AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,

vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the
registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos,"
with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be
annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to
have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of
the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in
law." It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three
separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different
buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658. Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of
3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby
cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee ... is
hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...
x x x x x x x x x
Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of
16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled
with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to
succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...
Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of
15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with
respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to
succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an additional memorandum
stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds
of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of
Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of
January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title
No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested
annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who subsequently
upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal
point in controversy, the Commissioner observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the Original Certificate of
Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three
different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three
co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to
the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise be
surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was
unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these
titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.et
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to compel annotation of
the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the
production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for
registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under this provision, according to
petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of "registered
owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three
vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was
illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that there is only one
duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production
whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds
to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title
were in existence, presumably issued under section 43
*
of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land
Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is
beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction.
There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely
affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The
law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both
must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the
title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of
Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the action taken by the
Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is,
property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should
first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal
conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the
partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the
result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is
assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which
justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property which he
donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had
sold portions of the same land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the
civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the
validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may
well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected
by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of the
Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

BALBIN V. REGISTER OF DEEDS
Where several co-owners duplicate of certificates of titles are issued, a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered without surrendering all the copies to the Register of Deeds so that every copy of thereof would
contain identical entries of the transactions affecting the land covered.

FACTS: Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy
of the registered owners certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be
annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of
the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being legally defective or otherwise not
sufficient in law. It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are
three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and
Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owners duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owners copies
of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the register of deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the action of the Register
of Deeds in a resolution.

ISSUE: W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper
HELD: YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their integrity may be affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If different copies
were permitted to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be
available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio and his
deceased wife Nemesia Mina, there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse
may make such a conveyance. Assuming the conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face
an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact that 2/3 portion of the property which
Cornelio donated was more than his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had
sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.
Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelios civil status, character of land and validity of
conveyances are in issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case and parties may protect their
rights by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.

DENR et al VS. YAP et al Leave a comment
DENR et al VS. YAP et al
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under
the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts
on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to
have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay
Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public
forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised
Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code,as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In
2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was
similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has
not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay
Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification
modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with
one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No.
1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of
these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming suchpresumption is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification
was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable
and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or
both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No.
1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were
decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of
Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to
classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no
longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the
public domain.

2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present
or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a
matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands
that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of
proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the
proof in each particular case

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain
into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of
wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually
be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on
the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to
determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest
cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their
automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take
steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for
original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or
to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in
the House of Representatives.