CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FINALS REVIEWER

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Pardoning Power of the President
Sec. 19, Art. VII P may grant reprieves, commutations, pardons after
conviction of final judgment, except in impeachment cases

Torres vs. Gonzales
Torres contends that pronouncement of guilt of subsequent crime is
necessary before revoking parole.

The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.

Garcia vs. COA
Garcia wants to retain his position and payment of back wages after grant of
executive clemency.

The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely
obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found
him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This
can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner
from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement,
which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that
petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment;
he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemencyPetitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service
entitles him to back wages.

This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a
result of his unjust dismissal from the service.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Sec. 25, Art. VI C may not increase appro recommended by P for govt
operations; specific appropriations needed; follow procedure for approval;
special appro bill should be specific; transfer of appro not allowed thru any
law, but augmentation is allowed; release of discretionary funds need
vouchers; if no appro bill passed, last bill shall be enforced until new one is
passed.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII fiscal autonomy of J; no reduction of appro by C lower than
prev year; release is automatic and regular.

Removal of Deputy Justice
Sec. 2, Art. XI P, VP, Members of SC, CC and O removal thru impeachment
Sec. 3(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
In re Gonzales
An anonymous letter sent to Gonzales re disbarment charges for Fernan

A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be
thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either
criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or
misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

Judicial Power, Judicial Review

Political questions issues w/c are to be decided by people
Justiceable questions civil/personal/property rights


Marcos vs. Manglapus
On the power of P Cory to bar the return of Marcoses in the Philippines

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines

Functions of Judicial Review
Legitimating/Positive act of sustaining validity of consti; burden of proof
w/ suitor; presumption of constitutionality
Checking/Negative explicitly denouncing a law as unconsti; grave abuse of
discretion
Symbolic/Teaching conveying to bench and bar re parallel circumstances
on SC jurisprudence

Occena vs.COMELEC
Occena and Gonzales assailing validity of 1973 constitution

What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review
has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly
demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check
as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the
acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter
case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as
constitutionally deficient.

Sec 4(2), Art. VIII SC en banc to hear and decide case on constitutionality of
law, treaty, agreements

Salonga vs. Cruz Pano
Salonga linked to several bombings in Manila during Marcos regime

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees.

Requisites of Judicial Review
1. Actual case or controversy ripe for JR, not by hypothesis
2. Proper party personal & substantial claim
3. Raise at the earliest possible time
4. Necessity for determination of case

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISIONS

Term: 7 yrs w/out reappointment; no temporary/acting capacity

Sec. 1, Art. IXB Civil Service Commission. 1 chair, 2 comms; NB citizens, @
least 35, proven capacity for public admin, not candidates in preceding
elections

Scope all branches/govt corp w/ orig charter
Class Career (merit & fitness, tech quali) and Non-career (other quali)

Romualdez III vs. CSC
Romualdez asks for reinstatement, invoking security of tenure

A temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of
office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing
power. Thus, the matter of converting such a temporary appointment to a
permanent one is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing
authority. Respondent CSC cannot direct the appointing authority to make
such an appointment if it is not so disposed.

Sec. 1, Art. IXC Commission on Elections. 1 chair, 6 comms. NB citizens, @
least 35, college degree, not candidates in preceding elections, majority are
Bar members, including chair.


Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista
Petitioner contends appointment of Bautista as COMELEC chair whilst
retaining position as Sol Gen is unconstitutional

In the case at bar, however, as we have found that the respondent's
designation to act temporarily a member of the Commission on Elections is
unlawful because it offends against the provision of the Constitution creating
the Commission on Elections, the dismissal of the petition would deny and
deprive the parties that are affected by such designation of a remedy and
relief, because no one is entitled now to the office and a party who is not
entitled to the office may not institute quo warrant proceedings, and the
respondent as Solicitor General, the only other party who may institute the
proceedings, would not proceed against himself.

No Temporary/Acting Designation

Brillantes vs. Yorac
Brillantes contending the appointment of Yorac as acting COMELEC Chair

The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for
the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary
designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and
not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all,
did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by
the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the
participation of the President, however well-meaning The Constitution
provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members.
That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.

Election period and Election campaign
Sec. 9, Art. IXC commence 90 days before and end 30 days after election
day

Peralta vs. COMELEC
Petitioners assailing constitutionality of an Election Code provision on
campaign period

At any rate, insofar as objections to the fixing of the campaign period for
elections in general are concerned, it is apparent that there is a distinction
between the "election period" and "campaign period" The distinction is
further made apparent by the fact that the "election period" under Section 5
of Article XII-C of the Constitution extends even beyond the day of the
election itself, while the "campaign period", by reason of its nature and
purpose, must necessarily be before the elections are held. There is,
therefore, no conflict with the constitutional provision.

Sec. 1, Art. IXD Commission on Audit. 1 chair, 2 comms, NB citizens, @
least 35, not candidates in preceding elections, must be CPA for 10 years or
member of bar, practicing for 10 years; members not in same profession.

Powers: Sec. 2(1), Art. IXD examine, audit, settle all accounts on rev and
receipts thereof, expenditures, use of funds by govt and agencies and corpo
w/orig charter.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Sec. 3 (5,7), Art. XI impeachment proceedings only once a year; removal of
office and disqualification from holding office only, but may be subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment accdg to law.

CITIZENSHIP

1973 Constitution
Sec. 4, Art. III - A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.

1987 Constitution
Sec. 2, Art. IV Natural born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.

Lo Beng Ha Ong vs Republic
Ong petitions for naturalization and cancellation of alien certificate of
registration

Appellee's arguments miss the nature of citizenship and the power of the
state over it. The provisions of the civil code that she relies upon govern the
relations between husband and wife inter se; but the law on citizenship is
political in character (Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315), and the
national policy is one for selective admission to Philippine
citizenship.

Citizenship is not a right similar to those that exist between
husband and wife or between private persons, but..

.. is a privilege which a sovereign government may confer on, or withhold
from, an alien or grant to him on such conditions as it sees fit, without the
support of any reason whatsoever. (3 C.J.S. 834)

In re Mallare
Mallare in proving his Filipino citizenship, established the citizenship of his
father

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself
a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights
and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship. Neither could any act taken
on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship.

US vs Ong Tianse
Respondent has no certificate of registration, subject to deportation to China

It is a rule established by the courts of the United States and constantly
applied by those of the Philippine Islands, that presumption, in question of
citizenship, always lies in favor of the claimant of citizenship in accordance
with the American laws, under the doctrine of jus soli, it has been held that
citizenship generally depends on the place of birth, and it is this doctrine that
governs the decision of the present case.

Commonwealth Act No. 473
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. - Any woman who
is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in
the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the
naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen,
and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the
parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still
a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent,
shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching
the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the
American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the
necessary oath of allegiance.

Moy Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration
Lau Yuen Yeung contends deportation order based on her Chinese citizenship

an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her
marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the
explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized.
the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically
produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of
citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the
Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration
vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the
Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the
Philippines.

Po Siok Pin vs. COMELEC
Po Siok Pin asking the Court to prevent deportation of wife and children

Consequently, Tan De Eng, the wife of Po Siok Pin, became a Philippine
Citizen when the latter took his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen on
May 23, 1964 if she does not have any of the disqualifications to become a
Philippine citizen.
Likewise, by virtue of section 15, the three children of Tan De Eng and Po Siok
Pin, who were born in China, who were in the Philippines at the time their
father was naturalized, and who must be of age now, automatically became
Philippine citizens. They should ask for the cancellation of their alien
certificates of registration.

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC 1989
On disqualification of Frivaldo as Governor due to his American citizenship

Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized
American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC 1996
Frivaldo reacquiring citizenship thru repatriation, allowing him to assume
gubernatorial position
Under Philippine law,

citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization or by repatriation Since Frivaldo re-assumed his
citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day

the term of office of governor
(and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon On the other hand, said statute also
provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born
Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725
such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and
cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified
procedure of repatriation.

Aznar vs. COMELEC
On Osmenas disqualification, being both an American and Filipino

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present
direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of
the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate
stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino Be it
noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual
citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not
yet been enacted.

STATE IMMUNITY

Sec. 3, Art. XVI The State may not be sued without its consent

Santiago vs. Republic
Santiago wants to revoke deed of donation due to alleged breach of
conditions made by Bureau of Plant Industry

It is expressed in language plain and unmistakable: "The State may not be
sued without its consent. The Republic cannot be proceeded against unless it
allows itself to be sued.
a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled
to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.
He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental
postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to
accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the
negation of arbitrariness and inequity.

Act. 3083
Sec. 1 Complaint against Government. Subject to the provisions of this
Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits
to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties.

C.A. No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445
Sec. 49 Period for rendering decisions of the Commission. The Commission
shall decide any case brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for resolution. If the account or claim involved in the case needs
reference to other persons or offices, or to a party interested, the period
shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper
decision is received by it.
Sec. 50 Appeal from decisions of the Commission. The party aggrieved by any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission may within thirty days from his
receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the
manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or
ruling adversely affects the interest of any government agency, the appeal
may be taken by the proper head of that agency.
RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

Sec. 22 (a) Every LGU, as a corporation, shall have the following power: (2)
To sue and be sued

New Civil Code

Art. 2180 (6) of NCC The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Art. 2189 of NCC Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.