Comparison with the similar arguments put forward by the laws in the Crito shows

how closely considerations of patriotism intertwine with those of abstract justice; the
citizen must regard his city as his parents, and in virtue of that relationship he must
acknowledge an abstract obligation to obey it. This diversity of opinion amply
conrms Morrisons shrewd observation that the great messy hairball of the issue
that is the philosophers return to the cave has no clear resolution without importing a
great deal that is not explicit in the text, so any answer that is put forward by its
advocates is speculative (pp. 2423).
In addition to the value of its bibliography, a volume of this kind provides a
snapshot of the scholarly work being done on its subject (primarily in the
Anglophone world) at the time of its publication. Its longer-term utility depends on
the value of its individual contributions, some of which are likely to enter the canon
of the literature on the dialogue, while others sink without trace. I am prepared to
hazard the prediction that among the contributions to this volume which will still be
regularly read in twenty years time are those by Sedley, Nicholas Denyer on the Sun
and Line (a model of lucidity, which makes illuminating use of the mathematical
background) and Jessica Moss on the critique of imitative poetry; the clarity and
freshness of this piece make it, in my view, one of the best discussions of this hoary
topic, and it should be on everyones reading list.
Corpus Christi College, Oxford C. C. W. TAYLOR
christopher.taylor@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
THE SOPHIST
Axniri ( D. ) Image and Paradigm in Platos Sophist. Pp. xviii + 279.
Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2007. Cased, US$32. ISBN:
978-1-930972-04-9.
doi:10.1017/S0009840X08001868
A.s book treats Platos Sophist in three parts. It rst presents an analysis of the whole
dialogue, although the nal denition (264b268a) is visited briey. Then a new
translation is provided, followed by an appendix which examines some scholarly
discussions (the main target is G.E.L.Owen, Plato on Not-being [1971]). The
translation is generally good, and its readable English will lessen the stress for readers
who nd the dialogue full of unusual expressions and complex arguments. While it is
based on the new OCT (D. Robinson, 1995), it has the good sense, for example, to
adopt the manuscripts reading against the emendation at 251a (p. 224, n. 211).
The whole strategy for reading the Sophist is presented at the outset (pp. xivxv). A.
aims to establish three main points in the book: (1) the dialogue as a whole is
aporetic, creating a reductio ad absurdum, for its apparent conclusion derives from
assumptions that are shown in the middle section to be untenable; (2) the dialogue is
meant to cricitise Parmenides, whose incomplete thought leads to sophistry; (3) the
dialogue indirectly argues for the necessity of the ontological distinction between
paradigm and image, the basis for the theory of participation as an account of reality
and meaning. The meaning of these claims gradually emerges as the author proceeds
to analyse each argument.
However, a reader may feel ambivalent about a combination of the step-by-step
analysis of Platos argument and the proposed line of reading, repeated throughout
the book. On the one hand, the analysis seems to pay due attention to the details of
The Classical Review vol. 59 no. 1 The Classical Association 2009; all rights reserved
1nr ci:ssi c:i rvi rv 65
the argument from the rst part of the dialogue, which is often neglected by analytic
philosophers. It provides a good guide for readers, and helps them to follow the
dicult arguments. It also introduces relevant texts from Plato and Aristotle.
However, the references to and comparisons with other works are not neutral but
deeply embedded in the whole strategy of reading the Sophist as an intended failure.
For example, the survey of Platos method of division (pp. 1033) tries to show how
the Sophist, in contrast with the others, fails. While the point that the Sophist concerns
negative denition (pp. 28, 41, 47, 50, etc.) is philosophically interesting, it is simply
taken as a mark of failure. Moreover, A. even suggests that the demarcation between
sophistry and philosophy is made more clearly here [i.e. Phlb. 15bc] than in the
Sophist (p. 25). It is unlikely that a full discussion of dissociation between the sophist
and the philosopher in the Sophist does not match a single passage, however
signicant, of the Philebus, where no single example of sophists or sophistikos
appears.
A. identies the starting point of failure as the initial agreement that locates the
sophistry in art (221cd; cf. pp. 415, 52, etc.). That agreement is indeed problematic,
but it does not follow that the whole attempt is destined to fail completely. Sophistry is
not nothing, but something like an art, so it is reasonable to pursue its essence within
the eld of art as far as possible. If it eventually emerges how sophistry diers from
genuine art, this conclusion does not necessarily come from a reductio.
Commentators generally agree that the initial attempts at denition of the sophist
(up to 236c) are stuck so that the rst half of the middle section (up to 251a) is
aporetic, even though it contains many hints of philosophical importance. The
departure of A.s reading from the traditional one is his assumption that the aporetic
character continues through the middle section and up to the end; in other words, he
sees that the initial misleading position governs the whole dialogue, to which Plato
never provides (nor intends) any solution or analysis through a long discussion.
However, whereas one might follow A.s continual indications of problems and
failures in Platos argument up to 251a, it will be dicult to accept that the latter half
(usually called the solution part concerning dialectic, the combination of megista
gen, and the explication of falsehood) goes on committing the same error (pp. 1413,
1578); the treatment of this crux (Part 3, about 50 pages) is comparatively short and
simple if we consider the ordinary treatment of it.
Some Platonic dialogues are normally called aporetic because they end in aporia
without any positive conclusion (e.g. Charmides, Euthyphro, Theaetetus). In the
Sophist, however, while the interlocutors explicitly conclude the rst inquiry into
being and not-being as aporiai (250d251a), from there they turn to solving these
aporiai, eventually to declare that the inquiry has been successful (258c260b,
264b265b, 268bd). Therefore, when A. calls Soph. aporetic, his appellation diverges
from the ordinary use and Platos use of that word. Plato himself gives us no
indication in the Sophist that the whole inquiry, especially the nal conclusion, is a
failure.
Apart from the strategic implausibility, the role of the main speaker, the Eleatic
Visitor, remains unexamined. A. never discusses who this person is, but seems to take
it for granted that the Eleatic Visitor reproduces the failure of Parmenides and
Eleatic dichotomy (pp. 86, 92, cf. Point 2). The rst introduction of this guest (216a)
indicates that he has some connection with Parmenides and the Eleatic circle, but it
does not specify what (for an extreme possibility, see N.-L. Corderos reading of the
text in his French and Spanish editions). At least the Eleatic Visitor clearly announces
that he will cross-examine and refute his fathers (sc. Parmenides) logos (241d242a).
66 1nr ci:ssi c:i rvi rv
However, A. takes it that the Eleatic Visitor keeps the mistaken premises of
Parmenides till the end of the dialogue. I wonder, for example, how we understand his
role in the subsequent dialogue, the Politicus, which has little to do with Eleaticism. It
would be more reasonable to suppose, as most commentators do, that, at least in the
latter half of the middle section, the Eleatic Visitor corrects, through good dialectical
discussion, some insucient ideas of Parmenides, so that Plato presents positive
arguments there.
Although the preceding works that A. mainly considers, namely those of Owen and
R.E. Allen, are important, the recent literature both in English and in other languages
pays more attention to the dialogue as a whole and sheds new light on it. It is
unfortunate that A. misses these new arguments to balance against his own. If A.s
attempt to prove Points 1 and 3 fails, as I feel it does, it should be concluded that
participation as discussed in the middle dialogues is irrelevant, and that the issue of
image and reality is dierently treated here. According to the hermeneutic principle,
wherever Plato appears to fail in argument, we should reconsider our own reading
and ask whether we are missing something important. Platos dialogues, especially the
Sophist, challenge us as a mirror of our own philosophy.
Keio University NOBURU NOTOMI
notomi@z8.keio.jp
THE SEVENTH LETTER
KN:n ( R. ) (ed., trans.) Platons Siebter Brief. Einleitung, Text,
bersetzung, Kommentar. (Spudasmata 110.) Pp. viii + 337.
Hildesheim, Zurich and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006. Paper,
48. ISBN: 978-3-487-13168-9.
doi:10.1017/S0009840X0800187X
The Seventh Letter, addressed to the followers of Dio of Syracuse, is without doubt a
central document for the study of Platos biography, political philosophy and
conceptions of orality and literacy. This is true whether it is a genuine work of Plato
or a forgery by an Academic philosopher writing some years after Platos death. A
new study of such an important text is always welcome, and K.s edition with German
translation, commentary and introduction raises high expectations. It originates in
the authors dissertation submitted at the University of Tbingen in 2005.
The Introduction starts with a chapter on the uexata quaestio of authenticity. K.
lists some of the major arguments that have been used in the past to contest Platos
authorship. Without going into details, he rejects them all by following the arguments
of previous scholars. He states that authenticity has become a communis opinio today;
but this conclusion seems to be somewhat exaggerated, since scholars as distinguished
as Mansfeld, Tarrant and Schoeld deny authenticity of the whole or parts of the
letter.
1
A chapter follows on the events in Sicily between 413 and 344. Such a discussion is
crucial for the problems of chronology and for the motives of the people involved.
The Classical Review vol. 59 no. 1 The Classical Association 2009; all rights reserved
1nr ci:ssi c:i rvi rv 67
1
J. Mansfeld, Greek Philolosophy in the Geschichte des Altertums, Elenchos 10 (1989),
2360; H. Tarrant, Middle Platonism and the Seventh Epistle, Phronesis 28 (1983), 75103;
M. Schoeld, Plato. Political Philosophy (Oxford, 2006), pp. 1319.