RF 4cs of 432nd TRW

Go!
The case of General "Jack" Lavelle, the

suits double-crossed him
March 23, 2007
The USAF's RF-4C and 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
(TRW)
RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft over Vietnam, 11th TRS, 432nd TRW, Udorn
RAFB, Thailand, 1968. Presented by Gary Avey at ickr. This is an actual
combat reconnaissance mission own by Capt. Raymond I. Lennon, the pilot,
and Major Donald B. Avey, the navigator/photo systems ofcer (PSO), in USAF
parlance at the time, the front-seater and the back-seater. Both were assigned to
the 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS), 432nd Tactical
Reconnaissance Wing (TRW), Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). As
an aside, Major Avey ew his last RF-4C Vietnam mission in early afternoon
through the Mu Gia pass, arguably one of the most dangerous zones over which
to y, and he and his pilot did it in broad daylight. Thanks to Gary Avey, Major
Avrey's son for use of the photo and the background. Consent is not given to
redistribute, reprint, sell or use the image in any way.
We are going to introduce you to and focus on the RF-4C and the
432nd Tactical TRW because much of the brew-ha-ha over
General Lavelle revolved around how RF-4C reconnaissance
missions were being own over North Vietnam by this wing.
Furthermore, the RF-4C photo reconnaissance aircraft was the
mainstay of theater tactical photography throughout Southeast
Asia. It handled most of southern North Vietnam and Route Pack
6 to the north, and Laos.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The organizational mess: the
cardinal military rule, unity
of command, demolished.
The "Rules of Engagement"
story in the Vietnam-Laos
Wars
The year 1968, a pivotal one
to this story; a reminder of
the signicant events
Reconnaissance over North
Vietnam: the RF-4C
Phantom II and the 432nd
Tactical Reconnaissance
Wing (TRW)
Events leading to the
double-cross, a sad episode
in civilian control of the
military
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The case of General "Jack" Lavelle le:///Users/edmarek/Documents/Talking%20Proud/HistoryLav...
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Two RF-4C squadrons from the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance
Wing (TRW) at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand ew more than 80
percent of all reconnaissance ights over North Vietnam.
The air bases in Thailand. Presented by American Forces Thailand Network
unofcial web site.
Udorn grew to be a very large base, in part because it was
strategically located and could accommodate the size of air
forces positioned there, which not only included the USAF, but
also the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), the Royal Laotian Air
Force (RLAF), and CIA's Air America. As an aside, to help
explain the complexities of this air base, the men working on the
ightline had a rack lled with aircraft insignia plates, US, Thai,
Lao and, we understand, others, that slipped into a mounting on
the fuselage of T-28 ghters located there.

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Udorn RAFB, 1969. Presented by rascott.com
It is important to understand the 432nd Wing. It is easy to be
misled by the nomenclature, "tactical reconnaissance wing." It
most certainly was that, but it was much more. At the time
General Lavelle took charge of 7th AF, the 432nd had two
squadrons of RF-4Cs and two of F-4Ds, the former for
reconnaissance, the latter for attack and air superiority.
This is a F-4D of the 555th TFS, Udorn RTAFB, 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance
Wing (TRW). Presented by 5057 Phantoms.
This made the 432nd TRW an unusual wing at the time in the
USAF. It had a dual reconnaissance and ghter mission, the
former unarmed, the latter fully armed, the former to nd
lucrative targets, the latter to destroy them and protect the
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reconnaissance force.
The rst US military people to arrive at Udorn RTAFB got there
in 1961, the result of a secret agreement between the US and
Thailand that would also include sending Thai troops into Laos
and Vietnam. The Royal Thai government was very sensitive to
publicity about the American deployments on the one hand, but
was very supportive of them on the other.
The problem for Thailand was that the Laotian civil war was
spreading into Thailand. The Thais feared being overwhelmed by
Laotian refugees, and even feared the Pathet Lao and their North
Vietnamese partners might extend their war into Thailand.
Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen of China meeting with the visiting General
Secretary of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) Prasong Wongwiwat
(second from right in the front) in April 1961. Presented by China's
International Department Central Committee of CPC.
Indeed a communist movement did
grow in north and northeastern
Thailand, two areas traditionally
neglected by Bangkok. This photo,
courtesy of D.K.Wyatt, presented
by the University of Hawaii Press,
shows female communist guerrillas
in Thailand in the 1970s.
The Soviets were in the thick of
supporting the communist Pathet
Lao forces against the feeble Royal
Laotian government.
Furthermore, Thailand had signed the Manila Pact and had a
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history of being pro-western; Thai forces served in Korea, for
example.
The Royal Thai Air Force RTAF ew reconnaissance over Laos
as early as 1960. PACAF analysts were sent over to help
interpret the imagery.
The net result was that much of what occurred from these bases
in Thailand was a secret for a very long time. We hesitate saying
when the USAF arrived at Udorn because of the secrecy
involved. Our understanding is the rst USAF unit to arrive was
the 333rd Air Base Squadron in October 1964, made up mostly
of people on temporary duty from Don Muang. The 333rd
reported to the 13th AF in the Philippines and to the 6234th TFW
at Korat RTAFB. At that time, the 6234th was the only USAF
tactical ghter wing in Thailand. From 1965 through 1967,
F-104 Starghters operated from here, rotating in and out on
temporary duty status, providing escort service to Royal Thai Air
Force (RTAF) T-28s, and USAF F-4 and F-105 ghter bombers
ying against targets in Laos, the USAF ying into North
Vietnam as well.
The 432nd TRW "Hunters"
organized in September 1966 with
two reconnaissance squadrons, the
11th Tactical Reconnaissance
Squadron (TRS) equipped with
RF-4Cs, and the 20th TRS equipped
with RF-101s. In October 1967, the
20th was deactivated and replaced
by the 14th TRS, another RF-4C
squadron. So, for our purposes, the
wing had two reconnaissance
squadrons, the 11th and 14th.
Recalling earlier discussions about the organizational mess used
to ght the war in Vietnam-Laos, the 432nd Wing was
administratively a 13th AF wing and reported to the Deputy
Commander, 7th/13th AF, also known as Det 1, 7th AF, Udorn.
But, while in the air on their way for missions in North Vietnam,
its pilots and aircraft were under the operational control of the
7th AF. Missions to North Vietnam fell under PACAF and
Laotian missions fell under CINCPAC through PACAF with the
ambassador in there somewhere.
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F-4D-28-MC Phantom 65-0683 of the 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Jan 20,
1972. Presented by answers.com
Also in 1967, the 432nd TRW received a tactical ghter
squadron (TFS), the 13th TFS "Panther Pack" with the F-4D
ghter-bomber, and in 1968 the 555th TFS "Triple Nickel," also
with F-4Ds. The design was for these aircraft to destroy targets,
on the ground and in the air, in Laos, the RVN and North
Vietnam. Other ghter squadrons were to be assigned to Udorn
later, after the period we are examining affecting General
Lavelle. The base has a fascinating history.
Most people know what an F-4D ghter bomber aircraft can do.
We want to talk more about the RF-4C. As an aside, RF-4C
crews often endured some verbal harassment from their "ghter
jock" brothers in the F-4Ds, often called "recce pukes," mostly in
good fun, sometimes the cause of a bar-room brawl.
You will soon see that the RF-4C aircraft carried very high
technology imagery systems and demanded considerable courage
and airmanship from its crews. Furthermore, the lm they
brought back to base was virtually the only tactically useable
imagery available to our eld commanders during the war. These
crews served and sacriced the same as did any others.
RF-4C from the 14th TRS, 432nd TRW, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. Note no
missiles on the rails. He's unarmed. The belly tank is for fuel. Presented by
wikipedia
The RF-4C was distinguishable mainly as the result of its more
pointed, elongated nose, which was about four feet longer than
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that of the F-4. This nose was designed to house three camera
stations, a mapping radar, infrared imaging systems, and a small
terrain avoidance-terrain following radar. We'll talk about these
more in a moment.
The RF-4C, a variant of the F-4 Phantom II ghter, had a range
of about 1,632 miles, cruise speed 575 mph, max speed 1,384
mph, and could y to altitudes up to 55,200 feet. RF-4Cs were
unarmed. Their only defense was avoidance through evasive
maneuvers and high speed. There were many reasons why the
RF-4C was unarmed. We believe the dominant reason was that
the USAF leadership wanted RF-4C crews to concentrate on
good reconnaissance instead of trying to chase MiGs or attack
ground targets.
RF-4Cs mostly ew alone. Sometimes they had armed escorts,
and sometimes they ew as part of a ghter package.
You might use this photo of an actual air strike to envision the
scenario we are about to describe. This is a strike in progress.
The photo was presented by Jimmie Butler, a former forward air
controller (FAC) pilot. Jimmie believes the photo is from the
collection of Colonel Craig Elliott and was taken in 1968. Now,
to the scenario. As an aside, we've done an article on these FACs
ying the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog, "The O-1 'Bird Dog,' the
toughest dog in the ght, 'our little ivver.'"
Sometimes the RF-4Cs would marry up with a strike package
and a FAC. In such an instance, the RF-4C might go in on a
photo run of an intended target. Once he peeled off and pulled
up, a FAC would mark the target with smoke. In the above case,
a FAC marked the target with his rockets. Then the attack
ghters would come in for the kill. The larger plumes of smoke
are probably from a strike that occurred just a few minutes
earlier. There is little wind to dissipate it. The whiter plume at the
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base of the tall plume suggests something was hit besides banana
trees. Butler believes the hits in the lower center have just
occurred as the photo was taken, and were probably off-target,
intended to hit where the earlier strikes hit. The challenge in
1968 for the F-105 and F-4 pilots was rules that said pull up at
least above 4,500 feet above the terrain, which means they
literally lobbed their ordnance from about two miles away.
Precision guided munitions came later.
In any event, presume that the strikes are over. Now the RF-4C
would go back on another photo run to lm the bomb damage.
He would probably have to loiter around for a while waiting for
the smoke to clear, and would no doubt do that at a higher
altitude.
This is not a combat ight, but instead a training ight that gives you a good
sense for how a mission might be own, in this instance against a US NIKE
surface-to-air missile (SAM) site. This mission was own by the 38th TRS, 26th
TRW, Zweibrucken, Germany. Presented by 38TRS (unofcial).
You might imagine here that that NIKE site in this photo is the
target that was attacked in the previous photo, and the RF-4C is
making his second run for BDA imagery. The enemy has been hit
and is not in a good mood. He knows the RF-4C will probably
come by for his BDA run. He's already had a chance to gauge his
ring against the FAC and earlier air attacks. So he's ready. It
was this second run that could be very dangerous.
Note the that RF-4C in the image is ying straight and level.
While the RF-4C's recce systems took a lot of superb
photography, to get such good imagery required them to y
straight and level at relatively low altitudes and at cruising
speeds; 480 knots at 1,000 feet was the ofcial norm, though we
have seen many crews say they often went to 400-600-800 feet,
especially in poor weather and night. Low altitude ying was
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driven mostly by the need to get under the clouds; the cameras
were very good at higher altitudes, but they could not see
through the clouds. The intelligence analysts wanted
photography with reasonably constant scale, in order to know
what size things were that were being imaged. This required the
pilots to stay at about the same level above the ground
throughout the photo run. When ying that low down through
valleys, they were easy prey for guns on the surrounding hills. It
was normal for the pilot to have to keep his aircraft straight and
level at low altitude for as much as 4-5 minutes. There could be
no banking or turning; if done, the photography would be
useless.
These are the mountains that make up much of the mountainous divide between
Laos and both Vietnams. Photo credit: W.E. Garrett, from, "The Hmong in
Laos, no place to run," published by the January 1974 edition of National
Geographic
Much of the region over which the 432nd ew was rough terrain,
meaning many pilots had to go up and down the hills, tough with
this big, powerful aircraft, and rough on the crew because a
sudden jerk down the hill meant negative G forces that brought
everything in the cockpit into the crews' faces, most notably the
dirt and dust.
Let's take a closer look at the high tech imagery equipment
aboard this bad-boy.
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Use this graphic to identify what kind of equipment was at each station. A
description of camera types for each station is provided below.
This is the forward section of an RF-4C from the 22nd TRS at RAF Alconbury,
Britain, shot in June 1982. Presented by Recon Rhinos.
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Getting ready to install cameras in prep for RAM 90. Picture is taken in the
summer of 1990 at Zweibrucken AB, Germany. We believe the man standing aft
of Station 2 is working on Station 3. We cannot see the SLAR antenna or the IR
scanner and do not know whether they are installed in this aircraft. We believe
that "round-looking" double canister at bottom center of the photo is a camera
system lm magazine; this one looks like the upgraded KS-87 camera lm
magazine. Photo provided by John Hateld, Prescott Valley, Arizona. Presented
by Aviation Enthusiast Corner.
The following text and graphic were provided by Phantom
Variants.
"The RF-4C's nose featured three camera stations that
could be congured by ground crews with different camera
ts: Station 1 could accommodate a KS-87 or KS-72
camera; Station 2" was behind station 1, and included a
camera port staring downward, as well as camera ports
staring off to each side. It could accommodate various
combinations of KS-72, KS-87, or panoramic KA-56
cameras in vertical or oblique (angled to the side)
mountings; Station 3 included two vertical ports. It could
accommodate a KA-91 or KA-55A high-altitude
panoramic camera; dual KS-87s with different focal
lengths; or KC-1A, KC-1B, or T-11 mapping cameras. A
Goodyear AN/APQ-102 side looking airborne radar
(SLAR) that shot radar beams out to the sides of the
aircraft and recorded the echoes on a long lm strip, giving
an all-weather view of the terrain alongside the aircraft's
ight path. The AN/APQ-102 also had a "moving target
indicator (MTI)" capability that picked out any vehicle
moving at more than 9.25 KPH (5.75 MPH or 5 knots)
perpendicular to the aircraft's ight path, highlighting the
target on the lm strip. An AN/AAS-18 infrared line
scanner was mounted under the back-seat position and
stared out of the belly vertically. It recorded infrared
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imagery on a lm strip to provide a thermal map of the
terrain below the aircraft's ight path."
All the imaging systems were tied to the aircraft's navigational
system to record precise locations. Film was developed at Udorn
immediately after recovery, done by highly trained photo
interpreters (PIs) in imagery exploitation trailers located near the
runway. These were called "Recce Techs," or Reconnaissance
Technical Squadrons, RTS. The PIs prepared air target folders
(maps, charts and photo mosaics) for the aircrews, bomb damage
assessments, and intelligence analyses of "where an enemy was,
what he was doing, and what he had to do it with" (excerpt from
Asia from Above: The 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron,
Yokota AB, Japan, July 1957-March 1971).
The crews often had to y multiple parallel lines of ight,
perhaps 5-10 miles long, back and forth over the area they were
imaging to get the required area coverage. We'll talk a little more
about this technique later.
KA-91C panoramic camera. Positioned at Station 3. We believe that RF-4Cs
used in Vietnam used an earlier "B" model. It provided wide-angle coverage of
the terrain. Presented by Wright-Patterson AFB
The photographic camera systems used lm and demanded
reasonably good weather; they could not see through the clouds.
That said, these camera systems provided the highest resolution
photography of all the systems, superb for bomb damage
assessment (BDA) and ushing out targets hiding under cover
and concealment. The photoash ejection systems enabled the
cameras to be used at night. These were photoash cartridges
dropped from the aircraft to illuminate the target, something like
a are. We have seen reports that they were 4.5 million
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candlepower ashes.
Night ying over Vietnam and Laos was dicey for everyone who
did it. The Time magazine of July 29, 1966, "Eyes in the Sky,"
quoted then-Captain Gale Hearn, an RF-4C pilot in the RVN who
specialized in night ying, saying this:
"We're more scared of those mountains than we are of the
Viet Cong. You learn to trust your radar out there. When
the moon goes down, it's like ying through an ink bottle."
This is a Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) photo taken by a RF-4C on July 1,
1969. A KS-72/6in. camera was used for this photo. Presented by Jimmie Butler.
A moment on BDA. This was a very important mission role for
the RF-4C. Commanders had to know what level of damage was
inicted on a target in order to decide whether another strike
package had to go back or not. Some ghter pilots were anxious
about RF-4C BDA photography, because it provided a good
visual score card on their accuracy, perhaps contributing to their
use of that phrase, "recce puke."
Duane Webb, a Navy lm developer aboard the USS Kitty Hawk
1968-69, describes the importance of BDA well:
"Reconnaissance planes have to go back and see if it's
done, or the planes that do the bombing will have to go
back and do it again."
The infrared system was all-weather, day-night. Fundamentally,
it detected heat variation. For example, along the Ho Chi Minh
trail, the enemy would learn of an incoming aircraft, drive off the
roads under the cover of thick jungle canopy. They might be able
to hide from the photo systems, but the infrared could pick up
their engine heat.
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Some aircraft were also outtted with a side-looking arrayed
radar (SLAR) which was an all-weather, day-night imaging
system. This was pioneer technology that today is something to
behold.
We understand that the 432nd TRW might y 40-50 sorties per
day, shooting up to a cumulative seven miles of lm. Following
the partial bombing halt of March 1968, the wing was restricted
to North Vietnam's southern panhandle (RP-1) and Laos, with
the SR-71 ying farther north. The SR-71 was good, but it
recovered in Okinawa, Japan, and took a long time for the photo
results to get back to the eld. Furthermore, it was controlled by
SAC, not the 7th AF, and it was in high demand elsewhere,
Korea for example.
The RF-4C was operated by a total of nine squadrons in the
Vietnam Laos War. A total of 83 aircraft were lost, seventy-two
in combat and 38 of those over North Vietnam. No RF-4C was
lost to enemy MiG aircraft. Of the 72 lost in combat, seven were
shot down by SAMs and 65 by AAA or small arms. This
underscores the lethality of AAA systems and small arms to
aircraft ying mid-altitude and even low altitude ights.
We want to conclude this section by telling a few stories about
the men who ew these missions. It is important to understand
what they did. It is imprint to the Lavelle story as well.
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The Ho Chi Minh Trail stretched hundreds of miles through Laos and Cambodia
before terminating in South Vietnam. Mountain passes allowed access. Graphic
credit: Zaur Eylanbekov. Presented by Air Force Magazine.
Lt. Col. Gilbert S. Palmer
Capt. Thomas Wright
Palmer-Wright, 14th TRS, Udorn, Thailand: On February 27,
1968 Lt. Col. Gilbert S. Palmer, pilot, and Capt. Thomas Wright,
weapons systems ofcer (WSO), were tasked to y a section of
Route 137 running through the Ban Karai Pass. They were to y
a southwest to northeast track from Laos into North Vietnam.
The Ban Karai Pass was one of two major passes through
difcult mountains between North Vietnam into Laos,
connecting to the Ho Chi Minh trail, the main supply line for the
North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. The Ban Karai was very
treacherous, high mountains with karst ridges, lined with enemy
gun emplacements on both sides, and in many places very
narrow to traverse by air. Palmer's mission was a daylight run,
some clouds with tops at 2-3,000 ft, visibility 2-3 miles, callsign
"Sumo." They approached the target area, checked in with the
Airborne Battleeld Command and Control Center (ABCCC),
and a FAC on-station. The area was heavily defended and
populated by enemy and/or enemy sympathizers. Palmer checked
in and reported everything normal. The crew was never heard
from again, and neither they or their aircraft were ever found.
There are many such stories --- crew checks in normal, never
heard from again, as though it simply vanished into the ether.
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Capt. Halle William "Bud" Smith
1st Lt. Charles Bilfolchi
Smith-Bilfolchi, 16th TRS, Tan Son Nhut, RVN: Capt. Halle
Smith, pilot, and 1st Lt. Charles Bilfolchi, WSO were tasked to
conduct a night time reconnaissance mission on January 8, 1968
out of Tan Son Nhut AB, Saigon, RVN. There was extreme haze,
scattered clouds at 2-3,000 ft with overcast in the mountainous
areas. Their ight was monitored by radar, they were cleared into
their area in Kontum Province about 40 minutes after launch, and
then they were told their ight could no longer be followed by
friendly radar. They acknowledged, and were never heard from
again. An Army helicopter spotted a wreckage at next light. A
long-range reconnaissance team from the 4th Infantry Division
was sent in. Bad weather delayed their arrival until January 11.
They found considerable wreckage correlating to an RF-4C on
top of a ridge and in the trees. No evidence of the crew was
found. The aircraft appeared to have crashed into the side of a
mountain. Two surveys were conducted of the site in 1993 and
2000. Vietnamese citizens turned over human remains they said
they had found at the site. Bolfolchi was positively identied, he
has been returned and buried at Arlington National Cemetery. To
our knowledge, Capt. Smith has not yet been found.
Setterquist-Bergiven, 14th TRS, Udorn, Thailand: On August
22, 1968, 1st Lt. Francis L. Setterquist, pilot, and 1st Lt Charles
Bergiven were assigned a low altitude night reconnaissance
mission over North Vietnam. Their target area was about 50
miles northwest of Dong Hoi in Quang Binh Province, the
southernmost North Vietnamese province, on the DMZ. They
were given clearance to proceed on their target run, and they
were never heard from again.
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Major Mark L. Stephensen
1st Lt. Gary R. Sigler
Stephenson-Sigler, 11th TRS, Udorn, Thailand: On April 29,
1967, Major Mark L. Stephensen, pilot, and 1st Lt Gary R. Sigler
launched out of Udorn RTAFB headed for the Hanoi region.
Their mission, a night-time mission, was to conduct BDA of
bridges at Hanoi that were struck by F-105 Thuds that day.
About 60 miles from Hanoi, their systems indicated that SAM
radar had locked on to their aircraft. Attempting to evade the
missile, the crew dove the aircraft to get as close to the deck as
they could. They began evasive maneuvers, trying to break the
radar lock, a common maneuver in this kind of situation. The
aircraft crashed against trees on a hill and then into the side of
another hill. Sigler ejected after the rst impact, was captured
two days later, and served as a POW for nearly six years. He
suffered serious burns, and a broken back, but was nonetheless
severely tortured during captivity. Major Stephensen's remains
were returned by the Vietnamese in April 1988. It is not known
whether he had served any of the intervening years as a POW or
whether he died in the crash.
Capt. William R. Stroven Capt. Kenneth A. Stonebraker
Stonebraker-Stroven, 11TRS, Udorn, Thailand: On October
28, 1968 Captains William R. Stroven, pilot, and Kenneth A.
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Stonebraker, navigator, callsign "Diode," departed Udorn
RTAFB for a single-aircraft reconnaissance mission over North
Vietnam. One report has said their target was the Quang Khe
Ferry near the enemy port of Dong Hoi; another said it was an
ammunition supply dump near Hanoi. We believe the former to
have been the target. Weather was overcast cloud cover with a
2,000 ft. ceiling, 6,000 ft tops and showers. Capt. Stroven
checked in with the "Alleycat" ABCCC and requested clearance
to commence the photo run, during the 0500 hour. Following the
photo run, they checked in with the "Waterboy" Ground
Controlled Intercept (GCI) radar site on the coast at Qhuy Nhon
to ask for ight instructions, a trafc report, and current weather.
We suspect they were also interested in avoiding any offshore
naval re that might be coming their way. Waterboy then lost
contact. Very little information is available about their loss,
except that most analysts believe they went down somewhere
west of Dong Hoi, which was over jungle covered mountains. No
wreckage was ever located. The crew was never located. These
men have not yet come home.
Phil Rowe, 12th TRS, Tan Son
Nhut AB, RVN, 1968-1969:
Rowe operates a web site, "Some
RF-4C Info & Stories," which we
commend to you. He has over 20
short stories. We read them all,
and plucked out a few highlights
that talk directly to mission
conduct.
We mentioned area coverage
earlier. He has a simple chart, and
explains how it was done. He was
the WSO on a ight tasked to
photograph a target area about
5x15 miles, and decided seven
parallel lines would be needed to
do the job. It was a moonless,
night mission. He employed the
infrared scanner, the pilot ew
about 480 knots at 1,000 ft over
fairly level terrain.
On the rst run, the crew noted
arcing light above them. Unsure
of what it was, they did their
second run and saw more high
arcing tracers, well above them.
On the third leg, they ew
between tracers coming from
both sides, but still overhead.
The pilot jacked up the speed to
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540 knots, and, determined to
nish the mission, they
completed all seven legs. They
then cranked her up to 25,000 ft
for the short trip back home. They never did nd out what the
tracers were and never learned why they were tasked to
photograph that area.
While over North Vietnam, Rowe detected on his receivers that
an enemy surface-to-air missile site was getting ready to launch
against his aircraft. He told his pilot to make an evasive
maneuver, the skipper dove her to about 400 ft, leveling off
barely above the trees, and the two of them watched two missiles
passing by into the clouds above. He said they looked like
telephone poles!
Cuthburt-Ruhling, 14th TRS,
Udorn, Thailand: Capt. Bradley
G. Cuthburt and his backseater,
Capt. Mark J. Ruhling (shown
here), 14th TRS, Udorn RAFB,
Thailand, launched out of Udorn on
November 23, 1968 on a
reconnaissance mission over North
Vietnam. Their target was a SAM
site in North Vietnam. Their aircraft
was shot down near Dong Hoi,
North Vietnam. Ejection procedures
were initiated. Both canopies
ejected. Ruhling's ejection seat
malfunctioned. He saw Cuthburt go out of the aircraft. Cuthburt's
ejection seat rockets burned Ruhling's helmet. Ruhling
re-initiated his ejection handle and, on the second try, it worked
and he ejected safely. After landing on the ground, Ruhling
established radio contact with other aircraft in the area and
advised his capture was imminent. He was captured, served as a
POW, and was released in 1973. Capt. Cuthburt remains listed as
MIA. Both Ruhling and other aircrew in the area saw Cuthburt's
chute deploy, but he was never heard from again and his remains
have not been found. His dog-tag was recovered and there was
hearsay evidence he was beaten to death by local wood-cutters.
This was the rst USAF aircraft lost over North Vietnam
following the bombing halt of November 1968.
Before closing this section, we were fortunate to come across an
interview conducted in February 2002 with Alan Osur, a former
USAF ofcer and photo interpreter with the 432nd TRW at
Udorn. His entire interview is presented by The Vietnam
Archive, Oral History Project at Texas Tech University. He
arrived at Udorn in October 1966, so his memories are of
operations before the bombing halt, mostly the Rolling Thunder
bombing operation over Laos and North Vietnam. We've picked
19 of 25 8/5/10 10:12 AM
out some highlights that we found particularly interesting and
informative.
F-105 "Thuds" and F-4 "Phantoms" ew most of the tactical bombing runs
against Hanoi during Rolling Thunder. The normal attack route in was to cross
the Red River, then y over to "Thud Ridge," then turn and y low level down
Thud Ridge directly to Hanoi and its near environs, or cross over Thud Ridge
and strike targets to the northeast of Thud Ridge.
Hanoi and Haiphong were known as "the barrel." When
the Frag (ight) orders came in, they had identiers, BB, B
or nothing. BB was the double barrel; in the 432nd's case,
the ight was over Hanoi; the Navy had Haiphong. If the
identier was a single B, the ight was to Route Pack 6,
northwestern North Vietnam, including the outskirts of
Hanoi. If there were no identier, the mission to someplace
else, considered by some as an easier ight. The wing
might get 20 lines (ights) per day on average.
At this point in the war, the 432nd only ew
reconnaissance ights as part of Rolling Thunder. For the
most part, the 432nd ew just over North Vietnam, though
they overew Laos to get there and back. The ghter-
bombers came out of other bases. That changed when the
two ghter squadrons came to Udorn later.
Udorn was Air America's major hub. Their pilots had to
debrief every mission, so they were a fount of intelligence.
On occasion, they would ask the RF-4C guys to take some
photos on the Q-T, on their way home from North
Vietnam, of targets of interest in Laos to CIA. Most guys
would do it.
20 of 25 8/5/10 10:12 AM
The number one threat to the recce birds was the SAM-2,
the SA-2; next was AAA, mostly the 57 mm and 85 mm,
which could operate at 20-30,000 ft. They were both radar
controlled. The 37 mm was a threat at lower altitudes, and
was optically controlled. The MiGs were the least
threatening.
The weather recces were usually the rst to go, between
3-4 AM. It took about an hour to get up there, so they
provided early morning forecasts.
Hanoi/Bac Mai aireld BDA photo following an attack, January 6, 1973.
Presented by the US Centennial of Flight Commission.
The main mission was BDA, most often for the F-4 and
F-105 bomb runs over the North. Not all, but a lot of BDA
was own in conjunction with a strike package. BDA
missions had both good and bad news. The bad news was
that the ghter bomber missions had gotten everyone's
attention in North Vietnam, so a recce ying through got
them when they were wide awake and angry. The good
news was the enemy would use a lot of missiles to ght off
the bombers, so oft times they were plum out of missiles
when the recce came through. The MiGs were returning or
already had returned to base, so they were of little threat.
The AAA, though, was always there and had plenty of
rounds.
21 of 25 8/5/10 10:12 AM
When their RF-4Cs were hit, they were almost always hit
over the North, and very seldom made it back to base. The
crews either died or were caught as POWs. Some POWs
lived; some were murdered; some would die of illness.
After some considerable debate and after ying air escorts
for the recces for a while, the decision was made that it
was safer for the recce to conduct his ight alone. When
escorts were provided, the entire ight attracted too much
attention and they started losing escorts.
During the 1966-67 period, RF-4C ights over Laos did
not encounter a signicant threat, because they were ying
at 20-30,000 ft. through that area and the enemy didn't yet
have a lot of high altitude AAA there to get at them.
Hanoi Petroleum storage site on re, a strategic target, three miles north
of Hanoi. This is a BDA photo following an USAF F-105 strike on June
30, 1966 Air Force. Presented by Air & Space Power Journal.
The tough missions were Hanoi and the entire Red River
Valley area (see the photo above). That's where the targets
of interest to the USAF were. And that's where the high
concentrations of SAMs and AAA were. Most of the recce
ights up North were at high or medium level altitudes.
That was because most of their targets were strategic
targets, and those were heavily defended. As a general
rule, the 432nd did not y RF-4Cs over the Ho Chi Minh
trail. The recce units in the RVN took care of that.
When heading over the North, the RF-4Cs would try to y
in formation, usually in pairs. That allowed them to use
their jammers together, making them more effective
against the SAM radars. If they became separated, it was
easier for a SA-2 Fan Song radar to pick them up and re.
22 of 25 8/5/10 10:12 AM
One of the RF-4C's cameras could swing from horizon to
horizon, so if his partner got hit, quite often he could get a
photo of the explosion and, hopefully, a successful
ejection.
The camera lm photography was the major source of
intelligence. The infrared was useful usually only when the
bombers had struck things like power plants. Then a night
RF-4C infrared ight could ascertain whether the plant's
lights were on or off, indicating the level of damage
inicted.
The rst order of business at the post mission debrieng
was to offer the crew some whiskey. The USAF provided
some real rot-gut brandy and whiskey, so the debrieng
ofcers would bring in their own stuff, good stuff, to give
the crews. Many felt guilty sitting in the safety of Udorn
while the pilots went up North to do their thing, so they
brought in the real McCoy for the returning aircrews. This
allowed the crew to settle down and relax, especially if
they had had a very tough run.
Most of the time, the recce birds knew when there was a
MiG in their area. There was an air surveillance aircraft
always on orbit over the Gulf of Tonkin, and he would call
out MiG warnings as soon as the MiGs lifted off their
runways and emerged out of the ground clutter. This was
an automatic abort criteria for a RF-4C. He had no way to
ght the MiG (by design), he could not outmaneuver a
MiG, but he could outrun him. Heavy cloud cover over the
target was also an abort item, but it was the crew's call as
to whether it would try to duck down below it and take a
chance.
The leadership at wing and squadron level was impressive.
The farther away the leadership was, the less impressive it
was. Getting a swinging bamboo bridge as a JCS target
approved by the president would cause a lot of mockery
and joking among the iers. Many felt that many of the
targets were "ridiculous." Sending four F-4s to bomb a
swinging bamboo bridge with 6,750 lb bombs and then
two RF-4Cs to see if they knocked it down seemed liked
overkill.
23 of 25 8/5/10 10:12 AM
Getting the same ingress and egress routes, day after day,
from 7th AF drew a great deal of criticism from the
aircrews; too much predictability.
It was obvious to the men at Udorn as early as 1967 that
the US was not "winning" the war. There were too many
bombing restrictions:
"You couldn't go here, you couldn't go there, you
couldn't attack this target, you couldn't attack that
target ... Generally speaking, we all thought they
were dumb restrictions. The table talk, the consensus
was that these were dumb restrictions."
The following was perhaps Alan Osur's most damning comment
directed at the suits in Washington:
"Crap or get off the pot. We weren't doing it right. If we're
not going to do it right, then get out ... To me, the number
one lesson of Vietnam is you do it right, or you don't do it
at all ... If you're going to ght the war, you do it right, or
if you're worried about collateral damage and image and
24 of 25 8/5/10 10:12 AM
all that, then that's not your war, pick another one, or you
don't pick any, but you don't mess around."
Well, that's what the suits did in the Vietnam-Laos War. They
"messed around." We're nally going to get to the matter of
General Lavelle. We've presented a lot of history and background
that will be helpful to you as you contend with this next section.
Events leading to the double-cross, a sad episode in civilian
control of the military
25 of 25 8/5/10 10:12 AM

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The case of General "Jack" Lavelle, the

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