IV.

Philippines as a State
A. State: Definition/Elements

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO CAMPOS
RUEDA, respondent..
FERNANDO, J.:
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as
may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign
country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
1
is now
ripe for adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus reversed
the action taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as
administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95
as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the
Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to
the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court on the
assumption that the need for resolving the principal question would be obviated, referred the matter back
to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax
exemption required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an order from the Court of Tax Appeals
submitting copies of legislation of Tangier that would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not
lacking. It was not until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision. When the petition
for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an element of novelty.
Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was held by this Court that the aforesaid provision
does not require that the "foreign country" possess an international personality to come within its
terms.
2
Accordingly, we have to affirm.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the background facts as
follows: "This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the
estate of the deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the
respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the
transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de
la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira
for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of
Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left,
among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines."
3
Then came this portion: "On
September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of
the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment for
state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of
P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955, an amended return
was filed ... wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as
exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another
assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84,
respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the
request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P239,439.49
representing deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests
and compromise penalties ... . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the
following day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax
exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad
valorem penalties ... . However, respondent denied request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and received
by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no
reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently,
respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and compromise
penalties."
4

The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the
parties regarding the values of the properties and the mathematical correctness of the deficiency
assessments, the principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting
by the Collector of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of
Section 122. In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed
decision states: "In fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the
last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that
foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not
impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or
whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier
should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption
benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code."
5

Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly submitted, but as
above indicated, instead of ruling definitely on the question, this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to
inquire further into the question of reciprocity and sent back the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for
the motion of evidence thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads as follows: "While
section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal property' in both
subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes muebles situados en Tanger',
'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger', 'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this Court
may be able to determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions
required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being, going into the merits of the
issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the
reception of evidence or proof on whether or not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and
'movable properties as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace 'intangible person property', as
used in the Tax Code."
6
In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals admitted evidence
submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws of
Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal,
including furniture and personal effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that
date and in said zone, to the payment of any death tax, whatever might have been the nationality of the
deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted in an order of such Court referring the matter
back to us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on September 9, 1963.
Respondent presented no evidence."
7

The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the
time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible
person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the
foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar
exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal
property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country."
8
The only obstacle
therefore to a definitive ruling is whether or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition
of internal personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country".
Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an
affirmance of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line
with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of
outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through
a government functioning under a regime of
law.
9
It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society
under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
10
It has been referred
to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote
the general welfare.
11
Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the
nation."
12
This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its
people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its
sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski
could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its
allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions.
13
McIver similarly would point to the power
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter
into international relations.
14
With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact
independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine.
15

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not
successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on
January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara,
16
it was specifically held by us:
"Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we
believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from
the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the Philippines."
17
There can be no doubt
that California as a state in the American Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality.
Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.
18

What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the
doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the
sense, did fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the Court by the then Acting
Chief Justicem Bengson who thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity, in Kiene v.
Collector of Internal Revenue.
19
As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents submitted
to it proof of the laws of Liechtenstein that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift
taxes on intangible property of Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board
declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or inheritance taxes were collectible,
Ludwig Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein when he passed away."
20
Then came this definitive ruling:
"The Collector hereafter named the respondent cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and of this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-resident
foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the principle
'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such property is admittedly taxable here. Without the proviso above
quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and
inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions are such that
demand reciprocity as in this case. And the exemption must be honored."
21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
B. Territory: Archipelagic Doctrine
EN BANC
SOMBILON VS ROMULO
DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007.

The facts are not disputed.

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed
Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein,
sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:

The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis,
Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint under oath filed by
Suzette S. Nicolas, which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex A,
committed as follows:

That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
Olongapo City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accuseds
(sic), being then members of the United States Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr.,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by
means of force, threat and intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of
the intoxication of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually
abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year
old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel
and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by
accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to
her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]


Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was
granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.

During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales to the
RTC of Makati for security reasons, the United States Government faithfully complied with its
undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.

On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its Decision,
finding defendant Smith guilty, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence
against accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL.
DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex, are hereby
ACQUITTED to the crime charged.

The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused L/CPL. DANIEL J.
SMITH, also of the US Marine Corps at the USS Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined under Article 266-A, paragraph
1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-
B, first paragraph thereof, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together with the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of the same Code.

Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in
the facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby
temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.

Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify complainant SUZETTE S.
NICOLAS in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.[2]


As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders.

On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a
contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention under
the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the
Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December
19, 2006 which states:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two
nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S.
military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

(Sgd.) KRISTIE A. KENNEY (Sgd.) ALBERTO G. ROMULO
Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic
of America of the Philippines

DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006__


and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the
United States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed
between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine
Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building,
U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded
round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail authorities, under the
direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will
have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms
of the VFA.


The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS the petition for having
become moot.[3]

Hence, the present actions.

The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the parties
submitted their memoranda.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith
because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.

This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the
VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora,[4] brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.

Against the barriers of res judicata vis--vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis--vis all the parties, the
reversal of the previous ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial
importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well as a specific mandate of the
Constitution.

The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not
be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.


The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the
United States military bases in the country.

It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine
Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United States agreed
to cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus
a few islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and
facilities, which the United States retained for itself.

This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the
Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine
territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.

Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by
the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for
ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines
regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate.

Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases
were finally ceded to the Philippines.

To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in the 1987
Constitution.

The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the
Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the
situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in
our territory were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.

Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether or not
the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.

This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.

First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,[5] the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government.

The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said
State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the
internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and
consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further
implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the
provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.[6]

The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the
concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:[7]

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Signed at Washington, August 30, 1951.

The Parties of this Treaty

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to
strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples
together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against
imperialist aggression during the last war.

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common
determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential
aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the
preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of
regional security in the Pacific area.

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in
any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to
settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in
their international relation from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties
separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult
together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the
opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of
the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of
the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.

ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is
deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on
the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels
or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any
way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the
United Nations of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will
come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at
Manila.

ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate
it one year after notice has been given to the other party.

IN WITHNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:
(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO
(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

For the United States of America:

(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON
(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES
(Sgd.) TOM CONNALLY
(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY[8]


Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to
resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.
The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises,
is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The
Preamble of the VFA states:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
their desire to strengthen international and regional security in the Pacific area;

Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;

Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic
of the Philippines;

Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines
promotes their common security interests;

Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel visiting the
Republic of the Philippines;

Have agreed as follows:[9]


Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not
necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US
Congress under the CaseZablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that
the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a
treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our
Constitution.[10]

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact
that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence allowed under the
RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified
and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the
Constitutional provision resulting from such presence.

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions.

The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces
in the Philippines, the following rules apply:


Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction

x x x
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise
jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request,
from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States
military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without
delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial
proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary
cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government
regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the
event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall
be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the
time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time during which
scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely
notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution,
namely, that providing for the exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all
courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of
an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused,
which also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).

Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all
other accused.[11]

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is
immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces
Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions,
according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the
principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending
State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.[12]

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of
procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around
the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to
the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial
immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction
or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such
immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a
foreign State allowed to enter another States territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states
that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment
when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g.,
after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA:

Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction

x x x
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel
shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States
authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to
visits and material assistance.


It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial
and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover
detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall
be by Philippine authorities. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and
22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy,
are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not by Philippine authorities.

Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the
United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as
mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v.
Texas ( 552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered into by the
United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-
executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.

On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:

G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R. No. 176051
(Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).

The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three (3) days a
Comment/Manifestation on the following points:

1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement of the recent US
Supreme Court decision in Jose Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect
that treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to
carry them into effect; and that, while treaties may comprise international commitments, they
are not domestic law unless Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be self-executory and is ratified on these terms?

2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either because it is self-
executory or because there exists legislation to implement it.

3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was concurred in by
the US Senate and, if so, is there proof of the US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta,
J., no part.

After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:

First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because
the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended
to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter
of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its
obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.

Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act,
USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive
agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately
implemented. The parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been
registered under the Case-Zablocki Act.

In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and
the Avena decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin
decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not self-executing and are not registrable
under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.

Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on
March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session,
Vol. 98 Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.

The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in domestic
courts varies from country to country.

As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require
legislation whereas others do not.

It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec.
25, to require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity
with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and
the enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under
international law.

Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi,[13] an executive
agreement is a treaty within the meaning of that word in international law and constitutes
enforceable domestic law vis--vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in
Weinberger enforced the provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential
employment to Filipinos in the US Bases here.


Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:

1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in
accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution.

2. ExecutiveCongressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President
and Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate.

3. Sole Executive Agreements. These are agreements entered into by the President.
They are to be submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions
of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and may be
implemented.

As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance
has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA
itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10,
1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and
22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the
appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V,
Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this
Court.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters pending
therein, namely, the petition for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the
judgment of conviction. No costs. SO ORDERED.
C. People

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU
TIAN, CHUA LIM PAOalias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants, vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 20037)
denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed
by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim
Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows:.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before
the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without
the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted
the same to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio
King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments
(Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of
the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars.
1

Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by
the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and
cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty.
On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented
against them in the Deportation Board for the reason, among others, that the same do not constitute
legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to
entertain such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of the Board of February
9, 1953, petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition,
which petition was given due course in our resolution of July 7, 1953, but made returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The case was docketed in the lower court as
Special Proceeding No. 20037.
At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing
Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas
corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among
others, that the Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges
filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee
Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he was found in the same
decision of the trial court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the United States Air Force
in order that the latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the investigation of the
purchase of $130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was involved.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding the validity of the
delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the
purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the
security, welfare and interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the deportation
Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation
of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the
arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present appeal. .
It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released on bail, but before the
charges filed against them were actually investigated, petitioners-appellant raised the question of
jurisdiction of the Deportation Board, first before said body, then in the Court of First Instance, and
now before us. Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and,
consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate, on the
ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the power to
deport to be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration
was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the
enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise
of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its Section 52, it
provides:.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry
of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom,
with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven
which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:.
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in
the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated
to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is
contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses
in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."
While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the
President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of
Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed
should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the
President can deport an alien-which provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing
effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a
ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. And the, exercise of
this power by the chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions.
2

Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected
in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board
of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that the President is invested with power to deport,
still he may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
and on no other, as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be
deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the
Chief Executive. This contention is not without merit, considering that whenever the legislature
believes a certain act or conduct to be a just cause for deportation, it invariably enacts a law to that
effect. Thus, in a number of amendatory acts, grounds have been added to those originally contained
in Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as justifying deportation of an alien, as well as other
laws which provide deportation as part of the penalty imposed on aliens committing violation
thereof.
Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering,
hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations an
economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503
amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore order
the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act
charged.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is
clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." The first
executive order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26, 1934),
constituting a board to take action on complaints against foreigners, to conduct investigations and
thereafter make recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936,
President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens
charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein provided, and make the corresponding
recommendation.
3
Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the
authorized agent of the President.
This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct
investigation, i.e., whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien
complained of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same
may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.1awphl.nt
Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No.
613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority, among others, to
make arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific power to be exercised in connection
with such investigation. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the first time, saw it
necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947, providing
For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation Board
created under Executive Order No. 37, dated January 4, 1947, and facilitating the execution
of the order of deportation whenever the President decides the case against the respondent. I,
Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order that all respondents in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the
Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and containing such conditions as he may
prescribe. .
x x x x x x x x x
Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien
under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent.
It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue
of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of
formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien
complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his
provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman
of the Board.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose
authority the President's power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the
power to arrest. But the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief
Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation granted
him, such as the authority to order the arrest of the foreigner charged as undesirable.
In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is
guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:.
3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III,
Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v.
Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law
wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same
is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both
citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found
in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of
arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement "to be determined by the judge"
is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the
Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence,
under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such
determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our
Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable
cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between
warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one
suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against
him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a
violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as
then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause.
Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect
compliance of an order of contempt.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect
the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order
the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the
alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a
bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in
the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this
proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide on whether or not the President
himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive
order of deportation has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether,
conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien
complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise
of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the
curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as
the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent
to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence
of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the discretion
of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority
devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official
functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an
implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter
under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a
person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning
to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that
implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The
guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky
foundation.
We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation
Board (G.R. No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated, however, that the power of arrest was not
squarely raised in that proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's proposition that
the President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against him did not
constitute ground for deportation. .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or
aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is
declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is
declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With
the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.