National Security Agency (NSA)

Keynote Address by
General Keith Alexander,
Director,
National Security Agency,
Black Hat USA !"#
$ocation% $as &egas, Ne'ada
Date% (ednesday, )uly #", !"#
Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
STAFF: Without further ado, lets welcome General Alexander to the stage. (Applause.
G!"!#A$ %!&T' A$!(A")!#: Well, Tre* and +eff, than,s. Than,s for that
introduction.
& thin, what the* said to start out with is the reason &m here. This is the technical
foundation for our worlds communications, *ou fol,s right here, and the issue that stands -efore
us toda* is one of what do we do next, how do we start this discussion on defending our nation
and protecting our ci.il li-erties and pri.ac*.
The reason &m here is -ecause *ou ma* ha.e some ideas of how we can do it -etter. We
need to hear those ideas.
/ut e0uall* important, from m* perspecti.e, is that *ou get the facts. And so what &m
going to do toda* is tr* to la* out those facts.
"ow as Tre* or +eff said, there are good reasons wh* some of this is classified and wh*
some of it is stuff that we 1ust dont put out there. And the -ig reason, from m* perspecti.e, is
-ecause terrorists use our communications. The* li.e among us. 'ow do we come up with a
program to stop terrorism and to protect our ci.il li-erties and pri.ac*2 This is perhaps one of
the -iggest issues facing our countr* toda*.
& also want *ou to get a sense for the people at the "ational Securit* Agenc*. &t has -een
the greatest honor and pri.ilege of m* life to lead these no-le fol,s. The*re the ones 3 and
*oull get a little -it of sense of what the*.e done for our countr* o.er the past eight *ears while
&.e -een there. And their reputation is tarnished -ecause all the facts arent on the ta-le, -ut *ou
can help us articulate the facts properl*.
& will answer e.er* 0uestion to the fullest extent possi-le, and & promise *ou the truth 3
what we ,now, what were doing and what & cannot tell *ou -ecause we dont want to 1eopardi4e
our future defense.
What were going to do in this -riefing is gi.e *ou the facts on these programs 3 the
-usiness record, F&SA, on FAA 567 3 on what we.e done to stop terrorist attac,s, address some
of the pro-lems that we see out there with inaccurate statements and tal, a-out where do we go
from here.
Thats where *ou come in. We need to hear from *ou, -ecause the tools and the things
we use are .er* much the same as the tools that man* of *ou use in securing networ,s.
The difference, in part, is the o.ersight and the compliance that we ha.e in these
programs. That part is missing in much of the discussion.
& -elie.e its important for *ou to hear that, for *ou to understand what these people ha.e
to do in order to do their 1o- to defend this nation and the o.ersight regime that we ha.e with the
courts, with 8ongress and with the administration. & thin, *ou need to understand that to get the
full understanding of what we do and what we do not do.
& thin, its important to also step -ac,. $ets go -ac, to the -eginning. 'ow did we get
here2 And normall*, -eing a general, & would sa*, next slide. ($aughter. /ut the* ga.e me a
de.ice. ($aughter. And the* said, figure it out. ($aughter.
&t sa*s 9cue.: & thought that would -e 9clue.: ;%.
So there we go. $ets go -ac, to <==>, the World Trade 8enter. &t grows prett* 0uic,l*
3 %ho-ar Towers, the east African em-ass* -om-ings, the ?SS 8ole, =@<<. AlABaida on the
ones on the -ottom there, throughout %halid Shei,h Cohammed, helped fund the first World
Trade 8enter and was the mastermind -ehind =@<<. We -ecame a nation transformed.
The intelligence communit*, according to the =@<< commission, failed to connect the
dots. What do & mean -* that2 What do & mean -* failed to connect the dots2 We had intercepts
of one of the =@<< hi1ac,ers, Cihdhar, from Demen. We didnt ,now -ecause we didnt ha.e the
tools and the capa-ilities to see that he was actuall* in 8alifornia. We couldnt pro.ide the right
tip or information that connected that foreign dot to a domestic plot. The intelligence communit*
failed to connect those dots. And now what were doing is putting into existence these programs.
/ut & thin,, in order to understand 3 so how do we actuall* use these programs2 From
m* perspecti.e, its important to first understand the people at the "ational Securit* Agenc*,
what the* do and how the* do it. So from m* perspecti.e, the -est first thing is to step -ac, and
sa*, what did the* do during this time period2 What are the* doing2
And so our 1o- is defending this countr*, sa.ing li.es, supporting our troops in com-at.
And when *ou thin, a-out our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Carine that were in &ra0 and in
Afghanistan, it is our responsi-ilit*, along with the rest of the intelligence communit*, to pro.ide
the information that the* need to sur.i.e, to go after the enem*.
What *ou see on this slide is one of those tools that we -rought to -ear. This is a
technical tool. Whats not shown on this slide is the thousands of "SA personnel who
.olunteered to go forward. ;.er E,666 "SA emplo*ees ha.e gone to Afghanistan and &ra0.
Twent* of those cr*ptologists paid the ultimate price to ensure our troops had the intelligence
the* need. Thats a no-le purpose. Thats what these people do.
And *ou can see the impact. And for me, it was an honor and pri.ilege to wor, with
these fol,s. The time and the effort that the* spent, our discussions with General )a.e Fetraeus,
General Stan Cc8hr*stal, #a* ;dierno, $lo*d Austin and Admiral /ill Cc#a.en 3 our 1o- was
to pro.ide that intelligence that the* needed and the timeliness that the* needed it to help them
go after the ad.ersar*. And *ou can see the significant drop that occurred as we implemented
those capa-ilities in &ra0 and our troops went forward.
This is a-solutel* super-. The mindset of these people is foreign intelligence to sa.e
li.es 3 our li.es, our militar*, our ci.ilian. That is a true no-le effort. And those are the t*pes of
people & ha.e the great honor and pri.ilege to lead. /ut the discussion toda* has to ta,e that next
step, what a-out counterterrorism2 And what do we do a-out the discussion that & put on the
ta-le, from the World Trade 8enter in <==> to =@<<2 What now2
We failed to connect the dots. And so, we had to come up with a wa* of helping to stop
the attac,. ;ur go.ernment 3 8ongress, the administration and the courts 3 all 1oined together to
come up with programs that would meet our 8onstitution and help us connect those dots.
& thin, its important to understand the strict o.ersight that goes into these programs
-ecause the assumption is that people are out there 1ust wheeling and dealing, and nothing could
-e further from the truth. We ha.e tremendous o.ersight and compliance in these programs,
audita-ilit*. And for man* of *ou with the technical -ac,ground 3 (inaudi-le 3 net flow and
other things li,e that, *ou ,now that we can audit the actions of our people a hundred percent in
this case. And we do that.
/ut this information and the wa* our countr* has put it together is something that we
should also put forward as an example for the rest of the world, -ecause what comes out is were
collecting e.er*thing. That is not true. What were doing is for foreign intelligence purposes to
go after counterterrorism, counterproliferation, c*-erattac,s. And its focused. And if *ou thin,
a-out net flow and the amount of information, *ou couldnt afford 3 we dont want to collect
e.er*thing. &t ma,es our anal*sis harder. &f *our intent is to go after terrorists, how do we do
that2 And so there are two programs that we ha.e here: a metadata program, one that helps us
connect the dots in the least intrusi.e wa* that we canG and FAA 567 or Section 567 authorit*,
which allows us to go after content. &m going to go each of these in detail.
/ut & want to put out one thing thats important. &ndustr* 1ust doesnt dump stuff to us
and sa*, he*, heres some interesting facts. The* are compelled -* a court order to compl*.
The* are compelled -* a court order to compl* where all three -ranches of our go.ernment ha.e
come together, thin, a-out a lawful intercept program that we ha.e here. & thin, this is a
standard for other countries -ecause we ha.e the court o.erseeing it, we ha.e 8ongress
o.erseeing it, we ha.e the administration, and &ll go into all the different parts of the
administration that o.ersees it.
And &.e heard some people sa* that the court is a ru--er stamp. &m on the other end of
that ta-le with federal 1udges. And an*-od* here whos -een up against a federal 1udge ,nows
that these are people with tremendous legal experience that dont ta,e an* 3 tr*ing to thin, of a
word here 3 (laughter 3 from e.en a fourAstar general. The* want to ma,e sure that what were
doing comports with the 8onstitution and the law. And the* are dead serious on it. These are
fol,s that ha.e gi.en their whole li.es to our nations 1udiciar* s*stem. These are fol,s who
,now the*re pro-a-l* not going to go to the Supreme 8ourt, -ut the* want to do something for
our nation. These are tremendous 1udges. The* arent a ru--er stamp. And &.e -een in front of
that court a num-er of times. & can tell *ou from the wire-rushings that & recei.ed, the* are not a
ru--er stamp.
$ets go into the details of these programs. Fress the -utton.
& thought it would -e important to gi.e *ou a picture of what our anal*sts actuall* see.
There it is, right inside. This is for counterterrorism purposes, a program designed to go after
communications of foreign terrorist organi4ations to help us connect those dots from a foreign
actor to someone who ma* -e in the ?nited States tr*ing to do us harm. This program was
designed specificall* to help us go after that 3 (inaudi-le. & thin, its important to ha.e some of
the facts on the ta-le here for me to gi.e *ou more facts.
First, as *ou can see, what *ou ha.e is the date and time of the call, the calling num-er
and the call 3 the duration of the call. And we also put in the origin of the metadata data. And
*ou can see it sa*s (9-usiness record F&SA: 2 1ust as another case, -ecause our anal*sts who
wor, this 3 thats a flag for them that sa*s this is important (court data 2.
This does not include the content of the communications. This does not include *our
phone calls or mine, *our emails, nor mine, *our SCS messages. There is no content. There are
no names in the data-ase, no address, no credit card num-ers and no locational information is
used. $et me gi.e *ou an example of how this was important and how the foreign intelligence
agencies, li,e 8&A and "SA wor,ed with F/& to help stop terrorist acti.ities.
And this actuall* was gi.en out pu-licl* 3 /asaal* Coalin, a terrorist who was in
8alifornia. We (had an 2 intercept of the communications 3 (in Somalia 2 3 phone num-er of a
person (tal,ing a-out 2 terrorist acti.ities, and that phone num-er, -ased on what the* were
tal,ing a-out, allowed us to loo, into the data-ase. What does that mean2 The data-ase is li,e a
loc,-ox. The controls that go on this data-ase are greater than an* data repositor* in the
go.ernment, and the o.ersight is the same.
To get a num-er appro.ed, there are onl* 77 people in "SA that can appro.e that
num-er. The* had to pro.e that meets the standard set -* the court, that this has that
counterterrorism nexus with alABaidaArelated groups. Then and onl* then is that num-er added
to a list that can -e 0ueried. ;nl* those num-ers on that list can -e 0ueried into that data-ase. &f
*ou mist*pe a num-er, the data-ase will re1ect it, -ecause it has to -e on that list. ;nl* >H
anal*sts at ("SA 2 are authori4ed to run 0ueries. The* ha.e to go through three separate
different training regimen and pass a test to do 3 to actuall* do 0ueries into that data-ase.
&n 76<7, there were less than >66 num-ers that were appro.ed 3 -less *ou 3 appro.ed for
0ueries 3 less than >66 num-ers. Those 0ueries resulted in (<7 2 reports to the F/&. Those
reports contained less than H66 num-ers. "ot millions, not hundreds of thousands, not tens of
thousands 3 less than H66.
The intent of this program was to find a terrorist actor and identif* that to the F/&. &f *ou
thin, a-out it, the F/& is a great agenc*. )irector /o- Cueller is one of the greatest people &.e
e.er met. 'is agenc* does tremendous wor, for this countr*. ;ur 1o- is not to complicate his
life -* gi.ing him as man* num-ers as we can. ;ur 1o- is to help them focus on the right
num-ers.
And the num-er that we ga.e him in 8alifornia 3 the* had actuall* had 3 we ga.e that to
them in 7665. &n 766I, the* had ordered an in.estigation on that indi.idual, -ut did not ha.e
enough information to open the full field in.estigation, so the* closed that in.estigation down.
&n 7665, with the num-er we ga.e them, the* had enough information. The* ta,e that num-er ,
and now their portion of this is the* can ta,e a national securit* (clip 2, find out who that
num-er -elongs to, and the* found out it was /asaal* Coalin. The* can then, with pro-a-le
cause, get a warrant. "SA onl* has the fact of a num-er. F/& could ta,e that, see where it
connects to, use a national securit* letter and the legal authorities gi.en to them to ta,e the next
step. That resulted in the capture of /asaal* Coalin from a (terrorist 2 support for terrorism and
se.eral coAconspirators.
The other program that & would li,e to tal, to is the one we refer to sometimes as F#&SC.
/ut F#&SC is part of it. &ts the FAA 567 authorit*. This is for foreign intelligence purposes.
This is content. This is not targeting ?.S. persons. This is targeting threats o.erseas. This is our
lawful intercept program, which is analogous to man* other countries around the world. The*
compel ser.ice pro.iders to pro.ide information 1ust as we do. /ut & mentioned earlier, we ha.e,
& -elie.e, a great standard, what we loo, at, the court, 8ongress and the administration all
loo,ing at 3 (inaudi-le.
& should mention on the pre.ious slide, a hundred percent audita-ilit*. $et me 1ust go
-ac, to that. & didnt gi.e *ou that part, and & promised & would, so & dont want *ou to thin, &
left that out. A hundred percent audita-ilit*. ;h, that was 0uic,. (Fause. So ma*-e there is a
no going -ac,.
So on this program, a hundred percent audita-ilit* on e.er* 0uer* that we ma,e. And
that is o.erseen -* our inspector general, our general counsel. &n 766=, in our discussions with
the president when he first came on -oard, we tal,ed to him a-out these programs. And the issue
was, how do we ,now the compliance is there, and what more can we do2
We stood up, wor,ing with the committees in 8ongress, a directorate of compliance.
This directorate of compliance was headed -* legal professionals and information specialists that
can loo, at e.er*thing that we do in these programs and ensure the* comport with the court
orders, -ut we also ha.e o.ersight from the director of national intelligence, general counsel and
&G of the )efense )epartment, from the )epartment of +ustice, from the White 'ouse, from
8ongress, the intel committees and from the courts. ;ur people ha.e to ta,e courses and pass
exams to use this data.
So the same le.el of control is gi.en to the FAA 567. &n fact, this is the one that at times
people sa*, the* are listening to all our communications. That is not authori4ed under this. /ut
the issue would -e, for me standing me up here, man* are going to sa*, well, & hear what *oure
sa*ing, -ut & dont trust them. 8ongress did a re.iew of this program o.er a fourA*ear period, the
Senate Select 8ommittee on &ntelligence. And o.er that fourA*ear period, the* found no willful
or ,nowledgea-le .iolations of the law or the intent of the law in this program.
Core specificall*, the* found no one at "SA had e.er gone outside the -oundaries of
what we.e -een gi.en. Thats the fact. What *oure hearing, what *oure seeing, what people
are sa*ing is, well, the* could. The fact is the* dont. And if the* did, our auditing tools would
detect them, and the* would -e held accounta-le. And the* ,now that from the courses that the*
ta,e and the pledge that the* ma,e to this nation. And the* ta,e that .er* seriousl*.
#emem-er, their intent is not to go after our communications. Their intent is to find the
terrorist that wal,s among us. 'ow can we do that2 Well, we ha.e two programs that help us do
that. ;ne is on metadata, the least intrusi.e 3 (inaudi-le 3 that we can figure out. And thats
something that we should discuss that allows us to home in and gi.e the F/& greater insights into
these actors. And we ha.e this content program 3 again, audited. Again, our people that go
through this ha.e to go through these courses and pass those tests.
There are allegations out there that the* listen to all our emails, the* do all these things.
Thats wrong. We dont. And if we did, we would -e held accounta-le 3 a hundred percent
audita-ilit* on what we do. At times & loo, at that and sa*, this is too much. ;ur people sa* its
the right thing to do. The nation needs to ,now were going to do the right thing. We compl*
with the court orders and do this exactl* right, and if we ma,e a mista,e, we hold oursel.es
accounta-le and report it to e.er*one.
& want to gi.e *ou an example of what this means to us, what this means to our nation.
&m going to tal, a-out the Ja4i case, or the "ew Dor, 8it* su-wa* -om-, -ecause & thin, its
important for *ou to understand how these programs come together. ;ur "SA, our 8&A, our
foreign intelligence agencies, our allies ha.e good wa*s to go after terrorists.
;ne of those was an alABaida operati.e operating out of Fa,istan, and we had insight as
to some of his communications and what he was doing. We too, his name (into 2 the 567 court,
compelled one of the ser.ice pro.iders to gi.e us the content of his communications, his email.
&n those emails, we saw him wor,ing with an indi.idual un,nown to us, discussing an imminent
terrorist attac,. All we ,new is the* were loo,ing for the recipes for -om-s. We got an email
address. &n the email was a phone num-er. We didnt ,now if the phone num-er was ?.S. or
o.erseas.
We ga.e the email address to the F/&. Again, the F/& has legal authorities then to ta,e
that email address and find out whose address is this. And this was "a1i-ullah Ja4i, a terrorist in
8olorado. And the* told us that the phone num-er that was in that email wasnt his. We used
that phone num-er to go into the -usiness records, F&SA data, -ecause he had nexus to an alA
BaidaArelated operation. We found the first connection from that phone num-er in 8olorado to
an un,nown phone num-er to the F/& in "ew Dor, 8it*.
/ut the important thing was that phone num-er in "ew Dor, 8it* also was tal,ing to
another terroristArelated actor in another la*er to how to get another terrorist. That helped us tell
the F/& that num-er in "ew Dor, 8it* is reall* important. That num-er was Adis Cedun1a1in
Time was of the essence in this case. Dou ma* recall that Ja4i was dri.ing across the
countr* to conduct the attac,G we intercepted this around the sixth of Septem-er and the attac,
was supposed to occur -* <I Septem-er. The F/& has to put these pieces together -ased on our
input, what the* get from customs and -order patrol, what the* get from other intelligence
agencies and law enforcement and figure out whats going down. The* are super-G the* stopped
this attac,. This would ha.e -een the -iggest attac, in the ?nited States since =@<<. &t came to 3
the initial tip came from the F#&SC FAA 567 data. /usiness #ecord F&SA is a tool that also
adds .alue, -ut it can onl* add .alue in the ?nited States.
So what does that mean2 What ha.e these capa-ilities done2 We ha.e tal,ed a-out HI
different terroristArelated acti.itiesG &.e put them up here so that *ou can see what we.e -een
a-le to do. These are facts. This is a partnership -etween our foreign intelligence agencies and
the F/&, -etween our countr* and our allies. We stopped <> related terrorist acti.ities in the
?nited States and 7H more in !urope.
There are a num-er of things that come out of this (slide 2. First, the /usiness #ecord
F&SA can onl* help if there was a (lin, 2 in the ?nited States. &t had a role in <7 of those <>. &n
four, it came up with no results that was operation 3 (inaudi-le 3 .alue to the F/&. &n the other
eight, it pro.ided leads for the F/& to go after.
FAA 567 pro.ides .alue across H> of these and in roughl* half of them, it was the initial
tip. ;ur mission 3 stopping terrorism, is one of the most important things.
B: FreedomK
G!". A$!(A")!#: !xactl*. (8huc,les. And with that, when *ou thin, a-out it,
how could we do that2 /ecause we stand for freedom.
B: /ullshitK ($aughter.
G!". A$!(A")!#: "ot -ad 3 (applause 3 -ut & thin, what *oure sa*ing is that in
these cases, whats the decision2 Wheres the discussion2 And what other tools should we ha.e
to stop those2
B: (;ff mic 3 prosecute.
B: /ut wh* would 8ongress 3 wh* would we -elie.e that *oure not l*ing to us right
now2
G!". A$!(A")!#: & ha.ent lied to the 8ongress.
B: What a-out 3 (inaudi-le 3 congressional testimon*2
STAFF: Wait for the 0uestion session.
G!". A$!(A")!#: Than, *ou for that. /ut & do thin, this is important for us to ha.e
this discussion, -ecause in m* opinion, what *ou 0uic,l* -elie.e is that which is written in the
press without loo,ing at the facts. This is the greatest technical center for 3 (inaudi-le 3 in the
world. & as, that *ou all loo, at those facts, chec, that out. #ead the congressional testimon*.
$oo, at what we are tal,ing a-out here, -ecause this is our nations future. This is what we.e
done with these programs 3 (inaudi-le. Those are facts.
And what we see coming at our countr* is more of the same. So the 0uestion that we
ha.e with all of us, so what do we do2 $ets -egin that discussion. Without the facts 3
(inaudi-le 3 ha.e that discussion, so that people who are re.ealing information that can hurt the
future of this countr* and our citi4ens, & -elie.e that its irresponsi-le, it will ha.e significant
damage to our countr*. 'ow do we defend this countr*2 Thats the 0uestion. What *oure
as,ing us to do is to defend the countr*. And *ou ta,e an oath to that 8onstitution, and we ta,e
that .er* seriousl*. &ts not either@or. &ts -oth. And so here, if *ou want to -e constructi.e, if
*ou want to help get this right, -e part of that discussion. Fut the facts on the ta-le. Thats what
we need. Dou need to understand what were tr*ing to do to defend the countr* and protect ci.il
li-erties 3 (inaudi-le.
;n the -usiness record F&SA, <H 1udges 3 (inaudi-le 3 >I times. 8ongress 3 (inaudi-le
3 the administration 3 (inaudi-le. This morning, the director of national intelligence 3
(inaudi-le 3 declassified some of those. #e.iew that, see what we do in going after 3
(inaudi-le. So with that, &d li,e to open it up for 0uestions.
B: So o-.iousl* we ha.e 3 (off mic 3 capa-ilities, -ut wh* do so man* countries in the
world want to attac, us 3 (off mic2
STAFF: Forgi.e me gu*s, generall* spea,ing, *ou pro.ide the ,e*note the opportunit*
to determine if he wants to accept 0uestions from the audience or to recei.e them in an organi4ed
manner. We reached out to the communit* to tr* to gather those, to organi4e thoseA we weighted
them, ran,ed them. This is not canned, the general doesnt ,now what were throwing at him,
-ut & want to ma,e sure that were as,ing *our 0uestions for *ou. 'es got a .er* limited
amount of time.
G!". A$!(A")!#: & ha.e no pro-lem 3 (inaudi-le. & thin, thats a great 0uestion.
(8ross tal,.
G!". A$!(A")!#: So the 0uestion that was as,ed was, so wh* do countries want to
attac, us2 Wh* does alABaida want to attac, us2 Wh* do we stand in the wa* of them reaching
their o-1ecti.e2 And & thin, *ou should loo, at what the*re tr*ing to create: a caliphate. The*
-elie.e that the Ciddle !ast should -e run under the &slamic law, sharia form of law, and that
e.er*-od* should compl* with their form of law, and that we in the ?nited States, wor,ing in
the Ciddle !ast, ha.e stood in their wa*. The* want to attac, us.
B: The* want to attac, us -ecause were -om-ing themK ($aughter, applause.
G!". A$!(A")!#: So it is 3 it is interesting that when *ou loo, at it, go -ac, to the
facts of =>, World Trade 8enter, the 8ole, loo, at the !ast African em-ass* -om-ings. $oo, at
=@<<. So thats what we face 3 go ahead.
STAFF: General, do *ou ha.e time to read a 0uestion 3 (off mic 3 do *ou thin, that our
national securit* intelligence and monitoring initiati.es negati.el* impact our inno.ati.e
domestic capa-ilities a-ilit*, companies a-ilit* to ade0uatel* grow in foreign mar,ets o.er fears
of -ac, doors or co.ert access2 Core directl*, is the "SA ma,ing ?.S. companies less
competiti.e2
G!". A$!(A")!#: Thats a great 0uestion. So the 3 from m* perspecti.e, & thin, its
important that we put the facts on the ta-le of what a lawful intercept is and what these
companies are compelled to compl* with. And e.er* countr* has lawful intercept 3 or almost
e.er* countr* has lawful intercept programs that compel companies to pro.ide information. The
difference, from m* perspecti.e, is the o.ersight -* the courts, 8ongress and administration in
ensuring that we do this right.
STAFF: There was a great 0uestion posed *esterda*. & would li,e to echo that. There is
a clear difference -etween the "SA cannot and the "SA will not. &s it discretionar* or is it a
pre.entati.e control2
G!". A$!(A")!#: So there are -oth. & thin, there are technical things that we can do
to limit our collection. And we can do that. &n the ?nited States, if *ou thin, a-out 3 (inaudi-le
3 and what do *ou, perhaps, in securing a networ,, how do *ou loo, at different parts2 Dou can
shield off certain parts from collecting net filter data. We do the same thing to ensure we compl*
with the law.
So the domestic communications we can technicall* ta,e on, -ut there has to -e another
set of standards -ecause the realit* is communication is often times pre.ention. What happens if
we run into a ?.S. persons communications2 So part of what it has -een 3 (inaudi-le 3 tal,s
a-out the minimi4ation procedures, the training that e.er*one at "SA has to go through if we run
across those communications. And we hold our people accounta-le to doing that exactl* right.
STAFF: ;ne 0uestion that came up a lot out of -and, was once a classified document is
pu-licl* lea,ed, as in the case of the F#&SC documents, wh* does the classification remain the
same2 Wh* cant go.ernment emplo*ees loo, at the &nternet2 ($aughter.
G!". A$!(A")!#: Well, theres two reasons on that one. & thin, the issue is on this,
how do we protect our nation2 'ow do we defend it2 And our pu-lic 3 this is classified. &ts
not classified to ,eep it from *ou, a good person. &ts classified -ecause sitting among *ou are
people who wish us harm. &f we tell e.er*-od* exactl* what were doing then the ad.ersaries
will ,now how to get through our defenses.
Thats wh* & -elie.e that what has happened, the damage to our countr* is significant and
irre.ersi-le. What were tal,ing a-out is future terrorist attac,s. And when *ou loo, on this
slide here, will we ha.e the success o.er the next <6 *ears that we.e had o.er the last2 And &
thin, it is worth considering what would ha.e happened in the world if those attac,s 3 I7 of
those HI were terrorist plots. &f the* were successfull* executed, what would that mean to our
ci.il li-erties and pri.ac*2 So those are issues. "ow, wh* do we classif* 3 (inaudi-le2
(Applause.
STAFF: General, & ,now the "SA doesnt shop where we do. ;ur attendees here at
/lac, 'at ha.e a certain cadre of tools in our arsenal for defense. ;ur ad.ersaries are wellAread
3 (inaudi-le 3 ha.e access to our tools and means. We appreciate 3 (inaudi-le 3 what the "SA
is doing. And & ,now *ou cant share more. /ut & would li,e to spea, to *our decision on
whether or not these media lea,s ha.e affected the "SA.
G!". A$!(A")!#: Well, it has. Dou ,now, and & thin, *ou can hear it from some of
the comments that we.e gotten here. (&naudi-le 3 see, thin, a-out people who are willing to go
forward to &ra0 and Afghanistan to help insure our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Carines, so the*
can get the intelligence that the* need. & -elie.e these are the most no-le people that we ha.e
this countr*. The* are willing to put their li.es on the line for their fellow 3 their fellow soldiers
and fellow Americans, and other countries.
And 76 of them lost their li.es. And when *ou thin, a-out that, the issue is these same
people who ta,e that same oath to uphold and defend the 8onstitution (are 2 the ones that run
these programs. And we get all these allegations of what the* could -e doing. /ut when people
chec,, li,e the intelligence committee, the* found 4ero times thats happened. Thats no -ullshit.
Those are facts. (Applause.
Flease dont put that out in the open press. ($aughter. +ust that one word. & ha.e <H
grandchildren. ($aughter.
STAFF: #ight. ;ne more 0uestion -efore we -rea,, General. &n a moment, &.e got to
tal, to m* mom and dad. And & 1ust wanted to ,now, *our people cant listen to me call m*
mom, right2
G!". A$!(A")!#: Thats right.
STAFF: ;%.
G!". A$!(A")!#: And now theres two parts to that.
STAFF: Thats a *es or no 0uestionK ($aughter
G!". A$!(A")!#: & thin, 3 (inaudi-le 3 the issue 3 (inaudi-le 3 if *ou put that 3
(inaudi-le 3 we ha.e technical control 3 (inaudi-le. And then we ha.e polic*. So the technical
is the* cant. Dou ,now, & as,ed the same thing a-out m* daughters. & ha.e four daughters.
8an & go and intercept their emails2 "o.
STAFF: (to audience 8an *ou2($aughter.
G!". A$!(A")!#: /ut the technical limitations (are in there 2. "ow, people who tr*
to circum.ent that, there is also a hundred percent audit. So when *ou 3 (inaudi-le 3 m*
daughter at x.com, and an auditor that loo,s and sa*, whats the foreign intelligence purpose of
this 0uer*, and the anal*st 3 (inaudi-le 3 has to state that and show that what the*re doing
meets that standard.
B: (&naudi-le. (Scattered laughter.
G!". A$!(A")!#: Tre*s a good person. (&naudi-le.
STAFF: Are *ou sure2 ($aughter.
G!". A$!(A")!#: Well & guessL & hopeK "o terrorist associations. So the issue
onl* -ecomes the issue that & would as, *ou to loo, at. And all of those that find what were
doing that should -e limited more, m* comment is help us defend the countr* and come up with
a -etter solution. Doure the greatest gathering of technical talent an*where in the world. &f we
can ma,e this -etter, the whole reason & came here was to as, *ou to help us ma,e it -etter. And
if *ou disagree with what were doing, then *ou should help twice as much.
B: #ead the 8onstitution.
G!". A$!(A")!#: & ha.e. Dou should too. ($aughter, cheers, applause.
STAFF: General, & ,now it would ha.e -een a lot easier to not come. /lac, 'at is a
warm lo.ing crowd that lo.es on our guests in a different wa*. ($aughter. Than, *ou so much
for coming out.
G!". A$!(A")!#: Than, *ou. (Applause.
STAFF: (&naudi-le.

All right, gu*s. A couple of house,eeping items, and well get started.
First, Arsenal and the Sponsored Wor,shops ha.e -een mo.ed from the hallwa* down to
Cilano downstairs. Dou should chec, those out. Sponsored wor,shops onl* run toda*.
Arsenal has its own dedicated tur-o trac,, so *ou should chec, that out.
"um-er two, white papers and presentations are online at -lac,hat.com. Dou can pull
those down off the we-site..
Three, code of conduct. &ts important we ha.e one. )ont -e a 1er,. &ts at the -ottom of
-lac,hat.com if *ou need to chec, on it. &f something comes up, let us ,now.
We .alue *our feed-ac,. The "SA is not helping with the towers at the -ac, of the
room. ?se *our little -adge to scan that. Doull get an email o.er a couple minutes. &ts fi.e
0uestions. We .alue *our feed-ac,. Dour spea,ers want the feed-ac,. (!nd of audio.
(!")