RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER v. !ANUEL ". !ORAN, Ju#$% o& F'() *+),+-% o& !,+'l, F,-): This petition is for a writ of prohibition overruled with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. The petitioner was an accredited honorary consul of ruguay at Manila. !e was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila of falsification of a private document. !e ob"ected to the "urisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the nited #tates and the Constitution of the $hilippines the court below had no "urisdiction to try him. !is ob"ection was overruled hence this present petition. *u%: %hether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has "urisdiction to try the petitioner. H%l#: The counsel for the petitioner contend that the CIF of Manila has no "urisdiction according to &ticle III #ec. ' of the nited #tates Constitution which stipulated that the #upreme Court of the nited #tates has original "urisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors( public ministers( and consuls( and such "urisdiction which e)cludes the courts of the $hilippines and that that such "urisdiction is conferred e)clusively upon the #upreme Court of the $hilippines. Al).ou$. %-)'o+ 1/ o& A-) No. 136 v%) '+ ).% Su0(%1% Cou() ).% o('$'+,l 2u('#'-)'o+ )o 'u% 3(') o& mandamus, certiorari, 0(o.'4')'o+, .,4%, -o(0u, ,+# quo warranto, u-. 2u('#'-)'o+, 3, ,lo -o+&%((%# o+ ).% Cou() o& F'() *+),+-% 4y ).% Co#% o& C'v'l 5(o-%#u(%. *&ct +o. ,-.( secs. ,-/( ',/( '''( ''0( and 1'1.2 It results that the original "urisdiction possessed and e)ercised by the #upreme Court of the $hilippine Islands was not e)clusive of( but concurrent with( that of the Courts of First Instance. !ence( the Court of Instance has "urisdiction over the petitioner. G.R. No. 167867 J,+u,(y 68, 6888 JEFFRE9 L*ANG :HUEFENG; v. 5EO5LE OF <HE 5H*L*55*NES F,-): $etitioner is an economist working with the &sian 3evelopment 4ank *&342. !e was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court *MeTC2 of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for uttering defamatory words against fellow &34 worker 5oyce Cabal. $etitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. 6n &pril ,7( ,--8( the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City( acting pursuant to an advice from the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs that petitioner en"oyed immunity from legal processes under #ection 81 of the &greement between the &34 and the $hilippine 9overnment regarding the !ead:uarters of the &34 *hereinafter &greement2 dismissed the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution. 6n a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the $eople( the ;egional Trial Court of $asig City( 4ranch ,0.( annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases. &fter the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied( petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the &greement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court. *u%: %hether or not the petitioner is covered by immunity. H%l#: The 3F&<s determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the 3F&<s advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution( the latter<s right to due process was violated. Furthermore( the immunity mentioned under #ection 81 of the &greement is not absolute( but sub"ect to the e)ception that the act was done in =official capacity.= It should have been determined first if the case falls within the ambit of #ection 81*a2 thus( the prosecutor should have been given the chance to rebut the 3F& $rotocol. Finally( slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime( such as defamation( in the name of official duty. !ence( the petitioner is covered by immunity. G.R. No. L-37131 Nov%14%( 69, 19/6 <HE =ORLD HEAL<H ORGAN*>A<*ON ,+# DR. LEONCE "ERS<U9F< v. HON. BENJA!*N H. A?U*NO, , 5(%'#'+$ Ju#$% o& B(,+-. "***, Cou() o& F'() *+),+-% o& R'@,l F,-): The present petition is an original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent "udge<s refusal to :uash a search warrant issued by him at the instance of respondents Constabulary 6ffshore &ction Center *C6#&C2 officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of >erstuyft of the %!6 *%orld !ealth 6rganization2 notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity( as duly recognized by the ?)ecutive branch of the government and to prohibit respondent "udge from further proceedings in the matter. The #ecretary of Foreign &ffairs Carlos $. ;omulo pleaded to !on. &:uino that 3r. >erstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the !ost &greement and further re:uested for the suspension of the search warrant. The #olicitor 9eneral accordingly "oined the petitioner for the :uashal of the search warrant but respondent "udge nevertheless summarily denied the :uash hence( the petition at bar. *u%: %hether or not personal effect of %!6 6fficer 3r. >erstuyft can be e)empted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity. H%l#: The e)ecutive branch of the $hils has e)pressly recognized that >erstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity( pursuant to the provisions of the !ost &greement. The 3F& formally advised respondent "udge of the $hilippine 9overnment<s official position. The #olicitor 9eneral( as principal law officer of the gorvernment( likewise e)pressly affirmed said petitioner<s right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the :uashal of the search warrant. The unfortunate fact remains that respondent "udge chose to rely on the suspicion of respondents C6#&C officers =that the other remaining crates unopened contain contraband items= The provisions of ;epublic &ct /1 declares as null and void writs or processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a penal offense for =every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted( whether as party or as attorney( and every officer concerned in e)ecuting it= to obtain or enforce such writ or process. The Court( therefore( holds the respondent "udge acted without "urisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the :uashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner >erstuyft. The writs of certiorari and prohibition from the petitioners were granted. G.R. No. 87/78 S%0)%14%( 68, 1998 *N<ERNA<*ONAL CA<HOL*C *!!*GRA<*ON CO!!*SS*ON v. HON. 5URA CALLEJA *N HER CA5AC*<9 AS D*REC<OR OF <HE BUREAU OF LABOR RELA<*ONS F,-): &s an aftermath of the >ietnam %ar( the plight of >ietnamese refugees fleeing from #outh >ietnam<s communist rule confronted the international community. In response to this crisis( on '7 February ,-@,( an &greement was forged between the $hilippine 9overnment and the nited +ations !igh Commissioner for ;efugees whereby an operating center for processing IndoAChinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in 4ataan . ICMC was one of those accredited by the $hilippine 9overnment to operate the refugee processing center in Morong( 4ataan. It was incorporated in +ew Bork( #&( at the re:uest of the !oly #ee( as a nonAprofit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the nited +ations ?conomic and #ocial Council *?C6#6C2 and en"oys Consultative #tatus( Category II. &s an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the $hilippines( its activities are parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration *ICM2 and the International Committee of the ;ed Cross 6n ,8 5uly ,-@0( Trade nions of the $hilippines and &llied #ervices *T$ filed with the then Ministry of Cabor and ?mployment a $etition for Certification ?lection among the rank and file members employed by ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the nited +ations and( hence( en"oys diplomatic immunity. *u%: %hether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC e)tends to immunity from the application of $hilippine labor laws. H%l#: The grant of immunity from local "urisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The ob"ective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The e)ercise of "urisdiction by the 3epartment of Cabor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity( which is to shield the affairs of international organizations( in accordance with international practice( from political pressure or control by the host country to the pre"udice of member #tates of the organization( and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. #ection 7, of the Convention on the $rivileges and Immunities of the #pecialized &gencies of the nited +ations ,/ provides that =each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: *a2 disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party.= Moreover( pursuant to &rticle I> of the Memorandum of &greement between ICMC the the $hilippine 9overnment( whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC( the 9overnment is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Clauses on "urisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international 6rganizations. =The immunity covers the organization concerned( its property and its assets. It is e:ually applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem. ICMC did not invoke its immunity and( therefore( may be deemed to have waived it( assuming that during that period *,-@7A,-@12 it was tacitly recognized as en"oying such immunity. $etition is 9;&+T?3( the 6rder of the 4ureau of Cabor ;elations for certification election is #?T &#I3?( and the Temporary ;estraining 6rder earlier issued is made G.R. No. 178888, July 6, 6887 S%+,)o( AAu'l'+o 5'1%+)%l, J(., %) ,l. v O&&'-% o& ).% EB%-u)'v% S%-(%),(y (%0(%%+)%# 4y Ho+. Al4%()o Ro1ulo, ,+# <.% D%0,()1%+) O& Fo(%'$+ A&&,'(, R%0(%%+)%# By Ho+. Bl, O0l% F,-) C This is a petition for mandamus to compel the 6ffice of the ?)ecutive #ecretary and the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs to transmit *even without the signature of the $resident2 the signed copy of the ;ome #tatute of the International Criminal Court *ICC2 to the #enate of the $hilippines for its concurrence or ratification A in accordance with #ection ',( &rticle >II of the ,-@/ Constitution. $etitioners contend that that ratification of a treaty( under both domestic law and international law( is a function of the #enate. That under the treaty law and customary international law( $hilippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the ;ome #tatute. ;espondents on the other hand( :uestioned the legal standing of herein petitioners and argued that e)ecutive department has no duty to transmit the ;ome #tatute to the #enate for concurrence. *u% C %hether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant suit. %hether or not the ?)ecutive #ecretary and the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs have the ministerial duty to transmit to the #enate the copy of the ;ome #tatute signed by the $hilippine Member to the nited +ations even without the signature of the $resident. H%l#C 6nly #enator $imentel has a legal standing to the e)tent of his power as member of Congress. 6ther petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a direct in"ury from the nonAtransmittal and that they can seek redress in our domestic courts. $etitionersD interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. The power to ratify treaties does not belong to the #enate. nder ?.6. 81-( the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs *3F&2 prepares the ratification papers and forward the signed copy to the $resident for ratification. &fter the $resident has ratified it( 3F& shall submit the same to the #enate for concurrence. The $resident has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties( the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by re:uiring the concurrence of 'E7 of all the members of the #enate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. #ection ',( &rticle >II of the ,-@/ Constitution provides that Fno treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least twoAthirds of all the Members of the #enate.G The participation of the legislative branch in the treatyA making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the e)ecutive in the field of foreign relations. It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the power to ratify is vested in the $resident sub"ect to the concurrence of the #enate. The $resident has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the $hilippine representative whether or not to ratify a treaty. The signature does not signify final consent( it is ratification that binds the state to the provisions of the treaty and renders it effective. #enate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent( concurrence to the ratification. It is within the $resident to refuse to submit a treaty to the #enate or having secured its consent for its ratification( refuse to ratify it. #uch decision is within the competence of the $resident alone( which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of mandamus( Thus( the petition is 3I#MI##?3. G. R. No. 16/919, F%4(u,(y 14, 688/ 5l,('#%l !. A4,y, v. Ho+. S%-(%),(y H%(1o$%+% E. E4#,+%, J(. FAC<SC 6n May /( '..8 4ids and &wards Committee *4&C2 of the 3epartment of $ublic %orks and !ighways *3$%!2 issued a ;esolution +o. $5!CA&A.8A.,'. It was approved by 3$%! &cting #ecretary Florante #ori:uez. This resolution recommended the award to China ;oad H 4ridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract $ackage +o. I *C$ I2( which consists of the improvementErehabilitation of the #an &ndresA>iracA5ct. 4agoA>iga road( with the lengt of /-.@,@ kilometers( in the island province of Catanduanes. This Coan &greement +o. $!A'.8 was e)ecuted by and between the 54IC and the $hilippine 9overnment pursuant to the e)change of +otes e)ecuted by and between Mr. Boshihisa &ra( &mbassador ?)traordinary and $lenipotentiary of 5apan to the $hilippines( and then Foreign &ffairs #ecretary #iazon( in behalf of their respective governments. *SSUEC %hether or not the Coan &greement +o. $!A'.8 between the 54IC and the $hilippine 9overnment is a kind of a treaty. HELDC The Coan &greement +o. $!A'.8 taken in con"unction with the ?)change of +otes dated 3ecember '/( ,--- between the 5apanese 9overnment and the $hilippine 9overnment is an e)ecutive agreement. &n Fe)change of notesG is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the e)change of two documents( each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Itreaties( agreements( conventions( charters( protocols( declarations( memoranda of understanding( modus vivendi and e)change of notes all are refer to international instruments binding at international law. <hough these instruments differ from each other by title( they all have common features and international law has applied basically the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long practice among the #tates( which have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore( they are regarded as international customary law. GR No. 171447, A0('l 11, 6886 L'1 v EB%-u)'v% S%-(%),(y F,-)C This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petitionAinAintervention( praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the soAcalled =4alikatan .'A,= and that after due notice and hearing( that "udgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of in"unction andEor prohibition against the deployment of .#. troops in 4asilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. 4eginning 5anuary of this year '..'( personnel from the armed forces of the nited #tates of &merica started arriving in Mindanao to take part( in con"unction with the $hilippine military( in =4alikatan .'A,.= These soAcalled =4alikatan= e)ercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and &merican troops. In theory( they are a simulation of "oint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual 3efense Treaty( a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the $hilippines and the nited #tates in ,-1,. The entry of &merican troops into $hilippine soil is pro)imately rooted in the international antiAterrorism campaign declared by $resident 9eorge %. 4ush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on #eptember ,,( '..,. 6n February ,( '..'( petitioners &rthur 3. Cim and $aulino $. ?rsando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition( attacking the constitutionality of the "oint e)ercise. They were "oined subse:uently by #&+C&J&# and $&;TI36 +9 M&+99&9&%&( both partyAIist organizations( who filed a petitionAinAintervention on February ,,( '..'. *u%: %hether F4alikatan .'A,G is covered by the >isiting Forces &greement *>F&2. %hether the >F& authorized &merican soldiers to engage in combat operations in $hilippine territory. H%l#C In resolving the first issue( it is necessary to refer to the >F& itself. !owever( not much help can be had therefrom( unfortunately( since the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The >F& permits nited #tates personnel to engage on an impermanent basis in FactivitiesG( the e)act meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative( in that nited #tates personnel must Fabstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement( and in particular( from any political activity.G The #upreme Court( after studied reflection of &rticles 7, and 7' of #ection 7 of the >ienna Convention on the Caw of Treaties( concluded that the ambiguity sorrounding the meaning of the word FactivitiesG arose from accident. In our view( it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. nder these auspices( the >F& if given legitimacy to the current 4alikatan e)ercise. It is only logical to assume that F4alikatan .'A,G a mutual antiAterrorism advising( assisting and training e)ercise(G falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the conte)t of the agreement. In connection with the second issue( both the history and intent of the M3T and the >F& support conclusion that combatArelated activities( as opposed to combat itself are indeed authorized. More so( the Terms of ;eference are e)plicit enough. $aragraph @ of #ection I stipulates that # e)ercise participants may not engage in combat Fe)cept in selfA defense.G It is the opinion of the Court that neither the M3T nor the 3F& allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war in $hilippine territory bearing in mind the salutory prescription stated in the Charter of the nited +ations. In the same manner( both the M3T and the >F&( as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the $hilippines is a party( must be read in the conte)t of the ,-@/ Constitution. <hough the Constitution presents a conflict between the fundamental law and our obligations from international agreements( it however resolves it in section ' of &rticle >III of the Constitution. The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that # forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on the $hilippine territory. G. R. No. 1387/8, O-)o4%( 18, 6888 B,y,+ v. >,1o(, F,-)C The nited #tates panel met with the $hilippine panel to discussed( among others( the possible elements of the >isiting Forces &greement *>F&2. This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on 5anuary ,' and ,7( ,--@. Thereafter( $resident Fidel ;amos approved the >F&( which was respectively signed by #ecretary #iazon and nited #tates &mbassador Thomas !ubbard. $res. 5oseph ?strada ratified the >F& on 6ctober 1( ,--@ and on May '/( ,---( the senate approved it by *'E72 votes. Cause of &ction: $etitioners( among others( assert that #ec. '1( &rt K>III of the ,-@/ constitution is applicable and not #ection ',( &rticle >II. Following the argument of the petitioner( under they provision cited( the Fforeign military bases( troops( or facilitiesG may be allowed in the $hilippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a2 it must be a treaty( b2 it must be duly concurred in by the senate( ratified by a ma"ority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so re:uired by congress( and c2 recognized as such by the other contracting state. ;espondents( on the other hand( argue that #ection ', &rticle >II is applicable so that( what is re:uires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least twoAthirds of all the members of the senate. *SSUE: %hether or not the >F& governed by the provisions of #ection ',( &rt >II or of #ection '1( &rticle K>III of the ConstitutionL HELD: #ection '1( &rticle K>III( which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases( troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain e)tent and in a limited sense( however( the provisions of section ',( &rticle >II will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes re:uired to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate. The Constitution( makes no distinction between FtransientG and Fpermanent.G %e find nothing in section '1( &rticle K>III that re:uires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the $hilippines. It is inconse:uential whether the nited #tates treats the >F& only as an e)ecutive agreement because( under international law( an e)ecutive agreement is as binding as a treaty. Ku(o#, v J,l,+#o+', 83 5.'l. 197, GR No. L-6666, !,(-. 66, 1949 F,-) C #higenori Juroda( a former CieutenantA9eneral of the 5apanese Imperial &rmy and Commanding 9eneral of the Imperial Forces of the $hilippines was charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of #taff of the &rmed Forces of the $hilippines. !e had unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as a commander to control the operations of members of his command. $etitioner was duly prosecuted for acts committed in violation of the !ague Convention and the 9eneva Convention through the issuance and enforcement of ?)ecutive 6rder +o. 0@. ?)ecutive 6rder +o. 0@ provided the organization of such military commissions( established +ational %ar Crimes 6ffice and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. &ttorneys Melville !ussey and ;obert $ort of the nited #tates of &merica participated in the prosecution of the case in behalf of the nited #tates of &merica. *u% C %hether or not ?)ecutive 6rder +o. 0@ is legal and constitutional. H%l# C This court holds that the ?)ecutive 6rder +o. 0@ is legal and constitutional as provided in #ec. 7( &rt. II of the Constitution( thatA F The $hilippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy( and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.G The participation of the two &merican attorneys although under our law( they are not :ualified to practice law is valid and constitutional. Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law not by ;ules of the Court( which govern ordinary civil courts. There is nothing in ?)ecutive 6rder +o.0@ which re:uires counsels need to be :ualified to practice law in the $hilippines. In fact( it is common in military tribunals that counsels for the parties are usually military personnel. nder the doctrine of incorporation( although the $hilippines was not a signatory of the !ague and 9eneva Conventions( international "urisprudence is automatically incorporated in $hilippine law( thus making war crimes punishable in the $hilippines. The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law( with "urisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of ?)ecutive 6rder +o 0@( and having "urisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody( the court will not interfere with the due process of such Military Commission. $etition is denied with costs de oficio. G.R. No. L-/997, !,y 31, 197/ LAO H. *CHONG, '+ .' o3+ 4%.,l& ,+# '+ 4%.,l& o& o).%( ,l'%+ (%'#%+), -o(0o(,)'o+ ,+# 0,()+%(.'0 ,#v%(%ly ,&&%-)%#. 4y R%0u4l'- A-) No. 1188, 0%)')'o+%(, v. JA*!E HERNANDE>, S%-(%),(y o& F'+,+-%, ,+# !ARCEL*NO SAR!*EN<O, C')y <(%,u(%( o& !,+'l,, (%0o+#%+). F,-)C This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment( fundamental and farAreaching in significance. The enactment poses :uestions of due process( police power and e:ual protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact( that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually e)ist. &dmittedly springing from a deep( militant( and positive nationalistic impulse( the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it( and within the field of economy it regulates( Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national security( rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare( into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien( so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. 3o the facts and circumstances "ustify the enactmentL The rule in general is as follows: &liens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise "ustified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be re:uiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of &merican citizens. 4roadly speaking( the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the e)ercise of police power. *' &m.( 5ur. 80@A80-.2 *u%C Is the e)clusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. &rbitrary capricious( taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged thereinL H%l#C ;esuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and controlM that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the #tate( thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and futureM that the law does not violate the e:ual protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds e)ist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the e)ercise of the occupation regulated( nor the due process of law clause( because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilegeM that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its ob"ectives appear to us to be plainly evident N as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary N and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Cegislature( with whose power and discretion the 5udicial department of the 9overnment may not interfereM that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title( and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affectedM and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the sub"ect and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. #ome members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the li:uidation of e)isting businesses when the time comes for them to close. 6ur legal duty( however( is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and e:ual protection guaranteed in the Constitution. ;emedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the CegislatureM they are beyond our power and "urisdiction. The petition is hereby denied( with costs against petitioner. R,Au'@, v. B(,#&o(#, /7 5.'l. 78 :1948; FAC<S: 4y virtue of the proclamation issued by 9eneral of the &rmy Mac&rthur( petitioners were arrested by the 7.0 CIC and detained under security commitment order +o 7@1. The petitioners ;a:uiza( Tee !an Jee( and Infante were charged with ?spionage activity with the 5apanese( active collaboration with the enemy respectively. $ower for Commander of the # &rmy to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not :uestioned. !e based proclamation on the reasons that the apprehended have violated due allegiance to the # and it is a military necessity. $etitioners move for writ of !abeas Corpus. *SSUES: ,. %hether or not the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation. O+ote: The power of commander in chief of the # &rmy to issue a proclamation providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid( comfort and sustenance to the enemy( cannot be seriously :uestioned.P '. %hether or not this court has "urisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being sub"ected. H%l#: ,. +o. FThe war( in the legal sense( continues until( and terminated at the same time of( some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political department( and not the "udicial department( to determine if war has ended. The fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the # &rmy has already begun does not mean that the war has( in the legal sense( already terminated( which clearly it has not. 3elivery within the power of military authorities to make even before was terminates. '. +o. Civil Courts should not interfere. & foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it( is e)empt from civil and criminal "urisdiction of the place. 9rant of free passage implies a waiver of all "urisdiction over troops during passage *let them e)ercise their own discipline2. &ny attempt by our civil Courts to e)ercise "urisdiction over # troops would be a violation of our countryDs faith. 6n the other hand( petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities. !'Au'4, v. Co11,+#'+$ G%+%(,l, 88 5.'l. 66/ :1948; FAC<S: Mi:uiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee of the # army in the $hilippines who had been charged of disposing in the $ort of Manila &rea of things belonging to the # army in violation of the -8th article of %ar of the #. !e was arrested and a 9eneral CourtA Martial was appointed. !e was found guilty. &s a rule( the $hilippines being a sovereign nation has "urisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory but it may( by treaty or by agreement( consent that the # shall e)ercise "urisdiction over certain offenses committed within said portions of territory. *SSUES: ,. %hether or not the offense has been committed within a # base thus giving the # "urisdiction over the case. '. %6+ the offender is a member of the # armed forces H%l#: ,. +o. The $ort of Manila &rea where the offense was committed is not within a # base for it is not names in &nne) & or 4 of &rticle KK>I of the Military 4ase &greement *M4&2 and is merely part of the temporary :uarters located within presented limits of the city of Manila. Moreover( e)tended installations and temporary :uarters are not considered to have the same "urisdictional capacity as permanent bases and are governed by &rticle KIII paragraphs ' and 8. The offence at bar( therefore is in the beyond the "urisdiction of military courts. '. +o. nder the M4&( a civilian employee is not considered as a member of the # armed forces. ?ven under the articles of war( the mere fact that a civilian employee is in the service of the # &rmy does not make him a member of the armed forces. U.S. v. A. S'+$, 36 5.'l. 9/8 :191/; FAC<S: The defendant is a sub"ect of China employed as a fireman on a steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived the port of Cebu on &pril '1( ,-,/( after a voyage direct from the port of #aigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in #aigon( brought them on board the steamship and had them in his possession during the trip from #aigon to Cebu. %hen the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu( the authorities on making the search found the cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer<s engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in #aigon. !e did not confess( however( as to his purpose in buying the opium. !e did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug. *SSUE: %hether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the $hilippine Islands has been provenL H%l#: Bes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from which the drug discharged came into $hilippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In this case( it is to be noted that #ec. 8 of &ct +o. '7@, begins( F&ny person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the $hilippine IslandsIG Import and bring should be construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going into a port( without breaking bulk( is prima facie evidence of importation. The importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse( but merely the bringing them into the port( and the importation is complete before the entry to the customhouse. Moreover( possession for personal use is unlikely( "udging from the size of the amount brought. L',+$ v. 5%o0l%, 363 SCRA 676 :6888; FAC<S: $etitioner is an economist for &34 who was charged by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong city for allegedly uttering defamatory words against her fellow worker with two counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC "udge then received an office of protocol from the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs( stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 81 of the agreement bet &34 and the government. MeTC "udge( without notice( dismissed the two criminal cases. $rosecution filed writ of mandamus and certiorari and ordered the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest. *SSUE: %hether or not the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court. H%l#: !e is not covered by immunity because the commission of a crime is part of the performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the 3F& that a certain person is covered by immunity. That a person is covered by immunity is preliminary. 3ue process is right of the accused as much as the prosecution. #landering a person is not covered by the agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of official duty. nder >ienna convention on 3iplomatic ;elations( commission of a crime is not part of official duty. 6n the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted( suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. 4eing purely a statutory right( preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear than no preliminary investigation is re:uired in cases falling within the "urisdiction of the MeTC. 4esides( the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the courtDs "urisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. U.S. v. S3%%), 1 5.'l. 18 :1981; FAC<S: #weet was employed by the nited #tates military who committed an offense against a $6%. !is case is filed with the CFI( who is given original "urisdiction in all criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 0 months is imposed. !e is now contending that the courts are without "urisdiction because he was Facting in the line of duty.G *SSUES: ,. %hether or not the case at bar is within the "urisdiction of the CFI. '. %hether or not an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the penal codeL 7. &ssuming that it is an offence under the penal code( whether or not the military character sustained by the person charged with the offence at the time of its commission e)empts him from the ordinary "urisdiction of the civil tribunalsL H%l#: ,. Bes. 4y &ct +o. ,70 of the #A$hil Commission( the CFIs are given original "urisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more than 0 months imprisonment or a fine greater than Q,.. may be imposed. Furthermore( CFIs have "urisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the $enal Code within their territorial limits( regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the "urisdiction of the CFI because he failed to prove that he was indeed acting in theline of duty. '. Bes. Though assault by military officer against a $6% is not in the ;$C( physical assault charges may be pressed under the ;$C. 7. +o. The application of the general principle that the "urisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character brought before them for trial *;.&. +o. /.112. &ppellant claims that the act was servicebut this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes "urisdiction of the case.G 5udgment: 5udgment thereby affirmed F&n offense charged against a military officer in conse:uence of an act done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face( where such offense is against the military law( is not within the "urisdiction of the courts of the Civil 9overnment.G RR$er Cooper( 5.( concurring S%-(%),(y o& Ju)'-% v. L,+)'o+, 366 SCRA 168 :6888; FAC<S: 6n 5une ,@( ,--- the 3epartment of 5ustice received from the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs a re:uest for the e)tradition of private respondent Mark 5imenez to the .#. The 9rand 5ury Indictment( the warrant for his arrest( and other supporting documents for said e)tradition were attached along with the re:uest. Charges include: ,. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the # '. &ttempt to evade or defeat ta) 7. Fraud by wire( radio( or television 8. False statement or entries 1. ?lection contribution in name of another The 3epartment of 5ustice( through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the e)tradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. ;espondent( then re:uested for copies of all the documents included in the e)tradition re:uest and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The #ecretary of 5ustice denied re:uest on the ff. grounds: ,. !e found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. &t that point in time( the 365 is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and re:uirements under the relevant law *$3 ,.0-N$hilippine ?)tradition Caw2 and treaty *;$A# ?)tradition Treaty2 have been complied with by the ;e:uesting 9overnment. ?valuation by the 365 of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. '. The .#. re:uested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. 7. Finally( the country is bound to the >ienna convention on the law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus( certiorari( and prohibition. The ;TC of +C; ruled in favor of the respondent. #ecretary of 5ustice was made to issue a copy of the re:uested papers( as well as conducting further proceedings. *SSUES: ,. %hether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing. '. %hether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the $hilippine 9overnment under the ;$A# Treaty. 7. %6+ there is any conflict between private respondentDs basic due process rights and the provisions of the ;$A# ?)tradition treaty H%l#: ,. Bes. #ection '*a2 of $3 ,.@0 defines e)tradition as Fthe removal of an accused from the $hilippines with the ob"ect of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the re:uesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the e)ecution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the re:uesting state or government.G <hough the in:uisitorial power e)ercised by the 3epartment of 5ustice as an administrative agency due to the failure of the 3F& to comply lacks any "udicial discretion( it primarily sets the wheels for the e)tradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective e)tradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective e)tradite pending the submission of the re:uest and the temporary arrest of the prospective e)tradite during the pendency of the e)tradition petition in court. Clearly( there is an impending threat to a prospective e)traditeeDs liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. 4ecause of such conse:uences( the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding( the conse:uences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for and ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective e)tradite. In essence( therefore( the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. 4ut the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life( liberty( or property( the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal( and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar( similar to a preliminary investigation( the evaluation stage of the e)tradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent( can possibly lead to his arrest( and to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus( the e)traditee must be accorded due process rights of notice and hearing according to &rt. 7 sec ,8*,2 and *'2( as well as &rt. 7 sec /Nthe right of the people to information on matters of public concern and the corollary right to access to official records and documents. The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation( having conse:uences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective e)tradite. & favorable action in an e)tradition re:uest e)poses a person to eventual e)tradition to a foreign country( thus e)hibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result R the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice and hearing are applicable in criminal( civil and administrative proceedings. +onobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests( and upon notice( may claim the right to appear therein and present their side. ;ights to notice and hearing: 3ispensable in 7 cases: a.%hen there is an urgent need for immediate action *preventive suspension in administrative charges( padlocking filthy restaurants( cancellation of passport2. b.%here there is tentativeness of administrative action( and the respondent is not prevented from en"oying the right to notice and hearing at a later time *summary distraint and levy of the property of a delin:uent ta)payer( replacement of an appointee2 c.Twin rights have been offered( but the right to e)ercise them had not been claimed. '. +o. The .#. and the $hilippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective "urisdictions. 4oth states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesnDt fall under the three e)ceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the #ection 7 ;ules ,,' of the ;ules of Court. 7. +o. 3octrine of incorporation under international law( as applied in most countries( decrees that rules of international law are given e:ual standing with( but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. +o conflict. >eil of secrecy is lifted during trial. ;e:uest should impose veil at any stage. 5udgment: $etition dismissed for lack of merit. BANCO NAC*ONAL DE CUBA v SABBA<*NO 3/6 US 398D 84 :19642 FAC<S In 5uly ,-0.( the Cuban government retaliated against the # for various measures imposed against the Castro government by e)propriating property held by # citizens in Cuba. This included the seizure of sugar owned by C&>. & different &merican company( Farr( %hitlock H Co. had contracted to buy this sugar from C&>( but after it was seized( they bought it directly from the Cuban government. &fter receiving the sugar( however( Farr( %hitlock H Co. did not pay the Cuban governmentAAinstead( they paid C&><s legal representative( #abbatino. 4anco +acional de Cuba( the national bank of Cuba *acting on behalf of the Cuban government2( filed a suit in the # 3istrict Court for the #outhern 3istrict of +B against #abbatino( to recover the money paid for the sugar. The 3istrict Court and the C& ruled in favor of #abbatino( and the case was appealed to the #C. *SSUE %hether the &ct of #tate 3octrine should be applied HELD 9ES. The Court applied the &ct of #tate 3octrine and upheld the legality of the e)propriation because it was an official act of another country( not sub"ect to :uestion in the # courts. The Court refused to hold that the e)propriation violated international law( because there no clear unity of international opinion disapproving the seizure of land or property in a country by a government of that country. It noted that interposition of the ?)ecutive was unnecessary to prevent the courts from interfering in the affairs of state( as a single court could upset delicate international negotiations through the assertion of # law in another country. Finally( the Court found no bar to application of the doctrine should imposed by the fact that Cuba had brought the suit( comparing this to the sovereign immunity en"oyed by the # states which can sue( but cannot be sued. Go <',+ C.,' v. Co11''o+%( o& *11'$(,)'o+ 9; +o. CA'.081( '' #eptember ,-00 F,-)C 9o Tian Chai *9o2 is a Chinese national( admitted as a temporary visitor into the $hilippines on &pril '7( ,-8/. !aving failed to leave upon e)piration of his visa( notwithstanding the granted e)tensions( he was arrested March ,( ,-1.. 3uring the deportation proceedings( he was temporarily released under bail. Cater( the 4oard of Commissioners *4oC2 unanimously declared him to have unlawfully overstayed in the $hilippines and ordered his deportation on the first available flight. The %arrant for deportation was issued on March @( ,-1,( but the actual arrest and custody by the immigration authorities was ,, years later( on 6ct @( ,-0'. 3uring his detention and pending his deportation to Taiwan( 9o filed a petition for habeas corpus. In his petition( he alleged *,2 the representations made by his counsel in admission and repatriation to Taiwan were futile( and *'2 it was unlikely that the $hil. 9ovDt would be able to deport him in the near future. #o he prayed for temporary liberty on bail( with the case of Borovsky v. Commissioner as basis( which said that F& foreign national( not an enemy and no criminal charges were filed against or "udicially issues( was also entitled to protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of lawG The lower court ruled in favor of 9o. It took notice of the fact that there were indeed negotiations between the Chinese and the $hilippine 9overnments( and recognizes that these take time. !owever in this case( the petition of habeas corpus has been filed only l% ).,+ 6 1o+). from 9oDs arrest and detention. &nd deportation can only be effect when the matters are final. It cannot be said that the detention was for an unreasonable length of time. 6n the other hand( negotiations between the $hil and Taiwanese governments may drag on for a long time( it would be un"ust to detain the petitioner for that length of time. The Court in the case of Borovsky v. Commissioner said the 0 months is considered a reasonable length of time as the limit( after which a writ of habeas may be ordered( and release on bail in an amount the court may deem proper. !ence the lower court ordered release under bail( after such lapse of 0 months. 6n appeal( Commissioner contends that the lower court erred in the provided si) month limit( applying Borovsky, because *,2 it compels the $hil. 9ovDt to finalize negotiations to 0 months( *'2 unlike 4orovsky( 9o is +6T a stateless individual( but a national who can be deported to Taiwan and *72 The court has no authority to interfere. *u%C ,. %hether or not 9o may be released on bail during the pendency of the negotiations '. %hether or not the 0 month period may be applied to this case. 7. %hether or not 9o had an inherent right to bail. 8. %hether or not the Courts can interfere with Immigration authorityL H%l#C ,. +o. The Court ruled in many previous cases( a Chinese national declared to be overstaying may be sub"ect to deportation pending negotiations. It has been ruled that there is nothing Fun"ustG in the detention of the overstaying Chinese nationals( because all is in accordance of $hilippine Caws. &lso( as in Tan Seng Pao v. Commissioner( the petitioner is +6T a stateless aliens hence has a J+6%+ country( to which he may be deported to. If there be any delay( it is not due to the fault or negligence of the 9overnment or its officers. It may be a result from diplomatic negotiations which can have variable results( in any case( cannot be taken against the 9overnment and be a ground for declaring the order of deportation functus oficio. 6therwise( orders of deportation can easily be rendered ineffective by aliens frustrating all diplomatic efforts in negotiation. '. +o. The 0 month period may not be applied since the case of Borovsky is separate and distinct( 9o being an alien with a known state( therefore( the #upreme Court ruled against the lower courtDs ruling in 9oDs favor. 7. +o. &liens in deportation proceedings( as a rule( have no inherent right to bail and that any release can only be granted e)pressly by law *Bengzon v. campo2. In #ec 7/ *-2 *e2 of the $hil Imm &ct( it provides that F&ny alien...may be released under bond and other such conditions as may be imposed by the CommissionerG. +ote that it is only the Commissioner who had the power and discretion to grant bail. The word FmayG indicates bail is merely permissive and discretionary upon the Commissioner. 8. +o. The determination of the alienDs propriety( is sub"ect to the law and procedure under the Immigration &ct as to bail and release( and falls e)clusively within the "urisdiction of the Commissioner( and not the courts of "ustice. #imply because courts do not administer immigration laws. *The only thing the courts can check is the proper administration and e)ecution of $hilippine immigration laws( and ?KCC3?# the discretion of the Commissioners.2 K.o(o3 !'+u-.%( v CA ,+# S-,l@o GR No. 9//67 :1996; F,-): Jhosrow Minucher is the Cabor &ttachS of the ?mbassy of Iran in the $hil. &rthur #calzo( then connected with the &merican ?mbassy in Manila( was introduced to him by 5ose Inigo *an informer belonging to the military intelligence community2. &ccording to Inigo( #calzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to #calzo about his problems with the &merican ?mbassy regarding the e)pired visas of his wife( &bbas Torabian. 6ffering help( #calzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the 3rug ?nforcement &dministration *3?&2 assigned to the &merican ?mbassy in Manila. &s a result( #calzo e)pressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas. #calzo went to Minucher<s residence and asked to be entrusted with $ersian silk carpets( for which he had a buyer. The ne)t day( #calzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for Q'(.... It turned out that #calzo prepared a plan to frameAup a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. 4oth were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the 3angerous 3rugs &ct. Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. !owever( counsel for #calzo filed a motion to :uash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the $hilippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that #calzo is outside the $hilippines. TC denied the motion. C& dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the 3iplomatic +ote *advising the 3F& that #calzo is a member of the # diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking2( #calzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity. *u%: ,. %hether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a 3iplomatic +ote. '. %hether or not private respondent &rthur #calzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with the >ienna Convention on 3iplomatic ;elations H%l#: ,. +o. 5urisdiction over the person of the defendant is ac:uired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case( #calzo<s counsel filed a motion to :uash( which( in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an e)tension to file time to file an &nswer and filing an &nswer with Counterclaim. The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. #aid complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that #calzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher<s theory that he was a victim of frameAup hence( there is a prima facie showing that #calzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further( #calzo did not come forward with evidence to( prove that he acted in his official capacity. '. The #C 3?+I?3 the petition. Conformably with the >ienna Convention( the functions of the diplomatic mission involve( the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. 6nly Fdiplomatic agents(G are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed( the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. 4eing an &ttache( #calzoDs main function is to observe( analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. !e is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. 6n the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note( divesting the trial court of "urisdiction over his person( his diplomatic immunity is contentious. nder the related doctrine of #tate Immunity from #uit( the precept that a #tate cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a longAstanding rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent( although not necessarily a diplomatic personage( but acting in his official capacity( the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. #uing a representative of a state is believed to be( in effect( suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the #tate( in whose service he is( under the ma)im R par in parem( non habet imperium R that all states are sovereign e:uals and cannot assert "urisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the "udgment against an official would re:uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award( such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him( the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself( although it has not been formally impleaded & foreign agent( operating within a territory( can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable re:uirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The FbuyAbust operationG and other such acts are indication that the $hilippine government has given its imprimatur( if not consent( to the activities within $hilippine territory of agent #calzo of the nited #tates 3rug ?nforcement &gency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher( later acting as the poseurAbuyer during the buyAbust operation( and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher( #calzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. <AEADA "S. ANGARA 6/6 SCRA 18 F,-) 6n &pril ,1( ,--8( the $hilippine 9overnment represented by its #ecretary of the 3epartment of Trade and Industry signed the Final &ct binding the $hilippine 9overnment to submit to its respective competent authorities the %T6 *%orld Trade 6rganization2 &greements to seek approval for such. 6n 3ecember ,8( ,--8( ;esolution +o. -/ was adopted by the $hilippine #enate to ratify the %T6 &greement. This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the %T6 agreement as it violates #ec ,-( &rticle II( providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy( and #ections ,. and ,'( &rticle KII( providing for the FFilipino firstG policy. *u% %hether or not the ;esolution +o. -/ ratifying the %T6 &greement is unconstitutional. H%l#C The #upreme Court ruled the ;esolution +o. -/ is not unconstitutional. %hile the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods( services( labor and enterprises( at the same time( it recognizes the need for business e)change with the rest of the world on the bases of e:uality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words( the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore( the constitutional policy of a FselfAreliant and independent national economyG does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments( goods and services. It contemplates neither Feconomic seclusionG nor Fmendicancy in the international community.G The #enate( after deliberation and voting( gave its consent to the %T6 &greement thereby making it Fa part of the law of the landG. The #upreme Court gave due respect to an e:ual department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. &s a result( the ratification of the %T6 &greement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. & treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. & state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. BOR*S !EJOFF "S. D*REC<OR OF 5R*SONS 98 5.'l. /8 :19/9; Cou() o& ).% 5.'l'00'+% F,-)C The case is a second petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner 4oris Me"off( the first having been denied in a decision of this Court of 5uly 7.( ,-8-. !erein petitioner is an alien of ;ussian decent who was brought from #hanghai by the 5apanese forces. pon liberation( he was arrested as 5apanese spy by .#. &rmy Counter Intelligence Corps and was handed to the Commonwealth 9overnment for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth &ct +o. 0@'. Thereafter( the $eople Court ordered his release but the 3eportation 4oard taking his case up declared the petitioner as an illegal alien for lack of necessary documents presented upon entering the $hilippines. The immigration officials then ordered that the petitioner be deported on the first available transportation to ;ussia but failed to do so in several times. %hile the arrangements for his departure are being made and for the best interest of the country( petitioner Me"off was detained at the 4ilibid $rison in Muntinlupa. 6ver two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated( the 9overnment has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country. *u%C %hether or not prolonged detention of the petitioner is warranted by law and the Constitution. H%l#C The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and commanded the respondents to release the former from custody sub"ect to terms and conditions. The petitionerDs unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution( if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual( present( or uncontrollable. The possibility that he might "oin or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does not "ustify prolonged detention( the remedy in that case being to impose conditions in the order of release and e)act bail in a reasonable amount with sufficient sureties. !ence( a foreign national( not enemy( against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or "udicial order issued( may not be indefinitely be kept in detention. !e has the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to human beings( as proclaimed in the niversal 3eclaration of !uman ;ights approved by the 9eneral &ssembly of the nited +ations( of which the $hilippines is a member. A$u)'+ v E#u 88 SCRA 197 F,-)C This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Cetter of Instruction +o. ''-( issued by $resident Ferdinand ?. Marcos( re:uiring all vehicle owners( users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction( the Commissioner of the Cand Transportation 6ffice issued &dministrative 6rder +o. , directing the compliance thereof. This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subse:uent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process( e:ual protection of the law and undue delegation of police power. *u%C %hether or not the Cetter of Instruction +o. ''- and the subse:uent &dministrative 6rder issued is unconstitutional .%l#C The #upreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in :uestion are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the e)ercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact( the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions( as its premise and basis( the resolutions of the ,-0@ >ienna Convention on ;oad #igns and #ignals and the discussions on traffic safety by the nited +ations A that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways. J.B.L. R%y% v. B,$,)'+$, GR No. 67366 O-)o4%( 67, 1983 F,-) C $etitioner( retired 5ustice 54 .C ;eyes filed a petition to respondent( Mayor ;amon 4agatsing( the city mayor of manila that on behalf of antiAbases coalition sought a permit from the city of manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on october '0( ,-@7 from '... to 1... in the afternoon( starting from the luneta( a public park( to the gates of united states embassy( hardly two blocks away. 6nce there( and in an open space of the public property( a short program would be held. 6n october '.( ,-@7 the petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory in"unction because due to the fact that as of that date( petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his re:uest on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. 6n october '1( ,-@7( the answer of respondent mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on october ,-( suc permit was denied. *u% C ,. %hether or not holding a rally in front of the # embassy would be applicable or a violation of 6rdinance no./'-1 of the city of manila. '. %hether or not the denial of the e)ercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly was "ustified by clear and present danger. Rul'+$ : The petition was granted. The #upreme Court granted the mandatory in"unction allowing the proposed march and rally. The court found that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would "ustify the denial of the e)ercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly. 6ur country is signatory of the >ienna Convention. It is binding in our laws. The second paragraph of its &rticle '' that the receiving state is under a special duty to take appropriate steps tp protect the premise of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. That being the case( if there were clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage( or disturbance of the of the peace of the mission( or impairment of its dignity( there would be a "ustification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the embassy. U+')%# S),)% o& A1%('-, v. Gu'+)o 186 SCRA 644 FAC<SC These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In 9; +o. /00./( the private respondents are suing several officers of the # &ir Force stationed in Clark &ir 4ase in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said base. In 9; +o. /-8/.( Fabian 9enove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Camachia( 4elsa( Cartalla and 6rascion for his dismissal as cook in the # &ir Force ;ecreation Center at Camp 5ohn !ay &ir #tation in 4aguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation( from the testimony of 4elsa( Cartalla and 6rascion( that 9enove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Camachia( as club manager( suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. 9enoveDs reaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners. In 9; +o. @..,@( Cuis 4autista( who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano 6D 3onnell( an e)tension of Clark &ir 4as( was arrested following a buyAbust operation conducted by the individual petitioners who are officers of the # &ir Force and special agents of the &ir Force 6ffice of #pecial Investigators. 6n the basis of the sworn statements made by them( an information for violation of ;.&. 08'1( otherwise known as the 3angerous 3rugs &ct( was filed against 4autista in the ;TC of Tarlac. #aid officers testified against him at his trial. 4autista was dismissed from his employment. !e then filed a complaint against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. In 9; +o. @.'1@( a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners *e)cept the #2( for in"uries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. &ccording to the plaintiffs( the defendants beat them up( handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused e)tensive in"uries to them. The defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In a motion to dismiss the complaint( the # and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the #( which had not given its consent to be sued. *SSUEC %hether the defendants were also immune from suit under the ;$A# 4ases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties. HELDC The rule that a #tate may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. ?ven without such affirmation( we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. nder this doctrine( as accepted by the ma"ority of the states( such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and conse:uence of its membership in the society of nations. &ll states are sovereign e:uals and cannot assert "urisdiction over one another. %hile the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent( it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the "udgment against such officials will re:uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same( the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. %hen the government enters into a contract( it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. In the case o #( the customary law of international law on state immunity is e)pressed with more specificity in the ;$A# 4ases Treaty. There is no :uestion that the #( like any other state( will be deemed to have impliedly waived its nonAsuability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietory or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. It is clear from a study of the records of 9; +o. @..,@ that the petitioners therein were acting in the e)ercise of their official functions when they conducted the buyAbust operations against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the #( they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal( which has not given its consent to be sued. &s for 9; +o. @..,@( the record is too meager to indicate what really happened. The needed in:uiry first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Holy S%% v. Ro,('o J(. !"# SC$% &!' FAC<SC & piece of real property was ac:uired by the !oly #ee by way of donation from the &rchdiocese of Manila. The purpose was to construct the official place of residence of the $apal +uncio. Cater( the !oly #ee sold the property on condition that it will evict the s:uatters therein. For failure to comply with the condition( the !oly #ee was sued. It moved to dismiss on the ground of state immunity. *SSUEC %hether respondent trial court has "urisdiction over petitioner being a foreign state en"oying sovereign immunity. HELDC The ;epublic of the $hilippines has accorded the !oly #ee the status if a foreign sovereign( the !oly #ee( through its &mbassador( the $apal +uncio( has had diplomatic representations with the $hilippine 9overnment since ,-1/. The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the memorandum and certification of the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs. The 3F& has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the ?mbassy of the !oly #ee is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the ;epublic of the $hilippines e)empt from local "urisdiction and entitled to all the rights( privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country. The determination of the e)ecutive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political :uestion that is conclusive upon the courts. %here the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the e)ecutive branch( it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the e)ecutive arm of the government in conducting the countryDs foreign relations. 9,1,.'), v. S)y%( 9.;. CA,'- 3ecember ,-( ,-81 F,-): Bamashita was the Commanding 9eneral of the 5apanese army in the $hilippines during %orld %ar '. !e was charged before the &merican military commission for war crimes. !e filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against 9en. #tyer to reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. $etitioner also :uestioned the "urisdiction of the military tribunal. *u%C %hether or not the military tribunal has "urisdiction. H%l#: B?#. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. !ence( petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the #C invoked &rt. , of the !ague Convention +o. I> of ,-./( as well as &rt. ,- of !ague Convention +o. K( &rt. '0 of ,-'- 9eneva Convention among others. (abeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to his former status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military measure and not within the "urisdiction of the courts. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the military commission is not made a party respondent in the case. &s such( no order may be issued re:uiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.
HERBER< BRO=NELL, JR. v SUN L*FE ASSURANCE CO!5AN9 OF CANADA G.R. No. L-7/31, Ju+% 66, 1974 F,-): This is a petition instituted in the CFI under the provisions of $hilippines $roperty &ct of the # against the #un Cife &ssurance company of Canada to compel the latter to comply with the demand of the former to pay him the money which T of the proceeds of an endowment policy payable to &ihara( 5apanese national. The defenses of #un Cife &ssurance are that immunities in Trading with the ?nemy &ct of # is doubtful application in the $hilippines and defendant is a trustee of the fund and under legal obligation to see to it that it is paid to the person entitled.CFI granted the petition. !ence( appeal was filed with the #C contending that CFI erred in holding that the law is binding upon the inhabitants of the $hilippines. *u%: %6+ the Trading with the ?nemy &ct apply to $hilippines 9ovt. H%l#: Bes( & foreign law may have e)traterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin providedthe former in which it sought to be made operative gives its consent. The consent need not be e)press it is enough to be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers. In this case( the said act was conformed by $resident ;o)as in a "oint statement signed by him and by Commissioner Mc+utt. &mbassador ;omulo also formally e)pressed the conformity of the 9overnment of the $hilippines to the approval of said act to the &merican #enate. It is well settled in the # that its laws have no e)traterritorial effect. The application of said law in the $hilippines is based concurrently on $hilippines $roperty &ct of ,-80 and on the tacit consent and conduct of the 9overnment of the $hilippines in receiving the benefits of its provisions. HA= 5*A v CH*NA BANK*NG COR5ORA<*ON FAC<S !aw $ia had previously contracted a loan from China 4anking Corporation in the amount of $1(,.7.71( which( according to !aw $ia( had been completely paid( on different occasions from ,-8' to ,-88 through 4ank of Taiwan( Ctd.( which was appointed by the 5apanese Military authorities as li:uidator of China 4anking Corp. %ith this( !aw $ia instituted an action against China 4anking Corp. to compel the bank to e)ecute a deed of cancellation of mortgage on the property used as security for the loan and to deliver its title. !owever( upon service of summons( China 4anking Corp. demanded from !aw $ia for the payment of the sum of its indebtedness with interests( which also constituted its counter claim in its answer. ;TC rendered a decision in favor of China 4anking Corp. on the basis that there was no evidence to show that 4ank of Taiwan was authorized by China 4anking Corp. to accept !aw $ia<s payment and that 4ank of Taiwan( as an agency of the 5apanese invading army( was not authorized under the international law to li:uidate the business of China 4anking Corp. &s such( !aw $ia<s payment to 4ank of Taiwan has not e)tinguished his indebtedness to China 4anking Corp. *SSUE %hether the 5apanese Military &dministration had authority to order the li:uidation of the business of China 4anking Corp. and to appoint 4ank of Taiwan as li:uidator authorized as such to accept payment HELD 9ES. nder international law( the 5apanese Military authorities had power to order the li:uidation of China 4anking Corp. and to appoint and authorize 4ank of Taiwan as li:uidator to accept the payment in :uestion( because such li:uidation is not confiscation of the properties of China 4anking Corp.( but a mere se:uestration of its assets which re:uired its li:uidation. The se:uestration or li:uidation of enemy banks in occupied territories is authorized e)pressly( not only by the # &rmy and +aval Manual of Military 9overnment and Civil &ffairs( but also similar manuals of other countries( without violating &rt. 80 or other articles of the !ague ;egulations. They do not amount to an outright confiscation of private property. The purpose of such se:uestration( as e)pounded in the &nnual ;eport of the 6ffice of the &lien Custodian( is that enemyAowned property can be used to further the interest of the enemy and to impede their war efforts. &ll enemyA controlled assets can be used to finance propaganda( espionage( and sabotage in these countries or in countries friendly to their cause. It is presumed that 5apan( in se:uestering and li:uidating China 4anking Corp.( must have acted in accordance( either with her own Manual of the &rmy and +avy and Civil &ffairs 6; with her Trading with the ?nemy &ct( and even if not( it being permitted to the &llied +ations( specially the # and ?ngland( to se:uestrate( impound( and block enemy properties found within their own domain or in enemy territories occupied during the war by their armed forces( and it not being contrary to !ague ;egulations or international law( 5apan had also the right to do the same in the $hilippines by virtue of the international law principle that =what is permitted to one belligerent is also allowed to the other.= Taking these into consideration( it appears that 5apan did not intend to confiscate or appropriate the assets of said banks or the debts due them from their debtors. The fact that the 5apanese Military authorities failed to pay the enemy banks the balance of the money collected by the 4ank of Taiwan from the debtors of the said banks( did not and could not change the se:uestration by them of the bank<s assets during the war( into an outright confiscation thereof. It was physically impossible for the 5apanese Military authorities to do so because they were forcibly driven out of the $hilippines( following the read"ustment of rights of private property on land seized by the enemy provided by the Treaty of >ersailles and other peace treaties entered into at the close of %%I. The general principles underlying such arrangements are that the owners of properties seized are entitled to receive compensation for the loss or damage inflicted on their property by the emergency war measures taken by the enemy. #ince 5apan war notes were issued as legal tender( 5apan was bound to indemnify the aggrieved banks for the loss or damage on their property( in terms of $hil. $esos of # Q. #ince the 5apanese Military Forces had power to se:uestrate and impound the assets of China 4anking Corp. and to appoint 4ank of Taiwan as li:uidator( it follows that payments of !aw $ia to 4ank of Taiwan e)tinguished his obligations to China 4anking Corp. <HE *N<ERHANDEL CASE :*CJ JUDG!EN<, !ARCH 61, 1979; FAC<S The 9eneral &niline and Film Company *9&F2 is a corporation incorporated in the nited #tates. nder the FTrading with the ?nemy &ctG the government of the nited #tates took almost all of the shares of said company reasoning that such shares were controlled by I.9. Farben( a 9erman and therefore enemy company. I.9. Farben controlled the shares of 9&F through a #wiss company called I.9. Chemie of 4asle. !owever by ,-8.( I.9. Chemie had changed its name to Interhandel and was found by #wiss authorities to no longer be controlled by any 9erman or other enemy company. #witzerland therefore seeks the restoration of the shares of 9&F that is owned by Interhandel. #uch restoration is however being opposed by the nited #tates who still maintains its stance that Interhandle is being controlled by I.9. Farben. #witzerland would like to submit the dispute to the International Court of 5ustice however the nited #tates believes that the IC5 has no "urisdiction over the matter. #witzerland bases its claim that the IC5 has "urisdiction on &rt. 70( $ar. ' of the statute of the Court. *SSUE %hether the IC5 has "urisdiction to decide the case between #witzerland and the nited #tates of &merica HELD NO. The #wiss &pplication is inadmissible. The nited #tates presented four ob"ections to #witzerlandDs &pplication. 6ne of which was sustained therefore making the #wiss &pplication inadmissible. The ob"ection sustained held that the #wiss &pplication could not be entertained because not all local remedies have been e)hausted by Interhandel. The local remedy referred to is a case still pending in the # courts. 3octrine of the case *according to the book2: FD;eciprocity in the case of 3eclarations accepting compulsory "urisdiction of the Court enables a $arty to invoke a reservation to that acceptance which it has not e)pressed in its own 3eclaration but which the other $arty has e)pressed in its 3eclaration.D Thus( if a party that has made a 3eclaration unconditionally is brought to the court by another that has made a 3eclaration with conditions( the former can invoke the conditions in the latterDs 3eclaration. The situation in this case was that the nited #tates was invoking the reservation that it made when it accepted the statute of the Court on the countryDs acceptance of the CourtDs compulsory "urisdiction. #uch reservation sought to limit the courtDs "urisdiction to cases Fhereinafter arisingG 5uly '@( ,-8@. Following the doctrine stated in the bookM this means that #witzerland may therefore invoke such reservation if in their own declaration does not contain such. This is the effect of reciprocity. !owever( it cannot "ustify a #tate( in this instance the nited #tates( in relying upon a restriction which the other $arty( #witzerland has not included in its own 3eclaration. <HE 5A?UE<E HABANA CASE FAC<S The Pa)uete (abana was a sloop and the *ola was a schooner both were flying under the #panish flag and both were owned and manned by #panish sub"ects residing in Cuba which was then a colony of #pain. 4oth left !avana on a fishing e)pedition and upon making their way back to the capital encountered the naval blockade of the nited #tates of &merica who had recently declared war on #pain. The crews of both ships were unaware of the state of war between the two nations and were also unaware of the blockade of the navy. They nevertheless did not try to escape or resist. pon searching the vessels no weapons or ammunition was found and it appears that the crew members had no intention of aiding the cause of the #panish forces. Their ships were commandeered and brought to Fort Jeys in Florida wherein they were declared as prizes of war and auctioned off for Q8-. and Q@.. respectively. *SSUE %hether the fishing smacks were rightfully captured by armed vessels of the nited #tates during the recent war with #pain. HELD NO. The fishing vessels were captured illegally. 4y an ancient usage among civilized nations( beginning centuries ago and gradually ripening into a rule of international law( coast fishing vessels pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish have been recognized as e)empt( with their cargoes and crews( from capture as prize of war. The nited #tates had no authority to commandeer the fishing smacks in :uestion. #ources from as far back as ,8.7 were cited by the court to prove the ancient tradition. Cetters between kings of ?uropean powers were :uoted as well as treaties between ?uropean nations. &ll emphasized the need to spare fishermen and their vessels from the effects of war. #ome :uotes: FIn time of war( the freedom of fishing is respected by belligerentsM fishing boats are considered as neutralM in law( as in principle( they are not sub"ect either to capture or to confiscation.G =&n e)ception to the usage of capturing enemy<s private vessels at sea is the coast fishery. . . . This principle of immunity from capture of fishing boats is generally adopted by all maritime powers( and in actual warfare they are universally spared so long as they remain harmlessG =;egarding the capture of enemy property( an e)ception must be mentioned( which is a universal custom. Fishing vessels which belong to the ad"acent coast( and whose business yields only a necessary livelihood( are( from considerations of humanity( universally e)cluded from capture.= The capture was unlawful and the proceeds gained through the sale of the ships and their cargo should be restored to the claimant. <HE COUN< BERNADO<<E CASE :AD"*SOR9 O5*N*ON OF <HE *CJ ON RE5ARA<*ON FOR *NJUR*ES SUFFERED *N <HE SER"*CE OF <HE UN; FAC<S Folke 4ernadotte( Count of %isborg( was a #wedish diplomat and nobleman noted for his negotiation of the release of about 7,(... prisoners from the 9erman concentration camps during %%II. &fter the war( he was chosen by the victorious powers to be the + #ecurity Council mediator in the &rabAIsraeli conflict. !e was assassinated in 5erusalem by the militant Uionist group( Cehi( while pursuing his official duties. The + #ecurity Council condemned the killing of 4ernadotte as Fa cowardly act( which appears to have been committed by a criminal group of terrorists in 5erusalem while the + representative was fulfilling his peaceAseeking mission in the !oly Cand.G *SSUE In the event of an agent of the + in the performance of his duties suffering in"ury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a #tate( has the + the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible government with a view of obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage cause *,2 to the +( *'2 to the victim or to persons entitled through himL 3oes the + have international personalityL HELD 9ES. The Court states that the Charter conferred upon the + rights and obligations( which are different from those of its members. The Court stresses further the important political tasks of the +AAthe maintenance of international peace and security. &ccordingly( the Court concludes that the +( possessing as it does rights and obligations( has at the same time a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane( although it is certainly not a superA #tate. The Court reaches a conclusion that the + has the capacity to bring an international claim against a #tate *whether member or not2 for damage resulting from a breach by that #tate of its obligations towards the +. The Court points out that it is not called upon to determine the precise e)tent of the reparation( which the + would be entitled to recoverM the measure of the reparation should depend upon a number of factors. The Court points out in this connection that really only the 6rganization has the capacity to present a claim in the circumstances referred to( inasmuch as at the basis of an international claim there must be a breach by the defendant #tate of an obligation towards the 6rganization. In the present case the #tate of which the victim is a national could not complain of a breach of an obligation towards itself. !ere the obligation is assumed in favor of the 6rganization. !owever( the Court admits that the analogy of the traditional rule of diplomatic protection of nationals abroad does not in itself "ustify an affirmative reply. In fact( there e)ists no link of nationality between the + and its agents. This is a new situation and it must be analyzed. 3o the provisions of the Charter relating to the functions of the + imply that the latter is empowered to assure its agents limited protectionL These powers( which are essential to the performance of the functions of the +( must be regarded as a necessary implication arising from the Charter. In discharging its functions( the + may find it necessary to entrust its agents with important missions to be performed in disturbed parts of the world. These agents must be ensured of effective protection. It is only in this way that the agent will be able to carry out his duties satisfactorily. The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that the + has the capacity to e)ercise functional protection in respect of its agents. The situation is comparative simple: in the case of Member #tates( for these have assumed various obligations towards the 6rganization. 4ut what is the situation when a claim is brought against a #tate( which is not a Member of the 6rganizationL The Court is of opinion that the Members of the nited +ations created an entity possessing ob"ective international personality and not merely personality recognized by them alone. Vuestion +o. I, of the 9eneral &ssembly refers to the reconciliation of action by the nited +ations with such rights as may be possessed by the #tate of which the victim is a national. In other words( what is involved is possible competition between the rights of diplomatic protection( on the one hand( and functional protection on the other. The Court does not state here which of these two categories of protection should have priority and in the case of Member #tates it stresses their duty to render every assistance provided by &rticle ' of the Charter. It adds that the risk of competition between the 6rganization and the national #tate can be reduced or eliminated either by a general convention or by agreements entered into in each particular case( and it refers further to cases that have already arisen in which a practical solution has already been found. Finally( the Court e)amines the case in which the agent bears the nationality of the defendantA#tate. #ince the claim brought by the + is not based upon the nationality of the victim but rather upon his status as an agent of the +( it does not matter whether or not the #tate to which the claim is addressed regards him as its own national. The legal situation is not modified thereby. UNDERH*LL v HERNANDE> 168 U.S. 678 :189/; FAC<S In an ,@-' revolution( 9eneral !ernandez deposed the e)isting >enezuelan government and took control of Ciudad 4olivar( where $l nderhill( an &merican citizen( lived and ran a waterworks system for the city. nderhill applied to !ernandez( re:uesting a passport to leave the city. !ernandez initially refused( but ultimately granted it. %hen nderhill finally got back to the #( he brought an action to recover damages caused by the refusal to grant the passport( by his detention in >enezuela( for alleged confinement to his own house( and for certain alleged assaults and affronts by the soldiers of !ernandez<s army. *SSUE %hether the action instituted by nderhill will prosper HELD NO. The Court determined that !ernandez had acted in his official capacity as a military commander so his actions were those of the >enezuelan government. The Court therefore refused to hear the claim against !ernandez based on the A-) o& S),)% Do-)('+%. The Court reasoned( =?very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state( and the courts of one country will not sit in "udgment on the acts of the government of another( done within its own territory.= &lso( it did not matter that it was a revolution( and that the commander may not have had recognition at the time as the leader from outside the territory. %hat matters is that he succeeded and is now recognized as such. <HE NO<<EBOH! CASEC L*ECH<ENS<E*N v GUA<E!ALA :*CJ JUDG!EN<, NO"E!BER 18, 1973, A5R*L 6, 1977; FAC<S +ottebohm( born in 9ermany( possessed 9erman citizenship. <hough he lived in 9uatemala from ,-.1 until ,-87( he never became a citizen of 9uatemala. In ,-7-( +ottebohm applied to become a naturalized citizen of Ciechtenstein. The application was approved under e)ceptional circumstances and he became a citizen of Ciechtenstein. !e then returned to 9uatemala on his Ciechtenstein passport and informed the local government of his change of nationality. %hen he tried to return to 9uatemala once again in ,-87( he was refused entry as an enemy alien since the 9uatemalan authorities did not recognize his naturalization and regarded him as still 9erman. It has been suggested that the timing of the event was due to the recent entry of the # and 9uatemala into the %%II. !e was later e)tradited to the # where he was held at an internment camp until the end of the war. &ll his possessions in 9uatemala were confiscated. &fter his release( he lived out the rest of his life in Ciechtenstein. The 9overnment of Ciechtenstein granted +ottebohm protection against un"ust treatment by the government of 9uatemala and petitioned the IC5. !owever( the government of 9uatemala argued that +ottebohm did not gain Ciechtenstein citizenship for the purposes of international law. *SSUE %hether the conferment of the Ciechtenstein citizenship is not contrary to international law and if Ciechtenstein<s claim on behalf of +ottebohm is admissible in court HELD NO. The Court agreed with 9uatemala and held that the claims by Ciechtenstein were inadmissible. <hough the Court stated that it is the sovereign right of all states to determine its own citizens and criteria for becoming one in municipal law( such a process would have to be scrutinized on the international plain in :uestions of diplomatic protection. The Court upheld the principle of effective nationality( where the national must prove a meaningful connection to the state in :uestion. This principle was previously applied only in cases of dual nationality to determine which nationality should be used in a given case. !owever +ottebohm had forfeited his 9erman nationality and thus only had the nationality of Ciechtenstein. &ccording to the practice of #tates( nationality constitutes the "uridical e)pression of the fact that an individual is more closely connected with the population of a particular #tate. Conferred by a #tate( it only entitles that #tate to e)ercise protection if it constitutes a translation into "uridical terms of the individual<s connection with that #tate. %ith regard to +ottebohm( the Court pointed out that he always retained his family and business connections with 9ermany and that there is nothing to indicate that his application for naturalization in Ciechtenstein was motivated by any desire to disassociate himself from 9ermany. There is thus the absence of any bond of attachment with Ciechtenstein( but there is a longAstanding and close connection between him and 9uatemala( a link( which his naturalization in no way weakened. That naturalization was not based on any real prior connection with Ciechtenstein( nor did it in any way alter the manner <of life of the person upon whom it was conferred in e)ceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation. In both respects( it was lacking in the genuineness re:uisite to an act of such importance( if it is to be entitled to be respected by a #tate in the position of 9uatemala. It was granted without regard to the concept of nationality adopted in international relations. +aturalization was asked for not so much for the purpose of obtaining a legal recognition of +ottebohm<s membership in fact in the population of Ciechtenstein( as it was to enable him to substitute for his status as a national of a belligerent #tate that of the sub"ect of a neutral #tate( with the sole aim of thus coming within the protection of Ciechtenstein but not of becoming wedded to its traditions( its interests( its way of life or of assuming the obligations other than fiscal obligations and e)ercising the rights pertaining to the status thus ac:uired. Ju1,$ v NLRC GR 189913, D%- 17, 1994 F,-): Florencio #acramento was a support personnel of the 5oint nited #tates Military &ssistance 9roup to the $hilippines. %hen he was dismissed( he held a position as Illustrator ' was the president of a labor organization registered with 36C?. !owever( he was terminated due to the abolition of his position. !e filed a complaint with 36C? on the ground that he was illegally terminated. ;espondent asked for reinstatement. $etitioner filed for motion to dismiss as he invoked his immunity from suit. Cabor arbiter dismissed his suit and has petitioned in the +ational Cabor ;elations Commission and the latter reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter for the reason that the petitioner lost his right not to be suid because the petitioner failed to refute the e)istence of the employerA employee relationship and when he hired the services of the private respondent. *u%: %hether or not the petitioner has immunity from suit Rul'+$: The petitioner has immunity from suit. ?ven if he hired the services of the private respondent( it has still been acting on behalf of the governmental function of the nited #tates pursuant to the Military &ssistance &greement between the $hilippines and &merica. #ince #& has not consented for the waiver of its immunity from suit( the complaint shouldnDt have prospered. The immunity is one of the recognized principles of International law that the $hilippine adopts. !ence( the petition has been granted. UN*<ED S<A<ES OF A!ER*CA v. RE9ES 619 SCRA 196 :1993; FAC<S: ;espondent +elia Montoya( an &merican Citizen( worked as an I3 checker at the # +avy ?)change *+?K2 at the # Military &ssistance 9roup *5#M&92 head:uarters in Vuezon City. #heDs married to ?dgardo Montoya( a FilipinoA&merican serviceman employed by the # +avy H stationed in #an Francisco. $etitioner Ma)ine is an &merican Citizen employed at the 5#M&9 head:uarters as the activity e)change manager. 6n 5an. ''( ,-@/ Montoya bought some items from the retail store 4radford managed( where she had purchasing privileges. &fter shopping H while she was already at the parking lot( Mrs. Bong Jennedy( a fellow I3 checker approached her H told her that she needed to search her bags upon 4radfordDs instruction. Montoya approached 4radford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all 5#M&9 employees on that day. Mrs. Jennedy then performed the search on her person( bags H car in front of 4radford H other curious onlookers. +othing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. Montoya learned that she was the only person sub"ected to such search that day H she was informed by +?K #ecurity Manager ;oynon that +?K 5#M&9 employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrongAdoing. Montoya canDt recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrongA doing on her part. #he is aware of 4radfordDs propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft andEor shoplifting. Montoya filed a formal protest wEMr. ;oynon but no action was taken. Montoya filed a suit against 4radford for damages due to the oppressive H discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in e)cess of her authority as store manager. #he claims that she has been e)posed to contempt H ridicule causing her undue embarrassment H indignity. #he further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land wEc are a blow to our national pride H dignity. #he seeks for moral damages of $1..k and e)emplary damages of $,..k. 6n May ,7( ,-@/( #ummons H complaint were served on 4radford but instead of filing an answer( she along with #& government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: *,2 this is a suit against # wEc is a foreign sovereign immune from suit wEo its consent and *'2 4radford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under $hilA# Military &ssistance &greement of ,-8/ H Military 4ases &greement of ,-8/. They claim that # has rights( power H authority wEin the bases( necessary for the establishment( use H operation H defense thereof. It will also use facilities H areas wEin bases H will have effective command over the facilities( # personnel( employees( e:uipment H material. They further claim that checking of purchases at +?K is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect H safeguard merchandise( cash H e:uipment pursuant to par. ' H 8*b2 of +&>;?#&C?&CT #4IC I+#T. 11...,. 6n 5uly 0( ,-@/ ( Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that 4radford was about to leave the country H was removing H disposing her properties wEintent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by ;TC. 6n 5uly ,8( ,-@/( Montoya opposed 4radfordDs motion to dismiss. #he claims that: *,2 search was outside +?K 5#M&9 store thus itDs improper( unlawful H highlyA discriminatory and beyond 4radfordDs authorityM *'2 due to e)cess in authority and since her liability is personal( 4radford canDt rely on sovereign immunityM *72 4radfordDs act was committed outside the military base thus under the "urisdiction of $hilippine courtsM *82 the Court can in:uire into the factual circumstances of case to determine %6+ 4radford acted wEin or outside her authority. ;TC granted MontoyaDs motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by 4radford. Montoya allowed to present evidence H 4radford declared in default for failure to file an answer. ;TC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable( reckless( oppressive H against MontoyaDs liberty guaranteed by Consti. #he was awarded $7..k for moral damages( $,..k for e)emplary damages H $1.k for actual e)penses. 4radford filed a $etition for ;estraining 6rder. #C granted T;6 en"oining ;TC from enforcing decision. Montoya claims that 4radford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. ?ven if she were performing governmental acts( she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. #he claims that criminal acts of a public officerEemployee are his private acts H he alone is liable for such acts. #he believes that this case is under ;$ courtsD "urisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the # Military 4ases( it does not fall under offenses where # has been given right to e)ercise its "urisdiction and 4radford does not possess diplomatic immunity. #he further claims that ;$ courts can in:uire into the factual circumstances H determine %6+ 4radford is immune. *SSUESC ,. %6+ the case is under the ;TCDs "urisdiction. '. %6+ ;TC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying 4radfordDs motion to dismiss. 7. %6+ case at bar is a suit against the #tate. 8. %6+ 4radford en"oys diplomatic immunity. HELD: ,. Bes. Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. # did not obtain leave of court *something like asking for CourtDs permission2 to intervene in the present case. Technically( it should not be allowed to intervene but since ;TC entertained its motion to dismiss( it is deemed to have allowed # to intervene. 4y voluntarily appearing( # must be deemed to have sub"ected itself to ;TCDs "urisdiction. '. +o. $etitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in #ec. ,( ;ule ,0( ;ules of Court. Thus( it actually lacks cause of action. & cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid "udgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. & motion to dismiss wEc fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. ;TC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. 4ut this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the #C. 7. +o. 3octrine of state immunity is e)pressed in &rt. K>I( #ec. 7 of the ,-@/ Constitustion. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will re:uire the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. 4ut this is not all encompassing. ItDs a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law H in"urious to rights of plaintiff. #tate authorizes only legal acts by its officers. &ction against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the #tate wEin the rule of immunity of the #tate from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an in"ustice. It will not apply H may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private H personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts wEo authority or in e)cess of the powers vested in him. & public official is liable if he acted wEmalice H in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or "urisdiction. *#hauf vs. C&2 &lso( #& vs. 9uinto declared that #& is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the $hilippines merely because they have acted as agents of the # in the discharge of their official functions. In this case( 4radford was sued in her privateEpersonal capacity for acts done beyond the scope H place of her official function( thus( it falls wEin the e)ception to the doctrine of state immunity. 8. +o. First of all( she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under &rt. ,0*b2 of the ,-17 Military &ssistance &greement creating the 5#M&9. #econd( even diplomatic agents who en"oy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions *&rt. 7,( >ienna Convention on 3iplomatic ;elations2. $etition denied. T;6 lifted. E(%1% KooFoo(')-.F'+ v. Sol'-')o( G%+%(,l G.R. No. L-1816, Au$u) 6/, 1948 FAC<S: In &ugust ,-8,( appelleeApetitioner Jookooritchkin filed with the CFI of Camarines #ur a petition for naturalization( supported by *a2 the affidavits of e)A5udge 5aime M. ;eyes and 3r. #alvador Mariano( residents of Camarines #ur( *b2 his declaration of intention which was sworn in 5uly ,-8.( and *c2 notice of hearing. The petition was filed in &ugust ,-8, but was not heard until &ugust '@ and #ept. 7.( ,-8/ when appelleeApetitioner presented his evidence( since the province was invaded by the 5apanese forces during %%I and the case records had to be reconstituted after being destroyed during the war. &ppellant #ol9en crossAe)amined appelleeApetitionerDs witnesses but did not file any opposition and did not present any evidence to controvert the petition. The CFI granted the petition for naturalization( finding that appelleeApetitioner was a nativeAborn ;ussian who grew up as a citizen of and was part of the military of the defunct Imperial ;ussian 9overnment under the Czars. !e had several stints while in military service before he "oined the %hite ;ussian &rmy at >ladivostok and fought against the 4olsheviks until ,-'' when the latter force defeated the former. ;efusing to "oin the 4olshevik regime( he fled by sea to #hanghai( and eventually went to Manila as part of the group of %hite ;ussians under &dmiral #tark in March ,-'7. !e finally permanently resided in Iriga( Camarines #ur e)cept during his stint in the guerrilla force in Caramoan from ,-8' to 5uly ,-81. The lower court also made findings of the establishment of his family( employment( social life( his ability to speak and write ?nglish and 4icol( his good moral character( adherence to the underlying principles of the $hilippine Constitution( and being a stateless refugee belonging to no #tate. I##?#:
,. %E+ appelleeApetitionerDs declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen was valid and sufficient basis for his petition for naturalization. '. %E+ appelleeApetitioner sufficiently established legal residence in the $hilippines and could speak and write any of the principal $hilippine languages. 7. %E+ appelleeApetitioner was stateless refugee. !?C3: ,. #ection 1 of the ;evised +aturalization Caw applies and provides that FOnPo declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date( place and manner of his arrival has been issued.G %hile appelleepetitionerDs declaration was reconstituted( the attached certificate referred to in the declaration was not reconstituted. The #C ruled that the law does not state that the certificate is essential to the validity of the declaration as the only re:uirement is for the said certificate to be issued. There is the uncontroverted fact of appelleeApetitionerDs peaceful and continuous residence in the $hilippines for '1 years and statement in his declaration that a certificate had been attached to the said declaration. !ence( appellee petitionerDs declaration was valid under law in view of other competent evidence showing the facts sought to be established under the certificate that was not reconstituted. '. &ppelleeApetitioner has sufficiently shown legal residence in the $hilippines for a continuous period of not less than ,. years as re:uired by #ection ' of the ;evised +aturalization Caw. In addition( appelleeApetitioner had good command of both ?nglish and 4icol. %hile there may be many standards out there( none was set in the law on the re:uired ability to speak and write any of the principal $hilippine languages. &ppellee petitioner got along well with his comrades during his hazardous days in the guerrilla movement thus showing that he satisfied the re:uirement of the law. There was also circumstantial evidence that appelleeApetitioner also ought to know how to write 4icol( which uses the same alphabet used in ?nglish and so widely used in the $hilippines. 9iven his good command of ?nglish as shown in his testimony( appelleeApetitioner could easily make use of the same alphabet in the place where he had been residing for '1 years. 3. &ppellant #ol9en asserted that appelleeA petitioner failed to show that he lost his citizenship under the laws of ;ussia and that ;ussia granted to Filipinos the same right to be naturalized citizens. !owever( the #C still found that lower court did not err in finding appelleeA petitioner as a stateless refugee. &ppelleeA petitionerDs testimony that he is not a ;ussian citizen and that he has no citizenship is uncontroverted. There is also the wellAknown ruthlessness of modern dictatorships giving rise to a great number of stateless refugees or displaced persons( without country or flag. The tyrannical intolerance of dictatorships to opposition translates into beastly oppression( concentration camps and bloody purges( such that it is only natural that those who flee to other countries to escape such a situation( such as appelleeApetitioner( lose all bonds of attachments to their former fatherlands. =9L*E "S. RARANG G.R. No. /4137, !,y 68 1996, 689 SCRA 37/ FAC<S: $etitioner M. !. %ylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. 5ames %illiams was the commanding officer of the . #. +aval 4ase in #ubic 4ay( 6longapo City. $rivate respondent &urora I. ;arang was an employee in the office of the $rovost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard. M. !. %ylie( in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the .#. +aval #tation supervised the publication of the =$lan of the 3ay= *$632 which was published daily by the # +aval 4ase station. The $63 featured important announcements( necessary precautions( and general matters of interest to military personnel. 6ne of the regularfeatures of the $63 was the =action line in:uiry.= 6n February 7( ,-/@( the $63 made a publication( under the =+&>#T& &CTI6+ CI+? I+VI;B= which mentioned a certain person named F&uringG who is described as a disgrace to her division and to the 6ffice of the $rovost Marshal. The private respondent was the only one who was named =&uring= in the 6ffice of the $rovost Marshal and was subse:uently proven that it was her being referred to when petitioner M. !. %ylie wrote her a letter of apology for the =inadvertent= publication. The private respondent the filed an action for damages alleging that the article constituted false( in"urious( and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty( virtue and reputation e)posing her to public hatred( contempt and ridiculeM and that the libel was published and circulated in the ?nglish language and read by almost all the . #. +aval 4ase personnel. The defendants however contended by filing a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the defendants M. !. %ylie and Capt. 5ames %illiams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the nited #tates +avy and are( therefore( immune from suitM and the nited #tates +aval 4ase is an instrumentality of the # government which cannot be sued without its consent. *SSUE: %hether or not the officials of the nited #tates +aval 4ase are immune from suit. HELD: The sub"ect article in the # +ewsletter $63 dated February 7( ,-/@ mentions a certain =&uring= as =. . a disgrace to her division and to the 6ffice of the $rovost Marshal.= The same article e)plicitly implies that &uring was consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs. There is no :uestion that the &uring alluded to in the &rticle was the private respondent as she was the only &uring in the 6ffice of the $rovost Marshal. Moreover( as a result of this article( the private respondent was investigated by her supervisor. 4efore the article came out( the private respondent had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties. It may be argued that Captain 5ames %illiams as commandingofficer of the naval base is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base. This may be true as a general rule. In this particular case( however( the records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the records. The petitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and why their decisions should be reversed. &rticle ',/0 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person<s act or omission constituting fault or negligence( to wit: &rt. ',/0. %hoever by act or omission( causes damage to another( there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. #uch fault or negligence( if there is no preAe)isting contractual relation between the parties( is called a :uasiAdelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. =Fault= or =negligence= in this &rticle covers not only acts =not punishable by law= but also acts criminal in character( whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.= Moreover( &rticle '',-*/2 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel( slander or any other form of defamation. In effect( the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral damages for in"ury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or e)emplary damages. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the $63 dated February 7( ,-/@ is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. $etitioner %ylie himself admitted that the 6ffice of the $rovost Marshal e)plicitly recommended the deletion of the name &uring if the article were published. The petitioners( however( were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name =&uring.= #uch act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. &s a result of the petitioners< act( the private respondent( according to the record( suffered besmirched reputation( serious an)iety( wounded feelings and social humiliation( specially so( since the article was baseless and false. The petitioners( alone( in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent. ABA9A v. EBDANE G.R. No. 16/919 F%4. 14, 688/ F,-): The 9overnment of 5apan and the 9overnment of the $hilippines( through their respective representatives( namely( Mr. Boshihisa &ra( &mbassador ?)traordinary and $lenipotentiary of 5apan to the ;epublic of the $hilippines( and then #ecretary of Foreign &ffairs 3omingo C. #iazon( have reached an understanding concerning 5apanese loans to be e)tended to the $hilippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our countryDs economic stabilization and development efforts. The assailed resolution recommended the award to private respondent China ;oad H 4ridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract $ackage +o. I *C$ I2( which consists of the improvementErehabilitation of the #an &ndres *Codon2A >iracA5ct. 4agoA>iga road( with the length of /-.@,@ kilometers( in the island province of Catanduanes.The 3$%! caused the publication of the FInvitation to $re:ualify and to 4idG for the implementation of the C$ I pro"ect( in two leading national newspapers( namely( the Manila Times and Manila #tandard on +ovember '' and '-( and 3ecember 1( '..'. & total of twentyAthree *'72 foreign and local contractors responded to the invitation by submitting their accomplished pre:ualification documents on 5anuary '7( '..7. In accordance with the established pre:ualification criteria( eight contractors were evaluated or considered eligible to bid as concurred by the 54IC. $rior to the opening of the respective bid proposals( it was announced that the &pproved 4udget for the Contract *&4C2 was in the amount of $/7@(/,.(107.0/. The bid goes to private respondent China ;oad H 4ridge Corporation was corrected from the original $--7(,@7(-.8.-@ *with variance of 78.81W from the &4C2 to $-1'(108(@',./, *with variance of '@.-1W from the &4C2 based on their letter clarification dated &pril ',( '..8. The petitioners anchor the instant petition on the contention that the award of the contract to private respondent China ;oad H 4ridge Corporation violates ;& -,@8( particularly #ection 7, thereof which reads: #?C. 7,. Ceiling for 4id $rices. R The &4C shall be the upper limit or ceiling for the 4id prices. 4id prices that e)ceed this ceiling shall be dis:ualified outright from further participating in the bidding. There shall be no lower limit to the amount of the award. The petitioners insist that Coan &greement is neither an international nor an e)ecutive agreement that would bar the application of ;& -,@8. They point out that to be considered a treaty( an international or an e)ecutive agreement( the parties must be two sovereigns or #tates whereas in the case of Coan &greement +o. $!A$'.8( the parties are the $hilippine 9overnment and the 54IC( a banking agency of 5apan( which has a separate "uridical personality from the 5apanese 9overnment. The respondents however contend that foreign loan agreements( including Coan &greement +o. $!A$'.8( as e)ecutive agreements and( as such( should be observed pursuant to the fundamental principle in international law of pacta sunt servanda. The Constitution( the public respondents emphasize( recognizes the enforceability of e)ecutive agreements in the same way that it recognizes generally accepted principles of international law as forming part of the law of the land.78 This recognition allegedly buttresses the binding effect of e)ecutive agreements to which the $hilippine 9overnment is a signatory. It is pointed out by the public respondents that e)ecutive agreements are essentially contracts governing the rights and obligations of the parties. & contract( being the law between the parties( must be faithfully adhered to by them. 9uided by the fundamental rule of pacta sunt servanda( the $hilippine 9overnment bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligations under Coan &greement. *u%: %hether or not the the loan agreement violates ;& -,@8. H%l#: The court ruled in favor of the respondents. #ignificantly( an e)change of notes is considered a form of an e)ecutive agreement( which becomes binding through e)ecutive action without the need of a vote by the #enate or Congress. e)ecutive agreements( They sometimes take the form of e)change of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated FagreementsG or FprotocolsG. The fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda( which is( in fact( embodied in #ection 8 of ;& -,@8 as it provides that FOaPny treaty or international or e)ecutive agreement affecting the sub"ect matter of this &ct to which the $hilippine government is a signatory shall be observed(G the 3$%!( as the e)ecuting agency of the pro"ects financed by Coan &greement +o. $!A$'.8( rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works for the C$ I pro"ect to private respondent China ;oad H 4ridge Corporation. ='ll'% 9u v !'(',1 D%&%+o(-S,+)',$o GR No. 83886+ :1989; F,-)C %illie Bu *$etitioner2 is a naturalized Filipino citizen. $etitioner was holder of a $ortuguese passport and despite his naturalization on February ,.( ,-/@ applied for a renewal of his travel document with the $ortuguese ?mbassy in Tokyo and was issued same on 5uly ',( ,-@,. &lbeit( petitioner has renounced his former allegiance( he continues to revert to the former whenever convenient i.e. in business dealings and transactions local and overseas. !erein respondent has detained petitioner for eventual deportation alleging that the latter is not a citizen by virtue of his acts H evidences adduced. $etitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking his release from detention. *u%C %hether the 4ureau of Immigration H 3eportation *4I32 was "ustified in detaining petitioner and processing him for deportation. H%l#: The court a :uo( In 4oard of Immigration Commissioners vs. 9o 9allano( enunciated that e)press renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and e)plicitly and not left to inference or implication. $etitioner after having renounced $ortuguese citizenship upon naturalization( resumed or reac:uired his prior status as a $ortuguese citizen by applying for a renewal of his $ortuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after becoming a naturalized Filipino citizen. #uch acts is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of $hilippine Citizenship. $hilippine Citizenship( it must be stressed( is not a commodity or ware to be displayed when re:uired and suppressed when convenient. %herefore( premises considered( petitioner<s motion for release from detention is denied. The decision is immediately e)ecutory. G G.R. NO. 186/81, JUL9 63, 6888 H Eu%4'o Eu$%+'o K. Lo0%@ v. Co11''o+ o+ El%-)'o+ ,+# <%'% 5. "'ll,+u%v, F,-)C ?usebio ?ugenio J. Copez herein petitioner was a candidate for the 4arangay ?lection held last 6ctober '-( '../. $etitioner won but was nonetheless dis:ualified by C6M?C?C. &llegedly( he is a FilipinoA&merican. $etitioner avers that he is indeed a dual citizen pursuant to his compliance with the Citizenship ;etention H ;eA ac:uisition &ct of '..7 and that he returned to the $hilippines and possesses all the :ualifications to run for 4arangay Chairman( hence this petition. *u%C %hether herein petitioner( as a FilipinoA&merican or with dual citizenship( is eligible to run for the office of 4arangay Chairman. H%l#: The petition was dismissed and the order of the C6M?C?C dis:ualifying petitioner was upheld. The court stated that the petitioner cannot rely on >alles vs. C6M?C?C because his case does not sit four s:uares with the facts of the same and that the doctrine in >alles has been superseded by the enactment of ;.&. +o. -''1 in '..7 which e)pressly provides the conditions before those who reAac:uired Filipino citizenship may run for public office to wit: #ection 1. Civil an+ Political $ights an+ *iabilities. - Those who retain or reAac:uire $hilippine citizenship under this &ct shall en"oy full civil and political rights and be sub"ect to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under e)isting laws of the $hilippines and the following conditions: )))))) *'2 Those seeking elective public office in the $hilippines shall meet the :ualification for holding such public office as re:uired by the Constitution and e)isting laws and( at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy( make , 0%(o+,l ,+# 3o(+ (%+u+-',)'o+ o& ,+y ,+# ,ll &o(%'$+ -')'@%+.'0 4%&o(% ,+y 0u4l'- o&&'-%( ,u).o('@%# )o ,#1'+')%( ,+ o,).. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHAN FOOK, G.R. No. L-16968 O-)o4%( 6, 1961 FAC<SC The accused( a Chinese sub"ect( was a passenger of the nited #tates Military Transport #outh 4end. !aving been allowed by the immigration authorities to land( he left the boat on the same day. The following day( he went to pier no. , to get his baggage. &fter the search of the baggage in which postcards of an indecent character were found( a customs agent attempted to search the body of the accused( to which the latter apparently ob"ected. & dispute took place between the two( which terminated in the secret agent seizing the Chinaman by the arm with intent to search his body( after showing him his police badge. The accused resisted and struck the secret agent on the stomach. The latter in turn struck him on the neck. The customs inspector intervened and e)plained to the accused that Cruz was a customs secret service agent and had the right to search him in order to find whether he had on his person any contraband. Then the appellant made no further resistance and allowed himself to be searched. Chan Fook was prosecuted for the crime of resistance and disobedience to the public authority by the CFI of Manila. *SSUEC %hether or not accused is guilty of the crime of resistance and disobedience. H%l#: +o. The prosecution alleges that under section ,77@ of the &dministrative Code all persons coming into the $hilippine Islands from Foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by the customs authorities under such regulations as may be prescribed relative thereto. The defense( however( contends that once the accused has arrived at the point of his destination by being allowed to leave the boat and to land he was beyond the "urisdiction of the customs authorities( and( therefore( not liable to search without "udicial warrant. !aving in mind the aim of the law in authorizing the search of persons coming from foreign countries( which is to avoid the clandestine introduction into the $hilippine Islands of goods sub"ect to the payment of customs duties( or the importation of the articles prohibited by law( or the entrance of persons who have no right to reside in these Islands( after the customs authorities have permitted the accused to land in Manila( the terminus of his voyage( he ceased to be a passenger within the meaning of said section ,77@ of the &dministrative Code. The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents is fi)ed. If they go beyond it and they violate any recognized rights of the citizens( then the latter may resist the invasion. In the case at bar the action of the accused in laying his hands on the agent Cruz is an ade:uate defense to repel the aggression of the latter( who had seized him by the arm for the purpose of searching him. In accordance with the repeated decisions of the supreme court of #pain( the gravity of a disobedience to an order of a person in public authority is measured and graded by the circumstances surrounding the act( the motives prompting it( and the real importance of the transgression rather than by the source of the order disobeyed. &nd( taking into consideration the circumstances of the present case( wherein the agent Cruz had e)ceeded his functions( and wherein the accused acted in defense of the most highly esteemed of individual rights N the constitutional right to be secured against unreasonable searches N we are of the opinion that there is no ground for finding the accused guilty of the crime defined in article '1' of the $enal Code. The supreme court of #pain held that the act of obstinately disregarding an order of an agent of the authority does not constitute the crime of grave resistance and disobedience to an agent of the public authority where it appears that upon being directed for the third time( the accused obeyed( though uttering unpleasant words( for although the accused did not leave the premises on the first and second re:uests( he( however( obeyed on the third( and did not render it necessary for the public officer to make use of the means authorized by law to make himself respected. That the accused had no intention to resist and disobey the agents of the authority( in the legal sense of the word( is shows by the fact that by the mere e)planation of the customs inspector( he finally allowed himself to be searched. That foreigners in the $hilippines are entitled to the benefits of the individual rights secured by the $hilippine 4ill is undeniable. %hen Congress came to pass the &ct of 5uly ,( ,-.'( it enacted( almost in the language of the $resident<s instructions( the 4ill of ;ights of our Constitution. In view of the e)pressed declarations of the $resident( followed by the action of Congress( both adopting( with little alternation( the provisions of the 4ill of ;ights( there would seem to be no room for argument that in this form it was intended to carry to the $hilippine Islands those principles of our government which the $resident declared to be established as rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom( at the same time e)pressing regret that the inhabitants of the Islands had not therefore en"oyed their benefit. &nd according to the principles underlying the Constitution( as e)tended to the $hilippine Islands by the $resident<s instructions to the Commission and by the $hilippine 4ill( foreigners are entitled to the protection of their life( liberty( and property. 5H*L*55*NE !ANUFAC<UR*NG COR5ORA<*ON v. UN*ON *NSURANCE SOC*E<9 OF CAN<ON, L<D G.R. No. L-164/3 Nov%14%( 11, 1961 FAC<SC The plaintiff was the owner of the steel tank lighter named $hilmaco. The defendant is an insurance company organized under the laws of !ong Jong and duly authorized to transact business here. The defendant insured the plaintiff<s lighter and issued its policy for such insurance. 3uring the life of the policy and as a result of a typhoon( the lighter was sunk in the Manila 4ay( of which the plaintiff notified the defendant and demanded payment of the full amount of its policy( which the defendant refused( and denied its liability. $laintiff commenced an action and alleged in the complaint that the loss of the said steel tank lighter was total and the full amount for which it was insured upon such loss immediately became due and payable. For answer the defendant admits the issuance and delivery of the policy( and( as a further and separate defense( alleges that( under its terms( the defendant was only liable for an absolute total loss( and that there was not a total destruction of the lighter. The lower court rendered "udgment for the defendant. !ence( an appeal was taken. *SSUEC %hether or not defendant is liable. !eld: Bes. Counsel for the defendant points out that the policy provides that it =shall be of as much force and effect as the surest writing or policy of insurance made in Condon(= and contend that the policy should be construed under the Marine Caw of 9reat 4ritain( but as to what may be the law there is not alleged or proven. The law of 9reat 4ritain since the 3eclaration of Independence is the law of a foreign country( and( like any other foreign law( is matter of fact( which the courts of this country cannot be presumed to be ac:uainted with( or to have "udicial knowledge of( unless it is pleaded and proved. The rule that the courts of one country cannot take cognizance of the law of another without plea and proof has been constantly maintained at law and in e:uity( in ?ngland and &merica. %hen in a litigation the application of a foreign law( for e)ample the law of China( is sought( it is necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands( in a satisfactory manner( the e)istence of such law as a :uestion of factM and when proof of such a law is lacking( it is improper to apply unknown laws to suits pending before the courts of the Islands. In the ?nglish practice( a ship is a total loss when she has sustain such e)tensive damage that it would not be reasonably practical to repair her. The ordinary measure of prudence which the courts have adopted is this: If the ship( when repaired( will not be worth the sum which it would be necessary to e)pend upon her( the repairs are( practically speaking( impossible( and it is a case of total loss. *Citing a number of ?nglish authorities.2 &fter a careful consideration of the important case( the decision of the trial court should be reversed( and that a "udgment should be entered here in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant. 5EO5LE OF <HE 5H*L*55*NES v. LOL-LO ,+# SARA=, G.R. No. 1/978 F%4(u,(y 6/, 1966 FAC<SC 6n or about 5une 7.( ,-'.( two boats left matuta( a 3utch possession( for $eta( another 3utch possession. There the boat was surrounded by si) vintas manned by twentyAfour Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food( but once on the 3utch boat( too for themselves all of the cargo( attacked some of the men( and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. Two of the Moro marauders were ColAlo( who also raped one of the women( and #araw. ColAlo and #araw later returned to their home in #outh bian( TawiATawi( #ulu( $hilippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the CFI of #ulu with the crime of piracy. & demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros( based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the "urisdiction of the CFI( nor of any court of the $hilippine Islands( and that the facts did not constitute a public offense( under the laws in force in the $hilippine Islands. The demurrer was overruled by the trial "udge. 5udgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty. *SSUEC %hether or not the offense committed is penalized by $hilippine laws. H%l#: Bes. It is evident that the provisions of the $enal Code now in force in the $hilippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the nited #tates. 4y the Treaty of $aris( #pain ceded the $hilippine Islands to the nited #tates. & logical construction of articles of the $enal Code( like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy( would be that wherever =#pain= is mentioned( it should be substituted by the words =nited #tates= and wherever =#paniards= are mentioned( the word should be substituted by the e)pression =citizens of the nited #tates and citizens of the $hilippine Islands.= #omewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of nited #tates vs. #mith to give to the word =authority= as found in the $enal Code a limited meaning( which would no longer comprehend all religious( military( and civil officers( but only public officers in the 9overnment of the $hilippine Islands. 5EO5LE OF <HE 5H*L*55*NES v. =ONG CHENG, G.R. No. L-18964 O-)o4%( 19, 1966 FAC<SC %ong Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa( which is of ?nglish nationality( while anchored in Manila 4ay and two and a half miles from the shores of the city. %ong Cheng presented a demurrer to the criminal information( alleging lack of "urisdiction of the lower court. Cower court ruled in favor of the accused and thus dismissed the case. *SSUEC %hether or not $hilippines courts have "urisdiction over the crime committed on board a foreign merchant vessel anchored in our "urisdiction waters. H%l#: Bes. There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International CawM to wit( the French rule( according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial "urisdiction they were committed( unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territoryM and the ?nglish rule( based on the territorial principle and followed in the nited #tates( according to which( crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. 6f this two rules( it is the last one that obtains in this "urisdiction( because at present the theories and "urisprudence prevailing in the nited #tates on this matter are authority in the $hilippines which is now a territory of the nited #tates. %e have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts( because it being the primary ob"ect of our 6pium Caw to protect the inhabitants of the $hilippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug( its mere possession in such a ship( without being used in our territory( does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. !ence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order. 4ut to smoke opium within our territorial limits( even though aboard a foreign merchant ship( is certainly a breach of the public order here established( because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Cegislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. GO JUL*AN v. GO"ERN!EN< G.R. No. L-68889 O-)o4%( 66, 1963 FAC<SC 6n #ept. /( ,@--( 9o 5ulian( a Chinese merchant( was born in the $hilippines of Chinese parents. #ince then( he has been residing in Iloilo. In ,-''( he filed a petition in the CFI of Iloilo for naturalization as a citizen of the $hilippines under &ct +o. '-/'. !e admits that he was currently a citizen of the Chinese ;epublic and that he holds a certificate of residence issued under the &ct of Congress of &pr. '-( ,-.'. +othing in the records shows that his Chinese parents were considered as #panish sub"ects before the ratification of the Treaty of $aris. The &ttorneyA9eneral opposed his petition on the grounds that: *a2 the petitioner( being Chinese( was not entitled to the benefits granted by said law since it can only be availed of by Fcitizens of the nited #tates or foreigners who under the laws of the nited #tates may be become citizens of said country if residing thereinMG and *b2 under the laws of the nited #tates( 5ulian could not be naturalized as a citizen of the .#. even if he were residing therein. Lo3%( Cou() Rul'+$C The trial court sustained the opposition of the &ttorneyA9eneral and denied 5ulianDs petition. *SSUEC %hether or not petitioner may recover his $hilippine citizenship. H%l#: B?#. &ssuming that 5ulian( by reason of having been born in the $hilippines( had at least a latent right to $hilippine citizenshipM and assuming that during his minority( his father chose the nationality of his country in applying for a certificate of residence( in ,-.7( and that 5ulian( upon attaining the age of ma"ority( chose the nationality of his fatherM the :uestion that presents itself now for our consideration is whether or not the petition may recover the $hilippine citizenship under &ct +o. '-'/. In the case of ,nite+ States v. -ong .im %rk *,0- . #.( 08-2( the Court stated that the ,8 th &mendment affirmed the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory. The &mendment includes the children born within the territory of the nited #tates( of all other persons( of whatever race or color( domiciled within the nited #tates. #ection ' of the &ct of Congress of &ugust '-( ,-,0 provides: /S0C. !. That all inhabitants of the Philippine 1slan+s 2ho 2ere Spanish sub3ects on the eleventh +ay of %pril, eighteen hun+re+ an+ ninety-nine, an+ then resi+e+ in sai+ 1slan+s, an+ their chil+ren born subse)uent thereto, shall be +eeme+ an+ hel+ to be citizens of the Philippine 1slan+s, except such as shall have electe+ to preserve their allegiance to the Cro2n of Spain in accor+ance 2ith the provisions of the treaty of peace bet2een the ,nite+ States an+ Spain, signe+ at Paris 4ecember tenth, eighteen hun+re+ an+ ninety-eight, an+ except such others as have since become citizens of some other country5 Provi+e+, That the Philippine *egislature, herein provi+e+ for, is hereby authorize+ to provi+e by la2 for the ac)uisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine 1slan+s 2ho +o not come 2ithin the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the ,nite+ States, an+ such other persons resi+ing in the Philippine 1slan+s 2ho are citizens of the ,nite+ States, or 2ho coul+ become citizens of the ,nite+ States un+er the la2s of the ,nite+ States if resi+ing therein.6 4y virtue of the authority granted by said &ct( the $hilippine Cegislature enacted on March '0( ,-'.( &ct +o. '-'/ known as +aturalization Caw. #ection , of this &ct provides: /S0C. 7. -ho may become Philippine citizens. 8 Philippine citizenship may be ac)uire+ by5 9a: ;atives of the Philippines 2ho are not citizens thereof un+er the <ones *a2= 9b: natives of the other 1nsular possessions of the ,nite+ States= 9c: citizens of the ,nite+ States, or foreigners 2ho un+er the la2s of the ,nite+ States may become citizens of sai+ country if resi+ing therein.6 The Court is of the opinion that 5ulian is a native of the $hilippines within the meaning of the word =natives= used in the &ct and the &ct of Congress of &ugust '-( ,-,0. Therefore( since he is a native of the $hilippine Islands( but is not( however( within the provisions of #ection ' of the &ct of Congress of &ugust '-( ,-,0( for having chosen the nationality of his father( he may now recover his $hilippine citizenship( under section , of &ct +o. '-'/. &s Mr. 5ustice Malcolm( speaking of &ct +o. '-'/( says: /The only )ualification for a native of the Philippines to be able to ac)uire Philippine citizenship is that he must not be less than t2enty-one years of age.6 ?ven in viewing the :uestion from the standpoint that 5ulian is a Chinese on account of the fact that he chose the nationality of his father after attaining the age of ma"ority( the fact of his having born in the $hilippine still stands( and under the doctrine laid down in the %ong Jim &rk case( and followed by this court in various decisions( he may now recover his $hilippine citizenship under the provisions of the +aturalization &ct. BEHN, !E9ER I CO. v. S<ANLE9 G.R. No. L-6673/ D%-%14%( 8, 1964 FAC<SC In February ,-,@( during the war with 9ermany( all the business( property( and assets if every nature of a 4ehn( Meyer H Co. *4MC2( a foreign corporation with a branch in the $hilippines( were taken over by the &lien $roperty Custodian under the provisions of the Trading with the ?nemy &ct and a receiver appointed and placed in full charge of the business and assets of the firm. In February ,-,-( the &lien $roperty Custodian declared 4MC to be an enemy not holding a license granted by the $resident of the nited #tates and at the same time made demand upon the receiver to convey( transfer( assign( deliver and pay over to the Custodian all the property and assets of the firm( as well as the net proceeds of the sale and li:uidation of its business. In ,-''( in a civil case against 4MC( the CFI of Manila rendered a "udgment in favor of 5ureidini H 4ros. by declaring it to be the rightful owner of certain merchandise by virtue of a sale ordered by the 4ritish &dmiralty Court of &le)andria( ?gypt in a prize court proceedings. pon petition of 5ureidini H 4ros. as "udgment creditor of 4MC( the CFI ordered the appointment of a receiver of 4MCDs property( assets and estate. *SSUEC %hether or not $hilippine courts have "urisdiction to appoint a receiver of the property( assets and estate of a corporation which was declared by the &lien $roperty Custodian as an enemy. H%l#: +o. &ccording to #ection - of the Trading with ?nemy &ct( F?)cept as herein provided( the money or other property conveyed( transferred( assigned( delivered( or paid to the &lien $roperty Custodian shall not be liable to lien( attachment( garnishment( trustee( process( or e)ecution( or sub3ect to any or+er to +ecree of any court. #ince the firm was declared an enemy not holding license( it became the duty of the &lien $roperty Custodian to take possession of its business and all its assets within nited #tates territory. It must be presumed that this duty was fully performed and that the assets are now either actually or constructively in the possession of the &lien $roperty Custodian and under his control and thus( beyond the "urisdiction and control of the $hilippine courts. The only "urisdiction given to the courts of the $hilippines is in regard to criminal offenses under the &ct( as provided in #ection ,@ thereof. !aving said that( the appointment of the receiver was in e)cess of the "urisdiction of the $hilippine courts. *NGENOHL v. =AL<ER E. OLSEN AND CO., *NC., G.R. No. L-66688 J,+u,(y 16, 1967 FAC<SC Ingenohl filed a suit against the defendant( a corporation duly organized( e)isting and doing business under the laws of the $hilippines( before the #upreme Court of !ongkong for infringement of trademark. #ince Ingenohl and his company are alien enemies as declared by the &lien $roperty Custodian( its properties and other assets( including the trademarks( were seized and sold to 6lsen and Co. The #upreme Court of !ong Jong( which was then a colony of 9reat 4ritain( an ally of the nited #tates( of being a court of competent "urisdiction and having "urisdiction over both parties( rendered a final "udgment in favor of Ingenohl and refused to recognize the sale of said trademarks done by the &lien $roperty Custodian to 6lsen and Co. 3efendant corporation refused to pay Ingenhol !J3'0('88.'7( the amount awarded to the latter in the !ong Jong "udgment. Therefore( Ingenohl filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila( seeking to recover the costs ad"udged against the corporation by the !ongkong court. The lower court rendered "udgment in favor of Ingenohl for the amount of his claim( with interest of 0W p.a. *SSUEC %hether or not the "udgment of the !ongkong #upreme Court( being a foreign "udgment( may be enforced in the $hilippines. H%l#: +o. It is well settled( upon the ground of comity and the law of nations( that in the absence of treaty or statute( a "udgment rendered by a court of competent "urisdiction of one foreign country in which the parties appeared and contested the case on its merits( will be recognized and enforced in any other foreign country. 4ut here we have a statute which clearly defines the specific conditions upon which a foreign "udgment can be enforced in the $hilippine Islands( and we have a decision of the nited #tates #upreme Court which holds that =where there is no written law upon the sub"ect( such as treaty or statute( :uestions of international law must be determined by "udicial decisions( the works of "urists( and the acts and usages of civilized nations.= The converse of that proposition is also true that where you do have a treaty or statute( to enforce a foreign "udgment( it must come under and within the specific provisions of the treaty or statute. #ection 7,, of the Code of Civil $rocedure provides: F ) ) ) but the "udgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of "urisdiction( want of notice to the party( collusion( fraud( or clear mistake of law or factG. nder such a statute( where a party seeks to enforce a foreign "udgment( the defendant has a legal right to make any of such defenses( and if any of them is shown to properly e)ist( it will defeat the "udgment. RA<AN S*NGH v. GO"ERN!EN< G.R. No. L-38687 July 69, 1969 FAC<SC ;atan #ingh( filed an application for citizenship in the Court of First Instance in the $rovince of Uambales( praying that he be neutralized as a citizen of the $hilippine Islands. !e alleged that he was born at #angtipur( 5ullunder( $un"ab( India and was a sub"ect of 9reat 4ritainM and he had all the :ualifications re:uired by the +atralization Caw *&ct +o. '-'/2 as to age( residence( education( conduct( and he did not have any of the dis:ualifications of the said &ct. $etitioner alleges that he falls in the class of persons mentioned in paragraph *c2 in #ection , of =The +aturalization CawG. The provision of said law enumerates the classes of persons who may ac:uire $hilippine citizenship. They are: *a2 +atives of the $hilippines who are not citizens thereof under the 5ones CawM *b2 +atives of the other Insular possessions of the nited #tatesM *c2 Citizens of the nited #tates( or foreigners who under the laws of the nited #tates may become citizens of said country if residing therein. The law of the nited #tates regulating the immigration of alien to the nited #tates and their residence therein( is found in the &ct of Congress of ,-,/( which was e)pressly made applicable to the $hilippine Islands. #ection 7 of said &ct e)cludes from admission into the nited #tates various classes of persons( among which are the following: . . . natives of any country( province or dependency situate on the Continent of &sia west of one hundred and tenth *,,.th2 meridian of longitude east from 9reenwich and east of the fiftieth *1.th2 meridian of longitude east from 9reenwich and south of the fiftieth *1.th2 parallel of the latitude north( . . . #aid section 7 however( establishes an e)ception in favor of the persons who are natives of N That portion of said territory *Continent of &sia2 situate between the fiftieth *1.th2 and the si)tyAfourth *08th2 meridians of longitude east from 9reenwich and the twentyAfourth *'8th2 and the thirtyAeight *7@th2 parallels of latitude north( . . . From the aboveA:uoted provisions of the &cts of Congress of ,-,/( it clearly appears that natives of the Continent of &sia within specified limits are e)cluded from the admission into the nited #tates( with the e)ception of natives in the portion of the said continent =situate between the fiftieth *1th2 and the si)tyAfourth *08th2 meridians of longitude east from 9reenwich and the twentyAfourth *'8th2 and the thirtyAeight *7@th2 parallels of latitude north.= $etitioner contends he is a native of Johek( $rovince of 4aluchistan( India( because his parents were natives of the placeM that the $rovince of 4aluchistan is found between the 1.th and 08th meridians of longitude east from 9reenwich and the '8th and 7@th parallels of latitude northM that( therefore the appellant is a native of a territory whose residents are not e)cluded from admission into the nited #tates under the provisions of the saving clause of section 7 of the &ct of Congress of ,-,/( above :uoted( and that( conse:uently( the appellant is :ualified to become a citizen of the nited #tates under said &ct of Congress and also of the $hilippine Islands under the provisions of the +aturalization Caw of the $hilippine Cegislature in relation to said &ct of Congress. The "udge arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner was not :ualified to become a naturalized citizen of the $hilippine Islands( The lower court "udgment is affirmed. *SSUEC Is the petitioner a foreigner who( under the laws of the nited #tates( may become a citizen of that country residing thereinL H%l#C There is absolutely no proof in the record to show that the town of Johek( $rovince of 4aluchistan( is found in the portion of the &siatic Continent( whose natives are not e)cluded from admission into the nited #tates. %e have consulted the map of India ( particularly the $rovince of 4aluchistan for purpose of verifying the assertion of the appellant<s counsel. %e found( however( that the $rovince of 4aluchistan is inside the specified limits of &sia( whose natives are e)cluded from admission to the nited #tates( and is outside of the =territory situate between the 1.th and the 08th meridians of the longitude east from 9reenwich and the '8th and 7@th parallels of latitude north(< whose natives are not e)cluded from admission into the nited #tates( with the e)ception of a very small portion thereof of the northwest. 4ut neither in this portion nor in any other place of the $rovince of 4aluchistan did we find a place called Johek. The appellant has thus utterly failed to show that he is native of a place whose residents may be admitted into the nited #tates and may become citizens thereof. &nd moreover( the petitioner being a 4ritish sub"ect( we are of opinion that the principle 3us soli( and not that of 3us sanguinis( should be applied in this case. In ?ngland :uestions of citizenship are governed by the principle 3us soli. Therefore( in view of the fact that the appellant was born in the $rovince of $un"ab( India( he is dis:ualified from becoming a citizen of the nited #tates and conse:uently of the $hil. Islands. Su@%))% N'-ol, y So14'lo+ ". Al4%()o Ro1ulo, G.R. No. 1/7888, F%4(u,(y 11, 6889 F&CT#: ;espondent Cance Corporal *CEC$C2 3aniel #mith is a member of the # &rmed Forces. !e was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina( petitioner herein( sometime on +ovember ,( '..1. $ursuant to the >isiting Forces &greement *>F&2 between the ;epublic of the $hilippines and the # entered into( the #( at its re:uest( was granted custody of #mith. The ;TC of Makati rendered a decision finding defendant #mith guilty due to sufficient evidence. 3efendant #mith was taken out of the Makati "ail by a contingent of $hilippine law enforcement agents( purportedly acting under orders of the 3IC9 and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the # government under the new agreements between the $hilippines and the #( referred to as the ;omuloAJenney &greement. $etitioners contend that the $hilippines should have custody of defendant CEC$C #mith because( first of all( the >F& is void and unconstitutional. I##?: %6+ the >F& is void and unconstitutional. !?C3: +6. &rt. K>III( #ec. '1 states: #ec. '1. &fter the e)piration in ,--, of the &greement between the $hilippines and the nited #tates of &merica concerning Military 4ases( foreign military bases( troops( or facilities shall not be allowed in the $hilippines e)cept under a treaty duly concurred in by the #enate and( when the Congress so re:uires( ratified by a ma"ority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose( and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting #tate. The provision of &rt. K>III( #ec. '1 of the Constitution( is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the # &rmed Forces through the >F& is a presence Fallowed underG the ;$A# Mutual 3efense Treaty. #ince the ;$A# Mutual 3efense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the $hilippine #enate and the # #enate( there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence. The >F& being a valid and binding agreement( the parties are re:uired as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. &pplying( however( the provisions of >F&( the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. /%rt. >, Sec. 7?. The confinement or +etention by Philippine authorities of ,nite+ States personnel shall be carrie+ out in facilities agree+ on by appropriate Philippines an+ ,S authorities.6 Therefore( the ;omuloAJenney &greements of 3ecember ,- and ''( '..0( which are agreements on the detention of the accused '+ ).% U+')%# S),)% E14,y( are not in accord with the >F& itself because such detention is not Fby $hilippine authorities.G ;espondents should therefore comply with the >F& and negotiate with representatives of the nited #tates towards an agreement on detention facilities under $hilippine authorities as mandated by &rt. >( #ec. ,. of the >F&. G.R. No. L-663/9 D%-%14%( 6/, 1969 =*LL*A! C. REAGAN, E<. AL v. CO!!*SS*ONER OF *N<ERNAL RE"ENUE FAC<S: $etitioner ;eagan( a civilian employee of an &merican corporation providing technical assistance to the # &ir Force in the $hilippines( :uestioned the payment of the income ta) assessed on him by respondent CI; on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the # Marine Corps( the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field &ir 4ase at $ampanga. It is his contention( that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside $hilippine territory and therefore beyond our "urisdictional power to ta). !e seeks that an amount of $'(-/-... as the income ta) paid by him be refunded. *SSUE: %6+ the Clark Field &ir 4ase is a foreign property therefore e)cluded from the power of $hilippine ta)ation. HELD: +6. 4y the OMilitary 4asesP &greement( it should be noted( the $hilippine 9overnment merely consents that the nited #tates e)ercise "urisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity( courtesy( or e)pediency over the bases as part of the $hilippine territory or divested itself completely of "urisdiction over offenses committed therein. This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of the $hilippine 9overnment. The #tate is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the e)ercise of "urisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so( it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still sub"ect to its authority. Its "urisdiction may be diminished( but it does not disappear. #o it is with the bases under lease to the &merican armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of ,-8/. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. G.R. No. L-11174 !,(-. 61, 1916 E. !ERR*<< v. GO"ERN!EN< OF <HE 5H*L*55*NE *SLANDS F&CT#: Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred *,2 =in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to $1(...( instead of $'1(... as claimed in the complaint(= and *'2 =in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twentyAone days and fi)ing the damage accordingly in the sum of $'(000( instead of $0(... as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.= The &ttorneyA9eneral on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: *a2 in finding that the collision between the plaintiff<s motorcycle and the ambulance of the 9eneral !ospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur( who is an alleged agent or employee of the 9overnmentM *b2 in holding that the 9overnment of the $hilippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision( even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeurM and *c2 in rendering "udgment against the defendant for the sum of $,8(/8,. Conse:uently( the 9overnment issued an act allowing the plaintiff to commence a lawsuit against it. I##?: 1) %6+ the 9overnment conceded its liability to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence against it. 2) %6+ the chauffeur is a government employee or agent. !?C3: ,2 +6. 4y consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff( or create any cause of action in his favor( or e)tend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pree)isting liability and submits itself to the "urisdiction of the court( sub"ect to its right to interpose any lawful defense. '2 +6. %e will now e)amine the substantive law touching the defendant<s liability for the negligent acts of its officers( agents( and employees. $aragraph 1 of article ,-.7 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense 2hen it acts through a special agent, but not 2hen the +amage shoul+ have been cause+ by the official to 2hom properly it pertaine+ to +o the act performe+, in 2hich case the provisions of the prece+ing article shall be applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent( duly empowered by a +efinite or+er or commission to perform some act or charge+ 2ith some +efinite purpose 2hich gives rise to the claim. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the 9eneral !ospital was not such an agent. GRN L-37647 !,y 66, 1987. UN*<ED S<A<ES OF A!ER*CA, CA5<. JA!ES B. GALLO=A9, =*LL*A! *. COLL*NS ,+# ROBER< GOH*ER v. HON. v. !. RU*>, 5(%'#'+$ Ju#$% o& B(,+-. J", Cou() o& F'() *+),+-% o& R'@,l ,+# EL*G*O DE GU>!AN I CO., *NC. F&CT#: The nited #tates of &merica had a naval base in #ubic( Uambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military 4ases &greement between the $hilippines and the nited #tates. #ometime in May( ,-/'( the nited #tates invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair pro"ects. ?ligio de 9uzman land Co.( Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. #ubse:uent thereto( the company received from the # two telegrams re:uesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the re:uests. The company received a letter which was signed by %illiam I. Collins of 3epartment of the +avy of the nited #tates( also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not :ualify to receive an award for the pro"ects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs( and that the pro"ects were awarded to third parties. The company filed a complaint against the defendants herein demanding specific performance that the company be allowed to perform the work on the pro"ects and( in the event that specific performance was no longer possible( to order the defendants to pay damages. I##?: %6+ the # is immune from suit having dealt with a private corporation. !?C3: B?#. & #tate may be said to have descended the the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the e)ercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the pro"ects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the nited #tates and the $hilippines( indisputably a function of the government of the highest order( they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.