This fact sheet provides a brief overview of the types of information blocking, a selection of countries of concern, several means to circumvent Internet censorship, and the U.S. role in censorship circumvention.
This fact sheet provides a brief overview of the types of information blocking, a selection of countries of concern, several means to circumvent Internet censorship, and the U.S. role in censorship circumvention.
This fact sheet provides a brief overview of the types of information blocking, a selection of countries of concern, several means to circumvent Internet censorship, and the U.S. role in censorship circumvention.
Who does this censoring? What tools exist to circumvent this censorship? Introducton Recent news of the failed Cuban Twiter and increased censorship in Turkey have reignited the atenton paid to how the United States promotes its ideals abroad. Around the world, thousands of websites such as those focused on social media, politcal oppositon, and human rights are blocked from public view, preventng the disseminaton of great volumes of important informaton. Though U.S. public diplomacy should not rely on the internet, it is increasingly becoming an important foreign policy tool. Recognizing this, the U.S. supports a variety of key tools allowing users to circumvent politcal censorship online. This fact sheet provides a brief overview of the types of informaton blocking, a selecton of countries of concern, several means to circumvent Internet censorship, and the U.S. role in censorship circumventon. Madeline Bersch and Matthew Wallin - June 2014 Types of Censorship There are four main categories of informaton blocking online: 1. Services, such as email or the web; 2. Content, such as that of politcal oppositon websites, independent news sites, or human rights organizatons; 3. Users, or blocking content by specifc persons, such as human rights advocates or politcal dissidents; 4. Search engines, preventng search results from leading to specifc websites. 1 In order to specify the content or category to be blocked, the blocker may use an IP address; port or protocol; domain name; URL; content signature, or keyword. These resources may be used to distnguish the exact content to be prevented from Key Takeaways: Tere are a variety of direct and indirect forms of online censorship. Foreign governments employ several of these techniques to enforce online censorship. Several types of tools are available for censorship circumvention. Te U.S. is a major force in promoting anti-censorship tools. Briefng Note Internet Censorship and Circumvention Interact Join the discussion on censorship at #ASPcensorship Discuss circumvention with the authors at @MaddyBersch and @MatthewRWallin Learn more about ASP and our work in diplomacy at @amsecproject appearing in a users search engine results or web browser. 2 Furthermore, Internet censorship is carried out in several less-direct ways highlighted in recent news stories. These methods include, but are not limited to: Restrictng the speed of the Internet to impede the viewing and downloading of informaton and materials; Raising the cost of Internet access to levels that are cost-prohibitve to the populaton; Monitoring actvity to discourage the populaton from viewing specifc websites or classes of websites because the populaton knows they are being watched. Known Blockers Around the world, several authoritarian regimes are especially known for their censorship of the web. China and Iran are two such countries. China o China uses a wide range of censorship techniques. The Great Firewall includes the blocking of Chinese microblog sites and other politcally sensitve sites such as Facebook, Twiter, and The New York Times. 3 , 4 Reports that these sites were to be unblocked in Shanghai were later refuted by Chinese authorites. 5 o Facebook and Twiter have been blocked in mainland China since 2009. 6 This censorship gave rise to Sina Weibo, a collecton of microblogging sites similar to Twiter, which now boasts over 500 million users. 7 , 8 However, Weibo is stll subject to censorship. 9 o Censorship is not always fawless. In January, a massive Internet outage afectng two-thirds of Chinese Internet trafc was allegedly caused by a malfuncton of the Great Firewall, Chinas Internet control infrastructure. For over an hour, millions of users were rerouted to servers owned, ironically, by a company that works to fght web censorship. 10 Iran o Iran censors web content in a variety of ways, including fltering websites, limitng Internet speed, and monitoring the web actvity of individual citzens and bloggers. 11 o In Iran, nearly half of the 500 most popular overall Internet sites are blocked. Many websites categorized as art, news, or society are blocked, as are websites focused on specifc content such as politcs or critcism of the government. 12 , 13 o Across the country, Internet speed is limited to a maximum of 128 kbps, about twice the speed of a dial-up connecton but 50 tmes slower than a typical U.S. Internet connecton. 14 This speed, ofen as slow as 6 kbps, renders online informaton sharing extremely difcult and nearly impossible. 15
o Currently, Iran is collaboratng with China to create a Natonal Informaton Network in Iran, essentally a clean internet that would provide access only to content that has been approved by the Iranian government. 16 , 17 Turkey o While Turkey is not as historically known for policing its networks, recent events have raised concerns. o A law was passed earlier this year allowing the countrys telecommunicatons authority to block websites without a court order. 18 o In March, afer an audio recording of a high-level meetng which reportedly implicated several high-level ofcials in a corrupton investgaton was leaked on Twiter, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for the government to block the social media site. 19 o Following this, YouTube was blocked afer an audio recording of a high-level security meetng detailing possible acton in Syria was uploaded to the site. 20 o Turkish courts eventually reversed the blocking of both sites and Twiter. However, authorites defed the YouTube court order and contnued to block the video sharing site. 21 , 22 Turkey fnally unblocked YouTube access in early June, 2014. 23 Cuba o Recent news has also highlighted Cubas censorship of the Internet, mainly done through excessive charges for access and slowing the speed of the Internet. 24 o An inital lack of a telecommunicatons structure contributed to a very miniscule porton of the populaton having access to Internet at home; only a small percentage of Cubans have access to the Internet at work, which ofen consists of only the Cuban Intranet. 25 o Government-run Internet cafes provide a common source of web access, but at an expense of $6- $10 per hour of unlimited use. In a country where the average weekly salary is only $20access is cost-prohibitve for most. 26
o Additonally, despite recent investments made in the countrys telecommunicatons structure, Cuba possesses the lowest connecton speed in the Western Hemisphere, according to a Google Analytcs study. 27
Circumventon Tools There are four main types of technical tools used to circumvent Internet censorship. Proxies o The use of proxies in bypassing Internet censorship is useful for accessing specifc blocked foreign websites. In this case, the user may utlize a foreign proxy server with compatble programs to access the website. 28 A proxy server is essentally an intermediary computer, typically located in another country, that is able to access the blocked site. This proxy is used to fnd and return informaton for the user while disguising his or her IP address. 29 Tunneling/VPN o A virtual private network, or VPN, allows a user to create an encrypted tunnel to a diferent computer which may then be used to access the Internet. 30 The VPN/tunnel wraps the users web trafc to appear the same as other web trafc. As it is encrypted, the tunneled trafc is difcult to access or intercept by normal web flters. 31 DNS-based flters o The Domain Name System, or DNS, is a system that converts a websites numeric IP address to a standard URL. 32 DNS flters, while ofen put into place to block a specifc web IP address, can also be used to bypass censorship by changing the DNS server of the provider of the website to be accessed. As long as the second server is not also blocked, it is possible to navigate around the censorship. 33 Telescopic crypto (onion routng) o Onion routng works by creatng a system of network connectons that resist trafc analysis, eavesdropping, and other atacks by outside partes. 34 Essentally, it distribut[es] [web actvity] over several places on the Internet so no one point can link to a users destnaton. 35 The network then displays only that communicaton is occurring, not which partes are communicatng with one another. 36 o Tor is one of the most well-known onion routng services, and was originally developed by the U.S. Navy to protect government communicatons. Today, it is used to create a wall of privacy between an internet user and another party monitoring the internet. 37 U.S. Role in Censorship Circumventon The United States plays a strong role in promotng censorship circumventon, funding programs and tools advancing Internet freedom, countering Internet censorship, supportng secure communicatons, and contributng to policy and research programs for those facing censorship, as well as other related objectves. 38 Some examples and fgures are highlighted below. From 2008 to 2012, the Department of State and USAID have contributed more than $100 million in support of Internet freedom programs. 39 In 2013 alone, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for Internatonal Development (USAID) gave $25 million in awards to groups focused on censorship circumventon. 40 The Broadcastng Board of Governors is an independent federal agency that oversees U.S. internatonal broadcastng. Its target audience includes those in countries subject to internet and traditonal media censorship. 41 o The Open Technology Fund, part of Radio Free Asia within the Board, funds numerous projects dedicated to advancing Internet freedom and circumventng its censorship. Projects include developing an iOS version of TextSecure, an encrypted text messaging applicaton currently only available on Android devices; Cupcake Bridge, a browser extension that allows users to act as Tor bridges automatcally, removing the need to install specialized sofware; and the translatng of online toolkits from Security-in- a-box, a program designed to educate users on how to circumvent Internet censorship and remain undetected. 42 The Tor Project receives signifcant funding from the U.S. Government. 43 The U.S. is also a member of the Freedom Online Coaliton, a collecton of 22 like-minded countries working to advance the ability of individuals to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms online. 44 The Coaliton works with both civil society and the private sector, ofen working through multlateral organizatons to protect and increase users rights on the Internet. A Coaliton conference recently took place in Estonia in late April 2014. 45 Next Steps Issues surrounding internet censorship have wide-reaching consequences not exclusively limited to freedom of informaton. The U.S. has a variety of interests it should consider as its role in promotng freedom of communicaton evolves. Some of these issues include: Cyber security as an issue of personal securityHow do circumventon, security of electronic data, and protecton of anonymity ft into this? How do anonymity tools threaten or increase security of the U.S.? What role should the U.S. play considering the increasing popularity of mobile platorms? How can the U.S. work with foreign partes, whether publics or governments, to increase freedom to access online informaton? What role do non-state actors play in anonymity, circumventon and censorship? How do U.S. laws afectng usage of the internet afect the global scene for online communicaton? While censorship circumventon is vital to promotng U.S. foreign policy, it is also not always efectve against countermeasures, and should not be the end goal. It is necessary for U.S. government leaders to work with their foreign counterparts to not only fund and develop censorship circumventon programs, but to foster a broader dialogue on the subject and call for increased awareness of the importance of an open Internet for the countries in which this is not a current reality. Madeline Bersch is a Research Assistant & Intern at the American Security Project. She graduated from the University of Maryland College Park in May 2014 with a degree in Government & Politcs and minors in Arabic and Global Terrorism. Mathew Wallin is a Fellow at the American Security Project and holds a Masters in Public Diplomacy from the University of Southern California. (Endnotes) 1. Callanan, Cormac, Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, Alberto Escudero-Pascual, and Robert Guerra, Leaping Over the Firewall: A Review of Censorship Circumventon Tools, Pg. 19-20, Freedom House, April 2011, htp://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/fles/ inline_images/Censorship.pdf Accessed May 13, 2014 2. Ibid. 3. Woollastno, Victoria, China lifs ban on Facebook but only for people living in a 17 square mile area of Shanghai, Daily Mail Online, September 25, 2013, htp://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/artcle-2431861/China-lifs-ban-Facebook--people-living- working-small-area-Shanghai.html Accessed May 13, 2014 4. Chen, George, China to lif ban no Facebook but only within Shanghai free-trade zone, South China Morning Post, September 25, 2013, htp://www.scmp.com/news/china/artcle/1316598/exclusive-china-lif-ban-facebook-only-within-shanghai-free-trade- zone Accessed May 13, 2014 5. Rigg, Jamie, Chinese State Media Squashes Claims of Less Restricted Internet in Shanghai Zone, Endgadget, htp://www.engad- get.com/2013/09/26/china-not-unblocking-facebook-twiter-nyt-shanghai/ Accessed May 22, 2014 6. Ibid. 7. Pepitone, Julianne, Meet Sina Weibo and Alibaba, the Chinese E-Giants Comings to U.S., NBC News, March 14, 2014, htp://www. nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/meet-sina-weibo-alibaba-chinese-e-giants-coming-u-s-n54741 Accessed May 13, 2014 8. Hua, Yu, The Censorship Pendulum, The New York Times, February 4, 2014, htp://www.nytmes.com/2014/02/05/opinion/yu- hua-chinas-censorship-pendulum.html?ref=internetcensorship Accessed May 13, 2014 9. Ibid. 10. Qin, Amy, Chinese Web Outge Blamed on Censorship Glitch, The New York Times, January 22, 2014, htp://sinosphere.blogs. nytmes.com/2014/01/22/chinese-web-outage-blamed-on-censorship-glitch/?ref=internetcensorship Accessed May 13, 2014 11. Ministry of Communicatons and Informaton Technology, Internatonal Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, August 21, 2013, htp://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/08/ministry-communicatons/ Accessed May 13, 2014 12. Lee, Timothy B., Heres how Iran censors the Internet, The Washington Post, August 15, 2013, htp://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/15/heres-how-iran-censors-the-internet/ Accessed May 13, 2014 13. Ministry of Communicatons and Informaton Technology, Internatonal Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, August 21, 2013, htp://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/08/ministry-communicatons/ Accessed May 13, 2014 14. Lee, Timothy B., Heres how Iran censors the Internet, The Washington Post, August 15, 2013, htp://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/15/heres-how-iran-censors-the-internet/ Accessed May 13, 2014 15. Ministry of Communicatons and Informaton Technology, Internatonal Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, August 21, 2013, htp://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/08/ministry-communicatons/, Accessed May 13, 2014. 16. Eades, Mark C., Chinas Newest Export: Internet Censorship, U.S. News & World Report, January 30, 2014, htp://www.usnews. com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/01/30/china-is-exportng-internet-censorship-to-iran Accessed May 13, 2014 17. China to Help Iran Implement Its Closed Natonal Internet, Internatonal Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, January 21, 2014, htp://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/01/china-iran-internet/ Accessed May 13, 2014 18. Letsch, Constanze and Dominic Rushe, Turkey blocks YouTube amid natonal security concerns, The Guardian, March 28, 2014, htp://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/google-youtube-ban-turkey-erdogan Accessed May 13, 2014 19. Arsu, Sebnem, Turkish Ofcials Block Twiter in Leak Inquiry, The New York Times, March 20, 2014, htp://www.nytmes. com/2014/03/21/world/europe/turkish-ofcials-block-twiter-in-leak-inquiry.html?acton=click&module=Search&regi on=searchResults%230&version=&url=htp%3A%2F%2Fquery.nytmes.com%2Fsearch%2Fsitesearch%2F%3Facton%3 Dclick%26region%3DMasthead%26pgtype%3DHomepage%26module%3DSearchSubmit%26contentCollecton%3DHomepage%2 6t%3Dqry249%23%2Fturkey%2520twiter Accessed May 13, 2014 20. Letsch, Constanze and Dominic Rushe, Turkey blocks YouTube amid natonal security concerns, The Guardian, March 28, 2014, htp://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/google-youtube-ban-turkey-erdogan Accessed May 13, 2014 21. Yeginsu, Ceylan, Turkey Lifs Twiter Ban Afer Court Calls It Illegal, The New York Times, April 3, 2014, htp://www.nytmes. com/2014/04/04/world/middleeast/turkey-lifs-ban-on-twiter.html Accessed May 13, 2014 22. Butler, Daren, Turkey keeps YouTube block despire court rulings, Reuters, April 10, 2014, htp://www.reuters.com/art- cle/2014/04/10/us-turkey-youtube-idUSBREA390J320140410, Accessed May 13, 2014. 23. Francheschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo, Turkey Unblocks YouTube afer 2 Months, Mashable, htp://mashable.com/2014/06/03/turkey- unblocks-youtube/ Accessed June 11, 2014 24. Freedom on the Net 2013: Cuba, Freedom House, April 2013, htp://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/cuba#. U0hC26hdXmd Accesses May 13, 2014 25. Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo, The Internet in Cuba: 5 Things You Need to Know, Mashable, April 3, 2014, htp://mashable. com/2014/04/03/internet-freedom-cuba/ Accessed May 13, 2014 26. Wills, Santago, Cubas Internet: Its Bad, But It Might Get Beter, Fusion, August 7, 2013, htp://fusion.net/abc_univision/story/ internet-cuba-facts-myths-web-access-22566 Accessed May 13, 2014 27. Global Site Speed Overview: How Fast Are Websites Around The World?, Google Analytcs Blog, April 19, 2012, htp://analytcs. blogspot.com.es/2012/04/global-site-speed-overview-how-fast-are.html Accessed May 13, 2014 28. Callanan, Cormac, Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, Alberto Escudero-Pascual, and Robert Guerra, Leaping Over the Firewall: A Review of Censorship Circumventon Tools, Pg. 22, Freedom House, April 2011, htp://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/fles/inline_ images/Censorship.pdf Accessed May 13, 2014 29. Circumventon Tools, How To Bypass Internet Censorship, Pg. 5, March 10, 2011, htps://www.howtobypassinternetcensorship. org/fles/bypassing-censorship.pdf Accessed May 13, 2014 30. Circumventon Tools, How To Bypass Internet Censorship, Pg. 11, March 10, 2011, htps://www.howtobypassinternetcensorship. org/fles/bypassing-censorship.pdf Accessed May 13, 2014 31. Callanan, Cormac, Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, Alberto Escudero-Pascual, and Robert Guerra, Leaping Over the Firewall: A Review of Censorship Circumventon Tools, Pg. 22, Freedom House, April 2011, htp://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/fles/inline_ images/Censorship.pdf Accessed May 13, 2014 32. What is DNS?, Microsof TechNet, March 28, 2003, htp://technet.microsof.com/en-us/library/cc787921(v=ws.10).aspx Ac- cessed May 13, 2014 33. Callanan, Cormac, Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, Alberto Escudero-Pascual, and Robert Guerra, Leaping Over the Firewall: A Review of Censorship Circumventon Tools, Pg. 22, Freedom House, April 2011, htp://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/fles/inline_ images/Censorship.pdf Accessed May 13, 2014 34. Syverson, Paul, Onion Routng, Center for High Assurance Computer Systems of the U.S. Naval Research Lab, 2005, htp://www. onion-router.net/ Accessed May 13, 2014 35. Tor: Overview, Tor Project, htps://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#overview Accessed May 13, 2014 36. Syverson, Paul, Onion Routng, Center for High Assurance Computer Systems of the U.S. Naval Research Lab, 2005, htp://www. onion-router.net/ Accessed May 13, 2014 37. Tor: Overview, Tor Project, htps://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#overview Accessed May 13, 2014 38. Internet Freedom, U.S. Department of State, htp://www.state.gov/e/eb/cip/netreedom/index.htm Accessed May 13, 2014 39. Hanson, Fergus, Baked in and Wired: eUDiplomacy @ State in Internet Freedom: The Role of the U.S. State Department, The Brookings Insttuton, October 25, 2012, htp://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hanson-internet- freedom Accessed May 13, 2014 40. Internet Freedom, U.S. Department of State, htp://www.state.gov/e/eb/cip/netreedom/index.htm Accessed May 13, 2014 41. FAQs, Broadcastng Board of Governors, htp://www.bbg.gov/about-the-agency/history/faqs/ Accessed May 13, 2014 42. Projects, Open Technology Fund, htps://www.opentechfund.org/projects Accessed May 13, 2014 43. Wallin, Mathew, The New Public Diplomacy Imperatve, American Security Project, p. 19, htp://www.americansecurityproject. org/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperatve/ 44. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: Freedom Online Coaliton, November 20, 2012, htp://www.humanrights.gov/2012/11/20/ fact-sheet-freedom-online-coaliton/ Accessed May 13, 2014 45. Estonian e-Governance Academy, Concept Paper for Freedom Online Coaliton Conference 2014, htp://www.freedomonline.ee/ sites/www.freedomonline.ee/fles/docs/FOC%20Tallinn%20concept%20paper%20-%20designed%20ver2_0.pdf Accessed May 13, 2014 Te Honorable Gary Hart, Chairman Senator Hart served the State of Colorado in the U.S. Senate and was a member of the Committee on Armed Services during his tenure. Stuart Piltch Stuart Piltch is the Co-Founder and Managing Director of Cambridge Advisory Group, an actuarial and benefts consulting frm based in Philadelphia. Norman R. Augustine Mr. Augustine was Chairman and Principal Ofcer of the American Red Cross for nine years and Chairman of the Council of the National Academy of Engineering. Te Hon. Donald Beyer Te Hon. Donald Beyer is the former United States Ambassador to to Switzerland and Liechtenstein, as well as a former Lieutenant Governor and President of the Senate of Virginia. BOARD OF DIRECTORS Robert B. Crowe Robert B. Crowe is a Partner of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough in its Boston and Washington, DC ofces. He is co-chair of the frms Government Relations practice. Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.) Brigadier General Cheney is the Chief Executive Ofcer of ASP. Lieutenant General Daniel Christman, USA (Ret.) Lieutenant General Christman is Senior Vice President for International Afairs at the United States Chamber of Commerce. Lieutenant General John Castellaw, USMC (Ret.) John Castellaw is President of the Crockett Policy Institute (CPI), a non-partisan policy and research organization headquartered in Tennessee. Nelson W. Cunningham Nelson Cunningham is President of McLarty Associates. Lee Cullum Lee Cullum, at one time a commentator on the PBS NewsHour and All Tings Considered on NPR, currently contributes to the Dallas Morning News and hosts CEO. Admiral William Fallon, USN (Ret.) Admiral Fallon has led U.S. and Allied forces and played a leadership role in military and diplomatic matters at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Raj Fernando Raj Fernando is CEO and founder of Chopper Trading, a technology based trading frm headquartered in Chicago. Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.) Vice Admiral Gunn is the President of the Institute of Public Research at the CNA Corporation, a non-proft corporation in Virginia. General Lester L. Lyles, USAF (Ret.) General Lyles retired from the United States Air Force after a distinguished 35 year career. He is presently Chairman of USAA, a member of the Defense Science Board, and a member of the Presidents Intelligence Advisory Board. Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, USA (Ret.) Lieutenant General Kennedy was the frst woman to achieve the rank of three-star general in the United States Army. Dennis Mehiel Dennis Mehiel is the Principal Shareholder and Chairman of U.S. Corrugated, Inc. Ed Reilly Edward Reilly is CEO of Americas of FD International Limited, a leading global communications consultancy that is part of FTI Consulting, Inc. Governor Christine Todd Whitman Christine Todd Whitman is the President of the Whitman Strategy Group, a consulting frm that specializes in energy and environmental issues. Te American Security Project (ASP) is a nonpartisan organization created to educate the American public and the world about the changing nature of national security in the 21st Century. Gone are the days when a nations security could be measured by bombers and battleships. Security in this new era requires harnessing all of Americas strengths: the force of our diplomacy; the might of our military; the vigor and competitiveness of our economy; and the power of our ideals. We believe that America must lead in the pursuit of our common goals and shared security. We must confront international challenges with our partners and with all the tools at our disposal and address emerging problems before they become security crises. And to do this we must forge a bipartisan consensus here at home. ASP brings together prominent American business leaders, former members of Congress, retired military fag ofcers, and prominent former government ofcials. ASP conducts research on a broad range of issues and engages and empowers the American public by taking its fndings directly to them via events, traditional & new media, meetings, and publications. We live in a time when the threats to our security are as complex and diverse as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy challenges, and our economic wellbeing. Partisan bickering and age old solutions simply wont solve our problems. America and the world - needs an honest dialogue about security that is as robust as it is realistic. ASP exists to promote that dialogue, to forge that consensus, and to spur constructive action so that America meets the challenges to its security while seizing the opportunities that abound. www.americansecurityproject.org