THIRD DIVISION

VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO,

Petitioners,



- versus -




PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 167764

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
*

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 9, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION


PERALTA, J .:


Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal
Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution
[2]
dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
In an Information
[3]
dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and
Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows:

That on or about the 5
th
day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay
News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the
region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching
the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar
Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:

MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN

PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the
health of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its
employees.

However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel
Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician,
Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking
after the health problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.

One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing
in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began
September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation.
The doctor put her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had
rectum myoma and must undergo an operation.

Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los
Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic.
Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon
(Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one to recommend.

Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the
hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in
urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.


The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating
to the family and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed
and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.

This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole
on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned
it down because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was already
on the terminal state.

The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong
diagnosis of the company physician.

My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers,
be on your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of
physicians to remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at
the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.

Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians
treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of
multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent
drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals,
owned by a so-called charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too
greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are
cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.

The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although
mother's milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they
peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning
the former to milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia
from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!

My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who
died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos
St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and
responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused
knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous,
offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
[4]




Upon being arraigned
[5]
on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.

On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision
[6]
finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable
under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto
Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision
Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.
[7]



Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order
[8]
dated February 20, 1998.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.


Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.

Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:


I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS
WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN
THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND
COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION
COLUMNISTS.
[9]



Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when
petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself
at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who
sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the
columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not
entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public
good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice
in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty
of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion
column, which was the columnists exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay
News, did not have to share those views and should not be held responsible for the crime of libel.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the
element of malice required in every indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the
weighing anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA,
affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of
weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered,
may alter the result of the case a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation
of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an
issue via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging
them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had
jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.

The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense
charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

In Fukuzume v. People,
[10]
the Court ruled:

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the
trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection
based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover,
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by
law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case
of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered
the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances
involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not
present in the instant criminal case.
[11]


The Court finds merit in the petition.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v.
People
[12]
that:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
[13]



Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as
to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for
the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any
of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office
is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)


In Agbayani v. Sayo,
[14]
the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.
[15]


Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication
of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was
printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.

The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes
again, to wit:

That on or about the 5
th
day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of
Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout
the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of
impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and
medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr.
Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said
daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN....


The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the
City of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed thatIloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,
[16]
which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of
Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads:

That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
[Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent
of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing
him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously
cause to be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their
respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....
[17]



the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in
consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition:

x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word published is utilized
in the precise context of noting that the defendants cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a
magazine of general circulation in Manila. The Information states that the libelous articles were
published in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The place Manila is in turn
employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was
published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not
necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while
leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general
circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu.

Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction
in Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no
impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in general circulation.
Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a resident of
Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these
newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No.
4363 sought to avoid.
[18]


In Agustin v. Pamintuan,
[19]
which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the
libelous article was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Baguio and the entire Philippines, the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was
the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case
in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information
filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar
Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that
he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was
actually residing in another place.

Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,
[20]
where the Information for libel alleged that the offended party was the
Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community, the
Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio
City. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence
or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length
of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term
residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident,
one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular
place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined
with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is
possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have
been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing
therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant
may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and
spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may
have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute.
Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.
[21]



Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
[22]
Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue
requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear
this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution
dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527
is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.


















FIRST DIVISION

MANUEL S. ISIP,
Petitioner,




- versus -




PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 170298

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 26, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which seeks to set aside the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated 26
October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip to the extent that it affirmed with
modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isips conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No.
136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended
Decision
[2]
dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before
Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under the following information:

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received
from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (mens ring), valued at P200,000.00,
for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of
the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the
herein accused once in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to
defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use
and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated
amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.
[3]



Petitioners wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for
seven counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 146-84,
147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory portion of
the information in Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:

That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that her account with the bank is insufficient, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific Banking Corporation
Check No. 518672 in the amount of P562,000.00, in payment for assorted pieces of
jewelry, received from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the
drawee bank for payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and
notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of
the said check, accused refused and still refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated amount ofP562,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
[4]



The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when
the offense was committed, the number and amount of the check. The pertinent
data in the other informations are as follows:

Crim. Case No.

147-84
148-84
149-84
155-84
156-84
157-84
Date of Commission

17 March 1984
30 March 1984
12 March 1984
25 March 1984
29 March 1984
1 April 1984
No. of Check

518644
518645
030086
[5]

518674
518646
518669
Amount of Check

P50,000.00
P50,000.00
P150,000.00
P95,000.00
P90,000.00
P25,000.00


The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5)
counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84,
260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, received
from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome
shape ring and earrings valued at P120,000.00, with the obligation of selling the same
on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return them if not
sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein accused, once in possession of the
said jewelry by means of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of
confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert them to their own personal use and benefit and paid the same
with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984,
respectively, in the amount of P90,000 and P25,000, respectively, which upon
presentation with the bank was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and
notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of
the said check, failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice in the abovestated amount
of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency.
[6]



Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date
of receipt and agreed date of return, and the number, date and amount of the
checks issued in payment thereof, the four other informations are similarly
worded. The specifics thereof are as follows:

Crim. Case No.


Value of
Jewelry

Date of
Receipt

Agreed Date
of Return

Check No./Date


Amount


257-84
260-84
261-84
378-84
P150,000
P95,000
P562,000
P200,000
03-07-84
03-20-84
03-20-84
02-03-84
03-30-84
03-27-84
03-27-84
-
030086/03-12-84
518647/03-25-84
518672/03-27-84
518644/03-17-84
518645/03-30-84
P150,000
P95,000
P562,000
P50,000
P50,000


When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not
guilty. There being only one complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the cases
followed.

The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of
Appeals in the parties respective briefs, are the following:

i) Prosecution Version.

Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced
to complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by complainants
father, Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then
engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling
habitus (pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).

Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced
complainant to be their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant acceded to (p. 14,
ibid).

Thus, the operation went smoothly that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18,
tsn, ibid).

On February 3, 1984, at complainants residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant
spouses received from complainant a 6 carat mens ring valued at P200,000.00 with the
condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis
for P200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the same, they have to return the ring if
sold on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).

On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds
thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and 30,
1984, respectively, for P50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt
of the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as a witness (pp.
9-11, tsn, ibid).

This particular mens ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa
while Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30,
respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.

In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainants
residence in Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with
35 pieces of south sea pearls with diamond worth P150,000.00. The condition was that
the proceeds be turned over to complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29,
tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of turning over the proceeds or return the
Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984 for P150,000.00 (RCBC
check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and
Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainants
residence in Cavite City and got from the latter a mens ring (7 carats)
worth P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he return the ring
or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but
Mr. Isip sought an extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984came and
went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of
Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.

On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from complainant
one (1) Dome shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds valued
at P120,000.00. As with their previous agreement, the item was to be returned or the
proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following
morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal checks (Check Nos. 518646 and
518669 dated March 29, 1984 for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively) in payment
for the Dome shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip
and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.

At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of
complainant and got from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one (1)
baguette necklace worth P95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip
signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the proceeds thereof be delivered
to complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a
check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5,
tsn, October 22, 1993).

The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for
Estafa against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.

Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant
informing him that Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur
saying that, that was the most opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of
jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit
O) acknowledging the value thereof to the tune of P562,000.00.

Exhibit O contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be
delivered on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit O, Mrs. Isip
issued a postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount
of P562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22,
1993).

This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the
couple and Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22.

All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6,
1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against insufficient
funds. Demand letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).

ii) Defense Version.

During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had
his residence at Room 411, 4
th
Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero
Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street,
Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964
(Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and
Marietta M. Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business
undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr.,
Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business;
while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in PX goods,
real estate and cars, which she started when she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr.,
10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started
obtaining jewelry from losing or financially-strapped players which she repledged as
security for financing she obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant
Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about a year, when Nemesio Jose
ran short of capital, he referred appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo Jose, with
address at the Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-
14; Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning early 1983, at complainants residence at Plaza Tower
Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband who
participated only as a witness, started having transactions with complainant who, on
different dates in February, March and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for
which appellant Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and
complainant to be sold on commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return
the jewelry to complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions,
appellant Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the
payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed, had returned
the unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of payment for other
jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in Balanga,
Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to be
registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1,
2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of appellants to
complainant have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-
39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Mariettaissued which were
initially dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In
fact, complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed against
appellants. Complainant however failed to return some of the redeemed and/or paid
checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the pretext that he did not bring them
(Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some default in payment and
complainant suspected that she would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for the
pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that appellants sign certain documents to
avoid any misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they
do not comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain good
relations with complainant, appellantMarietta signed the document acknowledging
obligations to him in one sitting, which appellant Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-
22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions were entered into
in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before the Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr.,
Idem, 23-24).
[7]



On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion thereof reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta
M. Isip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos.
146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of prision correctional (sic) in each
case; and of Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P120,000.00 for the value of the articles
misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00; Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P95,000.00; Crim. Case
No. 261-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years
and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
amount of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify
the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84,
260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found
guilty of Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in
the amount of P200,000.00 value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the
costs.
[8]



In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these
cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo
Joses ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from
the Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It said the defense failed to
substantially prove its allegations that the transactions occurred in Manila,
particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that complainant is a resident of
Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta Isip that the money with
which the complainant initially agreed to finance their transactions was
withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further refuted the defenses
claim that the transactions happened in Manila. The trial court likewise found the
defenses contention, that the obligations were already paid and set-off with the
turnover to complainant of personal and real properties, to be untenable for it is
contrary to human nature to demand payment when the same had already been
made and the alleged set-offs were for other cases which were settled amicably
and subsequently dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutors Office at the
instance of the complainant.

The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated
the pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-
84 and 378-84 and violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks
mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84
and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in Criminal Cases No.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him to have acted as a mere
witness when he signed the receipts involved in said cases, but found him liable in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a 7-carat diamond mens ring
which he secured from the complainant.

Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning
the following as errors:

- I -

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES
AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT
NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS
COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

- II -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD IN
NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS
INCURRED BY APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT
CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.

- III -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD
BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH
INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE
AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.

- IV -

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND MARIETTA M.
ISIP GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME
FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
AND/OR THAT THE LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL.
[9]



Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died
thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.

In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed
of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII)

1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the
sentence imposed on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
that the sum of P200,000.00 he was ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear
interest at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid;

2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84 is REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged; and

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is
REVERSED and accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged, but ordering them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and severally, the
sums of P120,000.00, P150,000.00, P95,000.00, P562,000.00 and P200,000.00
representing the amounts involved in said cases, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from filing of the information until fully paid.
[10]



The Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts finding that the venue was
properly laid and that the checks were delivered by the two accused and/or that
the transactions transpired at complainants ancestral home in Cavite City, and
that, consequently, the offenses charged took place within its territorial
jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on the ground that
since the checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor
thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 4
of the Ministry of Justice.

As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by Marietta
Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there was no payment
to speak of. It also found the defenses claim of redemption/dacion en pago
that real and personal properties were conveyed to complainant who executed
affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases to be
unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though novation does not
extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as long at it
occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In these five cases, it
ruled that there was novation because complainant accepted the checks issued by
Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said
cases. Consequently, the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and
petitioner,
[11]
but held them liable to complainant for the value of the jewelry
involved.

As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling of conviction. It found petitioners
claims that he did not receive the jewelry worth P200,000.00 mentioned in the
information; that the receipt he issued for said jewelry was among those
documents which were forced upon him to sign under threat of criminal
prosecution; and that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with
complainant, to be not persuasive.

On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his
deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration insofar as
it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly
liable, jointly and severally, with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-
84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.
[12]


On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of
Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision, rendered an Amended
Decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par.
3 of the dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as follows:

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-
84 is REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of those cases
DISMISSED.
[13]



Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No.
136-84. He raises the following issues:

First WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;

Second WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER
RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; and

Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.


On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and
conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that
any of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84
took place in Cavite City. First, he states that the residence of the parties is
immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it
is non sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral house in
Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and had the transactions there
with him when he and his late wife were actual residents of Manila. Mere
convenience suggests that their transaction was entered into in Manila. He adds
that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is likewise
inconsequential because it is where the subject item was delivered and received
by petitioner and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines venue
where Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it
does not follow that because complainant may have been on leave from the
Bureau of Customs, the transactions were necessarily entered into during that
leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no competent proof showing that
during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and that the transactions
involved, including the subject of Criminal Case 136-84 covering roughly the
period from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional.
[14]
The place where the crime was committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
[15]
It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
[16]


In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced
that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had
sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took
place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of
absence
[17]
from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was
properly laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that
the transaction involved was entered into inManila. The age-old but familiar rule
that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.
[18]


In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and
competent evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues
that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone
unerringly suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not
persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far fromManila does not necessarily
mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not
prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods
that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not
improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but
twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces
of jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by
petitioners late wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against
accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion
that the transactions were not entered into inCavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.
[19]
It
is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court.
[20]
In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to
reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to
apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that the
particular transaction took place in Cavite City.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals holding
that the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received by
petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the receipt
evidencing delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but merely to
preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact remains that there is no
showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no
competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever
actually received by, or delivered to, him.

We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported by
the evidence on record. The acknowledgment receipt
[21]
executed by petitioner is
very clear evidence that he received the ring in question. Petitioners claim that
he did not receive any ring and merely executed said receipt in order to preserve
his friendship with the complainant deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import
and obligation of what he executed and signed. The following disputable
presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions have been fair and regular; and
(d) That the ordinary course of business has been followed
[22]
Thus, it is
presumed that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its
contents and consequences. We know that petitioner understood fully well the
ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon him
then to overcome these presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do
so. Aside from his self-serving allegation that he signed the receipt to preserve
his friendship with complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut
said presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the
acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant
in Cavite City.

Petitioners argument that he did not receive the subject ring
[23]
is further
belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter testified that said ring was
borrowed by him on7 March 1984.
[24]
In all, the delivery of the ring and the
transaction regarding the same occurred in Cavite City.

Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia
argumenti that any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring
subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was
effectively extinguished by novation. The personal and real properties
delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient to cover or offset
whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact that
complainant executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the dismissal of some
of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of
novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it
rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim that he signed the receipt
supposedly covering the same under threat of prosecution and merely to
preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have denied the
application of the rule of novation on said case because the rejected initial claim
(that he did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their
good relations) was but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to
deny the application of the novation rule in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation
[25]
cannot be applied in
Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the personal and real
properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his family were more than
sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations
incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered to complainant
were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not some as in
this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late wife. This, complainant did
not do for the simple reason that the properties conveyed to him were not
enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his deceased
wife. Complainant testified that the properties he received were in settlement of
cases other than the cases being tried herein.
[26]
In particular, he said that
petitioner and his spouse settled eight cases which were subsequently dismissed
when they delivered properties as payment.
[27]
It follows then that the
obligations incurred by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the
criminal cases herein tried were filed.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation
in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not believe his (alternative)
defense of denial, is untenable. The main reason why the Court of Appeals did
not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements of novation are
present. For novation to take place, four essential requisites have to be met,
namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned
to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth
of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, only the first element is
extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation,
was that there were checks issued as payment, though subsequently dishonored,
for the pieces of jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that
neither petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring
that could have extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new
obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is
clear that petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of
the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1)
the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or
converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or property;
(3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money or
property.
[28]
All these are present in this case. Petitioner received from
complainant a seven-carat diamond (mens ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the
purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of
the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or
converted said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the
same. Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed to return
the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to
complainant in the amount of P200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find
the same to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively,
areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:


CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson



MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice



ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division



CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.




REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice











Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial)
Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.
Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.

PARAS, J .:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside
the orders of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-
22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was
anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject
matter is purely civil in nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to
transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in
behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required
to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the
principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted
on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was
charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26,
1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of
petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu
City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the
fact that private respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged
misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not proper
for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned
by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2,
Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go
to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment
(Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it
would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of
this criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966
cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by
law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the
findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth
under the laws of the Philippine with principal address at 9th floor,
G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following
manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance
agent of said corporation, among whose duties were to remit
collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn
over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or immediately
upon demand, collected and received the amount of P368,850.00
representing payments of insurance premiums from customers, but
herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so
and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of
P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the
amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense
was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15,
1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has
jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the
place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of
estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of
business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she
collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state
that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J .:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal
ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance
No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.
1
The referral-complaint of the police was received by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.
2
The corresponding information was
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
3

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was
denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge.
4

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the
following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not
exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective
of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further,
That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed
and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading
as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of
law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should
have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint
against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General
also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing
the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts,
or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases,
without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals:
5

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this
Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion
that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing
of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All
that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the
Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been
incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the
canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover
the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."
6
Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section
2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter
of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable
to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code
witharresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in
the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond
their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning
of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged
commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of
Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May
30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the
filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after
the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.






Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984
MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance,
Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of Dumaguete, and JULIAN L.
TEVES, respondents.
Geminiano M. Eleccion and Jose A. Arbas for petitioners.
Lenin R. Victoriano for private respondent.

D E C I S I O N
CUEVAS, J.:
Petitioners Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and charged with
ADULTERY before the defunct Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental under Criminal Case No.
1079 assigned to Branch Ill thereof, presided over by the Honorable respondent Judge. The said
criminal proceeding was initiated by a letter-complaint dated July 13, 1972
1
thumbmarked and sworn
to by complainant Julian L. Teves, the husband of petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves, on the same
date before respondent City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug. Said letter-complaint reads as follows:
Sir:
I have the honor to file a criminal complaint for Adultery against my wife Milagros Donio-Teves and
her paramour, Manuel Moreno, residents of this City and Bouffard Subdivision, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental, respectively.
The affidavits of my witnesses are hereto attached
Truly yours,
(Thumbmark)
JULIAN L.TEVES
Complainant
WITNESSES TO THUMBMARK:
1. (Sgd) Mita D. Escao
2. (Sgd) Rubi Villariza Destano
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of July, 1972, at Dumaguete City.
(Sgd) PABLO E. CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Dumaguete City
Attached to the said letter-complaint were the affidavits of Elisa Chiu, Milagros Quiteves and
Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina, witnesses of complainant Julian L. Teves.
2

On the basis thereof, respondent City Fiscal conducted a preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
charge. Complainant Julian L. Teves took the witness stand affirmed the statements appearing in his
letter-complaint. He also identified one of the respondents, his wife Milagros Donio-Teves.
Thereafter, he was cross-examined lengthily by counsel for both respondents, now petitioners.
After terminating his examination, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of
the City Fiscal to take cognizance of the case on the ground that there was no proper complaint filed
by complainant Julian L. Teves. The motion was denied and continuation of the preliminary
investigation was thereafter set for December 2, 1972. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order of denial was likewise denied by the respondent City Fiscal. Meanwhile, complainant
Julian L. Teves filed a new letter-complaint dated January 16, 1973, this time attaching his affidavit
thereto.
The said letter-complaint
3
reads as follows:
The City Fiscal
Dumaguete City
Sir:
I hereby accused my wife Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour Manuel Moreno, residents of
Bais City and Bouffard Subdivision, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, respectively of the crime of Adultery
committed as follows:
That on or about and during the months of May, 1970, to December, 1970, in the City of Dumaguete,
and within the jurisdiction of this Office for preliminary investigation, the said Milagros Donio-Teves
who is my wife, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with her co-accused
Manuel Moreno, who is not her husband, while the latter, knowing her to be married, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of her.
Contrary to law.
I hereby attach my affidavit in support of this complaint, in addition to the affidavits of Milagros
Quiteves, Elisa Chin and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina. This complaint is in amplification of my Complaint
, dated July 23, 1972, against the same persons for the same offense, filed with your office on July
13, 1972.
Truly yours,
(THUMBMARK)
JULIAN L. TEVES
Complainant
xxx xxx xxx
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of January, 1973, at Dumaguete City.
(Sgd) PABLO E. CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Continuation of the preliminary investigation was set for February 12, 1973. It was later reset to
March 6, 1973 and finally to March 23, 1973 at the instance of respondents-petitioners.
At the resumption of the preliminary investigation scheduled on March 23, 1973, petitioners filed a
Joint Urge Omnibus Motion dated March 23, 1973, praying that portions of the affidavits of Elisa
Chiu, Milagros Quiteves and Lorenzo Regala-Lacsina which relate to the adulterous acts allegedly
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Dumaguete City be ordered stricken out, the same not
falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent City Fiscal. With the said motion still unresolved, an
information to which a complaint thumbmarked by complainant Julian L. Teves, was filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on March 26, 1973 which, as herein earlier stated,
was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 1097. The complaint reads:
Complaint
The undersigned complainant accused MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO of the
crime of ADULTERY, committed as follows:
That on or about and during the months of May, 1970 to December, 1970, and for sometime prior
and subsequent thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES, being then united in lawful wedlock
with the undersigned complainant, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with, and had carnal
knowledge of, her co-accused MANUEL MORENO, who in turn, knowing that said MILAGROS
DONIO-TEVES was a married woman, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with, and had carnal
knowledge of her.
Contrary to law.
City of Dumaguete, Philippines, March 26, 1973.
His Thumbmark
JULIAN L. TEVES
Complainant
WITNESS TO THUMBMARK:
(Sgd) YOLANDA D. BAGUIO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 1973, in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines.
(Sgd) PABLO E. CABAHUG
City Fiscal
Witnesses:
1. Julian L. Teves, Bais City
2. Elisa Chiu, Bais City
3. Milagros Quiteves, Bais City
4. Lorenza Regala-Lacsina, Bais City and others.
On September 28, 1973, the day before the scheduled arraignment, petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves
filed a Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the offense charged
and the persons of both accused; and the authority of respondent City Fiscal of Dumaguete to file
the information. In a Manifestation dated September 28, 1973, petitioner Manuel Moreno formally
adopted as his own, Milagros Donio-Teves aforesaid Motion to Quash.
After the Opposition and Joint Answer to Opposition were filed, respondent Judge issued an Order
dated December 3, 1973 denying petitioners Motion to Quash for lack of merit. Petitioners joint
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated January 14, 1974. Arraignment of
petitioners was set for March 1, 1974 and later reset to March 7, 1974.
Hence, the instant petition for CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS with preliminary
injunction praying for the annulment of:
(1) all the proceedings conducted by the respondent City Fiscal that led to the filing of the challenged
information;
(2) the Order of the Honorable respondent Judge dated December 3, 1973 denying petitioners
motion to quash as well as the Order dated January 14, 1974 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration; and
(3) commanding the respondent Trial Judge and respondent City Fiscal to desist from taking any
further action.
The petition is devoid of merit. Hence, its dismissal is in order.
Petitioners attack against the validity of the proceedings conducted by the respondent City Fiscal is
anchored on the lack of a valid complaint on the part of the offended party. The challenge against
jurisdiction having been acquired over the case and persons of the accused, is similarly predicated
on the same ground absence of a valid complaint.
Adultery, being a private offense, it cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse who cannot institute the criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
4

This Court has invariably maintained strict adherence to this jurisdictional requirement of a complaint
by the offended party, as defined in Section 2 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court and Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code.
5
So much so, that an Information filed with the provincial fiscal wherein the
offended party signed at the bottom thereof over and above the signature of the prosecuting officer,
the information even reciting that the provincial fiscal charges defendant with the crime of seduction
at the instance of the offended party was considered insufficient.
6
In another case,
7
this Court motu
proprio dismissed the case for failure of the aggrieved party to file the proper complaint for the
offense of oral defamation imputing the commission of an offense which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, although the accused never raised the question on appeal, thereby dramatizing the necessity
of strict compliance with the above legal requirement even to the extent of nullifying all the
proceedings already had in the lower court.
However, this legal requirement was imposed out of consideration for the aggrieved party who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
trial.
8
Thus, the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the
affront committed by the erring spouse. This should be the overriding consideration in determining
the issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied
with. For, indeed, it is the spirit rather than the letter of the law which should prevail.
9

The complaint referred to which is required by way of initiating the criminal prosecution of crimes
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is, however, that one filed with the Court and not that which is
necessary to start the required preliminary investigation by the fiscals office.
10
In the latter case, a
letter of complaint sufficed for the purpose.
Coming back to the case at bar, the desire of the offended party Julian L. Teves to bring his wife and
her alleged paramour before the bar of justice is only too evident. Such determination of purpose on
his part is amply demonstrated in the strong and unequivocal statement contained in his first
complaint of July 13, 1972 making clear and implicit his purpose, which is no other than to file a
criminal complaint for ADULTERY against my wife Milagros Donio-Teves and her paramour Manuel
Moreno plus the fact that he filed no less than three (3) complaints in order to meet the objections
of the petitioner herein as to the sufficiency of his first complaint dated July 13, 1972.
Petitioners submission that there is no sufficient and valid complaint instituted in the instant
case so as to confer jurisdiction over the offense and persons of the accused (herein petitioners),
hardly convince Us. The second complaint dated January 16, 1973 filed with the Fiscals Office and
that filed with the respondent Court on March 26, 1973, are both sufficient and valid complaints. Both
state the name of the defendants; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed which is an absolute
compliance with what Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court prescribe.
11
Both complaints were also thumbmarked by and under oath of the complainant.
The allegations of the complaints fully apprised petitioners of the facts and acts subject matter
thereof and enables them to fully comprehend to which acts of theirs it refers.
12
Both sufficiently
identify the acts constituting the offense, sufficient enough to enable the Court to pronounce a valid
judgment thereon in case of conviction.
13

As it is, doubt could not have set in and confusion would not have arisen had the Fiscal limited
himself merely to the filing of the complaint (thumbmarked and under oath of the complainant)
instead of an information with the complaint annexed thereto.
Finally, as a last-ditch attempt to throw the ADULTERY case out of court, petitioners invoked the
death of the complainant which took place on April 14, 1974 and during the pendency of this case,
as an added argument in support of their plea for dismissal.
Such a stand is erroneous. Death of the offended party is not a ground for extinguishment of criminal
liability whether total
14
or partial.
15
The participation of the offended party is essential not for the
maintenance of the criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof.
The term private crimes in reference to felonies which cannot be prosecuted except upon
complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is misleading. Far from what it implies, it is not only the
aggrieved party who is offended in such crimes but also the State. Every violation of penal laws
results in the disturbance of public order and safety which the State is committed to uphold and
protect. If the law imposes the condition that private crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted
except upon complaint filed by the offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier out of consideration
for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the
scandal of a public trial. Once a complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is ascertained and
the action proceeds just as in any other crime. This is shown by the fact that after filing a complaint,
any pardon given by the complainant to the offender would be unavailing.
16
It is true, the institution of
the action in so- called private crimes is at the option of the aggrieved party. But it is equally true that
once the choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in full force beyond the control of, and in
spite of the complainant, his death notwithstanding.
17

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED. The Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court Branch of Negros Oriental to whose sala Criminal Case No. 1097 had been assigned, is
hereby ordered to immediately continue with the trial of the aforementioned case and render
judgment thereon on the basis of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.












PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE ELPEDES y
SUNAS, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Rape is condemnable. It becomes twice reprehensible if committed against ones flesh and
blood.
[1]
The despicability of incestuous rape which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the barrel
of moral depravity
[2]
is depicted in all its sordidness in the instant case brought to this Court for
automatic review.
On the basis of two (2) sworn criminal complaints executed by the offended party, accused
Jose Elpedes y Sunas was charged with the crime of Rape in two (2) Informations.
The Information in Criminal Case No. Ir-4688
[3]
alleges
That on or about the 11
th
day of February 1997, at Brgy. Bacolod, Municipality of
Bato, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with
his own daughter ALMA S. ELPEDES, a minor against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the other hand, the Information in Criminal Case No. Ir-4689
[4]
avers -
That sometime in the year 1991, at Barangay Bacolod, Municipality of Bato, Province
of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by
means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with his own daughter ALMA
S. ELPEDES, a 9 year old girl, against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused entered a plea of Not guilty.
[5]
The cases, which were
consolidated, thereafter proceeded to joint trial.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of one count of rape, while acquitting him of the other charge, thus:
Finally, this Court is convinced in Crim. Case No. Ir-4688 involving the incident on
February 11, 1997, the evidence of the prosecution has clearly and sufficiently
established the factual and legal basis for a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, accordingly this Court in the performance of its sworn duty has
no choice but to impose upon the accused Jose Elpedes the mandatory supreme
penalty of death pursuant to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659.
However, in Criminal Case No. Ir-4689 which allegedly happened in 1991, the
evidence not being convincing as it is not supported by a clear and substantial
evidence except for the claim of Alma who was only 9 nine years old when the rape
was committed by her father and as heretofore stated, this Court entertains doubt on
the culpability of the accused, and consequently he is acquitted of the crime charged
in the information.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellant assails his
conviction on the grounds that:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED ON FEBRUARY 11, 1997 (No. Ir-4688) DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE COMPLAINING WITNESS CATEGORICALLY TESTIFIED
DURING THE TRIAL THAT SHE WAS SEXUALLY VIOLATED ON
AUGUST 11, 1997.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE APPARENT
INCONSISTENCIES THEREIN.
III
ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS NO DISCREPANCY OF THE MATERIAL
DATES, THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY
ALLEGE IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE VICTIM WAS UNDER 18 AT
THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE RAPE.
The versions of the incidents of both Prosecution and Defense, as culled from their
respective evidence, was summarized thus by the trial court:
Alma S. Elpedes, testified in substance, that she is 15 years old as she was born on
October 12, 1982
[6]
as shown in the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Bato, Camarines Sur.
[7]
She signed the complaint now marked as
Exhibit A-Crim Case No. Ir-4688 and Exhibit A-Crim. Case No. Ir-4689. Her father
is Jose Elpedes, the accused in the 2 above-entitled cases.
[8]

In the year 1991 (the month she could not recall) she was only 9 years old when she
was raped by her father, Jose Elpedes. She was then a grade II pupil. She recalled that
she was then in their house in Bacolod, Bato, Camarines Sur when she was raped by
her father. She did not go to school that day because she was told by her father to
watch over her younger brother. Aside from her father, together with her in the house
were her younger brothers and grandmother who was old and already blind.
[9]
The rape
was committed when her father removed her shorts and panty and she was forced to
lie down and he inserted his penis in her vagina. At the time she was raped, her
mother was also in the house doing the laundry.
[10]

On February 11, 1997, she was raped again in the house when she was already 14
years old.
[11]
At the time of the rape her mother was in Manila. This rape incident was
committed when her father undressed her, strangled and boxed her.
[12]
As a result of
the rape on February 11, 1997 she got pregnant. When she told her mother of the
pregnancy and that it was her father who impregnated her she would not believe [her]
but instead even beat her until her body became swollen.
[13]
As she was already
pregnant and could no longer go to school because in her condition she could hardly
walk and her stomach was painful she was brought to Barangay Tapayas, Balatan,
Camarines Sur by her mother to the house of her uncle, Orlando Santor
[14]
where she
gave birth to a child on October 12, 1997. The child was, however, dead when it was
delivered. She was then brought by her uncle to the Center for Girls in Sorsogon
under the care of the DSWD.
On cross-examination, she testified that the rape incident on February 11, 1997
happened at nighttime while the first rape in 1991 was done in the daytime. On
February 11, 1997 when she was raped by her father she was sleeping in one of the 4
rooms in the house together with her sister Jocelyn. When she was being raped she
tried to rouse and tell her sister, she did not mind but just pretended to
sleep. Although inside her room there was no light but outside the room was a light
that enabled her to recognize her father who was then in short pants without [his] shirt
on. While her father was raping her she could not resist him because he was strong
and she was boxed and strangled causing her to lose consciousness. When she
regained consciousness she saw her father sitting outside at the balcony. When her
brothers woke up she did not tell them of what her father did to her because her father
threatened to kill her. At that time he made the threat he was then poking a nipper at
her back. Despite that she was already showing signs of pregnancy by vomiting and
her stomach was getting bigger, her mother did not have her examined by a doctor.
[15]

x x x x x x x x x
The accused testifying in his own behalf denied the charges against him. He claimed
that when he was so insistent in asking Alma who impregnated her and she refused to
reveal the one responsible, he beat her and that was the reason Alma ran away from
home. In beating her on the buttocks he only used his bare hands.
[16]
Alma ran away
from home and went to her uncles house in Tapayas, Balatan, Camarines Sur. He
claimed that his house in Bacolod, Bato Camarines Sur is big measuring 10 x 10
meters with 4 rooms. He testified that Alma slept with her sister Jocelyn, and brothers
Michael, Junior and Vicente. He also said that he seldom slept in his house as he
went out fishing and spent the night at the lakeshore.
On the evening of February 11, 1997, he was at home. The room where he and his
children slept was always lighted with one 40-watt fluorescent lamp because his
children were still small.
[17]
He knew that Alma had a miscarriage on October 12, 1997
because her cousin went to the house. Before October 9, 1997 he did not know that
Alma was pregnant because she was going to school and he seldom saw her as he was
always out of the house.
[18]

In support of his cause, accused-appellant first insists that he can not be convicted of rape
committed on February 11, 1997 because the victim testified that she was raped on August 11,
1997. He points out that the victim never testified that she was raped on February 11, 1997, as
alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. Ir-4688, and claims that he can not be convicted
as charged when the evidence shows that rape was committed on a date other than that indicated
in the information.
The argument is neither novel nor persuasive.
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense
with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars.
[19]
The record reveals that accused-
appellant did not ask for a bill of particulars in accordance with Rule 116, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court,
[20]
which provides:
SEC. 10. Bill of particulars. Accused may, at or before arraignment, move for a bill
of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion
shall specify the alleged defects and details desired.
The failure to move for specifications or the quashal of the information on any of the
grounds provided for in the Rules of Court deprives accused of the right to object to evidence
which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general
terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime.
[21]
It is too late in the day
for accused-appellant to raise this issue now because objections as to matters of form or
substance in the information can not be made for the first time on appeal.
[22]
Besides, the exact
date of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the crime.
[23]
In People v.
Gianan,
[24]
the Court held:
It is settled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element thereof, as this
crime is defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is
the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated
therein, i.e. (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, Section 11. As long as it alleges
that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed, an information is sufficient. Thus, in People v.
Bugayong,
[25]
it was held when the time given in the (information) is not the essence of
the offense, the time need not be proven as alleged and that the complaint will be
sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the
period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the
action. (Italics provided)
Indeed, under Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the information need only state
the approximate time of the commission of the offense. Section 11 thereof provides:
SEC. 11. Time of the commission of the offense.- It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have
been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint will permit. (Italics provided)
Accused-appellant next seeks to impugn the credibility of the victim by pointing out
inconsistencies in her testimony with regard to the age and gender of the stillborn fetus.
These inconsistencies adverted to by accused-appellant do not detract from the stark fact that
the victim was raped.
When a victim of rape says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
[26]
Guided by this dictum, the
Court has meticulously scrutinized the testimony of complaining witness Alma S. Elpedes and
ultimately reached the conclusion that the offense charged did occur. Almas testimony on the
act of rape perpetrated against her by accused-appellant is clear and could have only been
narrated by a victim subjected to such a sexual assault.
Under rigorous cross-examination, private complainant remained steadfast and never
wavered in her assertion that accused-appellant forced her to have sexual intercourse with
him.
[27]
On review, the Court finds that her testimony bears the hallmarks of truth. It is consistent
in material points. The rule is that when a rape victims testimony is straightforward and candid,
unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its
material points, the same must be given full faith and credit.
[28]

Accused merely raised denial as his defense. Such a defense is unavailing given the facts
prevailing herein. The Court has consistently held that for alibi or denial to prosper, it must be
proven that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. Alibi and denial are inherently weak
defenses and unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same can not prevail over
the positive declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner,
convincingly identified the accused-appellant as the defiler of her chastity. When assayed
against the testimony of the private complainant who testified on affirmative matters
[29]
such a
hackneyed defense is reduced into a futile and pathetic attempt at exculpation. Denial is an
inherently weak defense which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by
the victim of the accused-appellant as the violator of her honor.
[30]

The defense alleges that someone else and not the accused was the defiler of the victims
virtue and that she was forced by the police to point to him as the perpetrator of such a
despicable crime. This contention, however, simply borders on the preposterous and is too
unnatural to deserve faith and credence. Be that as it may, these claims pale into
insignificance vis--vis the complainants vehement disclaimer to the contrary.
[31]
The gravity of
filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughters accusation must be taken
seriously. It simply goes against the grain of human experience for a girl to fabricate a story
which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth,
for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. More so, where her charges could mean the
execution of her own father, as in this case.
In other words, the positive assertions of the victim that he raped her is entitled to greater
weight.
[32]
While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this
effect can not overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.
[33]
Her testimony never wavered
even after it had been explained to her that her father could be meted the death penalty if found
guilty.
[34]
It certainly would take a most senseless kind of depravity for a young daughter to
concoct a story of rape which would consign her own father to the supreme penalty of death if
the same were not the truth.
[35]
Furthermore, no young girl of decent repute would allow the
examination of her private parts or subject herself to the shame, embarassment and humiliation
of a public trial, if she has not in fact been raped.
[36]

A word must, however, be made with regard to the other incidents of rape mentioned by
private complainant during the course of her testimony. Each and every charge of rape is a
distinct and separate crime so that each of the rapes charged should be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
[37]
Thus, private complainants bare statements that she was raped on several other
occasions by the accused-appellant is clearly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish guilt
of the accused-appellant insofar as the other acts of rape are concerned. In People v.
Garcia,
[38]
the Court pointed out that
x x x the indefinite testimonial evidence that complainant was raped every week is
decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of appellant
therefor with the required quantum of evidence. So much of such indefinite
imputations of rape, which are uncorroborated by any other evidence fall within this
category.
At any rate, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the trial court. The act of rape
is rendered all the more heinous and reprehensible in this case inasmuch as the victim is merely a
young lass of fifteen while her defiler is her father.
Nevertheless, while accused-appellants guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court finds the imposition of the death penalty against him unwarranted. The Court has
consistently declared that the circumstances under the amendatory provisions of R.A. No. 7659,
Section 11, the attendance of which would mandate the imposition of the single indivisible
penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. As such, they should be alleged in
the information and proved at the trial. Addressing the issue on the propriety of the punishment
imposed, the trial court meted out the death penalty on accused-appellant pursuant to Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, whose pertinent portions state that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x.
The trial court imposed the penalty of death after taking into consideration the age of Alma
who was then fourteen (14) years old
[39]
and the fact that accused-appellant is her father. A
reading of the accusatory portion of the information, however, reveals that while the qualifying
circumstance of relationship has been alleged therein, the averment on private complainants
minority has not been accurately pleaded in the indictment. The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, now specifically require both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the information,
[40]
viz:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Defects in the crafting of informations especially in indictments for Qualified Rape
prompted this Court to exhort public prosecutors to be more circumspect in the drafting
thereof. Thus, in People v. Nunez:
[41]

Taking into account the growing number of cases where qualified rape under Section
11 of R.A. 7659, although proven during trial could still not be properly penalized
because of defects in the Information, We urge the prosecuting fiscals who are
charged with the responsibility of preparing Informations to state with particularity
the attendant circumstances provided for under Section 11 of R.A. 7659. More
specifically, in qualified rape, both the fact of minority of the victim and the actual
relationship between the parties, as worded in R.A. 7659, must be alleged in the
Information. Otherwise, We shall continue to fail both the law and the victim whom
the law have sought to protect. (Emphasis and italics provided)
Given the circumstances of this case, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
failure to allege accurately the minority of the victim in the information bars accused-appellants
conviction for rape in its qualified form which is punishable by death.
[42]
It must be borne in mind
that the requirement for complete allegations on the particulars of the indictment is based on the
right of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charges against him so that he may
adequately prepare for his defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
[43]

The Court notes that the court a quo neither awarded any indemnity ex delicto, which
current jurisprudence has fixed at P50,000.00,
[44]
nor moral damages on account of the rape. It
must be stressed in this regard that civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of
moral damages which is automatically granted in rape cases.
[45]
Pursuant to controlling case law,
the award of P50,000.00 ex delicto is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.
[46]
Moral
damages are additionally awarded without need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.
[47]
This
is because it is recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting
from the odiousness of the crime to warrant per se the award of moral damages.
[48]

The anguish and the pain a victim had to endure are evident.
[49]
The Court need not belabor
the fact that the offended party in a rape case is victim many times over. In our culture which
puts a premium on the virtue of purity or virginity, rape stigmatizes the victim more than the
perpetrator.
[50]
Considering that the offender is the father of the victim, accused-appellant should
likewise pay the victim exemplary damages,
[51]
which pursuant to controlling case law, has been
fixed at P25,000.00.
[52]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to pay the offended party
P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto; P50,000.00 as moral damages and 25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 153979 February 6, 2006
REGINO SY CATIIS, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (17th Division), REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D.
LOPEZ,LUZVIMINDA A. PORTUGUEZ and THE BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND
PENOLOGY, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, MAKATI CITY JAIL, THROUGH ITS OFFICER-IN-
CHARGE WARDEN, CHIEF INSP. ISAGANI M. GAMINO,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Regino Sy Catiis (petitioner) seeking to nullify
the Decision
1
dated June 14, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which sustained the Order dated
December 18, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City,
2
allowing private
respondents to post bail and the Order dated December 21, 2001 of the Executive Judge of the
same court
3
approving the surety bond posted by respondents and their release.
Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001 against private respondents Reynaldo A.
Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez, Luzviminda A. Portuguez and a certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, for violation of Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 (syndicated estafa) and other related offenses. The
complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 01-10686. Private respondents, except for Tafalla, filed their joint
counter-affidavits denying the charges against them.
On October 10, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued a Resolution
4
finding
the existence of a probable cause for syndicated Estafa against private respondents and Tafalla with
no bail recommended. The Resolution was approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
An Information was filed on the same day by Prosecutor Jurado against private respondents and
Tafalla before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and raffled off to Branch 96, which reads:
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D. LOPEZ, LUZVIMINDA A.
PORTUGUEZ and MARGIELYN TAFALLA, of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the Revise Penal Code in relation to P.D. 1689, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000 or subsequent thereto in Quezon City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another in a syndicated manner consisting
of five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, with intent to gain and by means of fraud and deceit,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and several other
persons in the following manner, to wit: by falsely or fraudulently pretending or representing, in a
transaction or series of transactions, which they made with the Complainant and the public in
general to the effect that they were in a legitimate business of foreign exchange trading successively
or simultaneously operating under the following name and style of Asia Profits Philippines,
Incorporation, Winggold Management Philippines Incorporated, Belkin Management Consultancy,
Inc. and/or Belkin Profits Limited or other unregistered foreign entities induced and succeeded in
inducing complainant and several other persons to give and deliver and in fact, the latter and said
persons gave and delivered to said accused the amount of at least US$ 123,461.14 or its equivalent
in Philippine Pesos on the strength of said manifestations and representations, the accused knowing
fully well that the above-named corporations registered with the SEC and/or those unregistered
foreign entities are not licensed nor authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations
and that such manifestations and representations to transact in foreign exchange were false and
fraudulent that resulted to the damage and prejudice of the complainant and other persons and that
the defraudation pertains to funds solicited from the public in general by such
corporations/associations.
5

On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding probable cause against all
the accused and approved the recommendation of the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-
bailable. The corresponding warrants of arrest were issued.
6

A return
7
on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M. Coronel, PNP Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, with the information that except for Margielyn
Tafalla, who remained at large, all other accused were already detained at the Makati City Jail.
On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by Judge Bersamin setting the case for
arraignment on November 20, 2001. Private respondents on the same day filed an urgent motion to
fix bail.
On November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned, entered pleas of not guilty. The
Prosecution was required to file their comment/opposition on private respondents motion to fix bail
which they did through the Private Prosecutor with the conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur
O. Malabaguio.
8

On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his earlier Order of
November 7, 2001 by declaring that the offense charged is bailable. In finding that the accused are
entitled to bail, Judge Bersamin made the following disquisitions:
x x x
In order to impose the penalty of life imprisonment to death under Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1689, the estafa
or swindling must be committed by a syndicate. The law plainly states that a syndicate consists
of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise, or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money or
of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
Herein, only four persons are actually charged. Consequently, the estafa charged has no relation to
the crime punished with life imprisonment to death under Sec. 1, Presidential Decree No. 1689.
The allegation of the information that the accused conspired with each other "in a syndicated manner
consisting of five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme" cannot change the juridical nature of the
offense charged. If the Government has chosen to indict only four persons, without more, the
obvious reason is that only the persons actually charged were involved in the commission of
the offense. As such, there was no syndicate.
In all likelihood, the allegation of "in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons"
is made herein solely for having bail denied. Whether that is true or not is beside the point, but the
Court cannot now lend itself to such a likelihood which, according to the foregoing disquisition, lacks
legal basis. For that matter, the Court must recant its approval of the recommendation to deny bail.
The Prosecution represents that the Supreme Court has affirmed in People vs. Romero a conviction
under Presidential Decree No.1689 "even if the accused charged is only less than five (5) accused."
Such representation is grossly misleading. Far to the contrary, in People v. Romero, where two
accused were actually charged but only one was ultimately penalized due to the death of the other
accused during the pendency of the case, the Supreme Court did not impose the higher penalty of
life imprisonment to death because the Prosecution "failed to clearly establish that the corporation
was a syndicate, as defined under the law," holding, instead, that, since the crime was not
committed by a syndicate, the proper penalty is that provided in the second paragraph of Sec.1,
P.D. No. 1689, to wit:
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000.00 pesos.
Yet, one should ask: Where, as here, the amount alleged in the information clearly "exceeds
100,000.00 pesos" such that the second paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1689, is applicable, is the
offense still bailable considering that the range of the imposable penalty is from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Rule 110, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information should aver, among others,
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of the offense "in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment."
A perusal of the information discloses that no aggravating circumstance has been alleged in the
information. The omission consequently precludes the State from proving any aggravating
circumstancewhich will raise the penalty to its maximum period of reclusion perpetua. The Court
itself is also prohibited from imposing reclusion perpetua, since the requirement of complete
allegations of the particulars in the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully
informed of the nature of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare for his defense
pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As stated in People v. Romero, supra, the penalty under the second paragraph of Sec.1, P.D. No.
1689, when there is neither mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant, is the medium
period of reclusion temporal, that is from sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Hence, the offense charged is unquestionably bailable.
9

On December 26, 2001, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
10
assailing the Order of Judge Bersamin
allowing private respondents to post bail.
On the same day, then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr.,
11
Justice on Duty Per Office
Memorandum of Presiding Justice, issued a Resolution
12
granting petitioners prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order, thus, private respondents and all those acting for and in their behalf
were temporarily restrained from enforcing and implementing the Order of Judge Bersamin and from
further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 01-105430.
However, unknown to petitioner, private respondents had already filed or posted their surety bonds
on December 21, 2001 with the Office of Executive Judge Monina A. Zenarosa
13
who approved the
same on the same day and ordered the immediate release of private respondents unless held for
other lawful cause.
14
Petitioner filed a supplemental petition with the CA on January 14, 2002
assailing the jurisdiction of Judge Zenarosa in issuing the Order dated December 21, 2001.
On June 14, 2002, the CA issued its assailed decision denying due course to the petition and
dismissed the same after it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Bersamin and
Judge Zenarosa in issuing the assailed orders.
Hence, the instant petition filed by petitioner raising the following issues, to wit:
A
Whether or not the issuance of the questioned Decision promulgated June 14, 2002 by the
17th Division of the Court of Appeals sustaining the validity of the 1st assailed Order dated
December 18, 2001 of Hon. Presiding Judge Lucas P. Bersamin of Branch 96 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ruling that there should be at least five (5) persons that
must be charged under Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1689 is not in accordance with
law or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
B
Whether or not the questioned Decision sanctioning the grant of bail in the 1st assailed
Order dated December 18, 2001 of Hon. Presiding Judge Lucas P. Bersamin of Branch 96 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City violated Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and actually departed from the accepted and usual course in the
determination of bailability of criminal offenses.
C
Whether or not the questioned Decision sustaining the order of release in the 2nd assailed
Order dated December 21 of Hon. Executive Judge Monina A. Zenarosa of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure
15

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, the term "any
person" must be understood and read in its singular meaning so that even only one person can be
indicted for committing "estafa or other forms of swindling" in relation to P.D. No. 1689 citing the
case of People v. Romero; that Judge Bersamin erred when he already computed the possible
penalty in case of private respondents conviction; that the capital nature of an offense for the
purpose of bailability is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, not by penalty which may
actually be imposed since the latter requires a consideration of the evidence on trial; that since no
evidence had yet been presented by both prosecution and defense, Judge Bersamin has again
shown bias by already computing the imposable penalty just to stretch the application of the law and
questionably grant bail in favor of private Respondents.
We are not persuaded.
The CA found that the assailed order of Judge Bersamin cannot be characterized as one issued with
grave abuse of discretion for he correctly determined that the Information did not charge a
syndicated Estafa; that with only four charged in the information, it could not be considered as
committed by a syndicate which must consist of five or more persons and he cannot be faulted for
that.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, increasing the penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa, provides:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined
in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more
persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders,
or members of rural banks cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers associations, or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion
temporal toreclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
Clearly, P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the amount
involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law as
"consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal
act, transaction, enterprise or scheme." Under the second paragraph, it is provided that if the
offenders are not members of a syndicate, they shall nevertheless be held liable for the acts
prohibited by the law but they shall be penalized by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the
amount of the fraud is more than P100,000.00.
Petitioners interpretation that the term "any person" in the first paragraph of section 1 could mean
that even one person can be indicted for syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the law. It
bears stressing that the law must be considered as a whole, just as it is necessary to consider a
sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true meaning.
16
It is a dangerous practice to base
construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may be qualified by the other
portion.
17
In fact, there is no need for any construction or interpretation of P. D. No. 1689 since the
law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 has defined what
constitutes a syndicate and such definition is controlling. Where a requirement is made in explicit
and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is
obeyed.
18

In this case, the Information specifically charged only four persons without specifying any other
person who had participated in the commission of the crime charged, thus, based on the definition of
syndicate under the law, the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate. We find no reversible
error committed by the CA when it upheld the ruling of Judge Bersamin that with only four persons
actually charged, the estafa charged has no relation to the crime punished with life imprisonment to
death under section 1 of P. D. No. 1689.
The wordings in the information that the accused conspired with each other "in a syndicated manner
consisting of five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme" is not sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the law on what constitute a syndicate. It bears stressing that the first paragraph of
the accusatory portion of the Information charges only four persons. To repeat, P.D. No. 1689 has
provided for the definition of a syndicate and it is controlling. As correctly found by the trial court, if
the government has chosen to indict only four persons, without more, the obvious reason is that only
the persons actually charged were involved in the commission of the offense, thus, there was no
syndicate.1avvphil. net
Petitioners reliance in People v. Romero to support his argument is misleading. First, the issue of
whether only one person can be indicted for syndicated estafa was not an issue in the Romero case.
Secondly, the Court did not impose the penalty of life imprisonment to death on the accused since
the prosecution failed to clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate as defined under the
law. There is no other way of establishing a syndicate under P.D. No. 1689 than by the adherence to
the definition provided by law.
Since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of
life imprisonment to death cannot be imposed on private Respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct
when he ruled that private respondents could only be punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua in case of conviction since the amount of the fraud exceeds P100,000.00. The next
question is, whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is bailable despite
that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal toreclusion perpetua?
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall
be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be
expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
considered by the trial court in their judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial.
19
A
reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating circumstance, thus
Judge Bersamin is correct when he found that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is
imposable in case of conviction.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. In
pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody
shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. Since the imposable penalty
on private respondents, in case of conviction, is reclusion temporal, they are entitled to bail as a
matter of right. Notably, Judge Bersamin issued his Order finding the crime charge bailable and fixed
the amount of P150,000.00 each for the provisional liberty of private respondents only after
petitioner had submitted their comment/opposition to petitioners motion to fix bail.
Petitioner claims that the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing private respondents to post bail already
prejudged the case; that he summarily decided the eventual and imminent dismissal of the criminal
case without even the reception of evidence; that such prejudgment came from a ruling on a mere
issue of bail.
Such argument is baseless. The Order was issued on the basis that the allegations in the
Information do not establish that the crime charged was committed by a syndicate as defined under
the law where the penalty of life imprisonment to death could be imposed. Nowhere in the Order did
Judge Bersamin state that the act complained of is not punishable at all.
Petitioner next contends that private respondents filing of bail with Executive Judge Monina
Zenarosa, other than Branch 96 where the case is pending, is questionable and not in accordance
with Section 17, Rule 114
20
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure; that the records show that
when private respondents filed their bail with Judge Zenarosa, Branch 96 was open and available as
private respondents through their representative were able to pay for the issuance of the
certifications on the Information and the Order dated December 18, 2001; that petitioners counsel
and the Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur Malabaguio had personally received their respective copies
of the Order dated December 18, 2001 inside the staff room of Branch 96 and they even attested
that Judge Bersamin was physically present on December 21, 2002, the day private respondents
filed their bail bond with Judge Zenarosa; that despite these circumstances, Judge Zenarosa still
exercised jurisdiction over the bail filed by private respondents and issued the Order dated
December 21, 2001 approving the surety bonds and ordering the release of private respondents;
that the CAs justification that Judge Zenarosa accepted the bail bond due to the fact that Judge
Bersamin was momentarily out of his office or premises at the time of posting of the bond was not
borne by the records.
We are not persuaded.
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that bail in the amount
fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. While Branch 96 is
open and available on the day private respondents posted their bail with Judge Zenarosa, it does not
necessarily follow that Judge Bersamin was available at that precise moment. Although it is alleged
in the supplemental petition prepared by petitioners counsel, Atty. Rodeo Nuez, with the conformity
of Prosecutor Malabaguio filed before the CA that both of them saw Judge Bersamin discharging his
function on that day, it is not under oath. Moreover, it is not specifically stated in the supplemental
petition that at the exact time Judge Zenarosa approved the bail, Judge Bersamin was available.
Thus, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that official duty had been regularly performed
21
by
Judge Zenarosa under the rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 14, 2002 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J .:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are
as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident
was a legitimate police operation.
1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the
Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by
the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) information for murder
2
before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,
3
the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.
4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
informations
5
before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together
with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused
6
was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975.
7
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one
or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent
of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution
8
dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting,
9
the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299
10
and No. 1094
11
(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844
12
(sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales),
were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the
said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249
13
by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution
14
denying the motion
for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8,
1996."
On the same day
15
the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved
it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson,
and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has
been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4
with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases
16
(Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating
his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to
suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that
the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and
a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation
and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng
case pending before the Sandiganbayan.
18
They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of
the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the
Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of
the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the
petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution
19
requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible
period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject
amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed
the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.
20
The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in
Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486
21
created the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
1606,
22
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,
23
P.D. No. 1860,
24
P.D. No. 1861,
25
R.A. No.
7975,
26
and R.A. No. 8249.
27
Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders
Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate,
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals
and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A,
issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal
accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from
the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused"
appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to
this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent
28
or higher. On the
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases,
29
contends that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is
a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery),
30
(d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases),
31
or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee
32
holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is
not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The
phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4.
The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to
the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law
33
because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed
into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness.
34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,
35

all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences.
36
In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations,
37
it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form
of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision
in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law
is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived
as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya
38
for their participation in
the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.
39
R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by
23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the
committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid
law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law
41
for they are deprived of their right to
procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull,
42
an ex post factolaw is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense on order to convict the defendant.
43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage.
44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty.
45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.
46
R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;
47
or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment.
48
R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.
49
Not being a
penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
has already been rejected by the court several times
50
considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in
the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
51
R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition.
52
Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.
53
It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.
54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law.
55
On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the
power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.
56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion
in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title
57
is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
58
Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement,
since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject.
59
The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its
power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.
60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and
the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall
now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner
and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or informations,
61
and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.
63
This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to
their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed
in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,
64
we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.
65
This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations."
66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
the facts."
67
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v.
Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such
a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and
second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact andcircumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is
presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."
70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations
for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of
the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations
71
for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage
of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public
office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there
willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM
JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during
the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the
crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as
among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein
that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of
the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information
that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the
accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,
72
where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him
with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . .
at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control
where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as
such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense
and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely
allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of
P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their
common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to
public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
73
not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
said cases.1wphi 1. nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J .:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are
as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident
was a legitimate police operation.
1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the
Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by
the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) information for murder
2
before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,
3
the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.
4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
informations
5
before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together
with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused
6
was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975.
7
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one
or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent
of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution
8
dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting,
9
the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299
10
and No. 1094
11
(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844
12
(sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales),
were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the
said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249
13
by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution
14
denying the motion
for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8,
1996."
On the same day
15
the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved
it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson,
and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has
been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4
with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases
16
(Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating
his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to
suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that
the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and
a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation
and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng
case pending before the Sandiganbayan.
18
They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of
the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the
Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of
the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the
petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution
19
requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible
period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject
amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed
the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.
20
The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in
Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486
21
created the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
1606,
22
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,
23
P.D. No. 1860,
24
P.D. No. 1861,
25
R.A. No.
7975,
26
and R.A. No. 8249.
27
Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders
Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate,
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals
and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A,
issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal
accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from
the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused"
appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to
this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent
28
or higher. On the
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases,
29
contends that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is
a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery),
30
(d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases),
31
or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee
32
holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is
not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The
phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4.
The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to
the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law
33
because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed
into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness.
34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,
35

all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences.
36
In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations,
37
it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form
of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision
in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law
is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived
as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya
38
for their participation in
the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.
39
R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by
23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the
committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid
law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law
41
for they are deprived of their right to
procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull,
42
an ex post factolaw is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense on order to convict the defendant.
43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage.
44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty.
45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.
46
R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;
47
or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment.
48
R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.
49
Not being a
penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
has already been rejected by the court several times
50
considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in
the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
51
R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition.
52
Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.
53
It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.
54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law.
55
On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the
power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.
56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion
in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title
57
is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
58
Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement,
since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject.
59
The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its
power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.
60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and
the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall
now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner
and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or informations,
61
and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.
63
This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to
their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed
in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,
64
we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.
65
This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations."
66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
the facts."
67
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v.
Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such
a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and
second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact andcircumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is
presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."
70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations
for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of
the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations
71
for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage
of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public
office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there
willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM
JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during
the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the
crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as
among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein
that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of
the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information
that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the
accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,
72
where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him
with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . .
at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control
where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as
such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense
and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely
allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of
P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their
common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to
public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
73
not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
said cases.1wphi 1. nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45772 March 25, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO, Presiding Judge, Branch IV-B, CFI Rizal, Quezon City;
ANTONIO CIMARRA, ULPIANO VILLAR, BAYANI CATINDIG, and AVELINO DE
LEON, respondents.

PADILLA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, to set aside the
order of the respondent court, dated 10 February 1977, denying petitioner's Motion to Admit
Amended Information and the order, dated 22 February 1977, of the same court, denying the Motion
for Reconsideration of said earlier order.
On 21 March 1977, the court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from
proceeding to hear and decide the case until further orders from the Court.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia G, Valdez, filed
an Information for "Roberry" before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV-B, Quezon City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-6821, against Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig
and Avelino de Leon. Said accused (now private respondents) were all members of the police force
of Quezon City and were charged as accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery committed by the
minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded guilty and had been convicted in Criminal Case
No. QF-76-051 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza
was convicted for the robbery of the same items, articles and jewelries belonging to Ding Velayo,
Inc. valued at P 75,591.40 and enumerated in the original information
1
against herein private
respondents as:
One (1) Arminius revolver, cal. 22 with six ammo SN-165928
One (1) gold men's ring 'signet'
Five (5) ID plates yellow gold
Four (4) ID plates yellow gold
Six (6) bracelets lock yellow gold
One (1) anniversary pendant yellow gold
Three (3) heart shape with assorted birthstones
One (1) lady's (ring) white gold setting
One (1) white gold ring mounting 18 karats
One (1) white gold ring mounting 18 karats
One (1) yellow gold stud
One (1) lady's white gold ring setting
One (1) white gold ring mounting
One (1) pc. white gold earring mounting
Twelve (12) pcs. of semi-precious stone bands with one broken
Two (2) Ivory bracelets
One (1) Silver bracelets
One (1) yellow ring gold with blue stone
Two (2) wedding gold rings yellow
One (1) Minolta pocket size camera
One (1) pink handbag
One (1) bunch keys
Upon arraignment on 25 October 1976, all of the accused (now private respondents) entered a plea
of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them. Accordingly, trial on the merits was scheduled by the
respondent court. However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to
Admit Amended Information, dated 28 December 1976, seeking to amend the original information
by: (1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2)
alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and jewelries alleged
to have been stolen in the original Information and substituting them with a different set of items
valued at P71,336.80
2
to wit:
Four (4) pcs. of I.D.
Plates

14 Karat
yellow gold
P 24.00
each
Thirteen (13)
pcs. of I.D.

Plates KYG P 26.40
each
Five (5) pcs. of
anniversary

Pendant 14 P 17.00
KYG each
Three (3) pcs. of
pendant w/

birthstones
14 KYG
P 16.00
each
Two (2) pcs. of
Signet plain

14 Karat
yello gold
rings
P 204.00
each
Four (4) pcs. of
lady's bracelet,

14 KYG oval
shape
P 30.00
each
Four (4) pcs. of
necklace 14
KYG
P 140.00
each

One (1) set of
ring & earrings

mounting w/
23 brills 14
KYG

Two (2) pcs. of
ladies I.D.

bracelet 14
KYG
P 120.00
each
Nine (9) pcs. of
diamond design

earrings 14
KYG
P 32.00
each
Five (5) pcs. of
Sput-nik cross

4 KYG P 99.00
each
One (1) pc. of
ladies ring

mounting 14
KYG
P 290.00
One (1) pc. of
lady's sole
diamond ring,

about .40ct
w/ yellow
gold

ring
mounting,
and one pair

of earrings
white gold
solo

diamond
about .25ct
w/ black

onyx P
2,000.00
One (1) pc.
lady's bracelet
14 KYG
P 1,500.00
One (1) pc.
chain 24KYG
necklace

w/ small
diamond
P
1,500.00
One (1) pc.
Lapiz Lazuli ring
14 KYG
P 1,000.00
One (1) pc.
Lapiz Lazuli 18
KYG
P 1,000.00
One (1) pc.
Lady's ring w/ 2
Jade stone,

white gold w/
small

diamonds
and one pc.

lady's ring
white gold,

14 K w/ 2
small
diamonds

w/ one Jade P
2,000.00
Six (6) pcs. of
fancy chains and
bracelets
P 40.00
each
One (1) pair of
yellow gold
earrings w/

pearl for
children
P 70.00
One (1) pc.
yellow gold ring
w/ blue

sapphire for
children
P 150.00
One (1) brown
envelope,
containing 2

pairs of 1/g
loop
earrings,

14 karat P 780.00
Cash money
(inside the said
envelope)
P 555.00
One (1) pc. silver
bracelet
P 50.00
One (1) pc.
bronze bracelet
P 30.00
One (1) pc. ring
blue stone YG
P 250.00
One (1) pc.
Lapiz Lazuli
band
P 100.00
One (1) pc.
Coral band
P 30.00
One (1) pc. ring
w/ diamond
stone,

14 KWG
mounting
P 250.00
Two (2) pcs. of
14 YG part
bracelet
P 200.00
Three (3) pcs. of
men's ring 14
KYG
P
1,500.00
One (1) pc.
pendant 14 KYG
P
2,000.00
One (1) pc.
loose diamond
about

4.50 karats
antigo
P
27,000.00
One (1) pc.
loose diamond
about

2.05 carats
each antigo
cut
P
20,000.00
One (1) pc.
Cannon camera
w/

black case P
1,200.00
One (1) pc.
Yashika camera
w/

lens cover P
1,300.00
One (1) pc.
Cannon camera
w/

black case P
1,100.00
Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The respondent court
resolved to deny the proposed amendments contained in the Amended Information in the previously
referred to order dated 10 February 1977. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order but the respondent court, on 22 February 1977, denied said motion; hence, this petition.
Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time
before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the
information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the
rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence
the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.
3

On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.
4

The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly substantial
and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to
"Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby
exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable
for the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea
of "not guilty" during their arraignment.
Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely different
articles from those originally complained of, affects the essense of the imputed crime, and would
deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the
preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private
respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had
already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the originalinformation. To charge them now
as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be
manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court.
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously
included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents
with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court. In People v.
Zulueta,
5
it was held that:
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will
have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the
allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the
accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co-
conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby
widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered
weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem
inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy,
bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial.
Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused
is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to
avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many
facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.
To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will
make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but also for the
acts of their co-conspirators.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The orders of the respondent court, dated 10 February
1977 and 22 February 1977 are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on 21 March
1977 is LIFTED.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J .:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal
ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance
No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.
1
The referral-complaint of the police was received by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.
2
The corresponding information was
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
3

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was
denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge.
4

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the
following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not
exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective
of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further,
That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed
and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading
as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of
law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should
have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint
against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General
also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing
the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts,
or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases,
without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals:
5

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this
Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion
that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing
of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All
that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the
Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been
incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the
canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover
the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."
6
Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section
2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter
of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable
to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code
witharresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in
the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond
their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning
of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged
commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of
Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May
30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the
filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after
the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975
LEONARDO ALMEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as presiding judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, and HON. GREGORIO PINEDA, City Fiscal of Pasay
City, respondents.
Honorio Makalintal, Jr. for petitioner.
Pasay City Fiscal Gregorio Pineda for respondent.

CASTRO, J .:
The petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with
the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court
of Pasig, Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond
recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the
respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash.
At the hearing of February 18, 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond
in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for
reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and
recidivism on the part of Almeda.
At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at
a previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and
habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a)
such an amendment was premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in
court, (b) the motion to amend should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object
formally, and (c) the proposed amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering that he
had already pleaded not guilty to the information. The trial court nevertheless granted the
respondent fiscal's motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied.
Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there,
entered his amendment by annotating the same on the back of the document. The petitioner
forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion
and a motion for reconsideration were denied in open court.
Hence, the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Two issues are posed to us for resolution: First, whether the respondent judge has the authority to
require a strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his
provisional liberty, and second, whether the amendment to the information, after a plea of not guilty
thereto, was properly allowed in both substance and procedure.
1. As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose
of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial.
1

In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the
Constitution,
2
and may not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention,
3
or by
reason of his prior absconding.
4
In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution
further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical cause the imposition of an
unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. We have thus held that "where conditions imposed
upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional
right to bail, we would not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy."
5

Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of
surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property
bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner,
and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a
relatively small premium. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy
of the price at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the
production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or
acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the
possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused
as to have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.
Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his
posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The
sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there
should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the
government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only
because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing
cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail
presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered.
6
And
even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to
the accused. This is clearly deducible from the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. At any time after the amount of bail is fixed by
order, the defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the nearest collector of
internal revenue, or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the sum mentioned in the
order, and upon delivering to the court a proper certificate of the deposit, must be
discharged from custody. Money thus deposited, shall be applied to the payment of
the fine and costs for which judgment may be given; and the surplus, if any, shall be
returned to the defendant.
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain
his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the
motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety bond. Based on the petitioner's
past record,
7
the range of his career in crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling
amount of bail. The likelihood of his jumping bail or committing other harm to the citizenry while on
provisional liberty is a consideration that simply cannot be ignored.
Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it could increase
the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over
the person of the accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by
a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the
conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of
his movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the
requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution
8
"Trial may proceed notwithstanding his
absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."
With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the
following factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give bail: (2) the nature of the
offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the accused (5)
the health of the accused; (6) the character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the
accused's appearance or non-appearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether
the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond
for appearance at trial in other cases. 9
It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise extreme care and caution in the
screening of bondsmen and sureties in regard to their reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside
from the other precautions hitherto considered useful courts should see to it that all surety bonds are
accompanied by corresponding clearances from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
Bondsmen who cannot make good their undertaking render inutile all efforts at making the bail
system work in this jurisdiction.
2. Anent the second issue posed by the petitioner, the amendment of the information to include
allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism, after a previous plea thereto by the accused, is
valid and in no way violates his right to be fully apprised before trial of the charges against him.
Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has discretion to allow
amendments to the information on all matters of form after the defendant has pleaded and during the
trial when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. What are prohibited
at this stage of the proceedings are amendments in substance. And the substantial matter in a
complaint or information is the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
10

Under our law, a person is considered a habitual delinquent "if within a period of ten years from the
date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa orfalsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener."
11
The law
imposes an additional penalty based on the criminal propensity of the accused apart from that provided
by law for the last crime of which he is found guilty. Habitual delinquency is not however, a crime in itself,
it is only a factor in determining a total penalty.
12
Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of
habitual delinquency does not establish a new crime, but only regulates the "effect of the attendance of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency." as its caption indicates. In fact, the
provision on habitual delinquency is found in a section of the Code prescribing rules for the application of
penalties, not in a section defining offense.
13
A recidivist, upon the other hand, is one who, at the time of
his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced
in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Recidivism is likewise not a criminal offense; it is but one of
the aggravating circumstances enumerated by the said Code.
14

The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect of charging
another offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified theft (of a motor vehicle) contained in
the information. Neither do they tend to correct any defect in the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter of the case. The said new allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction. They do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case
nor possibly prejudice the form of defense the accused has or will assume. Consequently, in
authorizing the amendments, the respondent judge acted with due consideration of the petitioner's
rights and did not abuse his discretion.
Anent the petitioner's claim that the amendment of the information by the State places him in double
jeopardy, it should be remembered that there is double jeopardy only when all the following
requisites obtain in the original prosecution; (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent
court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent.
15

It is clear that the petitioner Almeda has not yet been convicted nor acquitted of the charge of
qualified theft of a motor vehicle contained in the original information. Neither has the case against
him been dismissed or otherwise terminated. The mere amendment of the information to include
allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism does not have the effect of a dismissal of the
criminal action for qualified theft alleged in the original information.
16

It cannot likewise be said that the accused is being placed in jeopardy a second time for the past
crimes of which he had been convicted. The constitutional objection, on the ground of double
jeopardy, to the statute providing an additional penalty to be meted out to habitual delinquents, has
long been rejected.
17

The procedure taken by the respondent fiscal and allowed by the respondent judge in the
amendment of the information does not, however, merit our approbation. Under section 2 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court, "all motions shall be made in writing except motions for continuance made in
the presence of the adverse party, or those made in the course of a hearing or trial." A motion to
amend the information, after the accused has pleaded thereto, is certainly one that should be placed
in writing and properly set for hearing. We are loath to give our imprimatur to the kind of shortcut
devised by the respondents, especially as it relates to an alteration in the information. Considering,
however, that the petitioner was not deprived of his day in court and was in fact given advance
warning of the proposed amendment, although orally, we refrain from disturbing the said
amendment.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of the respondent judge of February 18, 1970 denying the motion of the
petitioner Almeda that he be allowed to post a surety bond instead of a cash bond is hereby set
aside, without prejudice, however, to increasing the amount of the bail bond and/or the imposition of
such conditions as the respondent judge might consider desirable and proper for the purpose of
insuring the attendance of the petitioner at the trial, provided they are consistent with the views
herein expressed. No costs.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.