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Guilford Press
Lukcs' Later Ontology
Author(s): Paul Browne
Source: Science & Society, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Summer, 1990), pp. 193-218
Published by: Guilford Press
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Science &
Society,
Vol.
54,
No.
2,
Summer
1990, 193-218

0

Lukcs' Later
Ontology
PAUL BROWNE
I
THE EARLY 1930S
ONWARDS,
Georg
Lukcs
gradually began working
out a new dialectical
ontology,
at
the heart of which was the
concept
of labor
(Lukcs, 1967,
1983).
l
Unable for
political
reasons before 1956 to
develop
this
historical materialist
ontology
in a
fully explicit
and
systematic
fashion,
Lukcs
only
undertook the task in the 1960s in The
Specificity of
the Aesthetic and the
Ontology of
Social
Being.
The idea
of Marxism as a
self-mediating,
self-critical vision of the
world,
rooted in a dialectical
ontology
of social
being, represented
the
instrument and
program
of Lukcs' endeavors in later life.
Lukcs'
early writings
have
justifiably
received enormous
attention from scholars in recent
years,
to the extent that his
"road to Marx" has become a well-worn
path.
In
contrast,
his final
philosophical
work,
the
1700-page Ontology of
Social
Being,
re-
mains almost
completely
unknown.
Although
written in the
1960s,
the
original
German edition was not
published
in full until
1986. However the full edition has been available for a number of
years
in
translation,
and three
key chapters
have been available in
English
for some ten
years.2 Despite
this,
what had been intended
1 I would like to thank Michelle
Weinroth,
Chris
Arthur,
Douglas Moggach
and Bill
Livant for their
help
and
encouragement
in
my
work on dialectical
ontology.
2 The
original
German edition of the
Ontology
was not
published
in full until the
mid-1980s
(Lukcs, 1984; 1986). However,
Chapters
3,
4 and 5 of the book were
published
as
separate
volumes
by
Luchterhand in the
early
1970s:
Hegels falsche
und
echte
Ontologie
(1971),
Die
ontologischen Grundprinzipien
von Marx
(1972),
Die Arbeit
(1973).
These three
chapters
were
subsequently published by
Merlin Press of London in an
English
translation
by
David Fernbach
(Lukcs, 1978a, 1978b, 1980).
These are the
only parts
of the
Ontology
to have
appeared
in
English
so far. The
complete
edition of
the
Ontology
has been translated into other
languages,
such as Italian and
Hungarian:
Per
l'ontologia
dell'essere sociale,
Roma: Editori
Riuniti, I, 1976, II, 1977;
A trsadalmi Ut
ontolgijrl,
I: T'rtneti
fejezetek,
II: Szistematikus
fejezetek,
III:
Prolegomena, Budapest:
Magvet,
1976.
193
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194 SCIENCE f SOCIETY
as Lukcs' final
synthesis
of historical materialism remains virtual-
ly
unread and
unnoticed,
nearly
20
years
after his death.3 The
aim of this article is to initiate discussion of the
book,
by outlining
its
purpose,
its central
category
of
labor,
and some of its theoreti-
cal and
political implications.
Like Karel Kosik's
contemporary
book,
The Dialectics
of
the
Concrete,
the
Ontology
is above all a reflection on the
conditions,
structure and differentiation of human
activity,
and on the rela-
tion between value and
history.
Its essential concern is the
possibility
of human
emancipation
after the
discrediting
of the
dogmatic
Marxisms of the Second
International,
the Comintern
and the Cominform
years.
Lukcs' commitment is to a radical
democratization of social
life,
to a vision of a
society
free of
exploitation
or domination.
The current historical
epoch
is marked
by
the
complementary
trends of
ecological
disaster and reification of social relations and
processes
(characterized by
the coexistence of narrow fields of
scientific rationalization and the
backdrop
of an
everyday
life
dominated
by superstition
-
e.g.,
the
magical
belief in the om-
nipotence
of
technology).
In this context the
defetishizing,
enlightening
mission of Lukcs'
Ontology
becomes clear. Three
points
in
particular
deserve mention here:
(i)
in a so-called
post-industrial age
in which
language
and
information have
supposedly supplanted
labor and
production,
the
Ontology
establishes,
by categorial analysis,
the
ontological
primacy
of labor within social
being;
(ii)
in a time of
unprecedented ecological
deterioration,
the
Ontology places
nature
firmly
on the
agenda
of historical materi-
alism;
(iii)
in a
period suffering
from the
hangover
induced
by
the
3 The
Ontology
has been
virtually,
but not
totally ignored.
A number of
publications
dealing
with it in one
way
or another are available in
English (Boella, 1985; Browne,
1987; Heller, 1983; HFMV, 1983;
Jos,
1983; Prev, 1988;
Varga, 1985). However,
none of these texts
attempts
to
provide
the reader with a
synoptic
view of dialectical
ontology
as a
project.
With the
exception
of
Preve,
all these commentators tend to
approach
Lukcs' work with a
very specific polemical
or
conceptual
issue in mind and
fail to address his
thought
in its own terms. For
attempts
to do
this,
one must turn to
secondary
literature in other
languages
(see Franco, 1986; Preve, 1986; Tertulian,
1980, 1984).
But it is
surely indispensable
to establish what Lukcs was
attempting
to do
before
condemning
the
Ontology's alleged political implications
as some have done
(Boella, 1985; HFMV, 1983).
The
primary
aim of this article is to draw attention to a
very
rich,
worthwhile and
unfairly neglected
work
by
one of the
greatest
of Marxist
philosophers.
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 195
orgiastic
celebration of the "death of the
subject,"
the
Ontology
soberly
clarifies the
constitution,
attributes and limits of
subjectiv-
ity, teleology
and freedom.
One can sum
up
the
guiding spirit
of the
Ontology
in Lukcs'
slogan:
return to Marx!
(Heller, 1983, 189).
In a sense the book is
no more than a
commentary
on several
key passages
in Marx's
writings:
the
critique
of
Hegel
in the 1844
Manuscripts;
the
chap-
ter on the labor
process
in
Capital,
Volume
I;
the 1857 "Introduc-
tion to the
Critique
of Political
Economy";
etc. But the
Ontology
also offers
something
new and
quite
different. Lukcs' return to
Marx
is,
in true dialectical
fashion,
a move forward into a new
stage
in the
development
of historical materialism. Lukcs draws
out the
implications
of Marx's statements in the
light
of Nicolai
Hartmann's
insight
into the need for an
ontological
elucidation of
the
complexity
of
reality.
This enables Lukcs to make
great
strides in
clarifying
the
categorial
structure of
being.
The crucial
idea is that
being
is
complex,
historical and
highly
differentiated:
inorganic, organic
and social
being
all have different
categorial
structures. Social
being
itself is a
complex of complexes,
which
emerges historically
from
organic being, just
as the latter
emerged
historically
from
inorganic being.
Social
being
is a
totality
(but
never an
identity)
made
up
of
differently
constituted,
highly
differentiated,
historically emergent
and
changing spheres
of hu-
man
activity.
The basic units of social
being
are themselves com-
plex:
individual humans as
biological
entities are
subject
to laws of
inorganic
and
organic
as well as social
being;
and the basic struc-
ture of social
practice
also
displays
a
complex
dialectic of
catego-
ries which never achieve a final
identity.
The term
"ontology"
is an awkward
one,
given
its
metaphysi-
cal antecedents which aim at
elucidating
fundamental,
universal
categories
of
Being beyond history,
and thus
beyond
the basic
qualitative
difference between nature and
society
(for
a
critique
of
attempts
to construe Marxism as an
ontology
understood in that
sense,
see
Schmidt, 1971,
and
Moggach,
1981).
Lukcs uses ontol-
ogy
in a rather different
sense,
as
implying
a
particular
attitude
towards
reality, consisting
of the
discovery
of "the forms of
being
that new movements of the
complex produce"
(Pinkus, 1975, 21).
As
such,
ontology
is concerned with the
actually existing
con-
ditions of concrete
reality,
rather than the
possibilities
and
princi-
ples
of
cognition
of
reality,
and seeks to transcend this level of
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196 SCIENCE f SOCIETY
immediate concreteness
by elucidating
the various different
forms of
being
which
converge
in it.
Ontology implies
a historical
understanding
of its
object,
a reconstruction of
complexes
in their
real
development,
rather than some
logical
deduction of
catego-
ries. At the same time it never
forgets
the irreducible
complexity
of
being: ontology
can never uncover some individual element
from which all others are derived
historically.
Lukcs is thus far
removed here from the
metaphysics
of the
Subject,
the
Origins
and the End which haunts the
imaginations
of
post-structuralists.
For Lukcs
complexity
is the foundation of
historicity,
and
totality
as a
complex
is itself made
up
of
complexes
(Lukcs,
1978b, 27).
Within
society,
the individual
represents
an irreducible
complex
of different forms of
being (inorganic, organic,
social)
and
society
itself is
always
a
complex
of
heterogeneous
relations in which
humans
engage, through
collective
reproductive
and transforma-
tive
activity,
in a constant metabolism with nature
(organic
and
inorganic being),
both human and non-human.
Ontology
does not
just grasp reality
as dialectical but is
itself
dialectical in its structure and
development.
In the final
analysis,
all human
activity
tends to
proceed "ontologically,"
in that it must
first address the
"really
existent,"
master it
(moment
of
analysis)
and transcend it
(moment
of
synthesis).
In
stressing
that
every
ontological inquiry
must start from the
really
existent,
Lukcs has in
mind what Karel Kosik calls the
pseudo-concrete
(Kosik, 1978),
the
phenomenal
forms of social life as
they present
themselves to
analysis
in a
given
concrete situation.
Beginning
with the most
elementary
forms of social
activity
as
they appear
in the
everyday
life of
individuals,
ontological analysis
of immediate
reality
discov-
ers more and more
complex
mediations until it arrives at the most
fundamental structural features of its
object;
but it also involves
the historical
investigation
of the
emergence
and
becoming
of
categories
of social
being
(Lukcs, 1978b, 12).4
This
investigation
is followed
by
the reconstruction of the
concrete,
the return to the
initial
starting point
but now seen in the
light
of this
odyssey
of the
mind.
Reality
now
appears
as the "rich
totality
of
many
de-
terminations and relations"
(Marx, 1973, 100).
Marxist
ontology
4 For an
analysis
of how Lukcs
puts
this method into
practice
in The
Specificity of
the
Aesthetic,
see
Rusch, 1986,
and
Tertulian, 1980;
for similar comments on
method,
see
Hartmann, 1953, 29.
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 197
in Lukcs' sense
generalizes
the method of Marx's
critique
of
political economy.
This is no doubt
why
the
eight chapters
of the
Ontology
are divided into a
survey
of different
approaches
to the
problem
of
ontology
(reminiscent
of Marx's Theories
of Surplus
Value)
and a
logical
reconstruction of the main
categories, moving
from the abstract to the concrete
(and
reminiscent as such of
Capital).
Of course this
parallelism
should be
interpreted
with caution.
Lukcs no doubt intended his
critique
of the
major
currents of
20th-century philosophy
-
how these had enshrined reification
in refined
systems
-
to be reminiscent of Marx's
critique
of the
theoretical codification of the
phenomenal
forms of
capitalist
society
in the
pseudo-concrete categories
of
political economy.
Marx
sought
in
Capital
to uncover the laws of motion of the
capitalist
mode of
production;
the
Ontology appears
to seek the
basic structures of social
being
itself.
However,
it is worth
noting
that the
systematic part
of the
Ontology
is entitled "The Most
Important
Problems." It does not claim to
expound
in an ex-
haustive
way
the
categories
of social
being.
Rather,
its
aim,
and
that of the book as a
whole,
is to intervene
polemically
and
politically
in the context of Eastern
European politics
in the era of
dtente,
in order to "bend the stick" forward towards a
genuine
"return to Marx"
-
a return which could not
help
but
present
a
completely
new
understanding
of
Marx,
if it was to be a
genuine
dialectical
appropriation
of his
legacy. Although
the structure of
the book is reminiscent of
Marx,
it should be taken more as a
symbol
of the
spirit
which animates it than as evidence of an exact
correspondence
between it and Marx's
magnum opus.
Lukcs in-
tended
ontology
(as
a
method),
not
Ontology
(as
a
book)
to be
synonymous
with Marx's
Critique.
In this
sense,
Marx and Lukcs
share the
objective
of
dialectically discovering
the essence
by
an-
alyzing
the
unfolding
of the
phenomena,
and in this
way
of
reconstructing
in
thought
the structures of
reality.
Both Lukcs
and Marx follow
Hegel
in
rejecting
Kant's contention that
things-
in-themselves are unknowable.
They
believe instead that
cogni-
tion of the
thing-in-itself
can be
achieved,
by showing
that
reality
as it is in itself is the
totality
which is
brought
to
light
when
phenomena
are
grasped
in the essential
unity
of their dialectical
unfolding.
One
might
well ask here whether the reconstruction of the
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198 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
concrete is to be achieved
by
the self-movement of the
concept
itself
(as
in
Hegel's Logic),
or whether instead it consists of
"adding
in"
empirical
facts earlier abstracted. Lukcs' and Marx's
project
is
to reconstruct the structure of the concrete
by seizing
the essence
within the succession of
phenomena.
This is not in their view a
self-movement of the
concept,
but the a
posteriori systematic
con-
ceptualization
of an
already existing reality.
The
exposition
of this
systematic theory presents categories
in a
logical
rather than chro-
nological
order. The order of
categories
in
Capital
does not mir-
ror their historical order of
emergence
(Browne,
1980, 254-270).
In the initial
stages
of the
exposition only
those
categories
are
examined which in their abstract
generality
are
directly pertinent
to the
presentation
of the most crucial
aspects
of the
problem;
further
stages
of the
exposition
can then
progressively integrate
into this
introductory
outline ever more concrete determinations
and
specifications
of the actual state of affairs in its full
complex-
ity.
As Lukcs
puts
it:
Since a real isolation of individual
processes by
means of actual
experiments
is
ontologically
excluded in the area of social
being,
there can
only
be
thought
experiments
of an abstractive
character,
which are
employed
to
investigate
theoretically
how
specific
economic
relations, connections, forces,
etc. work
themselves
out,
when all the circumstances that
block,
inhibit and
modify
their
validity
in its
pure
form are excluded.
(Lukcs, 1978b, 33;
Lukcs' comments are
based on Marx's "1857 Introduction to the
Critique
of Political
Economy"
and
on the
preface
to the first German edition of
Capital,
Volume
I.)
There is no
question
here of some
speculative self-development
of the
Concept, "concentrating
itself,
probing
its own
depths,
and
unfolding
itself out of
itself,
by
itself; rather,
"the method of
rising
from the abstract to the concrete is
only
the
way
in which
thought appropriates
the
concrete,
reproduces
it as the concrete
in the mind"
(Marx, 1973, 101).
The orientation towards the
"really
existent,"
and therefore
the insistence on the "concrete
analysis
of the concrete
situation,"
is the fundamental
principle
Lukcs seeks to stress in the
Ontology.
In
expounding
this
methodological
stance,
Lukcs
engages
in a
continuous
polemic against
all
philosophies
which conflate ontol-
ogy
with
logic
and
epistemology,
or which subordinate the former
to the latter. Lukcs
goes
so far in this that he seems at times to
advocate the
complete rejection
and abandonment of
epistemol-
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 199
ogy
as such. Of course this is
polemical
over-statement. As will
become clear in the course of this
exposition,
Lukcs' later
philosophy
could not
possibly dispense
with
epistemology.
However Lukcs sees Marxist
ontology
and the
thought
of its
precursors
from the Renaissance onwards as linked to the rise of
science and thus the
struggle
to
emancipate humanity
from
religious mystification
and
manipulation.
Where the
young
Lukcs shared Max Weber's
tragic
vision of
modernity
as dis-
enchantment and rationalization of the
world,
the later Lukcs
adopts
a more
optimistic
and
positive
assessment
(Franco, 1986,
132-133),
often even
quoting
Marx's comments on the
pro-
gressive
character of
capitalist development
in world
history
(Lukcs, 1984, 595).
In
observing
that
philosophy
has been
dominated for the last few centuries
by epistemology
and
logic,
Lukcs claims that the social mission of
epistemology
from Car-
dinal Bellarmini to Kant and to the
present
was to establish the
scientific
hegemony
of natural science while at the same time
preserving
a
space
for
religious
or
quasi-religious
(irrationalist)
ontologies.
Thus Kantian
philosophy recognizes
the
validity
of
scientific
thought
in the
phenomenal
world,
but
simultaneously
places
the world-in-itself
beyond
the reach of
understanding,
thereby making
it a
possible object
of fideism.
Max Weber's
position
can be seen as
typical
of the
develop-
ment of this
problematic.
While
giving expression
to the
disrepute
into which
religious ontology
had fallen
by
his
time,
he neverthe-
less held to a vision of
reality
as
essentially
irrational. His
theory
is
consequently
founded on a relativist
epistemology
which denies
the
possibility
of
objective knowledge grasping
the essence and
fundamental structures of social
reality.
But when Lukcs uses the
Weberian term
"thought experiment"
to describe the
ontological
method of
abstraction,
he is
poles apart
from Weber
(Lukcs,
1984, 7-8, 325ff.;
on Weber's notion of the
"thought experiment"
see
Weber, 1968).
Lukcs does not believe in the
possibility
of
science ever
exhaustively explaining
all of
reality
once and for
all;
at most it can tend towards that
goal, achieving
ever closer
ap-
proximations
of the
real,
because of the infinite richness and
intrinsic
historicity
of the concrete. For this
reason,
Lukcs talks
of
"thought experiments."
But whereas Weber concludes from
the
infinity
of the
particular
that one cannot avoid
nominalism,
Lukcs like Marx holds to the realist
position
that
theory
can
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200 SCIENCE tf SOCIETY
represent
the essential laws of motion of social
existence,
and that
the fundamental
categories
of social
thought
are
categories
of
being.
For Lukcs the decisive
categories
which allowed the
develop-
ment of the materialist dialectic stem from
Hegel,
notwithstand-
ing
the
great
differences between the latter and Marx. One can-
not overestimate the
importance
for dialectical
ontology
of
Hegel's
notion of
totality
as the
"identity
of
identity
and non-
identity,"
which first
begins
to
bring
out the full
meaning
of the
"unity
of
opposites."
For the
point
of such a
unity
is
precisely
that
the
opposites
are one and
yet
several,
the same and
yet
differ-
ent
-
a difference which is irreducible. The
unity
of
opposites
is
a
reflection
determination
(Lukcs, 1984, 527ff).
Lukcs follows
Hegel
in
grasping
reflection determinations not
just
as constella-
tions of autonomous and
independently existing objects facing
each other in
complete opposition
and mutual
exclusion,
but as
categories
whose
opposed
and exclusive character is simul-
taneously
a
necessary unity
of mutual determination and defini-
tion.
The reflection determinations mark
Hegel's supersession
of
mechanical
materialism,
subjective
idealism and romanticism.
Hegel's conceptualization
of
distinction-within-unity
allowed him
to avoid the
Enlightenment's
conflation of natural and social
ontologies
and to
grasp history
as
something qualitatively
new in
relation to nature. Moreover
Hegel
conceived of distinction-
within-unity
as a
process,
as the
systematic development
of
categories through
their differentiation and
supersession.
In
op-
position
to
subjective
idealism,
he saw the dialectic not
merely
as
the work of
theory,
but as the actual evolution of
reality
itself,
and the
categories
as the actual
components
of
objective reality.
Other thinkers had
developed
views of
reality
as
dialectical;
but
Lukcs sees
Hegel
as the first since Heraclitus to make contradic-
tion the fundamental
ontological principle
and the first to
grasp
reality
in its immanence. This
clearly distinguishes Hegel
from
philosophers
of transcendence such as Nicholas Cusanus or
Schelling,
who
explained
the world not in terms of a
principle
immanent to itself
(which Hegel's
Absolute
Spirit
is in Lukcs's
view),
but in terms of an ultimate transcendent
Being
or
Principle,
and who thus remained
trapped
in
religious
(or
crypto-religious)
ontology.
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 201
According
to
Lukcs,
Hegel's
dialectic
provides
the basis for
overcoming
all
one-sided,
dualist and reductionist forms of
thought.
However,
despite
all of these
advances,
it fails to
satisfy
Lukcs
completely.
He sees the central
problem
of
Hegel's
philosophy
as the reconciliation of a view of the historical
present
as the realization of reason on the one
hand,
and of a
recognition
of the
contradictory
character of
reality
on the other. Now it is
possible
to discern a
rationality
in
history
and even attribute to the
latter an
autonomy
in relation to each of the individual lives and
actions it contains. An individual existence cannot direct
history
or
consciously
alter its fundamental tendencies. Rather it finds its
own conditions of realization and the limits of its
possibilities
in it.
Nevertheless historical
rationality
is itself the
product
of the activ-
ity
of human individuals
(Lukcs, 1984, 486).
Hegel
tends, however,
to
grasp history
not as the rational
process
of
development
of
humanity
in relation to
nature,
but
as the natural and human
process
of
development
of Reason.
This idealist inversion of
subject
and
predicate implies
a teleo-
logical
view of
history
as a
logical progression
in which individual
logical categories
are identical to real
ones,
and their combina-
tion and
succession,
as well as hierarchical
order,
are identical
to the
ontological genesis
and structure of
reality.
As Marx
put
it,
speaking
of
Hegel's political philosophy:
"The concern of
phi-
losophy
is not the
logic
of the
subject-matter
but the
subject-
matter of
logic. Logic
does not
provide
a
proof
of the state but
the state
provides
a
proof
of
logic" (quoted by
Lukcs, 1978a,
20).
Hegel grasps
the
relationship
between
logical
and
ontological
questions
as one of
simple identity.
However the necessities of this
logical system
cause
Hegel repeatedly
to do violence to
reality
in
his
presentation
of
it,
contrary
to his own dialectical method
which aimed at
revealing
the inner laws of motion of the
phe-
nomena themselves. For
Lukcs,
one can
say
that
Hegel's philoso-
phy
contains two
ontologies:
a
genuine ontology,
which
grasps
categories
as
"dynamic components
of
reality,"
and
reality
as
"universal
historicity moving
in
contradictions";
and a false ontol-
ogy,
in which
genuine ontological relationships
are distorted
through
their insertion in the
straightjacket
of a
preconceived,
rigid logical hierarchy.
The reflection determinations
represent
the core of
Hegel's genuine ontology,
while the identical
subject-
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202 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
object,
and the conflation of
objectification
and
alienation,
are the
vehicles of his
false ontology
(Lukcs, 1984, 489ff.; Lukcs, 1975,
537-567).
In
making
this distinction between
logic
and
ontology,
Lukcs
is able to
bring together
the criticism of the three main faults
Marx discovered in
Hegel:
the inversion
of subject
and
predicate,
speculative
construction,
and the
conflation of
the
philosophical develop-
ment
of categories
with their realization in
reality.
The first denotes
Hegel's
attribution of
ontological primacy
to consciousness over
being,
the second the construction of a
system
of
categories
on
this basis and the third the identification of the
logically
ordered
development
of
categories
in
philosophical presentation
with
their real
genesis
and historical
development.
Lukcs thus re-
capitulates
the Marxist
critique
of
Hegel's
idealism,
but
gives
it a
new,
more
comprehensive,
formulation. At the same
time,
while
Lukcs
appears
to
accept Engels'
criticism of a contradiction be-
tween
system
and method in
Hegel,
his
analysis clearly
indicates
the limits of this
approach.
For the latter is
primarily
concerned
with the closure of
Hegel's system,
with the
problem
of the "end of
history."
Lukcs'
analysis
shows that the
"system/method"
con-
tradiction does not
just appear
in the culmination of
Hegel's
system,
but affects it
throughout,
and is better described as a
contradiction between a false and
genuine ontology.
The
problem
here lies not so much in the
systematic
as in the hierarchical nature
of the
categorical presentation. Hegel
fits
everything
into the
system
in such a
way
that the
"later,
higher placed category
[is]
the
'truth' of the
earlier,
lower
one,
so that the
logical relationship
between those two
categories
constitutes the essential connection
of real
objective complexes"
(Lukcs, 1978a, 51).
Thus animal
nature becomes the truth of
vegetable
nature,
and the earth the
truth of the solar
system.
Blatant
discrepancies emerge
between
logic
and
genuine ontology
in the
logically
hierarchical construc-
tion of
systems.
The effect of
Engels' only partial critique
of
Hegel
in terms of
his
system
and method can be seen from his failure to draw a clear
distinction between the dialectics of nature and the dialectics of
social
being.
In
Anti-Dhring
and elsewhere he
attempted
to de-
fine some
general
laws of dialectics and demonstrate that histori-
cal dialectics have their basis in the dialectics of nature. But in
doing
so he attributed universal
ontological validity
to
logical
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 203
principles
which are
ontologically
effective
only
at certain levels of
being
or which
operate differently
at the various levels. He thus
ended
up obscuring
the
specificity
of certain
categories,
while
completely ignoring
others or
presenting
them
inadequately.
The
classic
response
to this
position
was that of Lukcs
himself,
in
History
and Class Consciousness. But while the
description
in the
latter of nature as a social
category
is
epistemologically
correct,
it is
ontologically quite inadequate.
Whereas
Engels'
fault lies in the
confusion of
logical
and
ontological questions,
Lukcs' error in
History
and Class Consciousness can be traced to the occlusion of the
ontological by
the
epistemological question
of nature
-
a
prob-
lem
directly
linked to the notion of the identical
subject-object.
In
the
Ontology,
Lukcs allows for a dialectic of
nature,
but stresses
the fact that not all
categories operate
or have the same function
at all levels of
being,
or in all
complexes.
II
For Lukcs the basic model for all social
practice,
and as such the
necessary starting point
for the
systematic exposition
of the ontol-
ogy
of social
being,
must be
sought
in the labor
process.
The latter
marks the transition from nature to
society,
for it is the
insuper-
able metabolism between
social,
organic
and
inorganic being
with-
out which
society
could not exist
(Lukcs, 1980).
The social
theory
of
History
and Class Consciousness brackets out nature.
Lukcs' later
ontology
returns nature
squarely
to the heart of
social
theory by choosing
labor as its
starting point.
To ensure its
own
survival,
humanity
must
"appropriate
Nature's
productions
in a form
adapted
to its own wants"
(Marx, 1977, 173)
on an
ongoing
basis;
human
beings
must therefore
constantly oppose
themselves to nature as her own forces. The distinction between
humanity
and
nature,
and
therefore
between
subject
and
object, emerges,
and is ever
posited
anew,
within the labor
process.
The
subject-object
dialectic cannot be found in
inorganic
and
organic being,
but is
specific
to social
being.
In
constituting
this
dialectic,
the labor
process inaugurates
a new realm of
being
characterized
by
its own
specific
structure and laws of motion. The
appearance
of this new
realm however in no
way
abolishes
organic
and
inorganic being,
which retain their
autonomy.
The
complexity
and
heterogeneity
of
being
in
general
is
insuperable.
The focus on labor
signals
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204 SCIENCE tf SOCIETY
Lukcs' abandonment of his
youthful quest
for an
identity
which
would abolish an
original autonomy
of life in relation to
form,
and his
espousal
instead of a
philosophy of non-identity
directed
towards the
exploration of
the dialectical
unity-within-distinction of pro-
cesses
of being. Finally,
labor is the
founding category
of social
being,
because it is the basic source of the latter's
historicity:
in
changing
their natural world
by
their
labor,
human
beings
also
change
their own nature.
To take the labor
process
as the basic model does not
imply
that it
represents
some
supposed
essence to which all else could be
reduced,
or that societies do not
necessarily encompass
a lot more
than what is contained in the immediate metabolism between
humans and
nature,
or that
struggles
over "economic"
production
in the narrow sense defined
by
the
capitalist
mode of
production
are
politically necessarily
more
important
than other sorts of
conflict. In
choosing
to
begin
with the labor
process
Lukcs is
abstracting
the
complex
which best defines the
specificity
of social
being
in relation to nature. All other social
complexes already
involve labor as a constituent of their social character. Lukcs
insists
repeatedly
on the abstract character of his discussion of the
labor
process
and on its
provisional
nature,
as
merely
one level of
analysis
to be
superseded by
other,
more concrete
ones,
just
as the
analysis
of value in the first volume of
Capital
is
superseded by
the
analysis
of
prices
of
production
in the third volume.
The central character of the
concept
of labor in the
Ontology
is
grounded
in the fact that the labor
process displays,
at least in
ovo,
all of the essential characteristics of social
being.
The labor
pro-
cess is not structured as a set of antinomies to be
eventually
sublated once and for all in an
all-encompassing identity
(as
in
History
and Class
Consciousness),
but rather as a set of reflection
determinations which
ceaselessly interpenetrate
and
separate
out
again,
their
identity
and distinctiveness abolished and
reproduced
in an incessant dialectic. Social
being generally
is characterized
by
a number of such series of dialectical interactions which are
specific
to it and which first arise in the labor
process.
In human
nature a
part
of nature
distinguishes
itself from nature as such.
Consciousness
emerges
as the
opposite
of
being,
as a
non-being,
which is nevertheless a
necessary
moment of
being
without which
the dialectic of social existence could not arise. The dialectic of
being
and consciousness is
only intelligible
as the dialectic between
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 205
subject
and
object
in material
activity
in which the human
agent
confronts the
reality
constituted
by past activity,
and in transform-
ing
it constitutes a new
objectivity.
The
process
of this transforma-
tion must be
grasped
as a dialectic of
theory
and
practice,
with
theory consisting
in the
positing
of an end and the
discovery
of
the means of its
realization,
and
practice
as the attainment of the
end
through
the
setting
in motion of the
necessary
means. The
labor
process
thus involves a dialectic between
possibility
and
actuality predicated
on the dialectic between
positing
of the end
and
investigation
of the means
(the availability
of the latter alone
making
the
goal
an
objective possibility
and
allowing
the actualiza-
tion of the
potentialities
inherent in the
being
of
objects).5
As a dialectic of
subject
and
object,
of
theory
and
practice,
of
end and
means,
labor resolves the
antinomy
of
teleology
and
causality,
and reveals their
unity-within-distinction
as a reflection
determination. All human
practice
consists of
teleological projects
setting
in motion causal series. The outcome of labor is
always
causally
determined but the causes are
posited by
the
subject,
and
are thus
transformed,
without their nature
being
violated. Nature
remains "a
system
of
complexes
whose law-like character
persists
in
complete
indifference to all human efforts and ideas"
(Lukcs,
1980, 11-12).
Investigation
of the means discovers in this
system
various
properties
which in
given
combinations enable the
subject
to realize the
posited goal.
The stone as such contains no inherent
tendency
to become an axe. But certain of its
properties
allow the
laborer to make an axe of it
(Lukcs, 1980,
10-1
1).
As Lukcs
puts
it:
The
teleological positing "simply"
makes use of nature's own
activity,
while on
the other hand . . . the transformation of this
activity
makes it its own
opposite.
This natural
activity
is thus
transformed,
without a
change
in the natural ontolo-
gy
of its
foundations,
into
something posited.
. . . Without
being subjected
to an
internal
change,
the natural
objects
and natural forces
give
rise to
something
completely
different;
man in his labour can fit their
properties,
and the laws of
their
motion,
into
completely
new
combinations,
endowing
them with com-
5 When
considering
the individual labor
process
as it relates to other social
complexes,
i.e.,
in a more concrete context,
one would have to include this
very
relation
among
the
conditions of actualization of its end. When we consider the labor
process
in abstraction
from social conditions,
investigation
of the means refers
only
to
discovery
of the tools
and materials
(and
the
organic
and
inorganic
conditions of their
implementation)
needed to
carry
out
purposive activity.
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206 SCIENCE s? SOCIETY
pletely
new functions and modes of
operation.
But since this can
only
be done
from amid the
insuperable ontological
character of natural
laws,
the
only
altera-
tion in the natural
categories
can consist in the fact that
they
are
posited
-
in the
ontological
sense;
their
positedness
is the mediation of their subordination to the
determining ideological positing,
which is also what makes the
posited
in-
terweaving
of
causality
and
teleology
into a
unitary
and
homogeneous object,
process,
etc.
Nature and
labour,
means and
end,
thus
produce something
that is in itself
homogeneous:
the labour
process,
and
finally
the
product
of labour.
(Lukcs,
1980, 12-13.)
Practice determines
specific objects by isolating,
or
abstracting,
them from their
given
context and
projecting
them into a new
complex
(it
makes no difference whether such
objects
are use-
values or social
relations).
Determination is
negation
of the exist-
ing
state of affairs and the
positing
of a new
objectivity (Moggach,
1981; Lefbvre, 1968, 119ff.).
According
to Lukcs the characteristic nature of
negations
in
the realm of social
being
resides "in the fact that
every
human
social
activity
is
necessarily
the
product
of
alternatives,
and
pre-
supposes
a choice or decision in relation to these. The alternative
thus
gives
rise to a
bifurcation
of the
objective
world effected
by
the
subject
on the basis of the known
properties
of the
object,
in
relation to the reactions which the interactions with the world
induce"
(Lukcs,
1978a, 45-46).
This bifurcation takes the form
of a series of
oppositions, ranging
from that between useful and
non-useful to the most
highly developed
and
relatively
auton-
omous
values,
such as
good
and evil. The
positing
of such
opposi-
tions
presupposes
a
homogenization
of
heterogeneous reality by
previous practice,
and the act of choice
gives
rise to a new state of
affairs.
Every
form of
practice
takes the form of a
teleological
positing,
i.e. the
setting
of
goals,
of
purpose, involving
an irreduc-
ible choice between alternatives.
The
subject-object
relation
plays
itself out in
every
moment of
the
history
of social
being
and can never achieve a final reconcilia-
tion. It must
constantly go through
the
phases
of distinction and
unity
which mark the
growth
and renewal of human nature
(Lukcs, 1984, 499ff.).
Labor is a
phenomenological process,
but
not one which leads to the realization of an identical
subject-
object,
but rather which involves a
heightening
and enrichment of
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 207
subjectivity
within
life,
a metabolism in which humans
constantly
both unite
with,
and
distinguish
themselves
from,
nature and
each other. For there to be a dialectical
unity,
the elements of the
relationship
must not be
juxtaposed
in a
merely
external fashion
to each
other,
but must
participate
in a common
unity.
On a
very
abstract level the latter
may
be understood in an initial moment as
the
homogeneous sphere
of nature in which
humanity
and its
environment are
immediately
united. In a second moment the
homogeneity
of this
sphere
is
disrupted by
the
teleological posit-
ing, setting
in motion the labor
process
and thus a new
sphere
of
(social)
being, heterogeneous
in relation to the first.
Finally
the
unfolding
of reflection determinations
(substance-subject,
causality-teleology, necessity-freedom)
in the labor
process
con-
stitutes a new
homogeneous
medium,
a
higher unity
of
humanity
and nature in
society.
This
homogeneous
medium is not
merely
the use-value
pro-
duced,
but also the network of social
relations,
the new forms of
practice,
and the
array
of new means of
production
and forms of
labor
power,
created
by
the labor
process,
in short all the
objecti-
fications
of human
activity.
In the labor
process
and other forms of
social
practice,
the human
subject objectifies
itself,
in that in
transforming
external
reality
and
thereby
itself,
it constitutes new
forms of
objectivity,
which include both use-values and social
relations. Lukcs
emphasizes
the need to
supersede
the
vulgar
materialist view that
materiality
consists
only
of actual
physical
things,
while other forms of
objectivity,
such as social relations
and
products
of
thought,
are attributed to the
"supposedly
auton-
omous
activity
of consciousness"
(Lukcs, 1963, I, 589).
While
reality,
as humans confront
it,
is
always
mediated
by
the
social
totality,
i.e.,
by
human
practice,
it is still more than a mere
product,
as it is characterized
by complexes
and laws of
organic
and
inorganic being
which exist
independently
of human
activity.
Objectification
does not
represent
the creation of new matter out
of
nothingness,
but an interaction between
subject
and
object
in
which a new
objectivity
arises. Human
beings
act
upon
the world
as it is
given,
use the materials contained in
it,
and set in motion its
processes
in order to realize
goals they
have
posited. "Through
labour,
a
teleological positing
is realized within material
being,
as
the rise of a new
objectivity"
(Lukcs, 1980, 3; 1963, I, 552-553).
The hiatus between form and matter which bedevilled Kantian-
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208 SCIENCE f SOCIETY
ism and the
subsequent
idealist
attempts
to
supersede
it,
is both
affirmed and
negated
here. The
form-giving principle
-
the
teleological positing
-
is united with
matter,
inasmuch
as,
in
Marx's
words,
"man confronts nature as one of her own forces"
(Marx, 1977, 173);
at the same time the
teleological positing
determines a
portion
of
existing reality
as matter within the
medium of a new labor
process,
thus
creating
a
discontinuity
implying
a
rupture
or
heterogeneity
between form and matter.
Looking
at the issue on the more concrete
plane
of
history,
we
then have to
distinguish
two
processes:
the confrontation of sub-
ject
and
object
and its
supersession,
as a
process
of
objectification
in the labor
process;
and the
opposition
between
subject
and
object
as a
process
of alienation in the division of labor and the
institution of
private property.
In
History
and Class Consciousness
the first
process
tended to be reduced to the second one in the
analysis
of
capitalist society,
with the
consequence
that the aboli-
tion of alienation was seen as the abolition of
objectification,
of the
distinction between
subject
and
object,
and thus as the
identity
of
subject
and
object
instead of their dialectical
unity.
Under the
assumption
of the identical
subject-object,
with
objectivity
but the self-externalization of the
subject,
the latter's
adequate
self-consciousness
(the standpoint
of
totality
or
imputed
proletarian
class
consciousness)
is the truth.
Adequate knowledge
must be
immediately given;
the
opacity
of
immediacy
would
characterize a state of reification.
However,
the
non-identity
of
subject
and
object
is
inevitable,
because of the
insuperable
char-
acter of the natural
boundary
and the
insuperable
relative auton-
omy
of individual
subjectivity
within collective
practice.
Given the
dynamic unity
of
subject
and
object displayed
in
labor,
the con-
stant need to
bridge
the
gap
between actual and
potential
knowl-
edge
means that immediate consciousness remains
inadequate
without
by
that token
being
reified. Absolute truth is then the
constantly expanding
limit of
knowledge
traced
by
the extent of
human
objectification,
and
knowledge
must be
grasped
as a
pro-
cess of
perpetual approximation.
The nature of
truth,
and the
criterion of
practice
which determines
epistemological validity,
appear
as
highly
differentiated. Given the
postulate
of the iden-
tical
subject-object, proletarian
revolution could
appear
as an in-
stant of revelation and fulfillment
during
which all other instants
could be
experienced
in their true essence. The
rejection
of
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 209
the identical
subject-object
leads to the definition of truth as a
process.
Its
many
moments
range
from the minute
empirical
observations made in the labor
process
to the
all-encompassing
categorial system
of dialectical
ontology.
It is determined
throughout by
the entire
complex
of human
objectifications,
from
the
simplest
activities of
everyday
life to the most
highly
de-
veloped practices,
such as
art,
science or
philosophy.
The
totality
of
society
is a
complex
of
complexes
constituted
by
human
teleological positings
and the causal series
they
set in
motion. The
processes, relationships
and
products
which arise out
of these
teleological positings
can
crystallize
into structures of
objectivity
which then become the material and
instruments,
as
well as the
conditioning
context and
medium,
of further
posit-
ings.
Social
being
is thus constituted
by
an incessant dialectic
between individual human
beings, processes
of
objectification,
objectified
structures of action and
thought,
and
society
as a
whole. In the entire
prehistory
of
humanity
(i.e.,
in all social
formations
up
to the
present, including
the
capitalist
mode of
production
and
"post-revolutionary"
societies,
in which alienation
has not been
abolished),
human
beings
have no
adequate grasp
of
the overall social
process.
While in
precapitalist
modes of
produc-
tion
they
are above all dominated
by
the forces of
organic
and
inorganic
nature,
in the
capitalist
era alienated human
productive
capacities
and social
relationships
become the dominant force.6
Historically,
the division of labor
accompanying
the
development
of
productive
forces causes various
complexes
to
acquire
a relative
autonomy,
their own
dynamic
and
rhythm
of
development,
and
to become
self-perpetuating
institutions. Such are
art,
science and
philosophy,
which have their distant roots in the
investigation
of
means which is
part
of
every technological project.
But such
complexes
nevertheless are
only
actualized,
only
have social valid-
6 Of
course,
since there can never be an identical
subject-object,
total control of all social
and natural
processes
is out of the
question.
The labor
process
for one
thing constantly
produces
unintended and unforeseen
results,
which constitute the basis for further
development
but which also
constantly present
new,
unresolved
problems.
This in itself
renders
illusory
the idea that a "scientific
management"
of social
development by
a
centralized
authority
would lead to the swiftest and most efficient resolution of
society's
problems.
In
fact,
and this is an
implication
of the final
chapter
of
History
and Class
Consciousness,
as well as of the
Ontology,
socialist
planning
must involve the
development
of the
greatest possible maturity
of
knowledge
and consciousness in each member of
society,
an
option only
conceivable
given
the
greatest possible
democratization.
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210 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
ity
and
meaning,
in the context of
subject-object relationships
which are
always
structured as
teleological projects.
What this
signifies
is that
thought
is never a
detached, neutral,
value-free
contemplation
of
reality.
While it reflects and
represents reality,
it
always
does so in the context of a
specific process
of
objectification
in which it assumes a
particular
form and is animated
by
certain
values. It is
always
therefore a
projection, reproduction
and crea-
tion of
meaning.
Even in art and
science,
in which the
subject
raises himself above
everyday experience,
there is
always
a dimen-
sion of
partisanship. Arising historically
as autonomous
spheres
out of the
problem
of
investigation
of
means,
and actualized
only
in their dialectical
relationship
with scientific and artistic
practice
on the one
hand,
and
everyday
life on the
other,
science and art
appear
as laboratories
producing
the means to realize
goals
and
fulfil human needs
-
specifically
needs of consciousness and self-
consciousness.
In his later
works,
Lukcs
constantly espouses
a reflection
theory
of
knowledge,
and often
argues
that the
many possible
reflections of
reality
leave the latter
unchanged
(Lukcs,
1963, I,
35).
As
traditionally
understood,
and
convincingly
criticized in
History
and Class
Consciousness,
the
theory
of reflection
implies
a
relation of
exteriority
between
being
and
consciousness,
which it
appears
difficult to reconcile with the
truly
dialectical
unity
of
theory
and
practice,
and consciousness and
being, postulated by
Marxism. The elements of the solution to this
problem
can be
found in the
Ontology
(a)
in the crucial distinction between ontolo-
gy
and
epistemology
which allows the reconciliation
(i)
of the
ontological primacy
and
original independence
of
being
in rela-
tion to consciousness and
(ii)
of the construction of
objectivity by
the conscious
subject,
in other words the dialectic of sensuous
objectivity
and of
subjective activity,
in line with the first Thesis on
Feuerbach;
and
(b)
in the
ontological analysis
of the labor
process
underlying
this
distinction,
which reveals the
necessary
constant
interpntration
between consciousness and
being,
between
theory
and
practice,
in the
processes
of
teleological positing
and
investigation
of the means of
realizing posited goals.
From an
ontological point
of
view,
cognition
is
always
a
reflection,
in that it
is
always
a
response
and a relation to a
given.
Lukcs in line with
this defines the human
being
as an antwortendes
Wesen,
a
respond-
ing being,
an
expression strikingly
reminiscent of Bakhtin
(Ter-
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 2 1 1
tulian, 1984, 145; Bakhtin, 1986, 60ff.).
Like Caudwell and Bakh-
tin
(Caudwell,
1977, 190, 192, 218-219; Bakhtin, 1985,
passim;
Browne, 1984),
Lukcs in the
Ontology
never sees
cognition
as the
neutral
reproduction
of a
thing-in-itself
,
but
always
as a
particular
attitude to
something,
inscribed in a
specific
collective
praxis
and
therefore in a
specific relationship
to an
object.
It is in virtue of this variable
relationship
to
reality
that Lukcs
rightly
claims that reflection is never the
photographic reproduc-
tion of the
object;
but he is not clear
enough
when he declares that
different
types
of reflections all relate to the same
reality
in-
dependent
of consciousness. Of
course,
reality
is unified
(even
in
its
heterogeneity)
from the
point
of view of Marxist
ontology;
there can be no
question
of the coexistence of different
realities,
whether
corresponding
or not to different human faculties.
Moreover,
individual
cognition
cannot
change
the laws and struc-
tures of
reality;
and it is no less true that forms of consciousness
do not exist
independently
of
any
material
activity,
and therefore
could
not,
as
pure
consciousness,
affect
reality.
But because
cogni-
tion
never is
merely
an individual
act,
but
always part
and
parcel
of collective material
activity,
it can
play
a role in
transforming
reality. Certainly
the laws and structures of
organic
and
inorganic
being
remain
unchanged by
human
praxis;
but the latter can
certainly
transform the laws and structures of social
being
in
fundamental
ways.
When science and
art,
as
highly developed
forms of collective material
activity,
create new structures of hu-
man consciousness and
self-consciousness,
they
not
only
create
new attitudes to
reality
as a
whole;
they
also create new forms of
(artistic
and
scientific)
praxis
which become
specific objects
of
their
respective positings.
Artists and scientists
always
intervene in
specific ideological
environments,
confronting specific
semiotic
objectifications
with their own
specific
histories and traditions of
creation and
reception.
Ill
There is a
widespread tendency today
to
reject
the historical
materialist
analysis
of the role of labor in the constitution of social
being,
and to
espouse
instead some version of a
theory
of discourse
as constitutive of
society.
For
example
some
contemporary
ideal-
ists
attempt
a kind of "Kantian revolution"
by shifting
attention
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212 SCIENCE f SOCIETY
away
from the structures of a
reality beyond
consciousness or
discourse,
and
focusing
instead on the structures of consciousness
or discourse
(see
for
example
SHLP, 1983; Ellis/Coward, 1977).
Here the notion that discourse is the basic model of all
(social)
reality
leads to the view that
subjectivity
and
objectivity
are not
features of an extra-discursive
reality,
but
grammatical
structures
of discourse. From a historical materialist
perspective,
notions of
subjectivity
and
objectivity
in
language
reflect the structure of
human
practical activity
as it transforms the material environ-
ment;
for some discourse theorists this view of
practical activity
is
derived from the
ideological
structure of
grammar,
and is an
uncritical
acceptance
of an
ideological representation
of a
sup-
posed thing-in-itself.
Less
idealistic,
J.
Habermas nevertheless also
rejects
the onto-
logical primacy
of
labor,
viewing
the latter
(i)
as
involving
a form
of instrumental
rationality predicated
on the
nomological
model
of the natural
sciences,
and
consisting
of the
manipulation
of its
objects according
to norms of technical
efficiency;
and
(ii)
as
embodying
a
"philosophy
of the
cogito,"
of a self-sufficient sub-
ject confronting
the
object-world. According
to
Habermas,
the
primacy
of labor
marginalizes
the discursive constitution of ethi-
cal values and therefore fails to achieve a
non-positivistic
un-
derstanding
of the constitution of
personality.
Habermas sees
Marxism
(including
Lukcs and
Adorno)
as
imprisoned
within
philosophies
of
consciousness,
and thus outdated in the
light
of
what he and
many
others see as the
paradigm
shift of 20th-
century thought
from the
philosophy
of consciousness to the
philosophy
of
language
(Habermas, 1984).
For
Habermas,
the
starting point
must be the "notion of a
symbolically
structured
life-world,
in which human
reflexivity
is constituted"
(Giddens,
1985, 105).
One could
say
that Habermas' distinction between instru-
mental
rationality
in labor and communicative
rationality
in
sym-
bolic interaction is a modern rendition of the neo-Kantian distinc-
tion between natural and cultural
sciences,
and
ultimately
of
Kant's distinction between
pure
and
practical
reason. This dual-
ism
fragments
once more the
unity
of
praxis
which is the hallmark
of historical
materialism,
and in the
process
throws
up
a number
of difficult
questions.
The
"paradigm
shift" from labor to com-
munication,
in
leaving
aside
preoccupation
with the sensuous
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 2 1 3
character of human
life,
divorces human
activity
from this
sensuousness,
making
the latter
appear
a
passive
substratum. It
therefore restores the dualism of materialism and idealism criti-
cized
by
Marx in the first Thesis on Feuerbach.
Moving
from a
philosophy
of consciousness to a
philosophy
of
language
does not
as such entail the abandonment of idealism. An exclusive
pre-
occupation
with discourse in fact
completely
eliminates all
ecologi-
cal considerations from social
theory
(Aronowitz, 1986-87, 13,
makes this
point
well)
-
ontologically
a most inconvenient
by-
product
of such
thinking!
In order to vindicate Lukcs'
emphasis
on labor in the Ontolo-
gy,
it must be stressed that it is neither the cornerstone
of
a
philosophy of
the
cogito,
nor reducible to the model
of
instrumental
rationality.
In this
respect
one must
disagree
with N. Tertulianas
suggestion
that the
Ontology
is a
philosophy
of the
subject,
and that
objectification
and
alienation are
phenomenological
moments of
subjectivity
(Ter-
tulian, 1984, 136-137).
As Tertulian himself has noted
elsewhere,
the
Ontology
is much more a
theory
of the constitution of
subjectiv-
ity by practice,
and in the first instance
by
labor
(Tertulian, 1980,
189; Lukcs, 1963, 1, 85).
Confusion can arise out of the fact that
the first
chapter
of the
systematic part
of the
Ontology
consists of a
discussion of the labor
process
in the abstract. The aim of this is
the demonstration that all of the
categories
which are distinctive
of social
being
are
present
in the labor
process,
and that the latter
can be
grasped
as the foundation of the
historicity
of social
being.
Because it is
portrayed
in so abstract a
fashion, however,
the labor
process appears
in this
chapter
as the relation between an in-
dividual
subject
and his
environment,
and the conditions are not
analyzed
which
produce
the initial
teleological positing
which sets
in motion the labor
process. Taking
this
chapter
out of
context,
one could then
interpret
labor
-
the model of social
practice
-
as individual
purposive activity governed by
instrumental ration-
ality.
Such an
approach
seems at first
sight
similar to the model of
labor criticized
by
Habermas. But Lukcs' comments on social
reproduction
which succeed those on labor
immediately
intro-
duce the concrete discussion of social relations and
language,
showing
that individuals'
range
of alternative choices is
socially
constituted
(Lukcs,
1986, Il7ff.).
Praxis
(including
labor)
is not
generated by
isolated in-
dividuals whose
subjectivity
is
given
a
priori,
and who then come
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214 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
into contact with each other and interact. It is rather a collective
dialectic,
of which
individuality
and interaction are moments.
Human
beings
do not first stand outside of nature and then relate
to it
instrumentally
in their
labor; rather,
they
are first
part
of
nature and differentiate themselves from it within
it,
and it is this
which makes them
human,
which makes them
subjects.
The social
is
natural,
even if it is not identical with the
organic
or the
inorganic.
Labor is a
dialogue
with and within nature
(a
dialogue
which becomes distorted due to alienation
just
as the
dialogue
between human
beings
does
-
indeed reification and
ecological
disaster are
products
of the same
process),
in which the in-
terlocutors,
subject
and
object,
are constituted and
develop
in a
process
of endless
interaction,
without ever
achieving
the
identity
described in
History
and Class Consciousness. Historical materialist
ontology
is therefore neither a
philosophy
of the
cogito,
founded
on a
primordial,
self-sufficient
subject,
nor a
philosophy
of con-
sciousness in the
style
of
Hegel
or
History
and Class Consciousness.
The
point
of the
chapter
on labor is to show the
insuperable
character and inextricable connection between the "active" and
"passive"
moments, i.e.,
between
subject
and
substance,
teleology
and
causality,
and freedom and
necessity.
At the end of his Mod-
ern German
Philosophy, Rdiger
Bubner
points
out that
many
theorists who have set out to formulate a
concept
of action which
goes beyond
models of natural
causality
have ended
up conflating
action and
meaning,
thus
devoting
much time to
debating
the
meaning
of
action,
but not its structure. Bubner calls for a
theory
capable
of
going beyond
the
antinomy
of material
causality
and
subjective meaning
(Bubner,
1981, 215).
Lukcs'
Ontology,
build-
ing
on Marx's Theses on
Feuerbach,
does
precisely
this.
All
objectification
entails the
emergence
of
subjectivity
and
intersubjectivity.
As a
teleological project, every
labor
process
is
the site of choices between
alternatives,
and
every
such choice in
Lukcs' view
necessarily
involves an element of freedom
(if
not
the immediate
producer's,
then that of the controller of the
pro-
cess),
judgements
of value
(ranging
from the most basic assess-
ments of technical
efficiency
and economic
utility
to
highly
com-
plex
ethical and aesthetic
evaluations),
and
(underpinning
and
following
from value
judgements) prescriptions
of what
ought
to be
(Sollen).
Freedom,
value and Sollen are thus constitutive
categories
of social
being arising along
with human consciousness out of the
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 215
metabolism between
humanity
and nature. Like
consciousness,
they
are not
epiphenomenal aspects
of some inevitable
objective
necessity;
but like
consciousness,
they
are
indissolubly
linked to
the material
reality
from which
they
first
emerge
(Lukcs, 1984,
133-137).
Lukcs'
concept
of labor is no mere instrumental activ-
ity
which would have to be
supplemented by
a
category
of com-
municative
rationality
because of its blindness to
questions
of
value and
freedom;
on the
contrary,
his
point
is that freedom and
value cannot be
conceptualized properly except
on the basis of an
ontological analysis
of labor. Lukcs'
theory
in no
way
excludes a
theory
of
communication,
but rather demonstrates the
necessity
of
grasping
communication in its dialectical
unity
with labor
(Lukcs,
1984, 141n).
Thus Lukcs stresses the simultaneous his-
torical
appearance
of labor and
language
(Lukcs, 1963, I, 38;
Lukcs, 1986, 118ff.).
It is of course clear that if one excludes
Robinsonnades,
all labor is a collective social
activity;
and this is
why
Marx saw the forces and relations of
production
as
being insepar-
able
aspects
of the same
process.
Lukcs' choice of the
concept
of labor as his
starting point
could itself be
regarded
as
just
another theoretical ideal
type.
And
indeed it
ought
to be
incomplete
and
provisional,
for the
unity
of
theory
and
practice
renders,
in Mszros'
words,
"all theoretical
solutions
strictly
transient,
incomplete
and 'other directed' . . .
subordinate ... to the overall
dynamism
of
self-developing
social
praxis"
(Mszros,
1982, 111-112).
The
point
however is that
Lukcs'
totalizing
and
open-ended approach
does not exclude
other determinations and is also
capable
of
accounting
for its own
structures and
presuppositions.
It offers a much more
supple
and
subtle
synthesizing principle
than the alternative
regulatory
methodologies
and
disciplines
(such
as
structuralism,
semiology,
cybernetics
or
deconstruction)
to which scientific thinkers have
turned in recent
years
(Almsi,
1984, 130-135).
Even while
recognizing
the
incomplete
and
provisional
character of knowl-
edge,
Marxism can
only prove adequate
as an instrument of
cognition by adhering
to its
original systematic, totalizing urge.
As
Mszros
puts
it:
In
reality philosophy
is advanced in the form of
partial
totalizations which of
necessity
constitute,
at
any given point
in
time,
including
the
post-Hegelian
phase
of
development,
some kind of
system
without which the
very
idea of
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216 SCIENCE of SOCIETY
"relative
truths,"
would make no sense whatsoever. The alternative to the
Hege-
lian
concept
of absolute truth is not "the entire human race" as the notional
possessor
of some such "absolute truth" but the
totalizing synthesis
of attainable
levels of
knowledge progressively superseded
in the collective
enterprise
of
particular systems.
(Mszros, 1982, 113-114.)
Such a historical
process
of incessant sublation of
partial systems
cannot be the task of monadic
cognitive subjects,
but
only
a
collective
enterprise
(Mszros,
1982, 112-113).
Marxism is an
objective, unitary
and
dynamic system
which
only
exists
actually
within a
complex
dialectic in which it is raw
material,
instrument
and
product
of
subjects engaged
in
practical activity
and social
struggle.
It is
open
to diverse
reinterpretations
and
developments
rooted in the
divergent
historical
experiences
of its
recipients
and
exponents.
The constant aim of the latter must however be to
synthesize
these different versions. One of the most
important
and
insightful aspects
of Lenin's
theory
of the
revolutionary party
was his idea that it should function as the collective
memory
of the
proletariat,
as the instrument for
analyzing, synthesizing
and dis-
seminating
the historical
experience
of class
struggle.
So
long
as
one adheres to the
contemplative
attitude
implied by
the view-
point
of the "isolated individual in
bourgeois society,"
i.e.,
so
long
as the laws and
principles
constituted
by
collective social
praxis
impose
themselves on consciousness as unalterable human
pro-
cesses,
one can be content either with
purely epistemological
or
with
sociological approaches
to
problems
of social
analysis
for
which individuals are
always
the
objects
of forces which
they
neither
comprehend
nor control.
Reviving
the
inspiration
of
Marx's Theses on
Feuerbach,
the Lukcsian tradition
points
the
way
beyond
the
point
of view of the isolated
individual,
beyond
epistemology
and
sociology,
to the
ontological problem
of the
categorial
structure of
subject-object
dialectics,
and in
doing
so
provides
the theoretical foundation for an
adequate totalizing
conceptualization
of the
problem
of the
historically
constituted
relationships
between
individuals,
social
structures,
the social
totality
and nature.
Universit d'Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada
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LUKCS' LATER ONTOLOGY 2 1 7
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