Metaphysics and Music Dramas

Honors Program
Millsaps College

Metaphysics and Music Dramas:
Schopenhauerian Elements of Sex, Music, and Compassion in
Wagners Tristan und Isolde, Die Meistersinger von
Nrnberg, and Parsifal

by

Ann Gabrielle Richardson

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Honors Program

February 9, 2013

_____________
Timothy Coker

PRELUDE TO ACT ONE........................................1
ACT ONE The Philosophy
1. Scene One German Intellectualism...................4
a. The Authority and Autonomy of Reason
b. Kants Transcendental Idealism
c. Schopenhauers Modifications
2. Scene Two Schopenhauers Metaphysics..............15
a. Metaphysics of Sexuality
b. Metaphysics of Music
c. Metaphysics of Compassion
PRELUDE TO ACT TWO.......................................27
ACT TWO The Music
1. Scene One Sexuality in Tristan und Isolde.........30
a. Species vs. individual
b. Metaphysics in the text
c. Character of the music
d. Psychology of the individuals
e. Imagery and representations
2. Scene Two Music in Die Meistersinger von
Nrnberg.........................................44
a. Metaphysics and aesthetic contemplation
b. Musical convention and elitism
c. Character of the music
d. Psychology of Wahn
3. Scene Three Compassion in Parsifal................57
a. Brief introduction
b. Compassion as the basis for morality
c. Psychology of the individuals
d. Metaphysics in the text
e. Character of the music
f. The Will and concluding remarks
POSTLUDE.................................................99
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SUPPLEMENTAL DVDS......................101

Richardson 1
PRELUDE TO ACT ONE

Parsifal is a work of summation, in which the composer
gathered and joined together the threads of his past.
Carl Dahlhaus, Richard Wagners Music Dramas
1

First conceived in 1845, sketched in 1865, and finally
premiered in 1882, Richard Wagners music drama Parsifal
holds the distinction of being not only the last but one of
the first of the German composers philosophically mature
works. Wagners final period of creative output delivered
a collection of epic music dramas comprised of his Ring
cycle, Tristan und Isolde, Die Meistersinger von Nrnberg,
and Parsifal. Tristan and Meistersinger in particular have
come to be considered Schopenhauerian music dramas, so
named because Wagner based them upon the metaphysical
theories of the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer,
whom he first read in 1854 and whose ideas he adhered to
thereafter. Much research has been published directly
correlating Tristan and Meistersinger with Schopenhauers
conception of the metaphysical Will (see Richard Wagners
Music Dramas, by Carl Dahlhaus; The Tristan Chord by Bryan

1
Dahlhaus, Carl. Richard Wagners Music Dramas. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, England, 1971. Book. p. 144

Richardson 2
Magee; Wagner by Michael Tanner, etc.). However, the last
of Wagners music dramas, Parsifal, has inspired far fewer
inquiries into the possible connection with Schopenhauers
metaphysics; this may be partly because of its subject
matter and plot, and partly because it is different
musically from Tristan and Meistersinger.
The difficulty lies in the fact that the connections
between Parsifal and Schopenhauers metaphysics are not as
evident as they are in Tristan and Meistersinger. Wagner
based Tristan upon Schopenhauers metaphysics of human
sexuality, and Meistersinger upon Schopenhauers
metaphysics of music. These connections are plain, and
will be discussed in subsequent chapters, but because the
metaphysics are not perceptible in Parsifal in the same
manner that they are in the previous music dramas, the work
tends to be approached with caution. This thesis will view
Parsifal through a Schopenhauerian lens, using original
research to draw connections between the music drama and
Schopenhauers metaphysics of compassion. It is the
authors expectation that the result will offer a unique
perspective from which to view Wagners summary work, a
perspective that, should it be accepted, would identify
Parsifal as Wagners last Schopenhauerian music drama.

Richardson 3
This paper has been organized in a two-part
investigation. The first half of the paper will acquaint
the reader with both Immanuel Kants philosophy of
transcendental idealism and Arthur Schopenhauers
conceptions of the noumenal and phenomenal experience in
terms of the metaphysics of the Will, all of which form the
foundation of study for Wagners music dramas. The second
half of the paper will take a diachronic approach to
Richard Wagners productions: it will draw upon published
research in order to explore in detail Wagners treatment
of sexual and musical metaphysics in Tristan und Isolde and
Die Meistersinger von Nrnberg; and the paper will conclude
with this authors original commentary on Parsifal.

Richardson 4
ACT ONE THE PHILOSOPHY

SCENE ONE GERMAN INTELLECTUALISM

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with
experience. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason
2

~ The Authority and Autonomy of Reason ~

During the latter half of the eighteenth-century
Enlightenment, German intellectuals were struggling with an
issue that posed significant concerns for the understanding
of human philosophy: the authority of reason.
3
There had
arisen a higher order of critical thinking, called meta-
criticism, which threatened the validity of reason by
maintaining that the critique of reason is self-reflexive,
i.e., if reason possesses the authority to assess all
ideas, then ipso facto it must possess the authority to
criticize itself.
4
This questioning of reasons innate
critical authority resulted in a disturbing impasse: either
thinkers were reduced to denouncing their beliefs and

2
Magee, Bryan. The Philosophy of Schopenhauer. Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1983. Book. p. 65
3
Beiser, Frederick C. The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant
to Fichte. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987.
Book. p. 1
4
Ibid, p. 6

Richardson 5
professing skepticism (From whence comes the authority of
reason? How do I know that I know this?), or they had to
denounce both reason and the demands of meta-criticism and
dogmatically accept the gaps in their own rationale.
It was out of this confused philosophical environment
that thinker Immanuel Kant emerged with his Critique of
Pure Reason. Dubbed the Father of German Idealism, Kant
aimed in his Critique to develop an understanding of
ultimate reality what we really know, and how we really
know it. He proposed a dualistic model that sought to
uphold both the value of empirical thinking and the
autonomy of reason; this theory was known as
transcendental idealism. The theory argued that reason
functioned according to certain laws, and that ...these
laws [were] the necessary conditions for any possible
experience.
5
Prior to Kant, reasoning could not be based
on an un-provable concept, therefore ultimate reality could
not be known based on empiricism. Kants starting point
for transcendental idealism, however, was based on that
exact caveat: What we can perceive, experience or know
must inevitably depend not only on what there is to
perceive, experience, or know, but also on whatever
apparatus we have for perceiving, experiencing, and

5
Ibid, p. 6

Richardson 6
knowing.... Thus, Kant said that we cannot know or
experience anything beyond what our senses allow us to know
or experience. This idea of the limitation of the human
subjects ability to perceive objects surrounding it
provided the basis out of which the motto for German
idealism eventually grew: Selbst dann bin ich die Welt (I
myself am the world).

~ Kants Transcendental Idealism ~

The idea that we can only understand what we perceive
seems straightforward, and indeed it is; however, the idea
does imply some pre-existing conditions, two in particular.
1) The first pre-condition is that we be able to perceive
what our sensory apparatus communicate to us; i.e., if we
cannot receive visual, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, and
aural data through our senses, then we cannot organize the
data into a perception.
6
2) The second pre-condition is
that an object exists independently of experience, as ding-
an-sich, or as a thing in itself, but that we cannot
perceive it as such.
7
In order to illustrate the concept of
ding-an-sich, philosopher Bryan Magee, in The Philosophy of

6
Magee, p. 64
7
Ibid, p. 65

Richardson 7
Schopenhauer, posed the following helpful thought
experiment: If we try to comprehend an apple, all of our
knowledge about its shape, color, taste, smell, size,
structure, etc. is dependent on our sensory apparatus; if
we experimentally attempt to conceive of what the apple is
in itself, without the aid of these sense-dependent
faculties, we arrive at something that is
indistinguishable from nothing at all. We simply cannot
perceive what the apple is in itself; we have no access
to its nature other than what is supplied to us by our own
senses. Thus, we distill the following conclusions from
the two pre-conditions: we are limited by our senses in so
far as what objects we, the human subject, can perceive;
and objects may exist independently of our human subject,
i.e., outside the realm of those sensory limitations.
Using the nature of things-in-themselves and the
limits of human mental perception, Kant took the next step
in formulating the crux of his theory.
Kant... supposed that the objects of our experience
must have some substratum of independent existence
in other words, that there must be things in
themselves, independently of our experience of them
but that what they thus were in themselves was

Richardson 8
something which we could form no conception of, since
everything about the way we can conceptualize them is
experience-dependent.
8

This substratum of independent existence, of which we
cannot conceive or know, Kant dubbed the noumenal
existence; the stratum of dependent existence of which we
can conceive and know, he dubbed the phenomenal
existence.
9
To state this differently, all that we can
understand, perceive, or know is contained within the
phenomenal, and all things-in-themselves are contained in
the noumenal, of which we have no conception because it
lies outside the capabilities of our senses. To summarize,
then, the core of Kants transcendental idealism theory,
are three consequential points:
1) If our senses cannot perceive and organize data, then we
cannot conceive of the data as falling under a concept.
2) Because we can only experience what we can sense, our
version of reality is constrained to what we perceive.
3) We can surmise that though we realize the noumenal
reality exists, we can never know it as long as we are
limited by the phenomenal state of our senses.

8
Ibid, p. 68
9
Ibid, p. 94

Richardson 9
~Schopenhauers Modifications~

One certain aspect of Kants transcendental technique
and its dualistic nature between the noumenal and
phenomenal prompted finicky contention with critics: the
statement that we can ...know nature insofar as it
conformed to our a priori concepts, but not insofar as it
existed apart from and prior to them [i.e., nature as a
thing-in-itself].
10
Philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, in
particular, professed dissatisfaction with Kants claim
that we could not experience things-in-themselves or the
noumenal world, and made it his philosophys aim to
correctly identify and characterize the phenomenal-noumenal
worlds.
11
While the core of Schopenhauers philosophy was
based on Kants distinction of the phenomenal and noumenal
worlds, with which Schopenhauer enthusiastically agreed,
Schopenhauer did not accept Kants point that humans are
incapable of experiencing things-in-themselves or the
noumenal; he thus modified Kants transcendental theory to
include the bridging concept of the Will.
12

10
Beiser, p. 13
11
Thilly, Frank and Ledger Wood. A History of Philosophy. Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston Inc., New York, 1957. Book. p. 497
12
Tanner, Michael. Schopenhauer. Routledge, New York, 1999. p. 5

Richardson 10
Schopenhauers diversion from Kant occurred in the
second book of the his key work, The World as Will and
Representation. Schopenhauer accepted the reasoning that
our limited senses will only allow us to experience the
phenomenal world, and deliberately chose the word
representation to mean the content of experience;
unlike Kant, however, he could not accept that we have no
access whatsoever to the noumenal world or things-in-
themselves, and rather thought that we can access the
noumenal through a faculty called the Will.
13
In order to
explore this concept, here, paraphrased, is the opening
passage from chapter two of Schopenhauers second book of
WWR. Schopenhauer says that our knowledge, or our
representation, of the phenomenal world, though bound by
higher-order pre-conditions, nevertheless is delivered to
us by our body and its senses; therefore, because
representation comes to us from the body, and the body
itself is individualized from any other body (principium
individuationis), then we ourselves are simply phenomenal
representations. Ergo, if we are phenomenal
representations, then our own things-in-themselves must
exist in the noumenal world. Schopenhauer gives us the key
to connecting to our thing-in-itself in the form of the

13
Ibid, p. 9

Richardson 11
Will, which he defines as the unified cosmic principle
that is everything, and underlies all appearances, as
unconscious, mindless, therefore only like our own wills in
respect of its ruthless striving;
14
otherwise defined, the
Will may be thought of as an undifferentiated force or an
energy underlying the total existence (i.e., the
phenomenal and the noumenal worlds together), whose
essential nature is characterized by drive.
15

Schopenhauer attributes two relevant meanings to the
word will: either to the Will as the cosmic
undifferentiated Will-in-itself, defined above, or to the
concept of will as is generally understood to mean a human
want, desire, or striving. These two concepts form the
link between our phenomenal representations and our
noumenal thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer asserts that the
world as it really is is the Will, and that the world as it
appears is representation.
16
Returning to the same passage
paraphrased on the previous page, Schopenhauer states that
the action of the body is nothing but the act of will
objectified, meaning simply that the all senses and
functions of the body occur as an expression of human will,
since action implies nothing more than a will acted

14
Ibid, p. 13
15
Thilly, Wood. Ibid.
16
Tanner, Schopenhauer. p. 12

Richardson 12
upon.
17
Schopenhauer is supposing that the body is a
representation of our human will; and because the human
will is a manifested striving or drive, his next claim
supposes that the human will is the phenomenal
manifestation of the noumenal Will-in-itself. Following
Schopenhauers logic, it is indeed possible to know the
noumenal and things-in-themselves, because by knowing what
we will, we have a direct line to what we really are.
18

Thus, Schopenhauers most important modification to Kants
theory implied what transcendental idealism did not: it
allowed that we are phenomenal representations of the Will,
which itself, by encompassing the phenomenal and noumenal
worlds, constitutes total existence, or ultimate reality;
Schopenhauer therefore identified ultimate reality as the
Will-in-itself.
Schopenhauer also believed, in a second modification
of Kants theories, that the nature of the noumenal world
was singular, not plural. Recall Kants supposition that
...the objects of our experience must have some substratum
of independent existence in other words, that there must
be things in themselves, independently of our experience of
them. We have seen how Schopenhauer modified Kants

17
Magee, p. 124
18
Tanner, Schopenhauer. p. 11

Richardson 13
notion that things-in-themselves are unknowable; however,
Kants conception of the noumenal world held what
Schopenhauer considered to be an error, which he took upon
himself to correct. Kant envisioned the noumenal world to
be the substratum of existence containing things-in-
themselves, which we could not experience because the
noumenal world cannot obtain the experiential concepts of
space, time, and causality. However, by the exact same
reasoning, because space, time, and causality were
considered to be subjective and did not apply to the
noumenal, the noumenal could not therefore obtain
plurality: i.e., things as they are in themselves, lying
as they would outside all possibility of space and time,
would not be differentiable.
19
Kants oversight on the
nature of things-in-themselves in relation to the noumenal
world prompted Schopenhauers response that the noumenal
must be free from all plurality; according to Schopenhauer,
the noumenal is singular, one, and wholly undifferentiated.
The principium individuationis of the phenomenal world
disappears in the noumenal.
20
Thus, the critical conclusion
runs as follows: since Schopenhauer sees the Will as the
total reality of existence, and since all differentiation

19
Magee, p. 129
20
Ibid.

Richardson 14
in the phenomenal is illusory, then all things-in-
themselves, including our human things-in-themselves, are
ultimately part of one whole and completely
undifferentiated thing-in-itself the Will. This
conclusion has far-reaching implications for Schopenhauers
metaphysics. The conclusion also made a great impact upon
Wagner as he penned his music dramas; indeed, Wagner so
infused the idea into his works that it surfaces as a
central key to understanding both Tristan und Isolde and
Parsifal, both of which will be discussed presently.

Richardson 15
SCENE TWO SCHOPENHAUERS METAPHYSICS

Behind our existence lies something else that becomes
accessible to us only by our shaking off the world.
Arthur Schopenhauer
21

Schopenhauer defined the Will as an undifferentiated
energy that constitutes ultimate reality by encompassing
both the phenomenal and noumenal realms. He also described
the Wills nature as being characterized by an intense
drive or striving. Schopenhauer believed that this drive,
or striving, of the Will is represented in humanity as an
attempt to ensure the continued existence of the Will he
contended that the Will-in-itself survives by manifesting
itself in us as the will-to-live.
22
Schopenhauer thought
that this will-to-live was the strongest human urge in the
phenomenal world consequently, he reasoned that we
ultimately pursue it over any other end. The striving of
the Will is also manifested in the longings of day to day
needs (hunger, sexual desire, sleep, etc.. Since these
yearnings are insatiable, our satisfaction, once attained,
is immediately thwarted; thus the Will ultimately sets us

21
Qtd. in Magee, p. 161
22
Thilly, Wood, p. 498

Richardson 16
on a path toward unhappiness, fear, and frustration the
characteristics of Schopenhauers pessimistic view of
reality. In addition to its being a source of misery and
frustration, Schopenhauer also considered the human wills
perpetual longing to be the source of human selfishness,
ego, and motive; in turn, he saw selfishness, ego, and
motive as being the sources of potential immoral behavior.
Following this logic, the only means by which we might
detach ourselves from a life of constant misery,
frustration, and immorality would be to detach ourselves
from our phenomenal will-to-live, subsequently negating the
striving influence of the Will itself. According to
Schopenhauer, the foremost step to achieving this
detachment is to obtain a reflective state of awareness: a
state in which one has recognized the will, acknowledged
the wills influence, and consciously reflected upon the
workings of the will. Once an individual has reached this
critical state of awareness concerning the will, he may
then rationally decide whether to affirm it, or to deny
it.
23

Schopenhauer explored three alternate metaphysical
means to achieving this calming, or quieting, of the Will:

23
Kossler, Matthias. Life Is but a Mirror: On the Connection between
Ethics, Metaphysics and Character in Schopenhauer. European Journal
of Philosophy, 16(2), pp. 230-250: Aug. 2008. p. 238

Richardson 17
the means of human sexuality, music, and compassion.
Sexual and musical metaphysics correspond to Wagners
Tristan und Isolde and Meistersinger, respectively; the
metaphysics of compassion in relation to Parsifal will be
discussed later in this paper. Because the metaphysical
topics play critical roles in the music dramas, it shall be
useful to explain them further.

~ Metaphysics of Sexuality ~

Schopenhauer stated that, second to the will-to-live,
the sexual impulse is the strongest human urge: Next to
the love of life, it [the sexual impulse] shows itself here
as the strongest and most active of all motives.... What is
decided by it is nothing less than the composition of the
next generation.
24
Indeed, the sexual impulse is simply
another manifestation of the ultimate Will both the will-
to-live and the impulse to procreate are manifestations of
the Wills drive to survive.
For all amorousness is rooted in the sexual
impulse alone, [it] is in fact absolutely only a
more closely determined, specialized, and indeed,

24
Schopenhauer, Arthur and E. F. J. Payne (translator). The World as
Will and Representation, Vol. 2. Dover Publications, Inc., New York,
1958. p. 533 - 534

Richardson 18
in the strictest sense, individualized sexual
impulse...therefore the will of the individual
appears at an enhanced power as the will of the
species... That which makes itself known to the
individual consciousness as sexual impulse in general,
and without direction to a definite individual of
the other sex, is in itself, and apart from the
phenomenon, simply the will-to-live.
25

The sexual impulse, therefore, represents not the
principium individuationis concept of love, but the Will as
reflected in the will-to-live of the phenomenal species.
Thus, passion, being the realization of the sexual impulse,
is also the manifestation of the will of the human species,
and is thus a representation of the ultimate Will.
Schopenhauer asserted that passion is heightened based
on a) the compatibility of two individuals, and b) the
magnitude of the will; the better suited, the more intense
the longing.
The highest degrees of this [sexual impulse]...
spring from the suitability of two individualities
to each other. By virtue of this, the
will...exhibiting itself in the whole species, feels a
longing. This longing is in keeping with the

25
Ibid, p. 533 - 535

Richardson 19
magnitude of the will, and therefore exceeds the
measure of a mortal heart.
26

Because the longing of the will is a manifestation of the
longing of an entire species as well as the fundamental
Will, it outstrips the individual humans ability to long
endure it without a respite: Here the individual is too
weak a vessel to be capable of enduring the infinite
longing of the will of the species which is concentrated on
a definite object.
27
Thus, the necessity for relief in
some form arises. The calming of the sexual impulse may be
attained through the release found in the sexual act,
which, in affirmation of the will, satisfies the wills
desire to survive; it also may be calmed through the denial
of the will, in which case the state of reflective
awareness allows for either a rational decision to spurn
the sexual impulse, or the individual chooses to escape the
sexual impulse by giving up his life and escaping the
phenomenal entirely. This denial of the wills drive to
procreate also negates the will-to-live: To free [life]
from this [constant suffering] is reserved for the denial
of the will-to-live; through this denial, the individual
will tears itself away from the stem of the species, and

26
Ibid, p. 537
27
Ibid, p. 554

Richardson 20
gives up that existence in it. The individual ultimately
attains peace through detachment from the will.
28

~ Metaphysics of Music ~

The metaphysics of music likewise come into play in
Wagners second Schopenhauerian opera, Meistersinger.
Schopenhauer states the following:
...music, since it passes over the Ideas, is also
quite independent of the phenomenal world, positively
ignores it, and, to a certain extent, could still
exist even if there were no world at all, which
cannot be said of the other arts. Thus music is as
immediate an objectification and copy of the whole
Will as the world itself is...music is a copy of the
Will itself.
29

Schopenhauer considered music to be a direct representation
of the Will itself; music, then, may be considered an
analogue to the human will in so far as it is a direct
manifestation of the ultimate Will.
30

28
Ibid, p. 560
29
Schopenhauer, Arthur and E. F. J. Payne (translator). The World as
Will and Representation, Vol. 1. Dover Publications, Inc., New York,
1958. p. 257
30
Barry, Elizabeth Wendell. What Wagner Found in Schopenhauers
Philosophy. The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 124-137:
January 1925. p. 127

Richardson 21
[Music] therefore expresses the metaphysical to
everything physical in the world, the thing-in-
itself to every phenomenon. Accordingly, we could
just as well call the world embodied music as
embodied will.
31

Hence, in the same manner that the human will is
characterized by a drive which constantly seeks release,
music also may be considered as being characterized by a
striving which seeks satisfaction, as both the human will
and music are direct representations of the ever-striving
Will. Schopenhauer names several topics, all taken from
the study of music theory, as examples of the striving and
calming found in music: dissonance vs. consonance, the
suspension, the melody, the complete cadence, and the two
modes of major and minor.
Dissonances of pitch represent the striving of the
music, and consonances represent the calming, or
satisfaction, of the music.
The connection of the metaphysical significance
of music...rests on the fact that what resists our
apprehension, namely the irrational relation or
dissonance, becomes the natural image of what
resists our will; and, conversely, the consonance or

31
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1. p. 262

Richardson 22
the rational relation, by easily adapting itself to
our apprehension, becomes the image of the
satisfaction of our will.
32

This concept of dissonance vs. consonance underlies the
rest of the examples named by Schopenhauer. The element of
the suspension is a definitive illustration of the striving
and calming in music: the presence of a dissonant pitch
against normal, or correct, harmonies creates a longing for
consonance and resolution. When considering melody,
Schopenhauer acknowledges the existence of an antecedent
and a consequent melodic phrase; these two phrases
constitute a musical period. He considers the period to
be an arch from a settled state, to a striving state, back
to a settled state thus, the melodic line itself is
characterized by discord and reconciliation. Music is also
characterized by discord and reconciliation in its harmonic
construction if the music begins in one key, or is
supported by one fundamental tone, but at some point
deviates to another key, it is in a state of discord;
however, the return to the original key or fundamental tone
at the complete cadence returns the music to a state of
reconciliation. Likewise, if the music does not return to
the complete cadence, if that resolution is continuously

32

Richardson 23
denied, the discord continues. Schopenhauer also saw a
correlation between the two states of the will
dissatisfaction and satisfaction and the existence of two
general modes minor and major, respectively. The minor
mode, being associated with longing and/or unsettledness,
is a musical state of dissatisfaction, and the major mode
is the analogous state of satisfaction. In these musical
examples of striving and calming, Schopenhauer saw and
recognized an analogue of the satisfaction of the will
which is enhanced through delay.
33

~ Metaphysics of Compassion ~

The metaphysics of compassion will be connected
further to Wagners final music drama, Parsifal, in the
final chapter of this paper; for now, they simply need to
be understood. Schopenhauer saw compassion as a means for
calming the metaphysical Will. Since we understand that
the phenomenal individual is itself a representation of our
undifferentiated oneness in the noumenal reality, we can
experience compassion for those individuals who are in a

33
Ibid, p. 456

Richardson 24
state of suffering.
34
We also realize a connection with
other individuals by acknowledging the character of the
species, or rather, by recognizing that the human will is
merely the drive of the human species, and not the
individuals will:
35

Thus, whoever is still involved in the principium
individuationis, in egoism, knows only particular
things and their relation to his own person, and
these then become ever renewed motives of his
willing. On the other hand, that knowledge of the
whole, of the inner nature of the thing-in-
itself...becomes the quieter of all and every
willing.
36

These realizations are only possible if an individual has
moved past the principium individuationis and attained a
clear, reflective awareness of the will: Only when the
thinking subject forgets his interest in the particular and
becomes a clear mirror of the object does the world
become comprehensible as a whole.
37

Briefly recall Schopenhauers concept that ego,

34
Fox, Michael Allen. Boundless Compassion: The Contemporary
Relevance of Schopenhauers Ethics. The European Legacy, Vol. 11,
No. 4, pp. 369 387. 2006. Journal article. p. 372
35
Kossler, p. 238
36
37
Kossler, p. 238.

Richardson 25
selfishness, and motive are the sources of corrupt
behavior. Schopenhauer identified three preeminent motives
for human behavior: egoism, malice, and compassion.
38
Of
these three, the only motive from which works of
philanthropy and justice can spring is compassion:
[Schopenhauer] claimed that there are four ultimate
ends for human action; namely, ones own weal, ones
own woe, anothers weal, and anothers woe. ...Virtues
of justice and loving kindness are based on
compassion, and since [Schopenhauer] holds that these
are the cardinal virtues, he claims to have proven
that compassion is the basis for all virtue. Only
insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does
it have moral worth; and every action resulting from
any other motive has none.
39

Schopenhauer believed that a persons inner intelligible
character was determined for life; however, though we
cannot change our character, we may acquire empirical
character through heightened self-awareness and reflection
on the will.
In summary, compassion ultimately quiets the Will

38
Fox, p. 372
39
Cartwright, David E. Compassion and Solidarity with Sufferers: The
Metaphysics of Mitleid. European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 16
Issue 2, pp. 292-310: Aug. 2008. Journal Article. p. 295 - 296

Richardson 26
because, in feeling sympathy for others, one essentially
denies the individualistic egoism of the human will.
40

An individual possessing a good character sees
through the principium individuationis, space and
time, and cognizes immediately, and without
inferences, that the being in itself of his own
appearance is also that of others, namely, that will
to life which constitutes the inner nature of
everything, and lives in all.
41

The more aware our character is of the workings of the
will, the more heightened our capacity for compassion will
be; and the more heighted our capacity is for compassion,
the easier it will be to calm the struggles of the human
will, and subsequently, the Will-in-itself.

END ACT ONE

"#
Barry, Elizabeth Wendell. P. 130
41
Cartwright, p. 297

Richardson 27
PRELUDE TO ACT TWO

Born in Leipzig in 1813, Wagner had no ambitions in
his early career other than simply becoming an established
composer and conductor of opera. His early French grand
operas (Die Feen, Das Liebesverbot, Rienzi) were based on
the models of French opera and the works of Donizetti and
Rossini; they were loose attempts at operatic composition,
the works of a juvenile composer who had yet to define his
identity. The composition of his Romantic operas (Der
Fliegend Hollnder, Tannhuser, Lohengren) occurred during
and after the period of the 1848 European revolutions;
during this period, Wagner attained the support of King
Ludwig II of Bavaria, whose patronage eventually enabled
him to realize his dream of building a specialized
Festspielhaus (festival drama house) in Bayreuth.
It was during this period as well, in 1854, that
Wagner was introduced to the pessimistic philosophy of
Arthur Schopenhauer; the philosophy struck a chord with
Wagner, who recognized in Schopenhauers philosophies a
likeness to his own pessimistic outlook. The resulting
music dramas of this period, the Ring cycle, Tristan und
Isolde, Die Meistersinger von Nrnberg, and Parsifal, were

Richardson 28
the mature expressions of Wagners ideas on operatic
reform. Two of Wagners final three dramatic works,
Tristan und Isolde and Die Meistersinger, became known
commonly as his Schopenhauerian operas due to the
specificity of Schopenhauerian references in the plots.
Those two music dramas, plus Parsifal, were Wagners last
staged compositions: each was a modified Gesamtkunstwerk,
and each featured in some capacity Wagners concept of
endless melody.
The term Gesamtkunstwerk was introduced by Wagner as
part of his view on operatic reform; the compound means
synthesized art work, and called for a new form of opera
in which all elements music, drama, staging, sets
should be simultaneously independent yet inextricable from
one another. Wagner further developed this idea by
juxtaposing Unendliche melodie (endless melody) upon the
Gesamtkunstwerk; in part because Schopenhauer accorded
music the metaphysical distinction of being a direct link
to the Will, Wagner came to believe that music should
ultimately drive all other elements of the Gesamtkunstwerk.
Thus, the orchestra became the prime mover of Wagners
Schopenhauerian music dramas. Often, Wagners music dramas
are considered to be symphonic works with vocal commentary;

Richardson 29
this is a misconstrued outlook on Wagners perception of
the total Gesamtkunstwerk indeed, he believed that the
music should support all other elements, however, yet he
felt that the libretto and the music should function in an
intercutting relationship rather than remain isolated
from one another. The term endless melody refers to
Wagners technique of composing fluid instrumental music,
sonorities and lines that are continuously eliding from one
unit to the next, from the beginning of a prelude or act
until the end of the section. Endless melody drives the
drama forward without respite, and as such is a compelling
device, particularly in a Schopenhauerian Gesamtkunstwerk
as it mirrors the incessant drive of the Will.
Recall this papers intent: to use original research
to draw connections between Parsifal and Schopenhauers
metaphysics of compassion. This perspective will be
presented in its entirety in Scene Three; however, in order
to provide models for how that discussion will proceed,
this paper will now turn to existing research with which to
explore diachronically Wagners treatment of sexual and
musical metaphysics in Tristan und Isolde and Die
Meistersinger von Nrnberg.

Richardson 30
ACT TWO THE MUSIC

SCENE ONE SEXUALITY IN TRISTAN UND ISOLDE

Wagner is not interested in the mechanics of seduction
as such; he is concerned with the forces which bring people
together, which are out of the control of either of them.
Michael Tanner, Wagner
42

~ SPECIES VS. THE INDIVIDUAL ~

The genius of the species generally wages war with
the guardian geniuses of the individuals; it is their
pursuer and enemy, always ready to ruthlessly destroy
personal happiness in order to carry out its ends (from
Metaphysics of Sexual Love).
43
This Will-of-the-Species is
precisely the metaphysical root of Wagners first
Schopenhauerian music drama, Tristan und Isolde. The work
is widely considered to be both an erotic piece and a
tragedy, however both designations seem to fall short of
capturing the essence of the work in light of its
metaphysical subject matter. The work is essentially an

42
Tanner, Michael. Wagner. Princeton University Press, New Jersey,
1996. Book. p. 43
"$
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 2. P. 556

Richardson 31
expos on the struggle of two individuals who have been
irrefutably attracted to each other by the will of the
species.
44
Their attempts to quiet their yearnings by
attaining the noumenal realm are thwarted repeatedly by the
intrusion of the phenomenal world, and they only find
relief from the phenomenal when they have both willingly
released their holds on life, passing into liebestod, or
love-death.
45
It is understandable why Nietzsche called
Tristan an opus metaphysicum: Wagners primary source
being Schopenhauers Metaphysics of Sexual Love, the drama
is metaphysical ...precisely insofar as it grants the Will
an overwhelming musical-dramatic presence.
46

A fine line now arises that must be carefully
delineated before progressing. Upon initial study, two
contradictory impressions of Wagners treatment of
Schopenhauers sexual metaphysics surface in Tristan: the
first is in accord with Schopenhauers insistence that
reflective awareness and moral contemplation are the only
paths to quieting the Will; the second is a deceptive
suggestion that the Will may be quieted through sex

44
Barry, Elizabeth-Wendell. P. 135
"%
Wagner, Richard. Tristan und Isolde. G. Schirmer Opera Score
Editions. Copyright 1934. Piano score. p. 186, first system, m. 2-3
46
Mller, Ulrich and Peter Wapnewski. (Trans. ed. John Deathridge).
Wagner Handbook. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992. Book. p.
290

Richardson 32
itself.
47
The latter is not metaphysically correct in the
context of the music drama: the sexual act may only succeed
in temporarily satisfying the Will, while Tristan und
Isolde as a whole is concerned with calming and utterly
escaping the incessant drive of the Will. Wagner composes
in a manner that seems to suggest both impressions; only
the stipulations of the metaphysical source material lend a
clear solution to the muddle.
Tristan illustrates the three methods described in
Schopenhauers Metaphysics of Sexual Love for negating the
Will-of-the-Species. It illustrates the attempt to calm
the Will by the attainment of a state of reflective
awareness and contemplation, as brought about by the
introduction of the Love-Death potion in Act I (though this
attempt fails and leaves them in yearning, as they are not
fighting only against themselves but are attracted to each
other by the ultimate Will-of-the-Species).
48
It
illustrates the satisfaction of the Will through the
completion of the sexual act itself (Act II, Tristan and
Isoldes colloquy), though in accordance with the
metaphysical nature of the Will and the sexual act, the
satisfaction they derive is fleeting and leaves them

47
Ibid, 291.
48
Wagner, Richard. Tristan und Isolde. Piano score. Act I, Scene V

Richardson 33
yearning still; and it also illustrates the third method of
quieting the Will, that of the voluntary giving up of life,
the tearing away of ones individual will from the Will-of-
the-Species, and the deliberate detachment of oneself from
the phenomenal this final method is the only recourse
that ultimately (in the last scene of Act III) allows
Tristan and Isolde to escape the unbearable yearning of the
phenomenal realm and attain oneness in the noumenal.
49

~ METAPHYSICS IN THE TEXT ~

Wagner penned his own librettos to all of his works,
taking particular pains that the text of his
Schopenhauerian music dramas accurately reflected the
source material. He accomplished this both by including
direct textual references, and, arguably, by manipulating
the structure of the poetry itself. As Act II functions as
the centerpiece of the drama, both in placement and in
content, it will serve as the source for the following
textual examples.
The colloquy between Tristan and Isolde is so
far removed from the antithetical dialogue of traditional
drama that it seems almost irrelevant whether the speaker

49
Dahlhaus, p. 51

Richardson 34
is Tristan or Isolde; the sentences and fragments of
sentences are interchangeable, and indeed sometimes are
exchanged.
50
Indeed it is so; the beginning of Act II,
Scene II finds the dialogue between Tristan and Isolde very
juvenile, excited, overlapping, almost as if they are too
excited to contain their speech and are compelled to finish
each others sentences. As the duet progresses, their
lines become longer, less individualized, and more
sophisticated instead of finishing each others words,
they are saying the same words; and near the end of the
colloquy, they have become so in tune with each other that
their thoughts no longer need expounding. The text of the
two individuals essentially undergoes an artful transition
from separate and frantic to mature and unified. This
reflects a sophisticated handling of text with attention
paid to metaphysical meaning Wagner has written a textual
transition in which two people become one in will.
A direct example of a textual reference is the word
wahn, or folly. The term is a key one for the work;
Hartmut Reinhardt argues that it signifies that ...an
individual is permanently deceived by the Will-of-the-
Species, which in its urge to exist exploits the love

50
Ibid, p. 49

Richardson 35
instinct toward its own ends.
51
Another recurring term is
Sehnsucht, or Sehnen, both of which are equivalent to
longing or yearning. At any point during the work that
Tristan is ensnared in the phenomenal realm, he is in a
heady state of Sehnsucht; this term, this longing, is
arguably the key to the entire music drama.
52
Last to be
considered is the potent phrase Selbst dann bin ich die
Welt, which translates to I myself am the world.
In the centre of the work, at the climax of the
most famous part of the so-called love duet, the
lovers sing together, Selbst dann bin ich die
Welt, an astoundingly audacious claim...: if each
of them is the world, then they are one another.
That, too, is something from which they dont flinch,
as they move on to the final stretch of the duet,
and do indeed exchange... identities, building upon
wave after wave of orchestral sound, in what is
without competition the longest, most extreme climax
in music and still they have not achieved what they
were striving for, precisely because they are still
in a state of striving.
53

Tristan and Isolde, by acknowledging I myself am the

51
Mller, p. 292
52
Tanner, Michael. Wagner. P. 148
53
Ibid, ps. 142- 143

Richardson 36
world, acknowledge that they will be one and the same in
the noumenal; this is a clear and compelling reference to
German Intellectualism as expounded upon by Schopenhauer.

~ CHARACTER OF THE MUSIC ~

Wagner himself stated that musically, Tristan is about
the art of transition.
The beginning of the scene [Act II] offers life,
pressed down and running over in the most turbulent
emotion the ending, the most solemn, intensely felt
longing for death. Those are the cornerposts: now
just you take a look, my dear, at how Ive connected
them, how it leads over from one to the other! There
you have the secret of my musical form.
54

The preludes and the eliding melodies and leitmotivs form a
musical journey; they continuously transform us from our
initial, unaware state of mind in terms of the Will to a
reflective state of mind by the end of the work.
Dahlhaus elegantly describes Wagners use of
leitmotivs in Tristan und Isolde:
The [leit]motives associated with death and
day are primarily musical allegories and provide

54
Qtd. in Dahlhaus, p. 57

Richardson 37
an analogy to the allegorical tendency of the
text...Not only are motives related to one another
the Suffering motive is an inversion of the Yearning
motive, and Markes motive, at least at the outset,
is an inversion of Tristans but they also blend
into one another and are finally lost in shapeless
intangibility.
55

Dahlhaus implies that Wagner so far developed the idea of
transition from phenomenal to noumenal that he incorporated
the idea into his treatment of leitmotivs they reflect
the eventual merging of the phenomenal into unity,
particularly the Loves Longing, Loves Bliss, and Loves
Deception themes, and to an extent the King Marke and
Tristans Honor themes. Tristans Honor first appears in
Act I, Scene V, as Tristan makes his entrance before
Isolde; the codified repetition (over ten soundings) serves
to drive home Tristans knightly character; this theme also
expresses Tristans station in the opera as King Markes
most trusted escort to Isolde. Wagner later in Act II,
Scene III, inverts the Tristans Honor theme, after Tristan
has unwittingly betrayed King Marke. This inverted version
later becomes the Tristans Deception theme. In the
prelude to Act III, the music has again been derived from

55
Ibid, ps. 62 - 63

Richardson 38
the Tristans Honor theme; however, the theme is now
developed to the point that it is hardly recognizable.
The Fate Theme is initially heard along with the
Tristan chord in the first four measures of the Act I
prelude, and it reappears throughout the acts at potent
moments, often foreshadowing or following a metaphysical
high point in the text. This theme, which features two
chromatic lines progressing in opposing directions, may be
said to induce a sense of yearning for resolution that is
never satisfied; and because they are in opposing
directions, they are contradicting each other, representing
conflict. This idea of chromaticism vs. diatonicism will
be revisited in the discussion on Parsifal. The Tristan
chord itself (F B D# G#) heralds the instability and
longing for resolution to be encountered throughout the
music drama. With two raised pitches (D# and G#,
introducing two possible leading tones to the new tonal
centers of E and A respectively), it has the potential to
modulate to several tonal areas, making it harmonically
unsettled and causing a sense of anxiety in the listener.
By understanding that Schopenhauer considered death to
be the portal through which one passes into the noumenal
oneness, it becomes apparent that the Death Theme does not

Richardson 39
function as a foreshadower of tragedy, but rather as an
expression of Tristans inner desire to be free of the
yearning placed upon him in the phenomenal reality. The
Day Theme expresses the state of unquiet suffering that
Tristan must undergo; it is a direct reference to
Schopenhauers phenomenal realm. When it appears in
conjunction with text by Tristan, the implication is that
Tristan is feeling the constraints of his situation he is
trapped in the phenomenal and is yearning to escape.
British philosopher Michael Tanner summarizes the
importance of the prelude: The prelude to Tristan,
Wagners most renowned contribution to the history of
music, is something more than that. It is so complete an
expression of the yearning which permeates the whole work
that one might...assume that it must pre-empt what
follows.
56
The Act I prelude, introduced by the Fate Theme
and the Tristan chord, is pervaded by deceptive cadences
and harmonies that keep the listener in a state of
anxiousness; the prelude offers no sense of tonic center,
nor steady beat, nor sense of cadence; we are simply
swimming in a perpetual state of yearning. The Act I
prelude suggests the unattainable noumenal; likewise, the
prelude of Act II suggests the intrusion of the phenomenal;

56
Tanner, Michael. Wagner. p. 141

Richardson 40
it opens with a stark pronunciation of the Day Theme,
leaving no doubt that this act will be a struggle for
Tristan and Isolde. The prelude to Act III further
solidifies the oppression of the phenomenal world in Act
II. It is dark, minor, and ironically one of the more
harmonically stable sections of music in the work ironic
because of the emotional turmoil pervading the characters
in this act. The prelude establishes Tristans despair as
he lies wounded, unable to attain the noumenal with Isolde.

~ PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INDIVIDUALS ~

Act I of Tristan is about abolishing one perception of
psychology and establishing a new one: psychology no longer
assumes individual relationships, it assumes only one self,
noumenal unity; all we see or hear from this point on in
the music drama will be based around this new concept.
Act I is a stupendous psychological drama, worked
out with remarkable economy and thoroughness, but
all directed to showing the comparatively superficial
level of merely human passion... In Act II, from
Isoldes sublime invocation of Frau Minne (the goddess
of a previously unheard-of love) onwards, psychology

Richardson 41
is rendered pointless for the rest of the act, so far
as the lovers are concerned. It is a demolition of
the very notion which psychology presupposes, that of
the self in relation to other selves and the external
world.
57

In other words, Wagner, in essence, is preparing the
audience for the psychological complexity of Acts II and
III by presenting over one-hundred pages of explanation.
Ultimately, Tristan und Isolde lives up to its name:
the psychological impact is focused entirely upon the title
characters, with only a brief nod given to King Marke in
Act II. The first Act focuses upon Isolde, Act II upon
both, and Act III upon Tristan and his metaphysical insight
as gained at the end of Act II; Act III reveals, however,
that though considerable emphasis is placed upon Isolde as
a prime mover in the action of the music drama, the work
has been dedicated much more so to Tristan than to Isolde.
It is Tristans character, and Tristans thoughts and
actions that are the psychological focus of the drama.
Wagner does give Isolde her moment, however, at the
conclusion of the work with her sublime Liebestod, or love-
death:
Isolde, convinced that Tristan is smiling at her,

57
Ibid, p. 146

Richardson 42
ascends, or is submerged, with him to a point where
she can be absorbed in des Welt-Atems wehendem All
(in the world-breaths encompassing all), and her
final words, as she sinks as if transfigured, Wagner
carefully writes, are unbewusst, hochste Lust!
(unconscious, highest bliss!).
58

Though throughout the work it has been Tristan who has
gained metaphysical understanding and acted accordingly,
ultimately Isolde is the one who clinches Wagners thesis,
clarifying with the last words of the music drama what the
whole work has been about.

~ IMAGERY AND REPRESENTATIONS ~

Wagner, in the spirit of Gesamtkunstwerk, employed
three important images in order to reflect the poignancy of
Schopenhauers metaphysics. The most vital imagery is the
use of day and night to represent the phenomenal and
noumenal realms, respectively. Tristan and Isolde, in the
Act II colloquy, and indeed throughout the work, make a
case against the Day, the phenomenal situation in which
they live; when their expositions are complete, they are in
turn free to explore the Night, or the noumenal realm.

58
Ibid, p. 150

Richardson 43
This metaphorical day-night/phenomenal-noumenal
representation is not one of which Tristan and Isolde are
ignorant; when Tristan asks Isolde to accompany him to Das
Wunderreich der Nacht (the Wonder-realm of Night) in Act
II, he is referring to the noumenal oneness from which he
left for this illusory world.
59
The second important image
is that of the love-death potion. The love-death potion
functions as the catalyst by which Tristan and Isolde
achieve a state of reflective awareness, a state without
which (according to Schopenhauers metaphysics) the
noumenal cannot be attained. The potion, contrary to
appearances, alters nothing; it does not cause Tristan and
Isolde to fall in love, it simply brings into the open
something which already exists but has not previously been
admitted.
60
Tristan and Isolde acknowledge that they are
at the mercy of the Will-of-the-species and realize that
the only way they can defeat it is by dying to it; the
love-death potion is the concrete representation of these
abstract realizations.

59
Wagner, Richard. Tristan und Isolde. Piano score. p. 210-211
60
Dalhaus, p. 51

Richardson 44
SCENE TWO MUSIC IN DIE MEISTERSINGER VON NRNBERG

Wollt ihr nach Regeln messen, was nicht nach eurer Regeln
Lauf, der eignen Spur vergessen, sucht davon erst die
Regeln auf! [Though his ways are not our ways, he seems to
have a way of his own. Such a song should not be
criticized by our rules, but we should seek for rules to
fit it].
61
Hans Sachs, Die Meistersinger

~ METAPHYSICS AND AESTHETIC CONTEMPLATION ~

On the surface, Wagners second Schopenhauerian music
drama differs substantially from the tragedy of Tristan und
Isolde. Meistersinger is a comedy, albeit a turbulent one;
it is the second piece by Wagner that is historically
based, set in circa 1550s Nuremberg with a central focus on
the historical figure of Mastersinger Hans Sachs; and
instead of the tremulous, chromatic music of Tristan, the
overture of Meistersinger facilitates a return to the
diatonic system, and the music maintains this clarity of
structure and harmony throughout most of the work.
However, underneath the surface, Meistersinger is perhaps

61
Wagner, Richard. Die Meistersinger von Nrnberg. Schott & Co.,
London, 1903. Orchestral score. p. 160, 1
st
3
rd
systems

Richardson 45
the most profound metaphysical statement on the value of
art yet composed.
The greatest and most fascinating contrast between
Tristan and Meistersinger is not that one is
preoccupied with metaphysics, and the other
unconcerned with it, but that Wagner moves from his
most patently doctrinal work to his most covertly
instructive one.
62

As this quote implies, Meistersinger is not an obvious
presentation of Wagners newly developed musical and
psychological philosophies, like Tristan, but rather is a
refined and subtle discourse on the metaphysics of music
and the contemplation of art.
Schopenhauers philosophy is found in Meistersinger as
a subtle connection between metaphysics and aesthetic
contemplation. Recall Schopenhauers view that music
stands above all other arts with regard to the Will:
...music, since it passes over the Ideas, is also
quite independent of the phenomenal world, positively
ignores it, and, to a certain extent, could still
exist even if there were no world at all, which cannot
be said of the other arts. Thus music is as immediate
an objectification and copy of the whole Will as the

62
Tanner, Wagner, p. 157

Richardson 46
world itself is...music is a copy of the Will
itself.
63

Now consider this quote by Schopenhauer:
Because music does not...exhibit the Ideas or grades
of the wills objectification, but directly the Will
itself, we can also explain that it acts directly on
the will, i.e., the feelings, passions, and emotions
of the hearer.
64

In other words, Schopenhauers assertion that music is a
copy of the Will itself explains musics ability to
manipulate our drives, our passions, and our emotions. The
Will strives and therefore evokes in us a striving, thus
music also strives, evoking the equivalent striving in its
listeners. The way to escape this striving is to approach
ones encounter with music from an aesthetically
enlightened perspective, thereby negating the Will and
allowing the subject to experience music contemplatively
without being compromised by the interest of the Will.
65

Elizabeth W. Barry states the following:
The tormented human soul in contemplating a work
of Art loses all sense of his existence in time and

63
64
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 2, p. 448
65
Schopenhauer, Arthur and Bailey T. Saunders (translator). Complete
Essays of Schopenhauer. Willey Book Company, New York, 1942. Book.
Vol. VII, p. 43

Richardson 47
space, frees himself from his tyrannical Will and in
a state of pure perception gazes and becomes lost in
the Idea that is mirrored in the masterpiece.
66

This state, which might be called aesthetic meditation, of
disinterested appreciation, of contemplative attitude
toward music, is what Meistersinger is fundamentally about.

~ MUSICAL CONVENTION AND ELITISM ~

A central point of Meistersinger is the relationship
between music itself and conventional attitudes concerning
music. Die Meistersinger is, more than anything else,
about the connections between life and art, between
individuals lives and the art they produce, and between
the life of a community and its attitude to art.
67

Repeatedly throughout the plot of Meistersinger, issues
arise concerning the characters relationships with music:
the principle characters of Hans Sachs and Walther von
Stolzing have a profound discussion on the innate nature of
art in Act III; the Master Singers are concerned only with
dogmatically adhering to the set traditional rules of
composition; Walther is heedless of any limits imposed upon

66
Barry, Elizabeth Wendell, p. 126
67

Richardson 48
his singing and resultantly produces untraditional
compositions; and Beckmesser tries to adhere to tradition
but lacks beauty or creativity in his work, failing utterly
at any attempts to create art. That the focus of
Meistersinger is on the traditional vs. untraditional
nature of music in relation to socially accepted convention
is highly significant, for two reasons: firstly, this focus
is where much of Schopenhauers philosophy surfaces the
aesthetical query of whether music holds more value in
being methodically created, in a detailed contemplative
process, versus whimsically created, in an instinctual and
Will-driven process; and secondly, this focus directly
refers to an interesting and long-standing query in music
history that was particularly relevant in light of Wagners
own musical accomplishments with Tristan und Isolde the
question of whether music should continue to adhere to the
set conventions of its traditional diatonic harmonic
system, or whether music should push past those
conventions, progressing into new harmonic systems and
requiring the creation of new rules. On that note, C.A.
Barry eloquently stated the following in an 1881 address to
the Royal Musical Association:
Die Meistersinger represents the victory of genius,

Richardson 49
aided by good sense, over pedantry and
conventionalism. The moral sought to be conveyed is
this: that art is progressive, and that rules are
useful, and are only to be broken by those who have
learned to observe them.
68

Meistersinger also brings into bold relief the debate
of whether music should cater to societys musical elites
or whether it should be accessible to the majority. In the
first act, Hans Sachs makes a suggestion that the
Mastersingers should allow the public to have a vote in
matter of the annual singing competition, claiming that the
rules of the Mastersingers should be tried against society
in order to ensure their artistic validity; the
Mastersingers quickly object, saying that the moment the
common people enter into art is the moment that art
ceases.
69
Immediately in the music drama, a dichotomy has
been identified between those capable and those incapable
of recognizing aesthetic value in music. While this is a
long-debated dichotomy in music history, in Meistersinger
the split functions also as yet another reference to
Schopenhauers metaphysical conditions of aesthetical

68
Barry, C. A. Introductory to the Study of Wagners Comic Opera, Die
Meistersinger von Nrnberg. Proceedings of the Musical Association,
7
th
Sess., pp. 75 98: 1880 1881. Journal article. p. 91
69
Wagner, Die Meistersinger von Nrnberg. Orchestral score. p. 108 -
114

Richardson 50
awareness. The young knight Walther von Stolzing knows
nothing of the Mastersingers Tabulatur of musical rules,
yet in Act III he is inspired by a Schopenhauerian dream in
which he conceives the almost perfectly composed Prize
Song.
70
In reverse, Beckmesser, who knows the Tabulatur
completely, has no natural creativity and his music is
stunted and unoriginal; for all his study of the
information, he has gained no aesthetical awareness.
71
Hans
Sachs is the enlightened character who is able to come to a
balanced perspective on music through contemplation;
Walther is the unenlightened fool who, through the dreaming
process, acquires the aesthetical awareness to calm his
irrational urges; and Beckmesser cannot attain an
aesthetical perspective free of personal interest. All
three of these characters are caught up in the dual-
dichotomy of elitism/unawareness vs.
accessibility/awareness, and all three emerge from the work
with different results. Meistersinger makes the case that
...There must be a balance between tradition and the
individual talent,
72
and that music as an aesthetic
experience may be made available to everyone through the
contemplative journey.

70
Barry, C. A., p. 88
71
Schopenhauer, Complete Essays of Schopenhauer. Vol. IV, p. 36
72

Richardson 51

Unlike the music of Tristan und Isolde, which is
heavily chromatic and pushes the edges of Romantic harmony,
Wagners music in Meistersinger is much more reminiscent of
conventional forms of music, seeking to emulate the
musical setting of 16
th
century Germany. This is ironic,
especially considering the previous section of this paper
which discussed the progression of music past set
conventions.
Meistersinger is reminiscent of early 16
th
century
German music in that Wagner employs older forms and
stylistic techniques, such as the bar form of stollen und
abgesang, chorales, grand choruses, non-declamatory
singing, and contrapuntal writing. Wagner also utilizes
more diatonic harmony in Meistersinger; however, while he
dramatically reduces the chromaticism as compared to
Tristan, he maintains what modern theorists would consider
a progressive approach by heightening the complexity of the
dissonances.
73
While Wagner accomplishes abstract
illustrations of Schopenhauers philosophy directly in the
leitmotivs of Tristan und Isolde, the result here is more

73
Dahlhaus, p. 73

Richardson 52
concrete: by decreasing the chromaticism, returning to a
somewhat clean slate of clearly recognizable musical
form, and then increasing the complexity of the
dissonances, Wagner throws into sharp relief the
theoretical elements of Schopenhauers musical metaphysics,
such as dissonance vs. consonance, suspensions, periods,
forms, cadences, keys, and modes.
Wagners overture to Meistersinger illustrates two
features of the music drama that, though they imitate the
conventional, carry over traces of Wagners style from
Tristan these are endless melody and the leitmotivs.
The overture, a masterpiece of sonorous
instrumentation and contrapuntal complicacy,
presents us with a thoroughly realistic picture
of mediaeval German life. Its leading themes
severally illustrate the pompousness of the
mastersingers, the pertness of their apprentices,
and Walthers passionate love for Eva. Without
coming to a full close it leads directly to the
first scene.
74

Wagner retains the sense of endless melody, so perfected in
Tristan, by never allowing the motion of the music to
cease. Likewise, Wagner retains the concept of leitmotivs;

74
Barry, C. A., p. 81

Richardson 53
however, in Meistersinger, they do not serve so much to
represent Schopenhauers metaphysical elements, but rather
undergo a transformation from those of Tristan, a
transformation that will prove significant to the
metaphysical meaning in the music of Wagners ultimate
work, Parsifal. In Tristan, the leitmotivs are singularly
representational and appear individually, with the
occasional inversion or layering; however, ...in Die
Meistersinger, motives combine to build up themes, or
expand to create melodies...The principle of the motivic
linking is closely connected with that of the motivic
working the symphonic development technique: both are
emanations of musical logic as opposed to musical
plasticity.
75
With this motivic linking of leitmotivs,
not only do Wagners themes begin to expand in length and
complexity, the metaphysical meaning associated with each
individual leitmotiv combines and expands as well, creating
higher-order leitmotivs, so-to-speak. Wagners aim is
not necessarily to create smooth musical themes so much as
to create rational, metaphysical statements. As such,
though the music of Meistersinger is itself not as imbued
with metaphysical meaning, it functions as the critical

75
Dahlhaus, p. 78 79

Richardson 54
bridge between the metaphysical music of Tristan and the
metaphysical music of Parsifal.

~ PSYCHOLOGY OF WAHN ~

The term wahn is given a high degree of value in
Meistersinger, more so even than in Tristan, for Wagner
gives to Hans Sachs a full monologue in Act III that is
dedicated entirely to the contemplation of the term. Wahn
may be loosely defined as folly; Reinhardt described it
as signifying an individual that has been duped in some
form by the influence of the Will. If only a single
instance of Schopenhauerian influence had to be identified
from Meistersinger, the wahn monologue would be the
quintessential example. Sachs speaks of an ever present
striving, or folly, in mankind, and of how, ...stayed in
its course, in sleep it regains strength, and with new
force wakes.
76

The town and world chronicle which Hans Sachs
consults in his researches is to all intents and
purposes Schopenhauers World as Will and
Representation, and the conclusion which Hans Sachs
reaches is again entirely Schopenhauerian: whether a

76
Wagner, Die Meistersinger von Nrnberg. Orchestral score. p. 368

Richardson 55
goblin, a glow worm, or even the lilac with its
wonderful scent has done the damage, in the final
analysis it is all a matter of that same blind Will
and that causality to which Schopenhauer is firmly
committed. (Reinhardt)
77

Sachs comes to the realization that the Will has been
affecting the circumstances of the plot to this point, and
takes it upon himself to rationally work some noble result
from the folly that has prevailed upon Nuremberg. Also,
Wagner delivers a hint of the metaphysics in this monologue
that will figure so prominently in Parsifal, those
concerning the metaphysics of compassion:
For Sachs, [Wahn] is the word which characterizes
everything, and which therefore seems to mark him
out as a faithful Schopenhauerian. He begins...only
able to see Wahn as a source of pain and evil
tearing their own flesh, people mistake their own
cries for those of their neighbours whom they are
mistreating... (Tanner).
78

This is a reference to the unified state of humanity that
Schopenhauer declares exists in the noumenal realm. Wagner
also uses this monologue to summarize Meistersingers point

77
Mller, p. 292
78

Richardson 56
concerning the importance of aesthetic contemplation:
Thus Sachs has realized that everything is Wahn,
that there is no getting round it or beyond it. So
if there is to be positive value in the world, as
well as ineliminable evil, that will be by ingenious
manipulation of illusion, not by its replacement by
truth, or reality.
79

Sachs achieves the insight in his monologue that the World
is merely a Representation; Wagner confirms the insight by
subtly asserting both the value of music as an art, and
also the importance of the aesthetic contemplation of music
as a vital way to achieve our independence from the Will.

79
Ibid, p. 164

Richardson 57

SCENE THREE COMPASSION IN PARSIFAL

Durch Mitleid wissend, der reine Tor!
[The pure fool, made wise by compassion!]
80

Amfortas, Parsifal

~ BRIEF INTRODUCTION ~

This paper will now turn to its final intention to
submit a purely Schopenhauerian perspective of Parsifal,
using original research to draw connections between the
music drama and Schopenhauers metaphysics of compassion.
Whereas much scholarship exists concerning the
relationships of Tristan and Meistersinger to
Schopenhauers metaphysics, such material on Parsifal is
limited. The literature in circulation is informative,
often speaking of Schopenhauers views or Wagners use of
compassion in the work; however most of the pieces do not
go into significant metaphysical depth, nor have any pieces
surfaced that view Parsifal from a purely Schopenhauerian
perspective. Such pieces include Edmund J. Dehnerts
Parsifal as Will and Idea (The Journal of Aesthetic and

80
Wagner, Richard. Parsifal. Schott & Co., London. No date. Orchestral
score. p. 18

Richardson 58
Art Criticism, Vol. 18, No. 4; June, 1960), in which
Dehnert recognizes Schopenhauerian influence in the music
drama but also identifies Christianity as a main facet of
his perception. Another such piece would include Carolyn
Abbates Wagner, On Modulation and Tristan (Cambridge
Opera Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1989), in which Abbate
presents engaging commentary on Wagners use of poetic
ideas and metaphysical leitmotivs in Tristan und Isolde,
but does not consider their application to Parsifal. Also,
Kevin C. Karnes Wagner, Klimt, and the Metaphysics of
Creativity in fin-de-sicle Vienna (Journal of American
Musicological Society, Vol. 62, No. 3, Fall 2009) draws a
solid connection between the metaphysics of Schopenhauer as
applied to Meistersinger, but does not discuss any such
connections in Parsifal. In short, while treatises abound
on Tristan and Meistersinger, no such direct studies of a
Schopenhauerian, metaphysical base to Parsifal seem to have
surfaced. The exception would be William Kindermanns A
Companion to Wagners Parsifal, which features an essay by
Ulrike Kienzle entitled Parsifal and Religion: A Christian
Music Drama?. This essay identifies compassion as a prime
mover in the opera, and attributes Wagners use of
compassion to his reading of Schopenhauer; however, though

Richardson 59
enlightening, the perspective is much the same as Dehnerts
essay, in that it approaches compassion from a Christian
perspective. Therefore, in this chapter, I will use my own
research and a solely Schopenhauerian approach to highlight
the connections between Parsifal and the metaphysics of
compassion.
In order to provide context and orientation for the
upcoming discussion, a plot summary is here presented, as
condensed from the Metropolitan Operas synopsis of its
upcoming 2013 production of Parsifal.

ACT I. Medieval Spain. Near the castle of Monsalvat,
Gurnemanz, knight of the Holy Grail, rises. Two Knights
prepare a morning bath for their leader Amfortas, who
suffers from an incurable wound. Kundry, an ageless woman
of many guises, rushes in with balsam for Amfortas. As
Gurnemanz bewails Amfortas' wound, his companions ask him
to tell about the sorcerer Klingsor, who once tried to join
the knightly brotherhood. Denied because of his worldly
lust, he tried to gain acceptance by castrating himself and
again was rejected. Now an implacable foe, Klingsor
entrapped Amfortas with a beautiful woman: while the king
was lying in her arms, Klingsor snatched from him the holy

Richardson 60
spear (which had pierced Christ's side) and stabbed
Amfortas. The wound can be healed only by an innocent youth
made wise through compassion. Suddenly a swan falls to the
ground, struck by an arrow. The Knights drag in a youth,
Parsifal, whom Gurnemanz rebukes for shooting the bird. The
young man flings away his bow and arrows in shame. Kundry
relates that his father, Gamuret, died in battle; his
mother, Herzeleide, reared the boy in the forest, but now
she too is dead. Gurnemanz leads Parsifal to the castle,
wondering if he may be the prophecy's fulfillment.
In the Hall of the Grail, Amfortas and his Knights prepare
the Last Supper. The voice of Amfortass father, Titurel,
bids him uncover the vessel, but Amfortas hesitates, his
anguish rising in the presence of the blood of Christ. At
length Titurel orders the Esquires to uncover the chalice,
which casts a glow about the hall. As bread and wine are
offered, an invisible choir is heard from above. Parsifal
understands nothing. Gurnemanz angrily drives the
uncomprehending youth away.
ACT II. Klingsor summons Kundry to seduce Parsifal. Having
secured Amfortas' spear, he now seeks to inherit the Grail
by destroying Parsifal, whom he recognizes as the order's
salvation. Kundry, hoping for redemption, protests in vain.

Richardson 61
In Klingsor's magic garden, Kundry, transformed into a
siren, enters to woo Parsifal with tender memories of his
childhood and mother. As she offers a passionate kiss, the
youth recoils, understanding at last the mystery of
Amfortas' wound and his own mission. Cursing Parsifal to
wander hopelessly in search of Monsalvat, she calls on
Klingsor, who hurls the holy spear. The youth catches it
and makes the sign of the cross, causing the castle to
vanish.
ACT III. Gurnemanz, now an old hermit, finds the penitent
Kundry exhausted in a thicket. As he revives her, a knight
in armor approaches. Gurnemanz recognizes Parsifal and the
spear. Parsifal describes years of trying to find his way
back to Amfortas and the Grail. Parsifal anoints Kundry,
then exclaims at the beauty of the spring fields. They walk
toward the castle. The Communion table has vanished from
the Hall of the Grail. No longer able to uncover the
chalice, Amfortas begs the Knights to end his anguish with
death, but Parsifal touches him with the spear, which heals
the wound. Raising the chalice, he accepts the homage of
the Knights as their new leader. Kundry, released at last
from her curse of wandering, falls dying. (Opera News;
accessed September 16, 2012, from www.metoperafamily.org).

Richardson 62
~ COMPASSION AS THE BASIS FOR MORALITY ~

For Schopenhauer, the sole basis of morality was the
element of compassion. Recall from the earlier
conversation on the metaphysics of compassion
Schopenhauers position that the Will holds over humanity
the illusion of principium individuationis, or the dupe
that we are separate, selfish bodies in the phenomenal.
Recall also Schopenhauers belief that compassion removes
from us that sense of distinction from our fellows because
through it we have gained insight into the workings of the
Will, the insight that we are one in the noumenal:
Schopenhauer believed that freedom could be
attained by the acquisition of a different kind of
insight: this is new information of a philosophical
sort...namely, the knowledge that the world is will
and that we are all co-sufferers on an equal par
with one another... Insight into the world as will
promotes good conduct actions that are morally
praiseworthy because it arouses our sense of kinship
with other sentient beings, and this in turn taps
into our feelings of sympathy with them.
81

Schopenhauer believed that by attaining a compassionate

81
Fox, p. 372

Richardson 63
state and realizing that our differences are superficial in
the phenomenal, we could then recognize whether our actions
are being driven by motives that would tend toward being
inherently moral.
Actions of voluntary justice, pure philanthropy,
and real magnanimity are the ones that possess
genuine moral worth, in [Schopenhauers] view, which
means that they spring from a motive or incentive
other than egoism or malice. Since, as he holds,
all actions stem from either egoism, malice or
compassion (though one may give way to another), the
only choice left for a causal explanation and origin
of morally praiseworthy behaviour is compassion.
This brings us to the heart of the matter: malice
(aimed at causing injury) clearly cannot produce
actions of genuine moral worth; egoism (aimed purely
at self-gain) clearly cannot take the good of others
seriously as an end-in-itself and, as we learn from
experience, can only produce social good fortuitously.
Therefore only compassion, which does aim at
realizing the good of others, can yield actions of
genuine moral worth. (Fox)
82

82
Ibid, p. 374

Richardson 64
This motivational analysis allows us to understand the
characters in Parsifal more clearly: Amfortas actions
spring from egoism; Kundrys from fear, which is a
derivation of egoism; Klingsors from malice; Gurnemanzs
from a combination of pity and desperation, ultimately
tending toward egoism; and Parsifals from total
compassion. More will be said on the individual psychology
shortly.
In addition to Schopenhauers view that actions spring
from three motives (egoism, malice, and compassion), he
also believed that though we cannot inherently change our
character, we can acquire character through a heightened
state of self-awareness. This acquisition of character is
the focal point of Parsifals self-journey throughout the
three acts; Parsifals character, his ability to
distinguish the motives behind his and others actions, and
his knowledge of the workings of the Will all remain
unchanged and ignorant until he gains insight into the
world, firstly after killing the swan and attacking Kundry,
and more completely after Kundrys kiss in Act II. Kundry
muddles through her own self-journey, but never
accomplishes the insight necessary to overcome her
situation.

Richardson 65
Finally, Schopenhauer sees this acquisition of moral
character, discernment, and compassion as one that must be
accomplished inwardly, personally, and without aid from
others. One must arrive at the genuine moral state of
being via personal contemplation and insight, because if
instructed by an external source, we may act upon the
instruction with no more thought other than for our own
benefit. This is relevant to Parsifals relationships with
both Gurnemanz and Kundry; Gurnemanz tries to effect an
insightful change in Parsifal when he brings him to the
Grail ceremony in Act I, but Parsifals character, in order
to become truly noble, must be awakened from an inner moral
aspect, not from the houndings of Gurnemanz. However,
Gurnemanzs earlier reproaches for shooting the swan do
affect Parsifal, because Gurnemanz ensures that Parsifal
enters into and shares the swans pain. Parsifals later
exhortations of Kundry in Act II, though, after he has
received her kiss and realized a moral direction, are
unfortunately useless until she herself can achieve the
insight from within.
Before delving any further into Parsifal as a
Schopenhauerian opera, the nature of compassion as the
basis for morality had to be explored, otherwise Parsifal

Richardson 66
becomes convoluted and difficult to interpret.
Schopenhauer is not merely saying the obvious
that one often feels good when doing good but
that compassionate acts create an inner state of
harmony and equilibrium within the psyche, because
these acts are in tune with the deepest metaphysical
truth about the world, namely, that we are
fundamentally connected to one another.
83

This inner state of harmony and equilibrium, of balance
and symmetry, is a primary focal point for Wagner, evident
especially in the peaceful resolution of both the plot and
the music in Act III. I submit that an understanding of
the metaphysics of compassion as the basis for morality is
critical in order to comprehend Parsifal as a
Schopenhauerian music drama.

~ PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INDIVIDUALS ~

Despite being the title character, Parsifal is
unexpectedly the most psychologically straightforward
individual in the work. His motives are relatively simple
to search out, thanks to the fact that at the beginning of
the work, he has none! Parsifal, as the chorus intones

83
Ibid, p. 378

Richardson 67
(refer to sound ex. 1), is a guileless one, an ignorant
albeit innocent fool; he does not know the distinction
between good and wicked, he knows nothing of moral
character, nor does he know anything of compassion or pity.
His actions are instinctive, guided by the Will, and his
emotions stir to the point of violence: as Schopenhauer
stated, Every fit of anger is something common every
unrestrained display of joy, or of hate, or fear in other
words, every movement of the Will.
84
The incident with the
swan is the first encounter Parsifal has with compassion,
or pain, or moral actions; Gurnemanz, suspecting that
Parsifal may be the pure one who can cure King Amfortas,
puts him through a guilt trip of rigorous, though gentle,
reproaches, and the moral exhortations cause such a rise of
remorse within Parsifal that he snaps his bow. This is the
first elementary step in his contemplative journey: the
passion with which he snaps his bow is still violent in its
outburst, very much an instinctual reaction to his pain.
He is no more enlightened than he was before.
Parsifals second step in his journey is an utter
failure; he will not learn compassion until Act II, when he
is confronted by Kundry. Gurnemanz leads him to the Grail
ceremony, hoping that the incident with the swan will have

84
Schopenhauer, Complete Essays of Schopenhauer. Vol. V, p. 43

Richardson 68
awakened in him some deeper capacity for compassion;
however, at the end of the ceremony, after Parsifal has
stood quietly throughout Amfortas desperate entreaties as
well as the communion rite, Gurnemanz finds that Parsifal
does not understand what has transpired.
The Grail vision had, then, taught the guileless
one nothing. He could not see his mission he was
as yet unawakened to the deeper life of the spirit...
His inner life must be deepened and developed, else
he can never read aright the message of the Grail.
85

In frustration, Gurnemanz turns Parsifal out of the hall,
ending the first act. If Parsifal is to acquire the
sensibilities of moral character, he must acquire them on
his personal journey, not by the exhortations or
demonstrations of others.
Act II is the dramatic turning point for Parsifal; he
accomplishes, almost instantly, a metamorphosis of
character from the guileless, irrational fool to a fully
compassionate, rational individual. This transformation is
brought about by the tenderizing of his character to pain,
his and others. If Parsifal feels compassion, it will be
by understanding pain, his own and/or someone elses. At

85
Haweis, Hugh R. Parsifal: Story and Analysis of Wagners Great Opera.
Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York, 1905. Dissertation. p. 13

Richardson 69
the crucial moment, as we shall see, he wont make the
distinction.
86
After being turned away from the hall of
the Grail, Parsifal arrives at the castle of the evil
Klingsor, where he is beset by beautiful flower maidens;
however, as the innocent pure fool, he has not yet learned
to be tempted, and resists them all easily. Parsifal also
resists Kundrys advances, however her entreaties cause him
to begin to feel, and he lapses into a contemplative state,
broken only when she succeeds in kissing him. The kiss is
the centerpiece of the act; it is the medium by which
Parsifal enters into sympathy with Amfortas, feeling the
kings physical and mental pain as his own (refer to sound
ex. 2). This kiss, while arousing in him the stormiest
feelings, causes a sharp pain, as of Amfortas own wound,
piercing his very heart.
87

[Parsifal] feels in himself the temptation, the
longing and the suffering of Amfortas, and perceives
the world as the aggregation of common guilt and an
unending circle of misery, which can be broken only
by compassion and renunciation, by rejection of the
will and its blind urging and compulsion.
88

Parsifal, in the long dialogue with Kundry, has passed from

86
Tanner, Wagner. p. 189
87
Haweis, p. 15
88
Dahlhaus, p. 146

Richardson 70
ignorance to enlightenment: He steps forth unconquered,
still guileless, but no more a fool. The knowledge of
good and evil has come, but the struggle is already
passed.
89
He is now fully compassionate, sympathetic to
Kundrys pathetic situation, and aware of his duty to heal
Amfortas and restore the harmony of the Knighthood.
Act III sees Parsifal return to the hall of the Grail
not as an ignorant fool, but as a redeeming figure,
bringing healing, salvation, and pardon to Amfortas and
Kundry. No longer is Parsifal ruled by the irrational
workings of the Will; he has acquired insight and
character, quieting the drive of the Will with compassion.
The guileless one from Act I has matured: once ignorant
of pity, instinctively irrational and ruled by the Will,
and unable to distinguish moral actions from evil ones, he
has become compassionate and contemplative, capable of
distinguishing the nature of the motives behind his and
others actions (refer to sound ex. 3).
While Parsifal is the namesake character of the music
drama, Amfortas is by far the most tragic figure.
Parsifals actions from Act II forward were driven by
motives of compassion (...the will that spurs Parsifal
on to deeds of valour is broken by the coming of

89
Haweis, p. 16

Richardson 71
compassion,
90
), however Amfortas actions are driven by
egoism. Amfortas sinned firstly by ignoring the sacred
nature of the Holy Spear and taking it with him into battle
against the evil Klingsor, and sinned again when he lost
the Spear to Klingsor after being seduced by none other
than Kundry in the midst of the battle. Klingsor inflicted
a wound upon Amfortas that will not heal; it is a constant
source of suffering and agony for Amfortas, and though he
is bitterly remorseful and knows he is not worthy to
minister holy communion, the Grail will not let him die
until he has been redeemed.
The tragic nature of Amfortas situation is most
poignant:
He [is] sore, stricken in sin, yet Guardian of
the Grail, guilty among the guiltless, oppressed
with pain, bowed down with shame, craving for
restoration, overwhelmed with unworthiness, yet
chosen to stand and minister before the Lord on
behalf of His saints!
91

The suffering which Amfortas bears is extremely personal,
and yet it is representative of the suffering that all
humanity endures; it is representative of our

90
Dahlhaus, p. 144
91
Haweis, p. 11

Richardson 72
interconnectedness.
92
That interconnectedness, born from
the Schopenhauerian knowledge that we are one in the
noumenal, is what allows the other characters, and by
extent, us as an audience, to feel sympathy to Amfortas.
Gurnemanz looks upon Amfortas with compassion, for he knows
the circumstances behind Amfortas situation; Kundry also
feels compassion for Amfortas, though partly because she
feels bitter guilt for her part in his sin. Whereas the
knights press Amfortas and look upon him with only slight
empathy and desperation when he fails to summon the courage
to perform the office of communion, Parsifal is able to
extend full compassion to the fallen king because he shares
in part the kings emotional suffering, as he also was
nearly tempted by Kundry. Ultimately, Amfortas will never
find peace until he is redeemed: There can be no world
peace without inner peace.
93
Because of the division of
the principium individuationis, Amfortas (and by extent,
Kundry) are divided from peace, which only Parsifal can
grant them through redemption.
Here, however, the following question arises: if the
other characters, and we as an audience, feel sympathy for
Amfortas, why then can they/we not redeem him also? The

92
Dahlhaus, p. 151
93
Fox, p. 379

Richardson 73
answer is found in the return to Schopenhauers three
motives, as well as in the nature of the pure fool: as
Kienzle puts it, Parsifal is predestined by his
compassionate nature to overcome egotism...The will cannot
negate itself or redeem itself.
94
Parsifal is the only
character whose motives are not driven in some form by
egoism or malice; his motives are purely compassionate.
The motives of the other characters will be discussed
subsequently; suffice it to say briefly, in the context of
the question, that Gurnemanz, Kundry, and the Knights are
not capable of redeeming Amfortas because, though they are
sympathetic, their compassion is stained by some derivation
of egoism. In turn, we as an audience, though we also feel
sympathy for Amfortas, are unable to redeem Amfortas for
two reasons: 1) physically, our actions and emotions are
not able to interact directly with the ongoing drama
itself; and 2) metaphorically, we have not achieved the
self-awareness of our own wills necessary to afford us the
capacity for pure compassion. Thus, Amfortas, and by
extension the other characters as well, are all dependent
entirely upon Parsifal for redemptive compassion, and all
for the same reasoning. Amfortas situation is truly

&"
Kindermann, William and Katherine R. Syer. A Companion to Wagners
Parsifal. Camden House, Rochester, 2005. Book. p. 94, 99

Richardson 74
realism raised to the sublime.
95

Kundrys character is perhaps the most complex, made
so by her dual service to both the Grail and Klingsor. Her
actions are motivated by fear and remorse, both of which
are derivations of egoism. Kundry is the most world-wise
of all the characters, for under Klingsors spell she has
served for many lifetimes, all the while living with no
redemption because she had dared to mock the Christ upon
the road to the crucifixion. And yet, for all her worldly
wisdom, she has not acquired the pure insightful character
that Parsifal will attain; as long as she is tainted with
her sin, she cannot overcome the workings of her own will,
and is ultimately a slave to Klingsor, whose spell may be
considered to be a representative working of the Will.
In Act I, Kundry serves the Grail, bringing news,
delivering messages, and securing balsam for the kings
wound. However, at any point during the action that Kundry
performs a deed of service on her own accord without being
ordered by the knights, the spell of Klingsor activates,
causing her to fall back into a sleeping trance (refer to
sound ex. 4). Her personal attempts to gain grace are
useless, and whenever those overtures toward goodness
occur, her suffering literally drags her back down.

95
Haweis, p. 15

Richardson 75
Those long trances... apparently last for months,
or years, and form the transition periods between
her mood of Grail service and the Klingsor slavery
into which she must next relapse in spite of
herself.
96
Such a trance occurs when Kundry, unbidden,
seeks to aid Parsifal when he swoons upon learning from her
that his mother has died; she returns to sleep, and is not
seen again until Act II.
In Act II, Klingsor bids Kundry to seduce Parsifal
she resists, but is forced to serve him. In the duet that
follows between herself and Parsifal, as Parsifal resists
her, she begins to feel that he can redeem her, but through
Klingsors magic she is duped into believing that that
redemption can only come through her physical union with
Parsifal: in essence, she is duped by Will-of-the-Species
into believing that she can only escape her torment through
the sexual union. Or, recalling Reinhardts description of
wahn as signifying an individual that has been duped in
some form by the influence of the Will, it could be said
that Kundry exists in an almost perpetual state of wahn.
Parsifal, in this Act II duet, completes the
Schopenhauerian journey to insight, however Kundry does

96
Ibid, p. 10

Richardson 76
not, and Parsifals moral exhortations for her to allow him
to redeem her fall upon deaf ears, because she cannot
understand that he means to redeem her through compassion,
not the sexual union.
Act III is Kundrys turning point, as it is for
Amfortas. Upon Parsifals return to the hall of the Grail,
he has changed, in demeanor and in appearance, and Kundry
realizes that he can bring her true salvation. She
repents, and with pity he blesses, saving her from
Klingsors spell. Because of Parsifals compassion, she
can at last attain the peace of heart necessary to acquire
moral character. As Parsifal uncovers the Grail to perform
the office of communion, Kundry dies, finally pure and no
longer bound to service in atonement for her sin.
Klingsor is the truly vile character in the work, his
actions being entirely motivated by egoism and above all,
angry, burning malice. And yet, because of the very
reasons that he is evil, he merits a compassionate response
not on the grounds that his fellow characters feel pity
for him, but on the principles of Schopenhauers
metaphysics. Schopenhauer recognized what could be called
compassion at a distance, compassion for individuals
beyond immediate perception...understood only as occupying

Richardson 77
undesirable social roles.
97
The manipulation of Klingsor
as an evil character and yet one worthy of our compassion
is an example of Wagners careful sleight of hand.
Klingsor, once wishing to enter the Grail brotherhood, was
denied entrance due to his egotistical motives; he went
away, trying to attain forgiveness, but he was unable to
conquer his sins, and in desperation castrated himself.
When he tried to reenter the brotherhood, he was scornfully
turned away by Titurel, Amfortas father; thus he became
enraged and, turning to wicked magic, gave himself over to
be wholly consumed by hate. In no manner do we as an
audience want to feel sympathy for this character. Indeed,
the first reactions of Titurel, Amfortas, and Kundry when
they encounter Klingsor are revulsion and bitterness.
However, on the metaphysical principles of compassion,
Klingsor is a character worthy of sympathy. Wanting to be
near the Grail, Klingsor tried to banish his sinful nature
through repentance as well as a desperate physical action,
but his hope was denied; in a manner, his situation is
almost as tragic as Amfortas. As Schopenhauer stated,
Consequently what can move [people] to good deeds and to
works of affection is always only knowledge of the

97
Cartwright, p. 304

Richardson 78
suffering of others.
98
...that knowledge of the whole, of
the inner nature of the thing-in-itself...
99
is what allows
Klingsor the merit of being afforded some manner of
sympathy: we can all sympathize with the reason for his
suffering, if not with the result of it, because we
recognize the interrelated nature of humanity and therefore
take part, in some capacity, in his suffering.
Finally, the psychology underlying Gurnemanz is
straightforward: he is the narrator of the story, passive
in action except for berating Parsifal for his unnecessary
killing of the swan and for his ignorance of the Grail
ceremony. The exasperation he exhibits in throwing
Parsifal from the hall in Act I is not so much anger
towards Parsifal, but disappointment for having allowed
himself the hope that Parsifal would be Amfortas foretold
redeemer. He extends compassion to Amfortas, as well as to
Kundry, albeit berating Kundry for her part in Amfortas
fall in the same manner that he later does Parsifal for
killing the swan. Gurnemanzs actions are motivated by a
combination of compassion for his fellows as well as
desperation for the healing and survival of the Grail
brotherhood; as such, he is driven by that proverbial human

98
99
Ibid, p. 379

Richardson 79
mix of egoism and compassion, which as Schopenhauer
perceptively said, the one [which] may give way to
another.
In summary of this section, Parsifal gains
philosophical awareness through the metaphysical means of
compassion, Amfortas and Kundry are both ultimately
restored by Parsifals compassion, Klingsor himself merits
a compassionate allowance, and Gurnemanz extends compassion
to Amfortas and Kundry, as well as to Parsifal. In some
manner, each principle character is connected with
Schopenhauers metaphysical idea of compassion.

~ METAPHYSICS IN THE TEXT ~

Wagner left more signs that Parsifal is about the
value of compassion than simply the characters
psychological states; he also left clues in the libretto
that point towards the significance of compassion. The
term Mitleid is the German equivalent of compassion,
but its meaning also carries the subtle nuances of pity,
yearning, and being in a state of sorrow with others.
Wagner uses the term very specifically in his text in
regard to compassion and pity. The term is used thrice in

Richardson 80
reference to the Grails prophecy concerning Parsifal:
Durch Mitleid wissend, der reine Tor [The pure fool, made
wise by compassion!]. Amfortas uses the term as a
descriptor for Christs motivation for dying on the cross:
...in Mitleids heiligem Sehnen, [...with tender, pitiful
yearning.]. The Grail Knights herald the power of
compassion (Durch des Mitleids Liebesmacht... [Through
the power of compassion...]), and Gurnemanz uses the term
to greet Parsifal upon his return in Act III (Mitleidvoll
Duldender, heiltatvoll Wissender! [Pitying and patient
one, healing and knowing one!]). Kundry uses the term in a
morose recognition of her own guilt: Ha! Wahnsinn!
Mitleid! Mitleid mit mir? [Ha! Madness! Pity! Pity for
me?]. And finally, Parsifal uses the term in Act III in
reference to Amfortas suffering: Gesegnet sei dein
Leiden, das Mitleids hchste Kraft, und reinsten Wissens
Macht dem zagen Toren gab! [Blessed be your suffring,
which gave the power of compassion and strength or purity
to him the timid fool!].
Wagner placed a great deal of textual emphasis on
forgiveness and repentance from sin, as well as on the
concept of redemption. Wagner made heavy use of those
subjects in order to set up his principles of compassion;

Richardson 81
without sin and the characters desires to repent from
their error, there would be no dramatic necessity for
Parsifals acquisition of moral character. With the
recognition that the difference between him and me is now
no longer absolute,...Schopenhauer immediately connects
compassion to the pursuit of anothers well-being.
100
In
other words, Parsifals acquired cognizance of the workings
of the Will allows him the aptitude to carry out his
mission of aiding others through compassion:
The magnanimous person who forgives his enemy
and returns good for evil is sublime, and receives
the highest praise, because he still recognized his
own true nature even where it was emphatically
denied.
101

Amfortas and Kundry are the two characters most
desirous of forgiveness, and are in a constant state of
repentance throughout the work. Amfortas plea for
forgiveness comes in Act I: For Him and for His
benediction, my eager heart is yearning. My inmost soul
desires atonement from God, our only Saviour.
102
Kundrys
penitent state is commented upon by Gurnemanz: She seems
renewed, repenting sin long since committed, which at that

100
Cartwright, p. 296
101
Ibid, p. 301
102
Wagner, Parsifal. Orchestral score. p. 71

Richardson 82
time was not forgiven.
103
Parsifal heals Amfortas, granting
his desire for forgiveness; as well, Parsifal baptizes
Kundry, then imparts to her a kiss symbolic of pardon and
peace.
104
On the matter of Parsifal as a redemptive work,
Wagner took Schopenhauers view of compassion as a quieter
of the Will and expanded it:
Schopenhauer claims that living itself is the
original sin. That Wagner always held a position
which amounts to that comes out in the fact that
the redeemers in his works long to redeem just
as much as the sinners long to be redeemed. Hence
it is entirely appropriate, and could well have been
a planned effect, unquestionably casting light back
over a lifetimes work, that the final words of
Parsifal, intoned by the chorus, are Erlsung dem
Erlser(Redemption to the redeemer).
105

Redemption as a subject is expressively treated by Parsifal
in Act II, upon having rejected Kundrys advances: his
first expression describes the results of redemption upon
the world (Redemptions rapture, pure and mild, sends
healing power through creation!
106
), and his second

103
Ibid, p. 24
104
Haweis, p. 19
105
106
Wagner, Parsifal. Orchestral score. p. 177

Richardson 83
expression describes the nature of redemption as being
sprung from compassion: Yes, sinner, I do offer thee
Redemption, he can say to Kundry; not in thy way, but in
the Lord Christs way of sacrifice.
107
As Dahlhaus most
succinctly observes of the connection between compassion
and redemption throughout the entirety of Parsifal: The
compassion that is a dull sensation in the first act, and
widens into recognition, cosmic perception, in the
second, is at last directed outwards in the third as the
deed of redemption.
108
In other words, we are made aware
of compassion, then we understand compassion, and finally
we see compassion realized in action. Parsifals redeeming
actions would not have been possible had he not experienced
the journey toward awareness of compassion.


When describing his own works, Wagner once defined his
music dramas as ...deeds of music which have become
visible;
109
the description applies well to Parsifal.
Carolyn Abbate also acknowledges Wagners comments:
Wagner argued (with rare consistency) from Oper

107
Haweis, p. 18
108
Dahlhaus, p. 147
109
Ibid, p. 53

Richardson 84
und Drama in 1851...that a poetic idea, which
first takes shape as text, is projected into music
born of that 'poetic intention', and the music
realizes this poetic idea in the 'region of
perception that has no need of words. The drama
can proceed, according to Wagner's dogma, only from
the musical realization.
110

Sound examples 5, 6, and 7 present excerpts from the
opening preludes of Tristan, Meistersinger, and Parsifal:
the character, or poetic intention, of each music drama is
quite distinct; the leitmotivs set up the chromatic
yearning in Tristan, the sound of convention in
Meistersinger, and, I submit, a dramatically different
sound-scape of compassion in Parsifal.
Once singular representations in Tristan und Isolde,
then evolving combinations of meaning in Die Meistersinger,
Wagners leitmotivs emerge in Parsifal as perfected,
metaphorical themes, constructed of up to two and three
smaller leitmotivs at a time. Wagner took special care
that the leitmotivs of Parsifal should come across so
clearly that, knowing their meaning, a listener could
perceive the poetic intention merely by following the

''#
Abbate, Carolyn. Wagner, On Modulation and Tristan. Cambridge
Opera Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 33-58: March 1989. Journal
Article. p. 35

Richardson 85
orchestra. The acute clarity of the Wagnerian orchestra
in this last Gesamtkunstwerk is in line with Schopenhauers
opinion on the supremacy of music above text: The words
are...of secondary value, as the effect of the tones is
incomparably more powerful, more infallible, and more rapid
than that of the words.
111
This resonates in Parsifal
though Wagner himself updated Schopenhauers view so that
the text and music intercut in importance, the drama itself
is more poignant because of the metaphorical implications
lent to it by the leitmotivs.
Parsifal is, I argue, Wagners most sophisticated
illustration of his mature leitmotivic technique.
Music, according to Schopenhauer...is an art
which represents pure, unmixed feelings, passions
in the abstract, freed from the trammels of the
reality to which they owe their specific identity
and motivation... [Wagner] recognized that leitmotivic
technique provided him with the means to admit music
to a realm which is otherwise closed to it. Once
leitmotivs have been sufficiently clearly expounded
they are musical metaphors, and by their blending,
mingling or allusion to each other they make it
possible to express divided feelings or ambiguities

111

Richardson 86
which are otherwise beyond the scope of music.
112

There are over twenty distinct leitmotivs in Parsifal, the
most prominent of which are the following: the Motive of
Faith, the Motive of the Pure Fool, the Motive of the
Grail, and the opening gesture of the Act I Prelude, which
is in itself a combination of the Sacrament Motive, the
Motive of Suffering, and the Motive of the Spear. The
Motive of Faith often appears in tandem with the Motive of
the Grail, itself actually taken by Wagner from the
religious Dresden Amen musical acclamation, which would
have been well known at the time Parsifal premiered: thus,
the two motives together serve as a metaphor attributing
spiritual essence to the plot (see Figs. 1 and 2 below).

Fig. 1, The Motive of the Grail (Dresden Amen)
(http://www.rwagner.net/e-frame.html)

112
Dahlhaus, p. 153

Richardson 87
Fig. 2, The Motive of Faith

The Motive of the Pure Fool is heard every time the
words Durch Mitleid wissend, der reine Tor are sung; the
addition of music to this phrase further distinguishes and
singles out the role that Parsifal will play (see Fig. 3).

Fig. 3, Motive of the Pure Fool

Richardson 88
The opening gesture of Act I is made of the Sacrament,
a major triad, which bleeds seamlessly into the Motive of
Suffering almost the exact same motive as the Day Theme
in Tristan which then elides into the Motive of the Spear
(see Fig. 4).

Fig. 4, A = Sacrament, B = Motive of Suffering, C =
Spear (http://www.rwagner.net/e-frame.html)

The combination of these three motives foreshadows exactly
the heart of the dramatic dilemma for Amfortas: the office
of communion is accompanied by suffering, which only the
Spear can assuage. Also, the Sacrament motive is often
combined with the Grail motive (the Dresden Amen), itself
attached to the Motive of Faith. The Motive of Suffering
appears continuously throughout the work, underlying
instances of compassion and hurt on Parsifals part, as
well as the moments when Amfortas and Kundry are in the

Richardson 89
throes of redemptive suffering.
The various mixing and matching of leitmotivs to
create large, sweeping themes gives Parsifal a more
cohesive and holistic sound than Tristan or even to an
extent, Meistersinger. In general, the individual
leitmotivs fall into one of two categories, either diatonic
or chromatic; the diatonic motives are representative of
pureness, whereas the chromatic motives are representative
of suffering and evil:
In greatly simplified terms, the use of musical
motives in Parsifal is governed and conditioned by
the contrast of chromaticism and diatonicism: the
chromaticism that conveys the deceptions of Klingsors
kingdom also expresses the anguish of Amfortas, while
the expressive range of the diatonicism reaches from
the nave simplicity of Parsifals motive to the
sublimity of the Grail themes.
113

Thus, if the themes which are normally diatonic are heard
in chromatic derivations, such as the Dresden Amen in Act
II during Klingsors declamations (see Fig. 5), the
implication is that the pureness represented by that motive
has been tainted.

113
Ibid, p. 151

Richardson 90
Fig. 5, Dresden Amen, chromatic; p. 97 in score

In his essay The Genesis of the Music (A Companion to
Wagners Parsifal), William Kindermann also acknowledges
the diatonic vs. chromatic nature of the music of Parsifal,
particularly in passages associated with Amfortas (see Fig.
6).
114

Fig. 6, Motive of Amfortas Anguish, Act II; chromatic

114
Kindermann, p. 168

Richardson 91
The Act III prelude exhibits this diatonic vs. chromatic
derivation (see Fig. 7):
The opening prelude of the third and last act...
is full of pain and restlessness the pain of
wretched years of long waiting for a deliverer,
who comes not; the restlessness and misery of a
hope deferred, the weariness of life without a
single joy. The motives, discolored as it were by
grief, work up to a distorted version of the Grail
subject... Is the Grail, too, then turned into a
mocking spirit to the unhappy Amfortas?
115

Fig. 7, Grail Motive, distorted; p. 204 in score

By manipulating the motives in this manner, Wagner adds yet
another layer of meaning onto the musical metaphors: he
takes the base meaning of a single leitmotiv, combines it

115
Haweis, p. 18

Richardson 92
with a second leitmotiv to create a larger idea, and then
slightly manipulates those leitmotivs themselves in order
to create a super-layer of representation. Instead of only
having to consider the implications of the single
leitmotivs, one also must take into account simultaneously
what the leitmotivs mean when manipulated from their
original form. Wagner raises the leitmotiv from an
identifying musical gesture associated with a single idea
or person to an item of music that is dynamic (no pun
intended) and capable of raising musical questions.
Overall, the music of Parsifal is noble in character
it is calm in tone, tinged simultaneously with joy and
sadness, and generally devoid of both the intense sexual
longing felt in Tristan and the more conventional musical
sound of Meistersinger. This is not to say that there is
no emotion in the music: of course there is a deep level of
emotion represented, however that emotion is musically
treated in accordance with the characters journeys toward
compassion. The music associated with Kundry, Klingsor,
Amfortas, Gurnemanz and Parsifal, illustrates the
appropriate state of each character along each step of his
or her own journey, from irrational to rational, from
impetuous to humble and9 controlled. Indeed, the overall

Richardson 93
musical soundscape of Parsifal is so distanced from the
yearning of the Will-of-the-Species in Tristan, as well as
from the more conventional phenomenal treatment of music
in Meistersinger, that it could be considered the
compassionate distancing from both extreme views of the
Will it views the Will from an calm, understanding
perspective. The leitmotivs underscore the psychological
states of each of the characters, and add additional layers
of meaning in the form of combinations and modal changes.
The work is metaphorical, representative of the sublime
journey of compassion that the characters and the audience
are taking. Tanner most eloquently expresses the musics
nature when considering the Act I Prelude: The
Prelude...is a piece of scrupulous exposition which
simultaneously contrives to offer the faintest hope of
peace at the end of what is evidently going to be a long,
excruciating journey.
116
Schopenhauers reminder that music
is a direct representation of the Will resonates heavily
with Parsifal, and serves as an excellent explanation of
why its music as a whole is so powerful:
[Music] never expresses the phenomenon, but only
the inner nature, the in-itself, of every phenomenon,
the will itself. Therefore music does not express

116

Richardson 94
this or that particular and definite pleasure, this
or that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety,
merriment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain, sorrow,
horror, gaiety, merriment, peace of mind themselves,
to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential
nature.
117

Therein lies the key point for the music of Parsifal: I
argue that the music does not represent any particular
rendering of compassion, but rather compassion itself in
its abstract nature (refer to sound ex. 8).

~ THE WILL AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ~

Wagner, in Parsifal, illustrates the Schopenhauerian
metaphysics of compassion with the journey of the
guileless, innocent fool.
Wagner adopted Schopenhauers ethics...In
feeling pity for others we deny the Will as
expressed in ourselves and lose our individuality
in entering into or sympathizing with another being.
By constant practice in living in others we lose
the sense of a personal existence and thwart the

117

Richardson 95
expression in ourselves of the will-to-live.
118

The difference with Parsifal is that the Will itself
assumes a more subtle role: though it still functions as
the ultimate antagonist in the work, it is not so
shockingly forward and wanton as in Tristan, nor is it the
plain subject of verbal commentary as in Meistersinger.
The Will here is a passive force in that the irrational
deeds driven by it have already been committed: Klingsor,
Amfortas, and Kundry have already faced the drive of the
Will and succumbed to it, and upon the beginning of the
opera are seen coping with the repercussions of their
actions. Twice we actually see the Will actively engage:
briefly in Act I, when Parsifal shoots the swan, and
substantially in Act II, when Kundry, under the influence
of Klingsors spell, is driven to seduce Parsifal by the
Will-of-the-Species. For the remainder of the music drama,
the Wills presence is passive present and ever working,
but subtle.
While in Tristan, clear references are made to the
noumenal night, the phenomenal day, and immeasurable
yearnings, and while in Meistersinger Hans Sachs quotes
nigh verbatim a Schopenhauerian passage concerning the
madness of wahn and the Will, not a single verbal reference

118
Barry, Elizabeth Wendell, p. 130

Richardson 96
is made to the Will in Parsifal. Ironically, this passive
treatment of the Will is precisely the reason why I have
concluded that Parsifal is Wagners most powerful
commentary on Schopenhauerian metaphysics. By allowing the
Will to take an ever present but passive position, Wagner
ensured that the audience would have to join the characters
in their journey of moral contemplation in order to
comprehend the work we truly must work to follow the
reasoning behind the characters actions and motives,
instead of having them hand-fed to us as in Tristan and
Meistersinger. In order to appreciate Parsifals impact,
we must acknowledge our own oneness and the necessity for
compassion, in Schopenhauers terms; we must enter into
sympathy with and lose ourselves to individuality. It
is only in terms of this ethic of compassion, founded on a
metaphysic of the unity of living things, that Parsifal
makes sense.
119
Viewed from this perspective, Parsifal
transforms into a personal metaphysical commentary, and it
is only with the aid of this metaphysical analysis of
compassion that I have come to understand Parsifal in what
I believe to be its full Schopenhauerian value.

END ACT TWO

119

Richardson 97
POSTLUDE

Nothing should remain for the synthesizing
intellect to do in the face of a performance of a
dramatic work of art; everything presented in it must be
so conclusive that our feeling about it is brought to
rest; for in the bringing to rest of this feeling, after
its highest arousal in sympathy with it, lies that very
peace which leads us to the instinctive understanding of
life. In drama we must become knowers through feeling.
[from Wagners treatise Opera and Drama].
120

For all the resources one may consult when exploring a
work or art, none have such an impact as the original
itself. As such, though we may identify the metaphysical
principles that underlie Wagners Parsifal, and though we
may gain a sense of the subtleties of the work, it is my
opinion that we will only achieve a full appreciation of
the work if we enter into sympathy with it and become
knowers through feeling. Parsifal as a music drama
demands our attention, draws us in, and becomes as relative
a personal commentary on our own actions as it actually is
for its characters.

120
Ibid, p. 9

Richardson 98
Parsifal as a message is a comment on the human
condition, while Parsifal as a music drama may be
considered in retrospect Wagners ultimate Gesamtkunstwerk,
not only in terms of its place as his final music drama,
but also in terms of its subject matter. Though this paper
has been specifically concerned with the metaphysical
importance of compassion in Parsifal, my study has also
identified references in the work to Schopenhauers
metaphysical theories of human sexuality and music. The
likelihood of Parsifal being Wagners deliberate
representation of all three metaphysical means to quieting
the Will is a fascinating, and not implausible, prospect,
and would constitute an excellent topic for further study.
For the present, however, I conclude this project with my
last, appreciative interpretation of the music drama, the
opinion that Parsifal achieves the sublime goal of bringing
us all, even if only momentarily, into a noumenal sense of
oneness with our fellow man through the element of
compassion.

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SUPPLEMENTAL SOURCES AND DVDS

23. Die Meistersinger von Nrnberg. Conducted by James
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27. Parsifal Synopsis, courtesy of Opera News, accessed
September 16, 2012; www.metoperafamily.org.
Website.

28. Richard Wagner: Parsifal Leitmotives, accessed
September 22, 2012; http://www.rwagner.net/e-
frame.html. Website.

29. Tristan und Isolde. Conducted by James Levine.
Metropolitan Opera, New York: 2004. DVD.

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