CANON 10

Samala vs Valencia
FACTS: A complaint was filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate
occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting
false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental
fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. After respondent
filed his Comment, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Reyes prepared the Report and
Recommendation and found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year. The Court adopts
the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the
recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
In Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for
nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also
acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga.
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve
Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante
- one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed. In his
decision, Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz warned respondent to refrain from repeating the
act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and
Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for
Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500
against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-
MK.
Records further reveal that respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he
was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga albeit he filed
the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. Respondent also admitted that
he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against
Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled
"Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as
the two were the owners of the property and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for
ejectment. But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however,
avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with
estafa. Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 for ejectment, respondent submitted
TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500
was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995. During the hearing before
Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was
the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the
court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. Respondent further avers that
Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission
was filed in 2002. Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK
for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27,
2000,
35
before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he
came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed
during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK
were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times. Hence,
respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in
lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay
who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has
eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife
died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying
in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair
with Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the latter as his second family.
51
He
reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa
and another in Marikina.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer has committed acts in violation of the Canons of
Professional Responisbility
HELD: On serving as counsel for contending parties. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not,
without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. He may not also undertake to discharge
conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
16
It springs from the relation of attorney
and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's
representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez
against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding
sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No.
95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, but the same will not exculpate him from the charge
of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to
refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the
Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial
court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez,
dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in
trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was
already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the
degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a
lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community. Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a
mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. That respondent
subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction
as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
The Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and
violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein
Resolution.
ANALYSIS: As to the courts, a lawyer has the duty not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. Also, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Upon his admission
to the bar, he swore that he will do no falsehood, and will not do anything to mislead the court. In
such situations, it does not matter whether the court was really misled or not. What is decisive is
the intent of such lawyer to deceive the court which will render him liable for such act.
As to the lawyers clients, it is the duty of a lawyer to maintain inviolate the confidence
reposed in them by the client. Such duty does not cease even when the professional relationship
of the attorney and client has been terminated. It is perpetual and outlasts such professional
relationship. Along with such duty requires a lawyer to represent conflicting interests only upon
written consent of all those concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. It does not only
covers cases which are confidential in nature, but also those which are confided in which no
confidence has been bestowed. A way to determine the inconsistency of interests is to determine
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent n attorney from the full discharge of his duty
of undivided loyalty to his client and whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired in the previous employment. The attorney- client
relationship prohibits an attorney from accepting employment from his clients adversary either in
the same case or in a different but related action. Such applied whether or not the lawyer has
acquired confidential information from his former client. The reason for the prohibition is found in
the relation of the attorney- client, which is one based on trust and confidences of the highest
degree.


RENATO M. MALIGAYA vs. ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR.,
A.C. No. 6198, September 15, 2006

Facts: Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate Generals Service is before us on a
charge of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of a civil
case. The civil case was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a
doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers
for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of
the case, Atty. Doronilla said:

And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant
Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we
withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that
understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension.

Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked
a number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in
writing and file the appropriate pleading. However, Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or
anything else to substantiate his averments.

Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. The complaint, was referred to a commissioner for
investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never
entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuit. Atty. Doronilla explained his side, admitted
several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement. He explained in his memorandum that
his main concern was to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial.
He pointed out that his false statement had no effect on the continuance of the case and
therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant. Investigating commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating
a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending that he be suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a
period of three months.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Doronilla violated the Code of Professional Reponsibility.

Held: The Supreme Court averred that by stating untruthfully in open court that complainant
had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits Atty. Doronilla breached the peremptory tenets of ethical
conduct. He violated the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth
and to act honestly should not become a common reality. To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

His act infringed on every lawyers duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. Atty. Doronillas unethical conduct
was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he
had done. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to
an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been
meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as a sort of question to complainant
regarding a pending proposal to settle the case.

In the light of his avowal that his only aim was to settle the case amicably among
comrades in arms without going to trial, perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he
really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the
proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no
justification for speaking falsely in court. A lawyers duty to the court to employ only such means
as are consistent with truth and honor forbids recourse to misrepresentation. Thus, even as we
give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the
parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a
means to that end.

Atty. Doronillas offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice x x x.

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the
practice of law. For this reason, the Supreme Court disagreed with the IBPs recommendation for
Atty. Doronillas suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of
this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronillas liability as a member of the legal
profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. His suspension from
employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from
the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct
shall be dealt with more severely.

Analysis: I agree with the deciasion of the Supreme Court. There is a strong public interest
involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of
justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Atty. Doronilla
maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of the civil case.
There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that makes it necessary
under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true.

As provided in the Lawyer's Oathand the Code of Professional Responsibilty A lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.



PLUS BUILDERS and EDGARDO C. GARCIA v. Atty. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR.
A.M. No. 2006-11-SC. September 13, 2006.

FACTS: On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite
(PARAD) of DAR, DARAB CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-99, inclusive, against
Leopoldo De Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido De Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez
Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco; Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra
(TENANTS/FARMERS) in which the petitioners received a favorable decision. On December 17,
1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed
a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation. As a result, PARAD did not give due
course to the same. On March 27, 2000, another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name
of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a
manifestation stating that he is representing TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were
bona fide members of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC). Then came ANASTACIO.
On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary
judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation granted to Tenants/Farmers, filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction of Caption and Amendment of Judgment (referring
to the Decision of PARAD of Cavite dated November 15, 1999.) After realizing that his motion
failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD judgment, a Petition for
Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash
Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition plus Damages was filed by Respondent before the
DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed
by another lawyer (Atty. Willy Roxas.) TRO was issued by DARAB. On appeal by the petitioners
to CA, the court rendered the TRO as null and void for having been issued w/o
jurisdiction.Enraged by his defeat, Respondent filed a verified "Action to Quiet Title" before
the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite praying for a TRO, (it was later dismissed on the
ground of res judicata) among others, to deliberately and maliciously stop the enforcement of the
Decisions of the higher courts to implement the PARAD Decision dated November 15, 1999. In
addition, Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in the
practice of law as KDC LEGAL SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which
included KDC as law partners in violation of the Rules on the practice of law with non-lawyers.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of
justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the
rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the
courts. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or
consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.
Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.

Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal
profession. Thus, while lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse
their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case that has repeatedly been rejected. Neither
should they use their knowledge of the law as an instrument to harass a party or to misuse
judicial processes. These acts constitute serious transgression of their professional oath.

It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision,
respondent resorted to a different forum to pursue his clients lost cause. In the disturbance
compensation case, he represented his clients as tenants and acknowledged that complainants
were the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title, however, he conveniently
repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse possessors
claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to obtain a temporary restraining order
preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicators decision. While a lawyer owes absolute
fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice
of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics
of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid
of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in
the unauthorized practice of law (refer to CANON 9)

WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct
and is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

Analysis: Although the court deemed it right that the respondent be held guilty, I do not fully
agree with the penalty imposed upon him. The practice of law is far more different than any
profession in such a way that serving the public is incumbent upon a lawyer, having said that, it
should be given stress that a lawyer is not given his license to practice to give him the freedom to
conduct any money-making scheme that opportune him. The respondent in his own cunning
way devised certain legal actions which does not only impede the propagation of justice but also
manipulate the unlearned.
I believe it would be more apt to impose upon him a penalty of at least 3 months
suspension in order for him to know the gravity of the consequences due to a lawyer whose
demeanor runs counter to the means and the ends of justice.



CANON 11

Judge Lacurom vs Atty. Jacoba
AC 7252, March 10, 2006.

Facts: Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rule 11.03, 11.04 and 19.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff
Alejandro R. Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico
Barrientos. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the
RTC. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge. On
29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in
favor of Veneracion. Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for
Inhibition) dated 30 July 2001 (30 July 2001 motion), one pertinent portion of which read:

II. PREFATORY STATEMENT

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of
factual and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable RTC acted
as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW
HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
On 6 Aug. 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain
why he should not be held in contempt of court for the very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. The respondents replied that they were just
articulating their feelings of schok, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good
fortune not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must
believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less.

On 13 Sept. 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and
penalized her with imprisonment for five days and fine of 1,000. Judge Lacurom later rendered a
decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of 500 for
typing or preparing the said motion while he was serving his suspension from the practice of law.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The
corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine
the charge against Velasco-Jacoba. There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-
Jacoba appears on 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed
by Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the Rule of Court. By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco_Jacoba in
effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of
delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from
mere scrap of paper to that of a court document. This violation is an act of falsehood before the
courts, which is itself is a ground for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any
other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. We now consider the evidence
as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the
inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.

His answer with second motion for inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes account.
Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his guns
and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental. No doubt,
the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba
to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent
nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner and an insult to the judiciary
and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words
created a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. In maintaining the respect due to the
courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the clients
cause through fair and honest means.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for 2 yrs.
Effective upon finality of this decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the
practice of law for 2mos. effective upon finality of this decision. We STERNLY WARN
respondents that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.

Analysis: The suspension of Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the
practice of law is just. It is said that Canon 11 of the CPR constantly remind lawyers that second
only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.

Court orders, however erroneous they may be, must be respected especially by lawyers
who are themselves officers of the court. The language of a lawyer, both oral and written, must be
respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his
behavioral attitude towards his brethren in the profession for a lawyer who uses intemperate,
abusive, abrasive or threatening language betrays disrespect to the court, disgrace the bar and
invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power.




JOHNNY NG v. ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR.

AC 7252 (CBD 05-1434), November 22, 2006


FACTS: A verified complaint was filed by Johnny Ng against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline, for Disbarment. Complainant
alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) while respondent is the counsel for complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision

affirming the decision of the
LA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit stating that they cannot
help suspecting that the decision under consideration was merely copied from the pleadings of
respondents-appellees with very slight modifications. Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the
myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the tent in front of the wall and closed his eyes to
the open wide passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and egress of the
premises, are blocked by something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired vision cannot
be trusted, no doubt about it. Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims.
In his Answer respondent Alar contends that the instant complaint only intends to harass him and
to influence the result of the cases between complainant and the workers in the different fora
where they are pending; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility applies only
suppletorily at the NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary
matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides for adequate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases
before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers
practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court. Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the
affidavit of union president Marilyn Batan wherein it is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in several instances. In Answer to the Counter-
Complaint respondents Paras and Cruz alleged that they merely instructed their client on how to
go about filing the case, after having been served a copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8
should not be perceived as an excuse for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by
their brother lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the only reason the number of
complainants were reduced is because of the amicable settlement they were able to reach with
most of them; their engagement for legal services is only for labor and litigation cases. In his
Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of using
improper and abusive language and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of
not less than three months with a stern warning that more severe penalty will be imposed in case
similar misconduct is again committed. On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did
not find any actionable misconduct against Attys. Paras and Cruz and therefore recommended
that the Counter-Complaint against them be dismissed for lack of merit. Acting on the Report and
Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors issued the Resolution hereinbefore quoted.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Alar is correct in stating that the Code of Professional
Responsibility will only apply suppletorily to the NLRC.

HELD: While the Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that respondent Alar
deserves only a reprimand. The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking
both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety
and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that
does not admit any justification.
A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. Submitting pleadings containing
countless insults and diatribes against the NLRC and attacking both its moral and intellectual
integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. Respondent's
assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or justices and
therefore not part of the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not
apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court held that respondent became
unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the
Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration
of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
It does not deter the Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave
or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar. Respondent has
clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions erode
the publics perception of the legal profession.

However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of
Governors is not proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of
P5,000.00. Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no
reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims
despite sufficient opportunity to do so.
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of Canons 8
and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely. The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael
Cruzis DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ANALYSIS: I concur with the Supreme Court that Atty. Alar violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility but I will only recommend that Atty. Alar must only be reprimanded. It is a must for
lawyers that their arguments written or oral should be gracious to both the court and the court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to
another. Hence, Atty. Alar did not use the proper languages to express his disgust with the
decision of the NLRC.

However, reprimand will serve justice to the actions of Atty. Alar. His motion was
presented in a manner necessary for lawyer to do so. He still kept in mind the proper way on
presenting his arguments. Furthermore, there was nothing in the motion that downgraded the
personality of the NLRC commissioner.

Gaisano v. Abrogar
G.R. No. 145213. March 28, 2006]


FACTS: Respondent International Exchange Bank opened a credit line in favor of Looyuko to
which petitioner Go executed a Surety Agreement binding himself solidarily for all debts incurred
under the credit line. On various occasions, the defendants availed of the credit line and when the
debts became due, the Bank demanded that the defendants settle their obligations, however,
defendants failed to pay. Respondent bank filed a Complaint before the RTC for Collection of a
Sum of Money against petitioner and Looyuko. Petitioner, at the start of the proceedings and until
the case was submitted for decision, was represented by counsel, Atty. Javier. On October 7, the
RTC rendered a decision, finding petitioner and Looyuko jointly and severally liable to the Bank.
The decision was received by Atty. Javier, as counsel of record for petitioner on October 20. Prior
to this receipt, however, the relationship had apparently turned sour for counsel and client. On
September 30, Atty. Javier wrote to petitioner, informing the latter that he was withdrawing his
services as counsel. Petitioner, however, formally released Atty. Javier only on October 29,
through a Notice of Termination. On November 5, petitioner, now represented by Atty. Caneda,
Jr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration. When the RTC denied the motion, petitioner through his
new lawyer filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC issued an Order denying the Notice of Appeal on
the ground that the reglementary period had already expired one day before petitioner filed his
Notice of Appeal, considering that the Registry Return Card showed that Atty. Javier received a
copy of the decision on October 20. The decision having become final and executory, upon
motion by the Bank, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution against petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA to assail the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Notice of Appeal
and the granting of the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Petitioner claims that he should not be
bound by the receipt of the decision by Atty. Javier who was no longer his counsel when the latter
received the decision. The CA rendered a decision that denied the petition for lack of merit. The
appellate court held that the reglementary period to file the appeal began to run when Atty. Javier,
who was still counsel of record as far as the RTC was concerned, received a copy of the
decision. Hence the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not his Notice of Appeal from the decision of the RTC should be given due
course despite having been filed late.

HELD: The petition is without merit. The Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that the decision
was properly mailed to Atty. Javier as he was still counsel of record. His receipt of the decision on
October 20, is, therefore, the starting point from which to count the 15-day reglementary period.
The RTC, therefore, correctly dismissed the Notice of Appeal that was filed late. Moreover, under
Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may withdraw his representation by
written consent of his client filed in court. Otherwise, notice and hearing on the withdrawal are
necessary. Therefore, even if Atty. Javier had already written a letter to petitioner withdrawing his
services as counsel, it did not become effective until after the submission by petitioner of the
letter officially terminating Atty. Javiers services on October 29. In fact, petitioner even stated in
the letter that his termination of Atty. Javiers services was effective only beginning October 29.
This constitutes an admission by petitioner that when Atty. Javier received the decision, he was
still considered by petitioner as his counsel.

Before closing, the Court has a few observations regarding the conduct of petitioner and
his counsel in this case. The petitioner made accusations against everyone connected to the
case. 1) Looyuko had withdrawn his appeal; 2) Looyukos counsel, Atty. Flaminiano, conformed
to the writ of execution; 3) Atty. Javier neglected his case and continued to represent Looyuko in
other cases; 4) Looyuko supported the Motion to Cite petitioner for contempt that was filed by the
Bank; and, 5) Judge Abrogar was once an assistant fiscal under then Manila City Fiscal Atty.
Flaminiano. Petitioners particular attack against an RTC Judge is a serious accusation that
erodes trust and confidence in our judicial system. This Court will not hesitate to sanction persons
who recklessly and nonchalantly impute ill motives that are nothing more than unfounded
speculations. The above suspicious circumstances enumerated, whether taken together or
separately, are plainly unjustified as they fail to even remotely show the existence of a grand
conspiracy against petitioner. For all their derogatory implication, they are clearly unsubstantiated
and disrespectful to a member of the Bench. The Court is dismayed that such baseless attacks
were assisted by counsel, who is an officer of the court. Under Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS. In particular, he shall not attribute to a judge
motives not supported by the records or by evidence. A lawyer should submit grievances against
a Judge to the proper authorities only. Atty. Caneda, Jr. should have known better than to permit
the irresponsible and unsupported claim against Judge Abrogar to be included in the pleadings.
Allowing such statements to be made is against a lawyers oath of office and goes against the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Atty. Caneda, Jr. are STRICTLY
WARNED not to make disrespectful statements against a Judge without basis in the records or
the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

ANALYSIS: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. Lawyers are allowed to voice out
grievances and submit accusations even against a judge, however, it must be supported by the
records and must be made to the proper authorities only, as provided by Rule 11.05 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Although Atty. Caneda has suspicions of ill-motives and conspiracy by the judge and the
opposing counsel, and even if it were true and supported by the records or by evidence, it is still
his duty to observe and maintain respect to the courts and judicial officers. His failure to do so
violated his oath as a lawyer as well as Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as it
erodes the trust and confidence of the people in our judicial system. I believe that the penalty of
strict warning is proper because the attacks that he made were only implications and not
expressly direct.



In Re Bagabuyo
Adm. Case No. 7006, October 9, 2007

FACTS: This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in People v.
Plaza, heard before the sala of Judge Tan, RTC of Surigao City. The case was originally raffled to
the sala of Judge Buyser. The Counsel for the defense filed a motion to fix the amount of bail
bond. Respondent Bagabuyo, then Senor State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the
case, mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion
perpetua, was not subject to bail under the Rules of Court. However, Judge Buyser inhibited
himself from further trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Bagabuyo that he lacks
the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix
the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused. The case was transferred to Branch 29
presided by Judge Tan. Judge tan favorably resolved the motion to fix amount of bail bond and
fixed the amount of bond at P40, 000. Bagabuyo file a motion for reconsideration which motion
was denied for lack of merit. Bagabuyo appealed fro these orders to the CA.

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of
an article regarding the order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The Article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for
allowing murder suspect to bail out. Later the RTC of Surigao City directed Bagabuyo and the
writer of the article to appear in court to explain why they should be cited in contempt
Respondent admitted that he held a press conference but refused to answer whether he made
the statements in the article. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of
the court. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA. Despite the citation of indirect
contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in a radio station and again
attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in the proceedings of the
criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bagabuyo violated the Code of professional Responsibility.

HELD: Bagabuyo SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with stern warning
against repetition of similar offense which shall be dealt with accordingly.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are imposed by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and he should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05
of Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities
only. Respondent violated Rule 11.05 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference where he made statements against the Order allowing the accused to be released on
bail. Respondent also violated canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the newspaper article. Respondents statement in the article which were
made while the criminal case is still pending in court also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13 which
states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Respondent also violated the Lawyers
oath as he was sworn to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. It is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the court a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold
the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.
Respect for the court guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such
respect, would be resting on a shaky foundation. The Court is not against lawyers raising
grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure
for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.

ANALYSIS: Atty. Bagabuyo was sanctioned with a penalty finely deserved. This case will
exemplify that lawyers who no right whatsoever to disrespect the administrator of justice. Any act
tending to lead to such an effect cannot be justified by the fact that the advocate knows more
about the law as compared to the sitting judge. Court orders, however erroneous they maybe,
must be respected especially by lawyers who are themselves officers of the court. This attitude is
essential to the maintenance of a government of laws and not of men. This respect must be had
not because of the incumbents to the judicial position but because of the authority that vests in
them. Hence, in no case may a lawyer lambast the personal character of a judge simply
because the latter committed a reversible error.

The circumstance that Bagabuyo is actually a public officer should be considered as
aggravating. If a Senior state prosecutor can disrespect a judge of a trial court, the other
prosecutors lower in rank may view the court with a significantly lowered ascendancy. This is a
dangerous situation in the States effort to administer justice. In fact, this attitude from public
officers may be imitated by other lawyers thus causing a disastrous contagion in the legal
profession, which could ultimately lead to the abolition of one of the fundamental compass of the
professional ethics that is the maintenance of due respect to the courts. It may happen that the
counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the judge who presides over the court. It
may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions.
Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under these adverse
conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice.




CANON 12

PABLO R. OLIVARES v. ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR.
A.C. No. 6323, April 13, 2007

Facts: Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly
sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in
Olivares Building in Paraaque. In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case
was dismissed for improper venue. Six years later, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of
contract with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The case was again dismissed
for failure to prosecute. Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order
dismissing case but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal. The subsequent
petition for review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. On January 29,
2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, where it was
again dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and prescription. Respondent, on the other hand,
asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to protect and prosecute the
interests of his client. Respondent further claims he could not refuse his clients request to file a
new case because Al-Rasheed was the oppressed party in the transaction.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibilities.

Held: A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes. Moreover, a lawyers should not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. With all this in mind,
respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Olivares. He ought to
have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of
procedural law. Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at
the expense of truth and justice. Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Courts processes. It
constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file
multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful
violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only
such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.

The Supreme Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBDs
recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate
to the violation committed. However, in view of respondents death on September 27, 2006, the
penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this
disciplinary case moot and academic.

Analysis: It is generally true that lawyers have the obligations to protect and prosecute the
interests or rights of their client by filing the proper action, however, if such rights already
prescribed or such action was dismissed due to their own fault or inaction they can not assail that
they are still performing their duty since they are already estopped by law on exercising their
rights. They can not file any legal actions to different courts just to pursue their interests since
such act would constitute harassment on the part of the respondent and would also constitute
disrespect to the integrity of the court in making their decisions.

Lawyers ought to have known that previous dismissal of a case is prejudicial since it had
the effect of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary
principle of procedural law. Moreover, as correctly stated by the Supreme Court, a lawyers
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice. Lawyers have the
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice but filing multiple actions
constitutes an abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade justice.

RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN
BACULBAS v. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING.
A.C. No. 7062 September 26, 2006[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355]
FACTS: Complainants sought the disbarment of Atty. Suing before the IBP on the grounds of
deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Herein complainants were among the complainants in "Microplast, Inc. Workers Union,
Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny
Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for ULP and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the
therein respondents. Said case was consolidated with "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et
al.," for Illegal Strike. In 2001, the NLRC dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the
employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP, and directed the reinstatement of the 9
complainants to their former position with full backwages. The decision became final and
executory. However, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February
27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal
Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned. Herein complainants, 4
of the 7 who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and
sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations
therefor. Hence, this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with
his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, "frustrated" the implementation of the Writ of Execution by
presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents. Complainants also filed a criminal
complaint for Falsification against respondent and his clients before the Prosecutors Office.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent actually committed the falsification.
Whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged
RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the
same as bogus and falsified.
HELD: Respondent places the responsibility of ascertaining the identities of the parties who
executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims on the Labor Arbiter; however, he, himself had the
same responsibility because he was under obligation to protect his clients interest, especially
given the amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His
answers to the clarificatory questions of COMM Hababag show otherwise; wherein, he claims
that he was only asked to go to the Office of the Labor Arbiter in order to witness the signing and
for a lawyer to be present, and not to get involved. However, he also conceded that the purpose
of his presence is to represent his and see that these documents are properly signed and that
these people are properly identified and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos.
Besides, by respondents own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the
true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims That should have alerted
him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients interest. But he was not
and he did not.
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence." A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of
practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his
client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the
rules of law legally applied. The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence
(exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual
prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is
ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x x x
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client
Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag: Not only did
respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt not
to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted respondents claim that the Release
Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one presented at the Arbiters
Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the
money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice.
He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar
Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a
disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers
or an examination into his character. While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and
circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by
the IBP. This Court finds that respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months is
in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and
gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
ANALYSIS: I disagree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Respondent should be given a
harsher penalty of suspension for 6 months because even if it was not proven that he
manipulated the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaim, there was no negligence on his
part. I believe that he was aware that he aware of the false identities of the persons who signed
the quitclaims; this was shown during the interviews.
Moreover, there intent to obstruct justice when he tried to influence his client while
testifying before the Commissioner; and during said trial, the client contradicted respondents
claim that he was not the one who prepared the Release Waiver and Quitclaim presented.
CANON 15

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS v. Atty. MACARIO D.
ARQUILLO.
AC 6632 : August 2, 2005

Facts: A letter complaint was filed with the integrated Bar of the Philippnis by Ben A. Nicolas,
acting for himself and on behalf of Northwestern University, Inc. In that Letter-Complaint, Atty.
Macario D. Arquillo was charged with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his
oath as attorney by representing conflicting interests.
Complainant alleges that in a consolidated NLRC cases, respondent appeared and acted as
counsels for both complainants . Complainants, as their evidence, submitted the Motion to
Dismiss dated August 12, 1997 filed by Jose G. Castro, represented by his counsel, herein
respondent filed before the NLRC of San Fernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later or on
August 28, 1997, respondent filed a Complainants Consolidated Position Paper, this time
representing some of the complainants in the very same consolidated case. In his Report,
Commissioner Dennis B. Funa found respondent guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule
under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the former recommended the latters
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. The Board of Governors of the
IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Funa, with the modification that
the period of suspension was increased to two (2) years. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied..

Issue: Whether or not Respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Held: The court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the
recommended period of suspension to one year.

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall
not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent, given
after a full disclosure of the facts

When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests,
the existence of which is determined by three separate tests:
(1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is
also duty-bound to oppose it for another client;
(2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may
injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one
any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or
(3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty
to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance of that duty.

In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counsel for Respondent Jose C. Castro
in NLRC Cases, filed a Motion to Dismiss those cases. Shortly thereafter, a position paper was
filed by Atty. Arquillo as counsel for several complainants in another consolidated NLRC Cases
All the cases in the second set were included in the first one, for which he had filed the subject
Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, in his position paper for the complainants, Atty. Arquillo
protected his other client. This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillos acts cannot be justified by
the fact that, in the end, Castro was proven to be not personally liable for the claims of the
dismissed employees. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer
should have known that there was an obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief
that they were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the
complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of the respondents.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of
this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the
future.

Analysis: The Code of professional responsibility highly proscribes the act of a lawyer in
representing conflicting interests. An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a
hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers representation of both sides of an
issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect
to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the
attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.

The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the clients
claim against the other and to properly represent the latter in the unrelated action, or, if he can do
so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the
successful client. The foregoing considerations will strongly tend to deprive the relation of
attorney and client of those special elements which make it one of trust and confidence.



LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA
AC 6836 : January 23, 2006

FACTS: Gonzales was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before the
Municipal Trial Court of Santiago City, where she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA,
CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana
handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner. A decision was rendered in the
civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and
P6,000.00 as attorneys fees. Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of
execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint
against the said sheriff with the court. Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of
Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding
her complaint before the Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases
for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation.
Respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses;
respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since respondents acceptance of the
cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and
respondents law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rule 15.03.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable under Rule 15.03 of the CPR

HELD: It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such
prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-
client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are expected not
only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.



The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case
handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by
Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of
opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the
very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the amount of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely. .
Analysis: The issue of conflicting interests between different clients of the same lawyer has
always been a debate at least for some lawyers who argue that no such conflict exists. In the
case at hand, Atty. Cabucana clearly represented divergent interests as he represented a sheriff
who is an executor of his former client Leticia Gonzales whom the latter had conflict with. It takes
the minutest of common sense to see that such was a conflict. An advocate of justice is expected
no less than to weigh the issues in order to come up with a supposition on whether there is
indeed a conflict. Respondent being a lawyer is expected such.
The fine of Php 2,000 is but fitting to be imposed upon the lawyer. The stern warning is
also enough for the respondent to see that justice has no room for tolerating the acts of lawyers
who even without intent, represents conflicting interests of different clients. Likewise, they are
expected to represent the client with all good fidelity.


NESTOR PEREZ Vs. ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE;
March 30, 2006 A.C. No. 6160

Facts: In a letter-complaint addressed to then Chief Justice Davide, Jr., complainant Perez
charged respondent Atty. de la Torre with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for
representing conflicting interests. Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among
them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that
respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained
and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared
extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the
heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed
against them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as
the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained
at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial
confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and
robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial
confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized
as a state-witness. Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his
extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he
was convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing
the extrajudicial confession.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Held: There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. There is a representation of conflicting
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles
of public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all
the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The
nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to
accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their
extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after
apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were
under no compulsion to give their confession. The excuse proffered by the respondent does not
exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. As found by the IBP, at the time respondent
was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion
Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of
opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.

What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their
confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses
knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent,
who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment
before conceding to accuseds choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from
acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial
confession. Considering that this is respondents first infraction, disbarment as sought by the
complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a
suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for
THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Analysis: The existence of a lawyer-client relationship requires that the lawyer maintains the
highest degree of respect towards the confidence reposed upon him by his client. Such
relationship requires the disclosure of information necessary to render legal services efficiently.
Hence, the lawyer must not represent conflicting interests, without the written consent of the
clients. Such prohibition is placed to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Hence, a lawyer must at all times take into consideration the welfare of his client before
doing any further actions. The existence on the rule on privilege communications and prohibition
against representing conflicting interest are means of safeguarding the interests of the client.


Samala vs Valencia
FACTS: A complaint was filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate
occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting
false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental
fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. After respondent
filed his Comment, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Reyes prepared the Report and
Recommendation and found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year. The Court adopts
the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the
recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
In Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for
nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also
acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga.
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve
Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante
- one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed. In his
decision, Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz warned respondent to refrain from repeating the
act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and
Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for
Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500
against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-
MK.
Records further reveal that respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he
was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga albeit he filed
the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. Respondent also admitted that
he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against
Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled
"Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as
the two were the owners of the property and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for
ejectment. But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however,
avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with
estafa. Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 for ejectment, respondent submitted
TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500
was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995. During the hearing before
Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was
the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the
court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. Respondent further avers that
Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission
was filed in 2002. Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK
for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27,
2000,
35
before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he
came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed
during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK
were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times. Hence,
respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in
lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of th
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay
who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has
eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife
died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying
in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair
with Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the latter as his second family.
51
He
reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa
and another in Marikina.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer has committed acts in violation of the Canons of
Professional Responisbility
HELD: On serving as counsel for contending parties. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not,
without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. He may not also undertake to discharge
conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
16
It springs from the relation of attorney
and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's
representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez
against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding
sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No.
95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, but the same will not exculpate him from the charge
of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to
refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the
Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial
court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez,
dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in
trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was
already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the
degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a
lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community. Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a
mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. That respondent
subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction
as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
The Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and
violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein
Resolution.
ANALYSIS: As to the courts, a lawyer has the duty not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. Also, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Upon his admission
to the bar, he swore that he will do no falsehood, and will not do anything to mislead the court. In
such situations, it does not matter whether the court was really misled or not. What is decisive is
the intent of such lawyer to deceive the court which will render him liable for such act.
As to the lawyers clients, it is the duty of a lawyer to maintain inviolate the confidence
reposed in them by the client. Such duty does not cease even when the professional relationship
of the attorney and client has been terminated. It is perpetual and outlasts such professional
relationship. Along with such duty requires a lawyer to represent conflicting interests only upon
written consent of all those concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. It does not only
covers cases which are confidential in nature, but also those which are confided in which no
confidence has been bestowed. A way to determine the inconsistency of interests is to determine
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent n attorney from the full discharge of his duty
of undivided loyalty to his client and whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired in the previous employment. The attorney- client
relationship prohibits an attorney from accepting employment from his clients adversary either in
the same case or in a different but related action. Such applied whether or not the lawyer has
acquired confidential information from his former client. The reason for the prohibition is found in
the relation of the attorney- client, which is one based on trust and confidences of the highest
degree.

CANON 16

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, v. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA.
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Facts: In an earlier case (A.C. No. 6052) filed by complainant for the disqualification of
respondent to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao on the
ground that respondent lacks the moral qualification because of respondents alleged
misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of
California ( respondent was charged of misappropriating his clients funds) and alleged violation of
the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 because he is not really
from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque. The court ruled that the
administrative complaint filed against respondent by one of his clients when he was practicing law
in California cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification to run for the position he
is aspiring for. Since there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative
charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings, regarding the
second issue the court said that respondent has the discretion to choose the particular chapter
where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will
become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only
proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one
chapter at the same time. Subsequently, Complainant filed this present administrative complaint
for disbarment and/or suspension against respondent based on the same grounds mentioned in
A.C. No. 6052. Respondent interposed the defense of res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not res judicata applies in the present case.
Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign
jurisdiction and who has been recommended for suspension from the practice of law in said
foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar based on the said
recommendation.
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Res judicata does not apply. The two administrative cases involve different subject
matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of
Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the
present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first
administrative case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or
circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action
is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The two cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent
Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case
what is being sought is Atty. de Veras suspension or disbarment.
However, considering that there was only a mere recommendation for suspension, the
recommendation will not serve as a prima facie evidence of unethical behavior of complainant.
Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by
the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are
likewise unethical under Philippine law. Complainant proved both.
Atty. de Vera handled an insurance case involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an
automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by his clients father for the release of
the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case
which he then deposited to his personal account. By insisting that he was authorized by his
clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use
of the Willis funds for his own personal use. In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding
on to his clients money without the latters acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity
and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using
the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical
behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he
belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. Respondent
violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client. Respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for two years.
ANALYSIS: A lawyer-client relationship devolves upon a fiduciary relation based on trust and confidence.
A lawyer is considered to hold property which may come into his possession by virtue of a lawyer-client in
trust for his client and by such he is not authorized to use the same without authority and consent of his
client. The law creates this trust upon such properties that may come upon or that the lawyer may
posses in behalf of his client for the protection of the latter. The lawyer through his legal know how may
use the same to acquire properties of his client which the latter may not be aware of.
In every case once a lawyer comes into possession of a property of his client he is duty bound to
exercise due diligence in managing or preserving the same for the benefit of his client.


CELIA ARROYO-POSIDIO v. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN
AC 6051, April 1, 2007.


FACTS: Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent in Special Proceeding
No. C-525, entitled Testate Estate of deceased Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo and paid
respondent legal fees in the amount of P20,000.00. However, on June 6, 1990, respondent
withdrew his appearance as counsel in the said case. Sometime in August 1996, respondent
contacted complainant and showed her documents consisting of tax declarations of properties
purportedly forming part of the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman-Arroyo, but were not included in
the Inventory of Properties for distribution in Special Proceeding No. C-525. He convinced
complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged undeclared properties and
demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees therefor. After several months, however, respondent failed
to institute any action. Complainant decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the
return of the P100,000.00, but respondent refused despite repeated demands. Consequently,
complainant filed an action for sum of money and damages against respondent to which the trial
court rendered a decision in her favor. To satisfy the judgment against him, respondent issued
Prudential Bank check in the amount of P120,000.00. However, upon presentment for payment,
the check was dishonored for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. Despite a written notice of
dishonor and demand, respondent refused to honor his obligation. Hence, this administrative
complaint charging respondent with deceit, fraud, dishonesty and commission of acts in violation
of the lawyers oath. Respondent denied complainants allegations. He admitted having
received the amount of P100,000.00 but claimed that the same was partial payment for his
services in Special Proceeding Case No. C-525. Further, he alleged that he had already paid
complainant the amount of P150,000.00 as evidenced by a Receipt & Quitclaim dated August 10,
2000.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires the lawyer to
account for all money or property collected or received for or from his client. Where a client gives
money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, the lawyer should, upon failure to take such step and
spend the money for it, immediately return the money to his client. In the instant case, respondent
received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees for filing additional claims against the estate of
Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institute an action, thus it was imperative
that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon demand therefor. Having received
payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified in keeping
complainants money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal to
do so despite complainants repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he
pledges not to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his
clients.

Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes. And while
respondent issued a check in favor of complainant, the check was later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account. Needless to say, the act of issuing a bouncing check
further compounded respondents infractions. Time and again, we have held that the act of a
lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes willful dishonesty
and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. Such conduct
indicates the respondents unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

It is clear from the foregoing that respondent fell short of the exacting moral and ethical
standards imposed on members of the legal profession. Respondents refusal to return
complainants money upon demand, his failure to comply with the lawful orders of the trial court,
as well as the issuance of a bouncing check, reveal his failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer
in consonance with the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ANALYSIS: Well-settled is the rule that the relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly
fiduciary. A lawyer should refrain from any action whereby he takes advantage of the conrfidence
reposed in him by his client to further his personal interest. Such fiduciary and confidential
relation of attorney and client requires that the former should account for all funds and property
received or held by him for the clients benefit.

The attendant circumstances in the case at bar, clearly show his moral depravity that
unfavorably affects public confidence in the legal profession. Indeed, the Court is correct in
holding that respondents acts reveal his failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance
with the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.


EDUARDO P. MENESES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RODOLFO P. MACALINO,
RESPONDENT.
AC 6551, February 27, 2006.

Facts:Complainant alleged that sometime in March 1993, respondent offered his legal services to
complainant to help secure the release of complainants car from the Bureau of Customs.
Respondent proposed to handle the case for a package deal of P60,000. Complainant agreed
and initially gave respondent P10,000 for processing of the papers. In June 1993, respondent
asked for P30,000 to expedite the release of the car. In both instances, respondent did not issue
a receipt but promised to furnish complainant with a receipt from the Bureau of Customs. Since
then, respondent failed to give complainant an update on the matter.Complainant repeatedly went
to respondents house to inquire on the status of the release of the car. Complainant was always
told that respondent was not around and to just return another day. This went on for more than a
year.
In April 1994, complainant went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to file a complaint
for estafa against respondent. The NBI set the complaint for investigation on 27 April 1994.
Respondent wrote a letter to the NBI dated 26 April 1994, requesting for postponement of the
investigation to 12 May 1994. Respondent stated in his letter that he would settle the matter
amicably with complainant and return the P40,000. Respondent failed to appear for the
investigation scheduled on 12 May 1994. Respondent sent another letter to the NBI dated 23 May
1994, requesting for the suspension of the proceedings because he had partially settled the
case. Respondent attached the acknowledgment receipt signed by complainant representing the
partial refund of P20,000. Respondent promised to pay the balance on or before 8 June 1994.
However, respondent did not pay the balance. The NBI set the complaint for investigation twice
and subpoenaed respondent but he failed to appear. On 22 January 1996, the NBI, through
Director Mariano M. Mison, found insufficient evidence to prosecute respondent for estafa.
Nevertheless, the NBI advised complainant to file a complaint for disbarment against respondent.
On 30 April 1996, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent with
the Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainant charged respondent with failure to render legal services, failure to refund balance of
legal fees, and failure to apprise the complainant of the status of the case all in violation of the
lawyers oath of office. In an Order dated 23 July 1998, Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina
M. Alejandro-Abbas (Commissioner Abbas) ordered respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint. Respondent was also warned that if he failed to file an answer, the Commission would
consider him in default and the case would be heard ex-parte. Although he received the Order,
respondent failed to file an answer.
The case was set for initial hearing on 7 May 2002. Despite receipt of the notice of hearing,
respondent failed to appear. Complainant was present and he informed Commissioner Abbas
that he had previously filed a complaint for estafa against respondent with the NBI.
Commissioner Abbas then issued a subpoena duces tecum to Mr. Waldo Palattao, or his duly
authorized representative, of the Anti-Fraud Action Division of the NBI for the case folder and all
the documents pertaining to the complaint. Mr. Emil Rejano, a confidential agent of the NBI,
submitted all the documents during the hearing on 29 July 2002.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the code of professional responsibility

Held: The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, it is the lawyers duty to keep the
client regularly and fully updated on the developments of the clients case. The Code provides
that [a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
The records show that after receiving P40,000, respondent was never heard of again.
Respondent kept complainant in the dark about the status of the release of the car. Only after
complainant filed a complaint with the NBI did respondent communicate with complainant.
Moreover, it appears that respondent failed to render any legal service to facilitate the cars
release. In fact, respondent failed to secure the release of the car. Respondents failure to
communicate with complainant was an unjustified denial of complainants right to be fully
informed of the status of the case.

The Code mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. The Code further states that [a] lawyer shall account
for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Furthermore, [a] lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due and upon demand. When a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.Respondent specifically received the P40,000 for his
legal services and for the processing fee to facilitate the release of complainants car. Since
respondent failed to render any legal service to complainant and he also failed to secure the cars
release, respondent should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant.
But even after demand, respondent did not return the money. Again, respondent waited until
complainant filed a complaint with the NBI before he refunded the P20,000. Even then,
respondent failed to return the balance of P20,000 as he promised.Respondents failure to return
the money to complainant upon demand is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety and
a violation of the trust reposed on him.Respondents unjustified withholding of money belonging
to the complainant warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.

The Court notes that
respondents actuation reveals a high degree of irresponsibility and shows his lack of respect for
the IBP and its proceedings. Respondents attitude demonstrates a character which stains the
nobility of the legal profession.


Analysis: There is clearly a breach of lawyer-client relations when a lawyer is remise of his duty
to inform the client of the status of his case, as well as to render an accounting of the money or
property given by the client to his lawyer. It is also a violation of fidelity which a lawyer owes to his
client if the lawyer is not diligent in handling the case of his client such as failure to file pleadings,
or to attend hearing.



Admirisin vs Javier
AC No. 2591. September 8, 2006

FACTS: Complainant Leticia Admisin needed the help of a lawyer in having her son-in-law,
Alfredo Monterde charged with qualified theft, released from the Caloocan City Jail. Complainant
claims that respondent lawyer advised her to file a bail bond but informed respondent that her
only money was P500. Complainant contends that respondent received the money, issued a
receipt and promised that Monterde would be released from jail the following day. Complainant
also alleges that respondent failed to keep his promise in having Monterde released. Complainant
went to respondents office several times but it seemed that respondent was avoiding her.
Monterde was later released upon settlement of the case with his employer. Complainant claims
that she demanded for the return of the P500 but respondent failed to return this amount.
Respondent did not file any comment or answer. He only appeared in the investigative hearings
conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General. Respondent, in his testimony, claims he was not
hired by complainant as legal counsel. Respondent alleges complainant only asked his help to
secure a bail bond. Respondent admits he received P500 for the bail bond and called up Carlos
Alberto (Alberto), an insurance agent. Respondent claims he gave the P500 to Alberto.
However, the amount was not sufficient to pay for the bond. Respondent denies that he promised
to have Monterde released immediately. Respondent claims he advised complainant to get back
her money directly from Alberto. Alberto, the insurance agent, was presented during the hearing.
He testified that respondent came to him to secure a bail bond for qualified theft. Alberto showed
a copy of the personal bail bond issued by Philippine Phoenix Surety but it was not filed in court
because complainant failed to pay the balance. He also testified that Pablo Adrimisin asked for
the refund of the P500 but the amount could not be refunded due to expenses already incurred
and forfeiture of the remainder in favor of Albertos office.

The bail bond contained a stamped Limitation of Liability clause. The clause states
Authorized limit of the bond shall not exceed P20,000 and it is not valid for theft and robbery
cases. The portion Not valid for theft and robbery cases was deleted with a marking pen but
this cancellation was not signed or initialed. Alberto was asked why the cancellation was
unsigned. Alberto replied that he had no knowledge on who made the stamp or the cancellation.
The OSG recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for not less than
one year. It said that the charge of deceit and misrepresentation against respondent has been
sufficiently established. Respondent himself admits that he received from complainant the sum of
P500.00 for the bail bond of complainants son-in-law Alfredo Monterde; that he failed to secure
Monterdes release from jail; and that he did not return the sum of P500.00 to complainant.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent lawyer is in violation of Canon 16.

HELD: The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The Code mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Consequently, a lawyer should
account for the money received from a client. The Code also enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Respondent himself admitted the receipt of P500 from complainant as payment for the bail bond
as shown in his testimony. By his receipt of the amount, respondent agreed to take up
complainants cause and owed fidelity to complainant and her cause, even if complainant never
paid any fee. Lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.

There were also irregularities in the personal bail bond. Firstly, it was issued on 20 July
1983 but notarized sometime in 1984 as seen in the Notarial Certificate. The Court therefore
agrees with OSGs finding that respondents defense that he secured a bail bond was a mere
afterthought. Furthermore, complainant filed her complaint on 12 September 1983, which means
that the bond was notarized only after the complaint was filed. Secondly, the bail bond was not
valid for theft and robbery cases. Although there was a cancellation of such phrase through
marking pen, the same was not countersigned, and hence the cancellation was void. Thirdly, the
payment for the bond was not recorded and neither was it remitted to the issuer of the bond. This
means that the bond was a mere piece of paper without any value for it failed to serve its
purpose. Complainant demanded for the return of the P500 but respondent kept on insisting that
complainant seek refund from Alberto. Respondent has the duty to account for the money
entrusted to him by complainant.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Rolando S. Javier from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

ANALYSIS: The fiduciary relationship between the attorney and the client requires that a lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession in
accordance with Canon 16 and that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client In accordance with Rule 16.01. A lawyer may receive money or
property from his client in the course of their professional relationship. This gives rise to the duty
of the lawyer to account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a
lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must
immediately be returned to the client on demand. In the present case, money for the payment of
the bonds premium was not used for the purpose intended. Hence, respondent must return the
amount to complainant upon demand.

A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
A lawyer who fails to account his clients money or return the same may be disciplined, which
may range from suspension to disbarment depending upon the surrounding circumstances of
each case. A lawyer shall refrain from doing any action which would be for his personal benefit or
advantage and which would tend to abuse or take advantage of the confidence reposed in him by
his client.




DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR. vs. ATTY. MINERVO T. LANGIT
A.C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006,

Facts: David L. Almendarez (Complainan), Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Minervo T. Langit (Respondent) for acts
unbecoming a lawyer. Complainant, as attorney-in-fact of his mother Pura Lioanag Vda. de
Almendarez, was the plaintiff in an ejectment case before the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan
City. Respondent served as complainant's counsel. While the case was pending, defendant
Roger Bumanlag ("Bumanlag") deposited monthly rentals for the property in dispute to the Branch
Clerk of Court. The trial court rendered a decision in the ejectment case based on a compromise
agreement executed by complainant and Bumanlag. The trial court issued an alias writ of
execution for the satisfaction of the decision. A court order granted the Omnibus Motion for
Execution and Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals filed by respondent as complainant's counsel.
Respondent filed a second motion for withdrawal of deposited rentals, which the trial court also
granted. Complainant learned that respondent was able to withdraw the rentals deposited by
Bumanlag. Felicidad Daroy ("Daroy"), Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court, confirmed this to
complainant who received from Daroy copies of the two withdrawal slips drawn from the trial
court's savings account. One slip dated 10 March 2000 was for P28,000, and another slip dated
19 April 2000 was for P227,000. Thus, respondent received a total of P255,000, as evidenced by
two receipts signed by him. The withdrawals were made through Daroy's authorized
representative Antonia Macaraeg, but Daroy personally delivered the money to respondent.
Respondent did not inform complainant of these transactions. Complainant, through his new
counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent respondent a final demand letter for the accounting and
return of the P255,000. 6 Respondent failed to reply.Hence, this case for disbarment against
respondent for failing to account for complainant's funds.

Isssue: Whether or not Atty. Langit violated the CPR.

Held: The Court sustained the findings of the IBP which ordered the penalty of two years of
suspension. Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of
money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and
returning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as
counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant. The
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") states:

CANON 16A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.03A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court's approval of
the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could
have collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his legal services, provided he
gave prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's
money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney's fees. In this case,
respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to
retain the money.

Respondent's failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter's demands
gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit.
This is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics, impairing public
confidence in the legal profession. More specifically, it renders respondent liable not only for
violating the Code but also for contempt, as stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court:

SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this
section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

Additionally, respondent failed to observe Canon 17 of the Code, which obligates the
lawyer to take up the cause of his client with entire zeal and devotion. It seems that after
respondent received the withdrawn deposits, he never contacted complainant again. He did not
pursue the implementation of the writ of execution issued in the ejectment case, to the prejudice
of complainant. By his inaction, respondent violated the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Analysis: I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The respondent's acts constitutes
gross violation of morality. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client when due or
upon demand. The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good faith,
loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the attorney. Respondent miserably failed in this regard.
Instead, he demonstrated a lack of integrity, care, and devotion required by the legal profession
from its members. By his acts, he failed to exhibit the characters and qualitites expected of a
lawyer. He failed to protect the trust and confidence reposed by his client to him.

CANON 18


FLORENCIA M. SOMOSOT, v. ATTY. ELIAS A. PONTEVEDRA.
A.C. No. 4285, May 2, 2006

FACTS: On July 28, 1994, complainant Florencia M. Somosot (now deceased) filed a verified
complaint against respondent Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra for neglect of duty and for professional
misconduct for unlawfully keeping money belonging to her. It appears that complainant was one
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. X-98, for reconveyance and recovery of possession, pending
before the RTC of Negros Occidental. Respondent (Atty. Pontevedra) was complainants counsel
of record. On Jan. 15, 1991, the trial court ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda since the case that had been pending for already twenty-three (23) years. Both of the
parties counsels did not comply with the order. Complainant repeatedly reminded respondent
about the deadline, but respondent still failed to file a memorandum. Instead, respondent
allegedly entered into an oral agreement with the opposing counsel that they would both forego
with the filing of the memorandum. After almost two years, complainants daughter, Wilma S.
Pones, sent respondent (Atty. Pontevedra) a money order for P1,000 as payment for the
preparation of the memorandum. Since the period for filing had already lapsed, respondent took
no action on complainants request. Neither did he present the money order to the post office for
payment. Complainant later learned that the case had been submitted for decision without any
memoranda. She asked for a certification to this effect from the trial court, then sent a letter to
respondent through Wilma Pones asking respondent to return the money and explain the
certification. Respondent ignored her request. Thus, complainant filed the instant case.
Respondent (Atty. Pontevedra), argued that his failure to prepare the memorandum was justified.
He explained that complainants family lawyer, Atty. Ponteras, handled the prosecution of the
case and the presentation of witnesses. Unfortunately, Atty. Ponteras died after the presentation
of the last defense witness and his notes were lost. Complainant could not produce copies of the
transcripts of stenographic notes while respondents case folders were also lost by Atty. Ponteras
who borrowed but failed to return it. Consequently, with nothing to aid him in the preparation of
the memorandum, respondent was allegedly left with no recourse but simply to enter into an
agreement with the opposing counsel to submit the case without memorandum. The Court
referred the case to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. Before the case could be heard, however, complainant (Somosot) died. The
Commission found respondent (Atty. Pontevedra) liable for breach of his professional duties and
recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned. The Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Commission finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondents negligence in the performance of his professional duties towards his client, Atty.
Elias Pontevedra is hereby REPRIMANDED and Warned that any similar or other complaint in
the future for breach of his professional duties will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether respondent (Atty. Pontevedra) violated the Canons of CPR in failing to file the
required memorandum in Civil Case No. X-98 and for keeping the money order despite
complainants request for its return.

HELD: We agree with the IBP that respondent should be appropriately sanctioned. Canon 17 of
the CPR provides that lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and must therefore
be always mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Under Canon 18, they are
mandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence. They are not to "neglect a
legal matter entrusted to them and their negligence in connection therewith shall render
them liable." Additionally, they are required to keep their client informed of the status of the
latters cases and to respond within a reasonable time to requests for information. In this case,
respondent failed to exercise that degree of diligence required of him in the performance
of his duties. While it was impossible for him to prepare a memorandum without the transcripts
of stenographic notes and his case folder, and while respondent may have been constrained
simply to enter into an agreement with the opposing counsel to submit the case for decision
without memorandum, respondent failed to inform the trial court of said agreement. He
should have filed a manifestation before the trial court informing it of the agreement instead of
leaving the trial court waiting and wondering whether said memoranda will be filed at all. His
omission not only gave complainant much anxiety, it also needlessly compounded the long delay
in the resolution of the 23-year-old case. Worse, respondent did not inform complainant that the
case had been submitted for decision without memorandum despite complainants repeated
requests for information regarding the status of her case.

Moreover, respondent should have accounted for the money order. Having received the
money order as payment for professional services that he was unable to render, respondent
should have returned it when complainants daughter demanded it from him so that complainant
could ask for a refund from the issuing post office. As provided in Canon 16, a lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. He is
required by Rule 16.03 of said canon to deliver such funds and property of his client when
demanded. However, considering the absence of any showing that respondent had acted with
malice, bad faith, or other evil motive in failing to inform the trial court of the agreement to submit
the case for decision and in failing to account for the money order, we deem the recommended
penalty of reprimand sufficient penalty.

Complainants prayer for damages is denied. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment
is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is
a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken solely for the public welfare.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elias Pontevedra is hereby REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that the commission of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely. He is ordered to return immediately the postal money order in the amount of
P1,000.00 to complainants heirs. drachz08 3-B PALE

ANALYSIS: I disagree with the penalty imposed by the Supreme Court upon Atty. Elias
Pontevedra. I believe that a stiffer penalty must have been imposed upon him even though the
Supreme Court finds nothing in the evidence that acted with malice, bad faith, or other evil motive
in failing to inform the trial court of the agreement to submit the case for decision and in failing to
account for the money order.

The penalty of reprimand and warning is not the proper penalty imposed. He should have
been fined and suspended for at least one month in the practice of the legal profession. Atty.
Pontevedra clearly violates the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his clients when he fails to perform what has been expected
from him..

Certainly, he knew that the said case has been pending for a very long time. What he
should have been done is to do his best to protect the interest of his client and to see to it that
justice is done. Unfortunately, he failed to do it but rather adds to the burden of his client, thus, I
believe that he deserve a higher or stiffer penalty.




CONSORCIA S. ROLLON vs. Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL
AC 6424 : March 4, 2005

Facts: The affidavit of the complainant alleges the ff: I went to the office of Atty. Naraval together
with my son, Freddie Rollon, to seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the MTC in
Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon for Collection of Sum
of Money with Prayer for Attachment; After going over the documents I brought with me
pertaining to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I was required to pay the
amount of P8,000.00 for the filing and partial service fee, which amount was paid. As per the
instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son returned to his office the following week to make follow-up on
said case. However, I was informed later by my son that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my
case because the latter was so busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty.
Naraval, still there was no action done on our case; I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to
Atty. Naraval, because of the latters failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he will
assist me in the above-mentioned case; My son went to Atty. Naravals office that same day to
inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my
documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval
always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in their house, and that he
could not give us back the amount we paid him P8,000.00 because he has no money; Having
failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP
President of Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline; In an
Order, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez,
directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The same directive was reiterated
issued through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any answer despite his
receipt of the Orders.
[
Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD proceeded
with the investigation ex parte. Its Order, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required
complainant to submit her position paper within 10 days from receipt thereof, after which the case
was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the CPR.

Held: Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person
who may wish to become their client. They may decline employment and refuse to accept
representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively or competently. But once they
agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to
undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Practicing lawyers may accept only as
many cases as they can efficiently handle.
[13]
Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once
lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they
do any less, then they fail their lawyers oath.

Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their
candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither
overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some
prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. If they
find that their clients cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible. The failure of respondent to
fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the
courts, but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys
entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Respondent clearly fell short of the
demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to
his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and
to the general public.
[24]
Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice,
his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the
profession.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is
ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainants
eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum, from
October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of
the Bar Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.

Analysis: When a lawyer accepts professional employment from a client agrees that he shall
serve his client with competence and diligence. For by agreeing diligence or that reasonable
degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do
necessary therefore, and his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligation
diligently.

In addition, accepting professional employment, he holds himself out of his client that he
is knowledgeable, competent and skillful to handle the case. Furthermore, keeping the client fully
informed of important developments of his case will minimize occasions for misunderstanding or
loss of trust and confidence in the attorney.


CARLOS B. REYES v. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN.
A.C. No. 5835. April 15, 2005

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Carlos Reyes against Atty. Jeremias
Vitan for gross negligence. The complaint alleges that complainant Carlos Reyes hired the services of
respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan for the purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charge against his
sister-in-law, Estelita Reyes, and the latters niece, Julieta P. Alegonza; that both women refused to abide
with the Decision of Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ordering the partition of the
properties left by complainants brother Damaso B. Reyes; and that respondent, after receiving the
amount of P17,000.00, did not take any action on complainants case.
We referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued several orders to respondent directing him
to file his answer to the complaint, but he failed to do so. He only sent his secretary to represent him
during the proceedings. IBP Commissioner Navarro submitted to the IBP Board of Governors her Report
and Recommendation stating that respondent not only violated Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of Cannon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for having neglected a legal matter entrusted to him and did not
inform complainant the status of his case but also disregarded the orders of the Commission without
reasons which amounted to utter disrespect of authority and unethical conduct in the practice of his
profession, thus, should be sanctioned. It was recommended that he suspended from the practice of
profession. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approvedthe above Report and Recommendation
of IBP Commissioner Navarro. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not theres an attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant.
HELD: When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that
he agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was
established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve his client, herein complainant, with
competence and attend to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion.
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainants case
and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and
ability to preserve his clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the
ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not
only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.
The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family
makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just
to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. Significantly, respondent also violated
his oath as a lawyer, which declares in part, that he will not delay any man for money or malice and will
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his client.
However, the recommended penalty by the IBP is too harsh. Jurisprudence shows that lighter
sanctions have been imposed for violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of the
offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is ordered to return to complainant within five (5)
days from notice the sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation
of this Decision until the full amount shall have been returned.

ANALYSIS: I concur with the decision of the court. It is a rule that the moment a lawyer accepted money
in exchange of legal services there already exist an attorney-client relationship. In the case at bar, Atty.
Vitan cannot deny that his acceptance of the money is the start of an attorney-client relationship with the
complainant. There is an established fact that complainant sought his services to represent him in court.
Hence, there is a failure on the part of respondent.
I would like to recommend that he be suspended from practicing his profession for one-
year period because he had made the public lose its confidence in the profession. Legal profession is not
a money-making business. The actions of Atty. Vitan stained the integrity of the profession which has
been subject to numerous criticisms. Hence, a higher penalty is necessary.


Vda. De Enriguez v. San Jose
A.C. No. 3569. February 23, 2007

FACTS: Complainant hired the services of respondent Atty. San Jose for the purpose of filing an
unlawful detainer case against one Alipante, who defaulted in the payment of monthly rentals.
Respondent failed to file the appropriate civil case, despite payment to him of P2,000 attorneys
fees, so she decided to withdraw the case from respondent. She demanded the return of the
pertinent documents but despite repeated demands, respondent refused and failed to return the
documents. As a result, the action for unlawful detainer prescribed. Complainant prayed that
Atty. San Jose be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. In his Comment, respondent
denied being negligent. He alleged that he received a letter from the complainant informing him
that the lessee had already agreed to vacate the premises, and thus, the filing of an unlawful
detainer case had become unnecessary. Respondent also explained that he did not file the case
even before receiving complainants letter because there was a vacancy in the sala of the MCTC
of Camarines Sur. He claimed that he informed complainant that the case could not be filed until
a new judge was appointed, but he promised to file the case before the action prescribed. After
investigation, the investigating officer found that respondent was indeed remiss in the
performance of his professional duties as counsel. According to Commissioner Julio C.
Elamparo, the only complete work respondent rendered to his client was sending a demand letter
for the lessee to vacate the subject premises within ten days from receipt of the demand letter.
The Commissioner also found respondents explanation for his failure to file the case
unsatisfactory and concluded that respondent was guilty of negligence in the performance of his
duty as a lawyer for abandonment of his clients cause. The Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted the report and recommendation of the Commissioner finding respondent liable for
negligence but only imposed the penalty of one-month suspension. Respondent filed a petition
seeking the dismissal of the case against him and prayed that he be exonerated. He denied
being negligent. He claimed that the IBP Board of Governors misinterpreted the complainants
letter, which stated that the complainant and her lessee came to an agreement for the latter to
vacate the leased premises. He claimed that he relied on that letter thereby negating the
necessity of further filing a case for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. San Jose is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Ethics.

HELD: The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent Atty. San Jose should be held liable for
negligence; thus, his petition for exoneration should be denied for utter lack of merit. The Code of
Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. A lawyer engaged to
represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost
diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he
should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client. It is
not enough that a practitioner is qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare
adequately and give the appropriate attention to his legal work. Respondent fell short of the
diligence required of a lawyer entrusted with a case. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is
the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it
to its conclusion. However, respondent in this case failed to file the appropriate civil case after
sending a demand letter. The failure to file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence on the
part of respondent. Moreover, this Court finds reprehensible respondents failure to heed the
request of his client for the return of the case documents. That respondent gave no reasonable
explanation for that failure makes his neglect patent. Respondent aggravates his misconduct by
blaming the courts. Respondents excuse that the MCTC having jurisdiction over the case was
vacant; that filing of a case would be useless; and that the best thing to do was to wait for the
vacancy to be filled, finds no support in the practice of law. The vacancy in court did not suspend
the courts official existence, much less render it functus oficio. Respondent also relies in vain on
complainants letter wherein complainant informed respondent of her decision to withdraw the
case. According to the complainant, she resorted to the letter so she could retrieve the records
she previously handed over to the respondent, but he continued to refuse to return them. It may
be noted that the letter was sent to respondent a few days before the lapse of the one-year
prescriptive period. If respondent had earlier filed a case, there would have been no need for
complainant to resort to that letter to get the records in line with her plan to have the Public
Attorneys Office assist in filing the appropriate case. Needless to stress, because of the
respondents failure to file the appropriate case, and his refusal to return the documents, time ran
out and the action for unlawful detainer case was barred by prescription. Damage and prejudice
to the clients cause was undeniable. The Court finds the recommended penalty of one-month
suspension from the practice of law too light. In previous cases, we have imposed six months
suspension for violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the
necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is hereby declared guilty of violation of
Canon 18 specifically Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Resolution.

ANALYSIS: The devotion and diligence to the cause of his client which is required from a lawyer
is absent the present case. Although a lawyer cannot be expected to be flawless in the
performance of his duties and in his dealings, gross negligence is inexcusable and is a ground for
disciplinary action.

I find the penalty of six months suspension imposed against respondent lawyer too light
considering that not only did he neglect his duties to his client but he also willfully and deliberately
refused to return the documents of his client despite repeated demands which led to the barring
of the cause of action of the latter by prescription.



SPOUSES ANTONIO and NORMA SORIANO vs. ATTY. REYNALDO P. REYES,
A.C. No. 4676, May 4, 2006

Facts: Complainants alleged that sometime in the latter part of 1990, they engaged the services
of respondent in a case they filed against Peninsula Development Bank entitled, Norton
Resources and Development Corporation, et al. v. Peninsula Development Bank. The case was
for Declaration of Nullity with Injunction and/or Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City. While the case was pending, respondent reassured complainants that he
was diligently attending to the case and will inform them of the status of their case.

In 1994, complainants again engaged the services of respondent in a case they filed
against the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center entitled, Spouses Antonio M. Soriano
and Norma Soriano v. Technology and Livelihood Resource Center for Declaration of Nullity with
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC of Davao City. During the pendency
of the second case, complainants inquired from respondent the status of the earlier case, the
latter informed them that the same was still pending and/or ongoing. Later, complainants learned
that the first case was dismissed on 16 December 1991 for failure of the respondent to file a pre-
trial brief. A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied in an Order dated 27
April 1992.
As to the second case, complainants likewise found out that the case was dismissed for failure to
prosecute. Upon filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, though, the case was reconsidered and
reinstated on 15 August 1995. Claiming that the acts of respondent greatly prejudiced and
damaged them, complainants filed a Complaint for disbarment against respondent before this
Court. However, a Motion to Withdraw Testimony and Evidence was filed by complainant Norma
B. Soriano before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibilities.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case executed
by a complainant does not automatically exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of negligence
has been duly proved. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.

Hence, Respondents failure to file the pre-trial brief constitutes inexcusable negligence.
The importance of filing a pre-trial brief cannot be gainsaid. Respondent did not only fail to file the
pre-trial brief within the given period. Worse, he had not submitted the required pre-trial brief even
at the time he filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal several months later.
Expectedly, the motion for reconsideration was denied by the court. Respondents negligence is
apparent in the trial courts denial of the motion for reconsideration. Clearly, respondent was not
able to protect his clients interest through his own fault. Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by reason of
Atty. Reyess negligence, complainant suffered actual loss.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Reynaldo Reyes is found GUILTY
of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Analysis: The Court correctly ruled this case. Lawyers have the obligations to protect and
prosecute the interests or rights of their client they also have the duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Neglect in the performance of their duty is not one of the
efficient way on the proper administration of justice in fact it is the other way around since such
neglect is prejudicial to the rights of their client and constitutes improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade justice. A lawyer is hired because his client trusted him and that
the latter assumed that his lawyer would exercise all the necessary means to protect and
prosecute his interests, hence such trust must be preserve and the lawyer should maintain fidelity
to his client. In the case at hand, respondent should have given adequate attention, care and time
to his cases. In failing to inform his clients of the status of their cases, respondent failed to
exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such manners of professional employment.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court is correct is ruling that the affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case executed by a complainant does not automatically exonerate the respondent.
Legal Profession affects the public because their primary duty is to protect the law and see to it
that justice is served to everyone. Hence it would be improper and precarious to allow a negligent
lawyer to render his service open to anyone or to be at large without imposing proper disciplinary
action to him.




SPOUSES WILLIAM ADECER AND TERESITA P. ADECER v. ATTY. EMMANUEL AKUT
May 3, 2006


Facts: This a petition for disbarment against Atty. Emmanuel Akut. Respondent was the legal
counsel in the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. William Adecer and Teresita
Adecer in which complainants were convicted under Article 318 of the RPC (Other Deceits),
before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro, and were sentenced to the penalty of arresto mayor and a
fine of not less than P30,000.00, and to pay civil liability. On 25 March 1997, respondent received
a copy of the MTCCs Decision

dated 12 March 1997, and on 26 March 1997, the Decision was
promulgated in the absence of the complainants, who were accorded due notice. Complainants
and respondent received a copy of the Decision via registered mail on 4 April 1997. Respondent
had fifteen (15) days from 25 March 1997, or until 9 April 1997, to file either an appeal or a
petition for probation in behalf of the complainants. However, it was only on 16 May 1997 over
a month after the Decision had become final and executory that respondent filed a Petition for
Probation, explaining that he was out of town during the period for filing an appeal. The MTCC
issued a Writ of Execution On 19 May 1997. The next day, a warrant of arrest was served on
complainants and they were incarcerated.

The Petition for Probation was denied. The MTCC held that the law does not permit the
grant of probation after the lapse of the period for filing an appeal. With regard to respondents
allegation that he was out of town during the period for filing an appeal, the MTCC examined the
calendars of various courts and ascertained that respondent had scheduled and attended
hearings before several courts in Cagayan de Oro during said period. This prompted the MTCC
to comment, [t]he court does not know if defense counsel suffered a sudden lack of vitamins to
make him forget his duties towards his clients. It appears that complainants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with an Atty. Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo as pro bono counsel for the complainants.
The motion was also denied. The records also reflect that complainants filed a pleading entitled
Urgent Omnibus Motions to Recall Writ of Execution and for a Second Motion for Reconsideration
with Leave of Court. On 29 July 1997, while serving their sentence at the Lumbia Detention and
Rehabilitation Center, complainants filed the instant administrative case praying that respondent
be disbarred and ordered to reimburse complainants of expenses, with interest and damages.

Issue: Whether respondent is administratively liable for a violating the principles of legal ethics
and the CPR in filing the Petition for Probation beyond the reglementary period.

Held: Commissioner Wilfredo EJE Reyes found that respondent failed to exercise the proper
diligence in dealing with the case of his clients and recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) month and admonished henceforth to be more careful in the
performance of his duties to his clients. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the findings of Commissioner Reyes with the modification that respondent instead be
suspended for six (6) months. We affirm the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and
adopt the recommendation of the Board of Governors. The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. He shall not handle
any legal matter without adequate preparation. Nor shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him; his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Respondent is bound by the representations he made in his Memorandum in Support of
the Petition for Probation, i.e., that a timely petition for probation was not filed due to the fact that
he was out of town and that complainants were laboring under the misapprehension that the civil
liability must be paid in full before probation could be availed of. Either of his two explanations
is enough ground to render him liable for negligence under the Code of Professional Conduct.
First, despite his receipt of a copy of the Decision and the consequent running of the fifteen (15)-
day period to file a petition for probation, respondent went out of town without contacting
complainants to give them proper legal advice. Furthermore, his admission that complainants
were [1] under the impression that they first had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a
petition for probation and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) days from their counsels
receipt of a copy of the decision to file their petition, proves that he failed to give complainants
timely legal advise.

When he received a copy of the Decision, he was in town, and could have made time to
confer with his clients. Even if he had left town during the entire 15-day period, he could have
found a way to speak with them thru cellular phones, long distance telephone, or overnight
delivery. There are many ways to provide proper representation for his clients and many things
which respondent could have done that would give this Court the impression that he had the least
bit of concern for his clients cause. But nothing of the sort was presented by respondent. Since
he is primarily responsible for filing the vital pleading that would have made possible for his
clients to avail of probation, we find that respondents omission is a culpable act of negligence for
which he must be held liable.

Furthermore, when the MTCC decided to take judicial notice of his scheduled hearings
within Cagayan de Oro to expose his lie, respondent explained that he was in town to attend
some of the more important hearings but was out of town most of the time. Every case a
lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of his impression that
one case or hearing is more important than the other.

Respondent has attached a death certificate showing that his wife died from cardiac
arrest close to the period in question. We commiserate with respondent for the loss of his wife,
and appreciate fully that during the period of a mans existence when the sense of mortality and
loss is most closely felt more then ever, it would appear that no responsibility is more important
than tending to loved ones. However, such is the lawyers charge that no personal consideration
should stand in the way of performing a legal duty. In these situations, it is only fair that a lawyer
should lighten his case load lest he prejudice his clients cases.

We have held that the failure of an attorney to file a timely motion for reconsideration or
an appeal renders him liable for negligence under the Code of Professional Responsibility. In the
instant case, the negligence exhibited by the respondent is made more grievous by the fact that
the Decision to be acted upon is one that subjects his clients to incarceration. The liberty of ones
clients is not to be taken lightly, whether the sentence is for destierro or reclusion perpetua.
Litigants entrust their properties, liberties, and even lives, in the hands of their lawyers, who must
protect these values with utmost zeal and vigilance.

The lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and
he should provide a quality of services at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect
of a competent lawyer in the like situation. By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he represents
that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having
reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests
and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor, and his client may reasonably expect him to
discharge his obligations diligently. Respondent has failed to measure up to his oath.

Analysis: I agree with the decision of the Court. Even if he respondents negligence was made
more grievous because his clients liberty was at stake, this was mitigated by the fact that the
petiotioners themselves failed to take more interest in their case. They failed to attend the
promulgation of the Decision despite due notification.

Furthermore, each person has a different way of dealing and reacting when faced with the
knowledge that a loved one is sick and dying. One cannot question how another handles such
situation, and cannot dictate how another should prioritize thye performance of his duties. Atty.
Akut should be given consideration for the confusion which he may have faced when trying to find
solution to his wifes illness. If not for the above, a more severe penalty should have been given.



Balatbat v. Sanchez,
AC No. 1666, April 13, 2007

FACTS: Balatbat alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Sanchez to undertake his defense
in a civil case for recovery of money. According to Balatbat, he did not attend the scheduled
meetings because Sanchez told him that there was no need to be present. But when he verified
the status of the case from the Court, he was surprised to learn that a decision had already been
rendered. Balatbat alleges that the enforcement of the decision caused him and his family untold
miseries, embarrassment, and public ridicule. The city court declared Balatbat in default for failure
to appear during the hearing. Plaintiff was thereafter allowed to present evidence ex parte. After
three days, a judgment adverse to complainant was rendered, prompting the plaintiff to move for
execution ex parte which was subsequently granted. Balatbat then went to Sanchezs office and
the latter said that they were on a loss. When asked to show the copy of the decision, Sanchez
replied it was already in default. Balatbat demanded the records of the case to be shown to him
but Sanchez refused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Sanchez is administratively liable for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Sanchez SUSPENDED for 1 month and sternly warned for violating Rule 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Sanchez did not properly withdraw as counsel for
complainant. The attorney-client relation continues until the client gives a notice of discharge, or
manifests to the court or tribunal where the case is pending that counsel is being discharged, with
a copy served upon the adverse party. Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is to have
either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving him of the duties of
counsel. This rule is consistent with the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination and is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his
retainer until his effective discharge from the case or the final disposition of the entire subject
matter of the litigation. The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that the new counsel is
properly recorded and the records properly handed over. The abandonment of a client in violation
of the attorneys contract amounts to an ignorance of the most elementary principles of
professional ethics.

The negligent failure of respondent to act accordingly under the circumstances clearly
negates not only his claim that he appeared in court always mindful of his duties but also his vow
to serve his client with competence and diligence and not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Respondents actuations likewise violated Rule 18.04 which mandates that a lawyer keeps the
client informed of the status of the case and respond within a reasonable time to a clients request
for information. A client must never be left in the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith
and confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.

Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts in the prosecution or
defense of a clients cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interests of his client, he also serves the ends of justice does honor to the bar and
helps maintain the respects of the community to the legal profession.

ANALYSIS: This case is another forensic illustration of the Court disciplining a lawyer for
neglecting his duty to serve a client with competence and diligence. Every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance. While many
desires to be part of the legal brotherhood and practice the lawyers work, some of those who
were successful enough to get in do not do their job the proper way. This embarrasses the legal
profession. But the one directly and greatly affected is the client who usually pays good money
just to motivate his lawyer to fight for his cause. For this reasons, a heavier penalty should be
imposed against lawyers violating the aforementioned duties.

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires the lawyer to display warm zeal and
utmost dedication to this duty. Moreover, the client is entitled to the fullest disclosure of the mode
and manner by which his interest is defended or why certain steps are taken or committed or
omitted. And a lawyer who repeatedly disdains to answer the inquiries of his client violates his
duties and neglects the clients interest. This downgrades the attorney-client relationship, a
relationship which is traditionally viewed as highly fiduciary in nature.


CANON 19

ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES vs. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

Facts: Complainant Atty. Briones is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson.
Respondent Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel for the Heirs of the late Luz J. Henson
(Heirs). On April 9, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the RTC a notice of appeal from the Order
dated April 3, 2002, questioning the payment of commission to Atty. Briones. On April 29, 2002,
Atty. Jimenez filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order dated March 12, 2002,
appointing the firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit at the expense of the late Luz J.
Henson, as well as the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it denied their motion for
recommendation. On July 26, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the CA a Petition for Mandamus,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 71844, alleging that the respondent Judge therein unlawfully refused to
comply with his ministerial duty to approve their appeal which was perfected on time. Atty.
Briones, in his Comment, contends that the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, represented by Atty.
Jimenez, are guilty of forum shopping for which reason, the petition should be dismissed. On
February 11, 2003, the CA without touching on the forum shopping issue, granted the petition and
ordered the respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal taken by Atty. Jimenez from the
Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to Atty. Briones.
Atty. Briones then filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 159130, praying for the dismissal of the appeal from the
Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it ordered the payment of commission to him, as the Special
Administrator of the estate of the deceased Luz J. Henson. The Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. Atty. Briones (hereinafter
referred to as complainant) filed his "Memorandum with Administrative Complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Jacinto Jimenez, Counsel for Respondents" for violation of Rule 19.01 and Rule
12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum
shopping. Complainant claims that Atty. Jimenez (hereinafter referred to as respondent) and the
Heirs engaged again in forum shopping when respondent, as counsel for the Heirs, filed a
criminal complaint and executed an affidavit against complainant for resisting and seriously
disobeying the RTC Order dated April 3, 2002 which directed complainant to deliver the residue
of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares, punishable under Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code. Complainant further claims that respondent violated Rules 19.01 and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court in its Resolution dated January 24, 2005, in G.R. No. 159130, resolved to
docket the complaint against Atty. Jimenez as a regular administrative complaint; referred said
Complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC); and required Atty. Jimenez to comment.
Respondent filed his Comment on April 6, 2005. He contends that when he assisted the Heirs in
filing a criminal case against complainant, he was merely fulfilling his legal duty to take the
necessary steps to protect the interests of his clients; that it cannot serve as basis for filing an
administrative case against him. On January 31, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and
Recommendation recommending that the administrative complaint against Atty. Jimenez be
dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Records
show that respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, filed a special civil
action docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the
accounting firm of Alba, Romeo and Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 71488 assailing the Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of
commission to complainant. It is evident that there is identity of parties but different causes of
action and reliefs sought. Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.

However, there is sufficient ground in support of complainant's claim that respondent
violated Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Records reveal that before
respondent assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant, he sent
demand letters to the latter to comply with the Order of Judge Tipon to deliver the residue of the
estate to the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson. Considering that complainant did not reply to the
demand letters, respondent opted to file said criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal
to obey the lawful order of the court.

The Order referred to is the third part of the assailed Order dated April 3, 2002 which
directs complainant to deliver the residue to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. As aptly
pointed out by complainant, respondent should have first filed the proper motion with the RTC for
execution of the third part of said Order instead of immediately resorting to the filing of criminal
complaint against him. A mere perusal of the rest of the Order dated April 3, 2002 readily
discloses that the approval of the report of complainant as Special Administrator was suspended
prior to the audit of the administration of complainant. Consequently, the RTC would still have to
determine and define the residue referred to in the subject Order. The filing of the criminal
complaint was evidently premature.

Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not violate Rule 19.01
because he assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant after the
latter ignored the demand letters sent to him; and that a lawyer owes his client the exercise of
utmost prudence and capability. The Court is not convinced. Fair play demands that respondent
should have filed the proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the
estate delivered to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.

Analysis: I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The Canon provides that a lawyer's
performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law. A lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. To permit lawyers
to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to
defeat one of the purposes of the statethe administration of justice.

Respondent failed to live up to the expectation of being an officer of the court to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. It is immaterial whether he acted with malice or
bad faith. Thus, respondent should have been fined rather than by simply being reprimanded.
Being a lawyer, he should conduct himself in a manner that will not affect the integrity and
honesty of his proffesional colleagues as representation of justice.



VALERIANA U. DALISAY vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.,
AC 5655 : April 22, 2005.

Facts: In 2001, complainant Valeriana Dalisay engaged respondent Mauricios services as
counsel in Civil Case entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana,
respondent, pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal.
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00
from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated
the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but
respondent refused.
In 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the
complainant, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his
alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office. She
recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the
complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. Incidentally, upon learning of our
Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil
Case. There, he learned of the trial courts Decision in 2001 holding that the tax declarations
and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the
Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant
charging her with violations of Article 171[2] and 172,[3] and/or Article 182[4] of the Revised
Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.

In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:

First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel of complainant. She hired him for the
purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for
review of a decree.

Second, Civil Case in which complainant is a party was considered submitted for decision as
early as 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as
counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about it.

Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him
from doing his job.

And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in said case, prompting him to file falsification
cases against her.

In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (
1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he
filed falsification charges against her;
(2) respondent should have returned her money;
(3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed
that they are falsified; and
(4) his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is attorney-client relationship in the present case.
Whether or not respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between lawyer and
client.

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:

Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client
to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for
every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But
once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to
the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion

Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56, 000.00
from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the
performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to
show that he respondent entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil
Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he
initiated new petitions.

At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents services
in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is
unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of
the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to
complainant.

Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil Case No.
00-044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle
Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed
to do this simple task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect
to be paid for doing nothing.

In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to
complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. He
further claims that he would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by handling a
case without adequate preparation. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his
acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill
and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the
certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to
verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any
action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment
of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his
fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case
No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to
render legal services to complainant.

Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case
No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19
outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal
proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and
only within the bounds of the law,

WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated
April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the
Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.

Analysis: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He shall serve his client with competence and diligence. As a lawyer,
respondent is expected to know Rule 19.02. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted
complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he
should terminate his relationship with her.

Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there
is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified
the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why
we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged
falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result
of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of
fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainants title only after the news of his
suspension spread in the legal community. There is absurdity in invoking subsequent
knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli. Obviously, in filing
falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness.



Lijauco v. Terrado
A.C. No. 6317, August 31, 2006

FACTS: Lijauco engaged the services of respondent Terrado for P70,000.00 to assist in
recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank in the amount of P180,000.00 and the
release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Laguna. The said property which is registered
in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then
pending before the RTC. Respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement which she subsequently entered into. Respondent denied the accusations against
him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legal
services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include the
writ of possession case pending before the RTC. The complaint was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 9.02.

HELD: Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants
savings deposit from Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he
acted as complainants counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter
and the bank. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for
legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Respondents disregard for his clients interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in
the compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her
property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the
bank, and that she releases her claims against it. As found by the Investigating Commissioner,
complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she
could still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure.

Respondents admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral
fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation
of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02,
18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from
notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court
proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

ANALYSIS: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court in finding respondent lawyer guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Not only tremendous effort, expense, and time
are needed to be admitted to the law profession but also a good moral character which is a vital
requisite. These are all continuing qualifications that must be present with the lawyer at all times.
When a lawyer accepts a clients case, he must devote himself to the cause of his client. The
legal profession is a noble profession and is looked upon by the client with a high degree of
respect. Being advocates of justice, much are expected from lawyers and any neglect of duty
leads to the discredit of the profession.

The penalty of six months suspension imposed against respondent for charging
exorbitant or unreasonable fees in violation of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility was proper as similarly imposed in the early case of Dalisay vs. Atty. Batas
Mauricio, Jr. (A.C. No. 5655. April 22, 2005) and other previous cases having violations of the
same nature. However, in the present case, respondent also violated Rules 1.01, 9.02 and 18.02.
Therefore, a much severe penalty should be applied to him.



CANON 20


ALEX B. CUETO, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, JR.
A.C. No. 5798. January 20, 2005


Facts: Engr. Alex Cueto alleged that in October 1999 he engaged the services of respondent as
notary public, the latter being the father of the owner of the building subject of the Construction
Agreement to be notarized. He was then accompanied by a certain Val Rivera, the building
administrator of respondents son Jose Jimenez III. After notarizing the agreement, respondent
demanded P50,000 as notarial fee. Despite his surprise as to the cost of the notarial service,
complainant informed respondent that he only had P30,000 in cash. Respondent persuaded
complainant to pay the P30,000 and to issue a check for the remaining P20,000. Being
unfamiliar with the cost of notarial services, complainant paid all his cash and issued a check.
Before the maturity date of the check, complainant requested respondent not to deposit the same
for lack of sufficient funds. He also informed respondent that the latters son Jose Jimenez III had
not yet paid his services as general contractor. Still, respondent deposited the check which was
consequently dishonored. Meanwhile, the P2,500,000 check issued by respondents son to
complainant as initial payment pursuant to the Agreement was itself dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account.

Subsequently, Atty. Jimenez lodged a complaint for violation of BP 22 against Cueto. In
the meantime, Cueto filed his own administrative complaint against alleging that Jimenez violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Professional Ethics when he filed the
criminal case against Cueto so he could collect the balance of his notarial fee. Respondent was
required to answer the complaint filed against him but despite notice, however, respondent failed
to file his answer and to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After hearing the
case ex-parte, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that Atty. Jose B. Jimenez, Jr. be reprimanded. The Board of
Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 20 and Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Held: Complainants claim that respondents P50,000 notarial fee was exorbitant is debatable.
As confirmed by the IBP, it is a recognized legal practice in real estate transactions and
construction projects to base the amount of notarial fees on the contract price. Based on the
amount demanded by respondent, the fee represented only 1% of the contract price of
P5,000,000. It cannot be said therefore that respondent notary demanded more than a
reasonable recompense for his service.

Also, the two contracting parties implicitly agreed on the cost of Jimenezs notarial
service. It was Cuetos responsibility to first inquire how much he was going to be charged for
notarization. And once informed, he was free to accept or reject it, or negotiate for a lower
amount. In this case, complainants concern that the other party to the construction agreement
was the son of respondent notary and that his non-availment of respondents service might
jeopardize the agreement, was purely speculative. There was no compulsion to avail of
respondents service. Moreover, his failure to negotiate the amount of the fee was an implicit
acquiescence to the terms of the notarial service. His subsequent act of paying in cash and in
check all the more proved it. However, we agree with the IBP that respondents conduct in filing a
criminal case for violation of BP 22 against complainant (when the check representing the
P20,000 balance was dishonored for insufficient funds) was highly improper.

Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that [a]
lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Likewise, in Canon
14 of the Canons of Professional Ethics it states that, [c]ontroversies with clients concerning
compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-respect
and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his service; and lawsuits with the clients
should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud.

There was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud obtaining in this case to justify the legal
action taken by respondent. As borne out by the records, complainant Cueto had already paid
more than half of respondents fee. To resort to a suit to recover the balance reveals a certain
kind of shameful conduct and inconsiderate behavior that clearly undermines the tenet embodied
in Canon 15 that [A] lawyer should observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client. And what can we say about the failure of respondents son Jose III to
pay his own obligation to complainant Cueto? It in all probability explains why Cueto ran short of
funds. Respondent therefore should have been more tolerant of the delay incurred by
complainant Cueto.

Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr. is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for violating Canon 20,
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Analysis: The decade long problem of clogged-dockets of courts, and the snail pace movement
of the justice system in the Philippines, has made the judicial process in the Philippines inefficient
and costly. Hence, the modern trend nowadays is to settle and compromise actions and
litigations. Legal actions should only be considered as an option, rather than the primary means
to protect and enforce rights. Legal actions must only be pursued when there is a violation of the
law ripe for judicial intervention.

In enforcing rights between parties, a strain in the relationship usually results, which may
never be removed. A lawyer therefore, must not commence actions against his client for the
collection of his compensation, unless he has exhausted all non-judicial remedies. Such an action
would affect the lawyer-client relationship between the two parties. The lawyer-client relationship
is a sacred one, having the nature of an agency relationship. Hence, a lawyer must do all things
to protect such relationship, and not do any action to affect such relationship since this would
result to the prejudice of both parties and the efficiency of the judicial system. However, a lawyer
is not prevented to take legal actions. Lawsuits with the clients should be resorted to only to
prevent injustice, imposition or fraud.



Lijauco v. Terrado
A.C. No. 6317, August 31, 2006

FACTS: Lijauco engaged the services of respondent Terrado for P70,000.00 to assist in
recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank in the amount of P180,000.00 and the
release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Laguna. The said property which is registered
in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then
pending before the RTC. Respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement which she subsequently entered into. Respondent denied the accusations against
him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legal
services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include the
writ of possession case pending before the RTC. The complaint was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 9.02.

HELD: Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants
savings deposit from Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he
acted as complainants counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter
and the bank. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for
legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Respondents disregard for his clients interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in
the compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her
property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the
bank, and that she releases her claims against it. As found by the Investigating Commissioner,
complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she
could still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure.

Respondents admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral
fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation
of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02,
18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from
notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court
proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

ANALYSIS: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court in finding respondent lawyer guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Not only tremendous effort, expense, and time
are needed to be admitted to the law profession but also a good moral character which is a vital
requisite. These are all continuing qualifications that must be present with the lawyer at all times.
When a lawyer accepts a clients case, he must devote himself to the cause of his client. The
legal profession is a noble profession and is looked upon by the client with a high degree of
respect. Being advocates of justice, much are expected from lawyers and any neglect of duty
leads to the discredit of the profession.

The penalty of six months suspension imposed against respondent for charging
exorbitant or unreasonable fees in violation of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility was proper as similarly imposed in the early case of Dalisay vs. Atty. Batas
Mauricio, Jr. (A.C. No. 5655. April 22, 2005) and other previous cases having violations of the
same nature. However, in the present case, respondent also violated Rules 1.01, 9.02 and 18.02.
Therefore, a much severe penalty should be applied to him.


ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR v.
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER,
ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES,
TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES.
G.R. No. 152072 January 31, 2006

Facts: Atty. Roxas and Atty. Pastor represented the Zuzuarreguis in an expropriation proceeding
of their 179 hectar property against the NHA. The parties executed a letter of agreement which
provides for the compensation of Atty. Roxas and Atty. Pastor which provides that the
Zuzuarreguis agree and confirm that for and in consideration of their services as lawyers and
counsels in the said expropriation case, they commit and bind themselves to pay Atty. Roxas &
Pastor, as their contingent attorneys fees any and all amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN
PESOS (P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds. A Compromise Agreement was
executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA in the expropriation case. The Compromise
Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui
properties would be at P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. The NHA released the
bonds which amounted to P54, 500,000.00. However, Atty. Roxas & Pastor only gave the
Zuzuarreguis P30, 520,000.00 in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the
Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by
the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the
bonds. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that Atty. Roxas & Pastor to deliver to the yield
corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA. Attys. Roxas and Pastor contend that the Zuzuarreguis
are only entitled to the amount of P17.00 per square meter for the 1,790,570.36 square meters
expropriated by the government. This was, according to them, embodied in the Letter-Agreement

Issue: Whether or not the letter-agreement executed by the zuzuarreguis, and attys. Roxas and
pastor, fixing the exact amount that must go to the former, should stand as law between the
parties.

Held: It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. Obligations arising from contracts
have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy, the same are binding as between the parties.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for
their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited
by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20,
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to
forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the
NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00.
Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a
Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the
circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order. The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to
P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one
hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata. The amount of
P17.00 that should go to the Zuzuarreguis represents 87.18% of the P19.50 per square meter
just compensation, (P17,073,224.84) The P2.50 per square meter that was to go to Attys. Roxas
and Pastor, on the other hand, represents 12.82% (P2,510,653.16.)

ANALYSIS: I personally to not agree with the ruling of the case. For me it is an arbitrary display
of encroachment of the courts judicial powers upon the private contract between two parties
which was validly, knowingly, legally entered upon. A contract is the law between the contacting
parties. It creates a legal tie between two parties obligating each other to perform something for
the other and giving something in return. In instances where such contracts are contrary to law,
morals, public policy, good customs, the courts consider the as void. In case of vitiation of one of
the contracting parties consent it is still considered valid for all purposes which however may be
annulled by the party whose consent was vitiated.
In the preceding case, the courts disregarded the contract between the parties and
substituted their own judgment in fixing the petitioners compensation for legal services rendered
for the respondents. The court justified its ruling on the reason that such compensation in the
agreement cannot be demanded considering that the case ended with a compromise agreement
and the retention by the respondents which totaled to 44% of the amount of the bonds released
by the NHA as payment was unconscionable and excessive. Such justification is unacceptable.
The mere fact that the expropriation case ended with a compromise agreement that there was no
full blown hearing cannot justify reduction of the agreed compensation of the parties. It does not
follow the when a case reached a compromise agreement lawyers exerted less effort or less
application of the legal knowledge that would justify less compensation. The fact that their
compensation agreement is very clear as to the amount to be received for legal services
rendered regardless whether there is a full blown hearing or not entitles the lawyer to such
amount agreed upon. Nowhere in the facts of the case shows that respondents were not aware
of the bonds that would be paid, and it does not also say that they were unaware that there be
yields in said bonds neither did it state that petitioners employ fraud or trickery to respondents.
Hence respondents could and should have been aware of such circumstances to determine the
compensation for their lawyers. They cannot later on complain that they received less than that
which they ought to receive or that the paid more than they ought to pay for their lawyers.



CANON 21

BUN SIONG YAO v. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO
AC 7023, March 6, 2006.


FACTS: Complainant alleged that since 1987 he retained the services of respondent as his
personal lawyer. Respondent is a stockholder and the retained counsel of Solar Farms &
Livelihood Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation of which complainant is a majority
stockholder. Complainant purchased several parcels of land using his personal funds but were
registered in the name of the corporations upon the advice of respondent. Respondent, who was
also the brother in-law of complainants wife, had in 1999 a disagreement with the latter and
thereafter respondent demanded the return of his investment in the corporations but when
complainant refused to pay, he filed eight charges for estafa and falsification of commercial
documents against the complainant and his wife and the other officers of the corporation.
Respondent also filed a complaint against complainant for alleged non-compliance with the
reportorial requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and another complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Malabon City for alleged violation of Section 75 of the Corporation Code. Respondent also filed
a similar complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
Complainant alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his wife is a form of harassment
and constitutes an abuse of the confidential information which respondent obtained by virtue of
his employment as counsel. Complainant argued that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests when he filed several suits not only against the complainant and the other
officers of the corporation, but also against the two corporations of which he is both a stockholder
and retained counsel. Respondent claimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation; that the funds used to purchase several parcels of land were not
the personal funds of complainant but pertain to Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation; that since
1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar Textile Finishing Corporation; that he
never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal cases he filed but only used
those information which he obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder.


ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary
one. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications
made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The
protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation,
nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.

Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondents act of filing multiple suits on
similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum-shopping, as correctly found by the
investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action.
Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In
doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with
complainant and complainants companies for his own end.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS

ANALYSIS: As it has been repeatedly held, attorney-client relationship is one which is highly
fiduciary and confidential. As such, a lawyer is duty-bound to maintain inviolate the confidence
and to preserve the secrets of his client and therefore, neither of them nor anyone who stands in
a confidential relationship with either of them can be compelled to disclose any privileged
communication.

In the case at bar, respondents act clearly constitute a violation of the Canon of
Professional Responsibility which warrants administrative sanction. The fact that he used
information that he has obtained in his professional relation with complainants has been proven.
Needless to say, respondent capitalized on such position to the disadvantage of the
complainants, something which the Court and the public in general cannot countenance.



Canon 22

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN
v. ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1893. March 14, 2006.

Facts: On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando
M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the
accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and
the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the
Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial
ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide
and one count of attempted homicide. At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of
herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial,
respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the
attached Second Motion for Reconsideration. Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan,
respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May
2002. Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent
telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries,
complainants went to respondent?s last known address only to find out that he had moved out
without any forwarding address. More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were
constrained to personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news
from respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to
discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition
for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.Complainants also learned that the said Resolution
had attained finality and warrants of arrest had already been issued against the accused because
respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary
period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.
This prompted Complainant to file a complaint affidavit alleging that respondent violated his
oath, and he acted with gross negligence and gross misconduct. Complainant also alleged that of
mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this
Court to the prejudice of petitioners therein.
In his Comment, respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was
not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of
attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the
accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.Respondent claims
that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere
effort and in true spirit of the Lawyer?s Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. Though
admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal
representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the
decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the
accused, his other profesComplainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint
1
on 15
August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyer?s
Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligencesional obligations were neglected and that all these
were done without proper and adequate remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the
last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, seeking an additional thirty (30) days to
file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the
corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the
accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered
the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling
the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial
consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further
professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He
wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person
between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and
attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with
the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the
registry receipt issued for the letter. Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be
discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to
file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it
would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent.
Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to
his office.
Issue: whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional responsibility.

Held: Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter?s cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client?s rights, and the exertion of the his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules
of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
In the case at bar, he definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a
counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner
Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or
complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had
changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings he filed, it can be gleaned
that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants.
Presumably, at some point, respondent?s office would have received the Court?s Resolution
dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform
the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondent?s office to check
the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he
opted not to return their calls. Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the
accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should
have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should
have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given
instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as
suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of
the accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the
Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused
and gave them instructions on how to go about respondent?s withdrawal from the case defies
credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper
withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such
was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card,
which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3
Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondent?s naked claim, especially so that
complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the
latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel
only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-
client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate
the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. A lawyer?s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises
only from the client?s written consent or from a good cause.
Analysis: After agreeing to take up the cause of a client,to which a client-relationship is created,
a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the
attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.
As part of of his fidelity to clients cause, a lawyer must inform the client whatever the
development of the case he is handling, in which the respondent in the case at bar failed to do. It
also a recognized rule that whenever a lawyer desires to withdraw his services, he must obtained
a written consent of his client, in which the respondent in this case failed to do. Hence, the
respondent was indeed guilty of violating his oath and guilty of gross misconduct and gross
negligence.