.Ibid.,105.
32.Ibid.,115,218.
33.Ibid.,221.
34.Ibid.,252.
35.Tocquevillediscoveredtheformsand(hethought)therootsofAmericanmasssocietybeforethetwoprocessesstressedbyArendt,massproductionandmass
immigration,evenbegan.
36.OR,139.
37.Shealsosharessomeoftheproblematicfeaturesoftheiranalyses.Mostnotably,sheusesthecategoryof"normalization"todescribeamodelofsocialintegration
andsocializationthatinvolvesinternalizingnormsinsuchawayastodeprivetheindividualofallautonomouspossibilitiesforaction(HC,4041).Evenifthis
conceptiondoescorrespondtotheassumptionsofwhatusedtobethedominant(butnevertheonlyavailable)paradigminsocializationtheory,theresulting
juxtapositionofpoliticalactionandsocialintegrationisahighlyunfortunateextensionofArendt'scritiqueofthesocial.Itgivestheimpressionthatpublicpoliticalaction
isnotinanywayorientedtowardrules,andthatorientationtowardrulescanneverbeautonomousor"postconventional."Theresultingcontrastofancientand
modernsocietythusyieldsanunacceptablereversemodernizationthesisthatunjustifiablydisregardstheroleoftradition,custom,convention,andevenlawinthe
ancientworldaswellastheMarxianconceptionofthesimultaneousriseandalienationofindividualfreedominthemodernworld.
38.HC,40.
39.OT,4345.
40.OnViolence,3839.
41.OR,269.
42.HC,203OR,105.
43.Here,ArendttendstoreproduceuncriticallyRousseau'scritiqueofsocietyand,byimplication,ofwomen.SeeJ.J.Rousseau,Emile[1762](NewYork:Dutton,
1974),book5,esp.348ff.,352ff.and"DiscourseontheSciencesandtheArts,"inR.D.Masters,ed.,TheFirstandSecondDiscourses(NewYork:St.Martin's
Press,1964).

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44.OR,105.
45."Crisis,"199HC,4041foraverydifferentview,seeReinhartKoselleck,CritiqueandCrisis:EnlightenmentandthePathogenesisofModernSociety
[1959](Cambridge:MITPress,1988).
46.OT,6465.
47.Arendttendstoreproducetherepublicancritiqueofsalonsociety,whichwaslateraimed,amongotherthings,atsilencinganddisempoweringwomen.
48.OR,7678,226228.
49.ItisworthnotingthatthetwoeventsArendtseemstocombineintoasinglelogictherevolutionarytransferofthenotionofsovereigntyfromthekingtothe
peopleandtheriseofapoliticsofinterest(i.e.,theintrusionofthepoorandtheirdemandsontothepoliticalscene)arenotlogicallyconnected.Indeed,evenArendt
separatestheminherownnarrativeinOnRevolution.Thebulkofthatbook,includingthecentralchapteronthesocialquestion,emphasizesthecollapseofnascent
republicaninstitutionsfoundedbytherevolutionaries(theruleoflaw,theNationalAssembly)inthefaceofthepressureofthesansculottesorlepeuple,whosewill
Robespierreclaimedto"represent"or,rather,embody.Thepeopleappearforthemostpartasaneedymobscreamingforbread.Inthesamecontext,Arendtenters
intoalongcritiqueofRousseau,whosebrandofrepublicanismbasedontheideasofindivisiblesovereignty,generalwill,andhatredofplurality(faction,federalism,
corporatebodies,etc.)wasinheritedbytheJacobins.ThisissupposedlytheideologicalreasonwhytheFrenchRevolutionwasdivertedfromthetaskoffounding
politicalinstitutionsandfocusedinsteadonsolvingthesocialquestionbywhatevermeansnecessary,intheprocessviolatingevenrevolutionarylegalityandstartingthe
Terror.Inthiscase,however,Arendtistooclosetothestandpointoftherevolutionaryactors(theJacobins),takingtheirideologyatfacevalue.Itshouldnotbe
forgottenthatforRousseau,thesovereignpeoplewhosewillandinterestcouldnotbedividedoralienatedwerebynomeansthemiserableorthepoororevenwage
laborers,butratheranidealizedcommunityofindependentfarmers.Thus,theunitarylogicthatArendtcorrectlycriticizesleadingfromtheking'ssovereigntytothe
indivisiblesovereigntyofthepeople,whichcannotberepresentedbutonlyembodied,whichcannotbeinstitutionalizedinoneassemblybecausenohallwillholdthem
all,andwhichleadstothelogicofsubstitutionalism,instability,competitionbetweencontendersclaimingtoembodythiswill,manipulation,plebiscitaryacclaim,and
terrorisnotthelogicofmiserygonepublic,butinsteadadilemmainherentinanymodelofradicaldemocracythatrejectsrepresentationinprinciple.Laterinher
text(240241),ArendtcorrectsherownhistoricalrecordandclaimsthatinFrance,asinAmerica,realrepublicaninstitutionswerecreatedduringthecourseofthe
revolutionandbythepeoplethemselves.Here,atlast,thepeopleappearnotasamobdemandingbreadbutascollectiveactorscreatingtheirownpolitical
institutions.ShealsoindicatesthatRobespierrecrushedthesefreespacesdevelopedbythepeoplethepopularsocieties,thesectionsofthePariscommune,the
revolutionarymunicipal

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council,theclubsinthenameof"thegreatpopularSocietyofthewholeFrenchpeople."Thisclaimisdistinctfromthoseemergencymeasuresnecessaryto
overcomediremisery.Perhapsthetwologicscametogetherhistorically,buttheyarenonethelessseparate,andinRobespierre'shandstheblurbetweenthem
madeforaconvenientideology.Arendt'sbrilliantcritiqueofbothoftheselogicsdoesnotleadhertoreflectonthepoliticaldilemmasofdirectdemocracy(what
shecalls"republicanism")becauseshesharessomeofitscorepremises,namely,therejectionofinterestrepresentationandparliamentarism.Herowncarefully
craftedpluralistic,federal,councilmodelisthussubjecttosomeofthesamedilemmasshecriticizesyetobscuresbyattributingthemtothesocialeconomic
question.
50.Theconnectionbetweenthesocialashighsocietyandastheproblemofpovertyisstillnotclear.Indeed,wearenotconvincedthatthereisaconnection.
However,onthesymboliclevelatleast,Arendtclearlysawthemasbeingconnected.Shecertainlydoesnotbelievethattheintriguesofacourtlysocietywhoseelite
isdeniedrealpoliticalpowerareuniquetotheabsolutemonarchiesoftheeighteenthcenturythecourtlylifeofmanyorientaldespotismscouldbesimilarly
described.Whatwasunique,however,andcouldbethemissinglinkonasymboliclevelbetweenthetwoextremesofherconceptofthesocial(highsocietyandthe
poor)wastheprominentandvisibleroleofwomeninboth.Afterall,womenweretheoneswhoranthesalonsofhighsocietyjustpriortotheFrenchrevolutionand
whobroughttheconcernsofthehouseholdintothepublicarenaduringthatrevolution.Therepublicanhatredoftheimmoral,false,hypocritical,unnatural,and
frivolouswaysofaristocraticsocietycametobesymbolizedbythealltoovisiblewomen(theprecieuses)ofthesalon,againstwhichthemoralisticdiscourseof
republicanismwasexplicitlyaimed.Thisdiscoursewaseasilytransformedintoacondemnationofthedisorderlyandincreasinglyvisiblerevolutionarywomeninthe
streetsandinthesectionswhenitcametimetorepressthevoicesofsocietyinthenameofrepublicanprinciples(civicvirtuefor,andresponsiblepublicactionby,
mendomesticityandprivatevirtueforwomen).Womenwerethefirsttobeexcludedfromtheradicalclubsandsections,thefirsttobesilencedbytheJacobin
dictatorship,andthemostnotableexceptiontotheuniversalrightsofmanandcitizen.Itisironicthat,whileArendtabhorsthis"republican"solutiontothesocial
question,whichofcoursequicklymovedbeyondtheexclusionofwomenfromthepublicrealmtoitsdestructionandtothedemiseofrepublicanismitself,sheshares
theverycategoriesoftherepublicandiscoursethatjustifiedtheprocess.ItisapitythathercritiqueofJacobinismdidnotencompassthisdiscoursebut,givenher
categorialframework,suchacritiquewasimpossible.SeeLandes,WomenandThePublicSphere.
51.OR,268269.
52.HC,5961,64,67(note72),7072.
53.Ibid.,126,133134.
54.Ibid.,40.

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55.Ibid.,38,50.
56.Ibid.,47,50,70.Characteristically,theArendtianmodelofintimacydoesnotassumethemodelofintersubjectiverelations,basedoncommunicationand
solidarity,thatisstressedbytheFrankfurtSchoolfromMaxHorkheimertoJrgenHabermas.Theprivateandpublicspheres,intimacynotwithstanding,arenot
organizedinastructurallyhomologousway.Rather,theyarebasedoncompetingmodelsoforganization.Thepublicsphereiscomposedofpeersandorganizedon
thebasisofegalitarianprinciplestheprivatesphereiscomposedofunequalsandorganizedontheprinciplesofpatriarchy.Asaresult,Arendthasnowayof
postulatinganycontinuitybetweenthesphereofthefamilyandthepublicsphere.Arendt'sconceptofintimacyreinforcesthenotionofawatertightseparationbetween
themthatalwaysremainsdesirableinherframework.IntimacyisimportanttoArendtbecauseitcreatesmodernindividualityandmodernliterature.Giventhe
patriarchalstructureoftheintimatesphere,however,itisclearlyonlymaleswhocanbecomefullindividualstheyaretheoneswhoarenurturedintheprivateintimate
spheretodevelopintoautonomousindividualsandthentoleaveittobecomerecognizedasindividualsinthepublicsphere.Thus,oneofthemainreasonswhythe
intimacyoftheprivatespherecannotwithstandtheonslaughtof"thesocial"i.e.,oflevelingandstatepenetrationisthattheprivatesphereitselfisinstitutionalizedin
acontradictoryway:Ontheonehand,themodernfamilyisbasedonthenormsofequality,freedom,voluntaryassociation,subjectivity,mutualrecognition,andhence
intimacyontheother,itisstructuredhierarchicallyandpredicatedonthesubjugationofwomen.
57.ThisviewdoesinfactappearinArendt'slateressayoncivildisobedience,butitdoessodespite,ratherthanonthebasisof,hercategorialframework.(See
chapter11.)Inotherwords,whileArendtisintentontherevivalofpoliticalsociety,herveryconceptionofmodernsocietypreventsherfromdevelopingTocqueville's
othercrucialcategoryandexaminingtherelationbetweencivilandpoliticalsociety.Civilsocietyappearsonlyastheprivatespherepreservedthroughindividualrights
orasmasssociety.Theassociationalcomponentsofmoderncivilsocietyareeitherignoredorinterpretedintermsofinterestgroups.
58.OR,169171.
59.Ibid.,255andpassim.
60.Ibid.,168.
61.Ibid.,179.Sheomitsrestrictionsbasedonbirthintheformofgenderorrace.
62.Ibid.,275279.
63.Ibid.,273.
64.Ibid.,232.
65.Ibid.,144.
66.Ibid.,182.

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67.Ibid.,189190.
68.Ibid.,147.
69.OT,290297.
70.Ibid.,252ff.
71.Ibid.,92,115,134,218.
72.OR,108109.
73.Ibid.,126127.
74.Ibid.,143.
75.Ibid.,32,108.
76.Ibid.,217218.
77.Ibid.,32notethephrasing.
78.Ibid.,218.
79.OT,295297.
80.ThisisthepositionArendtherselfwastotakeinCrisisinTheRepublic(NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1969)inherdiscussionofcivildisobedience,in
spiteofratherthanonthebasisofhertheoreticalframework.
81.HC,215.
82.Ibid.,215220.ThisisaplayonMarx'sformula"inbutnotofcivilsociety,"fromhis"CritiqueofHegel'sPhilosophyofRight:AnIntroduction"[1843],inKarl
MarxandFriedrichEngels,CollectedWorks,vol.2(NewYork:InternationalPublishers,1975).Thislinkhelpstoestablish,philologically,Arendt'scritiqueofthe
socialasacritiqueofcivilsociety,ifsuchaproofwereneeded.
83.OR,273275.
84.HC,219.
85.Indeed,itseemsasifArendtwantstoreplacethepartyparliamentarysystemwithafederalmodelofworkers'councilsandanefficientbutgreatlyreducedstate
administrationthefirstbeingtheproperlypoliticalspace,thesecondthespaceinwhichinterestclaimswouldbeprocessed.Civilsocietywouldbeprotectedby
individualrights,but,onthismodel,itcertainlycouldnotprotectitselfagainstthestatesinceitwouldhavenopoliticalform,nopublicrepresentativebodiesor
spokesmen,andnointernalpublicspacesdistinctfromthecouncilsthatcomprisepoliticalsociety.Civilsocietywould,inshort,behelplessnotonlyagainstthestate
administrationbutalsoagainstpoliticalsocietyitself.
86.OR,270.
87.Seechapter10.Theprewar"collectivebehavior"schoolofBlumerdidnotautomaticallyidentifysocialmovementswithmassmovementsandwasinfactstill
capableofseeingtheir"public"dimension.
88.Foradistinctionbetweenthesetwoconceptsofthepoliticalandpolitics,seeDickHoward,TheMarxianLegacy,2ded.(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesota
Press,1989).HowardconvincinglydemonstratesthatClaudeLefortand,espe

Page655
cially,CorneliusCastoriadishaveaverydifferentattitudetomodernpoliticsthanArendt.Thisisstrikingbecauseofthemanyimportantparallelsbetweentheir
workandArendt's.
Chapter5
1.JrgenHabermas,TheStructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere[1962](Cambridge:MITPress,1989hereaftercitedasPublicSphere).
2.Nevertheless,thestartingpointofSchmitt'srevivalofthetoposofpublicitytheassertionthatdiscussionandopennessrepresenttheprincipleof
parliamentarismcanbeinterpretedintwowaysthatleadtoeachofthesethinkers.Oneoftheseseemstoindicateamodelofthestateaparliamentarystatebased
onpublicdiscussionandleadstoArendt.Theother,focusingontheemergenceofasocialandapoliticalsphereinthestate,leadstoHabermas.
3.CarlSchmitt,TheCrisisofParliamentaryDemocracy[1923](Cambridge:MITPress,1985hereaftercitedasCrisis),25.
4.Ibid.,5,34.
5.Hedoesnotseethefundamentaldifferencebetweenintegrationthroughstrategiccalculationandthroughmutualpersuasion.(Thesameistrueofliberalswhotalk
about"themarketplaceofideas.")Foranelaborationofthedifference,seeJrgenHabermas,TheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.1(Boston:BeaconPress,
1984),chaps.1,4.
6.Crisis,35CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical[1932](NewBrunswick,NJ:RutgersUniversityPress,1976),7172.
7.Crisis,3.Hesays,moreover,"Greatpoliticaldecisions...nolongerresulttoday[1923](iftheyeverdid)frombalancingopinionsandcounteropinionsin
publicdebate"(49,ouremphasis).ThepointisthatSchmitttreatstheideaofdecisionthroughpublicdiscussionasanormafivecounterfactualprincipleoflegitimation
thathas,however,someinstitutionalfoundations.Thus,itmakesaslittlesensetocriticizehimbycontrastingthediscussionprinciplewithnineteenthcenturyrealityas
byrecallingthepreliberal,nondiscursivetypesofparliamentarism.See,forexmple,JohnKeane,DemocracyandCivilSociety(London:Verso,1988),164170.
BothoftheseelementsrepresentessentialcontrastsforSchmitt'sownthesis.
8.DerHterderVerfassung,2ded.(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1931hereaftercitedasHter),78.Itwouldbefutiletodenythatthesesecondarynorms
followingfromtheprimaryonereceivedtheirinstitutionalexpressionundernineteenthcenturyconditions.Schmittoverlookstheircontinuedsignificanceinthe
twentiethcentury,buthecertainlyhasacasetotheextentthatonlyinthelattercontextdidtheredevelopacomprehensivepracticeofpartypoliticsthattendedto
reducedramaticallythesignificanceofthenormslinkedtothemetanormofpublicity.MaxWeberisrighttofindtherootsofthispartypoliticsinthenineteenth
century,yethealsodistinguishesdemocraticpartypoliticsfromclassicalparliamentarism.See,e.g.,"ParliamentandGovernmentina

Page656
ReconstructedGermany,"inEconomyandSociety,vol.2(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1978).Schmitt'sthesisconcerningafundamentalchangein
parliamentarismcannotberefutedaroundtheempiricalpresenceorabsenceofgenuinepublicdiscourse,alwaysacounterfactual,butonlybyrefutingWeber's
thesisonthetransformationofpartypolitics,whichwasinfacttheprimarysourceforCrisis.
9.Crisis,34.
10.Ibid.,47.
11.Hter,7374.
12.ThisanalysisdoesnotapplyverywelltoEngland,whoseabsolutismwasaparliamentaryoneandwhosestate,evenintheliberalepoch,wasaselforganizationof
a(narrowlyconceived)society.SeeWernerConze,"DieSpannungsfeldvonStaatundGesellschaftimVormrz,"inWernerConze,ed.,StaatundGesellschaftim
deutschenVormrz18151848(Stuttgart:Klett,1962),208210.ThepolemicalcontrastintheEnglishspeakingcontextwasbestdevelopedbyThomasPainein
CommonSense,takingthepointofviewofcolonial"parliaments"againsttheparliamentarystate.
13.Hter,7374.Notetheshiftfromadiscussionbasedmodelofpublicitytoadramaturgicalone.
14.ThoughlessclearlythantheMarxofthe18thBrumaireofLouisBonaparte(NewYork:InternationalPublishers,1963),6566.
15.Crisis,36,39.
16.Ibid.,4950.
17.Ibid.,50.
18.Ibid.,38.
19.ReinhartKoselleck,KritikundKrise[1959](Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1973),publishedinEnglishasCritiqueandCrisis:EnlightenmentandthePathogenesis
ofModernSociety(Cambridge:MITPress,1988).
20.KoselleckdoesnotincludeEnglandinhisthesis,althoughhedoesstressthatHobbesandLockewerethefirsttothematizethedualisticconsequencesof
absolutism.Accordingtohim,bythetimeoftheEnlightenment,EnglishelitesocietyrepresentedinParliamentsuccessfullyavoidedapolemicalpolarizationwiththe
royalexecutive(46).SeealsoConze,"DieSpannungsfeld,"208.NeitherConzeorKosellecknotestheobviousinconsistencyofthisEnglishexceptionwithSchmitt's
pictureofthepolemicalstabilizationofliberalparliamentarism.
21.KritikundKrise,4654.
22.Ibid.,6568.
23.Ibid.,8197.
24.KoselleckcouldanswerthatwhatoccurredinFranceinaveryshortperiod,duringtheriseandcollapseofrevolutionaryparliamentarismonitsroadto
democracy,wastooccurintheGermanstatesinamuchlongerperiod,simply

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becausethebureaucraticmilitarystatedidnotcollapseuntil1918.ThiswouldbeconvincingbutwouldhavetobeextendedinawayinconsistentwithSchmitt's
thesis.Ineffect,apartfromafewconstellationsthatprovedtobetemporary,themodernstatecreatedbyabsolutismdidnotcollapse,anditsparliamentary
(societalpublic)limitationremainedextremelyrelevant.Thedeclineofparliamentarism,althoughempiricallyplausible,hastobeanalyzedintermsotherthanthe
subsumptionofthestatebysociety.
25.ThissimilaritytoWalterBenjamin'snotionofDialektikimStillstandishardlyfortuitous.SeeArendt'sessayintroducingBenjamin'sIlluminations(NewYork:
Schocken,1969).
26.WeleaveoutofconsiderationthefactthatatthetimeHabermaswasaratherclassicalMarxistforwhomtheriseofthemodernstatewasafunctionofthe
developmentofcapitalismandtheliberalmomentoftheearlymodernpublicspherewassubordinatedtothebourgeoisone.Infact,hisrichanalysis,focusingonthe
enlightenmentstruggleagainstabsolutism,contradictsinmanyrespectsthissimpleMarxianscheme.
27.Wediscussedthereasonsforthisprejudiceinchapter2.
28.PublicSphere,5355.
29.Ibid.,46(ourtranslation).
30.Ibid.,5556.
31.Includingfeministcritiquesoftheideologyofthebourgeoismodeloftheintimatesphereofthefamilyaswellastheliberalbourgeoispublicsphere.
32.Onehopesthattheycanalsobeinstitutionalizedinanonpatriarchalformofthefamily.
33.Foradiscussionofthistransitionfromafeministpointofview,seeJoanLandes,WomenandthePublicSphereintheAgeoftheFrenchRevolution(Ithaca:
CornellUniversityPress,1988).Herthesisisthat,alongwiththenewformsofdiscourse,theveryidealsofthebourgeoispublicspherewerepermeatedbyadeeply
patriarchalrepublicanideology,explicitlyconstructedoverandagainstwomen'sformsofspeechandpowerintheprebourgeoissalonsociety.Thetargetofthe
bourgeoispublicspherewasthehierarchicalstructure,privileges,hypocrisy,corruption,andexclusionarymechanismsofthesocietyoforders,butthesalonsociety
runbytheprecieusescametosymbolizeallthatwaswrongwiththeoldregime.Thus,thedissolutionofthesalon,togetherwiththeexclusionofwomenfromall
aspectsofpubliclifeandtheirsequestrationinthenewlyemergingdomesticsphere,wasdeemedtobeessentialifnewformsofpublicityoutsidethisspherewereto
bedeveloped.Landesarguesthattheveryarticulationofthegeneralnormofbourgeoispublicityinteractionfreefromdominationintermsofasetofdichotomies
suchasuniversalityvs.particularityandobjectivityvs.emotionalityreflectedarigid,genderedseparationbetweenpublicandprivate(domestic)spheres.Thisonly
apparentlyuniversalsymboliccodewasinfactmale:Itlockedwomenoutandsilencedthem(inpartbymakingtheirattemptstorepresenttheirinterestsappearas
particularisticorirrational).

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Overall,womenhadsufferedalossofpower,privilege,andlegalstandingcomparedwiththeoldregime,whilethebourgeoispublicspherebasedonrepublican
ideologyemergedasahighlygenderedoneessentially,andnotcontingently,masculine.
34.PublicSphere,33.
35.Ibid.,53,55.
36.Ibid.,28,82.
37.SeeAlfredCobban,TheSocialInterpretationoftheFrenchRevolution(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1964)FranoisFuret,
InterpretingtheFrenchRevolution(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982).
38.PublicSphere,67ff.
39.E.P.Thompson,TheMakingoftheEnglishWorkingClass(NewYork:RandomHouse,1963).
40.PublicSphere,5964.Inordertoseetherelationshipbetweenparticularinterestsandgeneralnorms,itisworthtakingacloserlookatHabermas'sdepictionof
thedevelopmentoftheEnglishmodelofthepoliticalpublicsphere.Accordingtohim,thisdevelopmentinvolved,withsomehistoricalconnectionsto"coffeehouse
society,"theemergenceofpublicopinionasaninstitutionfromacontextinwhichpoliticaljournalismandtheriseofan"opposition"mutuallyconditionedeachother.
Thepoliticalpress,firstestablishedasanorganofthegovernment,reallycameintoitsowninthehandsoftheWhigandlaterToryoppositionsthatsought,attimes
successfully,toinfluencepolicyfromoutsideofparliament,bymobilizingandmanipulatingpublicopinion.Indeed,itisthroughpoliticaljournalismratherthanpublic
meetingsandorganizationsthattheoppositionledbyBolingbrokefirstinstitutionalizeditselfinthelongperiodofWhigruleunderWalpole.Theemergenceofthe
politicalpublicspheremightbedepictedininstrumentaltermsthatwouldapplytothejournalismofDefoe,Swift,andBolingbrokepublicopinionwouldthenbean
instrumentbywhichanoppositioncouldexertandretainsomepower,aninstrumentreluctantlypermittedbyarulingpartywithadoubtfulelectoralbaseinorderto
avoidareturnofopenconflict,thatis,civilwar.Habermas'sstressisnotthisinstrumentalone,however.Inordertomobilizeapublicopinionalreadyformedbythe
criticalspiritoftheaudiencesforliteratureandart,evenBolingbrokeiscompelledtotrytodemonstratethejusticeandrightnessofthecaseoftheoppositionagainst
thecorruptpartyofthegovernment.Evenmoreimportant,theinstitutionalizationofformsofpublicscrutinyovertheactionsofgovernment,promotedbyoppositional
journalism,leadstoinstitutionsthatwillbindthissameoppositionwheninpower.Thegradualtransformationofthedeliberationsofparliamentintopublicones,a
developmentthattookacenturyandahalf,allowedthetransformationofareasoningpublic,originallytheinstrumentofparties,intothemainagencyexercising
politicalsupervision.ItseemssomewhatexaggeratedforHabermastodeclaretheparliamentfollowingtheFirstReformBillan"organofpublicopinion."Itmightbe
moreappropriate

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todescribethe"criticalpublic,"sociallywiderthanparliamentaryrepresentationevenaftertheReformBill,asaconstantlyexpandingforegroundofparliamentary
deliberationscapableofexertinganinfluenceuponthosedeliberations.
41.PublicSphere,8485.
42.Ibid.,65.
43.Ibid.,4:"Tendenciespointingtothecollapseofthepublicsphereareunmistakable,forwhileitsscopeisexpandingimpressively,itsfunctionhasbecome
progressivelyinsignificant."
44.Ibid.,6667.
45.SeeCohen,ClassandCivilSociety,34.
46.PublicSphere,30.
47.Thefurtherpossibilityofdifferentiatingcivilsocietyfromthebourgeoiseconomyandthestate,firstsuggestedbyGramsciandeventuallytakenoverbyHabermas,
doesnotyetappearinPublicSphere.
48.PublicSphere,5556.
49.Thisisamodifiedversionofthescheme(ibid.,30).
50.Ibid.,5556.
51.Ibid.
52.Ibid.,19.
53.Ibid.4.
54.Ibid.,5152.
55.Ibid.,54.
56.Ibid.,8283(translationmodified).
57.Ibid.,84.
58.Ibid.,136138.
59.Ibid.,55.
60.Theironyofthisdevelopmentisstriking.Theidealofhumanitycomingfromtheintimatesphereofthefamilyandpervadingtheliterarypublicsphereisofcourse
moral,universalist,andantipoliticalaclearreflectionofthepositionofwomeninbourgeoiscivilsociety.Womencametorepresent"morality"andthe"interestsof
humanity"byvirtueoftheirverypowerlessnessand"disinterestedness"(theirsupposedlackofastrongselfwithrealparticularinterests),withoutbeingdeemed
capableofattainingauniversalist,reasonedmoralpointofviewthemselvestheirpresenceastheaudienceoftheliterarypublicsphereandasthesymbolofmoral
humanitywaslinkedtotheirexclusionfromallthespheresofcivilsocietyandthepolity,apartfromthefamily.Thisiswhytheycouldsymbolizeratherthanattainthe
universalist,moralpointofviewandwhythenormofhumanityitselfreflectedtheproblematicpositionofwomen:powerlesshumanity.Suchanidealofmoralistic
humanismseekingtoabolishthepowerof

Page660
institutionsbetheyincivilsocietyorthestateisambiguous,tosaytheleast.Accordingly,theidentificationofl'hommeandcitoyenisdoublyideological.
61.PublicSphere,5556.
62.Ibid.,7475.
63.Ibid.,8182.
64.Ibid.,83.
65.Ibid.,84.
66.Ibid.,85.
67.Wewouldaddgenderinterestsalso.
68.PublicSphere,88.
69.Ibid.,123124.
70.Ibid.,125.
71.Ibid.,127128.
72.Ibid.,161.
73.Ibid.,129.
74.Hedoesnot,however,telluswhatwouldhappentothepatriarchalcharacterofthebourgeoisfamily.DidHabermasin1962simplyassumethat,oncethefamily
isnolongerbourgeois,onceeconomicpowernolongerpenetratestheintimatesphere,theproblemofpatriarchydissolves?ThisstandardMarxistpositionis
unconvincing.
75.PublicSphere,129.
76.Ibid.(ourtranslationandemphasis).
77.Itisamistaketostylizethemasliberal,asHabermasdoes,although,unlikeMarx,theydomaintainthefullideaoftheliberalpublicsphere.
78.PublicSphere,136.
79.ForTocquevilleandMill,participationinegalitariananddemocraticvoluntaryassociationsandothertypesofdeliberativebodiesincivilsociety(suchasjuries)
providestheexperienceoffreedomtotheprivatecitizen.Onsuchamodel,thefirstassociationinwhichtheexperienceofandtrainingfortheexerciseoffreedom
couldbemadewould,ofcourse,beanonbourgeois,nonpatriarchal,egalitarianformofthefamily.However,unlikeHegel,TocquevilleandMillneverassumethat
individualsabandontheirparticularinterestswithintheassociationstowhichtheybelong:Theytakeonthe(relatively)moregeneralinterestsoftheassociation,but
withoutlosingtheirownparticularconcernsandgoals.
80.PublicSphere,128129.
81.''Today"herereferstotheWeimarperiod.
82.Crisis,67.

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83.Hter,89.HereSchmittassumesthatthisunificationwas,afterall,real.Elsewherehemaintainsthatitwasmereshow.Theambiguityisparalleledbyhistwo
argumentsmaintaining,respectively,theemergenceofone(mereshow)vs.two(real)willsofthestateunderliberalism.
84.ToSchmitt,thisRousseauianmodeliscompletelyimpossible.
85.Crisis,89,1314,2627.
86.Ibid.,15.
87.Hter,8388.Thispointisinconsistentwiththeideaofapolemicalrelationofparliamenttotheexecutive.Thequestioniswhetherthereare,accordingto
Schmitt,twopartiallyantagonisticstatewillsinliberalparliamentarism,aviewdifficulttoreconcilewithotherassertionsofhis,inparticularhisquasiHegelian
insistenceonthestateasaunifiedcenterofloyalty(seeHter,90).
88.SeeWeber,"ParliamentandGovernmentinaReconstructedGermany."Weber'sanalysisisanalogoustoSchmitt'sregardingtheendoftheliberalparliamentary
modeloftheemergenceofgoodleaders.Weber'snormativeconcern,however,unlikeSchmitt's,wastofindacounterweighttothebureaucraticstate.
89.Crisis,7,4950.
90.SeeClaudeLefort,"PoliticsandHumanRights,"inThePoliticalFormsofModernSociety(Cambridge:MITPress,1986).
91.ConceptofthePolitical,2223.
92.Hter,78.
93.ConceptofthePolitical,22.
94.Ibid.,23Hter,79.
95.ConceptofthePolitical,23(ouremphasis).
96.ConfusingthetwoformsofdifferentiationleadstotheambivalentattitudenotedbyLeoStrauss(withoutseeingtheactualreason)towardfunctionaldifferentiation.
Itisdefendedagainstaformofsegmentationimplyingtheprimacyofthesocial,whichisagreaterthreattosovereignty,butisgivenupvisvisfunctionaltotalization
ordedifferentiationimplyingtheprimacyofthepolitical.
97.CarlSchmitt,LegalittundLegitimitt,3ded.(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1932,1980),96.
98.Ibid.,8990.Onpage98,hearguesthat,ineffect,theresultwastheexistenceoftwoconstitutionsinone.
99.OttoKirchheimerclaimedthattheauthoritarianstateinGermanydidnotmanagetoovercomeinternalpluralizationandfragmentation.Seehis"Changesinthe
StructureofPoliticalCompromise"[1941],inAndrewAratoandEikeGebhardt,eds.,TheEssentialFrankfurtSchoolReader(NewYork:Urizen,1978),4970.

Page662
100.TheFrankfurtwritersforesawthispossibilityearly,asinFriedrichPollock'sdistinctionbetweendemocraticandauthoritarianversionsofstatecapitalism.Seehis
"StateCapitalism"[1941],inAratoandGebhardt,eds.,TheEssentialFrankfurtSchoolReader,7194.
101.JrgenHabermas,"TechnologyandScienceasIdeology,"inTowardaRationalSociety(Boston:BeaconPress,1970)LegitimationCrisis(Boston:Beacon
Press,1975)ClausOffe,StrukturproblemedeskapitalistischenStaates(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1972).Itisimportanttonotethat,wellbeforetheemergenceof
neoconservatism,Offestressedthatstateinterventionismproduceddysfunctionsinadministrativerationality(the"crisisofcrisismanagement"),whileHabermas
insistedonunavoidablegapsindemocraticlegitimacyconcerningtheuseofpublicinterventionforprivateends,givenshrinkingresourcesinculturalmotivation.
102.OttoKirchheimer,"ChangesintheStructureofPoliticalCompromise"and"InSearchofSovereignty,"inPolitics,LawandSocialChange(NewYork:
ColumbiaUniversityPress,1969).
103.PublicSphere,144.
104.SeehisessaysinContradictionsoftheWelfareState(Cambridge:MITPress,1984)andDisorganizedCapitalism(Cambridge:MITPress,1985).
105.PublicSphere,155.
106.Ibid.,159,162.
107.Ibid.,169.
108.Ibid.,175.
109.Ibid.,198.
110.Ibid.,203204.
111.Ibid.,193ff.
112.Ibid.,211,213.
113.Ibid.,215.
114.Ibid.,216.
115.Ibid.,218219.
116.Thiswasespeciallythecasebecause,eveninthe1960s,HabermasdidnotmakeuseofWalterBenjamin'sargumentsconcerningthepossibilitiesof
emancipationinherentintheculturalsituationofmodernity.
117.PublicSphere,176.
118.Ibid.,177.
119.ThisargumentalsobreakswithArendt,whocouldnotseeanythingpositiveaboutthewelfarestate.Habermascriticizesitsdepoliticizingconsequencesbutfinds
itsdedifferentiationofstateandcivilsocietypositivetotheextentthatitanticipatestheunifiedMarxianstatesociety.Sincehejuxtaposesthisprojectedentitytoa
noneconomicintimatesphere,intheendheproducesasynthesisof

Page663
MarxandArendtthatismoredualisticthantheutopiaofMarxbut,unlikethatofArendt,includeseconomicaffairsinpublicdeliberations.
120.PublicSphere,222225.
121.Ibid.,178179.
122.Ibid.,224225.Thisargument,too,wasintroducedintoFrankfurtSchooldiscussionsbyOttoKirchheimersee"Weimarundwasdann?,"translatedas
"WeimarandWhatThen?,"inPolitics,LawandSocialChange.Kirchheimersubsequentlyabandoneditwiththedevelopmentoftheauthoritarianstate,which
suddenlymadethecriticaldismissalofnegativerightsunacceptable.
123.PublicSphere,226.
124.Ibid.,229.
125.Ibid.,229.EvidentlyHabermasinterpretstheambiguoustermTeilhaberrechte(rightsofparticipation,orrightsofmembership)inthesenseofactivedemocratic
"participation"ratherthanmerepassivebelonging.
126.Ibid.,229231.
127.Ibid.,177178.
128.Ibid.,232233.AccordingtoHabermas,thisconflictisatpresentundecided.Weshouldnottaketooseriouslyhisoptimisticassessmentaccordingtoamodel
oftheHegelian"ListderVernunft,"whichseekstoconceive"thepublicsphereoperatingunderconditionsofthewelfarestateasaprocessofselfrealization:being
abletoestablishitselfonlygradually,competingwiththeothertendency,which,turningagainstitself,reducesthecriticalpoweroftheprincipleofthepublicinthe
tremendouslyexpandedpublicsphere"(233,ourtranslation).
129.Seechapter8.
Chapter6
1.ForadetailedanalysisofthestrengthsandlimitsoftheMarxiancritiqueofcivilsociety,seeJeanL.Cohen,ClassandCivilSociety:TheLimitsofMarxian
CriticalTheory(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1982).
2.AsthemostimportantofLouisAlthusser'sstudents,Foucault,ofcourse,iswellversedinMarxism.However,herejectsbothhumanistandstructuralversionsof
thetheoryandseesMarxismnotasaradicalbreakwithmodern(nineteenthcentury)thoughtbutasoneelementwithinit.AsheputsitinTheOrderofThings(New
York:RandomHouse,1970),"Marxismexistsinnineteenthcenturythoughtlikeafishinwater:thatis,itisunabletobreatheanywhereelse"(262).
3.MichelFoucault,Power/Knowledge(NewYork:Pantheon,1972),89.
4.SeeFoucault,TheOrderofThings,250263,367387,forthecritiqueofutopianthought.Thesectionon"Manandhisdoubles"constitutesanimportantcritique
ofthephilosophicaltraditionbegunbyDescartesthathascometobecalled"thephilosophyofthesubject."AccordingtoFoucault,Marxisttheorydoesnot

Page664
escapetheantinomiestypicalofthisphilosophicaltradition,despiteitsrevolutionaryselfunderstanding.Indeed,theMarxiantheoryofarevolutionary
macrosubject(theproletariat)sharestheprojectofmasterythatistypicalofalltheversionsofthephilosophyofthesubjectandinthisrespectisquitedangerous.
5.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,81,145.
6.SeeCohen,ClassandCivilSociety,2352.
7.ForadiscussionoftheMarxianthesisthattheanatomyofcivilsocietyistobelocatedineconomicrelationsandinthecategoryoflabor,seeCohen,Classand
CivilSociety,5382.ForanexcellentcritiqueofMarx'sanalysisofrights,seeClaudeLefort,"PoliticsandHumanRights,"inThePoliticalFormsofModern
Society(Cambridge:MITPress,1986),239272.
8.MichelFoucault,DisciplineandPunish(NewYork:Pantheon,1977),222.
9.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,95.
10.Ibid.
11.Foucaultarguesthat,evenforabsolutism,thejuridicalpoliticalconceptofpowerwasbynomeansadequatetodescribethemannerinwhichpowerwas
exercised.Nevertheless,itisthecodeaccordingtowhichpowerpresentsitself.
12.MichelFoucault,TheHistoryofSexuality,vol.1(NewYork:Pantheon,1978),85.
13.Ibid.,136.
14.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,104105.
15.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,89.
16.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,105.
17.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,88.
18.Ibid.,8889.
19.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,105.
20.Ibid.,106.
21.Foradiscussionofthispoint,seeJrgenHabermas,ThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity(Cambridge:MITPress,1987),286293.
22.Ibid.,290.
23.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,144.
24.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,96.
25.Ibid.,107.
26.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,144.Foucaultclearlyhasinmindlegaldevelopmentsinthewelfarestate,gearedtoregulate,control,andincreasewelfareandthe
securityoflife.
27.Ibid.,86.

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28.ForadiscussionofthenormativeambiguitiesofFoucault'swork,seeNancyFraser,UnrulyPractices(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1989).
29.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,89.
30.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,98.
31.ForacritiqueofFoucault'shypostatizationoftheconceptofpower,seeBernardFlynn,"FoucaultandtheBodyPolitic,"ManandWorld20(1987):6584.
32.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,142,andHistoryofSexuality,9293.
33.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,93.
34.Ibid.,9495.
35.Seechapters3and7.
36.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,139.
37.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,221.
38.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,47.
39.Ibid.,4748.
40."Thisreal,noncorporealsoulisnotasubstanceitistheelementinwhicharearticulatedtheeffectsofacertaintypeofpowerandthereferenceofacertaintype
ofknowledge,themachinerybywhichpowergivesrisetoacertaincorpusofknowledge....Onthisrealityreference,variousconceptshavebeenconstructedand
domainsofanalysiscarvedout:psyche,subjectivity,personality,consciousness,etc.onithavebeenbuiltscientifictechniquesanddiscourses,andthemoralclaimsof
humanism"(DisciplineandPunish,2930).SeealsothediscussioninFraser,UnrulyPractices,3553.
41.DisciplineandPunish,27.
42.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,6061.Thisauthoritycan,ofcourse,alsobeourselves.
43.Ibid.,60.
44.SeeFraser,UnrulyPractices,4243.
45.SeeHabermas,PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,270.
46.Fraser,UnrulyPractices,1754.
47.Habermas,PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,270.
48.Ibid.
49.Ibid.,276.SeealsoCharlesTaylor,"FoucaultonFreedomandTruth,"inDavidCouzensHoy,ed.,Foucault:ACriticalReader(Oxford:Blackwell,1986),
69102,andThomasMcCarthy,"TheCritiqueofImpureReason:FoucaultandtheFrankfurtSchool,"inIdealsandIllusions:OnReconstructionand
DeconstructioninContemporaryCriticalTheory(Cambridge:MITPress,1991),4375.
50.Flynn,"FoucaultandtheBodyPolitic,"criticizesFoucault'spositivistaccountofpowerrelations.

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51.Habermas,PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,286293.SeealsoMcCarthy,"TheCritiqueofImpureReason."
52.Taylor,"FoucaultonFreedomandTruth,"94.
53.Ibid.,9091.
54.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,61.
55.TheconceptofthesubjectisoneofthemaintargetsofFoucault'swork.ThedilemmasandtrapsofthemoderntheoryofsubjectivityformthemainfocusofThe
OrderofThings.ForananalysisofFoucault'scritiqueofthemoderntheoryofthesubjectandacomparisonwiththerelevanttheoriesofAdornoandHorkheimer,
seePeterDewes,LogicsofDisintegration(London:Verson,1987),144171.SeealsothechaptersonFoucaultinAxelHonneth,TheCritiqueofPower
(Cambridge:MITPress,1991),andHabermas,ThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,238266.
56.Foucaulthadalreadyanalyzedtheconnectionbetweendiscourseandpractices,knowledgeandpower,inMadnessandCivilization[1961](NewYork:
RandomHouse,1965).Confinementandcontinuoussupervision,isolation,individuation,regulation,andmanipulationoftheinmateconstitutedthenewsocial
techniques(practices)thatwereintimatelyconnectedwiththeemergingdisciplinesofthehumansciences(psychology,pedagogy,sociology,penology,etc.)that
subjectedtheobjectofobservationtothemonitoringgazeofthespecialist.Thediscussionofconfinement,supervision,andtherefineddifferentiationoftheinmatesof
thenewtotalinstitutions(firsttheasylumandclinic,butthenalsothebarracks,theschool,theprison,andthefactory)fromthestartresteduponaconceptionof
practicesthatinvolvedthecoercivediscipliningofsomebyothers.ButinTheBirthoftheClinic[1963](NewYork:RandomHouse,1973),Foucaultabandoned
thehermeneuticapproachandreplaceditwithastructuralistanalysisofdiscoursesthatrefrainedfromseekinganyaccesstotheexcludedandrepressed.The
ArchaeologyofKnowledge[1969](NewYork:Harper&Row,1972)isFoucault'smethodologicalstatementofthisswitchinorientation.Yetthebasicconceptof
powerwasnotrefinedandarticulateduntilDisciplineandPunish.Similarly,theepochaldivisionsthatcharacterizethedevelopmentofthemodernpenalsystemare
thesameasthosedescribedinFoucault'searliestwork,MadnessandCivilization.
57.Inhisearlierworks,especiallyMadnessandCivilizationandTheOrderofThings,fourepochsofhistorywerestressed:theHighMiddleAges,the
Renaissance,theclassicalage,andmodernity.Forourconcerns,wetakeupthelasttwostagesastheyappearinDisciplineandPunish.
58.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,298seealso299308.Foucault'spointhereisthatdisciplinarypowerandtechniquesofsurveillanceandcontrolhave
appearedinnonpenalinstitutions(publicassistancewithintheorphanage,thereformatory,theschool,thecharitablesociety,theworkshop,thehospital,etc.)andnow
constituteacontinuousprocessof"normalization"continuouswithinandacrosssocietalinstitutions,continuousincriteriaandtechniques,continu

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ousinconstitutingnotonlycrimebuteverydeparturefromthenormasdeviance.Indeedtheprisonitselfasaclosedinstitutionmaybecomeanachronisticas
disciplinarynetworksthroughoutthesocialbodytakeoverjudicialfunctionsofnormalizingjudgmentandassumeevergreatersharesofthepowersofsupervision
andassessment.
59.Asindicatedabove,theseepochscorrespondtostandardmodelsofculturalandsocialhistory.Ofcourse,Foucault'sveryenterpriseofgenealogical
historiographymakesclaimstobeanewwayofdoinghistory.Forourpurposes,theconceptualandmethodologicalinnovationsandproblemsinvolvedingenealogy
arenotdirectlyatissue,buttheybearonourproblematicandareworthabriefcomment.InTheOrderofThingsandtheArchaeologyofKnowledge,Foucault
hadalreadyanalyzedthe"discursiveformations"and"practices"specifictothenewhumansciencesandthemodernphilosophyofconsciousnessinitiatedbyKant.He
arguedthatthe''willtotruth"istypicaloftheinexorablestrivingofthatmodernentity,thecognitivesubject,towardtheimpossiblegoalofmasteryofitselfandthe
externalworld.Thesciencesofman(criminology,pedagogy,psychiatry,medicine,psychology,etc.)enterintothisprojectbycreatingandcontrollingtheindividual
subjectthroughtheirspecificsocialtechniques,whichtakeshapeintherelevantinstitutions(prisons,schools,clinics,hospitals)andconstructalinkbetween
knowledgeandpower.Theturntogenealogicalhistoriographyplacespoweratthecorenotonlyofthemoderndiscursiveformationorthetypesoftruthclaimsofthe
humansciencesbutofalldiscoursesineverysociety.ThetermisNietzsche'sseeMichelFoucault,"Nietzsche,Genealogy,History,"inLanguage,Counter
Memory,Practice:SelectedEssaysandInterviews(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1977),139164,andtheintroductiontoTheArchaeologyofKnowledge,
317.Themoderninterweavingofknowledgeandpowerisonlyoneamongmanyhistoricallydistinctformsofthe"willtopower,"eachofwhichapparentlyhasits
owntypeofknowledge/truthclaims.Genealogyunmaskstheserelations,revealingtheconnectionsamongtherise,shape,anddisplacementofdiscursiveformations
andtheemergence,techniques,andshiftsfromonerelationshipofforcestoanother.DisciplineandPunishisexemplaryinthisregard.Itanswersthepreviously
unresolvedquestionofjusthowscientificdiscoursesandpracticesarerelated:Genealogicalresearchrevealstheproductivityofpowertechnologiesthatnotonly
instrumentalizediscoursesbutaretheirconstitutivepreconditions.(AsHabermaspointsout,though,thisquestionisresolvedonlyatthecostofintroducinganotherset
ofproblems,nottheleastofwhichisFoucault's"ambiguous"useofthecategoryofpoweritself.)Genealogicalhistoriography,togetherwithanallencompassingbut
neverquitedefinedconceptionofpower,constituteatheoreticalandmethodologicaluniversewithinwhichitispossibletoarticulatesocialrelations,truthclaims,
formsofknowledge,andsocial/politicalprojectsonlyasforms,expressions,orstrategiesofpower.
60.Thedatesdifferfromthoseofothermodernizationtheories,andthewholeemphasisdiffersfromtheMarxianapproachinonecrucialrespect:Whatotherscall
traditionalsociety,Marxcalls"feudalism,"andhehimselfneglectsthe

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absolutiststate.ForaneoMarxianattempttoaddresstheabsolutistperiodheadonandfititintotheMarxiantrajectory,seePerryAnderson,Lineagesofthe
AbsolutistState(London:NewLeftBooks,1974),1559.
61.TheclassicworkinthisareaisAlexisdeTocqueville'sTheOldRegimeandtheFrenchRevolution(NewYork:Doubleday,1955).SeealsoRobertNisbet,
TheQuestForCommunity(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1953),andReadingsonSocialChange(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1967),and
TheodorAdornoandMaxHorkheimer,DialecticofEnlightenment(NewYork:HerderandHerder,1972).
62.Tocqueville,TheOldRegimeandtheFrenchRevolution.
63.Thatis,thedistinctionbetweenthediscussions,deliberations,anddebatescharacteristicoflegislaturesandbureaucratic/administrativeformsofdecisionmaking.
Forananalysisofthesystematicdistinctionsbetweentheseformsof"action,"seeHannahArendt,TheHumanCondition(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,
1958).
64.AlexisdeTocqueville,DemocracyinAmerica(NewYork:Doubleday,1969).
65.SeeNisbet,TheQuestforCommunity.Foucaultoffersnotheoryofsocialintegration.Apparently,hebelievesthatsocietycanbeintegratedsolelythrough
strategicpowerrelationsanddisciplinarytechnologies.Sincehedispenseswiththevariousmodelsofintegrationofferedbysociologicaltheory(socialintegration
throughthemediumoflanguage,values,norms,orprocessesofmutualunderstanding)withoutresortingtosystemsorexchangetheoriesasanalternative,heisunable
toaccountforthestabilizationofformsofinteractionorfortheinstitutionalizationofpower.SeeHonneth,TheCritiqueofPower,andHabermas,The
PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,287288.
66.This,ofcourse,despitethegenealogicaldisclaimerregardingthepossibilityofacommonmeasureonthebasisofwhichtwodifferentpowertruthregimesmight
becompared.Foucaultclearlymeanstosaythatasymmetricpowerrelationsaremorepervasive,moreintrusive,andmorecontrollingofpeople'severydaylivesin
modernsocietythanintheoldregime.
67.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,48.
68.Thiswasthestandarddefinitionofsovereigntyintheeighteenthcentury.SeeFoucault'sdiscussionofthehistoricalunderstandingoftheconceptofsovereigntyin
Power/Knowledge,92108.
69.Onlyinaseparateand,strangelyenough,earlierlecturedoesFoucaultarguethatsovereigntyandrightsarethestakesinthestrugglebetweencompetingcamps
aroundthegeneralsystemofpower(Power/Knowledge,103).Thisistheonlyhintonecanfindofthecompetitionbetweenthesocietyofordersandthestate
makingprojectoftheabsolutemonarch.
70.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,47.ItisinterestingtocompareFoucault'saccountwiththatofEmileDurkheim,TheDivisionofLaborinSociety(NewYork:
FreePress,1933).Indeed,FoucaultseemstobeinvertingtheclassicalDurkheimeanthesis.

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71.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,82.
72.Ibid.,59.
73.Ibid.,91.
74.Accordingly,thesovereign'slawcouldappearassomethingimposedfromabove.Thecriminal'schallengetothelawcouldthusactivatethesupportandsolidarity
ofthepopulation.Thecriminalcouldbecomeaherobecauseitisthelawoftheother,notofthelocalcommunity,thatisatissue.Punishmentherestrikesterrorinto
peoples'heartsbutdoesnotcreateanidentityofthepeoplewiththesovereignandhislaw.Onthecontrary,theidentitycreatedisbetweenthepeopleandthe
criminal,whoisseenasoneoftheirown.Thisiswhatchangeswhen,undertheclaimsofpopularsovereigntyandliberaljurisprudence,basedontheideaofthelaw
asemanatingfromthecommunityasawholeandthemoralsubjectasthecounterpartofthelegalperson,thecriminaliscreatedasanenemyofsociety.
75.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,27141.
76.Fora"proFoucaultian"analysisofthisdifference,seeJohnRajchman,"Habermas'Complaint,"NewGermanCritique,no.45(Fall1988):163191.Fora
"proHabermasian''account,seeDewes,LogicsofDisintegration,144245.
77."ToposetheproblemintermsoftheStatemeanstocontinueposingitintermsofsovereignandsovereignty,thatistosayintermsoflaw.Ifonedescribesall
thesephenomenaofpowerasdependentontheStateapparatus,thismeansgraspingthemasessentiallyrepressive....Idon'twanttosaythattheStateisn't
importantwhatIwanttosayisthatrelationsofpower,andhencetheanalysisthatmustbemadeofthem,necessarilyextendbeyondthelimitsofthestate....The
stateissuperstructuraltoawholeseriesofpowernetworksthatinvestthebody,sexuality,thefamily,kinship,knowledge,technologyandsoforth"(Foucault,
Power/Knowledge,122).
78.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,110.
79.Ibid.,63.
80.Ibid.,80.
81.Ibid.,222.
82.SeeFlynn,"FoucaultandtheBodyPolitic,"foracritiqueofFoucault'spositivismandreductionismvisvisthesymbolicdimensionofsociallife,eveninhis
analysisoftheoldregime.
83.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,81.
84.Ibid.,85.
85.Ibid.
86.Ibid.,87.
87.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,6.Butseepage114forasomewhatcontradictoryclaim.
88.Ibid.,123.

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89.Ibid.,127.
90.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,213.
91.Ibid.,215.
92.Ibid.,216217.
93.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,25.
94.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,171.
95.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,26.
96.Ibid.,143.
97.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,101.
98.Honneth,TheCritiqueofPower,157175.
99.Dewes,LogicsofDisintegration,145146andpassim.
100.Ibid.ThisiswhatdistinguishedhisanalysisfrombothclassicalliberalandneoMarxisttheoriesthatseestateinterventionasarelativelyrecentphenomenon.
Dewesisclearlyusingathreepartmodel,andhisinterpretationofFoucaultsurelyleadstotheimplicationthatcivilsocietyis,fromthestart,adomainpermeatedby
powerrelationsanddomination.
101.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,188.
102.ForadiscussionofFoucault'stheoryofthe"governmentalizationofthestate,"seeBarrySmart,Foucault,Marxism,andCritique(London:Routledge,1983),
119122.
103.Ibid.,188.
104.Ibid.,116119.
105.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,215.
106.Justhowonewoulddifferentiatebetween"totalitarian"ormodern"authoritarian"regimesandWesterndemocraciesfromaFoucaultianpointofviewisunclear.
107.SeeHonneth,TheCritiqueofPower,chap.5,andHabermas,ThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,266294.ForaneoMarxistaccount,seeSmart,
Foucault,Marxism,andCritique,120122.Smart'sshortdiscussionpresentsbothFoucault'sanalysisofthesocialandthatofhisdisciple,Donzelot.Accordingto
FoucaultandDonzelot,"'thesocial'denotesaparticularhistoricalevent,namelytheemergenceofanetworkorrelayofinstitutionsandfunctionsthroughwhicha
productiveorpositivepowerisexercisedoverpopulations"(122).Theemergenceofthesocialreferstothosedimensionsoflifethataretobe"protected"fromthe
effectsofeconomicfluctuationsandgrantedacertainsecurity.Thus,thesocialandtheassociatedmeasuresandmechanismsdirectedtowardsuchdimensionsof
populationasfertility,age,health,economicactivity,welfare,andeducationrepresentashiftinthewaypowerisexercisedoverindividualsandaparticularformof
cohesionwithinsociety.Theformeristheexerciseofpowerconnectedwithknowledgeacquiredthroughtheadministrative,technocratic

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formulasofsocialmanagement.Thelatter,solidarity,isreallyacodewordfortheaidthroughcontrolthatistypicalofsocialwelfareprograms.Inbothcases,"the
social"isnotsomethingautonomousbutaproductofpowertechniquesandanobjectthatisliterallycreatedthroughtechniquesofcontrol.
108.Whatremainsunclearinallthisisjustwhattheglobalizationofpowerrelationsbythestateandthebourgeoisiemeans.Isthisatheoryofthededifferentiationof
state,society,andeconomy?Isitatheoryofthelatecapitalistwelfarestate?Isthepurposetosteerusawayfromprojectsofdemocratizationofthestateorsociety
oreconomyandtoparryquestionsoflegitimacywithissuesoftherelationsofforces?Ifpowerisglobalized,whataboutresistancetoglobalpower?Thereseemto
benoanswerstothesedisturbingquestionsinFoucault'stexts.
109.Foucaultseemstoreducethesocialtothesumofsetsofpowerrelationsinwhichactioniscoordinatedsolelythroughthe"reciprocity"ofstrategiccalculations.
Butithasbeencleartosociologists,atleastsinceDurkheim'scritiqueofSpencer'scontractualmodelofsociety,thatstrategicformsofinteractiondon'tsufficefor
maintainingthesocialbondor,inmoremodernterms,socialintegration.Yet,ifalloldsolidarities,traditions,andautonomousassociationsare,ineffect,
gleichgestaltet,ifnormsareinstrumentsofnormalization,thenwhatisthesocialbondbesidespower?Asweshallsee,thisonesidedconceptionofthesocialismost
significantforFoucault'stheoryofresistance,foritleaveshimwithouttheconceptualmeansnecessarytoaccountforthelogicoreventhepossibilityofcollective
action,whichpresupposesformsofsolidarity,association,andsocialbondingthatcannotbereducedtothelogicofstrategicinteraction.Paradoxically,the"loss"of
thestateintheanalysisoftheoldregimeiscomplementedbythe"loss"ofsocietyinthediscussionofthenew.
110.OnthelackofdiscussionofdemocracyinFoucault'swork,seeFlynn,"FoucaultandtheBodyPolitic,"6584.
111.SeetheaccountinDewes,LogicsofDisintegration,145199.Thisistiedtothecritiqueofthephilosophyofthesubject.
112.ThisisaclearreferencetoHegel'sdiscussionofthese"gains"ofmodernity.SeetheKnoxtranslationofHegel'sPhilosophyofRight(Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress,1952),75104.
113.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,193.
114.Foucault'sthesisisthatdisciplinarytechniquesoriginateinspecificclosedinstitutionsandthenaredeinstitutionalizedandcirculatefreelythroughoutsociety
(DisciplineandPunish,211).
115.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,213214.
116.Ibid.,177.
117.ForHabermas,onthecontrary,itispreciselytheemergencewithintheoldregimeoftheadministrativeapparatusofthemodernstate,alongsideandin
contradictiontothesocietyoforderswithitsrepresentativepublicity,thatisspecificallymodern.Statesovereigntyandtheemergenceofanewformof

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bourgeoispublicity(ofwhichthereformers'discourseisapart)constitutethetwokeypolesofmodernpubliclife.Ofcourse,Habermasknowsthatpower
relationsdevelopwithinsocietyandeconomyaswellasinthestate.Moreover,he,likeFoucault,recognizesthattheEnlightenmentreformers'dreamofasociety
freeofdominationandastatewhosepowerisclearlydelimitedandcontrolledbythepublicrepresentativesofsocietyisneverrealized.Nevertheless,the
"contradictoryinstitutionalization"ofthebourgeoispublicspherethecreationofparliaments,aRechtsstaat,rights,andpublicspacesincivilsocietyismore
thanamereveilorcarrierofanewmodalityofdomination.Thedifferentiationofstateandsocietyinitiatedundertheoldregimethroughstatemakingprocesses,
strugglesfrombelow,andthelegal,constitutionalarticulationofrightsestablishednewspacesfortheemergenceofnewandautonomoussolidaritiesontheterrain
ofanowmoderncivilsociety.Inshort,thecontinueddiscourseofsovereigntyandlegitimacyinmodernsocietyisnotananachronism.Itwitnessestwokey
institutionalfacts:theexistenceofacentralizedstatepowerdistinctfromsociety,andtheinstitutionalizationofsomeofthekeyprinciplesofthebourgeoispublic
sphereandindividualrights.Theseconstitutethepossibilityfortheemergenceofnewformsofassociation,publicity,plurality,solidarity,andcounterpowerwithin
theframeworkofamoderncivilsociety.Civil,political,andsocialrightsarenotsimplytheexpressionofindividualizingpowertechniquestheyconstituteasocial
realm,aterrainonwhichprivateindividualscancometogether,associate,communicate,andpubliclyarticulatetheirviewsinprint,inart,orindiscussions.The
publicsphere,whichislatertobecomeaterrainofcontentionamongconflictinggroupsandprojects,mustbeseenasatleastdualistic.
IfHabermaserrsinfocusingexclusivelyontherise,discourse,andstructureofthebourgeoispublicsphere,neglectingitscontradictoryrelationtoplebeian,
proletarian,andwomen'sformsofassociationandpublicity,Foucaulterrsinomittingtheentirecategoryofthepublicsphereand,withit,allformsofautonomous
voluntaryassociation.
118.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,207.
119.SeeFoucault,Power/Knowledge,106.
120.Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,216.
121.Ibid.,168.
122.Ibid.andFoucault,Power/Knowledge,208.
123.Forananalysisthatmaintainsthatthecritiqueremainscaughtinthephilosophyofthesubject,seeHabermas,PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,chaps.9,
10.
124.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,142.
125.SeeMcCarthy,"TheCritiqueofImpureReason."
126.HerbertMarcuse,ErosandCivilization(Boston:BeaconPress,1955).ThiswasFoucault'searlierstrategy,whichhethenrejectedinMadnessand
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127.HabermashasaskedpreciselythesequestionsonthebasisofhiscritiqueofFoucault(PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,284).
128.Foucault,HistoryofSexuality,157.OuranalysishasbeenbasedonFoucault'sworkupthroughthistext.Somehavearguedthatanothershiftinhisthinkingis
indicatedinthesecondandthirdvolumesofhishistoryofsexuality:MichelFoucault,TheUsesofPleasure(NewYork:RandomHouse,1990),andTheCareof
theSelf(NewYork:RandomHouse,1988).Inthesetexts,Foucaultallegedlyabandonedhisonesidedconceptionoftheselfandthesubject,temperedhisall
pervasivenotionofpower,andprovidedtherudimentsofanewconceptionofthesocial.Thismaybethecase,butithardlyaffectsourgeneralanalysisofhisposition
oncivilsociety.Neitherworkaddressesmoderntimes:ThefirstisonGreece,thesecondonRome.Thefocusofthesetextsisonselfformativeprocessesand
conceptionsofbodilypleasuresandsexualitythatdonotconstitutethehermeneutic,desiringsubjectofsexualitycastigatedbyFoucaultinthefirstvolumeofthe
series.Whilethereareinterestinginsightsinthesevolumes,Foucaultdiedbeforehehadachancetodevelopthenewlinesofthoughttheysuggest.Webelievethathis
assessmentofcivilsocietyasacarceralsocietywouldhavetoberadicallyrevisedforhislateinsightsintotheself,subjectivity,andthesocialtobearfruit.Fora
criticalview,seeMcCarthy,"TheCritiqueofImpureReason,"andPeterDews,"TheReturnoftheSubjectintheLateFoucault,"RadicalPhilosophy51(Spring
1989).
129.Seechapter9.
130.Taylor,"FoucaultonFreedomandTruth,"8283.
131.Itisalsoourthesisthatsocialmovementsstruggleoverthepowertodefinenorms,collectiveidentities,etc.Foradiscussionofthislogicofcollectiveaction,see
thesectiononTouraineinchapter10.
132.Seechapter9foradiscussionofthetwosidednessoftheinstitutionsofcivilsocietyandtherelationofsocialmovementstothisdualism.
133.Foucault,Power/Knowledge,96.
134.Ibid.,107.WesuspectthatFoucault'sentirediscussionof"thejuridical"makessenseonlywithreferencetotheFrenchconceptionoflawasitderivesfrom
Rousseau.Lawarticulatesthegeneralwillandprotectstheindividualagainstexecutivearbitrariness.Thereislittleneedonthisviewforadistinctionbetweenindividual
rightsagainstthestateandlaw.Foucaultneverseriouslyaddressesthisdistinction.
135.Ibid.,108.
136.Ibid.
Chapter7
1.SeeespeciallyHabermas'scritiqueofhermeneutics,"AReviewofGadamer'sTruthandMethod,"inFredDallmayrandThomasMcCarthy,eds.,Understanding
andSocialInquiry(NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1977),and"The

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HermeneuticClaimtoUniversality,"inJosefBleicher,ed.,HermeneuticsasMethod,PhilosophyandCritique(London:Routledge,1980).Forasummaryof
thedebate,seeThomasMcCarthy,TheCriticalTheoryofJrgenHabermas(Cambridge:MITPress,1978).Recently,severalauthors,includingDieter
Misgeld,ThomasMcCarthy,NancyFraser,andHansJoas,haveagainchallengedHabermas'spositioninthisdebate,especiallyaroundthesystem/lifeworld
distinction.SeethespecialissueofNewGermanCritique,no.35(SpringSummer1985),andHabermas'sresponsetosomeofhiscriticsinAxelHonnethand
HansJoas,eds.,CommunicativeAction(Cambridge:MITPress,1991).
2.CarlSchmittandsomesocialhistorianshaveuncoveredsuchadoubleprojectioninthecaseoftheliberalconceptofcivilsociety.See,e.g.,OttoBrunner,Land
undHerrschaft,5thed.(Darmstadt:WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft,1973).ButsimilardifficultiesariseforthepolisorientedconceptsofArendtandCastoriadis
andthemedievalistconceptsofGierke,Maitland,Figgis,andLaski.
3.TheuseoftheconceptofcivilsocietyintheworkofReinhardtBendixandS.N.Eisenstadtisintelligentandcreative,butneitherhasexaminedthesocialscientific
validityofthisessentiallyphilosophicalconcept,whichtheytakeoverdirectlyfromhistoriographyandthehistoryofpoliticaltheory.SeeReinhardtBendix,Kingsand
People(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1978),357377,523ff.andS.N.Eisenstadt,Tradition,ChangeandModernity(NewYork:Wiley,1973),
231ff.IdentifyingcivilsocietymoreorlesswithMontesquieu'scorpsintermdiaires,Bendixhassomedifficultyindifferentiatingbetweenasocietyofordersand
moderncivilsociety.Eisenstadt,surprisinglyenoughinthestyleoftheyoungMarx,identifiescivilwithclasssocietyandthusmissesthedimensionthatBendixinsists
on,alongwiththatofanewtypeofpublicsphere.NeitherreconstructstheconceptalongtherichtrajectorythatTalcottParsonsdescribed,perhapsbecauseonly
ParsonssawhisconceptionintermsofthemultilevelHegelianmodel.
4.Theproblemcomesupagainandagaininessayslike"Interaction,Organization,andSociety,""PositiveLawandIdeology,""PoliticsasaSocialSystem,""The
EconomyasaSocialSystem,""WorldtimeandSystemHistory,''and"TheSelfthematizationofSociety,"allinNiklasLuhmann,TheDifferentiationofSociety
(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1982hereaftercitedasDifferentiation)"ModerneSystemtheorienalsFormgesamtgesellschaftlicherAnalyse,"inJrgen
HabermasandNiklasLuhmann,TheoriederGesellschaftoderSozialthechnologie(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1971hereafterSozialtechnologie)"Politische
Planung,"inNiklasLuhmann,PolitischePlanung(Opladen:WestdeutscherVerlag,1971hereafterPlanung)"Gesellschaft,"inNiklasLuhmann,Soziologische
Aufklrung,vol.1(Opladen:WestdeutscherVerlag,1970hereafterAufklrung1)and"DieWeltgesellschaft,"inSoziologischeAufklrung,vol.2(Opladen:
WestdeutscherVerlag,1982hereafterAufklrung2).
5.Differentiation,73,223.
6.See"DieWeltgesellschaft,"inAufklrung2.

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7."Interaction,OrganizationandSociety,""PositiveLawandIdeology,""PoliticsasaSocialSystem,''"TheEconomyasaSocialSystem,"and"TheDifferentiationof
Society,"inDifferentiation"Gesellschaft,"inAufklrung1"DieWeltgesellschaft,"inAufklrung2and"ffentlicheMeinung"and"KomplexittundDemokratie,"
inPlanung.
8.Planung,36Differentiation,333.
9.Differentiation,335336.
10.SeeHannahArendt,TheHumanCondition(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1958)andCorneliusCastoriadis'sarticleonAristotleinCrossroadsinthe
Labyrinth(Cambridge:MITPress,1984).
11."ModerneSystemtheorienalsFormgesamtgesellschaftlicherAnalyse,"inSozialtechnologie,78Aufklrung1,138.
12.Differentiation,161,295.
13.Aufklrung1,138Differentiation,19.
14.Differentiation,7880,336337,339.LuhmannseesthisviewpersistingintheParsonianattempttoviewthepoliticalsubsystemasaformofcollectiveaction
dedicatedtotheattainmentofcommonsocialgoals.Hesubstitutesthegenerationofbindingdecisionsforvariouspossiblesocialusesasthefunctionofapolitical
subsystemorganizedaroundthemediumofpower.
15.Ibid.,334335.
16.Aufklrung2,5152.
17.Differentiation,334.
18.HereheisinoppositiontoParsonsandHabermas,whobothseemtochoosemoney.Thus,Luhmannseemstotakemoreatfacevaluetheselfthematizationof
politicalsocietyinancientpoliticalphilosophy!
19.Differentiation,337.
20.Ibid.,193,338.
21.Ibid.,341343.
22.Ibid.,191,222,338.
23.Ibid.,338.
24.Ibid.,205.
25.Ibid.,203204.
26.Ibid.,340.
27.Ibid.,202.
28.Ibid.,338.
29.Ibid.,342.
30.Ibid.,225.
31.Ibid.,357ff.

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32.SeeClausOffe,ContradictionsoftheWelfareState(Cambridge:MITPress,1985),3564.
33.NiklasLuhmannLegitimationalsVerfahren,2ded.(Darmstadt:LuchterhandVerlag,1975hereaftercitedasLegitimation),160161.
34.NiklasLuhmann,ASociologicalTheoryofLaw(London:Routledge,1972hereaftercitedasSociologyofLaw),149,283ff.
35.Differentiation,340Aufklrung1,141.
36.Differentiation,138.
37.MaxWeber,EconomyandSociety,vol.1(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1978),54,56.
38.Differentiation,132.Inlaterworks,thisreductionismidentifyingthepoliticalsystemwiththestateislinkedtothepointofviewoftheadministration"takingitself
forthewhole,"andevento"bureaucracy'sprotectionandscreen,"justastheunderstandingofpoliticsasdemocracyandasleadershipareidentifiedasthe
reductionismsofthepublicandpartysystems,respectively.SeetheessayscollectedinNiklasLuhmann,PoliticalTheoryintheWelfareState(Berlin:deGruyter,
1990hereaftercitedasPoliticalTheory),55,148.Theseessaysalsoexpressasomewhatdifferent,thoughnotnecessarilyinconsistent,conceptionimplyingthe
continuedpossibilityandeventheunavoidabilityofspeakingofthestateandoftheoppositionofstateandsociety(109andnote100)onthelevelofpoliticaltheory
andnotpoliticalscience.Theconclusionisevenmoreexplicitlydrawnwithrespecttotheconceptofthestateintheessay''StateandPolitics,"inPoliticalTheory,
123,128,134,136,141146,152153.Crucialinthiscontextisthedistinctionbetweentwotypesoftheory.Whereastheoriesofpoliticalscience(oranyscience)
aresaidtoberesearchprogramsoperatinginthesubsystemofscienceandarevalidatedonlybyscientificcriteria,politicaltheory(oranyother"reflectiontheory"ofa
givensubsystem)isherepresentedasaformofintellectualactivitywithinthesubsystem,whosefunctionistobuildelementsofselfreflection,selfobservation,and
evenselfcriticismintoitsprocesses,herethepoliticalprocess.Politicaltheoryreliesonpoliticalscience(itis"subsidized"byscience)butneednotoperatewithinthe
strictlimitsofscientificconceptformationandvalidation(PoliticalTheory,2425,5456,107109).Thelevelofcomplexityofreflectiontheoriesisnecessarily
lowerthanthatoftheirsubsystemsaswellasof"scientifictheories"ofthese(ibid.,118119,152).Nevertheless,politicaltheory,unlikepoliticalscience,canplaya
roleinthepoliticalsystemofwhichitisanelementindeed,itiscrucialfortheformationofselfidentitythroughselfobservation(ibid.,119120,136,153).Inthis
context,Luhmannforthefirsttimedenouncesthescientisticfallacyofimaginingthatinallrespectsscientificunderstandingsandtheirapplicationsaremoreadequateto
politicalrealitythanaretheselfunderstandingsofpoliticalactors.Heowesthisinsighttohistheoryofautopoieticsystems,evenifhehasnotbeenmovedtherebyto
incorporateahermeneuticperspectiveintohisconception.Norhashebeenabletoshowwhetherandhowatwowaycommunicationbetweenpoliticalscienceand
politicaltheoryispossible.Ourpresentationand

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critiqueofLuhmannfocusonwhatheunderstandsashisscientificanalysisofpolitics.Whileweunderstandourownworkaspoliticaltheoryverymuchinthe
sensejustarticulated,weagreewithLuhmannthathedoesnotsucceedinproducingsuchatheoryinPoliticalTheory(seepage115).Atissue,however,is
somethingmorethanhisstyleofpresentation,whichiswhatheseemstoimply.
39.Differentiation,140,378note3.
40.Ibid.,236.
41.Planung,5455.
42.Differentiation,128129.
43.Inhismostrecentrelevantstatements,Luhmannislessdismissivewithrespecttothedifferentiationofstateandsociety.Wehavealreadyseenthat,onthelevelof
politicaltheory,heconsidersthedistinctionandtheconceptofthestatetobea(sofar)irreplaceablepartoftheselfidentificationofthepoliticalsubsystem,despiteits
scientificuntenability.Butevenonthelevelofsocialscience,orratherofitshistory,Luhmannnowconcedesthatthedifferentiationofstateandsocietyrepresentedan
earlyunderstandingofthedifferentiationofthesocialsystem,bothfromthepointofviewofthedevelopmentofadifferentiatedeconomyandfromthatofthe
delimitationofthepoliticalsystembyconstitutionallaw.SeePoliticalTheory,133andnote28.
44.TalcottParsons,PoliticsandSocialStructure(NewYork:FreePress,1969),208209.
45.Ibid.,209,240.
46.Ibid.,214,334.
47.Ibid.,248249.
48.Thisis,unfortunately,ambiguouslypresentedin"ThePoliticalAspectofSocialStructureandProcess,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure,339342.Itwould
seem,however,thatthefourpartschemepresentedhereishisfinalword,sinceitcorrespondstothegeneralarchitechtonicofhissystem.Threeofthefour
subsystemsareinvolvedinprocessesof"doubleinterchange":thebureaucracywiththeeconomythelegitimatingorconstitutionalsubsystemwithcultureandthe
integrativeorassociationalsubsystemwiththesocietalcommunity.Thissymmetryisannoyingbecauseallsubsystemsofthepolityhaveinterchangeswiththesocietal
community,asindicatedbythethreefoldsystemofrightsofmembershipParsonsadoptsfromMarshall(civil:constitutionalsubsystempolitical:associational
subsystemsocial:bureaucraticsubsystem).
49.Parsons,PoliticsandSocialStructure,377.
50.Differentiation,144.
51.Planung,40.
52.Ibid.,39,44.
53.Ibid.,35.
54.Ibid.,40.

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55.SeeSozialtechnologie,chap.2.
56.Planung,42.
57.Ibid.,43.
58.Differentiation,114115.
59.Morerecently,LuhmannhasredefineddemocracyinwaysthatnolongerallowanunderstandingofpoliticsinSovietsocietiesasaspeciesofdemocratic
government.Henowunderstandsdemocracyasidenticaleithertothepolitical(orpartypolitical,itisnotclearwhich)versionofthegeneralcharacteristicofself
observationinautopoieticsystems,orasthecodingofthepoliticalsubsystemofthepoliticalsystemintermsofthepartyinpower(orgovernment)andtheopposition.
Thetwoareconnectedbecausebinarycodingintermsoftheconceptoftheoppositionisseen(rightly,inourview)astheprimarymethodofpromotingself
observationinpolitics.SeePoliticalTheory,105,aswellaschaps.5,9.(WeleavetothesidethatLuhmannisinconsistent,elsewheredescribingdemocracyasthe
selfobservationorselfreflectionofthepublicsubsystemofthepoliticalsystem[ibid.,55].Inourview,thisambiguityisinfactaconcessiontoabroadertheoryof
democracythanhisownindeed,inonecontextatleast,thetwoconceptions,linkingpublicandpartypolitics,seemtobeincludedundertheheadingof
"democracy"[ibid.,125].)
Inourview,thenewconceptionofdemocracybasedonthecodeofgovernmentoppositionremainsnarrowandinadequateforthepurposesofpoliticaltheoryin
Luhmann'sownsenseofthisterm.Thedefinitionofdemocracyintermsofgovernmentandoppositiontendstoloseitsspecificityespeciallywhenthesamepairof
conceptsisdefinedasthecode(somewhatimplausibly,giventhefriendenemycodeofmoderntotalitarianism)ofmodernpoliticsassuch:SeeEcological
Communication(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1989),86.Luhmannis,ofcourse,awareofthestillsomewhatexceptionalnatureofthepoliticsof
governmentandoppositioninresponse,heisnowforcedtoconsidersystemswithoutapoliticaloppositionasreversionstoahierarchicalorderofgovernment
andgovernedandasinsufficientlydifferentiated,thereforebyimplicationneithermodernnordemocratic.Nevertheless,formodern,differentiatedpoliticalsystems,
heidentifiesthebasicconstitutivecodeofpoliticswithdemocracy.Asaresult,heimplicitlyrulesoutoforderallquestionsofmoreorlessdemocracyinourtype
ofsociety.Allprojectsofdemocratizationbecomeforhimnecessarily(andnotjustempirically,asinmanyrelevantcases)attemptstoabolishthecodeof
governmentandoppositionandthereforebydefinitionundemocratic.(See"TheTheoryofPoliticalOpposition"[1987],inPoliticalTheory,_167,174175.)
Thisanalysisisopentoimmanentcriticism.Heassertsthattheoldergovernmentgovernedcodeisnotreplacedbutonlysupplementedbythatofgovernment
opposition.Inthiscase,theissueofdemocracyaswellasthatofdemocratizationcanberedefinedintermsoftherelationofthetwocodes,thetypeofbalance
thatisreachedbetweenthem,andtheconditionsunderwhicheachhasprimacy.Luhmannhasbeenabletodothisquitewellwiththe

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competingcodesoforganizations(seeMacht[Stuttgart:EnkeVerlag,1975],chap.3)andinthecaseofhisanalysisoftheofficialandunofficialcyclesofpolitics
intermsofnormalityconflict(seePoliticalTheory,4850).Theidentificationofdemocracymerelywiththepresenceofthecodegovernmentoppositionthus
shieldsthecodeofgovernmentgovernedfromcriticism.Thisposition,onthelevelofpoliticaltheory,doesnotsupportaviablepoliticaloppositionandis
compatiblewithitsfactualifnotformal"disappearance"documentedbyKirchheimer,forexample.Luhmannadmitsasmuch(PoliticalTheory,177).
Inourview,theviabilityofopposition,andthereforeofdemocracy,isdueonlytothesuperiorityofthecodeofgovernmentoppositiontothatofgovernment
governed.Thissuperiority,orevenagenuinelybalancedrelationbetweenthetwocodes,dependsontheestablishmentofathirdcode,oneLuhmannrejectsfrom
thestart:thatofparliamentaryandnonparliamentarypolitics,ofpoliticalandcivilsociety.Thisideadoes,however,sneakbackintohisanalysisintwoplaces.
First,theimageofthe"parasite"pointstothepublicastheunintendedbeneficiaryoftheconflictofgovernmentandopposition.Excludedbythe"formal"or
"official"systemofpolitics,andconfinedonlytothe''illusory"politicsofelections,thepublic"sneaksback"ontheinformalorunofficiallevelduetothe
opportunitiespresentedbyagovernmentprotectingitspositionandanoppositionseekingtotakeover.Bothimplicitlyappealtothepublicoutsidetheformal
systemofdecisionmaking(PoliticalTheory,178179).Second,actualantagonismbetweenoppositionandgovernmentdoesdiminishsincethetwoelementsof
abipolarratherthanhierarchicalsystemactuallypresupposeeachother,andhypotheticallycanalwaysimaginethemselvesinplaceoftheother.ButLuhmann
pointsoutthetendencytoproduceverbalandevenillusoryconflicts,whichheinterpretsas"aformofopennessthroughwhichsocietalinterestscanbeassignedto
onesideoranother"(PoliticalTheory,184).Hedoesnotnoticethatunlesssocialinterestsareactuallyorganizedandarticulatedbyassociationsand
organizationsoutsidethepoliticalsystem,andunlesstheseinhoweveracomplexmannerarerearticulatedandaggregatedinthepoliticalsystem,theconflicts
ofthelatterwillbeperceivedasmereshow,asmere"politics"inthenegativesenseoftheterm,withdeeplydamagingconsequencesforthecodeofgovernment
andopposition.
60.Planung,44.
61.SeeJrgenHabermas,LegitimationCrisis(Boston:BeaconPress,1975),130.Hiscritiquefocusesontheissueofdemocratizationofplanningourproblemis
thedemocratizationofcivilsocietyanditsmediations.
62.Planung,1012,21.
63.Ibid.,21.
64.Ibid.,13.
65.Ibid.,20.
66.Ibid.,17.
67.Ibid.,26.

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68.Ibid.,2223.
69.Ibid.,27.
70.Ibid.,28.Inthecontextofhislesssystematicanalysis(his"politicaltheory"),Luhmannisevenlessrestrainedinhisuseofthecategoriesofcivilsocietyoutsidethe
politicalsystemproper.Inparticular,persons,law,andpublicopinion(notethecorrespondencetoHabermas'sthreedomainsofthelifeworld:personality,society,
andculture)areunderstoodas"externalizing"formsofpoliticalproblemsolvingoutsidetheframeworkofthepoliticalsystemproper.SeePoliticalTheory,6062.
71.Ibid.,1819.
72.Ibid.,13.
73.Ibid.,2425.
74.ApossibilityoncementionedbyLuhmanninregardtoelections(seeLegitimation,162).
75.Planung,26.
76.Legitimation,158.
77.Ibid.,183.
78.Ibid.,190.
79.Ibid.,154,161.
80.Ibid.,200.
81.Ibid.,158.
82.Ibid.,159.
83.Ibid.,169.
84.Ibid.,166167.
85.Ibid.,161163.
86.Ibid.,174,190.
87.Ibid.,183ff.
88.Theseincludetheimplicitdistinctionbetween"friend"and"enemy"ininteractionsbargainingwithselectedimportantsocialinterestspersonalandgrouprelations
andrelianceonalreadypackagedandbureaucraticallymanagedinformation.
89.Legitimation,194.
90.Ibid.,190(ouremphasis).
91.Inalatertext(PoliticalTheory,4850),theofficialandunofficialversionsofmodernpoliticalprocessarepresentedintermsoftwoalternatingcyclicaldynamics.
Inthe"official"cycle,thepublicinfluencespoliticalpartiesthroughelections,thepartiessettheboundariesandprioritiesforadministrativedecisionsthroughlegislative
andothermeans,theadministrationsubjectsthepublictoitsbindingdecisions,andsoon.Inthe"unofficial"or"counter"cycle,the

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administrationdraftsbillsfortheparliamentaryparties,thepartiesinfluencethevoteoftheelectorate,andthepublicinfluencestheadministration"throughvarious
channels,likeinterestgroupsandemotionalappeals."Luhmannstillassertsthattheunofficialmodel(whichinthisversioninvolves"civilsociety"inpolitics,although
limitedtocorporatistandpopulistforms)prevailsinnormalcases.Buthenowarguesthattheofficialmodel,restingon"legallyregulatedauthority"prevailsin
casesofconflict.Inourview,thislattereventualitywouldinvolvethepublicinitspeculiarmediatingrole,asaninstitutionofbothcivilandpoliticalsociety.
AccordingtoLuhmann,thereisabalancebetweenthetwocyclesthatisslowlydisplacedtowardtheinformalorunofficialmodel.ThisthesislinksLuhmanntothe
Schmittiancritiqueofparliamentarism,thoughlessstronglythaninthecaseofhisearlierconception,whichtendedtoreducetheofficialversiontomereshow.
Indeed,theemphasisontheroleofthisversionincasesofconflictrepresentsanironic,SchmittianreplytoSchmittwhoaffirmedtheirrelevanceofformal
institutionsin"emergencies."
92.J.Schumpeter,Capitalism,SocialismandDemocracy,3ded.(NewYork:Harper&Row,1947),291292.
93.T.H.Marshall,"CitizenshipandSocialClass,"inClass,CitizenshipandSocialDevelopment(NewYork:Doubleday,1964),71ff.
94.Parsons,unlikeMarshall,doesnotcallthesesocialprerequisitesrights.
95.TalcottParsons,PoliticsandSocialStructure(NewYork:FreePress,1969),259260TheSystemofModernSocieties(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice
Hall,1971),8183.
96.SeeParsons,TheSystemofModernSocieties,6263seealsopages9294foradiscussionoftheciviccomponentintermsofdifferentiationratherthan
inclusion.
97.AndthisatatimewhenhewasgreatlyundertheinfluenceofParsons.SeeNiklasLuhmann,GrundrechtealsInstitution(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1965
hereaftercitedasGrundrechte).AdmittedlyhedidnothaveaccesstoParsons's1965"FullCitizenshipfortheNegroAmerican?"(reprintedinPoliticsandSocial
Structure),inwhichheintroducedMarshall'sframework.WhetherornotheknewParsons'sconceptionofrights,hisownrootsinlegalpositivismpointedhim
primarilytotheproblemofdifferentiationbecauseofanissuethatwasoflittleconcerntoParsons:theselflimitationofthepoliticalthroughpoliticallyenactedlaw.The
problemofinclusion,inheritedfromMarshallandParsons,doesmakeanappearanceinalaterwork(PoliticalTheory,3437),buttheconceptishereinterpreted
narrowlyintermsofthepoliticalsystemandnotintermsofthesocietalcommunityoritsstandins,whichwouldprovidemoregeneralsocialcitizenshipor
membership.AndwhileLuhmannnotesthetransformation,inthecontextofthedevelopmentofthewelfarestate,ofthesemanticsofpoliticalinclusionfrombenefitsto
claims,eventhisperceptiondoesnotleadhimtolinktheproblemofinclusiontothatofrights.Evidently,helinksonlyMarshall'ssocialdimensionofcitizenshipto
inclusion,andnotthecivilandpoliticaldimensions.

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98.Grundrechte,24.
99.SeeGntherTeubner,"SubstantiveandReflexiveElementsinModernLaw,"LawandSocietyReview17,no.2(1983):239301.Teubnerpointstothetension
betweentheinflationarytendenciesemanatingfromthepoliticalsystem'sfunctionofproducingbindingdecisionsandtheneedtomanagethecomplicatedinputoutput
relationswithothersubsystems.Inthisargument,itisreflexivitythatresolvesthetensionandgivesrisetoselflimitation.Justthisselflimitation,webelieve,represents
thepoliticalsideofrightscreation,apointthatLuhmanndidnotyetmakein1965.Inourview,fundamentalrightsarethebestexamplesofreflexivelaw(Teubner)or
lawasinstitution(Habermas).
100.Grundrechte,23.
101.Ibid.,43,182183.
102.Ibid.,24,41.
103.Ibid.,36.
104.Ibid.,63.
105.Ibid.,73.
106.Ibid.,76.
107.Ibid.,75andesp.note60.
108.Ibid.,81.
109.Ibid.,96,concerningtheprotectionofmarriagebasedonlove,threatenedbythefamily,notthestate.
110.Ibid.,95,99.
111.Ibid.,107.
112.Ibid.,115.
113.Ibid.,126.
114.Differentiation,212213.
115.In1965,Luhmanndidnotyetaffirmthispositionasclearly(seeGrundrechte,113note13)ashedidinhis1970essay"WirtschaftalssozialesSystem,"in
Differentiation,190225.
116.Grundrechte,115Differentiation,201,210211.
117.Grundrechte,115.
118.Ibid.,138ff.,151ff.
119.Ibid.,149.
120.Ibid.,140144.
121.Ibid.,99.Laterworkseemstoleaveopenthepossibilitythatbothmodelsofdifferentiationmightbeused,oneonthelevelofthescienceofpoliticsandtheother
onthelevelofpoliticaltheory(seePoliticalTheory,109andnote100,133andnote28).Seealsonote38aboveforthisdistinctionoftwotypesoftheory,one
interrogatingtherelevantparticipantsandparticipatinginpoliticsby

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observingandcriticizingitfromwithin,theotherscientificallyobservingthisspherefromtheoutside(includingitsselfobservation).
122.Thisargumentismadeforthelegalsystemasawholeinthe1976essay"TheAutonomyoftheLegalSystem,"inDifferentiation,128129.Itis,moreover,
stronglyimpliedthattheendoftheautonomyofthelegalsystemwithlaw,forexample,becomingaspecificationofpolitics(127)wouldhaveconsequencesof
dedifferentiationforsocietyasawhole(130).
123.SociologyofLaw,17.
124.NiklasLuhmann,"NormeninsoziologischerPerspektive,"SozialeWelt8,no.20(1969):40hereaftercitedas"Normen."
125.Ibid.,4748,forexample.Luhmannoftenusesaconceptofeverydaylifeorlifeworldtoindicatetheroles,ininteraction,ofstructuresnottakenupin
differentiatedsubsystems.Itisonthislevelthatherepeatedlylocatesthebulkofnormativeexperienceandexpectation.Unfortunately,therelationoflifeworldto
systemisnotclarifiedinhismodel,andtheusageseemsinconsistentwithhissystem/environmentmodelofsocialsystemsandsubsystems.Cf.SociologyofLaw,47.
126."Normen,"37SociologyofLaw,33.IncontradistinctiontoFoucault,Luhmanndistinguishesbetween"norm"and"normalization."Normalizationrepresentsa
prenormativeundifferentiatedstructureofexpectation,involvingnoeffortstobringbacktoconformitythe"deviant,"whosebehaviorisnotunderstoodas"serious,''
"free,"or"interested."Normalizationaimsatconditionsratherthanactions,anditinvolvesnocreationof"universal"standards(SociologyofLaw,3637).
127.SociologyofLaw,7780.Thisisourinterpretation,onalowerlevelofabstraction,ofLuhmann'sowndefinitionoflawas"congruentlygeneralizednormative
behavioralexpectations"(77).
128."Normen,"3031SociologyofLaw,24ff.
129."Normen,"32SociologyofLaw,27.
130.SociologyofLaw,26.
131."Normen,"33ff.SociologyofLaw,29ff.
132."Normen,"33SociologyofLaw,3031.ItiscrucialaswellaspossibletorefuteLuhmann'spremisethatnormativelearningisacontradictioninterms(see
chapter9).Inparticular,thenotionofthecommunicativecreationorrevisionofnorms,marginalizedbyLuhmann,isacluetothedirectionthisdemonstrationmight
take.Linkedtotheideaofcriticalcommunicationaboutnorms,thenotionofcounterfactualitycanbebroughttobearinconnectionwithlearningthroughthePiaget
KohlbergHabermasmodelofmoraldevelopment.Luhmann'sownmodelofanormafivestyleofexpectationisidentifiedonlywithatraditionalorconventional
attitudetowardnorms.Paradoxically,astheempiricallybasedontogeneticmodelofKohlbergshows,acognitiveattitudetowardnormsrepresentsthelowestlevelof
normativedevelopment.ForLuhmann,onlya

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retreattoexactlythisattitudewouldrepresentlearning.Ananswertohimispossibleonlyifapostconventionalrelationshiptonormscouldbeshowntobe
compatiblewithanormative(counterfactual)structure.Itseemsthat,forHabermasatleast,counterfactualitypersistsontheleveloftheidealconditionsof
discourse,nottobeidentifiedwiththeempiricalprocessesofcomingtoanunderstanding,whichneverthelesspresupposethem(seechapter8).
133.SociologyofLaw,3840.
134.Ibid.,49ff.
135.Ibid.,5152.
136.Ibid.,7879,8485.
137.Ibid.,138.
138.Differentiation,95.
139.QuasimediumbecauseinSociologyofLaw,167168,Luhmannneveractuallyassignstheroleoftranslatingselectivityorselectivedecisionstoprocedure,and
hespeaksonlyof"theselectionofcollectivelybindingdecisions."Indeed,hismajorworkinthesociologyoflawnevertreatslawdirectlyasamediumandistherefore
ambiguousaboutthestatusoflawasasubsystemofsociety.Subsequentworksarecleareronthisissue.Intheconceptionoflawasanautopoietic,selfreferential
subsystem,normativelyclosedandcognitivelyopen,itsfullequalitywithotherautonomoussubsystemsisatleastasserted.See,e.g.,thechapteronlawinEcological
Communication.PoliticalTheory,82ff.,isalone,however,intreatinglawasamedium,entirelyparalleltomoney.
140.SociologyofLaw,160.
141.Differentiation,104.
142.Ibid.,122,132.
143.SociologyofLaw,188.
144.Ibid.,187.
145.Differentiation,132.
146.NiklasLuhmann,"TheSelfReproductionofLawandItsLimits,"inG.Teubner,ed.,DilemmasofLawintheWelfareState(Berlin:deGruyter,1986),113.
147.Ibid.,113,124.
148."Normen,"47.
149.SociologyofLaw,161162,182.
150.Ibid.,182183.
151."Normen,"4647.Interestinglyenough,Luhmann'sconception,inwhichthecounterfactual,normativeorientationofthejudgesrepresentsthesoleguaranteeof
thereproductionoflawasanormativesystem,comesclosetoH.L.A.Hart'sinsistencethatinalegalorderjudges(or"officials")mustbeabletoassumeaninternal
evaluative(ratherthanmerelyobservational)perspectivewithregardtothevalidityoflaws.ButthedifferencesbetweenHartand

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Luhmannareevenmoreinstructive,becausefortheformerthedivisionofthepopulationintoofficialsandallothersrepresentsanalmostpathologicallimitingcase
ofwhatstillconstitutesalegalor.Inany"healthy"society,Harttellsus,manyordinarypeople("normally...themajorityofsociety")regularlytaketheinternal
perspective,althoughitmustbeassumedthattherearesomewhomerelywishtoobservewhetherornotcertainlawsarefollowedandenforced,andact
accordingly.SeeH.L.A.Hart,TheConceptofLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1961),8688,113.Weshouldnotethatthemeaningoftheinternal
perspectiveinHartisnotreduced,asitisinLuhmann,toamoreorlessconventionalunwillingnesstolearninordertomaintaincounterfactualnorms,butis
expressedintermsofacriticalevaluativeattitudethatinvolvesapostconventional,reflectiveattitude.Undoubtedly,bothoftheseandeventheircombinationare
possibleinthecaseofjudgmentsoflegalvalidity.
152.SociologyofLaw,201.
153.Ibid.,202.
154.Luhmann,"TheSelfReproductionofLaw,"113.
Chapter8
1.Forthebestrecentdefenseofrightsorientedliberalism,seeRonaldDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1978).Foragood
discussionoftheliberalidealofneutrality,seeCharlesLarmore,PatternsofMoralComplexity(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987).
2.SeeCarolePateman,ParticipationandDemocraticTheory(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1970),andTheProblemofPolitical
Obligation:ACriticalAnalysisofLiberalTheory(NewYork:Wiley,1979).SeealsoC.B.MacPherson,TheLifeandTimesofLiberalDemocracy(Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,1977),andDemocraticTheory(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1973).
3.Wearethinkinghereofkeydimensionsofthe"newsocialmovements"intheWest,includingtheecology,citizeninitiative,feminist,andpeacemovements,and
Poland'sSolidarityintheEast.Foradiscussionofthesenewmovements,seechapter10.SeealsoAndrewArato,"CivilSocietyvs.theState,"Telos,no.50
(Winter,198182):1948:JeanL.Cohen,"RethinkingSocialMovements,"BerkeleyJournalofSociology28(1983):97113,and"StrategyorIdentity:New
TheoreticalParadigmsandContemporarySocialMovements,"SocialResearch52,no.4(Winter1985):663716AndrewAratoandJeanL.Cohen,"TheGerman
GreenParty,''Dissent8(Summer1984):327333,and"SocialMovements,CivilSocietyandtheProblemofSovereignty,"PraxisInternational4,no.3(1984):
266283.
4.AndrewAratoandJeanL.Cohen,"CivilSocietyandSocialTheory,"ThesisEleven,no.21(1988):4064.Seechapters4and6.ThesameholdstrueforNiklas
Luhmann(seechapter7).
5.JeanL.Cohen,ClassSocietyandCivilSociety:TheLimitsofMarxianCriticalTheory(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1982).

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6.Whatfollowsisarestatementofthecoreassumptionsofdiscourseethicsthatareshared,despitedifferentformulations,bythetwomainpropoundersofthetheory:
JrgenHabermasandKarlOttoApel.WerelyforthemostpartonHabermas'sversion.Whetherdiscourseethicscanbegivenatranscendental(Apel),auniversal
pragmatic(Habermas),oronlyahistorical(Castoriadis)foundation,andwhetherrationalargument(Habermas)ordecision(Heller)istohaveultimatepriorityin
relationtoour"choice"forsuchanethicsremainsanopenquestion.AnimpressivedebatebetweenCastoriadisandHabermasinDubrovnik,Yugoslavia,in1982
convincedusthatequallygoodargumentscanbegivenforhistoricityanduniversality.Ithasalsobecomeclearfromthisdebatethatthecommonelementinthetwo
positionsisthedualityoflevelsofanalysis:Strongertypesofargumentationarenecessaryforthemetalevel(theprocedurallevelofinstitutionalization)thanforthe
historicallevel(thatwhichisalreadyinstituted).FortheworkofKarlOttoApel,uponwhichwerely,seeTowardstheTransformationofPhilosophy(London:
RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1980),225285,and"NormativeEthicsandStrategicRationality:ThePhilosophicalProblemofaPoliticalEthic,"TheGraduate
FacultyPhilosophyJournal9,no.1(Winter1982):81109.ForJrgenHabermas,see''DiscourseEthics:NotesonaProgramofPhilosophicalJustification,"inhis
bookMoralConsciousnessandCommunicativeAction(Cambridge:MITPress,1990).
7.Thesetwodimensionsareseparable,withthefirsthavingpriority.SeeHabermas,"DiscourseEthics,"andalsohisreplytoLukesinJohnB.ThompsonandDavid
Held,eds.,Habermas:CriticalDebates(Cambridge:MITPress,1982),254.
8.SeealsoApel,"NormativeEthics,"100101.
9.JrgenHabermas,"AReplytoMyCritics,"inThompsonandHeld,eds.,Habermas:CriticalDebates,257.SeealsoJrgenHabermas,LegitimationCrisis
(Boston:BeaconPress,1975),89,and"DiscourseEthics."
10.SeeThomasMcCarthy,TheCriticalTheoryofJrgenHabermas(Cambridge:MITPress,1978),325AlbrechtWellmer,PraktischePhilosophieund
TheoriederGesellschaft(Konstanz:UniversittsverlagKonstanz,1979),1011Apel,TowardstheTransformationofPhilosophy,227,258259.
11.JrgenHabermas,"Wahrheitstheorien,"inWirklichkeitundReflexion:FestschriftfurWalterSchulz(Pfullingen,1973),251252,quotedinMcCarthy,
CriticalTheory,316.SeealsoHabermas,"DiscourseEthics,"99ff.,forthemostrecentformulationoftherulesofargumentation.
12.ForasuccinctformulationinEnglish,SeeSeylaBenhabib,Critique,Norm,andUtopia(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1986),284285.
13.SeeApel,TowardstheTransformationofPhilosophy,238239,wherehesocharacterizestheprocessesofbourgeoisdemocracy.
14.Habermas,"Reply,"257.SeealsoWellmer,PraktischePhilosophie,3334.
15.Habermas,"DiscourseEthics,"67.

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16.Foragooddiscussionofthispoint,seeAlessandroFerrara,"ACritiqueofHabermas'DiscourseEthic,"Telos,no.64(Summer1985):4574.
17.Habermas,"DiscourseEthics,"6876.
18.Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,108.McCarthystressesthisdimensionofthetheory,whileWellmer'stextsattempttoresidualizeit.
19.Habermas,"DiscourseEthics,"65.
20.ThebestdiscussionsarebyAlbrechtWellmer,"ZurKritikderDiskursethik,"inEthikundDialog(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1986),andAgnesHeller,"The
DiscourseEthicofHabermas:CritiqueandAppraisal,"inThesisEleven,no.10/11(1985):517.Mostdiscussionsofthetheoryofdiscourseethicscenteraroundits
abilitytoserveasageneralmoraltheory.Oursis,webelieve,thefirstcomprehensivediscussionofitsabilitytoserveasatheoryofdemocraticlegitimacyandbasic
rights.
21.Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,88seealsoJrgenHabermas,"LegitimationProblemsandtheModernState,"inCommunicationandtheEvolutionof
Society(Boston:BeaconPress,1979).Toputthisanotherway,Habermas'sdiscourseethicscanbeseenasa"postHegelian"attempttobringtogethertheliberal
principleofbasicrights(andtheconceptionofnegativeliberty)andtheancientrepublican(andearlymodern)conceptionofpositivefreedomwithintheframeworkof
atheorythatpresupposesdifferentiation.UnliketheHegelianmodel,however,thetheoryofdiscourseethicsdoesnotleadonetoconstruethenormativeconception
ofpolitics(orthenormativeprinciplesunderlyinglaw)intermsofamonistic,substantive,andultimatelynondemocraticconceptionofethicallife.Instead,asatheory
ofdemocraticlegitimacy,discourseethicsmakesitpossibletoconceiveofanewformofpublicfreedomappropriatetoapluralityofformsoflife,onethat
presupposesandinpartjustifiestheprincipleofbasicrightsseeJeanL.Cohen,"MoralityorSittlichkeit:TowardsaPostHegelianSolution,"CardosoLawReview
10,nos.56(March/April1989):13891414.
22.Heller,"TheDiscourseEthic,"7Wellmer,"ZurKritikderDiskursethik,"5155.
23.Foracritiqueofthepublic/privatedichotomyalongtheselines,seeSusanOkin,Justice,GenderandtheFamily(NewYork:BasicBooks,1989).Okin
challengestheassumptionthatbecausethefamilyisa"privaterealm,"itis"beyondjustice."Sheconvincinglyarguesthatthe"circumstancesofjustice"discussedby
HumeandRawlsobtaininthefamily:Husbands,wives,andchildrenhavedifferingaswellascommoninterests.Accordingly,rightscanbeclaimedbyallfamily
members.Ourinclusionofthefamilywithincivilsocietyaccordswiththisargument.Ofcourse,familylawdiffersfromcontractoradministrativelaw,butthis"private
sphere"isnonethelesslegallyregulated,evenifcertaindecisionswithinitaredeemedprivate.
24.Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,8789.ForagooddiscussionofWellmer'scritique,seeAlessandroFerrara,"CriticalTheoryandItsDiscontents:OnWellmer's
CritiqueofHabermas,"PraxisInternational9,no.3(October1989):305320.

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25.HabermasspecificallyaddressesWeber'sversionofthisthesis.
26.Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,95117alsohisTheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.1(Boston:BeaconPress,1984),254270.
27.Someclarificationisneededhere.Habermaspresentsdiscourseethicsasageneralmoraltheory.Insodoing,hedistinguishesbetweenthemoralpointofview
("theright")andmattersofindividualorgroupidentityorculturalvaluesystems("thegood").Hisownversionofthepublic/privatedichotomythusreferstothe
distinctionbetweenuniversalisticmoralprinciples(public)andparticularvaluesthatinformaperson'swayoflife,identityneeds,lifeplan,etc.(private).Whilehe
arguesthatculturalvaluescanbecomecandidatesforgeneralsocietalnorms,thedistinctionrestsontheassumptionthatthoseculturalvalues,identityneeds,and
componentsofformsoflifethatcannotbeuniversalizeddonotbelongtotherealmofthemoralbutinvolveaestheticevaluativeissuesinstead.Thistypeofclaim
causesheateddebateamongmoraltheorists.Somearguethatonecanneversevertherightfromthegood.Othersarguethatthiswayofseparatingthetwoneedlessly
narrowsthedomainofthemoralwhileunacceptablydemotingquestionsofthegoodfrommattersofprincipletomattersoftaste.Wehaveattemptedtocircumvent
thedebateatthislevelbycastingdiscourseethicsasaspecificsubsetofmoraltheory,onethatdealswiththeunderlyingprinciplesoflegitimatedecisionmakingina
constitutionaldemocracy.Butourversionofthetheorydoespresupposeadomainofautonomousmoraljudgmentthatconstitutesalimittothereachofdemocratic
decisionmaking.This"domain"isitselfrecognizedbytheprincipleoffundamentalrights,which,asweshallshow,standsinacomplexrelationshiptotheprinciplesof
discourseethics.Accordingly,whatwearecalling"private"referstothemoralreflectionsandchoicesofindividualsaswellastheirjudgmentsregardingtheirprojects
andidentityneeds.Privacyrights,asweshallsee,securepreciselythisterrain.Whileallrightsareconnectedtoapublicprincipleinthattheymustbeasserted,agreed
upon,andinstitutionalizedaslaw,whattheyprotect,especiallyinthecaseofprivacy,becomesofflimitstopublic,legal,orpoliticalcontrol.Inotherwords,publicly
articulated,legallyprotectedprivacyrightsconstitutearealmofautonomousjudgmentthatisbeyondpoliticalregulation.However,privacyassuchisnotattachedtoa
particularinstitutionaldomainbutreferstoaspectsofindividualfunctioninginalldomainsoflife.Moreover,thisconceptionofprivacyisnotbasedonanatomistic
modelofthesovereignsubjectorasocialindividual.Onthecontrary,preciselybecauseindividualsdeveloptheirpersonalandcollectiveidentitiesincomplex
interactiveprocessesandarealwaysembeddedinawebofrelationswithothers,andbecausethereisapluralityofmoralconceptionsinanymoderncivilsociety,the
capacitytomakeautonomousmoralchoicesandtheabilitytodeveloppersonalprojectsrequireprotectionandrecognition.Onthisinteractiveorintersubjective
conceptionofindividuality,communicationwithothersintheformofgivingreasonsorexplainingidentityneedshas,ofcourse,acentralroletoplay.Butsodoesideal
asopposedtorealdialogue,withdrawalfromaswellasparticipationininteraction.Moreover,communicativeinteractionisnotthesameasdiscourse.Indeed,we
agree

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withHabermasthatthosevalues,identityneeds,componentsofformsoflife,andindividualprojectsthatcannotbeuniversalizedarenotsubjecttothestricturesof
discourseethics,althoughwewouldnotdenythemamoralstatus.Inshort,weassumethattherearetwonormativerealms:theprivateandthepublic.Theprivate
referstoautonomous,individualmoralreflection,decision,judgment,andresponsibilitythepublicreferstothereachoflegalandpoliticalnormsorjustice.We
thussimultaneouslynarrowthereachofdiscourseethics,unburdeningitoftheweightofbeingageneralmoraltheory,andextendthestatusofthemoraltowhat
hasbeendeemedprivate.
28.JrgenHabermas,"CivilDisobedience:LitmusTestfortheDemocraticConstitutionalState,"BerkeleyJournalofSociology30(1985):95116.Forafull
discussionoftheseissues,seechapter11.
29.Seechapter8forafulldiscussionofthispoint.SeealsothechapteroncivildisobedienceinDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,206222.
30.Ferraraarguesthispointwell.However,hisanalysisfocusesprimarilyondiscourseethicsasageneralmoraltheoryanddoesnotclarifytheissuewithrespecttoa
theoryofpoliticallegitimacy.SeeFerrara,"ACritiqueofHabermas'DiscourseEthic,"7174.Itisacommonmistakeofinterpreterstoassumethatdiscourseethics
naivelyimpliesthepossibilityandvalidityofanyconsensusinpracticaldiscourse.Thisisnotthepoint.Rather,discourseethicsarticulatesthecriteriathatmustguide
practicaldiscussionsonnormsandthatmayormaynotleadtoagreement.Aconsensusthatviolatestheprinciplesofdiscourseethicscouldnotbecalledrational.
31.Habermasarguesthatthestepfromvirtualtoactualdiscoursemustbetakeninthemoraldomain.ButwefindWellmer'scritiqueofthisclaimtobestrong.
Wellmerdeniesthatanactualdiscourseisrequiredinthemoraldomain.Healsoarguesthatthepresuppositionsofargumentdonotsufficetosustainamoralprinciple.
Sincewedonotwanttotakeastandonthequestionofwhichtypeofpostconventionalmoraltheoryconstitutesthehigheststageofmoralreasoning,wegrantthat
principledpostconventionalmoralreasoningneednotinvolveanactualdialogue.NeitherKantiannorutilitarianmoraltheoryrequiresit,yetbotharepostconventional
onHabermas'scriteria.Foradiscussionofthisissue,seeThomasMcCarthy,"RationalityandRelativism:Habermas''Overcoming'ofHermeneutics,"inThompson
andHeld,eds.,Habermas:CriticalDebates,5778.SeealsoWellmer,EthikundDialog,102113.
32.SeeWellmer,PraktischePhilosophie,11,31ff.
33.CitedinJrgenHabermas,"DieUtopiedesgutenHerrschers,"inKulturundKritik(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1973),386AlvinGouldner,TheFutureof
IntellectualsandtheRiseoftheNewClass(NewYork:Seabury,1979),3839.
34.Habermas,"UtopiedesgutenHerrschers,"387.
35.JrgenHabermas,TheoryandPractice(Boston:BeaconPress,1973),3740.
36.Apelgoesevenfurtherandexplicitlypostulatesadialecticalrelationbetweenthe"realcommunicationcommunity"andthe"ideal"one,accordingtowhich

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thesecondiscounterfactuallyanticipatedinthefirstasa"realpossibility"(TowardstheTransformationofPhilosophy,280281).Apeloscillatesbetweentwo
positions:onethatseesexistingformsofdemocracyasformsof"empiricalconsensus"andassignsthestatusofa"realcommunicationcommunity"(ladenwith
possibility)toallcommunities,andanotherthatfindstheinstitutionsofcontemporarydemocraciestobethelociofthedialecticbetweenrealandideal
communication("NormativeEthics,"102103).
37.Wellmer,PraktischePhilosophie,4647.
38.Heller,"TheDiscourseEthic,"1316.
39.Wellmer,"berVernunft,Emanzipation,undUtopie,"inEthikundDialog,208221.
40.Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,89,and"DiscourseEthics,"6566.
41.Ibid.
42.McCarthy,CriticalTheory,327328.
43.Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,65117.
44.Ibid.SeealsoHabermas,"Reply,"257258McCarthy,CriticalTheory,331,andHabermas,"UtopiedesgutenHerrschers,"384.
45.Habermas,"DiscourseEthics,"72.
46.Ibid.
47.Wellmer,"berVernunft,"206.
48.SeetheexcursusonTugendhatinHabermas,"DiscourseEthics,"6876.SeylaBenhabib,"IntheShadowofAristotleandHegel:CommunicativeEthicsand
CurrentControversiesinPracticalPhilosophy,"inMichaelKelly,ed.,HermeneuticsandCriticalTheoryinEthicsandPolitics(Cambridge:MITPress,1990),1
31,alsoeliminatestheprincipleofuniversalizationbut,unlikeTugendhat,insistsonthecognitivecharacterofdiscourseethics.
49.Habermas,"DiscourseEthics,"74.
50.Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,105.
51.Ibid.
52.WeowethisinsighttoAlessandroFerrara.
53.ThisisthepositionofAgnesHellerinBeyondJustice(Oxford:Blackwell,1987).ForacritiqueofHeller'sdecisionism,seeJeanL.Cohen,"Heller,Habermas
andJustice,"PraxisInternational8,no.4(January1989):491497.
54.Heller,"TheDiscourseEthic,"1314.
55.Habermas,CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,183.
56.OnHabermas'sview,lifeworldisthecomplementaryconcepttocommunicativeaction,anddiscourseisareflectiveformofcommunicativeaction.Whilelanguage
andcultureconstitutiveofidentityformabackground,thestructuralcomponentsoflifeworldculturalmodelsofnatureandourplaceinit,legitimatelyordered
interpersonalrelations,personalitystructuresandcapabilities

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alsodoubleascomponentsoftheobjective,social,andsubjectiveworldsthatwecanthematizeandreflectupon.Thedecenteredstructureofthemodern
understandingoftheworldandthedifferentiationamongourformalworldconceptsmeansthat"thelifeworldlosesitsprejudgmentalpowerovereveryday
communicativepracticetothedegreethatactorsowetheirmutualunderstandingtotheirowninterpretativeperformances"(Habermas,TheTheoryof
CommunicativeAction,vol.2[Boston:BeaconPress,1987],133).Inotherwords,oncethereproductionofthestructuralcomponentsofthelifeworldisno
longermerelyroutedthroughthemediumofcommunicativeaction,butissaddledupontheinterpretativeaccomplishmentsoftheactorsthemselves,core
componentsofindividualandcollectiveidentitieslosetheir"givenness."Itbecomespossibletoreflectupontheseidentitiesandtoassessdimensionsofthem
criticallyfromthemoralpointofviewandalsofromthepointofviewofprojectsforselfrealization.Discourses,themostdemandingformofcommunicative
action,donotcreatecollectiveidentitiesoutofnothing,butcollectiveidentitiescanbereaffirmed,revised,orreinterpretedintheprocessofdiscourses.
57.Habermas,CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,184.Habermasarguesthatthislevelisreached,intheoryatleast,withRousseauandKant.Unlike
Weber,Habermasfindsmoreinnaturallawtheoriesofobligationthana"metaphysicsofreason"that,uponitsdissolution,leavesonlypositivelawsandlegal
proceduresastheirownselflegitimation.Hefinds,inshort,theideaofarationalagreementunderconditionsofsymmetricreciprocity,whichhereformulatesasthe
proceduralprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacy.
58.Forus,theconceptofidentitydoesnotreplacepracticalreasoninpoliticalethics.Rather,itlinksormediatesbetweenprinciplesofpracticalreason(the
proceduralmoment)andparticularinterestsorneedinterpretations.
59.Habermas,"DiscourseEthics,"104.
60.Thisparadoxhasledtoopposinginterpretationsofdiscourseethics.Forexample,AlessandroFerrara,in"CriticalTheoryandItsDiscontents,"hasinterpretedit
quiterigorouslyasadeontologicaltheorythatexcludesthepossibilityofadiscourseonneedinterpretationsorculturalvalues.Conversely,SeylaBenhabib,in"Inthe
ShadowofAristotleandHegel,"16,maintainsthatthediscussionofneedinterpretationshasaplaceindiscourseethics,providedthatitisgivena"weak"
deontologicalinterpretation,andthatsuchadiscourserendersourconceptionsofthegoodlifeaccessibletomoralreflectionandmoraltransformation.Thereisample
evidencetoarguethatinhismorerecentworkHabermasstillassumesthattheneedinterpretationsofthosepotentiallyaffectedbyanormareappropriatecontentfor
discourse,butthisinterpretationmakessenseonlyifonetakesthemeaningoftheterm"generalizableinterest"inHabermas'sversionoftheprincipleofuniversalization
torefertothoseneedinterpretationsbasedonculturalvaluesthatareuniversalizable(see"DiscourseEthics,''104).TheoddityofBenhabib'spositionisthatshe
wantstodropHabermas's"reformulatedprincipleofuniversalization"fromthetheorywhileclaimingthatquestionsofthegoodlifeareaccessibletomoralreflection.
This

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positionconfusesmattersofselfrealizationwithmattersof(moral)selfdevelopment,underthemistakennotionthatbecausewecancommunicateabout,discuss,
andtherebyrenderfluidourneedinterpretations,thesesortsofdiscussionsamounttoadiscourse.Butthisisnot,strictlyspeaking,thecaseforHabermas.
Discussionisnotthesameasdiscourse.Rather,thediscourseinwhichneedinterpretationsenterisadiscoursethatwoulddrawthelinebetweentherightandthe
goodintermsofwhatisgeneralizableandwhatmustremainparticular.Theprincipleofuniversalizationisessentialtosuchanendeavor.Oncethatlineisdrawn,
needinterpretationscanbecomemattersofdiscussionandcritiquebutnotofargumentativediscourseinthestrictsense.WhileweagreewithBenhabibthatone
cannotdrawthelinebetweentherightandthegoodapriori,itisourpositionthatonecannotadequatelyassesshowdimensionsofthegoodenterintodiscourse
ethicsunlessoneretainstheprincipleofuniversalizationandintroducesanintermediaryvariabletheconceptofidentityintotheconsiderationofgeneralizable
interests.Otherwise,onetendstodissolvethedistinctionbetweentherightandthegoodthatremainstherockonwhichHabermas'stheorystandsorfalls.
61.CharlesTaylor,"DieMotiveeinerVerfahrensethik,"inWolfgangKuhlman,ed.,MoralittundSittlichkeit(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1986),101134.
62.Habermas,"DiscourseEthics,"106.
63.SeeBenhabib,Critique,Norm,andUtopia,327353Ferrara,"ACritiqueofHabermas'DiscourseEthic."Ferrara'sdiscussionispertinenttoourconcerns.
HisbestinsightisthattheveryprincipleofuniversalizationofferedbyHabermasimpliesthatconsiderationsofidentityarecentraltodiscourseethics.Herightlynotes
thatdisputesoverthelegitimacyofnormsinvolvetheclashofdifferentidentitiesincomplexsocietiesandthatHabermaspresupposesaconceptofautonomyquite
differentfromthatofKant,namely,onethatcombinesdignitywithmanysideddevelopment(thecapacitytoliveone'slifetothefullest,accordingtoone'schosenlife
plan).Inanextremelysuggestivepassage,hecallsforincludingintheproceduralistnotionofjusticea"formal"conceptofthegood,understoodasrespectforthe
identityneedsofeachindividual.Thisformalconceptfocusesontheintegrityofindividualidentitiespotentiallyaffectedbyanormunderconsideration.However,
Ferraradoesnotdistinguishbetweendiscourseethicsasageneralmoraltheoryandasatheoryofpoliticallegitimacy.Indeed,thebulkofhisargumentisaddressedto
thetheoryasamoraltheory.Hence,itdiffersfundamentallyfromours.Moreover,thetheoreticalmeansFerrarausestomakehiscaseareunconvincing.Heseesthe
standardofthe"leastdisruptiveimpactonidentityneedsofallconcerned"asexternaltotheprincipleofjustice,thatis,asanadditionalprinciplemeanttobalancethe
principleofjustice.Indeed,hegoessofarastosaythat"if,aftertheidealspeechsituationhascometoasatisfactoryclose,onefeelsthebestargumentfailstodo
completejusticetosomeidentityneedsthattoone'sconsideredjudgmentwouldbestbemetbyasolutioninfavorofwhichoneisnotabletomakethebest
argument,thenoneisjustifiedindisregardingtheoutcomeoftheidealspeechsituationandactingonone'sbestintuition"(70).Suchapositionisconfusing

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withregardtoageneralmoraltheoryanddangerouswithregardtothetheoryofpoliticallegitimacyifleftunqualified.IfFerrarameansthatonemayengagein
conscientiousrefusalorcivildisobedienceoverthreatenedidentityneeds,thisisfine,butifhemeansthatonecansimplydisregardtheoutcomeofademocratic
discussion,thentheproblemofmaintainingcommitmenttodemocraticprocedurewouldbeoverwhelming.Ouranalysisoftherelationbetweenmoralityand
legalityononeside,andjusticeandsolidarityontheother,resolvesthedifficulties.
64.JrgenHabermas,"JusticeandSolidarity:OntheDiscussionConcerningStage6,"inThomasE.Wren,ed.,TheMoralDomain:EssaysintheOngoingDebate
betweenPhilosophyandtheSocialSciences(Cambridge:MITPress,1990),242.
65.Ibid.seealsoHabermas'sessay"MoralityandEthicalLife:DoesHegel'sCritiqueofKantApplytoDiscourseEthics?,"inMoralConsciousnessand
CommunicativeAction.
66.Habermas,"JusticeandSolidarity,"243,and"MoralityandEthicalLife,"199202.
67.Habermas,"JusticeandSolidarity,"225,andJrgenHabermas,ThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity(Cambridge:MITPress,1987),337366.
68.Habermas,"JusticeandSolidarity,"245246.
69.Ibid.,243.
70.Ibid.,243244.
71.Ibid.,244.
72.Ibid.247.
73.Ibid.
74.Habermas,"MoralityandEthicalLife,"203.
75.Ibid.,205.
76.Ibid.,202.
77.Ibid.,203204.
78.Ibid.,202.
79.Habermas,"JusticeandSolidarity,"245246.Habermasstatesthattheselimitscanbebrokenthroughifdiscourseshavebeeninstitutionalized.Byimplication,
discourseethicsreconstructsthemoralintuitionsofthoselivinginmoderncivilsocieties.orinsocietiesinwhichdiscoursesorbasicrightsareinplace.
80.Habermas,"MoralityandEthicalLife,"205.
81.Habermas,"JusticeandSolidarity,"246247.
82.Ibid.,247.
83.Habermas,"DiscourseEthics,"100.
84.Habermas,"MoralityandEthicalLife,"207.

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85.Habermas,MoralConsciousnessandCommunicativeAction,183.AlessandroFerrarahaspointedoutthatthisargumentwouldprobablysatisfyneitherthe
antimoderntraditionalist,whowouldrejecttheprospectofbringingone'snormorientationtothepostconventionallevel,giventheanomie,uncertainty,andlackof
socialintegrationthatarelinkedwithmodernity,northepostmodernist,whowouldcontendthattheexperienceofnormativityisjustanotherexpressionofpower.
Thislatterobjectionwasdiscussedinchapter6theformerwillbetakenupinchapter9.Here,wesimplynotethatthetheory'sobviousbiasinfavorofmodernity
doesnotmeanthatitisanapologistforexistinginstitutionsorprocessesofmodernization.Instead,discourseethics,inconjunctionwithadualisticsocialtheory,
providesacriticalstancevisvisthe"colonization"ofthelifeworld.Nordoesthetheoryposeanabstractoughtinfavorofmodernizationtotraditionalsocieties.It
does,however,helptounmaskstrategiesofretraditionalizationinalreadymodernizinglifeworlds.Thesecanbeinterpretedaspowerstrugglesinfavorof
hierarchical,authoritarian,andpatriarchalformsoflifeagainstegalitarian,democratic,andnonsexistinstitutionsthatareatleastpotentiallypossibleontheterrainofa
modernlifeworld.
86.Theoppositecharge,thatdiscourseethicsissoformalisticthatithasnoinstitutionalconsequences,hastwovariants:onethatacceptstheprojectofadiscursive
ethicsbutsearchesforinstitutionalmediation,andonethatconteststheprojectaltogether.Forthefirst,seeJeanL.Cohen,"WhyMorePoliticalTheory?,"Telos,no.
49(Summer1979):7094,andJackMendelson,"TheHabermasGadamerDebate,"NewGermanCritique,no.18(1979):4473.Forthesecond,seeSeyla
Benhabib,"ModernityandtheAporiasofCriticalTheory,"Telos,no.49(Fall1981):3959,andStevenLukes,"OfGodsandDemons:HabermasandPractical
Reason,"inThompsonandHeld,eds.,Habermas:CriticalDebates,134148.
87.Habermas,CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,183,186187.
88.ItisnoaccidentthatHannahArendtmistranslatestheAristotelianconceptofisonomiatomean"norule"insteadof"participatinginrulingandbeingruled."See
HannahArendt,TheHumanCondition(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1958),22.
89.Habermas,CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,186.
90.Ibid.
91.Ibid.
92.Habermas,"UtopiedesgutenHerrschers,"382.ThefirstmajordiscussionoftheinstitutionalizationofdiscoursesorthecreationofpublicspacesinHabermas's
workisinTheStructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere:AnInquiryintoaCategoryofBourgeoisSociety[1962](Cambridge:MITPress,1989).
93.Habermas,TheoryandPractice,25McCarthy,CriticalTheory,324.
94.Habermas,TheoryandPractice,2526Habermas,"UtopiedesgutenHerrschers,"383.Thethesisofthebourgeoispublicsphereinvolvestheideathatthe
newprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyaffectspowerthroughaninstitution

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alizationofpublicspaces,suchasparliaments,whichexercisecontroloverexecutivepower(inprinciple,atleast).ButinhiscritiqueofRousseauforhaving
confusedtheleveloftheprincipleoflegitimacywiththatoforganization,HabermasdoesnotseemtorealizethatpreciselythisstepallowedRousseautomove
fromavirtualtoanactualdiscoursemodel(CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,185186).Nevertheless,identifyingdemocraticlegitimacyoreven
actualdemocraticconsensuswithasinglemodeloforganizationremainsuntenable.Ontheotherhand,asmerelyaprincipleoflegitimacy,democracycaneasily
becomeasourceof"legitimation"fornondemocraticpractices.
95.Habermas,"UtopiedesgutenHerrschers,"383.
96.Ibid.
97.Ibid.Anothersplitoccursbetween"realistic"democraticelitetheoryandMarxistcritiquesofformaldemocracy.SeeHabermas,TheoryandPractice,27.
98.Habermas,"DieUtopiedesgutenHerrschers,"385.
99.Ibid.,383,andHabermas,LegitimationCrisis,130ff.
100.Habermas,"Reply,"252.
101.JrgenHabermas,TheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,524ff.Forthemostdetailedbutonesidedversion,seeHabermas,StructuralTransformation,
181250.SeealsoCohen,"WhyMorePoliticalTheory?"
102.Habermas,TheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,362.Weofferamoredetaileddiscussionofthisprobleminchapter9.
103.Ibid.,364.Withregardtothedemocraticstate'sforerunner,theRechtsstaat,whichnowbecomesparadoxicallytheonlyunambiguousstageguaranteeing
freedom,thedemocraticstategainsontheleveloftheprincipleoflegitimacyandlosesonthelevelofactualinstitutionaldevelopmentastrangeconclusionthat
Habermasmightnotwanttoclaim.
104.ThereseemstobeasignificantdifferenceinthewayHabermashandlestheproblemofinstitutionsfromthetwokeynormativepointsofviewestablishedby
discourseethics:democraticlegitimacyandbasicrights.Theformerleadstoablindalley,butthelatterseemspromisingbecause,onceHabermasshiftstheanalysisof
rightsfromtheconceptualframeworkofnormativedevelopment/institutionaldeclinetothesystem/lifeworlddichotomy,rightsappeartoestablishthatbasicminimum
ontheinstitutionallevelthatisneededfordiscourseethics,andthepossibilityofdualisticdevelopmentopensup.
105.Foradiscussionofthisidea,seeClaudeLefort,"PoliticsandHumanRights,"inThePoliticalFormsofModernSociety(Cambridge:MITPress,1986).
LefortdrawsonHannahArendt'sOnTotalitarianism(NewYork,1958),296,forthisidea.
106.Fortheideaoffundamentaluniversalrightsinthestrongsense,seeDworkin,"TakingRightsSeriously,"inTakingRightsSeriously.
107.SeeJanosKis,L'EgaleDignit(Paris:Seuil,1989).

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108.AlbrechtWellmer,"ModelsofFreedomintheModernWorld,"inKelly,ed.,HermeneuticsandCriticalTheoryinEthicsandPolitics,247.
109.McCarthy,CriticalTheory,327328,352.Thereisnoreasonwhyaspectsofthevariousconceptionsofautonomycannotbecombined.Thus,autonomyin
thesenseofmoralselflegislationandjudgment(Kant),theabilitytochooseone'sownplanoflifeandpathofselfdevelopment(Mill),andtheabilitytotakeon
dialoguerolesandachievereflexivityvisvistheserolesandalsototakeontheroleoftheother(Habermas)areallconstituentcomponentsoftheideaofautonomy
atissuehere.Needlesstosay,weassumethatitispossibletoformulateaconceptionofautonomythatavoidstheselfmonitoring,repressivetendenciesassociated
withtheideaofmastery,sorelentlesslycriticizedbyFoucault.
110.Wellmer,"ModelsofFreedom,"241.
111.Ibid.,227252.
112.Benhabib,"IntheShadowofAristotleandHegel."
113.Thiswouldamounttoareversaloftheclassicalliberalapproach,whichviewstherightsofcommunication(assembly,association,media)andpolitical
participation(suffrage,officeholding)asinstrumentaltosecuringthecorecomplexofrights:thosethatinstitutethedomainofnegativeliberty(whichmaybeconstrued
inanextremelibertarianformsuchthatprivatepropertyisthecorerightandthecoretotheconceptofrights,orinalessextremeliberalformthatallowsforwelfare
andothertypesofpropertyownership).Inourview,though,therightstocommunicationdomorethanprotectadomainofcivilsocietyfromthestate.Theyarealso
thepoliticalpreconditionsfordemocraticwillformation.Indeed,democraticlegitimacyandparticipationaregeneratedonthisveryterrain.
114.Habermas,"MoralityandEthicalLife,"205.
115.Ibid.,268.
116.Habermas,TheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,362363.Thistexthasnoparallelreservationsaboutinstitutionalizingliberties.
117.Itmaystillbeobjectedthatnormsaredefensiblepreciselyasinstitutions(asisdonebyParsonsand,attimes,byHabermas).Inthiscase,wewouldhaveto
speakaboutinstitutionaldevelopmentvisvisrightsasopposedtoorganizationaldecline.Wehave,however,begunwithausagethatjuxtaposesnorms(legitimacy)
toinstitutionalizationororganization.
118.Lefortalsogivesaconvincingargumentagainsttheliberalideologyofrightsthatconstruesthemasexclusivelymoralandapoliticalguarantorsofnegativeliberty.
Marxhimselfwasseducedbythisinterpretationtoenvisionasocietythatdidnotneedrights.Itwouldbedisastroustoreproducesuchaninterpretationbecausethe
onlypossibleconclusionswouldbe,onceagain,apologyorrevolution,andweseekawaybeyondthisunacceptablesetofalternatives.
119.JrgenHabermas,"OnSocialIdentity,"Telos,no.19(Spring1974),100.

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120.SeeJrgenHabermas,"TheNewObscurity:TheCrisisoftheWelfareStateandtheExhaustionofUtopianEnergies,"inTheNewConservatism:Cultural
CriticismandtheHistorians'Debate(Cambridge:MITPress,1985).SeealsoAndrewAratoandJeanL.Cohen,"PoliticsandtheReconstructionoftheConcept
ofCivilSociety,"inAxelHonnethetal.,eds.,ZwischenbetracthungenImProzessderAufklrung(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1989).
121.Habermas,TheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,chaps.6and8.
122.Wellmer,"berVernunft,"198.
123.Ibid.,214221.
124.Ibid.
125.Ibid.,220.
126.Ibid.,198.
127.Ibid.,209.
128.Ibid.,175181.
129.Ibid.,190199.
130.Ibid,216217.
131.Ibid.,189199.
132.Ibid,178179.
133.Ibid.,200201.
134.WithrespecttoHegel,thisinvolvestwolevelsofmediationratherthanone,namely,politicalandeconomicsociety.Histheoryinvolvestheformeronly,ina
different,moredialecticalterminology.
135.UnlikeParsons'sconceptofsocietalcommunity,however,ourconceptionofcivilsocietyisitself"decentered."Itisnotconstruedasacollectivity(of
collectivities)orasaunifiedsocialbodyintegratingthewholeofsociety,butastheplural,differentiated,institutionaldimensionofthelifeworld.
136.GuillermoO'DonnellandPhilippeSchmitter,TransitionsfromAuthoritarianRule(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins,1986).Thisworkdemonstratesthatprojectsfor
totalrevolutiondonotyieldpoliticaldemocracy.Thesamepointhasbeenarguedinthecontextof"totalitarian"regimesbyKuron'stheoryofselflimitingrevolution.
SeeAndrewArato,"TheDemocraticTheoryofthePolishOpposition:NormativeIntentionsandStrategicAmbiguities,"WorkingPapersoftheHelenKellogg
Institute(NotreDame,1984).
137.KarlMarx,TheEighteenthBrumaireofLouisBonaparte(NewYork:InternationalPublishers,1969),66.
138.AratoandCohen,"ThePoliticsofCivilSociety."
139.Foramoredetaileddiscussionoftheinfluenceofcivilonpoliticalsociety,seechapters9and10.
140.G.D.H.Cole,GuildSocialismRestated(NewBrunswick,NJ:TransactionBooks,1980)HaroldLaski,StudiesintheProblemofSovereignty(New
Haven:Yale

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UniversityPress,1917),AuthorityintheModernState(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1919),andTheFoundationsofSovereigntyandOtherEssays
(NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1921).
141.Foradiscussionoftheimportanceofdemocratizingneocorporatestructuresofcompromise,seeHabermas,StructuralTransformation,sec.23.
Chapter9
1.Aswehaveseen,evenLuhmann'sdefenseofdifferentiationdoesnotredoundtothebenefitofcivilsociety,whoseinstitutionshisconceptionabsorbsintothe
politicalsystem.
2.Habermasreintroducedtheconceptofcivilsocietyinhiscomprehensiveexaminationofoneofitsbasiccategories:thepublicsphere.Undertheinfluenceofthe
FrankfurtSchool'sphilosophyofhistoryandadirectlyorindirectlyappropriatedversionofCarlSchmitt'sworkonstate/societyfusion,Habermastracedouta
processofthedecline,oreventheend,ofcivilsociety.Hislaterattemptstoreconstructkeynotionsoftheclassicaldoctrineofpolitics,suchaspraxisortechne,
stressedthemetatheoreticallevel.Forawhile,onlyopponentslikeLuhmannnoticedthatHabermas'srelationtotheclassicalconceptofcivilsocietyactuallywent
deeper.However,aslongasHabermaswasengagedinareconstructionofhistoricalmaterialism,hecouldnotfreehimselffromtheprejudicesofMarxandmostof
Marxisminrelationtocivilsociety.WewouldarguethatthisfundamentalbreakoccurswithTheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,whichnotonlyreverses(forthe
firsttime)thebleakearlierverdictconcerningtheconceptofcivilsocietybutamountstoitsreconstruction.
3.JrgenHabermas,CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety(Boston:BeaconPress,1979),95.Thenewconceptualmeansrequiredforthereconstruction
ofcivilsocietyinthissensethedevelopmentofadifferentiatedtheoryofactionandadualistictheoreticalframeworkstressingbothlifeworldandsystemwere
developedbyHabermasoveraperiodoffifteenorsoyears.However,onlyinTheTheoryofCommunicativeActionistheinterrelationofthesetwofundamental
stepsfinallysatisfactory,andonlyheredothepotentiallinkstoatheoryofcivilsocietybecomeclear.
4.Asisnowwellknown,thefirststepofthisstrategyisthedevelopmentofatheoryofcommunicativeactionthatdifferentiatestheconceptsofactionandtranscends
thelimitationsofallsubjectphilosophiesalongwiththeconceptofteleologicalaction.
5.SeeAghAttila,"TheTriangleModelofSocietyandBeyond,"inV.Gathy,ed.,StateandCivilSociety:Relationshipsinflux(Budapest,1989).Wedonot
believeitisaccuratetocreditPolnyiwiththediscoveryofthisthreepartconception.InTheGreatTransformation,forexample,hedidnotdistinguishbetween
societalandeconomicattacksonearlynineteenthcenturypaternalismorbetweensocietalistandstatistformsofresponsetotheselfregulatingmarketlaterinthe
century.Polnyi'sveryrealcontributiontotheconceptioninquestionliesinhisdiscoveryofthetension,obscuredinbothliberalandMarxistdichotomous

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models,betweeneconomicandcivilsociety.Ouroverallanalysisowesmuchtohim,evenifwearelesspositivethanheaboutpreindustrialpaternalismandmore
negativeaboutallmodelsofpostliberalstatism.Theseattitudesaresupportablepreciselybecauseofthethreepartmodelthatwasnotyetavailabletohim.
6.WeowethefirstcriticalstimulusinthiscontexttoGyrgyMarkus,whostressedthesuperiorityofthismodelforunderstandingSolidarityasfarbackas1981.
7.SeeA.Arato,"CivilSociety,HistoryandSocialism:ReplytoJohnKeane,"PraxisInternational9,nos.12(AprilJuly1989):140144
8.Seechapter4.
9.SeeKarlPolnyi,TheGreatTransformation(NewYork:RinehartandCo.,1944),71.
10.Ibid.,141.
11.MaxWeber'stheoryofmodernityispredicatedonthisassumption.
12.Polnyi,TheGreatTransformation,130132.
13.ThiscritiqueisfreefrommethodologicalreductionismseeJrgenHabermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,2vols.[1981](Boston:BeaconPress,
1984,1987hereaftercitedasTCA).
14.TCA,vol.2,267272.
15.Ibid.,185,270271.
16.Ibid.,269seealsoJfirgenHabermas,"HannahArendt:OntheConceptofPower,"inPhilosophicalPoliticalProfiles(Cambridge:MITPress,1983).
17.AsidefromParsons'sfundamentalarticle,"TheConceptofPower,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure(NewYork:FreePress,1969),seealsoNiklasLuhmann,
Macht(Stuttgart:EnkeVerlag,1975).Theconceptionofthestateadministrationasasystemintegratedbythemediumofpowerhasbeenradicallychallengedby
ThomasMcCarthy,whoseemsmorewillingthansomelesscarefulcriticstoconcedethisstatustothemarketeconomyandtomoney.Seehisessay"Complexityand
Democracy:TheSeducementsofSystemsTheory,"inIdealsandIllusions:OnReconstructionandDeconstructioninContemporarySocialTheory(Cambridge:
MITPress,1991).Surprisingly,givenhisobviousdesiretocontinueusingthisconception,Habermashaschosentoanswerthiscriticisminasomewhatsketchyand
tentativemannersee"AReply,"inAxelHonnethandHansJoas,eds.,CommunicativeAction(Cambridge:MITPress,1991).Whilewecannotundertakeafurther
metatheoreticaldevelopmentofHabermas'spositionthatwouldbeneededtomakethisaspectofhisdualisticsocialtheoryfullyconvincing,thecentralityofatwo
subsystem,twomediaconceptiontoouroverallargumentrequiresthatwereplytoMcCarthy.
1.McCarthymoreorlessdisregardsthefactthatHabermas,unlikeParsonsandLuhmann,systematicallystressesthedifferencebetweenmoneyandpower
beyondthesinglepointthatonlypowerrequireslegitimation.Indeed,Habermas,inourviewrightly,offersahierarchicalconceptioninwhichthemediumof

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moneyrepresentsthemostabstractandautomaticformoffunctioning,followedbythemediumofpower(withitsmultiplecodes,lowerlevelofcirculation,
dependenceonaction,etc.)andinturnbygeneralizedformsofcommunicationsuchasinfluenceandreputation(whichstillsubstituteforordinarylanguage
communication).ManyofthedifferencesbetweenmoneyandpowerstressedbyMcCarthycanalreadybeaccommodatedonthislevelofHabermas'soriginal
argument.
2.FollowingHabermas'soccasionalbadexample,McCarthyseemstoidentifybeing"formallyorganized"withoperatingasasubsystem.Formalorganizationis
certainlyarequirement(andhenceamarkofidentification)oftheconstructionofthesubsystemofpower,butformalorganizationisanecessaryconditionof
institutionalizationandnotitsfundamentalmechanism.WithLuhmann,wemightsaythatformalandespeciallylegalrulesrepresentacodeofpowerthatshouldnot
beconfusedwithitsoperation.Moreover,itisnot(unlikemoneyinthecaseoftheeconomy)theonlyrelevantcode.(ForLuhmann,symbolsofpower,symbolic
usesofpower,andstatushierarchyrepresentsomeoftheotherpossiblecodesofpower,andwewouldaddinformalrulesaswell,includingthecodeofformal
informalitselfaswellasrulesofgender.)Finally,thecategorypairformalinformalshouldnotbeidentifiedwiththatofsystemlifeworldsincetherecanbeinformal
mediacodes,ontheonehand,andformalrelationships(kinshipstructures)inthelifeworld,ontheother.
Forthesereasons,theevidenceofmodernorganizationtheoryconcerningtheroleofthe"informal"inorganizations,towhichMcCarthyrefers,doesnotdisprove
theoperationofpowerasamedium,whichconsistsinthetransferofselectivityoftheabilitytodeterminewhatcanbesaidanddonewithoutordinary
languagecommunication,relyingonaconditioningofexpectations(andofexpectationsofexpectations)throughinverselinkagesofrelativelypreferredand
relativelyrejectedcombinationsofalternativesofatleasttwopersons.(Typically,andwithactiontheoreticsimplification:Powerholderspreferacombinationof
noncomplianceandsanctiontooneofnoncomplianceandnosanction,whileweakerpartiesprefercomplianceandnosanctiontononcomplianceandsanction.It
isimportantthateachmustbeabletoanticipatethepreferenceoftheother.)Suchtransfercanoccurthroughcommandandthreat,butitsefficacyisgreatly
enhancedwhenitisfacilitatedbyarelianceonbinarycodes.Thisisthecrucialpoint.Thesecanbeformalrulescodedaslegalillegal,buttheycanalsotakethe
form(andinactualorganizations,theyalwaysdotaketheform)of"subsidiarycodes"aswell,suchasinformalrulescodedintermsofformalinformal,superior
inferior,higherlower,supporteropponentrelations.Undoubtedly,actualcommandsandagreementsamongequals(althoughagreementsamongunequalsshould
betreatedwithcare)alsoplayaroleinorganizationaldecisionmaking.Assumingthewelldocumentedabilityoforganizations(actualizedwhentheinformaland
formalreinforceratherthanopposeeachother!)toreducegreatlythetimeconstraintsofdecisionmakingandtoproducemoreorlessautomaticformsof
functioning,itremainshighlyplausibletostressthecentralroleofformalandinformalcodesofpower,as

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againstformalandinformalordinarylanguagecommunication.Givenhisrelianceontheevidenceofrecentorganizationtheory,wedoubtthatMcCarthywould
wishtoexplaintheefficiencyoforganizations,andtheirdramaticincreaseofpower,onthebasisofaWeberianactiontheoreticconceptioninwhichthe
organizationisineffectaninstrumentinthehandsoftheformalheadofthehierarchy,whoistheonlygenuineactor.SeeNiklasLuhmann,''Ends,Dominationand
System,"inTheDifferentiationofSociety(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1982).
3.McCarthyisrighttoquestionwhetherthedualisticsocialtheoryallowsapoliticalstrategybasedonHabermas'sownnormativepremises,whethertoomany
concessionstosystemtheoryproduceapoliticalconceptionthatisunnecessarilydefensive.Heisclosetodiscoveringthereasonfortherightnessofthesequalms
whenhepointstotheambiguitiesofHabermas'sconceptsofpoliticalsystem,administrativesystem,andstateapparatus.Indeed,theacceptanceofthesystems
theoreticlinkingofthewholedomainofthe"state,"whichishardlyconsistentinHabermasandwhichconvergeswiththeoldFrankfurtSchoolnotionofthefull
administrativereductionofthepublicsphere,doesleadtoanunnecessarilydefensiveconception.Ourwholeargumentisanattempttoshowthatthedualistic
socialtheoryinitselfdoesnotleadtosuchanoutcomeandthatHabermas'snormativetheory,formalizedindiscourseethics,isbestinterpretedintermsofthis
socialtheoryasleadingtoaprogramofselflimitingradicaldemocracy.Inparticular,weintroducetheconceptofpoliticalsocietyasamediatinglevelthat,from
thelifeworldpointofview,representsanoutpostofpublicityandpotentialsocietalinfluenceand,fromthesystemspointofview,representsreflexiveformsof
regulationfromtheoutsidethroughselfregulation.
4.ThealternativeconceptionMcCarthyoftenalludestobutdoesnotactuallyadopt(ordecisivelyreject),namely,apraxisphilosophicalretranslationofthe
theoryofcommunicativeaction,couldverywellinvolveareturntofundamentalistdreamsoftheconversionofall"reified"systemstoregimesofdirectdemocratic
participation.Wearehavingsomedifficultyininterpretingtheideaofnonregressivededifferentiationofeconomyandstate,whichMcCarthyseemstoadvancein
theformofanopenquestion.Hedoesnotexplainwhatwouldbe"regressive"and"nonregressive."Hedoesnot,moreover,clarifywhetherby"dedifferentiation"
hemeansmerelyredefiningboundariesbetweensystemandlifeworld,establishingmorecomplexinputoutputrelationsamongspheres,orevenintroducing
institutionsofmediationinwhichbothformsofcoordination,communicationandpower,playarole(threeoptionswealsoadvocate),orifhebelievesthatthe
wholepoliticaldomain,includingthestateadministrativesystem,couldandshouldbecomespheresofdemocraticparticipationandcommunicativeaction
coordinationprimarily.Theassimilationof"latentfunctions"tothelifeworldasbackgroundspeaksforthislatteralternative.Ourownpointisnotthatelementsof
systemfunctioningcouldnotbetakenupandthematizedincommunicativecontexts(inamannersimilartothebackgroundelementsofalifeworld)andperhaps
reabsorbedinthelifeworld,butthat

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(unliketheelementsofthelifeworldthatrepresentpassivereservoirsofmeaningonwhichactorscandraw)mediaregulatedsystemcontextsaredynamicand
haveanobjective,selfunfolding"logic"(e.g.,theproliferationofbureaucraticofficesdespitetheintentionsofallconcerned).
WesharethereasonsforHabermas'sabandoningofhisearlierinterpretationofdemocratizationintermsofparticipatorydemocracy,linkedtoglobalplanninga
positionMcCarthyrestates,butwithoutreallyarguingforit.EvenifhostilitytoasystemicallyfunctioningeconomycannotingeneralbeattributedtoMcCarthy,
andthereforehispositionstopsshortofacompletereturntotraditionalpraxisphilosophy,hedoesavoidcriticizingthelatter'sassumptionswithrespecttothestate
whosesystemiccharacteristicsinonecontextatleastheiswillingtoattributetocommodification,thatis,penetrationbyaforeign,economiclogic.Inourview,
suchathoroughlyLukcsianapproach,ifactuallydeveloped,wouldhavetoreviveoldconceptionsaboutthestateaspotentiallyafullyneutralinstrumentinthe
handsofdemocraticdecisionmakers,conceptionsthatcanonlylegitimatestatismitselfbyoccludingthelogicofthemodernstate.Wecanbeawareofthislogic
andlearntorestrictitonlyifwedonottreatthewholesphereofthestate,andinparticularthestateadministrativesystem,aseitherlifeworldorareflexofthe
economicsystem.Granted,futureconceptionsmaygiveusotherwaysofunderstandingthelogicofthestatethanthatofsystemstheory.McCarthyinanycase
hardlyoffersusmodelsforadesiredalternativetypeoffunctionalanalysisasidefromDasKapital,whichmightperhapsleadtoamoredynamicconceptionofthe
logicoftheeconomythanthatofHabermas,butonlyatthecostofreductionismwithrespecttothestateandofillusions(asG.Markus,J.Kis,andG.Bence
haveshowninastillunpublished1971manuscript,"IsaCritiqueofPoliticalEconomyAtAllPossible?")ofreplacingtheanarchyofproductionbycentral
planning.(TheabovementionedLukcsiantheoryofreificationisonlyaderivativeofMarx'smodel,whiletheWeberianconceptionofbureaucracyisaction
theoreticandshouldinanycaseberuledoutinlightoftheorganizationtheoreticargumentsusedbyMcCarthy.)ItseemstousthatHabermas'snormativeideals
(andthepoliticalintentionsweprobablysharewithMcCarthy)canbewellarticulatedintermsofthedualisticsocialtheorythatdistinguishesbetweensubsystems
ofstateadministrationandeconomyandthattheyareincompatiblewithbothdemocraticfundamentalismandthestatismtowhichitisnecessarilylinked.
18.TCA,vol.2,chap.6,containsasystematicanalysisofthedistinctionbetweensystemandlifeworld.
19.SeeJrgenHabermas,"TechnologyandScienceasIdeology,"inTowardaRationalSociety(Boston:BeaconPress,1970)TCA,vol.2,chap.7.
20.Habermasdiscussesseveralapproachestothelifeworldconcept,includingthephenomenologicalapproachofHusserlandthesociologicalapproachofSchutz
andLuckmann,inTCA,vol.2,126ff.
21.SeeHabermas'scharts,TCA,vol.2,142144.Inresponsetocriticisms,Habermaswasforcedtoarticulatethefactthathislifeworldconcepthastwo

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levels:aphilosophical(formalpragmatic)oneandasociologicalonesee"AReply,"245.
22.FollowingParsonsandWeber,Habermasarguesthatwiththeonsetofmodernizationprocesses,thesecomponentsofthelifeworldareincreasinglydifferentiated
fromoneanotherseeTCA,vol.2,145.
23.Ibid.,137138.
24.Identifyingthesociologicalandinstitutionallevelsofthelifeworldinvolvesa"sociologistic"oversimplification.Thethree"structuralcomponentsofthelifeworld"can
eachberegardedfromthepointofviewofthreeprocesses:culturalreproduction,socialintegration,andsocialization.Strictlyspeaking,wegettotheinstitutionallevel
onlybyregardingthethreestructuralcomponents,eachlinkedtotheresourcesofmeaning,solidarity,andpersonalcompetence,fromthepointofviewofsocial
integration.Thisperspectiveleadstothethreeinstitutionalcomplexeswefocuson:institutionsofsocializationsocialgroupsandassociationsandinstitutionsof
culture.Theoversimplificationisacceptableinourcontextsincetheproblemofcivilsocietybelongstosociologyratherthantopsychologyorculturaltheory.
25.Wemeaninstitutionssuchasfamilies,schools,universities,andthoseinvolvedintheproductionanddisseminationofart,science,etc.Therewasneverany
justificationforHegeltohaveomittedthefamilyfromcivilsocietyorforGramscitohaveignoredit.
26.TCA,vol.2,185,270271.
27.Ibid.,319320.
28.Fortheconversetobestrictlytrue,theremustbeasolutiontothetimeconstraintsondecisionmakingthatdoesnotinvolverelianceonthemediumwhosescope
isnotbeingreduced.Thisdifficultyarisesbecause,inreducingthescopeofamedium,itisdifficulttodiscoveraformof"decolonization"thatchallengesthe
functioningofmediaperse,andthisviolatestherequirementsofmodernity.However,itiscertainlyimplausibletoarguethatanygivenrestrictionofdemocratic
decisionmakingisjustifiedbecauseoftimeconstraints.Weshalltrytoshowthatitisinprinciplepossibletoextendthescopeofdemocraticparticipationthrougha
combinationofrepresentativeinstitutions,movements,andinitiativesthatusethemechanismofinfluence.
29.TCA,vol.2,185.
30.Ibid.,186.
31.Itcannot,however,beindiscriminatelyexpandedtoallofthemediainLuhmann'sgeneralmodel,suchasloveorscientifictruth.
32.Indeed,CarlSchmitt'sapplicationoftheargumenttotheWeimarrepublicwasintendedtolegitimizeexisting(Italianfascist)and(possibly)desiredfuture
totalitarianstates.
33.ClausOffe,"NewSocialMovements:ChallengingtheBoundariesofInstitutionalPolitics,"SocialResearch52,no.4(Winter1987):817820.

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34.ClausOffe,"TheSeparationofFormandContentinLiberalDemocracy,"inContradictionsoftheWelfareState(Cambridge:MITPress,1985).
35.Offe,"CompetitivePartyDemocracyandtheKeynesianWelfareState,"inContradictionsoftheWelfareState.
36.Withthesupposedshrinkingofthistraditionallifeworld,Luhmann'srepeatedreferencestosomekindofroleforactualdiscussionininstitutionalizedprocesses
remainanomalousandwithoutfoundation.
37.TCA,vol.2,145146.
38.TCA,vol.1,340341.
39.ThisisthestepbeyondParsons,whoseconceptofsocietalcommunityallowsonlyfornormativecoordinationofactionandaconventionalrelationtostandards.
40.Habermas,"TowardaReconstructionofHistoricalMaterialism,"inCommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,154155.Habermasoriginallyrootedall
moralandlegaldevelopmentultimatelyinthesuccessionofthreemodelsofcommunicativeaction:symbolicallymediatedinteraction,propositionallydifferentiated
speech,andargumentativespeech,correspondingtopreconventional,conventional,andpostconventionalmoralstructures,respectively.Inhislaterwritings,theidea
ofmodernizingthelifeworldfocusesonthetransitionfromthesecondtothethirdmodel.Interestinglyenough,normativedevelopmentinLuhmann,involvingthe
differentiationofnormativeandcognitivestyles,focusesonthetransitionfromthefirsttothesecondmodel.
41.Habermas,"MoralDevelopmentandEgoIdentity,"inCommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,7790.
42.Habermas,"HistoricalMaterialismandtheDevelopmentofNormativeStructures,"inCommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,118.
43.Habermas,"TowardaReconstructionofHistoricalMaterialism,"156.Focusingonformsofargumentationdoesnotreducethestructureofmutualexpectationsto
actualcommunication,asLuhmannmightcharge.Indeed,evenheadmitstoreservingthescarceresourceofactualcommunicationtocasesofconflict,without,
however,seeingtheneedtoinvestigatethepossiblestructuresofsuchcommunication.Itispreciselythesestructuresthatallowthepreservationofanormativestyleof
expectationinthecaseofpositivelaw,somethingLuhmanndesiresbutisunabletoexplain.See,e.g.,"TheSelfReproductionofLawandItsLimits,"inG.Teubner,
ed.,DilemmasofLawintheWelfareState(Berlin:deGruyter,1986),125.
44.RonaldDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1978),especiallychaps.2and3.
45.Dworkin,"HardCases,"inTakingRightsSeriously.
46.H.L.A.Hart,TheConceptofLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1961).
47.Seechapter11.
48.Seechapter8.

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49.TCA,vol.1,260261.Hisowndistinctionbetweenlawasinstitutionandasmedium,yetanotherversionoftheprinciple/normdistinction,speaksagainstthis
interpretation.
50.TCA,vol.2,178.
51.TCA,vol.1,341.
52.SeeClaudeLefort,"HumanRightsandPolitics,"inThePoliticalFormsofModernSociety(Cambridge:MITPress,1986),andJeanL.Cohen,ClassSociety
andCivilSociety:TheLimitsofMarxianCriticalTheory(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1982),chap.1.
53.SeeAnthonyGiddens,TheNationStateandViolence(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985),chap.8.Giddens'spositionisinternallyinconsistent,
seeingrightsalternatelyasformsofsurveillancethatbecomefieldsofcontentionbetweensurveillanceandautonomyandasformsofresponsetotypesofsurveillance
insociety.Wehavelessobjectiontothesecondpositionthantothefirst,whichwouldmakestateadministrationsthesourceofrights,withcivilinitiativesproducing
onlyalternativeinterpretationsoftheserights.
54.Weareusingthisconceptoforganizingprincipletoindicatetheinstitutionalcoreofasocietythatisresponsibleforitssocialidentity,locatedatthecrossroadsof
socialandsystemintegration.SeeJrgenHabermas,LegitimationCrisis(Boston:BeaconPress,1975),andCommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,154ff.
Moreover,wefinditconvincingthat,foragivenformation,themodeloflawandmoralityindicatesthestructureofitsprincipleoforganization.SeeTCA,vol.2,173
175.Forthesocialformationofcivilsociety(Habermasspeaksofstate/economydifferentiationonlyinthiscontext),wefindthisprincipletobelinkednottothe
institutionalizationofformallaw(Habermas)orofthepositivityoflaw(Luhmann),buttothatoffundamentalrights.ItisrevealingthatHabermas,too,exploresthe
typologyofmodernstateandsocietyrelationsfromthispointofview.
55.Insodoing,heofferstheclearestconnectionofhisanalysisofthelifeworldtotheconceptofcivilsociety.Inparticular,hisrelianceonajuxtapositionofeconomy
statelifeworld,orofallhishistoricaltypes,indicatesthatheshouldhaverevisedhisoccasionaltreatmentoftheorganizationalprincipleofthemodernepochinterms
ofthedifferentiationofstateandeconomic(orcivil)societysee,e.g.,CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,154TCA,vol.2,178.
56.TCA,vol.2,357ff.
57.Ibid.
58.Habermas'sconcernincreatingthistypologywasprimarilyfordistortionsstemmingfromthecapitalistnatureoftheeconomyanditsoverextensionandlaterfrom
thestatistimplicationsofwelfaresystems.Weshouldnotethatthishistorycouldberewrittenfromtheperspectiveofanotherseriousperversionofculturallyavailable
potentials,namely,thereconstructionofthefamilyonmodernterrain.Sequesteringwomenintotherolesofwifeandmotherdeformedthefunctionandstructureofthe
intimatespherewithrespecttothe

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developmentofitsmembers'subjectivityandindividualityandalsodeformedtheimportofdomesticgenderhierarchiesforthesystemicdifferentiationofworkand
politicalroles(i.e.,theinterpretationoftheserolesasasbeingformenonly).
59.Thus,JeanBodinratherthanThomasHobbesshouldbeseenastherepresentativetheoristofthisepoch.
60.TCA,vol.2,364.
61.Ibid.
62.These,ofcourse,couldnotremainrightswithouttheirprotective,negativecharacterindicatingdisabilitiesofthesovereign.SeeH.L.A.Hart,"Rights,"inEssays
onBentham:StudiesinJurisprudenceandPoliticalTheory(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1982).
63.TCA,vol.2,361.
64.SeeHart,"Rights."Itisconceivablethatsomebenefitcouldtakeonthestructureofaright.Butforabenefittobearight,ratherthantheoutcomeofapolicy,it
wouldhavetotakeonthestructureofafundamentalright:Itwouldhavetobefullyactionable,limitableonlybyanotherright,anduniversalinitsapplication(i.e.,not
relatedtothecharacteristicsofaparticulargroupbutpertainingtoindividualsassuch).SuchconsiderationsledRawlstotreatthesocalledsocialrightsonlyas
preconditionsofgenuinerightsorliberties.SeeJohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1971),204205,andalsoDworkin,Taking
RightsSeriously.
65.Thus,thecontrastbetweenTeilhaberrechte,inthesenseofrightsofmembership,andFreiheitsrechte,inthesenseoffreedomsorliberties,wouldbewelltaken
here.ButthepointshouldnotbetransposedtowhatoughttobecalledTeilnehmerrechte,rightsofparticipation,evenifinbothcaseswecanspeakofbureaucratic
implementationleadingtocontradiction.Inthecaseofmembershiprights,thebenefitstructureoftheirformulationispredisposedtobureaucraticimplementation.
Rightsofparticipation,however,incorporateanegativeaswellasapositivedimensionandarethustruerights.
66.AndrewArato,"CriticalSociologyandAuthoritarianStateSocialism,"inDavidHeldandJohnThompson,eds.,Habermas:CriticalDebates(Cambridge:MIT
Press,1982)E.Fraenkel,TheDualState(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1941).
67.TCA,vol.1,221223,233.
68.Habermas'sdefinitionofculturalmodernityasinvolvingthefallofsubstantivereasonandthedifferentiationofthevaluespheresofart,science,andmorality
followsWeber.Weberattributestoculturalmodernityandsecularizationthephenomenaoflossofmeaningandlossoffreedom.HorkheimerandAdornoreproduce
thisthesis.SeethediscussioninTCA,vol.1,346352.
69.TCA,vol.2,153ff.
70.Ibid.,330331.

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71.Ibid.,361364.
72.Seechapter8.
73.TCA,vol.2,328.Wehavetranslatedbrgerlichenas"civil."Itisanobviousmistaketorenderas"bourgeois"asocietywhosethreelevelsareindicatedby
bourgeois,citoyen,andhomme.(Ofcourse,l'hommeheremeanshumanity,notmen.)
74.Seechapter8andJrgenHabermas,"TheNewObscurity:TheCrisisoftheWelfareStateandtheExhaustionofUtopianEnergies,"inTheNewConservatism:
CulturalCriticismandtheHistorians'Debate(Cambridge:MITPress,1989).
75.Ibid.
76.Weseelittlereasontodescribeasutopianthewelfarestatemodelofcompensationforthealienationoflabor,evenattheheightofreformism,asHabermasdoes
in"TheNewObscurity."Indeed,wedonotseetherationalorganizationofasocietyoflaborersasaprimarycharacteristicoftheearlier,socialistutopia,especially
sincemanyversionsofthisutopiainvolvednotthehumanizationoflaborbutthedramaticminimizationoflabortimeinfact,theabolitionoflabor.Thesocialistutopia
isprimarilyoneofpower(organizingthewholeofsocietyandnotjustproduction),justastheeconomicliberalutopiaisoneofthemarket.Itiswhenthey
incorporatedliberaldreamsaboutthegrowthofproductionthattheorganizationoflaborbecameafactorinsocialistutopias.
77.SeeespeciallyT.W.Adorno'smostutopianwork,NegativeDialectics(NewYork:SeaburyPress,1973).
78.HannahArendt'scounterexample,theAmericanrevolution,isinthiscontextaconservativerevolutionatbest,sinceitcouldrelyonexisting(state)institutionsasits
pouvoirconstituant.Norevolutionaryutopiasfoundinspirationinthismodel.WeshouldnotethatArendt'sownutopia,partiallybasedonthismodel,isclearlya
selflimitingcommunicationsmodel.Sherefusestototalizedemocraticpowerandseekstolimititthroughlawandtradition.ItisanothermatterthatinOnRevolution
(NewYork:PenguinBooks,1977)shelinksthetraditionoflimitationofruletothedryingupofdemocraticparticipation.
79.SeeM.Gauchet,"TheRightsofMan,"inF.FuretandM.Ozouf,eds.,ACriticalDictionaryoftheFrenchRevolution(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,
1989).
80.SeeFranoisFuret,InterpretingtheFrenchRevolution(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1971).
81.Seechapter1.
82.Seechapter10.
83.ThebestdiscussionoftherelationbetweenimmanentandtranscendentcriticismisstillT.W.Adorno's"CulturalCriticismandSociety,"inPrisms(Cambridge:
MITPress,1981).SeealsoCohen,ClassandCivilSociety,andAndrewArato,"IntroductiontoSociologyofCulture,"inAndrewAratoandEikeGebhardt,eds.,
TheEssentialFrankfurtSchoolReader(NewYork:UrizenPress,1979).

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84.T.W.Adorno,"Ideology,"inFrankfurtInstituteforSocialResearch,AspectsofSociology(Boston:BeaconPress,1972)HerbertMarcuse,OneDimensional
Man(Boston:BeaconPress,1972).InSovietMarxism(NewYork:Vintage,1961),MarcusehadnotyetextendedtheclaimofonedimensionalitytoSoviet
society,withitssupposedlygenuineideologyoforthodoxMarxism.Withinafewyears,though,heabandonedthisreservation.
85.Foraninterestinghistoricalanalysisthatsupportsthisthesis,seeCarlDegler,AtOdds:WomenandtheFamilyinAmericafromtheRevolutiontothe
Present(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1980).Deglerarguesthatthedevelopmentoftheintimatesphereofthefamily,togetherwiththedoctrineofseparate
spheresandthenewconceptionofchildhood,openeduptheterrainonwhichwomenwereabletoexperiencethebeginningsofasenseofself,despitethefactthatit
wastiedtotheroleofwifeandmother.Itwasthisnewconceptionthatprojectedthemintothe"public"sphereandultimatelyledtoclaimsforautonomyand
individualityinallspheresoflife,thuschallengingthepatriarchalcharacterofthefirstformofthecompanionatefamilyand,ultimately,thedoctrineofseparatespheres
itself.Seechapter10.
86.InterpretersfromWalterBenjamintoHansMagnusEnzensbergerhavestressedthisagainstthecontraryviewofAdorno.
87.Habermasmayexcludethembecauseofanexaggeratedfearofallcorporatismandparticularismsee"TheNewObscurity."Inthiscontext,themedicine
suggestedacombinationofuniversalnormativejustificationsandthepluralismofsubculturesisjustified.Thefearthatthesesubculturesmerelyconstitute"amirror
imageoftheneocorporatisticgrayzone"isnotjustified,however,giventherelationoftheassociationstoanythingbutgrayformsofalternativepublics.
88.ThediscussioninGabrielA.AlmondandSidneyVerba,CivicCulture:PoliticalAttitudesandDemocracyinFiveNations(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1963),isstillimpressiveonthispoint,andtheywereprovedcorrectbythenewmovementsoftheperiodthatfollowedpublicationoftheirbook.
89.Seechapter10.
90.TCA,vol.2,chap.8.
91.Theideaoflawasamediumdoesnotmeanthatweconceiveoflawasamediumofcommunicationlikemoneyandpowerbut,rather,thatweunderstandlawin
someofitscapacities,thedominantonesincontemporarysociety,asfunctionalizedtofacilitatetheoperationofthemediaoftheadministrativestateandthemarket
economy.Inthisview,lawrepresentsthecodethroughwhichthegenuinemediumofpowerwouldoperate,touseLuhmann'sterm.Thedistinctionbetweenlawas
institutionandlawasmedium,moreover,mayrefertothesamelegalcodeoperatingintwodifferentwaysforexample,thesamestatutemightbeappliedby
administrativecourtsandalsobytrial(jury)courts.Wemight,ofcourse,regardthecompletepoliticalinstrumentalizationoflawasitsreductiontoamedium,butthis
wouldbeidenticaltothemediumofpower,whichinordertooperatemustberepresentedinacodethatis,ifnolongergenuinelylegal,thenperhapsmoralor
historicalphilosophicalorreli

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gious.Thereare,unfortunately,sufficientexamplesofeachoftheseoptionstoday.
Ournotionthattherearealternativesincontemporarylegalprocessescouldbederivedbymeansotherthanthedistinctionbetweenlawasmediumandlawas
institution.Inparticular,Unger'sdistinctionamongformal,substantive,andprocedurallawrepresentsafruitfulalternativestartingpoint.Parsonswasthefirsttonote
anelectiveaffinitybetweenformallawandeconomicsociety,betweensubstantivelawandstateadministration,andbetweenprocedurallawandcivilsociety.Itmight
infactbebettertotreatformalandsubstantivelawthemselves,inanalogytoliberalandwelfarestatejuridification,asambiguousfromthepointofviewofcivil
society,asempoweringgroupsandindividualswhilealsopromotingnewformsofdependenceandunfreedom.Asaformofreflexivelaw,procedurallaw(i.e.,
proceduresappliedtootherprocedures)cannotreplacetheothertypesofmodernlaw.Themetalevelpresupposeslevelstowhichitmustbeapplied,inthiscaseina
reflexivemanner.However,theincreaseduseofprocedurallawcanreinforcetheempoweringdimensionofsubstantiveandformallaw.Thiscould,ofcourse,alsobe
seenasreinforcingthedimension,aspect,orapplicationoflawasaninstitution.Whileweshallarguelaterthatreflexivelawhelpsintroduceanewformof
postregulatoryregulationofstateandeconomy,itmayalsorepresentanimportantbulwarkofthelifeworldagainstcolonizationoperatingthroughlegalcodes.
92.SeeR.M.Unger,LawinModernSociety(NewYork:FreePress,1976),192200F.Ewald,"AConceptofSocialLaw,"andG.Teubner,"AfterLegal
Instrumentalism?StrategicModelsofPostregulatoryLaw,"bothinTeubner,ed.,DilemmasofLawintheWelfareState.EvenLuhmannnowseemsmoreinclined
toacceptthishistoricizedposition,pointingtothepoliticizationoflawinwelfarestatessee''TheSelfReproductionofLawandItsLimits,"inDilemmasofLawin
theWelfareState.Hemakesthemistake,though,ofconsideringtheprojectof"reflexivelaw"tobeevenmoredestructiveofnormsthaninstrumentalization.At
times,Ungerseemstomakeasimilarmistake,treatingsubstantiveandprocedurallawinanundifferentiatedwayasbothexpressiveofpurposivelegalreasoningand
destructiveoftheruleoflawsee,e.g.,LawinModernSociety,195.Elsewhere,though,herightlynotestheincorporationofformalityinprocedurallaw,whichthus
becomesacompromisebetweenformalandsubstantivelawsee,e.g.,LawinModernSociety,212.
93.Seechapter10.
94.Inourview,neoconservatismaddsthedefenseofatraditional,authoritariancivilsocietytotheneoliberalcultofthemagicofthemarket.Itwouldtakeustoofar
afieldtodeterminewhichoftheseapproachesispoliticallyviable,especiallysincewebelievebothareplaguedbyinternalcontradictionshavingtodowiththe
neoliberalattempttoimagineasocietywithoutsocialintegrationandtheneoconservativedesiretomaketraditionandauthoritycompatiblewithafullyautonomous
marketrationality.Nevertheless,bothneoliberalismandneoconservatismremainpoliticallymoreviablethanthefundamentalistrejectionofboththemodernstateand
themoderneconomy.

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95.SeeA.Przeworski,CapitalismandSocialDemocracy(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985).SeealsoClausOffe,"Bindung,Fessel,
Bremse,"inAxelHonnethetal.,eds.,ZwischenbetrachtungenimProzessderAufklrung(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1989):"Wedonotknowwhatthepoliticaland
economicinstitutionsofsocialismconsistofevenifweknew,theroadtothemwouldbeunknownevenifitwereknown,relevantpartsofthepopulationwouldnot
bereadytoenteriteveniftheywereready,therewouldnotbeanyguaranteethattheestablishedconditionwouldbecapableoffunctioningandimmunefrom
regressionsevenifallthiscouldbeguaranteed,agreatpartoftoday'spoliticallythematizedsocialproblemswouldremainunsolved"(746,note9).
96.Seetheintroductionandchapter1.
97.Seechapter6onFoucault.
98.WehaveinmindJamesO'Connor,FiscalCrisisoftheState(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1973)ClausOffe'sessaysinStrukturproblemedes
kapitalistischenStaates(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1982)andlaterinContradictionsoftheWelfareStateandHabermas,LegitimationCrisis.
99.Offe,ContradictionsoftheWelfareState,149154.
100.Afterall,asidefromthedisastrousexperienceofstatesocialism,thewelfarestatehasbeentheonlyinstitutionalrealizationofsomeofthesignificanthopesof
socialistmovements,evenifitevolvedwithintheframeworkofcapitalisteconomies.Asatypeofsocialistexperiment,socialdemocraticreformismendsnotwiththe
variousBadGodesbergprogramsbutwiththetransitionfromKeynesianexpansioniststrategiestothecrisismanagementofestablishedwelfarestates.See
Przeworski,CapitalismandSocialDemocracy.
101.SeeJrgenHabermas,ThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity(Cambridge:MITPress,1987),358ff.
102.Ibid.seealsoHabermas,"TheNewObscurity."
103.Inseveralworks,JanosKornaidevelopstheconceptofthesoftbudgetaryconstraint,which,unliketheconceptsof"shortage"or"resourceconstraint,"is
applicabletocapitalisteconomies.SeeinparticularTheEconomicsofShortage(Amsterdam:NorthHolland,1980),theessays"TheReproductionofShortage,"
"HardandSoftBudgetConstraints,"and"DegreesofPaternalism''inContradictionsandDilemmas(Cambridge:MITPress,1986),and"Apuhakltsgvetsi
korlt,"Tervgazdasgifrum,no.3(Budapest,1986).
104.ThislogicwasreconstructedforstatesocialisminthetheoriesofcyclesofeconomistssuchasT.BauerandK.A.Ss.Thecyclesofinvestmentunderstate
socialismarethebestevidenceforthesystemconstitutingabilityofthemediumofpower,sinceweknowthatthestructureofexpectationandbargainingthat
underliesthesecyclesisapoliticaloneinwhichthepossessionofpowerandnoteconomicefficiencydeterminesoutcomes.
105.Kornai,"Apuhakltsgvetsikorlt,"11ff.
106.Someimportantareasarethusunderregulated,whileothersareoverregulated.

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107.Offe,"CompetitivePartyDemocracyandtheKeynesianWelfareState,"200.ItisaninterestingaspectofKornai'sconceptionaswellthatitisnotonlystate
interventionassuchbutastructureofexpectingroutineinterventionthatsoftensbudgetaryconstraintsandorientsfirmstopolitical,hierarchicalratherthaneconomic,
horizontalcompetitionsee,e.g.,"TheReproductionofShortage,"14.
108.Oneshoulddistinguishtherelatedphenomenaofshortageandinflation,evenifbothcanbeduetosurplusdemand.Inflation,intheWestatleast,isa
phenomenonofdemandconstrainedeconomiesinwhichsurplusdemandleadstohigherpricesforavailablegoods.ShortageinSoviettyperesourceconstrained
economies(nottobeequatedwiththegeneraleconomiccategoryofscarcity)representsasituationinwhichgoodsareunavailableevenataninflationaryprice.For
thedistinctionbetweendemandandresourceconstrainedeconomies,seeKornai,"TheReproductionofShortage."
109.SeePrzeworski,CapitalismandSocialDemocracy.Habermasnotesthat,inEuropeatleast,itistheloyalistsofthewelfarestatewhoaretheconservatives
see"TheNewObscurity."
110.SeeHabermas,"TheNewObscurity,"andArato,"CivilSociety,HistoryandSocialism,"140144.
111.SeeArato,"CivilSociety,HistoryandSocialism."
112.See,e.g.,JeanL.Cohen,"RethinkingSocialMovements,"BerkeleyJournalofSociology28(1983):97113AndrewAratoandJeanL.Cohen,"Social
Movements,CivilSocietyandtheProblemofSovereignty,"PraxisInternational4,no.3(1984):266283.
113.Habermas,"TheNewObscurity,"64.
114.Ibid.
115.Habermas,PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,363364.Theterm"reflexive,"adoptedfromLuhmann,meanstheapplicationofaprocessorastrategyto
itself(proceduretoprocedure,decisiontodecision,etc.).SeeLuhmann's"ReflexiveMechanismen,"inSoziologischeAufklrung,vol.1(Opladen:Westdeutscher
Verlag,1970),92112.
116.ThepointhereisnotthatcountriesliketheUnitedStateswithminimalprotectionsagainstmarketforces(lackinguniversalhealthinsuranceandjobtraining
programs,forexample)shouldsomehowforegothese,butratherthatitisnotnecessarytotreadthepathmarkedoutbyEuropeansocialdemocraciesfirstandonly
thentofigureoutwaystoundotheexpensive,oppressivelybureaucratic,paternalisticstructuressuchsystemshaveerectedinthenameofsolidarity.Onecanstill
selectivelyincorporatetheachievementsofmoreadvancedwelfarestatesforexample,substitutinguniveralistfor"meanstested"benefitsincertaincases.
117.Habermas,personalcorrespondence,1986.

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118.Habermas,PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,364.Thetranslationhereisinadequate,thoughseetheGermanedition,DerphilosophischeDiskursder
Moderne(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1985),422433.
119.ParsonsseemstoarguethecontraryseeespeciallyTalcottParsonsandNeilSmelser,EconomyandSociety(NewYork:FreePress,1956).Habermasfora
fleetingmomentseemedtofallintothispositionsee"TheNewObscurity,"65.JustasHabermasclaimsthatsomeofLuhmann'sfollowersareforcedtoletthetheory
ofcommunicativeactioninthroughthebackdoorbecauseofotherwiseunsolvableproblems,hehimselfseemsattimestoexperienceasimilartemptationwithregard
tothetheoryofautopoieticsystems.Inthiscase,though,Habermasashorttimelaterrejectsthenotionthatanewsteeringmediumofanothernewsubsystemcan
bringautopoieticsystemsunderselflimitingformsofcontrolseePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,363
120.Thus,itisaseriousmistaketocounterposesolidarityandrightsasUngerdoesinhisotherwisesophisticatedanalysisoftheconceptofsolidarity(Lawin
ModernSociety,206213).
121.MancurOlson,TheLogicofCollectiveAction(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1973)AlbertHirschman,ShiftingInvolvements(Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress,1982),chap.5.
122.Onthelatterpoint,seechapter10.WeshouldnotethatHabermashasnowrevisedthepessimisticgeneralthesesofTheStructuralTransformationofthe
PublicSphereandreturnedtohisoriginallyhesitantproposalaccordingtowhichtherevivaloftheemancipatingpremiseoftheclassicalpublicsphereinthe
contemporaryworldcanonlybetheworkofapluralityofassociations,internallypublicintheirorganizationandaimingatreconstitutingpublicdiscussiononalllevels
ofsociety.Withthismove,Habermasputshistheoryofsocialmovementsonnewfoundations,replacingthe(empiricallyfalse)breakdowntheorywithatheoryof
associationsoperatingonthemicrolevelofsociety.
123.AndrGorz,FarewelltotheWorkingClass(Boston:SouthEndPress,1982).
124.Ibid.,97100.
125.Ibid.,97.JohnKeaneinDemocracyandCivilSociety(London:Verso,1988)repeatsGorz'sbiasforstateplanningoftherealmofnecessity,seemstoidentify
stateownedornationalizedpropertywithsocializedproperty,andhopestosavemarketsbystickingthemintotherealmoffreedomorcivilsocietyalongwith
cooperation,reciprocity,andbarter.Thisoperationdispenseswiththeideathatmarketsontheonesideandassociationsandpublicsontheotherrepresententirely
differentlogicsandhavedifferentrelationsto"necessity."Thissleightofhandcausestheoreticalimpotenceinfaceoftheassimilationofthefunctioningofonetothe
other,leadingeithertoeconomicprimitivismortothecolonizationofthelifeworld.Atissueisnotthepossibilityoreventhenecessityofmaterialactivitycoordinated
byreciprocity,cooperation,andmutualityandlinkedtodifferentformsofpropertyasthematerialfoundationsofautonomyandsolidarityincivilsociety.Thereisno
reasontocontesttheimportanceof"economic"activity,inPolnyi's''substantive"senseoftheterm,forreproducing

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civilsociety.Whatweinsiston,however,andKeaneneglects,istheimportanceforanygenuinelymodernsociety,andespeciallyforcivilsociety,oftheexistence
ofeconomicmechanismsdifferentiatedfromallformsofsocialintegrationtheimportance,inotherwords,oftheeconomyinPolnyi's"formal"sense.This
dimensioncannotbeaccommodatedinthedichotomousframeworkofstateandcivilsocietywithoutfallingbackintotheillusionsofastatistcoordinationofthe
moderneconomythatreappearinGorz.
126.Gorz,FarewelltotheWorkingClass,104.
127.ItmaybethatGorzconsidersthethreepartframeworkindispensablefordescribingthecapitalistpresent,involvingatleasttherelativemutualindependenceof
marketeconomyandstateadministration,andthatheproposesthetwopartmodelinvolvingthestatizationofalleconomiclifedifferentiatedfromcivilsocietyonlyfor
thefuture.EvensuchamodelwouldbetestimonytotheMarxistorthodoxyofhisconception.
128.Keane,DemocracyandCivilSociety,87
129.See,inparticular,ClausOffe,DisorganizedCapitalism(Cambridge:MITPress,1985),chaps.2,3.
130.Itisnotentirelyconvincingthatthepresentformoftheproposedarrangement,involvingguaranteedincomes,iscompatiblewiththeexistenceofanygenuine
labormarketandthatsomefinetuningofincomedifferentialscansimultaneouslymaintaintheprestigeofformsofactivityinthesecondsectorandtherelative
economicadvantagesofworkinthefirst.Wearenotcompetenttoevaluatetheviabilityoftheoverallmodel.Underpresentcircumstances,though,wesupportthe
politicalstrategyofreducingformalizedworktimeaswellasinitiativestowardthebroaderevaluationandmoreextensiveutilizationbybothsexesofcooperativeand
reciprocalformsofactivity,whichtodayformasphereofactivitymostlyofwomen.
131.Offe,DisorganizedCapitalism,7071.
132.Seechapter11.
133.HabermasemployshisownframeworkinawaythatisattimesprecariouslyclosetoGorz'sdualisticschemes,whichheneverthelessrejectsonamoreconcrete
politicallevel.
134.Inourconception,politicalassociations,parties,andparliamentsrepresentthekeyinstitutionsofpoliticalsociety.Theycanallincorporatethedimensionof
publicity,althoughthismustbemadecompatiblewiththedemandsofstrategicreason.Hence,unlikethepublicsofcivilsociety,thoseofpoliticalsocietycannot
guaranteeopenended,fullyunrestrictedcommunicationandcanachieverelativeequalityofaccessandparticipationonlybyformalrulesofprocedure.Despitethis
limitation,thepoliticalpublicisanopenstructurebecauseofitspermeabilitytogeneralsocialcommunication.Wemustadmitthatitisdifficulttoapplythesame
conceptiontoeconomicsociety,whereconditionsofpublicityandthereforethepossibilitiesofdemocratizationareevenmorerestricted.Weareatpresentinclinedto
stresspropertyandparticipationasthe

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keycategoriesofmediationofeconomicsociety.Itmaybethatthelowerdegreeofparticipationinthisspherecanbecompensatedforbyapluralityofformsof
property,throughwhichcivilsocietyanditsinstitutionscouldinprinciplegainfootholdsineconomicsociety.Indeed,theparticipationofcommunities,nonprofit
organizations,andevenwelfareagenciesintheownershipofproductivepropertycouldinprinciplereplacewelfarestateformsofregulation.Inaddition,
institutionssuchascollectivebargaining,representationofworkersoncompanyboards,andgrievanceproceduresareallpartof"economicsociety."
135.Teubner,"AfterLegalInstrumentalism?,"315.
136.G.Teubner,"CorporateFiduciaryDutiesandtheirBeneficiaries,"inK.J.HoptandG.Teubner,eds.,CorporateGovernanceandDirectorsLiabilities
(Berlin:deGruyter,1985),162"AfterLegalInstrumentalism?,"315316.
137.G.Teubner,"SubstantiveandReflexiveElementsinModernLaw,"LawandSocietyReview17,no.2(1983):272"AfterLegalInstrumentalism?,"312.
138.TCA,vol.2,371Teubner,"AfterLegalInstrumentalism?,"317.
139.Teubner,"SubstantiveandReflexiveElementsinModernLaw,"275.
140.Ibid.,257,267,275.
141.Teubner,"AfterLegalInstrumentalism?,"317.Healsomentionsexamples,developedtodifferentextents,inpropertylaw(ibid.,317),contractlaw("Substantive
andReflexiveElementsinModernLaw,"256),andcompanylaw("CorporateFiduciaryDutiesandtheirBeneficiaries,"166ff.).
142.Teubner,"SubstantiveandReflexiveElementsinModernLaw,"278.
143.Ibid.,272273.
144.Teubner,"CorporateFiduciaryDutiesandtheirBeneficiaries,"165.
145.Teubner,"AfterLegalInstrumentalism?,"316317.
146.Ibid.,316.
147.Teubner,"CorporateFiduciaryDutiesandtheirBeneficiaries,"159.
148.Teubner,"SubstantiveandReflexiveElementsinModernLaw,"273.
149.H.Willke,"ThreeTypesofLegalStructure:TheConditional,thePurposiveandtheRelationalProgram,"inTeubner,ed.,DilemmasofLawintheWelfare
State,290291.
150.ItneednotconcernusherethatWillke'sempiricalexampletheneocorporatistKonzertierteAktion(ConcertedAction)establishedbytheSocialDemocrats
oftheGrandCoalitionin1967isafundamentallynonpublicdiscoursethatwasnotopentoparticipationbyallcentrallyaffectedinterests.Thisweaknessmayflow
fromWillke'soverallconception.Totheextentthathefindsitdifficulttoconceptualizetheinstitutionalimplicationsofthepartofhisanalysisthatreliesonadiscourse
model,hefallsbackonadiscoursethatseemstoplayacoordinatingroleinthecontextchosen,thatofbargainingamonggovernment,labor,andbusiness.The
neocorporatistchoice,however,isnohelpwiththesecondproblem:thelegitimatesettingofgoalsandpurposesforallrelevantsubsystems.

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151.ThisproblemmaybelessdifficultforLuhmanntodealwithbecausehisproposalforrestoredautopoiesisislessintrusive,lessinterventionist.Hearguesonlyfor
selfregulationperseandnotfortheindirectregulationofselfregulation.ItistheresidualideaofnormativeregulationthatexposesTeubnertothequestion:Whatis
thesourceofthiscommonregulation,andhowcanhavingsuchacommonsourcebereconciledwithselfregulation?
152.Habermas,PhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity,364365.
153.SeeTalcottParsons,"OntheConceptofPoliticalPower"and"OntheConceptofInfluence,"inPoliticsandSocialStructure,363ff.,410418,432436.
154.TCA,vol.2,182ff.,278282.
155.Parsons,"OntheConceptofInfluence,"416418.
156.Weshallexplorethenatureofsocietaldiscursiveprocessesthatcanbecomerelevantforsteeringinchapters10and11.
157.SeeM.Gonzales(P.Piccone),"ExorcisingPerestroika,"Telos,no.81(Fall1989).
158.AlainTouraine,TheVoiceandtheEye(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981),chaps.5,6.
159.OnlyanEastGermanyfullyincorporatedintotheWestcouldfullyturninanelitedemocraticdirectionwithoutdelegitimation.HencethedeclineoftheNeues
Forum,anorganizationobviouslyofcivilsociety.Inothercountries,similarlyconstitutedorganizationshaveremainedimportant,havingmadeasomewhatmore
determinedturnthanNeuesForuminthedirectionofpoliticalsociety.
160.Thisisthetaskpresentedtoallpoliticalactors,constitutingpartofapouvoirconstituantaccordingtoHannahArendt.
161.Tothisextent,wegoalongwiththe"liberalconservative"programofJanosKornaiasexpressed,forexample,inRoadtoaFreeEconomy(NewYork:
Norton,1990)evenifwefindithardtounderstandwhyheproposesleavingthestateownedsectorinitspresentform(exceptforahighlyunlikelyreductionof
theirbudgetarysupportsandsubsidies).Perhapsheconsiderstheothersuggestedsolutions,intheabsenceoflegitimateprivatebuyersand"operativecapital"(suchas
workers'ownershiporpublicstockdistributionschemes),tobemerelynovelincarnationsoftheillusionsofmarketsocialismthatwouldleadtoinformal
bureaucratizationinlegitimateforms.Thus,inhisview,theseschemeswouldnotbeaslikelytoleadtoreductionsofsubsidiestothe"bureaucraticsector"aswould
thepresent,discreditedarrangements.Inourview,theoppositeistrueinthecontextoftheexistinginformal''clientelistic"networkstowhichtheoldmanagershave
accesswhilethenewworkers'councilsorcitizenownerswouldnot.
162.Hegoesasfarasopposingevensignificantincometaxesfortoday'sentrepreneurs,despitetheabundantevidencefromtheWestthatsuchapolicydoesnot
necessarilypromoteeithersavingsorinvestment.

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Chapter10
1.SeeJeanL.Cohen,"RethinkingSocialMovements,"BerkeleyJournalofSociology28(1983):97113AndrewAratoandJeanL.Cohen,"TheGermanGreen
Party,"Dissent(Summer1984):327333AndrewAratoandJeanL.Cohen,"SocialMovements,CivilSocietyandtheProblemofSovereignty,"Praxis
International4(October1984):266283andJeanL.Cohen,"StrategyorIdentity:NewTheoreticalParadigmsandContemporarySocialMovements,''Social
Research52,no.4(Winter1985):663716.
Therearemanyotherkindsofcontemporarymovements.Some,suchasthereligiousrightandtherighttolifemovement,speakinthenameoftheautonomyof
civilsocietywhiledefendingatraditionalistlifeworldagainstitsfurthermodernization.Movementsinspiredbyneoconservativeideologyseektodefendthe
economy(propertyrights)againststateinterventionandegalitarianreform.Andthelabormovementstillexists.Ourfocusinthischapter,however,issolelyon
movementsorientedtowardthefurtherdemocratizationandmodernization(inthenormativesense)ofsocial,political,oreconomicinstitutions.
2.SeeCohen,"StrategyorIdentity"BertKlandermansandSidneyTarrow,"MobilizationintoSocialMovements:SynthesizingEuropeanandAmerican
Approaches,"InternationalSocialMovementResearch1(1988):138.
3.Cohen,"StrategyorIdentity,"667668.
4.RalphH.Turner,ed.,RobertE.ParkonSocialControlandCollectiveBehavior:SelectedPapers(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1967)Herbert
Blumer,"CollectiveBehavior,"inAlfredMcClungLee,ed.,NewOutlineofthePrinciplesofSociology(NewYork:Barnes&Noble,1951),and"Collective
Behavior,"inJ.B.Gittler,ed.,ReviewofSociology:AnalysisofaDecade(NewYork:Wiley,1957)R.G.TurnerandL.M.Killian,CollectiveBehavior
(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1957).Forasummaryofcollectivebehaviortheories,seeGaryT.MarxandJamesL.Wood,"StrandsofTheoryand
ResearchinCollectiveBehavior,"AnnualReviewofSociology1(1975):368428.
5.W.Kornhauser,ThePoliticsofMassSociety(NewYork:FreePress,1959)HannahArendt,TheOriginsofTotalitarianism(NewYork:HarcourtBrace
Jovanovich,1951)NeilSmelser,TheTheoryofCollectiveBehavior(NewYork:FreePress,1962).WiththeexceptionofArendt'swork,whichwediscussedin
chapter4,thetheoriesofmasssocietyandmassmovementsconstituteasynthesisofeliteandpluralisttheoriesofdemocracy.Onthisaccount,democracyinvolvesa
politicalsystemcharacterizedbyfreeelections,competition,andalternationandispredicatedonamodelofcivilsocietycharacterizedbycivilprivatismplus
participationbyactiveminoritiesthroughinterestgroupsandpoliticalparties.Here,"extrainstitutional"collectiveactionsmotivatedbystrongideologicalbeliefsappear
tobeantidemocraticandthreateningtotheconsensusthatunderliestheinstitutionsofacivilsociety.Inotherwords,theyseemtoheraldtheonslaughtof"mass
society,"whichistakentomeanthekindofsocietycreatedbyfascistandcommunistmovements.Ironically,theconceptofmasssocietywasusedbythetheoristsof
theFrankfurtSchool(Adorno,Horkheimer,

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Marcuse)toanalyzethemodelofcivilsocietylaudedbythepluralists(especiallyinwhatseemedtobeitsmostperfectincarnation,theUnitedStates).Onemight
betemptedtoconcludethattheselattertheoristsdefendedamoreegalitarianandpoliticallyactivemodelofcivilsocietythandidtheelitepluralistorcollective
behaviorschool,butthefactisthattheirneoMarxistorientationpreventedthemfromdevelopinganadequatetheoryofeithercivilsocietyorsocialmovements.
6.Forareviewoftheevidence,seeJ.CraigJenkins,"ResourceMobilizationTheoryandtheStudyofSocialMovements,"AnnualReviewofSociology9(1983):
527553AnthonyOberschall,SocialConflictandSocialMovements(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1973).
7.MancurOlson,TheLogicofCollectiveAction(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1965)JohnD.McCarthyandMayerN.Zald,"ResourceMobilization
andSocialMovements:APartialTheory,"AmericanJournalofSociology82(May1977):212241CharlesTilly,LouiseTilly,andRichardTilly,TheRebellious
Century:18301930(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1975)WilliamGamson,TheStrategyofSocialProtest(Homewood,IL:Dorsey,1975)Oberschall,
SocialConflictandSocialMovementsSidneyTarrow,"StrugglingtoReform:SocialMovementsandPolicyChangeduringCyclesofProtest,"WesternSocieties
Paperno.15,CornellUniversity,1983B.Klandermans,H.Kriesl,andS.Tarrow,"FromStructuretoAction:ComparingSocialMovementResearchacross
Cultures,"InternationalSocialMovementResearch1(1988).
8.CharlesPerrow,"TheSixtiesObserved,"inMayerN.ZaldandJohnD.McCarthy,eds.,TheDynamicsofSocialMovements(Cambridge:Winthrop,1979),
199.Perrowcharacterizedthepoliticalprocessversionofresourcemobilizationtheoryas"Clausewitzian"becauseitconceivesofprotestasthecontinuationof
orderlypoliticsbyother(disorderly)meansasgrowingoutofthepursuitofinterestsotherwiseunattainable.Butheerrsinarguingthatonlytheorganizational
entrepreneurialmodeliseconomisticinthatitattributescostbenefitcalculationstothecollectiveactors.Tilly'smodelsuffersfromsimilardifficulties.
9.Somemembersoftheresourcemobilizationschoolacknowledgeavarietyoforganizationalformsformodernmovements,buttheoverallemphasisisonformal
organization.Theschoolhasbeenaccusedofaninabilitytodistinguishbetweeninterestgroupsandsocialmovementassociations.SeeJenkins,"Resource
MobilizationTheory,"541543.
10.SeeBruceFiremanandW.A.Gamson,"UtilitarianLogicintheResourceMobilizationPerspective,"inZaldandMcCarthy,eds.,DynamicsofSocial
Movements,144.
11.Ibid.
12.SeeTilly,Tilly,andTilly,TheRebelliousCentury,6.
13.Ibid.,86(ouremphasis).
14.CharlesTilly,"EuropeanViolenceandCollectiveActionsince1700,"revised

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versionofapaperpresentedattheConferenceonPoliticalViolenceandTerrorism,InstitutoCarloCattaneo,Bologna,June1982.
15.Foradiscussionoftheseactiontypes,seeTilly,Tilly,andTilly,RebelliousCentury,4855,249252,andCharlesTilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution
(Reading,MA:AddisonWesley,1978),143151.
16.Tilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution,167.
17.Tilly,"EuropeanViolence,"11.
18.Tilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution,5297.
19.Tilly,"EuropeanViolence,"24.SeealsoCharlesTilly,"FightsandFestivalsin20thCenturyIledeFrance,"WorkingPaperno.305,CenterforResearchon
SocialOrganization,UniversityofMichigan,December1983,6368.
20.Sometheorists,ofcourse,emphasizedsuchinnovationsinorganizationandmobilizationprocessesasthedeliberatechoiceofdecentralizedstructures,grassroots
participation,andfederatednationalorganizations.Theyalsotooknoteoftheemphasisonsuchgoalsasdirectpersonalinvolvementinpoliticalaction,selfhelp,
personalchange,andthecreationofnewidentitiesandsolidarities.However,mostoftheanalystsintheresourcemobilizationtraditionconcludedthatthese"new"
orientations,ontheirown,resultinalossofstrategiceffectiveness.ThisistruedespiteZaldandAsh'searlyargumentthatdifferentorganizationalstructuresare
effectivefordifferentgoals:SeeM.N.ZaldandR.Ash,"SocialMovementOrganizations:Growth,Decay,andChange,"SocialForces44,no.3(1966):327341.
21.JohnMcCarthyandMayerZald,TheTrendofSocialMovements(Morristown,NJ:GeneralLearning,1973),"OrganizationalIntellectualsandtheCriticismof
Society,"SocialScienceReview49(1975):344362,and"ResourceMobilizationandSocialMovements,"AmericanJournalofSociology82(1977):1212
1241.
22.SeeJ.CraigJenkinsandCraigM.Eckert,"ChannellingBlackInsurgency:ElitePatronageandProfessionalSocialMovementOrganizationsintheDevelopment
oftheBlackMovement,"AmericanSociologicalReview51(1986):812829.
23.Ibid.
24.Ibid.,816.Theyciteincreasedblackvoterparticipation,theimportanceofblacksasavoterblock,theincreaseinthenumberofblackofficeholders,andthe
reductioninthemostovertformsofdiscriminationineducationandemployment.
25.Ibid.,820.Althoughincreasingpoliticalopportunities(e.g.,favorableSupremeCourtdecisions,federalcivilrightsbills)didfacilitatetheriseofthemovement,
thesewereopportunities,notdirectpatronage.AnexcludedgroupcannotcountonprofessionalSMOsandelitepatronstoprotectandadvanceitsinterestsagainst
powerfulopponentswithoutsustainedindigenousmobilization.ThisisnottodenytheroleofprofessionalSMOsinthesuccessesofthecivilrightsmovementbut
simplytoemphasizethatbothagrassrootspoliticsofidentityandinfluenceandapoliticsofreformandinclusionwereimportant.
26.Ibid.,827.Thisholdstrueforthecivilrightsmovementaswell.

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27.SeeAlessandroPizzorno,"PoliticalExchangeandCollectiveIdentityinIndustrialConflict,"inC.CrouchandA.Pizzorno,eds.,TheResurgenceofClass
ConflictinWesternEuropesince1968,vol.2(London:Macmillan,1978),277298.
28.ThispoliticalbiasisespeciallyevidentintherecentexpansionofresourcemobilizationtheorytoincludeconsiderationofwhatSidneyTarrow,in"Strugglingto
Reform,"hascalledthe"politicalopportunitystructure."DrawingoutimplicationsoftheworkofWilson,Lipsky,Tilly,andothers,Tarrowusesthisconceptto
differentiate"external"variablesthatareimportantinexplainingmovementsuccessfrom"internal"resourcemobilization.Ofcourse,healsodefinessuccessinpolitical
terms,astheunfoldingofaprocessofpolicyinnovationinthepoliticalsystemthataddressestheprotesters'statedneeds,buthisanalysisofthepoliticalopportunity
structureandhisconceptofcyclesofprotestandreformexpandonthenarrowdiscussionofinfluenceinearlierresourcemobilizationtheory.Atthesametime,his
workindicatesthelimitsofanapproachfocusingexclusivelyonthepoliticalsystemfortheanalysisofthegoalsandaddresseesofcontemporarysocialmovements.
Thepoliticalopportunitystructureincorporatesthreefeaturesofthepoliticalsystemthataresignificantformovementsuccess:thedegreeofopennessofformal
politicalinstitutions,thedegreeofstabilityofpoliticalalignmentswithinthepoliticalsystem,andtheavailabilityandstrategicpostureofsupportgroups.Thefirst
reflectsformal,structural,andconjuncturalfactorsinpoliticalsystems,whilethesecondandthirdbringinthetargetsofinfluenceofcollectiveaction.Tarrow
specifiesawiderangeofmovementaddressees,includingsupportgroupswithincivilsocietybutexternaltothemovementitselfinterestgroupswithinstitutional
access,whocanbeenergizedandemboldenedbymovementactivitytopressforsharedgoalspoliticalandadministrativeelitesinallsectorsofthepolitical
system,whosedegreeofunityandperceptionoftheelectoralrealignmentsthatmightresultfromcollectiveactionaffecttheiropennesstomovementgoalsand
politicalparties,whomayrespondtoautonomousmovementactivitybyadoptingorcooptingmovementissues.However,neitherafavorablepoliticalopportunity
structurenorefficientinternalorganizationissufficienttoexplainmovementsuccess.Inaddition,theimpactofprotestonreformmustbeanalyzedinlightof"the
combinationofresourcesandconstraintsthatarecharacteristicofperiodsofgeneralmobilizationinwholesocialsystems."Insuchperiods,aprotestcycle
emergesinwhichthereisahighlevelofconflictthatisdiffusedthroughoutthenationalterritory,involvingmorethanonesocialsectorandentailingtheappearance
ofnewtechniquesofprotestandnewformsoforganization(Tarrow,"StrugglingtoReform,"3739).Evenifthecausalrelationbetweenacycleofreformand
wavesofsocialprotestremainsproblematic(someprotestcyclessimplyfail,whileothersaretriggeredbyreformsthatprecedethem),theydooftencoincide,and
thesuccessofindividualmovementsisoftencontingentuponwhetherandwhentheyemergeduringthecycle.Inotherwords,boththepoliticalopportunity
structureandthereceptivityofpoliticalelitesandsupportgroupstostrategiesofinfluenceonthepartofsocialmovementsdependinpartonthedynamicsof
protestcycles.While

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thisisconvincingasfarasitgoes,theexpandedanalysisoftargetsofinfluenceisstillundulyconstrainedbythelimitsoftheoverallapproach.Itisstrikingthata
theoreticalframeworkorientedtotheanalysisofinfluencedoesnotaddress,ordismissesinpassing,suchobviouslyrelevantconcernsaschangesinpublic
opinion,theroleofthemedia,andtransformationsintheuniverseofpoliticaldiscourse.Theverywayinwhichtheseissuesaretakenupanddismissedisinitself
revealing.Changesin"massopinion,"bywhichTarrowunderstandsvaluechange,aretakenupasapossiblecauseofsocialprotest(39,laInglehart)andthen
discardedasbeingunproved.Butmightitnotbethatpublicopinionandculturalchangeformoneofthegoalsandtargetsofinfluenceofcollectiveaction?Media
coverageisalsotakenupinapurelyinstrumentalway,asfacilitatingorobstructingmovementactivity(followingOberschall,"SocialConflict,"andToddGitlin,
TheWholeWorldIsWatching[Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1980]).Butaren'ttheinitiationandexpansionofpublicdiscussiononissuesandnorms
andthedemocratizationoftheculturalpublicspherealsopossiblemovementgoals?Surelyoneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofmodernmovementsistheircreation
ofalternativecommunicationnetworksnewspapers,presses,bookstores,institutes,programsofstudy,publicationsofallkindsthatexpandthepublicsphere
butareaimedinthefirstinstanceat"influencing"notelitesbutpotentialparticipantsand"conscienceconstituencies."Thealternativepublicspheres"succeed''to
theextenttowhichtheytriggerreflection,surviveasarenasofcommunication,orbecomepartoftheinstitutionalizedpublicsphere.Finally,althoughTarrowgrants
thatthegeneralevolutionofinformedoreliteopinionisrelevanttomovementsuccess,hestatesthatchangesinthepolitical"universeofdiscourse"comprisea
"foggy"area(34)thatcanaffectthepoliticalopportunitystructurebutcannotbe"operationalized."Perhaps,butthisfoggyareahappenstobeoneofthecentral
targetsofcontemporarycollectiveaction.Indeed,theuniverseofpoliticaldiscourse,alongwithsocialnorms,socialrolesthatareregulatedbynorms,andthe
consciousnessofcollectiveactorsaswellaselites,areall"addressees"ofthestrategyofinfluenceofcontemporarysocialmovements.Butonlyifoneseesthat
civilsocietyitsinstitutionalstructure,socialrelations,andnormativearticulationisnotonlytheterrainbutalsothetargetofthenewsocialmovements,canone
assessthesignificanceofsuchastrategy.
29.Tilly,"FightsandFestivalsin20thCenturyIledeFrance."
30.Pizzorno,"PoliticalExchange,"293,and"OntheRationalityofDemocraticChoice,"Telos,no.63(Spring1985):4169.SeethediscussionofPizzorno's
approachinCohen,"StrategyorIdentity,"691695.
31.Herethesituationisthereverseofthatoftheresourcemobilizationparadigm.Anactualschoolhas,inthiscase,emergedaroundTouraine'sexpandedmodel
ratherthanaroundthe"simpleidentitymodel."
32.AlainTouraine,TheVoiceandtheEye(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981),3132.
33.AlbertoMelucci,"TheNewSocialMovements:ATheoreticalApproach,"

Page721
SocialScienceInformation19,no.2(1980):199226.
34.Touraine,TheVoiceandtheEye,56.
35.AlainTouraine,"AnIntroductiontotheStudyofSocialMovements,"SocialResearch52,no.4(1985):749787.
36.AlainTouraine,"TriumphorDownfallofCivilSociety?,"inHumanitiesinReview,vol.1(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983),223.
37.Ibid.,221227.
38.HenceTouraine'ssweepingcriticismoftheresourcemobilizationparadigmin"IntroductiontotheStudyofSocialMovements."
39.Touraine,"TriumphorDownfall,"220.Inotherwords,socialmovementsstruggleoverthetypeofcivilsocietytobeinstitutionalized,whereas"historical
movements,"situatedonthediachronicaxis,struggletoestablishcivilsocietyandarepresentativepoliticalsociety.
40.Touraine,TheVoiceandtheEye,61.
41.Ibid.,115.By"metasocialguarantees"ofthesocialorder,Tourainemeanssuchthingsasreligion,philosophiesofhistory,economiclaws,andevolutionary
theoriesofprogress.
42.SeeTouraine,"IntroductiontotheStudyofSocialMovements."
43.Touraine,"TriumphorDownfall,"106107.
44.Ibid.,138.
45.SeeTouraine,"IntroductiontotheStudyofSocialMovements."
46.Foradiscussionoftheothersocietaltypes,seeAlainTouraine,TheSelfProductionofSociety(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1977),92109.
47.Touraine,"TriumphorDownfall,"229,ouremphasis.
48.Cohen,ClassandCivilSociety,214228.
49.JrgenHabermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.1(Boston:BeaconPress,1984),86.
50.Ibid.,85101.
51.SeeJrgenHabermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2(Boston:BeaconPress,1985),332403.ForacriticaldiscussionofHabermas's
approachtosocialmovementsovertheyears,seeCohen,"StrategyorIdentity,"708716.
52.Seetheconcludingsectionofthischapterforamorecompletediscussionofthefourcomponentsoftheduallogicofcontemporarymovements.
53.AlainTouraine,TheMayMovement(NewYork:RandomHouse,1971)JrgenHabermas,StudentundPolitik(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1961),
ProtestbewegungundHochschulreform(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1969),andTowardsaRationalSociety(Boston:BeaconPress,1970).
54.JrgenHabermas,DieneueUnbersittlichkeit(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1985),8182,offersareevaluationofhisearlierpoliticalassessmentoftheNewLeft.
55.SeeCohen,ClassandCivilSociety,194228JeanL.Cohen,"WhyMore

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PoliticalTheory?,"Telos,no.40(Summer1979):7094.
56.SeethediscussioninHabermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,301403.
57.AmongthemovementsHabermasreferstoasnewarethefeminist,ecology,peace,youth,minority,antinuclear,andcitizeninitiativemovements(TheTheoryof
CommunicativeAction,vol.2,393).
58.Habermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,395.
59.Ibid.,396.
60.Thus,herediscoversTilly's"reactive"and"proactive"typesofcollectiveaction.
61.Inthisregard,hisanalysisislessperceptivethanthatofTouraine,whosawthatsocialmovementstargetingthenormsandidentitiesofcivilsocietyinvolvea
strugglewithasocialadversaryandthatthestakesofthestrugglearethefutureshapeoftheinstitutionsofcivilsociety.
62.Habermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,392.
63.NancyFraser,"What'sCriticalaboutCriticalTheory?TheCaseofHabermasandGender,"NewGermanCritique,no.35(Spring/Summer1985):97131.
Foradifferentview,seeLindaNicholson,GenderandHistory:TheLimitsofSocialTheoryintheAgeoftheFamily(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,
1986).
64.Fraser,"What'sCriticalaboutCriticalTheory?,"111.
65.Ibid.,107.AccordingtoFraser,Habermastiesthisdistinctiontothatbetweenmaterialandsymbolicreproduction.
66.Ibid.,109.
67.Ibid.,115.
68.Ibid.,109.
69.Ibid.,124.
70.Ibid.,115.
71.Ibid.,113.Fraserstates:"Byomittinganymentionofthechildrearerrole,andbyfailingtothematizethegendersubtextunderlyingtherolesofworkerand
consumer,Habermasfailstounderstandpreciselyhowthecapitalistworkplaceislinkedtothemodern,restricted,maleheadednuclearfamily.Similarly,byfailingto
thematizethemasculinesubtextofthecitizenrole,hemisses...thewaythemasculinecitizensoldierprotectorrolelinksthestateandpublicspherenotonlytoone
anotherbutalsotothefamilyandtothepaidworkplace....Andhemisses,finally,thewaythefemininechildrearerrolelinksallfourinstitutionstooneanotherby
overseeingtheconstructionofthemasculineandfemininegenderedsubjectsneededtofilleveryroleinclassicalcapitalism"(117).
72.Moreover,FraserpresupposeskeyfeaturesoftheHabermasiantheoryofmodernityevenwhenshecriticizesitandevenwhenshereconstructsitsunthematized
gendersubtext.

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73.Webynomeanswanttoarguethatthistheoryissufficienttoaddressallfeministconcerns.Itwouldcertainlyhavetobesupplementedbythecrucialcontributions
ofpsychoanalyticandpostmodernfeministphilosophy.Butasfarassocialtheorygoes,wefindthedualistictheoryofcivilsocietytoberemarkablyfruitful.
74.Fraser,"What'sCriticalaboutCriticalTheory?,"99103.ShetakesHabermasathiswordthatthisdistinctionistiedtoasubstantivedistinctionbetweenthe
symbolicandmaterialreproductionofthelifeworld.Shecorrectlyarguesthatitisnotpossibletodistinguishamongactivitiesonthebasisofa"naturalkinds"
distinctionbetweenthematerialandthesymbolic,andshecriticizesHabermasforrelyingonsuchassumptions.ThiscriticismechoesourownseeAndrewAratoand
JeanL.Cohen,"PoliticsandtheReconstructionoftheConceptofCivilSociety,"inAxelHonnethetal.,eds.,ZwischenbetracthungenImProzessderAufklrung
(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1989).Itisnottrue,though,thatdualisticsocialtheorystandsorfallswiththereifieddistinctionbetweenthesymbolicandthematerial.
75.Habermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,310.Foramoredetaileddiscussionofthesepoints,seechapter9.
76.Foranunconvincingattempt,seeNiklasLuhmann,LoveasPassion:TheCodificationofIntimacy(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1987).
77.Fraser,however,alsotendstoconflatethelevelofanalysisofcoordinatingmechanismswiththeanalysisofthevarioustypesofaction.Shethusinsiststhat
strategicandinstrumentalactionoccurinlifeworldinstitutionsinfamiliesandthatcommunicativeaction(basedonpatriarchalnorms)occursinthesubsystems.But
thisisnotaseriousargumentagainstthesystem/lifeworlddistinctionindeed,itisoftenassertedbyHabermashimself.Alloftheactiontypesappearinallofthe
institutions.Theabstractcategoriesofsystemandlifeworldindicateonlywheretheweightofcoordinationliesinagiveninstitutionalframework.Wewouldalsoreject
referencestothefamilyasaneconomicsystemforanothersetofreasons:Thepsychodynamicsofidentityformationingeneralandofgenderidentitiesinparticular
canhardlybeanalyzedinsuchterms.
78.SeeAlisonM.Jaggar,FeministPoliticsandHumanNature(Totowa,NJ:RowmanandLittlefield,1988),5183,207249.Seealsotheclassicarticleby
HeidiHartmann,"TheUnhappyMarriageofMarxismandFeminism:TowardsaMoreProgressiveUnion,"inLydiaSargent,ed.,WomenandRevolution(Boston:
SouthEndPress,1981),142.
79.SeeBarbaraStark,"ConstitutionalAnalysisoftheBabyMDecision,"HarvardWomen'sLawJournal11(1988):1953.
80.Studiesofthedomesticdivisionoflaborindicatethatmanywomenwantamoreequitabledivisionofdomesticlaborbutcan'tachieveitbecauseofdifferentialsin
powerandinearningcapacity.Foradiscussionofchangingfamilypatternsandthewaysinwhichwomenaredeprivedofequalvoiceinthe

Page724
family,seeKathleenGerson,HardChoices(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985).SeealsoSusanOkin,Justice,Gender,andtheFamily(New
York:BasicBooks,1989),134170.
81.Moreover,onourview,itispreciselybecausethefamilyisacoreinstitutioninandofcivilsociety(andneitheranaturalpresuppositionofcivilsocietynorjustone
morecomponentofaneconomicsubsystem)thategalitarianprinciplescanbeappliedtoittoafargreaterextentthantoafirmorabureaucracy.
82.ForaninterestingaccountoftheemergenceofmoderngenderrolesintheUnitedStatesinthenineteenthcentury,seeCarlDegler,AtOdds:Womenandthe
FamilyinAmericafromtheRevolutiontothePresent(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1980).Degleralsogivesagoodaccountofthedebateoverthe
impactofthecompanionatefamilyformandthecultofdomesticitythatformedaroundwomen'srelegationtotherolesofwifeandmotherinthesecondhalfofthe
nineteenthcentury(see210328especially).
83.Seechapter9,note17.
84.SeeNiklasLuhmann,Macht(Stuttgart:EnkeVerlag,1975),4748.Luhmannmentionsonlyexamplesprecedingtheinstitutionalizationofthemediumofpower,
butheclearlyconcedesthepossibilityofthegenerationandutilizationofpoweroutsidethepoliticalsubsystem(91ff.heexplicitlymentionspowerinthefamily).
Luhmannprovidesnoreasonagainsttheexistenceofnonmediaregulatedformsofpower,despitehisgeneralidentificationofmodernitywithmediaorganizedforms
ofinteraction.Asmightbeexpected,Foucault'sworkexcelsinanalyzingthenonsystemic,multipleformsofpower.
85.Luhmann,Macht,7,1112,2224.
86.Inaformalorganizationwithseveraloperativecodes,therecanbedifferentformsofinequalitywhichmayormaynotconvergeinthehierarchicalsummitas
wellasnonhierarchicalpowerrelationsalloperatingatthesametime.
87.Habermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,263."Ifresponsibilitymeansthatonecanorientone'sactionstocriticizablevalidityclaims,thenaction
coordinationthathasbeendetachedfromcommunicativelyachievedconsensusnolongerrequiresresponsibleparticipants."
88.SuchwouldbetheactiontheoreticWeberianconceptionofdomination.
89.Habermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,268270.Habermasexplainsinwhatwayspowerdiffersfrommoneyasasteeringmedium.
90.Thecodesresponsibleforthetransmissionofpowercantaketheformofcommandslinkedtothreatsandinvolveordinarylanguagecommunication.Thatis,
powercanoperateas"domination"intheactiontheoreticsense.Itcanalsooperateasageneralformofcommunicationseebelow.
91.Habermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,vol.2,275.
92.Luhmann,forexample,undertheanalogousheadingofthegeneralizationofinfluence,speaksofauthority,reputation,andleadership,alllocatedatalevelof
functioningbetweenpowerasamediumanddirectcommands.SeeLuhmann,

Page725
Macht,7576.Thisconfirmsourpointthatgeneralizedformsofcommunicationcanactasformsofpower.Weinsist,however,thatthecodesareneverentirely
fixedbutareopentoreinterpretation,challenges,andcreativeappropriatiationbyactors.
93.Theyproviderelieffromlifeworldcomplexitybut,unlikesteeringmedia,donottechnicizethelifeworld.SeeHabermas'sdiscussioninTheTheoryof
CommunicativeAction,vol.2,277.
94.Frasersuggeststreatinggenderasa"mediumofexchange"inordertoaccountforthewayinwhichitlinksthevariousinstitutionaldomains.Fraser,"What's
CriticalaboutCriticalTheory?,"113,117.Ofcourse,Fraserwantstointerpretgenderasamediumlikemoneyandpower.Shemissesthedistinctionbetween
steeringmediaandgeneralizedformsofcommunicationandisthusledtothemisleadingviewthatgenderasapowercodefunctionsinthesamewayastheseother
media.Butthiscannotbeso,forthereasonsgiveninthetext.
95.ForanoverviewofthisprocessintheUnitedStates,seeJulieMatthaei,AnEconomicHistoryofWomeninAmerica(NewYork:SchockenBooks,1982)
Degler,AtOddsJoanB.Landes,WomenandthePublicSphereintheAgeoftheFrenchRevolution(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1988).
96.Landes,WomenandthePublicSphereJudithShklar,MenandCitizens(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress,1969).
97.Itwould,however,bemisleadingtodeducefromthefeministperspectiveondifferentiationdiscussedabovethattheinstitutionalarticulationofmoderncivilsociety
iswhollynegative.Onthecontrary,theculturalpotentialsofmodernityhaveenteredintoitsinstitutionalarticulation,albeitselectively.Hencetheambivalentcharacter,
reflectedinthedebatesamongfeministtheorists,ofthemodernfamily.The"companionate"familycomposedofamalebreadwinner,afemalehomemaker,andtheir
childrendidproduceintimacy,privacy,andanewfocusonchildhoodindividuality.Italsoconstitutedanideologicalandinstitutionalterraininwhichwomencould
begintodeveloptheirownconceptionofselfandthepowertoassertcontrolovertheirbodiesandlives.Therestrictionofwomentothedomesticsphere,however,
wenthandinhandwithadenialofthemostbasicrightsandofthestatusofautonomousindividuality,personhood,andcitizenship,whichappearedincompatiblewith
theroleofnurturer.Bytheendofthenineteenthcentury,thedevelopmentofthefamilywagesystem(foughtforbyorganizedmaleworkers),theexclusionofwomen
fromtheunionmovement,andthe"protectivelaborlaws"thatexcludedwomenfrommostjobshadlockedwomenintoasituationofdependencythathasonly
recentlybeguntobeseriouslychallenged,ideologicallyandstructurally.Thefeministperspectivethusrevealsthedoublecharacterofthefamilythatisparalleltothe
dualitiesofallthepublicandprivateinstitutionsinmoderncivilsocietydiscussedinchapter9.
98.Fraseradmitsasmuch:"Agendersensitivereadingofthesearrangements...vindicatesHabermas'sclaimthatinclassicalcapitalismthe(official)economyisnot
allpowerfulbutis,rather,insomesignificantmeasureinscribedwithin

Page726
andsubjecttothenormsandmeaningsofeverydaylife"("What'sCriticalaboutCriticalTheory?,"118).
99.Fraser,"What'sCriticalaboutCriticalTheory?,"124.
100.Habermas,TheTheoryofCommnicativeAction,vol.2,369.
101.SeeLenoreWeitzman,TheDivorceRevolution(NewYork:FreePress,1985)DeborahL.Rhode,JusticeandGender(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1989)MarthaFinemanandNancyThomadsen,eds.,AtTheBoundariesofLaw(NewYork:Routledge,1991).
102.Oddlyenough,itispreciselytheideaofathreattothecommunicativeinfrastructureofcivilsociety,articulatedindualisticsocialtheory,thatFraserobjectsto
most.Sheconteststheideathatthereisanycategorialdistinctiontobemadebetweenwelfarereformsaddressedtothepaidworkplaceandthoseaddressedtothe
internaldynamicsofthefamily.Forher,the"empirical"ambivalenceofreforminthelattercasestemsfromthepatriarchalcharacterofwelfaresystemsandnotfrom
theinherentlysymboliccharacteroflifeworldinstitutions.Indeed,havingrejectedtheverydistinctionbetweensystemandlifeworldasandrocentric,shearguesthat
thereisnotheoreticalbasisfordifferentiallyevaluatingthetwokindsofreformsseeFraser,"What'sCriticalaboutCriticalTheory?,"124.Wedonotagree.
103.ThisseemstobeFraser'sownpositionwhenshepointsoutthattherearetwodifferentkindsofprogramsinwelfarestates:one"masculine,"aimedatbenefiting
principalbreadwinners,theother"feminine,"orientedtowardthe"negativesofpossessiveindividuals,"to"domesticfailures"("What'sCriticalaboutCriticalTheory?,''
122123).
104.Habermas,TheTheoryofCommnicativeAction,vol.2,35.
105.Indeed,ifweignoresuchissues,theywillnotdisappearbutwillbe(andhavebeen)formulatedinwaysantitheticaltofeminism.Wearethinkingofthe
neoconservativecritiqueofthewelfarestate,whichaimsatremovingsystemintegrativemechanismsfromcivilsocietywhileretraditionalizingit.
106.Thereisalreadyaninterestingdebateamongfeministsonthisissue.Theliteratureisvastforanentreeintothediscussion,seeLindaGordon,"WhatDoes
WelfareRegulate?,"SocialResearch55,no.4(Winter1988):609630,andFrancesFoxPivenandRichardA.Cloward,"WelfareDoesn'tShoreUpTraditional
FamilyRoles:AReplytoLindaGordon,"SocialResearch55,no.4(Winter1988):631648.
107.Forexample,oncethetypicalworkerisnolongerconstruedasamalebreadwinnerbutasawomanormanwhoisalsolikelytoberesponsibleatsomepointfor
thecareofchildrenorelders,thenecessityofrevisingthestructureoflaborandoflabortimebecomesobvious,andtheargumentfordaycarecentersatthe
workplace,flexibleworkschedules,andparentalleave,forexample,becomesstronger.Itissurelynotaccidentalthatfeministshavebeguntoarticulateandfightfor
thesesortsofreforms.Clearly,sucheffortsmustcomple

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mentattemptsattransformingthegenderhierarchieswithintheinstitutionsofcivilsociety.
108.Forarecentdiscussionofthetheneedtoapplynormsofjusticetothefamilyinparticularandtogenderrelationsingeneral,seeOkin,Justice,Gender,andthe
Family.Ofcourse,therearemanynewmovementsthatseektheoppositegoaltherighttolifemovement,forexample,hasasabasicgoalaretraditionalizationof
thecoreinstitutionsofcivilsociety.
109.ThisinvolvesawidevarietyofstrategiesrangingfromlobbyingCongressortheexecutivebranch,rightsorientedpoliticsfocusingonthecourts,andworkingin
politicalparties,dependingonthepoliticalopportunitystructure.
110.Forahermeneutic,participantobservationapproach,seeSaraEvans,PersonalPolitics(NewYork:RandomHouse,1979).Forananalysisthatdrawson
resourcemobilizationtheoryaswellasaccountsofrolestrainandrelativedeprivation,seeJoFreeman,ThePoliticsofWomen'sLiberation(NewYork:McKay,
1975).TheessaysinthevolumeeditedbyMaryFainsodKatzensteinandCarolMcClurgMueller,eds.,Women'sMovementsoftheUnitedStatesandEurope
(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1987),focusonpoliticalopportunitystructuresandpublicpolicywhileEthelKlein,GenderPolitics(Cambridge:Harvard
UniversityPress,1984),focusesontheroleofconsciousnessinfeministmovements.Despitetheirvariedfoci,alloftheseworksconfirmourthesisthataduallogic
wasalwaysoperativeinfeministmovements.
111.Whiletheiremphasesvary,mostofthediscussionsoftheoriginofthe"secondwave"offeminismstressthefollowing"structural"changesandtechnological
developmentsthattransformedtheroleofwomeninthetwentiethcentury:advancesinmedicalsciencethatloweredthebirthrateandthetimedevotedtochildrearing,
risingmaritalinstability,laborsavingdevicesthatgavewomenmoretimefortasksotherthanhousework,improvementsineducationalopportunity,integrationof
womenintotheworkforce,formalintegrationofwomenintothepolitythroughacquisitionoftherighttovote,massiveentryofwomenintouniversities,displacement
offemalefunctionsoutsidethehomethroughurbanizationandindustrialization,andincreasedgovernmentinvolvementinprovidingsocialservices.Ontheirown,
however,structuralchangescannotaccountforthegenesisorlogicofthemovementseeKlein,GenderPolitics,132.
112.Klein,GenderPolitics,3281.
113.Anationwideorganizationalbase,resources,andleadershipintheformoftraditionalwomen'svolunteerorganizations(whichwerenotoriginallyfeministin
ideologybutfocusedonwomen'sconcerns)wasbuiltbetween1890and1925,andtheseassociationsusedtheirresourcestopromotewomen'srightsupthroughthe
1960s.Asinthecaseofthenineteenthcenturywomen'smovement,thecontemporaryfeministmovementemergedinthecontextofothervitalsocialmovements.
Moreover,ittookadvantageofthegeneralreformorientationoftheKennedyandJohnsonyears.In1961,PresidentKennedyestablishedaPresidentialCommission
ontheStatusofWomen,thefirstofitskind,andstate

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levelorganizationsonwomen'sstatussoonfollowed.SeeEvans,PersonalPolitics,andKlein,GenderPolitics.
114.AsEthelKleinaptlyputsit,"Thistraditionallobbycouldnot,byitself,succeedinpassingabroadspectrumofwomen'srightslegislation.Theeffortsof
specificallyfeministorganizations,suchasNOW,WEAL,NWPC,andradicalwomen'sgroups,werecriticaltorallyingthetroopsandformingthesocialmovement
neededtoturntheconcernforwomen'sissuesintoaction"(GenderPolitics,5).SeealsoFreeman,ThePoliticsofWomen'sLiberation,2829JoyceGelband
MarianL.Palley,WomenandPublicPolicies(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1982),18.
115.Foracomparisonoftheformstakenbywomen'smovementsinvariouscountries,seeJoyceGelb,"SocialMovement'Success':AComparativeAnalysisof
FeminismintheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom,"inKatzensteinandMueller,eds.,Women'sMovementsoftheUnitedStatesandEurope,267289
"EqualityandAutonomy:FeministPoliticsintheUnitedStatesandWestGermany,"ibid.,172195andKarenBeckwith,"ResponsetoFeminismintheItalian
Parliament:Divorce,Abortion,andSexualViolenceLegislation,"ibid.,153171.
116.ThemainexceptionsinthisregardareSweedenandNorway.Here,theexistenceofpowerfulsocialdemocraticpartiesconstitutedadifferent"political
opportunitystructure"thanintheUnitedStates,France,andItaly.Manybenefitsforwomenwereenactedthroughpressurewithinthesepartiesandnotthroughthe
activitiesofanautonomousfeministmovement.However,debateshavebeguntodayinthesecountriesaswelloverthedesirabilityofamoreautonomouscivilsociety
andofanautonomousfeministmovement.SeeSylviaHewlett,ALesserLife(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1986),341383HelgaHernes,WelfareStateand
WomanPower(Oslo:NorwegianUniversityPress,1987).
117.SeeFreeman,ThePoliticsofWomen'sLiberation,4850Klein,GenderPolitics,931GelbandPalley,WomenandPublicPolicies,2461AnnN.
CostainandW.DouglasCostain,"StrategyandTacticsoftheWomen'sMovementintheUnitedStates:TheRoleofPoliticalParties,"inKatzensteinandMueller,
eds.,TheWomen'sMovementsoftheUnitedStatesandWesternEurope,196214.
118.Foranaccountoftheemergenceofthisbranchofthefeministmovement,seeEvans,PersonalPolitics.
119.Whiletheformeratfirsteschewedthedramaticdirectactioneffortsofthelattergroupsandthelatterhadlittleinterestinthelobbyingeffortsofinsiderssuchas
NOW,thesharpdistinctionbetwenwomen'srightsadvocates("liberalfeminists")andwomen'sliberationgroups("radicalfeminists")disappearedafter1968.NOW
becameinvolvedinsponsoringmassprotestactionsandwhenconsiderablenumbersofmilitantfeministsjoinedlocalchapters,italsoembracedmanyoftheissuesof
theearlyradicals(suchasabortion)aswellastheirparticipatoryideologyandtheirfocusonselfdeterminationandautonomyalongsideequalrights.Atthesametime,
byvirtueofjoiningorganizationssuchasNOW,movementactivistslearnedtheimportanceofthepoliticsofinfluence.

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FordetailedanalysesofthistrajectoryinAmericanfeminism,seeCostainandCostain,"StrategyandTacticsoftheWomen'sMovementintheUnitedStates,"
andGelbandPalley,WomenandPublicPolicies.
120.CostainandCostain,"StrategiesandTacticsoftheWomen'sMovementintheUnitedStates,"201.
121.AsWilmaScottHeide,headofNOWin1972,putit,"NOWhasworkedwithinandoutsidethesystemtoinitiatechangeandimplementwomen'srightsand
lawsandexecutiveordersonpubliccontracts....Ourtacticsandstrategyincludepoliteletters,interruptionofconferencesandSenatecommittees,demonstrating
andconsultations,callingforandcoordinatingtheAugust26StrikesforEquality,rhetoricandpositiveprograms,sisterlyandbrotherlyconsciousnessraising,
experimentswithneworganizationalpatternsandleadershipstyles"(citedinCostainandCostain,"StrategyandTacticsoftheWomen'sMovementintheUnited
States,"200).
122.Todaythefeministmovementiscomprisedofatleastfivetypesofgroups:massmembershiporganizationsspecializedfeministorganizationsincludinglitigation
andresearchgroupsprofessionallobbiessingleissuegroupstraditionalwomen'sgroupsandanelectoralcampaignsectorthatincludesPACsandgroupsoperating
withintheframeworkoftheDemocraticparty.Feministassociationscontinuetoflourishincivilsocietyandtoorganizemyriadnewspapers,magazines,newsletters,
directactions,sheltersforbatteredwomen,childcarecenters,consciousnessraisinggroups,andsoon.Despitetheapparentdeclineinspectacularmasscollective
actions,thefeministmovementcontinuestotargetthepublicspheretoinfluenceconsciousnessandaltergendernorms.Thestrikingspreadofwomen'sstudiesinthe
universitiesandinlawschoolsisalsoworthnoting.SeeGelbandPalley,WomenandPublicPolicies,2627JoFreeman,"WhomYouKnowvs.WhomYou
Represent:FeministInfluenceintheDemocraticandRepublicanParties,"inKatzensteinandMueller,eds.,Women'sMovementsoftheUnitedStatesandEurope,
215246.
123.GelbandPalley,WomenandPublicPolicies,2627Freeman,"WhomYouKnow"Klein,GenderPolitics,2933.
124.CostainandCostain,"StrategyandTacticsoftheWomen'sMovementintheUnitedStates,"203.
125.GelbandPalley,WomenandPublicPolicies,2627Freeman,"WhomYouKnow."
126.Reedv.Reed,404U.S.71(1971)Roev.Wade,410U.S.113(1973).Successeshavesometimesbeenlimitedorfollowedbysignificantreversals.Inthecase
ofsexdiscrimination,feministshavefailedtogetsexincludedasa"suspectclassification"underthefourteenthamendmentortosecurepassageoftheERA.Inthe
caseofabortion,sinceRoev.Wadecourtsandlegislatureshavebeencuttingbackonwomen'srighttochoose,andavocalantiabortionmovementhasemerged.
Moreover,withinthefeministmovement,debateshavearisenaroundevery"success"asthelimitsoflegalreformalongthelinesofequalrightshavebecomefelt.
Noneofthisobviatesourmoregeneralpoint.

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127.Wearenotarguingthatfeministsorwomeninitiatedthereformsalludedtoabove.Inmanyinstances,reformprocesseswereinitiatedbyotherinterestgroupsfor
reasonshavingnothingtodowithwomen'sinterestsorfeministconcerns.TheinstitutionofnofaultdivorceinCaliforniaandeventheinitiationofthereformof
abortionlawsarecasesinpoint.Nevertheless,thedynamicsofthesereformswereinformedbythefeministdiscourseand,soonthereafter,byfeministactivists,see
Weitzman,TheDivorceRevolution,andKristinLuker,AbortionandthePoliticsofMotherhood(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984).
128.Untilwomencametobeperceivedasindividuals,thepoliticsofequalrightshadnochanceofsuccess.Anduntilthepatriarchalstructureofthedomesticsphere
anditsnegativeinfluenceonotherdomainsofsocietywasthematizedandchallenged,equalorequivalentrightscouldneverbeequalforwomen.
129.GelbandPalley,WomenandPublicPolicies,45.
130.Klein,GenderPolitics,92.
131.Ibid.
132.Thingslookdifferentinpractice,however.Foradiscussionofthegendereddivisionoflaborathomeandatworkandthedifficultiesthiscontinuestoimposeon
women,seeGerson,HardChoices.ForstatisticsonthecontinuingwagegapbetweenwomenandmenandthefeminizationofpovertyintheUnitedStates,see
Hewlett,ALesserLife,51138.
133.KatzensteinandMueller,eds.,Women'sMovementsoftheUnitedStatesandEurope,passim.
134.JaneJenson,"ChangingDiscourse,ChangingAgendas:PoliticalRightsandReproductivePoliciesinFrance,"inKatzensteinandMueller,eds.,Women's
MovementsoftheUnitedStatesandEurope,6465.By"universeofpoliticaldiscourse,"Jensonmeansthesetofbeliefsabouthowpoliticsshouldbeconducted,
theboundariesofpoliticaldiscussion,andthekindsofconflictsresolvablethroughpoliticalprocesses.Theuniverseofpoliticaldiscoursefunctionsasagatekeeperto
politicalaction,selectingorinhibitingtherangeofactors,issues,policyalternatives,alliancestrategies,andcollectiveidentitiesavailableforachievingchange.
135.Ibid.,6880.WomengotthevoteinFrancein1945asarewardforserviceintheresistance,atatimewhenthefeministmovementwasmoribund.TheLoi
Neuwirthof1968legalizedcontraceptionformarriedwomenbutalsorestrictedtheadvertisingofcontraceptivesandtheirusebysinglewomen.Theprimaryintentof
thelawwastohelpfamiliescontroltheirfertilitytomeetfamilygoalsofmaterialwellbeingandemotionalsupportforchildren,nottogivewomenachoiceover
whetherornottohavechildren.Womenwerestilldefinedwithinafamilyframeofreference.
136.Ibid.,8086.
137.GelbandPalley,WomenandPublicPolicies,30.Feministshavealsochallengedmaleconceptionsofthestandardsofjustice.

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138.Theabortiondebatehasalsochallengedmaleconceptionsofrightsor,rather,ofthepersontowhomrightsapply.Itshouldnotcomeasasurprisethatthis
debatehasposedafundamentalchallengetotheveryconceptionofrights,sinceithasbeennotoriouslydifficulttoconceiveofarighttoabortionalongthetraditional
linesofarighttoone'sbodyasone'sownpropertywheninthatbodythereisanotherpotentialpersonwhoclearlydoesnot"belongto"oneasproperty.Butona
nonpossessive,individualistmodelofrights,itbecomesclearthatthelegalpersonhood,moralsubjectivity,andparticularidentityofwomenareatstake,andthese
outweighthestate'sinterestinfetallifeinthefirsttrimester.
139.SeeAnitaAllen,UneasyAccess:PrivacyforWomeninaFreeSociety(Totowa,NJ:RowmanandLittlefield,1988).
140.Jenson,"ChangingDiscourse,ChangingAgendas,"8283.Foraninsightfulanalysisofthefeministdiscourseonabortionanditsconflictwithtraditionalist
discourses,seeLuker,AbortionandthePoliticsofMotherhood.
141.Byinsistingthatwomenberecognizedasindividuals,persons,andcitizensaswellassituatedwomen,thecontemporaryfeministmovementbringstogetherthe
valuesofuniversalism,plurality,anddifference.Byimplication,theconceptofequalitybeforethelawitselfisbeingaltered,foritcannolongermeanthatequalrights
andnondiscriminationapplyonlytothosewhoaresimilarlysituated.Thisisbecausewomenandmencanneverbesimilarlysituatedwhenitcomestothequestionof
abortionorreproductiverightsgenerally.
142.SeeJenkinsandEckert,"ChannellingBlackInsurgency,"orPizzorno,"PoliticalExchangeandCollectiveIdentityinIndustrialConflict."
143.Pizzorno,"PoliticalExchangeandCollectiveIdentityinIndustrialConflict,"293.
144.Fora"stagemodel"analysisofthefeministmovement,seeCostainandCostain,"StrategyandTacticsoftheWomen'sMovementintheUnitedStates."Seealso
ClausOffe,"ReflectionsontheInstitutionalSelfTransformationofMovementPolitics:ATentativeStageModel,"inRussellDaltonandManfredKchler,eds.,
ChallengingthePoliticalOrder:NewSocialandPoliticalMovementsinWesternDemocracies(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1990).Offepresentsan
interestinganalysisofthecontradictionsfacingthenewsocialmovementsatthevariousstagesoftheirdevelopment.Healsoargues,however,thatevenatthelast
stage,thatofinstitutionalization,therewillbegoodreasonsforthesemovementstoretainimportantaspectsofacivilsocietyoriented"defensive"politics.
145.Offe,"ReflectionsontheInstitutionalSelfTransformationofMovementPolitics,"15.
146.Thevastincreaseinelectoralandlobbyingpoliticsbyorganizedprofessionalsinthe1980swasasignoftheinstitutionalizationofthewomen'smovementinthe
UnitedStates.However,thecontinuingstrengthofprochoicedemonstrationsandselfhelpgroupsindicatesthatidentityorientedpoliticsisstillverymuchonthe
agenda.

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147.JaneMansbridge,WhyWeLosttheERA(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1986)Luker,AbortionandthePoliticsofMotherhood.Themain
oppositiontotheERAstemmednotfromeconomicfactorsbutfromafearthatwomen'sroleinthefamilywouldchange.
148.Thestakesoffeministmovementlieaboveallintheinstitutionalizationofapostconventionalinterpretationofgenderidentityandnonhierarchicalgenderrelations
incivilsociety.Indeed,werewomento"succeed"ingainingrecognitionsimplyasanother"differentandparticular"specialinterest,asanotherlobbyorconstituency
ofpoliticalparties,theuniversalandtransformativethrustof"women'sissues"woulddisappearfromview.Ontheotherside,werefeminismtobeconstruedonlyasa
struggleforinclusionandequalrights,theissuesofgenderidentity,bodilyintegrity,thenatureofthefamily,andthestructureofinstitutionsandsocialrelationswithin
thepublicandprivatespheresofcivilsocietywouldbeobscured.
149.SeeE.P.Thompson,TheMakingoftheEnglishWorkingClass(NewYork:RandomHouse,1963).
150.SeeCohen,"RethinkingSocialMovements."
151.Thatis,vulnerabilitytothecapitalisteconomyononesideandtoadministrativecontrolbyagenciesofthewelfarestateontheother.
Chapter11
1.Seechapter8.
2.Seechapters2and3.Inotherwords,ourargumentrestsontheassumptionthattheidealofdemocracyparticipatinginpubliclifeandhavingasayinthelaws
andpoliciesunderwhichweliveisanidealofcollectiveautonomythatcomplementstheideaofmoralautonomy.
3.SeeMichaelWalzer,Obligations(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress1970),2445.
4.ThisisaparaphraseofRawls'sformulation.SeeJohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1971).Rawlsspeaksofanearlyjust
constitutionaldemocracyinordertoindicatethatnopoliticalproceduralrulecanguaranteeajustoutcomeinthesensethatallrightswillbeprotectedandnotviolated.
Weaddthenotionofanearlydemocraticconstitutionaldemocracytoindicatethatnosingleprocedureorcombinationofprocedurescanguaranteethefullrealization
ofdemocraticparticipationoranoutcomethatallcanaccept.
5.Foranearlydiscussionofthevariousargumentsforandagainstcivildisobedience,seeCarlCohen,CivilDisobedience:Conscience,Tactics,andtheLaw
(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1971).Foranoverviewofwhathascometobelabeledtheorthodoxtheoryofcivildisobedience,seeG.G.James,"The
OrthodoxTheoryofCivilDisobedience,"SocialTheoryandPractice2,no.4(1973),especiallythereferencesinnote2.Forarecentcomprehensivediscussion,
seeKentGreenawalt,ConflictsofLawandMorality(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1987).

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6.JrgenHabermas,"CivilDisobedience:LitmusTestfortheDemocraticConstitutionalState,"BerkeleyJournalOfSociology30(1985):99.
7.Wearenotaddressingcivildisobediencewithintheframeworkofauthoritarianregimes,whichseekstoinstitutionalizetheprincipleofrightsandrepresentative
democracy.Rather,theissuebeforeusisthejustificationandroleofcivildisobedienceinconstitutionaldemocracieswithvitalcivilsocieties,whereinrights,
democraticprocedures,andtheruleoflawarealreadyinstitutionalized.SeeRawls,ATheoryofJustice,363,foradiscussionofthismatter.
8.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,363.
9.Thereisanenormousliteratureoncivildisobedienceandpoliticalobligation.Mostofitfallswithintheframeworkofliberalpoliticaltheorybasedonthesocial
contractmodeloronjurisprudentialreflections.Seriousphilosophicaldiscussionofthematterbeganin1961whentheEasternDivisionoftheAmericanPhilosophical
Associationheldasymposiumonthetopic.Somethinglikeanorthodoxliberalviewisshared,withminorvariations,byHugoBedau,JohnRawls,RonaldDworkin,
ChristianBay,RudolphWeingartner,JosephBetz,andCarlCohen.Forreferences,seeJames,"TheOrthodoxTheoryofCivilDisobedience,"496.SeealsoRawls,
ATheoryofJustice,chap.6,andRonaldDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1978),chap.8,andAMatterofPrinciple
(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1985),chap.4.
Fordiscussionsofcivildisobediencewithinthetraditionofdemocraticpoliticaltheory,seeHowardZinn,DisobedienceandDemocracy(NewYork:Random
House,1978)Walzer,ObligationsHannahArendt,CrisisintheRepublic(NewYork:HarcourtBraceandJovanovich,1969),51102CarolePateman,The
ProblemofPoliticalObligation(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1979)Habermas,"CivilDisobedience."
Forreferencestothejurisprudentialliterature,seeHannahArendt,CrisisintheRepublic,5157,notes.Foramorerecentview,seeGreenawalt,Conflictsof
LawandMorality.
10.AccordingtoDworkin,"Itissillytospeakofthedutytoobeythelawassuch"(TakingRightsSeriously,192193).
11.Theessayscitedinnote4werewrittenintheaftermathofthecivilrightsandantiwarmovementsintheUnitedStates.Dworkin'ssecondessayinAMatterof
Principlewaswritteninresponsetothe1981Germanpeacemovement.
12.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,366367Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,206222.Bothalsoassumethatactorsshouldhavealreadytriedtomaketheircase
throughordinarylegalandpoliticalchannels.Buttherearetimeswhenthisisnotpossible.Forexample,apregnantwomanwhowantsanabortioncannotwaitfora
legislativeorcourtdecision.CivilrightsactivistscouldnotmakeuseofthecourtsorthelegislativeprocessintheSouthbecausetheseinstitutionswerepreciselythe
onesdenyingblacksjustice.
13.ThisishowHabermasinterpretsRawlsandDworkin,butinfactheusestheirargumentsbasedonindividualrightstomakehisowncasefortheprinciplesof
democraticlegitimacy.

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14.Thefullrangeofcitizenrightstogetherwithcertaincivilrightsthatguaranteefreedomofspeech,assembly,etc.,areunderstoodasrightsoftheindividualthatallow
participationinthepoliticalsystemthroughinstitutionssuchasparties,thepress,elections,parliaments,andinterestgroups.These,togetherwithotherguaranteessuch
astheseparationofpowersandpublicity,protectcitizensfromabusesofpowerbytheirrepresentativeswhilesecuringtheirparticipationintherepresentativepolitical
system.Whentheseworkwell,therewouldseemtobenoneedforillegalextrainstitutionalpoliticalactivityotherthanactivityaimedatthedefenseofindividualrights.
15.Forahorizontalmodelofobligation,seeHannahArendt,"CivilDisobedience,"inCrisisintheRepublic,8586.CarolePatemanhaselaboratedthisviewsee
TheProblemofPoliticalObligation,136.Foranothermodelofhorizontalobligationsbasedonaphilosophicallypluralistconception,seeWalzer,Obligations,
123.
16.Forboth,ofcourse,ajustsocietymustincludedistributivejustice(considerRawls'ssecondprincipleofjusticeandDworkin'sdiscussionsofwelfaremechanisms
basedonclaimstoequality).Butneitherofthemacceptscivildisobedienceforthesakeofdistributivejustice.
17.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,363.
18.ItisalsolocatedintheproceduressetdownintheConstitutionforthedivisionofpowers,ruleoflaw,voting,etc.Forthebestdiscussionofthemeaningofa
moralrightassomethingthatimpliesasuprainstitutionalmoment,seeDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously.Indeed,theworkofbothRawlsandDworkinrevealsan
importantevolutionwithinliberaltheory,inthattheyhavesoughttodevelopatheoryofrightsthathasatitscoreaconceptofindividualautonomyratherthana
conceptofprivateproperty.Inthisregard,RobertNozick'sAnarchy,State,andUtopia(NewYork:BasicBooks,1968)representsastepbackward.
19.SeeRawls,ATheoryofJustice,27,onplurality,andDworkin,"Liberalism,"inAMatterofPrinciple,181204.ThemainproblemconfrontingRawlsishow
wecanarriveatbindingprinciplesofjusticewhosejustificationdoesnotderivefromanyparticularconceptionofthegood.TherationalchoiceargumentinATheory
ofJustice,whichapparentlyappliestoeveryoneeverywhere,providesoneanswer.Rawls'sessay,"TheIdeaofanOverlappingConsensus,"OxfordJournalof
LegalStudies7,no.1(1987):125,providesanother.Forourpositiononthistopic,seechapter8.
20.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,364365.Dworkindistinguishesbetweenconscientiousrefusalandcivildisobedienceinsomewhatdifferentterms:His"integrity
based"civildisobedienceisthesameasRawls'sconscientiousrefusal,andhis"Justicebased"civildisobedienceissimilartoRawls'sgeneralconceptofcivil
disobedience.Dworkinalsospeaksof"policybased"civildisobedience(AMatterofPrinciple,107).
21.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,365.

Page735
22.Thatis,neutralargumentsmustbegiven,or,rather,argumentsthatdonotdrawonanyparticularconceptionofthegoodbutonlyonthesharedconceptionofthe
right.Thus,civildisobediencecaninvolvetheviolationofalawotherthantheonebeingprotesteditisalsomorethanatestcasebecausetherelevantactorsare
preparedtoopposethestatuteevenifitisupheld.SeeRawls,ATheoryofJustice,365.
23.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,370.
24.Ibid.,356362Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,211212.Dworkinreferstolegislationbasedonprejudiceastheimpositionof"externalpreferences"(234
235).
25.Thetwoprinciplesofjusticeare:"(1)Eachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostextensivetotalsystemofequalbasiclibertiescompatiblewithasimilar
systemoflibertyforall.(2)Socialandeconomicinequalitiesaretobearrangedsothattheyareboth(a)tothegreatestbenefitoftheleastadvantaged,consistentwith
thejustsavingsprinciple,and(b)attachedtoofficesandpositionsopentoallunderconditionsoffairequalityofopportunity"(Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,302).For
Rawls'soriginalposition,seeibid.,1722.Forthedefinitionofajustconstitution,justlegislation,andthediscussionofthestatusofmajorityrule,seeibid.,195201
and356362.
26.Forthedefinitionofimperfectproceduraljustice,seeRawls,ATheoryofJustice,353354,356.
27.Ibid.,371377.
28.Ibid.,111116,342350.Tothesecategoriesofprivilegedindividualsthe"principleoffairness"appliesthatis,inadditiontotheirnaturaldutytocomply,those
individualswhogainrealadvantagesfromasocialsystemareevenmoreboundtocomply.Rawls'sconcerninaddingthisprincipleofobligationtonaturaldutyisto
avoidfreeriding(116).Onthistopic,seealsoPateman,TheProblemofPoliticalObligation,118120.
29.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,115.
30.Ibid.,335336.ManycommentatorshavepointedoutthatRawls'sunderstandingofthecontractas"hypothetical"rendersitirrelevanttotheproblemofpolitical
obligationasitariseswithrespecttocivildisobedience.SeeDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,151.Indeed,aswehaveseen,Rawlsmakeslittleuseofthecontract
ideawhenaddressingtheissueofcivildisobedience.
31.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,352.
32.Byimplication,thesecondcaseforRawlswouldinvolvemoreseriousactsofrebellionorresistanceaimedatestablishinganewsocietybasedonadifferent
conceptionofjustice.
33.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,372.
34.Hencethethreeconditionsthatmustobtainbeforeonecanengageincivildisobedience:First,itmustbenonviolent,shouldnotinterferewithothers'civilliberties,
andshouldnottaketheformofathreat.Second,theremustbegrave

Page736
injustice.Third,onemusthavegonethroughtheproperchannelsanddiscoveredthatonecannotinfluencethelegislativemajority.SeeRawls,ATheoryof
Justice,372374.
35.Itservesasaprophylacticintwoways.First,itdissuadesthoseinpowerfromabusingtheirpoweramajorpotentialsourceofinstabilityandsecond,itworks
againstfundamentalismonthepartofcollectiveactors.Civildisobedienceisnotactiononthebasisofanabsoluterighttoactonone'smoralconscience.Itisbased
insteadonanappealtothesharedpoliticalconceptionsofjusticeandconstitutionalprinciples.Inthissense,itisselflimiting.
36.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,367ff.
37.Thisrestrictionnotonlylimitstherangeofcivildisobediencewithrespecttopolicydecisionsbythelegislaturebutalsoexcludesanentirerangeofactivity,namely,
citizenactionwithrespecttotheeconomy.ThisisgroundedtheoreticallybyRawls'sdenialofthestatusofrightsto''socioeconomicclaims"basedonthedistinction
betweentheworthoflibertyandlibertyitself.Theformerreferstoentitlementsorothermeansthatallowourlibertytohavevaluetousthelatterreferstorights.
Rawlshasinmindissuesofdistributivejustice,buthisconceptionmissestheissueofthestructureofauthorityanddecisionmakingwithintheworkplaceitself.Thereis
noroominhistheoryforarighttocollectivebargainingoranythingelsethatfallsundertheheadingofdemocratizationorconstitutionalizationoftheworkplace.Thisis
agraveomission,foracasecancertainlybemadeforthelegitimacyofcivildisobedienceinthisdomain.Foranexcellentdiscussionofthisissue,seeWalzer,
Obligations,chap.2.Weagreethatcivildisobedienceforthepurposeofestablishingcollectivebargainingandsimilarrightsisappropriateandlegitimate.Civilsociety
mustbeabletoinfluenceeconomicaswellaspoliticalsociety.Itisabletoinfluencethepolitybecausecorrespondingstructuresopeninprincipletoinfluence
(parliamentsorcourts,forexample)areinplace(politicalsociety).Thesamesortsof"receptors"oughttoexistintheeconomy(economicsociety).Seealso
Greenawalt,ConflictsofLawandMorality,230233.
38.ForacritiqueofRawlsonthisscore,seePateman,TheProblemofPoliticalObligation,118129.
39.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,390.
40.Ibid.,385.
41."Acommunity'ssenseofjusticeismorelikelytoberevealedinthefactthatthe(political)majoritycannotbringitselftotakethestepsnecessarytosuppressthe
minorityandtopunishactsofcivildisobedienceasthelawallows....Inspiteofitssuperiorpower,themajoritymayabandonitspositionandacquiesceinthe
proposalsofthedissenters"(ATheoryofJustice,387).
42.OthershavearguedthatRawls'sconceptionisoverlyrestrictiveinthatitomitsfromtherangeoflegitimatereasonsforcivildisobediencemoralprinciplesthatare
notgenerallyacceptedinasociety.Rawlsdoesaddressthisproblemundertherubricofconscientiousrefusal,buthedoesnottakeupthe

Page737
issueofattemptsbyconcernedcitizenstopresenttheirmoralpositionasacandidateforinclusioninthepoliticalcultureofthesocietythroughactsofcivil
disobedience.Becausepoliticalnormsareinstitutionalizedmoralvaluesandbecause,overtime,therepertoireofpoliticalnormschanges,newvaluesare
institutionalized,andoldnormsarereinterpreted,thisomissionisserious.Webelievethatitcanbetracedbacktotherelativelystaticconceptionofjusticein
Rawls'stheory.Foradiscussionofthisproblem,seePeterSinger,DemocracyandDisobedience(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1973),8692.
43.Weincludethecourtsinourconceptionof"politicalsociety."Courtsarenotopentoeconomicpressureorpoliticalpower,butjudgesmustbeopentoinfluence
inthesenseofadjustinginterpretationsoflawtoprinciples,tradition,andtheprevailingsenseofjusticeofthecommunity.
44.Singer,DemocracyandDisobedience,385.
45.Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,185.
46.Ibid.,192.Dworkinmakesanimportantdistinctionbetweenwhatisright(theperspectiveofmoralconscience)andhavingrights(198199).Havingmoralrights
againstthestatemeansthattherearelimitsthestatecannottransgresswithoutgoodreason,principlesitcannotviolatewithoutdoinginjustice.Thisincludesadomain
ofindividualmoraljudgment(negativeliberty)inwhicheachpersoncandecidewhatitisrighttodo.Rights,however,derivenotfromanyindividual'smoraljudgment
butfromaconceptionofhumandignityorequalitythatisattheheartofacommunity'scommonconceptionofjustice.Theyrendereachperson'sjudgment
autonomousbutrestonpoliticalprinciplesthatpertaintoeveryone.Constitutionalrightsaretheintersectionofmoralrightsandlegalrighttheyconsistofmoral
principlesthathavebeenrecognizedasvalidnorms.
47.Ibid.,215.Theissueisnotthatthelawmaynotbestatedclearlybutthattherearegoodargumentsonbothsides.
48.Ibid.,211212.
49.Ibid.,212.Sinceanopen,postconventionalsocietywillconsiderbothmorality(principles)andprecedent,therecanbenoauthoritativeinstanceofinterpretation.
Noteventhehighestcourthasprivilegedaccesstothetruth.
50.Ibid.,212.
51.Ibid.,212,214,216217,219220.
52.Greenawait,ConflictsofLawandMorality,227.
53.Ibid.,227229.Attemptstoarguethatbasicrightscanbedefendedwithoutappealingtosubstantivedueprocessorfundamentalvaluesareunconvincingbecause
proceduraldemocraticlegitimacyalsorestsonafundamentalvalue,namely,representativedemocracy.Fortheprocessargument,seeJohnHartEly,Democracy
andDistrust(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1980).
54.Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,205.

Page738
55.Ibid.Thelegitimacyofmajorityrulerequiresthatthebasicrightsofminoritiesnotbeviolatedandthattheybegivenequalconcernandrespect.
56.Unlikemostliberaltheoristsofcivildisobedience,whotrytomakesuchdistinctionsonthebasisofthecontentoftheact(violentornonviolent,useornonuseof
force),theintentoftheact,ortheintegrityoftheactors(moralprobityorirresponsibility),Dworkinrecognizesthatsuchanapproachisunconvincing.Allactsofcivil
disobediencearecomplex,itishardtodefineforce,andtheviolenceinsuchactsisoftenaresponsetogovernmentalrepression.
57.Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,82.
58.Dworkin,AMatterofPrinciple,107.AthirdtypeofcivildisobediencebasicallywhatRawlsdefinesasconscientiousrefusaliscalledbyDworkin"integrity
basedcivildisobedience."
59.Ibid.,111.
60.Dworkinhimselfhasmadesuchargumentswithrespecttoforeignpolicyissues.HeattemptedtodefendtheantiVietnamwarmovementonthebasisofrights
arguments,butultimatelyhismodeofarguingisunconvincing.Whiletherewereaspectsofthemovementthatraisedquestionsofindividualrights(student
exemptions),themovementwasalsochallengingapolicydecisionmadebygovernmentandwouldhavedonesoevenifconstitutionaltechnicalitieshadbeen
observed.Ourpointisthatcertainactsofcivildisobediencechallengeapolicywhennoone'sindividualrightsaredirectlyconcernedbutissuesofdemocraticdecision
makingandpoliticalmoralityareatstakeandifthesecannotbejustifiedbyarightsbasedargument,theycannonethelessbejustifiedethicallybyargumentsbasedon
democraticprinciples.Seebelow,note63.
61.Courtsoughttobeimmunetopressuresexercisedthroughmoneyorpower,butjudgesmustbeopentoindirectinfluence,mediatedthrougharguments,by
contemporarypoliticalculture.Assuch,theyarepartofpoliticalsociety.
62.Backedupbytherelevantcivilrightsoffreespeech,assembly,association,andthelike.
63.Note,forexample,hisdiscussionoftheantiVietnamwarmovement:Hetriestotranslatetheclaimsofthedissentersintothesortofrightsclaimsalawyerwould
make.Thisworksfordraftlawinequities,butithardlyconvinceswithrespecttothemoralobjectionthattheUnitedStateswasusingunconscionableweaponsand
tacticsorthattheUnitedStateshadnointerestatstakeinVietnamthatcouldjustifyforcingcitizenstorisktheirlivesthere.Whatwasatstakewasclearlyhowwar
decisionsshouldbemade,thecreationofapublicdebate,theinsistencethatmoralandnormativepoliticalissuesandnotjust"reasonsofstate"wereatissue,andthe
insistencethat,inademocracy,thepeopleshouldbeabletoinfluencesuchadecisionmakingprocess.Theissuewasnotoneofconscientiousrefusal,sincethose
involvedinthemovementwerenotonlythosewhoriskedbeingdrafted.SeeDworkin,AMatterofPrinciple,208209.

Page739
64.Despitehisdefenseofpolicybasedcivildisobedience,heinterpretstheonlyexamplehegivesofitasbeingcovertlynonpersuasive.
65.Dworkin,AMatterofPrinciple,112.
66.SeeHabermas,"CivilDisobedience."
67.ThephraseusedbyDworkinfortheAmericancivilrightsmovement,whichattemptedtoeducatepublicopinion,createpublicspacesforitsexpression,andfind
waysforitsinfluencetobefelt(AMatterofPrinciple,112).WeshouldnotethatactionssuchasthoseofOperationRescueintheUnitedStateswouldnotqualify
asjustifiedcivildisobedienceonthesegrounds,sincetheyinvolvetacticsofintimidationratherthanpersuasionandseektoimposeaparticularworldviewonsociety
ratherthanappealingtotheprinciplesofjusticeofthecommunity.
68.Everyelementofthisdefinitioncouldbechallengedthisistheriskfacedbyanyattemptatdefinition.Tohelpavoidtheworstabusesofsuchexercises,weshould
clarifyafewpoints.By"public,"wemeanthattheillegalactmustbemadeknown,butnotnecessarilywhileitisbeingcommitted(althoughthisisusuallythecase).
Norisitabsolutelynecessarythattheauthorsoftheactmakethemselvesknown,thoughthis,too,shouldordinarilybepublicknowledge.Thepouringofbloodon
draftfilesduringtheVietnamprotestsisaninstructiveexample.Theseactstookplaceinsecrecyandtheactorsretainedtheiranonymity,buttheactswereclearly
symbolicandintendedtobecomepublicknowledge.
By"illegal,"wemeanthatthereisanintentionalviolationofthelawthatisnotmeanttocallintoquestiontheruleoflawasawholeortheconstitutionalsystem
itself.Readinesstoacceptthelegalconsequencesoftransgressionsoflegalitydemonstratetheactors'fidelitytoa"nearlyjust,nearlydemocratic"constitution,but
itisnotabsolutelyrequired.
By"nonviolent,"wemeanthatthecharacteroftheprotestissymbolicandcommunicativeor,inDworkin'sphrase,persuasive.Strategicpowerplaysthatinvolve
violencearehardtojustifyascivildisobedience.Nevertheless,inconcretesituationsviolencecanoccur.Theassessmentoftheviolencemustbemadewith
referencetowhoinitiatedit,theoverallcontext,andthepurposeoftheact.Thehistoryofthelabormovementprovidesmanyexamplesofviolentstrikesthatcan
beseenasactsofcivildisobedience.Forceandviolencearenotoriouslyhardtodefine,andtheirmeaningcanbestretchedtoincludeallformsofcoercionor
narroweddowntomeanonlyphysicalviolence.WeacceptGnterFrankenberg'sformulationin"ZivilerUngehorsamundrechtsstaatlicheDemokratie,"
Juristenzeitung39(March1984):266ff.:"Onlythoseinfractionsarecivilthatdonotcontravenethe'proportionalityofmeans'and,especially,thatsafeguardthe
physicalandpsychicintegrityoftheopponentsofprotestandofinnocentbystanders."
Finally,byappealstothecapacityofreasonandthesenseofjusticeofthepopulation,wemeantoindicatethatcivildisobedienceisacalltomembersofbothcivil
andpoliticalsocietytoreflectuponthebasicprinciplesthatunderlieaconstitutionaldemocracyandtochangethoselaws,policies,andinstitutionalarrangements
thatviolatetheseprinciples.

Page740
69.Forexample,notethathere"nonneutral"meansthatlegislationinvolvesgeneralnormsthatincorporateaconceptionofthegood,whileelsewhereDworkin
interpretsittoreferonlytoforeign,economic,andsocialpolicydecisions.
70.Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,255.
71.Foradiscussionoftheconceptofidentityinradicaldemocratictheory,seeCarlSchmitt,TheCrisisofParliamentaryDemocracy[1923](Cambridge:MIT
Press,1985).SeealsothesectionsonSchmittinchapter3.
72.ThispositionistypicalofcontemporaryneocommunitariansoftheneoAristotelian(MacIntyre)orneoRepublican(Sandel,Taylor,etal.)stripe.
73.Thishasbeenrecognizedbynondemocratsaswell.CarlSchmittproceedsfromthepremisethatpopularsovereigntycannotbeinstitutionalizedthepeople'swill
intheformofthepouvoirconstituantalwaysremainsaboveoroutsidethelaw.Theconclusionshedrawsfromthisinsightare,ofcourse,hardlydemocratic:Since
thepeople'swillcanneitherberepresentednor,undermodernconditions,formedinonegeneralassembly,itcanonlybeembodiedinapersonwhoclaimstodoso
andwhoisaffirmedinthisclaimthroughtechniquesofacclamation.Accordingly,theleaderreunitesinhisorherpersonlegitimacy(theprinciplesbehindthelaw)and
sovereignty(theabilitytomakeemergencydecisions).Forthisreason,onthebasisofthemodelofdemocracyasidentity,whichhefindsinRousseau,inJacobinism,
andinBolshevism,Schmittconcludesthatthelinebetweendemocracyanddictatorshipisathinoneindeed.
74.ThisislesstrueofArendtthanofHabermas.ThegreatflawinArendt'soveralltheoryisitsantipathytomoderncivilsocietyanditsanachronistic,dichotomous
categorialframework(seechapter4).Heressayoncivildisobedience,writteninresponsetopracticalissuesintheUnitedStates,tendstoburstthroughtherigidities
ofhertheoreticalmodel.
75.Arendt,CrisisintheRepublic,51102Habermas,"CivilDisobedience."
76.Dworkingoesfairlyfarbecause,unlikemostliberalandlegalisticdefenders,hedoesnotstressthatanactofcivildisobedienceislegitimateonlyifthelawbreakers
arewillingtoacceptpunishmentfortheiract.Instead,hisemphasisisondecriminalization,lenientpunishment,etc.
77.Arendt,CrisisintheRepublic,98.
78.Ibid.,55.SeealsoWalzer,Obligations,4.
79.Arendt,CrisisintheRepublic,74.
80.Itisworthnotingherethatonedimensionmissinginliberalandmostdemocraticdiscussionsofcivildisobedienceisitsroleandlegitimacywithregardtothe
economy.Itisnotsurprisingthatliberalsconcernedwithbasiclibertieswouldignoresuchconsiderations,butitisoddthatdemocratictheoryhasnotaddressedit
directly.Arendtmentionsitonlyinpassing.Rawlsexplicitlyrejectsthelegitimacyofactsofcivildisobediencewithrespecttomattersofdistributive

Page741
justice.DworkinandHabermasaresilentontheissue.Walzerisoneofthefewradicaldemocratstohavediscussedcivildisobediencewithrespecttoeconomic
institutions.Hearguesthattheprivateeconomiccorporationmustbeconsideredapoliticalcommunitywithinthelargercommunityofthestate.Today
corporationscollecttaxesonbehalfofthestate,maintainstandardsrequiredbythestate,andspendstatemoneyandenforcerulesandregulationswiththe
ultimatesupportofthestate.Theycarryoutsemiofficialfunctionsandexercisepowerandauthorityoverworkers.Buttheauthorityofcorporateofficersisrarely
legitimatedinademocraticfashion.Corporatepowerisexercisedoveremployeesubjectsinwaysnotdissimilarfromthoseofauthoritarianstates.Somesubjects
ofcorporateauthorityhave,ofcourse,managedtowinrightsagainstitthatareprotectedbythestate,specifyingsuchmattersasworkinghoursortherightto
strike.Thestrike,infact,wasforalongtimethemostcommonformofworkingclasscivildisobedience.Often,violenceorforcewasinvolvedinthesitinsand
sitdownstrategiesoftheworkers'movement,andWalzerarguesthatsuchactions,eveniftheyappearasrevolutionaryinthattheyaimatalteringthedistribution
ofpowerwithinthecorporation,fallwithinthelimitsofcivilitysolongastherevolutionisnotaimedatthestateitself(Obligations,31).Thepointhemakeshereis
thatoftentherearenolegalchannelstobegonethrough.Thus,theseactsoflimited"revolutionary"civildisobediencecanbeseenaseffortstoextenddemocratic
constitutionalprinciplestoarealminwhichclaimstoabsolutepowerbyofficialsbasedonpropertyrightsareextremelyunconvincing.Whilecorporateandstate
officialstendtoseethecorporationasapieceofpropertyratherthanapoliticalcommunity(aseconomicsociety,inourterminology),itclearlyinvolvesboth.The
pointatissueintheseactsofcivildisobedienceisnotwhoownsthecorporationbutwhatsuchownershipentailsandwhatgovernmentalpowersmanagementcan
legitimatelyclaim.Walzerpointsoutthatacharacteristicfeaturesoffeudalregimesisthattheownershipofpropertyentailsgovernmentalpowers,butnomodern
stateandcertainlynodemocraticconstitutionalstatecouldtoleratesuchasituation.Thus,hearguesthattheinterestsofademocraticstatewouldbebestserved
bycorporatedemocratization.Therethereforeexistsatypeofcivildisobediencethatchallengesnotstatelawsandpoliciesbutonlythosecorporateauthorities
thatthestateprotects.Weagreewiththisargumentwithoneproviso:Economicefficiencyshouldnotbesacrificedintototodemocraticpressure.
81.Arendt,CrisisintheRepublic,96.
82.Seechapter4.Wearethinkingoftherigidoppositionbetweentheprivateandthepublicspheres,ontheonehand,andtheconceptionofmodernsocietyasmass
society,ontheother.Thistheoreticalmodelexcludes,bydefinition,theconceptionofcivilsocietywehavebeenformulating.Atbest,itallowsforaconceptionof
politicalsocietybetweentheprivatesphere,individualisticallyconceived,andthestateasgovernment.ButArendt'sunderstandingofcivildisobedienceimpliesa
modelofpoliticalsocietyopentotheinfluenceofprivatecitizensactingcollectively,anditpresupposesacomplexmodelofcivilsocietyinwhichpowerisdispersed
anddelegatedonlyinpartandconditionallyto

Page742
politicalsocietyorthestate.Inshort,thediscussionofcivildisobedienceforcesArendttoreintroduceonthelevelofcontent,ifnottheoretically,someofthecore
componentsoftheconceptofcivilsociety:associationsandsocialmovements,whicharedistinctfromprotototalitarianmassmovements.
83.Seechapter4.
84.NotethechangeinArendt'spositioninTheHumanCondition(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1958),23,whereshecastigatessocietasasthelossofthe
political.
85.Arendt,CrisisintheRepublic,89,95.
86.Ibid.,97.
87.TherearetheoreticalreasonsforArendt'sinabilitytospellthisout,namely,herassumptionofthedeclineofthepublicspherewiththeonsetofmodernityandthe
emergenceandexpansionofthatblurredrealmthatmixespublicandprivate,namely,society(civilsociety).
88.ThisisthemodelspelledoutattheendofArendt'sOnRevolution(NewYork:PenguinBooks,1977).
89.Habermas,"CivilDisobedience,"101,106.
90.Ibid.,102.
91.Ibid.,103.
92.Ibid.,104.
93.Thatis,thosewhoarenotmembersofparliaments,unions,orparties(politicalsociety),thosewithoutaccesstothemassmedia,thosewhocannotthreatento
withholdinvestmentsduringelectioncampaignsinshort,thosewithoutmuchmoneyorpower.SeeHabermas,"CivilDisobedience,"104.
94.Forexample,disputesoverwhichinstanceofgovernmentaldecisionmakingshouldgovernthesitingofanuclearpowerplant.Foranexcellentdiscussionofthese
issues,seeClausOffe,"LegitimationThroughMajorityRule?,"inDisorganizedCapitalism(Cambridge:MITPress,1985),259299.
95.Ibid.
96.Habermas,"CivilDisobedience,"111.
97.Ibid.,105.Hereistheproperdemocratictheoryofthepouvoirconstituant.HabermasdrawsquitedifferentconclusionsfromaninsightsimilartoCarlSchmitt's.
Itistruethatthepouvoirconstituantcannotbefullyinstitutionalizedinademocraticregime.Theideathatelectionsplusacompetitivepartysystemandtheruleof
lawcouldinstitutionalizeorcircumscribepopularsovereigntyisquiteunconvincing.Schmitt,inhisargumentagainstliberalism,turnsthisinsightintoajustificationfor
decisionismandthearbitrary,sovereignwilloftheexecutive.Butthereisanotherwaytodrawouttheimplicationsofthisinsightintothenatureofthepolitical.Ina
democraticconstitutionalstate,onecantakeittomean,asOffeandHabermashaveargued,thatconstitutionalism,withitsprinciplesofrightsanddemocratic
legitimacy,restsonapartialinstitutionaliza

Page743
tionofthepouvoirconstituantandindeedprovidesinstitutionallyforthereversionofsovereigntytothepeopleintheideasofconstitutionalconventionsand
constitutionalamendments.Thetheoryofcivildisobediencetakesthisonestepfurther.Itisnotpossibletoinstitutionalizecivildisobedience.Butwhileitcannotbe
madelegal,itcanenterintoapoliticalculture.Socialmovementsoperatingoutsidetheexistingpartypoliticalsystemcanrecognizetheneedforcontinualrevision
ofconstitutionaldemocracieswithouttherebybecomingpermanentrevolutionsorchallengingthelegalorderasawhole.Theinsightthatsovereigntycanneverbe
fullyinstitutionalizedthusneednotplayintoSchmittianargumentsforexecutivepowerbutcanreaffirmtheprinciplesofdemocraticlegitimacy.
98.HabermasarguesthatthisiswhatdistinguishesthenewsocialmovementsfromtheNewLeftwithitsfalserevolutionaryideals.
99.Habermas,unlikeDworkin,arguesthatthiswastrueoftheGermanantimissileprotestsofthelate1980s,whichheinterpretsasaseriesofsymboliccollective
actionsaimedatconvincingpublicopinionandinfluencingthelegislativemajorityandnotasanelitistpowerplay.
100.Inotherwords,iftheprincipleofmajorityruleistobeviablewithregardtothenormativecomponentoflegislation,wherethemerecountingofpreferencesis
inadequateanditisnotaquestionofindividualrights,itmustbebroughtbacktoasetofmoralprinciplesthatunderliedemocratictheory.Weaddressedthisunder
theheadingofdemocraticlegitimacyinchapter8.
101.Liketheideaofmoralrights,theprincipleofdemocraticlegitimacyoperatesasasetofcounterfactualnormsthatthestatecanpartlybutnevercompletely
institutionalize.Thestatemonopolizesthelegitimateuseofviolence,butitcannotmonopolizepoliticswithoutbecomingantidemocratic,withoutviolatingtheideaof
popularsovereigntyandthedemocraticlegitimacylinkedtoit.

Page745
INDEX
A
Abendroth,Wolfgang,251
Abertura,5253
Abortion,554555,558,729n126
Absolutiststate,92,120,122,183,191,203,242
inearlymodernconceptualhistory,8687
Foucault'sconceptionof,261,274275
Habermas'sconceptionof,216218,443444
Koselleck'sconceptionof,206208
Action
Arendtandtwomodelsof,647n10
public,178179,302,306
strategic,512513,520
teleological,520521
SeealsoActionrepertoireCollectiveactionCommunicativeaction
Actionrepertoire,504505
Administration,governmentas,231,464
Arendt'sconceptionof,183,192193
anddemocracy,644n108
Foucault'sconceptionof,274,282,285
Habermas'sconceptionof,252253
Luhmann'sconceptionof,312,314,321
SeealsoBureaucracyandbureaucratization
Adorno,TheodorW.,242,243,244,245,408,453,457
Advertising,245246
Althusser,Louis,159161
AmericanRevolution,184,195
Americansociety
Arendt'sconceptionof,184,185,188,191,194197,595598
Parsons'sconceptionof,118,134137,142
Anarchism,38
Anderson,Perry,161164,173
Anonymity,186,288,335
Antinuclearmovement,580,586587
Antisittlichkeit,93,9596,97
Antistatism,1115,30.SeealsoLiberalismNeoconservatismStatism
AntiVietnamwarmovement,580,738n60,738n63
Apathy,political,18,166,324,325,460
andelitetheorists,608n11
SeealsoDepoliticization
Apel,KarlOtto,349,370
Aquinas,Thomas,85
Arendt,Hannah,7,174,299,308,359,412,421
andcivildisobedience,593599,603

Page746
Arendt(continued)
andFoucault,255,346
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,221,222,241,242,243,244,247248,425
normativecritiqueofcivilsocietyby,177200
andpublicsphere,178190,201,203,211,212
OnRevolution,180,183,597
astheoristofdirectdemocracy,390,412
Argentina,49
Argumentation
anddiscourseethics,364367,372,382383,387389
andinfluence,486
postconventionalstructuresof,437438
SeealsoCommunication
AristotleandAristotelianism,84,91,304305,386,411,451
Associations,voluntary,2,23,24,29,39,48,62,230,346,436,451,500
absenceofinHabermas'sanalysis,461462,463
andcivildisobedience,596597
anddefenseoflifeworld,472474
anddiscourseethics,411,412413,417418
inearlymodernconceptualhistory,8687
inFoucault'sview,274,280,290,293,294295
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,242243,251252,253
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistcivilsociety,146,147148,150155
inHegel'sview,633n105
inLuhmann'sview,301,308,311,332,340
Parsons'sconceptionof,117,119,130131,133,135,136,140141
SeealsoEstatesSocialmovements
Austin,John,125,353
Authoritarianism,36,44,5253,63,346,412,490
anddiscourseethics,360374
inEasternEuropeandLatinAmerica,73,7879
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,245,251,252
andfusionofcivilsocietyandstate,232,235,239,240,241
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistcivilsociety,155,156,161
SeealsoDominationElitesNeoconservatismStatismTotalitarianism
Autonomy
anddiscourseethics,381,386,356357,397399,400404,411,413
andliberalism,89,211,226
rejectionofbyFoucault,269,274,294
andrightsthesis,2122,356357,610n29
threatsto,194195,244
SeealsoIndividualismandindividualityLiberalismLiberty,negativePrivatesphereRights
Avineri,Shlomo,99,116
Axes,Touraine'ssocial
diachronic,513514,516,519520
synchronic,514,516,519520
B
Bayle,Pierre,208209
Benjamin,Walter,178,292
BillofRights,89,128,196,197,454,598
"Binarycodes"ofpower,541
Biopower,267,268,277,281282,283
Blacks,American,136.SeealsoCivilRightsMovement
Bloch,Marc,453
Bobbio,Norberto,72,145,149,154,159,164174
Bodin,Jean,87
Bonapartism,143,152

Page747
Bourgeoisieandthebourgeois,210
bourgeoisconstitutionalstate,443444(seealsoConstitutionsandconstitutionalism)
inFoucault'sview,258,259,260,277,281284
andGramsci'sideaofasocialistcivilsociety,146,151,155
andGramsci'ssuccessors,160,164,165
inHabermas'sview,211,214,216217,251,443,447
inHegel'sview,96,97
inLuhmann'sview,304
inMarx'sview,346
andthepublicsphere,221231,657658n33,672n117,694695n94(seealsoPublicsphere)
SeealsoCapitalismLiberalismMarxismandneoMarxism
Brazil,49,50,52,53,55
Breakdownthesis,463,499500,514,530
Bruni,Leonardo,85
Brunner,Otto,86
Budgetaryconstraints,hardvs.soft,467468
Bureaucracyandbureaucratization,15,57,130,166,212,235,277,301
inArendt'sview,185186,187,597
andfusionargument,235,242,244,245,309
inHabermas'sview,242,244,245,404,439,445446,450,459,461
inHegel'sview,99,102104,116
SeealsoAdministration,governmentasWelfarestate
Brgerlich(bourgeois),97
BrgerlicheGesellschaft(civilsociety),viii,93,97,142,156,178,213,304
BrgerlicherStand,90
C
Caesarism,143,152
Capitalism,2,45,116,166,281,305,308,410,423,439
Althusser'sviewof,160161
andcivilsociety,160161,162,410
democratic,432433
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistsociety,143,147,148,149,155
Habermas'sviewof,216,223
andideologyofsecondleftinFrance,37,40,42
andParson'sview,121,123,129,133134,135,140,142
unrestrained,24,2930,76,129
andwelfarestate,1314,140,142,465466
SeealsoBourgeoisieandthebourgeoisClassstruggleEconomicsocietyLiberaldemocracyLiberalismNeoconservatismWorkingclassandworkers'
movement
Cardoso,FernandoH.,5354,57,58,76,77,79,81
Castoriadis,Cornelius,37
Categoricalimperative,349
Catholicchurch,andcivilsociety,144
CenterPlatform,82
CFDTlaborunion,39
Children,224,545
andchildrearing,533537,722n71
Chile,3,53,55
Circumstancesofjustice,388
Citizenship,6,84,85,97,263,415,432,450,452
andcivildisobedience,569570,579,580,582,586,590591,597598,601
complex,127129,327
Luhmann'sconceptionof,304,310,325,466
masculinesubtextof,722n71,725n97(seealsoDomination:maleWomen:subjugationof)
vs.privateself,590591
andpublicsphere,220,223,224,228229,230
andrights,195
andwomen'srights,543,550,554

Page748
Citizenship(continued)
SeealsoHommeIndividualismandindividualityRights
Citizensociety,90,97
Citoyen.SeeCitizenship
Citystate,118.SeealsoPolis
Medieval,7,85
Civildisobedience,173,438,564568
andcontemporaryliberaldemocratictheory,568590
anddemocratictheory,568,590604
anddiscourseethics,355356,396
andtheeconomy,736n37,740741n80
''justicebased,"382,583
nonpersuasivestrategiesof,584,586587
persuasivestrategiesof,584
"policybased,"584
public,illegal,andnonviolent,739n68
selflimitationof,602603
threeconditionsof,735736n34
SeealsoLawandlegalsystem:andcivildisobedienceLegitimacyandlegitimation:ofcivildisobedienceRights:andcivildisobedience
Civilprivatism,565,608n12
Civilrightsmovement,507,508,580
Civilservice,102104.SeealsoBureaucracyandbureaucratization
Civilsociety,24,2931,345347
andcollectiveaction,513,515516
commoncoreofallinterpretationsof,74
andcontemporarypoliticaltheory,1826
andcreationoffreeinstitutionsinEast,487491
anddiscourseethics,395,410420
dualisticsolutionstopoliticsof,474477
anddualpolitics,555563
earlymodernconceptualhistoryof,8391
EasternEuropeandpoliticsof,487491
andFrenchsecondleft,3738
fusionwithstate(SchmittandHabermas),241254
genealogyofmodern(Foucault),269286
andHegel'ssynthesis,91102
ideaofsocialist(Gramsci),142159
institutionaltwodimensionalityofexisting,456463
andintegrationthroughthestate,inHegel'ssynthesis,102105
andlifeworldanddifferentiationofsociety,423433(seealsoDifferentiationLifeworld)
negativedimensionsof,442451
negativityof,andlossofthesocial(Foucault),286298
Offe'sprogramof,4447
andPolishDemocraticopposition,3236
politicsof,463491
reconstructionof,421463
returnofmediationstopoliticsof,477480
revivalofconceptof,1518
socialintegrationthrough,inHegel'ssynthesis,106116
beyondtraditional,433442
betweentraditionandmodernity(Parsons),118142
intransitionfromLatinAmericandictatorships,4858
utopiaof,451456
SeealsoEconomicsocietyLifeworldPoliticalsocietyPublicsphereSocialmovements
Classstruggle,146,147,161,259.SeealsoMarxismandneoMarxismReformRevolutionStratification,socialWorkingclassandworkers'movement
Cognitivedevelopmentalpsychology,437

Page749
Collectiveaction,514515
andcivildisobedience,576(seealsoCivildisobedience)
competitive,500501
inFoucault'sscheme,671n109
proactive(offensive),501502,505,519,528,531532
reactive(defensive),500501,505,519,528,531532,574
SeealsoCollectiveidentitySocialmovements
Collectiveidentity,100,293294,422,486,510513
Habermas'sconceptionof,357,368370,372374,377,378,383,384,386
SeealsoCollectiveactionCollectivewillCollectivitySolidarity
Collectivewill,188.SeealsoCollectiveidentity
Collectivity,126.SeealsoCollectiveidentity
Colonization,422,447,449,450,455,463,479
andfeministchallenge,534,544545
bymoneyandpower,525,526
andsocialmovements,565
andwelfarestate,465,466,469
SeealsoReification
CommitteefortheDefenseofWorkers(KOR),33
Commonidentity.SeeCollectiveidentity
Communication,211,212,216,243,253,293,297,315
andconsensusbuildinginLuhmann'sview,335336
anddiscourseethics,346,361,364,370,371,386,391,411,413,418
andlawinLuhmann'sview,301,303304,305,340(seealsoLaw)
andthelifeworld,427,428
andLuhmann'spoliticalsystem,309,311,316321
rightsof,329333,400410,413414,455(seealsoRights)
SeealsoArgumentationCommunicativeactionDiscourseMassmediaPublicopinionSpeech,public
Communicativeaction,399,429,435436,439,520,522,539,541542
andthelifeworld,690691n56
threemodelsof,704n40
SeealsoCommunicationDiscourseethics
Communicativeinteraction,2223
Communism
council,38(seealsoCouncilgovernments)
Soviettype,31
Communitarianism,40,136,139,400
tensionofwithrightsorientedliberalism,3,910,2023
Competition
economic,14
forpoliticalpower,56,45(seealsoElections)
Compromise,363364
Confessionaltechniques,268,269270,287
Conflict
anddiscourseethics,371,375,413,414
andlawinLuhmann'sscheme,334,339
political,inLuhmann'sscheme,323324
CongressofPeoples'Deputies,66
Conscience,92,158,207,328,356,401402
andcivildisobedience,570,736n35(seealsoCivildisobedience)
SeealsoMoralprinciples
Conscientiousobjection,355,382,579582,593594
Consensus,94,144,289,335
anddiscourseethics,348350,356,357,381,391,413

Page750
Consensus(continued)
empiricalandrational(Habermas),361374,402,407408
andthelifeworld,427,433
inParsons'sscheme,126,127,130131
SeealsoConsentConstitutionsandconstitutionalismDemocracyDemocraticlegitimacy,principleofHegemonyandcounterhegemonyLegitimacyand
legitimationMajorityrule
Consent,163,188,191,246,294.SeealsoConsensus
Constitutionsandconstitutionalism
inArendt'sscheme,180,181,192197,593599
andcivildisobedience,567603,742743n97
Foucault'sconceptionof,263,278
inHabermas'sscheme,226,249250,354,396,397,414
inHegel'sscheme,90,100,110
inLuhmann'sscheme,331,336,339
inParsons'sscheme,127,128
SeealsoDemocracyParliamentarismRights
Consumerism,246,449450
Contractsandcontractarianism,260262,265,278
andjustice,573
SeealsoSocialcontracttheory
Corporation,Hegel'stheoryofthe,99,117,185
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistcivilsociety,142,145146
andsocialintegrationthroughcivilsociety,106110,113116
SeealsoAssociations,voluntaryEstateassemblyEstates
Corporatism,253,432433
neo,608n14
Corruption,political,185,186187
Costbenefitcalculations,498
Councilgovernments,192193,199,393,409,418,654n25
Couverture,545
Crime,275,278279,282.SeealsoIllegalityLawandlegalsystem
Crisismanagement,469
Crisisofcrisismanagement,465,662n101
Criticaltheory,2
Critiqueoffunctionalistreason(Habermas),426
Croce,Benedetto,144
Crowd,496,498
Culturalintermediations,17,419
Culturalmodernity.SeeModernityandmodernization:cultural
Culturalvalues,2324
Culture,428,434435,436,458.SeealsoMasssocietyandculture
Czechoslovakia,17,31,68,82
D
DeclarationoftheRightsofManandCitizen,89,90,128,196,454
Deconstruction,2
Dedifferentiation,7
anddeclineofpublicandprivatespheres,183,229
andtheexpectationofexpectations,335
andfundamentalrights,330,441442
andfusionofstateandsociety,237239,246247,254,431432
andmovements,125
andparticipation,128,230,451,592
andSoviettypesocieties,315316
SeealsoDifferentiationFusionofstateandsociety
Democracy,5,72,301,432
Bobbio'sconceptionof,165174,418419
centralizing,411,419,593
andcivildisobedience,590604
constitutedphaseof,489491

Page751
constitutivephaseof,488489
elitevs.participatory,48
federalist,411,419,593
Habermas'sconceptionof,390410
industrial,419,593
inLatinAmerica,5657,58
Luhmann'sconceptionof,314316,678679n59
pluralityand,412,416417,418420(seealsoPluralism)
reachof,social,608n10
representative,168171,393394,411419,591,593,602(seealsoParliamentarism)
inSchmitt'sconception,231241
socialist,168,469
territorial,419
SeealsoCouncilgovernmentsDemocraticconstitutionalstateDemocraticlegitimacy,principleofDemocratizationDirectdemocracyElitemodelof
democracyFundamentalismLiberaldemocracyRadicaldemocracyRepublicanismRevolution:democraticWelfarestate:democratic
Democraticconstitutionalstate,443445.SeealsoConstitutionsandconstitutionalism
Democraticlegitimacy,principleof
andbourgeoispublicsphere,694695n94
andchargeofauthoritarianismagainstdiscourseethics,368369,370371,372
anddemocratictheoryandcivildisobedience,591,598604
anddiscourseethicsandcivilsociety,411,416,418,419
andinstitutionaldeficitofdiscourseethics,389392,395,398410
andinstitutionaltwodimensionalityofcivilsociety,459
andjustice,609n23
andliberaldemocratictheoryandcivildisobedience,569,576577,586,588
andobjectdomainofdiscourseethics,347360
asorganizationalprinciple,609n22andutopiaofcivilsociety,454
SeealsoDemocracyLegitimacyandlegitimation
Democratization,3,1617,19,26,30
Bobbio'sconceptionof,159,164,165,167,170174
andcivildisobedience,567,602604
anddeclineofpublicsphere(Habermas),244245,248
inEurope,32,36,39,44,76,8082
Foucault'sconceptionof,277,278,289
Habermas'sconceptionof,219,390,391,393,405,414420
inLatinAmerica,48,50,52,53,8082
Luhmann'sconceptionof,315,316
Parsons'sconceptionof,119,138,141
Schmitt'sconceptionof,205,232,234,235,236,238
SeealsoDemocracy
Demonstrations,502
mass,oflate1960s,596
Deontologicalethicaltheories,374375,378,380,386387,389
Depoliticization,57,76,174,316,346,450
Arendt'sconceptionof,182,183184,186,191,199
Schmitt'sconceptionof,235,237238,239
SeealsoApathyColonizationMasssocietyandculture
Deregulation,andthewelfarestate,14
Devlin,Lord,588
Dewes,Peter,284285

Page752
Dictatorships.SeeAuthoritarianismTotalitarianism
Differentiation,19,79,80,88,143,158,160,174,206,433,493
Arendt'sconceptionof,180,190191,193,196197
andcivilsocietyandthelifeworld,423433,434435
anddiscourseethics,411420
andFoucault'sanalysis,256,257,280281,286
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,246254
andthelifeworld,377
Luhmann'sconceptionof,300301,306314,317321,327338,422,424,636n19
Marx'sconceptionof,643n101
Parsons'sconceptionof,118123,127130,134136,140
andthepublicsphere,219,221,225,228231
andutopiaofcivilsociety,452456
SeealsoDedifferentiationMediationSelflimitationSocialintegrationSolidarity
Dignity,8,138,376.SeealsoAutonomyRights
Directdemocracy
Arendt'sconceptionof,651652n49
Bobbio'sconceptionof,168169,171
andcivildisobedience,590,593,597
anddiscourseethics,390,393,411,412,419
Disciplinarytechnologies,267269,279285,294,296
Discourse,487
andchargeofauthoritarianismindiscourseethics,361,366,370373
institutionalizationof,392393
motivationfor,387389
anduniversalityofdiscourseethics,382383
SeealsoCommunicationCommunicativeactionSpeech,public
Discourseethics,21,603
andchargeofauthoritarianism,360374
andcivilsociety,410420
anddemocratization,414420
difficultywiththeoryof,346347
andexcessiveformalism,375382
asgeneralmoraltheory,688689n27
andthegoodlife,374389
institutionaldeficitof,389410,527528
andmodernity,694n85(seealsoModernityandmodernization)
andmotivation,386389
objectdomainof,347360
opposinginterpretationsof,691692n60
andrights,695n104(seealsoRights)
astheoryofdemocraticlegitimacy,687n21
anduniversality,382386
Domesticity,cultof,543
Domination
Foucault'sconceptionof,255269,278,283,286,294,295,297
male,533,539542,544,551
andpostindustrialcollectiveaction,515518,519,525,526
inpublicsphere,224,226,227
SeealsoAuthoritarianismColonizationDisciplinarytechnologiesPowerStatismSurveillanceTotalitarianism
Draftresistance,580,581
Dualization,8586
Durkheim,Emile,100,116,289,461
andfunctionalrepresentation,169,170,416
andParsons,119,122,131,300,306,333,525
andsolidarity,373
Dworkin,Ronald,438
andcivildisobedience,568571,577590,595,599,600,601

Page753
EasternEurope,2,16,31,6669,7381
comparisonsandproblemsin,6982
inlate1980s,5869
andpoliticsofcivilsociety,487491
SeealsoCzechoslovakiaEastGermanyHungaryPoland
EastGermany,1617,490491
Economicsociety,20,7577,133135,182,195,346
anddemocratization,713714n134
Habermas'sconceptionof,416418
Luhmann'sconceptionof,304308,309,311,330331,424
SeealsoCapitalismCivilsocietyLifeworldPoliticalsocietyPublicsphere
Economy.SeeEconomicsociety
Elections,5355,6465,294,321325,331,459
andcollectiveaction,502
SeealsoConsensusInfluenceVote
Elitemodelofdemocracy,20,69,137,192,445
andBobbio,267,170,173
andcivildisobedience,565,590(seealsoCivildisobedience)
anddemocratizationofcivilsociety,611n50
anddiscourseethics,390,393
andLuhmann,313,459460
vs.participatorymodel,3,48,58,608n12
SeealsoDemocracyElites
Elites,29,81,166,172,207
inEasternEurope,6769,81
inHegel'sscheme,111112
inLatinAmerica,5455,6769,81
inParsons'sscheme,125,135
associalactors,502,506,507,513,517,602
SeealsoAuthoritarianismElitemodelofdemocracy
Engels,Friedrich,142
England,122,217218,443
andmodernrevolutions,120121
aftertheGloriousRevolution,8990
Enlightenment,273,316,392
dialecticof,407
Habermas'sconceptionof,212,215219
hypocrisyofantipoliticsin,209210,212,215,218
Koselleck'sconceptionof,206208,212,215,216217
Scottish,90
society,8691,92
Equality,substantive,452
EqualRightsAmendmentandequalrights,551,558,729n126
politicsof,731n141
Estateassembly,106,110113,115,116,203.SeealsoEstatesParliamentarism
Estates(Stnde),9899,100,207
andderbrgerlicherStand,90
feudal,86universal,102104
SeealsoAssociations,voluntaryCorporation,Hegel'stheoryoftheParliamentarism
Ethos,84,85,87,113,433
inHegel'sscheme,91,92,94,113,628n38
Executivebranch,236,239
Expectations,normativeandcognitive,303304,333336,338339,437,540
Externalconstitution(Habermas),482
F
Family,86,143,171,346,417,456,545
inArendt'sscheme,180181,189
ascoreinstitutionofcivilsociety,724n81
declineofintimatesphereof,243244
intheEnlightenment,627n23

Page754
Family(continued)
andfeministcritique,532539
inHegel'sscheme,95,96,99,100,106,108,143,628631n48
andpublicsphere,213215,216,223224
fromsystem/lifeworldstandpoint,458,459
SeealsoChildrenKinshipWomen
Fascism,Italian,240
Feedbacks,319
Feminism
anddualisticsocialtheory,532548
SeealsoFeministmovementWomen
Feministmovement,508,529,530
controversywithin,607n4
fivetypesofgroupsin,729n122
inFrance,553554
andlifecyclemodel,557558
"older"branchof,551552
andpostconventionalinterpretationofgender,732n148
andspreadoffeministconsciousness,553
"younger"branchof,551552
SeealsoFeminism
Ferguson,Adam,90,92
Feudalsociety,86,120
Fichte,JohannGottlieb,90,91
FirstAmendment,594,598
FirstReformBill,219,658659n40
Formalism,excessive,anddiscourseethics,375382.SeealsoProceduresandproceduralism
Foucault,Michel,174,421,451,502,525
asanarchist,441,462
andArendt,185,346
DisciplineandPunish,266,267,269,272286
andgenealogicalcritiqueofcivilsociety,255298
TheHistoryofSexuality,266,267
andlossofthesocial,289298
andMarx,256269,663n2,663664n4
andnegativesideofcivilsociety,447,451,465
TheOrderofThings,269
Power/Knowledge,266
SeealsoGenealogy
France,3,122,210,216217
Enlightenmentin,89,90
ideologyofsecondleftin,3642,77,465,614n17
andstatistJacobinpoliticalculture,614n18
Frankfurtschool,71,211,292
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,241,245,247,250
thesisofonedimensionality,410,423,432,457,459,527
Fraser,Nancy,479
critiqueofdualisticsocialtheoryby,532548
Freedom,8,23,52,128
Arendt'sconceptionof,180,191,196197,211
Enlightenmentand,207
Foucault'sconceptionof,265,269,270,271,272,287,294
Hegel'sconceptionof,91,93112,113115,116
Luhmann'sconceptionof,328329,330
andneoconservatism,43
andwelfarestate,394
SeealsoLawandlegalsystemLiberty,negativeRights
FrenchRevolution,183,185,188,217,273,262.SeealsoDeclarationoftheRightsofManandCitizenReignofTerror
Fundamentalism,24,25,82,410,453,464,561,565
inParsons'sscheme,124,125,136
SeealsoDirectdemocracyRadicaldemocracy
Fusionofstateandsociety
Habermas'sconceptionof,241254
Luhmann'sconceptionof,308312
Schmitt'sconceptionof,231241

Page755
andtotalitarianism,432
SeealsoColonizationDedifferentiationStatismTotalitarianism
G
GartonAsh,Timothy,487
GDR,488
Gegensittlichkeit,95,100,102.SeealsoAntisittlichkeit
Gender
blindness,533534
asmedium,534535,542545
Genealogy
ofmoderncivilsociety,269286
andmodernization,272286
asnewwayofdoinghistory,667n59
philosophicalandnormativeambiguitiesof,269272
Germany,Enlightenmentin,9091.SeealsoEastGermanyGreensWestGermany
GloriousRevolution,8990,218
Goodlife,anddiscourseethics,373,374389
Gorz,Andr,42,72,474477
FarewelltotheWorkingClass,75
Gramsci,Antonio,116,117,249
andfivephasesofrelationbetweenstateandcivilsociety,147
andGermantradition,71,78,79,117,249,311,421,425
andideaofsocialistcivilsociety,142159
andParsons,118,119,410,421,422,425,426
PrisonNotebooks,164165
andproletarianrevolution,641642n82
successorsof,159174
threepartconceptualframeworkof,78,143,643644n107
twoconceptsofstateof,640n78
Gravina,GianVincenzo,88
"Greatrefusal,"469
Greens(WestGermany),4247,8081,82,465,524
Guizot,FranoisPierreGuillaume,205
H
Habermas,Jrgen,72,174,178,210,299,300,308,316,317,421,593
andchargeofauthoritarianism,360374
andcivildisobedience,599603
anddefenseofthelifeworld,471474(seealsoLifeworld)
anddiscourseethicsandthegoodlife,374389
andfeministmovement,532555
andFoucault,255,256,271,276277,292293
fusionofcivilsocietyandstateinStrukturwandelof,241254
andHegel,100,116
andinstitutionaldeficitofdiscourseethics,389410
andKoselleck,178,212,215217
onlawandregulation,482,485,486487
LegitimationCrisis,447,448,485
andlifeworld,422463,471474,478480(seealsoLifeworld)
andLuhmann,308,316,317
andobjectdomainofdiscourseethics,347360
andpublicsphere,210231,417418,712n22(seealsoPublicsphere)
andSchmitt,201,211,213,216
Strukturwandelderffentlichkeit,241254,417418,407,425,430
TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,407,463,520521
andtheoryofdiscourseethics,21
andtheoryofsocialmovements,524532
andwelfarestate,406,466471
Hart,H.L.A.,353,438,579
Hegel,G.W.F.,75,78,79,89,90,143,162,174,185,360,421,425
anddiscourseethics,409410,411,414

Page756
Hegel(continued)
andfusionofcivilsocietywithstate,233,248,249
andintegrationofcivilsocietythroughthestate,102105
andLuhmann,310,311,313
andParsons,119120,126,133,142,300,313
andpublicsphere,203,205,206,210,213,219,223
Rechtsphilosophie(PhilosophyofRight),91,93,113114,145
andsocialintegrationthroughcivilsociety,106116,478
andsynthesisofcivilsociety,91102
andtheoryofcivilsociety,409410
Hegemonyandcounterhegemony,149150,151,152,160,161,162163,165,425.SeealsoDomination
Heiman,G.,107
Heller,Agnes,362,367
Hermeneuticistfallacy,494
Hermeneutics,299
Historicalmaterialism,145,152
Hobbes,Thomas,21,97,125,206,207,353
Leviathan,8788
Homme(humanbeing),310,452
andbourgeois,219,220,223224,228229,244,310
andcitoyen(citizen),223224,228229,230,452,660n60
SeealsoAutonomyCitizenshipIndividualismandindividualitySoul
Honneth,Axel,284,479
Horkheimer,Max,214,242,243,453
Household.SeeOikos
Humanism,269,295
Humansciences,267,279
Hume,David,90,367
HungarianCommunistparty,6465,69
HungarianRevolutionof1956,73
Hungary,16,17,31,60,6369,81,82,488
failureofconversionin,620621n117
SeealsoKadaristsystem
I
Idealspeechsituation,348,361,385,407
Identity,374381,385386
asmediation,691n58,692n60,692693n63
model,510,512513,521
politicsof,503504,509,526,560
andpracticalreason,691n58
SeealsoCollectiveidentityIndividualismandindividuality
Identityorientedparadigm,493,559
Ideologicalstateapparatuses,160,161,162
Ideology,214,227,238,262,315,422,457
Illegality,275,276,279,281.SeealsoCrimeLawandlegalsystem
Ilting,KarlHeinz,113114,115
Immanentcritique,95,139,142,237,265,457458
ofLuhmann'sredefinitionofdemocracy,678679n59
Imperativemandate,111
Inclusion,politicsof,526,560
andabortion,555
Incomes,guaranteed,713n130
Individualismandindividuality,10,41,179,376382
Arendt'sconceptionof,179
anddiscourseethics,376382
Foucault'sconceptionof,273,287288
Hegel'sconceptionof,97
possessive,2223
SeealsoAutonomyCitizenshipHommeLiberalismNeoconservatismPropertyRightsSoul
Influence,226,486487
inLuhmann'sscheme,311,322323,331
inParsons'sscheme,131133,138,311,486487

Page757
politicsof,504,507,509,526,532,553,556,563,565566,584,585,600
withoutpower,186,207
SeealsoElectionsInterestsPublicopinion
Inputoutputrelations,308,311,430432
Institutionalizednorms,297,334,335
Instrumentalstrategicmodel,559
Interests,169,199,450,459,585
andfusionofcivilsocietywithstate,234235,238
generalvs.particular,361374,379,691692n60
andparties,608n8,608n9,646n142
politicsof,188189
SeealsoInfluenceMotivation
Intimatesphere.SeeFamilyPrivatesphere
Investors,610n36,710n104
Ironlawofoligarchy(Michels),473474,557,560561
Isonomia,179,694n88
Italy,144,152
J
Jenkins,J.Craig,andCraigM.Eckert,506,508
Jenson,Jane,553
Journalism,political,658659n40
Judges,339340,438,579,684685n151
Justice,8,9,101,108,294,359
andcivildisobedience,569590
anddiscourseethics,374,375,376382,385,394
twoprinciplesof,735n25
SeealsoLawandlegalsystemRights
K
Kadaristsystem,60,61,64
Kant,Immanuel,386,394,398,411,435
andcategoricalimperative,349,350,382
asEnlightenmentprecursorofHegel,89,90,91,92,360
Karlsbaddecrees,115
Keynesianeconomicdoctrine,11,39,41,469
Kinship,120,137,301.SeealsoFamily
Kirchheimer,Otto,242,244,245
Kis,Jnos,65,79
Kohlberg,Lawrence,376,438
Kornai,Jnos,468,490
Koselleck,Reinhart,174,178,299
KritikundKrise,206210
andoriginsofliberalpublicsphere,206210,212,215,216218,224
Kszeg,F.,65
Kuron,Jacek,32,72,76
L
Laborlegislation,595
LatinAmerica,2,15,17,67,77,81,490
anddictatorships,4858,70,80,81
SeealsoArgentinaBrazilChileUruguay
Lawandlegalsystem,62,64,156,157,225,255,346,395,397
absolutist,443
Arendt'sconceptionof,191,193194
civilandpublic,429
andcivildisobedience,560590
anddiscourseethics,413414
asethos,84(seealsoEthos)
Foucault'sconceptionof,259265,275,278280,286,287,297
Hegel'sconceptionof,100102,109,110111,112113
Kant'sconceptionof,90
legitimacyof,580582
Luhmann'sconceptionof,301,303,306,310312,326,330341
asmediumandinstitution,462463,546547,708709n91
Montesquieu'sconceptionof,88
andmoraltheory,351360,437438(seealsoMoralprinciples)

Page758
Lawandlegalsystem(continued)
natural,89
obligationtoobey,570,572,578579
observer'sandparticipant'sperspectivesof,579582,684685n151
Parsons'sconceptionof,121,139142,639n39
penetrationoflifeworldinto,436437
positive,436439
reflexive,andpostregulatoryregulation,480487
stagesof,437438
testingvalidityof,579582
SeealsoJusticeNormsParliamentarismProceduresandproceduralismRights
Lefort,Claude,39,405
Legislature.SeeLawandlegalsystemParliamentarism
Legitimacyandlegitimation
andauthoritarianregimes,50,51,52,55,239(seealsoAuthoritarianism)
ofcivildisobedience,566568,569,588,590(seealsoCivildisobedience)
andconsent,191(seealsoConsent)
ofconstituentassemblies,193
ofdomination,361(seealsoDomination)
Foucault'sconceptionof,261265,279,286
oflaw,580582(seealsoLawandlegalsystem)
andliberalpublicsphere,248,250,254(seealsoPublicsphere)
Luhmann'sconceptionof,306,324326,332,339340
andneoconservatism,43
ofsocialvalues,126
SeealsoConsensusConstitutionandconstitutionalismContractsandcontractarianismDemocracyDemocraticlegitimacy,principleofMajorityruleSocial
contracttheory
Leninistavantgardism,453
Liberaldemocracy,80,81,316,332
inAnderson'sscheme,161,164
inBobbio'sscheme,165,166,170
andcivildisobedience,568590
andcivilsociety,457,461,470471
inLatinAmerica,70
Offe'scritiqueof,4547
andreflexivecontinuationofthewelfarestate,468471
Schmitt'sconceptionof,233241
SeealsoDemocracyLiberalism
Liberalism,77,81,144,178,203
ambiguityof,423424
andcivildisobedience,604
anddemocracy,345
andelitedemocracy,615616n41(seealsoElitemodelofdemocracyElites)
andnegativeliberty,113114(seealsoLiberty,negative)
neo,30,42,75,330,488,709n94
andneutrality,21,57(seealsoNeutralityandneutralization)
Offe'scritiqueof,4547
andpublicsphere,220,225(seealsoPublicsphere)
reductionismof,425
andrepublicanism,192(seealsoRepublicanism)
rightsoriented,89,206,211,330
Schmitt'sconceptionof,233241
andwelfarestate,465466,468469,490491(seealsoWelfarestate)
SeealsoLiberaldemocracyLiberalpublicsphere
Liberalization,48,53
Liberalpublicsphere,411
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,248,249
andliteraryandpoliticalpublicsphere,217218,222227
originsof,201210,316317,418

Page759
SeealsoBourgeoisieandthebourgeoisPublicsphere
Liberty,negative,9,10,17,22,114,128,265
inArendt'sscheme,184,196
andautonomy,398399,402(seealsoAutonomy)
anddifferentiatedcivilsociety,409,603
failedutopiaof,452
inHegel'sPhilosophyofRight,113114
inParsons'sscheme,128
andrightsofparticipation,249251,696n113
SeealsoAutonomyFreedomLiberalismPrivatespherePropertyRights
Lifecyclemodel,320,556563
''Lifeform,"389
Lifeworld,377,378,380,389,433
andcivilsocietyanddifferentiationofsociety,423433
andcommunicativeaction,690691n56(seealsoCommunicativeaction)
defenseof,471474
asdifferentiatedfromsystem,372,422,426427,434,449,480524525,531533,538,539,545
fourstagesof,inrelationtostateandeconomy,442447
inLuhmann'sscheme,683n125
penetrationintolegalinstitutionsof,436439
rationalizationof,434436,439,452,448,458,525
andreconstructingcivilsociety,421463
andregulation,485487
andrights,440442
structuralcomponentsof,428429,434435,703n24
andutopiaofcivilsociety,453454,456
Linguisticcodes,535
Locke,John,8788,89,190,596597
Lowenthal,Leo,245
Luhmann,Niklas,91,132,174,422,445
anddifferentiationofsociety,422,423,424,430,431,432
anddiscourseethics,351,353
andFoucault,255256,267
andinstitutionaltwodimensionalityofexistingcivilsociety,457458,459460,462,463
andsystemstheoreticcritique,299341
andtraditionalcivilsociety,433,436437,438,440,441,442
andwelfarestate,466467
Lukcs,Georg,71,116,363,408,447,453,458
M
McCarthy,JohnD.,andMayerN.Zald,498,499,506,508
Macpherson,C.B.,45
Magnus,Albertus,85
Majorityrule,10,47,239
andcivildisobedience,572,583585,586,600,601,603
SeealsoConsensusDemocracy
Mandates,binding,168169
Manipulation,112,301,320321
Marcuse,Herbert,37,292,453,457
Marshall,T.H.,11,140,327,445446
Marx,Karl,86,162,346,525
andArendt,177,185,195
anddiscourseethics,410,411,413,414
andFoucault,256269,286,290,297
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,242,248
DasKapital,474
andGramsci,142,143,145,146,152,156,159
andHegel,78,79,102,103,116
andpublicsphere,219,220,224,228,229,230,231

Page760
Marx(continued)
andutopiaofcivilsociety,451
"ZurJudenfrage,"156
SeealsoMarxismandneoMarxism
MarxismandneoMarxism,12,102,117,122,159,182
andallinclusiveeconomicsociety,423424
crisisof,7071,565
andcritiqueofrights,441
andEasternEurope,75,76
andfusionargument,235,236,242,253
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistsociety,142,145,148,149,153,156
andHabermas'swork,393,408,409,410
inLuhmann'sscheme,304,308,311
andpublicsphere,210,214,216,227228,231
andsexualrepression,281282
traditionofWestern,453
andWestGermanGreens,44,45,47
SeealsoMarx,Karl
Masoniclodge,207
Masscommunications,133.SeealsoCommunicationMassmedia
Massmedia,137,138,245246,312,459,460461.SeealsoMasscommunicationsMasssocietyandculturePublicopinion
Massmobilization,4849,50
Masssocietyandculture,166,325,346,459
Arendt'sconceptionof,177,184,189,190,199200
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,243245
SeealsoMassmedia
Masssocietytheories,495,716717n5
"Meaning,"301,315,428
Media,458,472
steering,427,535,536,541
SeealsoCommunicationMassmediaMediationMoneyandpower
Mediation,96,112,319
Arendt'scritiqueof,198,201
andcommonidentity,372373
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,245,248,251
andlifeworld,430,432
Luhmann'sconceptionof,319320,331,337
andoriginsofliberalpublicsphere,203206
political,80,624625n140
andpublicsphere,211,213216,223,230,231,412414
andreturntopoliticsofcivilsociety,477480
SeealsoDifferentiationLifeworldSocialintegrationParliamentarismSocialmovementsSolidarity
MerleauPonty,Maurice,408
Metanorm,347349,356,366367,373374,386,398
Michels,Roberto,168,473474.SeealsoIronlawofoligarchy
Michnik,Adam,31,33,35,76
Middleclass,"new,"12
Mill,JohnStuart,229231,398
Mobilizationanddemobilization,5556,63,66,77,200.SeealsoSocialmovements
Modernityandmodernization,2425,29,132
inArendt'sscheme,177,178,181,187
andcollectiveaction,500505
cultural,447,448,524,531,706n68
anddifferentiation,120,327,158
anddivisionbetweenmoralityandlegality,359
anddomination,257
inHegel'sscheme,92,109,116

Page761
genealogicalaccountof,272286
andinstitutionaldeficitofdiscourseethics,393,405
ofthelifeworld,377,458
andmigrationofwork,538
negativesideof,448,449
andpublicsphere,206,212,213,221
andtraditionincivilsociety,118142,433442
SeealsoDifferentiation
Moneyandmonetization,98,207,440,433
Moneyandpower,224
defenseoflifeworldagainst,471474
differencebetween,305306,426,699700n1
infeministcritique,532,533,534,543,544
vs.influence,486487,504,506,526
andironlawofoligarchy,561
inthelifeworld,426,429,430431,439,453456
Luhmann'sconceptionof,305307,312,317,340,430431,440
negativedimensionsof,448,449
Parsons'sconceptionof,132,133,138
reactionsagainst,528530
andsteeringsystems,479480
twodimensionalityof,458,461
inthewelfarestate,466,469
SeealsoCapitalismMediaPower
Montesquieu,CharlesLouisdeSecondat,8889,90,91,107
Moralauthority,541
Morality,910,23,93,129,414andcivildisobedience,571572,579,580,582,583,589(seealsoCivildisobedience)
anddiscourse,689n31(seealsoDiscourse)
Habermas'sconceptionof,350360,377378,387389
Hegel'sconceptionof,9495
Koselleck'sconceptionof,206208
Luhmann'sconceptionof,303304,306
SeealsoEthosRights
Motivation,200,426
anddiscourseethics,386389
inLuhmann'sscheme,305,312,314,325,375
inParsons'sscheme,126,138
SeealsoInterests
Movements.SeeSocialmovements
N
NationalSocialism,240
Nationstate,127,181,649n21
Naturalduty,572573
Naturalisticfallacy,366
Needs.SeeSystemofneeds
Neoconservatism,3,15,2324,25,30,42,77,78,709n94
vs.defenseofwelfarestate,1115,465466,468469
andsocialmovements,716nl
Neocorporatism,4546
Neumann,Franz,250
Neutralityandneutralization,8,21,450,466
Luhmann'sconceptionof,310,316317,319,329
andrightsthesis,611n54,611612n57
SeealsoDepoliticization
Newevolutionism,31,33,35,64,66,72
NewLeft,136,505,527,554
NewPoorLaw,218
Newsocialmovementsparadigm,496497,510523
Nietzsche,Friedrich,435
Nisbet,RobertAlexander,273
InSearchofCommunity,442
Norms
asdifferentiatedfromfacts,437
Luhmann'sconceptionof,333341,683684n132
Habermas'sconceptionof,347360,362374,379,380,386

Page762
O
Objectivistfallacy,494
O'Donnell,Guillermo,58,76,77
Offe,Claus,75,77,80,308,432,465,601
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,242,243
andprojectofseparatingfreedomfromnecessity,476477
andWestGermanGreens,43,4447
Oikos,84,177,180,181,302
polisduality,84,181,213
SeealsoFamilyPrivatesphere
Olson,Mancur,498
Onedimensionalitythesis,247,423,436,457,527,708n84
Organizationalentrepreneurialapproach,498
P
Paine,Thomas:CommonSense,89
Panopticon(Bentham),279,288
Parliamentarism,67,69,81,112,115,146,189,199,210,413
Anderson'sconceptionof,161164
Bobbio'sconceptionof,166,169170
andcivildisobedience,576577,591,598
Foucault'sconceptionof,261,278,294
Habermas'sconceptionof,212,217218,222,244245,246,410
Luhmann'sconceptionof,316,321326,338,459
Schmitt'sconceptionof,201206,233236,239241
SeealsoCorporationDemocracyEstateassemblyEstatesParties,political
Parsons,Talcott,100,174,267,289,410,486,522,525
andcivilsociety,116,117,118142
anddifferentiation,425,426,427,428,432,447
andFoucault,267,289
andLuhmann,300,306,311,312313,326327,331,333,337,341
SeealsoSocietalcommunity
Participation.SeeDemocracyFreedomLiberty,negativePublicsphereRights
Parties,political
Arendt'sconceptionof,189,198,199,598
Bobbio'sconceptionof,169,174
catchall,13,240241,245,460,608n8
andcivilsocietyintransitionfromdictatorship,5358
inEasternEurope,6869
Gramsci'sconceptionof,150,151
Habermas'sconceptionof,251252,459,460
Luhmann'sconceptionof,312,315,316,322,323
Schmitt'sconceptionof,235,239,240241,245
SeealsoAssociations,voluntaryElectionsParliamentarismSocialmovements
Patriarchy.SeeDomination:maleFamilyWomen:subjugationof
Pelczynski,ZbigniewA.,114
Person,legal,287288
Personality,428,433,436
Phronesis,388389
Pizzorno,Alessandro,510
Pluralism,1,10,1820,34,56,67,158,170,289,346
American,116,135,137
Bobbio'sconceptionof,171174
andchargeofauthoritarianismagainstdiscourseethics,363365,368,373
Foucault'sconceptionof,289
andfusionofcivilsocietyandstate,236,239,242
andleftistcriticism,461462
anduniversalityofdiscourseethics,383,386
SeealsoAssociations,voluntaryDemocracyDifferentiation

Page763
Parties,politicalSocialmovements
Pluralization,85
Pbel(rabble),103,105
Poland,3,17,50,488,489
anddemocraticopposition,3136
inlate1980s,5860,6569,8182
SeealsoPolishSolidarity
Polnyi,Karl,29,75,121,122123,444,489
anddifferentiationofsociety,423,424,425426,432
TheGreatTransformation,442
Polarization,67,78
Police,104105,108,109,114,282283,289
Polis,7,85,178,179,302,592
oikosduality,84,181,213
restrictivenotionofcitizenshipin,626
Polishdemocraticopposition,3136.
SeealsoPoland
PolishSolidarity,17
inlate1980s,58,5960,65,76,8182
andPolishdemocraticopposition,31,3336
andunionmovement,614n16,620n113
Politicalopportunitystructure,550,719720n28
inNorwayandSweden,728n116
Politicalprocess
model,498,521
officialandunofficialversions(Luhmann),680681n91
Politicalsociety,44,53,57,60,110,114,221
asalternativetocivilsociety,7881
Althusser'sconceptionof,159160
Arendt'sconceptionof,178,191
andcivildisobedience,574575
democratizationof,713nl34
anddiscourseethics,412417
inearlymodernconceptualhistory,8391
andEasternEuropeinlate1980s,6668,73
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistcivilsociety,153,156,157
andideologyofsecondleftinFrance,3738,41
Luhmann'sconceptionof,301326,330332,337338,340
andresourcemobilizationtheory,508509
SeealsoCivilsocietyDemocracyEconomicsocietyLifeworldPolitikekoinoniaPublicsphereSocialmovements
Politicaltheory
andcivilsociety,1826
debatesin,415
anddefenseofwelfarestatevs.neoconservativeantistatism,1115
andelitevs.participatorydemocracy,48
andrightsorientedliberalismvs.communitarianism,810
andpoliticalscience,677678n38,682683n121
Politicsofinfluence.SeeInfluence
Politicsofinterest.SeeInterest
Politikekoinonia(politicalsociety/community),8486,90,177,191,301303.SeealsoPoliticalsocietyPublicsphere
Pollock,Friedrich,242
Populism,49,69,75,7677,490
Positivefreedom,23
PostMarxism,2,70,71,510.SeealsoMarx,KarlMarxismandneoMarxism
Postmodernism,politicsof,612613n64
Poststatistpolitics,7172
Power,4,34,87,103,107,122,157,160,165,172,303
Arendt'sconceptionof,179,190197,596,598
andcollectiveaction,503

Page764
Power(continued)
ashostileasymmetricrelationofforces(Foucault),266295
juridicalmodelof(Foucault),257266
andmaledominance,533,539541
andmodernorganizationtheory,700701n2
asneutralmedium,466,470(seealsoNeutralityandneutralization)
andregulation,483485
andrights,442(seealsoRights)
SeealsoMoneyandpowerPoliticalsociety
Prestige,541.SeealsoInfluence
Principles,438.SeealsoLawandlegalsystemMetanormMoralprinciplesRights
Prison,272273,288
Privatesphere,18,160,288,347,411
Arendt'sconceptionof,178182,185,189190,194,195,198200,247248,649n19
fusionwithpublicsphere,247,248
Hegel'sconceptionof,96,113114
andlifeworld,429431(seealsoLifeworld)
andliteraryandpoliticalpublicspheres,211216,21921,226
andobjectdomainofdiscourseethics,351352,355356
SeealsoAutonomyCapitalismFamilyLiberty,negativeLifeworldMoralprinciplesPropertyPublicsphereRights
Proceduresandproceduralism,94,102,131,391392,482
andlaw,140142,334341,579,583,600(seealsoLawandlegalsystem)
Professionalization,ofmovements,507508,557
Proletariat.SeeWorkingclassandworkers'movement
Propaganda,245246.SeealsoColonizationMassmedia
Property,8,22,75,123
andautonomy,226,229,398399(seealsoAutonomy)
andeconomicsociety,624n138
andprivacy,181,189,190,195(seealsoPrivatesphere)
rightsof,281,330,444,609n26
andsocialautonomy,625626n145
SeealsoPrivatesphereLiberty,negativeRights
Przeworski,Adam,469
Publicoffice,276277
Publicopinion,506
Arendt'sconceptionof,184,185,187188
andcivildisobedience,575576,582,583,585,588590,596,598599,603
andfusionofstateandcivilsociety,227,230,233,246,251
Habermas'sconceptionof,220222,227,230
Hegel'sconceptionof,95,100,106,111114,116,634n121
Luhmann'sconceptionof,301,315,317321,323,325
andobjectdomainofdiscourseethics,356,359
Schmitt'sconceptionof,205206
SeealsoCommunicationCommunicativeactionMasscommunicationsSocialmovementsSpeech,public
Publicrelationsasmediation,245246
Publicsphere,277,288,312,346,392
Arendt'stheoryof,178180,185186,190,194,195,198203,211,212,593
anddiscourseethics,411,412,417418
Englishmodelofpolitical,658659n40
inFoucault'sscheme,671672nl17

Page765
Habermas'sconceptionof,211231,241251
inHegel'sscheme,96,113114
andlifeworld,429431(seealsoLifeworld)
fromliterarytopolitical(Habermas),210231,244245
andtwodimensionalityofcivilsociety,459463
SeealsoEconomicsocietyMediationPoliticalsocietyPrivatesphere
Punishment,274276,278,288.SeealsoDisciplinarytechnologiesPrison
Pureidentitymodel.SeeIdentity:model
R
Radicaldemocracy
andcivildisobedience,590592
anddualisticmodelofcivilsociety,451452,454,474
andfusionofstateandcivilsociety,232,245
SeealsoDemocracyDirectdemocracyFundamentalism
Rationalactorapproach,498
Rationalization.SeeLifeworld:rationalizationofthe
Rawls,John,21,388,398
andcivildisobedience,568577,578,583,599,600
Realmoffreedom,474475,476
Realmofnecessity,474475,476
"Receptors,"544,547
Rechtsstaat(constitutionalstate),129
Rechtsstaatlichkeit(constitutionalism),62,64
Reductionistfunctionalism,12,159,161,162,424,425
Reedv.Reed,552,729n126
Referenda,168169
Reform,31,32,6061,63,64
ascrisismanagement,469
Foucault'sconceptionof,278279
andGramsci'sideaofasocialistcivilsociety,150,155,158
andnewevolution,66(seealsoNewevolutionism)
politicsof,526,560,565
vs.revolution,30,39,70,7274,410,621n18
soulless,423,451
ofwelfarestate,547548
Regulatedsociety,156,157158,165.SeealsoStatismWelfarestate
Reification,247,457,458,486.SeealsoColonization
ReignofTerror,153,216.SeealsoFrenchRevolution
Reliefeffect,542
Republicanism,209,221
Arendt'sconceptionof,183,191,192,194,200
Hegel'sconceptionof,92,107,114,635n128
SeealsoDemocracy
Resistances(Foucault),291298,671n108,671n109
Resourcemobilizationparadigm,493,496497,497509,520,521,523,550,560
"objective"variablesin,497498
Respublica,33,87,191,221
Christiana,85
Restoration,217
Revolution,31,32,39,56,66,454
Arendt'sconceptionof,193,195,211
bourgeois,216219
democratic,122,128,134,135,182,294,327,423,454455
EastEuropean,624n134,624n135
educational,123124,134,136
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistcivilsociety,143,158,159
industrial,122,134
political,HellerandFehr'sdefinitionof,623n133
vs.reform,30,39,70,7274,410,621n18

Page766
Revolution(continued)
andSovietUnion,118,143
threemoderntypesof,120125
Ricardo,David,99
Riedel,Manfred,90,91,299
Rights,33,39,41,48,62,63,89
andabsolutiststate,443
anarchistpositionon,441
Arendt'sconceptionof,191,194,195198
assumptionsof,609n27
andauthoritariansocialism,446
andbourgeoisconstitutionalstate,443444
andcivildisobedience,566568,574575,577578,582,583590,602
civilvs.political,444445
andcollectiveaction,502
anddemocraticconstitutionalstate,444445
anddemocraticlegitimacy,369,371,373
anddemocraticrevolution,455456
anddemocraticwelfarestate,445446
anddiscourseethics,413414,419,695n104(seealsoDiscourseethics)
andfeministchallenge,545548
Foucault'sconceptionof,259266,275,278281,287,294297
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,249254
Hegel'sconceptionof,92,93,101102,109,114,115
andinstitutionalizingdiscourseethics,395410
Kant'sconceptionof,90
liberal,810,2223(seealsoLiberalism)
andthelifeworld,422,433,440442(seealsoLifeworld)
andliteraryandpoliticalpublicspheres,211,216,226,228229
Luhmann'sconceptionof,311312,326341
asmediation,477479
andneoconservatism,13,14
andobjectdomainofdiscourseethics,350360
Parsons'sconceptionof,127129
ofprivatesphere,455,552,555(seealsoPrivatesphere)
andsocioeconomicclaims,736n37
andsuccessofsocialmovements,562(seealsoSocialmovements)
threecomplexesof,441
vs.whatisright,737n37
SeealsoAutonomyConstitutionsandconstitutionalismFreedomIndividualismandindividualityLawandlegalsystemLiberty,negativeMoralprinciples
Property
Rightsorientedliberalism,3,2021,23
vs.communitarianism,810(seealsoCommunitarianism)
SeealsoLiberalismRights
Riotandrevolt,276
Risorgimento,144,152
ROAD(CivicMovementDemocraticAction),82
Rocardgroup,39
Roev.Wade,552,729n126
Rosanvallon,Pierre,3942,73
andPatrickViveret,37,3839,4546
Rousseau,JeanJacques,7,89
anddemocraticlegitimation,391
andHegel,107
andradicaldemocracy,208209,232,261,390,590592
S
Salonsociety,276277
Arendt'sconceptionof,182,186,187
andthepublicsphere,207,212,214,215,224
andwomen,651n47,652n50,657n33

Page767
Sanctions,305,334,335,336,426
Schmitt,Carl,174,421
andFoucault,260,285286
andfusionargumentinHabermas'sStrukturwandel,242,245
andfusionofcivilsocietyandstate,231241,422,423,425
andLuhmann,300301,308,323324
andoriginsofliberalpublicsphere,201206,207,209,210,213,216,218,222,231
Schmitter,PhillipeC.,76,77
Schumpeter,Joseph,4,314,315,326,390
Secondleft,French,3642,44,45
Selectiveinstitutionalization,524525
Selflimitation,57,63
ofcivildisobedience,601602
ofcivilsociety,32,58,63
ofdemocracy,39,403,454,482
Enlightenment,208
individual,356,403
andPolishDemocraticopposition,32,35
ofthepoliticalsystem,326,332
andrights,477(seealsoRights)
ofsocialmovements,1516,47,470(seealsoSocialmovements)
ofthestate,225,254,330331,396(seealsoState)
ofsubsystems,481,483
SeealsoDifferentiation
Selflimitingradicalism,72,492493
Selflimitingrevolution,72,74
Selfreflection,513,515,518,520,522,524.SeealsoSelflimitation
"Sensors,"471,472,478,483,487,526
Sexuality,68,269270,282284,291,293
Sittlichkeit(ethicalbehavior),9298,142,347,360
andclassicaldemocratictheory,609n21
Smelser,Neil,124,496,499500,521522
Smith,Adam,90,98
SocialContract(Poland),64,73
Socialcontracttheory,8788,190,349,596598
SocialDemocraticparty(Germany),42
Socialevolution,438
Socialintegration,117
inFoucault'sscheme,668n65
Hegel'stheoryof,99105
SeealsoDifferentiationMediationSolidarity
Socialism,121,123,124,173,423,453
authoritarianstate,446
French,39
Socialmovements,34,39,41,48,52,74,7577,79
Arendt'sconceptionof,198,199200
Bobbio'sconceptionof,173,174
andcivildisobedience,565566
contemporary,anddualisticsocialtheory,523532
contemporary,andnewtheoreticalparadigms,493497
criteriaofsuccessfor,559563,719720n28
andEasternEuropeinlate1980s,6162,64,68
andeconomicandpoliticalsociety,7477,79
andFoucault,295296,298
Gramsci'sconceptionof,146147
Habermas'sconceptionof,394,396,527532
ideologistsof,299300
andnewsocialmovementsparadigm,510523
normativelyoriented,521522
Parsons'sconceptionof,124125,138

Page768
Socialmovements(continued)
particularismof,528,529,530,549,621622n120(seealsoCollectiveidentity)
andresourcemobilizationparadigm,497509
selflimitationof,1516
twocrucialambiguitiesof,2930
andWestGermanGreens,43,4647
SeealsoAssociations,voluntaryLifeworldPublicsphereSocialtheory,dualisticSolidarity
Socialmovementorganizations(SMOs),505506,507
andcivilrightsmovement,718n25
Socialpsychologytradition,495
Socialrealm(Arendt),178,181200,201
Socialscience,299300,494,666n56
Socialstaat,237238
Socialtheory,dualistic
andcivilsociety,555563
andcontemporarysocialmovements,523532
feministcritiqueof,532548
andfeministmovement,548555
McCarthy'salternativeto,701702n4
asunnecessarilydefensive,701n3
SeealsoLifeworld
Socialtypes,theoryof,519
Societalcommunity,307,312,327,427,436
andcivilsociety,117,119,120,121,125141
SeealsoParsons,Talcott
Societascivilis,84,85,87,97
Societasscientifica,307
Society.SeeAmericansocietyCivilsocietyEconomicsocietyLifeworldMasssocietyandculturePoliticalsocietySocialmovementsSocietalcommunity
Solidarity,167,179,312,359
ascodewordforcontrol,671n108
andcollectiveidentity,370,373
andcommunicativeaction,435436
ascomplementtojustice,377378
anddefenseofthelifeworld,472
Enlightenment,207,214
andgenealogicalaccountofmodernization,274276,279,280
inHegel'sscheme,100,106108,111112
andideologyofsecondleftinFrance,38,40,41
andthelifeworld,428429
andmodernization,500
andnegativityofsocietyandlossofthesocial,290,293294
inParsons'sscheme,119,124,125,131132,135,138,139,359
suppressionof,77,148
anduniversality,382386
SeealsoCollectiveidentityIdentityLifeworldPolishSolidarity
SollenandSein("ought"and"is"),tensionbetween,9394,95,394,407
Sorel,Georges,144
Soul,267268,269,287.SeealsoCitizenshipHommeIndividualismandindividualityPerson,legal
SovietUnion,118,307,315,316,447,488
andEasternEuropeinlate1980s,6061,62,6667,70
emergenceofparliamentarymediationsin,622
andGramsci'sideaofsocialcivilsociety,143,148,151159
polarizationsinsocietyof,619n109
Sovereignty,259260,275,276,279
Spaeman,Robert,361
Speech,public,178179,205,206,377,594
asdisobedience,573574
SeealsoCommunicationCommunicativeactionDiscoursePublicopinion

Page769
Stability
economic,11
government,5,6,70
Stagemodelofcollectiveaction.SeeLifecyclemodel
Stnde.SeeEstates
Stndestaat,274,443
Arendt'sconceptionof,182,183,191
inearlymodernconceptualhistory,8687,90
Gramsci'sconceptionof,146,147
Hegel'sconceptionof,110,111,116,118
Staniszkis,Jadwiga,59
State
Arendt'sconceptionof,181,194195
Foucault'sconceptionof,282286
intervention,225,234,238,242,244,247,250,330,340,430,432433(seealsoStatismWelfarestate)
riseofthemodern,8788
SeealsoAbsolutiststateFusionofstateandsocietyStatesocietydichotomyStatism
Statesocietydichotomy
Arendt'sconceptionof,203204
inferiorityofasmodelforcivilsociety,423424,430,463464
Luhmann'sconceptionof,329330
SchmittandKoselleck'sconceptionof,206
andsystem/lifeworldduality,426427
SeealsoThreepartmodel
Statism,1,13,29,30,37,39,44,9697,174,251
inGramsci'sthought,151159
inHegel'sthought,102105,108109,112,113
SeealsoAntistatismMarxismandneoMarxismRegulatedsocietyStateTotalitarianismWelfarestate
Steeringmechanism,415,417,418,472473,479480
anddemocratization,480
Stepan,Alfred,79
Strategicactiontheory,513,514
Stratification,social,9899,123,257,290.SeealsoClassstruggle
Structuralistfunctionalistmodelofcollectivebehavior,495
Supplysideeconomists,1314
SupremeCourt,577,578
Surrogacycontracts,537
Surveillance,282,287,288,294,666667n58.SeealsoPanopticonVisibility
Systemintegration,427
System/lifeworlddistinction.SeeLifeworld:asdifferentiatedfromsystem
Systemofneeds,117,126,142,147,203
inHegel'sscheme,95105,113,113,116
Systemstheory
andthefamily,536
andregulation,484486,487
SeealsoLuhmann,Niklas
T
Tarrow,Sidney,498,521
Taylor,Charles,93,295,375,380
Teubner,G.,481485,487
''Therapeutization,"450
Threepartmodel,429,442,616n44
andfusionargument,422,425426
superiorityoverdichotomousmodel,410,464
SeealsoStatesocietydichotomy
Tilly,Charles,519,521
andresourcemobilizationparadigm,498,499506,509
Tilly,Louise,Charles,andRichard,498
Tocqueville,Alexisde,242,253,421,478
andArendt,182,185,188,192,598

Page770
Tocqueville(continued)
anddemocratizationofcivilsociety,16,19,116,117,253
andFoucault,273,274
andFrenchtradition,78
andGramsci,146,157
andHegel,75,105,107,111,115,116
andideologyofsecondleftinFrance,3738
andliteraryandpublicspheres,221,223,229231
andParsons,133,135,136
Tnnies,Ferdinand,119,125126
Totalitarianism,37,286,327,346,409
Arendt'sconceptionof,184,190,200
andfusionargument,432
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistsociety,147149,154,159
Luhmann'sconceptionof,346
andPolishDemocraticopposition,33,34,36
SeealsoAbsolutiststateAuthoritarianismStatism
Totalizingtheory,257
Touraine,Alan,488,527,531,549
circularityofmodelof,518520
andnewsocialmovementsparadigm,510523
Traditionalism,2325
andcivilsociety,118142,433442
SeealsoLiberalismModernityandmodernizationNeoconservatism
Tribalsociety,120
Trotsky,Leon,152
Truth,relativityof,270,271
Tugendhat,Ernst,364365,366,367
U
Unger,RobertoM.:
LawinModernSociety,139142
Ungovernability,2324
Unions,11,123,133,146,150,151,198,200
Universalism,337
anddiscourseethics(Habermas),377,382386
Habermas'sconceptionof,349350,366(seealsoUniversalization,principleof)
Hegel'sconceptionof,92104,107115
liberal,89,2122
Universalization,principleof,350,367,369371,374,691692n60
Uruguay,53,56
Utopiasandutopianism,278,407,592
Arendt's,707n78
bourgeois,214
andcivildisobedience,566567
andcivilsociety,119,423,451456
anddemocraticlegitimacy,407
Gramsci's,155159
Habermas's,227228,231,348,390,409
liberal,452
overpoliticizeddemocratic,38
andpluralityofdemocracies,419420
Polnyi's,424
selflimiting,457
socialist,77,707n76
totalizing,456457
welfarestate,707n76
workers',192,592
V
Verfallsgeschichte,211
Visibility,280,288
Violenceandrepression,162163
Viveret,PatrickSeeRosanvallon,Pierre
Vote,4,5,131,171,246,394.SeealsoConsensusElectionsMajorityrule
W
Wagelabor,andhousework,536538
Walesa,Lech,60
Warofthegods,365,373
Wealth,186187,189.SeealsoMoneyandpower

Page771
Weber,Max,280,300,309,353,390,435
and"lossoffreedomandmeaning,"447,448
andtheoryofbureaucracy,116,245,280
andverstehen,392
"warofthegods"thesisof,365
Weffort,Francisco,50,77
Weimar,236,239240,241,242
Welfarestate,3,24,242,255,340
ambiguityof,concerningfreedom,394
Arendt'sconceptionof,185186,189
andconsumerism,449450
critiqueof,464468
defenseof,vs.neoconservativeantistatism,1115
democratic,443,445446
"forfailures,"612n63,726n103
andfeministcritique,544548
Foucault'sconceptionof,284
Habermas'sconceptionof,249250,447
Hegel'santicipationof,105,116
andideologyofsecondleftinFrance,40,4244
Parsons'sconceptionof,123,135,139,140,142
promiseof,422423
reflexivecontinuationof,26,468471
Westerntype,asoptionintheEast,490491
SeealsoState:interventionStatism
Wellmer,Albrecht,361,364,399,420
anddiscourseethics,401,402,407410
WestGermany,4247,460,488.SeealsoGreens
Westminstermodel,ofparliament,69
Willke,H.,484486,487
WilliamofMoerbeke,85
Wojcicki,K.,33,74
Women,215,221,224,456
inArendt'sscheme,648649n16,652n50,653n56
subjugationof,653n56,657658n33,659660n60,705706n58(seealsoDomination:male)
SeealsoFamilyFeminismFeministmovement
Workandworkethic,12,14,98,168.SeealsoWagelabor,andhouseworkWorker
Worker,543,549550
freedfromgenderdiscrimination,726727n107
Workingclassandworkers'movement,8,70,282,361,559,592
Anderson'sconceptionof,162,164
inArendt'sscheme,198199
andGramsci'sideaofsocialistsociety,147158
Habermas'sconceptionof,447
inHegel'sscheme,9899
Parsons'sconceptionof,125,133
andwelfarestate,464,477
Workplace,168,170,171,474,475
WritersofPolishdemocraticopposition,76.SeealsoPoland