Soc Choice Welfare (1989) 6:103-125

S o c i a l C h o i e e
Welfare
Springer-Verlag 1989
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power*
J. Snyder
Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA
Received April 28, 1987/Accepted April 12, 1988
Abst ract . The rel at i onshi p bet ween the di st ri but i on of an interest group' s
members (i.e., vot ers) across legislative districts and the gr oup' s ability t o
influence gover nment pol i cy is not well under st ood. We pr opose a simple model
of interest groups and legislative deci si onmaki ng t o charact eri ze this rel at i on-
ship formal l y, and anal yze t he model for t he case of t hree compet i ng interest
groups. We find t hat an interest group' s expect ed power is maxi mi zed when its
members are evenl y di vi ded across (in + 1)/2 of the m districts, except when t he
gr oup is somewhat small, in which case its expect ed power is maxi mi zed when it
is evenly di vi ded across all m districts. Expect ed power decreases sharpl y as a
gr oup' s member s become concent r at ed in fewer t han (m + 1)/2 districts.
1. Int roduct i on
Despi t e t he widely held view t hat special interest groups have a pr of ound influence
on public decisions at all levels of gover nment in all types of political systems, we
know relatively little about the sources of i nt erest -group power. Systematic st udy of
i nt erest -group influence has pr oved to be exceedingly difficult, and t hus much of
what has been wri t t en is anecdot al or speculative. There are few general t heoret i cal
proposi t i ons about t he likely out come of i nt erest -group politics, and few detailed,
wel l -document ed regularities. In part i cul ar, t here is no fully sat i sfact ory expl ana-
t i on why some groups t end to receive mor e benefits f r om gover nment t han others.
In this paper we focus on a part i cul ar source of i nt erest -group power, a gr oup' s
membershi p as a pot ent i al bl ock of voters. While political scientists have l ong
recogni zed t he pot ent i al i mpor t ance of such "vot e- power ", it has received relatively
little at t ent i on in much of the f or mal t heoret i cal literature. For example, t he so-
called economi c t heor y devel oped by Stigler (1979), Pel t zman (1976), and Becker
* The author would like to thank the participants of the Workshop in Applications of Economics at
the University of Chicago fpr their helpful comments, and the Center for the Study of the Economy and
the State for its financial support.
104 J. Snyder
(1983) adopts the view that "voting and majorities are not the fundamental
determinants of political influence even in democracies".1 These authors emphasize
the importance of lobbying and campaign contributions, and the free-rider
problems a group faces in trying to finance these activities. However, one of the
most important rewards a group can offer a politician is the votes of its members.
This is true even for fairly small groups, because the margin of victory for political
office if often small - a block of several thousand votes can turn defeat into victory.
Also, since the costs of voting are small (or perhaps even negative, after accounting
for "psychic benefits"), groups probably do not face severe free-rider problems in
getting their members to vote. Thus, even a group that is "too big" to generate larger
per-member campaign contributions (due to free-riding) may have a large amount
of influence per member if its members vote as a block.
The available empirical evidence seems to confirm this view. Studies by Pincus
(1977), Ray (1981), Lavergne (1983), Gardner (1985), and Miller (1986) find mixed
support for the importance of free-riding. / For example, contrary to the prediction
based on free-rider arguments, Miller and Pincus find a significant positive
relationship between group size and the per-member benefit to the group. Also,
studies attempting to link campaign contributions by interest groups to Con-
gressional voting on issues important to the groups have had mixed success.
Silberman and Durden (1976), Chappell (1982), and Kau and Rubin (1982) found
evidence that interest-group contributions influenced Congressmen's votes on such
issues as the minimum wage, the Bl-bomber, the debt limit, the windfall profits tax,
and wage and price controls. On the other hand, Chappell (1981), (1982), Welch
(1982), and Wright (1985) found a weak relationship between contributions and
votes on legislation regarding cargo preferences, crude oil tax rebates, milk price
supports, highway construction and regulation of physicians? There is stronger
evidence that a group's "vote-power" matters, at least for the few groups studied.
Welch (1982) found a strong positive relationship between the probability that a
Congressman would vote in favor of higher dairy price supports and the amount of
dairy production (highly correlated with the number of daily farmers) in his district.
Similarly, Kau and Rubin (1982) found that the number of union members, and the
number of farmers, in a Congressman's district generally (although not always) had
a significant impact on his vote over a wide range of issues important to the groups.
If the votes of an interest group's members are an important source of its
political influence, then in a representative democracy with geographically defined
constituencies, the geographic distribution of the group's members is potentially a
critical variable. Two groups of roughly the same size may have greatly different
amounts of political power because the members of one group are "well-
distributed" in some sense, while those of the other group are not. Political scientists
1 Becker (1983, p. 385), hi s italics.
2 On t he ot her ha nd, t hes e st udi es pr ovi de s t r ong evi dence for a not he r pr opos i t i on o f t he economi c
t heor y, t ha t hi gher deadwei ght cost s of subsi di zi ng a gr oup l ead t o l ower subsi di es for t he gr oup.
3 Of cour se, t hese r esul t s ar e di ffi cul t t o i nt er pr et becaus e a Co n g r e s s ma n ' s vot e on a ny single bill ma y
be t he out c ome of vot e- t r adi ng or s ome ot her st r at egi c cons i der at i ons , or it ma y be pur el y symbol i c. It is
di ffi cul t t o es t i mat e t he t r ue ext ent of an i nt er est gr oup' s i nf l uence over pol i cy f r om t he anal ysi s o f
i ndi vi dual bills.
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power 105
often not e t hat such geographical considerations may matter, 4 but there are few
general conclusions about exactly how t hey may matter. Most existing studies have
discussed part i cul ar empirical cases or theoretical examples (see, for example,
Spilerman and Dickens 1974; Johnst on 1977, 1982; Tayl or and Johnst on 1979). In
this paper we at t empt to characterize more generally the relationship between the
di st ri but i on of a group' s members and the group' s power.
We analyze a simple formal model of legislative deci si onmaki ng and interest
groups in which the sole source of a group' s political influence is the vot i ng power
of its members. The model allows us to describe the relationship between the
geographic di st ri but i on of a group' s members, in particular the "degree of
dispersion' ,, and the group' s political power, as measured by various power indexes
used in other studies. We consider onl y the case of three groups "di vi di ng a dol l ar",
the now classic paradi gm of redistributive politics. Our mai n result is t hat except for
fairly small groups, a group' s average power is greatest when its members are evenly
divided across slightly more t han hal f of the legislative districts. Average power
decreases sharply as the group' s membership becomes concent rat ed in fewer t han
hal f of the districts. Average power also falls as the group becomes more dispersed,
but not as significantly. For small groups, average power is highest when the group
is very widely dispersed, with members evenly divided across all of the districts.
Before proceeding, we shoul d ment i on several short comi ngs of the model
presented below, which affect the generality of our results. Firstly, we t ake the set of
interest groups, and their sizes and membershi p distributions, as given. Thus, we
abstract from the i mpor t ant problems of redistricting and group f or mat i on and
change. (Our results do t ouch on these issues however, suggesting a characteristic of
groups t hat are likely to thrive in the political arena, and suggesting also a fact or
influencing groups' preferences about how district lines shoul d be drawn. )
Secondly, we assume t hat all legislators are the same, while in fact t hey generally are
not. In the U.S. for example, some legislators are members or chai rmen of
part i cul arl y i mpor t ant committees or subcommittees, or hol d priviledged positions
within their party. Thirdly, there are no political parties. Parties are clearly an
i mpor t ant consideration, but we have not yet managed to i ncorporat e t hem i nt o the
model. Thus, we appeal to the widely held belief t hat , at least in the U.S. Congress,
part y cont rol is often rat her weak, part i cul arl y wi t h regards to some i mpor t ant
regul at ory/ redi st ri but i onal issues. Lastly, as not ed above, we treat the vot i ng power
of a group' s membershi p as the onl y source of the group' s influence, ignoring other
resources such as campai gn cont ri but i ons and direct lobbying efforts. Fut ur e
research shoul d work to combi ne these different factors in a single framework.
2. A Simple Model of Legislatures and Interest Group Power
There is a set N= {1 . . . . . n} of interest groups and a set M- - {1 . . . . . m} of political
districts, m odd. Bot h sets part i t i on the popul at i on of voters, so each voter is a
member of exactly one group and one district. Each district elects one representa-
tive to the legislature, by majority-rule. The legislature is a uni cameral body t hat
4 See, for example, Hrebenar and Scott (1982, pp. 31-32).
106 J. Snyder
passes legislation by maj or i t y- r ul e; thus, a pr oposal x defeats anot her pr oposal y i f
and onl y i f the number of legislators who vot e f or x is great er t han the number of
legislators who vot e f or y.
In deciding how t o vot e on any pai r of proposal s, a legislator considers onl y how
his choice affects his chances for reelection. Thus, a legislator votes f or x over y i f
and onl y i f the number of vot ers in his district who prefer x to y is great er t han the
number who prefer y to x. 5 Not e t hat this st rat egy is most reasonabl e i f we t hi nk of
each " pr opos al " as somet hi ng like the al l ocat i on of utilities t o t he vari ous groups
pr oduced by all of t he bills passed duri ng the legislative session. Except in a wor l d of
r at her naive vot ers and/ or legislators, a legislator' s st rat egy on any single bill is not
so st rai ght forward (even i f he is concer ned onl y about t he next election), as he must
take i nt o account the effects on his const i t uent s of ot her bills t o be consi dered
duri ng t he legislative session, and t he possibility f or logrolling across bills. 6
Gi ven this st ruct ure, we can define a cooperat i ve game among the groups t hat is
pl ayed t hr ough the legislature. Let sij denot e t he number of vot ers f r om gr oupj t hat
live in district i. We say a coal i t i on of groups C cont rol s district i i f and onl y i f its
members collectively account f or mor e t han hal f of the vot ers in district i. We call C
winning if and onl y i f it cont rol s mor e t han hal f of the districts, 7 i.e., i f and onl y i f
) m+ l
# W( C) = # i Z s i j > E sij~>=
2
jC j M- C J
(=~S denot es t he cardi nal i t y of set S.) This is a nat ur al defi ni t i on - any winning
coal i t i on coul d effectively force t he legislature t o pass a pr oposal by promi si ng t o
suppor t (via its member s' vot es in the next election) any legislator who vot es f or t he
proposal , and t o oppose any legislator who votes against the proposal . I f the
coal i t i on' s t hreat s and promi ses are credible, t hen all t hose represent at i ves f r om
districts in which t he coal i t i on' s member s const i t ut e a maj or i t y will f avor t he
proposal . Since this is a maj or i t y of the districts, the pr oposal will pass. A coal i t i on
t hat is not winning is losing.
Assigning a value of 1 to all winning coalitions, and a val ue of 0 to all losing
coalitions, we have a strong, simple, pr oper game. As in most vot i ng games, in
general this game has no core. However, we can use one of several val ue-t ype
sol ut i on concepts, such as vot i ng weights (when such weights exist), t he Shapley-
Shubi k value, or t he Banzhaf index, to det ermi ne the relative power of the di fferent
groups.
s To appl y t he model t o a specific pol i cy ar ea we mi ght wi sh t o modi f y t he mode l as f ol l ows: Fi x t he
pol i cy area, a nd s uppos e t ha t each di st r i ct c ont a i ns " i nt er es t ed" vot er s, who s uppor t or oppos e t hei r
r epr esent at i ve solely on t he basi s of hi s pe r f or ma nc e wi t h r espect t o t he gi ven pol i cy area, a nd
" uni nt e r e s t e d" vot ers. As s u me t he n t ha t a r epr esent at i ve vot es for a pr opos a l i f a nd onl y i f mor e
i nt er est ed vot er s i n hi s di st ri ct pr ef er t he pr opos al t h a n oppos e it. Thi s s t r at egy is especi al l y compel l i ng i f
t he l egi sl at or expect s t he uni nt er es t ed vot er s i n hi s di st ri ct t o di vi de t hei r vot es evenl y bet ween h i m and
hi s oppone nt , or i f he is ver y unc e r t a i n a bout h o w t hey will vot e. I n any case, it is t he l ogi cal s t r at egy
whenever mor e vot es are pr ef er r ed t o less.
6 A si mi l ar caveat appl i es t o t he var i at i on pr opos e d i n Foot not e 5. I n par t i cul ar , we mi ght have to
wor r y a b o u t l ogrol l i ng acr oss pol i cy areas.
7 Thi s def i ni t i on is s at i s f act or y as l ong as t he n u mb e r o f di st ri ct s a nd t he t ot al n u mb e r o f vot er s i n each
di st ri ct are bot h odd, but mu s t be modi f i ed i f ei t her or b o t h of t hese are even, to a c c ount f or t he
possi bi l i t y of ties. For t he pur pos e s of t hi s paper , we i gnor e ties.
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power 107
A si mpl e exampl e will i l l ust rat e t hese i deas. Cons i der fi ve i nt er est gr oups , whos e
me mbe r s ar e di s t r i but ed acr os s fi ve equal - si zed di st ri ct s i n t he f ol l owi ng f a s hi on:
Groups
District 1 2 3 4 5
1 3 1 0 0 1
2 0 3 0 0 2
3 0 0 3 0 2
4 1 2 0 2 0
5 1 0 2 2 0
We c a n easi l y ver i f y t ha t t he wi nni ng coal i t i ons ar e {1,2}, {1,3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3, 4},
and all super set s o f t hese (e. g. , {1, 2, 3} is al so wi nni ng) . F o r exampl e, gr oups 1
a nd 4 t oge t he r a c c o u n t f or t hr ee vot er s, hence a maj or i t y, i n each o f di st ri ct s 1, 4,
and 5; t hus {1,4} is a wi nni ng coal i t i on. Thi s ga me can be r epr es ent ed as a
wei ght ed ma j or i t y vot i ng ga me i f we assi gn t he f ol l owi ng wei ght s t o t he gr oups :
w t = 2/ 5, w 2 = w 3 = w 4 = 1/5, a nd w s = 0. The n a coal i t i on C is wi nni ng i f a n d onl y i f
w j > 1/2, t ha t is, i f a nd onl y i f it has mo r e t h a n ha l f o f t he t ot al wei ght . The
j s c
Sha pl e y- Shubi k val ues are V 1 = 1/2, V 2 = V 3 = V 4 = 1/6, and V 5 = 0. Thi s exampl e
poi nt s out several i nt er est i ng p h e n o me n a : ( 1 ) Some wi nni ng coal i t i ons ma y have
less t h a n ha l f o f t he vot er s - e. g. , { 1,2} is wi nni ng, but it has onl y 2/ 5 o f t he vot er s ;
( 2 ) g r o u p size and powe r need n o t be hi ghl y cor r el at ed - e. g. , g r o u p 1 is smal l er
t ha n g r o u p 2, a nd t he same size as gr oups 3 and 5, yet it has a hi gher vot i ng wei ght
a nd Shapl ey val ue; and ( 3 ) even a r el at i vel y l ar ge g r o u p ma y have no p o we r at all -
g r o u p 5, whi ch is t he s ame size as gr oups 1 and 3, a nd l ar ger t ha n g r o u p 4, is
power l ess - t ha t is, it ma y never a dd val ue t o a coal i t i on by j oi ni ng it. These
p h e n o me n a are pe r ha ps mo r e n o t e wo r t h y cons i der i ng t ha t all di st ri ct s are t he same
size. 8
I n s ubs equent sect i ons, we will cons i der a g r o u p o f s ome fi xed t ot al size (i.e.,
s ome fi xed n u mb e r o f member s ) , a nd c o mp a r e t he g r o u p ' s rel at i ve powe r unde r
di f f er ent di s t r i but i ons o f its me mbe r s acr oss t he di st ri ct s. Thus , i f t he size o f g r o u p
j is t j , we call a di s t r i but i on s j = ( s i j . . . . , s m j ) f e a s i b l e i f a nd onl y i f sij > 0 f or all i,
a nd ~ s i j = t j . Al so, t o avoi d unneces s ar y t echni cal det ai l s, we al l ow t he s u t o be
i = 1
noni nt eger s . Tha t is, we t r eat gr oups as i f t hey ar e "i nf i ni t el y l ar ge" r el at i ve t o t he
n u mb e r o f di st ri ct s.
Th r o u g h o u t mo s t o f t hi s pa pe r we r est r i ct a t t e nt i on t o t he speci al case o f t hr ee
i nt er est gr oups . I t is s t r a i ght f or wa r d t o s how t ha t wi t h onl y t hr ee gr oups t her e ar e
j us t f our possi bl e st r uct ur es (i. e., char act er i s t i c f unct i ons ) f or t he c oope r a t i ve g a me :
8 In fact, even when ai1 groups are the same size and all districts are the same size, we can find
distributions of the groups' members such that some coalitions with just slightly more than one-fourth of
the voters are winning (this is not suprising, since to obtain "half of the voters in half of the districts" one
needs only one-fourth of all the voters), and distributions such that slightly less than half of the groups
are powerless.
108 J. Snyder
ei t her one of the gr oups is a wi nni ng coal i t i on by itself (there are t hree st ruct ures of
this t ype), or else every coal i t i on of t wo or mor e gr oups is a wi nni ng coal i t i on. I n any
of the first t hree cases, the gr oup t hat is wi nni ng cont rol s t he legislature - i.e., is a
" di ct at or " - and any of the usual power measur es, i ncl udi ng vot i ng weights, give a
val ue of 1 t o the wi nni ng gr oup and a val ue of 0 t o t he ot her gr oups (also, this
al l ocat i on is t he core of t he game). I n the f our t h case, the si t uat i on is symmet r i c f or
all groups, and any of the usual power measur es give each gr oup a val ue of 1/3. We
let Wj denot e the power of gr oup j .
3. Domination Doesn't Tell Us Very Much
I t shoul d be cl ear f r om t he exampl e in t he pr evi ous sect i on t hat a gr oup' s rel at i ve
power depends not onl y on t he di st ri but i on of its own member s, but on the
di st ri but i ons of the ot her gr oups ' member s as well. Thus, t he defi ni t i on of a " g o o d "
or " b a d " di st r i but i on of vot er s mus t t ake i nt o account the di st ri but i ons of all
groups.
An obvi ous way t o r ank t he di fferent member s hi p di st ri but i ons is by a
domi nance rel at i on. We say t hat a di st r i but i on sj of a g r o u p j ' s member s dominates
anot her di st r i but i on sj i f and onl y i f sj gives g r o u p j at least as much power as does sj
regardl ess of the di st r i but i on of ot her gr oups ' vot ers, and strictly mor e power t han sj
f or some di st ri but i ons of t he ot her groups. That is, i f we pick, say, j = 1, and let
W1 (sl, . . . , s,) denot e the power of gr oup 1 given vot er di st ri but i ons (sl , . . . , s,), t hen
Sl domi nat es s[ if and onl y i f W1 (sl, s2, . . . , s,) > WI (s[, sz, . . . , s, ) f or all (s2 . . . . . , s,),
wi t h strict i nequal i t y f or some (s 2 . . . . , s,).
Unf or t unat el y, for mos t cases we are concer ned with, it is rare t hat one
member s hi p di st r i but i on domi nat es anot her , so domi nance is not ver y i nf or mat i ve.
I n part i cul ar, i f t here are t hree groups, we have
Proposition 1. Fi x the number o f voters in each 9roup and consider only f easi bl e
membership distributions. I f group 1 is not the largest group (i.e., t 1 =<max(t 2, t3) )
then no distribution o f 9roup 1 's members dominates any other.
Pr oof See Appendi x.
Thus, when st udyi ng " s mal l " or "aver age- si zed" groups, t he domi nance
rel at i on is compl et el y uni nf or mat i ve.
When consi deri ng the l argest group, we can find some member s hi p
di st ri but i ons t hat are domi nat ed. For exampl e i f gr oup 1 is so l arge t hat
q >( 2 m/ ( m+l ) ) ( t z +t 3 ) , t hen i f its member s are evenl y di vi ded a mong all m
districts - i.e., i f s a = t l / m f or all i - t hen it is cert ai n t o cont r ol the legislature,
regardl ess of t he di st r i but i on of the ot her gr oups ' member s. Thus, any di st r i but i on
s~ such t hat W 1 (s~, s 2, s3) < 1 for some s 2 and s 3 - f or exampl e, any s~ wi t h s~t = 0 in
mor e t han hal f the districts - is domi nat ed by sl = ( q / m . . . . . t~/m). Or, i f gr oup 1 is
not quite so large, we have t he fol l owi ng
Proposition 2. Suppose ma x (t 2, t3) < tl < ( 2m/ ( m + 1)) (t2 + t3). I f sl is any distribu-
tion o f group 1 ' s voters such that there exi st s k ~ M such that ~ si~ > t 2 + t 3f or all S
i e S
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power ~09
with k s S and 4~S>( m+1) / 2, then there exists a feasible distribution s[ that
dominates sl .
Proof. See Appendi x.
The domi nat ed di st r i but i on s 1 of Pr oposi t i on 2 is " t oo concent r at ed", t hat is, it
put s t oo ma ny of gr oup l ' s member s in district k. The gr oup woul d al ways be bet t er-
of f (have mor e rel at i ve power ) i f its vot er s were mor e spr ead out , in an appr opr i at e
fashi on. We will fi nd results si mi l ar t o this in spirit in t he next section of t he paper .
The mai n poi nt of t he pr esent sect i on however, embodi ed in Pr oposi t i on 1, is
t hat we cannot use the domi nance r el at i on t o r ank di fferent member s hi p
di st ri but i ons and mus t t hus t ur n t o some weaker not i on.
4. Membership Distribution and Average Power: Two Specifications
Gi ven our i nabi l i t y to effectively compar e di st ri but i ons by t he domi nance rel at i on,
we t ur n in this sect i on t o a s omewhat weaker criterion. Specifically, we r ank a
gr oup' s member s hi p di st ri but i ons by how much power t hey yield " on aver age",
where we aver age over t he possi bl e member s hi p di st ri but i ons of t he ot her groups.
Thi s cri t eri on is less t han fully sat i sf act or y since the choi ce of a pr obabi l i t y measur e
over t he ot her gr oups ' member s hi p di st ri but i ons is necessari l y ar bi t r ar y. On the
ot her hand, once a choi ce is made, we get some cl earcut predi ct i ons.
Lacki ng much pr i or i nf or mat i on t o guide us, ei t her f r om t heor y or fact s about
the act ual di st r i but i on of gr oup member s hi p di st ri but i ons in the worl d, we exami ne
t wo al t ernat i ves whi ch have some appeal . As in t he previ ous section, we t r eat onl y
the case of t hree i nt erest groups, and r ank the di fferent member s hi p di st ri but i ons of
gr oup 1 - thus, we t ake gr oup l ' s di st ri but i on as known, and specify a pr obabi l i t y
measur e over the member s hi p di st ri but i ons of gr oups 2 and 3.
The first f or mul at i on is mot i vat ed by t he ar gument t hat , havi ng no st r ong
reasons to believe t hat some di st ri but i ons are mor e or less likely t o occur t han ot hers
( per haps because we have not t hought enough about the pr obl em) , we mi ght as well
assume t hat all di st ri but i ons are equal l y likely. Thus, we fix the t ot al sizes of gr oups
2 and 3 at t 2 = t 3 = 1 , and assume t hat the member s hi p di st ri but i ons ( S 1 2 . . . . , S m 2 ) and
(s13 . . . . , sin3 ) are i ndependent r a ndom vect ors, each j oi nt l y di st ri but ed uni f or ml y
v e r t h e m - s i m p l e x ( i ' e " v e r { s j l ~ s ~ J = l } )
I n the second f or mul at i on, we assume si mpl y t hat for all districts i ~ M
={1, ... , m} and all gr oups j e { 2 , 3}, the sij are i ndependent r a ndom vari abl es,
di st ri but ed uni f or ml y on [0,2/m]. Not e first t hat under this speci fi cat i on the t ot al
sizes of gr oups 2 and 3 are not fixed but r andom, wi t h means E(t2) = E(t3) = 1. Mor e
i mpor t ant l y, not all member s hi p di st ri but i ons of gr oups 2 and 3 are equal l y
pr obabl e; rat her, the gr oups ' member s are mor e likely t o be spr ead out t han
concent r at ed in a few districts. Also, the gr oups will t end to be smal l er in t ot al size i f
t hei r member s hi ps are concent r at ed. These ma y in fact be desi rabl e propert i es, f or
9 Alternatively, we might also assume that the groups' sizes, t 2 and ta, are random variables, or at least
examine cases where t2 + t3.
110 J. Snyder
two reasons. First, in some cases there may be empirical reasons to suspect t hat
distributions in which a group' s members are fairly evenly spread out are more
likely to occur t han others. For example, if groups are defined by occupat i onal
i ndust ry (e.g., steelworkers, farmers, doctors, etc.), t hen service i ndust ry groups
(e.g., realtors and insurance agents) will necessarily t end to be spread out
geographically, rat her t han concent rat ed in one region. I f service industries empl oy
a large fract i on of the popul at i on and are politically active, t hen we may expect t o
see widely distributed groups involved in political bargai ni ng games relative more
often t han concent rat ed groups. A second, perhaps more i mport ant , argument is
the following. We show later in the paper t hat , under either of the two specifications
of the probabi l i t y measure over membership distributions of groups 2 and 3, i f
group l ' s members are geographically very concentrated, t hen the group will on
average have very little power. Thus, i f the benefits a group receives from
government are closely linked to its power, we mi ght expect t hat , over time,
geographically concent rat ed groups woul d drop out of the political game, given
t hat it is costly to play. This woul d be true especially for groups t hat are bot h large
and concentrated, since in addi t i on to having little power based on the voting
strength of their members (due to t oo much concentration), such groups may face
severe free-rider problems in t ryi ng to collect other resources (such as money for
campai gn contributions) t hat woul d increase their power. The latter probl em may
not be as i mpor t ant for small, concent rat ed groups. This at t ri t i on would skew the
di st ri but i on of politically active groups in a direction consistent with the second
formul at i on. Thus, while neither of our specifications is, as far as we know, the
out come of a more general equilibrium model in which groups may enter or exit, the
first specification, assigning equal probabi l i t y to all distributions, is more obviously
open to criticism along these lines.
5. Average Power under the Second Specification
To characterize the relation between group l ' s membershi p di st ri but i on and its
average power, we must calculate the probabilities of the four possible out comes to
the political game described in Sect. 2 above. Gr oupj controls the legislature i f and
onl y i f it controls (m + 1)/2 of the m districts. Thus, the probabi l i t y t hat group j
controls the legislature is
k=m~l {SI #S=k}
(5.1)
where Pij is the probabi l i t y t hat gr oupj controls district i. For example, i f m = 3 t hen
Pj =Pl j P2j ( 1 - P3j ) +Pl j (1 - P2 ~) P3 j + (1 - PI j ) P2~P3~ +Pl j Pz j P3 j .
Recall that, using voting weights (or any of the usual power indices) to evaluate
the different outcomes, W1 = 1 i f group I controls the legislature, Wx =0 i f
either group 2 or group 3 controls the legislature, and /411=1/3 otherwise.
Thus, p r o b ( Wl = l / 3 ) = l - P 1 - P 2 - P 3 , and the expected power of group 1 is
E(Wt ) = P1 + (1/3) (1 - P~ - Pz - P3) = (1/3) + (2/3) Pa - (1/3) ( Pz + P3).
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power 111
No w fi x a d i s t r i b u t i o n S I = ( S l l . . . . . Sml ) f or g r o u p 1. Un d e r t he s e c o n d
s pe c i f i c a t i on o f t he me a s u r e ove r t he me mb e r s h i p d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f g r o u p s 2 a n d 3,
t he s~j a r e al l i n d e p e n d e n t , so we c a n t r e a t t he di s t r i ct s one at a t i me. Gr o u p 1 c on-
t r ol s di s t r i c t i i f a n d onl y i f s a > sf2 + s~3. Thus , si nce si2 a n d s~3 a r e b o t h d i s t r i b u t e d
u n i f o r ml y o n [0, 2/ m], t hi s oc c ur s wi t h p r o b a b i l i t y
P i l ( S i l ) =
m2 2
Y S~l 0 _-_s. = m
~ - T m - s " ' m
4
1 - - <s n
m
(5.2)
Gr o u p 2 c o n t r o l s di s t r i c t i i f a n d onl y i f si2 > S i l + Si3 , or si2 --si 3 > s , . Thus , t he
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t g r o u p 2 c o n t r o l s di s t r i c t i is
I 2 2
- s . , 0 < s . < - -
m
Pi 2 ( s , ) =
[
0 , - - < S i l
m
(5.3)
Al s o, b y s y mme t r y Pi 3 (Sil) = P i 2 ( si l ) . Us i n g ( 5. 1) - ( 5. 3) we c a n wr i t e p r o b ( W 1 = 1),
p r o b ( W 1 = 0 ) a n d E ( W 1 ) as f unc t i ons o f g r o u p l ' s me mb e r s h i p d i s t r i b u t i o n s l .
The s e f u n c t i o n s ar e, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , qui t e n o n c o n v e x , a n d t hus s o me wh a t di f f i cul t
t o c h a r a c t e r i z e i n det ai l . Al s o, t he r i g h t - h a n d si de o f (5. 1) b e c o me s ve r y l ong as t he
n u mb e r o f g r o u p s get s l ar ge.
To s i mpl i f y ma t t e r s , we f ocus on d i s t r i b u t i o n s i n whi c h g r o u p l ' s me mb e r s a r e
evenl y d i v i d e d a c r os s s ome s ubs e t o f t he di s t r i ct s , t h a t i s
~ t l / k , i e S (5. 4)
s i l = [ O , i e M - S ,
whe r e S is a s ubs et o f M wi t h # S = k, f or s ome k < m, a n d t 1 is t he t o t a l si ze o f g r o u p
1. Wh i l e t hi s is a s ma l l s ubs et o f al l pos s i bl e d i s t r i b u t i o n s , i t a l l ows us t o a d d r e s s
c l e a nl y t he i s s ue o f " c o n c e n t r a t i o n vs. d i s p e r s i o n " . Us i n g a ny o f t he us ua l me a s u r e s
o f di s pe r s i on, we wo u l d f i nd t h a t a mo n g d i s t r i b u t i o n s s a t i s f yi ng (5. 4), t he degr ee o f
d i s p e r s i o n i s i nc r e a s i ng i n k )
lo For example, we might use the following definition, which has been studied by Atkinson and others
in the context of income inequality. Let s 1 and s~ be two membership distributions with s 11 >. . . --> s,,l,
S;a >__... > s~a , and ~ sll = ~ s;t. Then s 1 is more dispersed (exhibits more dispersion)than s; if and only
i =1 ~=1
if there exists i* such that s il --< s~i for all i N i*, and sil >= s~x for all i > i*, with strict equality for some i.
Note that this gives only a partial ordering of the sets of all possible distributions. Thus, for example,
(1,1,1,1,0) is more dispersed than (2,2,0,0,0), but it is neither more nor less dispersed than
(2,1/2,1/2,1/2,1/2).
112 J. Snyder
We c o n s i d e r di f f e r e nt val ues f or t he t o t a l si ze t a o f g r o u p 1, b e c a u s e t he r es ul t s
v a r y wi t h t hi s size. Ta b l e s 1- 3 a n d Fi gs . 1- 9 t el l t he s t or y. I n t he f i gur es, we p l o t
E( W1) , p r o b (W1 = 1) a n d p r o b ( W 1 = 0) as f unc t i ons o f t 1 , f or t he cas e o f 3, 5, a n d 7
di s t r i ct s . Al o n g e a c h c ur ve i n e a c h f i gur e, k is f i xed; t hus , t he r e a r e m cur ves i n e a c h
f i gur e ( wher e m is t he n u mb e r o f di s t r i ct s ) , one f or e a c h pos s i bl e va l ue o f k . The mo s t
i nt e r e s t i ng o b s e r v a t i o n , r e c o r d e d i n Ta bl e s 1- 3 a n d Fi gs . 1- 3, is
Table 1
Entries give E(W1) Three districts
k fi 1/4 1/2 3/4 1 5/4 3/2 7/4 2
1 0. 1016 0 . 1 5 6 3 0 . 1 6 6 7 0 . 1 6 6 7 0 . 1 6 6 7 0 . 1 6 6 7 0 . 1 6 6 7 0. 1667
2 0. 1135 0 . 2 0 6 4 0.2862 0.3652 0.4608 0.5873 0.7221 0.8438
3 0.1152 0.2067 0 . 2 7 6 4 0 . 3 3 3 3 0 . 3 9 0 3 0 . 4 6 0 0 0 . 5 5 1 5 0. 6667
Table 2
Entries give E(Wx) Five districts
k t a 1/4 1/2 3/4 1 5/4 3/2 7/4 2
1 0. 1074 0 . 1 2 5 0 0 . 1 2 5 0 0 . 1 2 5 0 0 . 1 2 5 0 0 . 1 2 5 0 0 . 1 2 5 0 0. 1250
2 0. 1318 0 . 2 1 4 8 0 . 2 4 9 0 0 . 2 5 0 0 0 . 2 5 0 0 0 . 2 5 0 0 0 . 2 5 0 0 0. 2500
3 0. 1378 0 . 2 3 5 9 0.3008 0.3542 0.4388 0.5809 0.7475 0.8949
4 0.1401 0 . 2 3 9 5 0 . 3 0 0 5 0 . 3 4 0 9 0 . 3 9 0 7 0 . 4 8 5 0 0 . 6 3 7 9 0. 7897
5 0.1412 0.2407 0 . 2 9 9 2 0 . 3 3 3 3 0 . 3 6 7 5 0 . 4 2 5 9 0 . 5 2 5 5 0. 6667
Table 3
Entries give E(W1) Seven districts
k t 1 1/4 1/2 3/4 1 5/4 3/2 7/4 2
1 0. 1025 0 . 1 0 4 2 0 . 1 0 4 2 0 . 1 0 4 2 0 . 1 0 4 2 0 . 1 0 4 2 0 . 1 0 4 2 0. 1042
2 0. 1424 0 . 2 0 5 1 0 . 2 0 8 3 0 . 2 0 8 3 0 . 2 0 8 3 0 . 2 0 8 3 0 . 2 0 8 3 0. 2083
3 0.1531 0 . 2 4 6 5 0 . 2 8 7 7 0 . 2 9 1 7 0 . 2 9 1 7 0 . 2 9 7 1 0 . 1 9 2 7 0. 2917
4 0. 1574 0 . 2 5 8 3 0 . 3 1 1 7 0.3450 0.4138 0.5601 0.7519 0.9205
5 0. 1596 0 . 2 6 2 0 0 . 3 1 3 4 0 . 3 3 9 6 0 . 3 8 2 9 0 . 5 0 2 9 0 . 6 8 5 1 0. 8518
6 0. 1609 0 . 2 6 3 7 0.3135 0 . 3 3 5 8 0 . 3 6 4 1 0 . 4 3 7 5 0 . 5 8 8 8 0. 7685
7 0.1618 0.2647 0 . 3 1 3 3 0 . 3 3 3 3 0 . 3 5 3 3 0 . 4 0 2 0 0 . 5 0 4 9 0. 6667
Obs e r va t i on 1. Fi x m a n d c o n s i d e r al l d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f t he f o r m gi ven i n (5. 4). The r e
exi st t * a n d ** t ** < t m, wi t h _., = t * < 1, s uch t h a t f or a n y t 1 < t **, E( W1) is u n i q u e l y
ma x i mi z e d wh e n k =m; f or a n y t l <t * , E( W1) is u n i q u e l y ma x i mi z e d wh e n
k =( m+l ) / 2 ; a n d f or a n y t 1 ~( t * * , t *) , E( W1) is u n i q u e l y ma x i mi z e d f or s ome k
b e t we e n (m + 1)/ 2 a n d m.
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power 113
1.0-
& 9 -
0. 8-
0. 7-
0. 6-
0 . 5 -
0.z~-
0 . 3 -
0 . 2 -
0.1
0
2
3
1
o ! 5 '1 ~ ' 5 ~ 2 ' s ~ , ~
E(W~) 3 Di st ri ct s
Fig. 1
1, 0-
0 . 9 -
0. 8-
0. 7-
0, 6-
0. 5-
0.L,-
0. 3-
0. 2-
0 1 -
0
0
1
o l s ~ ~ ' s ~ 2 ' 5 ~ t , '
E(W~) 5 Di st ri ct s
Fig. 2
114 J. Snyder
1. 0-
0.9-
0,8-
0.7-
0.6-
0.5-
0.4.-
0.3-
0,2-
0.1-
0
I I ~
o15 ,15 2!5 3 , ,
E ( W I ) 7 D i s t r i c t s
Fig. 3
Recall t hat E( t 2 ) =E( t 3 ) = 1. Thus, Observat i on 1 implies t hat i f gr oup 1 is
consi derabl y smaller t han t he average size of t he ot her groups t hen its average
power is greatest when its members are evenly divided across all m districts, and i f
gr oup 1 is larger t han the average size of t he ot her groups t hen its average power is
greatest when its members are evenl y di vi ded across (m + 1)/2 of t he districts. While
we have not pr oved this f or ar bi t r ar y m, the pat t er n seems clear. Looki ng again at
Tables 1-3 and Figs. 1-3, we not e also the fol l owi ng interesting feat ure:
Observation 2. For any t l , gr oup 1's expect ed power declines sharpl y as k dr ops
bel ow (m + 1)/2, and cont i nues t o decline qui ckl y as k falls t o 1.
Thus i f gr oup 1's members are concent r at ed in less t han hal f of t he districts, the
gr oup will have little expect ed power.
The reasons f or these results become clearer i f we t ur n to Figs. 4- 9 describing
pr ob (W1 = 1) and pr ob ( W 1 = 0). 11 I f gr oup 1 is concent r at ed in fewer t han hal f of
the districts, t hen it has no chance of cont rol l i ng the legislature. Also, t he mor e
concent r at ed gr oup 1 becomes, t he mor e likely it is t o be powerl ess; t hat is, t he less
likely it is t o pr event one of the ot her groups f r om cont rol l i ng the legislature. Thi s is
11 We mi ght al so cons i der a noncooper at i ve ga me i n whi ch each i nt er est gr oup act s i n i sol at i on,
l obbyi ng for s ome pr opos al it f avor s. I f t he pr obabi l i t y t ha t l egi sl at or s vot e for gr oup l ' s pr opos a l ar e
gi ven by (5.2), a nd t he gr oup needs t he s uppor t of a maj or i t y of t he l egi sl at ure f or its pr opos a l t o pass,
t he n t he gr oup' s i nf l uence is me a s ur e si mpl y by pr ob ( W 1 = 1), or P1. The speci f i cat i on i n (5.2) is not
unr eas onabl e, a l t hough it is obvi ous l y a speci al case, so t he r el at i ons hi p bet ween P1 a nd gr oup l ' s
me mbe r s hi p di s t r i but i on is of s ome i nt er est i n itself.
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power 115
because i f gr oup 1 has no members in a given district t hen it has no chance of
prevent i ng one of the ot her groups f r om cont rol l i ng t hat district. Exami ni ng (5.3),
we see t hat in each district t here are consi derabl e "decreasi ng r et ur ns", in t erms of
reduci ng the pr obabi l i t y t hat one of t he ot her groups cont rol s t he district, t o havi ng
addi t i onal gr oup member s in the district. In or der f or one of the ot her groups t o
cont r ol the legislature, it must cont r ol mor e t han hal f of the districts; t hus t he
pr obabi l i t y t hat gr oup I is powerless is smaller when the gr oup has a few members in
many districts t han when it has many members in a few districts, at least up t o the
poi nt at which it has members in hal f of the districts.
As gr oup 1 becomes even mor e widely distributed, t he si t uat i on is compl i cat ed
in t wo ways. Firstly, the gr oup can somet i mes cont r ol the legislature itself. We see
f r om Figs. 4- 6 t hat (regardless of the size of gr oup 1) t he probabi l i t y t hat this occurs
is greatest when gr oup 1 's members are evenly divided across (m + 1)/2 districts, and
it decreases monot oni cal l y as the gr oup becomes mor e and mor e dispersed. The
r eason f or this is not obvi ous, as it involves a t r adeof f : as t he gr oup becomes mor e
widely dispersed, it has a hi gher pr obabi l i t y of cont rol l i ng some districts, and a
l ower pr obabi l i t y of cont rol l i ng others. Evidently, the l at t er effect is mor e
i mpor t ant t han t he former, given t he specification of t he pr obabi l i t y measure on s 2
and s 3. Secondl y, t here are opposi ng effects on the pr obabi l i t y t hat gr oup 1 is
powerless. As the gr oup becomes mor e widely dispersed, it has a higher pr obabi l i t y
of prevent i ng t he ot her groups f r om cont rol l i ng some districts, and a l ower
probabi l i t y of prevent i ng such cont r ol in ot her districts. Whi ch effect domi nat es
depends on the size of gr oup 1" t here exists a t ***< 1 such t hat i f t 1 < t ***
1.0-
0 . 9 -
0. 8-
0. 7-
0. 6-
0. 5-
04. -
0 3 -
0. 2-
0. 1-
o
o
1
I I ] ~ [ I
0 5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 f~
Prob (W~ =1) 3 Di stri cts
Fig. 4
116 J. Snyder
1. 0-
0. 9-
0. 8-
0. 7-
0. 6-
0. 5-
0.A-
0. 3-
0. 2-
0. 1-
0
o ! 5
1,2
i i l i t
1 i s ~ 2 ! 5 ~ t l
Pr ob( W~=l ) 5Di st r i ct s
F i g . 5
1. 0-
0. 9-
0. 8-
0. 7-
0. 6-
0. 5-
O.A-
0. 3-
0. 2-
0.1
0
i
0.5
4
S
s 23
1 1 ~ ~ 2 ! 5 ; t ~
Prob {Wl = 1 I 7 Di stri cts
F i g . 6
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power 117
1.0-
0. 9-
0.8
0.7
0, 6-
0. 5-
0.4.-
0. 3-
0.2-
0 . I -
0 I I I I
0.5 1 1.5 2
Prob(Wl =O) 3Di st ri ct s
I
215 3 t l
Fig. 7
1.0
0.9
0.8-
0. 7-
0 . 6 -
0. 5-
0. 4-
0. 3-
0. 2-
0.1
0
0 1 6
I I
1 1 6 ~ 2 1 ~
Prob(W~=O) 5 Districts
D
Fig. 8
118 J. Snyder
] . 0 -
09-
0.8-
0.7-
06-
05-
0.z,-
03-
0.2-
0.1-
0
0
I I
Prob [W 1= 0 } 7 Di st ri ct s
Fig. 9
t hen pr ob (Wa = 0) decreases as t he gr oup becomes mor e widely dispersed, and i f
t I > t *** t hen the opposi t e holds. Thus, f or t 1 > t *** t here is no confl i ct bet ween
increasing p r o b ( Wl = l ) and decreasing p r o b ( Wi =0 ) , and E(W1) is clearly
maxi mi zed when k =( m+l ) / 1 . For t i <t * * * however, t here is a conflict, pro-
duci ng the t* and t** of Obser vat i on 1.
To see whet her or not we miss anyt hi ng interesting by restricting at t ent i on t o
membershi p di st ri but i ons of t he f or m given by (5.4), we investigate the case of t hree
districts in mor e detail. The most i mpor t ant result is
Proposition 3. There exists t* such that f or any t i < t*, E(W1)/ s uniquely maximized,
over all feasible distributions of group 1, when the members of group 1 are evenly
divided over all three districts; and f or any t 1 > t *, E( Wi ) is uniquely maxi mi zed when
the members of group 1 are evenly divided over two of the three districts.
Proof. See Appendi x.
Thus, at least f or t he case of t hree districts, including di st ri but i ons t hat do not
satisfy (5.4) does not change our basic finding. We st rongl y suspect t hat the same
hol ds for l arger number s of districts as well.
It woul d of course be still mor e satisfying to have a mor e general pr oposi t i on
about the rel at i on bet ween dispersion and expect ed power, but we leave t hat f or
fut ure work.
Political Geography and Interest-Group Power 119
6. Average Power under the First Specification
The first specification of t he pr obabi l i t y model on s 2 and s3 in which sz and s3 are
each dr awn uni f or ml y f r om t he m-simplex (where m is t he number of districts), is
mor e difficult to wor k with t han the second, because we must t reat all districts
simultaneously. The results are similar, however, t o t hose f ound f or the second
specification in Sect. 5, at least f or the case we anal yze of t hree districts. In
part i cul ar, we have
Proposition 4. There exists t * < l such that for any t 1 <t *, E(W1) is uniquely
maximized, over all feasible distributions of group 1, when the members of group 1 are
evenly divided across all three districts; and for tl~(t*, l], E(W1) is uniquely
maximized when the members of group 1 are evenly divided across two of the three
districts.
Proof See Appendi x.
Not e t hat we have not investigated E(W1) f or t 1 > 1. We also find t hat
pr ob (W~ = 1) behaves exact l y as in the second specification. That is, f or any t~ < 1,
p r o b ( W 1 =1) is uni quel y maxi mi zed (over all possible distributions) when t he
members of gr oup 1 are evenl y divided over t wo of the t hree districts. The one
difference occurs in t he f unct i on prob(W~ = 0). We find t hat f or the first specifi-
cat i on, pr ob ( W 1 = 0) is uni quel y mi ni mi zed when the members of gr oup I are evenly
divided across all t hree districts, f or any tl < 1. That is, the "swi t chpoi nt ", t *** < ],
which exists f or t he second specification (recall Observat i on 1), does not exist in the
first specification.
7. Conclusions
Once we recognize t he confl i ct i ng effects of variables such as gr oup size and
geographi c concent r at i on, it is not surprising t hat studies at t empt i ng t o det ermi ne
t he effects of free-riding on political influence, which have used these variables t o
measure the ext ent of free-riding, have met which onl y mixed success. The effects of
gr oup size are st r ai ght f or war d: while larger groups may face great er free-rider
probl ems, such groups also have mor e vot ers and hence pot ent i al l y mor e political
clout, since, aft er all, it is vot es t hat politicians need f or reelection. The effects of
geographi c dispersion are less obvious. Mor e dispersed groups may face mor e free-
riding as distance makes or gani zat i on and enforcement mor e difficult. On the ot her
hand, as shown in this paper, groups t hat are concent r at ed in onl y a few legislative
districts will have very little power based on the vot i ng st rengt h of t hei r members.
Abst ract i ng f r om the free-ride pr obl em, we find an " opt i mal " degree of dispersion,
beyond which power decreases with increased dispersion. Thus, aft er a poi nt , the
effects of increased dispersion on free-riding and "vot e power " operat e in the same
direction.
120 J. Snyder
Appendix
P r o o f o f Proposition 1. L e t s j a n d s[ b e t wo f e a s i b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f g r o u p 1.
Wi t h o u t l os s o f g e n e r a l i t y , s u p p o s e t 2 > t l . Al s o w i t h o u t l os s o f g e n e r a l i t y ,
s u p p o s e s[1 < s i t a n d s~l <s z l . We f i n d f e a s i b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n s s z a n d s a s u c h t h a t
W1 ( s t , s2, s3) < W1 ( s [ , s z , s3), p r o v i n g t h a t s t d o e s n o t d o m i n a t e s ; . P i c k Sz as f o l -
l ows " 812 = 0, SZt < $22 < r a i n (s~l , $11 $21), Si2 -~- Si l A r d f o r i t {3 . . . . , ( m + 3) / 2},
/ (.+3>/2
wh e r e d = ( 2 / ( r n - 1 ) ) ' ~ t 2 - s 2 2 - _ i~=~_ s a ) , a n d s i 2 = 0 f o r i e { ( m + 5 ) / 2 . . . . , m} .
P i c k s 3 s u c h t h a t si3 = 0 f o r i t {2 . . . . . ( m + 3) / 2}, a n d sia = 2 t 3 / ( m - 1 ) > 0 f o r al l
i e { 1 , ( m + 5 ) / 2 . . . . , m} . T h e n s 2 a n d s 3 a r e b o t h f e a s i bl e . N o w d > ( 2 / ( m - 1 ) )
(m+3)/2
t z - S l l - s 2 1 i~=3 s a ) >=( 2 / ( m- 1 ) ) ( t z - t l ) >=O; s o s i 2 > s i t = s i l + s i 3 , f o r al l
i t {2 . . . . . ( m + 3) / 2}. A n d ~ { 2 , . . . , ( m + 3) / 2) = ( m + 1)/ 2, s o W2 ( s l , s2, s3) = 1 a n d
t h u s Wt ( s t , S z , S 3 ) =O; b u t Wl (s~, s2, s3)>=l / 3, s i nc e s i 2 < s . + s i 3 f o r al l
i t { 1 , 2 , ( m + 3 ) / 2 . . . . , m ) ( t h u s W 2 ( s t , s 2 , s 3 ) ~ I ) a n d s ~3<s i l +s i z f o r al l
i t {2 . . . . , ( m + 3)/ 2} ( t h u s W 3( st , s2, s3) / = 1). So s 1 d o e s n o t d o m i n a t e s t . Q E D
P r o o f o f Proposition 2. Wi t h o u t l o s s o f g e n e r a l i t y , l e t k = 1 a n d l e t s 1 s a t i s f y
(m+1)/2
s 2 t < s a l < . . . < s m t . L e t d = ~ s i l - t 2 - t 3 > O . De f i n e s~ b y s ' l l = s , t - d a n d
i =1
s;l = sit + d/ ( m - 1) f o r i t {2, . . . , m}. N o t e t h a t s t 1 > 0 ( s i nc e s t t > d b y t h e a s s u m p -
t i o n t h a t t t < ( 2m/ ( m + 1) ) ( t z ta)), a n d ~ s~l = ~ s a , s o s[ i s f e a s i bl e . Al s o , f o r
/ =1 i =1
(m + 1)/2
al l S w i t h l t S a n d # S > ( m + 1 ) / 2 , ~ S~z >t z +t 3 s i nc e ~, s~2> ~ S ; z - d / 2
\
i eS i e S i =1
t 2 + t 3 + d / 2 ) . We n o w s h o w t h a t (i) W1 ( s l , S 2, S3) ~--- 1 i mp l i e s W 1 (s~, s 2, s3) = 1,
/
a n d (ii) W t (s'l, s2, s3) = 0 i mp l i e s W 1 ( s t , s2, s3) = 0, wh i c h p r o v e s t h a t s~ d o mi -
n a t e s s , .
( i ) I f Wt ( s t , S z , S 3 ) = l t h e n t h e r e e xi s t s S wi t h ~ S = ( m + 1 ) / 2 s u c h t h a t
s a > s,2 > s~a f o r al l i e s. I f 1 S, o r i f I e S b u t s [ t > st 2 + s13, t h e n s~l > si2 si3 f o r
al l i ~ S, s o W 1 (s'l, s2, sa) = 1. Ot h e r wi s e , i f 1 e S a n d s~ 1 ---- s12 + s13 t h e n t h e r e e xi s t s
/
j E ( M - S ) s u c h t h a t s j l >S j z +S j 3 ( s i n c e # ( ( M - S ) u { 1 } ) = ( m + l ) / 2 a n d t h u s
\
\
2 s ~l >t E+t 3 ) , i n wh i c h c a s e S;l >s, a+Si a f o r al l i e ( S - { 1 } ) w { j } , a n d
i~ (M--S)u{1}
/
a g a i n Wl ( s ; , s z , s3) = 1.
(i i ) I f Wt ( s [ , s 2, s3) = 0 t h e n e i t h e r Wz ( s ; , s 2, s3) = 1 o r W 3 ( s [ , s2, s3) = 1.
Wi t h o u t l os s o f g e n e r a l i t y , s u p p o s e t h e f o r m e r h o l d s . T h e n t h e r e e xi s t S wi t h
# S = ( m + 1) / 2 s u c h t h a t si2 > s; t + si3 f o r al l i ~ S. Al s o 1 S s i nce i f 1 ~ S t h e n
s~2 > 2 s ; t + 2 s , ~, wh i c h wo u l d i mp l y t h a t t z + t 3 ~ 2 sl2 - ~ si3 > ~ Si l '
ieS i~S ieS i~S I~S ieS
a contradiction. Thus sa<s~t for all itS, so si~>S~x+S~3 for all ieS,
so Wt (Sx, s2, s3) = 0. QED
P o l i t i c a l G e o g r a p h y a n d I n t e r e s t - G r o u p P o w e r 121
P r o o f o f Pr opos i t i on 3. Not e first t hat i f tl > 8/3, t hen put t i ng Sl =( t l / 2, q / 2 , 0),
gr oup I cont rol s t he legislature with pr obabi l i t y 1, whi ch cannot be i mpr oved upon.
Thus, we onl y consi der tl < 8/3. Also, since p , = 1 for all s~l >4/ 3, we can restrict
at t ent i on t o s 1 such t hat s~l <4/ 3 f or all i. Finally, exploiting symmet ry, we can
suppose t hat s31 < s21 < s11. Subst i t ut i ng (5.2) and (5.3) into (5. I) and put t i ng n = 3,
we have
81 ( e 2 ~2 2 2 2 2 9 2
~ - k11 321 + S l l $31 "t- $21 $31 - - ~- 4 1 S ~ 1 $ 3 1 ) '
9 9 4 2 2 __g( g__Sl l ) ) S3t . _~_g~221S31
g - ( ( l - - g ( ~ ' - - S l l ) ) $ 2 1 - ~ ( 1 9 4 2 9 2
_ _ 9 ( 1 _ _ 9 4 2 2 2
( ~ - - - $ 1 1 ) ) $ 2 1 S 3 1 ,
( ~ _ _ 9 ( 3 4 _ _ _ $ 1 1 ) 2 ) ( ] 9 4 2 9 9 4 2
- g( x- s ~O ) +~0- ~- ( k- s11) )~1
pl ( s l ) = _9( 1 9 4- 2 9 3 2 2 2
- - g ( ~ - - - S l l ) ) ( 1 - - ~ - ( ~ - - $ 2 1 ) ) $ 2 1 S 3 1 ,
9 4 2 9 4 - 2
( 1 - - ~ - ( ~ - - $ 1 1 ) ) ( ] - - g ( ~ - - - $ 2 1 ) )
and
C
P1 (sl) = /
L
q _ ( ~ 9 4 2 _ _ ~
- ~ ( ~ - s 1 1 ) ) 0 (k-s~l) :)
"~- ( 1 9 ( 4 ~ ~ 2 ~ ( 1 9 4 2
- - ~ ~ - - o Z l ] ] - - ~ ( ~ - - $ 3 1 ) )
- - 2 ( 1 ~ ( ~ S ) 2 ~ ( 1 9 4 2
- - ~ ( ~ - - $ 2 1 ) ) ( 1 9 4 2
- ~ ( x - s ~ 0 )
- - 8 3 - - 11 )
i f s11< 2
i fs21=<~<sl l
i f s31 <2 < Se I
i f 2<s 31
81 2 2 2 2
~((~-s11) (~-s21) +(2-s102(~-s302
_[._(2 $ 2 1 ) 2 / 2 - ",2 9 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 " 2
~ - ~ a x ) - ~- t ~- s 11) ( ~ - s 2 0 ( ~ - s 3 z ) ) l f s a l < x
81 2 2 2 2
~ ( ( g - s z l ) ( ~ - s 3 1 ) i f s2a <=2 < s l l
0 i f otherwise .
Also, Pa ( s 1 ) =P2 ( s 1 ) , so E ( W I [ S l ) = + Z ( P I ( S l ) - P 2 ( s l ) ) . We must solve
3
m a x E ( W l l s l ) subject to ~ s i l = t l . Fi ndi ng this sol ut i on is st rai ght forward,
Sl i = l
but ext remel y t edi ous since E ( WI [ ") is not concave and t here are f our di fferent
"r egi ons" to deal with, so we onl y sketch the pr oof here. The idea is simply t o find all
the candi dat es f or a maxi mum, and choose t he largest.
Let L ( s l , 2 ) = E ( W l [ s l ) + 2 ( t I - S l l - $ 2 1 - - S 3 1 ) denot es the Lagr angi an of the
maxi mi zat i on probl em. Denot e the regions s31 < szl < s 11 < 2/3, s31 < s21 < 2/3 < s 11,
s31 < 2/3 < s21 < s 11, and 2/3 < s31 < s21 _< s 11 by ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) , and ( i v ) respectively
(see Fig. 10). Not e t hat , except where s i 1 ~ { 0 , 2 / 3 , 4 / 3 } f or some i, s 1 solves t he
maxi mi zat i on pr obl em onl y i f the fi rst -order condi t i ons
8L ~?L OL
=0
8s11 8s 21 8s31
hol d at s 1 . Call poi nt s such t hat sil ~ {0,2/3,4/3} f or some i " bounda r y" points, and
all ot hers "i nt er i or " points.
122 J. Snyder
( t l , 0 , 0 ) ( h . 0 , 0 )
& ~ . /4 2 t l 2 ~ D. 4 f3
J l t
h T ' - f - T " / A ; ~ 7 ' ' 1 - 5 - ' ~ '
(5-,-2
/ I'"'
/ ,
/ t ~ , - ~ - , y I / / ~ \
,/ / \
( 0 , 0 . t 11 (0, t l , 0 } ( 0 . 0 , t 1) ( 0 , t l , 0 )
(t~,0.0)
A
A t l 2 t l 2 I / ~
( ~ . ~ - ~ , - ~ " ~ , / ~ . .... \
/
/. 2 2 \1, t l l l l J [-~','~',U]
\ "
' 3 " 3 ' 3 ' , 1 \ \
/111/ " ' , L Fig. lO
{0.0.t 1 ) { 0 , t l , 0 )
2<t~ ~<813
First, we show t hat for regions ( i X ) and ( i i i ) t here are no i nt eri or poi nt s t hat
satisfy the fi rst -order condi t i ons, and t hus we need onl y consider the boundar i es of
L 8L
these regions. For regi on ( i i ) t he pr oof proceeds as follows" ~s2i - Osax i ff either
s21 =s31 or s2i =(36s~x - 9 6 s a i +24s3i + 1 6 ) / ( 8 1 s ~ i s 3 1 - 2 1 6 s a l s 3 i +72s3x +24) .
The l at t er condi t i on implies t hat f or all (Sax, s21 ) e (2/3, 4/3) x (0, 2/3), s2i > 2/3, so
it cannot hold. Thus, s2i =s3i . But this implies t hat
~L ~L
4= #~2 t f or all (Six, s31 ) e (2/3, 4/3) x (0, 2/3) .
8Sxl
c~L 3L
The pr oof f or regi on ( i i i ) is similar: - - = i ff either s i i =s 2i or
~ S x x ~ s z x
six (16 (2 - s z l ) - 12 (5 - s 2 x ) s ~ l ) / ( 4 - 3szl ) (4 - %2 0. The l at t er condi t i on implies
t hat si t >4/ 3 for all (Szi, S3x)e (2/3 , 4/3) x (0, 2/3), so we must have six =Szi . But
t hen
0L 3L
+ ~ f or all (s2i, s3x ) ~ (2/3, 4/3) x (0, 2/3) .
3sxi
Next we show t hat f or regi on ( i v ) the onl y i nt eri or poi nt satisfying t he first-
or der condi t i ons is s 1 = (t l / 3, t a / 3 , i l l 3 ) .
Pol i t i cal Ge o g r a p h y a n d I n t e r e s t - Gr o u p P o we r 123
T u r n i n g t o r e g i o n ( i ) , we s h o w t h a t t h e o n l y i n t e r i o r p o i n t s t h a t s a t i s f y t h e
f i r s t - o r d e r c o n d i t i o n s a r e s l = ( t l / 3 , t l / 3, q / 3 ) , a n d a p o i n t wi t h sia=s2a a n d
ska = (27s3~ - 54~a + 48si1 - 8)/27si1 (2 - 3siO, wh e r e e i t h e r i = 1 a n d k = 3 o r i = 3
a n d k - - 1. ( Th e p r o p e r c h o i c e , wh i c h d e p e n d s o n t h e v a l u e o f t a , s i mp l y i ns ur e s
t h a t Saa ___saa. ) T h e p r o o f is as f o l l o ws :
0 L a L
i f f e i t h e r saa =s 2a
(~Sl a - - 8S21
o r
sat = ( s ~ a ( 2 7 s 2 a - 1 8 ) - F S31 (48 - 3 6 s 2 0 - 8 ) / ( - 2 7 s ~ 1 + ( 3 6 - 5 4 s 2 1 ) s 3 1 + 1 8 s 2 a )
-f(sz~, s 3 1 ) .
Si mi l a r l y,
0 L 0 L
~Sia--~s31
a n d
i f f s l l =s a a o r s l l = f ( s a a , s21) ,
0 L a L
(~s2 a - (~$3 a
i f f s2a =s 3a o r s21 = f ( s 3 1 , s H) .
F o r al l (s2t , $31 ) @ ( 0, 2/ 3) x (0, 2/ 3) s u c h t h a t Sza +s 3a , f (s21 , s3a ) =#f(s3a , s2a ). T h u s
we mu s t h a v e six =s ~l f o r s o me i a n d j . So, e i t h e r saa = s 2 2 = s 3 ~ , o r sll = s j a a n d
Ski =f ( s l a, S , ) = (27S31 --54S~1 +48S~ 1 - - 8) / 27Si a (2--3S~1). By t h e c o n s t r a i n t s
s3a <s 2a <Sa a , we c a n ge t s et j = 2 i n t h e l a t t e r case.
Fi n a l l y , we a n a l y z e t h e " b o u n d a r i e s " . On t h e b o u n d a r y wi t h s31 = 0, E(W1]sa) is
ma x i mi z e d ( f o r a n y t l ) a t ( f i / 2, f i / 2, 0). N o t e t h a t t o s h o w t hi s f o r t a E ( 2/ 3, 4/ 3) we
mu s t c o n s i d e r r e g i o n s ( i ) a n d ( i i ) , a n d f o r t 1 e ( 4/ 3, 2) we mu s t c o n s i d e r r e g i o n s
( i i ) a n d ( i i i ) . Al o n g t h e b o u n d a r y wi t h s l l = 2/ 3, E ( W a Isl) is a l wa y s i n c r e a s i n g i n
s z l , so E(Walsa) is ma x i mi z e d wh e n Sea is as l a r ge as pos s i bl e ( e i t h e r t I - 2 / 3 o r 2/ 3
d e p e n d i n g o n t i ) . Si mi l a r l y, E(WalsO is ma x i mi z e d a l o n g t h e b o u n d a r y s3t = 2/ 3 a t
t h e p o i n t ( t 1 - 4 / 3 , 2/ 3, 2/ 3) . Al o n g t h e b o u n d a r y s l l = 4/ 3, E( W~ ]sa) is ma x i mi z e d
e i t h e r a t ( 4/ 3, t l / 2 - 2 / 3 , q / 2 - 2 / 3 ) o r ( 4/ 3, t I - 4 / 3 , 0), d e p e n d i n g o n t I .
Wi t h al l t h e c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e g l o b a l m a x i m u m o f E(Walsl) a t h a n d , we n o w
s i mp l y c o mp a r e t h e m. T h e c o mp a r i s o n s a r e s t r a i g h t f o r wa r d e x c e p t f o r t h e p o i n t
wi t h S~l =s 2 a , Ski = f ( s i a , S~I) b e c a u s e f o r f i x e d ta i t is di f f i c ul t t o c a l c u l a t e s a e xa c t l y.
I t is mu c h e a s i e r i n t hi s c a s e t o f i x Sea a n d c o mp a r e E(Wa (Sl)) a t t h e r e s u l t i n g p o i n t
s~ wi t h ma x ( E( Wl l ( Ta (s20/2, 71 (s21)/2, 0)), E(Wal (t'a (s2a)/3, 7a ( s 20/ 3, 71 (s2a)/ 3))),
wh e r e t'l (szl) = 2 Szl + f ( s 2 t , Szl ). O f c o u r s e , o n l y va l ue s o f s21 s uc h t h a t 71 (s21)/2 < 2
n e e d t o be c o n s i d e r e d . T h e c o mp a r i s o n s r e v e a l t h a t f o r al l t a < t * ( wh e r e
t * ~ 0 . 5 1 3 ) , E( Wl l Sl ) is ma x i mi z e d a t (tx/3, ta/3, f i / 3) , whi l e f o r al l q > t ~ ,
E(WI[Sl) is ma x i mi z e d a t ( q / 2 , q / 2 , 0). Q E D
Pr o o f o f Proposition 4. Re c a l l t h a t u n d e r s p e c i f i c a t i o n one , f o r e a c h j E {2, 3},
s j =( s aj , Szj, Saj ) h a s a j o i n t d i s t r i b u t i o n t h a t is u n i f o r m o n t h e u n i t s i mp l e x
124 J. Snyder
f
_3
)
{sj[ ~ si~ = 12. Thus, i f Sll __<1 and $21 __<] t hen the probability t hat group 1 controls
t
i=1 J 8 2 1 8 1 1
bot h districts 1 and 2 is 4 S ~ ( s z x - s 2 z ) ( s l l - s l z ) d s l z d s 2 z = ~ t s 2 1 " Similar
o o
formul a hol d for the other pairs of districts. If t 1 ~ 1 t hen clearly Sil < 1 for all i; also,
i f t 1 <1 t hen group 1 can never control all three districts. Thus, for t t < 1, the
probabi l i t y t hat group 1 controls the legislature is Pt (st) = s~t ~1 + s~t sZt + s~i s ~.
The probabi l i t y t hat group 2 controls districts 1 and 2 is
1 - - 8 1 1 - - S 2 1 ]- - - 8 1 1 - - $ 2 1 - - 8 2 3
2 S ~ (1 - s l l - s 2 i - s l 3 -s23)2ds13ds23 =~(1 - s l l s 2 1 ) 4
o o
Similar formul a hol d for the other pairs of districts, and again it is impossible for
group 2 to cont rol all three districts. Thus, the probabi l i t y t hat group 2 controls the
legislature is P2 (s1) ---= 1 ((1 - s 11 s21)4 + (1 - - s t t s31)4 + (1 - s 11 s31)4) .
Now P3 (s~) = P2 (si) by symmet ry, so E(Wt Ist) = 1/3 + 2/3 (Px (st) - P2 (sl)). We
3
must solve max E ( Wl l s 0 subject to ~ sit = q, where tl < 1. This is perhaps most
sl i =l
easily done by maki ng the subst i t ut i on s 3 = q - s21 - s it to eliminate the const rai nt ;
and t hen solving the unconst rai ned maxi mi zat i on problem.
The points t hat satisfy the first-order condi t i ons are (tx/3, f i / 3, q 3 ) and
points of the form sii =( t 1 + 1)/ 2-]/ / 3(11 t ~ - 3 0 q +29) / 6, s i l =Ski = ( q - 1)/4
+ ]//3 (11 t 2 - 30 t + 29)/12. (Note, the latter t ype are feasible onl y for values of t i
close to 1). Checking the boundar y with, say s3x =0, we find t hat E( Wl l s i ) is
maximized at (q/ 2, ta/2, 0). Compari ng all these canditates for a solution, we find
t hat for t 1 < t~' (where t* ~0. 901), E( Wi [ s i ) is maximized (q/ 3, q / 3 , q/ 3), and for t i
>t ~' , E( WI [ s l ) is maximized at ( t l / 2, q / 2 , 0 ) . By symmetry, ( q / 2 , 0 , q / 2 ) and
(0, tl/2, ti/2) are also solutions. QED
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