A.C. No.

9514 April 10, 2013

BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint
1
for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile
against respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.
The Facts of the case are not disputed.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit
2
signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn
Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda
Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is
disqualified to perform the notarial act
3
per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if
he:
x x x x
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal
4
within the fourth civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the
complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards.
In his comment
5
to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted
Jandoquiles material allegations. The issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the
single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree
of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid identification cards
is a ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for
disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be
considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their complaint-
affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid identification cards since he
knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-
law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case
instead of referring it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. We agree with him, however, that his violation is not a
sufficient ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond dispute. Atty.
Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from
performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within
the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it
behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the document.
We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more as counsel
of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The
notarial certificate
6
at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a
notary public, with a notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the
notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid
identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6,
Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or
affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this case,
Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his
wifes sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty.
Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer
requiring them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault
for failing to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was
included therein that he knows the three affiants personally.
7
Let it be impressed that
Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his relatives
within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid defense as to the second
charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the disqualification rule.
As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule
IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To our
mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross
immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27,
8
Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez
9
where we reprimanded
Cortez and disqualified him from being commissioned as notary public for six months.
We were convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than disbarment, would
already suffice as sanction for Cortezs violation. In Cortez, we noted the prohibition in
Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that a person shall not
perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not
personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special power of
attorney without having the alleged signatories appear before him. In imposing the less
severe punishment, we were mindful that removal from the Bar should not really be
decreed when any punishment less severe such as reprimand, temporary suspension or
fine would accomplish the end desired.1wphi1
Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty.
Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a punishment less severe than disbarment would
suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is
presently commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla,
Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his
disqualification has lapsed.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice














A.C. No. 7350 February 18, 2013
PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
The case stemmed from a Complaint
1
filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by
complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos against respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of
Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of
Non-Tenancy
2
in violation of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed
by complainant, but the latter denies said execution and claims that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented are not hers. She further claims
that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian Anton.
3
Complainant added that she did not
personally appear before respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise,
states that respondent's client, Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said
falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property registered in her
name to that of Dollente.
4

In his Comment,
5
respondent admitted having prepared and notarized the document in
question at the request of his client Dollente, who assured him that it was personally
signed by complainant and that the CTC appearing therein is owned by her.
6
He, thus,
claims good faith in notarizing the subject document.
In a Resolution
7
dated April 16, 2007, the OBC referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers.
8
Complainant insists that she was deprived of her property because of
the illegal notarization of the subject document.
9
Respondent, on the other hand, admits
having notarized the document in question and asks for apology and forgiveness from
complainant as a result of his indiscretion.
10

In his report, Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) reported that
respondent indeed notarized the subject document in the absence of the alleged affiant
having been brought only to respondent by Dollente. It turned out later that the
document was falsified and the CTC belonged to another person and not to complainant.
He further observed that respondent did not attempt to refute the accusation against him;
rather, he even apologized for the complained act.
11
Commissioner Funa, thus,
recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, and that he be meted the penalty
of six (6) months suspension as a lawyer and six (6) months suspension as a Notary
Public.
12

On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-166
which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Roseller A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month.
13

Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was
denied. The above resolution was further modified in Resolution No. XX-2012-117, dated
March 10, 2012, to read as follows:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously MODIFY
as it is hereby MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII- 2008-166 dated April 15, 2008, in
addition to Respondents SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1) month, Atty.
Roseller A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for six (6) months. (Emphasis in
the original)
The findings of the IBP are well taken.
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the necessity of
the affiants personal appearance before the notary public:
14

x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to
the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
Moreover, Section 12,
15
Rule II, of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines the
"competent evidence of identity" referred to above.
In this case, respondent admits that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject
affidavit but he likewise notarized the same without the affiants personal appearance. He
explained that he did so merely upon the assurance of his client Dollente that the
document was executed by complainant. In notarizing the document, respondent
contented himself with the presentation of a CTC despite the Rules clear requirement of
presentation of competent evidence of identity such as an identification card with
photograph and signature. With this indiscretion, respondent failed to ascertain the
genuineness of the affiants signature which turned out to be a forgery. In failing to
observe the requirements of the Rules, even the CTC presented, purportedly owned by
complainant, turned out to belong to somebody else.
To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed
the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
16
Without the appearance
of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would
be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the partys free act or deed.
17

As aptly observed by the Court in Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan:
18

The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to
authenticate documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the
adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to
the absent affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the
affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or
that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the partys free act and deed.
19

The Court has repeatedly emphasized in a number of cases
20
the important role a notary
public performs, to wit:
x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with
substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof
of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
21

Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to
those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of
a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization.
22
He should, thus, be held
liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
23
The
responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because
of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
24
Lawyers commissioned as notaries
public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
25
1wphi1
As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that recommended by the
IBP which is one month suspension as a lawyer and six months suspension as notary
public, considering that respondent himself prepared the document, and he performed
the notarial act without the personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her
with competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use of a
CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed himself to be an instrument of
fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public
fails to discharge his duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his
notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year.
26

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent
commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for
two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and the
Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it entered into
respondent's personal record.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

























G.R. No. 114829 March 1, 1995
MAXIMINO GAMIDO Y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. NEW BILIBID PRISONS (NBP)
OFFICIALS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the Resolution of 7 September 1994, we required Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea of No. 42
National Road corner Bruger Subdivision, Putatan, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, to show
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for making it appear in
the jurat of the petition in this case that the petitioner subscribed the verification and
swore to before him, as notary public, on 19 April 1994, when in truth and in fact the
petitioner did not.
In his Explanation of 23 December 1994 which was received by this Court on 25 January
1995, Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea admitted having executed the jurat without the presence
of petitioner Gamido. He alleges:
Firstly, I must honestly admit that I notarized it not in his presence. I did it in
the honest belief that since it is jurat and not an acknowledgement, it would
be alrights [sic] to do so considering that prior to April 19, 1994 and
thereafter, I know Mr. Gamido since I have been in and out of New Bilibid
Prisons, not only because my office is here only across the Municipal Building
of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila but because I handled a number of cases
involving prisoners and guards of NBP as well as some of its personnels [sic].
That in fact, I attempted to have the document personally signed by him but
considering that I have to strictly observe rules and regulations of the NBP,
particularly on visit, I did not pursue anymore my intention to have it
notarized before me.
Secondly, that in notarizing the document, I honestly feel and by heart and in
good faith, that as a notary public and as a practicing lawyer, I could
modestly contribute in the orderly administration of justice. The Gamido
family use to come in the office and in fact hiring the legal services of the
undersigned but I refused to handle since I am already pre-occupied in other
cases of similar importance. That on December 13, 1994 I receive a letter
from Mr. Gamido, last paragraph of which is read as follows:
Sanay po Atty. ay maawa kayo sa akin na nagdudusa nang
walang kasalanan. Alang alang po sa kaawa awa kong familiya,
kailangan ang aking kalinga. Ang tulong ninyo ang siyang daan
upang ako ay makaalis sa pagpapahirap nang mga taong walang
puso at kaluluwa, walang awa sa kapwa, at sa sambayanang
Pilipino.
Then he apologizes to the Court and assures it that henceforth he would be more careful
and circumspect:
That I am praying for an apology to the Hon. Supreme Court if what I did was
wrong and the Hon. Supreme Court is assured that perhaps what transpired
was a wrong judgment or honest mistake. That the Hon. Chairman and its
Hon. Members are assured that when I signed the petition not in Gamido's
presence it is never intended to do a wrong, to commit illegal or criminal acts
but merely in the honest and sincere belief that it is valid and legal. The Hon.
Supreme Court is assured that it is never intended for malice or for money.
This Hon. Chairman and its Hon. Members are further assured that from
hereon, I am more careful and circumspect in the exercise of this noble and
grand profession and that no amount or consideration will sway or change
this conviction. This is my life. This is the life of my family.
Atty. dela Rea's explanation is unsatisfactory; however, his spontaneous voluntary
admission may be considered in mitigation of his liability.
As a notary public for a long time, as evidenced by the fact that his questioned jurat is
indicated to have been entered in Book 45 of his notarial register, he should know the
similarities and differences between a jurat and anacknowledgement.
A jurat which is, normally in this form:
Subscribed and sworn to before me in _______________, this ____ day of
____________, affiant having exhibited to me his Community (before,
Residence) Tax Certificate No. ____________ issued at ______________ on
____________.
"is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was sworn to
before him (Theobald vs. Chicago Ry. Co., 75 Ill. App. 208). It is not a part of a pleading
but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was properly made (Young vs. Wooden,
265 SW 24, 204 Ky. 694)." (LORENZO M. TAADA and FRANCISCO A. RODRIGO, Modern
Legal Forms, vol. I, sixth ed., 1985 printing, 31). The jurat in the petition in the case also
begins with the words "subscribed and sworn to me."
To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to sign at the end of a
document (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1279). To swear means to put on oath; to
declare on oath the truth of a pleading, etc. (Id., 1298). Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant
must sign the document in the presence of and take his oath before a notary public or
any other person authorized to administer oaths.
As to acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or an officer
duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by
law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
(See Lorenzo M. Taada and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Modern Philippine Legal
Forms, vol. II, 1964 Fifth ed., 735).
It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the notary public
or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.
The claim or belief of Atty. dela Rea that the presence of petitioner Gamido was not
necessary for the juratbecause it is not an acknowledgment is patently baseless. If this
had been his belief since he was first commissioned as a notary public, then he has been
making a mockery of the legal solemnity of an oath in a jurat. Notaries public and others
authorized by law to administer oaths or to take acknowledgments should not take for
granted the solemn duties appertaining to their offices. Such duties are dictated by public
policy and are impressed with public interest.
His prior acquaintance and friendship with petitioner Gamido provides no excuse for
non-compliance with his duty. If Atty. dela Rea were faithful to his duty as a notary public
and if he wanted to accommodate a friend who was inside a prison, he could have gone to
the latter's cell since he openly admitted that he has "been in and out of New Bilibid
Prisons, not only because [his] office is here only across the Municipal Building of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila but because [he] handled a number of cases involving prisoners
and guards of NBP as well as some of its personnels [sic]."
Administratively, as a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea
committed grave misconduct when he agreed to prepare the jurat in the petition in this
case in the absence of petitioner Gamido, thereby making it appear that the latter
personally signed the certification of the petition and took his oath before him when in
truth and in fact the said petitioner did not.
WHEREFORE, for grave misconduct, ATTY. ICASIANO I. DELA REA is hereby FINED in the
sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), without prejudice to criminal prosecution as
may be warranted under the circumstances. He is WARNED that the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.







A.C. No. 6655
PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO G.
PASCUA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint
1
of Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla seeking
the disbarment of respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying a public
document and evading the payment of correct taxes through the use of falsified
documents.
Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized two
Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale. The
first deed
2
was for a consideration of P250,000 and appears to have been executed and
signed by Lopes surviving spouse, Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant,
Virginia Caalim-Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and Shirley
Mipanga. The second deed
3
was for a consideration of P1,000,000 and appears to have
been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as the first deed. The two deeds
have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book numbers in the notarial
portion.
Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs signatures were
falsified. She contends that her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and
was confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center, Tuguegarao City, at the time the
deeds were allegedly signed by her, as shown by a certification
4
from said hospital. The
certification, dated February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr. Alice Anghad, Medical Officer IV,
attested that Marivinia has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of the Cagayan Valley
Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after being diagnosed of "Substance Induced Psychosis"
and "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type."
Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and
they came to know of their existence only recently. She further claims that the
Community Tax Certificates
5
(CTCs) in her name and in the names of her mother and her
sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley and not by them. Complainant
submits the affidavit
6
executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer of C-8, Claveria,
Cagayan, on August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at the instance of
Shirley and were paid without the complainant and her co-heirs personally appearing
before him. Gawayon stated that the signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs
are not genuine and authentic because it can be seen with the naked eyes that the
signatures are similar in all three CTCs.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to
annul a previously simulated deed of sale
7
dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed by
Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a
complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old and still
single.
In his comment,
8
respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed
Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies any
irregularity in their execution. He claims that the preparation and notarization of the
subject deeds were made under the following circumstances:
In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley
Mipanga went to his house and requested him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential
lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. He was informed by the parties that the agreed purchase
price is P1,000,000 and was presented the certificate of title to the property. Upon
finding that the registered owner is "Lope Caalim, married to Caridad Tabarrejos" and
knowing that Lope already died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for, and was given, the
names and personal circumstances of Lopes surviving children. He asked where Marivinia
was, but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained home as she was not feeling well. As
Caridad assured him that they will fetch Marivinia after the deed of conveyance is
prepared, he proceeded to ask the parties to present their CTCs. Caridad and Pacita,
however, told him that they have not secured their CTCs while Virginia forgot to bring
hers. So he instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria.
An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad, Virginia,
complainant and Marivinia. After he finished typing the deed and the details of the CTCs,
Caridad said that she will bring the deed with her to Claveria for her daughters to sign. He
then told them that it was necessary for him to meet them all in one place for them to
acknowledge the deed before him as notary public. It was agreed upon that they will all
meet at the house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on that same
day.
Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon. There he saw
Shirley, Caridad, complainant, Pacita and Marivinia with two other persons whom he later
learned were the instrumental witnesses to the execution of the document. Upon being
informed that the parties have already affixed their signatures on the deed, he examined
the document then inquired from the heirs if the signatures appearing therein were theirs
and if they were truly selling the property for P1,000,000. The heirs answered in the
affirmative, thereby ratifying and acknowledging the instrument and its contents as their
own free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, he notarized the document and then gave the
original and two carbon copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession.
Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed to effect
registration of the deed and transfer of the title in her and her husbands name. He
replied that all the unpaid land taxes should be paid including the capital gains tax,
documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) which will
then issue the necessary clearance for registration. When asked how much taxes are
payable, he replied that it depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which will be
based on the zonal value or selling price stated in the deed of sale. He added that the
estate taxes due, with interests and surcharges, would also have to be paid. Since the
consideration for the sale is P1,000,000, the taxes payable was quite enormous. Shirley
asked him who between the vendor and the vendee should pay the taxes, and he replied
that under the law, it is the obligation of the vendors to pay said taxes but it still depends
upon the agreement of the parties. He asked if there was already an agreement on the
matter, but the parties replied in the negative.
Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of taxes. Caridad and
her co-vendors, however, refused and said that a big portion of the P1,000,000 paid to
them was already used by them to pay and settle their other obligations. Shirley then
offered to pay one-half of whatever amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted that
another document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of only P250,000 so that
they need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was anyway already willing
to pay one-half of the taxes based on the selling price stated in the first deed. This
resulted in a heated discussion between the parties, which was, however, later resolved
by an agreement to execute a second deed. The prospect of preparing an additional deed,
however, irritated respondent as it meant additional work for him. Thus, respondent went
home.
Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to prepare the
second deed with the reduced selling price. Moved by his humane and compassionate
disposition, respondent gave in to the parties plea.
In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses, respondent
prepared and notarized the second deed providing for the lower consideration of
only P250,000. He used the same document number, page number and book number in
the notarial portion as the first deed because according to him, the second deed was
intended by the parties to supplant the first.
Respondent denies complainants assertions that the two deeds are simulated and
falsified, averring that as stated above, all the parties acknowledged the same before him.
Likewise, he and his clients, the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga, presented the
subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S also pending before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly under
confinement at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent
cites a medical certificate
9
stating that Marivinia was confined in said hospital from May 3,
1999 to August 10, 1999. He also points out that Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 2836-S pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for the
annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint states that she is mentally
or physically incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked the
appointment of a guardian for her.
By Resolution
10
dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation
11
dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose Roderick F.
Fernando found respondent administratively liable on account of his indispensable
participation in an act designed to defraud the government. He recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and that his notarial
commission, if still existing, be revoked and that respondent be prohibited from being
commissioned as a notary public for two years.
According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable defense to
justify his actions. As a notary, it was his responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of
the act of notarization were followed. As a lawyer, it was likewise incumbent upon him
that the document he drafted and subsequently notarized was neither unlawful nor
fraudulent. Commissioner Fernando ruled that respondent failed on both counts since he
drafted a document that reflected an untruthful consideration that served to reduce
unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he completed the act by likewise
notarizing and thus converting the document into a public document.
On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner
Fernandos report and recommendation but imposed a higher penalty on respondent. Its
Resolution No. XVII-2007-285 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;" and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents violation of Notarial Law and for his participation to a transaction that
effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of his Notarial Commission for
two (2) years with Warning that a similar violation in the future will be dealt with
severely.
12

The above resolution is well taken.
By respondents own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and
notarization of the subject deeds of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a
member of the bar and as notary public.
Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the
true consideration for the transaction is P1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the
parties when they appeared before him for the preparation of the first document as well
as the notarization thereof. He then claimed to have been "moved by his humane and
compassionate disposition" when he acceded to the parties plea that he prepare and
notarize the second deed with a lower consideration of P250,000 in order to reduce the
corresponding tax liability. However, as noted by Commissioner Fernando, the two deeds
were used by respondent and his client as evidence in a judicial proceeding (Civil Case
No. 2671-S), which only meant that both documents still subsist and hence contrary to
respondents contention that the second deed reflecting a lower consideration was
intended to supersede the first deed.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the
present complaint are insufficient for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed
falsified and absolutely simulated. We have previously ruled that a deed of sale that
allegedly states a price lower than the true consideration is nonetheless binding between
the parties and their successors in interest.
13
Complainant, however, firmly maintains that
she and her co-heirs had no participation whatsoever in the execution of the subject
deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery, simulation and fraud raised by the complainant
in this proceeding apparently are still to be resolved in the pending suit filed by the
complainant and her co-heirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No. 2836-
S).
With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state
the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on
the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in
a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount
much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in
depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act clearly
violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
X x x x
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of
the law, he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of
the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he is
entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve
considering its nature and purpose.
In Gonzales v. Ramos,
14
we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct the notarial act
is:
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of
Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. Such act is no empty
gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a
notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand
and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of
requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with
public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.
15

Moreover, while respondents duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the
identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless
incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement or at least
refrain from being a party to its consummation.
16
Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any notarial act for
transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described
in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate
fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral;
x x x x
In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite knowledge of its
illegal purpose. His purported desire to accommodate the request of his client will not
absolve respondent who, as a member of the legal profession, should have stood his
ground and not yielded to the importunings of his clients. Respondent should have been
more prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to commit falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any.
17
As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the
legal profession.
18

Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004Rules on Notarial
Practice when he gavethe second document the same document number, page number
and book number as the first:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. x x x
x x x x
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall
also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
X x x x
Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document number, page
number and book number as in the first deed, reasoning that the second deed was
intended to supplant and cancel the first deed. He therefore knowingly violated the above
rule, in furtherance of his clients intention of concealing the actual purchase price so as
to avoid paying the taxes rightly due to the Government.
Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true agreement of
the parties and hence superseding the first deed they had executed, respondent remains
liable under the afore-cited Section 2(e) which requires that each instrument or
document, executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before the notary public shall be given a
number corresponding to the one in his register. Said rule is not concerned with the
validity or efficacy of the document or instrument recorded but merely to ensure the
accuracy and integrity of the entries in the notarial register.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
19
Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds _herefore.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
X x x x
In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance
of one of the signatories was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission
and disqualification from re-appointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales was
likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. Said penalty was in accord with
the cases of Bon v. Ziga,
20
Serzo v. Flores,
21
Zaballero v. Montalvan
22
and Tabas v.
Mangibin.
23
The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent in
Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
24

In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of
suspension and revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. In line withcurrent jurisprudence, and as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors, the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from
re-appointment as notary public for two years is in order.
With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold that the one-
year suspension imposed in Gonzales and the other cases is not applicable considering
that respondent not only failed to faithfully comply with the rules on notarial practice, he
also violated his oath when he prepared and notarized the second deed for the purpose
of avoiding the payment of correct amount of taxes, thus abetting an activity aimed at
defiance of the law. Under these circumstances, we find the two-year suspension
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as proper and commensurate to the
infraction committed by respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial commission,
if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he isDISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public
for a period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the
Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice













A.C. No. 5377 June 15, 2006
VICTOR LINGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P.
BALIGA, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment
1
filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo
Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga on November 16, 2000. Complainant alleged that
respondents, both notaries public, falsified certain public documents.
The case has its roots in a complaint for annulment of title with damages
2
filed by Isaac
Villegas against complainant with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5036. Respondent Calubaquib signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping
3
of the complaint as notary public and entered the
same as Doc. No. 182; Page No. 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996. Complainant alleges
that this document was falsified because according to the records of the National
Archives, the document entered as Doc. No. 182; Page 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of
1996 in respondent Calubaquibs notarial register was an affidavit of one Daniel
Malayao.
4

The trial court decided Civil Case No. 5036 in favor of complainant
5
and, as a result, the
plaintiff there, through respondent Calubaquib, appealed it to the Court of Appeals,
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55837.
On file with the records of this case is a special power of attorney
6
dated September 10,
1996 executed by Isaac Villegas appointing respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-
fact to "enter into a compromise agreement under such terms and conditions acceptable
to him" which was notarized by respondent Baliga and entered as Doc. No. 548, Page No.
110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996.
7
Complainant alleged that this special power of
attorney was also falsified because, according to respondent Baligas notarial register,
Doc. No. 548; Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996 pertains to an affidavit of loss
of one Pedro Telan,
8
dated August 26, 1996.
In addition, on January 2, 1995, respondent Baliga filed a petition for reappointment as
notary public for and in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, which was notarized by respondent
Calubaquib and entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08, Book No.
CXXX, Series of 1995. However, Notarial Register Book No. CXXX was for the year 1996
and entered there as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08 was a cancellation of real estate mortgage
dated January 11, 1996.
In his answer,
9
respondent Baliga admitted the incorrectness of the entries and simply
attributed them to the inadvertence in good faith of his secretary to whom he had left the
task of entering all his notarial documents.
Respondent Calubaquibs comment,
10
however, contained a much lengthier account of
the alleged events leading up to this case, the bulk of which was meant to cast
complainant and his motives in a sinister light. In a nutshell, he made it appear that the
reason for the complaint was that he (respondent) thwarted a fraudulent attempt by
complainant to grab a parcel of land. He also stated that complainant had filed a case for
falsification of documents against him with the Ombudsman but it was dismissed.
In the end, however, he (like his co-respondent Baliga) admitted to the mistaken entries
and also ascribed the same to his "legal assistants." Similarly, by way of defense, he
pointed out that the Notarial Law "provides that only contracts need to have their copies
included in the notarial records. It does not require affidavits, verifications or
subscriptions of petitions which are mere allegations of facts to be entered in the Notarial
Register, despite widespread practice to the contrary."
Upon receipt of respondents comments, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In the course of the proceedings before the IBP, complainant alleged that respondent
Calubaquib, with the help of respondent Baliga and several other persons, was trying to
deprive him (complainant) of a parcel of land he had bought from Isaac Villegas mother-
in-law. According to complainant, respondent impersonated Villegas, who was in hiding
due to several civil and criminal cases pending against him, by forging his signature in all
documents and pleadings related to the civil case filed against him (complainant). He
pointed to the incorrect notarial entries as proof of this falsification.
He presented in evidence a motion for withdrawal
11
filed in the Court of Appeals,
apparently by Villegas, disavowing any involvement in the case filed by respondent
Calubaquib.
To further buttress his allegations of falsification, complainant pointed out that
respondent Calubaquib seemed unable to physically produce Villegas. For example, when
the Ombudsman ordered him to produce Villegas, respondent Calubaquib merely
presented an affidavit
12
supposedly executed by Villegas and sworn to before a "highly
regarded [Department of Justice] official."
In the IBPs report and recommendation,
13
dated December 7, 2001, Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found respondents "liable for inexcusable negligence" and
recommended the revocation of the commission of respondents Calubaquib and Baliga as
notaries public for two years from receipt of the final decision. Commissioner Maalas
report did not touch on complainants allegations of forgery.
When the IBP resolved
14
to adopt Commissioner Maalas report and recommendation,
both complainant
15
and respondent Baliga
16
filed motions for reconsideration
17
with this
Court. Respondent Calubaquib opposed
18
complainants motion for reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration, complainant assailed the penalty recommended by the
IBP as grossly inadequate. Reiterating his allegation of forgery, he attached documents
bearing Villegas allegedly forged signature as well as documents with his supposed real
signature
19
for comparison.
In his opposition/comment, respondent Calubaquib refuted complainants scathing
accusations of fraud and abuse of his public position, and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent Baliga decried the penalty
imposed as disproportionate to the infraction he had committed.
The respondents having admitted responsibility for the notarial entries, the question now
is whether these were the product of a mere mistake or evidence of larger scheme to
defraud complainant whose allegations, if true, are serious enough to merit the
disbarment of both respondents.
The missing link, as it were, between the admitted infractions of respondents and the
nefarious machinations alleged by complainant is whether or not the latter was able to
prove that Villegas signature on the documents notarized by respondents was in fact
forged.
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. Mere allegation thereof is not evidence.
20
One who alleges forgery has the
burden of proving the same.
21
We find that complainant failed to discharge this burden.
Complainant alleged mainly that Villegas could not possibly have signed the documents
in question because he was a fugitive from justice, with "several civil and criminal cases
pending against him." Assuming this allegation to be true, it proved nothing. The mere
fact that Villegas was a fugitive from justice did not preclude the possibility that he might
have secretly met with his lawyer for purposes of filing a suit. It would have been different
had complainant presented evidence that Villegas was, at the time the questioned
documents were executed, definitely somewhere else. But the bare argument that
Villegas being a fugitive rendered it impossible for him to sign some documents was
simply too nebulous to inspire belief.
As additional evidence, complainant presented, as attachments to his motion for
reconsideration, a number of documents purportedly bearing Villegas real signature, the
latest of which was the motion to withdraw allegedly filed by Villegas himself. However,
the veracity of the last of those documents was vigorously contested by an affidavit also
purportedly filed by Villegas. The two documents, both notarized, effectively cancelled
each other out, absent some other credible proof.
It is true that there were dissimilarities between the signatures purportedly belonging to
Villegas and his genuine signature on the conforme of the general power of
attorney
22
executed by his wife in favor of his mother-in-law. However, the fact of forgery
cannot be presumed simply because there are dissimilarities between the standard and
the questioned signatures.
23
If complainant was so sure the signatures were fake, he
should have submitted them for expert analysis to the National Bureau of Investigation,
the Philippine National Police or some other handwriting expert. The records are bereft of
any such analysis or even any attempt to have the signatures examined.
Furthermore, all the documents on which the contested signature appeared were
notarized. Notarial documents carry the presumption of regularity. To contradict them,
the evidence presented must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.
24
Complainants uncorroborated theory of an entire conspiracy of lawyers
and government officials beholden to respondent Calubaquib did not constitute such
evidence.
The forgery of Villegas signature having remained unproven, we can only hold
respondents liable for their omissions that have actually been proved.
In this respect, we find that the recommendations of IBP Commissioner Maala adopted by
the IBP were supported by the evidence on record, particularly the documents themselves
as well as the respondents own admission.
In response, on the other hand, to respondents feeble attempts to deflect the blame from
themselves and onto their staff, we call their attention to Sections 245, 246 and 249(b) of
the Notarial Law.
25

Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245. Notarial Register. Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as
the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he
shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying
for it and paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. The notary public shall enter in such register,
in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the
instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or
acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him for his services as notary in
connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy
thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description
of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning
with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission.The following derelictions of duty on
the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be
sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public
is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be
relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to
their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open
condemnation.
26
Respondents, especially Calubaquib, a self-proclaimed "prominent legal
practitioner," should have known better than to give us such a simple-minded excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or
routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that
interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be
prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public, the courts and the administrative
offices in general.
27

Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes
it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
28
Notaries public must
therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties.
29

Being not only lawyers but also public officers, respondents should have been acutely
aware of their responsibilities. Respondents acts did not amount to mere simple and
excusable negligence. Having failed to perform their sworn duty, respondents were
squarely in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
30
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty.
Jimmy P. Baliga are hereby found guilty of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of their lawyers oath. They are both
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately, with a
warning that another infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Their present commissions as notaries public, if any, are hereby REVOKED,
with DISQUALIFICATION from reappointment as notaries public for a period of two years.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo I.
Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga, and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator and Office of the Bar Confidant for
dissemination to all courts nationwide.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

















G.R. No. 129416 November 25, 2004
ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single document,
a deed of sale involving interest over real property, notarized by a person of questionable
capacity. The assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals, which overturned the findings of
fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the presumption of regularity
attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We conclude instead
that the document has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are as follow:
On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino (the Aquinos)
filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria
(Bustria).
1
The complaint sought to enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a
one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond located in Dasci,
Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or
under the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344.
2
The
conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby
Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to
grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven (7)
years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved and
incorporated the compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered on 7 September
1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986.
3
On 1 December 1989, petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno
(Tigno), in substitution of her deceased father Isidro Bustria,
4
attempted to repurchase
the property by filing a Motion for Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two
Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December 1989, the Aquinos
filed an opposition, arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that
Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment. In an Order dated 10 October 1999, the
RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.
5

In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was likewise opposed
by the Aquinos, and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 September 1991, Tigno filed an action
for Revival of Judgment,
6
seeking the revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so
that it could be executed accordingly.
7
The Aquinos filed an answer, wherein they alleged
that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale dated
17 October 1985.
8

Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia (De
Francia), the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Franklin Cario
(Judge Cario), who notarized the same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion
of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as their Exhibit No.
"8," the deed of sale (Deed of Sale)
9
purportedly executed by Bustria. The admission of
the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and
fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that
its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown, and not
even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's previous Motion for
Consignation.
10

In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in
evidence.
11
A Motion for Reconsideration praying for the admission of said exhibit was
denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994.
12

Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The RTC
therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the
testimonies of De Francia and Cario as conflicting.
13
The RTC likewise observed that
nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged by
Bustria;
14
that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or represented by his
counsel in connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale
15
or that
Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion
for Consignation.
16
The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion for Execution lodged
by Tigno had to be denied since more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the
judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become final and executory; but the judgment
could be revived by action such as the instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered
the revival of the judgment dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257.
17

The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
18
In the meantime, the RTC
allowed the execution pending appeal of its Decision.
19
On 23 December 1996, the Court
of Appeals Tenth Division promulgated a Decision
20
reversing and setting aside the RTC
Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial
inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that would taint the
document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and
substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-
assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null and
ineffective.
21
It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption
of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that
the document extinguished the right of Bustria's heirs to repurchase the property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tigno's Motion for Reconsideration,
22
the present
petition was filed before this Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and
misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He
also argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of Sale as a false,
fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based. As such, they
could normally lead to the dismissal of this Petition for Review. However, while this Court
is not ordinarily a trier of facts,
23
factual review may be warranted in instances when the
findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are contrary to each
other.
24
Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding the capacity of the
notary public, Judge Cario, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was
unfortunately silent on that matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos,
Pangasinan both parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the
foregoing instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan
There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by
way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a
jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before
him.
25
Under Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,
26
which has been replicated in
Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
27
the Deed of Sale should have been
acknowledged before a notary public.
28

But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is
determinative of this petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to
notarize the Deed of Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale,
was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos.
29
Petitioners point out,
citing Tabao v. Asis,
30
that municipal judges may not undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and other acts of conveyance which
bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges.
31
In response,
respondents claim that the prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from
notarizing documents took effect only in December of 1989, or four years after the Deed
of Sale was notarized by Cario.
32

Respondent's contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex
officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code.
33
However, as
far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,
34
the Court explicitly declared that municipal court
judges such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their
official duties.
35
The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge
Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our observations as to the errant
judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering that Judge Cario identified himself
in the Deed of Sale as "Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:"
[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular
notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business.
In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents
involving private transactions and sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA,
Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In doing so, he
obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex officio.
36

There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court
Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the
competency of a regular notary public provided that certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that
the exception applies.
37
The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards
Judge Cario's improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of
Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its
contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,
38
was even then not an
isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who ceased being a judge in
1986, for his improper notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer
be appropriate considering Judge Cario's advanced age, assuming he is still
alive.
39
However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation of the rule prohibiting
municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the exercise of their
official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been
notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the
authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to notarize
a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized.
The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in
good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person
pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the
elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial
commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly appointed
notary public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer
engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private
document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.
40
Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to
the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries
public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices
generally.
41

On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized?
True enough, from a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale
would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the
Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights
over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule
that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus,
it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the
validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for convenience.
42
We
have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a public
instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the
time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal
effects between the parties.
43

Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid notarization of the
Deed of Sale from the perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the case rests on the
admissibility of the Deed of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of Appeals no longer
holds true since the Deed of Sale is not a notarized document. Its proper probative value
is governed by the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 132 states:
Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of
public documents; hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the
alleged or attempted notarization performed by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the
document in question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the Deed
of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it
was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement of proof
under Section 20, Rule 132, which states:
Section 20. Proof of private document.Before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist
that its enforceability militates against Tigno's claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls
upon the Aquinos to prove its authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals
clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private document and in applying
the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents, as
distinguished from private documents.
Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it did not.
Section 20, Rule 132 provides ample discretion on the trier of fact before it may choose
to receive the private document in evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of
Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its veracity. The RTC was
not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound
discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very first time
respondents alleged the existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed their answer to
petitioner's current action to revive judgment.
44
Prior to the initiation of the present
action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement the Compromise Agreement
through two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos duly
opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but
they did not raise then the claim that such right to repurchase was already extinguished
by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only a few years
after the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents themselves were signatories.
Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale when they
opposed in court petitioner's successive attempts at consignation and execution of
judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in existence and valid, would have already precluded
Tigno's causes of action for either consignation or execution of judgment. The only
believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be
created when petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of judgmentan
existential anomaly if we were to agree with the respondents that such document had
been signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other observations
of the RTC. It also pointed to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos' tale of events. It
noted that no receipts were ever presented by the respondents to evidence actual
payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the respondents
that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts.
45
The Aquinos claimed that Bustria
kept all the receipts, an assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary
human nature to ask for receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the same.
46
In
itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be conclusive
since consideration is always presumed. However, given the totality of the circumstances
surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates against the claims of
the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals that Bustria
did not bother to seek his lawyer's assistance as regards the execution of the Deed of
Sale, considering that the subject property had previously been fiercely litigated.
Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would not be
rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of
the scenario strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as
credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the doubts raised
by the Court of Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was already ninety-three
(93) years old when he allegedly signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos
asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from his home in Dasol,
Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute the Deed of Sale. Without
discrediting the accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it
should be acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons of Bustria's age
are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on traveling significant
distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged signature of
Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record. Bustria's
signature in the 1981 Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising,
considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89) years old. However,
Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale, which if genuine was affixed when he was already
ninety-three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other
evident differences between Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale and on other
documents on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of circumstantial
evidence. These have to be weighed against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
fact that Bustria signed the Deed of Sale was established by the respective testimonies of
witnesses De Francia and Judge Cario. In its own appreciation of these testimonies, the
RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final measure of
analysis, the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was in error in
reversing the conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that Judge Cario
himself prepared and typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where the document was
signed,
47
while Judge Cario testified that he did not type the Deed of Sale since it was
already prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the signing.
48
On this point, the
Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record revealed no
material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario and De
Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency pointed out by
the RTC as to who prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point of consideration was the
due execution of the Deed of Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly come
out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no contradictions in the testimonies
of Judge Cario and De Francia on the question of whether or not Bustria signed the Deed
of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document. Thus, not only
the due execution of the document must be proven but also its authenticity. This factor
was not duly considered by the Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cario and De
Francia now become material not only to establish due execution, but also the
authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the
RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the
progenitor of this all-important document is a material evidentiary point. It is
disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the respondent offered to prove the Deed of
Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own personal and sensory
knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted the
document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge by
the documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be
necessary to establish the validity of the transaction it covers. However, since it is the
authenticity of the document itself that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on
that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about the due execution of
the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De
Francia are irreconcilable. It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either without
denigrating the competence and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cario was
truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be cast as to
the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of imagination, a high level
of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath and with
particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary public,
Judge Cario, would be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge Cario had indeed
authored the Deed of Sale, it would indeed be odd that he would not remember having
written the document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the same. If his testimony
as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all the reason to
make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably
establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on
the credibility of those witnesses of the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the
due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in
error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute conclusive value to the
testimonies of de Francia and Judge Cario. The totality of the picture leads us to agree
with the trial court that the Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution.
The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale, since its due
execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to the non-
existence of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut
the typical presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial
documents. However, for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an
unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than sufficient basis to conclude
that it is a spurious document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tigno's right to
repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of
judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when it
concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23 December 1996
and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is
REVERSED, and the Decision dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.










A.C. No. 7781 September 12, 2008
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE V. LEGASPI,
and JUANITO V. LEGASPI, complainants, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., Dolores L.
Dela Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L. Faustino, Jorge V. Legaspi, and Juanito V.
Legaspi alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent notarized a document denominated
as Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by
them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro. Complainants further alleged that: (1) their
signatures in this document were forged; (2) they did not appear and acknowledge the
document on July 16, 2004 before respondent, as notarizing officer; and (3) their
purported community tax certificates indicated in the document were not theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the
acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made it appear, among
other things, that complainants "personally came and appeared before him" and that they
affixed their signatures on the document in his presence. In the process, complainants
added, respondent effectively enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full ownership of
their deceased parents property in Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-303936 and sell the same to the Department of Public Works
and Highways.
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of the document in
question, but admitted having indeed notarized it. He explained that "he notarized [the]
document in good faith relying on the representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro
that the signatures and the community tax certificates appearing in the document were
true and correct." Navarro would not, according to respondent, lie to him having known,
and being neighbors of, each other for 30 years. Finally, respondent disclaimed liability
for any damage or injury considering that the falsified document had been revoked and
canceled.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner of the Office of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), found the following
as established: (1) the questioned document bore the signatures and community tax
certificates of, and purports to have been executed by, complainants and Navarro; (2)
respondent indeed notarized the questioned document on July 16, 2004; (3)
complainants did not appear and acknowledge the document before respondent on July
16, 2004; (4) respondent notarized the questioned document only on Navarros
representation that the signatures appearing and community tax certificates were true
and correct; and (5) respondent did not ascertain if the purported signatures of each of
the complainants appearing in the document belonged to them.
The Commission concluded that with respondents admission of having notarized the
document in question against the factual backdrop as thus established, a clear case of
falsification and violation of the Notarial Law had been committed when he stated in the
Acknowledgment that:
Before me, on this 16th day of July 16, 2004 at Manila, personally came and
appeared the above-named persons with their respective Community Tax
Certificates as follows:
x x x x
who are known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
instrument and they acknowledge to me that the same is their own free act and
deed. x x x
For the stated infraction, the Commission recommended, conformably with the Courts
ruling in Gonzales v. Ramos,
1
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year; that his notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked; and that he be
disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two (2) years. On September 28, 2007,
the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-147, adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Commission.
We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the premises holding it
together. It bears reiterating that notaries public should refrain from affixing their
signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the same
individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to attest to
the truth of what are stated therein, for under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the
Notarial Law, an instrument or document shall be considered authentic if the
acknowledgment is made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
2

Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question,
notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or
deed.
3
Furthermore, notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify that the
party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries public the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its
number, place, and date of issue as part of certification.
4
Rule II, Sec. 12 of the2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice
5
now requires a party to the instrument to present competent
evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.-The phrase "competent evidence of
identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to,
passport, drivers license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau
of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters ID, Barangay
certification, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security
System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate
from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department
of Social Welfare and Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC dated February 19, 2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
One last note. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with
fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest. It must be remembered that notarization is not a
routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public
instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of
its authenticity and due execution.
6
A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit
upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic
requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public on
notorized documents will be eroded.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law, the notarial commission of respondent Atty.
Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., if still existing, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt of a copy of this
Decision, with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and the
Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it entered into
respondents personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Brion, JJ., concur.