The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
ARTICLE XIII SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Calalang vs. Williams Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved torecommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Streetextending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing atAntipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from thedate of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National TrafficCommission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of themeasure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548,which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of PublicWorks and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the useof and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his firstindorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission,with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles belimited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to AzcarragaStreet. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his secondindorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of thelatter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles,between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of theopening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted.Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, broughtbefore the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, asChairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, asMayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringeupon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-beingand economic security of all the people.W/N there is an undue delegation of legislative power? Held: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does notconfer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon themand under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not todetermine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down bythe National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructionson, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or byexecutive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessaryor advisable in the public convenience and interest.The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, butmerely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said lawis to be predicated.To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when andhow long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or thetraffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrativefunction which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards anygiven group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State sothat justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by theGovernment of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elementsof society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in theinterrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption ofmeasures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlyingthe existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity ofinterdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that shouldbe equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economiclife, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting thehealth, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to thegreatest number."
World Development Report 2008
October 19, 2007 World Development Report 2008 calls for greater investment in agriculture in developing countries.The report warns that the sector must be placed at the center of the development agenda if the goals of halving extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 are to be realized. While 75 percent of the worlds poor live in rural areas in developing countries, a mere 4 percent of official development assistance goes to agriculture.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, a region heavily reliant on agriculture for overall growth, public spending for farming is also only 4 percent of total government spending and the sector is still taxed at relatively high levels.
For the poorest people, GDP growth originating in agriculture is about four times more effective in raising incomes of extremely poor people than GDP growth originating outside the sector.
Making the most of agricultural investment: A survey of business models that provide opportunities for smallholders
By Sonja Vermeulen and Lorenzo Cotula Published by IIED and FAO Website: www.iied.org/pubs 2010, 106pp, ISBN 978 1 84369 774 9(Pb), free to download Renewed interest in agricultural investment has led to a rise in large-scale acquisition of farmland and subsequently to heated debates over 'land-grabbing'. But little attention has been paid to alternative, and more inclusive, business models, such as contract farming schemes, joint ventures, management contracts, and new supply chain relationships. To address this gap, Making the most of agricultural investments examines a variety of business models and considers their opportunities and constraints, and options for scaling up. According to the authors, none of the business models reviewed emerged as the best option in all circumstances for smallholder farmers, but the extent to which an investment shared value with local smallholders was usually more important. "Depending on its specific terms, contract farming may be a vehicle for providing support and improving market access for smallholders - or an exploitative relationship where smallholders are effectively providers of cheap labour, and expected to carry production risks," the authors explain. The report does not imply that the alternative business models are preferable to large- scale plantations in all cases. "In some instances, plantations may be the best option for the investor, host country and the local community," the report states. "For example, in areas with very low population densities and little local capacity to engage in agricultural production, it may be difficult to establish business models that include local ownership and operation." But the authors observe that many countries are seemingly approving plantation-based projects without recognising alternatives. In order for more inclusive business models to work, the authors state that the willingness of companies to genuinely engage with these models is a key ingredient. Government policy, secure local land rights and the negotiating power of smallholders are also important. Moving forward, the report calls for a more thorough understanding of inclusive business models, national policies and programmes to promote and support these models, and action at the international level to minimise negative impacts and maximise opportunities for smallholder farmers.
Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, [G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989]
Facts: These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
Held: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
R.A. No. 2263: An Act Amending Certain Sections Of Republic Act Numbered One Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine, Otherwise Known As The Agricultural Tenancy Act Of The Philippines