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A2 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

What follows should act as reminders. For full revision you need to do more than rely on these notes. Use your course notes,
essays and text books.
1. Key Words: Religious language is cognii!e if it is thought of as conveying knowledge of what is really there. Religious
language is non"cognii!e it is thought as conveying feelings or expressing desires or guiding ways of behaving. Religious
language is re#$is if it is thought of as conveying testable facts that actually pertain in reality. Religious language is non"re#$is
it is thought of as conveying guiding ideals but with no basis in factual reality. Religious language offers # corres%ondence
&eory o' r(& if it is thought of as being able to point to the reality that it is trying to convey. Religious language offers #
co&erence &eory o' r(& if it is thought of as conveying making sense within a network of other beliefs which people hold to
be true.
2. W&# Re$igio(s L#ng(#ge is: Religious language is an outlet for emotion in special times of life. Religious language is the
language of worship. t is performative, ! baptise you in the name of the Father, the "on and the #oly "pirit$, and it is
prescriptive %law making & i.e. honour your father and mother'. #owever, none these uses of religious language is our focus.
O(r 'oc(s is &o) re$igio(s $#ng(#ge *ig& *#+e r(& c$#i*s #,o( &e re#$iy o' God #nd )&e&er i c#n s(cceed in doing
&is. (hilosophers have suggested many different ways in which this might be done. )hese include:
Via Negativa *nalogy "ymbol +yth
(hilosophers have made a distinction between c##%&#ic God"#$+ which involves reflection on the revealed names of ,od
such as !good$, or !wise$,$ %this includes analogy, symbol and myth' and #%o%&#ic God"#$+ which recognises that the reality
of ,od is beyond all such revealed names and so ,od in ,od-self is unknowable. )his is the view of the via negative.
3. Via Negativa : &e via negativa- or neg#i!e )#y is an attempt to prevent people from misrepresenting ,od. t argues that the
only way we can talk about ,od is ,y s#ying )&# God is no. For example, when we say that ,od is infinite we are saying that
,od is not finite, when we say that ,od is immortal we are saying that ,od is not mortal, when we say that ,od is immutable
we are saying that ,od is not mutable %able to change'. ,od is so beyond our ability to grasp that the only way we can get some
idea of the reality of ,od is by continuing saying that ,od is not what anyone claims ,od to be. ,od is more than whatever is
said of ,od. )his view was held by the ,reek philosopher P$oin(s %./0-.1/', the 2ewish philosopher .oses .#i*onides
%3340-3./5' and 6hristian medieval philosophers like Pse(do"/ionysi(s and 6hristian mystics like .eiser Ec+&#r %3.7/-
34.10. .#+e s(re yo( c#n s#y so*e&ing #,o( &e Via Negativa in e#c& o' &ese &in+ers so &# yo( #re #,$e o i$$(sr#e
#n #ns)er on &e Via Negativa )i& e1#*%$es. For all of these thinkers the real ,od is the ,od beyond whatever we speak of
as ,od. #uman language creates confusion when it is used to talk about ,od. )his makes it necessary to negate all the things
that we say about ,od. We must speak of ,od only by saying what ,od is not. n this way we can begin to experience a sense
of the mystery, total otherness and transcendence of ,od. )he via negativa is a way of unknowing it is not to be seen as a form
of scepticism or unbelief. 8ur language is inade9uate. We cannot talk about ,od. 8nly in recognising this can we affirm that
,od is more than we can ever hope to grasp. ,od is ineffable: can never be described so we can only ever say what ,od is not
Sreng&s o' &e Via Negativa
3. t allows things to be said about ,od without implying that the finite can grasp the infinite.
.. t asserts the claims of revelation, that ,od is good and then recognises goodness to be a human word and so must be negated
by saying too that ,od is not good to convey the transcendent reality of ,od$s goodness.
We#+nesses o' &e Via Negativa
1. )he via negativa may implicitly assume an idea of ,od 2. )he via negativa becomes a new way of speaking positively about
,od when, for example, we take the attributes of immutability, infinity, impassability etc. literally. 2. We would never be able to
identify an ob;ect if we were re9uired to talk of it only in negative terms. 3. )he via negativa may lead some people to conclude
that the reason why our language cannot describe ,od is because there is nothing to describe. 4. Religious people wish to say
something positive about ,od. i.e.S. 5&o*#s A6(in#s suggests that our language about ,od should be understood as
analogical.
3. An#$ogy #s # )#y o' e1%ressing &e &(*#n (nders#nding o' God
God is in'inie #nd &(*#n ,eings #re 'inie. Ho) c#n &e 'inie gr#s% )&# is in'inie7 Ho) c#n )ords dr#)n 'ro* 'inie
cre#(res c#%(re &e essence o' &e in'iniy )&ic& is God7 5&is is &e re#$ iss(e o' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge. S. 5&o*#s
A6(in#s %3..5-3.15' believed that the answer was to understand our talk of ,od as analogical. )his was an alternative to
understanding talk about ,od univocally with everyday uses of words or e9uivocally. <either of these two options, according to
*9uinas, allows us to say anything meaningful about ,od. 5o (se $#ng(#ge (ni!oc#$$y o' God *e#ns that a word used in a
human context such as !good$ or !love$ means exactly the same when applied to ,od. t is used in a literal way. A6(in#s
re8eced &is ,ec#(se attributes of ,od are part of the necessary essence of ,od %,od does not have wisdom or love ,od is
wisdom and love' whereas human attributes are contingent features of our being which could be otherwise. We would still be
who we are if we gave up loving but being loving is part of the essence of what it is to be ,od. )hus words that describe human
attributes cannot be used to describe ,od in a univocal way. 5o (se $#ng(#ge e6(i!oc#$$y o' God *e#ns that words do not
have the same meaning in a human context that they do when we use them to speak of ,od. A6(in#s re8eced &is ,ec#(se we
would never know anything about ,od. )o talk of ,od=s love, for example, would mean something so different from the various
forms of human love that we could never gain any intelligible knowledge of ,od by employing the word. An#$ogy, *9uinas
believed, allows us to speak of ,od in a meaningful way without taking the words we use literally. An#$ogy %ro!ides # *idd$e
)#y ,e)een (ni!oc#$ #nd e6(i!oc#$ (ses o' $#ng(#ge. *n analogy is made when we take a word from one context and apply it
appropriately to a second context in order to illuminate some feature of that second context which might otherwise go unnoticed
or unexplained. %planets and electrons in orbit' *nalogy makes a comparison, pointing simultaneously to a similarity and a
difference in the application of words from one context to the other. *9uinas points out that appropriate analogies can be made
.
in two different ways. #e calls these analogy of attribution and analogy of proportion. An#$ogy o' #ri,(ion is made when we
can establish a causal relationship between the two things which are being compared. )o use *9uinas$ example, a diet may be
said to be healthy because it causes health in the person who is said to be healthy. )here is a causal relationship between a
healthy diet and a healthy person. >9ually, we can talk of urine as being healthy as an analogy of attribution to the healthy
person that produced it. n the same way, we can use analogy to talk of ,od as !living$ drawn from human experience of life
because ,od is the cause of life. ,od can be said to be !good$ by analogy of attribution because ,od is the source %the cause' of
all goodness. ,od can be said to be wise because ,od is the source of all wisdom. #ere, the relation of the two terms is a
relation of cause. An#$ogy o' %ro%orion is made when we use words in proportion to the nature of the thing being described.
For example, we know what it means for a dog to be faithful based on an analogy of proportion with human faithfulness. ?ut a
dog$s faithfulness is merely a shadow of what we mean when we talk of human faithfulness. n the same way, human
faithfulness is merely a shadow of what it means to speak of ,od=s faithfulness. )he analogy of proportion is thus 9ualified by
the nature of what it is being applied to. )hus, a banana is said to be =good= in proportion to what it means to be a banana. *
human is said to be =good= in proportion to what it means to have the conscious but finite nature of a human being. ,od is said
to be =good= in proportion to what it means to have ,od=s infinite and eternal nature. We apply and then 9ualify the analogy
according to %or in proportion to' the nature of that to which the analogy is being applied. *ccording to @uns "cotus *nalogy of
proportion implies a connection of being between these items rather than ;ust a causal relationship and this connection must also
imply some form of univocity. #owever, *9uinas denies this. For *9uinas, words are used neither univocally nor purely
e9uivocally of ,od, but analogically. A#e notes thatB CWe cannot speak of ,od at all except in the language we use of creatures,
and so whatever is said both of ,od and creatures is said in virtue of the order that creatures have to ,od as to their source and
cause in which all the perfection of things pre-exist transcendentally.D %*9uinas=s Summa Theologiae in (atrick "herry
Philosophy of Religion p. 0E' )he order of relation and participation that creatures have to ,od allows analogy of proportion
while the pre-existence in ,od of all perfections as their source and cause allows for the analogy of attribution. )he link
between ,od and creatures through analogy is imperfect but one that, nevertheless, allows us to speak of ,od without limiting
the infinite reality of ,od. * similar approach to that of *9uinas$ analogy of proportion has been taken more recently by the
former bishop of @urham- I#n R#*sey %3F30-3F1.'. n his book Religious Language Ramsey argues that words like !good$,
and !wise$, are models which disclose something about ,od but these models have to be 9ualified by words like !infinite$ or
!eternal$ when applied to ,od. n this way the models are used in proportion to the reality of ,od rather than the reality of
human beings.
Sreng&s o' #n#$ogy
3. ,iven the infinity of ,od and the finitude of human language analogy provides an appropriate way of speaking about ,od that
is neither empty of content nor to be taken literally.
.. *nalogy gets beyond the impasse found in the failure of both e9uivocal and univocal uses of language to say anything about
,od.
4. t allows us to repeat with confidence the descriptions of ,od that are revealed in scripture.
We#+nesses o' #n#$ogy
3. n order for analogy to work we must assume it applies univocally. We have to know what it means to attribute love to ,od if
we are to understand the appropriateness of any attribution %the view of @un "cotus'.
.. "winburne 9uestions what is wrong with univocal language for ,od. We can legitimate speak of ,od$s goodness and our own
goodness univocally.
4. We know too little about ,od for analogical language to have any meaning. *nalogy operates in a context of what is
completely known. Get, in the case of ,od, we are dealing with the unknown. We have no idea what it might mean to attribute
infinite wisdom to ,od. human language must fall silent in the face of the mystery of ,od.%the view of via negativa'
4. Sy*,o$ #s # )#y o' e1%ressing &e &(*#n (nders#nding o' God
"ymbols evoke an understanding of ,od *ccording to P#($ 5i$$ic&, symbols are different from signs. "ymbols make it possible
to say something meaningful about ,od even though they are not to be understood as saying anything literal about ,od.
"ymbols not only stand for but also point to a meaning beyond themselves while not actually being that thing for which they
stand or point to. *ccording to )illich, the symbol also participates in the thing it symbolises. 2ust as the national flag as a
symbol of the nation participates in the life of the nation without being the nation so, e9ually, symbols for ,od like !love$ and
!being$ participate in the @ivine reality without actually being that reality. )his inner connection with the thing being
symbolised means that a true symbol is never chosen arbitrarily. "ymbols open up levels of reality that would otherwise not be
communicated. *lso remember to say how important symbols are in evoking meaning. )hink of the (oppy. n religion !light$
and !water$ are important symbols as are ritualised actions.
Pro,$e*s )i& 5i$$ic&9s (nders#nding o' sy*,o$s
3. )he distinction between signs and symbols is more complex than )illich thought.
.. )he issue of the non-symbolic raises a problem at the heart of )illich$s understanding of symbolic language. >ither there is
something non-symbolic to which the symbols for ,od refer: in which case something we say has to be non-symbolic or
everything is a symbol and symbols merely revolve around each other with no central focus.
4. )illich never ade9uately explains what it means to say that religious symbols participate in what they symbolise.
5. f every statement about ,od is symbolic it is not entirely clear what we are to make of creeds and other formalised statements
of faith which are not symbolic in intention.
O&er !ie)s o' sy*,o$s: Re#$iss #rg(e &# &ere is so*e&ing ($i*#e$y re#$ o )&ic& #$$ o(r sy*,o$s #,o( God re'er
)&ic& is no ise$' 8(s # sy*,o$. f only we had access to this @ivine reality we would be able to describe it as it literally is in
itself. )his view is expressed by :#ne .#rin Sos+ice, :o&n Hic+ #nd S#$$ie .cF#g(e. Sos+ice #rg(es that the reality of
,od is articulated in metaphors and which, while re9uiring revision over time, nonetheless, convey information about a reality
that, being so totally transcendent, cannot be spoken of in any other way. For Hic+, religious people use their own, culturally
bound, symbols to talk about the non-symbolic Real. .cF#g(e opts for a gamble of faith which says that there is a personal
power on the side of life and its fulfilment which we then express in appropriate symbols. For her, these should include
!mother$, !lover$ and !friend$. Non"re#$iss deny #$$ &is. 5&ey #rg(e &# #$$ )e e!er &#!e 'or #$+ing #,o( God is *ore
#nd *ore sy*,o$s. )his is the conclusion which /on ;(%i reaches. For &i*- sy*,o$s #re o(side$ess &ey 'or* )&# &ey
e!o+e #nd e!o+e e!ery&ing )&ic& &ey 'or*. )here is no real ,od outside of religious symbols. ,od is the creation of the
symbols we use to talk about ,od.
Sreng&s o' sy*,o$
3. * symbolic use of religious language provides a way of talking about ,od in a meaningful way without saying anything about
,od that is to be taken literally
.. For )illich, symbols and more potent than signs because they stand for, point to and participate in the thing they symbolise.
4. "ymbols allow us to describe ,od in new ways since the language is symbolic not literal. We could talk of ,od as !mother$ as
well as !father$. %+cFague, #ick'.
5. "ome symbols like light and water seem to have universal resonance as conveyers of meaning.
We#+nesses o' sy*,o$
3. "ymbols may come to take on a literal meaning. (eople become too attached to them %e.g. the symbol !father$ to speak of
,od'.
.. n the attempt to avoid idolatry a symbolic use of language might lead some to think there is no literal understanding of ,od
at all. f all symbols are drawn from the finite world then everything we say about ,od is going to be merely human.
4. *theists like Richard @awkins argue that understanding religious language in symbolic terms is an elaborate attempt to hide
the ultimate meaninglessness of talk about ,od.
5. "ymbols have their meaning within particular cultures and may only have meaning relative to culture. When cultures change
symbols can lose their resonance and power and discredit the reality they were meant to convey.
0. "ymbols may be arbitrary uses of language, particularly if we do not know what ,od is independently of the symbols we use.
<. .y& #s # )#y o' e1%ressing &e &(*#n (nders#nding o' God
*ccording to 2ohn #ick, CA*B myth is a story which is told but which is not literally true ... AandB does not literally apply, but
which invites a particular attitude in its hearers.D #owever, identifying mythical narratives is complex because there is not
always agreement on whether a narrative should be understood as a myth. )hose narratives which are identified as myth can be
understood as stories which convey sources of meaning and truth for those who narrate and connect with them. +yths point to
realities which cannot be expressed in any other way. #owever, there are debates about the extent to which myth conveys truth.
* myth may be a story that conveys meaning for the people that told them but should they also be understood as conveying
truths about world and in what senseH @o they convey literal truths or existential truths & truths about the nature of human
existence which could e9ually well be expressed once the narratives are de-mythologised into another idiomH From a religious
perspective, *y&s #re not false ways of looking at the world they are *e#ning'($ n#rr#i!es )&ic& e1%ress ,#sic &(*#n
concerns #,o( e1isence #nd co**(nic#e '(nd#*en#$ !#$(es. :+yth$s create and shape our view of the world. )here is no
gap between a person=s myth and a person=s view of the world. *ccording to A$#sd#ir .#cInyre, we cannot ask whether
people who think in mythical terms take their myths symbolically or literally because that distinction assumes a gap between
myth and world view. )his would suggest that once we become aware of our myths they lose their power: they no longer operate
as myths because the relation of immediacy to world-view is broken by a critical self-awareness. 8ur most effective myths are
those we do not consciously recognise as being myths. *ccording to 2oseph 6ampbell and 6arl 2ung modern life is dominated
by our own background myths: such as the myth of progress. "ome philosophers of religion, like K#ren Ar*srong, argue that
modern scientific talk about =?ig ?angs=, =?lack #oles=, ="ingularities= and =+ultiple Universes= is itself metaphorical and
symbolic language which scientists weave into a narrative that is essentially mythical in nature. =($*#nn #rg(ed &# ,e&ind
&e *y&ic#$ $#ng(#ge o' &e =i,$e- %#ric($#r$y &e #%oc#$y%ic $#ng(#ge o' &e Ne) 5es#*en- $ies no &isory ,( &e
e#c&ings >or kerygma0 o' &e e#r$y ;&(rc& in *y&ic#$ 'or*. )he process of understanding the mythic language of the ?ible
centres upon the significance of 2esus for &(*#n e1isence. ?ultmann believed that the early 6hurch expressed this
significance in the mythical language of their day. O(r #s+ no) is o see &ro(g& &is *y&ic#$ $#ng(#ge o &e r(&s #,o(
&(*#n e1isence #nno(nced in &e e#c&ings >kerygma) #,o( :es(s ;&ris. ?ultmann called this process ?de"*y&o$ogising.
t is the facts of human existence that, for ?ultmann, provides the link between the now un-meaningful mythical language of the
?ible and the concerns of our own time. )he analysis of human existence in existential philosophy provides the key for
unlocking or de-mythologising the meaning in the ?iblical myths. #owever, philosophers like Richard Iearney and ,ianni
Jattimo have pointed to problems with de-mythologising in this way. For Iearney there are other resources for de-
mythologising than existential analysis which would give a different meaning to the myths. For him myths act as pointers to a
hoped for future. For Jattimo it is de-mythologising which needs de-mythologising as we come to see that today we have our
own myths which shape our view of the world.
Sreng&s o' *y&
3. myth provides a way of conveying complex religious beliefs about ,od to the next generation in an easy to understand way.
.. +yths convey religious truth and meaning in a way that does not need to be taken literally
4. )his allows for an acceptance of both science and the traditional religious narratives. )he belief that is expressed in the
creation story can e9ually be held to apply to the ?ig ?ang and evolution. )he belief that ,od was working in 2esus understood
as myth rather than saying 2esus was uni9uely ,od allows 6hristians to keep the central importance of 2esus for them while also
accepting that ,od could also be working in the significant features of non-6hristian religions.
5. +yths communicate universal themes of human existence which through careful analysis can be demythologised to allow
their relevance to speak to any culture
0. +yths provide a narrative framework through which we develop a !world view$ that allows us to give coherence to ways in
which we engage with the world around us.
7. +yths offer ways of explaining puKKling features of existence.
1. +yth offers a positive way of speaking about ,od making the via negativa unnecessary.
E. +yths are over-abundant with meaning. Understanding traditional religious language as myth may open up a variety of
e9ually valid interpretations of the meaning behind traditional religious texts.
We#+nesses o' *y&
3. "cholars disagree about which stories are to be classified as myth.
2. Sc&o$#rs #$so dis#gree #,o( )&e&er &e )riers o' r#diion#$ re$igio(s n#rr#i!es such as the ,ospels inended &eir
n#rr#i!e o ,e (ndersood #s *y&. )here is also disagreement about the theological function of myths
4. +yths they may not now be the best form of narrative by which to convey beliefs or values. *ccording to ?ultmann, myths
are outdated ways of expressing religious truth. )hey need to be de-mythologised and re-expressed in terms which highlight
their original significance for human existence
5. )he over-abundance of meaning in myth creates such a diversity of 6hristian interpretations that the 6hristian faith may no
longer holds together as a coherent whole.
0. )here are no external criteria that would allow us to ;udge the validity of one interpretation of a myth over another.
7. )here is a danger in secular culture that re$igio(s n#rr#i!es )i$$ ,e (ndersood #s *y& not ,ec#(se o' # dee% !#$(#ion o'
*y& #s # n#rr#i!e 'or* ,( ,ec#(se (nders#nding &ese n#rr#i!es #s *y& ,eco*es &e on$y )#y o &o$d ono &e*
)i& so*e sor o' credi,i$iy i' &ey c#nno ,e (ndersood #s &isory. (eople like Kei& W#rd #nd 5o* Wrig& are not
happy to see this shift to myth to plicate secular sensibilities. For them, the resurrection is a historical not a mythical event
@. Iner%reing re$igio(s $#ng(#ge #s *y& *ig& s%eed (% &e dec$ine o' re$igio(s in &e Wes #s *ore #nd *ore %eo%$e
co*e o (nders#nd *y& no si*%$y #s (nr(e ,( #s *ir#ge #nd '#iry #$e.
E. +yths might be unable to function appropriately when we are consciously aware that they are myths.
F. t is not always clear that myths stand the test of time or that they are transferable to cultures from which they did not
originate. +yths are not universal they are culturally relative.
5&e %rinci%$e o' !eri'ic#ion #nd &e *e#ning'($ness o' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge
)he philosophy behind the verification principle is Logical (ositivism, worked out in the 3F./$s and 3F4/$s by a group of
philosophers who met in Jienna and known as the Jienna 6ircle. )he early work of Wittgenstein was influential but he was
never a member. n ?ritain, Logical (ositivism is associated with *. 2. *yer. ts aim was to provide the criteria by which it is
possible to determine the meaningful use of language. )hey argued that on$y An#$yic#$ a priori s#e*ens >s#e*ens o'
$ogic #nd *#&s0 #nd Syn&eic a posteriori s#e*ens >s#e*ens &# #re e*%iric#$$y es#,$e0 &#!e *e#ning. )hey
expressed this in terms of what came to be called &e srong !eri'ic#ion %rinci%$e which state that !W&# c#nno ,e !eri'ied
,y o,ser!#ion or #n#$ysis is *e#ning$ess.9 ;onse6(en$y- t&e gre# 6(esions o' *e#%&ysics #nd re$igion s(c& #s- AIs
&ere # God79- AW&# is &e %oin o' $i'e79 #nd AIs &ere $i'e #'er de#&79 #re i*%ossi,$e o #ns)er no ,ec#(se &ey #re
di''ic($ ,( ,ec#(se &ey #re *e#ning$ess. )he problem with the strong verification principle was that it excluded the
verifications of universals like !all polar bear are white$ and historical realities. )he members of the Jienna 6ircle tried,
without much success, to refine the principle to include all factual claims but exclude metaphysical and supernatural claims. n
?ritain, *yer suggested a weak verification principle which proposed that statements of fact only re9uire so*e re$e!#n
o,ser!#ion o deer*ine &eir %ro,#,$e r(& or '#$siy and conse9uently their meaningfulness. #owever, he later
abandoned this in favour of the strong version because the weak version appeared not necessarily to exclude the verification of
some religious beliefs. #e then proposed that some propositions are verifiable by direct observation while others are verifiable
indirectly by a connection they have with propositions that are directly verifiable by observation. ?ut this too seemed to leave
open the door to some forms of religious language. n the end, *yer was forced to admit that an exact elucidation of the
verification principle had eluded him.
Sreng&s o' !eri'ic#ion
3. Jerification tries to provides a clear criteria for determining what is and is not to count as a meaningful use of language.
.. t allows us to say what use of language points to ob;ective truths and what use of language merely give sub;ective opinion.
We#+nesses o' !eri'ic#ion
1. <o one has successfully expressed criteria of verification which satisfies the re9uirements of various disciplines. )he weak
verification principle seems to allow too much that we might not regard as true while the strong verification principles seems to
prevent the verifications of universal propositions and historical realities. 2. )he verification principle is not itself open to
verification. 2. *ccording to Wittengenstein the verification principle fails to see that the meaning of language cannot to be
determined by a single, empirical, criteria but has to be found in the ways it used within different forms of life.
Re$igio(s res%onses o !eri'ic#ion
Non"cognii!iss $i+e Ric&#rd =r#i&)#ie #nd :. H. R#nd#$$ %oin o( &# !eri'ic#ion on$y #%%$ies o re$igio(s $#ng(#ge
i' &e *e#ning o' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is e1c$(si!e$y e*%iric#$. 5&ey deny &is. For &e*- re$igio(s $#ng(#ge c#n ,e
*e#ning'($ )i&o( ,eing cognii!e or e*%iric#$$y es#,$e. For =r#i&)#ie and Randall, religious language functions not
by describing fact, it functions by directing our thoughts and our imagination to the way life ought to be lived. )he problem with
this view is that many people do think that religious language is making cognitive claims about the reality of ,od, the answer to
prayer and religious experience. 2ust to understand this language as an expression of emotion or as imaginative tool to help one
through live or as a badge of belonging or as pictorial way of understanding moral demands seems to miss the most important
aspect of belief.: its claim to give expression to the reality of ,od.
;ognii!iss $i+e :o&n Hic+ #nd Ric&#rd S)in,(rne points out that religious language is capable of verification. )he fact that
the principle was never successfully formulated in a way that excludes religious claims shows this. S)in,(rne #rg(es &#
given all the evidence it is more probable that ,od exists than that ,od does not exist and that this probability provides the
criteria necessary that allows the believer to insist that his or her religious claims are verifiable and hence cognitively
meaningful. #ick argues that religious language is meaningful because it is capable of esc&#o$ogic#$ !eri'ic#ion. 8ur
experience after death will tell us if religious language is verifiable or not. )his is a legitimate criterion to establish the
meaningfulness of religious language. #e tells the parable of two people on the road to a celestial city one thinks it exists the
other does not. )he debate between them is meaningful because it is possible they will come to the celestial city. )he problem
with "winburne$s view is that no accurate values can be attributed to factors which need to be assessed in working out the
probability that ,od is more likely to exist than not. "uch ;udgements are themselves likely to be sub;ective. )here are also
many problems with #icks view. %i'. t only verifies life after death not any other religious claim about ,od. %ii'. we can only
verify the truth and not the falsity of belief in life after death. %iii' Esc&#o$ogic#$ !eri'ic#ion does no #%%e#r o %#s &e es
o' &e '#$si'ic#ion %rinci%$e.
5&e %rinci%$e o' '#$si'ic#ion #nd &e *e#ning'($ness o' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge
*ntony Flew %3F.4-.//7' argued that religious language fails the test of meaningfulness because it does not cohere with the
principle of falsification. according to the falsification principle, 'or #ny &eory o ,e *e#ning'($ the person proposing i *(s
,e #,$e o s&o) &o)- in %rinci%$e- &e &eory co($d ,e '#$si'ied. Iarl (opper argued that social theories such as +arxism and
Freud$s psycho-analytical theory are not to be considered as scientifically meaningful because they fail to propose the conditions
under which they might be falsified. Flew, applies the principle of falsification to religious language. For a proposition to be
meaningful it must be possible to imagine a state of affairs that would make that proposition false. F$e) #rg(es &# #
%ro%osiion )&ic& does no r($e o( #ny&ing &#s no *e#ning. t is empty. )o avoid this )e &#!e o ,e #,$e o s#y )&#
)o($d co(n #g#ins # %ro%osiion i' &# %ro%osiion is o ,e #cce%ed #s *e#ning'($ . For example, we can imagine that the
moon might come crashing into the earth. f it did, this would falsify the propositions that make up our current theory of
gravity. )here would be a least this state of affairs that would not be compatible with the theory of gravity. )hus, asserting the
theory of gravity is to make a meaningful assertion. F$e) #rg(ed &# re$igio(s s#e*ens $i+e ?God &#s # %$#n?- or ?God
cre#ed &e )or$d?- or ?God $o!es (s #s # '#&er $o!es &is c&i$dren? #re #$$ *e#ning$ess s#e*ens ,ec#(se &e re$igio(s
,e$ie!er )o($d ne!er #$$o) &# s(c& s#e*ens co($d e!er ,e '#$si'ied. <o state of affairs, for the believer, would rule out
these claims about ,od so these claims about ,od appear compatible with any and every state of affairs. <othing would
contradict them. For Flew, a proposition that does not rule out anything has no meaning. t is empty. Religious language is
thus meaningless and empty. )o explain this he tells the parable of two explorers encountering a garden in the middle of a
;ungle clearing. 8ne explorer says, !"ome gardener must tend this plot$. )he other disagrees. Whatever experiment is done, the
person who thinks there is a gardener refuses to deny it. #e ;ust 9ualifies the nature of his belief in the gardener so as to explain
his non-appearance. #e is invisible, insensible etc. Flew points out that after such 9ualification there is no difference between
this and no gardener at all. 5&e ide# &#s s(''ered &e de#& o' # &o(s#nd 6(#$i'ic#ions. According o F$e)- &e re$igio(s
,e$ie!er #cs in &e s#*e )#y #s &e %erson in &e %#r#,$e )&o &in+s &# &ere is # g#rdener #$)#ys 6(#$i'ying &is c$#i*
so #s no ,e '#$si'ied ,y &e $#c+ o' e!idence. Flew considers the religious claim that !,od has a plan$ and =,od loves us as a
father loves his children.= What, he asks, for the believer, would count against this claimH What, in principle, would falsify his
belief and lead him to say, !Well if !x$ then would say there is no ,odH :(s #s &e in!isi,i$iy o' &e g#rdener is no #+en
o '#$si'y &e g#rdener9s e1isence- so &e in#ci!iy o' God- in &e '#ce o' e!i$- is no #+en o '#$si'y &e ,e$ie' in God9s
c#ring $o!e. R#&er- &#n #$$o) s(c& '#$si'ic#ion- &e &eis 6(#$i'ies &is inii#$ (nders#nding o' God. W&# )#s 'irs
#ssered #s &e ,e$ie' &#- AGod &#s # %$#n9- no) ,eco*es- AGod9s %$#n is # *ysery.9 2ust as the believer in the gardener in
the parable 9ualifies the way in which the gardener is to be understood %as invisible and intangible' so the theist 9ualifies the
nature and existence of ,od. 5&is re'(s#$ o #$$o) #ny&ing o '#$si'y ,e$ie' in God $e#ds o )&# F$e) c#$$ed B&e de#& o'
# &o(s#nd 6(#$i'ic#ionsD. f every challenge is met by a 9ualification because the theist is not prepared to accept that
anything will falsify his belief then eventually the initial assertion will be 9ualified into oblivion.
Sreng&s o' '#$si'ic#ion
1. Falsification tries to provides a clear criteria for determining what is and is not to count as a meaningful use of language. 2. t
offers an alternative to the failed principle of verification. 2. t polices the boundaries between scientific and non-scientific uses
of language rather the boundaries of linguistic meaning. 3. t makes us aware that by responding to criticism we might 9ualify
our beliefs so much that they no longer express the truths that we initially thought they did. t makes us aware of a distinction
between revising beliefs and 9ualifying them into oblivion.
Re$igio(s res%onses o '#$si'ic#ion
Non"cognii!iss $i+e R. . H#re point out that falsification only applies to religious language if the meaning of religious
language is exclusively empirical. #e denies this. For H#re- re$igio(s $#ng(#ge c#n ,e *e#ning'($ )i&o( ,eing cognii!e
or e*%iric#$$y es#,$e ,ec#(se i9s *e#ning res in &e di''erence i *#+es o # %ersons $i'e. )o illustrate this he tells the
story of the lunatic student who thinks all his teachers are out to kill him. )his belief effects his whole way of life and nothing
can persuade him otherwise. #are calls such beliefs !bliks$. We all have !bliks$ of some kind. For example, that we have a
finite life span. Religious belief is like a !blik$ * =blik= cannot be falsified but is, nevertheless, meaningful. . magine two
people, one has a =blik= which says that everything happens by chance the other has a =blik= that says nothing happens without
being directed to happen by the hidden hand of ,od. <either =blik= can be falsified but the issue is meaningful because the two
people will act very differently. )hey will have different outlooks to life according to their different =blik=. * =blik= is meaningful
even though it cannot be falsified because the =bliks= we may have shape the lives we live. Flew is wrong to think that the
principle of falsification makes religious language meaningless. )here are problems with #are$s view. >i0. it does not defend
the cognitive truth of religious language. the ,od of the !blik$ is not the ,od about whom 6hristians make ontological and
indeed cosmological claims. )hat ,od is supposed to be real whereas the ,od in the !blik$ has no reality outside the mind of the
person who has that !blik$ %ii'. 2ohn #ick notes that #are$s !blik$ does not allow for this a distinction between right and wrong
!blik. )he lunatic might be right. ?ut we have no way of knowing since there are no criteria to refer to outside of the blik in
9uestion.
;ognii!iss- $i+e =#si$ .ic&e$$- argue that falsification does not deny the fundamental commitments of religious believers. #e
tells the parable of the partisan and the stranger. )he partisan trust the stranger even when the stranger does things against the
resistance. )his is because of his fundamental belief in the trustworthiness of the stranger. *ccording to +itchell, religious
faith recognises that some things in the world do appear to falsify belief in ,od and that it is precisely this that makes faith
!faith$ rather than certainty. Faith implies the possibility of falsification without succumbing to it. @espite the test of faith,
nothing in the end counts decisively against it. t is not that the believer accepts no falsification but rather that the faith stands
the test of these apparent falsifications. Religious language, +itchell concludes, is meaningful because it does have some relation
to what believers take to be the fact of the matter and it is this which allows them to withstand what appears to falsify their
beliefs. 8ne problem with this approach is *n omnipotent and loving ,od would always act in the interests of people. ,od has
no excuse for being ambiguous. )he nature of ,od in the beliefs of 6hristians makes it difficult, without 9ualification, to assert
that !,od is on our side$ given the evil that exists in the world and other discoveries that seem to count against belief: and yet,
religious believers refuse to allow that these thing will lead them to give up their faith. Flew insists that such a faith ultimately
must die the death of a thousand 9ualifications.
We#+nesses o' '#$si'ic#ion
3. Falsification undermines ultimate commitments and beliefs that we all take on trust and shape our other beliefs %+itchell$s
point'
.. t might not itself be open to falsification. s there any state of affairs that might lead Flew to regard it as falseH
4. *ccording to Wittengenstein and R + #are the falsification principle fails to see that the meaning of language cannot to be
determined by empirical criteria alone but is found in the ways it is used within different forms of life or what #are calls !bliks$.
Wigensein #nd $#ng(#ge g#*es
In &is $#er %&i$oso%&y- Wittgenstein noted that &e s#*e )ords &#!e di''eren *e#nings de%ending (%on &e )#y &ey #re
(sed in di''eren cone1s. Wigensein c#$$s &ese cone1s ?'or*s o' $i'e?. f we get the use of words in different =forms of
life= mixed-up we will end up in confusion. 5&e %oin o' %&i$oso%&y- &e no) &o(g&- )#s no o de'ine &e %ro%er (se o'
$#ng(#ge ,( o &e$% %re!en con'(sion. P&i$oso%&y )#s *ore $i+e &er#%y 'or &e con'(sed &#n $i+e # science. f we
assume that religious language is used in the same way as scientific language is used then we are in effect confusing two
separate =forms of life=. Religion language has its own depth grammar. When we know how the language is being used we can
see the rules that govern its use, that is, we can detect the $#ng(#ge g#*e that is being played. Religion is a =form of life= which,
like science, communicates itself in a number of different language games. A ?'or* o' $i'e? is a taken-for-granted set of
behaviours, assumptions, or practices which condition the way we see the world. * =form of life= provides the context in which
words are used. )heir use will be governed by rules. )hese rules constitute the language game that is being played. )o
understand the meaning of words we have to be able to ascertain how they are being used: what game is being played. !f say,
!,od is love,$ am not, according to the followers of Wittgenstein, making a claim about ,od$s nature: am showing how the
word !,od$ is used in the context of a certain religious form of life. 8utside any such form of life any use of language appears
groundless.. )his even applies to scientific uses of language such as, !)his is an electron$ )his only makes sense for someone
who inhabits the form of life of the physicist. n the context of religious belief it makes perfect sense to say, =When pray, pray
to ,od=, because the depth grammar of this statement, as defined by its context, can mean nothing else. )he very meaning of the
practice of prayer is that it is prayer to ,od. #owever, this says nothing about the ob;ective nature of ,od in the scientific sense,
and everything about the life of the person who prays. n that life, prayer is prayer to ,od. Religious beliefs and language are
not like scientific hypotheses they are ways of regulating one=s life by reference to more important realities than scientific
hypotheses alone could appreciate. )o see this, you have to be able appreciate how a believers words are bound up with their
form of life. When a believer says that he will meet up with those he loves after his death, Wittgenstein tells us, that this
statement constitutes a way of looking at the world which cannot be reduced to other, scientific or ethical uses of language.
6onse9uently, Wittgenstein re;ects both a cognitive use of religious language like that found in #ick and a non-cognitive use of
religious language like that found in ?raithwaite.
Sreng&s o' $#ng(#ge g#*es
1. t recognises the distinctive value religious language has. 2. t negates the need to distinguish between cognitive and non-
cognitive uses of language replacing this distinction with the purpose which a language serves. 2. Language game theory polices
the boundaries between different uses of language thereby preventing confusion. 3. t is possible to defend the use of a religious
language within a religious form of life.
We#+nesses o' $#ng(#ge g#*es
1. Language games provide no criteria for ob;ective truth outside of particular games and so can lead to relativism. 2. )hose
outside of the religious language game will not understand it unless they first immerse themselves in it. 2. ?ecause the rules of a
language game emerge within a form of life it is not clear how these rules get revised. 3. "ome people argue that some uses of
language are not bound to a form of life but have an absolute meaning that transcends the context in which it is used.
O&er !ie)s #,o(r #nd (sed o' Re$igio(s L#ng(#ge
"ome religious writers argue that there is more to religious language than simply attempting to say what is true about ,od.
)hey argue that %ii' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is e*oi!e. t expresses feelings in worship about our sinful nature and our hopes for
salvation. 6ritics like * 2 *yer argue that religion is nothing but emotion and @awkins sees it as stirring up negative emotions
of hate and violence. #owever, Peer /ono!#n has argued that properly utilised re$igio(s $#ng(#ge &e$%s %eo%$e o disci%$ine
&eir e*oions #nd c&#nne$ &e* #%%ro%ri#e$y for positive gain. 6reating things like compassion for the weak. %iii' 8thers
argue that the sole and proper us of religious language is to express adoration. t is to praise ,od in prayer and worship. )o
thank ,od for all that ,od has done. )his is known as doxology. Re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is esseni#$ do1o$ogic#$ in n#(re.
8thers argue that %iv' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is (sed %er'or*#i!e$y. )he words themselves perform the role that makes the reality
of the event in which they are used. )his is most clearly seen in a baptism or a wedding: ! now pronounce you man and wife.$
We thank ,od by saying words of thanks. We praise ,od though words of praise. )he words make the reality. t is also argued
that %v' re$igio(s $#ng(#ge is o'en (sed %rescri%i!e$y as moral commands to encourage people to behave in a particular way.
Richard ?raithwaite, for example, has argued that religious language is essentially a story like mythical language with an ethical
purpose.

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