Aristotle: Philosophy and Politics, Theory and

Practice
by WalterJ. Tlwmpson
I
I will examine here what has become a common, and in many
respects all too casual, interpretation of the relation in Aristotle's
thought of two distinctions: on the one hand, that between theory
(theoria) and practice (praxis); on the other, that between philosophy
and politics.
On the currently prevailing account, the two pairs are symmetrical:
the distinction between theory and practice mirrors at the level of
activities of mind (energeiai) that between philosophy and politics at the
level of ways of life (bioi). Theory and practice as activities are bifur-
cated, and each is assigned to a distinctive way of life. On this account,
the distinction between ways of life is the distinction between activities
writ large. The philosophic life becomes the life of theory-the life in
accordance with, guided by, or composed of, theoretical activities-the
political life becomes the life of practice-the life in accordance with,
guided by, or composed of, practical activities.
1
The ambiguity in these
formulations is intentional, for as I have claimed above, the interpreta-
tion in question is a casual one. It of course makes a significant
difference which of these formulations one chooses, but it is not uncom-
mon for commentators to run them into one another, indifferently
switching from one to the next. Commentators are encouraged in their
imprecision by Aristotle's own treatment, for while he does indeed,
throughout his practical writings, distinguish both theory and practice
as activities and philosophy and politics as ways of life, and does,
moreover, loosely associate the pairs, he nowhere explores their relation
in any systematic fashion. Now, the absence of such an explicit thematic
treatment may appear a deficiency in Aristotle's account, it may be
considered an oversight on his part, but we should, at the outset at least,
and in order that we not miss something that Aristotle intends thereby
to show us, leave open the possibility that his silence on this matter is
109
110 REASON IN HISTORY
intended and that the absence of an explicit treatment of the two
distinctions is itself significant or revealing.
The consequences of the common interpretation I have outlined are
distressing. The dichotomous reading of the distinctions between the-
ory and practice, philosophy and politics, opens an unbridgeable rift
between thought and action, between "intellectual" and "moral"virtue,2
which undermines the integrity of Aristotle's ethical-political teaching
as a whole, and threatens to leave us with the unhappy alternatives of
an unreflective political activism and a philosophic amoralism. Com-
mentators are sent scrambling for a way to reconcile what appear to be
two divergent tendencies in Aristotle's thought: one which elevates
practice and its virtues to the central position in a good human life, and
another which denigrates practice in order to elevate theory and its
virtues to that central position. There have been several interpretive
responses to this dilemma. Some commentators attempt to dissolve the
dilemma by writing off, on the basis of some interpretation of the whole
of Aristotle's ethical-political teaching, one or the other tendency as
inconsistent with the whole. The choice of which tendency to mute
divides contemporary commentators into "inclusive end" and "dominant
end" interpreters. "Inclusive end" interpreters reject, while "dominant
end" interpreters accept, an "intellectualist" reading of Aristotle's teach-
ing on the human good; the former deny, while the latter affirm, that
Aristotle teaches the superiority of theoretical to practical activity, and
therefore, the superiority of the philosophic to the political way of life.
3
Other commentators allow the dilemma to stand, and maintain either
that Aristotle unintentionally forwarded two incompatible teachings,4
that the duality of teachings represents a genuine duality of alterna-
tives,5 or that the duality reflects a difference in the audience to whom
the respective teachings are addressed.
6
Each of these responses, however, begins from the dichotomous
interpretation of theory and practice, philosophy and politics, sketched
above. All read the distinction between activities and lives as a sym-
metrical dichotomy. All suppose, therefore, that for Aristotle to affirm
the superiority of an activity is for him to enjoin its corresponding
pursuit. All suppose, that is, that Aristotle intends his teaching on the
nature and worth of each activity qua activity to be determinative of
action in particular situations. This supposition, I will argue, is mis-
taken, and arises from a misinterpretation of the distinctions between
lives and activities.
At the root of the contemporary interpretive dilemmas, then, is a
confusion concerning the distinctions between theory and practice,
philosophy and politics. If the existence of these distinctions is beyond
doubt, their meaning and relation remain highly problematic. What is
required, therefore, is a careful reading of Aristotle's own differentiation
ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND PoLITICS 111
of the pairs. I will attend to this task of technical or terminological
clarification first.
II
Aristotle's method in political science (politike) is to begin with the
appearances (ta phainomena), with what is "first for" or most apparent
to us, and then to ascend, by way of dialectical clarification, to what is
"first in itself' or "first by nature" (NE I, 4, 1095a31-b4).7 In fidelity to
Aristotle's own way of proceeding, we too should begin from the appear-
ances.
Of the two pairs of distinctions, it is that between philosophy or the
philosopher and politics or the political mans that first comes to sight
in Aristotle's account (NE I, 5, 1095b14ff.). The difference or opposition
between lives seems more apparent, more immediate, than that be-
tween activities. Indeed, I will later argue that it is the priority of the
difference between lives which structures Aristotle's presentation ofthe
difference between activities. For the moment, however, let us notice
that according to Aristotle's own order of treatment, "first for us" is the
appearance of a difference between lives, of contending ways oflife; what
is "first in itself' -the precise nature of that difference-remains un-
clear.
At NE 1,5, Aristotle begins his inquiry into rival notions of happiness
and the good. From the lives men lead, he argues, the "prominent
candidates" are three: "the many and most vulgar hold [happiness and
the good to be] pleasure, and on account of this they love the life of
enjoyment (ton bion ton apolaustikon)." Such a life, and such a concep-
tion, Aristotle summarily dismisses as utterly slavish, as an existence
fit for cattle. Only the fact, he says, that some men in high places favor
such a life even gives it a hearing.
9
"Refined and practical men (hoi
charientes kai praktikai)," he continues, "[hold happiness and the good
to be] honor (timen), for this is nearly the end of the politicallife."l0 This
view Aristotle also criticizes as being too superficial. For honor seems
to rest more with the one who honors than the one who is honored, while
we think happiness to be something that is one's own and self-sufficient.
Moreover, it appears that those who pursue honor desire to be honored
only by men of practical wisdom, who know them, and who honor them
for their excellence. There is an unrecognized tension in the lives of
those who are considered "refined and practical" between the pursuit of
honor on the one hand, and the pursuit of excellence on the other.ll On
their own account, or in their own self-understanding, however, it is the
honor which is primary. The life devoted to the pursuit of this-albeit
qualified-honor they hold to be the politicallife.
12
The third candidate, the theoretical life (ho theoretikos) is identified,
but quickly dropped, with the promise of a later examination. Aristotle
remains silent on the identity of its proponents, and their peculiar view
of happiness and the good. By his silence we are led to wonder whether
112 REASON IN HISTORY
the character of this life-what distinguishes it from its rivals-is
indeed apparent, is prominent in the manner Aristotle had earlier
suggested. We wonder the more as he styles it the theoretical, rather
than the philosophic life. Is the character of theory or theorizing, its
difference from other sorts of activity or pursuit, in some sense elusive,
hidden from public view?
To this point Aristotle has said nothing explicit of the other of our
two pairs of distinctions, that between theory and practice. Indeed, this
distinction will not be taken up thematically until NE VI. Still, we do
receive anticipations ofthis later treatment, in the form of me tho do log i-
cal reflections on the nature of the inquiry carried out in NE and Pol.
The end of this study, which Aristotle calls political science, is not
knowledge (griOsis) but action (praxis) (NE I, 2, 1094b11 and I, 3,
1095a5). Thus, in his fullest statement: "Since, then, the present
matters are not for the sake of theory as the others are-for it is not in
order to know what virtue is that we are inquiring, but in order to
become good, since without this [our inquiry] would be of no benefit-it
is necessary for us to examine the things concerning actions, and how
we must act" (NE II, 2, 1103b26-31). A practical inquiry, then, is one
not only concerned with matters of action, but undertaken for the sake
of action itself. Moreover, while the subject matter of a theoretical
inquiry is as yet unclear, still we are told that it is pursued for its own
sake, for the sake of knowing itself.
We are led by Aristotle's remarks on the differences between inquir-
ies to wonder about the limits imposed on the present practical study
by the nature of its object and end. As for the former, we are told that
we can expect only as much precision as the subject matter will admit;
that because of the variability and contingency of action there cannot
be a science or art of action; that because actions are ultimate particu-
lars we cannot rest content with generalities but must scrutinize the
particulars; and that our generalities about matters of action will be less
true the more comprehensive we attempt to make them (NE I, 3,
1094b12-27; 11,2, 1103b35-1104a11; II, 7, 1107a28-32). As for the latter,
if political science is pursued for the sake of action, might it be the case
that the treatment of some problems will extend only so far as is
necessary to ensure right action?13 Might the inquiry as a whole be
bounded by practical and pedagogical concerns? I will return to this
question in my conclusion, but we would do well to keep it in mind as
we proceed. Let us look next to Aristotle's explicit treatment of the
distinction between theory and practice.
Having treated extensively of the excellences of character in NE II -V,
Aristotle turns, in NE VI, to an examination of the excellences of
thought.
14
His account here is perhaps the most technical of all the
discussions in his political science, so we will attempt to follow it closely.
Aristotle differentiates two sub-parts of what he has called the "reason-
having" (to logon echon) part of the soul: first, that by which we "study
(or theorize about-theorein) the beings whose principles cannot be
ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND PoLITICS 113
other than they are," and second, that by which "[we study the beings
whose principles] can be other than they are." The first part he terms
the scientific (to epistemonikon), the second the calculative or accounting
(to logistikon) part. He then examines the work or function (ergon) of
each part, with a view to determining its proper excellence, that which
disposes it to doing its work well.
There are, Aristotle maintains, two sorts of thought and truth (he
dianoia kai he aletheia): practical (praktike) and theoretical (or rather,
"theoretical and not practical or productive"). The object of the former
is a thing-to-be-done (to prakton), and because it concerns action or
acting, its work is said to be the attainment of "truth in agreement with
right desire." The object ofthe latter is a thing necessary and unchang-
ing, or a thing under the aspect of its necessity and unchangeability,
and its work is said to be the attainment of truth alone. Note that while
the work of both parts is said to be truth, the truth of practical thought
alone is somehow yoked with desire. This is so because the object of
practical thought is a thing-to-be-done, an action which mayor may not
come to be, and the motive force (arche kinesis) of action is thought yoked
with desire, or what Aristotle calls forechoice (prohairesis).15 "Thought
itself," Aristotle tells us, "moves nothing, but [only that thought] which
is for the sake of [something] and practical." Because it is forechoice
which puts us to act, and the origin of forechoice is "desire and reason
for the sake of something," doing well (eupraxia) requires both the
excellences ofthought and those of character, the concord or agreement
of reason (logos) and desire (orexis) (NE VI, 1-2, 1138b35-1139b7).
If we turn back now, to apply this discussion to the relation between
the distinctions of theory and practice, philosophy and politics, we will
see the error in the common and casual interpretation. On that reading
the distinction between theory and practice amounted to a bifurcation
ofthought and action, and the philosophic life became the life of thought,
the political life that of action. But according to NE VI, however, the
distinction between theory and practice is not a distinction between
thought and action but between two kinds of thought, differentiated by
their objects. Theoretical thought is about things that cannot be other-
wise, things whose existence and intelligibility is unalterable by human
action. Practical thought is about things that can be otherwise, things
whose existence or intelligibility depends on human action. But accord-
ing to this differentiation, to think about theorizing-to consider
whether one will, in some particular circumstance, engage in theoretical
thought-is to think not theoretically but practically. If theory itself is
about things that cannot be otherwise, then theory cannot be about
theorizing, about the practice or pursuit of theory. In any particular
situation, whether, when, or in what manner one will theorize is not a
theoretical but a practical question, a question of possible courses of
action. If one does theorize it is because he has chosen theorizing as
here and now more to-be-done than any other practicable alternative.
Moreover, unlike god or the gods, human beings are not simple and
114 REASON IN HISTORY
so cannot be in continuous activity. Natural human complexity entails
that our activities are many, and both come to be and pass away. If, as
Aristotle says, thought itself can move nothing, but only that thought
which is for the sake of something and practical, then only practical
thought can bring theoretical thought into being. Theorizing, then,
comes to be through that combination of thought yoked with desire that
Aristotle calls forechoice. Considered as an activity in which one may
or may not engage in any particular circumstance, theorizing is a
practice (see Pol VII, 3, 1325b16-21).16 And as a practice, it would seem,
the determination of its exercise must fall to the judgment of practical
reason.
On Aristotle's account, then, the realm of practice is encompassing
of all pursuits, of all human activities as chosen and performed, and
therefore, of the pursuit and performance of theory. However different
a practice theorizing may be, it is a practice all the same.
17
And, as
Aristotle says in concluding NE VI, though practical wisdom (phronesis)
is not authoritative (kuria) over theoretical wisdom (sophia), still it does
see to its coming to be (NE VI, 13, 1145a6-11).18 If, that is, practical
reason cannot construct the objects or the purpose of theory, cannot
make these to be other than they are, still practical reason does deter-
mine the where, and when, and in what manner that theorizing comes
to be. Considering activities not in themselves, in their nature as
energeiai, but as particular acts chosen and performed, practical reason
and its excellences are comprehensive (compare NE VI, 12, 1144al-9,
and VI, 13, 1145a2-6).
We have, therefore, no prima facie reason to suppose that the
determination of action in the case of theorizing differs fundamentally
from that determination in the case of any other possible practice.
Despite the fact that Aristotle clearly argues for the superiority oftheory
and wisdom qua activity and excellence (NE VI, 12, 1144a2-6; X, 7,
1177 a12-1177b26), 19 he nowhere suggests that from this teaching one
can deduce a decision rule-"maximize theorizing" -that would deter-
mine action in any particular case. Furthermore, he does not do so
because his teaching on the superiority of theory and its principal
virtue-that the excellent exercise of theory is most happiness-consti-
tuting because it is most actual, that is, most continuous, most pleasant,
most self-sufficient, most final, most leisured, etc.-is a teaching on the
nature of human being or human capacities or on the nature of the
human good. It is, in other words, a theoretical teaching, ''Human
being," however, does not act; particular human beings do, and they do
so in situations that are irreducibly unique. The "human good," more-
over, is not properly something that can be done; only particular actions
can. If, as Aristotle says, practice is concerned with ultimate particular
actions, then a theoretical teaching on human nature and the human
good cannot be determinative of action; it cannot simply be enacted.
Practically speaking, Aristotle will say that the end of action is doing
well (eupraxia). Doing well is happiness (eudaimonia) concretized,
ARIsTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND PoUTICS 115
rendered practical. The task of practical reason is to discern which
particular action, of the many that might possibly be done, should be
done, is appropriate in and for the particular circumstances in which
one acts. Practical wisdom perceives and commands that particular
action which constitutes doing well in the here and now (see NE I, 8,
1098b20-22; II, 9 1109b20-23; VI, 2, 1139b3-4; VI, 4, 1140b7-8; VI, 8,
1142a14-25; VI, 11, 1143a25-b25). A true account of human nature or
the human good will be useful, perhaps indispensable, in helping one to
structure one's life as a whole, to delimit one's broad entanglements,20
or to sort out in particular situations the nature of the activities or goods
at stake, but it cannot replace practical wisdom's particular situational
judgment of appropriateness.
2
III
Much more can, and should, be said on this question, but I would like
to step back from these matters of technical or terminological clarifica-
tion to address a subtler, but perhaps more fundamental, problem of
interpretation. I will inquire no longer into the nature ofthe distinctions
between theory and practice, philosophy and politics, but into the cause
or causes of the common appearance of those distinctions. On Aristotle's
view there should be reasons for this appearance, and knowing these
reasons should further our understanding of the distinctions them-
selves.
Let us first recall that Aristotle's procedure in political science is to
set out from the appearances, to begin with what is "first for us" and to
ascend by way of dialectical clarification to what is "fIrst in itself' or
"first by nature." In accordance with this method, Aristotle's own
treatment of the difference between activities and lives should be a
dialectical engagement ofthe first appearances of those distinctions. As
the inquiry at hand is political science, the first appearances should be
those that come to sight from within political life. Indeed, I will argue
that the common interpretation of the distinctions is precisely their first,
political appearance: the dichotomous reading of the distinctions be-
tween theory and practice, philosophy and politics, is the appearance to
those who are called "political" or "practical" men of the difference
between their own characteristic activity and way of life and the char-
acteristic activity and way oflife ofthe philosopher. That contemporary
commentators have followed the political men in their readings is a
product of their misunderstanding of the dialectical pedagogy of Aris-
totle's political science.
Some initial evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the treat-
ment of the "wise" at NE VI, 7. Aristotle there defines wisdom as
scientifIc knowledge (episteme) and insight (nous) concerning the things
most honorable by nature. "On account ofthis," he continues, "[people]
say that Anaxagoras and Thales and such men are wise (sop}wus) but
not practically wise (phronimous), when they seem ignorant of the
116 REASON IN HISTORY
things advantageous to themselves; and they say that they know things
extraordinary, and wonderful, and difficult, and divine, but useless,
because they do not seek the human goods (ta anthropina agatha).
Practical wisdom is concerned, however, with the human [goods], about
which there can be deliberation" (NE VI, 7, 1141b6-9).22 Because the
objects of wisdom are things beyond the pale of common human concern,
the pursuit of wisdom is taken not to belong to the realm of practice.
The uselessness of wisdom is taken to entail not merely the impracti-
cality, but the non-practicality of its pursuit. Anaxagoras is mentioned
again at NE X, 8, where Aristotle is defending the view that happiness
does not require "many and great" external goods, that one can do "the
things in accordance with virtue" with only moderate resources.
Anaxagoras is here cited as one who "did not seem to hold that the happy
man was either rich or powerful, saying that he would not be surprised
if such a man were to appear strange to the many; for they judge by
externals, as these are all they perceive" (NE X, 8, 1179al-16).23 The
rich and powerful, then, and those who look up to the rich and powerful,
greatly overestimate the necessity or worth of the external goods. To
these, who judge by externals, any life which pursues such goods even
moderately appears strange.24 Ifphilosophers seem to overvalue things
useless, they also undervalue the things commonly esteemed as truly
advantageous.
The common views of happiness, Aristotle tells us, exaggerate the
value of external goods. Ofthese views, that which is politically prepon-
derant-the view of the most respectable-holds that the greatest of the
external goods is honor (time). Those in positions of regard aim above
all at honor, and consider it the "prize" of excellence and noble deeds
(NE IV, 3, 1123b17-21); and in politics, too, honor is the reward for
contribution to the common advantage (NE VII, 13, 1163b3-8). Recall
that in NE I, in the initial examination of lives, the "refined and
practical" were said to take honor, or a qualified honor, to be the end of
human life.
25
And because politics offers the most and the grandest
opportunities for the pursuit of honor, they were said to devote them-
selves to the political life. It is this group of "political men" (hoi politikoi),
I will argue, who are Aristotle's principal interlocutors in his treatment
of our two pairs of distinctions. It is their conception of activities and
lives which, because politically preponderant, is "first for us." Their
perspective on the distinctions is the point from which Aristotle's dia-
lectic embarks.
The clearest examJ>le of the dialectical engagement of this view is
found at Pol VI, 2-3. Here Aristotle presides over a debate between
advocates of a life of political commitment and one of withdrawal,
between political activists and political quietists. "There is," he tells us,
"a dispute among those who agree that the most choiceworthy life is the
one accompanied by virtue, as to whether the political and practical life
is choiceworthy or rather the [life] divorced from all external things-
such as a sort oftheoretical [life]-which some say (tines phasin) is the
ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND PoLITICS 117
only [life] of a philosopher." Who these "some" are remains unclear, for
Aristotle speaks not in his own name, but in that of the disputants. We
should not assume, then, that this is his own casting of the alternatives,
especially in light of the passage immediately following: "It appears,"
Aristotle says, "that these two lives are the ones chosen by those
ambitious with regard to virtue (hoi philotimotatoi pros areten), both
formerly and in the present; and the two I mean (legO) are the political
and the philosophic" (pol VII, 2, 1324a25-32). Speaking for himself,
Aristotle distinguishes the political and the philosophic lives; he drops
the equation of political and practical, philosophic and theoretical which
characterized the conception of the original contenders.
As he continues, it becomes clear that Aristotle is working not with
his own understanding of the difference between lives and activities, but
with those of the respective advocates of a life of political withdrawal
and political commitment. The former, he says, "consider the life of a
free man (ton tou eleutherou bion) to differ from that of a political man
(tou politikou) and to be most choiceworthy of alL" The latter, on the
contrary, maintain that the political life is best, "for it is impossible for
one who does nothing to do well, and doing well and happiness are the
same thing (Pol VII, 3, 1325a19-23). The political men, that is, hold that
the "active and political life is the only life for a real man (andros)" (Pol
VII, 2, 1324a39-40).27 For them, that life alone which is busy with the
affairs of the polis is active. They reduce the realm of practice to that
of politics narrowly conceived.
The withdrawal of those who prefer to be "free men" is a reaction
against politics as practiced by the political men. "For the many,"
Aristotle says, "seem to think that political expertise (politike) is [the
same as] mastery (despotiken)," and seek to exercise such rule, if not
among themselves, then toward their neighbors (Pol VII, 2, 1324b32-
33). The origins of such a politics are found in the political men's
conception of the human good: a despotic politics, a politics of faction
within and conquest without, is a politics centered on the pursuit of
honor. As honor is a good scarce and essentially comparative, its pursuit
is a zero-sum game: what honor accrues to one is both lost to and
reduces the prominence of others. The pursuit of honor, then, whether
by individual or polis-and the latter is often an occasion for the former,
while the former is often put in the service of the latter-produces an
unstable, agonistic politics. Aristotle's dialectical pedagogy throughout
his political science seems especially directed at correcting such a view
of the political-from the rejection of honor as the highest end of human
activity (NE I, 5), through the replacement of honor by friendship as the
highest of external goods (NE VII, 7, IX, 9), to the account of regime
preservation through moderation of partisan claims (Pol V) and the
proposal for a non-imperialist foreign policy for the best regime (Pol VII,
14). Aristotle appears concerned above all to moderate the politics of
honor by redirecting the desire to excel toward those goods the pursuit
of which does not entail mastery, because they are more perfectly
118 REASON IN HISTORY
shareable (see NE IX, 9, 1170b10-13; Pol II, 7, 1267a8-13).
To resume our exposition of Pol VII, Aristotle next turns to adjudi-
cating the dispute between quietists and activists. Each, he says, is
correct in one way, incorrect in another. The former are right to say
that the life of the free man is better than that of the master, but they
are wrong to consider all forms of rule despotic. There is, Aristotle
maintains, a rule appropriate to free men, which differs in kind from
the rule of masters. The quietists are also wrong, he continues, "to
praise inactivity (apraktein) over activity (prattein); for happiness is
action (he gar eudaimonia praxis estin)" (Pol VII, 3, 1325a31-34). The
activists, then, are correct to maintain this. They err, however, in
holding that in order to act well and so be happy, one must exercise
dominion over all. They do not recognize that rule which is appropriate
among men free and in some way equal. 28
If happiness is doing well, Aristotle concludes, the best way of life for
both cities and individuals will be the practical life (ho praktikos). "But,"
he quickly interjects, "the practical life is not necessarily in relation to
others, nor are those thoughts alone practical which come to be from
action for the sake of what results, but much more those that have their
end in themselves, and those studies (theorias) and thoughts (dianoe-
seis) that are for their own sake. For doing well (eupraxia) is the end,
and so this too is a sort of practice" (Pol VII, 3, 1325b14-21). The sense
of practical is here expanded far beyond that recognized by those who
style themselves "practical" men. Theorizing emerges not only as a
practice, but as the most active of practices.
To recapitulate, to the "practical" and "political" men, or to those who
take their bearings by the "practical" and "political" men's conception,
there are but two sorts of life: the active and the inactive. Activity,
moreover, is equated with devotion to the "things of the polis." The only
choiceworthy life for a "man" is that busy with public affairs, with
matters of rule. To such men, the philosophic life, which is not obviously
dedicated to such activity,29 appears inactive. The philosopher, because
he pursues things which are in the common estimation useless, is
lumped together with the quietist as one who "does nothing." Now to
say that the philosophic life is inactive is not to say that theorizing, the
characteristic activity of the philosopher, is not a practice, but to say
that it is bad practice, that the philosopher is impractical because he
does not pursue the things truly worthwhile. Still, the strangeness of
the philosophic life, the fact that the true nature of its characteristic
activity does not publicly appear, encourages the transition from the
claim that theorizing is impractical to the claim that it is non-practical,
that theorizing is not a practice.
The dialectical reversal of Pol VII, 3, by which theorizing is revealed
not only as a practice but as the most active of practices, effects a shift
in the criteria by which activity is to be judged. Contrary to the
conception of the political men, activity is not busyness but actuality.
Theorizing is most active because the energeia of theoria is most actual,
ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND PoUTICS 119
in it a human being is most at work. Pol VII, then, looks back to NE
X.
30
Both works, therefore, conclude with a peroration which commends
the philosophic life as offering more of what one chooses political life for.
Aristotle leads his auditors away from the politics of honor, from the
conception of the happy life which is "first for us," toward the pursuit of
those goods which do not provoke rivalry because they are more perfectly
shareable. Along the way he subtly reveals to us his readers the
erroneous public face of the philosophic life. In engaging and then
correcting this appearance, Aristotle does a service both to those who
would be "practical" men and those who would be theorists. For no
longer can either take refuge in the dichotomous interpretation of their
characteristic activities.
IV
We have seen that Aristotle's own account of the distinctions between
theory and practice, philosophy and politics, is directed against the
dichotomous reading which currently prevails among commentators.
The cause of these contemporary misreadings is a hermeneutic failure,
a failure to appreciate the distinctive dialectical pedagogy of Aristotle's
political science. Commentators have failed to see that Aristotle's
account is structured by the requirements of a dilalectical engagement
with those opinions that are "first for us. "31 Because they have not begun
from these appearances, commentators have been led-perhaps ironi-
cally-to mistake for Aristotle's own view on the distinctions that of his
primary dialectical interlocutors. The dichotomous interpretation of
theory and practice, philosophy and politics which interpreters read out
of the texts is in fact the view of the class of political men who are the
primary target of Aristotle's dialectical pedagogy. The principal action
of Aristotle's own account lies in the dialectical engagement and trans-
formation of this view, the education of the political men away from the
'1ove of honor" which motivates the reduction of the realm of practice
into that of politics narrowly conceived. This pedagogical ascent, in
foreclosing to the political man a reduced conception of practice, at the
same time forecloses to the philosopher a reduced conception of theoriz-
ing. It is the great merit of Aristotle's pedagogy that it cuts both ways:
in rejecting a dualistic account of theory and practice it precludes the
kindred reductionisms of both an unreflective political activism and a
philosophic amoralism.
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana
120
REASON IN HISTORY

Notes
The author wishes to thank Fred R. Dallmayr, Edward A. Goerner, V.
Bradley Lewis, David K. O'Connor, John Roos, and Thomas W. Smith for helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Research on this paper was supported by the
Earhart Foundation and the Department of Government and International
Studies at the University of Notre Dame.
1. The interpretation outlined is of course an abstraction drawn from the
particular readings of many commentators. As representative examples of such
readings, see John Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," Essays on Aristotle's
Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980),
30-31; A. W. H. Adkins, "Theoria Versus Praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics and
the Republic," Classical Philology 73 (1978): 298, 300-01, but see, 303; Harry
V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1952),30-32,122-23,150; Jaffa, "Aristotle," History of Political Philosophy, 1st
ed., eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963),
127; David Keyt, 'The Meaning of Bios in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics," Ancient
Philosophy 9 (1989): 17-19; Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 5-6, 16-17,20-22, 178-79, 187,
215,250, but see 263; Carnes Lord, "Aristotle," History of Political Philosophy,
3rd ed., eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press, 1987), 123, 152-53; Aristide Tessitore, "Making the City Safe
for Philosophy: Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10," American Political Science
Review 84 (December 1990): 1257; Tessitore, "Aristotle's Ambiguous Account of
the Best Life," Polity 25 (Winter 1992): 201-09; Kathleen Wilkes, "The Good
Man and the Good for Man," Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 350-51.
The above readings share at least two common features: first, they fail
properly to distinguish between activities and lives, applying indifferently to
one what Aristotle will say of the other; second, they take practical, political and
"moral" on the one hand, and theoretical, philosophic, and "intellectual" on the
other, to be synonymous in all contexts.
2. The scare quotes intend to emphasize the fact that these are not properly
Aristotelian terms, and indeed do not comfortably map onto Aristotle's own
distinction between excellences of character (ethikai aretai) and excellences of
thought (aretai dianoetikai). The term "moral" is especially misleading insofar
as in its modern sense it connotes an autonomous, non-natural sphere of values,
a notion utterly foreign to Aristotle.
3. For the former, see Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia" and Martha
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),373-77. For the
latter, see Adkins, "Theoria Versus Praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics and the
Republic" and W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980). For an overview of the debate, see Keyt, "intellectual-
ism in Aristotle," Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, eds. John P. Anton
and Anthony Preus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), and
ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 121
Timothy D. Roche, "Ergon and Eudaimonia in Nicomachean Ethics I: Recon-
sidering the Intellectualist Interpretation," Journal of the History of Philosophy
26 (1988): 175-94.
4. John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1975), 144-80; but compare Cooper, "Contemplation
and Happiness: A Reconsideration," Synthese 72 (1987): 187-216.
5. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, 3-9,15-31.
6. Tessitore, "Making the City Safe for Philosophy," 1251-62.
7. Translations of Aristotle will be my own, from the Oxford Classical Text
editions: Ethica Nicomachea, ed. 1. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894),
hereafter NE; and Politica, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957),
hereafter Pol.
S. "Political man" is perhaps a cumbersome translation of the Greek poli-
tilws, but the available alternatives, "politician" and "statesman," are both too
one-sided in their connotations. A politikos is one devoted to ta politika, the
affairs of the polis, the business of political rule.
9. The quickness of his dismissal would lead us to believe that Aristotle
expects his audience to share his judgment on this life. Or perhaps he intends,
by branding it as slavish, to dissuade from its pursuit those who would otherwise
find such a life of seemingly unrestricted power attractive. The tyrant's life,
after all, has never been without its partisans.
10. Aristotle had earlier distinguished (NE I, 4, 1095a17 -24) the views of
the many (hoi polloi) from those of the wise (hoi sophoi) on the question, "what
is happiness?" The answer of the many had been some good "visible and
apparent, such as pleasure or wealth or honor." The answer of the wise was not
made clear, although Aristotle did make reference to the teaching of the
Platonists on the Good. It would appear that, though the "refined and practical"
are to be differentiated from the "many and most vulgar" who find happiness in
the life of pleasure, in contradistinction to the wise, the "refined and practical"
are still numbered among the many who find happiness in some visible and
apparent good. See also NE IX, 8, 1168b15-21.
11. This tension is most prominently displayed in the Aristotle's discussion
of magnanimity (ne megalopsychia) at NE IV, 3. The magnanimous man, says
Aristotle, desires to be honored, yet somehow knows that no honor is worthy of
his excellence. Thus, he is strangely inactive, waiting for some project worthy
of his greatness to come along. Given Aristotle's emphatic identification of
happiness with an activity, a being-at-work (energeia), rather than a mere
disposition to activity (hexis-see NE I, 8, 1098b32-1099a7; X, 6, 1176a32-b2),
it is difficult not to read his characterization in Book IV as a subtle critique of
magnanimity, and perhaps of the political simply, insofar as the goal of political
life is taken to be honor.
12. It is important to emphasize that this is not Aristotle's own conception
of the political, but his portrayal of those who are called "refined and practical"
and who devote themselves to the affairs of the polis. There is a tendency among
commentators to collapse "practical" into "political," to grant to the political
practitioner the practical excellences, and so to read Aristotle's commendation
of excellent practical activity as a valorization of politics. The danger in such a
122 REASON IN HISTORY
reading is that it threatens greatly to overestimate the virtue of those who
devote themselves to politics, and greatly to underestimate Aristotle's criticism
of politics as practiced in most, if not all, actual the grounds
precisely of its deficiency as practice. When Aristotle allows the "practical" or
"political" men to speak in their own name, they reveal themselves above all as
those who pursue a qualified honor.
The connection between excellence and honor lies in the fact that excellence
is a thing worthy of praise. It is a small step, however, from this true observation
to the false inference that what is excellent is what is praised.
On the love of honor (philotimia) in general, seeNE,IV, 4, 1125bl-26, where
Aristotle remarks that the virtue which hits the mean with respect to moderate
honors has no name, that is, is not publicly recognized. The pursuit of honor, it
seems, tends naturally to the extremes. The reason for this is that honor is a
good both scarce and comparative, so that its pursuit is a zero-sum game. On
the political consequences olthe pursuit of honor, see NE IX, 8, 1168b15-21 and
Pol VII, 2-3.
13. Consider, for example, the remarks which preface the soul division
which concludes Book I: the student of politics must study the soul, but only
with a view to his own purposes; a more precise treatment would be unneces-
sary. Thus Aristotle remains silent on the question whether the two parts of
the soul, the arational and the reason-having, are really distinct, or separable
only in thought, on the grounds that the answer makes no difference to the
present problem (NE I, 8, l102a24-34).
14. The division of soul which closes the first book (NE I, 8, l102a27-
l103alO), and which structures the presentation of books II-VI, does not corre-
spond to the distinction between theory and practice. The parts of the soul are
there said to be two, an arational (a logon) and a reason-having (to logon echon).
Three sub-parts are then distinguished: a nutritive part (to phutikon) belonging
to the arational, a desiring part (to orektikon), which, because it "somehow
participates in reason" by "listening to," "obeying," or "harmonizing with" it,
belongs either to the arational or the rational, and a part "having reason in an
authoritative way and in itself' which belongs to the rational. The division of
excellences into those of character (ethikai aretai) and those of thought (dianoeti-
kai aretai) corresponds not to the distinction between theory and practice, but
to that between the desiring part which participates in reason and the rational
part simply.
15. For a defense of this awkward but literal translation, see Laurence
Berns, "Spiritedness in Ethics and Politics: A Study in Aristotelian Psychology, "
Interpretation 12 (1984): 337.
16. In his commentary on this passage for Pol, Carnes Lord mutes the force
of Aristotle's identification of theorizing as a practice by omitting in his citation
the phrase, "[f]or doing well is the end, and so this too [namely, theorizing] is a
sort of practice." Lord protests that to speak of practice as including the activity
of theorizing is to use the term in a sense unacceptable to "practical men." This,
however, may just be Aristotle's point, that the "practical men's" conception of
practice is unwarrantedly narrow. See Lord, Education and Culture in the
Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
ARISTOTLE: PHILOSOPHY AND PoUTICS 123
1982), 187-88. Compare Pol VII, 14, 1333a24-26, where Aristotle speaks of
"practices" (praxeis) of both theoretical and practical reason.
17. See Stephen G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in
Aristotelian Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990),
100-01, 146-47; Stewart Umphrey, "Why Politike Philosophia?" Man and World
17 (1984): 440; and Nicholas Lobkowicz, "On the History of Theory and Prac-
tice," in Political Theory and Practice: New Perspectives, ed. Terrence Ball
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 14-17.
18. The full passage runs: "But [practical wisdom] is not authoritative over
wisdom or the better part, just as medicine [is not authoritative over] health.
For it does not use (chretai) it, but looks to how it might come to be; it issues
commands for the sake of it, but not to it." Aristotle is attempting here to ward
off a possible misunderstanding of his teaching that practical wisdom is com-
prehensive. The puzzle to which he is responding is stated at NE VI, 12,
1143b33-35: "In reference to these things it would seem strange if [practical
wisdom], being inferior to wisdom, were to be more authoritative than it. For
the producer [of a thing] rules and commands concerning it." Aristotle's re-
sponse, then attempts to ward off the false inference that practical wisdom,
because it is authoritative over the coming to be of theoretical wisdom, can also
dictate or construct what that wisdom is to be. The objects of theory, we recall,
cannot be other than they are, cannot be altered by human action.
19. This reading is commonly accepted among contemporary commentators:
see Cooper, Reason and Human Good, 144-80; Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness,
373-77; Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good,3-9, 15-31.
20. In saying this we must recognize that there are limits to the control we
can exercise over our lives. Our part in determining that which befalls us is
quite restricted; we can ourselves only imperfectly dictate the contexts of our
own action. I issue this caveat because many commentators equate rational
action with the enactment of a predetermined (if revisable) life-plan. Viewing
practical rationality in this way underplays the extent to which it is responsive
rather than stipulative. To do well on this view threatens to become successfully
forcing one's program on reality rather than appropriately meeting the require-
ments of the particular circumstances in which one finds oneself, circumstances
over which one exercises some, but limited control.
21. See Salkever, Finding the Mean, 146-48, 161.
22. Several ancient sources relate that Anaxagoras, when prosecuted under
Diopeithes' law on impiety for his astronomical teachings, was defended by none
other than Pericles, of whom Anaxagoras was said to be a close friend and
adviser, and who is identified at NE VI, 5,1140b7-10 as among those who are
thought to be practically wise because they study (theorein) the things good for
themselves and others. See Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical
Athens (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978),200-01. Thales, while notori-
ous for having fallen into a well while gazing at the heavens, is also said to have
used his knowledge of astronomy to earn a small fortune by monopolizing the
olive presses before what he predicted to be a bumper crop. By this, says
Aristotle, he showed those who reproached him for the uselessness of philosophy
that his poverty was a consequence only of his not taking wealth seriously. See
124 REASON IN HISTORY
Pol I, 11, 1259a5-21.
23. See note 10 above.
24. It should be emphasized that the class of those who appear strange
includes not only the philosopher, but anyone who attempts to "do things in
accordance with virtue." Aristotle's criticism is directed not at those who devote
themselves to practice simply, but at those who think that in order to "do noble
things" it is necessary "to be ruler over land and sea." See Pol VII, 2, 1324a35-
1325a5.
25. See notes 11-12 above. At both NE I, 5, 1095b22-30 and VIII, 7,
1159a22-27, those who pursue a qualified honor-who desire to be honored by
practically wise men, who know them, on account of their excellence-are said
to do so in order to be assured or persuaded of their own goodness. See note 26
below.
26. The other principal examples are these: first, the ascent from the
common assumption, set down at NE II, 2 as the basis for the discussion of the
virtues of character, that virtuous action is action "in accordance with right
reason" (kata ton orthon logon), to the view articulated at NE VI, 13, that virtue
is not only "in accordance with" but "accompanied by right reason" (meta tou
orthou logou). While on the former conception virtuous activity need merely
conform to a right rule, on the latter the active exercise of practical wisdom is
essential to doing well. The second example is the differentiation of continence
and incontinence from virtue and vice in Book VII, a differentiation which comes
to sight only after the treatment of practical wisdom. On the basis of this
distinction it appears that virtue is far rarer and virtuous action far more
difficult than had at first been supposed. Indeed, most human beings are,
Aristotle now tells us, somewhere between perfect incontinence and perfect
continence. The third example is the ascent from the opinion that honor is the
greatest of external goods to the defense of friendship in NE VIII and IX as truly
the greatest. The kind of self-knowledge and self-love that the highest sort of
friendship makes possible would seem to respond to the desire of those who
pursue a qualified honor to be assured of their own goodness.
27. On Aristotle's response to the "politics of virility," see Salkever, Finding
the Mean, 178-203.
28. See Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's
Politics (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 128-30.
29. We should bear in mind here that Aristotle directs his teaching in
political science particularly to those who are potential legislators. More gen-
erally, however, and because most regimes do not adequately tend to such
matters, it is offered to anyone who desires to make himself or those close to
him good. See NE X, 9, 1180a29-34.
30. If perhaps forward in the order of composition, the glance is still
backward in the logic of exposition. On the chronology of NE and Pol, see P. A.
Vander Waerdt, 'The Plan and Intention of Aristotle's Ethical and Political
Writings," Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991): 231-53.
31. The requirements of this dialectical engagement would then explain the
absence of an explicit thematic treatment of the relation of the two sets of
distinctions.