Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1) K A is a belief set
(K
2) A K A
(K
3) K A K +A
(K
4) If A / K then K +A K A
(K
5) K A = K
if and only if A
(K
6) If A B then K A = K B
(K
7) K (A B) (K A) +B
(K
8) If B / K A then (K A) +B K (A B)
Above postulates dont explicitly tell which beliefs to be retained and which to be removed.
They only circumscribe the set of rational solutions and dont lead to a unique solution as
in case of expansion.
2.3 Contraction
The change in epistemic state is called as contraction when some belief A has to be retracted
without adding extra information. Contraction as the name suggests requires removal of
all those beliefs which can imply the currently held belief A. A contraction function must
satisfy following postulates-
(K
1) K A is a belief set
(K
2) K A K
(K
3) If A / K then K A = K
(K
4) If ,A then A / K A
(K
5) K (K A) +A
(K
6) If A B then K A = K B
(K
7) (K A) (K B) K (A B)
(K
8) If A / K (A B) then K (A B) K A
Similar to revision, the postulates are not sucient to produce a unique contraction func-
tion and a notion of preference among the beliefs is necessary. Like for retracting A B
from CnA B, removing either A or B is sucient. Thus a sense of preference is must
to make a choice among the two possibilities.
2.4 Motivation Behind Postulates
Postulates for revision and contraction, as already said only regulate the desired properties
of these functions and dont lead to explicit denitions. K
7 and K
8
are concerned with minimal change. To ensure minimal change in K when revised with
A, expansion(+) of K A with another formula B and revision of K directly with A B
must be same provided K A + B does not become K
7 and K
8:
K
K A K B K A B
K
If A / K A B then K A B K A
Lemma 2.4.1 (i) K
7 is equivalent to K
and (ii) K
8 is equivalent to K
.
10 CHAPTER 2. EXPANSION, CONTRACTION AND REVISION
Proof (i) Suppose K
8 holds. Taking A
= A B and B
= A in K
8 directly gives K A
B +A K A, where K A B K A B +A.
Suppose K
= AB and B
= A in K
8,
K A = K A+B = K A B = K B +A = K B.
Similar to revision postulates K
14 give KA+A
K. Thus with K
5 (recovery), (K A) +A = K whenever A K.
Lemma 2.4.2 K
7 is equivalent to
K
K A Cn(A) K A B
Proof Let K
8 we have
KAB KA, KB. So we only need to prove KA, KB KAB. Let KA.
Using recovery and assumption we have (A B) K A and (A B) K B.
Thus using K
= A B and B
8 then gives K A B = K A K B.
Observation 2.4.1 If A K then A K (A B). We have used this result several
times in above proofs and will use it again in next chapter.
Observation 2.4.2 If A K A B or B A K A B then K A B = K B.
A K A B gives B A K A B which means B (A B) K A B.
(A B) B being a theorem is in K B and hence using previous theorem we have
K A B = K B.
2.5 Interrelations
Changes in epistemic states modelled as expansion, revision and contraction are interrelated.
Revision of a belief set K with respect to a sentence A can be seen as removal of any
incompatible information A and then addition of A along with all logical consequences.
This relationship is called Levi-identity and is written as-
K A = (K A) +A (2.2)
Let us call the revision function above R(). Following theorem tells that function R()
dened through Levi - identity is indeed a revision function.
Theorem 2.5.1 If a contraction function satises (K
1) to (K
1) to (K
7) and (K
7) and (K
8) respectively.
Proof
(K
2) A K A as (K A) A A (dilution or weakening).
12 CHAPTER 2. EXPANSION, CONTRACTION AND REVISION
(K
3) From (K
4) Let A / K, using (K
.
only if Let (K A) +A = K
.
Thus (K A) +A A and (K A) +A (A A).
Using D.T. K A (A A) and K A (A (A A)).
But second statement is same as K A ((A A) A) because (A
B) (B A). Using modus ponens we get K A A. (K
4) now implies
A.
(K
7) and (K
2) and (K
5) we have
K(AB) K K(AB) +(AB). Thus ((AB) ) K(A
B) +(A B) which on application of D.T. gives ((A B) ) K (A B) as
((A B) ) ((A B) ((A B) )).
(K
8) with A
= A B and B
1) to (K
1) to (K
7) and (K
7) and (K
8) respectively.
Proof
(K
2) K A = K K A K.
(K
3) Let A / K or A / K. Using (K
. (K
5) now gives A or A
which is a contradiction and hence A / K A.
(K
2).
(K
6) If A B then A B. From (K
= (A B)
and B
7) we get K ((A B) A) = K A K
(A B) + A. Similarly we can get K B K (A B) + B. Using
D.T., A , B K (A B). Now C() already satises (K
5) so
K (K K (A B)) + A B. And we have A B K (A B).
But A B , A , B and hence K (A B). Thus
K K (A B) = K (A B).
(K
= A B, B
= A and using (K
8) we have K (A B) + A
K (A B) A = K A. But K (A B) K (A B) +A and we have
K (A B) = K K (A B) K K A = K A.
Chapter 3
Constructing Contraction and
Revision
In previous chapter contraction and revision function were investigated indirectly by means
of a number of postulates imposed on the functions. It was also shown in that if it is possible
to give explicit construction of a contraction function, then this also yields a revision function
by means of Levi-Identity (or vice-versa through the Harper-identity). Thus epistemic
change on belief sets is completely determined by contraction function (or revision function).
The goal of this chapter is to present three constructions for contraction function leading
to single proposal.
3.1 Epistemic Entrenchment
If one can rank beliefs such that a preference among the beliefs can be induced then a
contraction function can be constructed. One such ranking (an ordering) is called Epistemic
Entrenchment ranking. This ranking is particular to the belief set K under consideration
and is a binary relation satisfying following postulates-
(EE1) is transitive.
(EE2) If A B then B A
(EE3) Either A B A or A B B
(EE4) K ,= K
B K : A < A B, if , A
K, otherwise
(3.1)
The symbol < is strict preference i.e. A < B (A B and A , B) A , B as is a
total order. A similar method can be used in the reverse way. Given a contraction function
an epistemic entrenchment ranking can be obtained as
A B if A / K (A B) or A B (3.2)
Following theorem proves that above ordering is indeed a epistemic entrenchment ranking.
14
3.1. EPISTEMIC ENTRENCHMENT 15
Theorem 3.1.1 Let be a contraction function and let K is a belief set. Then the ordering
dened in 3.2 is an epistemic entrenchment ranking.
Proof For the proof of EE(25)we will also consider an alternative of 3.2. We can replace
the premise A / K(AB) or AB by A / K(AB) or B K(AB). Using the
properties of contraction function, especially (K
7,
A K A C K ((A C) B) K (A B C). A K (A B C)
now gives B C / K (A B C) (if B C K (A B C) then by K
4
A B C which implies A K A B - a contradiction). From K
8 we now
get K (A B C) K B C. Since we assumed B / K B C, we get
B / K (A B C). Thus A B / K (A B C), and hence using K
8,
K (A B C) K A B. Now A K (A B C) K A B gives
contradiction. Thus A / K A C and A C.
(ii) A / KAB and BC. Suppose A KAC. Since BC, C KAC.
Hence A C K A C and we get A C. So A C.
(iii) AB and B / KBC. This is not possible as AB implies B KBC.
(iv) A B and B C. This directly implies A C and hence A C.
(EE2) We have to show that for all A, B L if A B then A B. Assuming A > B and
using the alternate denition we have A K (A B) and B / K (A B). But
then A B implies B K (A B) which leads to contradiction. Hence A B.
(EE3) We have to show for all A, B L, A AB or B AB. Let A , AB which
means that A KA(AB) = K(AB) and AB / K(AB). But then
B / K (A B) = K B (A B) must hold. Hence B A B.
(EE4) if Let A / K. Then (K
/ K
K = K , using (K
3)).
(EE5) We have to show that if for all B L, B A then A. Letting B = we have
/ K (A ) = K A or A K A. First assertion cant be true and hence
second one must be true. Thus A K A, which using (K
4) gives A
Theorem 3.1.2 Let K be a belief set. For every contraction function of K there is an epis-
temic entrenchment (related to K) such that 3.1 is true. Conversely for every epistemic
entrenchment related to K, there is a contraction function satisfying 3.1.
Proof For the rst part theorem 3.1.1 gives the required epistemic entrenchment ranking.
We only need to show that 3.1 holds for this ranking.
16 CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTING CONTRACTION AND REVISION
If , A then B K : A < A B = B K : A / K A (A B) = K A and
(A B) K A. We will show that if B K then (A / K A and (A B) K A)
(A / KA and B KA). B K (KA)+A (using (K
5) we have
K (K A) +A = (K A). Along with (K
2) we get (K A) = K.
For the second part we can dene the function as in equation 3.1. We only need to show
that this function is a contraction.
(K
2
..
n
) > A as by (EE2) A(
1
2
..
n
) = (A
1
) .. (A
n
)
which is equal to some A
k
(because of (EE3)) and for which A
k
> A. Now
(EE2) also gives A (
1
2
..
n
) A which with (EE1) gives A < A .
So for n 1 above proof works. If n = 0 then hence A and by (EE2),
C A for all C L. , A and (EE5) give C > A for some C. (EE1) now gives
A > A.
(K
3) As A / K, K ,= K
such that m m
K, A Cn(m
)
The denition gives very much what we desire, like m is closed and addition of anything
in K m to m gives K(proofs later). Surprisingly these subsets also satisfy K
(1 6),
[12, pp 6263] calls them maxichoice contractions. Here we can implement our basic rule
that logical inferences alone are insucient for structuring the belief change i.e. there has
to be a preference some where. We will see how further restrictions lead us to contraction
functions.
Let us denote all maximal subsets of K which fail to imply A in K by KA and
M(K) =
AK
KA. Note that if A / K then we take KA = K. For contraction
KA, instead of some m in KA we will choose some preferred elements of KA and take
their intersection. Let S denotes the selection function for choosing the preferred elements
in KA. Following denition may lead us to our contraction function.
K A =
S(KA) if , A
K otherwise
(3.3)
where, S(KA) KA
If function above is a contraction then it is called Partial Meet Contraction. Dierent
denitions of selection function S can lead us to dierent functions. But we will see that
the most appropriate S is when it chooses the top elements in KA based on a reexive
and transitive preference relation on all maximal sets M(K) of K.
S(KA) = m KA : m m
, m
KA (3.4)
Following results will help us in proving the theorem 5.3.1 which tells that partial meet
contraction function dened above is indeed a contraction.
Lemma 3.2.1 Let m is in KA for some A in K, then m is closed and Cn(m) = K
where K m.
Proof Let m and assume / m. Now m implies K as m K and K is
closed. Hence m m K, which implies m A or m A. But then
m A (as m ) gives contradiction.
For this we already have Cn(m) K and only K Cn(m ) has to be proved.
Let K m, we show that A m and hence any set containing A and m(in
particular Cn(m )) will imply . By contradiction suppose A / m which means
m m A K as (A ) and K. Thus (A ) A m. But
((A ) A) A gives that A m, a contradiction.
Second part of above result is very crucial. It says that all the beliefs in K outside m
behave similarly w.r.t. m. Suppose m is in KA for some A, and B K m then addition
of some in K m to m will give all of K and in particular B. Thus one can check that m
will also satisfy all the three conditions for the membership of KB. Here is the formalized
result-
18 CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTING CONTRACTION AND REVISION
Lemma 3.2.2 Let A K and m KA then B K m, m KB.
Using this result we compare K(A B), KA and KB. One can easily see that if
m K(A B) then it is in KA or KB because the second condition A B / m
implies A / m or B / m. What if m is in KA alone? The rst and second condition
for membership of KAB are satised. Now our previous result implies third condition.
Suppose m m
), Cn(m
1)-(K
8).
Proof
(K
1) This holds because each maximal subset m in S(KA) is closed and intersection
of closed sets is closed.
(K
4) Suppose A K A. This can only happen only under the alternate denition of
3.3 when K = K A and A.
(K
S(KA))
(
(S(KAKB))
(S(KA)S(KB)) = (
S(KA))(
S(KA)) (
S(KB)) =
(S(KA) S(KB))
(S(KA
KB)) =
S(KA B).
(K
m, m K(A B) and A / m
. Note that m
KA as A / m
. Now we
show
S(K(AB))
S(KA) then m
m, m K(AB)
due to transitivity of . Hence m
In the next section we present another approach for constructing contraction function.
3.3. SYSTEM OF SPHERES 19
3.3 System of Spheres
This method was employed by grove [9]. All the notations are borrowed from [8, section
4.5]. In this method we consider maximal consistent sets which are same as models as our
basic units. A set M L is called maximal consistent if -
(i) M is consistent i.e. B L s.t. B and B M.
(ii) If / M then M is inconsistent.
Let for a set of beliefs K, [K] denotes all maximal consistent extensions of K. Where a
set of beliefs M being maximal means . We use / to denote all maximal consistent sets.
Thus-
[K] = M / : K M (3.5)
For dening a contraction K A of K w.r.t. A, a system of spheres o is considered. Each
element of o is a subset of / i.e. it contains some maximal consistent sets. In addition o
satises following properties-
(i) o is totally ordered by . That is for any S, S
o either S S
or S
S.
(ii) [K] is the minimum of o i.e. if S o then [K] S.
(iii) / o.
(iv) If A is a belief and there is any sphere in o intersecting [A] then there is a smallest
sphere in S intersecting [A]. We will use S
A
for this smallest sphere.
Given the denition of o we can dene K A as those formulae of K that are near to
consequences of A. Formally-
K A =
([K] C(A)), if , A
K otherwise
where C(B) = [B] S
B
(3.6)
Simplifying the denition we get-
K A = (
[K]) (
C(A)) = K (
C(A)) (3.7)
as K =
[K]. We can see using Harper-Identity that
C(A) is nothing but revision of
K w.r.t. A. Before moving on to our main result we prove some small results.
Lemma 3.3.1 If A B then [A] [B] and S
B
S
A
.
Proof Let A B then if M [A] then B M implying that M [B]. Also S
A
[A] is
non empty implies S
A
[B] is not empty which further implies S
B
S
A
by virtue of (iv)
condition on o.
Lemma 3.3.2 [A B] = [A] [B]
Proof A, B (A B) implies [A] [B] [A B] using the previous result. For the
other way we will use following property of maximal consistent sets -
A B M then either A M or B M
If M [A B] then either A M or B M, implying M [A] or M [B] i.e.
M [A] [B].
20 CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTING CONTRACTION AND REVISION
Theorem 3.3.1 Let K-A be as in 3.7, then it satises K
(1 8).
Proof
(K
implying
A K or A K). Thus there is a maximal consistent extension of KA which
is in [K] and [A] hence S
[A]
= [K], implying K
(C(A)). Thus K A = K.
(K
7) We have to show K (
C(A)) (
C(B)) = K (
(C(A) C(B)))
K (
(C((A B)))). We will show that C((A B)) C(A) C(B). So,
C((AB)) = S
(AB)
[(AB)] = S
AB
[AB] = S
AB
([A][B]) =
(S
AB
[A]) (S
AB
[B]). But then A, B (A B) and previous
results imply (S
AB
[A]) (S
AB
[B]) (S
A
[A]) (S
B
[B]) =
C(A) C(B).
(K
8) Let A / K(AB) = K(
C(AB))
K (
C((A B))
C(A).
3.4 Implementation of Belief Revision
This section describes how a computer implementation of a contraction or revision func-
tion can be achieved. With every implementation there is always an overhead of proving
theorems eciently. Even if one ignores that, from computational point of view, it seems
impossible to deal directly with belief sets. For implementation, methods of partial meet
contraction and spheres are completely out of question. These methods use closed sets
as their basic units which are simply too big. Epistemic entrenchment (EE) seems to be
plausible choice because of explicit denition of a contraction. But then diculty arise as
ordering requires ranks on typically innite number of sentences. Also EE ordering is lost
in process of change, and as a consequence the iteration of change functions is not naturally
supported. In this chapter we describe a computational model which uses nite partial
entrenchment(FPE) ranking [1, chapter 15], [13]. This ranking is essentially a nite repre-
sentation of EE ranking. After describing FPE we give a PROLOG based implementation
of contraction functions.
3.4. IMPLEMENTATION OF BELIEF REVISION 21
3.4.1 Finite Partial Entrenchment Ranking
FPE grades the content of a nite knowledge base according to its epistemic importance.
Formally this ranking maps a nite set of sentences to rational numbers. The higher the
value assigned to a sentence the more rmly held it is, or the more entrenched it is.
Denition 3.4.1 A FPE ranking is a function B from a nite subset of sentences into
the interval [0, 1] such that the following conditions are satised for all domain(B) =
dom(B):
(i) dom(B) : B() < B() , if is not a tautology
(ii) If , then B() = 0
(iii) B() = 1 if and only if
Here 1
st
and 2
nd
conditions only put restrictions on tautologies and contradictory propo-
sitions. The rst condition says that a sentence assigned higher value than an arbitrary
sentence , do not entail . The sentences mapped to numbers greater than zero represent
the explicit beliefs, and their logical closure represents its implicit beliefs-
Denition 3.4.2 Let B denotes family of all FPE rankings. Then for some B in B,
exp(B) = dom(B) : B() > 0 and content(B) = Cn(exp(B)).
Let be a nontautological sentence and B be a nite partial entrenchment ranking then
degree of acceptance of is-
degree(B, ) =
(, i) if i degree(B, )
(B
(, 0))
+
(, i) otherwise
where
B
(, i)() =
with ,
, ,
Logical Rules:
, ,
(L)
;
, ,
,
;
,
(R)
;
, ,
, , ;
,
;
(M)
;
, ;
,
(L)
;
,
;
,
(R)
26 CHAPTER 4. THREE-VALUED LOGIC AND BELIEF REVISION
;
, ,
, ;
, ,
(M)
;
,
,
( L)
, ;
, , ;
,
;
,
( R)
;
, , ;
, ,
,
;
( M)
;
,
, ;
(L)
;
,
;
,
(M)
, ;
,
(R)
4.2.1 Truth of a Sequent
Having dened the sequents we need to give semantics associated with them. Let ;
with ,
is said to be true
under v and written v [= ;
or such that
v() = 0, 1/2 or 1 respectively. A valid sequent is true under all valuations and is denoted
as [= ;
.
4.2.2 Provability of a Sequent
A sequent ;
is root and
instances of Axiom Rule are the leaves. Root is obtained by gradual application of sequent
calculus rules on leaves. A provable sequent is written as ;
.
4.2.3 Equivalence
Soundness:If ;
then [= ;
.
Proof Since the sequent is provable, the derivation using the rules is nite and all the
branches start from axiom rule. Now any valuation v can assign only three values 0,1/2,1
to the repeating formula in the instance of axiom rule and hence according to our def-
inition the sequent is true under all valuations. Now all other sequent calculus rules are
constructed in a manner that, premise sequent is true under a valuation if and only if the
conclusion is true under it. Thus using the derivation we can conclude that our provable
sequent is also true under all valuations.
Completeness:If [= ;
then ;
.
Proof Let S be the set of sequents s.t.
build the derivation tree T whose root is this sequent and nodes are formed
using the rules in sequent calculus. Formally if ;
).
Since ,
and are nite T is nite. So we only need to prove that leaves of T are
nothing but instances of axiom rule. On the contrary let us assume that there is a leaf
1
;
1
1
such that
1
1
1
= . As rules are dened for all possible occur-
rences of a given type of formula this leaf can only have propositional letters. Now all
4.3. AUTOMATED PROOF METHODS 27
our rules are dened in a way that premise are valid if and only if conclusion is valid
and we have that
1
;
1
1
is valid as ;
1
and v(a) = 0 if a /
1
can make the sequent false,
leading to a contradiction. Hence leaves are instances of axiom rule and proof is nished.
and
= A
+
;
then
- if A < A
then
TDD(,
) = TDDmake(A, TDDor(
+
,
),TDDor(
),TDDor(
))
- if A > A
then
TDD(,
) = TDDmake(A, TDDor(,
+
),TDDor(,
),TDDor(,
))
- if A = A
then
TDD(,
) = TDDmake(A, TDDor(
+
,
+
),TDDor(
),TDDor(
))
4.4 Contraction and Revision
In this logic we expect some modications in contraction and revision postulates. First of
all we note that here A, A as well as A, A are inconsistent. So removal of A alone,
doesnt ensure safety when A has to be added. We have to remove A from our belief set
K before adding A. Thus Levi-Identity has to be changed. Also in Harper-identity we see
that K A and K A both dont have A implying that their intersection with K may
yield a contraction. But then due to p p it is expected that K A is farther than
K A w.r.t. consequences of A. Hence KK A is probably smaller than KK A,
forcing us to change Harper-Identity too. With the changed denitions and establishing
interrelationships we reach following denitions for revision and contraction.
Postulates for Contraction
(K
1) K A is a belief set
(K
2) K A K
(K
3) If A / K then K A = K
(K
4) If ,A then A / K A
(K
5) K (K A) +A
(K
6) If A B then K A = K B
(K
7) K A K B K (A B)
(K
8) If A / K (A B) then K (A B) K A
Postulates for Revision
(K
1) K A is a belief set
(K
2) A K A
(K
3) K A K +A
(K
4) If A / K then K +A K A
(K
5) K A = K
if and only if A
(K
6) If A B then K A = K B
(K
7) K (A B) (K A) +B
(K
8) If B / K A then (K A) +B K (A B)
Now we discuss the reasons behind changing postulates. For Contraction we only
changed (K
6. For K
5 is straight from
the following property of three valued logic, if K A is inconsistent then A K.
30 CHAPTER 4. THREE-VALUED LOGIC AND BELIEF REVISION
4.5 Interrelations
Changes in epistemic states modelled as expansion, revision and contraction are interrelated.
Revision of a belief set K with respect to a sentence A can be seen as removal of any
incompatible information A and then addition of A along with all logical consequences.
In 3valued logic the Levi-identity takes the following form-
K A = (K A) +A (4.3)
Let us call the revision function above R(). Following theorem tells that function R()
dened through Levi - identity is indeed a revision function.
Theorem 4.5.1 If a contraction function satises (K
1) to (K
1) to (K
7) and (K
7) and (K
8) respectively.
Proof
(K
1) From denition.
(K
2) A A hence (K A) +A A.
(K
3) From (K
4) Let A / K. Using (K
as B L, A, A B.
only if Let (K A) + A = K
6).
(K
7) will give (A B) K (A B) K
(A B) K ((A B) (A B)) = K (A). From where we can
get (K A+A B) = (K A+A) +B.
(A B) K (A B) can be shown by using (K
5), (A B)
K (A B) K K (A B) + (A B). Applying (D.T.) ((A
B) ((A B) )) K (A B). But ((A B) ((A B)
)) ((A B) ). Hence we get (A B) K (A B).
(K
8) with A
= (A B) and B
= A
we get K A K (A B). Hence we get K (A B) + (A B) and
our proof is complete as (A B) (A B).
4.6. EPISTEMIC ENTRENCHMENT 31
Similar to Levi identity, Harper Identity takes the following form-
K A = K K (A) (4.4)
Let us call revision function dened above C().
Theorem 4.5.2 If a revision function * satises (K
1) to (K
1) to (K
7) and (K
7) and (K
8) respectively.
Proof
(K
3) A / K implies A / K as A A. Using (K
4) we get K A = K +A
which means K K A = K.
(K
.
But then (K
5) gives A.
(K
2).
(K
6) Use A B i A B and (K
6).
(K
= (A B)
and B
7) we get K ((A B) A) = K A
K (A B) +A. Similarly we can get K B K (A B) +B. Using
D.T., A , B K (A B). Now C() already satises (K
5) so
K (K K (A B)) +A B. And we have (A B ) K (A B).
But (A B ), (A ), (B ) because = 0 or 1/2 demands
that one of the premises is not equal to 1 and hence K (A B). Thus
K K (A B) = K (A B).
(K
= A B, B =
A and using (K
8) we have K (A B) + A
K (AB) A = K A. But K (AB) K (AB) +A and we have
K (A B) = K K (A B) K K A = K A.
4.6 Epistemic Entrenchment
In 3-valued logic the epistemic entrenchment doesnt change signicantly. Epistemic en-
trenchment is mostly independent of nature of the inference relation. It only sees it as a
preference relation over the language. We will see that the earlier denition of contraction
in terms of Epistemic entrenchment works here.
32 CHAPTER 4. THREE-VALUED LOGIC AND BELIEF REVISION
Theorem 4.6.1 Let be a contraction function and let K is a belief set. Then the ordering
dened in 3.2 is an epistemic entrenchment ranking.
Proof Follows line by line similar to the classical case.
Theorem 4.6.2 Let K be a belief set. For every contraction function of K there is an epis-
temic entrenchment (related to K) such that 3.1 is true. Conversely for every epistemic
entrenchment related to K, there is a contraction function satisfying 3.1.
Proof For the rst part theorem 4.6.1 gives the required epistemic entrenchment ranking.
We only need to show that 3.1 holds for this ranking.
If , A then B K : A < A B = B K : A / K A (A B) = K A
and (A B) K A. We will show that if B K then the constraint (A / K A
and (A B) K A) on the above set is same as (A / K A and B K A) which
is same as K A.If B K A then obviously (A B) K A. For the other way
(B B) and B K implies B K and K A = K A. Using (K
5) as
K (KA)+A implies (A B) KA. Now (AB) (AB)
implies (A B) K A. But then (A B), (A B) B as for
B = 0, 1/2 B = 0 implying that both the premises cant be 1 and hence B K A.
If A then A K A. That is (K A) + A = K A. Using (K
5) we have
K (K A) +A = (K A). Along with (K
2) we get (K A) = K.
For the second part we can dene the function as in equation 3.1. We only need to show
that this function is a contraction. All the postulates go through easily except the (K
5).
Below is the proof-
(K
1)-(K
8).
Proof
4.8. SYSTEM OF SPHERES 33
(K
1) We show that each m KA is closed i.e. it is a belief set. And we already know
that intersection of closed sets is closed. Suppose m now suppose / m thus
m m K. Hence m A or m ( A), but then m A as m
giving contradiction.
(K
7) This proof goes similar to the classical case as in proof of theorem because (A
B) B holds here.
(K
8) Here too we dont use anything new, hence classical proof goes through.
4.8 System of Spheres
System of spheres derive contraction by maximal consistent sets. Since three-valued logic
distinguishes between A and A we have to be careful of denition of consistent sets. We
see that p p but converse is not true. If we dene consistency of K L as
B L such that B and B K
then there is no dierence. One can prove that this denition is equivalent to classical
denition of consistency. If we look at maximal consistent set M then also they satisfy
most properties of classical maximal consistent sets. Like if M then M. Hence we
dont need to alter the denition of maximal consistent sets. We need to change denition
of contraction. Since p, p is inconsistent, its sucient to take beliefs in KA which are
near to consequences of A. The following modication as expected serves the purpose-
K A = (
[K]) (
C(A)) = K (
C(A)) (4.5)
Before proving that above function is a contraction, we prove that maximal consistent sets
satisfy the property-
A B M then either A M or B M
Proof Let A B M but A, B / M. Hence MA and MB are inconsistent. Thus
A B M. But (A B) (A B) implies (A B) M implying M is
inconsistent, a contradiction. Besides this results concerning S
A
and [A] also hold. One can
easily show that if A B then S
B
S
A
and [A] [B].
Here comes our nal theorem-
Theorem 4.8.1 Let K A be as in 4.5, then it satises K
(1 8).
34 CHAPTER 4. THREE-VALUED LOGIC AND BELIEF REVISION
Proof
(K
1) Since maximal consistent sets are closed here, there intersection is also closed.
(K
, implying
A K or A K (as A A)). Thus there is a maximal consistent extension
of K A which is in [K] and [A] hence S
[A]
= [K], implying K
(C(A)).
Thus K A = K.
(K
7) The classical proof goes through in our 3-valued context as [AB] = [A] [B] and
(A B) (A B).
(K
of in
S
5
such that is a theorem in 3-valued logic if and only if
is a theorem in S
5
. The
embedding maps the connective M of Lukasiewicz algebra to possibility connective M of
S
5
. Hence our guess is perfect and our beliefs can be made vague by saying MA instead of
A.
After knowing the interpretation there are numerous uses of this kind of belief change.
In fact, since we dont loose anything as far as belief change in classical background is con-
cerned, one should think of it as fundamental. In day-today life we actually have possibility
notions in our beliefs.
4.10 Generalization to n-valued Logics
The belief change in 3-valued logics can be extended to n-valued logics. n-valued logics take
the n truth values L
n
= 0, 1/(n 1), ..., (n 2)/(n 1), 1. Interpretation of connectives
is same as that of 3-valued logic. In most of the 3-valued logic proofs, we noticed the
adjustments in classical proofs by replacing by and by . We also observed that
modus ponens with produces same results as with . So we expect our 3-valued results
to generalize for n-valued logics where we take A A (A (A ...(A
n2 times
A))..)
with A B A (A (A ...(A
n1 times
B))..). Following result will help us in embedding
classical logic into any n-valued logic. Since embedding is in terms of and , it is very
useful in generalization.
Lemma 4.10.1 Suppose is a formula in L and
based on L
n
such
that v
2
(p) v
n
(p) v
2
(p) + (n 2)/(n 1), for each propositional variable - p. Then for
any ,
v
2
() v
n
) v
2
() + (n 2)/(n 1) (4.6)
Proof We proceed by induction on length [[ of . When [[ = 1 then is a propositional
variable, for which inequality holds by assumption. Suppose inequality holds for any such
that [[ m. We prove that inequality holds for [[ = m+ 1:
(i) . If v
2
() = 0 then we only need to show v
n
) (n 2)/(n 1). v
2
() =
1 v
2
() = 1 and [[ = m gives 1 v
n
) v
2
() + (n 2)/(n 1) that is
v
n
) = 1. Hence v
n
) = v
n
) = 0 (n 2)/(n 1).
If v
2
() = 1 then we show that v
n
) = 1. v
2
() = 1 1 = 0, thus 0 v
n
)
(n 2)/(n 1). Hence v
n
) = v
n
) = 1.
(ii) . If v
2
( ) = 0 then v
2
() = 1 and v
2
() = 0. Using induction we
have v
n
) = 1 and v
n
) = v
n
) = v
n
) (n 2)/(n 1).
36 CHAPTER 4. THREE-VALUED LOGIC AND BELIEF REVISION
If v
2
( ) = 1 then if v
2
() = 0 then 0 v
n
) = 1. If v
2
() = 1 then v
2
() = 1 and hence
v
n
) = 1 and v
n
) = 1. Since v
n
(b) = 1 implies v
n
(b c) = v
n
(c), we have
v
n
) = v
n
) = 1.
(iii) or . Follows easily from the denitions v( ) = max(v(), v()) and
v( ) = min(v(), v()).
Theorem 4.10.1
is 1 on all valuations v
n
based on L
n
. Suppose v
n
is
some valuation based on L
n
. Then there exists a classical valuation v
2
whose n
th
lift is
v
n
, that is v
2
(p) v
n
(p) v
2
(p) + (n 2)/(n 1) for all propositional variables p. Now
using previous lemma we have v
2
() v
n
(
) = 1 and hence
is a
theorem in n-valued logic.
Now all the results obtained in 3-valued logic can be generalized to n valued logic.
Thus if we do belief changes with A instead of A then we get all the belief change results
in any n-valued logic. Making comparisons with existing approaches like [7] where belnaps
logic is used might be interesting.
Chapter 5
Rough Belief Revision
In this chapter we will see how rough logic can be used to do belief change. In 3-valued
logic we were able to provide room for vagueness by realizing the notion of possibility of
a belief. There a belief A can have a weaker assertion M(A). Here in rough logic we dont
introduce new assertions of a belief, instead we make them weaker by taking incomplete
evidences as beliefs. So a belief may fail as its truth was dependent upon some incomplete
information. Most denitions and initial results are borrowed from [3].
5.1 Rough Truth
The notion of rough truth was introduced in [15] as a part of the rst formal proposal on
reasoning with rough sets. It was proposed to reect inductive truth, i.e. truth relative to
our present state of knowledge, and one that, with gain of knowledge, leads to total, deduc-
tive truth. This sense of gradualness nds an expression in, possibly, the only qualitative
version of approximate orsoft truth, as opposed to other quantitative denitions found
in, e.g., probabilistic, multi-valued or fuzzy logics.
It has generally been accepted that the propositional aspects of rough set theory are
adequately expressed by the modal system S
5
. An S
5
(Kripke) model (X, R, ) is essentially
an approximation space (X, R) (X is some set with equivalence relation R on it) where
X ,= , with the function interpreting every well-formed formula(w) of S
5
as a rough set
in (X, R). If L, M denote the necessity and possibility connectives respectively, a modal w
L(M), representing denitely (possibly) , is interpreted by as the lower (upper)
approximation () x X : all x
then x
()
(() (()
c
)
c
) of the set (). In general for a subset A of X we can dene lower(A)
and upper(A) of as:
A =
[x] : x X, [x] A
A =
[x] : x X, [x] A ,=
where [x] is equivalence class of x
Now with all the above background, a w may be termed roughly true in /
(X, R, ), if () = X. The notion of truth can be extended to rough validity which can
be further used to dene rough consequence and rough (in)consistencey. The language of
rough logic L
R
is that of a normal modal propositional logic. In the following is any set
of ws, , any ws of L
R
.
37
38 CHAPTER 5. ROUGH BELIEF REVISION
5.1.1 The semantics
Denition 5.1.1 An S
5
-model / (X, R, ) is a rough model of , if and only if every
member of is roughly true in /, i.e. () = X.
Denition 5.1.2 is a rough semantic consequence of (denoted [ ) if and only if
every rough model of is a rough model of . If is empty, is said to be roughly valid,
written [ .
We present now the logic of L
R
which will serve as the base logic for rough belief change.
As already said the language is of a normal modal logic and let
S5
denotes the derivability
relation in S5. We consider two rules of inference:
R1. R2. M
M
where
S5
M M M M
The consequence relation dening the system L
R
is given as follows.
Denition 5.1.3 is a rough consequence of (denoted
R
) if and only if there is a
sequence
1
, ...,
n
( ) such that each
i
(i = 1, ..., n) is either (i) a theorem of S
5
, or (ii)
a member of , or (iii) derived from some of
1
, ...,
i1
by R1 or R2.
If is empty, is said to be a rough theorem, written
R
.
Some derived rules of inference:
DR1. DR2. (M)L
S5
(M)L
DR3. M DR4. M
M M
DR5. M DR6.
M
DR7. M DR8.
S5
M
M M M
Some immediate results are -
Theorem 5.1.1 (Deduction) For any , , , if
R
then
R
.
Theorem 5.1.2 (Soundness & completeness)
R
if and only if [ .
Theorem 5.1.3 L
R
is paraconsistent.
We state the following without proof. One may remark though, that the proof of
Theorem 5.1.4 uses only S
5
properties, and that of Theorem 5.1.6 uses the rule of inference
R2 (in fact, DR3).
5.2. ROUGH BELIEF CHANGE 39
Theorem 5.1.4 is roughly consistent if and only if it has a rough model.
Theorem 5.1.5
R
if and only if M = M :
S5
M
Theorem 5.1.6 If is not roughly consistent then
R
for every w .
Theorem 5.1.7 If M
R
for every w , then
R
.
Observation 5.1.1
The classical rules of Modus Ponens and Necessitation fail to be sound with respect to the
rough truth semantics. The rule ,
R
is not sound either, but R2 is sound
and suces for our purpose.
Interestingly, the soundness result establishes that the converse of the deduction theorem
is not true e.g.
R
p Lp, but p ,
R
Lp, p being any propositional variable.
However, the converse does go through, i.e.
R
implies
R
, if
is a modal w, i.e. is of the form L or M, for some w this is because of
DR2.
R
(M)L. So there is no dierence between the modal and non-modal ws in
terms of the object-level implication . However, as just noted, ,
R
L in general
indicating that the meta-level implication
R
does make this distinction.
5.2 Rough belief change
In classical belief revision, the base language is assumed ([12]) to be closed under the
Boolean operators of negation, conjunction, disjunction, and implication. The underly-
ing consequence relation is supraclassical (includes classical consequence) and satises cut,
deduction theorem, monotonicity and compactness.
In contrast, we consider the modal language of L
R
as the base. We follow the classical
line for the rest of the denitions. A belief set is a set K of ws such that Cn(K) = K.
For a pair (K, A), there is a unique belief set K A (K A) representing rough revision
(contraction) of K with respect to A. The new belief set can be dened through a new set
of eight basic postulates (that follow). The expansion K +A of K by the w A is the belief
set Cn(KA). It is expected that rough contraction/revision by two roughly equal [14]
beliefs would lead to identical belief sets. To express this, we make use of the rough equality
connective [11] in S
5
: A B (LA LB) (MA MB).
Postulates for rough revision
(K
2) A K A.
(K
3) K A K +A.
(K
4) If A , K, then K +A K A.
(K
6) If
R
A B, then K A = K B.
(K
2) K A K.
(K
3) If A , K, then K A = K.
(K
4) If A K A, then
R
A.
(K
) If LA K A, then
R
A.
(K
6) If
R
A B, then K A = K B.
(K
7) K A K B K (MA MB).
(K
1 and K
2, 3 and K
2, 3 are self-
explanatory. A , K implies consistency and hence rough consistency of K+A, so that, in
view of the previous remarks, K
5, we stipulate
that K A is generally roughly consistent, except in the case when A is roughly valid, i.e.
in no situation denitely A holds (though possibly A may hold). K
4 again stipulates
that, in general, A , K A, except when A is possible in all situations. K
could
appear more relevant: denitely A may follow from our beliefs despite contraction by A
only if A is, in every situation, possible. The controversial recovery postulate K
5 in [6] is
admitted here, only in the case of contraction with a denable/describable [14],[15] belief,
i.e. A such that
S5
A LA. The last two axioms express the relationship of change
functions with respect to beliefs and their conjunctions. The failure of soundness of the
classical conjunction rule A, B
R
A B here, necessitates a modication in the AGM
K
7, K
8, K
7, K
8.
Observation 5.2.1 K
implies K
5 and K
4 implies K
.
The following interrelationships between rough contraction and revision are then ob-
served, if the Levi and Harper identities [12] are used.
Theorem 5.2.1 Let the Levi identity give , i.e. K A (K A) +A,
where the contraction function satises only K
1 8 (K
1 8, thus K
is also satised.
Proof
(K
1 4) Follow easily.
(K
4,
R
A.
5.2. ROUGH BELIEF CHANGE 41
(K
6.
(K
6 ( is a
special case of ). Thus
K A = K ((MA MB) (MA MB)). *
Secondly, because of DR5, 6 and R2,
K +MA MB = Cn(K A, B), for any K. **
Let K MA MB, i.e. K (MA MB) MA MB
R
. By deduction
theorem, K(MAMB)
R
MAMB . So MAMB K(MA
MB) K K (MA MB) MA MB, the last by K
5, as MA MB
is equivalent to a modal w. It is then easy to see that K (MA MB)
R
MA MB . So MA MB K (MA MB) K (MA MB)
K ((MA MB) (MA MB)), by K
7. Therefore, using *, K A
R
(MA MB) . As (MA MB) is also equivalent to a modal w, by converse of
deduction theorem (cf. Observation 5.1.1(b)), KAMAMB
R
. By (**),
K A A, B(= K A+B)
R
.
(K
8, we
have KA = K((MAMB) (MA MB)) = K(MA MB) (MA
MB)) K((MAMB)). Thus, by **, Cn(K((MAMB)) A, B) =
K ((MA MB)) +MA MB = K (MA MB).
Theorem 5.2.2 Let be given by the Harper identity, i.e. K A K K A.
(a) If the revision function satises K
14, K
(K
68,
then satises K
1 8 (so K
is satised).
(b) If the revision function satises K
13, K
and K
58.
Proof
(K
1 3, 6) Follow easily.
((a), K
4) As A K A (by K
2) as well as A K A (assumption), K A is
inconsistent, and hence roughly so. Thus by K
,
R
A. It follows that
R
A.
((b), K
2. So, using S
5
properties, MK
A
S5
LA as well as MK A
S5
LA, implying that K A is not roughly
consistent. By K
5,
R
A. Thus
R
A.
(K
7) Using K
6 we have
K A = K MA = K ((MA MB) MA). *
By * and K
2 holds and
(MA MB) is equivalent to a modal w, K (MA MB)
R
M, by DR2.
Finally, by DR5, we have K (MA MB).
42 CHAPTER 5. ROUGH BELIEF REVISION
(K
8, K (MA MB) + MA
K ((MA MB) MA) = K MA = K A. So K (MA MB)
K (MA MB) +MA K A, and K
8 holds.
5.3 Partial Meet Contraction
In previous section we directly used Levi and Harper identity to investigate rough belief
change. Investigation led us to incorporate some changes in AGM postulates. Since our
results dont lead to a clear picture of the belief change, we start from a basic approach of
constructing contraction function. We can then identify new properties of the constructed
function and hence modify the AGM postulates in a systematic manner.
Similar to classical construction of contraction from maximal subsets of K which fail to
give A, we can construct partial meet contractions in rough background. If the denition
of maximal subsets of K is taken as in section 3.2 then we can show that following holds
Lemma 5.3.1 Let m is in KA for some A in K, then m is closed and Cn(m) = K
where K m.
Proof Let m
R
and assume / m. Now m
R
implies m
R
M which im-
plies M K as m K and K is closed. Hence m m M K, which implies
m M
R
A or m
R
M A. But then m
R
A, as m
R
M and M is modal,
which gives contradiction. Hence m.
For this we already have Cn(m ) K and only K Cn(m ) has to be proved.
Let K m, we show that MA M m and hence any set containing MA and m
(in particular Cn(m)) will imply M(). By contradiction suppose MA M / m
which means m m MA M K as
S5
M (MA M) and (M) K.
Thus (MA M) MA m. But
S5
((MA M) MA) MA gives that
MA(A) m, a contradiction.
Using second part of the above result, we again get that all the beliefs in K outside m
behave identically with respect to m. Suppose m is in KA for some A, and B K m
then addition of some in K m to m will give all of K and in particular B. Thus one can
check that m will satisfy all the three conditions for membership of KB. Thus we have-
Lemma 5.3.2 Let A K and m KA then B K m, m KB.
Using this result we compare K(MAMB), KA and KB. Note that MAMB
R
R
A, B. One can easily see that if m K(MA MB) then it is in KA or KB
because the second condition MA MB / m implies A / m or B / m. What if m is in
KA? The rst and second condition for membership of KMA MB are satised and
our previous lemma implies the third condition - Suppose m m
K, then in addition
to A Cn(m
), Cn(m
6, 7, 8
(K
1) K A is a belief set
(K
2) K A K
(K
3) If A / K then K A = K
(K
4) If ,
R
A then A / K A
(K
5) K (K A) +A
(K
6) If A
R R
B then K A = K B
(K
7) K A K B K (MA MB)
(K
1)-(K
8).
Proof
(K
1) This holds because each maximal subset m in S(KA) is closed and intersection
of closed sets is closed.
(K
4) If ,
R
A then KA is non-empty. Hence A / K A.
(K
5) Let K. Assume ,
R
A so that rst denition of 3.3 is used, we show that
(MA ) K A. Using second part of the lemma 5.3.1 with = A we get
m KA, Cn(m A(orMA)) = K. Thus MA m, K implying
MA K A =
6) Use, A
R
B and B
R
A implies KA = KB.
(K
7) If
R
A or
R
B then obviously this holds, if
R
A then K A = K and
K B = K (MA MB)(MA MB
R R
B). So let us assume ,
R
A and
,
R
B. We have to show (
S(KA)) (
S(KB))
(S(KA
KB))
(S(KA)S(KB)) =
(
S(KA))(
S(KA))(
S(KB)) =
(S(KA) S(KB))
(S(KA KB)) =
S(KMA MB).
(K
m, m K(MAMB) and A / m
. Note that m
KA as A / m
. Now we
show
S(K(MAMB))
S(KA) then m
m, m K(MA MB) due to transitivity of . Hence m
S(K(MA MB))
giving S(KA) S(K(MA MB)).
44 CHAPTER 5. ROUGH BELIEF REVISION
5.4 Rough Consistency
In rough logic we look at following types of consistencies. A subset of L
R
is:
Roughly consistent if M = MA : A is S5 consistent that is there is no B L
R
such that M
S5
B and M
S5
B.
Absolutely consistent if there is a B L
R
such that ,
R
B.
Negation consistent if there is no B in L
R
such that
R
B and
R
B.
Modal negation consistent if there is no B L
R
such that
R
MB and
R
MB.
Note that in S5, consistency is same as classical consistency where absolute and nega-
tion consistency coincide. Also in rough logic negation consistency implies modal negation
consistency but not otherwise.
Lemma 5.4.1 In L
R
, rough consistency, absolute consistency and modal negation consis-
tency are equivalent.
Proof Suppose is not roughly consistent then M is S5 inconsistent, that is to say for
all B L
R
M
S5
B. Hence M
S5
MB and we have
R
B for all B in L
R
that is
to say is not absolutely consistent. If is not absolutely consistent then obviously it is
not modal negation consistent. Finally suppose is not modal negation consistent. Thus
R
MB and
R
MB for some B L
R
. Hence M
S5
MMB and M
S5
MMB,
which is same as M
S5
MB, MB. Thus M is not S5 consistent or is not roughly
consistent.
Lemma 5.4.2 Let L
R
.
(i) A
R
B, B L
R
if and only if
R
MA.
(ii) MA
R
B, B L
R
if and only if
R
A.
Proof (i) if part follows directly from equivalence of absolute consistency and modal nega-
tion consistency. For only if part A
R
B if and only if M MA
S5
MB.
Thus in particular M MA
S5
MA. Using D.T., M
S5
MA MA, but
MA MA
S5
MA and hence M
S5
MA(MMA). Hence
R
MA.
(ii) Replacing A by MA in rst part we get MA
R
B, B L
R
if and only if
R
MMA. Since MMA LMA MA and MA
R R
A, the result follows.
5.5 Maximal Consistent Sets
In rough logic maximal consistent sets are those roughly consistent sets which become not
roughly consistent on adding anything outside them. Formally, M
r
L
R
is maximal con-
sistent if:
(i) M
r
is roughly consistent and
(ii) If A / M
r
then M
r
A is not roughly consistent.
Following properties of rough maximal consistent sets are notable:
(a) M
r
is closed : Suppose M
r
R
A andA / M
r
. Thus M
r
A is not roughly consistent.
Hence MM
r
MA is S5 inconsistent, that is MM
r
S5
MA. But then M
R
A
gives MM
S5
MA which with MM
r
S5
MA implies that M
r
is not roughly
consistent - a contradiction.
5.6. REVISION FROM SYSTEM OF SPHERES 45
(b) For every B L
R
exactly one of MB and MB is in M
r
: Obviously both MB
and MB can not be in M
r
as it is (also) modally negation consistent. Now suppose,
MB / M
r
. Thus MM
r
MMB(or MB) is not S5 consistent and we have MM
r
S5
MB(or MMB). Which implies M
r
R
MB or MB M
r
as M
r
is closed.
(c) For every B L
R
exactly one of LB and LB is in M
r
: Taking B as B in (b), we
get exactly one of LB(MB) or LB(MB) is in M
r
.
(d) Every roughly consistent set has a maximal consistent extension : Let
0
,
1
,
2
,
3
, ...
be an enumeration of L
R
. Construct
0
,
1
, ...,
i
, ... as:
0
:=
i+1
:=
i
i
if
i
i
is roughly consistent,
i
otherwise. Take M
r
=
i0
i
.
Note that each
i
is roughly consistent. Since M
r
, we only need to prove
that M
r
is maximal consistent. First M
r
is roughly consistent: Suppose not then
MM
r
S5
B, B, thus by compactness there is a nite subset of M
r
which gives both
B and B. Now if k is the maximum index of formulae contained in the nite subset
then M
k+1
S5
B, B meaning
k+1
is not roughly consistent - a contradiction. For
proving second condition, let A / M
r
. So A =
i
for some i and
i+1
does not contain
i
. Thus
i+1
=
i
and
i
i
is not roughly consistent. Thus M
r
i
is also
not roughly consistent as
i
M
r
.
(e) If K is closed and roughly consistent then K =
[K] : Since K is roughly consistent
[K] is non-empty, thus obviously K
[K].
(f) [MA MB] = [A] [B] : Straight from the fact that MA MB
R R
A, B.
5.6 Revision from System of Spheres
Using system of spheres we can obtain revision function. We dene the revision as:
K A =
C(A), if [A] ,=
K
where, C(A) = S
A
[A] (5.1)
Note that [A] is empty means A has no maximal consistent extension. That is possible only
when A is not roughly consistent which is same as
R
MA. Based on new properties of
maximal consistent sets we make changes in the classical postulates for revision. Following
postulates t best in rough context:
(K
1) K A is a belief set
(K
2) A K A
(K
3) K A K +A
(K
4) If MA / K then K +A K A
(K
5) K A = K
if and only if
R
MA
(K
6) If A
R R
B then K A = K B
(K
7) K (MA MB) (K A) +B
(K
1) C(A) contains maximal consistent sets which are closed. So there intersection has
to be closed, and hence K A is a belief set.
(K
2) If [A] is non-empty then each maximal consistent set in C(A) is also in [A] and hence
contains A, otherwise when [A] is empty K A = K
which contains A.
(K
3) If K +A = K
then
it is absolutely consistent and hence roughly consistent. Thus K + A has a maximal
consistent extension M
r
. Since M
r
contains both K and A, [K] [A] ,= and we
have S
A
= [K]. Thus C(A) = [K] [A]. But then [K +A] [K] [A] implying that
K A =
C(A) =
([K] [A])
[K +A] = K +A.
(K 4) If MA / K then K + A is roughly consistent which has a maximal consistent
extension. Thus S
A
= [K] and we have C(A) = [K] [A]. With [K] [A] [K +A],
we get K +A =
[K +A]
([K] [A]) =
C(A) = K A.
(K 5) if By denition K A can be K
only when
R
MA.
only if Using K
.
(K
6) Use A
R R
B implies [A] = [B].
(K
7, we get S
A
[A] S
MAMB
[MAMB]. But
MB KA implies MB M
r
for all M
r
S
A
[A], hence MB M
r
for all M
r
S
MAMB
[MA MB] = C(MA MB). Since B M
r
for all M
r
in
[MA MB] we get that M
r
for all M
r
in C(MA MB).
5.7 Epistemic Entrenchment
In rough context because of A, B ,
R R
A B the epistemic entrenchment ranking
denition must be changed. EE2 says that if A
R
B then B A, thus we have A and
B MA MB A B. Now EE3 can be left as it is or we can replace A B by
5.7. EPISTEMIC ENTRENCHMENT 47
MA MB. But then rst option makes MA MB =
E
A B, where C =
E
D means
C D and C D, and hence we choose the second option. Other postulates seem to be
fundamental to epistemic preference and left unchanged.
(EE1) is transitive.
(EE2) If A
R
B then B A
(EE3) Either MA MB A or MA MB B
(EE4) K ,= K
B K : A < A B, if ,
R
A
K, otherwise
(5.2)
A similar method can be used in the reverse way. Given a contraction function an epistemic
entrenchment ranking can be obtained as
A B if A / K (A B) or
R
A B (5.3)
Theorem 5.7.1 Let be a contraction function and let K is a belief set. Then the ordering
dened in 5.3 is an epistemic entrenchment ranking.
Proof Follows on the classical lines.
Theorem 5.7.2 Let K be a belief set. For every contraction function of K there is an epis-
temic entrenchment (related to K) such that 5.2 is true. Conversely for every epistemic
entrenchment related to K, there is a contraction function satisfying 5.2.
Proof For the rst part theorem 5.7.1 gives the required epistemic entrenchment ranking.
We only need to show that 5.2 holds for this ranking.
If ,
R
A then B K : A < A B = B K : A / K A (A B) = K A and
(A B) K A. We will show that if B K then (A / K A and (A B) K A)
is same as (A / K A and B K A) which is same as denition of K A. If B K
then using K
5) we have
K (K A) +A = (K A). Along with (K
2) we get K A = K.
For the second part we can dene the function as in equation 5.2. We only need to show
that this function is a contraction.
48 CHAPTER 5. ROUGH BELIEF REVISION
(K
1) Suppose K A
R
for some L
R
. By compactness of
R
there exist
1
,
2
, ..,
n
such that
1
,
2
...
n
R
that is to say M
1
M
2
... M
n
R
.
To show K A we have to show that K and either A < A or
R
A. Suppose ,
R
A, then A
i
=
E
MA M
i
> A for all
i
. Hence we have
MA(M
1
M
2
.. M
n
) > A as by (EE2) MA(M
1
M
2
.. M
n
) =
E
(MA M
1
) .. (MA M
n
) which is equal to some MA M
k
(because
of (EE3)) and for which MA M
k
=
E
A
k
> A. Now (EE2) also gives
MA (M
1
M
2
.. M
n
) MA M =
E
A which with (EE1) gives
A < A . So for n 1 above proof works. If n = 0 then
R
hence
R
A and
by (EE2), C A for all C L. ,
R
A and (EE5) give C > A for some C. (EE1)
now gives A > A.
(K
3) As A / K, K ,= K
4) A
R
A hence A =
E
A which means that A A > A is not possible.
(K
R
MA(MA M), by (EE2) we have C MA(MA M) for all C L
R
.
A(or MA) not being a theorem satises A < C for some C by (EE5). Thus by (EE1)
we get A < MA (MA M) =
E
A (MA MB).
(K
6) If A
R R
B then by (EE2) we have A =
E
B and A C =
E
B C. Thus
A < A C is same as B < B C. The equality of K A and K B now follows
from the denition.
(K
MA MB.
(K
1) to (K
1) to (K
7) and (K
7) and (K
8) respectively.
Proof
(K
2) A K A as (K MA) A
R
A.
(K
3) From (K
4) Let MA / K, using (K
5) if Let
R
MA. Thus MA and A(MA) (KMA)+A. Thus (KMA)+A
is not modal negation consistent. Hence (KMA) +A is not absolutely consistent
and is equal to K
.
only if Let (K MA) + A = K
4) now implies
R
MA.
(K
6) we have (K MB) =
(K MA)
R
(MA ). Thus (K MB) + B
R
(MA ) which in turn
yields (K MB) + B
R
as B
R
A(MA). So, K A K B. Similarly
K B K A giving K A = K B.
(K
7) and (K
2) and
(K
8) with A
= MA MB and B
= MA we get
(MAMB) K(MA MB) MA K(MA MB). Thus nally
K(MA MB) +(MAMB) = K(MAMB) as (MA MB)
R R
(MA MB).
Similar to levi identity, we change the Harper-identity.
K A = K K MA (5.5)
We call the function above C(). Following theorem ensures that C() is indeed a
contraction function.
Theorem 5.8.2 If a revision function * satises (K
1) to (K
1) to (K
7) and (K
7) and (K
8) respectively.
Proof
(K
2) K A = K K MA K.
(K
4), K MA =
K + (MA). But K K + (MA) giving K A = K K + (MA) = K.
(K
2),
MA K MA and we have K MA = K
. (K
5) now gives
R
MMA or
R
A.
(K
2).
(K
6) If A
R R
B then MA
R R
MB. From (K
= (MA
MB) and B
, B
, MB
5) so M K (K K (MA MB)) + MA
MB. And we have MA MB M K (MA MB). But MA MB
M, MA M, MB M
R
M and hence K (MA MB). Thus
K K (MA MB) = K (MA MB).
(K
= MA MB, B
= MA and using
5.8. INTERRELATIONS 51
(K