1. ARIZALA VS.

COURT OF APPEALS


FACTS:

The Industrial Peace Act, prohibited supervisors to become or continue to be members of labor
organizations composed of rank and file employees and it prescribed criminal sanctions for the violations
for the break of prohibition. It was under the regime of said IPA that the GSIS became bound by a collective
bargaining agreement executed between it the labor organization of its employees, aka GSIS Employees
Association. The agreement contained a maintainance of membership clause which provides that all
employees who, at the time of the execution of said agreement, were members of the union or became
members of the union thereafter were obliged to maintain membership in said union as a condition for their
continued employment in the GSIS.

At that time the petitioners Pablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao were respectively the Chief of the Accounting
Division and the Chief of the Billing Section of the said Division in the Central Visayas Regional Office of
the GSIS, while Leonardo Joven and FelindoBulandus were respectively Asst. Chief of the Accounting
Division and Asst. Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance Division of the same office.

They were demanded to resign from the GSIS Employees Association in view of their supervisory positions
but they refused to do so. 2 criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act was filed against them
and they were convicted before the City Court of Cebu.

The employees contend that that since the provisions of 1987 Constitution and of the Labor Code
subsequently promulgated, it repealed the Industrial Peace Act-placed employees of all categories in
government-owned or controlled corporations without distinction within the Civil Service, and provided that
the terms and conditions of their employment were to be "governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations" and hence, no longer subject of collective bargaining, the appellants ceased to fall within the
coverage of the Industrial Peace Act and should thus no longer continue to be prosecuted and exposed to
punishment for a violation thereof.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners criminal liability for violation of the industrial peace act may be deemed to have
been obliterated by virtue of subsequent legislation and the provisions of 1973 and 1987 constitution

HELD:

YES.

The Labor Code exempted government employees from the right to self organization for purposes of
collective bargaining. The reason for denying to government employees the right to "self-organization and
to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining" is presumably the same as
that under the Industrial Peace Act, i.e., that the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed
by law and not by collective bargaining.

But EO 111 restored the right to organize and to negotiate and bargain of employees of "government
corporations established under the Corporation Code." And EO 180, and apparently RA 6715(amended of
Labor Code), too, granted to all government employees the right of collective bargaining or negotiation
except as regards those terms of their employment which were fixed by law; and as to said terms fixed by
law, they were prohibited to strike to obtain changes thereof.

Under RA 6715 labor unions are regarded as organized either (a) "for purposes of negotiation," or (b) "for
furtherance and protection"of the members' rights. Membership in unions organized "for purposes of
negotiation" is open only to rank-and-file employees. "Supervisory employees" are ineligible "for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own," i.e., one organized "for furtherance and protection" of their rights and
interests. However, according to the Rules implementing RA 6715, "supervisory employees who are
included in an existing rank-and- file bargaining unit, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 shall
remain in that unit ..." Supervisory employees are "those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively
recommend such managerial actions 45 if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical
in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. 46

Membership in employees' organizations formed for purposes of negotiation are open to rank-and-file
employees only, as above mentioned, and not to high level employees. Indeed, "managerial employees" or
"high level employees" are, to repeat, "not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization" at all. A
managerial employee is defined as "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute, management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees


The petitioners appear to be correct in their view of the disappearance from the law of the prohibition on
supervisors being members of labor organizations composed of employees under their supervision. The
Labor Code (PD 442) allowed supervisors (if not managerial) to join rank-and-file unions. And under the
Implementing Rules of RA 6715, supervisors who were members of existing labor organizations on the
effectivity of said RA 6715 were explicitly authorized to "remain therein."

The decisive consideration is that at present, supervisors who were already members of a rank-and-file
labor organization at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, are authorized to "remain therein." It
seems plain, in other words, that the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor
organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on such membership, is not only
not a crime, but is explicitly allowed, under present law.

ACQUITTED






2. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL COMPANY ENERGY DEVT CORP. VS LEGARDA



FACTS:

Petitioner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Phil. National Oil Company. It filed with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE) a clearance application to dismiss the services or private respondent
VicentaEllelina, contractual employee on the ground of her alleged commission of crime (Alarm and Public
Scandal) during the Christmas party at the premises of the petitioner, when the raffle committee refused to
five him the prize corresponding his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab the armalite rifle of the PC Officer
outside the building despite the warning shots fired by the latter.

Petitioner was ordered by MOLE to reinstate Ellelina. Petitioner then questioned the jurisdiction of MOLE
over it on the ground that it is a government owned or controlled corporation. On the other hand, public
respondent contends that while petitioner is a subsidiary of PNOC, it is still covered by the Labor Code and
therefore within the jurisdiction of MOLE was it was organized under the Corporation Law and registered
with the SEC and that petitioner is estopped from questioning the Labor Depts jurisdiction as it subjected
itself to latter when it filed the application to terminate Ellelinas services.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is governed by the Labor Code

HELD:

YES. Under the present Constitution, Sec. 2(1) Art. IX-B, The Civil Service embraces all branches
subdivisions instrumentalities and agencies of the the Government, including government owned or
controlled corporations with original charter.

Thus, under the present law, the test in determining whether a GOCC is subject to the Civil Service Law is
the manner of its creation such that government corporations created by special charter are subject to
provisions while those incorporated under the Corporation are NOT within its coverage.

PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a GOCC whose employees
are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.



3. NWSA VS. NWSA CONSOLIDATED UNIONS

FACTS:

Petitioner National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority is a government-owned and controlled corporation
created under Republic Act No. 1383, while respondent NWSA Consolidated Unions are various labor
organizations composed of laborers and employees of the NAWASA. The other respondents are
intervenors Jesus Centeno, et al., hereinafter referred to as intervenors.

The Court of Industrial Relations (now NLRC) conducted a hearing on the controversy then existing
between petitioner and respondent unions specifically the implementation of the 40-Hour Week Law
(Republic Act No. 1880) Respondent intervenors filed a petition in intervention on the issue of additional
compensation for night work.

The court ruled that The NAWASA is an agency not performing governmental functions and, therefore, is
liable to pay additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays conformably to
Commonwealth Act No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, even if said days should be within the
staggered five-work days authorized by the President; the intervenors do not fall within the category of
managerial employees as contemplated in Republic Act 2377 and so are not exempt from the coverage of
the Eight-Hour Labor Law

ISSUE: Whether the intervenors are managerial employees within the meaning of Republic Act 2377 and,
therefore, not entitled to the benefits of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended;


HELD:

NO.

Section 2 of Republic Act 2377 provides.
Sec. 2.This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or
private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, managerial
employees outside sales personnel, domestic servants persons in the personal service of another and
members of the family of the employer working for him.
The term managerial employee in this Act shall mean either (a) any person whose primary duty consists
of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized
department or subdivision thereof, or (b) any officer or member of the managerial staff.

One of the distinguishing characteristics by which a managerial employee may be known as expressed in
the explanatory note of Republic Act No. 2377 is that he is not subject to the rigid observance of regular
office hours. The true worth of his service does not depend so much on the time he spends in office but
more on the results he accomplishes. In fact, he is free to go out of office anytime.

NON-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES COVERED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 444. Employees who
have little freedom of action and whose main function is merely to carry out the companys orders, plans
and policies, are not managerial employees and hence are covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444.
The philosophy behind the exemption of managerial employees from the 8-Hour Labor Law is that such
workers are not usually employed for every hour of work but their compensation is determined considering
their special training, experience or knowledge which requires the exercise of discretion and independent
judgment, or perform work related to management policies or general business operations along
specialized or technical lines. For these workers it is not feasible to provide a fixed hourly rate of pay or
maximum hours of labor.

The intervenors herein are holding position of responsibility. One of them is the Secretary of the Board of
Directors. Another is the private secretary of the general manager. Another is a public relations officer, and
many chiefs of divisions or sections and others are supervisors and overseers. Respondent court, however,
after examining carefully their respective functions, duties and responsibilities found that their primary
duties do not bear any direct relation with the management of the NAWASA, nor do they participate in the
formulation of its policies nor in the hiring and firing of its employees. The chiefs of divisions and sections
are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe for their execution. Hence, it
concludes, they have little freedom of action, as their main function is merely to carry out the companys
orders, plans and policies.


4.SAN MIGUEL BREWERY VS. DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORG.


FACTS:

The workers are employed by San Miguel Brewery and are members of Democratic Labor Organization.
After the morning roll call, the employees leave the plant of the company to go on their respective sales
routes either at 7:00 a.m. for soft drinks trucks, or 8:00 a.m. for beer trucks. They do not have a daily time
record. The company never require them to start their work as outside sales personnel earlier than the
above schedule.

The Democratic Labor Association filed a complaint against San Miguel Brewery demanding for overtime,
night shift differential pay and additional compensation for work done during Sundays and holidays. This is
denied by San Miguel on the ground that since the employees concerned are paid a commission on the
sales they make outside of the required 8 hours besides the fixed salary that is paid to them, they are not
entitled to overtime pay as for the reason that the commission they are paid already takes the place of such
overtime compensation. The company contends, that the employees can be likened to an employee who is
paid on piece-work, "pakiao", or commission basis, which is expressly excluded from the operation of the
Eight-Hour Labor Law

Judge Bautista who presided before the CIR:
1. With regard to overtime compensation, Judge Bautista held that the provisions of the Eight-Hour
Labor Law apply to the employees concerned for those working in the field or engaged in the sale
of the company's products outside its premises and consequently they should be paid the extra
compensation.

2. As to employees who work at night, Judge Bautista decreed that they be paid their
corresponding salary differentials for work done at night prior to January 1, 1949 with the present
qualification: 25% on the basis of their salary to those who work from 6:00 to 12:00 p.m., and 75%
to those who work from 12:01 to 6:00 in the morning.

3. With regard to work done during Sundays and holidays, Judge Bautista also decreed that the
employees concerned be paid an additional compensation of 25% as provided for in
Commonwealth Act No. 444 even if they had been paid a compensation on monthly salary basis.


ISSUE: Whether or not the field or outside employees are entitled to the benefits of the Eight Hour Labor
Law

HELD:

No. Eight-Hour Labor Law only has application where an employee or laborer is paid on a monthly or daily
basis, or is paid a monthly or daily compensation, in which case, if he is made to work beyond the requisite
period of 8 hours, he should be paid the additional compensation prescribed by law. This law has no
application when the employee or laborer is paid on a piece-work, "pakiao", or commission basis,
regardless of the time employed. The philosophy behind this exemption is that his earnings in the form of
commission based on the gross receipts of the day. His participation depends upon his industry so that the
more hours he employs in the work the greater are his gross returns and the higher his commission.

He works away from his employer's place of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his
employer, and his employer has no way of knowing the number of hours he works per day











Case 5 Apex Mining Company v. NLRC
FACTS:
- Sinclitica Candido was employed by Apex Mining to perform laundry services at its staff
house.
- In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis then on a monthly basis.
- On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task, she accidentally slipped
and hit her back on a stone.
- She was permitted to go on leave for medication.
- Mila de la Rosa, the supervisor, offered P5,000 to Sinclitica in order to persuade the latter to
quit her job. However, Sinclitica refused the offer and preferred to work.
- Sinclitica Candido was dismissed on February 4, 1988.

Issue: Whether or not the househelper in the staff house of an industrial company a domestic helper
or a regular employee

Held: REGULAR EMPLOYEE.
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code:
The term househelper as used herein is synonymous to the term domestic servant and
shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the
employers home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance
and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of
the employers family

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is
employed in the employers home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of
the employers family.

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said
employer.

While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or
laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter
case, service is being rendered in the staffhouse or within the premises of the business of the
employer. In such instance, THEY ARE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY OR EMPLOYER IN THE
BUSINESS CONCERNED.


















Case 6 Tan v. Lagrama

FACTS:
- Rolando Tan is the president of Supreme Theater Corp and the general magnager of Corwn
and Empire Theaters in Butuan City.
- Leovigildo Lagrama is a painter, making ad billboards and murals for the motion pictures
shown at the Empress, Supreme, and Crown theaters for 10 years.
- On October 17, 1998, Lagrama was scolded by Tan alleging that the former had urinated in
his workplace.
- Lagrama denied the allegations and claimed that he was not the only one who entered the
drawing area.
- Tan dismissed Lagrama.
- Lagrama filed a complaint before the NLRC.
- Lagrama was paid on a fixed piece work basis, i.e., that he was paid for every painting
turned as ad billboard or mural for the pictures shown in three theaters, on the basis of no
mural/billboard drawn, no pay policy.
Issue: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and private
respondent.

Held: YES. In determining whether there is an employer-employee relationship, the four-fold test
must be applied, to wit: (1) The power of selection and engagement of employees; (2) The control of
the employee with respect to the means and methods by which work is to be accomplished; (3) The
power to dismiss; and (4) The payment of wages.

Of the four, the control test is the most important. Compared to an employee, an independent
contractor is one who carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the
job, work, or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own
manner and method, free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected
with the performance of the work.

In the case, Tan claims that Lagrama was an independent contractor and never his employee
HOWEVER, evidence shows that the Lagrama performed his work as painter UNDER THE
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF TAN. Lagrama worked in a designated work area inside the Crown
theater of petitioner, for the use of which petitioner prescribed rules. The rules included the
observance of cleanliness and hygiene and a prohibition against unirating in the work area and any
place other than the toiler or restroom. Therefore, there exist an employer-employee relationship
between Tan and Lagrama.
















Case 7 Rada v. NLRC
FACTS:
- Hilario Radas initial employment with Philnor Consultants and planners, inc. was under a
Contract of Employment for a Definite Period. He was hired as Driver for the construction
supervision phase of the Manila North Expressway Extension for a term of about 24 months
effective July 1, 1977
- Radas employment expired on June 30, 1979.
- At the time the first contract of employment expired, respondent was in need of driver.
- Rada was offered the position of driver. The second contract of employment for a definite
period was for 10 months. (July 1, 1979 to April 30, 1980)
- The second contract expired. Radas contract was renewed for a period of 19 months, from
May 1, 1980 to November 30, 1981.
- The third contract was extended for a number of times, the last extension being for the period
of October 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985.
- Sometime in the second week of December 1985,Rada applied for Personal Clearance and
acknowledged having received the amount of P 3,796.20 representing conversion to cash of
unused leave credits and financial assistance. Rada aloes released the company from all
obligations in a Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.
- Rada later sued Philnor for non payment of separation pay and overtime pay. He said he is
entitled to be paid OT pay because he uses extra time to get to the project site from his home
and from the project site to his home everyday in total, he spends an average of 3 hours OT
every day.
Issue: Whether or not Rada is entitled to Separation and Overtime pay
Held: Separation pay NO. Overtime pay Yes.

Separation Pay
The SC ruled that Rada was a project employee whose work was coterminous with the project for
which he was hired. Project employees, as distinguished from regular or non-project employees, are
mentioned in Section 281 of the Labor Code as those where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee.
Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the
completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number
of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the
company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection with such
termination.
OT Pay
Rada is entitled to OT pay. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified points
along EDSA in going to the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way back from
the field office going home to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to Radas job as a
driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the
convenience of the employees, but primarily for the benefit of Philnor. As embodied in Philnors
memorandum, they allowed their drivers to bring home their transport vehicles in order for them to
provide a timely transport service and to avoid delay not really so that the drivers could enjoy the
benefits of the company vehicles nor for them to save on fair.





Case 8 Philippine Airlines v. NLRC
FACTS:
- Dr. Herminio A. Fabros was employed as a flight surgeon. He was assigned at the PAL Medical
Clinic at Nichols and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
- On February 17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. Fabros left the clinic to have dinner
at his residence, which was about five-minute drive away.
- A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. One of
its employees, Mr. Manuel Acosta, had suffered a heart attack.
- The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the
hospital.
- When Dr. Fabros reached the clinic at 7:51, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient.
- Upon learning about the incident, the Medical Director of the PAL ordered an investigation. In
his explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted that he was entitled to thirty-minute meal break and that
he immediately left his residence upon being informed about the emergency.
- PAL found that Dr. Fabros abandoned his post on February 17, 1994.
- Dr. Fabros was suspended for three months effective December 16, 1994.
- Dr. Fabros filed a complaint for illegal suspension against PAL.

Issue: Whether or not there was abandonment of post on the part of Dr. Fabros

Held: NO.
The facts depict that Dr. Fabros did not abandon his post. He left the clinic to eat dinner
at his house. Further, the nurse on duty knew the whereabouts of Dr. Fabros so that he
could be contacted easily. Furthermore, he immediately left his home knowing about the
emergency.

PAL contends that Dr. Fabros is obliged to stay at the company premises for not less than
8 hours. Thus, he may not leave even if he has to take his meal.

Under article 83 of the labor code, health personnel x x x shall hold regular office hours
for eight hours a day, for five days a week, EXCLUSIVE OF TIME FOR MEALS x x x

Article 85. Meal periods. X X X it shall be the duty of every employer to give his
employees NOT LESS THAN SIXTY MINUTES time-off for their regular meals.

The eight-hour work period does not include the meal break.

Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within the
company premises. Employees are not prohibited from going out of the premises as long
as they return to their posts on time. The act of Dr. Fabros of going home does not
constitute abandonment.









Case 9 National Development Company v. Court of Industrial Relations
FACTS:
- At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled corporation, there
were four shifts of work.
- From 8am to 4pm; From 6am to 2pm; From 2pm to 10pm; From 10pm to 6am.
- In each shift, there was a one-hour mealtime period.
- In 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working until the next
shift, petitioner, instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying
them for six hours only, claiming that the two hours corresponding to the mealtime periods
should not be included in computing compensation.
- The workers asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order payment of additional overtime
pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.

Issue: Whether or not the workers are entitled to the payment corresponding to the
mealtime periods.

HELD: Yes.
Under section 1, Com. Act no. 444, When the work is not continuous, the time during which
the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not
be counted

In the case, while it may be correct to say that it is well-high impossible for an employee to
work while he is eating, yet under Section 1 of Com. Act No. 444 such a time for eating can
only be segregated or deducted from his work, if the same is not continuous and the
employee can leave his working place and rest completely.

The time cards show that the work was continuous and without interruption.
is also evidence that the employees cannot freely leave their working paces nor rest
completely.

Therefore, the workers are entitled to the payment corresponding to the mealtime periods.























2. G.R. No. L-9831 October 30, 1957

ISAAC PERAL BOWLING ALLEY, petitioner,
vs.
UNITED EMPLOYEES WELFARE ASSOCIATION and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.


FACTS:

On October 6, 1952, the United Employees Welfare Association, a legitimate labor union,
presented a petition before the Department of Labor on behalf of the 36 pinboys of the Isaac
Peral Bowling Alley, allegedly affiliated with the said union. The petition (Case No. 754 of the
Department of Labor) made specific demands from the company among which were the
conversion of their (pinboys') wages from hourly to daily basis; vacation and sick leaves; medical
and hospital bills; payment of their wages during a strike if such strike had to be declared due to
the refusal of the company to consider their demands; and that the United Employees Welfare
Association be recognized as the sole bargaining agency.

The company filed its answer denying the material averments of the petition and contended that
in view of the nature of the business of the company, the payment of the wages of its pinboys
cannot be converted from the hourly to daily basis; that said pinboys were receiving wages in
accordance with law and were being paid additional compensation was actually shouldering
medical and hospitals bills of those injured or who become ill in line of duty; that the pinboys were
just casual workers and not permanently employed by the company; that the Union cannot be
recognized as the sole bargaining agency because aside form the fact that the pinboys were not
the only ones working in that establishment, the company had no confidence in said union. It
was, therefore prayed that the petition be dismissed with costs against therein petitioner.

ISSUE
1. whether those working in the night shift are entitled to 25 per cent additional compensation;
and.

2. whether the Court was right in awarding vacation and sick leave to the said 36 pinboys.


HELD:

1. the grant of additional compensation to those working at night has been recognized by this
Court as a valid exercise of the general powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and may be
allowed for "hygienic, medical, moral, cultural, and sociological reasons" (Shell Co. of the Phil.
Islands, Ltd. vs. National Labor Union,2 G. R. No. L-1309, July 26, 1948), and We find no reason
why the lower cannot apply the same measure to be workers involvqed herein considering that
irrespective of the nature of their jobs, those working at night suffer a continued general loss of
energies and are deprived of the same comfort. The ruling of the court a quo on his matter should
be, therefrom, affirmed.

2. In view of the absence of express legislation granting employees of private firms or
establishments the benefits of vacation and sick leaves with pay, said employees are not assured
of such privileges, which are proper subject matters for collective bargaining between employers
and employees. Although strictly speaking, therefore, there is no ground for the granting of said
privileges, the Court of Industrial Relations in the exercise of its broad powers under
Commonwealth Act No. 103 had on several occasions dealt with and granted claims for these
benefits. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 875 and the abolition of the Court's general
jurisdiction over labor disputes, this power seems to have been curtailed. It is believed, however,
that whenever the Court of Industrial Relations may exercise its powers of compulsory
arbitrations when a case is certified to it by the President of the Philippines, being again
possessed a general powers, said Court may still grant these benefits. (See authorities cited in
Francisco's Labor Laws, Vol. II, 3rd ed. p. 508 et seq).

In the case at bar, We cannot ignore the fact that the claim was passed upon by the lower Court
when it was still possessed of its broad powers and could have validly granted the same, as it
did. But it also appears that the Court a quo was aware of the financial condition of the company
as "not very sound due to losses reported during the years 1952 and 1953 although it had a little
profit in 1951" (p. 6 Decision), and considering that the ability of the employer to make payment of
these privileges must also be reckoned with, it is but just that this demand (sick and vacation
leaves with pay) be denied, at least for the time being. Anyway, this could be made the subject of
a future agreement between workers and the management.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in so far as it grants the 36 pinboys
represented by respondent United Employees Welfare Association sick and vacation leaves, a
matter which is left to further bargaining agreement between the parties, and with regard to the
payment of the hours of overtime allegedly earned by said pinboys of the hours which shall be
determined in the proper incident in the Lower Court after this decision becomes final, subject to
the doctrine on the point laid down by this Court in the case of Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs.
Luzon Marine Department Union (101 Phil., 257). Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.

































G.R. No. 78210


TEOFILO ARICA, DANILO BERNABE, MELQUIADES DOHINO, ABONDIO OMERTA, GIL
TANGIHAN, SAMUEL LABAJO, NESTOR NORBE, RODOLFO CONCEPCION, RICARDO
RICHA, RODOLFO NENO, ALBERTO BALATRO, BENJAMIN JUMAMOY, FERMIN DAAROL,
JOVENAL ENRIQUEZ, OSCAR BASAL, RAMON ACENA, JAIME BUGTAY, and 561 OTHERS,
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY KORONADO B. APUZEN, petitioners,

Vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON,
HONORABLE CONRADO B. MAGLAYA, HONORABLE ROSARIO B. ENCARNACION, and
STANDARD (PHILIPPINES) FRUIT CORPORATION, respondents.,




Labor Standards Hours of Work Assembly Time

FACTS:

Teofilo Arica et al and 561 others sued Standard Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) Philippines for
allegedly not paying the workers for their assembly time which takes place every work day from
5:30am to 6am. The assembly time consists of the roll call of the workers; their getting of
assignments from the foreman; their filling out of the Laborers Daily Accomplishment Report;
their getting of tools and equipments from the stockroom; and their going to the field to work. The
workers alleged that this is necessarily and primarily for STANFILCOs benefit.


ISSUE: Whether or not the workers assembly time should be paid.

HELD: No. The thirty minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent
of the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be
considered as waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code . . .
Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the
employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to
deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. In short, they are not subject to
the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the
assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures.













G.R. No. L-23458, National Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. National Shipyards Employees
and Workers Asso. and CIR, 18 SCRA 946

FACTS:

Following are the grievances lodged in the Court of Industrial Relations (herein referred to as
CIR)1 by respondent union against petitioner, Bay View Hotel, Inc., on September 27, 1962, viz:

"3. That the respondent [petitioner herein], in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, better
known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, has not been paying full overtime compensation to the
employees who have worked and have been working for more than eight hours a day due to the
exigency of the service and those also who have worked and have been working on Sundays and
legal holidays;

4. That the respondent, in violation of Sec. 10, letters (f) and (g), of Republic Act No. 602, better
known as the Minimum Wage Law, has been deducting the amount of P2.00 from each employee
every month allegedly for medical fees thus reducing the salaries of the employees without the
consent of the employees concerned;

5. That the respondent has not also been paying or has not been refunding in full to the
employees concerned the collection from the customers of the Manila Hotel of the extra "service
charge" in lieu of "tips" to the waiters or roomboys and which therefore are supposed to be paid
to said employees but respondent has not been able to pay or refund in full said collection to the
employees concerned;

6. That the respondent has not been complying with the grant of vacation leave of three (3) days
a year in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Contract between the respondent and the
Hotel Employees Union, another union in the respondent premises which is the collective
bargaining agency in the Collective Bargaining Contract with the respondent;

7. That the respondent has been dismissing many of the members of the petitioner union since
the organization and registration of the petitioner herein with the Department of Labor on May 31,
1962 beginning with the dismissal of the Treasurer Ramiro Zamora, and Manuel Braga, board
member, on the same date and thereafter, has dismissed and has been dismissing from the
service its employees who are members of the petitioner union without just cause or for union
activities up to this date, numbering 65 employees in all, 41 of whom were refused admission by
an illegal lock-out in the Laundry Department of the respondent on August 26, 1962, and [of] the
Bamboo Room on September 10, 1962, whose names and dates of dismissal are herewith
attached as Annex "A" and made a part of this petition;

ISSUE:

whether or not Cir has jurisdiction?

Held:

The jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, under the law and the jurisprudence, extends
only to cases involving (a) labor disputes affecting an industry which is indispensable to the
national interest and so certified by the President to the Court, Section 10, Republic Act No. 875;
(b) controversy about the minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law, Republic Act No. 602;
(c) hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, Commonwealth Act No. 444; and (d)
unfair labor practice. Section 5(a), Republic Act No. 875. PAFLU vs. Tan, 52 O.G. 5836. . . . And
such disputes and controversies, in order that they may fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations, must arise while the employer-employee relationship between the parties
exists, or the employee seeks reinstatement. When such relationship is over and the employee
does not seek reinstatement, all claims become money claims that fall under the jurisdiction of
the regular courts.


The industrial court has jurisdiction over the main causes of action with respect to minimum
wage, overtime compensation and unfair labor practice. Which places the complaint herein in its
entirety, including the two, within the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Because, all of said claims
arose out of the same employment.

We find reinforcement of this view in PRISCO, supra, where express pronouncement was made
that as long as the employer-employee relationship exists or is sought to be re-established, the
industrial court "has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with,
employment."11

We are unprepared to break away from the teaching in the cases just adverted to. To draw a
tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in labor litigations. A piecemeal resort to one
court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits. To force the employees to shuttle from one
court to another to secure full redress is a situation gravely prejudicial. The time to be lost, effort
wasted, anxiety augmented, additional expense incurred - these are considerations which weigh
heavily against split jurisdiction. Indeed, it is more in keeping with orderly administration of justice
that all the causes of action here "be cognizable and heard by only one court: the Court of
Industrial Relations."




































13) CALTEX REGULAR EMPLOYEES v CALTEX and NLRC
G.R. No. 111359
August 15, 1995

FACTS
Petitioner Union and Caltex entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement. The CBA included this
provision
the regular work week shall consist of eight (8) hours per day,
seven (7) days, Monday through Sunday, during which regular rates of pay
shall be paid in accordance with Annex B and work on the employee's one
"Day of Rest," shall be considered a special work day, during which "Day of
Rest" rates of pay shall be paid as provided in Annex B. Daily working
schedules shall be established by management in accordance with the
requirements of efficient operations on the basis of eight (8) hours per day
for any five (5) days. Provided, however employees required to work in
excess of forty (40) hours in any week shall be compensated in accordance
with Annex B of this Agreement.

The Annex B of the agreement includes the computations of the overtime pay, nightshift
differential, day off pay, holiday premium pay, Sunday premium pay.

Sometime in August 1986, the union called the attention of Caltex for the latters alleged violations
of Annex B (non payment of ot, nsd, etc). The industrial relations manager of Caltex informed the union that
the differential would be timely implemented. However, no differential payment was made for the work
performed on the first 2.5 hours on a Saturday.

The union filed a case against Caltex for unfair labor practice. Petitioner charged Caltex for
shortchanging its employees by paying the work performed on the first 2.5 hours of Saturday (rest day daw
nila) at regular rates when it should be paying at rest day rates. Caltex denied the charge and said that
Sunday was their rest day and not Saturday.

Labor Arbiter Guanio ruled in favor of the union and ruled that according to the CBA the employees
are given 2 rest days (sat and sun). On appeal by Caltex, the NLRC set aside the decision of the labor
arbiter. NLRC concluded that under the CBA, there is only 1 rest day (Sunday).

ISSUE
Whether the CBA provides 2 rest days (sat and sun) and therefore the first 2.5 hours of Saturday
be based on rest day rates.

HELD:
We agree with the NLRC that the intention of the parties to the 1985 CBA was to provide the
employees with only one (1) day of rest. The plain and ordinary meaning of the language of Article III is that
Caltex and the Union had agreed to pay "day of rest" rates for work performed on "an employee's one day
of rest". To the Court's mind, the use of the word "one" describing the phrase "day of rest [of an employee]"
emphasizes the fact that the parties had agreed that only a single day of rest shall be scheduled and shall
be provided to the employee.

In the present case, under the 1985 CBA, hours worked on a Saturday do not, by that fact alone,
necessarily constitute overtime work compensable at premium rates of pay, contrary to petitioner's
assertion. These are normal or regular work hours, compensable at regular rates of pay, as provided in the
1985 CBA; under that CBA, Saturday is not a rest day or a "day off". It is only when an employee has been
required on a Saturday to render work in excess of the forty (40) hours which constitute the regular work
week that such employee may be considered as performing overtime work on that Saturday. We consider
that the statutory prohibition against offsetting undertime one day with overtime another day has no
application in the case at bar.

In recapitulation, the parties' 1985 CBA stipulated that employees at the Manila Office, as well as
those similarly situated at the Legazpi and Marinduque Bulk Depots, shall be provided only one (1) day of
rest; Sunday, and not Saturday, was designated as this day of rest. Work performed on a Saturday is
accordingly to be paid at regular rates of pay, as a rule, unless the employee shall have been required to
render work in excess of forty (40) hours in a calendar week. The employee must, however, have in fact
rendered work in excess of forty (40) hours before hours subsequently worked become payable at premium
rates. We conclude that the NLRC correctly set aside the palpable error committed by Labor Arbiter
Guanio, when the latter imposed upon one of the parties to the 1985 CBA, an obligation which it had never
assumed.



























































14) PNB V PNB EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
115 SCRA 507
July 30, 1982

FACTS
- PNB and PNB Employees Association (PEMA) had a dispute regarding the proper computation of
overtime pay. PEMA wanted the cost of living allowance (granted in 1958) and longevity pay (granted in
1961) to be included in the computation. PNB disagreed and the 2 parties later went before the CIR to
resolve the dispute.
- CIR decided in favor of PEMA and held that PNB should compute the overtime pay of its employees on
the basis of the sum total of the employees basic salary or wage plus cost of living allowance and longevity
pay. The CIR relied on the ruling in NAWASA v NAWASA Consolidated Unions, which held that for
purposes of computing overtime compensation, regular wage includes all payments which the parties have
agreed shall be received during the work week, including differentiated payments for working at
undesirable times, such as at night and the board and lodging customarily furnished the employee. This
prompted PNB to appeal, hence this case.

ISSUE

WON the cost of living allowance and longevity pay should be included in the computation of overtime pay
as held by the CIR

HELD
NO.

Ratio
Overtime pay is for extra effort beyond that contemplated in the employment contract; additional
pay given for any other purpose cannot be included in the basis for the computation of overtime pay.

Absent a specific provision in the CBA, the bases for the computation of overtime pay are 2
computations, namely:

1. WON the additional pay is for extra work done or service rendered
2. WON the same is intended to be permanent and regular, not contingent nor temporary as a given only to
remedy a situation which can change any time.

Reasoning
Longevity pay cannot be included in the computation of overtime pay for the very simple reason
that the contrary is expressly stipulated in the CBA, which constitutes the law between the parties.

As regards cost of living allowance, there is nothing in Commonwealth Act 444 [or the 8-hour
Labor Law, now Art. 87 Labor Code] that could justify PEMAs posture that it should be added to the
regular wage in computing overtime pay. C.A. 444 prescribes that overtime work shall be paid at the same
rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least 25% additional. The law did not define what is a regular
wage or salary. What the law emphasized is that in addition to regular wage, there must be paid an
additional 25% of that regular wage to constitute overtime rate of pay. Parties were thus allowed to agree
on what shall be mutually considered regular pay from or upon which a 25% premium shall be based and
added to makeup overtime compensation.

No rule of universal application to other cases may be justifiably extracted from the NAWASA case.
CIR relies on the part of the NAWASA decision where the SC cited American decisions whose legislation
on overtime is at variance with the law in this jurisdiction. The US legislation considers work in excess of
forty hours a week as overtime; whereas, what is generally considered overtime in the Philippines is work
in excess of the regular 8 hours a day. It is understandably material to refer to precedents in the US for
purposes of computing weekly wages under a 40-hour week rule, since the particular issue involved in
NAWASA is the conversion of prior weekly regular earnings into daily rates without allowing diminution or
addition.

To apply the NAWASA computation would require a different formula for each and every
employee. It would require reference to and continued use of individual earnings in the past, thus
multiplying the administrative difficulties of the Company. It would be cumbersome and tedious a process to
compute overtime pay and this may again cause delays in payments, which in turn could lead to serious
disputes. To apply this mode of computation would retard and stifle the growth of unions themselves as
Companies would be irresistibly drawn into denying, new and additional fringe benefits, if not those already
existing, for fear of bloating their overhead expenses through overtime which, by reason of being unfixed,
becomes instead a veritable source of irritant in labor relations.

**Overtime Pay Rationale Why is a laborer or employee who works beyond the regular hours of work
entitled to extra compensation called, in this enlightened time, overtime pay?
Verily, there can be no other reason than that he is made to work longer than what is commensurate with
his agreed compensation for the statutorily fixed or voluntarily agreed hours of labor he is supposed to do.
When he thus spends additional time to his work, the effect upon him is multi- faceted; he puts in more
effort, physical and/or mental; he is delayed in going home to his family to enjoy the comforts thereof; he
might have no time for relaxation, amusement or sports; he might miss important pre-arranged
engagements; etc. It is thus the additional work, labor or service employed and the adverse effects just
mentioned of his longer stay in his place of work that justify and are the real reasons for the extra
compensation that is called overtime pay.

**Overtime Pay Definition The additional pay for service or work rendered or performed in excess of 8
hours a day by employees or laborers in employment covered by the 8 hour Labor Law [C.A. 444, now Art.
87 Labor Code] and not exempt from its requirements. It is computed by multiplying the overtime hourly
rate by the number of hours worked in excess of eight.

Disposition decision appealed from is REVERSED










































15) ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT, INC. v MINISTER OF LABOR
G.R. No. L-64967
September 23, 1985

FACTS
Miguel Aspera, private respondent, was a mechanical engineer who worked for the petitioner in
Saudi Arabia for nearly a year. His contract of employment provides

1. Work Schedule/Assignment. ... Your workdays shall be on a six-day work
week basis, with a working day consisting of ten (10) working hours. You
may be required to work overtime in excess of ten (10) hours each work
day and to work on your restdays and on Saudi Arabian legal holidays.
2. A monthly salary of P750.00 plus overtime pay for work rendered during
restdays/holidays and/or in excess of ten (10) hours during regular working
days.

Aspera worked 10 hours daily for 335 days. He claims that his monthly salary should correspond to
eight hours of daily work and that for the additional two hours daily, he was entitled to overtime pay at
$1.2162 per hour or to $814.85 for 670 hours during 335 working days.

NLRC and the Director of Employment Services sustained his claim and declared void the
stipulation for the 10-hour working day because it was contrary to the Eight- hour Labor Law. Hence, this
petition.

Petitioner contends that Aspera was a managerial employee hence, he should not be entitled to
overtime pay. It also asserts that Aspera was one of several employees who signed written contracts with a
"built-in" overtime pay in the ten-hour working day and that their basic monthly pay was adjusted to reflect
the higher amount covering the guaranteed two-hour extra time whether worked or unworked.

Moreover, it argues that the contracts were submitted to BES (Bureau of Employment Services)
Director Jonathan M.R.A. de la Cruz, the same director who rendered the questioned decision He
approved the same. Without his approval, the petitioner would not have stipulated the ten-hour work
schedule and would have provided for a lower basic salary for an eight-hour working day.

ISSUE
Whether Aspera is entitled to overtime pay.

HELD
We hold that under the particular circumstances of this case the Acting Minister of Labor and
Director De la Cruz committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in awarding
overtime pay and in disregarding a contract that De la Cruz himself, who is supposed to know the Eight-
Hour Labor Law, had previously sealed with his imprimatur. Because of that approval, the petitioner acted
in good faith in enforcing the contract.
Furthermore, Aspera had not denied that he was a managerial employee within the meaning of
Section 82. As such, he was not entitled to overtime pay.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Acting Minister of Labor dated November 16, 1981 is reversed and set
aside. Aspera's complaint is dismissed. No costs.












16) DEPARTMENT ADVISORY No. 2, series of 2004
HERE IS THE LINK
http://www.dole11.net/downloads/Department-Advisory-No.02-s2004.pdf




























































17) MERCURY DRUG CO., INC., petitioner, vs. NARDO DAYAO, ET AL., respondents
G.R. No. L-30452 September 30, 1982


FACTS:

NardoDayao and 70 others filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations against Mercury Drug Co., Inc., and/or Mariano Que,
President & General Manager, and Mercury Drug Co., Inc., Employees Association praying, with respect to respondent corporation
and its president and general manager: 1) payment of their unpaid back wages for work done on Sundays and legal holidays plus
25c/c additional compensation from date of their employment up to June 30, 1962; 2) payment of extra compensation on work done at
night; 3) reinstatement of JanuarioReferente and Oscar Echalar to their former positions with back salaries; and, as against the
respondent union, for its disestablishment and the refund of all monies it had collected from petitioners.

CIR rendered its decision that:

1. The claim of the petitioners for payment of back wages corresponding to the first four hours of work rendered on every other
Sunday and first four hours on legal holidays should be denied for lack of merit;

2. Respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay the sixty- nine (69) petitioners: (a) An additional sum equivalent
to 25% of their respective basic or regular salaries for services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays during the period from March
20, 1961 up to June 30, 1962; and (b) Another additional sum or premium equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular
salaries for nighttime services rendered from March 20, 1961 up to June 30, 1962; and

3. Petitioners' petition to convert them to monthly employees should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Not satisfied with the
decision, the respondents filed a motion for its reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration, was however, denied by the Court en
banc.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to claims for 25% additional compensation performing work during Sunday and
legal holidays.

b. Whether or not the 25% compensation had already been included in the private respondents monthly salaries.

c. Whether or not the contracts of employment were null and void was not put in issue, hence, the respondent court pursuant
to the Rules of Court should have refrained from ruling that such contracts of employment were null and void.

HELD:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. On the first issue, based on Sec. 4 CA No. 444, No person, firm or corporation, business
establishment or place of center of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays unless he is
paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That this prohibition
shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of
transportation or communication. In this case, the petitioner does not fall on exemptions.

On the second issue, their 25% additional compensation for work done on Sundays and Legal Holidays were not included in their
respective monthly salaries. The petitioner contention was not supported by substantial evidence.

The last issue, the Mercury Drug Co., Inc., maintains a chain of drugstores that are open every day of the week and, for some stores,
up to very late at night because of the nature of the pharmaceutical retail business. The respondents knew that they had to work
Sundays and holidays and at night, not as exceptions to the rule but as part of the regular course of employment. Presented with
contracts setting their compensation on an annual basis with an express waiver of extra compensation for work on Sundays and
holidays, the workers did not have much choice.

The private respondents were at a disadvantage insofar as the contractual relationship was concerned. Workers in our country do not
have the luxury or freedom of declining job openings or filing resignations even when some terms and conditions of employment are
not only onerous and inequitous but illegal.

It is precisely because of this situation that the framers of the Constitution embodied the provisions on social justice (Section 6, Article
11) and protection to labor (Section 9, Article I I) in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies.
















18) INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, ENRICO GONZALES and MA. THERESA
MONTEJO, petitioners, vs. INTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC., AND HONORABLE LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING,
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Respondent. They had a CBA.

Prior to the expiration of the CBA, respondent company was approached by the petitioner, through its officers. The Union inquired
about the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA which was set to expire in a few months. Salazar told the union
officers that the matter could be best discussed during the formal negotiations which would start soon.

All the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule. The employees stopped
working and left their workplace without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on.

To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the company, Salazar immediately asked for a meeting with the union
officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal work
schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union
officers that the matter could be better discussed during the formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently
unsatisfied with the answer of the company, theovertime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work
slowdown campaign during the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the production of the company.

Respondent company filed with the National NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner unions overtime boycott and work
slowdown which, according to respondent company, amounted to illegal strike. It also filed with Office Secretary of Labor a petition
for assumption of jurisdiction. Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor issued an assumption order over the labordispute.

Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing. Then Secretary
Quisumbing approved and adopted the report in his Order, finding illegal strike on the part of petitioner Union.

ISSUES:

a. WON the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an illegal strike.
b. WON the respondents have engaged in "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown".
c. WON Private Respondents act of extending substantial separation package to almost all involved officers of petitioner
union, during the pendency of the case, as tantamount to condonation, if indeed, there was any misdeed committed.

HELD:

a. On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to rule on the illegal strike
committed by petitioner union, it cannot be denied that the issues of overtime boycott and work slowdown amounting to
illegal strike before Labor Arbiter Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor Secretary.

The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the Secretary of Labor and Employments jurisdiction over labor-
related disputes was already settled in International Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor
Union (ALU) where the Court declared:

In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must
include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has
exclusive jurisdiction.

Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptionsthereto. This is evident from the
opening proviso therein reading (e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code x xx. Plainly, Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction,
subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary
dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor
arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said, it is fundamental that a statute is to be read in
a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.

In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code and Article 217(a) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective
of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary. Petition denied.

b. Yes. Members of the union by their own volition decided not to render overtime services in April 1993. Petitioner union even
admitted this in its Memorandum, dated 12 April 1999, filed with the Court of Appeals, as well as in the petition before this
Court, which both stated that "(s)sometime in April 1993, members of herein petitioner, on their own volition and in keeping
with the regular working hours in the Company x xx decided not to render overtime".[21] Such admission confirmed the
allegation of respondent company that petitioner engaged in overtime boycott and work slowdown which, to use the
words of Labor Arbiter Caday, was taken as a means to coerce respondent company to yield to its unreasonable demands.

More importantly, the overtime boycott or work slowdown by the employees constituted a violation of their CBA, which
prohibits the union or employee, during the existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of
work.

c. No. Respondent company correctly postured that at the time these union officers obtained their separation benefits, they
were still considered employees of the company. Hence, the company was merely complying with its legal obligations.
Respondent company could have withheld these benefits pending the final resolution of this case. Yet, considering perhaps
the financial hardships experienced by its employees and the economic situation prevailing, respondent company chose to
let its employees avail of their separation benefits. The Court views the gesture of respondent company as an act of
generosity for which it should not be punished.







































































19) REMERCO GARMENTS MANUFACTURING, petitioner, vs. HON. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
and ZENAIDA BUSTAMANTE, LUZ RAYMUNDO and RUTH CORPUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

During the period of their employment with petitioner, Luz Raymundo and Zenaida Bustamante were given three consecutive
warnings for alleged refusal to render overtime work. Finally, they were penalized with one week's suspension.

It appears that Luz Raymundo was required to work on October 15, 1978, a Sunday, despite her request for exemption to work on
that Sunday, her rest day. Her request was disapproved. For failure to report for work despite denial of her request, she was notified
of her dismissal effective upon expiration of her suspension. Thereafter, petitioner filed a clearance application to dismiss her on
grounds of insubordination. Raymundo opposed said application by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal and for money claims.With
respect to Zenaida Bustamante, she failed to report for work despite the expiration of her suspension. Petitioner contends that said
failure constitutes abandonment which it later invoke as ground for clearance application to dismiss her from employment. Like
Raymundo, Zenaida Bustamante opposed the clearance application by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming that her alleged
failure toreport for work was due to illness, as in fact, she was treated by one Dr. Lorenzo Yuson for fever and severe stomach
ache.Ruth Corpuz was also given a warning for refusal to render overtime work on another date, August 30, 1978. She was
subsequently dismissed on October 4, 1978 for having written a chalk mark on a nylon jacket for export allegedly a violation of Rule
26 of petitioner's rules and regulations, which provides: "Employees are strictly prohibited from defacing or writing on walls of the
factory, toilets or any other company property." The clearance application for her dismissal which she also opposed by filing a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The case was submitted for conciliation proceedings, but no settlement was arrived.

Acting Director of National Capital Region, MOLE, issued an order granting petitioner's application for clearance to terminate the
employment of private respondents and dismissing their complaints for lack of merit.Private respondents appealed the order to the
National Labor Relations Commission. Meanwhile, the Acting Director of the National Capital Region, MOLE, elevated the records of
the case to the Labor Appeals and Review Staff, Office of the Minister of Labor.

Minister of Labor rendered a decision reversing the appealed order and directed petitioner to reinstate private respondents Luz
Raymundo, Zenaida Bustamante and Ruth Corpuz to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with full
backwages.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Minister of Labor.

A petition for certiorari was filed by Petitioner with the prayer to annul the decision of the Minister of Labor assailed to have been
rendered without and/or lack of jurisdiction, and in lieu thereof, sustain the order of the Acting Director of the National Capital Region,
MOLE, granting the clearance application to dismiss Luz Raymundo, Zenaida Bustamante and Ruth Corpuz.

ISSUE:

WON sufficient legal grounds exist under the relevant facts and applicable law to justify the dismissal of private respondents Luz
Raymundo and Zenaida Bustamante.

HELD:

SC answers in the negative and affirmed the decision of the Minister of Labor. While it is true that it is the sole prerogative of the
management to dismiss or lay-off an employee, the exercise of such a prerogative, however, must be made without abuse of
discretion, for what is at stake is not only private respondents' positions but also their means of livelihood. Basically, the right of an
employer to dismiss an employee differs from and should not be confused with the manner in which such right is exercised. It must
not be oppressive and abusive since it affects one's person and property.

In the case of Luz Raymundo, she was charged of insubordination for allegedly refusing to work on a Sunday, which was her rest day.
The records show that the day before, she requested exemption from work on that Sunday and she was granted a clearance slip
allowing her to be absent on that Sunday by her immediate supervisor (Department Head). She had a valid ground, therefore, not to
work on that Sunday, and her failure to report that day cannot be considered as gross insubordination. The disapproval of her request
by top management reasonably creates the impression of a hostile attitude characterizing the efforts of petitioner (Management) of
easing out with undue haste the services of private respondents. Besides, petitioner has not shown that Luz Raymundo's failure to
report for work on that Sunday constitutes one of the just causes for termination under Article 283 of the New Labor Code.

On the other hand, in the case of Zenaida Bustamante, she allegedly abandoned her employment by failing to report for work after the
expiration of her suspension. Like Luz Raymundo, her one week suspension arose from her failure to report for work on a Sunday
which as explained in her opposition to the clearance application, was not without reason because on that day, she was ill and in fact
treated by Dr. Lorenzo Yuson for fever and severe stomach ache as shown by the medical certificate. On the consequent charge of
abandonment, it must be noted that Zenaida Bustamante filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to oppose the clearance application to
dismiss her. Of course, it is a recognized principle that abandonment of work by an employee is inconsistent with the immediate filing
of a complaint for illegal dismissal. It would be illogical for Zenaida Bustamante to abandon her job and then immediately file an action
seeking her reinstatement. At that time, no employee would recklessly abandon her job knowing fully well the acute unemployment
problem then existing and the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood.

The illegality of the dismissal of the herein private respondents, under the facts and circumstances disclosed, becomes even more
apparent in the light of the express provision of the Constitution, requiring the State to assure the workers "security of tenure" and "just
and humane conditions of work.The penalty of dismissal from the service, even assuming petitioner's charges to be true, is too
severe a penalty. It is a penalty out of proportion to the offense committed-failure to report for work on a Sunday - when after all,
suspension would suffice.The New Labor Code is clear on this point. It is the duty of every employer, whether operating for profit or
not, to provide each of his employees a rest period of not less than twenty four (24) hours after every six (6) consecutive normal work
days. Even if there really existed an urgency to require work on a rest day, (which is not in the instant case) outright dismissal from
employment is so severe a consequence, more so when justifiable grounds exist for failure to report for work.

Petitioner Remerco Garments Manufacturing is hereby ordered to reinstate Luz Raymundo and Zenaida Bustamante to their former or
substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and privileges with three-year (3) backwages computed from October
23, 1978.











































































20) PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and PRODUCERS BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 100701. March 28, 2001]

FACTS:

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), charging petitioner with diminution of benefits, non-compliance with Wage Order No. 6 and non-payment of holiday pay. In
addition, private respondent prayed for damages.Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro found private respondents claims to be
unmeritorious and dismissed its complaint. In a complete reversal, however, the NLRC granted all of private respondents claims,
except for damages.Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC. Hence, recourse to SC.

Petitioner contentions with regards to NLRCs ruling:

1. On the alleged diminution of benefits, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when (1) it contravened the Supreme Court decision
in Traders Royal Bank v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 88168 (2) its ruling is not justified by law and Art. 100 of the Labor Code, (3) its ruling
is contrary to the CBA, and (4) the so-called company practice invoked by it has no legal and moral bases.

2. On the alleged non-compliance with Wage Order No. 6, the NLRC again gravely abused its discretion when it patently and
palpably erred in holding that it is more inclined to adopt the stance of appellant (private respondent UNION) in this issue since it is
more in keeping with the law and its implementing provisions and the intendment of the parties as revealed in their CBA without
giving any reason or justification for such conclusions as the stance of appellant (private respondent UNION) does not traverse the
clear and correct finding and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter.

Furthermore, the petitioner, under conservatorship and distressed, is exempted under Wage Order No. 6.

Finally, the wage differentials under Wage Order No. 6 for November 1, 1984 and the corresponding adjustment thereof has
prescribed.

3. On the alleged non-payment of legal holiday pay, the NLRC again gravely abused its discretion when it patently and palpably erred
in approving and adopting the position of appellant (private respondent UNION) without giving any reason or justification therefor
which position does not squarely traverse or refute the Labor Arbiters correct finding and ruling.

ISSUES:

WON petitioner has violated the provisions of the Labor Code with regards to diminution of benefits, non-compliance with Wage No. 6
and non-payment of holiday pay.


HELD:No.
In Bonuses

Private respondent argument - the mid-year and Christmas bonuses, by reason of their having been given for thirteen consecutive
years, have ripened into a vested right and, as such, can no longer be unilaterally withdrawn by petitioner without violating Article 100
of Presidential Decree No. 442 which prohibits the diminution or elimination of benefits already being enjoyed by the employees.
Although private respondent concedes that the grant of a bonus is discretionary on the part of the employer, it argues that, by reason
of its long and regular concession, it may become part of the employees regular compensation.

Petitoners argument - it cannot be compelled to pay the alleged bonus differentials due to its depressed financial condition, as
evidenced by the fact that in 1984 it was placed under conservatorship by the Monetary Board. According to petitioner, it sustained
losses in the millions of pesos from 1984 to 1988, an assertion which was affirmed by the labor arbiter. Moreover, petitioner points out
that the collective bargaining agreement of the parties does not provide for the payment of any mid-year or Christmas bonus.

SC - A bonus is an amount granted and paid to an employee for his industry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the
employers business and made possible the realization of profits. It is an act of generosity granted by an enlightened employer to spur
the employee to greater efforts for the success of the business and realization of bigger profits. The granting of a bonus is a
management prerogative, something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient. Thus, a bonus is
not a demandable and enforceable obligation, except when it is made part of the wage, salary or compensation of the employee. An
employer cannot be forced to distribute bonuses which it can no longer afford to pay. To hold otherwise would be to penalize the
employer for his past generosity.

13
th
Month Pay

The intention of the law was to grant some relief not to all workers but only to those not actually paid a 13th month salary or what
amounts to it, by whatever name called. It was not envisioned that a double burden would be imposed on the employer already
paying his employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent whether out of pure generosity or on the basis of a binding agreement. To
impose upon an employer already giving his employees the equivalent of a 13th month pay would be to penalize him for his liberality
and in all probability, the employer would react by withdrawing the bonuses or resist further voluntary grants for fear that if and when a
law is passed giving the same benefits, his prior concessions might not be given due credit.

In the case at bar, even assuming the truth of private respondents claims as contained in its position paper or Memorandum
regarding the payments received by its members in the form of 13th month pay, mid-year bonus and Christmas bonus, it is noted that,
for each and every year involved, the total amount given by petitioner would still exceed, or at least be equal to, one month basic
salary and thus, may be considered as an equivalent of the 13th month pay mandated by PD 851. Thus, petitioner is justified in
crediting the mid-year bonus and Christmas bonus as part of the 13th month pay.

Wage Order No. 6

Wage Order No. 6, which came into effect on 1 November 1984, increased the statutory minimum wage of workers, with different
increases being specified for agricultural plantation and non-agricultural workers. The bone of contention, however, involves Section
4 thereof which reads -

All wage increase in wage and/or allowance granted by employers between June 17, 1984 and the effectivity of this Order shall be
credited as compliance with the minimum wage and allowance adjustments prescribed herein provided that where the increases are
less than the applicable amount provided in this Order, the employer shall pay the difference. Such increases shall not include
anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining agreements unless the agreement expressly provide otherwise.

The parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing for salary adjustments. In addition, the collective bargaining
agreement of the parties also included a provision on the chargeability of such salary or allowance increases against government-
ordered or legislated income adjustment.

Section 1 of Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement of the parties states that the parties have formulated and agreed on
the following highly substantial packaged increases in salary and allowance which take into account and cover (a) any deflati on in
income of employees because of such price increases and inflation and (b) the expected governmental response thereto in the form
of statutory adjustments in wages, allowances and benefits, during the next three (3) years of this Agreement The unequivocal
wording of this provision manifests the clear intent of the parties to apply the wage and allowance increases stipulated in the collective
bargaining agreement to any statutory wage and allowance adjustments issued during the effectivity of such agreement - from 1
March 1984 to 28 February 1987. Furthermore, contrary to private respondents contentions, there is nothing in the wording of
Section 2 of Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement that would prevent petitioner from crediting the first year salary and
allowance increases against the increases prescribed by Wage Order No. 6.

It would be inconsistent with the rationale underlying the creditability provision of Wage Order No. 6 if, after applying the first year
increase to Wage Order No. 5, the balance was not made chargeable to the increases under Wage Order No. 6 for the fact remains
that petitioner actually granted wage and allowance increases sufficient to cover the increases mandated by Wage Order No. 5 and
part of the increases mandated by Wage Order No. 6.

Holiday Pay

Petitioner has complied with the requirements of Article 94 of the Labor Code.Article 94 of the Labor Code provides that every worker
shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays and that the employer may require an employee to work on any holiday
but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate.

In this case, the Labor Arbiter found that the divisor used by petitioner in arriving at the employees daily rate for the purpose of
computing salary-related benefits is 314. This finding was not disputed by the NLRC. However, the divisor was reduced to 303 by
virtue of an inter-office memorandum. Corollarily, the Acting Convservator also approved the increase of meal allowance from P25.00
to P30.00 for a minimum of four (4) hours of work for Saturdays.

Proceeding from the unambiguous terms of the memorandum, the Labor Arbiter observed that the reduction of the divisor to 303 was
for the sole purpose of increasing the employees overtime pay and was not meant to replace the use of 314 as the divisor in the
computation of the daily rate for salary-related benefits.

One strong argument in favor of the petitioners stand is the fact that the Chartered Bank, in computing overtime compensation for its
employees, employs a divisor of 251 days. The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the
ten (10) legal holidays form the total number of calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid for all non-working days,
the divisor should be 365 and not 251.

Apparently, the divisor of 314 is arrived at by subtracting all Sundays from the total number of calendar days in a year, since
Saturdays are considered paid rest days, as stated in the inter-office memorandum. Thus, the use of 314 as a divisor leads to the
inevitable conclusion that the ten legal holidays are already included therein.

We agree with the labor arbiter that the reduction of the divisor to 303 was done for the sole purpose of increasing the employees
overtime pay, and was not meant to exclude holiday pay from the monthly salary of petitioners employees. In fact, it was expressly
stated in the inter-office memorandum - also referred to by private respondent in its pleadings - that the divisor of 314 will still be used
in the computation for cash conversion and in the determination of the daily rate.


















21. Asian Transmission Corp vs CA
Facts: The DOLE, through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an Explanatory Bulletin
dated March 11, 1993 wherein it clarified, inter alia, that employees are entitled to 200% of their
basic wage on April 9, 1993, whether unworked, which apart from being Good Friday is also Araw
ng Kagitingan.The bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998 when April 9 was both Maundy
Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan. Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner Asian
Transmission Corporation opted to pay its dailypaid employees only 100% of their basic pay on
April 9, 1998. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. Hence,
the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration.

On July 31, 1998, the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its
covered employees "200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9, 1998
which covers two regular holidays, namely, Araw ng Kagitignan and Maundy Thursday." The Voluntary
Arbitrator held that Article 94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday, the
computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not changed by the fact that there are
two holidays falling on one day, like on April 9, 1998 when it was Araw ng Kagitingan and at the same
time was Maundy Thursday; and that that the law, as amended, enumerates ten regular holidays for
every year should not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular
holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years, like 1993 and 1998, is also Holy Friday
or Maundy Thursday." The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator.

Issue: Whether or not the daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular holidays which fall
on the same day?

Ruling: Yes. Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular
holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily
basis. Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable
under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two
holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker
is entitled to receive.In the case at bar, there is nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the
entitlement to ten days of holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidays fall on the same day.






















22. Jose Rizal College vs NLRC

Facts:Petitioner Jose Rizal College(JRU) is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It has three groups of employees categorized as follows: (a)
personnel on monthly basis, who receive their monthly salary uniformly throughout the year, irrespective
of the actual number of working days in a month without deduction for holidays; (b) personnel on daily
basis who are paid on actual days worked and they receive unworked holiday pay and (c) collegiate
faculty who are paid on the basis of student contract hour. Before the start of the semester they sign
contracts with the college undertaking to meet their classes as per schedule. Unable to receive their
corresponding holiday pay, as claimed, from 1975 to 1977, private respondent National Alliance of
Teachers and Office Workers (NATOW) in behalf of the faculty and personnel of Jose Rizal College filed
with the Ministry of Labor a complaint against the college for said alleged non-payment of holiday pay.

Labor Arbiter ** rendered a decision on February 5, 1979, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The faculty and personnel of the respondent Jose Rizal College who are paid their salary by the
month uniformly in a school year, irrespective of the number of working days in a month,
without deduction for holidays, are presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays and
are no longer entitled to separate payment for the said regular holidays;
2. The personnel of the respondent Jose Rizal College who are paid their wages daily are entitled
to be paid the 10 unworked regular holidays according to the pertinent provisions of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code;
3. Collegiate faculty of the respondent Jose Rizal College who by contract are paid compensation
per student contract hour are not entitled to unworked regular holiday pay considering that
these regular holidays have been excluded in the programming of the student contact hours.
On appeal, respondent National Labor Relations Commission modified the decision appealed from, in the
sense that teaching personnel paid by the hour are declared to be entitled to holiday pay.

Issue: whether or not the school faculty who are paid per lecture hour are entitled to unworked holiday
pay

Ruling: No. The court believe that the implementing rule (Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule IV,
Book III, which reads: SEC. 8. Holiday pay of certain employees. (a) Private school teachers, including
faculty members of colleges and universities, may not be paid for the regular holidays during semestral
vacations. They shall, however, be paid for the regular holidays during Christmas vacations. ...)
is not justified by the provisions of the law which after all is silent with respect to faculty members paid by
the hour who because of their teaching contracts are obliged to work and consent to be paid only for
work actually done (except when an emergency or a fortuitous event or a national need calls for the
declaration of special holidays). Regular holidays specified as such by law are known to both school and
faculty members as no class days;" certainly the latter do not expect payment for said unworked days,
and this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the teaching contracts

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby set aside, and a new one is hereby RENDERED:
(a) exempting petitioner from paying hourly paid faculty members their pay for regular holidays,
whether the same be during the regular semesters of the school year or during semestral,
Christmas, or Holy Week vacations;
(b) but ordering petitioner to pay said faculty members their regular hourly rate on days declared as
special holidays or for some reason classes are called off or shortened for the hours they are supposed to
have taught, whether extensions of class days be ordered or not; in case of extensions said faculty
members shall likewise be paid their hourly rates should they teach during said extensions

23. JPL Marketing Promotions vs CA

Facts:
JPL Marketing and Promotions (hereinafter referred to as JPL) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of recruitment and placement of workers. On the other hand, private
respondents Noel Gonzales, Ramon Abesa III and Faustino Aninipot were employed by JPL as
merchandisers on separate dates and assigned at different establishments in Naga City and Daet,
Camarines Norte as attendants to the display of California Marketing Corporation (CMC), one of
petitioners clients. On 13 August 1996, JPL notified private respondents that CMC would stop its
direct merchandising activity in the Bicol Region, Isabela, and Cagayan Valley effective 15 August
1996.They were advised to wait for further notice as they would be transferred to other clients.
On 17 October 1996,private respondents Abesa and Gonzales filed before the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Branch Sub V complaints for illegal dismissal, praying for separation pay, 13th month
pay, service incentive leave pay and payment for moral damages. Aninipot filed a similar case
thereafter.

The Second Division of the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiters finding that when private respondents
filed their complaints, the six-month period had not yet expired, and that CMCs decision to stop its
operations in the areas was beyond the control of JPL, thus, they were not illegally dismissed.Setting aside
the Labor Arbiters decision, the NLRC ordered the payment of:
1. Separation pay, based on their last salary rate and counted from the first day of their
employment with the respondent JPL up to the finality of this judgment;
2. Service Incentive Leave pay, and 13th month pay, computed as in No.1 hereof.

CA affirmed in toto the NLRC Resolution

Issue: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay, 13
th
month pay and
service incentive leave pay

Ruling:
Separation Pay
No. Under Arts. 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, separation pay is authorized only in cases of dismissals
due to any of these reasons: (a) installation of labor saving devices; (b) redundancy; (c) retrenchment; (d)
cessation of the employer's business; and (e) when the employee is suffering from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health and to the health of his co-
employees.In addition, Sec. 4(b), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules to Implement the Labor Code
provides for the payment of separation pay to an employee entitled to reinstatement but the
establishment where he is to be reinstated has closed or has ceased operations or his present position no
longer exists at the time of reinstatement for reasons not attributable to the employer. The
common denominator of the instances where payment of separation pay is warranted is that the
employee was dismissed by the employer.In the instant case, there was no dismissal to speak
of.What they received from JPL was not a notice of termination of employment, but a memo
informing them of the termination of CMCs contract with JPL

13
th
month pay and service incentive leave pay
Yes. JPL cannot escape the payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay to private
respondents. Said benefits are mandated by law and should be given to employees as a matter of
right. Service incentive leave, as provided in Art. 95 of the Labor Code, is a yearly leave benefit of
five (5) days with pay, enjoyed by an employee who has rendered at least one year of service.
Unless specifically excepted, all establishments are required to grant service incentive leave to
their employees.private respondents were not given their 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay while they were under the employ of JPL. Instead, JPL provided salaries which were
over and above the minimum wage. The Court rules that the difference between the minimum
wage and the actual salary received by private respondents cannot be deemed as their 13th
month pay and service incentive leave pay as such difference is not equivalent to or of the same
import as the said benefits contemplated by law. Thus, as properly held by the Court of Appeals
and by the NLRC, private respondents are entitled to the 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay.









































24. Auto bus transport systems inc vs Antonio Bautista

Facts:Respondent Antonio Bautista has been employed by petitioner Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc.
(Autobus), as driver-conductor with travel routes Manila-Tuguegarao via Baguio, Baguio- Tuguegarao via
Manila and Manila-Tabuk via Baguio. Respondent was paid on commission basis, seven percent (7%) of
the total gross income per travel, on a twice a month basis.On 03 January 2000, while respondent was
driving Autobus No. 114 along Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, the bus he was driving accidentally bumped the
rear portion of Autobus No. 124, as the latter vehicle suddenly stopped at a sharp curve without giving
any warning. Respondent further alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully paid the amount
of P75,551.50, representing thirty percent (30%) of the cost of repair of the damaged buses and that
despite respondents pleas for reconsideration, the same was ignored by management. After a month,
management sent him a letter of termination. Respondent instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with
Money Claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay against Autobus.

Labor Arbiter rendered decision that the respondent must pay to the complainant the following:
a. his 13th month pay from the date of his hiring to the date of his dismissal, presently computed at
P78,117.87;
b. his service incentive leave pay for all the years he had been in service with the respondent, presently
computed at P13,788.05.

on the appealed decision, NLRC modified by deleting the award for 13
th
month pay but the service
incentive leave was maintained.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave

Ruling: Yes.

Art. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service
incentive leave of five days with pay.
Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
SECTION 1. Coverage. This rule shall apply to all employees except:

(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer including
those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid in a
fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof; . . .

According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, "field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who
regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer
and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Field
personnel are those who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Thus, in order to conclude whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if
actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so
doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employees time and performance are
constantly supervised by the employer.

As correctly concluded by the appellate court, respondent is not a field personnel but a regular employee
who performs tasks usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade of petitioners business.
Accordingly, respondent is entitled to the grant of service incentive leave.