G.R. No.

L-22554 August 29, 1975

DELFIN LIM &JIKIL TAHA vs. FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND ORLANDO MADDELA

On April 29, 1961, Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L SAN RAFAEL.
On April 9, 1962, Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan alleging that Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. On May 14, 1962,
after conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal de Leon filed with the CFI of Palawan the
corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Taha.

On June 15, 1962, Fiscal de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander, requesting him to direct the detachment commander
in Balabac to impound the motor launch. He reiterated his request on June 26, 1962, explaining
that its subsequent sale to a third party, Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the
same. So, on July 6, 1962, upon order of the Provincial Commander, Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac seized the motor launch from Lim and impounded it. On
July 15, 1962, Lim pleaded with Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused.
Likewise, on Sept 20, 1962, Taha asked Fiscal de Leon to return the seized property to Lim but
Fiscal de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.

All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, Lim and Taha, on Nov 19, 1962, filed
with the CFI a complaint for damages against Fiscal de Leon and Maddela. They alleged that
Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and there took away the hull of
the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal de Leon
who was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property. For the alleged
violation of their constitutional rights, plaintiffs prayed that defendants be ordered to pay jointly
and severally each of them the sum of P5,750.00 representing actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.

In their answer, defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative
defenses alleged that since the motor launch was forcibly taken with violence upon persons and
with intent to gain by Taha from Timbangcaya, without the latter's consent, it gave rise to the
filing of a criminal charge of robbery against Taha; that Fiscal de Leon, in his capacity as Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, ordered Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch for being
the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his
superior officer to impound said launch. They filed a counter-claim.

On Sept 13, 1965, CFI rendered its decision, upholding the validity of the seizure of the motor
launch on the ground that "the authority to impound evidences or exhibits or corpus delicti in a
case pending investigation is inherent in the Provincial Fiscal who controls the prosecution and
who introduces those exhibits in the court." Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint
of plaintiffs.

Hence, this appeal.







WON Fiscal de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question, without
a warrant of search and seizure, even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime

The gravamen of plaintiffs-appellants' argument is that the taking of the motor launch on July 6,
1962 by Maddela upon the order of Fiscal de Loon was in violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures since it was done without a warrant.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution then in force reads:
3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.


The seizure of the motor launch is unreasonable. A search and seizure to be reasonable must
be effected by means of a valid search warrant. And for a search warrant to be valid: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. Thus in a long line of decisions, this Court has declared invalid
search warrants which were issued in utter disregard of the constitutional injunction.


When Maddela entered the premises of Lim and impounded the motor launch, he was not
armed with a search warrant. He also effected the seizure without the consent of Lim. There can
be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. Defendants have
violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs against unreasonable search and seizure.

Under the old Constitution, the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or
magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper
warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law that recognized the
authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. True, RA 732 has broadened the power
of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge of
its power to determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, WON probable cause exists.

The defense of lack of time in procuring the search warrant cannot be sustained. The seizure
was not effected until July 6, 1962. Fiscal de Leon had all the time to procure a search warrant
had he wanted to and which he could have taken in less than a day, but he did not. The fact that
there was no time to secure a search warrant would not legally justify a search without one.



WON defendants are civilly liable to plaintiffs for damages allegedly suffered by them granting
that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. xxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.

ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(6) Illegal search; xxx xxx xxx
(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual
and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded.

In the instant case, Lim claimed that he purchased the motor launch from Taha in consideration
of P3,000.00, having given P2,000.00 as advanced payment; that since the seizure on July 6,
1962 the motor launch had been moored at Balabac Bay and because of exposure to the
elements it has become worthless at the time of the filing of the present action; that because of
the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he suffered moral damages in the sum of
P1,000.00; and that because of the violation of their constitutional rights they were constrained
to engage the services of a lawyer whom they have paid P1,500.00 for attorney's fees. We find
these claims of Lim amply supported by the evidence and therefore should be awarded the sum
of P3,000.00 as actual damages; P1,000.00 as moral damages and P750.00 for attorney's fees.
However, with respect co-plaintiff Taha, he is not entitled to recover any damage which he
alleged he had suffered from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had
already transferred the ownership and possession of the motor launch to Lim at the time it was
seized. He has no legal standing to question the validity of the seizure. The legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee or lawful occupant of the
premise searched cannot raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. Taha is not
without recourse though. He can still collect from his Lim the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.

Fiscal de Leon wanted to wash his hands of the incident by claiming that "he was in good faith,
without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to Taha" when he ordered the
seizure of the motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith.

To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation
of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should
have acted with malice or bad faith.

Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission, gave the following reasons during the
public hearings of the Joint Senate and House Committees, why good faith on the part of the
public officer or employee is immaterial. Thus:

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in
the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse
by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in he nature of a tort.

This article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the Civil Code to implement
democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing, and we made the article so
strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good
faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials
who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is
justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one's duty. And so, if we should
limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the
opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith,
which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights.

But Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the
order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful
orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's
exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal de Leon made his first request to the
Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962, Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch
despite repeated orders from his superior officer. It was only after he was furnished a copy of the
reply of Fiscal de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, justifying the necessity of the seizure of the motor
launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Lim could not prevent the court
from taking custody of the same, that he impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said
letter coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there was a
legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to
explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. Faced with a possible disciplinary action
from his Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of
the above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed and another one
entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering Fiscal de Leon to pay to Lim the sum of
P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages and, in addition, P750.00 for
attorney's fees.







G.R. No. 150256. March 25, 2004
CATALINO P. ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY MORALES,
MAX BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL, JR.

About 2am on April 14, 1987, while Morales, a reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight, was at the
Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters along United Nations Avenue, Manila, Emelita
Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a
complaint against Arafiles, director of NIAS, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible
abduction with attempted rape.

Emelita executed a sworn statement narrating the events surrounding the reported offenses.
T: Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
A: Para po magsuplong, tungkol sa karumaldumal na ginawa sa akin ni Arafiles ng PAG-ASA.
T: Kailan at saan ito nangyari?
A: Noong hong March 14, 1987, diyan ho sa Plaza Miranda ako sapilitan isinakay sa kotse niya
at itinuloy sa Flamingo hotel bandang alas pagitan ng 5:30 at 6:00 ng hapon.
T: Kailan naman ang sumunod na pagtatangka sa puri mo si Direktor Arafiles?
S: Kagabi ho. Bandang alas 9:00 ng gabi.
S: Kagagaling ko lang po sa aking klase sa Feati University noong March 14, 1987, bandang
5:45pm, habang ako ay naghihintay ng sasakyan pauwi ng may tumigil na sasakyan sa tabi ko
at bigla na lang po akong hinaltak ni Direktor Arafiles papasok sa loob ng kotse niya at may
ipina-amoy sa akin na nasa tissue na kulay yellow at bigla na lamang akong naghina at
nahilo. Sabay din ho sa pagpapa-amoy niya sa akin ang pagtutok niya sa akin ng isang kutsilyo
at sabi sa akin ay huwag daw akong makulit tapos ay pinatakbo na niya ang kotse niya. Maya-
maya ay nararamdaman kong karga niya ako pa-akyat sa isang hagdanan. Tapos ibinaba ako
sa isang kama at akoy unti-unti niyang hinubaran. Pinaghahalikan po niya ako at
nararamdaman ko rin ang mga kamay niya sa mga maseselan na parte ng katawan ko, pero
wala akong sapat na lakas para pigilin siya o sumigaw man lamang. Nagawa niyang makuha
ang aking pagka-babae noong gabing iyon at nararamdaman kong masakit na masakit ang
buong katawan ko. Tinakot niya ako na huwag magsumbong sa mga kapatid ko at sa mga
maykapangyarihan at kung hindi ay papatayin daw ako at tatanggalin pa sa trabaho at pati mga
kapatid ko ay papatayin daw po. Binibigyan ako ng pera pero ayaw kung tanggapin pero pilit
niyang inilagay sa bag ko at ng tingnan ko ay P55.00 lang. Pagkatapos ay hinila na niya akong
pababa at pilit ding pinasakay sa kotse niya at doon ako pinababa sa isang lugar na maraming
dumadaan ng biyaheng Quiapo at sumakay na lamang ako ng jeep pauwi. Kagabi naman po,
bandang 9pm, sa may kanto ng United Nations Ave., Ermita, habang hinihintay ko ang pinsan
ko, tumigil na naman sa tapat ko ang kotse ni Director. Bigla na lamang niya akong hinila sa
kotse sabay tutok sa akin ng kutsilyo at sabi ay huwag na raw akong papalag, total ay butas na
raw ako. Sa takot ko ay hindi ako nakakibo at itinuloy din ako sa Flamingo hotel. Ng
hinuhubaran na niya ako ay bigla na lamang nag-buzzer tapos naka-usap niya yong bellboy na
nagsabi sa kanya na may naghahanap daw sa akin o sa amin dalawa. Kinausap at binigyan niya
ng pera yong bellboy at yong guwardiya. Tapos ay doon kami bumaba sa likod na sa tingin ko
ay fire escape at nakalabas kami ng hotel tapos doon ako ibinaba sa isang lugar na hindi ko rin
matandaan kong saan at doon na lang ako kumuha ng taxi at nagpahatid ako sa Pasay City
Police ngunit dito rin ako itinuro.

Following the execution by Emelita of her sworn statement, Patrolman Chio made the following
entry in the Police Blotter which was perused by Morales:
280 11:00 PM 4/13/87 PAT. BENITO CHIO ON DUTY
2:00 AM 4/14/87 Subject Emelita Despuig y Puaso reported and personally came to this office
that she was abducted by a certain Catalino P. Arafiles and alledgely (sic) rape (sic) last March
14, 1987 in a motel in Ermita. The undersigned made a referral to Medico-legal for
Physical/Genital Exam. B. Chio.

Morales thereupon personally interviewed Emelita for the purpose of reporting the same in the
next issue of Peoples Journal Tonight. By his claim, he, after the interview, tried to contact
Arafiles at the NIAS office to verify Emelitas story but failed, the office having already closed.
Morales then wrote an account about Emelitas complaint and submitted it to his editor.

April 14, 1987, Morales report appeared as headline on Peoples Journal Tonight reading:
GOVT EXEC RAPES COED By ROMY MORALES
A PRETTY coed, working as a grant-in-aid scholar at a Manila university and as an office worker
at a govt office in Quezon City, was raped by her boss, a govt agency director, last March 15,
but afraid to lose her job and of being harmed she chose to keep her ordeal to herself.
Last night, the govt man, a director of NIAS, a branch of PAGASA, again abducted the girl after
following her around, forcing her into his car and locking her up in a Malate motel.
This time, however, the girl was not to be raped as easily as the first time, when the man used
chloroform in forcing her into submission.
The girl fought like a tigress, alerting roomboys at the Flamingo Motel at corner Carolina and
Quirino Ave. Perhaps as a ploy, motel personnel called up the room and told the man some
Capcom soldiers were waiting for them outside.
The call saved the girl from being raped the second time around.
Her abductor immediately left the motel, with the girl in tow, and then dropped her off
somewhere in Ermita.
When the man had gone, the girl took a taxi and went straight to the WPD and filed a complaint.
The girl, 20-year-old Emilita Arcillano (not her real name), said she was first raped last March
15 by her boss whom she identified as a certain Director Catalino Arafiles.
She recalled that while waiting for a ride at Plaza Miranda, Arafiles alighted from his Volkswagen
Beetle, dragged her inside and then pressed a cotton with chloroform on her mouth and nose.
When she regained consciousness she was already inside the Flamingo Motel, already raped.
She said Arafiles told her not to report the matter or she would lose her job and she and her
family would be harmed.
When the act was to be repeated last night, Emilita decided to fight. Nanlaban ako at
nagsisigaw at sinabi kong mabuti pang patayin na lang niya ako, Emilita told Pat. Benito Chio of
WPD General Assignments Section.
She said the suspect abducted her at the corner of Taft Ave. and United Nations Ave. at
about 9:15 last night.
When Arafiles was told Capcom soldiers were waiting for them outside the Flamingo Motel, he
allegedly paid P100 each to four roomboys to help him go out through a side gate.
The police will pick up Arafiles for questioning today.

About a year following the publication of above-quoted report or on April 13, 1988, petitioner
instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages arising therefrom.
In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that on account of the grossly malicious and overly
sensationalized reporting in the news item prepared by Morales, edited by respondent Buan,
Jr., allowed for publication by Villareal, Jr. as president of Philippine Journalists, Inc., and
published by Philippine Journalists, Inc., aspersions were cast on his character; his reputation as
a director of the NIAS at the PAGASA was injured; he became the object of public contempt
and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item
deferred his promotion to the position of Deputy Administrator of PAGASA.

In their Answer, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, they alleging that the
news item, having been sourced from the Police Blotter which is an official public document and
bolstered by a personal interview of the victim is therefore privileged and falls within the
protective constitutional provision of freedom of the press.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. It noted that the publication stated that a pretty
coed was raped by her boss, and not qualifying said statement that it was merely a report, with
such phrases as allegedly or reportedly. The article in question continued reporting as if it
were fact and truth the alleged abduction of the same girl by her boss, identified as Director of
the NIAS. Respondents MR having been denied they appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Citing Borjal et al. v. CA et al. which held that: The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to
a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might be
reasonably inferred from the facts. The CA found that petitioner was not able to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that respondents were motivated by a sinister intent to cause harm
and injury to him. Accordingly, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and dismissed
petitioners complaint. Petitioners MR was denied. Hence, the petition for review.

Whether the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents
of liability for damages NO

The complaint petitioner instituted is one for damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article
shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence
separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal
action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised
Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, those found in the Chapter on Human Relations,
namely Articles 19 and 21, provide:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The article must be construed
as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged,
explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous depends
upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. A publication claimed to
be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is
addressed would ordinarily understand it.


Petitioner brands the news item as a malicious sensationalization of a patently embellished
and salacious narration of fabricated facts involving rape and attempted rape incidents. For, so
petitioner argues, the police blotter which was the sole basis for the news item plainly shows that
there was only one count of abduction and rape reported by Emelita. Petitioners claim fails.

The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more
circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item
give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained
of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were
eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events
was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.

In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the
importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.

Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not
consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or
abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance
as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to
account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.


In fine, this Court finds that case against respondents has not been sufficiently established by
preponderance of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.




ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, et al. G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988

Plaintiffs brought a damage suit alleging that various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), were ordered by General Fabian Ver
"to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in
view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila." Plaintiffs allege
that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items; that they were arrested without
proper warrants; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; that they were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military
men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence in order to
obtain incriminatory confessions and in to punish them; that all violations of their constitutional
rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial
inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to
them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can
entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the
defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs.

On November 8, 1983, the RTC issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. A motion to
set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was
filed by the plaintiffs. On Dec 9, 1983, the defendants filed a comment.

On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further
proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of
dismissal to Judge Lising, to preclude any suspicion that he cannot resolve the pending motion
with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the
undersigned has no jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion. This order prompted plaintiffs to
resolve an amplificatory MR signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of
Mabini Legal Aid Committee on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a comment.

In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Lising, Presiding, without acting on the
motion to set aside order of Nov 8, 1983, issued an order. It ruled that since plaintiffs failed to file
a MR nor interposed an appeal, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs. Assailing the said
order, plaintiffs filed a MR on May 28,1984, claiming that the motion to set aside the order of Nov
8 and the MR was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.

In its resolution of Sept 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of
dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs is deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the defendants, the motion to set aside and reconsider
the Resolution of dismissal of the present complaint, dated Nov 8, 1983, is also denied.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and
set aside the respondent court's resolution of Nov 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its
resolution dated Sept 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it
did on Nov 9, 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.

Would the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bar a civil action for damages
for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution?

If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only
the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors?

We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.

At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secured in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in
his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, against the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the
deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear;
no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of
social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather
than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties
are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the
ruling power. The rule of law must prevail or else liberty will perish. Democracy cannot be a reign
of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for
whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going
to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment
which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls.


Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent General
Ver's order to TFM to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist terrorist underground
houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent implementation
resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and
arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents
Ver and the named members of the task force should be held liable for damages.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as
public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the
performance of official duties or function. In support of said contention, respondents maintain
that they are members of the AFP. Their primary duty is to safeguard public safety and order.
The Constitution no less provides that the President may call them "to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Art VII, Sec 9).
On Jan 17, 1981, the President issued Proc. No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing for the
continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining
dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection rebellion and subversion shall continue to be
in force and effect." By launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent
members of the AFP merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners
to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such
duties run contrary to the policy considerations to shield respondents as public officers from
undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of ability, and upon the
necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public functions from being
harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits.
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced.

The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of
official duties written the ambit of their powers. No one can be held legally responsible in
damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to
do. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of
controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive
authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the purpose
of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exercise of this authority.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were merely responding to their duty,
as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proc. No. 2054, despite the lifting of martial law on Jan 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution
remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe
obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another,
as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges
are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or
carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic
from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy
or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying
to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards
must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle
of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The
linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or
compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.

We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners
cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed
at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main
relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their
causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional
rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were
the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override
the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of
altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a
speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly
recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the
following to its text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a
quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or
trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.

Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to
remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages,
jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties
have been violated?

The doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. The doctrine of respondent
superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and
servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior
officers of the military and their subordinates. Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in
this case is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person
'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer
for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires
added meaning. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties
of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely
held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for,
the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that
violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it
should nonetheless be made clear that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who
are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson,
Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson,
Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the
acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically mentioned and
identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of
alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But
such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.

Firstly, Art 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties. The complaint in this litigation alleges facts
showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties
mentioned in Art 32 were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint contains a
detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face
of the complaint. To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of
action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if
admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of
them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court,
dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21,
1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings.












Independent Civil Action; Article 32

G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while Fortune
Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes,
among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to
its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands
subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days
before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and
"More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the
provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which
are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55%
provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."

On July 2, 1993, BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC
37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993,
Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20,
1993, respondent filed a MR requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied. The same
letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency and demanded payment within 10 days
from receipt. On Aug 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the CTA, which on Sept
30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. The CTA ruled that
RMC 37-93 is defective and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the
deficiency tax assessment issued. This ruling was affirmed by the CA, and finally by the SC. It
was held that RMC 37-93 has fallen short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in
her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to
equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within
the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and
therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

On Sept 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the
allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing
the parties to present evidence.

The case was elevated to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was
dismissed on the ground that under Art 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act
with malice or bad faith. CA ratiocinated that Sec 38, Book I of the Admin Code is the general
law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that
governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint
for damages.

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection
with the discharge of the functions of his/her office? YES
(2) Which as between Art 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code
should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?
(3) May petitioner be held liable for damages?

The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may
suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks.

An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.


Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence.

In addition, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his
acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office,
where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the
public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.












Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action
and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Article 32 of the Civil Code provides: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; x x x x
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; x x x x

The very nature of Art 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials
in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse
by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. It is firmly one
of the fundamental articles introduced in the Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no
real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so
comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that
official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly
and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a
plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with ones duty. And so, if we should limit the scope
of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object
of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which
is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights."

The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also
private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted
with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional
right of the plaintiff.


Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or
reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by
the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under
which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given
for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself,
would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the
absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of
anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant
acted without evil intent.



The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in
the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent
of the defendant. This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the
Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon
Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.

In Aberca v. Ver, it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and
assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate
his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for
the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and
liberties of the citizen. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be
made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.

On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on
the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of
their duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice,
and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said
provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is
general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or
omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular
specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is,
a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that
deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other
actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the
Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations
is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that
holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts
that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance
of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the
instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32
of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to
state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint
avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999
which affirmed the Order of the RTC denying petitioners motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED.

Independent Civil Actions; Art. 33; Fraud

G.R. No. L-37733 September 30, 1982
ALMARIO T. SALTA vs. JUDGE JESUS DE VEYRA, CFI of Manila, Branch XIV and PNB
G.R. No. L-38035 September 30, 1982
PNB vs. AMANTE P. PURISIMA, as Judge of the CFI of Manila and ALMARIO SALTA

Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. As such, his
duty was, among others, to grant loans or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending
on the amount of the loan applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he is supposed
to exercise care and prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and
regulations of the bank.

In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of PNB, Salta indiscriminately granted
certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a manner characterized by
negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the
amount of the loans. PNB filed a civil action in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case No. 79583, Branch
XIV) on April 22, 1970, and another case (Civil Case No. 88343, Branch VII) on Sept 23, 1972,
to recover losses the bank suffered. At the same time the bank caused to be filed, based on the
same acts, a criminal case with the Circuit Criminal Court at San Fernando, Pampanga for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In the criminal case, the Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the defense and acquitted
Salta of the offense charged in the Information, the prosecution having failed to prove the
essential elements of the crime charged. With his acquittal in the criminal case, Salta filed
Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases, based on Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides: (c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima took
diametrically opposing views, the former denying the motion, the latter granting it.

We sustain the order denying the motion to dismiss as issued by Judge de Veyra. Having been
acquitted by the Circuit Court of the charges of violation of the Anti-Graft Law, Defendant now
seeks the dismissal of the civil case which arose from the same set of facts. The motion to
dismiss must be denied for acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil
case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly the
accused would not be liable -there is no such a finding. Plaintiff in this present civil case bases
its case either on fraud or negligence - evidence that only requires a preponderance, unlike
beyond reasonable doubt which is the requisite in criminal cases.

Whether a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed
on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case (which is for violation of RA 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)


The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted
under the provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code. The criminal case is for the prosecution of
an offense the main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the
aforecited provision. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil
actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action
averred in the complaints. Definitely, We hold that the following allegation in the complaints
unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud:
13. That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which
rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily Identifiable in the manner
and scheme aforementioned.


That there is allegation of negligence is also unmistakably shown when the complaint states
that "the defendant as manager of Malolos Branch, in gross violation of the bank rules and
regulations, and without exercising necessary prudence, extended a number of credit
accommodations." On this allegation of negligence alone, the civil case may be maintained
as an entirely independent action from the criminal case. Consequently, Section 3(c),
Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court has no application thereto.

The ruling in the case of PNB vs. Bagamaspad unerringly charts the course to be followed in the
final resolution of these cases. The trial court based in the civil liability the appellants herein on
the provisions of Art 1718 and 1719 of the Civil Code, defining and enumerating the duties and
obligations of an agent and his liability for failure to comply with such duty. The defendant have
not only violated instructions of PNB, including things which the bank wanted done or not done,
all of which were fully understood by them but they also violated standing regulations regarding
the granting of loans; and what is more, thru their carelessness, laxity and negligence, they
allowed bans to be granted to persons who were not entitled to secure loans.

If petitioner's civil liability is, as alleged in the complaint, based on negligence, apart from
the averment of fraud, then on the strength of the aforesaid ruling, the civil action can be
maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.


In the case of an independent civil action under the Civil Code, the result of the criminal
case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirety irrelevant to the civil action. This
seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions 'entirely separate and
distinct' from the criminal action (Articles 22, 33, 34 and 2177). Hence in these cases, Rule 107
Sec. l(d) does not apply.










Under Article 31 of the Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to
be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to
conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Art 33, permitted in the same manner to be
filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of
the criminal case.

Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed
separately and to proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the
intention is patent to make the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect
whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so because the offenses specified in
Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be
made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their
respective juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling,
a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud, where the civil case may be filed
separately and proceed independently of the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter.

The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that
when the civil action is reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by
the prosecuting officer alone without intervention from a private counsel representing the
interest of the offended party. It is but just that when, as in the present instance, the
prosecution of the criminal case is left to the government prosecutor to undertake, any mistake
or mishandling of the case committed by the latter should not work to the prejudice of the
offended party whose interest would thus be protected by the measure contemplated by Article
33 and Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it should be stated with emphasis, for its decisive effect on how
the issue raised in this case should be disposed of, that in no manner may the resolution of the
Circuit Criminal Court be read as positively stating that the fact from which the civil action might
arise did not exist, as required in the provision relied upon by petitioner, Section 3(c), Rule III of
the Revised Rules of Court. As Judge de Veyra put it, "acquittal in the criminal case will not
be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a
finding that even civilly, the accused would not be liable-there is no such finding." There,
indeed, could not be such finding because the criminal court, aware that the civil case is not
before it, would be acting in excess of jurisdiction if it were to make any pronouncement in effect
disposing of a case pending before another court, over which it had not acquired jurisdiction.
Even if this were authorized by the Rules of Court, the validity of such rule would be open to
serious doubt as it would be affecting a matter of jurisdiction, which is substantive in character,
considering the constitutional limitation of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, that said
rules should not increase or diminish substantive rights.

WHEREFORE, the order denying the motion to dismiss issued in Civil Case No. 79583 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (G. R. No. L-37733) is affirmed, while the order granting a
similar motion in Civil Case No. 88343 of the same court (G. R. No. L-38035) is reversed. Let the
records of these two (2) cases be remanded to their respective courts of origin for proper further
proceedings.