Brillantes vs Yorac

Constitutional Law COMELECs Constitutional Independence

In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the
president to create a fact finding commission which would be
chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his
chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as
his substitute. Brillantes then questioned such appointment
urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall
any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantes claimed that the choice
of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president
violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional
commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the president in the discharge of their
functions. The designation made by the president has dubious
justification as it was merely grounded on the quote
administrative expediency to present the functions of the
COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on
existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and
unconstitutional.

AKBAYAN-Youth vs Commission on Election
Political Law Election Laws Right of Suffrage Extension of
Voters Registration
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth
movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for
the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already
ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons
aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition.
AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that
there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register
and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of
Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be
conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth
however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436,
the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers,
can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters
registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the extension of the voters
registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so
pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which
provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within
120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not
absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration
which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the
exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even
pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing
order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is
explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-
election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special
registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-
election matters because the additional voters from the special
two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the
book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then
entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will
have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and
distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would
have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the
special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than
good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are
disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths
pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual
youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that
the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also,
AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are
asking an extension because they failed to register on time for
some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids
the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. COMMISSIONERS ON
AUDIT (28 SEPT. 2008, CARPIO, J)
Substantial

Issue: WON the insurance benefits granted to the employees
require prior approval from the President as required under
Administrative Order No. 103

Petitioner:
The payment of the insurance premium for the health
benefits of its officers and employees was not unlawful
and improper since it was paid from an allocation of its
retained earnings pursuant to a valid appropriation
ordinance.
o Such enactment was a clear exercise of its
express powers under the principle of local
fiscal autonomy which includes the power of
LGUs to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities.
o Also, an LGU has fiscal control over its own
revenues derived solely from its own tax base.

Respondent:
Although LGUs are afforded local fiscal autonomy, LGUs
are still bound by RA 6758 and their actions are subject
to the scrutiny of the DBM and applicable auditing rules
and regulations enforced by the COA.
The grant of additional compensation, like the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in
the present case, must have prior Presidential approval
to conform with the state policy on salary
standardization for government workers.

Held: NO
Ratio:
AO 103 took effect eleven months before the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 720-
A. The main purpose of AO 103 is to prevent
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization
among government personnel, national or local, who
do not receive, or who receive less, productivity
incentive benefits or other forms of allowances or
benefits.
It is clear from Sec. 1 of AO 103 that the President
authorized all agencies of the national government as
well as LGUs to grant the maximum amount of P2,000
productivity incentive benefit to each employee. In Sec.
2, the President enjoined all heads of government
offices and agencies from granting productivity
incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of
allowances and benefits without the Presidents prior
approval.
From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103,
petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval
from the President since Sec. 2 states that the
prohibition applies only to government
offices/agencies, including GOCCs, as well as their
respective governing boards. Nowhere is it indicated
that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The
requirement then of prior approval from the President
under AO 103 is applicable only to departments,
bureaus, offices and GOCCs.
o Since LGUs are subject only to the power of
general supervision of the President, the
Presidents authority is limited to seeing to it
that rules are followed and laws are faithfully
executed. Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health
care insurance benefits in the present case
does not need the approval of the President
to be valid.
Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA
6758, the COA did not clearly establish that the medical
care benefits given by the government at the time
under PD 1519 were sufficient to cover the needs of
government employees especially those employed by
LGUs.
Petitioner correctly relied on the CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 33 which provided the policy framework
for working conditions at the workplace. All
government offices including LGUs were directed to
provide a health program for government employees
which included hospitalization services and annual
mental, medical-physical examinations.
o The CSC, through MC No. 33, as well as the
President, through AO 402, recognized the
deficiency of the state of health care and
medical services implemented at the time. RA
7875 (National Health Insurance Act)
instituting a National Health Insurance
Program (NHIP) for all Filipinos was only
approved two months after the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 720-A.
Even with the establishment of the NHIP, AO
402 was still issued three years later
addressing a primary concern that basic
health services under the NHIP either are still
inadequate or have not reached geographic
areas like that of petitioner.
Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy
as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Sec. 25,
Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the LGC, the Court
declares that the grant and release of the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits were
validly enacted through an ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Cagas vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012)
Post under case digests, Political Law at Monday, March 19,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of
the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated
national and local elections. The fast transmission of the results
led to thecompletion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes
cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was
proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista
garnering 159,527 votes. Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities,
vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and
resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010.
The Comelec issues orders stating that theprotestant paid the
cash deposit for filing of the case, and his petition set
out specific acts complained of. Petitioner moved to reconsider,
which was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
directly with the SC.
Issue: Whether the Comelec erred in no dismissing the petition
for insufficiency of form.
Held: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek
the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course. The court may have the
power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC,
limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the
Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Where the Commission in division committed grave
abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before
it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances
mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the
controversy to

ABC PARTY LIST v COMELEC
GR 193256, 3/22/2011
SUMMARY: Disqualification case against a party-list.Contention
whether HRET or COMELEC has jurisdiction.
FACTS:
5/25/2010: Mauricio jr filed petition for cancellation of
registration of ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party
list on grounds that it's a front for a religious
organization, Ang Dating Daan.
Respondent states that it was established by James Marty
Lim, 11 years president of Association of Barangay
chairmen, has national constituency, and represents a
marginalized sector and is not identified with any
religious sector.
6/2010: Petition dismissed on procedural and substantial
grounds.
ABC won a seat in the HoR.
COMELEC en banc reviews case, stating that Mauricio was
not given chance to present evidence, sets hearing.
ABC counters stating that COMELEC has no more
jurisdiction since ABC was already proclaimed winner and
COMELEC committing grave abuse of discretion upon
their holding of hearing/recognizing Mauricio's petition.
Hence, certiorari by ABC.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC still has jurisdiction over ABC when it
was already proclaimed a winner of the elections
RULING:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. COMELEC can
proceed with hearing as they have jurisdiction.
HELD:
COMELEC has jurisdiction over PARTY-LIST
REGISTRATION (derived from CONSTI ) while HRET has
jurisdiction over DISTRICT AND PARTYLIST
REPRESENTATIVES QUALIFICATION (from CONSTI).

Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 192856, March 8, 2011
Post under Political Law, villarama doctrines at Monday,
December 05, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in this case that despite
recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of
petitionerGonzalez. Subsequent events showed
that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also
taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of
the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to thecandidates
election and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.

Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy; Disqualification ofCandidate; Period
for Filing Petition. Petitioner Fernando V.Gonzalez and private
respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for
the position of Representative of the 3rdcongressional district of
the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010elections. On March
30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA
No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish
national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a
Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. The SC
explained the difference between Cancellation under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code and Disqualification under Section
68 of the OEC. A petition to cancel a candidates COC may be
filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required by law
is false. On the other hand, a petition fordisqualification of
a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 for
committing prohibited acts referred to in said section. As to the
ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, the
Court in a previous case elaborated that the misrepresentation
must be material, i.e. misrepresentation regarding
age,residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born
Filipino status. In this case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC)
based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-born
Filipino which was filed before the elections is in the nature of a
petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said
case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to
disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing
some grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the
petition as one filed both for disqualificationand cancellation of
COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule
25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable insofar as
determining the period for filing the petition. This Rule provides
the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date of
proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure forfiling a
petition for cancellation of COC is covered by Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as the prescriptive
period to be within five (5) days following the last day for
the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 4(B) of Resolution
No. 8696 represents another attempt to modify by a mere
procedural rule the statutory period for filing a petition to cancel
COC on the ground of false representation therein regarding a
candidates qualifications. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696
would supplant the prescribed period of filing of petition under
Section 78 with that provided in Section 68 even if the latter
provision does not at all cover the false representation regarding
age, residence and citizenship which may be raised in a petition
under Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule promulgated by
the COMELEC allowing a petition to cancel COC based on the
candidates non-compliance with constitutional and
statutory requirements for elective office, such as citizenship, to
be filed even beyond the period provided in Section 78 was
simply to remedy a perceived procedural gap though not
expressly stated in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous
case, had already rejected such justification.

Liberal Party, etc. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 191771, May 6, 2010.
Commission on Elections; registration of party coalition.
Comelec may not, through a resolution setting the deadline for
registration of political parties, differentiate between political
parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and
coalitions, on the other. There is no substantial distinction
among these entities germane to the act of registration that
would justify creating distinctions among them in terms of
deadlines. Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 8646, dated July 14,
2009, which sets August 17, 2009 as the deadline for filing
petitions for registration of political parties, without mentioning
political organizations and coalitions, should be understood as
covering the latter entities as well. A petition for registration as
a political coalition filed beyond that deadline is time-barred,
and the Comelec resolution granting that petition constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Political coalitions, even if composed of registered political
parties, need to register separately in accordance with
established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized
as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered
coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal
personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish
with other registered parties. If parties want to coalesce with
one another without the formal registration of their coalition,
they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their
members democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot
receive official recognition for their coalition.

Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, etc.
et al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.
Voter; residency requirement. The the residency requirement of
a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at
least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or
intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law prescribing the
qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally
settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from
a persons acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the
consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case,
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once
established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a
person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer
thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change
of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which
correspond with that purpose. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth
or for more than 72 years. His family is known to be among the
prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio
served in public office as Caloocan City Second District
representative in the House of Representatives, having been
elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In
2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these
occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these
circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the
doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has
qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City.
There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere,
or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his
residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the
list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No.
1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or
false address, or that he could not be physically found in the
address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not
operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These
purported misrepresentations in Asistios COC, if true, might
serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to the COC.
But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has
abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has
established residence outside of Caloocan City.

JAPZON v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009
FACTS:
Manuel Japzon (Japzon) and Jaime Ty (Ty) were
candidates for the Office of the Mayor in Gen. MacArthur, E.
Samar.
Ty was born on 09 Oct 1943 in Gen. MacArthur, E. Samar
(Gen. MacArthur) to a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. However, he went to the United States to work and
subsequently became naturalized as a US Citizen.
With the enactment of RA 9225 which granted dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed an application
for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship. On Oct. 2,
2005, Ty also executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines before the Vice-Consul in Los Angeles, CA.
When he returned to the Philippines, he applied for a
passport. On Oct. 26, 2005, he was issued a Philippine
passport indicating that he is a resident of Gen. MacArthur.
In 2006 and 2007, Ty secured community tax certificates
indicating said residence. On Jul 17, 2006, Ty was registered
as a voter in Gen. MacArthur. On Mar 19, 2007, he executed
a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
On Mar 28, 2007 filed his certificate of candidacy for the
mayoralty race in Gen. MacArthur. Having garnered the
highest vote during the May 14, 2007 elections, Ty was
proclaimed the winner.
On Jun 15, 2007, Japzon filed a Petition to disqualify/cancel
Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. He alleged that Ty was not a resident of
Gen. MacArthur for one (1) year immediately preceding the
elections. He alleged that while Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship, this did not automatically restored his residence.
In fact, Ty actually left for the US twice during the said
period. Due to this, Japzon prayed that he be declared the
winner in the elections, being the lone qualified candidate
for the position.
The COMELEC denied the Petition and the reconsideration
subsequently filed by Japzon. It found that Ty was able to
comply with the one (1) year residency requirement based
on the evidence of the acts performed by Ty.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Ty complied with the one (1) year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code.


HELD/RATIO:
YES. A natural-born born Filipino who reacquires Philippine
citizenship and who intends to run for public office must: (1) meet
the requirements under the Constitution and the law; and (2)
must also make a personal sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenshipsTy undoubtedly complied with the second
requirement when he executed a duly notarized Renunciation of
Philippine Citizenship. Ty also satisfied the first requirement,
which includes residency.

The reacquisition of Philippine citizenship does not
automatically restore the residence/domicile of the
person reacquiring the same. One must reestablish his
residence.Under US Law, residence in the US is
required to become naturalized as a US citizen. Thus,
when Ty became naturalized as a US citizen, it
necessarily meant that he already established his
residence in the US.

Under RA 9225 granting dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizen, no residency requirement was imposed.
In fact, residence was not at all touched upon in the
said statute. Thus, when Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship, he did not automatically restore his
residence in the Philippines. He must then reestablish
his residence in Gen. MacArthur in order to be qualified
to run as mayor therein.

Based on the facts, as found by the COMELEC, it is clear
that Ty was able to comply with the residency
requirement. Ty arrived in Gen. MacArthur on May 4,
2006. While he left for the US twice during the one (1)
year period, he actually resided in the place for nine (9)
of the twelve (12) months required. Moreover, his acts
of indicating said place as his residence in his passport,
placing himself under the local tax jurisdiction of the
place as evidenced by his community tax certificates,
and his registering as a voter of said place show his
intention to reestablish his residence in Gen.
MacArthur.

While Ty left twice for the US during the one (1) year
period, the fact that he returned to Gen. MacArthur
showed his animus manendi and animus revertendi.
The residency requirement does not require that the
candidate stay in the locality and never leave the place
for the full one (1) year period.

PENERA v. COMELEC G. R. No. 181613 September 11, 2009,
the conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or
partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of
Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on *h+olding
political caucuses, conference, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate.
The SC explained that Motorcade as provided
by Dictionary.com means
a procession or parade of automobiles or other motor vehicles.
There after proceeds to reason out that
the conduct thereof during election periods by the candidates
and their supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to
its widespread and pervasive practice. The obvious purpose of
the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and
the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting
public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the
recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the
voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are
undertaken for no other purpose than to promote the election of
a particular candidate or candidates.
The SC stated that PENERA could not deny that she did not take
part in the Motorcade as this was admitted in her position paper
and that of her witness.
Noting the number of vehicles, two (2) jeepneys and ten (10)
motorcycles, multi-colored balloons, and the route of the
motorcade (3 barangays), and the waving of the hand and
throwing of sweet candies to the street, the SC could not believe
that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned as alleged
by PENERA.
PENERA cited Barroso v. Hon. Ampig, Jr., 385 Phil. 237 (2000) in
her defense. In that case the SC, supposedly ruled that a
motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their COCs was
not a form of political campaigning.
However, did not sway the court because it based its decision on
Section 80 of the Election Code which provides for the
Prohibition of Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity
Outside Campaign Period, Section 68 which provides for
Disqualification of any candidate for violating Section 80, and
Section 79(b)which defines the term election as legal basis. The
on the meaning of Motorcade and the Positions Papers for its
facts.


Panlaqui v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188671; February 24, 2010
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voters
inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and
determine the presence of a false representation of a material
fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the
misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there
was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of ones
qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was not
qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not
translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him
ineligible.

HELMA P. GAMINDE, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC. FLORES and
EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, Respondent.
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines
appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on
June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. OnSept ember
07, 1993, the Commi ssi on on Appoi nt ment ,
Congr ess of t he Phi l i ppi nes conf i r med
t heappointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner
sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the
expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998.
Opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February
02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory
opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February
02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chai r man Cor azon Al ma G.
de t he Commi ssi on on Audi t r equest i ng opi ni on on
whet her or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her
co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on
Audit, issued an opinion that the term of Commissioner
Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated inher
appointment conformably with the constitutional
intent.Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor
Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101
(99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining
to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02,
1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to
the Commission on Audit Enbanc.
On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision
dismissing petitioners appeal.
The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the
disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of office
may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper
which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her
term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the
President.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however,
on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion.
ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty.
Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission,
to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on
February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
RULING: The t er m of of f i ce of Ms. Thel ma P. Gami nde
as Commi ssi oner , Ci vi l Ser vi ce Commi ssi on, under
an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V.
Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02,
1999.However, she served as de facto Officer in good faith until
February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and
other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently,
the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such
salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus
staff. ACCORDINGLY, The Court REVERSED the decisions of the
Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and
emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her
coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from
February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000.