The Dragons of Philosophy and the

Rebirth of Metaphysics
Daniel F. Gilles
St. John's College
Those philosophical laborers after the noble model of Kant and Hegel have to
determine and press into formulas, whether in the realm of logic or political (moral)
thought or art, some great data of valuations that is, former positings of values,
creations of value which have become dominant and are for a time called "truths." It
is for these investigators to mae ever!thing that has happened and been esteemed so
far eas! to loo over, eas! to thin over, intelligible and manageable, to abbreviate
ever!thing long, even "time," and to overcome the entire past an enormous and
wonderful tas in whose service ever! subtle pride, ever! tough will can certainl! find
satisfaction.
Nietzsche, "e!ond #ood and $vil 211
%othing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover an! thing
new to the world in philosoph! and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their
own s!stems, b! decr!ing all those, which have been advanced before them.
Hme, & Treatise of Human %ature p. !iii
"mmanel #ant, $hose immense oeuvre em%races logic, metaph&sics, ethics, an' natral
science, an' $hose comprehensiveness rivals that o( )ristotle, stan's as the (irst great
s&stematizer o( mo'ern philosoph&. "n a *Copernican revoltion o( the min'+, #ant postlate'
the critical principle, that $e mst 'etermine the natre o( the $orl', not throgh its o$n
properties, %t throgh the properties o( our minds that are re-ire' (or or e!perience o( it.
"n(orming all o( hman e!perience, the e!planation an' 'ra$ing ot o( this principle (orm a
critical s&stem $hose e!position occpie' #ant (rom his p%lication o( the 'riti(ue of )ure
*eason in 1./1 to his 'eath in 1/01.
"n an occrrence either tragic or seren'ipitos, 'epen'ing on one's perspective, G. 2. F.
Hegel p%lishe' his )henomenolog! of +pirit in 1/0., a mere three &ears a(ter #ant's 'eath. 3he
%eginning o( an ops o( philosophical $or4 $hose e!hastiveness rivals #ant's o$n, the
)henomenolog! posite' another ne$ mo'e o( thoght, the 'ialectic. 3hogh 'ra$ing on 5lato's
concept o( the same name, Hegel's 'ialectic $as more than a 'ialoge %et$een in'ivi'als. "t
provi'e' a $a& (or philosoph& to overcome an! and all limited determinations o( thoght 6 not
least, the ver& principle o( critical s%7ectivit& at the center o( #ant's s&stem. )(ter so %rie( a
reign, it seeme' that #antian philosoph& $as itsel( 'estine' to %e overthro$n.
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"n'ee', sch $as Hegel's aspiration. 9emoaning the 'ecline o( metaph&sics a(ter #ant,
Hegel ta4es isse $ith #ant's critical principle, an' $ith the proo(s $hich #ant se' in the
'riti(ue of )ure *eason to 'emonstrate the necessit& thereo(. For #ant, metaph&sics is in
'esperate nee' o( a critical re(ormation, as 'ispla&e' %& the antinomies of pure reason. 3he
antinomies 'ispla& errors that reason mst inevita%l& (all into, in the (orm o( a 'ialoge %et$een
oppose' thesis an' antithesis. :vincing the inevita%le (ailre o( the past metaph&sics $hich
regar's o%7ects as things in themselves, the& point to the nee' (or a critical approach. 9t Hegel,
thogh in agreement $ith #ant a%ot past metaph&sics's limite'ness, %elieves the proper
response to this limite'ness to %e not a #antian $ith'ra$al into transcen'ental i'ealism ;i.e., the
separation o( appearances (rom things in themselves<, %t a 'ialectical overcoming o( the thesis8
antithesis opposition. #ant's presentation o( the antinomies' con(lict as insol%le (or reason,
$hich 'enies the possi%ilit& o( sch a 'ialectic, is (or Hegel a (la$e' piece o( argmentation,
thogh one $hose importance is n'enia%le ;+cience of ,ogic 21.1.=8/0, p. 1=081<,
These Kantian antinomies will alwa!s remain an important part of Kantian philosoph!. The!,
above all, caused the downfall of previous metaph!sics and can be regarded as a main transition
to more recent philosoph!. However, despite its great service, Kant-s e.position of these
antinomies is ver! imperfect, both because it is internall! awward and eccentric and because of
the inappropriateness of its result, which presupposes that cognition has no other forms of
thought than finite categories.
Hegel 'isagrees $ith #ant %oth in his argmentation o( the antinomies an' in the conclsion that
he 'erives (rom them.
3ogether, #ant an' Hegel 'o a great service to philosoph& %& raising metaph&sics %ac4
p (rom a -asi8m&stical concern to an o%7ect o( serios an' s&stemic thoght. 9t ho$ $ill
metaph&sics %e re%orn, throgh a #antian criti-e or throgh a Hegelian 'ialectic> 9ecase o(
the importance o( the #antian antinomies, this -estion rests largel& pon another one, Do #ant's
antinomies, an' $ith them the nee' (or a critical re(orm o( metaph&sics, (all to Hegel's criti-e>
828
The antinomies of pure reason
#ant inten's his antinomies to illstrate the natre o( the %attles $ithin *the com%at area
?$hich@ $e call metaph!sics+ ;)
1
viii<. "n these %attles, the t$o com%atants, thesis an' antithesis,
each sccee' in re(ting the other's argments, %t neither sccee's in esta%lishing his o$n
argment as irre(ta%le. )s neither si'e can attain certaint&, the onl& option (or previos
metaph&sics is an o%stinate retreat to one si'e or the other o( the antinom&, to s4epticism or
'ogmatism.
#ant attri%tes the (ailre o( %oth si'es to attain certaint& to their assmption that the
o%7ects o( or e!perience ;the appearances< are things in themselves. #ant smmarizes his
argment ths ;9 AB18A<,
If the world is a whole e.isting in itself, then it is either finite or infinite. %ow, both of these
alternatives are false / Hence it is also false that the world (the sum of all appearances) is a
whole e.isting in itself.
9& prespposing, as all previos metaph&sicians have 'one, the realit& o( appearances ;i.e., their
in'epen'ence o( or mo'e o( 4no$ing them<, the thesis an' antithesis (ail to (in' soli' gron',
an' in their (ailre 'emonstrate the nee' to re7ect this prespposition. Hence the antinomies
serve as an *in'irect proo(+ ;9 AB1< o( the transcen'ental i'ealit& o( appearances.
Hegel sees #ant's antinomies as prespposing their conclsions. For Hegel, the relevant
incorrect assmption is not that appearances are things in themselves, %t the converse, that
things in themselves are mere appearances, an' that $e can onl& thin4 them as sch. 3his latter
1 Citations to the ma7or $or4s o( #ant an' Hegel are a%%reviate' as (ollo$s,
)C9 D Criti-e o( 5re Eeason ;(irstCsecon' e'itions<. #ant, "mmanel, tr. 2erner S. 5lhar. 'riti(ue of )ure
*eason. Hac4ett, 1==F.
:G D :nc&clope'ia Gogic. Hegel, G.2.F, tr. 3.F. Geraets, 2.). Schting H H.S. Harris. The $nc!clopedia ,ogic.
Hac4ett, 1==1.
5S D 5henomenolog& o( Spirit. Hegel, G.2.F., tr. 3err& 5in4ar'. )henomenolog! of +pirit. Inp%lishe' 'ra(t, 200/.
Jhttp,CC$$$.scri%'.comC'ocC.FBB201/C385in4ar'85henomenolog&8:nglish83e!tK
SG D Science o( Gogic. Hegel, G.2.F., tr. George 'i Giovanni. The +cience of ,ogic. Cam%ri'ge, 2010. 5age
nm%ers are (or Hegel, G.2.F., tr. ). L. Miller. The +cience of ,ogic. 5romethes 9oo4s, 1==/.
8B8
assmption, ma'e %& #ant, taints $hat shol' %e an o%7ective e!amination o( previos
metaph&sical 'octrines $ith the s%7ective i'ealism o( #ant's o$n critical 'octrine.
#ant, in the smmar& o( his argment a%ove, gives s reason to sspect the vali'it& o(
Hegel's criti-e %& e-ating *the $orl'+ $ith *the sm o( all appearances+. Does #ant in (act
presppose the critical 'octrine in his argments (or the antinomies> )n' i( so, ho$ can the
antinomies (airl& pla& their proper role as an navoi'a%le pro%lem (or all prior metaph&sics>
The second antinomy
#ant's secon' antinom& ;91F28.1< is the one most s%stantivel& a''resse' %& Hegel. Get
s se Hegel's criti-e to e!amine the logic o( #ant's argments. 3he thesis o( the antinom&
asserts that
$ver! composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing at all e.ists but the
simple or what is composed of it.
3he antithesis claims that
%o composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there e.ists in the world nothing
simple at all.
3he proo(s o( %oth thesis an' antithesis ;as $ith all o( the antinomies< are in the (orm o( a
reductio ad absurdum, assming the position o( the opposite si'e an' 'emonstrating a
contra'iction. 3he thesis 'emonstrates that if composites 'i' not consist o( simples, composition
$ol' either %e impossi%le to annl ;$hich goes against the natre o( composition in
s%stances<, or else, a(ter it $as annlle', there $ol' remain nothing ;$hich goes against the
ver& s%stantialit& o( s%stances<. Hence composite s%stances mst consist o( simples.
Mean$hile, the antithesis sho$s that if composites consiste' o( simples, those simples $ol'
occp& space an' hence %e composite. Hence composite s%stances mst consist o( composites.
818
Hegel's general criticism is that the thesis an' antithesis each merel& assert *the t$o
oppose' moments o( a 'etermination+, an' that each argment *allege'l& elicits the sem%lance
o( proo( $hile in (act hi'ing an' ren'ering nrecogniza%le the merel& assertorical character o(
the claim+ ;SG 21.1/1, p. 1=2<. "n the case o( the thesis, Hegel arges that #ant's proo( is
circlar. He sa&s that the *nerve o( the proo(+ ;SG 21.1/1, p. 1=A< is #ant's parenthetical
assertion that *composition is onl& a contingent relation o( s%stances 6 a relation $ithot $hich
s%stances, as themselves permanent %eings, mst still s%sist+ ;91FB<, $hich #ant ses to arge
that composition cannot %e impossi%le to annl, i( the composite in -estion is a s%stance.
Hence the thesis, *%& assming composition as the mo'e o( connection o( an&thing s%stantial,
'ogmaticall& assmes the accidentalit! of this connection+ ;SG 21.1/., p. 1=.<. 3his assmption
*col' have %een imme'iatel& attache' as proo( to the thesis that the composite s%stance
consists o( simple parts $ithot the apagogic 'etor+ ;SG 21.1/B, p. 1=B<, i.e., $ithot the
reductio proo(. )s evi'ence that the thesis is assming $hat it oght to prove, Hegel notes #ant's
citation o( the a%ove assmption, *that composition is merel& an e!ternal state o( them+ ;91FA<
;the things in the $orl'<, as part o( the conclusion (or its argment.
3he last point can perhaps %e e!plaine' as a misrea'ing o( #ant on Hegel's part. Here is
the relevant portion o( #ant's conclsion ;9 1F1<,
0rom this it follows directl! that the things in the world are, one and all, simple beings1 that
composition is merel! an e.ternal state of them /
Hegel seems to rea' the *o( them+ ;*derselben+< as " have glosse' it a%ove 6 as re(erring to the
things in the $orl' 6 in $hich case this secon' conclsion 'oes appear i'entical $ith the
argment se' in the proo(. 9t perhaps #ant means its antece'ent to instea' %e *simple
%eings+
2
, in $hich case the thesis is not restating the argment %t noting the reslt, that the
2 G&er an' 2oo' ;#ant, "mmanel, tr. 5al G&er H )llen F. 2oo'. 'riti(ue of )ure *eason. Cam%ri'ge, 1==/<
translate the clase as *that composition is onl& an e!ternal state o( these %eings+, $hich at least testi(ies to the
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composite s%stance $e %egan $ith in the assertion o( the thesis is in (act compose' o( simples.
"n line $ith this, one might 'istingish %et$een the t$o ses o( *merel&+ C *onl&+ ;%oth
*nur+<. "n the proo( it seems to re(er to $hat t&pe o( relation composition is ;*composition is
onl& a contingent relation o( s%stances+, i.e., (or s%stances composition is onl& a contingent
relation<, $hile in the conclsion it re(ers to $hat composition is ;*composition is merel& an
e.ternal state of 2simple beings3+, i.e., composition is nothing more than that<. So the statement
in the conclsion o( the thesis asserts that ever& composition an' hence ever& composite thing is
compose' o( simples 6 an ans$er to the -estion o( the antinom& 6 $hereas the statement in the
argment cites the natre o( composition in or'er to 'e'ce that composition o( s%stances
cannot %e impossi%le to annl.
9t is the thesis's argment 7sti(ie' on more than merel& 'ogmatic gron's> 3he thesis
starts $ith the assmption that there are no simple s%stances, an' then procee's to annl all
composition, an' then to sho$ that this annlment reslts in the contra'iction o( alrea'& 4no$n
trths ;incl'ing the a%ove assmption<. Hegel sees this assmption, $hich the argment
intro'ces parentheticall&, as the linchpin o( the proo(. 3o e!amine #ant's assmptions, let s
ta4e Hegel's sggestion an' avoi' 'etors %& re$riting the proo( as a 'irect one,
4e have a composite substance before us. +ince it is composite onl! insofar as it is made up of
other things, we can decompose it, at least in our imagination. ,et its composition be annulled.
If its parts are still composite, let their composition be annulled, and so on1 i.e., let all
composition be annulled. 4e must be left with something, and it must itself be a substance, since
substance is permanent. "ut what we are left with must be simple, since all composition has been
annulled. Hence simple substances e.ist.
2hat assmptions 'oes this proo( rel& on> 3here seem to %e three main presppositions,
1. Composition involves ptting together other things ;parts<.
2. Composition is reversi%le, at least in thoght ;the composite can %e %ro4en 'o$n into its
grammatical via%ilit& o( this interpretation.
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parts<.
B. ) composite substance is itsel( ma'e p o( other s%stances, an' hence 'ecomposition
'oes not change the s%stantialit& o( something.
3he thir' assmption seems to %e the most controversial. Eather than, sa&, an )ristotelian
composite o( (orm an' matter, (or #ant s%stance is the s%stratm o( presentation itsel(, the
matter o( or ;an' o( an& possi%le< n'erstan'ing ;9 221 ((.<. Composites are (orme' %& ptting
together appearances *in so (ar as the& are otsi'e one another an' &et in connection+ ;9 2F182<,
so there is no change (rom one t&pe o( %eing to another in composition. ) composite s%stance,
i( ma'e p o( simples, mst %e ma'e p o( simple substances ;%ecase o( assmption B<.
Moreover, as the %asis o( the n'erstan'ing, s%stance mst %e permanent an' in'estrcti%le ;9
22/<. From this accont, the (irst an' secon' assmptions also (ollo$, $e pt together connecte'
appearances, $hich are themselves alrea'& appearancesN an' since $e pt them together
accor'ing to their connecte'ness, $e can also ta4e them apart %& the same principle.
Hegel 'isagrees that an& o( these assmptions are necessar& to prove $hat #ant's thesis
$ishes to prove. Compositeness, accor'ing to Hegel, implies %& its ver& 'e(inition composition
o( something else, $hich cannot %e the composite again %t mst %e the simple ;SG 21.1/2, p.
1=B<,
If in is said to consist of in again, the meaning of the (uestion regarding the something else of
which the in consists is missed1 the (uestion is not answered but is simpl! repeated / If the
simple which is said to be the other of the composite is taen to be onl! a relativel& simple
which, for itself, is composite in turn, then the (uestion stands as before. 0igurative
representation has in view, sa!, onl! this or that composite, to which this or that something might
also be assigned as its simple element, although for itself the latter is a composite. "ut the issue
here is the composite as sch.5
3o sa& that the composite as sch is compose' o( simples is $hat #ant $ol' call an anal&tical
proposition ;one $hose pre'icate (ollo$s 'irectl& (rom the 'e(inition o( the s%7ect<. Hence the
8.8
#antian assmptions a%ot s%stance are nnecessar& an' the proo( o( the thesis is an *apagogic
'etor+.
Mean$hile, in the case o( the antithesis, Hegel disagrees $ith the conclsion o( the
proo(, %t again sees the argment as a 'etor into #ant's critical 'octrine. 3he proo( o( the
antithesis is more e!plicit a%ot its assmptions, that *all composition (rom s%stances is
possi%le onl& in space+ ;9 1FB< an' that *an&thing real that occpies a space comprises a
mani(ol' ?o( elements@ otsi'e one another an' hence is composite+ ;9 1F1<. Since the assme'
simple elements o( the composite mst %e in space, the& mst %e composite. For Hegel, the
entire proo( comes 'o$n to the assmption *that ever!thing substantial is spatial, %t that space
does not consist of simple parts+, an' $ith this assme' *the $hole proo( is alrea'& (inishe'+
;21.1/A, p. 1=A<. 9t in (act, accor'ing to Hegel, *the s%stances oght not to have %een posite'
in space+ ;SG 21.1/A, p. 1=F<N onl& %ecase o( the critical tenet *that $e have a concept o( %o'ies
onl& as appearances+ ;21.1/F, p. 1=.< 'i' $e transpose the pre concept o( s%stance into
empirical space an' anal&ze it accor'ing to the #antian 'octrine o( $hat space is.
The grounds of the antinomies
For Hegel, %oth thesis an' antithesis 'eal $ith concepts $hich are nnecessaril&
*entangle' in O the representation o( the $orl', space, time, matter, an' so on+ ;SG 21.1/0, p.
1=1<. 3he se(l antinom& (or Hegel is not %et$een the trl& an' o%viosl& contra'ictor&
concepts o( the simple an' the composite %t %et$een the oppose' %t non8%inar& properties o(
'iscreteness an' continit&, $hich, nli4e the (ormer t$o concepts, represent the thoght
'eterminations *consi'ere' prel& in themselves+ ;SG 21.1/0, p. 1=2<. "n their conceptal prit&,
'iscreteness an' continit& are not ltimatel& oppose', %t rather represent opposite
'eterminations $hich can %e s%late' into a nit&.
8/8
#ant seems to agree $ith Hegel that as a%stract 'eterminations, 'iscreteness an'
continit& lac4 the same sort o( opposition as composite an' simple, sa&ing that since continit&
is *3he propert& o( magnit'es $here%& no part in them is the smallest possi%le ;i.e., no part is
simple<+ ;9 211<, there(ore magnit'es, %ecase the& are not s%stances, can %e sai' 'e(initivel&
to lac4 simple parts $hile remaining 'iscrete. 9t $hereas (or Hegel the antinom& is more
properl& %et$een these ltimatel& reconcila%le concepts, as pre an' nentangle', this
entanglement is precisel& $hat is essential to #ant's n'erstan'ing o( the antinomies, an' $hat
(or #ant cases the inevita%le antinom&. #ant's thesis points ot that in the case o( s%stances,
composites mst %e ltimatel& compose' o( simples %ecase o( their s%stantial natre. His
antithesis points ot that composites mst %e compose' ad infinitum o( composites, for the same
reason. "t is %ecase o( the natre o( the s%strate that the antinomies occr 6 an' it is %&
e!amining that s%strate that $e can solve those antinomies. So the assertion that the s%stantial
s%strate o( the antinomies *%ears no in(lence on the antinom& itsel(+ is in (act -ite the
opposite o( the case, (or #ant, it is precisel& %ecase $e are thin4ing o( these things as
s%stantial appearances that the antinom& o( simple an' composite occrs.
#ant is 7sti(ie' in sing the s%stantial (orm o( the simple8compositeC'iscrete8
continos opposition %ecase the point o( his criti-e is to anal&ze the natre o( appearances,
incl'ing s%stances. Gi4e$ise, $hile Hegel's criticism o( the apagogic natre o( #ant's proo(s
as hi'ing #ant's real assmptions ma& %e vali' (rom the stan'point o( one coming across the
proo(s e. novo throgh the lens o( Hegel's s&stem, $e have seen that (or someone $ho is
$or4ing throgh the conse-ences o( #ant's s&stem, those assmptions $ill have alrea'& %een
sho$n to %e tre. "t is natral that #ant $ol' re(er to them onl& parentheticall&.
9t %& spporting the argments in the antinomies on the gron's o( the natre o(
perception, have $e merel& pshe' the 'ogmatism o( the argment %ac4 (rom the thesis an'
8=8
antithesis to #ant himsel( %& letting the argment rel& pon #ant's o$n 'octrine> Hegel arges
that the proo(s o( %oth si'es are contaminate' $ith critical presppositions ;SG 21.1/., p. 1=.<,
If we then loo into the opposition of thesis and antithesis more accuratel! / we find that the
proof of the antithesis, b! transposing substances into space, dogmaticall! assumes continit&,
6ust as the proof of the thesis, but assuming composition as the mode of connection of an!thing
substantial, dogmaticall! assumes the acci'entalit& o( this connection O
2e have 7sti(ie' the thesis on seemingl& critical gron's, an' (on' that the antithesis also
7sti(ies itsel( in this $a&. "s this 7sti(ication 'ogmatic> "( #ant intro'ces the critical 'octrine
into the argments that are sppose' to re(te transcen'ental realism, then Hegel is right, it is not
onl& the thesis an' antithesis that appear circlar, %t also #ant's larger claim that their
opposition constittes an in'irect proo( o( transcen'ental i'ealism.
Pne response $ol' %e to sa& that the thesis an' antithesis merel& represent a historical
vie$point that illstrates reason's histor& as a *com%at area+. "n this case, $e might %e tempte'
to sa& that the antinomies are simpl& 'esigne' to sho$ that reason $ishes to have things %oth
$a&s, an' that the argments nee' not have per(ect rigor. 9t #ant re7ects this notion, sa&ing that
in the antinomies he has not soght to constrct a *la$&er's proo(+ %ase' on *(allacios
in(erences+ ;9 1A/<. 3he antinomies are inten'e' not onl& to sho$ the (alsehoo's that reason can
(all into, %t also to sho$ the necessit! o( reason (alling into those (alsehoo's, i( the 'istinction
%et$een appearances an' things in themselves is not ta4en into accont. For this latter prpose
their argments mst %e entirel& vali', e.cept (or ignoring that 'istinction. Pnl& in this $a& can
these other$ise *$ell8(on'e'+ ;9 ABA< argments serve as an in'irect proo( o( the
transcen'ental i'ealit& o( appearances %& 'isproving their common assmption, *that
appearances, or a $orl' o( sense comprising them all, are things in themselves+ ;9 ABA<.
9t 'o the presppositions o( the thesis an' antithesis in (act stem (rom #ant's critical
tenets> "t seems clear that the& rel& pon the natre o( or e!perience. 9t perhaps this reliance
8108
can %e 'istingishe' (rom #ant's position, viz. that appearances are not things in themselves.
3hogh the thesis an' antithesis rel& pon the natre o( appearances, the& 'o not 'epen' pon
appearances %eing separate (rom things in themselves. "n'ee', as it trns ot, the& assme that
appearances are things in themselves. Eather than prespposing an&thing a%ot $hether
appearances are or are not things in themselves, #ant ma& %e merel& having the thesis an'
antithesis %egin $ith the netral gron' o( appearance. Hence #ant's -estion is, *$hat t&pes o(
e!periences can or min's hol'>+ His ans$er is that since the $orl' ;as e!perience'< cannot %e
(inite or in(inite, neither can it e!ist ;in or min's< as a thing in itsel(. 9t an argment that
ignores the speci(ications in the parentheses a%ove is not relevant to #ant's -estion. "n'ee',
#ant concl'es that i( $e trl& consi'er things in themselves, $e can sa& nothing a%ot them.
Despite $hat previos philosophers thoght, their s%7ect matter has not %een things in
themselves. Eather, those philosophers have e!plore' appearances as if the& $ere things in
themselves. 3his is the line o( thoght $hich the antithetic o( pre reason mst recapitlate. 9t
to 'o this in a plasi%le $a&, $e mst %egin $ith appearances. "n #ant's metaphor, $e %egin
(rom *the terrain o( e!perience+ ;9 .<, $hich is 4no$n to %e soli', an' procee' to investigate
$hether $e can ma4e sorties ot into the *ocean+ o( *illsion+ ;9 2=A<. Hence the transcen'ental
'ialectic ;the e!position o( reason's errors, incl'ing the antinomies< must (ollo$ the
transcen'ental anal&tic ;the 'e'ction o( the concepts $ith $hich $e anal&ze the $orl'<. 3he
'ialectic, ta4ing p Hme's i'ea o( *e!perimental philosoph&+ ;Treatise of Human %ature !vi
B
<,
is an *e!periment $ith concepts an' principles that $e assme a priori+ ;9 !viii< 6 the
*elementar& concepts o( the n'erstan'ing+ ;9 !!ii n<. )s #ant sa&s, the e!periment is to see
$hether assming *that or e!periential cognition con(orms to o%7ects as things in themselves+
;9 !!< reslts in a contra'iction. 3o per(orm this e!periment in a scienti(ic $a&, $e mst %egin
B Hme, Davi'. Treatise of Human %ature. 5romethes 9oo4s, 1==2.
8118
$ith the non8controversial gron' o( cognition, or *things inso(ar as $e are ac-ainte' $ith
them ;i.e., inso(ar as the& are given to s<+ ;9 !!<. Here, too, #ant (ollo$s pon Hme,
speci(icall& his i'ea o( a *science o( man+ $hose *soli' (on'ation O mst %e lai' on
e!perience an' o%servation+ ;Treatise !vi< an' (rom $hich $e can *vo&age O pon that
%on'less ocean+ o( philosoph& ;Treatise 2FB81<.
9t $h& 'oes #ant have his argments %egin (rom appearances i( he $ishes to refute the
metaph&sicians $ho have (aile' to 'o so> 5erhaps it is %ecase, a(ter Hme, it seems impossi%le
to (in' certaint&, as the *4nights+ ;9 1A0< o( the com%at gron' $ish to 'o, $ithot a''ressing
the isse o( $hether things otsi'e o( s are real. #ant sa&s that the antinomies are errors that
reason natrall& (alls into, so (or post8Hmean philosoph& to ignore Hme $ol' %e to provi'e a
metaph&sics that reason is no longer li4el& to (in' itsel( in. 3o some 'egree, 'ogmatism an'
s4epticism are simpl& impossi%le to re(te. "n the (ormer case, a 'ogmatist's assertion that simpl&
re(se' to listen to Hme's criti-e $ol' %e impossi%le to re(te %& its o$n logic, thogh #ant
$ol' claim that logic to %e inconsistent $ith or e!perienceN an' in the latter case even Hegel
a'mits that some s4eptics $ill simpl& toss ever&thing *into the same empt& a%&ss+ ;5S Q.=<. 9t
(or the philosopher $ho has honestl& consi'ere' Hme's argments, the netral gron' is the
o%7ects o( or e!perience, so there is no$here else to %egin the antinomies than $ith or
e!perience o( the o%7ects in -estion. 2e mst have some philosophical %asis to arge (rom or
else there $ill simpl& %e 'ogmatism or s4epticism, %t that %asis can onl& %e the ncontroversial
matter o( ever&'a& e!perience. "n #ant's metaphor, the anal&sis o( this e!perience provi'es the
*goo' (on'ation+ $hich 5lato, in his metaph&sical speclations, lac4e' ;9=<. Pr, to se the
metaphor o( the com%at area, i( the com%atants emerge (rom slipper& gron' an' (ight on
slipper& gron', then nothing can %e sai' to have %een sho$n e!cept that $e appear to have no
certaint& at all. "nstea', the& mst %egin on the (irm gron' o( $hat is 4no$n to s as thin4ing
8128
%eings, an' onl& %& ventring ot onto the nsta%le terrain o( asserting the 4no$le'ge o( things
in themselves lose their (ooting an' (all into a %attle $ithot a victor.
9eginning an&$here other than $ith appearances $ol' not allo$ s to consi'er the
s%stantial natre o( the composites that the secon' antinom& 'eals $ith an' resce orselves
(rom the com%at gron' o( transcen'ental illsion. So #ant mst $al4 a (ine line %et$een
ma4ing his proo(s circlar, %& rel&ing pon his o$n assmptions, or ma4ing them illegitimate,
%& rel&ing pon 'octrinal (alsehoo's. 2e mst %e care(l, in sing the natre o( appearances, not
to %ecome 'ogmatic an' assert critical 'octrine. 2e can 'o this, in the case o( the secon'
antinom&, %& ta4ing *s%stance+ to re(er not to s%stance as it is thoght o( in an& particlar
'octrine 6 incl'ing the critical 6 %t as the minimm presppose' %& or thoght. "n the critical
'octrine this is all that appearances are, %t in the antinomies $e mst consi'er them as the&
appear to s regar'less o( their possi%le realit&. 2e can emplo& the same principles that #ant
7sti(ies in the transcen'ental anal&tic throgh the natre o( e!perience, %t $ithot asserting
their stats as mere principles o( thoght. )s #ant sggests %& noting that )ristotle arrive' at ten
o( #ant's t$elve categories o( the n'erstan'ing ;9 10.<, the principles o( thoght are emplo&e'
%& all philosophers, al%eit in a con(se' $a& 'e to their %eing mista4en (or principles o( the
natre o( things in themselves. 2hat is at isse in the anal&tic is not so mch the content o( the
principles as their statusN an' in the 'ialectic $e can contine to se these principles $hile
sspen'ing or 7'gment as to $hether or not the& appl& to things in themselves.
The second antinomy (part II)
Get s appl& this i'ea o( sing or %asic e!periences to the secon' antinom&. 3he thing
$e are consi'ering is composite s%stance. 3o avoi' controversies over $hether substance
consists o( )-inian compon's, Gcretian atoms, Gei%nizian mona's, compon's o( the (or
81B8
elements, or something else entirel&, let s simpl& consi'er it as the matter of appearances. )s an
appearance alone, $hat 'o $e 4no$ a%ot it as a composite> 3hat it appears to have parts. 9t
$hat are its parts ma'e p o(> )re the& themselves ma'e p o( parts, an' so on ad infinitum 6 in
$hich case appearances seem to %e ltimatel& ma'e p o( nothing at all> Pr mst there
ltimatel& %e simple parts 6 in $hich case ho$ can it appear to have parts ;e.g., a le(t si'e an' a
right si'e<> 9oth the t$o conclsions an' the t$o o%7ections seem tre to the n'erstan'ing
%ase' on its sal application o( rles to o%7ects o( e!perience. Hence $e mst either s%late
them %& asserting reason's spremac& over the limits o( the n'erstan'ing, as Hegel 'oes, or
$ith'ra$ the -estion as nans$era%le %& reason, (ollo$ing #ant.
2e can no$ see $h& #ant e-ates *the $orl'+ $ith the sm o( all appearances. 3he
thesis an' antithesis represent positions that reason *mst come pon+ 8 not in the con(se' (orm
that it $ol' have prior to Hme, $here $e ta4e appearances (or real things $ithot noticing $e
have 'one so, %t 'irectl& an' $ith the a$areness that $e are 'iscssing s%stances *in the
$orl'+ ;9 1F2<, that is, in *the sm o( all appearances+. "n other $or's, the thesis an' antithesis
represent in the most 'irect (orm the reslts o( postlating the nomenal ;things8in8themselves<
natre o( appearances, rather than in the con(se' an' na$are (orm o( all philosoph& prior to
Hme. "n'ee', the (orm o( each si'e's argment imme'iatel& 'emonstrates their prespposition,
%eginning $ith the (irst sentence ;91F28A<,
3H:S"S
O
0or suppose that composite substances did not
consist of simple parts. In that case...
%ow since this case contradicts the
presupposition, there remains onl! the second
case7 vi8., that the substantive composite in the
world consists of simple parts.
)N3"3H:S"S
...
+uppose that a composite thing (as substance)
consists of simple parts. %ow /
/ therefore the simple would be a substantive
composite which is self9contradictor!. 2Hence
no composite things consist of simple parts.3
9& asserting that composite s%stances 'o or 'o not consist o( simple parts, an' that i( one is
8118
(alse the other (ollo$s, the thesis an' antithesis presppose that the natre o( composite
s%stances is 4no$n. Hence $e see $h& #ant chooses to $rite the proo(s o( the thesis an'
antithesis apagogicall&, to sho$ that each proo( is (alse (rom the ver& %eginning, (rom the
reductio assmption that prespposes that $e 4no$ the $a& things trl& are.
2e can also no$ see the reason (or the apparentl& *lopsi'e', 'is7ointe'+ ;SG 21.1/1
1
<,
*a$4$ar' an' eccentric+ ;SG 21.1/0< natre o( #ant's proo(. 2e note' a%ove that Hegel thin4s
#ant's proo( o( the thesis can %e re'ce' to t$o steps,
1. Composition o( s%stances is acci'ental
2. 3here(ore, the essence o( s%stances is the simple
9t the simplicit& o( this proo( hi'es several o( its o$n assmptions, $hich, i( ma'e e!plicit,
ma4e the proo( rather longer,
1. Composition o( s%stances is acci'ental
2. 3he acci'ental is not the essence o( a s%stance
B. 3here(ore the composite is not the essence o( a s%stance
1. 3here mst %e an essence o( a s%stance
A. 3here(ore something other than the composite is the essence o( the s%stance
F. 3he simple is the onl& thing other than the composite
.. 3here(ore the essence o( a s%stance is the simple
2hile the reasoning o( this proo( is clearer than that o( #ant's, #ant's proo( is clearer in a
'i((erent $a&. #ant %egins $ith the composite 6 $ith the niversal st(( o( appearances on $hich
the n'erstan'ing operates. He then procee's to anal&ze the composite in the $a& that reason is
'ra$n to 'o 6 %& e!ten'ing the proce'res ;the concepts< o( the n'erstan'ing in or'er to
'ecompose it 6 an' then e!amines $hat remains. He (in's that $hat remains mst %e the simple,
%ecase, as reason %elieves, o( the natre o( the concepts o( the n'erstan'ing ;7st as the proo(
o( the antithesis (in's that $hat remains mst %e the composite %ecase o( those same concepts<.
"n essence, #ant presents a phenomenological proof o( the $a& reason mst thin4. Hegel's proo(
1 )ll citations here are (rom the :uantit! chapter o( the +cience of ,ogic, $hich rns (rom 21.1.F821.1=B, $ith
each German page %eing a little less than one page in m& e'ition.
81A8
is a logical proo( $hich, $hile vali', 'oes not represent the mirage that reason (in's itsel( plle'
in to.
The deceptions of reason
2e might $on'er, $h& is reason 'ra$n to these -estions, $here it inevita%l& (in's itsel(
in error> #ant's analog& to empirical illsion in the $orl' o( the senses is help(l. 2e can
compare the antinomies to mirages, $hich $e cannot avoi' e!periencing even thogh $e 4no$
o( their (alsit&. Ho$ever, $e mst %e care(l $ith the analog&, since #ant claims that trth an'
error come not (rom the senses, %t (rom the 7'gments $e ma4e a%ot them ;9 BA0<. ) mirage
is not in (act (alse nless $e ta4e it to accratel& represent the position o( an o%7ect. Similarl&,
the n'erstan'ing itsel( can never %e (alse $hen operating accor'ing to its o$n la$s. 9t
presma%l&, $e can still call %oth mirages an' certain o( or n'erstan'ing's principles
deceptive. #ant sa&s that $hen sensi%ilit& *in(lences the n'erstan'ing's acts themselves an'
'etermines it to ma4e 7'gments, ?it@ is a %asis o( error.+ ;9 BA1<. "n or e!perience, there seem
to %e times $hen sensi%ilit& 'oes not so in(lence the n'erstan'ingN %t at the times $hen it
'oes, it can %e consi'ere' 'eceptive. Similarl&, $here reason in(lences the n'erstan'ing to
transgress its %on's, it is transcendent, i.e., it 'eceives s into %elieving in the nomenal natre
o( appearances.
2h& then 'oes the transcen'ent se ;as 'istingishe' (rom the transcendental se, $hich
is the se prior to e!perience< o( the principles o( the n'erstan'ing occr to s> #ant sa&s that
*in or reason O there lie %asic rles an' ma!ims o( its se that have entirel& the loo4 o(
o%7ective principles+ ;9 BAB<, sggesting that these ma!ims not onl& ten' to occr %t in (act are
alrea'& e!isting in s. "n the First 5re(ace, #ant attri%tes reason's 'eception to its having
*principles that it cannot avoi' sing in the corse o( e!perience, an' that this e!perience at the
81F8
same time s((icientl& 7sti(ies it in sing+ ;) vii<, $hich then compel reason to *resort to
principles that go %e&on' all possi%le se in e!perience+ ;) viii<. "t is clear that there are t$o
'i((erent t&pes o( principles o( reason, representing t$o 'i((erent t&pes o( se o( the principles o(
the n'erstan'ing. 3he (irst are the principles (or the proper maintenance o( the se o( the
n'erstan'ing. 9& sing them, *or reason ;as in'ee' its natre re-ires it to 'o< ascen's ever
higher, to more remote con'itions+ ;) vii8iii<. 9t $hen the con'itions rn ot, reason inevita%l&
$ishes to ta4e p other principles 6 the transcen'ent ones, $hich allo$ it to presppose the
totalit& o( the con'itions as given to it an' cognize things in themselves. So those principles
(l(ill reason's 'esire (or the highest possi%le ans$ers 6 a 'esire $hich, thogh impossi%le to
(l(ill, reason mst have in or'er to lea' s to categorize the n'erstan'ing's principles
e((icientl&. 3he ta4ing p o( the transcen'ent principles occrs, as sggeste' %& #ant's metaphors
o( mirages, throgh a sort o( laziness, 7st as or min' is (oole' %& the sal a'e-ac& o( ta4ing
or visal representation o( an o%7ect to represent its real size, so reason is 'eceive' %& its natral
se o( the principles o( the n'erstan'ing to (in' the case o( an event or the con'ition o( a
con'itione' to thin4 that the entire se-ence o( cases or con'itions can %e 'iscovere' i( it so
'esires. 9t in (act, in this $a& reason $ol' %e given, as a conclsion, $hat is is sppose' to %e
given to the n'erstan'ing onl& as a tas4.
System and organism
Hence $hat at (irst seeme' to %e *s%lime i'eas+ that *(ar srpass the vale o( all other
hman science+ ;9 1=1< are in (act reveale' to %e 'eceptions, an' the soltions to the *-estions
(or $hose soltion the mathematician $ol' gla'l& give a$a& his entire science+ ;9 1=1< are
sho$n not to %elong to speclative reason. Ret this loss is also a gain. )t the same time as he
(rstrates theoretical reason's hopes (or its o$n ans$ers to these -estions, #ant is a%le to satis(&
81.8
*one o( reason's most important concerns+ ;9 !v< 6 the 'esire (or metaph&sics to %ecome a
science 6 %& in e((ect completing metaph!sics. *Pnce metaph&sics has %een %roght %& this
criti-e onto the secre path o( a science... it can complete its $or4 an' pt it asi'e (or the se o(
posterit&, as a capital that can never %e increase'+ ;9 !!iii8iv<. Moreover, the %ene(it o( this
secrit& is not onl& theoretical %t also practical. ) scienti(icall& limite' speclative reason $ill
prevent reason's e!pansion into the ethical realm that is the proper 'omain o( practical reason,
an' hence *ct o((, at the ver& root, materialism, fatalism, atheism, O fanaticism, O
superstition, O idealism?,@ an' septicism+ ;9 !!!iv<, pro'cing a %ene(it not onl& (or
philosoph& %t (or the p%lic.
Central to the secrit& o( #ant's metaph&sics is the s&stematic natre o( his $or4. For
#ant, *Hman reason is %& natre architectonic. ".e., it regar's all cognitions as %elonging to a
possi%le s&stem+ ;9 A02<. 3he *s&stematic nit&+ $hich reason searches (or is in (act *$hat trns
common cognition into science+ ;9 /F0<. Hence #ant sees his 'riti(ue as re(lecting the strctre
o( pre reason, $here *ever&thing is an organ, i.e., ever&thing is there (or the sa4e o( each
mem%er, an' each in'ivi'al mem%er is there (or the sa4e o( all+ ;9 !!!vii8iii<. "n #ant's o$n
s&stem, *2e o%tain the same reslt $hether $e procee' (rom the mintest elements all the $a&
to the $hole o( pre reason+, or vice versa ;9 !!!viii<, an' *an& attempt to alter even the
smallest part imme'iatel& gives rise to contra'ictions+ ;9 !!!viii<. Having create' his o$n (ine8
tne' $e%, #ant is hope(l *that this s&stem $ill contine to maintain itsel( in this nchangea%le
state+ ;9 !!!viii< to perpetit&.
"t is natral that Hegel $ol' ta4e this static s&stem as a challenge. )ccepting #ant's
s&stem $ol' mean leaving (tre metaph&sicians $ith little to 'o %t strengthen the ties o( the
#antian s&stem, a prsit $hich #ant sa&s is *nothing more than the tas4 o( arranging ever&thing
in the didactic manner accor'ing to their aims, &et $ithot their %eing a%le to increase the
81/8
content in the least+ ;) !!<. )s a testament to the e((icac& o( #ant's s&stem, Hegel %egins the
+cience of ,ogic %& noting that #ant's teaching that *the n'erstan'ing oght not to %e allo$e'
to soar a%ove e!perience+ ;SG 21.A, p. 2A< has le' to *the 'o$n(all o( metaph&sics+ ;SG 21.F, p.
2A<. Nor has #ant's restriction o( speclative reason le' to a more ethical p%licN rather, a(ter
#ant $e (in' that a pre s%7ectivism in ethics has ta4en hol', $ith no gi'ance (rom reason at
all ;:G Secon' 5re(ace<,
0rom the mistaen view that the inade(uac! of finite categories to e.press truth entails the
impossibilit! of ob6ective cognition, we derive 6ustification for pronouncing and denouncing
according to our feelings and sub6ective opinions. &ssurances present themselves in place of
proofs / and the more uncritical the! are, the more the! count as ;pure.5 / ;0rom the $vil
<ne the! are free, but the evil still remains51 and the evil is ten times worse than before, because
the! entrust themselves to it without an! distrust or criticism.
Hegel is o( corse a$are that #ant 'oes not inten' (or reason to %e remove' (rom ethics, %t
onl& (or its speclative pretensions to %e 'ivorce' (rom its practical se. Still, #ant's attempt to
*annl nowledge in or'er to ma4e room (or faith5 ;9 !!!< is (or Hegel misgi'e' an' in'ee'
para'o!ical, since ethics an' metaph&sics are not isolate' magisteria %t are e-all& %ase' *on
the 'evelopment o( thoght an' the concept+ ;)hilosoph! of *ight, 5re(ace, p. F
A
<.
3o reclaim the athorit& o( metaph&sics, Hegel attac4s #ant's s&stem %& challenging its
ver& staticness. "n the pre(ace to the )henomenolog! he criticizes the si'e o( science $hich
asserts *imme'iate rationalit& an' 'ivinit&+ ;5S Q11<, sa&ing that its e!pansion *trns ot not to
have come a%ot %& $a& o( one an' the same thing giving itsel( 'iverse shapes %t rather %& $a&
o( the shapeless repetition o( one an' the same thing $hich is onl& e!ternall& applie' to 'iverse
material an' $hich contains onl& the te'ios sem%lance o( 'iversit&+ ;5S Q1A<. "n contrast, sa&s
Hegel, *3he trth is the $hole. 9t the $hole is onl& the essence per(ecting itsel( throgh its
'evelopment.+ ;5S Q20<. Hegel 'oes not 'iscar' the i'ea o( philosoph& as a s&stem 6 he re(ers to
A Hegel, G.2.F, tr. 3. M. #no!. Hegel-s )hilosoph! of *ight. P!(or', 1=F..
81=8
his o$n oeuvre as *the s&stem o( science+ ;SG 21.=, p. 2=<, an' sa&s that *3he tre shape in
$hich trth e!ists can onl& %e the scienti(ic s&stem o( that trth.+ ;5S QA<. 9t this s&stem mst
%e %ilt (rom the gron' p along the *sel(8constrcting path+ ;SG 21./, p. 2/< o( the 'ialectic, a
*spirital movement+ ;SG 21./, p. 2/< in accor'ance $ith *an altogether ne$ concept o(
scienti(ic proce're+ ;SG 21.., p. 2.<. Moreover, its %il'er mst *comprehen' the 'iversit& o(
philosophical s&stems as the progressive 'evelopment o( trth+ ;5S Q2<. 3hogh #ant clearl&
inten's his o$n s&stem to have the -alities o( an organism 6 reciprocit& o( parts, capacit& (or
sel(8repair 6 Hegel sees #ant's s&stem as lac4ing the most essential -alit& o( an organism,
motion, in the (orm o( sel(8moving 'evelopment into its matre (orm. 3he 'ialectic is a process
$hich carries its 'evelopmental ten'enc& $ithin itsel(, gro$ing not throgh the ot$ar'
e!pansion o( a single principle %t throgh an p$ar' gro$th in $hich principles, concepts, an'
in'ee' $hole s&stems are arrive' at an' then srpasse'. "n Hegel's analog&, the %lossom replaces
the %' an' the (rit replaces the %lossom, each sho$ing the previos *to %e a (alse e!istence o(
the plant+ 6 %t at the same time a necessar& one. 5revios s&stems are part o( the natral
evoltion o( the organism, $hich itsel( is not so mch s&stematic as metas&stematic, em%racing
all s&stems.
)ccor'ingl&, (or Hegel the antinomies are not evi'ence o( reason's (ailre, %t a part o(
its gro$th. Hegel ac4no$le'ges that #ant's antinomies are sperior to the poplar notion o( a
'ialectic, $hich pro'ces a *semblance o( contradictions+ ;:G Q/1< %et$een t$o 'eterminations
o( the n'erstan'ing an' spposes the semblance to %e (alse, in that the& actall& 'emonstrate
*ho$ each a%stract 'etermination o( the n'erstan'ing, ta4en simpl& on its o$n terms, overtrns
imme'iatel& into its opposite+. 9t #ant's conclsion, that the re(tation o( each si'e %& the
other is evi'ence that $e mst $ith'ra$ to (irmer gron', is criticize' %& Hegel as one $here
*reason is not capa%le o( cognizing the rational+ ;SG 21.10<. Hegel might agree that if s%stances
8208
col' %e thoght onl& accor'ing to #ant's concepts, then $e $ol' %e stc4 in ncertaint& a%ot
$hat things in themselves are li4eN %t instea' $e are a%le to s%sme the con(licting i'eas a%ot
things into a ne$ concept, $hich itsel( has its antinom&, an' so on, ntil $e reach a%solte
4no$le'ge. Hence, $hereas (or #ant the antinomies are essential in the hm%ling o( reason,
since *nothing %t hitting pon a clear contra'iction can stop or progress+ ;9 /<, (or Hegel each
ne$ antinom& prompts reason to s%late the (init'e o( the previos 'etermination an' move
closer to the a%solte. )n' nli4e in #ant, $here the (or antinomies emerge (rom the 'ivision o(
the categories o( the n'erstan'ing ;9 1=0<, (or Hegel ever! concept contains an antinom& ;SG
21.1/0, p. 1=1<, an' hence a 'ialectic, to %e s%late'.
The future of metaphysics
#ant an' Hegel can %oth %e seen as ltimatel& respon'ing to Hme, %t in 'i((erent $a&s.
#ant em%races s%7ectivit& $hile Hegel see4s to overcome it. 3heir 'isagreement is centere' on
the principle note' a%ove, that *cognition has no other (orms o( thoght than (inite categories+.
For Hegel, #ant's se o( this principle as a soltion to the antinomies *has no other reslt than to
ma4e the so8calle' con(lict into something sub6ective $herein, o( corse, the same illsion still
persists 7st as n'ispelle' as %e(ore. ) tre soltion can onl& consist in that t$o 'eterminations
O have trth O onl& in their s%late' %eing+ ;SG 21.1/1, p. 1=1<. Hegel sees #ant's s%7ective
pivot as $orthless, since s%7ective an' o%7ective, i( an&thing more than *tric48$or's+ ;5S Q.F<,
are concepts that themselves mst %e s%late'. #ant's insistence that $e %egin $ith an anal&sis o(
the o%7ects o( or min' as sch is misgi'e', since the ver& 'ivi'e %et$een s%7ect an' o%7ect
nee's to %e overcome. 2e accomplish this overcoming throgh that same speclative reason
$hich #ant restraine', %t $hich (or Hegel contains the antinom& o( the s%7ective an' the
o%7ective, an' sho$s that the& *are not onl& i'entical %t also 'istinct+ ;an' vice versaS< ;:G
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Q/2<. 9& shattering the 'istinction %et$een s%7ect an' o%7ect $e can restore speclative reason,
$hich *apprehen's the nit& o( the 'eterminations in their opposition+ an' *contains the ver&
antitheses at $hich the n'erstan'ing stops short+ ;$nc!clopedia ,ogic Q/2<, to its right(l role
o( s%sming the 'istinctions o( the n'erstan'ing ;rather than %eing st&mie' %& them<, an' can
pt metaph&sics, $hich #ant notes $as once *calle' the (ueen o( all the sciences+ ;) viii<, %ac4
pon her throne.
2hat $ol' #ant's response to Hegel %e> Hegel positions himsel( $ell to avoi' %eing
la%ele' as 7st another 'ogmatist. 2ell a$are o( #ant's 'ismissal o( the 'ogmatic tra'ition, he
ta4es care to position himsel( not as part o( the *previos metaph&sics+ $hich #ant re(te' %t
as part o( a *more recent philosoph&+. Nor is this mere rhetoric, as $e have sho$n, Hegel is not
merel& s&stematic %t metas&stematic, propon'ing not a (inite 'ogma %t a 'octrine o( change
an' progress.
Ret the Hmean -estion remains open, ho$ $e can %e certain that or reasoning
'escri%es an& real trth> "n the intro'ction to the )henomenolog! Hegel sggests a *mistrst o(
this mistrst+, an' points ot in a general $a& that it itsel( prespposes a 'ivi'e %et$een
cognition an' realit& ;5 Q.1<. 3his is all ver& $ell, %t a mistrst o( the mistrst har'l& leaves s
$ith certaint&N an' thogh Hegel's pro7ect o( ignoring the *tric48$or's+ o( #antian philosoph&
an' instea' 'escri%ing the evoltion o( thoght ma& provi'e a compelling alternative to #ant, it
is har' to see ho$ it $ol' compel the #antian critic to give p his 'o%ts.
"n a $a& #ant an' Hegel (all into the roles o( s4eptic an' 'ogmatist, respectivel&, in each
other's respective s&stems. #ant might vie$ Hegel as another 'ogmatist se'ce' %& the
e!pansionist 'esires o( reason 6 in this case, not in ignorance o( the limits thereo(, %t in $ill(l
spite o( them. )n' Hegel sees an a'herence to #antian philosoph& as an a%&ssal s4epticism that
simpl& re(ses to grasp its o$n positive negation, (orever engage' in *the act o( casting $hat is
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'istinct an' 'eterminate into the a%&ss o( the voi'+ ;5 Q1F<. 9t neither can sccee' in entirel&
re%4ing the other, an' hence Hegel an' #ant mst en'lessl& attac4 each other, li4e the t$o
'ragons o( Merlin's 'ream $hose (ighting n'ermines the (on'ations o( Lortigern's castle. For
their 'isagreement concerns not merel& $hat the right ans$ers are, %t the natre o( the
-estions that $e mst as4. #ant's -estion is $hether the s%7ect or the o%7ect is the 'eterminant
o( or realit&N Hegel's, $hether the s%7ect is in (act separate (rom $hat is 4no$n. 2hether or
not (tre metaph&sics em%races either o( these t$o thin4ers' s&stems, it $ill have to 'eal $ith
these -estions %e(ore the %il'ing o( the castle o( reason ma& procee'.
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