SUMMARY OF RECENT DOCTRINES

By SJS
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one
is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is referred to
as actual or compensatory damages.
Actual damages are such compensation or
damages for an injury that will put the injured
party in the position in which he had been before
he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or
losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement. To justify an
award of actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of
loss. Credence can be given only to claims
which are duly supported by receipts. Job
estimates as to cost of repair to property not
sufficient to establish amount actually spent for
repair! BF Metal v. Lomotan, April "#, $%%& '.
Tinga!
(n the case of moral damages, recovery is more
an exception rather than the rule. An award of
moral damages would require, firstly, evidence
of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant) secondly, a culpable act or omission
factually established) thirdly, proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the damages sustained by
the claimant) and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article $$"* and Article $$$% of
the +ivil +ode. BF Metal v. Lomotan, April "#,
$%%& '. Tinga!
Owners of damaged property are not entitled
to moral damages if there is no proof that the
accident was willful. Article $$$% does spea,
of awarding moral damages where there is injury
to property, but the injury must be willful and the
circumstances show that such damages are
justly due. BF Metal v. Lomotan, April "#, $%%&
'. Tinga!
-hen an employee of a drugstore misreads the
prescription, and gave the customer a potent
sleeping tablet .instead of something to ,eep his
blood sugar down/, and the customer is involved
in a vehicular accident because he fell asleep
while driving, the proximate cause of the
accident is the gross negligence of the
employee. The employer is li,ewise liable.
+onsidering the business of the drugstore, the
employee should have been very cautious in
dispensing medicines. The care required must
be commensurate with the danger involved, and
the s,ill employed must correspond with the
superior ,nowledge of the business which the
law demands. 0oral 1 exemplary damages
awarded. Mercury Drug v. Baking, 0ay $2,
$%%3.
4edestrian, instead of using overpass, crosses
+ommonwealth avenue and was hit by speeding
Tamaraw 56. The driver brought the pedestrian
to the hospital, returns to his 56 and then flees.
(n a suit for damages against the driver and
owner, both were held liable. 7ut the pedestrian
was held contributorily negligent, and damages
reduced by $%8. Mendoza v. Soriano, 'une &,
$%%3
The driver of pic,up had slowed down as he was
about to ma,e a u9turn while at the outer lane
.instead of occupying the inner lane/ when he
got hit by a speeding vehicle. The driver of the
speeding vehicle admitted that he saw the
pic,up at about $% meters away but did not step
on the bra,es until after the collision. 7oth
vehicles were the only ones on the road. S+
found both parties were negligent:at fault, and
applied the doctrine of last clear chance. The
other driver found liable as well as his employer.
;wner of pic,9up who was on board the vehicle
when the accident happened was awarded
moral damages, after having established that he
suffered shoc,, serious anxiety and fright.
Lapanday gricultural v. ngala, 'une $%%3
A Toyota corolla driven by a "3 year old was on
the left most inner land and a #9wheeler truc, of
0ercury right beside it when the truc, suddenly
swerved to its left and slammed into the car. At
the time of the accident, the driver of the truc,
only had a traffic violation receipt as his driver<s
license was confiscated for rec,less driving. S+
found truc, driver and employer liable. Awarded
actual damages .hospital expenses, medicines,
medical services/. And, because tort9feasors
are liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the negligence,
also awarded approx. 4$=.20 as life care
cost:continuous rehabilitation and therapy .the
victim was paraly>ed, chances of wal,ing and
performing basic bodily functions nil/. The
award was computed based on average
monthly expense and actuarial computation of
remaining years. 4lus 4"%0 for the loss or
impairment of earning capacity .only "3, nearly
#feet tall, member of school varsity bas,etball
team, class president and editor9in9chief of
school annual, good leadership qualities,
exceptional student in academics and extra9
curricular activities, and had passed ?4, @AS?,
?A4 and offer of athletic scholarship from Sto.
Tomas/. Also awarded moral and exemplary
damages and attorney<s fees. Mercury Drug v.
!uang, 'une $$, $%%3
The extant rule is that a public officer shall not
be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages and for attorney<s fees for acts done in
the performance of official duties, unless there is
a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence. The plaintiff must prove that these
officers exhibited acts characteri>ed by evident
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. 7ut even
if their acts has not been so tainted, public
officers may still be held liable for nominal
damages if they had violated the plaintiffBs
constitutional rights, under Art. =$ of the +ivil
+ode. ?nder this article, it is not necessary that
the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.
To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner,
even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of oneBs duties.
"o#uangco v. ", 'uly $, "***.
Article $$$" of the +ivil +ode authori>es the
award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose
right has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recogni>ing that right, not for indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also
award nominal damages in every case where a
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SUMMARY OF RECENT DOCTRINES
By SJS
property right has been invaded. The amount of
such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, with the relevant
circumstances ta,en into account. "o#uangco v.
", 'uly $, "***.
$espondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner %a public officer& in her private
capacity for damages under rticle '( of the
"ivil "ode) for the issuance of a ta* revenue
memorandum circular +hich purportedly
violated respondent,s constitutional right against
deprivation of property +ithout due process of
la+ and the right to e-ual protection of the la+s.
.etitioner claims that since the suit is grounded
on her acts done in the performance of her
functions as a public officer) it is Section '/)
Book 0 of the dministrative "ode +hich should
be applied. 12nder this provision) liability +ill
attach only +hen there is a clear sho+ing of bad
faith) malice) or gross negligence.3 She also
claims that rticle '( is a general la+ on the
liability of public officers4 +hile Section '/) Book
0 of the dministrative "ode is a special la+ on
the superior public officers, liability) such that) if
the complaint) as in the instant case) does not
allege bad faith) malice) or gross negligence) the
same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of
action.
May a public officer be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in connection
with the discharge of the functions of his/her
office? Which as between Article 32 of the
Civil Code and Section 38 !oo" # of the
Ad$inistrative Code should govern in
deter$ining whether the co$plaint states a
cause of action?
"o#uangco) Jr. v. " ."**&/ has ruled that a
public officer who directly or indirectly violates
the constitutional rights of another, may be
validly sued for damages under Article =$ of the
+ivil +ode even if his acts were not so tainted
with malice or bad faith. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly
sued in his:her private capacity for acts done in
the course of the performance of the functions of
the office, where said public officerC ."/ acted
with malice, bad faith, or negligence) or .$/
where the public officer violated a constitutional
right of the plaintiff.
Article =$ was meant to hold not only public
officers but also private individuals civilly liable
for violation of the rights enumerated. (t is not
necessary that the defendant under this Article
should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose,
which is the effective protection of individual
rights. (t suffices that there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff. Article =$ of
the +ivil +ode specifies in clear and unequivocal
terms a particular specie of an DactE that may
give rise to an action for damages against a
public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of
rights and liberties. (ndeed, Article =$ is the
special provision that deals specifically with
violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. All other actionable acts of public
officers are governed by Sections =& and =* of
the Administrative +ode. -hile the +ivil +ode,
specifically, the +hapter on Fuman Gelations is
a general law, Article =$ of the same +hapter is
a special and specific provision that holds a
public officer liable for and allows redress from a
particular class of wrongful acts that may be
committed by public officers. +ompared thus
with Section =& of the Administrative +ode,
which broadly deals with civil liability arising from
errors in the performance of duties, Article =$ of
the +ivil +ode is the specific provision which
must be applied in the case precisely filed to
see, damages for violation of constitutional
rights.

Since the complaint in the case was brought
under Article =$ of the +ivil +ode and
considering that bad faith and malice are not
necessary in an action based on Article =$ of the
+ivil +ode, the failure to specifically allege the
same will not amount to failure to state a cause
of action. The courts below therefore correctly
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action, since it is
enough that the complaint avers a violation of a
constitutional right of the plaintiff. 5inzons6"hato
v. Fortune 7obacco) H.G. Io. "J"=%*, 'une "*,
$%%3.
The award of compensatory damages for the
loss of the deceasedBs earning capacity should
be deleted for lac, of basis. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity. 7y way of exception, damages
for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence
when ."/ the deceased is self9employed earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, and judicial notice may be ta,en of the fact
that in the deceasedBs line of wor, no
documentary evidence is available) or .$/ the
deceased is employed as a daily wage wor,er
earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
7are testimony as to the earning capacity of the
deceased is not enough, and the deceased did
not fall within the exceptions. Fowever, the
fact of loss having been established, temperate
damages should be awarded. ?nder Article
$$$J of the +ivil +ode, temperate or moderate
damages, which are more than nominal but less
than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount can not, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
The S+ noted two earlier cases where Art. $$$J
was applied to justify the award of temperate
damages in lieu of damages for loss of earning
capacity which was not substantiated by the
required documentary proof. 5ictory Liner v.
8ammad, Iovember $2, $%%J
A ban, refused to release a mortgage
cancellation document of A7+ and lead to the
failure of A7+ to generate the required capital to
meet its distribution targets, and the cancellation
of a distribution agreement with another
company. The S+ ruled that the wrongful acts
of the ban, adversely affected, in one way or
another, the commercial credit of A7+, greatly
contributed to, if not, decisively caused the
premature stoppage of its business operations
and the consequent loss of business
opportunity. Since these losses are not
susceptible to pecuniary estimation, temperate
damages were awarded. .remiere Development
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SUMMARY OF RECENT DOCTRINES
By SJS
Bank v. ") April "J, $%%J.
@efendant lost in an ejectment suit and aside
from being ejected and declared liable for
arrears, was also assessed 4=K per day as
damages, pursuant to the lease contract.
@efendant claims that the 4=K award as
damages was improper in the light of the
doctrine enunciated in = cases that Lthe only
damages that can be recovered in an ejectment
suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the
real property. ;ther damages must be claimed
in an ordinary action.L The S+ ruled that
reliance on the three cases was misplaced as
they dealt with additional damages and charges
other than liquidated damages, defined as
L.those agreed upon by the parties to a contract,
to be paid in case of breach thereofL. The trial
court, was merely enforcing what was stipulated
upon in blac, and white in the lease contract.
zcuna v. ", 0arch $%, "**#.
The court sustained the award of moral and
exemplary damages, having found them justified
under the circumstances. 7ut since plaintiffs
had limited their claim for moral and exemplary
damages to a total of 4=2K, the S+ said that the
award should not exceed that amount.
Makabali v. ", 'anuary $$, "*&&
The term Laggravating circumstancesL used by
the +ivil +ode, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense
has a two9pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages
to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a
shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. ?nli,e the criminal
which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is li,ewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. (t would ma,e little sense for an award
of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when
it is qualifying. -ithal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. (n fine, relative to the civil aspect of
the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article !" of the Civil Code. 4eople v.
+atubig, August $=, $%%" en banc!
(n a vehicular collision, the court ruled for the
plaintiff, the owner of a passenger jeepney.
Fowever, the court noted that plaintiff left his
passenger jeepney by the roadside at the mercy
of the elements, which was contrary to Article
$$%= of the +ivil +ode .parties suffering from
loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family to minimi>e the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question/.
7ut since petitioners failed to offer in evidence
the estimated amount of the damage caused by
plaintiff<s unconcern towards the damaged
vehicle, they could not reduce the award. #t is
the burden of defendant to show
satisfactorily not only that the injured party
could have mitigated his damages but also
the amount thereof$ failing in this regard, the
amount of damages awarded cannot be
proportionately reduced. Lim v. ", 'anuary
"#, $%%$.
Awards for moral and exemplary damages
cannot be the subject of execution pending
appeal. The execution of any award for moral
and exemplary damages is dependent on the
outcome of the main case. ?nli,e the actual
damages for which the defendants may clearly
be held liable if they breach a specific contract
and the amounts of which are fixed and certain,
liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary
damages as well as the exact amounts remain
uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by
the +ourt. The existence of the factual bases of
these types of damages and their causal relation
to the defendantBs act will have to be determined
in the light of errors on appeal. (t is possible that
the defendant, after all, while liable for actual
damages may not be liable for moral and
exemplary damages. ;r as in some cases
elevated to the Supreme +ourt, the awards may
be reduced. 0S v. ") 'une $*, "***.
The case of So 4ing 7un v. +A laid down the
elements of tortious interference with
contractual relationsC .a/ existence of a valid
contract) .b/ ,nowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of the contract and .c/
interference of the third person without legal
justification or excuse. (n that case, petitioner So
4ing 7un occupied the premises which the
corporation of his grandfather was leasing from
private respondent, without the ,nowledge and
permission of the corporation.
A person may held liable for malicious
interference only when there was no legal
justification or excuse for his action or when
his conduct was stirred by a wrongful
motive. To sustain a case for tortious
interference, the defendant must have acted
with malice or must have been driven by purely
impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. (n other
words, his act of interference cannot be justified.
Thus, if the purchase of the subject property was
merely an advancement of his financial or
economic interests, absent any proof that he
was enthused by improper motives, he is not a
malicious interferer. This would ma,e it a case
of damnum absque injuria or damage without
injury. Lagon v. ", 0arch "&, $%%2.
Medical malpractice case) +here the doctor +as
grossly negligent and the hospital +as sought to
be declared vicariously liable. The +ourt found
no single evidence pointing to hospital<s
exercise of control over the doctor, who was
found to be an independent contractor9
physician. 7ut the hospital was found liable
under the doctrine of apparent authority,
because the hospital ."/ granted staff privileges
to the doctor) .$/ made the husband sign forms
relating to the operation using the hospital<s
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SUMMARY OF RECENT DOCTRINES
By SJS
letterhead .strengthening the belief that the
doctor was a member of the staff/) .=/ when the
complications arose the doctor referred the case
to the head of the ;7HMI of the Fospital<s .
9ogales c. "apitol Medical "enter, @ecember
"*, $%%#
(n general, a hospital is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor9
physician. There is, however, an exception to
this principle. The hospital may be liable if the
physician is the %ostensible% agent of the
hospital &a'a %doctrine of apparent
authority(). 9ogales c. "apitol Medical "enter,
@ecember "*, $%%#
The doctrine of apparent authority
essentially involves two factors to determine
the liability of an independent*contractor
physician. The first factor focuses on the
hospitalBs manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital
acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was
an employee or agent of the hospital. (n this
regard, the hospital need not ma,e express
representations to the patient that the treating
physician is an employee of the hospital) rather
a representation may be general and implied.
The second factor focuses on the patientBs
reliance. (t is sometimes characteri>ed as an
inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance
upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
9ogales c. "apitol Medical "enter, @ecember
"*, $%%#
The doctrine of apparent authority is a
species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article
"J=" of the +ivil +ode provides that Lt!hrough
estoppel, an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person ma,ing it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon.L Estoppel rests on
this ruleC L-henever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it.L 9ogales c. "apitol Medical "enter,
@ecember "*, $%%#
(n another medical malpractice suit where the
gross negligence of the doctor was established,
and the hospital li,ewise sought to be held
liable. The +ourt said that traditionally, the
hospital is not considered an employer within the
context of Art. $"&% of the +ivil +ode, and , La
hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or
negligence of a physician or surgeon in the
treatment or operation of patients.L Fowever, by
virtue of the pronouncement in the Gamos case
.+hich had been reversed on this issue:/ that
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer9
employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians. .rofessional Services v. gana,
'anuary =", $%%3.
The +ourt also said that the Gamos
pronouncement is not the only basis in
sustaining hospital<s liability, as it is also
anchored upon the agency principle of apparent
authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine
of corporate negligence which have gained
acceptance in the determination of a hospitalBs
liability for negligent acts of health professionals.
.rofessional Services v. gana, 'anuary =",
$%%3.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes
referred to as the Lholding outL theory, or
doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by
estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. (t
imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of
a contractual relationship, but rather because of
the actions of a principal or an employer in
somehow misleading the public into believing
that the relationship or the authority exists. in
cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by
its actions, has held out a particular physician as
its agent and:or employee and that a patient has
accepted treatment from that physician in the
reasonable belief that it is being rendered in
behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be
liable for the physicianBs negligence.
.rofessional Services v. gana, 'anuary =",
$%%3.
(n this case, there were public displays in the
lobby of the Fospital the names and
speciali>ations of the physicians associated or
accredited by it so it is now estopped from
passing all the blame to the physicians whose
names it proudly paraded in the public directory
leading the public to believe that it vouched for
their s,ill and competence. (ndeed, the hospital<s
act is tantamount to holding out to the public that
the Fospital, through its accredited physicians,
offers quality health care services. 7y
accrediting the doctors and publicly advertising
their qualifications, the hospital created the
impression that they were its agents, authori>ed
to perform medical or surgical services for its
patients. As expected, these patients accepted
the services on the reasonable belief that such
were being rendered by the hospital or its
employees, agents, or servants. .rofessional
Services v. gana, 'anuary =", $%%3.
Actions for damages based on quasi9delicts are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery
of a sum of money for the damages suffered
because of the defendantBs alleged tortious acts,
and are therefore capable of pecuniary
estimation. 5ault or negligence, which the +ourt
of Appeals claims is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, is not actionable by itself. 5or such
fault or negligence to be actionable, there must
be a resulting damage to a third person. The
relief available to the offended party in such
cases is for the reparation, restitution, or
payment of such damage, without which any
alleged offended party has no cause of action or
relief. The fault or negligence of the defendant,
therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the
claim for damages, and there can be no action
based on quasi9delict without a claim for
damages. 0niego v. .urganan, 0arch $J, $%%#
A child was hit by a van and died. -hile the
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SUMMARY OF RECENT DOCTRINES
By SJS
criminal case was ongoing, the driver committed
suicide. The criminal case was thus dismissed.
The parents of the child filed a case against the
employer of the driver. The employers sought
for dismissal on the ground that, since the case
was one to impose subsidiary liability, there
must first be conviction of the driver, as the
parents had not reserved the right to file a
separate action. The +ourt ruled that the
0aniago case relied on by the employers was
inapplicable. There, the civil case was filed while
the criminal case against the employee was still
pending. Fere, the criminal case against the
employee driver was prematurely terminated
due to his death. 4recisely, the parents filed
their case because no remedy can be obtained
by them against the employers with the
dismissal of the criminal case against their driver
during the pendency thereof. That there was no
reservation to institute a separate civil action for
damages is of no moment because the criminal
case was dismissed without any pronouncement
having been made therein. (n reality, therefor, it
is as if there was no criminal case to spea, of in
the first place. And for the employers to insist for
the conviction of their driver as a condition sine
qua non to hold them liable for damages is to
as, for the impossible. L.8. Foods v. 8abor,
Sept. $#, $%%#
Train hits 0ercedes 7en>. 4assenger of car
dies. The doctrine of last clear chance does not
apply when the proximate cause of the accident
has been established to be the negligence of
defendant. Also, as to award of damages due to
death of passenger of the car, the contributory
negligence of the driver of the car will not lead to
mitigation of liability because there was no
allegation or proof between the relationship the
passenger and the driver. .hil. 9ational
$ail+ays v. Brunty, Iov. $, $%%#
4etitioner bought a car, the engine of which he
sought to be replaced after more than a year
because the engine he had developed a crac,.
-hen Toyota refused, he filed a case for
damages. The case was dismissed on
prescription .# months for implied warranty/.
+ontrary to petitioner<s claim that moral and
exemplary damages and attorneyBs fees is
based on quasi9delict or breach of contract, such
are merely ancillary to the main cause of action
which is based on warranty against hidden
defects. -ithout the latter, the former cannot
stand alone. De 8uzman v. 7oyota "ubao, Iov.
$*, $%%#
Evangeline went to Ecology 7an, to renew her
time deposit. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm
holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached
security guard 4ajarillo, who was stationed
outside the ban,, and pulled out her firearm from
her bag to deposit the same for safe,eeping.
Suddenly, 4ajarillo shot Evangeline with his
service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen
instantly causing her death. The guard was
convicted in a criminal case. (n the separate
civil case for damages, the +A ruled that, since
the source of damages in the case must be the
crime of homicide, for which he had already
been found guilty of and serving sentence
thereof, the employers could only be subsidiarily
liable, pursuant to Articles "%% 1 "%= of the
Gevised 4enal +ode. The S+ reversed, as the
plaintiffs were invo,ing their right to recover
damages for the employer<s vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by guard<s act
of shooting and ,illing Evangeline under Article
$"3#. Safeguard Security v. 7angco, @ecember
"J, $%%#
%ules on #nterest &+astern ,hipping case
(. -hen an obligation, regardless of its
source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi9contracts,
delicts or quasi9delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for damages. The
provisions under Title 6N((( on L@amagesL of the
+ivil +ode govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
((. -ith regard particularly to an award of
interest, in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as
well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
followsC
". -hen the obligation is breached, and
it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in
writing. 5urthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. (n the
absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be "$8 per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial
or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article ""#*
of the +ivil +ode.
$. -hen an obligation, not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of
#8 per annum. Io interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until
the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is
made judicially or extrajudicially .Art.
""#*, +ivil +ode/ but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the
court is made .at which time the
quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained/. The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in
any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
=. -hen the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest
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SUMMARY OF RECENT DOCTRINES
By SJS
whether the case falls under paragraph
" or paragraph $, above, shall be "$8
per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit..
Page 6of 6