Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECIONS !"# CIRILO RO$ MONE%O, respondents.

&A'UNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.

1
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
epresentatives be !a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one "ear immediatel" preceding the election.!
(

The mischief which this provision # reproduced verbatim from the 197$ Constitution # see%s
to prevent is the possibilit" of a !stranger or newcomer unac&uainted with the conditions and
needs of a communit" and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
communit".!
)
'etitioner (melda omualde)*+arcos filed her Certificate of Candidac" for the position of
epresentative of the ,irst -istrict of .e"te with the 'rovincial /lection 0upervisor on +arch
8, 1991, providing the following information in item no. 82
*
/0(-/3C/ (3 TH/ C430T(T5/3C6 7H// ( 0//8 T4 9/ /./CT/-
(++/-(AT/.6 '/C/-(3: TH/ /./CT(432 ;;;;;;;;;; 6ears and
seven +onths.
4n +arch <$, 1991, private respondent Cirilo o" +onte=o, the incumbent epresentative of
the ,irst -istrict of .e"te and a candidate for the same position, filed a !'etition for
Cancellation and -is&ualification!
5
with the Commission on /lections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional re&uirement for residenc". (n his petition, private respondent
contended that +rs. +arcos lac%ed the Constitution>s one "ear residenc" re&uirement for
candidates for the House of epresentatives on the evidence of declarations made b" her in
?oter egistration ecord 9@*3o. $$@977<
6
and in her Certificate of Candidac". He pra"ed
that !an order be issued declaring ApetitionerB dis&ualified and canceling the certificate of
candidac".!
7
4n +arch <9, 1991, petitioner filed an AmendedCCorrected Certificate of Candidac", changing
the entr" !seven! months to !since childhood! in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
8
4n
the same da", the 'rovincial /lection 0upervisor of .e"te informed petitioner that2
DTEhis office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidac" on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing
of the same having alread" lapsed on +arch <F, 1991. The
CorrectedCAmended Certificate of Candidac" should have been filed on or
before the +arch <F, 1991 deadline.
9
Conse&uentl", petitioner filed the AmendedCCorrected Certificate of Candidac" with the
C4+/./C>s Head 4ffice in (ntramuros, +anila on
+arch $1, 1991. Her Answer to private respondent>s petition in 0'A 3o. 91*FF9 was li%ewise
filed with the head office on the same da". (n said Answer, petitioner averred that the entr" of
the word !seven! in her original Certificate of Candidac" was the result of an !honest
misinterpretation!
1+
which she sought to rectif" b" adding the words !since childhood! in her
AmendedCCorrected Certificate of Candidac" and that !she has alwa"s maintained Tacloban
Cit" as her domicile or residence.
11
(mpugning respondent>s motive in filing the petition
see%ing her dis&ualification, she noted that2
7hen respondent Apetitioner hereinB announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban Cit" and run for Congress in the ,irst -istrict
of .e"te, petitioner immediatel" opposed her intended registration b" writing
a letter stating that !she is not a resident of said cit" but of 9aranga" 4lot,
Tolosa, .e"te. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her siG month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition
with the C4+/./C to transfer the town of Tolosa from the ,irst -istrict to the
0econd -istrict and pursued such a move up to the 0upreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner>s opponent in the
congressional election in the ,irst -istrict. He also filed a bill, along with other
.e"te Congressmen, see%ing the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the ,irst -istrict, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the 0enate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same ob=ective, as it is obvious
that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the =udgment and verdict
of the electorate of the ,irst -istrict of .e"te in an honest, orderl", peaceful,
free and clean elections on +a" 8, 1991.
1(
4n April <@, 1991, the 0econd -ivision of the Commission on /lections AC4+/./CB, b" a
vote of < to 1,
1)
came up with a esolution 1B finding private respondent>s 'etition for
-is&ualification in 0'A 91*FF9 meritoriousH <B stri%ing off petitioner>s CorrectedCAmended
Certificate of Candidac" of +arch $1, 1991H and $B canceling her original Certificate of
Candidac".
1*
-ealing with two primar" issues, namel", the validit" of amending the original
Certificate of Candidac" after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidac", and
petitioner>s compliance with the one "ear residenc" re&uirement, the 0econd -ivision held2
espondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed
word !0even! AmonthsB was a result of an !honest misinterpretation or honest
mista%e! on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subse&uentl" be
allowed. 0he averred that she thought that what was as%ed was her !actual
and ph"sical! presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in
the ,irst .egislative -istrict, to which she could have responded !since
childhood.! (n an accompan"ing affidavit, she stated that her domicile is
Tacloban Cit", a component of the ,irst -istrict, to which she alwa"s
intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned.
,urthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner>s theor" of
dis&ualification b" alleging that she has been a resident of the ,irst
.egislative -istrict of .e"te since childhood, although she onl" became a
resident of the +unicipalit" of Tolosa for seven months. 0he asserts that she
has alwa"s been a resident of Tacloban Cit", a component of the ,irst
-istrict, before coming to the +unicipalit" of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban Cit" so that
she can be a candidate for the -istrict. However, this intention was rebuffed
when petitioner wrote the /lection 4fficer of Tacloban not to allow
respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. 0he never
disputed this claim and instead implicitl" acceded to it b" registering in
Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent>s claim of !honest misinterpretation or honest
mista%e.! 9esides, the Certificate of Candidac" onl" as%s for /0(-/3C/.
0ince on the basis of her Answer, she was &uite aware of !residence of
origin! which she interprets to be Tacloban Cit", it is curious wh" she did not
cite Tacloban Cit" in her Certificate of Candidac". Her eGplanation that she
thought what was as%ed was her actual and ph"sical presence in Tolosa is
not eas" to believe because there is none in the &uestion that insinuates
about Tolosa. (n fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidac" spea%s clearl"
of !esidenc" in the CONSTITUENCY where ( see% to be elected
immediatel" preceding the election.! Thus, the eGplanation of respondent fails
to be persuasive.
,rom the foregoing, respondent>s defense of an honest mista%e or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent>s contention that an amendment ma" be
made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC A< 0CA 917B. The reliance
of respondent on the case of Alial" is misplaced. The case onl" applies to the
!inconse&uential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primaril" to secure timel" and orderl"
conduct of elections.! The 0upreme Court in that case considered the
amendment onl" as a matter of form. 9ut in the instant case, the amendment
cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconse&uential deviation.
The change in the number of "ears of residence in the place where
respondent see%s to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her
&ualification as a candidac", speciall" those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which adversel" affects the
filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought b" the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrit" of
the election.
+oreover, to allow respondent to change the seven A7B month period of her
residenc" in order to prolong it b" claiming it was !since childhood! is to allow
an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical
accurac" of the 7 months residenc" the respondent indicated in her certificate
of candidac" can be gleaned from her entr" in her ?oter>s egistration
ecord accomplished on Ianuar" <8, 1991 which reflects that she is a
resident of 9rg". 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te for J months at the time of the said
registration AAnneG A, 'etitionB. 0aid accurac" is further buttressed b" her
letter to the election officer of 0an Iuan, +etro +anila, dated August <@,
199@, re&uesting for the cancellation of her registration in the 'ermanent .ist
of ?oters thereat so that she can be re*registered or transferred to 9rg". 4lot,
Tolosa, .e"te. The dates of these three A$B different documents show the
respondent>s consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
4lot, Tolosa, .e"te from +etro +anila onl" for such limited period of time,
starting in the last wee% of August 199@ which on +arch 8, 1991 will onl" sum
up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe
in the respondent>s contention that it was an error.
GGG GGG GGG
9ased on these reasons the AmendedCCorrected Certificate of Candidac"
cannot be admitted b" this Commission.
GGG GGG GGG
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that respondent has not complied with the one "ear residenc" re&uirement of
the Constitution.
(n election cases, the term !residence! has alwa"s been considered as
s"non"mous with !domicile! which imports not onl" the intention to reside in a
fiGed place but also personal presence in*that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. -omicile denotes a fiGed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for li%e reasons, one intends
to return. A'erfecto ,a"pon vs. /liseo Kuirino, 9J 'hil <9@H omualde) vs.
TC*Tacloban, <<J 0CA @F8B. (n respondent>s case, when she returned to
the 'hilippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but 0an
Iuan, +etro +anila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to +etro +anila
and not Tacloban.
This -ivision is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the ,irst
-istrict since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
&ualification where she is otherwise constitutionall" dis&ualified. (t cannot
hold ground in the face of the facts admitted b" the respondent in her
affidavit. /Gcept for the time that she studied and wor%ed for some "ears after
graduation in Tacloban Cit", she continuousl" lived in +anila. (n 1919, after
her husband was elected 0enator, she lived and resided in 0an Iuan, +etro
+anila where she was a registered voter. (n 19J1, she lived in 0an +iguel,
+anila where she was again a registered voter. (n 1978, she served as
member of the 9atasang 'ambansa as the representative of the Cit" of
+anila and later on served as the :overnor of +etro +anila. 0he could not
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the Cit" of
+anila. ,urthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidac" for the office
of the 'resident in 199<, she claimed to be a resident of 0an Iuan, +etro
+anila. As a matter of fact on August <@, 199@, respondent wrote a letter with
the election officer of 0an Iuan, +etro +anila re&uesting for the cancellation
of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she ma" be re*
registered or transferred to 9aranga" 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban Cit" since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidac" because she
became a resident of man" places, including +etro +anila. This debun%s her
claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, .e"te, she was a resident of the
,irst .egislative -istrict of .e"te since childhood.
(n this case, respondent>s conduct reveals her lac% of intention to ma%e
Tacloban her domicile. 0he registered as a voter in different places and on
several occasions declared that she was a resident of +anila. Although she
spent her school da"s in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned
such place when she chose to sta" and reside in other different places. (n the
case of Romualdez vs. RTC A<<J 0CA @F8B the Court eGplained how one
ac&uires a new domicile b" choice. There must concur2 A1B residence or
bodil" presence in the new localit"H A<B intention to remain thereH and A$B
intention to abandon the old domicile. (n other words there must basicall" be
animus manendi with animus non revertendi. 7hen respondent chose to sta"
in (locos and later on in +anila, coupled with her intention to sta" there b"
registering as a voter there and eGpressl" declaring that she is a resident of
that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban Cit", where she
spent her childhood and school da"s, as her place of domicile.
'ure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must li%ewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. espondent>s statements to the effect
that she has alwa"s intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompan"ing conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice
of residence. espondent has not presented an" evidence to show that her
conduct, one "ear prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban.
7orse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had
been a resident of +anila.
(t is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the ,irst
-istrict of .e"te !since childhood.!
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of
the ,irst -istrict of .e"te for more than one "ear, petitioner correctl" pointed
out that on Ianuar" <8, 1991 respondent registered as a voter at precinct 3o.
18*A of 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te. (n doing so, she placed in her ?oter egistration
ecord that she resided in the municipalit" of Tolosa for a period of siG
months. This ma" be inconse&uential as argued b" the respondent since it
refers onl" to her residence in Tolosa, .e"te. 9ut her failure to prove that she
was a resident of the ,irst -istrict of .e"te prior to her residence in Tolosa
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for siG months onl".
15
(n a esolution promulgated a da" before the +a" 8, 1991 elections, the C4+/./C en ban
denied petitioner>s +otion for econsideration
16
of the April <@, 1991 esolution declaring her
not &ualified to run for the position of +ember of the House of epresentatives for the ,irst
.egislative -istrict of .e"te.
17
The esolution tersel" stated2
After deliberating on the +otion for econsideration, the Commission
/04.?/- to -/36 it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re*eGamination of the resolution granting the petition for
dis&ualification.
18
4n +a" 11, 1991, the C4+/./C issued a esolution allowing petitioner>s proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the ,irst -istrict of .e"te. 4n the same da", however, the
C4+/./C reversed itself and issued a second esolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
19
(n a 0upplemental 'etition dated <1 +a" 1991, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the ,irst -istrict of .e"te
held +a" 8, 1991 based on the canvass completed b" the 'rovincial 9oard of Canvassers on
+a" 1@, 1991. 'etitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 7F,@71
votes compared to the $J,8$$ votes received b" espondent +onte=o. A cop" of said
Certificate of Canvass was anneGed to the 0upplemental 'etition.
4n account of the esolutions dis&ualif"ing petitioner from running for the congressional seat
of the ,irst -istrict of .e"te and the public respondent>s esolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
'etitioner raises several issues in her 4riginal and 0upplemental 'etitions. The principal
issues ma" be classified into two general areas2
I. The issue o! "etitioner#s $uali!iations
7hether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the ,irst
-istrict of .e"te for a period of one "ear at the time of the +a" 9, 1991
elections.
II. The %urisditional Issue
aB 'rior to the elections
7hether or not the C4+/./C properl" eGercised its =urisdiction in
dis&ualif"ing petitioner outside the period mandated b" the 4mnibus /lection
Code for dis&ualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
bB After the /lections
7hether or not the House of epresentatives /lectoral Tribunal assumed
eGclusive =urisdiction over the &uestion of petitioner>s &ualifications after the
+a" 8, 1991 elections.
I. "etitioner#s $uali!iation
A perusal of the esolution of the C4+/./C>s 0econd -ivision reveals a startling confusion
in the application of settled concepts of !-omicile! and !esidence! in election law. 7hile the
C4+/./C seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is s"non"mous with domicile, the esolution reveals a tendenc" to
substitute or mista%e the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate>s &ualifications for election to the House of
epresentatives as re&uired b" the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose
of meeting the &ualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our =urisdiction.
Article 1F of the Civil Code decrees that !DfEor the eGercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.! (n On&
vs. Re'ubli
(+
this court too% the concept of domicile to mean an individual>s !permanent
home!, !a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that the" disclose intent.!
(1
9ased on
the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of !the fact of residing or ph"sical presence
in a fiGed place! and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanentl".
esidence, in its ordinar" conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. (t is the ph"sical presence of a person in a given area, communit" or countr".
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has ta%en up his abode ends. 4ne
ma" see% a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. (f a person>s intent be
to remain, it becomes his domicileH if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence.
((
(t is thus, &uite perfectl" normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can onl" have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfull" abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
(n Uyten&su vs. Re'ubli,
()
we laid this distinction &uite clearl"2
There is a difference between domicile and residence. !esidence! is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporar"H !domicile!
denotes a fiGed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man ma" have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. esidence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at an" time, but he ma" have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generall" his place
of domicile, but it is not b" an" means necessaril" so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
,or political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated b" the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearl"
and une&uivocall" emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
s"non"mousl" with domicile.
(n Nuval vs. (uray,
(*
the Court held that !the term residence. . . is s"non"mous with domicile
which imports not onl" intention to reside in a fiGed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.!
(5
Larena vs. Teves
(6
reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the &ualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
+unicipal 'resident of -umaguete, 3egros 4riental. )ay'on vs. *uirino,
(7
held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence.
(8
0o
settled is the concept Aof domicileB in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence &ualification for certain elective
positions have placed be"ond doubt the principle that when the Constitution spea%s of
!residence! in election law, it actuall" means onl" !domicile! to wit2
+r. 3olledo2 7ith respect to 0ection 1, ( remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to re&uire residence in the
place not less than one "ear immediatel" preceding the da" of the elections.
0o m" &uestion is2 7hat is the Committee>s concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislatureL (s it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residenceL
+r. -avide2 +adame 'resident, insofar as the regular members of the
3ational Assembl" are concerned, the proposed section merel" provides,
among others, !and a resident thereof!, that is, in the district for a period of
not less than one "ear preceding the da" of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 197$ Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
(9
GGG GGG GGG
+rs. osario 9raid2 The neGt &uestion is on 0ection 7, page <. ( thin%
Commissioner 3olledo has raised the same point that !resident! has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
+r. -e los e"es2 -omicile.
+s. osario 9raid2 6es, 0o, would the gentleman consider at the proper time
to go bac% to actual residence rather than mere intention to resideL
+r. -e los e"es2 9ut we might encounter some difficult" especiall"
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on 0uffrage sa"s
that ,ilipinos living abroad ma" vote as enacted b" law. 0o, we have to stic%
to the original concept that it should be b" domicile and not ph"sical
residence.
)+
(n Co vs. Eletoral Tribunal o! the +ouse o! Re'resentatives,
)1
this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviousl" adhered to the definition given to the term
residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.
)(
(n the light of the principles =ust discussed, has petitioner (melda omualde) +arcos satisfied
the residenc" re&uirement mandated b" Article ?(, 0ec. J of the 1987 ConstitutionL 4f what
significance is the &uestioned entr" in petitioner>s Certificate of Candidac" stating her
residence in the ,irst .egislative -istrict of .e"te as seven A7B monthsL
(t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidac" which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution>s residenc"
&ualification re&uirement. The said statement becomes material onl" when there is or appears
to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render
a candidate ineligible. (t would be plainl" ridiculous for a candidate to deliberatel" and
%nowingl" ma%e a statement in a certificate of candidac" which would lead to his or her
dis&ualification.
(t stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merel" committed an honest mista%e in =otting the
word !seven! in the space provided for the residenc" &ualification re&uirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the &uestioned entr" obviousl" resulted in the subse&uent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual sta" in Tolosa,
.e"te instead of her period of residence in the ,irst district, which was !since childhood! in the
space provided. These circumstances and events are ampl" detailed in the C4+/./C>s
0econd -ivision>s &uestioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. ,or instance,
when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban Cit" to ma%e her
eligible to run in the ,irst -istrict, private respondent +onte=o opposed the same, claiming
that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban Cit". 'etitioner then registered in her
place of actual residence in the ,irst -istrict, which is Tolosa, .e"te, a fact which she
subse&uentl" noted down in her Certificate of Candidac". A close loo% at said certificate
would reveal the possible source of the confusion2 the entr" for residence A(tem 3o. 7B is
followed immediatel" b" the entr" for residence in the constituenc" where a candidate see%s
election thus2
7. /0(-/3C/ Acomplete AddressB2 ,r&y- Olot. Tolosa. Leyte
'40T 4,,(C/ A--/00 ,4 /./CT(43 '5'40/02 ,r&y- Olot. Tolosa.
Leyte
8. /0(-/3C/ (3 TH/ C430T(T5/3C6 7H// ( 0//8 T4
9/ /./CT/- (++/-(AT/.6 '/C/-(3: TH/ /./CT(432;;;;;;;;;
6ears and Seven +onths.
Having been forced b" private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in .e"te
instead of petitioner>s claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had =otted down her period
of sta" in her legal residence or domicile. The =uGtaposition of entries in (tem 7 and (tem 8 #
the first re&uiring actual residence and the second re&uiring domicile # coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner>s registration as a voter in Tolosa obviousl" led to her
writing down an unintended entr" for which she could be dis&ualified. This honest mista%e
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the ,irst -istrict if such fact
were established b" means more convincing than a mere entr" on a piece of paper.
7e now proceed to the matter of petitioner>s domicile.
(n support of its asseveration that petitioner>s domicile could not possibl" be in the ,irst
-istrict of .e"te, the 0econd -ivision of the C4+/./C, in its assailed esolution of April
<@,1991 maintains that !eGcept for the time when ApetitionerB studied and wor%ed for some
"ears after graduation in Tacloban Cit", she continuousl" lived in +anila.! The esolution
additionall" cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner>s domicile ought to be
an" place where she lived in the last few decades eGcept Tacloban, .e"te. ,irst, according to
the esolution, petitioner, in 1919, resided in 0an Iuan, +etro +anila where she was also
registered voter. Then, in 19J1, following the election of her husband to the 'hilippine
presidenc", she lived in 0an +iguel, +anila where she as a voter. (n 1978 and thereafter, she
served as a member of the 9atasang 'ambansa and :overnor of +etro +anila. !0he could
not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of +etro +anila,! the
C4+/./C stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
7e have stated, man" times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if
he has lived and maintained residences in different places. esidence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to stud" or to do other things of a temporar" or
semi*permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion b" the
C4+/./C that !she could not have been a resident of Tacloban Cit" since childhood up to
the time she filed her certificate of candidac" because she became a resident of man"
places! flies in the face of settled =urisprudence in which this Court carefull" made distinctions
between AactualB residence and domicile for election law purposes. (n Larena vs. Teves,
))

su'ra, we stressed2
DTEhis court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his famil" in a municipalit" without having ever
had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or
with his famil" in another municipalit", has his residence in the former
municipalit", notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
municipalit" in &uestion and having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating ever" time that he is a resident of the latter
municipalit".
+ore significantl", in )ay'on vs. *uirino,
)*
7e eGplained that2
A citi)en ma" leave the place of his birth to loo% for !greener pastures,! as the
sa"ing goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes stud" in other
places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. 7hen an election
is to be held, the citi)en who left his birthplace to improve his lot ma" desire
to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for an" other reason, he ma" not absent himself from his
professional or business activitiesH so there he registers himself as voter as
he has the &ualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunit" to choose the officials who are to run the government especiall"
in national elections. -espite such registration, the animus revertendi to his
home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsa%en him. This ma"
be the eGplanation wh" the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. (t finds =ustification in the natural
desire and longing of ever" person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one>s birth must be overcome b" positive
proof of abandonment for another.
,rom the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above*cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of epresentative of the ,irst
-istrict of .e"te, the C4+/./C was obviousl" referring to petitioner>s various places of
AactualB residence, not her domicile. (n doing so, it not onl" ignored settled =urisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the 4mnibus /lection Code A9.'. 881B.
)5
7hat is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner>s domicile, which we lift verbatim from the C4+/./C>s 0econd -ivision>s assailed
esolution2
)6
(n or about 19$8 when respondent was a little over 8 "ears old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, .e"te ATacloban Cit"B. 0he studied in
the Hol" (nfant Academ" in Tacloban from 19$8 to 19@9 when she graduated
from high school. 0he pursued her college studies in 0t. 'aul>s College, now
-ivine 7ord 5niversit" in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
/ducation. Thereafter, she taught in the .e"te Chinese 0chool, still in
Tacloban Cit". (n 191< she went to +anila to wor% with her cousin, the late
spea%er -aniel M. omualde) in his office in the House of epresentatives.
(n 191@, she married eG*'resident ,erdinand /. +arcos when he was still a
congressman of (locos 3orte and registered there as a voter. 7hen her
husband was elected 0enator of the epublic in 1919, she and her husband
lived together in 0an Iuan, i)al where she registered as a voter. (n 19J1,
when her husband was elected 'resident of the epublic of the 'hilippines,
she lived with him in +alacanang 'alace and registered as a voter in 0an
+iguel, +anila.
D(En ,ebruar" 198J Ashe claimed thatB she and her famil" were abducted and
%idnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. (n 3ovember 1991, she came home to
+anila. (n 199<, respondent ran for election as 'resident of the 'hilippines
and filed her Certificate of Candidac" wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of 0an Iuan, +etro +anila.
Appl"ing the principles discussed to the facts found b" C4+/./C, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. 3one of
these purposes une&uivocall" point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, .e"te. +oreover, while petitioner was born in +anila, as a minor she naturall"
followed the domicile of her parents. 0he grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there
and eventuall" established residence in different parts of the countr" for various reasons.
/ven during her husband>s presidenc", at the height of the +arcos egime>s powers,
petitioner %ept her close ties to her domicile of origin b" establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthda"s and other important personal milestones in her home province,
instituting well*publici)ed pro=ects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or b" appointment, alwa"s with either her influence or consent.
These well*publici)ed ties to her domicile of origin are part of the histor" and lore of the
&uarter centur" of +arcos power in our countr". /ither the" were entirel" ignored in the
C4+/./C>0 esolutions, or the ma=orit" of the C4+/./C did not %now what the rest of the
countr" alwa"s %new2 the fact of petitioner>s domicile in Tacloban, .e"te.
'rivate respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner>s domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight "ears old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 191<, she !abandoned her residenc" AsiB therein for man" "ears and . . . Acould
notB re*establish her domicile in said place b" merel" eGpressing her intention to live there
again.! 7e do not agree.
,irst, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once ac&uired is retained until a
new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner>s being born in +anila,
Tacloban, .e"te was her domicile of origin b" operation of law. This domicile was not
established onl" when her father brought his famil" bac% to .e"te contrar" to private
respondent>s averments.
0econd, domicile of origin is not easil" lost. To successfull" effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate2
)7
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicileH
<. A bona !ide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new oneH and
$. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
(n the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. 4nl" with evidence showing concurrence of all three
re&uirements can the presumption of continuit" or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence re&uires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
)8
(n the case at bench, the evidence adduced b" private
respondent plainl" lac%s the degree of persuasiveness re&uired to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect
an abandonment re&uires the voluntar" act of relin&uishing petitioner>s former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing Adomiilium
voluntariumB.
(n this connection, it cannot be correctl" argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin b"
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late 'resident ,erdinand /. +arcos in
191<. ,or there is a clearl" established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
!domicile! and !residence.!
)9
The presumption that the wife automaticall" gains the
husband>s domicile b" operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the
term !residence! in Article 11F of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the
two concepts are well delineated. -r. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area eGplains2
(n the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. 9oth terms impl" relations between a person and a placeH but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or =uridical,
independent of the necessit" of ph"sical presence.
*+
Article 11F of the Civil Code provides2
Art. 11F. # The husband shall fiG the residence of the famil". 9ut the court
ma" eGempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the epublic.
A surve" of =urisprudence relating to Article 11F or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
the" affect the female spouse upon marriage "ields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automaticall" loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband>s choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 11F is a virtual restatement of Article 18 of the 0panish Civil Code of 1889 which
states2
.a mu=er esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde &uiera &ue fi=e su
residencia. .os Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con =usta causa eGimirla de
esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o> a pais
eGtran=ero.
3ote the use of the phrase !donde $uiera su !i/e de residenia! in the afore&uoted article, which means wherever Athe
husbandB 0ishes to establish residene. This part of the article clearl" contemplates onl" actual residence because it refers
to a positive act of fiGing a famil" home or residence. +oreover, this interpretation is further strengthened b" the phrase
!uando el marido translade su residenia! in the same provision which means, !when the husband shall trans!er his
residence,! referring to another positive act of relocating the famil" to another home or place of actual residence. The article
obviousl" cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fiGed,
fairl"*permanent concept when it plainl" connotes the possibilit" of transferring from one place to another not onl" once, but
as often as the husband ma" deem fit to move his famil", a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual
residence.
The right of the husband to fiG the actual residence is in harmon" with the intention of the law to strengthen and unif" the
famil", recogni)ing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles Aof originB. This
difference could, for the sa%e of famil" unit", be reconciled onl" b" allowing the husband to fiG a single place of actual
residence.
?er" significantl", Article 11F of the Civil Code is found under Title ? under the heading2 (:HT0 A3- 49.(:AT(430
9/T7//3 H509A3- A3- 7(,/. (mmediatel" preceding Article 11F is Article 1F9 which obliges the husband and wife to
live together, thus2
Art. 1F9. # The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelit"
and render mutual help and support.
The dut" to live together can onl" be fulfilled if the husband and wife are ph"sicall" together. This ta%es into account the
situations where the couple has man" residences Aas in the case of the petitionerB. (f the husband has to sta" in or transfer to
an" one of their residences, the wife should necessaril" be with him in order that the" ma" !live together.! Hence, it is illogical
to conclude that Art. 11F refers to !domicile! and not to !residence.! 4therwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the
wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, sta"s in one of their AvariousB residences. As
-r. Tolentino further eGplains2
esidence and -omicile # 7hether the word !residence! as used with reference to particular matters
is s"non"mous with !domicile! is a &uestion of some difficult", and the ultimate decision must be made
from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. 0ometimes the" are used
s"non"mousl", at other times the" are distinguished from one another.
GGG GGG GGG
esidence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the ph"sical presence of a person in a place. A
person can have two or more residences, such as a countr" residence and a cit" residence. esidence
is ac&uired b" living in placeH on the other hand, domicile can eGist without actuall" living in the place.
The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to sta" there permanentl", even if residence is also established in some other
place.
*1
(n fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron*clad principleH (n cases appl"ing the Civil Code on the &uestion of a
common matrimonial residence, our =urisprudence has recogni)ed certain situations
*(
where
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed
to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviousl" practical reasons,
revert to her original domicile Aapart from being allowed to opt for a new oneB. (n 1e la 2ina
vs. 2illareal
*)
this Court held that !DaE married woman ma" ac&uire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the eGistence of the marriage where the husband
has given cause for divorce.!
**
3ote that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. (n instances where the wife actuall"
opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separatel" from her husband either b" ta%ing new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. (n Arroyo vs. 2as$ues de Arroyo
*5

the Court held that2
5pon eGamination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this countr" to attempt to compel one of the spouses
to cohabit with, and render con=ugal rights to, the other. 4f course where the
propert" rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. 9ut we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
an order, enforcible AsiB b" process of contempt, ma" be entered to compel
the restitution of the purel" personal right of consortium. At best such an
order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
under the same roofH and he eGperience of those countries where the courts
of =ustice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows
that the polic" of the practice is eGtremel" &uestionable. Thus in /ngland,
formerl" the /cclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
con=ugal rights at the instance of either husband or wifeH and if the facts were
found to warrant it, that court would ma%e a mandator" decree, enforceable
b" process of contempt in case of disobedience, re&uiring the delin&uent
part" to live with the other and render con=ugal rights. 6et this practice was
sometimes critici)ed even b" the =udges who felt bound to enforce such
orders, and in 3eldon v. 3eldon A9 '.-. 1<B, decided in 188$, 0ir Iames
Hannen, 'resident in the 'robate, -ivorce and Admiralt" -ivision of the High
Court of Iustice, eGpressed his regret that the /nglish law on the sub=ect was
not the same as that which prevailed in 0cotland, where a decree of
adherence, e&uivalent to the decree for the restitution of con=ugal rights in
/ngland, could be obtained b" the in=ured spouse, but could not be enforced
b" imprisonment. Accordingl", in obedience to the growing sentiment against
the practice, the +atrimonial Causes Act A188@B abolished the remed" of
imprisonmentH though a decree for the restitution of con=ugal rights can still
be procured, and in case of disobedience ma" serve in appropriate cases as
the basis of an order for the periodical pa"ment of a stipend in the character
of alimon".
(n the voluminous =urisprudence of the 5nited 0tates, onl" one court, so far
as we can discover, has ever attempted to ma%e a preemptor" order
re&uiring one of the spouses to live with the otherH and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the Cit" of 3ew 4rleans. The decision referred to
A9ahn v. -arb", $J .a. Ann., 7FB was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of .ouisiana similar to article 1J of the 0panish Civil Code. (t was decided
man" "ears ago, and the doctrine evidentl" has not been fruitful even in the
0tate of .ouisiana. (n other states of the American 5nion the idea of
enforcing cohabitation b" process of contempt is re=ected. A<1 C"c., 11@8B.
(n a decision of Ianuar" <, 19F9, the 0upreme Court of 0pain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de ?alladolid re&uiring a
wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to
do so, to ma%e a particular disposition of certain mone" and effects then in
her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the
ganancial propert", all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the propert" which she had brought to the marriage. A11$ Iur. Civ., pp.
1, 11B 9ut it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile was sanctioned b" an" other penalt" than the conse&uences
that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her
propert"H and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessaril" have been followed b" imprisonment for contempt.
'arentheticall" when 'etitioner was married to then Congressman +arcos, in 191@, petitioner
was obliged # b" virtue of Article 11F of the Civil Code # to follow her husband>s actual
place of residence fiGed b" him. The problem here is that at that time, +r. +arcos had several
places of residence, among which were 0an Iuan, i)al and 9atac, (locos 3orte. There is no
showing which of these places +r. +arcos did fiG as his famil">s residence. 9ut assuming that
+r. +arcos had fiGed an" of these places as the con=ugal residence, what petitioner gained
upon marriage was actual residence. 0he did not lose her domicile of origin.
4n the other hand, the common law concept of !matrimonial domicile! appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our =urisprudential eGperiences after the drafting of the Civil Code
of 191F, into the 3ew ,amil" Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of
the Civil Code and the ,amil" Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted b" the
term domicile in an entirel" new provision AArt. J9B distinctl" different in meaning and spirit
from that found in Article 11F. The provision recogni)es revolutionar" changes in the concept
of women>s rights in the intervening "ears b" ma%ing the choice of domicile a product of
mutual agreement between the spouses.
*6
7ithout as much belaboring the point, the term residence ma" mean one thing in civil law Aor
under the Civil CodeB and &uite another thing in political law. 7hat stands clear is that insofar
as the Civil Code is concerned*affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife # the
term residence should onl" be interpreted to mean !actual residence.! The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former 'resident in 191@, she %ept her domicile of origin and merel"
gained a new home, not a domiilium neessarium.
/ven assuming for the sa%e of argument that petitioner gained a new !domicile! after her
marriage and onl" ac&uired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner>s
acts following her return to the countr" clearl" indicate that she not onl" impliedl" but
eGpressl" chose her domicile of origin Aassuming this was lost b" operation of lawB as her
domicile. This !choice! was une&uivocall" eGpressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
'C:: when petitioner sought the 'C::>s permission to !rehabilitate AourB ancestral house in
Tacloban and ,arm in 4lot, .e"te. . . to ma%e them livable for the +arcos famil" to have a
home in our homeland.!
*7
,urthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 199<
in Tacloban, .e"te, while living in her brother>s house, an act which supports the domiciliar"
intention clearl" manifested in her letters to the 'C:: Chairman. 0he could not have gone
straight to her home in 0an Iuan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previousl"
looted b" vandals. Her !homes! and !residences! following her arrival in various parts of
+etro +anila merel" &ualified as temporar" or !actual residences,! not domicile. +oreover,
and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the
marriage, it would be highl" illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original
domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situations eGist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile
different from her husband.
(n the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated b" this court up
to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established b" the parties weigh heavil" in favor
of a conclusion supporting petitioner>s claim of legal residence or domicile in the ,irst -istrict
of .e"te.
((. The /urisditional issue
'etitioner alleges that the =urisdiction of the C4+/./C had alread" lapsed considering that
the assailed resolutions were rendered on April <@, 1991, fourteen A1@B da"s before the
election in violation of 0ection 78 of the 4mnibus /lection Code.
*8
+oreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of epresentatives /lectoral Tribunal and not the C4+/./C
which has =urisdiction over the election of members of the House of epresentatives in
accordance with Article ?( 0ec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
(t is a settled doctrine that a statute re&uiring rendition of =udgment within a specified time is
generall" construed to be merel" director",
*9
!so that non*compliance with them does not
invalidate the =udgment on the theor" that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearl" indicated it.!
5+
The difference between a mandator" and a director" provision is often
made on grounds of necessit". Adopting the same view held b" several American authorities,
this court in Marelino vs. Cruz held that2
51
The difference between a mandator" and director" provision is often
determined on grounds of eGpedienc", the reason being that less in=ur"
results to the general public b" disregarding than enforcing the letter of the
law.
(n Tra'' v. M Cormi4, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirt" A$FB da"s within which a decree ma" be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that !the statutor"
provisions which ma" be thus departed from with impunit", without affecting
the validit" of statutor" proceedings, are usuall" those which relate to the
mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of
the .egislature or some incident of the essential act.! Thus, in said case, the
statute under eGamination was construed merel" to be director".
The mischief in petitioner>s contending that the C4+/./C should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the 4mnibus /lection Code because it lac%ed
=urisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other &uasi*=udicial bodies would then refuse to
render =udgments merel" on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period.
(n an" event, with the enactment of 0ections J and 7 of .A. JJ@J in relation to 0ection 78 of
9.'. 881,
5(
it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose =urisdiction to hear
and decide a pending dis&ualification case under 0ection 78 of 9.'. 881 even after the
elections.
As to the House of epresentatives /lectoral Tribunal>s supposed assumption of =urisdiction
over the issue of petitioner>s &ualifications after the +a" 8, 1991 elections, suffice it to sa" that
H/T>s =urisdiction as the sole =udge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
&ualifications of members of Congress begins onl" after a candidate has become a member
of the House of epresentatives.
5)
'etitioner not being a member of the House of
epresentatives, it is obvious that the H/T at this point has no =urisdiction over the &uestion.
(t would be an abdication of man" of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberatel" ma%e distinctions in law solel" on the basis of the personalit" of
a petitioner in a case. 4bviousl" a distinction was made on such a ground here. 0urel", man"
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sa%e perpetuating
power during the pre*/-0A regime. 7e renege on these sacred ideals, including the
meaning and spirit of /-0A ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to
den" an individual what he or she =ustl" deserves in law. +oreover, in doing so, we condemn
ourselves to repeat the mista%es of the past.
7H//,4/, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessar" residence
&ualifications to run for a seat in the House of epresentatives in the ,irst -istrict of .e"te,
the C4+/./C>s &uestioned esolutions dated April <@, +a" 7, +a" 11, and +a" <1, 1991
are hereb" 0/T A0(-/. espondent C4+/./C is hereb" directed to order the 'rovincial
9oard of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the dul" elected epresentative of the ,irst
-istrict of .e"te.
04 4-//-.
)eliiano. %-. is on leave-



Sep!r!te Op,",o"-

'UNO, J., concurring2
(t was Aristotle who taught man%ind that things that are ali%e should be
treated ali%e, while things that are unali%e should be treated unali%e in
proportion to their unali%eness.
1
.i%e other candidates, petitioner has clearl" met the
residence re&uirement provided b" 0ection J, Article ?( of the Constitution.
(
7e cannot
dis&ualif" her and treat her unali%e, for the Constitution guarantees e&ual protection of the
law. ( proceed from the following factual and legal propositions2
,irst. There is no &uestion that petitioner>s original domicile is in Tacloban, .e"te. Her parents
were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. The" have vast real estate
in the place. 'etitioner went to school and thereafter wor%ed there. ( consider Tacloban as her
initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as
it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minorH and her domicile of choice, as she
continued living there even after reaching the age of ma=orit".
0econd. There is also no &uestion that in +a", 191@, petitioner married the late 'resident
,erdinand /. +arcos. 9" contracting marriage, her domicile became sub=ect to change b"
law, and the right to change it was given b" Article 11F of the Civil Code provides2
Art. 11F. The husband shall !i5 the residene o! the !amily. 9ut the court ma"
eGempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless
in the service of the epublic.
)
A/mphasis suppliedB
(n 1e la 2i6a v. 2illareal and (eo'ano,
*
this Court eGplained wh" the domicile of the
wife ought to follow that of the husband. 7e held2 !The reason is founded upon the
theoreti identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the
other. (t is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation,
as it ordinaril" eGists, where union and harmon" prevail.!
5
(n accord with this
ob=ective, Article 1F9 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife !to live
together.!
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner>s marria&e to former
'resident +arcos i'so !ato resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. ( respectfull" submit
that her marriage by itsel! alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 11F
of the Civil Code merel" gave the husband the right to fiG the domicile of the famil". (n the
eGercise of the right, the husband ma" e5'liitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which
case, the wife>s domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also im'liitly ac&uiesce to
his wife>s prior domicile even if it is different. 0o we held in de la 2i6a,
6
. . . . 7hen married women as well as children sub=ect to parental authorit"
live, 0ith the a$uiesene o! their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct
from where the latter live, the" have their own inde'endent domiile. . . .
(t is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different
domicile b" the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior
to their marriage. The domiciliar" decision made b" the husband in the eGercise of the
right conferred b" Article 11F of the Civil Code binds the wife. An" and all acts of a
wife during her coverture contrar" to the domiciliar" choice of the husband cannot
change in an" wa" the domicile legall" fiGed b" the husband. These acts are void not
onl" because the wife lac%s the capacit" to choose her domicile but also because
the" are contrar" to law and public polic".
(n the case at bench, it is not disputed that former 'resident +arcos eGercised his right to fiG
the famil" domicile and established it in 9atac, (locos 3orte, where he was then the
congressman. At that 'artiular 'oint o! time and throu&hout their married li!e. 'etitioner lost
her domiile in Taloban. Leyte. 0ince petitioner>s 9atac domicile has been fiGed b" operation
of law, it was not affected in 1919 when her husband was elected as 0enator, when the" lived
in 0an Iuan, i)al and where she registered as a voter. (t was not also affected in 19J1 when
her husband was elected 'resident, when the" lived in +alacaNang 'alace, and when she
registered as a voter in 0an +iguel, +anila. 3or was it affected when she served as a
member of the ,atasan& "ambansa, +inister of Human 0ettlements and :overnor of +etro
+anila during the incumbenc" of her husband as 'resident of the nation. 5nder Article 11F of
the Civil Code, it was onl" her husband who could change the famil" domicile in 9atac and
the evidence shows he did not effect an" such change. To a large degree, this follows the
common law that !a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and b" operation of law,
ac&uires that of her husband, no matter 0here the 0i!e atually lives or 0hat she believes or
intends.!
7
,ourth. The more difficult tas% is how to interpret the effect of the death on 0eptember <8,
1989 of former 'resident +arcos on petitioner>s 9atac domicile. The issue is of !irst
im'ression in our =urisdiction and two A<B schools of thought contend for acceptance. 4ne is
espoused b" our distinguished colleague, +r. Iustice -avide, Ir., heavil" rel"ing on American
authorities.
8
He echoes the theor" that a!ter the husband#s death. the 0i!e retains the last
domiile o! her husband until she ma4es an atual han&e.
( do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her
dead husband>s domicile is based on anient ommon la0 0hih 0e an no lon&er a''ly in
the "hili''ine settin& today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the
husband and denied to her the power of ac&uiring a domicile of her own separate and apart
from him.
9
.egal scholars agree that two A<B reasons support this common law doctrine. The
!irst reason as pinpointed b" the legendar" 9lac%stone is derived from the view that !the ver"
being or legal eGistence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.!
1+
The
seond reason lies in !the desirabilit" of having the interests of each member of the famil"
unit governed b" the same law.!
11
The 'resum'tion that the wife retains the domicile of her
deceased husband is an e5tension of this common law concept. The one't and its
e5tension have 'rovided some o! the most ini$uitous /uris'rudene a&ainst 0omen. (t was
under common law that the 187$ American case of ,rad0ell v. Illinois
1(
was decided where
women were denied the right to practice law. (t was unblushingl" ruled that !the natural and
proper timidit" and delicac" which belongs to the female seG evidentl" unfits it for man" of the
occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator.! (ndeed, the rulings relied upon b"
+r. Iustice -avide in CI0
1)
and A+ I5 <d
1*
are American state court decisions handed
down between the "ears 1917
15
and 19$8,
16
or be!ore the time 0hen 0omen 0ere aorded
e$uality o! ri&hts 0ith men. 5ndeniabl", the women>s liberation movement resulted in far*
ranging state legislations in the 5nited 0tates to eliminate gender ine&ualit".
17
0tarting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts li%ewise liberali)ed their rulings as the" started
invalidating laws infected with gender*bias. (t was in 1971 when the 50 0upreme Court in
Reed v. Reed,
18
struc% a big blow for women e&ualit" when it declared as unconstitutional an
(daho law that re&uired probate courts to choose male famil" members over females as
estate administrators. (t held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot =ustif" a seG*
based distinction. These si&ni!iant han&es both in la0 and in ase la0 on the status o!
0omen virtually obliterated the ini$uitous ommon la0 surrenderin& the ri&hts o! married
0omen to their husbands based on the dubious theory o! the 'arties# theoreti oneness. The
Cor'us %uris Seundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women>s right
as the" observed2 !However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the
status of married women and departing from the common law theor" of marriage, there is no
reason 0hy a 0i!e may not a$uire a se'arate domiile !or every 'ur'ose 4no0n to the la0.!

19
(n publishing in 19J9 the Restatement o! the La0. Seond 7Con!lit o! La0s 8d9, the
reputable American .aw (nstitute also categoricall" stated that the view of 9lac%stone !. . . is
no lon&er held. As the result o! statutes and ourt deisions. a 0i!e no0 'ossesses 'ratially
the same ri&hts and 'o0ers as her unmarried sister.!
(+
(n the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the
anahronisti ommon la0 that demeans women, especiall" married women. ( submit that the
Court has no choice eGcept to brea% awa" from this common law rule, the root of the man"
degradations of ,ilipino women. 9efore 1988, our laws particularl" the Civil Code, were full of
gender discriminations against women. 4ur esteemed colleague, +adam Iustice ,lerida uth
omero, cited a few of them as follows2
(1
GGG GGG GGG
Le&al 1isabilities Su!!ered by 3ives
3ot generall" %nown is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under
certain restrictions or disabilities. ,or instance, the wife cannot accept gifts
from others, regardless of the seG of the giver or the value of the gift, other
than from her ver" close relatives, without her husband>s consent. 0he ma"
accept onl" from, sa", her parents, parents*in*law, brothers, sisters and the
relatives within the so*called fourth civil degree. 0he ma" not eGercise her
profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband ob=ects on
serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their famil" in
accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes !serious
grounds! for ob=ecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
GGG GGG GGG
9ecause of the present ine&uitable situation, the amendments to the Civil
.aw being proposed b" the 5niversit" of the 'hilippines .aw Center would
allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the
divorced spouses are free to get married a "ear after the divorce is decreed
b" the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an e&ual
footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are
specified as the grounds for absolute divorce2 A1B adulter" or having a
paramour committed b" the respondent in an" of the wa"s specified in the
evised 'enal Code or A<B an attempt b" the respondent against the life of
the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the evised 'enal
CodeH A$B abandonment of the petitioner b" the respondent without =ust cause
for a period of three consecutive "earsH or A@B habitual maltreatment.
7ith respect to propert" relations, the husband is automaticall" the
administrator of the con=ugal propert" owned in common b" the married
couple even if the wife ma" be the more astute or enterprising partner. The
law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such
administrator. Conse&uentl", the husband is authori)ed to engage in acts and
enter into transactions beneficial to the con=ugal partnership. The wife,
however, cannot similarl" bind the partnership without the husband>s consent.
And while both eGercise =oint parental authorit" over their children, it is the
father whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the propert"
pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Ta%ing the lead in Asia, our government eGerted efforts, principall" through
legislations, to eliminate ine&ualit" between men and women in our land. The
0atershed ame on Au&ust :. ;<== 0hen our )amily Code too4 e!!et 0hih. amon&
others. terminated the une$ual treatment o! husband and 0i!e as to their ri&hts and
res'onsibilities.
((
The ,amil" Code attained this elusive ob=ective b" giving new rights to married women and b"
abolishing seG*based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given
the =oint right to administer the famil" propert", whether in the absolute communit" s"stem or
in the s"stem of con=ugal partnershipH
()
=oint parental authorit" over their minor children, both
over their persons as well as their propertiesH
(*
=oint responsibilit" for the support of the
famil"H
(5
the right to =ointl" manage the householdH
(6
and, the right to ob=ect to their husband>s
eGercise of profession, occupation, business or activit".
(7
O! 'artiular relevane to the ase
at benh is Artile >< o! the )amily Code 0hih too4 a0ay the e5lusive ri&ht o! the husband
to !i5 the !amily domiile and &ave it /ointly to the husband and the 0i!e. thus2
Art. J9. The husband and 0i!e shall !i5 the !amily domiile. (n case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court ma" eGempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
eGemption. However, such eGemption shall not appl" if the same is not
compatible with the solidarit" of the famil". A/mphasis suppliedB
Artile >< re'ealed Artile ;;? o! the Civil Code. Commenting on the dut" of the
husband and wife to live together, former +adam Iustice Alice 0empio*-i" of the
Court of Appeals specified the instances when a 0i!e may no0 re!use to live 0ith her
husband, thus2
(8
A<B The wife has the dut" to live with her husband, but she ma" refuse to do
so in certain cases li%e2
AaB (f the place chosen b" the husband as famil" residence is
dangerous to her .ifeH
AbB (f the husband sub=ects her to maltreatment or abusive
conduct or insults, ma%ing common life impossibleH
AcB (f the husband compels her to live with his parents, but
she cannot get along with her mother*in*law and the" have
constant &uarrels A-el osario v. -el osario, CA, @J 4:
J1<<BH
AdB 7here the husband has continuousl" carried illicit
relations for 1F "ears with different women and treated his
wife roughl" and without consideration. A-adivas v.
?illanueva, 1@ 'hil. 9<BH
AeB 7here the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no
mone" to his famil" for food and necessities, and at the same
time insulting his wife and la"ing hands on her. A'anuncio v.
0ula, CA, $@ 4: 1<9BH
AfB (f the husband has no fiGed residence and lives a
vagabond life as a tramp A1 +anresa $<9BH
AgB (f the husband is carr"ing on a shameful business at
home A:ahn v. -arb", $8 .a. Ann. 7FB.
The inesa'able onlusion is that our )amily Code has om'letely emani'ated the
0i!e !rom the ontrol o! the husband, thus abandoning the parties> theoretic identit" of
interest. 3o less than the late revered +r. Iustice I.9... e"es who chaired the Civil
Code evision Committee of the 5' .aw Center gave this insightful view in one of his
rare lectures after retirement2
(9
GGG GGG GGG
The ,amil" Code is primaril" intended to reform the famil" law so as to
emancipate the wife from the eGclusive control of the husband and to place
her at parit" with him insofar as the famil" is concerned. The 0i!e and the
husband are no0 'laed on e$ual standin& by the Code. The" are now =oint
administrators of the famil" properties and eGercise =oint authorit" over the
persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authorit" in the
famil". The husband 0ill no lon&er 'revail over the 0i!e but she has to agree
on all matters concerning the famil". A/mphasis suppliedB
(n light of the ,amil" Code which abrogated the ine&ualit" between husband and wife
as started and perpetuated b" the common law, there is no reason in es'ousin& the
anomalous rule that the 0i!e still retains the domiile o! her dead husband. Article 11F
of the Civil Code which provides the statutor" support for this stance has been
repealed b" Article J9 of the ,amil" Code. 9" its repeal, it becomes a dead*letter law,
and we are not free to resurrect it b" giving it further effect in an" wa" or manner such
as b" ruling that the petitioner is still bound b" the domiciliar" determination of her
dead husband.
Aside from rec%oning with the ,amil" Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm
guarantees of due process and e&ual protection of
law.
)+
It an hardly be doubted that the ommon la0 im'osition on a married 0oman o! her
dead husband#s domiile even beyond his &rave is 'atently disriminatory to 0omen. (t is a
gender*based discrimination and is not rationall" related to the ob=ective of promoting famil"
solidarit". (t cannot survive a constitutional challenge. (ndeed, compared with our previous
fundamental laws, the ;<=@ Constitution is more onerned 0ith e$uality bet0een se5es as it
e5'liitly ommands that the State !. . . shall ensure !undamental e$uality be!ore the la0 o!
0omen and men.! To be eGact, section 1@, Article (( provides2 !The 0tate recogni)es the role
of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental e&ualit" before the law of women
and men. 7e shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if
we insist on giving our women the caveman>s treatment.
'rescinding from these premises, ( respectfull" submit that the better stane is to rule that
'etitioner rea$uired her Taloban domiile u'on the death o! her husband in ;<=<. This is
the necessar" conse&uence of the view that petitioner>s 9atac dictated domicile did not
continue after her husband>s deathH otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will
violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at an" point of time. This
stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was ta%en awa" b"
Article 11F of the Civil Code, a right now recogni)ed b" the ,amil" Code and protected b" the
Constitution. .i%ewise, ( cannot see the fairness of the common law re&uiring petitioner to
choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her 9atac domicile.
0he lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased
husband when he fiGed their domicile in 9atac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her
be"ond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed.
Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has
abandoned her dead husband>s domicile. There is neither rh"me nor reason for this gender*
based burden.
,ut even assumin& ar&uendo that there is need !or onvinin& 'roo! that 'etitioner hose to
rea$uire her Taloban domiile. still. the reords reveal am'le evidene to this e!!et. (n her
affidavit submitted to the respondent C4+/./C, petitioner averred2
GGG GGG GGG
$J. (n 3ovember, 1991, ( came home to our beloved countr", after several
re&uests for m" return were denied b" 'resident Cora)on C. A&uino, and
after ( filed suits for our :overnment to issue me m" passport.
$7. 9ut ( came home without the mortal remains of m" beloved husband,
'resident ,erdinand /. +arcos, which the :overnment considered a threat to
the national securit" and welfare.
$8. 5pon m" return to the countr", ( wanted to immediatel" live and reside in
Tacloban Cit" or in 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te, even if m" residences there were not
livable as the" had been destro"ed and cannibali)ed. The 'C::, however,
did not permit and allow me.
$9. As a conse&uence, ( had to live at various times in the 7estin 'hilippine
'la)a in 'asa" Cit", a friend>s apartment on A"ala Avenue, a house in 0outh
,orbes 'ar% which m" daughter rented, and 'acific 'la)a, all in +a%ati.
@F. After the 199< 'residential /lections, ( lived and resided in the residence
of m" brother in 0an Iose, Tacloban Cit", and pursued m" negotiations with
'C:: to recover m" se&uestered residences in Tacloban Cit" and 9aranga"
4lot, Tolosa, .e"te.
@F.1 (n preparation for m" observance of All 0aints> -a" and
All 0ouls> -a" that "ear, ( renovated m" parents> burial
grounds and entombed their bones which had been
eGcalvated, unearthed and scattered.
@1. 4n 3ovember <9, 199$, ( formall" wrote 'C:: Chairman +agtanggol
:unigundo for permissions to #
. . . rehabilitate . . . AoBur ancestral house in Tacloban and
farmhouse in 4lot, .e"te . . . to ma%e them livable for us the
+arcos famil" to have a home in our own motherland.
GGG GGG GGG
@<. (t was onl" on FJ Iune 199@, however, when 'C:: Chairman
:unigundo, in his letter to Col. 0imeon 8empis, Ir., 'C:: egion 8
epresentative, allowed me to repair and renovate m" .e"te residences. (
&uote part of his letter2
-ear Col. 8empis,
5pon representation b" +rs. (melda . +arcos to this
Commission, that she intends to visit our se&uestered
properties in .e"te, please allow her access thereto. 0he
ma" also cause repairs and renovation of the se&uestered
properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her
underta%ing said repairs is not authori)ation for her to ta%e
over said properties, and that all eGpenses shall be for her
account and not reimbursable. 'lease eGtend the necessar"
courtes" to her.
GGG GGG GGG
@$. ( was not permitted, however, to live and sta" in the 0to. 3iNo 0hrine
residence in Tacloban Cit" where ( wanted to sta" and reside, after repairs
and renovations were completed. (n August 199@, ( transferred from 0an
Iose, Tacloban Cit", to m" residence in 9aranga" 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te, when
'C:: permitted me to sta" and live there.
It is then lear that in ;<<8 'etitioner reestablished her domiile in the )irst 1istrit o!
Leyte. (t is not disputed that in 199<, she first lived at the house of her brother in 0an
Iose, Tacloban Cit" and later, in August 199@, she transferred her residence in
9aranga" 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te. 9oth Tacloban Cit" and the municipalit" of 4lot are
within the ,irst -istrict of .e"te. 0ince petitioner reestablished her old domicile in
199< in the ,irst -istrict of .e"te, she more than complied with the constitutional
re&uirement of residence
!. . . for a period of not less than one "ear immediatel" preceding the da" of the
election,! i.e., the +a" 8, 1991 elections.
The evidene 'resented by the 'rivate res'ondent to ne&ate the Taloban domiile o!
'etitioner is nil. He presented petitioner>s ?oter>s egistration ecord filed with the 9oard of
/lection (nspectors of 'recinct 1F*A of 9aranga" 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te wherein she stated that
her period of residence in said baranga" was siG AJB months as of the date of her filing of said
?oter>s egistration ecord on Ianuar" <8, 1991.
)1
This statement in petitioner>s ?oter>s
egistration ecord is a nonA're/udiial admission. The Constitution re&uires at least one A1B
"ear residence in the distrit in which the candidate shall be elected. (n the case at bench, the
reference is the ,irst -istrict of .e"te. 'etitioner>s statement 'roved that she resided in 4lot
siG AJB months before Ianuar" <8, 1991 but did not dis'rove that she has also resided in
Tacloban Cit" starting 199<. As aforestated, 4lot and Tacloban Cit" are both within the ,irst
-istrict of .e"te, hence, her siG AJB months residence in 4lot should be counted not against,
but in her favor. 'rivate respondent also presented petitioner>s Certificate of Candidac" filed
on +arch 8, 1991
)(
where she placed seven A7B months after (tem 3o. 8 which called for
information regarding !residence in the constituenc" where ( see% to be elected immediatel"
preceding the election.! Again, this original certificate of candidac" has no evidentiar" value
because an +arch 1, 1991 it was corrected b" petitioner. (n her AmendedCCorrected
Certificate of Candidac",
))
petitioner wrote !since childhood! after (tem 3o. 8. The
amendment of a certificate of candidac" to correct a bona !ide mista%e has been allowed b"
this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,
)*

viz.2
GGG GGG GGG
The absence of the signature of the 0ecretar" of the local chapter 3.' in the
original certificate of candidac" presented before the deadline 0eptember 11,
1919, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment o! the erti!iate.
althou&h at a date a!ter the deadline. but be!ore the eletion. 0as substantial
om'liane 0ith the la0. and the de!et 0as ured.
(t goes without sa"ing that petitioner>s erroneous Certificate of Candidac" filed on
+arch 8, 1991 cannot be used as evidence against her. 'rivate respondent>s petition
for the dis&ualification of petitioner rested alone on these two A<B brittle pieces of
documentar" evidence # petitioner>s ?oter>s egistration ecord and her original
Certificate of Candidac". anged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her
ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent>s two A<B pieces of evidence
are too insufficient to dis&ualif" petitioner, more so, to den" her the right to represent
the people of the ,irst -istrict of .e"te who have overwhelmingl" voted for her.
,ifth. 0ection 1F, Article (O*C of the Constitution mandates that !bona !ide candidates for an"
public office shall be free from an" form of harassment and discrimination.!
)5
A detached
reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and eGtra*legal
obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people>s
representative in the ,irst -istrict of .e"te. (n petitioner>s Answer to the petition to dis&ualif"
her, she averred2
)6
GGG GGG GGG
1F. 'etitioner>s Aherein private respondent +onte=oB motive in filing the instant
petition is devious. 7hen respondent Apetitioner hereinB announced that she
was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban Cit" and run for Congress in
the ,irst -istrict of .e"te, petitioner A+onte=oB immediatel" opposed her
intended registration b" writing a letter stating that !she is not a resident of
said cit" but of 9aranga" 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te.! AAnneG !<! of respondent>s
affidavit, AnneG !<!B. After respondent Apetitioner hereinB had registered as a
voter in Tolosa following completion of her siG*month actual residence
therein, petitioner A+onte=oB filed a petition with the C4+/./C to transfer the
town of Tolosa from the ,irst -istrict to the 0econd -istrict and pursued such
move up to the 0upreme Court in :.. 3o. 1187F<, his purpose being to
remove respondent Apetitioner hereinB as petitioner>s A+onte=o>sB opponent in
the congressional election in the ,irst -istrict. He also filed a bill, along with
other .e"te Congressmen, see%ing to create another legislative district, to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the ,irst -istrict and to ma%e it a part of the
new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the
0enate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition, for the same ob=ective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit
himself along with respondent Apetitioner hereinB for the =udgment and verdict
of the electorate of the ,irst -istrict of .e"te in an honest, orderl", peaceful,
free and clean elections on +a" 8, 1991.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive e"e of Commissioner +aambong who in his -issenting 4pinion,
)7

held2
GGG GGG GGG
'rior to the registration date # Ianuar" <8, 1991 the petitioner Aherein
private respondent +onte=oB wrote the /lection 4fficer of Tacloban Cit" not to
allow respondent Apetitioner hereinB to register thereat since she is a resident
of Tolosa and not Tacloban Cit". The purpose of this move of the petitioner
A+onte=oB is not lost to AsiB the Commission. (n 53- 3o. 91*FF1 AIn the
matter o! the Le&islative 1istrits o! the "rovines o! Leyte. Iloilo. and South
Cotabato. Out o! 3hih the Ne0 "rovines o! ,iliran. (uimaras and
Saran&&ani 3ere Res'etively CreatedB, . . . Hon. Cirilo o" :. +onte=o,
epresentative, ,irst -istrict of .e"te, wanted the +unicipalit" of Tolosa, in
the ,irst -istrict of .e"te, transferred to the 0econd -istrict of .e"te. The
Hon. 0ergio A.,. Apostol, epresentative of the 0econd -istrict of .e"te,
opposed the move of the petitioner A+onte=oB. 5nder Comelec esolution 3o.
<7$J A-ecember <9, 199@B, the Commission on /lections refused to ma%e
the proposed transfer. 'etitioner A+onte=oB filed !Motion !or Reonsideration
o! Resolution
No. 8@:>! which the Commission denied in a esolution promulgated on
,ebruar" 1, 1991. 'etitioner A+onte=oB filed a petition for ertiorari before the
Honorable 0upreme Court ACirilo o" :. +onte=o vs. Commission on
/lections, :.. 3o. 1187F<B &uestioning the resolution of the Commission.
9elieving that he could get a favorable ruling from the 0upreme Court,
petitioner A+onte=oB tried to ma%e sure that the respondent Apetitioner hereinB
will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as
epresentative not in the ,irst but in the 0econd -istrict.
(t did not happen. 4n +arch 1J, 1991, the Honorable 0upreme Court
unanimousl" promulgated a !1eision,! penned b" Associate Iustice
e"nato 0. 'uno, the dispositive portion of which reads2
(3 ?(/7 7H//4,, 0ection 1 of esolution 3o. <7$J
insofar as it transferred the municipalit" of Capoocan of the
0econd -istrict and the municipalit" of 'alompon of the
,ourth -istrict to the Third -istrict of the province of .e"te, is
annulled and set aside. 7e also den" the 'etition pra"ing for
the transfer of the municipalit" of Tolosa from the ,irst
-istrict to the 0econd -istrict of the province of .e"te. 3o
costs.
'etitioner>s A+onte=o>sB plan did not wor%. 9ut the respondent Apetitioner
hereinB was constrained to register in the +unicipalit" of Tolosa where her
house is instead of Tacloban Cit", her domicile. (n an" case, both Tacloban
Cit" and Tolosa are in the ,irst .egislative -istrict.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of ran%
harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to den" her e&ual
access to a public office. 7e cannot commit an" hermeneutic violence to the
Constitution b" torturing the meaning of e&ualit", the end result of which will allow the
harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past
of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all ,ilipinos.
'etitioner cannot be ad=udged b" a !different! Constitution, and the worst wa" to
interpret the Constitution is to in=ect in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
0iGth. (n (alle&o v. 2era,
)8
we eGplained that the reason for this residence re&uirement is !to
eGclude a stranger or newcomer, unac&uainted, with the conditions and needs of a
communit" and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
communit" . . . .! 'etitioner>s lifetime contacts with the ,irst -istrict of .e"te cannot be
contested. 3obod" can claim that she is not ac&uainted with its problems because she is a
stranger to the place. 3one can argue she cannot satisf" the intent of the Constitution.
0eventh. (n resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the
will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received 0event" Thousand
,our Hundred 0event"*one A7F,@71B votes, while private respondent got onl" Thirt"*0iG
Thousand /ight Hundred Thirt"*Three A$J,8$$B votes. 'etitioner is clearl" the overwhelming
choice of the electorate of the ,irst -istrict of .e"te and this is not a sleight of statistics. 7e
cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highl" arguable technical considerations. (n case of
doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people>s political =udgment.
A !inal 'oint. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunit" to rectif" the
ine&ualit" of status between women and men b" re=ecting the ini&uitous common law
precedents on the domicile of married women and b" redefining domicile in accord with our
own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternall" tethered to the
domicile dictated b" her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous
balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. 7e should not allow the dead to govern the
living even if the glories of "ester"ears seduce us to shout long live the deadP The ,amil"
Code buried this gender*based discrimination against married women and we should not
eGcavate what has been entombed. +ore importantl", the Constitution forbids it.
( vote to grant the petition.
,ellosillo and Melo. %%-. onur-
.RANCISCO, J., concurring2
( concur with +r. Iustice 8apunan>s ponencia finding petitioner &ualified for the position of
epresentative of the ,irst Congressional -istrict of .e"te. ( wish, however, to eGpress a few
comments on the issue of petitioner>s domicile.
-omicile has been defined as that place in which a person>s habitation is fiGed, without an"
present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properl" the domicile of a person in
which he has voluntaril" fiGed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporar"
purpose, but with a present intention of ma%ing it his permanent home A<8 C.I.0. Q1B. (t
denotes a fiGed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for
li%e reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that
the" disclose intent. A4ng Huan Tin v. epublic, 19 0CA 9JJ, 9J9B
-omicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to ever"
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his famil",
or of the person on whom he is legall" dependent at the time of his birth. 7hile the domicile of
origin is generall" the place where one is born or reared, it ma"be elsewhere A<8 C.I.0. Q1B.
-omicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen
for himself to displace his previous domicileH it has for its true basis or foundation the intention
of the person A<8 C.I.0. QJB. (n order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and
ac&uired a new one called domicile of choice, the following re&uisites must concur, namel",
AaB residence or bodil" presence in the new localit", AbB intention to remain there or animus
manendi, and AcB an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi
Aomualde) v. TC, 9r. 7, Tacloban Cit", <<J 0CA @F8, @11B. A third classification is
domicile b" operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own
intention or actual residence, ordinaril" resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the
wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child A<8 C.I.0. Q7B.
(n election law, when our Constitution spea%s of residence for election purposes it means
domicile ACo v. /lectoral Tribunal of the House of epresentatives, 199 0CA J9<, 71$H
3uval v. :ura", 1< 'hil. J@1, J11B. To m" mind, public respondent Commission on /lections
misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner>s dis&ualification b" ruling that
petitioner failed to compl" with the constitutionall" mandated one*"ear residence re&uirement.
Apparentl", public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner>s sta" and
registration as voter in man" places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her
established domicile of origin in Tacloban, .e"te. (n several decisions, though, the Court has
laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence A,a"pon v. Kuirino, 9J 'hil.
<9@, $FFB. espondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule eGcept
to surmise petitioner>s intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
(t has been suggested that petitioner>s domicile of origin was supplanted b" a new domicile
due to her marriage, a domicile b" operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of
her husband in 1989 she retains her husband>s domicile, i.e., 9atac, (locos 3orte, until she
ma%es an actual change thereof. ( find this proposition &uite untenable.
Tacloban, .e"te, is petitioner>s domicile of origin which was involuntaril" supplanted with
another, i.e., 9atac, (locos 3orte, upon her marriage in 191@ with then Congressman +arcos.
9" legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. (n m" view, the reason for the law is
for the spouses to full" and effectivel" perform their marital duties and obligations to one
another.
1
The &uestion of domicile, however, is not affected b" the fact that it was the legal or
moral dut" of the individual to reside in a given place A<8 C.I.0. Q11B. Thus, while the wife
retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automaticall" loses it upon
the latter>s termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. 4therwise, petitioner, after
her marriage was ended b" the death of her husband, would be placed in a &uite absurd and
unfair situation of having been freed from all wifel" obligations "et made to hold on to one
which no longer serves an" meaningful purpose.
(t is m" view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, .e"te upon
her husband>s death without even signif"ing her intention to that effect. (t is for the private
respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectivel" abandoned
Tacloban, .e"te for 9atac, (locos 3orte or for some other placeCs. The clear rule is that it is
the part" Aherein private respondentB claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his
residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantl" such abandonment or loss
A,a"pon v. Kuirino, su'ra at <98H <8 C.I.0. Q1JB, because the presumption is strongl" in favor
of an original or former domicile, as against an ac&uired one A<8 C.I.0. Q1JB. 'rivate
respondent unfortunatel" failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing
proof that petitioner has ac&uired whether voluntaril" or involuntaril", a new domicile to
replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrar", clearl" show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional
one*"ear residence re&uirement. After her eGile abroad, she returned to the 'hilippines in
1991 to reside in 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te, but the 'residential Commission on :ood :overnment
which se&uestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her
transient sta" in various places in +anila AAffidavit p.J, attached as AnneG ( of the 'etitionB. (n
199<, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidac" her residence
as 0an Iuan, +etro +anila. After her loss therein, she went bac% to Tacloban Cit", ac&uired
her residence certificate
(
and resided with her brother in 0an Iose. 0he resided in 0an Iose,
Tacloban Cit" until August of 199@ when she was allowed b" the 'C:: to move and reside
in her se&uestered residential house in 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te AAnneG (, p. JB.
)
(t was in the same
month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in 0an
Iuan, +etro +anila in order to register anew as voter of 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te, which she did on
Ianuar" <8, 1991. ,rom this se&uence of events, ( find it &uite improper to use as the
rec%oning period of the one*"ear residence re&uirement the date when she applied for the
cancellation of her previous registration in 0an Iuan, +etro +anila. The fact which private
respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the
199< presidential election from 0an Iuan, +etro +anila to 0an Iose, Tacloban Cit", and
resided therein until August of 199@. 0he later transferred to 4lot, Tolosa, .e"te AAnneG (, p.
7B. (t appearing that both Tacloban Cit" and Tolosa, .e"te are within the ,irst Congressional
-istrict of .e"te, it indubitabl" stands that she had more than a "ear of residence in the
constituenc" she sought to be elected. 'etitioner, therefore, has satisfactoril" complied with
the one*"ear &ualification re&uired b" the 1987 Constitution.
( vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion2
'etitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the C4+/./C ruled that she was
dis&ualified from running for epresentative of her -istrict and that, in the event that she
should, nevertheless, muster a ma=orit" vote, her proclamation should be suspended. 3ot b"
a straightforward ruling did the C4+/./C pronounce its decision as has been its unvar"ing
practice in the past, but b" a startling succession of !reverse somersaults.! (ndicative of its
shifting stance visAaAvis petitioner>s certificate of candidac" were first, the action of its 0econd
-ivision dis&ualif"ing her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidac" b" a vote of <*1
on April <@, 1991H then the denial b" the C4+/./C en ban of her +otion for
econsideration on +a" 7, 1991, a da" before the electionH then because she persisted in
running, its decision on
+a" 11, 1991 or three da"s after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the
results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes Aobviousl"
noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingl" over her opponentB, but almost simultaneousl"
reversing itself b" directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be
suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the dis&ualification issue presented b" the case at bench is the
interpretation to be given to the one*"ear residenc" re&uirement imposed b" the Constitution
on aspirants for a Congressional seat.
1
9earing in mind that the term !resident! has been held to be s"non"mous with !domicile! for
election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner>s domicile was in the ,irst
-istrict of .e"te and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one "ear.
5ndisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
-epending on what theor" one adopts, the same ma" have been changed when she married
,erdinand /. +arcos, then domiciled in 9atac, b" operation of law. Assuming it did, his death
certainl" released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fiGed b" him during
his lifetime. 7hat ma" confuse the la"man at this point is the fact that the term !domicile! ma"
refer to !domicile of origin,! !domicile of choice,! or !domicile b" operation of law,! which
sub=ect we shall not belabor since it has been ampl" discussed b" the 'onente and in the
other separate opinions.
(n an" case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
husband>s death on the domicile of the widow. 0ome scholars opine that the widow>s domicile
remains unchangedH that the deceased husband>s wishes perforce still bind the wife he has
left behind. :iven this interpretation, the widow cannot possibl" go far enough to sever the
domiciliar" tie imposed b" her husband.
(t is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterall" to fiG the
residence or domicile of the famil", as laid down in the Civil Code,
(
but to continue giving
obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underl"ing the mutual dut" of the spouses to
live together has ceased, is to close one>s e"es to the star% realities of the present.
At the other eGtreme is the position that the widow automaticall" reverts to her domicile of
origin upon the demise of her husband. -oes the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has
to be endowed somehow with a domicileL To answer this &uestion which is far from
rhetorical, one will have to %eep in mind the basic principles of domicile. /ver"one must have
a domicile. Then one must have onl" a single domicile for the same purpose at an" given
time. 4nce established, a domicile remains until a new one is ac&uired, for no person lives
who has no domicile, as defined b" the law be is sub=ect to.
At this =uncture, we are confronted with an uneGplored legal terrain in this =urisdiction,
rendered more mur%" b" the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the
state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the dar%ness with the beacon light
of truth, as dictated b" eGperience and the necessit" of according petitioner her right to
choose her domicile in %eeping with the enlightened global trend to recogni)e and protect the
human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedl", the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social
rights are concerned, is a relativel" recent phenomenon that too% seed onl" in the middle of
this centur". (t is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the 'hilippines had been
coloni)ed b" 0pain, a conservative, Catholic countr" which transplanted to our shores the 4ld
7orld cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of
the 0panish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to
accept such concepts as the husband>s being the head of the famil" and the wife>s
subordination to his authorit". (n such role, his was the right to ma%e vital decisions for the
famil". +an" instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us,
namel", that !the husband shall fiG the residence of the famil".!
)
9ecause he is made
responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the famil",
*
he is also empowered to be
the administrator of the con=ugal propert", with a few eGceptions
5
and ma", therefore, dispose
of the con=ugal partnership propert" for the purposes specified under the lawH
6
whereas, as a
general rule, the wife cannot bind the con=ugal partnership without the husband>s consent.
7

As regards the propert" pertaining to the children under parental authorit", the father is the
legal administrator and onl" in his absence ma" the mother assume his powers.
8
-emeaning
to the wife>s dignit" are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practicall" relegating her
to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few2 The wife cannot, without
the husband>s consent, ac&uire an" gratuitous title, eGcept from her ascendants,
descendants, parents*in*law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. 9 7ith respect
to her emplo"ment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife eGercises her
profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the
famil", according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid
grounds. 1F +ost offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal*minded is the effective prohibition
upon a widow to get married till after three hundred da"s following the death of her husband,
unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a
subse&uent marriage loses the parental authorit" over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has eGpressl" provided in his will that his widow might marr"
again, and has ordered that in such case she should %eep and eGercise parental authorit"
over their children. 1< Again, an instance of a husband>s overarching influence from be"ond
the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered b" ,ilipino wives for hundreds of "ears evo%ed no
protest from them until the concept of human rights and e&ualit" between and among nations
and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the 5nited 3ations Charter of which the
'hilippines was one of the original signatories. 9" then, the 0panish !con&uistadores! had
been overthrown b" the American forces at the turn of the centur". The bedroc% of the 5.3.
Charter was firml" anchored on this credo2 !to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights,
in the dignit" and worth of the human person, in the e$ual ri&hts o! men and 0omen.!
A/mphasis suppliedB
(t too% over thirt" "ears before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largel" to
the burgeoning of the feminist movement. 7hat ma" be regarded as the international
bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the /limination of All
,orms of -iscrimination Against 7omen AC/-A7B adopted b" the 5.3. :eneral
Assembl" which entered into force as an international treat" on 0eptember $, 1981.
(n ratif"ing the instrument, the 'hilippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit
and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that !The 'hilippines. . . adopts the
generall" accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the polic" of peace, e&ualit", =ustice, freedom, cooperation, and amit" with
all nations.!
1)
4ne such principle embodied in the C/-A7 is granting to men and
women !the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons
and the !reedom to hoose their residene and domiile.!
1*
A/mphasis suppliedB.
C/-A7>s pro*women orientation which was not lost on ,ilipino women was reflected in the
1987 Constitution of the 'hilippines and later, in the ,amil" Code,
15
both of which were
speedil" approved b" the first lad" 'resident of the countr", Cora)on C. A&uino. 3otable for
its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for e&ualit" between the seGes
are the following provisions2 !The 0tate values the dignit" of ever" human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights!