Abelard's Own Theory

This is precisely the conclusion Abelard himself draws on p. 177: "it remains to ascribe
universality of this sort to words alone". Only they are predicated of many. This passage
marks a maor point of articulation in the discussion. Abelard has now committed himself
to nominalism. !e have yet to see how the details work out.
On pp. 177"17#$ Abelard gives some preliminary e%planations of the grammatical sense
in which words may be called particular &individual' or universal. Then$ on p. 17#$ he
raises some (uestions that will serve to lead into the core of Abelard)s own view. There
are two (uestions$ both having to do with the "signification" of those general or universal
words. &*c+eon$ whose translation appears in ,yman and !alsh$ translates )significatio)
as "meaning". !e)ll say some more about that in a moment.'
(1) -irst$ there seems to be nothing for a universal word to name$ "no subect thing"$ as
Abelard says. -or he has ust argued that there are no universal entities in the realists)
sense to be named by universal words. !e)ll see Abelard)s answer to this in a bit.
(2) .ut second$ there doesn)t seem to be anything for universal names to signify either.
,ere we need a little lesson in the medieval terminology of signification. Aristotle$ in De
interpretatione /$ 10b11"21$ says that verbs "signify" something ust as names do$
because he who uses a verb "establishes an understanding" " in .oethius) 3atin translation
the phrase is )constituere intellectum)$ usually construed with the genitive. ,ence$ in
general$ terms signify what they establish an understanding of$ or in more collo(uial
terminology$ they signify what they make us think of when we hear them. &4t follows
from this basic notion of signification$ which all medievals used$ that signification is a
species of the causal relation$ and is ust as transitive as causality is. 4f A signifies B and
B signifies C$ then A signifies C too. 5ome authors e%plicitly drew this conclusion. This$
incidentally$ is one reason why it is wrong to translate )significatio) as "meaning".
*eaning$ whatever it is$ is not transitive6 signification is.'
4n effect$ therefore$ the second of Abelard)s (uestions is "!hat does a universal term
make us think of when we hear it7" 8ertainly$ it doesn)t make us think of a universal
thing$ since he has ust argued that there are no such things. .ut it doesn)t seem to make
us think of any individual thing either. !hen 4 hear the word )man)$ 4 am not made to
think of 5ocrates any more than 4 am made to think of 9lato. And 4 cannot be made to
think of all men$ since 4 don)t know all men. There are lots of people on the other side of
the world &in fact$ there are lots of them on the other side of the street' that 4 have never
thought of in particular. 5urely$ when 4 hear the word )man)$ 4 am not made to think of
them " e%cept in some very general sense that seems impossible to e%plain$ since we have
no general entities on this theory.
4n short$ there are two problems: (1) :niversal terms don)t seem to have anything to
name$ and (2) they don)t seem to have anything to signify either.
,ence it looks as if universal terms cannot be sermones in Abelard)s sense " that is$
significant words or significant voces " since there is nothing for them to signify or name.
4t looks$ therefore$ as if Abelard)s nominalism is committed to saying that universal terms
are mere words without significance " mere flatus vocis$ in ;oscelin)s phrase " with all the
conse(uences that entails for our knowledge of the world. ,ow is Abelard going to avoid
this7 ,ow is he going to distinguish his view from ;oscelin)s7
!ell$ he does. ,e sketches his answer in the middle paragraph on p. 171 &before getting
down to details'. ".ut this is not so$" he says.
-irst of all$ what about naming7 The obection here was that there is nothing for a
universal term to name because there is no universal thing for it to name. Abelard)s
response is in effect$ "5o what7" !hy can)t the term name individual things7
Abelard)s reply here is a bit obscure$ but seems to run something like this. The obection
works only if we think of naming as a kind of signification$ and then argue that terms that
signify more than one thing are equivocal &p. 177'. On pain of e(uivocation$ therefore$
universal terms cannot name many things$ if naming is a kind of signification$ and since
they cannot name ust one universal thing &since there is no such thing'$ it follows that
they cannot name at all.
Abelard)s reply in effect severs the notion of naming from the notion of signification$ in
the sense of signification according to which a term is e(uivocal if it signifies several
things. Abelard is willing to allow that there is a sense in which naming is a kind of
signification. :niversal terms$ he says$ signify "in a manner" by nomination &<naming'.
.ut that is not the kind of signification that is involved in e(uivocation.
4t is not entirely clear to me why Abelard is willing to allow nomination or naming to be
a kind of signification at all " even "in a manner". Anselm had already done something
like this in his De grammatico$ but the whole idea there is a bit strained. 4n any case$ it is
clear that naming is not signification in the sense that seems to be presupposed by the
obection. 4 think$ therefore$ that Abelard has successfully handled the first obection. ,is
answer proceeds by making the notion of naming in effect the same as the notion of
predicating$ and by distinguishing it from signification in the sense in which multiple
signification would entail e(uivocation.
The second obection$ however$ is harder. !hat are we made to think of when we hear
the word )man)7 4n short$ what is the link"up between our universal terms$ our concepts$
and the e%ternal world7 ,ow are we going to save Abelard)s nominalism from the
epistemological skepticism that it threatens to yield7 This is the meat of Abelard)s theory.
!ell$ here is where considerations about e(uivocation do apply. 4f a universal term is
going to be universal$ it must establish in us a single understanding$ a single concept.
&):nderstanding) in these conte%ts does not mean the faculty of understanding$ but either
the act of understanding or else the o!ect of such an act.'
That concept has to be a general concept. .ut what is it a concept of7 =ot of a general or
universal thing$ since there aren)t any. =either does the universal term make us think of
individual things$ for the reasons the obection states and Abelard apparently accepts.
And yet that general concept must somehow be grounded in those individual things$ on
pain of severing our thought from the world and reducing the theory to ;oscelin)s.
There must therefore$ Abelard says &p. 171'$ be some common reason or cause why the
universal term is "imposed on" the several individuals it names &"imposition" is the
assigning of names to things'$ and so names the several individuals it does$ and which
links the name to the general concept we have when we hear the term. This "common
reason or cause" is going to be the linkage between our concepts and the world that saves
the obectivity of our knowledge.
!ell$ how does it work7 !e need to look at both sides of the (uestion: at this mysterious
"common reason or cause"$ and also at the "common concept" that it grounds.
!e have seen that Abelard critici>ed !illiam of 8hampeau%)s second view for saying
that$ while 5ocrates and 9lato had two distinct essences$ nevertheless they agreed "
"indifferently"$ to be sure " in man or in humanity. Abelard thought that this was ust a
verbal smoke screen. Abelard says instead that 5ocrates and 9lato agree$ or are alike in
eing a man$ or in eing man.
5o what7 !hat is the big difference here7 !ell$ there is a big difference. A man is a
thing " a )res). And there is no thing in which 5ocrates and 9lato agree$ no thing they can
share$ as Abelard has already argued.
=evertheless$ they must somehow agree$ there must be some community between them$
or else there would be no obective basis for our calling them both men$ and we would be
left with subectivity and skepticism " and ;oscelin)s doctrine. The common predication
of the word )man) of both of them must be tied to reality somehow.
!ell$ Abelard bites the bullet. 5ince 5ocrates and 9lato cannot "agree in" or share any
common thing$ and since they must nevertheless have some community$ it follows that
they must agree in or share some item that is not a thing " not a res.
They do not agree in man$ he says$ but they do agree in eing a man &hominem esse'$
otherwise translated as "to be a man". Being a man$ therefore$ is not a thing.
This does not mean that eing a man is nothing$ that it isn)t really out there. 4t is really
out there. 4t has to be$ since there is an important episte" mological ob for it to do. Only it
is not a thing " not a res.
4nstead$ it is what Abelard calls a "status" &fourth declension$ so that the plural is also
)status)'. 5ocrates and 9lato agree in the status of man " that is$ in eing a man$ or in to e
a man &pp. 171"1#?'. "!e appeal$" he says$ "to no essence" &p. 1#?' " that is$ to no thing.
Oh great$ you may say. !hat on earth is going on7 !hen it comes to the crunch$ Abelard
tries to fake his way out by appealing to some contrived and utterly mysterious kind of
"non"thing" he calls a status. That)s not a theory6 that)s a sign of desperation@ 4sn)t
Abelard in fact throwing the whole thing away7 4sn)t this mysterious status of man ust
the old realist universal man in disguise7 ,asn)t Abelard distinguished his own doctrine
from realism by nothing more than a verbal subterfuge7
This is a particularly pressing (uestion once we reali>e that Abelard needs the status for
basically epistemological reasons$ and epistemology has always provided the main
arguments for realism.
4n order to see what is going on$ we must remember the way Abelard$ following
Aristotle$ defined a universal in the first place. A universal for Abelard is that which is
predicated of many. And while Abelard seems perfectly willing to speak in some
passages in his writings of things being predicated of things$ he is not willing to allow
things to be predicated of many things$ since "it remains to ascribe universality of this
sort to words alone" &p. 177'.
The universal man of !illiam of 8hampeau%)s first theory was a universal because it was
supposed to be predicated of many. The status$ however$ which is ust as obective$ is not
a universal because it cannot be predicated of many. To see this$ we must look at the
3atin.
!hat is the status of man7 4t is$ he says$ eing a man. =ow )being) is ambiguous in
Anglish. 4t can be either (a) an adective &a participle$ in particular'$ meaning that which
is$ or else it can be () a noun &a gerund$ in particular' meaning what that which is does "
namely$ be. &8ompare the difference between )The living and the dead) and )5ummertime$
and the living is easy).' .oth of these senses come into play in the phrase )Avery being has
being).
4n 3atin$ these are (uite distinct verb"forms. !hat we have in the present case$ where we
are talking about eing a man$ is the gerund$ the nominal form. And in 3atin$ the
nominative of the gerund is the infinitive. 5o to make this perfectly clear$ we can say that
the status of man is to e a man &hominem esse'.
=ow the 3atin sentence ),oc est hominem esse) &in Anglish$ )This is to"be"a"man)' is
certainly odd$ and perhaps even ill"formed. &4n Anglish$ there is a reading of )this is to be
a man) that makes sense$ namely$ as amounting to )This is going to be a man)$ or )This
ought to be a man). .ut that is (uite different in 3atin$ and involves the gerundive$ not the
gerund.'
=ow 4 am not very concerned whether you understand all the grammatical fine"tuning
here. .ut the general point is important. Although Abelard doesn)t say so$ 4 suspect that
this grammatical business is the reason why the status of man " to e a man or hominem
esse " cannot be predicated of many. 4t cannot be predicated at all. 4t is simply of the
wrong form. 4t results in gibberish.
5yntactically$ this is a matter of grammar. *etaphysically$ it can be approached
somewhat differently.
The theory of the categories may be regarded as providing a list of the basic kinds of
predicates " whether we construe that linguistically or metaphysically. .ut the status of
man does not fit into any of the ten recogni>ed Aristotelian categories. ,ence$ it cannot
be predicated$ and so a fortiori cannot be predicated of many.
4t follows of course that the status not only cannot be predicated of many$ it cannot be
predicated of even one. ,ence the status is not only not a universal$ it is not an individual
either. 4 suspect this is what Abelard means when he says that the status is not a thing.
Abelard (uotes Aristotle &p. 172' as saying that some things are universal and others are
individual.
Abelard disagrees about universals$ of course$ but the point is that since the status cannot
be either an individual or a universal$ it follows on the authority of Aristotle that it cannot
be a thing at all.
Again$ in another passage$ later in the "ogica ingredientius &in his #losses on the
Categories'$ Abelard says that the categories signify the ten primary genera of things.
9resumably then$ since the status does not fit into a category$ it is not a thing. .ut it is
still out there.
To some e%tent$ this is speculation. Abelard simply is not very informative about these
non"things. .ut something like this must be going on$ or else 4 do not see how everything
Abelard says can be reconciled.
At this point$ let us recall the two kinds of realism we have in circulation:
(a) $redicational realism$ the view that there are real$ non"linguistic things that are
predicable of many.
() Boethian realism$ the view that there are real entities " whether you want to call them
"things" or not is up to you " that are common as a whole$ simultaneously$ and in a
metaphysically intimate manner$ to several things.
4t now looks as if Abelard is a nominalist in the Aristotelian sense$ but a realist in the
.oethian sense. ,is doctrine of the status fits .oethius) definition of a universal e%actly "
or else it will do not do its ob of grounding the obectivity of our knowledge. $lease note
this carefully.
4t is the logical doctrine of predication$ therefore$ that is at the heart of Abelard)s
nominalism. ,e is a nominalist only in the "predicational" sense.
=ow what about the second side of our problem$ the (uestion of the "common concept"7
!hat does a universal term$ after all$ signify or make us think of7 =ow you might well
ask$ "!hat about the status7" !ouldn)t that serve7 9erhaps it would. .ut Abelard doesn)t
take that route$ for reasons we shall see in a moment.
To ask the (uestion as precisely as possible: !hat is the thing of which a universal term
establishes an understanding or concept7 There must be only one$ under pain of
e(uivocation.
!ell$ since it cannot be any real thing$ as Abelard has already argued$ it is$ he says &p.
1#?'$ a "certain imaginary and fictive thing" " a "res ficta". That is$ it is purely an
intentional o!ect$ a thought o!ect. 4t is in no sense real " not even in the sense in which
the status is real even though it is not a "thing". The thought obect is a thing$ only it is a
fake thing " a metaphysically impossible thing$ if Abelard)s arguments against !illiam of
8hampeau%)s realism are correct.
3ater people will distinguish real eing &esse reale'$ which all of us enoy$ from
intentional eing &esse intentionale'$ which thought obects enoy. &)4ntentional) here in
the sense that thought intends or aims at$ "tends towards"$ its obect$ whether the obect is
real or not.' This is the germ of the doctrine of intentionality that will play such a big role
in modern phenomenology. 9eople always say that .rentano got this notion from the
5cholastics. !ell$ he didn)t get it from Abelard6 he got from later 5cholastics. .ut we can
already see the germ of it in Abelard.
There seems to be some obscurity in Abelard concerning the res ficta. On the one hand$
he seems to think that this res ficta is a product of the activity of the mind$ like dream
images$ and that it is this product we are made to think of when we hear a general or
universal term &p. 1#?'. On the other hand$ later in the "ogica ingredientius$ in his
#losses on the De interpretatione$ he seems to say that such images or figments are not
what we think of when we hear a general term$ but rather mental products that are the
means by which we think of what they are images of. !e do not think of the images$ we
think of things through the images.
The terminology$ at least$ and perhaps the content of the doctrine as well$ is fluid here.
9erhaps the best way to view it is this. The universal term estalishes in us an
understanding$ a concept$ thought of as a kind of mental picture. That concept or picture
is of a metaphysically impossible obect. 5ince terms signify that of which they establish
an understanding in us$ and not that understanding or concept itself$ it is the impossile
intentional o!ect that is signified by the universal term$ not the concept or image of that
obect.
Bust which of these " the impossible obect or the understanding or concept of that obect "
is to be called the res ficta$ 4 am not clear. .ut from the way Abelard introduces the term
on p. 1#?$ it seems to me that the res ficta is the intentional obect$ not the concept or
image$ and it is that res ficta that is signified by the term. .ut if 4 am wrong about this$
and the res ficta is to be identified with the concept or image$ it is easy to make the
terminological adustment. 4n that case$ the term will signify the intentional obect of the
res ficta or image.
This theory is part of an account of all terms$ not ust of universal ones. 9roper names as
well as universal terms produce or establish in us a concept or image of an intentional
obect$ which the term signifies. 4n the case of a proper name$ of course$ the intentional
obect is an individual and so may also be a really e%isting obect. -or universal terms$
however$ this cannot happen.
At the top of p. 1#1$ Abelard suggests an e%ception to this. A proper name " say$
)5ocrates) " need not produce in us a concept or image of 5ocrates$ he says$ provided that
5ocrates is present in person and 4 perceive him. -or in that case we do not need the
image in order to be made to think of 5ocrates6 the reality suffices. .ut where 5ocrates is
absent$ 4 do need his image in order to think of him. &=ote: 4s Abelard here reecting the
Augustinian theory of representative perception7' !here the term is a universal term$
however$ there can never be a universal thing really present to my perception$ since there
are no universal things out there at all. ,ence for universal terms we always need an
image or concept in order to think of what they signify.
.efore we get too far afield$ let me point out something. 4n the penultimate paragraph on
p. 1#?$ Abelard considers a view that denies that concepts or images are intentional
obects or products of the mind)s activity$ but instead identifies the concept or image with
the very act of thinking itself. Abelard doesn)t really argue against this view$ but he says
he disagrees with it. This is an interesting view$ because after toying with a "fictum"
theory very much like Abelard)s$ !illiam of Ockham in the fourteenth century will opt
for the act theory Abelard here reects$ the theory that concepts are identical with the
mental acts themselves$ not with the products of those acts$ and certainly not with their
obects.
5o far$ then$ we have a fictum theory for Abelard$ a theory that applies e(ually to general
concepts and to particular or individual ones. !hat is the difference between these two
kinds of concepts7 The distinction is drawn on p. 1#1. 9articular or individual concepts
are mental pictures or images that represent one thing to the e%clusion of others " for
instance$ the image of 5ocrates. Ceneral concepts are mental pictures or images that
represent several things at once. They are in that sense "confused" concepts. This does
not mean that there is anything wrong with them$ or that they are stupid. 4t means that
they "fuse together" a number of things. The concept "man"$ for instance$ is e(ually a
picture of every man. 4t is not any more a picture of 9lato than it is of 5ocrates$ or vice
versa. .ut it is more a picture of those men than it is of anything that is not a man.
!ell$ this is troublesome$ of course. At the bottom of p. 1#1$ Abelard gives us an
analogy. ,e says that we can paint a picture of a particular lion " "limping or mutilated or
wounded by the spear of ,ercules"$ as he oddly puts it. .ut we can also$ he goes on$ paint
a picture of no lion in particular$ but of a lion in general. This of course suggests that
Abelard is leaving himself wide open to all the obections .erkeley would later raise
against the notion of abstract general ideas " obections based precisely on the
identification of concepts or ideas with mental images.
.ut let us not push this point. 3et us suppose that Abelard can answer such obections "
perhaps by pointing to the image of a "speckled hen". 4f you know the literature on
.erkeley$ you will catch the allusion. &=evertheless$ whether Abelard can answer such
obections or not$ the analogy with painting still seems to be a bad analogy.'
4f we do not push the obection$ then we can summari>e Abelard this way:
(1) 4n the absence of individuals to the senses$ a proper name$ for instance )5ocrates)$
brings to mind the image or picture of 5ocrates$ and signifies the individual 5ocrates. 4t
does this whether 5ocrates e%ists or not.
(2) A universal term$ for instance )man)$ brings to mind a general picture or concept of no
one man in particular$ but of a man in general$ and signifies the metaphysically
impossible man in general that 4 think of through that concept or image.
Thus$ terms as a whole signify a realist world$ a world with universal things in it " only
that realist world is a world of intentional obects$ not of realities. &ealism is the correct
theory for the world we picture$ the world we think of. 4t is$ unfortunately$ not the correct
theory for the world that e%ists.
The doctrine of metaphysical realism makes the mistake of thinking that the world that is
signified is the real world. Abelard thinks it is not. ,is distinction between naming and
signifying properly speaking makes this outcome possible.
.oethius$ in his Commentary on $orphyry &8hapter DsE above'$ said that we can separate
in the mind things that cannot be separated in reality. !e can form abstract$ general
concepts although there is no such thing as a general or universal entity. Abelard is in
effect ust accepting this theory$ and spelling it out in more detail. :nfortunately$ he
complicates matters by identifying concepts with images.
Fou may well think this outcome is a rather ironic one for a doctrine that is trying to
preserve the obectivity of our knowledge. After all$ the upshot of the whole thing is that
the world we think about$ and so the only world we could even have a chance of
knowing$ is not the world that e%ists$ but rather a metaphysically impossible world
populated with universals. !hat kind of obectivity does a doctrine like that preserve7
This brings us back to a (uestion we put off a while ago: !hy cannot the status serve as
the significate of a universal term7 !hy cannot the term )man) make us think of the status
of man7 4t seems to be ust the kind of significate we want. 4t is common to many$ even
though it is not predicable of many. And it would clearly ground the obectivity of our
knowledge if it were the significate of the universal term. 4n that case$ the universal term
could make us think of something real$ even if not strictly a thing$ and not of some
impossible universal thing predicable of many. The world that is signified$ the world we
think of or conceive$ would then be ust the real world after all$ and knowledge would be
saved.
The reason Abelard does not adopt this attractive approach is that he thinks we cannot
form an image of a status.
.efore 4 give you my reasons for this$ 4 should mention one study that disagrees with me.
4t is *artin *. Tweedale$ Aailard on 'niversals$ &Amsterdam: =orth",olland$ 1170'.
On p. 2?# of that book$ Tweedale takes Abelard to hold that universal terms do signify
the status. 4 find no te%t to support this claim$ and indeed 4 think the whole business about
painting pictures of general lions goes against it. .ut there is one passage in particular
where 4 think Abelard clearly reects this possibility. On p. 1#2$ Abelard asks whether a
universal term signifies the form to which the understanding is directed. ,e is talking
here about the intentional obect and not the image. And he goes on to say that this view
is confirmed both by authority and by reason. &=ote the interesting pairing here.' The )by
reason) seems to clinch it. The "authority" he cites is 9riscian$ the famous 3atin
grammarian &c. G??'. 9riscian$ in a rather obscure passage given by Abelard$ seems to
suggest$ Abelard says$ that the divine ideas " that is$ Cod)s concepts " are concepts of the
status of things.
4t is easy to see why they would have to be$ since the metaphysical structure of creatures
is supposed to be patterned after the divine ideas. That suggests that the ideas are ideas of
the status$ which do enter into the metaphysical structure of things$ rather than of
metaphysically impossible universals$ which do not.
Bust how we get from this to the conclusion that universal terms signify the thought
obect is not clear. .ut in any case$ Abelard seems to accept that conclusion6 it is
confirmed. he says$ "by reason". !hat he does not accept " and here 4 think Tweedale
misinterprets the passage " is the suggestion that the intentional obect is the status.
That)s fine for Cod$ he says$ but not for us. (e cannot form an image or concept of the
status. !e have no way to picture accurately what it is to e a man. That is because the
status cannot be sensed6 it is not a sensible (uality. !e have no perceptual access to it$
and therefore do not know how to picture it$ we "men$" he says on p. 1#2$ "who learn
things only through the senses." =otice how Abelard is here beginning the Aristotelian
break with the 9latonicHAugustinian tradition. That tradition would never have said
anything like that. The remark is all the more surprising here$ since Abelard didn)t have
all that much more of the Aristotelian te%ts at disposal than did the earlier medievals. &,e
did have a bit more of the Aristotelian logical works$ which were ust beginning to be
translated in Abelard)s day. 4n one passage$ he confides breathlessly that he has actually
seen a 3atin copy of Aristotle)s )ophistical &efutations.'
The only things we know about men are their sensible (ualities$ so that the picture we
make to ourselves when we hear the term )man) must be constructed out of those
ingredients.
Cod)s knowledge$ however$ is not confined to what can be sensed$ so that Cod can
picture the status of things. The connection between thought and reality is much closer
for Cod)s thought than it can ever be for our own.
Iery well$ but what does all this mean for the connection between our thought and reality
in the final analysis7
!ell$ the status provides an obective non"arbitrary basis for the imposition of terms. The
term )man) is "imposed" to name all men because they are men$ because they agree in
being men. They share a common status.
The term cannot signify that status$ however$ because we cannot picture it. .ut we do the
best we can$ and form a kind of monstrous image of no one man in particular$ but of an
impossible man in general. This image is serviceable6 it might$ for instance$ guide us in
predicating the word )man) correctly$ since it is after all e(ually a representation of every
man and of nothing (uite so much as a man. 4t can serve that function. .ut it is too
indefinite and indeterminate to be an e%act image of any possible reality. And there is
where the realists make their mistake.
.efore we turn to an evaluation of this view$ let us look briefly at the end of Abelard)s
discussion. On pp. 1#/"1#0 there is a further discussion of abstraction$ taken from
.oethius) Commentary on $orphyry. Then he turns to answer the four (uestions he raised
at the beginning of the passage.
(1) !ith respect to 9orphyry)s first (uestion$ whether genera and species subsist$ Abelard
glosses this as: Jo the words " general and specific words " signify something real$ or are
they purely mental$ that is$ do they not signify something real7 Aelard*s answer+ .oth.
They signify y nomination " that is$ they name or are truly predicable of " real things.
.ut those real things are individual things$ not universal ones. On the other hand$ in the
other sense of )signify)$ the strict sense &what the terms make us think of'$ they signify
nothing real$ but only a fictive intentional obect. That fiction nevertheless is not e%actly
empty$ for the reason e%plained in his discussion of abstraction.
(2) As for 9orphyry)s second (uestion$ are genera and species corporeal or incorporeal$
Abelard glosses this as: Jo they signify corporeal or incorporeal things7 And again
Abelard)s answer is: .oth. And once again$ he trades on the two senses of signification.
.y nomination$ they signify corporeal things6 in the strict sense they do not$ but only
signify fictions.
(,) !ith respect to 9orphyry)s third (uestion$ are genera and species in sensible things or
separated from them$ Abelard glosses this as: Jo genera and species words signify things
in sensible things or do they signify things not in sensibles7 And once again$ as you no
doubt have come to e%pect by now$ his answer is: .oth. .y nomination$ they signify or
name things in sensibles. -or instance$ )humanity) signifies &names' the humanities in
5ocrates and 9lato. .ut more strictly$ they signify the common intentional obects$ those
impossible things that are not in a sensible obect but are only fictions.
(-) -inally$ what about Abelard)s own$ fourth (uestion: 8an universals continue to e%ist
without any singulars7 Again$ he parses this: 8an universal terms continue to signify as
they do if there are no singulars that fall under the universal$ no individuals for such
terms to be predicated of7 Again$ his answer is: Fes and =o. &This is not a man who
wrote the )ic et .on for nothing@' They obviously cannot signify then by nomination$ but
ust as obviously they can continue to signify in the strict sense6 they can signify the
common intentional obect.
The distinction between nomination and signification in the strict sense is therefore the
main vehicle for Abelard)s answering the four (uestions that frame his discussion. .ut
don)t be fooled. There)s a lot more than that going on in this passage.
=ow$ let us pause to evaluate this theory. 4t is subtle and deep$ no doubt$ but 4 think it ust
will not work. !hat$ after all$ leads us to form e%actly the image we do when we hear the
word )man) " an image of an impossible man in general$ but an image that is nevertheless
e(ually if not e%actly a representation of ust e%actly those individuals who share in the
status of man7
!hat a coincidence@ 4sn)t it odd that the fit should be so e%act7 4t seems that this must be
an e%traordinary coincidence unless we are led to do this by somehow getting in touch
with the status. The status must guide us. .ut how can that be7 On Abelard)s own
account$ we cannot sense the status and so cannot form any concept or picture of it.
4t looks as though we can have no inkling at all of the status of things. And if that is so$
then while the status may very well be out there$ it can be of no epistemological use to us
whatever " and the whole proect breaks down.