INTRODUCTION (CASES)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local
Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Local Government, respondents.
Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J .:p
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local
Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed
against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of
authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation
of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
1
The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk
at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health
Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and
Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay
tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
2
We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health,
Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival
candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the
exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office
where her qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the
function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the
office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and
functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments
aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to
perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that
her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was
withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she
was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in
an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and
complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo
Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their
complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office
was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office,
Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other
complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner,
together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza
Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the
radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and
there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the
group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen
using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by
former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed
against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the
City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other
detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day.
3

The Mayor thereafter answered
4
and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of
Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-
21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City.
Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received
them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the
scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The
hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the
way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in
view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City.
Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement
under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers
denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by
telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their
witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension
order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner agai n
asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the
complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The
petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were
held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants
testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of
the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However,
the motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on
November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion
to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal
to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed.
However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the
hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were
sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was
denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.
On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and
the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On
December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were
considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case
filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive
suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able
to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.
5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the
respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he
succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an
action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending
Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-
Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No.
20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition,
6
(Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the
complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On
July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated
January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been
similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from
implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two
decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January
15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in
hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary
had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him
7
arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal
to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party
8
and the running political rivalry they maintained in the
last congressional and local elections;
9
and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.
10
He also
alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an
election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988),
11
notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded
with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases.
12
He likewise
contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the
costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request.
13
He states that he asked for postponement
on "valid and justifiable"
14
grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which
required confinement; that his "vital"
15
witness was also hospitalized
16
but that the latter unduly denied
his request.
17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local
Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument
reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what
manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he
and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated
are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he,
Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political
circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting
complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to
seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the
Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial
admissions as he would have us accept them
18
for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore,
because his say so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public
official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties
regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on
account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to
be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints
against the petitioners.
19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling
reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule
Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part
of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the
Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor
Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's
alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution
20
no longer allows the President, as the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials.
According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government
units and second, by deleting the phrase
21
as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power
of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the
Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities
and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by
law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument
goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it
any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government
acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we
quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister
of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said
complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after
receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety
days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed
with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid
period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.
24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or
municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when
there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense
so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of
said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its
termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault,
neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension.
25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in
deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate,
suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63
of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language,
the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as
conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion
that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all
authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the
federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to
have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics."
26
Autonomy, in the
constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean
local government units from over-dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to,
among other things, the passage of a local government code,
27
a local tax law,
28
income distribution
legislation,
29
and a national representation law,
30
and measures
31
designed to realize autonomy at the
local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government
under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress
to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate
its exercise to the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio,
the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs,
as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.
33
The Constitution did nothing
more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held,
34
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court
had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him
over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section
64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ...
35

xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for test of the latter."
36
"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
37
As we held,
38
however, "investigating" is
not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is
apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases,Lacson v.
Roque,
39
Hebron v. Reyes,
40
and Mondano v. Silvosa,
41
and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor
General.
42
In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision
"as may be provided by law,"
43
a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that
the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board."
44
However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to
exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal
officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are
always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to
constitutional limitations.
45

In Hebron we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the
same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or
clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers ...
46

In Mondano, the Court held:
... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of
any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such
charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case
suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in
his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question."
Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision
to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If
it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that
vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then
such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Arti cle
VII of the Constitution.
47

xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on
appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code.
48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not
because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but
because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the
Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional
Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by
themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of
removal from the President,
50
Commissioner Blas Ople would not.
51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government
Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may
stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter.
We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and
effect.
52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."
53
The Constitution as we
observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs
of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the
imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-
dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a
regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self- government.
As we observed in one case,
54
decentralization means devolution of national administration but not
power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What
bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten
administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event
that all ten cases yield prima faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public
office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make
him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held:
56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of
office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension
decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he
would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal
mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable
to. it is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the
people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or
malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as
in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if
there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A
preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable
length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in
the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a
case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted
likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the services of the man they had
elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted
in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons,
58
and so
also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a
suspension, as we have held,
59
is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the
investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses"
60
or to keep him off "the records
and other evidence.
61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local
official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days,
62
which is to say that it need not
be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought
to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to
insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of
innocence unless and until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no
more than sixty days. As we held,
63
a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add,
nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon
is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all
intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven.
Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would
have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice
is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions
when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to
build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the
respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin
him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated
effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a
legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively,
and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future
suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve
a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner
(which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of
suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing
what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting,
for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges
are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to
undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or
administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out
further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima
facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of
power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may
provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny
legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided
regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the
manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control"
(which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be
suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault,
neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in
computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper
charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his
previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor
Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining
administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of
Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ concur.





Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93252 November 8, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 November 8, 1991
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local
Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA, respondents.
G.R. No. 95245 November 8, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Local Government, respondents.
Manuel Lazaro and Vincent Rondaris for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 93252 & 95245.
R E S O L U T I O N

PADILLA, J .:p
Before the Court for resolution are the various issues raised by Rodolfo T. Ganzon's urgent motion, dated
7 September 1991, wherein he asks the Court to dissolve the temporary restraining order (TRO) it had
issued, dated 5 September 1991, against the TRO earlier issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25840 entitled Ganzon vs. Santos, et al.
On 5 August 1991, the Court's decision in the present case was promulgated, upholding the validity of the
orders of preventive suspension issued by respondent Secretary Santos, the dispositive part of which
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future
suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against
him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED
to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED
No costs. 1
A brief summary of the facts that led to this Court's decision of 5 August 1991 ("main decision", for
brevity) is as follows:
1. Sometime in 1988, a series of ten (10) administrative complaints were filed by various
city officials, against petitioner Ganzon, the elected City Mayor of Iloilo City, on various
charges such as abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct and others.
2. In the course of the hearing of the administrative cases, respondent Secretary Santos
issued against petitioner Ganzon three (3) separate orders of preventive suspension
dated 11 August 1988, 11 October 1988, and 3 May 1990, each of the orders to last for a
60-day period.
Petitioner assailed the validity of the said orders by filing with the Court of Appeals two
(2) separate petitions for prohibition docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 16417 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 20736. On 7 September 1988 and 5 July 1990, the appellate court rendered the
decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 16417 and 20736 dismissing the petitions for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioner Ganzon filed with this Court two (2) separate petitions assailing the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 16417 (subject of G.R. No. 93252), and that in CA-G.R. SP
No. 20736 (subject of G.R. No. 95245) 2
3. On 26 June 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order barring the respondent
Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of
the Court of Appeals' two (2) decisions.
However, it appears that even before the promulgation on 5 August 1991 of the main decision,
respondent Secretary Santos had issued on 3 July 1991 against petitioner Ganzon another order of
preventive suspension in connection with Administrative Case No. 51-90 filed by complainant Octavius J.
Jopson, which order states:
It appearing from a perusal of the complaint as well as the answer in Administrative Case
No 51-90,entitled Octavius J. Jopson, Complainant, versus, Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon,
Respondent, for Oppression, etc., that there is reasonable ground to believe that
Respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, as prayed for by Complainant
Jopson, you are hereby preventively suspendedfrom office for a period
of sixty (60) days effective immediately. (Emphasis supplied)
On 6 July 1991, petitioner Ganzon filed his "extremely urgent motion" (with supplemental motions later
filed) questioning the validity of the said last mentioned suspension order. This Court issued a resolution
dated 9 July 1991, requiring respondents to comment on petitioner's urgent motion.
After the main decision in the present petitions was rendered by the Court on 5 August 1991, respondents
filed motions dated, 9 and 29 August 1991 alleging therein that the issues raised in petitioner's motion (6
July 1991) were rendered moot and academic by the said decision, and seeking clarification on whether it
was still necessary to comply with this Court's resolutions requiring respondents to file comment on
petitioner's said motion of 6 July 1991.
Meanwhile, on 29 August 1991, respondent Santos issued a memorandum addressed to petitioner
Ganzon, in connection with the 5 August 1991 main decision, stating therein that the third order of
preventive suspension issued against petitioner on 3 May 1990 shall be deemed in force and effect. The
memorandum states:
The Supreme Court, in its Decision in the above-referred cases, which affirmed the
authority of the Secretary of Local Government to discipline local elective officials,
explicitly states that,
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration
of his third suspension and lifting for the purpose, the Temporary
Restraining Order earlier issued . . .
In view thereof, the third preventive suspension imposed on you, photo copy of which is
hereto attached, is hereby deemed in force.
On 30 August 1991, petitioner Ganzon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus, docketed
CA-G.R. SP No. 25480 against respondents. On the same day, petitioner filed in these petitions his
"manifestation and compliance," alleging that he had already fully served the suspension orders issued
against him, in compliance with the main decision of 5 August 1991, and that he should be allowed to re-
assume his office starting 4 September 1991.
Meanwhile, in reaction to the memorandum dated 29 August 1991 issued by respondent Santos,
petitioner filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 a motion praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, which motion was granted by the Court of Appeals, when on 3 September 1991, it (CA) issued the
said TRO. On 4 September 1991, respondents filed with this Court a motion asking for the issuance of a
restraining order addressed to the Court of Appeals and against the TRO issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
25840. Granting respondents' motion, this Court on 5 September 1991 issued a temporary restraining
order directing the Court of Appeals to cease and desist from implementing the TRO it had issued dated 3
September 1991 immediately suspending the implementation of the order of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government dated 29 August 1991. On 9 September 1991, petitioner Ganzon filed a motion to
dissolve this Court's restraining order dated 5 September 1991.
The records show that petitioner Ganzon, to this date, remains suspended from office (as the elected
Mayor of Iloilo City) and since the order of preventive suspension dated 3 July 1991 (the fourth
suspension order 3 ) was issued against him by respondent Secretary; in other words, he has been
serving the said fourth suspension order which is to expire after a period of 60 days, or on 4 September
1991.
Similar to the argument raised in his petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840,
petitioner Ganzon, in support of his plea for the lifting of the TRO dated 5 September 1991 issued by this
Court, in re: TRO dated 3 September 1991, issued by Court of Appeals, contends that inasmuch as he
has already served fully the suspension orders issued against him, in compliance with the mandate of this
Court's decision dated 5 August 1991, coupled with the fact that he had also completely served by 4
September 1991 the fourth order of preventive suspension dated 3 July 1991, he should therefore be
allowed to re-assume his office starting 4 September 1991.
On the other hand, respondent Secretary maintains that petitioner Ganzon can be allowed to return to his
office (as Mayor of Iloilo City) only after 19 October 1991, as it is only after such date when petitioner may
be said to have fully served the preventive suspension orders as decreed in the main decision and in the
order dated 3 July 1991 (fourth suspension).
The question then is when petitioner Ganzon may be allowed to re-assume his position and duties as
mayor of Iloilo City. Is it only after 19 October 1991 as claimed by respondents, or at some earlier date?
The answer to this question would depend on how petitioner has served the preventive suspension
orders issued against him.
We note that the main decision refers to three (3) orders of preventive suspension each to last for 60
days. The first, dated 11 August 1988, was admittedly fully served by petitioner. The second order dated
11 October 1988 was not served because its enforcement was restrained by an order of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City upon petition of petitioner himself. 4 As to the third order dated 3 May 1990, the
main decision states that petitioner is allowed to serve the duration of said third suspension order. It
would seem, therefore, that after petitioner has served in full the third suspension order as decreed in the
main decision, he can then return to his official duties as Iloilo City Mayor.
However, we must also take note of the supervening 3 July 1991 order, again suspending petitioner from
office for another 60 days, which order was issued even before the main decision of 5 August 1991 was
promulgated. (The records show, however, that petitioner has in fact fully served the fourth suspension
order, as admitted by respondents no less. This will be discussed shortly; but any issue on its validity is
now moot and academic. 5Besides, it is clear that this fourth suspension order is not one of the three
orders covered by and subject of the main decision).
Considering, nonetheless, the necessity of serving the third and fourth orders of suspension, there is
need to look into when petitioner started to serve these orders so as to determine when their
service expires.
Petitioner contends that the following are the periods within which he stayed out of his office as he was
serving the orders of preventive suspension issued against him:
FROM Up to and Including
May 4, 1990 May 18, 1990 6
June 9, 1990 June 26, 1990 7
July 5, 1991 September 3, 1991 8
Petitioner argues that for the periods of 4 May 18 May 1990, and 9 June to 26 June 1990, he was serving
the third suspension order; whereas for the period of 5 July to 3 September 1991, he was then serving
the fourth suspension order.
On the other hand, respondent Secretary contends that as to the third order of preventive suspension,
dated 3 May 1990, petitioner served it only from 4 May 1990 to 19 May 1990. 9 Respondent denies that
from 11 June to 30 June 1990 10petitioner had served again the third suspension order.
As to the fourth suspension order, respondent Secretary confirms that petitioner served it starting from 5
July 1991 to 3 September 1991.11
As regards the third suspension order, it is noted that though both parties admit that petitioner started
serving it on 4 May 1990, they however differ as to when the service ended (Petitioner claims he served it
even after 18 May 1990, whereas, respondent claims it ended 19 May 1990.) In view of this divergence,
the Court rules that the third order was served by petitioner from 4 May 1990 up to 18 May 1990 only, the
latter date being the date when the Court of Appeals issued a TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 20736, 12 and
thus, interrupted petitioner's service of the suspension orders and enabled him re-assume his office as
Iloilo City Mayor.
We also do not accept petitioner's contention that from 9 June 1990 up to 26 June 1990 13 he again
started to serve the third suspension order, inasmuch as during the period of 9 June 1990 to 26 June
1990, the records show that he was then in office discharging the functions of the Mayor of Iloilo
City. 14 In sum, we rule that petitioner served the third suspension order only from 4 May 1990 up to 18
May 1990.
The period from 4 May 1990 to 18 May 1990 is equivalent to fourteen (14) days. 15 Hence, as to the third
suspension order (3 May 1990), petitioner having served fourteen (14) days of the 60-day preventive
suspension imposed in the order, 46 days still remained to be served by him as decreed in the main
decision. If we follow the mandate of such main decision which ordained that the third order be served
and that the temporary restraining order 16 against it be lifted, it would follow that the remaining 46 days
should be served starting 5 August 1991 (date of promulgation of main decision) until fully served.
Another way to serve the 46 days would be to begin serving it only on 4 September 1991 (the day after 3
September 1991 which was the last day of service for the fourth suspension order), or until 20 October
1991 (the 46th day from 4 September 1990).
However we take note of the fact that petitioner has already fully served the 60-day fourth order of
preventive suspension which started 5 July 1991 (that is, even before the main decision was rendered)
and ended on 3 September 1991. Petitioner raises the issue of whether he could or should be allowed to
serve the third and the fourth orders "simultaneously". If we allow his submission and accept
"simultaneous service", it would mean the following: that from 5 August 1991 (the date the TRO issued by
this Court was lifted) up to 3 September 1991 (the last day for serving the fourth order), twenty-nine (29)
days have elapsed; that these twenty-nine (29) days which form part of his service for the fourth order
can be also credited to his favor by treating said twenty-nine (29) days as forming part of his service of
the third order; if this were so, he would need to serve only seventeen (17) days more to complete the
service of the third order; said seventeen (17) days from 3 September 1991 will expire on 20 September
1991, which would be the last day for serving the third suspension order.
Respondents however object to adopting the idea of "simultaneous service," of preventive suspensions
as, according of them, this is not allowed under the Local Government Code.
We agree with petitioner that he can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of the third and fourth
suspension orders, for the following reasons.
If simultaneous service of two (2) suspension orders is allowed, this would work in favor of the petitioner
(an elective local official) as the balance of his third preventive suspension would, in effect, be reduced
from 46 days to 17 days.
It will be recalled that, in the main decision, noting that successive suspensions have been inflicted on
Mayor Ganzon we stated that what "is intriguing is that respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so
to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the
respondent Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort." 17 Surely, allowing petitioner to serve
simultaneously the overlapping third and fourth suspensions will favor him, (and presumably the local
constituency) and certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatever motive may be behind the
intriguing action of the respondent Secretary in issuing those successive suspension orders.
Furthermore, we may already take judicial notice of the recently-approved Local Government Code of
1991 (recently signed into law by the President) 18 which provides (as to imposition of preventive
suspensions) as follows:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension
xxx xxx xxx
b) . . . that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further that in the event that several administrative
cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more
than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and
known at the time of the first suspension.(emphasis supplied)
Since we can allow, as we here allow, under the bizarre circumstances of this case, petitioner to serve
the third and fourth orders simultaneously (insofar as they overlap), this means that, as explained earlier,
petitioner shall serve only 17 days more (not 46 days) to complete the service of the third order, that is,
starting from 3 September 1991 and ending on 20 September 1991. Hence, as of this latter date,
petitioner has complied with the mandate of the main decision for he has already fully served the third
preventive suspension which ended on 20 September 1991.
But then another issue is raised by respondents, i.e. that considering that the main decision refers to the
first, second and third orders of preventive suspension (as far as Mayor Ganzon is concerned), petitioner,
apart from serving the third order (the first one having been fully served), should also serve the second
order (for another 60 days) as the latter has admittedly not been serve yet due to a restraining order
issued by a trial court, 19 and considering that the dispositive portion of the main decision decreed that
"suspensions of petitioners (including the other petitioner Artieda in G.R. No. 93746) are affirmed."
We agree with the respondents on this point.
The main decision refers to the three (3) suspension orders the first, the second and the third. As
shown earlier, the first and the third orders have already been served. It is only the second order which
seems to have been unserved. If we follow the decision which states that the three (3) suspensions are
affirmed, there appears to be no reason why the second order should not be served for another 60-day
period. However, there is no cogent reason why, under the bizarre circumstances of this case where
the respondent Secretary has chosen to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead of
consolidating the several administrative cases of similar nature and close vintage we cannot allow the
concept of simultaneous service to apply to the second order (as we did in the third order). It would follow
then that the second order is also fully served to this date for the service of said second order would have
started on 5 August 1991 (when the main decision was rendered as this was the time when this Court
found and affirmed the validity of the three (3) suspension orders, including the second order). The 60-
day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4 October 1991.
It appears that as to the second preventive suspension, petitioner manifested that there is still an existing
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in Special Civil Action No. 18312,
entitled Ganzon vs. Santos, et al. 20
One may ask as to the status of the case pending with the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 33 insofar as the said
case involves the issue on the validity of the second preventive suspension order. Under the main
decision of this Court, dated 5 August 1991, second preventive suspension has been affirmed; under the
present resolution, said second preventive suspension has been served. Consequently, Special Civil
Action No. 18312 before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City has been rendered moot and academic,
insofar as the second preventive suspension order is concerned.
As to the petition (docketed CA-G. R. SP No. 25840) filed with the Court of Appeals, which involves the
question of the validity of the fourth order, and which has clearly been served, petitioner admitted that he
filed it, on the belief that it was the proper remedy for his reinstatement to office; thinking that his
suspensions have been served and ended. 21 As we have ruled that petitioner has served the
suspension orders decreed in the main decision and in the light of the finding of this Court that the fourth
preventive suspension order has been served, the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840; have also
become moot and academic, warranting dismissal thereof.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion of petitioner, dated 7 September 1991 is hereby GRANTED. The
temporary restraining order dated 5 September 1991 is hereby LIFTED. Respondents are ordered to
allow petitioner to re-assume his office as elected Mayor of Iloilo City effective immediately.
The Court of Appeal is directed to dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 for having become moot and
academic. The Region Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 before which petitioner's action for prohibition
(Special Civil Action No. 18312) is pending is also ordered to dismiss the said case for having become
moot and academic insofar as petitioner prays therein to enjoin his (second) preventive suspension.
This resolution is without prejudice to the administrative cases (where the first, second, third and fourth
preventive suspension orders were issued) proceeding on the merits thereof. Also, as decreed in the
main decision of 5 August 1991.
. . . petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on
account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts
committed prior to August 11, 1988. . . .
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.