You are on page 1of 33

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.

SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND


NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN
PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C.
AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO,
WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D.
LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO,
OND, PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC.
and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.
[1]
In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that
the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the
authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al),
filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality
of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the
principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it
prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed
their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section
3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within
ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources
within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into
agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation.
[2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
[3]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction
of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.
[4]

These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52*i+ which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership,
hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in
the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples.
[5]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to
the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.
[6]

Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of
the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of
the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources.
[7]

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA,
and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-
scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition
solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases
by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the
case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of
Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the
court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system.
Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March,
1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided
for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant
also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the
wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said
wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to
the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition
for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of
the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding
upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that
the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was
situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting
that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in
fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied
to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than
six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including
it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot,
including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the
proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the
same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that
system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course,
it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is
judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an
action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
(Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss,
219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary
action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete
and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an
interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are
parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same
questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the
very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give
the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not
have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should
not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in
some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be
lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
a collateralproceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period
prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of
titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the
parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who
should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel
of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact
that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred;
there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as
to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated,
even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system
can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is
notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has
been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens"
system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In
others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian
Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of
title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.)
48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R.,
118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of
construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of
title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two
certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and
cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page
99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include
the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming
under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two
certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered
land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
"To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of
registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one
year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a
direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of
real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it,
who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees
or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil
Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet
we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in
adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the
rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the
torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under
the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the
appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the
application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding
wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land
described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and
the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by
the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their
own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are
above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title.
If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the
law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then
nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain.
If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case,
he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured
their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the
mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the
damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the
parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al
of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case,
the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the
real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants.
He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of
the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the
subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be
permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment
duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land
upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of
the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity
of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be
applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original
parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has
no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor
had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against
the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule
that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No.
496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the
vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut
off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had
had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections.
In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that
phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a
mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by
virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including
the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent
purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two
innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two
innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be
protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with
which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said
sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first
original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the
public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land
so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary
to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629;
Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio
State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500;
Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House
of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every
fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or
good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance
of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875
and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.)
In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been
recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were
interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of
its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a
purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea
that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona
fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the
rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory
upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of
the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of
men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory
and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of
the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of
the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had
theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion
that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe
that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first
original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the
vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense,
can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original
certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By
reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior
original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to
minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase
"innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered
land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once
brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the
holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We
think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the
very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of
said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record
of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained
any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying
the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be
answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the
purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to
resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest
the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first
original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against
one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of
their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the
facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason
of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he
who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from
double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither
do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon
the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that
the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it
will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered
and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in
the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the
second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all
other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its
HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS (Second Division), AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA
CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
[G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996]
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON,
ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS,
FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in
these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and
have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a
total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or 214,047 quiniones,
[1]
on the basis of a
Spanish title, entitled Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894. The claim,
according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija,
Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City,
Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from
Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the
north and Tayabas Bay in the south.
[2]

Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles
and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate
court and in the Supreme Court,
[3]
in connection therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muoz, 23 SCRA
1183 [1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA
88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA
360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director of Lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336
[1994]
[4]
terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered by Spanish Land Titles,
for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the
matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must
end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and
the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation
of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing
parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein
embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the
Courts, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite
time, the issues must be laid to rest and the courts dispositions thereon accorded absolute
finality.
[5]
[Cited cases omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment
herein writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of
the estates claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint
[6]
for recovery of possession
and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its
decision
[7]
dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion
[8]
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants
Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of
the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorneys
fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with
damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio
San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera,
Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D.
Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria
Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation
and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the
aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to
portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982,
951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614
[9]
and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the
aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain
portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by
and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter
recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of the
Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23,
1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity
and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject
estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by
the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 312-B.
[10]

Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio
Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and
Victoria Chung Tiu.
[11]

On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco,
Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack
of cause of action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria
Chung Tiu.
[12]

Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the
following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the
parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title,
Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have
already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens system by private persons shall be
excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
[13]

The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied,
[14]
and so, the petitioner estate interposed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed
[15]
for
being unmeritorious and the lower courts decision was affirmed with costs against the
petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in
the proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the
Torrens System hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the
Titulo titled lands of private individuals;
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz
as correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain
and Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not
declaring the same as null and void.
[16]

Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992,
filed the present petition
[17]
docketed as G. R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a petition
[18]
for letters of
administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which
eventually resulted to an Order
[19]
dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect.
The dispositive portion
[20]
of the said Order reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:
1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect
and that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.
3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions involving
the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no
force and effect.
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising any acts of
possession or ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered by
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same.
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within twenty
days their final accounting and inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate which
had come into their possession or knowledge under oath.
7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the
presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.
The consideration and approval of the administrators final accounting and inventory
of the presentation of movants-intervenors evidence as well as the consideration of
all other incidents are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a. m.
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be
appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the
petitioners was received by the lower court without any opposition.
[21]

On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio
San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate.
[22]

On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro
upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
[23]

On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the
letters of administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the
properties of the estate to the following entities:
(a) The Commanding General
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
A. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and
Caloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan
and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various
municipalities in which properties of the estate are
located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon
City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
[24]

The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought
about by various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally
authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.
On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by
the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like
the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in court
proceedings, except where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act 496,
which is not true in the proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136
as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs
have lost whatever rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called Estate on the
ground of inaction, laches and/or prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of
inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so far
submitted, insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and
cannot be legally considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of
the petition considering that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already the
subject of valid adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in
State ownership.
[25]

On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings.
[26]

On February 16, 1977, the Republics Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration
was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby
DISMISSES the Opposition dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15,
1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are
ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories already filed
in Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
[27]

On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Republic.
[28]

On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a
52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or
173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and
Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente
Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and
Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
and entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-
mentioned tract of private land covered and described by said above-mentioned Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands
which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons,
or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands
declared by the government as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging
to the public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or
previously excluded by the Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court,
except those which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on a case to case basis,
of various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the said sales, quitclaims,
and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-administrator, is hereby revoked to take
effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the
responsibilities of administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose
appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby
ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate,
consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y
Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take
appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government offices
or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to the
Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of partition
of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line with the
projected urban land reform program of the government, corollary to the agricultural land
reform program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the
government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
[29]

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision:
[30]

On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the
Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12,1978, after
the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said
petition.
[31]

After hearings were conducted on the Republics Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez
issued the aforestated Order
[32]
dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge
Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and
void and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals
and alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republics
motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a prior
declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro.
[33]

On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs.
[34]
In
affirming the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its
discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to
controvert the Republics claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following
bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat
copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496
(Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the
Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land
Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision by invoking
certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly
recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
[35]

Hence, the herein petition,
[36]
docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court
resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15, 1994.
[37]

While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for
intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R. No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was
denied due process of law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent court
grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower courts null and
void judgment.
[38]

In G.R. No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a
question of title or ownership over which the lower court as an intestate court has no
jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated objections of the petitioners.
[39]

Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez
setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby
acted as an appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and
decision of Judges of equal rank.
[40]

Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge
Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the decision of
Judge Bagasao, both of which were already final.
[41]

Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was
appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence,
thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial
tribunal.
[42]

Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented
before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge
Fernandez who never received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guido
title over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the
Supreme Court upholding the Guido title.
[43]

Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the
petitioners Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower courts resolution of the
question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus,
before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine
whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of
administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling
the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI,
Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an intestate court,
[44]
to resolve the question of title
or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban.
[45]

The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae,
argues that petitioners contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned
the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-
bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly
covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be
mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the States patrimony or
improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased.
[46]

A probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what
shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the
issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Maingat v. Castillo,
[47]
that the main
function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either
summarily or through the process of administration. Thus, its function necessarily includes
the examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether
or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net
assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals,
[48]
we stated, thus:
x x x questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased
maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties, without
prejudice to third persons x x x
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether
certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the
estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this
light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia
[49]
that:
x x x The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person
through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the
said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory
submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and
credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance
with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and
credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an
heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the courts
attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the
inventory, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the observations, with power to determine
if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein
belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in
nature as to the ownership of the said properties.
[50]
[Underscoring Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any
reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge
Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and
void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order
of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez act of granting the motion for
reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not
personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a reviewing judge. By
setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag,
Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge
Fernandez, acting as a reviewing judge, proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction.
[51]

There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is
fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as
the record and the evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into
consideration and thoroughly studied. The reviewing judge argument of the petitioners-heirs
has no leg to stand on considering that the fact that the judge who penned the decision did
not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and
conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal.
[52]
In the case at
bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez
bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and
setting aside Judge Bagasaos Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez
disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November
17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R. No. 106496
committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on
the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with
this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and
106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership
by the late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16,
1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders
of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the
Land Registration Act
[53]
within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or
until August 16, 1976.
[54]
Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification
of their lands.
[55]
Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land
ownership.
[56]

Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued,
and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall
be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage
Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Act. 3344.
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to
wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of
public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been
perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of
dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and
litigations between legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public
lands, on the one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the said
Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property
ownership and threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this
system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of
the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership
unless accompanied by proof of actual possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings
under the Torrens system;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al.,
[57]
we took cognizance of this
Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission
of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after
their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136
was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August
13, 1976.
[58]
Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
[59]
Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be
the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao
who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in
setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under
P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special
proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the
nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored the fact that during the
pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties
into buying portions of the so-called estate with considerations running into millions of
pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and
religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the
gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and
unsuspecting victims.
[60]

In the same light, it does not escape this Courts onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-
judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession
and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R. No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge
Bagasaos Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulos validity notwithstanding the fact
that, by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez Order of
November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts holding in G.R. No. 103727
insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private
respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the
Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with
the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question
is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In
both cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs
failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. Q-RP) to produce it as
requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate,
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to
prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known
as hypoteca (the Spanish term is `hipoteca) allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the
said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the
action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did
not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the
Titulo was presented. (Exhs. C-9 to C-19).
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in
unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
SEC. 2. - Original writing must be produced; exceptions. - There can be no evidence of a
writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;"
x x x x x x x x x
Sections 4 and 5 of the same Rule further read:
SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. --- When the original
writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of
witnesses.
SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse partys custody. --- If the writing be
in the custody of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the
contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is
not necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained
or withheld by the adverse party.
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such
as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing
that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the
photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative
value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.
[61]

Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence
and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo
could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have
resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of Appeals,
[62]
we pointed
out that:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court.
[63]

In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge
Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo
Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as Questioned
Documents Report No. 230-163; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified
by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3)
the hipoteca registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasaos April 1978
decision correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness
of the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last
page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to
admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel for the
government whether he admits that there is actually a titulo propriedad 4136.
COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the Titulo and I think the question of counsel is already answered
by witness. The parties have not yet established the due existence of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the question. The witness is
a witness for the government, so with the testimony of this witness for the government to the
effect that there is actually in existence Titulo Propiedad 4136; we are asking the question
candidly to the government counsel whether he is prepared to state that there is really in
existence such Titulo Propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this Court that there was such a document examined by the NBI
insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and
they are found to be authentic.
[64]

The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our
pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
x x x the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977
(Exhibit `O-RP) concluded that the document contained material alterations as follows:
a) On line 15 of p. 1, Title and on line 5 of p. 2, Title, the word Pinagcamaligan was
written after Pulo;
b) On line 16, p. 1, Title, un was converted to mil;
c) On Line 18, p. 1, Title, mil was written at the end of tres in tres mil;
d) On line 19 of p. 1, Title, a semblance of mil was written after setentay tres;
e) On line 6, p. 2, Title, un was formed to a semblance of uni; and
f) On line 8, p. 2, Title, un was formed to mil.
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the Titulo. According
to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still pieces of black ashes around the rings of the
portions which are indications of burnings. The burnings were made on the very portions
where there were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the
burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act.
[65]

In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.
[66]
Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial courts judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
x x x The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of
Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to vastly
increase the area and change the location of the land described in the original title x x x.
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower
courts analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in
Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit Q-RP) was
issued to the two administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other
interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one
produced the Titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced,
the Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary evidence.
It was explained that the Titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain
Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that his present whereabouts could
not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of
the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance despite the
Court order to produce it in order to determine its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Parks whereabouts are unknown or that
there are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be that the
original would be adverse if produced.
[67]

As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate
estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their
admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value.
[68]

At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon.
Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al.
[69]
is
enlightening. In said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development
Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located
in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in
Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful
validity,
[70]
Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed
facts. First. The Title embraces land `located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon,
and Quezon City. Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan,
and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries
desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of
land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity
of the land claimed. (Oligan v.Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1,
8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil
51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a
Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare
or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373,
375). The fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for
classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadecos Rejoinder
to Opposition dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered
by its Titulo de Propiedadas 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its Opposition of
May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p.
48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadecos
land. Piadecos ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in
these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on
the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the
Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized
adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment -- showing the location,
boundaries and area of land applied for -- were to be filed with the Direccion General de
Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with the
assistance of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment
at one year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on
September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881
(Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have,
then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of
October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares
of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil.
146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of
January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares,
with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it
should be stated again that Piadecos Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000
hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894),
published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Ventura, op. cit., p.
28). That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from
publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of
the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands
established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of
August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial
boards established by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all
records and documents which they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director of
Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadecos title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either
dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura
Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its
rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban. From Piadecosexplanation -- not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188)
we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land
under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, forP8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio
Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4,
1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir,
adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its
certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June
27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco
when she conveyed the land to Piadecos treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B.
Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B.
Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo,
appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also
executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the
same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the
registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian
Castillo made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if
Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein
pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadecos title.
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
[71]
we
categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had
become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as
contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and
WIDORA v. Ortigasdocketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment
was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating
to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating
otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulos validity. In the WIDORA case,
the Titulos nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang
v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
[72]
the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, viz:
x x x conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in
one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same
parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required by merely identity of issues.
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The
Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of
ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before the
probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no net
estate to speak of after the Titulos exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R. No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents
Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. 2, Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh.
2- De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. 2 - Dela Cruz).
[73]
Under the Torrens system of
registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one
year from its final decree.
[74]
More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been
issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity.
[75]
As a last
hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the
petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the
private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross
negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to
substantiate the petitioners-heirs claim that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were
derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the negligence of counsel binds
the client.
[76]
The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced by the non-
presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership
itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela
Cruz, et al.,
[77]
we held:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his
client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it
may, such mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is
bound by the mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only
when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an
exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue
prejudice against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is
only an unsupported claim that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the negligence of its
counsel, without an explanation to that effect.
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were
denied due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is
unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are
not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of
Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the
Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be
used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant
in handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject
estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens
titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to
the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal
holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these
cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for review,
hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993,
[78]
denied Catalinos motion for leave to
reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in the
inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro and
Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496 are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R. No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992
is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows :
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights
could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any
portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby
ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

You might also like