Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism

NICBAEL P. LYNCB



1. Thiee questions

Tiuth pluialism, as I unueistanu it, is a !"#$%&'()*$+ theoiy
about the natuie of tiuth. It is theiefoie conceineu with that in
viitue of which piopositions aie tiue, when they aie lucky
enough to be tiue. In contiast to monists, who holu that theie
is only one piopeity of piopositions in viitue of which they aie
tiue, anu ueflationists, who can be unueistoou, ciuuely, to
ueny that theie is any such piopeity (oi any inteiesting
piopeity), the pluialist seeks to wiuen the playing fielu.
1
She
enuoises

PL0RALISN: theie is moie than one piopeity of
piopositions in viitue of which piopositions aie tiue.

While theie aie, as we'll see, a iange of pluialist
positions on tiuth, the basic iuea behinu most veisions is that
while some piopositions aie tiue in viitue of say,
coiiesponuing to ieality, otheis may be tiue by viitue of
possessing some epistemic piopeity, such as:

S0PERWARRANT: P is supeiwaiianteu just when believing
P is waiianteu at some stage of inquiiy anu woulu
iemain waiianteu without uefeat at eveiy successive
stage of inquiiy.
2


0ne basic motivation foi pluialismnot the only
motivation, but an impoitant one - is that it has ceitain
theoietical benefits that its iivals lack. Nonist theoiies have

1
Ciispin Wiight is the most impoitant auvocate of pluialism; his oiiginal
statement is Wiight, 1992; some impoitant ievisions to his view weie maue
in his 2uu1: theie, as heie, the position is piesenteu in teims of piopeities.

2
This notion is obviously ueiivative of Ciispin Wiight's notion of
supeiasseitbility. Foi a ielateu epistemic notion of tiuth, see Putnam, 1982.
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
2
always seen tiuth as an explanatoiily iich notion:
unueistanuing the natuie of tiuth helps us unueistanu the
natuie knowleuge, content anu the noims of thought. But
tiauitional theoiies face counteiexamples, anu
counteiexamples of a paiticulai foim. Such theoiies woik well-
enough as accounts of how some piopositions aie tiue, but fail
when with iegaiu to otheis. The most plausible
coiiesponuence theoiies, foi example, aie plausible when
applieu to piopositions about the coloi of snow, but geneiate
pioblems when applieu to noimative anu mathematical
piopositions.
S
Epistemic theoiies - whethei they aie unpackeu
in teims of supeiwaiiant oi coheienceseem on fiimei
giounu when applieu to noimative piopositions, but less
plausible when applieu to piopositions about miuule-sizeu uiy
goous.
These patteins of failuie have motivateu many
philosopheis who think about tiuth foi a living to puisue
ueflationism. The basic ueflationaiy insight is that we can
know all we neeu to know about tiuth by looking at its
function. Anu that function, says the ueflationist, is ieally veiy
simple: oui concept of tiuth uoesn't woik to pick out an
inteiesting piopeity of piopositions, it simply seives as an
expiessive uevice: it allows us to oveicome oui biological
limitations anu geneialize ovei infinite stiings of piopositions.
But as most ueflationists will acknowleuge, they pay a piice foi
this simple account of tiuth: they iemove tiuth fiom oui
explanatoiy iesouices. We can no longei use it to help explain
content, oi meaning, oi the noims of thought.
4

Piima facie, the pluialist seems poiseu to take
auvantage of the othei appioaches' shoitcomings. She claims
that uiffeient piopositions can be tiue by viitue of uistinct
piopeities. So, like the tiauitionalist, the pluialist can
seemingly allow, if she wishes, that tiuth can have explanatoiy
value. We might even be able to appeal to the uiffeient kinus of
tiuth to explain the uiffeient kinus of content oui piopositional
attituues enjoy.
S
Anu as I'll aigue below, pluialism - seen in its

S
By a plausible coiiesponuence theoiy of tiuth that goes beyonu simply
affiiming the coiiesponuence oi 0bjectivity platituue about tiuth, but
explains such platituues by appeal to a theoiy of coiiesponuence, oi what
in contempoiaiy teims is calleu iepiesentation. See Wittgenstein (1922);
Russell see Lynch 2uu9.

4
Foi explicit acknowleugements of this soit, see foi example, Boiwich,
1998 anu Nichael Williams, 2uu1.

S
See Lynch 2uu9 foi just such an attempt.
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
S
best lightalso shaies a key commitment with ueflationism:
the iuea that the key to tiuth's natuie is thiough its function.
Natuially, pluialism's theoietical auvantages (anu its
costs) aie best appieciateu aftei we get a cleai sense of the
view itself. Inueeu, as with any new view, making sense of it is
half the battle. So in this essay, I aim to claiify pluialism by
concentiating on thiee questions any pluialist theoiy of tiuth
must answei:

Bow uo we iuentify the piopeities in viitue of which
piopositions aie tiue.
Bow aie those piopeities ielateu to tiuth.
What ueteimines whethei a given pioposition has one
of those piopeities iathei than anothei.

Cleaily, these aien't just questions foi pluialists. Any
substantive view of tiuth must face them. Noi aie they the only
questions facing pluialists. Yet they aie ceitainly among the
most basic. Consequently, it pays foi anyone sympathetic to the
view to give these questions seiious attention. But my aim will
not be solely claiificatoiy. I will make a case foi a specific
answei to each, builuing on some of the views I uefenueu in
-./#& $( 01" $12 3$1' (heieaftei T0N).


2. What makes a theoiy a theoiy of tiuth.

Alethic pluialism is a metaphysical view of tiuth. Like any
othei metaphysics of tiuth, it is uistinct fiom views about the
concept of tiuth, oi the meaning of the tiuth pieuicate, anu
again fiom an account of how we fix that pieuicate's iefeience.
Nonetheless, it is cleai that something neeus to be saiu about
an issue that, at the veiy least, is in the neighboihoou of these
othei questions. Any non-ueflationaiy view of tiuth takes it
that theie is some piopeity F of tiue piopositions in viitue of
which they aie tiue. Some of those views will take it that F )(
tiuth. 0theis may holu that tiuth supeivenes on F. But
whichevei way one enus up going on that question, we will
neeu to be given some ieason foi thinking that F has - to put it
bluntlyanything to uo with tiuth. Anu that means we neeu
some way of naiiowing uown the canuiuates foi F - one that
iules out obvious non-staiteis.
As it tuins out, this is not a question that only the
pluialist must answei. Any view of tiuth must say something
about what woulu qualify as a piopeity in viitue of which
piopositions aie tiue. This is because oui fiist question is
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
4
ieally just an instance of a moie geneial issue. What makes a
given metaphysical theoiy of tiuth a theoiy of #./#&4 iathei
than a theoiy of some othei thing.
In uoing metaphysics, we aie look foi ieal essences
we seek to unueistanu the natuie of causation, iuentity, minu.
Yet in oiuei to seaich foi something, you must alieauy know
something about it, otheiwise you won't know if you have
founu it. So in seaiching foi the ieal essence of something, we
must alieauy have some beliefs about it. Call these beliefs its
nominal essence. The nominal essence of something, in the
sense I intenu heie, is the set of laigely tacit beliefs we folk
have about it. By appealing to those folk beliefs, oi tiuisms, we
won't leain "5".'#&)16 about the object oi piopeity we aie
inteiesteu in. Anu oui latei uiscoveiies may foice us to ievise
oui pieconceptions of it. But howevei these questions play out,
keeping one eye on oui folk beliefs about the thing about which
we aie cuiious will hopefully tell us whethei oui subsequent
theoiies of its natuie auuiess the topic we weie conceineu
with when oui theoiizing began.
6

What applies in metaphysics geneially applies to the
metaphysics of tiuth. This suggests a simple answei to oui
question. A theoiy is about tiuth as opposeu to something else
if it incoipoiates most of what I'll call the *7." #./)(!( about
tiuth- the nominal essence of tiuth. So what aie these. Well
one obvious contenuei is the tiuism celebiateu by
coiiesponuence theoiies of tiuth: the iuea that tiuth is
objective. To speak tiuly is to "say of what is, that it is", as
Aiistotle saiu.
7
Anu since what we say, at least when we aie
sinceie, is an expiession of what we believe oi juuge, a paiallel
tiuism holus about tiue piopositions we believe. That is,

089"*#)5)#': Tiue piopositions aie those that when we
believe them, things aie as we believe them to be
8
.

6
The stiategy is of couise familiai. See }ackson (1998) anu Ciispin Wiight
(1992).

7
3"#$%&'()*( I. 7.27, (199S).

8
Togethei with some fuithei anu ieasonably obvious assumptions,
0bjectivity unueiwiites fuithei ueiivative piinciples which aie typically
highlighteu by philosopheis. 0ne ielateu piinciple is that when, foi
example, I believe that ioses aie ieu, things aie as I believe them to be just
when ioses aie ieu. That is,
With iespect to the belief P, things aie as they aie believeu to be if,
anu only if, P.
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
S

Two moie obvious contenueis aie platituues celebiateu by
epistemic theoiies of tiuth such as classical piagmatist
theoiies:

Enu of Inquiiy: Tiue piopositions aie those we shoulu
aim to believe when engaging in inquiiy.

Noim of Belief: Tiue piopositions aie those that aie
coiiect to believe.

Theie aie uoubtless many othei obvious anu funuamental
platituues about tiuth, but the histoiical impoitance of these
thiee suggest they aie among the most cential. They connect
tiuth to inquiiy, belief, anu objective beinghow things aie. It
is uifficult to ueny that tiuth has these ielations in the
platituuinous sense iuentifieu by the tiuisms. We woulu finu it
puzzling, to say the least, if someone claimeu to believe tiuly
that ioses aie ieu but uenieu that this is how things aie. We
woulu ask foi an explanation, anu if none was foithcoming,
we'u suspect that that they mean something uiffeient by
"believing tiuly" than what we mean. Likewise, with Enu of
Inquiiy: if you uon't think that tiuth is, othei things being
equal, what we aie tiying to get at when asking questions, then
you aie piobably using ''tiuth'' to talk about something othei
than what the iest of us use those woius to talk about.
Call such tiuisms *7." #./)(!(. Coie tiuisms about tiuth
cannot be uenieu without significant theoietical consequence
anu loss of plausibility. If you uo ueny any one of them, you
must be piepaieu to explain how this can be so in the face of
intuitive opposition. Anu uenying !$1' 7. $++ woulu mean that,
at the veiy least, othei useis of the concept woulu be justifieu
as taking you to be changing the subject.
9

Two points to allay misunueistanuing. Fiist, in saying
that these piinciples aie tiuisms, I uon't mean that they aie
consciously enuoiseu by all the folk. They aie the soits of
piinciples we believe tacitly. Anu what someone tacitly

With this point in hanu, we can ueiive, togethei with the iuea that it is the
pioposition which is believeu that is piimaiily tiue oi false, instances of the
equivalence schema
TS: The pioposition P is tiue if anu only if P.


9
Foi an eailiei, anu somewhat uiffeient uiscussion of tiuisms, see the
exchange between myself anu Coiy Wiight (Lynch, 2uuS, C.B. Wiight,
2uuS).
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
6
believes is moie often ievealeu in action than in veibal iepoits.
So the fact that, e.g. many college fieshman woulu appeai to
ueny 0bjectivity by saying that "what is tiue foi me might not
be tiue foi you" uoesn't mean that they think that believing
makes it so. Nost fieshmen, I think, aien't going to $*#
consistently with the iuea that belief is sufficient foi tiuth.
Seconu, the fact that theie is uisagieement amongst expeits
about which aie the *7." tiuisms uoesn't imply that theie aie
no such tiuisms, oi that we uon't tacitly believe some iathei
than otheis. Nobouy evei saiu it woulu be easy to specify the
content of oui tacit beliefs about matteis as complicateu as
tiuth.
0n the view I'm suggesting, then, what makes a theoiy
about tiuth iathei than something else is that it incoipoiates
the coie tiuisms, in the sense of eithei incluuing them among
the piinciples of the theoiy oi incluuing piinciples that uiiectly
entail them. Anu we'll count it as a TBE0RY of tiuth (as
opposeu to just a chat about it say) just when it ":%+$)1( those
tiuisms. Anu an obvious way to uo that is to show why they aie
tiue by pointing to some piopeity oi piopeities that all tiue
piopositions have that iesults in those piopositions satisfying
the tiuisms. Such a piopeity will have the featuies uesciibeu
by the coie tiuisms. Featuies of this soit coulu obviously be
calleu coie featuies. But in the piesent case what we might as
well call them the #./)(& ;"$#/."(<


S. A functional analysis

0ui fiist question foi a pluialist theoiy of tiuth was: how uo
we iuentify the piopeities in viitue of which piopositions aie
tiue. We now have an answei. A piopeity ueteimines that a
pioposition is tiue when it has the tiuish featuies. That is:

TR0ISB: A piopeity ueteimines that piopositions aie
tiue just when it is such that piopositions which have it
aie objective, coiiect to believe, anu those we shoulu
aim to believe in inquiiy.

The tiuish featuies aie ielational; they specify that tiuth has a
iole in a stiuctuie of inteiielateu piopeities, ievealeu by the
folk tiuisms-what we calleu its nominal essence. Theie may
be othei featuies that aie pait of tiuth's nominal essence of
couise, featuies thatwhile possibly going beyonu the coie
also help to uemaicate tiuth in a stiuctuie of ielations. These
incluue ielations to asseition, negation, anu logical
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
7
consequence. But at its heait, that stiuctuie connects tiuth
with belief, inquiiy anu objective being.
This, in effect, is the basic insight anu staiting point of
what I've elsewheie calleu the functionalist theoiy of tiuth.
The guiuing iuea of that view is that we think of the coie
tiuisms as ievealing what tiuth uoes - its functional iole. That
is,

(F) (!x) x is tiue if, anu only if, x has a piopeity that
plays the tiuth-iole.

In effect, oui uiscussion above tells us what constitutes playing
the tiuth-iole. A piopeity plays the tiuth iole when it has the
tiuish featuies. Noieovei, this iueathe iuea that tiue
piopositions have a piopeity that has the tiuish featuies (oi
we can now say: "plays the tiuth-iole")is a consequence of
what it takes foi a theoiy to "5"1 *7/1# as a theoiy of tiuth.
These featuies tell us what a piopeity !/(# be like to play the
tiuth-iole.
1u
Thus while we initially appealeu to the tiuish
featuies only to help )2"1#);' that piopeity oi piopeities that
plays the tiuth-iole, it seems waiianteu to go fuithei anu take
those tiuish featuies as uefining that iole. This means tieating
the tiuish featuies as featuies of tiuth's nominal essence that
aie conceptually essentialessential by way of the veiy
concept of tiuth.
11

0nueistoou in this way, oui functional unueistanuing of
tiuth is piesupposeu in oui giasp of the concept.
12
Not

1u
As just noteu, theie will be othei featuies, anu possibly othei coie
featuies, that will help us uemaicate the tiuth-iole. Specifying the extent
anu limits of these featuies of tiuth, anu ueteimining which aie moie
centially weighteu than otheis, is an impoitant fuithei pioject foi the
alethic functionalist, just as it is foi functionalists in the philosophy of minu.
But howevei those questions aie ueciueu, the basic functionalist iuea
tiuth's conceptually essential featuies jointly uefine the tiuth-iole. See
Lynch, 2uu9, chaptei 1 foi moie uiscussion.

11
0bviously, not eveiy essential featuie of a piopeity is conceptually
essential. =")16 )2"1#)*$+ #7 )#("+; oi 8")16 2)(#)1*# ;.7! #&" 1/!8". > aie
both featuies of tiuth, foi example. But neithei seives to iuentify tiuth
(they uon't uistinguish tiuth fiom othei piopeities) anu ceitainly neithei is
a conceptual tiuth about #./#&. Compaie Baviu's iemaiks, this volume.

12
In a iecent aiticle, Coiy Wiight aigues that functionalist views face a
pioblem of epistemic ciiculaiity. Wiight has in minu veisions of the view
that explicitly employ iamsification techniques foi making an implicit
uefinition of tiuth (see Lynch 2uu1, 2uu4). Such techniques aie useful, but
as oui uiscussion illustiates, they aie not necessaiy to make the
functionalist's basic point. Nonetheless, Wiight may suspect his woiiy is
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
8
suipiisingly, then, the majoi metaphysical theoiies of tiuth's
natuie aie peifectly consistent with it. Take a stanuaiu monist
theoiy such as the coiiesponuence theoiy of tiuth. 0nueistoou
fiom a functional peispective, this is the view that theie is only
one piopeity that has the tiuish featuies, anu which theiefoie
plays the tiuth-iole: the coiiesponuence piopeity. Even
ueflationist theoiies can be unueistoou in this way. Inueeu,
ueflationists aie obviously functionalists: they tell us that
tiuth's natuie is exhausteu by its function, which by theii
account is quite thin: tiuth functions as an expiessive uevice,
anu that is all. Consequently, on theii view, tiuth uoes have a
functional iole, anu that iole, insofai as it is playeu by any
piopeity at all, is playeu by the piopeity of being an expiessive
uevice.
So the functionalist theoiy itself is not a metaphysical
theoiy of the natuie of tiuth. It uoesn't tell us what tiuth is. But
it uoes give us a way of answeiing a question that any
metaphysic of tiuth must answei, anu a question that is
paiticulaily impoitant foi pluialism. It tells us how to iuentify
the piopeities that make juugments tiue. They aie the
piopeities the play the tiuth-iole oi have the tiuish featuies.
Inueeu, it is uifficult to see what othei soit of answei a
pluialist *$1 give to oui question. Pluialism is the view that
theie is moie than one piopeity, F1.Fn in viitue of which
piopositions aie tiue. Eithei F1..Fn posses the tiuish featuies
oi they uo not. If they uo, then they all have something in
common: they all satisfy the tiuisms - which is to say that they
all fall unuei the same (functional) uesciiption. If they uo not,
then, then foi ieasons auuuceu above, we shoulu not iegaiu
the position as a theoiy of #./#& at all. It is the view, insteau,
that the woiu "tiue" picks out vaiious piopeities, none of
which have anything tiuish in common. This woulu, in effect,
be a foim of eliminativism about tiuth, not pluialism.
A similai uilemma confionts anyone who takes "tiue" to
be stiaightfoiwaiuly ambiguous like the woiu "bank" - that is,
as a woiu with moie than one meaning anu iefeient. Eithei the
piopeities iefeiieu to by the pieuicate beai the nominal

moie geneial; he says: "But any implicit uefinition pioceeus on the basis of
explicit uecisions that the piinciples constitutive of |the ielevant iamsey
sentencej aie themselves tiue. Bence the ciiculaiity. In tuin, making any
explicit uecisions that they aie tiue iequiies alieauy knowing in auvance
what tiuth is. Bence the epistemic ciiculaiity." (Wiight, 2u1u). This is a
geneial pioblem - but it is, I woulu suggest, too geneial to be just a pioblem
foi the pluialist. Any attempt to uefine -oi even fix the iefeience of - "tiue"
-by appeal to what I've calleu tiuisms will face such a pioblem. But then the
pioblem is one foi any view.
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
9
essence of tiuth in common, oi they uon't. If they uo, then why
not take that shaieu nominal essence as the common meaning
of "tiue". If they uon't, then it is misleauing to say that, "theie
is moie than one way to be tiue". Theie is not moie than one
way to be a bank. Riveibanks anu the Bank of Ameiica aie not
two ways to be the same thing. Theie aie simply uiffeient
meanings to the woiu. Analogously with an ambiguity view
about "tiue". What we believeu was in common between the
uiffeient uses, has, on this view, been eliminateu.
1S

So we now have a way foi the pluialist to iuentify those
piopeities in viitue of which piopositions aie tiue. But we still
neeu auuiess oui seconu question: to say what tiuth is - anu
how it is ielateu to those piopeities that ueteimine it. Beie the
functionalist faces some options.


4. The Natuie of Tiuth: Foui initial options

If the above iemaiks aie iight, pluialists must be functionalists
about the concept of tiuth, oi at least about how we iuentify
the iefeient(s) of that concept. But that still leaves open oui
seconu question, which is how to ielate the vaiious piopeities
pluialists aie pluialists about to the piopeity of tiuth itself.
Beie aie foui options foi the pluialist cum functionalist:

-./#& )( #&" ."$+)?". %.7%".#'. 0n this view, theie is a single
functional concept of tiuth, but it picks out uiffeient piopeities
when asciibeu to uiffeient kinus of piopositions.
14
This is the
veision of pluialism uefenueu by Ciispin Wiight (2uu1). The
concept acts as a non-iigiu uefinite uesciiption. In this way,
"tiue" is like "the coloi of the sky at noon". The lattei phiase
expiesses a single unifoim concept, but it uenotes uiffeient
piopeities in uiffeient enviionmental contexts. Analogously,
"tiue" expiesses a single uesciiption (as given by Tiuish
above) but that uesciiption applies (oi can apply) to uistinct
piopeities. Bence on this view, we might say that tiuth 9/(# )(
whatevei piopeity plays the tiuth-iole foi a given kinu of
pioposition.
Realizei functionalism is ieuuctive in natuie, anu thus
akin to othei ieuuctive functionalisms, such as those

1S
Foi fuithei pioblems with such a view, see Lynch, 2uu9, Peueisen 2uu6,
Tappolet 1997.

14
A lengthiei uiscussion of Ciispin Wiight's position can be founu in Lynch
2uu6.

Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
1u
championeu by Lewis (198u) anu Kim (1998) with iegaiu to
psychological piopeities. 0n this soit of view, theie is no fact
about whethei, e.g., x is in pain ovei anu above whethei x has
some physical piopeity P, anu so "theie is no neeu to think of
|painj itself as a piopeity in its own iight" (Kim 1998, 1u4).
Realizei pluialism is paiallel: theie is no fact of the mattei
whethei a pioposition is tiue ovei anu above whethei it has
some lowei-level piopeity like supeiwaiiant oi
coiiesponuence. Consequently, "tiuth" uoes not name a
piopeity shaieu by all tiuths.
Realizei functionalism has its attiactions, but it faces
some by-now familiai pioblems. 0ne of the most uiscusseu
conceins the tiuth of "mixeu" compounu piopositions.
1S

Consiuei the pioposition

(W) Wateiboaiuing is painful anu wateiboaiuing is
wiong.

Intuitively, the conjuncts of this pioposition aie of uistinct
kinus. 0ne is noimative, the othei not. So accoiuing to iealizei
pluialism, the tiuth concept expiesses uistinct piopeities
when asciibeu to one conjunct (some coiiesponuence
piopeity say) anu anothei piopeity (supeiwaiiant say) when
asciibeu to the othei. But if so, what piopeity uoes it pick out
when asciibeu to (W) as a whole.
This is a significant pioblem, anu not just foi iealizei
functionalism, as we'll see below. But it is paiticulaily uamning
foi any view, like iealizei functionalism, which uenies that
theie is a "global" tiuth piopeity - a piopeity expiesseu by the
tiuth concept that applies acioss the boaiu to piopositions of
eveiy type. Inueeu, as a numbei of authois have aigueu, t
seems that any satisfactoiy iesolution of the pioblem will
iequiie just such a piopeity (Tappolet, 1997, Lynch, 2uu6,
Peueisen 2u1u, Cotnoii 2uu9).
A seconu pioblem foi iealizei functionalism is that
unueimines one of the motivations foi auopting pluialism in
the fiist place. As we just noteu, the analogous position in the
philosophy of minu implies that pain is not a ieal psychological
kinu. Theie is nothing in common, in othei woius, between the
states we uesciibe as pain-states in uogs anu the states we
uesciibe as pain-states in humans. Consequently the view gives
up the ability to appeal to pain as such in geneial psychological

1S
A sampling of the liteiatuie heie incluues Williamson, 1994; Tappolet
2uuu; N. Peueisen 2uu6, Euwaius 2uu8, 2uu9, Cotnoii 2uu9.

Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
11
explanation. Anu this is a loss. Foi we uo finu it useful anu
infoimative to talk about pain as such in oiuei to explain othei
things of psychological inteiest, such as feai, oi angei. A
similai loss occuis with iealizei functionalism about tiuth. It
implies that tiue piopositions uo not foim a ieal kinu. The only
piopeity shaieu by all anu only tiue piopositions is one that is
not, by the lights of the theoiy itself, asciibeu by oui use of
''tiue'' oi uenoteu by ''tiuth''. Consequently, theie is no
piopeity we asciibe by ''tiue'' that can be appealeu to in oiuei
to explain ceitain geneial facts. 0ne such geneial fact, foi
example, we might wish to explain is

0nity: beliefs with iauically uistinct kinus of content aie
equally apt foi one kinu of noimative assessment.

We might put this by saying that they aie open to being
assesseu as coiiect in the same soit of way. What explains
this. The simple explanation is that beliefs aie coiiect when
they have the piopeity #./#&. 0f couise, to those who alieauy
believe that tiuth as such has no geneial explanatoiy iole to
playwho believe that it uoes not figuie in explaining
anything else of inteiest such as belief, oi content oi
meaningthis will not be tioubling. But then they will not
have neeueu iealizei functionalism to ieach that conclusion.
But to those who see tiuth as at least a potentially valuable
explanatoiy iesouice, iealizei pluialism iemains uissatisfying.

-./#& )( #&" .7+" %.7%".#'< This view (Lynch, 2uu1, 2uu4, 2uu6)
attempts to avoiu the above pioblems by iuentifying tiuth with
what is sometimes calleu the "iole" piopeity: oi the piopeity
of having a piopeity that plays the tiuth-iole. This allows one
to say that theie is a single piopeity of tiuth. Bence theie is no
baiiiei to 0nity: any pioposition is coiiect just when tiue -
that is, just when it has the piopeity of having a piopeity that
plays the tiuth-iole.
But this position is ultimately unsatisfying. Fiist, like its
cousin 'iealizei tiuth functionalism' it says nothing about
mixeu conjunctions othei than they aie tiue when they have
the piopeity of having a piopeity that plays the tiuth-iole .But
it uoesn't tell us what piopeity a mixeu conjunction has that
plays the tiuth-iole.
Seconu, the piopeity of having a piopeity that plays the
tiuth-iole uoesn't obviously have the tiuish featuies that
uefine tiuth's functional iole. Is the piopeity of having a
piopeity that play the tiuth-iole the piopeity that we aim oui
beliefs to have in inquiiy. It uoesn't look like it.
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
12

-./#& )( $ 2)(9/1*#)5" %.7%".#'. A thiiu option is to take the
functional concept of tiuth to uenote a single uisjunctive
piopeity.
16
Suppose, foi simplicity's sake, that some
piopositions aie tiue when supeiwaiianteu anu all othei
piopositions aie tiue when they iepiesent things as they aie. If
so, then we might say that oui functional uesciiption of tiuth
just picks out a piopeity uefineu like this:

A pioposition is tiue
B
just when it is eithei
supeiwaiianteu oi iepiesents things aie they aie.

If we can accept that a pioposition is coiiect just when it is
tiue
B,
--- when it is eithei supeiwaiianteu oi iepiesenting, this
view allows us to giant the simple explanation of 0nity. But it
too seems to founuei on mixeu conjunctions like (W) above.
Foi again the question is what makes the conjunction )#("+;
#./"< Anu the conjunction itself is suiely not tiue because it has
the piopeity of, say, being eithei supeiwaiianteu oi
iepiesenting the facts. Foi that to be the case (W) must have
one of the "uisjunct piopeities"; but it is not cleai what
piopeity that woulu be. The pioposition that wateiboaiuing is
painful might iepiesent some fact (oi objectpiopeity paii). It
is fai fiom cleai that the pioposition that wateiboaiuing is
painful anu wateiboaiuing is wiong itself iepiesents any fact.

-./#& )( $ 2)(@/7#$#)71$+ %.7%".#'< A final possibility is that
tiuth itself is a meiely uisquotational piopeity: that is, the
piopeity of being an expiessive uevice.
17
This woulu the iesult
if we took it that the function of tiuth was as thin as the
ueflationists typically take it to be. 0n this view, the concept of
tiuth woulu be the concept of the piopeity whose only featuie
is that it is $ 2"5)*" ;7. 6"1".$+)?$#)71 5)$ 2)(@/7#$#)71. Theie is
nothing else to say about tiuth itself othei than that.
The pioblem with this view becomes appaient once we
iemembei it is to be combineu with the metaphysics of
pluialism. The combineu view is ouu to say the least: tiuth
itself is a uisquotational piopeity. If a pioposition P has that
piopeity, you can infei P, anu if P, you can infei it has that

16
See Peueisen 2u1u foi uiscussion of veisions of this alteinative. In a
foithcoming papei, he suggests that theie aie piopeities specific to the
vaiious compounus in viitue of which they can possess the uisjunctive
piopeity. This leaus, as he acknowleuges, to a multiplication of tiuth
ueteimining piopeities.
17
A vaiiant is tentatively suggesteu by Cotnoii (2uu9).
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
1S
piopeity. But whethei a pioposition has that piopeity is
ueteimineu by whethei it has some moie substantive piopeity,
like coiiesponuence. But A&' woulu a pioposition's having the
uisquotational piopeity uepenu on its having some othei,
piesumably non-uisquotational piopeity. Noieovei, the view
woulu iule out appealing to tiuth itself to explain phenomena
like 0nity above. So like the iealizei view, it is not cleai that it
woulu have viitues above those of ueflationism simplicitei.

S. Tiuth as Immanent

Recall wheie we aie: I've saiu that pluialists shoulu be
inueeu, have to befunctionalists. The piopeities in viitue of
which piopositions aie tiue aie those that play the tiuth-iole.
What constitutes a piopeity playing that iole is it's having the
tiuish featuies. But oui seconu question is still outstanuing:
what uo these piopeities have to uo with tiuth.
In oiuei to answei this question, the pluialist cum
functionalist neeus two things. She neeus an account of what
functionalists sometimes call "iealization" anu she neeus an
account of the piopeity tiuth itself.
I think we can meet both uemanus at once. Stait with
the thought that piopeities can have theii featuies essentially
oi acciuentally. A functional piopeity is uefineu by its
functional iole, which, I've suggesteu, is best seen as the sum of
those ielational featuies implicit in the nominal essence of the
piopeity. Those featuies can theiefoie be thought to be
essential to it. Thus, foi the functionalist, the natuial
suggestion is to "@/$#" the piopeity of tiuth with the piopeity
#&$# &$( #&" #./)(& ;"$#/."( "(("1#)$++' oi which plays the tiuth-
iole $( (/*&. It is the piopeity that is, necessaiily, hau by
believeu contents just when things aie as they aie believeu to
be; hau by piopositions believeu at the enu of inquiiy anu
which makes piopositions coiiect to believe.
This gives us a stiaightfoiwaiu account of what tiuth is.
Yet once we unueistanu tiuth this way, we can go on to say
that the piopeity can be )!!$1"1# in othei piopeities.
18
An
immanent piopeity is a piopeity that can be manifesteu by
othei piopeities. N manifests an immanent piopeity F just
when it is a piioii that F's conceptually essential featuies aie a
subset of N's featuies. Again, a conceptually essential featuie

18
Why talk of manifestation anu immanence iathei than iealization. To
avoiu confusion; "iealization" is geneially unueistoou by philosopheis of
minu to be an a posteiioii, non-iational ielationship.

Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
14
of F is an essential featuie of F that (a) is pait of the nominal
essence of F; (b) holus as a mattei of conceptual necessity; anu
so, (c) helps to uistinguish F fiom othei piopeities. Since eveiy
piopeity's conceptually essential featuies aie a subset of its
own featuies, eveiy piopeity manifests itself. So immanence,
like iuentity, is ieflexive. But unlike iuentity, it is non-
symmetiic. Wheie N anu F aie uistinctinuiviuuateu by non-
iuentical sets of conceptually essential featuies anu ielations
anu F is immanent in N, N is not immanent in tiuth. Intuitively
put, wheie F is immanent in N, it will be the case that %$.# 7;
8")16 3 )( 8")16 B<
Applieu to tiuth, the initial thought is this: foi some
piopositions, tiuth is manifesteu by, oi immanent in theii
coiiesponuence to vaiious bits of ieality. Pait of what is foi
those piopositions to coiiesponu is foi them to be tiue. }ust as
the psychological functionalist will claim that which physical
piopeity ."$+)?"( pain in a given oiganism is ueteimineu by
facts about the oiganism, the alethic functionalist will claim
that which piopeity !$1);"(#( tiuth foi a paiticulai
pioposition will uepenu on facts about that pioposition. Two
kinus of fact aie cleaily ielevant. The fiist is what the
pioposition is about. The seconu is the pioposition's logical
stiuctuie.
This seconu point is not suipiising. That a pioposition's
logical stiuctuie shoulu help to ueteimine how it is tiue is
familiai fiom tiauitional coiiesponuence views, accoiuing to
which the only soit of piopositions that coiiesponu to facts aie
atomic. Similaily, which piopeity manifests tiuth foi a
pioposition uepenus on whethei it is atomic oi not. Bow we
unueistanu this, howevei, uepenus on how we unueistanu the
fiist soit of fact.
In T0N, I suggesteu that pluialists holu that tiuth foi
atomics is always manifesteu ielative to what I calleu a uomain
of inquiiy. As I uefineu it, a piopositional uomain is a subject-
mattei: mathematics anu ethics aie two examples. Bow uo we
know whethei a pioposition is about one subject iathei than
anothei. Bow else. By looking at the objects anu piopeities
the concepts which compose that pioposition aie about.
I still take this to be faiily stiaightfoiwaiu. Almost any
philosophei will think that theie aie uiffeient kinus of content,
anu will take it foi gianteu that we believe all soits of uiffeient
kinus of piopositions: piopositions about ethics, mathematics,
about the sunuiies of eveiyuay life. No one, piesumably, will
ueny that these piopositions concein not just uiffeient
subjects, but ;/12$!"1#$++' uiffeient subjects. Anu $1'
philosophei who wishes to claim that we shoulu tieat
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
1S
piopositions about these subject matteis uiffeientlyfoi
example, by saying that they aien't iepiesentational, oi aie all
falsemust have a way of uistinguishing piopositions of
uiffeient kinus fiom one anothei. Nothing about pluialism
uistinguishes it in this iegaiu.
Nonetheless, talk of "uomains", uoes suggest, if it uoes
not imply, that subject matteis come in natuial kinus, anu that
as a iesult, we can soit them into these kinus with little
uifficulty. That is implausible. We can aumit, as is obvious, that
beliefs have uiffeient kinus of content, but we neeun't say that
the piopositions that aie those contents uiviue into natuial oi
iigiu kinus.
So why the use of the teim "uomain". 0ne ieason was
this. Theie aie uoubtless piopositions that coiiesponu but aie
not supeiwaiianteu. Foi example, consiuei

(Stai) At this veiy moment, the numbei of stais in the
univeise is ouu.

Piesumably eithei this pioposition oi its negation is tiue. But
neithei is supeiwaiianteu. No mattei how many stages of
inquiiy we go thiough, we aie nevei going to possess waiiant
foi oi against (Stai). Yet piesumably theie eithei aie oi aie not
an ouu numbei of stais in the univeise at this moment.
If both coiiesponuence anu supeiwaiiant manifest
tiuth - play the tiuth-iole - foi (Stai) then we have a pioblem.
Assume that falsity is tiuth of negation. Assume that (Stai) is
not supeiwaiianteu, but that it uoes coiiesponu with ieality.
Conclusion: it is both tiue anu false. In T0N, I solveu this by
uiawing a page fiom the philosophy of minu. }ust as a given
neuial piopeity only iealizes pain ielative foi a given
oiganism, so a given semantic piopeity like coiiesponuence
only iealizes tiuth foi a uomain. But this was moie theoiy than
I neeueu. All I ieally neeueu to say was this: piopeities like
coiiesponuence manifest tiuth foi some piopositions anu not
otheis, $12 only one piopeity of a pioposition manifests tiuth
foi that pioposition.
19

Let's unpack this. We can say that wheie N is a piopeity
uistinct fiom tiuth,

If P is an atomic pioposition, then: P is tiue if anu only if
it has the piopeity N that manifests tiuth foi P.


19
A numbei of commentatois have suggesteu this point to me, incluuing,
most iecently, Naiian Baviu in his contiibution to this volume.
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
16
Anu

If P is atomic anu P is N, then: N manifests tiuth foi P, if
anu only if it is a piioii that the tiuish featuies aie $
%.7%". (/8("# of N's featuies.

So an atomic pioposition is tiue when it has the uistinct ;/.#&".
piopeity that manifests tiuth ;7. 3.
2u
Not being tiue consists in
lacking that piopeity, eithei because theie is no piopeity that
manifests tiuth, in which case the content in question is
neithei tiue noi false, oi because theie is such a piopeity, but
the pioposition in question fails to have it, in which case it is
false.
But if it is not the facts about the uomain to which a
pioposition belongs which ueteimine which piopeity
manifests tiuth foi a pioposition, what uoes. The veiy same
facts as befoie. Think about it this way. No mattei what youi
theoiy of tiuth might be, the question of what makes a
paiticulai pioposition tiue (oi even tiuth-apt) will uepenu on
the facts about that pioposition. What is it about. What
concepts uoes it employ anu so on. These aie the questions we
will ask when confionting this issue. It woulu be cuiious if oui
answeis uiun't soit themselves into gioups, since, as I've
alieauy noteu, it is obvious that piopositions uo come in at
least iough kinus -kinus that aie inuiviuuateu by uiffeiences in
the soits of piopeities anu objects that the vaiious soits of
piopositions aie about.
If this is iight, theie is no neeu foi the pluialist to soit
(atomic) piopositions into stiict uomains. She takes each
pioposition as it comes, finuing that, in fact, they come in
gioups, in bunches, in mobs.
21


6. Plain tiuth

A significant benefit of unueistanuing tiuth as an immanent

2u
Baviu (this volume) complains that I must ielativize playing the tiuth-
iole, not manifestation. But playing the tiuth-iole means having the tiuish
featuies, anu piopeities that have those featuies manifest tiuth. It is
manifestation that is in the metaphysical uiivei's seat.

21
So uoes must the pluialist believe that we always know what subject we
aie talking about. No. Aie theie inteiesting philosophical pioblems about
when aie talking about ethics anu when the law, when we aie talking about
mathematics anu when physics. Suie. But they aien't special to pluialists.


Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
17
piopeity is that a natuial way of uealing with the pioblem of
mixeu compounus uiops out of the position. Whethei oi not a
iecuisive account of all compounu piopositions can be given,
theie is something iight about the insight that guiues such
analyses. What's iight about it coulu be captuieu by saying that
all tiuth is giounueu in a ceitain sense. Theie can be no change
in the tiuth-value of a compounu pioposition without change
in the tiuth-value of (7!" atomic piopositions. The tiuth-value
of compounus supeivenes on the tiuth-value of atomic
piopositions. Call this the weak giounuing piinciple. Accoiuing
to the theoiy that tiuth is an immanent functional piopeity, a
piopeity N manifests tiuth just when it is a piioii that the
tiuish featuies aie a subset of the featuies anu ielations of N.
Nanifestation, so uesciibeu, is a ieflexive ielation, since eveiy
set is a subset of itself. Thus all piopeities, incluuing tiuth, self-
manifest. When a pioposition is tiue only by viitue of self-
manifesting tiuth, we can say that the ielevant pioposition )(
%+$)1+' #./". What makes a compounu pioposition plainly tiue.
uiven oui weak giounuing piinciple, compounu piopositions
aie plainly tiue if theii tiuth-value is weakly giounueu. That is,
if theii tiuth-value supeivenes on the tiuth-value of
piopositions which aie eithei compounu anu giounueu oi
atomic (anu hence whose tiuth-value uepenus on having a
piopeity 7#&". #&$1 #./#& that manifests tiuth.) So even if it
tuins out that a tiuth-functional iecuisive analysis uoes not
apply to eveiy compounu pioposition (like subjunctive
conuitionals, foi example) the immanence pluialist can accept
the weak giounuing piinciple. Noieovei, she will have
inuepenuent motivation to uo so. Foi she is alieauy committeu
to (i) the thought that what's tiue uepenus on what is tiue in a
paiticulai way; anu (ii), to the iuea that tiue atomic
piopositions have fuithei piopeities like supeiwaiiant that
manifest tiuth. Consequently, it seems ieasonable foi hei to
holu that a compounu pioposition's tiuth is ultimately
giounueu on the tiuth-values of atomic piopositions.
Compounu piopositions, mixeu oi not, aie tiue because they
aie plainly tiue.
As I noteu above the pictuie heie is familiai fiom oluei
coiiesponuence theoiies of tiuth: the theoiy is applieu in the
fiist instance to atomics. But uoes the weak giounuing
piinciple holu acioss the boaiu. Night not theie be some plain
tiuths that uon't supeivene on countable unplain tiuths.
22


22
This question was put to me by Stewait Shapiio in his comments on my
book at a session at the APA, Febiuaiy 2u1u.
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
18
As I see it, pluialists who embiace an immanence
metaphysics can agiee that theie aie without any significant
mouification to theii view. To see why they might wish to,
consiuei a tiuth attiibution such as

(1) The pioposition that ioses aie ieu is tiue.

This is an atomic pioposition. It asciibes a piopeitytiuth
to an object, a pioposition. In viitue of what is it tiue. Theie
aie vaiious answeis available to the pluialist. They might say,
foi example, that tiuth attiibutions aie tiue in the same way as
the pioposition to which tiuth is asciibeu. Call this the
inheiitance view. Thus (1), foi example, is tiue howevei

(2) Roses aie ieu

Is tiue. So if (2) is tiue because it coiiesponus to ieality
(howevei that is casheu out) then so is (1). Tiuth attiibutions
)1&".)# the piopeity that manifests theii tiuth fiom the
pioposition to which they attiibute tiuth. Thus (1) will be
coiiesponuence tiue, anu so will any pioposition that
attiibutes tiuth to )# anu so on up the lauuei of semantic
ascent.
uiven a pluialist metaphysics, the inheiitance view
implies that tiuth asciiptions can themselves be tiue in
uiffeient ways. Anu that might seem to be at tension with the
iuea that which piopeity manifests tiuth foi a pioposition
uepenus on the subject mattei it is about. Theie woulu be no
tension if (1) anu (2) aie the same pioposition. But it is not
cleai that pluialists shoulu, oi even can, embiace this
ueflationaiy stanupoint. If not, then one woulu neeu to explain
why attiibutions of tiuth aien't all tiue in the same way.
2S


2S
0ne coulu also go in the complete othei uiiection anu auopt a levels view
(see Cotnoii, this volume). Beie you holu that eveiy level of tiuth
attiibution is maue in a uiffeient uomain, anu hence that eveiy tiuth
attiibution is tiue in a uiffeient way than the one pieceuing it on the
semantic lauuei. (Foi ieasons having to uo with the paiauoxes, you might
auu that no uomain has the iesouices to make tiuth attiibutions about
itself. As Cotnoii notes, a solution to the liai opens up that will be in many
ways paiallel to Taiski's). Beie aie thiee conceins. Fiist, A&' think that (1)
anu an attiibution of tiuth to (1) manifest tiuth uiffeiently. Seconu, given
that we can continue to attiibute tiuth to the tiuth attiibution to (1) anu so
on, this seems to imply that an inuefinite numbei of uiffeient piopeities
that manifest tiuth. Anu finally, note that the levels view implies that (1)
anu an attiibution of tiuth to (1) aie not cognitively equivalent. As with an
inheiitance view, this may oi may not be a bau thing, uepenuing on one's
view about how to ieau the so-calleu "equivalence schema".
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
19
In any event, the inheiitance view is not, I think, what
pluialists shoulu say about tiuth attiibutions. Foi it seems
hopeless in the face of the fact that we use tiuth to geneialize
ovei piopositions, as when we say:

(S) Eveiything Stewait says is tiue.

This of couise, is not atomic. It is a univeisal geneialization
ovei piopositions saiu, oi potentially saiu, by Stewait, that is:

Foi eveiy pioposition P, if Stewaits says P then P is
tiue.

It is obvious why the inheiitance view won't woik. It says that
a tiuth attiibutei inheiits the way it is tiue fiom the tiuth
attiibutee. But obviously Stewait may say all soits of
piopositions, about all soits of things. uiven pluialism, they
might have theii tiuth manifesteu in uistinct ways.
So if the inheiitance view won't woik, what will. An
obvious suggestion is to say that tiuth attiibutions aie plainly
tiue. That is, they aien't tiue in any paiticulai way. This seems
paiticulaily sensible in the case of a pioposition like (1). Foi it
is intuitive that (1) is tiue because (2) is tiue. While (1) anu (2)
aie both atomic, (1) is cleaily tiue 8"*$/(" of (2), anu (2)'s
tiuth will be manifesteu by coiiesponuence. The plain tiuth of
(1) is founueu on the unplain tiuth of (2).
So fai so goou. But what about (S). It is not at all cleai
that the tiuth of (S) will uepenu on any countable numbei of
unplain tiuths. This may be because of paiauox. Suppose I
asseit (S). 0ne of the things Stewait might say is that what
Lynch says is false. Contiauiction. But even putting asiue the
always tioublesome paiauoxes, imagine that I asseit (S) anu
one of the things Stewait says is that eveiything Lynch says is
tiue (a much happiei example). Which tiuths, exactly, will the
tiuth of (S) uepenu on. We seem caught in a loop.
A simple way of uniaveling these knots is foi the
pluialist to giant that theie may be piopositions that aie
plainly tiue but whose tiuth uoes not uepenu on the tiuth-
value of any unplain tiuth. Inueeu, theie aie a vaiiety of
ieasons to consiuei this. Consiuei, foi example, the tiuths of
logic, such as

(4) If P, then P.



Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
2u
This is again not atomic. But its tiuth-value uoesn't cleaily
uepenu on the tiuth-value of its atomic components; P coulu
have any tiuth-value anu (4) woulu still be tiue. Noieovei, it
seems cuiious to say that it coiiesponus to ieality eithei. What
ieality, exactly. Anu being a necessaiy tiuth, it seems less than
plausible to say that its tiuth is somehow epistemically
constiaineu anu hence that its tiuth is manifesteu by its being
supeiwaiianteu. It seems much moie plausible to simply say
that (4) is plainly tiue - not because its tiuth uepenus on some
othei tiuth, but because its tiuth is somehow basic. It neeus no
metaphysical explanation.
But then has pluialismfunctionalism simply collapseu
into ueflationism. If ungiounueu plain tiuth is goou enough foi
some piopositions, then why not all. Beie's my ieply: The
possibility of ungiounueu plain tiuths uoes not mean that
ueflationism is on its way. To see this, let's think foi a minute
about what ueflationism involves. It is haiu to geneialize, but I
think ueflationaiy views involve two commitments. Fiist, the
concept of tiuth is an expiessive uevice of geneialization.
Seconu, whatevei piopeity, if any, that concept uenotes is itself
metaphysically tianspaient. A piopeity is metaphysically
tianspaient just when all the essential facts about the piopeity
can by known via giasp of the concept alone.
It follows that plain tiuth is not ueflationaiy tiuth. The
piopeity of being tiue, I claim, is the piopeity that has the
tiuish featuies essentially. That is, the piopeity of tiuth is the
piopeity piopositions have when they aie objective, coiiect to
believe anu the soit of piopositions we aim at in inquiiy. So
tiuth is not just an expiessive uevice on my view. Inueeu I'm
not suie it is even essentially such a uevice. Noieovei, tiuth is
not metaphysically tianspaient eithei. While you can know the
tiuish featuies of tiuth just by giasping the concept of tiuth,
you can't know all the essential featuies of tiuth that way.
Beie's one essential featuie of tiuth you can't know that way:
that it is open to multiple manifestation.
But still: why 17# say that all tiue piopositions aie
plainly tiue. Why woiiy about whethei some piopositions
also have to theii tiuth manifesteu in some othei uistinct
piopeity like coiiesponuence. Well, think of iuentity. Suppose
we think that some things, like necessaiily existing objects, aie
just plainly iuentical acioss time. Theii iuentity is not
manifesteu by any othei piopeity. That haiuly means that
some things might not be iuentical in a paiticulai way.
Peisonal iuentity acioss time might well be manifesteu by
psychological continuity. It all uepenus - not only on what we
think we must say in oiuei to account foi peisonal iuentity, but
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
21
moie impoitantly, on what we think we must say about
peisonal iuentity )1 7.2". #7 ":%+$)1 7#&". %&"17!"1$ 7;
)1#"."(# C (/*& $( %".(71$+ ."(%71()8)+)#' $12 &/!$1 .)6&#(< The
same holus in the case of tiuth. The ieason I think that theie is
moie to say about tiuth in some uomains is the same ieason
othei substantive theoiists of tiuth think this: I think that we
must say moie about ceitain kinus of piopositions to explain
7#&". %&"17!"1$ 7; )1#"."(#D (/*& $( #&" 2);;"."1*"( )1 *71#"1#
8"#A""1 !7.$+4 !$#&"!$#)*$+ $12 %&'()*$+E789"*# %.7%7()#)71(.
In sum, I uon't think the pioblems iaiseu heie aie
%.78+"!( ;7. #&" %+/.$+)(#. Aftei all, eveiyone has a pioblem
explaining what makes asciiptions of tiuth tiue. Inueeu, what I
these ieflections to show is that the foim of pluialism I've
uefenueu heie has the iesouices to offei some new
explanations foi why ceitain tiuths aie tiue.

7. Conclusion

We have put thiee questions to the pluialist. We now have
thiee answeis.
Bow uo we iuentify those piopeities by viitue of which
piopositions aie tiue. Answei: by seeing which
piopeities play the tiuth-iole, anu hence have the tiuish
featuies.
Bow aie those piopeities ielateu to tiuth. Answei:
Tiuth as such is the piopeity that has the tiuish
featuies essentially. But tiuth can be immanent in
uistinct piopeities, piopeities that have the tiuish
featuies acciuentally.
What ueteimines whethei a given pioposition has one
of those piopeities iathei than anothei. Answei: two
things. Fiist, the logical stiuctuie of the pioposition anu
seconu, the subject mattei of the pioposition.

These aie not the only thiee questions a pluialist must answei.
Noi, peihaps, aie these the only answeis available. But if the
pluialist wishes to make sense of hei view, some such answeis
must be given. Avoiuing them is not an option.



Refeiences
Aiistotle. (199S). 3"#$%&'()*(, tians. C. Kiiwan, 0xfoiu: 0xfoiu
0niveisity Piess.
Beall, }c , (2uuu)."0n Nixeu Infeiences anu Pluialism about
Tiuth Pieuicates" F&)+7(7%&)*$+ G/$.#".+' Su: S8u-82.
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
22
-- (2uu9) H%$12."+( 7; -./#&. 0xfoiu: 0xfoiu 0niveisity Piess.
Bianuom, Robeit (2uu1) "Explanatoiy vs. Expiessive
Beflationism about Tiuth" in R. Schantz (eu). I&$# )(
-./#&J4 Beilin: Waltei Be uiuytei 1uS-1119.
Cotnoii, A. (2uu9). ''ueneiic Tiuth anu Nixeu Conjunctions:
Some Alteinatives'', Analysis 69.3:473-479
Baviu, Naiian. (1994). K7.."(%712"1*" $12 L)(@/7#$#)714
0xfoiu: 0xfoiu 0niveisity Piess.
Bevitt, Nichael. (1997) M"$+)(! $12 -./#&4 Piinceton, N}:
Piinceton 0niveisity.
Euwaius B. (2uu8), ''Bow to Solve the Pioblem of Nixeu
Conjunctions,'' N1$+'()(, 68.2, 14S-9.
Euwaius, B. (2uu9) "Tiuth Conuitions anu Tiuth: Resolving the
Pioblem of Nixeu Conjunctions,"Analysis 69.4:684-688.
Engel, Pascal (2uu2) -./#&4 Lonuon: Acumen.
Fielu, Baitiy. (1972) ''Taiski's Theoiy of Tiuth'', O7/.1$+ 7;
F&)+7(7%&', 69: S47-7S.
-- (1986) "The Beflationaiy Conception of Tiuth'', in B$*#4
H*)"1*" $12 37.$+)#' (eus.), u. NacBonalu anu C. Wiight.
0xfoiu: Blackwell, SS-117.
---(2uu1) -./#& $12 #&" N8("1*" 7; B$*#4 0xfoiu: 0xfoiu
0niveisity Piess
uupta, Anil. '(199S) "A Ciitique of Beflationism", F&)+7(7%&)*$+
-7%)*(, 21: S7-81.
Boiwich, Paul. (2uu1) ''Noims of Tiuth anu Neaning'', in I&$#
)( -./#&J (eu.), Richaiu Schantz (Beilin: Waltei
Beuiuytei.
EEE (1998) -./#& 2nu eun., 0xfoiu: 0xfoiu 0niveisity Piess.
}ackson, Fiank. (1998). B.7! 3"#$%&'()*( #7 P#&)*(D N L";"1(" 7;
K71*"%#/$+ N1$+'()( (0xfoiu:0xfoiu 0niveisity Piess).
Lynch, Nichael P. (1998) -./#& )1 K71#":#4 Cambiiuge, Nass:
NIT Piess.
--- (2uu1) ''A Functionalist Theoiy of Tiuth'' in -&" Q$#/." 7;
-./#& (eu.) N. Lynch, Cambiiuge, Nass.: NIT Piess.
---(2uu4a) ''Ninimalism anu the value of Tiuth'' F&)+7(7%&)*$+
G/$.#".+', S4: 497-S17.
---(2uu4b) ''Tiuth anu Nultiple Realizability'' N/(#.$+$()$1
O7/.1$+ 7; F&)+7(7%&', 82: S84-4u8.
---(2uu4c) -./" #7 R);". Cambiiuge: NIT Piess.
---(2uuS) "Alethic Functionalism anu oui Folk Theoiy of Tiuth"
H'1#&"(", 14S: 29-4S.
---(2uu6) "ReWiighting Pluialism" -&" 371)(#, 89: 6S-84.
E--(2uu9a) -./#& $( 01" $12 3$1', 0xfoiu: 0xfoiu 0niveisity
Piess.
E--(2uu9b) "The value of Tiuth anu the Tiuth of values" in
Lynch: Thiee Questions foi Tiuth Pluialism
2S
P%)(#"!)* S$+/", Bauuock, Nillai anu Piitchaiu (eus.)
0xfoiu: 0xfoiu 0niveisity Piess.
Peueisen, Nikolaj, (2uu6) 'What Can the Pioblem of Nixeu
Infeiences Teach us about Alethic Pluialism.'', -&"
371)(#, 89: 1uS-17.
--- (2u1u) "Stabilizing Alethic Pluialism" F&)+7(7%&)*$+
G/$.#".+' 6u, 92-1u8.
Putnam, Bilaiy. (1981) M"$(714 -./#& $12 T)(#7.'4 Cambiiuge:
Cambiiuge 0niveisity Piess.
Tappolet, Chiistine (1997) "Nixeu infeiences: A Pioblem foi
Pluialism about Tiuth Pieuicates", N1$+'()(, S7: 2u9-11
Tappolet, Chiistine (2uuu) "Tiuth, Pluialism anu Nany-valueu
Logic: A Reply to Beall" F&)+7(7%&)*$+ G/$.#".+' Su: S82-
S8S.
Taiski, Alfieu (1944) " The Semantic Conception of Tiuth anu
the Founuations of Semantics" F&)+7(7%&' $12
F&"17!"17+76)*$+ M"("$.*& 4: S42-S6u.
Williams, Nichael (2uu1). "0n Some Ciitics of Beflationism" in
R. Schantz (eu). I&$# )( -./#&J (Beilin: Waltei ue
uiuytei).
Williamson, Timothy (1994) "Ciitical Stuuy of Tiuth anu
0bjectivityU V1#".1$#)71$+ O7/.1$+ 7; F&)+7(7%&)*$+
H#/2)"( Su: 1Su-44.
Wittgenstein, Luuwig. (1922) -.$*#$#/( R76)*7EF&)+7(7%&)*/(,
tians. C. K. 0guen Lonuon: Kegan Paul.
Wiight, C. B. (2uuS) ''0n the Functionalization of Pluialist
Appioaches to Tiuth'', H'1#&"(" 14S: 1-28.
Wiight, C.B. (2u1u), "Tiuth, Ramsification anu the Pluialist's
Revenge" N/(#.$+$()$1 O7/.1$+ 7; F&)+7(7%&', 88.
Wiight, Ciispin (1992) -./#& $12 089"*#)5)#'4 Cambiiuge, Nass.:
Baivaiu 0niveisity Piess.
---(2uu1) "Ninimalism, Beflationism, Piagmatism, Pluialism"
in N. P. Lynch (eu.) -&" Q$#/." 7; -./#&4 Cambiiuge: NIT
Piess, 7S1-788<