Dialectical pluralism: A theoretical conceptualization

of pluralism in psychology
Jason R. Goertzen
*
University of Alberta, Augustana Campus, Camrose, Alberta, Canada
a b s t r a c t
A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology called
dialectical pluralism is proposed in this paper. It is argued that this
approach provides an effective and efcient basis for scientic
progress in psychology. Three primary components of dialectical
pluralism are developed. First, drawing on Royces constructive
dialectics, it is contended that tension between competing theories
should be sustained in the hope of producing evaluative or inte-
grative solutions. Second, the unitydisunity debate in psychology
is reframed as a continuum and it is argued that oscillating periods
of convergent and divergent pluralism would provide a productive
model for scientic progress. Finally, intercontextualism is dis-
cussed as the underlying philosophical foundation for dialectical
pluralism. This alternative to both mainstream psychologys posi-
tivistempiricist foundations, as well as competing positions that
may be more contextualist in orientation, is expounded as the
justication for this new conceptualization. In particular, the limits
of a methodological unity based on positivistempiricist founda-
tions, as well as of a pragmatic pluralism based on contextualist
foundations, are both addressed by intercontextualism. As a result,
dialectical pluralism may provide a middle ground between these
two distinctive factions within psychology, while alleviating the
fragmentation of the discipline.
2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
* Department of Social Sciences, University of Alberta, Augustana Campus, 4901 46 Avenue, Camrose, Alberta T4V 2R3,
Canada.
E-mail address: jason.goertzen@ualberta.ca
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doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2009.09.013
New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 201209
Even if one rejects the extreme pictures of a rigorous, reduced, and unied science or a relativ-
istic, pluralistic, and disunied science, there are many places to occupy in the middle ground.
Which pluralistic picture of scientic practice should be endorsed, and what are the critical
standards retained? (Mitchell, 2003, p. 2).
Pluralismin psychology is generally lauded as positive, especially in reaction to past, failed efforts at
unifying the discipline under a single conceptual framework, and especially in areas of the discipline
inuenced by the developments of postmodernity. Pluralism is championed as productive (Derksen,
2005), strategically benecial for marginal areas of the discipline (Kirschner, 2006), and as necessary
for the real-world application of psychological knowledge in clinical settings (Carter, 2006), amongst
other benets. Pluralismis thus oftenviewed as a benecial, countering force to movements that might
problematically homogenize the discipline. Furthermore, it is often viewed as crucial for psychology in
light of postmodern theories that have highlighted the situated, contextual, perspectival, and relative
nature of knowledge and psychological life in general (e.g., Nagel, 1989). In short, pluralism is generally
conceptualized as benecial, even necessary, for a psychology that is tolerant and supportive of
multipledespecially marginalizeddperspectives.
However, in contrast to this optimistic portrayal, some theorists contend that pluralismtaken too far
results in a problematic fragmentation of the discipline (e.g., Goertzen, 2008b; Staats, 1983; Yanchar,
1997; Yanchar &Slife, 1997). Suchfragmentationcanresult insome parts of psychology splintering off to
formtheir owndisciplines, such as cognitive neuroscience (Church, 1990), withthe threat of psychology
ultimately rupturing or dissolving as an independent discipline (Gardner, 1992; Spence, 1987). Less
dramatically, but still to be taken seriously, psychologys fragmentation can prevent the integration of
specialized knowledge, which can lead to richer and more complete explanations of psychological
phenomena and events (Goertzen, 2008b; Staats, 1999; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2001). Additionally,
fragmentation can create tensions amongst psychologists, within psychology departments, and within
and between psychological organizations (Goertzen, 2008b; Sternberg, 2003, 2005). These and addi-
tional, related problems have led a number of theorists to argue that there is a crisis of fragmentation in
psychology (see Goertzen, 2005, 2008b).
In response to this claim, some critics argue that there is not, in fact, a crisis of fragmentation (e.g.,
Bower, 1993; McNally, 1992; Viney, 1996; see Goertzen, 2008b). Most commonly, such critics argue that
what some theorists call fragmentation is simply healthy differentiation or speciation (Bower, 1993;
McNally, 1992). However, elsewhere (Goertzen, 2008b), I summarize these no crisis arguments, and
also provide counterarguments that support the premise of there being a crisis of fragmentation in
psychology. For example, I counter that differentiation would imply cooperation, or at least a shared
basis of understanding, when in fact the specialized areas of, and approaches to, psychology may often
be competitive or even incommensurable.
Drawing an analogy from complexity theory, I also elsewhere (Goertzen, 2009a) conclude that
attempts to unify or divide psychology can both be problematic when taken too far toward the
extremes of the unitydisunity continuum. However, more theory is needed in order to adequately
conceptualize pluralism in psychology. For example, although I agree that it is indeed a positive to
contend that pluralism can be productive (Derksen, 2005), more elaborate theory is needed to indicate
how, why, and in what ways pluralism can be productive (Goertzen, 2006), especially in response to
some theorists contentions that the fragmentation of psychology, in fact, leads to a drop inproductivity
(e.g., some research that fails to cite appropriate previous research ends up reinventing the wheel or
being otherwise redundant; Staats, 1999; see also Thorngate, 1990).
In this paper, I develop dialectical pluralism as a way of conceptualizing pluralism in psychology
more efciently and effectively for scientic progress than the current fragmented or underdeveloped
calls for pluralism. I thus do not simply, optimistically offer dialectical pluralism as an obvious choice
for psychology, but instead as a rigorous theoretical conceptualization that takes seriously the
signicant consequences of both the homogenization and fragmentation of the discipline.
There are three primary components of dialectical pluralism that I will develop. First, with respect
to psychological theory, the tension between competing theories should be sustained over time in
order to pursue evaluative or integrative resolutions (it should be noted that this approach, therefore,
begins with the acknowledgement or recognition of competing theories and perspectives; see Teo,
J.R. Goertzen / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 201209 202
2010). Second, in terms of psychologys theoretical and methodological foundations, the discipline
should uctuate between periods of relative unity and disunity over time in a manner that facilitates
efcient scientic progress. Finally, my dialectical pluralismis based upon, and receives its justication
from, a philosophical foundation I am developing, which I am calling intercontextualism (Goertzen,
2009b). My development of this foundation proceeds fromcriticisms of both mainstream psychologys
positivistempiricist foundations, as well as of some critical alternatives that may be more con-
textualist (than the mainstream) in orientation (see Gulerce, 2010).
Before beginning, however, I should note that my use of dialectical in this paper is not drawn from
the famous theories of Hegel and Marx, but instead more modestly from the theoretical psychologist
Joseph Royces constructive dialectics (Royce, 1977, 1978, 1985, 1987). Royces platform provides
a theoretical starting point that I then alter and extend as I develop dialectical pluralism.
1. Royces constructive dialectics
Royce (1977, 1978, 1985, 1987) expounds an approach to theory construction and evaluation in
psychology that he calls constructive dialectics. It is based in large part on his view that psychology is
multi- in a variety of ways (e.g., multi-methodological, multi-theoretic; Royce, 1976). His view of
pluralismandpsychology is that contemporary psychology is conceptually pluralistic, and[furthermore]
a philosophyof psychologycannot be characterizedas truly indigenous unless it takes psychologys multi
nature into account (Royce, 1977, p. 23). He argues forcefully that psychology focuses heavily on the
production of empirical data to the exclusion of theoreticaldespecially integrative theoreticaldresearch.
As a consequence, he further argues that psychology has a plethora of data, and training in methodology
for the production of data, but no comparable products or training in terms of howto construct, evaluate,
and integrate theories based on this data.
Royce offers constructive dialectics in response to this problem in psychology. He explains that
constructive refers to the theories constructed by psychologists and that dialectics refers to the
process of sustaining the tension between competing theories over time in the hope of producing
integrative resolutions, or evaluative resolutions that would justify single theories as superior to
competing theories. He argues that this approach is better equipped to handle, scientically, the
complexity of psychological subject matter in its entirety, because simplistic philosophies and
theories are not adequate accounts of the overall complexity [of psychological subject matter] (Royce,
1977, p. 29). In other words, he argues that psychologydequipped with a new, post-Kuhnian philos-
ophy of sciencedneeds to deal with the total complexity of psychological subject matter, which would
inevitably lead to the construction of multiple, competing theories in need of evaluation and inte-
gration. In response to this multiplicity of newly constructed theories, Royce suggests that theories
should be only tentatively refuted, tentatively accepted, or subject to further evidence before being
evaluateddas opposed to prematurely rejected, embraced, or otherwise decisively evaluated.
Importantly for Royce, constructive dialectics involves dialectical analysis in the sense that theories
need to be critically evaluated on their own terms, but especially in relation to other, competing
theories. He explains that because theories are so difcult to ultimately conrm or refute, a set of
evaluative criteria would have to be developed for making tentative evaluations. However, Royce
acknowledges that any set of evaluative criteria necessitates prior assumptions and thus may be
subject to controversy. As a tentative solution, he argues that a pragmatic basis for action is needed. His
conclusion is to promote the proliferation of potentially viable theory and simultaneously to develop
a small number of theories that show the greatest potential for eventually becoming conceptually
powerful (Royce, 1985, p. 314).
However, Royce (1985) acknowledges at various points in the development of his theory of
constructive dialectics that his approach is far from foolproof and, in fact, requires a substantial
investment of time and resources, while being comparable to playing the stock market in terms of
certainty (p. 313). As a result, he explains that psychologists should have modest expectations and
proceed in a bottom-up fashion, focusing on constructing and evaluating mini-theories rst before
moving to broader, more general theories. He stresses that this approach would be unlikely to ever
result in a single, integrated theory, but could still represent a pay-off in the direction of theoretical
unication (Royce, 1977, p. 16). He further stresses that this approach would bolster psychologists
J.R. Goertzen / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 201209 203
ability to construct, evaluate, and integrate theories, and would lead to greater emphasis on grappling
with underlying philosophical assumptions in relation to the philosophical schisms that plague
psychological subject matter (e.g., the mind-body problem; see also Goertzen, 2008b). He acknowl-
edges, however, that psychologys emphasis on empirical ndings should still be retained, in concert
with the emphasis placed on theory by constructive dialectics, and that it is this positive emphasis on
establishing empirical correlates for theoretical propositions that distinguishes psychology from
philosophy in a desirable way.
2. Critique of Royce
There is much in Royces theory of constructive dialectics that is worth preserving as the basis of
a conceptualization of pluralism in psychology that avoids disciplinary homogenization and frag-
mentation on the one hand, while efciently and effectively facilitating scientic progress on the other.
For example, his critique of psychologys emphasis on the production of novel, empirical ndings to the
relative exclusion of integrative theoretical research rings as true today as it did thirty years ago (see
Staats, 1999). Furthermore, his constructivist approach and call for psychology to nally, formally
acknowledge post-Kuhnian philosophy of science are both still appropriate for informing conceptions
of pluralism. His emphasis on positioning competing psychological theories in relation to one another
and pursuing evaluative criteria and integrative resolutions are both still extremely desirable for
a discipline with an increasingly fragmented literature and a plethora of unrelated, often unexamined
theories. Contemporary theorists have similarly called for the dialogical positioning of psychological
theories (e.g., Kristensen, Slife, & Yanchar, 2000; Smythe & McKenzie, 2010). In addition, Royces
arguments regarding the complexity of psychological subject matter and the relative, problematic
simplicity of many psychological theories also still apply. Finally, his acknowledgement of the
contingency of knowledge production and evaluation is an important insight for contemporary
conceptualizations of pluralism (see e.g., Mitchell, 2003).
However, there are limitations to Royces constructive dialectics that need to be addressed. For
example, Roycefollows animportant lineof theoretical argument that leads himintoa predicament when
addressing the problem of evaluation. Specically, he rightly argues that theories are extremely difcult
to evaluate (i.e., conrm, refute, etc.), particularly because anyevaluative criteria are themselves subject to
evaluation, potentially leading to an innite regress (see Chisholm, 1973; Yanchar, 1997). His response to
move toward pragmatism as a solution is currently a popular one (e.g., Hickman, 2007; Roth, 1987);
however, his conclusion to promote the proliferation of potentially viable theory and simultaneously to
developa small number of theories that showthe greatest potential for eventually becomingconceptually
powerful (Royce, 1985, p. 314) is vague and unhelpful for addressing this fundamental theoretical issue.
As a result, the interested psychologist is left to try and determine how to proceed.
A second concern is with Royces call to focus exclusively on the construction and evaluation of
mini-theories. In focusing only on the local or micro-level, relationships between diverse constructs
and theories are neglected. It is possible, and at times desirable, to use a more powerful theoretical
microscope, but an exclusive reliance on such a level of analysis can leave the psychologist unable to
see the forest for the trees (Chao, 2002; Staats, 1995) and thus can only exacerbate the fragmentation
of psychology. In other words, just as an exclusive focus on the macro-level can lead to supercial
treatments of specialized topics, so can an exclusive focus on the micro-level lead to narrow, unrelated
and fragmented, as well as potentially redundant, treatments of specialized topics.
Another potential concern with simply implementing Royces conceptualization as is, is that it
would do a disservice to one of the primary strengths of his approach, namely drawing on the
philosophy of science literature in order to inform the philosophy of psychology. Specically, he draws
on 1980s post-Kuhnian philosophy of science in making his arguments for constructive dialectics.
However, there have been continuing, important developments in the philosophy of science since
Royces time that can continue to inform conceptualizations of pluralism in psychology. For example,
Mitchells (2003) integrative pluralismda philosophy of biologydhas many important insights for
informing pluralism in psychology. Furthermore, the work of complexity theorists, such as Kauffman
(1995), can be useful as well (see Goertzen, 2009a). Thus, an updating of sorts is necessary for
expanding Royces constructive dialectics.
J.R. Goertzen / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 201209 204
One of the insights that can be drawn from this philosophy of science and complexity theory
literature is that psychology, as a complex system, can change over time, includingdnotablydalong
the unitydisunity continuum (Goertzen, 2009a). Royce (1985) argues that psychology suffers from
simultaneous pluralism and that progress would be signied by the discipline developing toward
sequential pluralism in a manner similar to Kuhnian paradigms. Although this argument has some
merit, a more complex picture emerges when psychology is conceptualized as dynamic, as capable of
transitioning between periods of divergent and convergent pluralism, and thus as being subject to the
waxing and waning of both centrifugal and centripetal trends (Altman, 1987). This more complex,
dynamic representation of psychology places greater emphasis on the potential benets of limited
periods of relative disunity than Royce conceives, likely because he is rightly attempting to counter
psychologys prolonged fragmentation.
In sum, Royces conceptualization, despite having much to offer that is valuable as a foundation, is
somewhat dated and suffers from some specic limitations. There have been some important devel-
opments since Royces time that can informnovel theoretical contributions with respect to pluralismin
psychology. One such recent development is the continued growth of the eld of complexity theory,
which I have drawn on to inform the conceptualization of a unitydisunity continuum for psychology
(Goertzen, 2009a).
3. The unitydisunity continuum
As I mentioned at the outset of this paper, pluralism has often been defended against perceived
attempts at homogenizing the discipline. This reaction is but one example of how the unitydisunity
issue has been debated as an eitheror dichotomy in the literature: either psychology unies (at the
expense of diversity/pluralism) or it remains disunied (with the risk of fragmentation)dand there are
strong champions on both sides of the debate (e.g., Staats, 1983, 1999 for unity and Koch, 1981, 1993 for
disunity). However, drawing on the complexity theory literature, I elsewhere (Goertzen, 2009a)
propose that this dichotomy should be understood as inaccurate and, instead, the unitydisunity
tension should be reframed as existing along a continuum (it should be noted, however, that this
continuum differs signicantly from the one proposed by Staats, 2004 who argues that psychology
moves solely from an initially disunied state to a unied state over time). Specically, this continuum
spans from uniformity on one extreme, through convergent pluralism, divergent pluralism, and nally
fragmentation on the opposite extreme, with the most productive form of pluralism existing between
convergent and divergent pluralism, analogous to complexity theorys edge of chaos (Kauffman,
1995). I maintain that both extremes of the continuum are problematic for psychology, and that
psychology, currently, is problematically at the fragmentation extreme. Furthermore, I argue that
psychology should ideally move between convergent and divergent pluralism over time.
4. Dialectical pluralism
My dynamic conceptualization of scientic progress in psychology is one of three main components
of dialectical pluralism that I will outline in this section. First, at the theoretical level, psychologys
pluralism should involve sustaining tensions between competing theories in dialogical relationship
over time, in the pursuit of successful evaluations and integrations of these theories. This approach,
based on Royces constructive dialectics, can lead to richer, more complete and complex explanations of
psychological phenomena and eventsdthat span differing levels of analysis and diverse theoretical
frameworks (see Goertzen, 2008b).
Second, at the broader level of the disciplines philosophy of science, I argue that psychologys
pluralism should be informed by contemporary philosophy of science writing (e.g., Mitchell, 2003), as
well as related bodies of literature, such as complexity science (e.g., Kauffman, 1995). Specically, in
contrast to Royce, I propose that psychologys research emphasis in terms of funding, publishing, and
overall general support (e.g., tenure and promotion criteria; see Fishman, 1987; Yanchar & Slife, 1997)
should oscillate over time between periods of convergent and divergent pluralismdas opposed to
continuing to exacerbate psychologys fragmentation or being made uniform through the topdown
imposition of a given unied theory. That is, this approach can facilitate more efcient scientic
J.R. Goertzen / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 201209 205
progress than the current, heavy emphasis on the production of novel empirical ndingsdto the
relative exclusion of integrative theoretical researchdby providing a logical and meaningful basis for
linking both of these important scientic tasks.
Finally, my dialectical pluralism is supported by my philosophical foundation of intercontextualism
(see Goertzen, 2009b), which entails acknowledging the contingency and complexity of knowledge,
the need for evaluation and integration of specialized knowledge and, most importantly, the need to
examinedboth empirically and theoreticallydthe complex interactions, interpenetrations, and other
relationships between contexts (e.g., different cultures in our era of globalization; different levels of
theoretical analysis, such as biological and phenomenological, etc.).
4.1. Constructive dialectics
First, I argue that, in order to counter psychologys prolonged fragmentation, a period of convergent
pluralism is needed. Following Royce (1977, 1978, 1985, 1987) and Staats (1999), I propose that the
discipline needs to supportdin terms of funding, publishing, and other concrete waysdan emphasis on
integrative theoretical and empirical research. During such phases of convergent pluralism, psycholo-
gists need to reect on the empirical ndings that have been produced and emphasize theoretical
research, such as theory-knitting (Kalmar & Sternberg, 1988), which will produce integrations of
specialized knowledge, or at least highlight actual and potential relationships. Wherever possible,
integrative empirical research is also welcome to test or otherwise help evaluate (e.g., nd empirical
correlates for) proposed theoretical integrations and relationships (although, in contrast to Kalmar &
Sternberg, 1988, I should note that empirical research itself rests on philosophical assumptions that are
subject to evaluation; and, therefore, empirical research by itself is insufcient for resolving competing
theories; see Slife & Williams, 1995). Following Royce, I suggest that, during phases of convergent
pluralism, competing theories need to be positioned in dialogical relationship in order to sustain the
tensions between them in the hope of producing novel evaluations or integrations of the theories.
One possible tactic for such breakthroughs that has been proposed (see Martin, 2007) is to search
for and uncover salient aspects (e.g., of a psychological phenomenon or event) that each of the indi-
vidual theories had previously overlooked. For example, if one psychological theory emphasizes
parental inuences on a given behaviour of a child, and a competing theory emphasizes peer inuences
on the same behaviour, there may be one or more relevant factors that are being overlooked by both
theories, such as the mediating effects of the childs self-esteem, that could provide the basis for
evaluating, integrating, or otherwise relating the two theories. In short, such overlooked salient factors
can be the basis for evaluating or bridging the competing theories.
4.2. Scientic progress in psychology as dynamic
However, my dialectical pluralismacknowledges the contingency of any evaluation and integration,
as well as of the production of knowledge more generally. For example, on the one hand psychologists
will always attempt such evaluations and integrations with incomplete knowledge of a given
psychological phenomenon or event (otherwise, there would, arguably, be no need for research on the
topic in the rst place). Furthermore, and more importantly, after the linguistic turn in the philosophy
of science, it is now commonly accepted that knowledge production is contingent on a variety of
contextual factors, including language, culture, politics, and economics, amongst others (see Walsh-
Bowers, 2010, regarding the importance of contextual, including irrational, factors in the production
of knowledge). As a result, as such contextual factors shift, psychologists perspectives regarding
psychologys accumulated knowledge, as well as psychological phenomena of interest, will also
change. Convergently, I suggest that such changes in perspective can lead to the recognition of
previously overlooked salient factors, in turn leading to novel evaluations and integrations. However,
and more likely, divergently, such changes in perspective can lead to the proliferation of divergent
empirical and theoretical research. Due in part to these shifting contextual factors, and corresponding
changes in perspectives, periods of convergent pluralism will always give way to periods of divergent
pluralismdone needs only a brief examination of the history of psychology to nd evidence of seeming
faddishness (Staats, 1991) regarding divergences with respect to topics of inquiry, for example. I
J.R. Goertzen / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 201209 206
maintaindin contrast to Royce, Staats, and othersdthat such periods of divergent pluralism can be
valuable for the discipline, since diversity and the intake of novel elements are both desirable for
a complex system, when not taken to the extreme (Kauffman, 1995). In sum, I argue that, ideally,
periods of divergent and convergent pluralism will necessarily give way to one another over timedif
supported by psychologists, since the actions of any social system depend in part on the agency of its
members (Bhaskar, 1998).
4.3. Intercontextualism
Finally, my dialectical pluralism rests on a philosophical foundation that I am developing, which I
am calling intercontextualism (Goertzen, 2009b). This approach rests on criticisms of both the
dominant mainstream philosophy of science in psychology (i.e., an amalgam of positivism and
empiricism; see Mitchell, 2003), as well as of the directions suggested by many contextualist alter-
natives (e.g., scientic explanation and evaluation should be constrained to local contexts only), which
represent an increasingly popular alternative to the more common (i.e., statistical, nomothetic)
approach to research. First, I challenge mainstream psychologys continued reliance on an outmoded
and heavily critiqued foundation (see Tolman, 1992) in light of developments in the philosophy of
science since the work of Kuhn. For example, I view both psychologys faith in null hypothesis
signicance testing (NHST) as a methodological panacea and unifying force, as well as the relative lack
of attention given to the constructivist, contextualist, and other critical developments in the philosophy
of science, as problematic (not to mention the lack of attention given to critiques of NHST internal to
mainstream psychology; see Krueger, 2001; Nickerson, 2000).
However, secondly, I also reject some of the conclusions of contextualist approaches as analternative
basis for conceptualizing pluralismin psychology (i.e., in response to mainstreampsychologys implicit
faith in a methodological unity). For example, contextualist approaches generally recommend focusing
onthe particular andlocal. Inother words, theyrecommendfocusingona particular context andthus on
making evaluations only within a given context as opposed to between contexts (e.g., Biagioli, 1996;
Fine, 1996; Stump, 1996). However, this pragmatic, contextual approach is problematic for at least two
reasons. First, as I previously mentioned, an exclusive reliance on a micro-level focus seriously risks
neglecting the complex relationships between contexts; and, second, an approach that recommends an
exclusive focus on particular contexts has nothing to offer psychologists struggling with the multi-
nature of psychological phenomena, or with the problem of evaluation between contexts. In short, the
pragmatic, contextualist adoption and authentication by the relevant community of inquirers (Fine,
1996, p. 234) is not a sufcient evaluative criterion for a truth claimin terms of escaping the problemof
evaluation, since it does nothing to assist making evaluations between relevant communities of
inquirersdand, in a fragmented psychology, the need for such evaluation is commonplace (see Martin,
2010; I shouldnote, however, that I acknowledge that there are differing approaches topragmatism, and
that I have addressed this concern elsewhere; see Goertzen, 2009b).
Intercontextualism builds upon contextualist philosophies by addressing the complex relationships
between contexts that are so characteristic of psychologyda discipline that spans multiple levels of
analysis (e.g., biological, cognitive, social, cultural, cross-cultural, and so on; see Martin, 2010). My
approach also builds upon Royces constructive dialectics by continuing to draw on the philosophy of
science literature to inform the philosophy of psychology. For example, Mitchells (2003) argument for
an integrative pluralism that involves the integration of various theoretical abstractions in service of
the concrete explanation of a given phenomenon is endorsed, although I acknowledge that such
integration is more challenging for psychology given that it would involve spanning thorny philo-
sophical fault lines, such as the mind-body problem, that are much less characteristic of biology by
comparison (for more on Mitchell and the philosophy of psychology, see Goertzen, 2008a).
Coming back to dialectical pluralism specically, intercontextualism serves as the philosophical
foundation for dialectical pluralismin that intercontextualismprovides its justication. In other words,
in contrast to positivism, empiricism, and contextualism, my intercontextualismprovides a basis for, for
example, incorporating an acknowledgement of the contingency underlying knowledge production,
while still recognizing the complexity and need for explanation of psychological phenomena, as well as
the subsequent needfor the evaluation and integrationof psychological theories. Thus, during phases of
J.R. Goertzen / New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 201209 207
convergent pluralism, intercontextualism provides a basis and justication for conceptualizing the
complexity of psychological phenomena and need for the evaluation and integration of theories in
service of the explanation of these phenomena. Furthermore, intercontextualism sensitizes psycholo-
gists to the need to examine the complex and various kinds of relationships between contexts, as well as
to the problem of evaluation that exists at this level of analysis. I believe it is worth noting that no
consensual solution to the problemof evaluation has yet been developed, but Royces recommendation
to develop contingent evaluative criteria provides a starting point for further discussion and theoretical
elaboration (see also Kristensen et al., 2000). In contrast, during phases of divergent pluralism, inter-
contextualism provides a basis and justication for conceptualizing the contingency of psychological
knowledge. My approach also acknowledges the continuing need for divergent empirical research in
order topursue lines of researchsuggested by the outcomes or limits of integrative research. Inaddition,
I argue that, by building upon contextualist philosophy, intercontextualism provides a basis for
informing the investigation of new psychological phenomena (or for employing new methodologies
with already researched phenomena)despecially as contexts change over time.
5. Conclusion: theorizing pluralism as dialectical
Insum, I maintainthat pluralismshouldnot be simply offeredas anobvious solutionfor psychologys
crisis of fragmentation, but instead should be rigorously conceptualized in a manner that avoids the
problematic extremes of either homogeneity or fragmentation. Furthermore, a pluralistic psychology
does not need to be conceived as static, but instead the discipline can and should uctuate dynamically
betweenperiods of convergent and divergent pluralismover time. This conception of scientic progress
provides an effective and efcient means for psychology to develop a productive knowledge base. My
dialectical pluralismbuilds uponRoyces constructive dialectics toprovide the indigenous philosophy of
psychology Royce called for, namely one that takes psychologys multi- nature into account. In other
words, dialectical pluralismdsupported by an underlying philosophical foundation of inter-
contextualismdprovides a conceptualization that can help psychologists grapple with the complexity
of psychological phenomena and the contingency of psychological knowledge. Furthermore, it can help
psychologists grapple with the perplexing problem of evaluation, especially in relation to the complex
andvariedrelationships that exist betweencontexts. My hope for dialectical pluralismis that, over time,
such an approach may help alleviate the fragmentation of psychology and provide a middle ground
between a positivistic mainstream and the contextualist margins that are steadily widening.
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