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Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Continued U.S. Support Necessary with Ongoing Regional Turmoil
By Brian Katulis, Hardin Lang, and Mokhtar Awad June 2014
Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Continued U.S. Support Necessary
with Ongoing Regional Turmoil
By Brian Katulis, Hardin Lang, and Mokhtar Awad June 2014
1 Introduction and summary
5 Jordans response to regional changes
and internal challenges since 2011
9 Jordans response to Islamist movements
20 Recommendations for U.S. policy in Jordan
25 Conclusion
28 Endnotes
Contents
1 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Introduction and summary
Jordan sits at the heart of a region facing increasing turmoil. To the north, the civil
war in Syria rages on unabated; so far, it has sent more than 600,000 Syrians into
Jordan.
1
Te war in Syria has motivated Islamist extremistssome of whom are
receiving fnancial, ideological, and political support from certain countries and pri-
vate individuals in the Persian Gulfto use Jordanian territory to recruit and send
militants into batle against the Assad regime.
To the east, Iraqs unresolved confict is becoming increasingly intertwined with
the Syrian civil war, adding to Jordans immediate security woes. Te Israeli-
Palestinian confictas well as the collapse of the latest round of peace talkshas
contributed to a sense of uncertainty regarding Jordans long-term future. Tese
unfavorable regional dynamics are straining Jordans already fragile economic,
social, and political conditions.
In the face of these considerable challenges, Jordans government remains resil-
ient and adaptable but heavily dependent on outside support to survive. Despite
repeated predictions of collapse, Jordans monarchy has avoided the chaos experi-
enced in Syria and Iraq, and it has defly coped with the political currents emanat-
ing from the 2011 uprisings that spread across the region. Jordans monarchy has
stuck to its playbook of managing limited change from above. It has made only
slight moves and gestures toward political and economic reform, while keeping
close tabs on challenges to its political legitimacy and working aggressively to
contain internal security threats generated by the regional turmoil.
Jordan remains one of the United States closest, most reliable, and most trusted
partners in the Middle East, and the country requires help to address the spillover
efects of the conficts in Syria and Iraq. Te support needed most urgently is
continued security cooperation, including intelligence sharing, surveillance, and
military equipment to help Jordan manage serious security threats. In addition,
continued and increased humanitarian aid for refugees is essential. Te United
States should work with partners in the region and Europe to help Jordan deal
with growing energy and water crises that are exacerbated by the high numbers of
2 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
refugees. Finally, the United States needs to continue to urge Jordans government
to implement a pragmatic program for long-term political and economic reform.
Such a reform program is essential to help Jordan manage the demographic, social,
and economic pressures that threaten to undermine its long-term stability.
Similar to other governments in the region, Jordan faces political and security
challenges emanating from a range of Islamist groups, including the Muslim
Brotherhood and Salafsts. Unlike in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates, however, the Muslim Brotherhood is not banned in Jordan, and the
monarchy has worked to include the Muslim Brotherhood in political life. Te
regime has also worked to co-opt Islamist forces and neutralize their threat to
Jordans power structure.
Jordan has a number of Salaf and jihadi movements that have been galvanized by
conficts in the region. Many have channeled their energy and resources toward
the civil war in Syria. But their enduring presence poses several questions regard-
ing Jordans long-term stability, as well as about the long-standing ideological
crosscurrents now afecting Jordan and the Middle East as a whole.
Tis report is based on a series of interviews conducted in Jordan in March. Te
Center for American Progress talked to a wide range of leaders within the govern-
ment and actors involved in political movements and civil society, including those in
Islamist movements. Tis study is part of a four-country research project conducted
by CAP in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Syriafour countries experiencing diverse
security, political, and economic dynamics. One specifc objective of this research
project is to examine how diferent countries are responding to the Arab uprisings
that began in 2011, as well as the growth and evolution of political Islamist groups
including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafstsover the past three years.
Key fndings of this research in Jordan include:

The current Jordanian system will endure, but pressure from external threats
is mounting and putting a strain on the fragile body politic. Syrian refugees
presence is further exacerbating domestic demands for political and economic
reforms. Syrias descent into chaos may discourage Jordanians from revolution,
but it does not seem to be stemming the tide of discontent among Jordanians
about the current economic and political system. Syrians in Jordan now amount to
nearly 10 percent of the countrys population, which could further destabilize the
demographic makeup of a country carefully balanced between the ruling minority
of native-Jordanian East Bankers and majority Palestinian-origin West Bankers.
3 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is recalibrating its strategy with an eye
toward building coalitions in the face of a regional tide against Islamists. Te
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, or JMB, is now seeking to build alliances with
Jordans tribes and other segments of society in order to quietly foment dissent
against the monarchy and pressure it to implement reforms. While the JMB
remains perhaps the largest force in the countrys political opposition, it does
not currently pose a threat to Jordans traditional power structure.

Jordans Salafi landscape is slowly evolving, but Salafi jihadists are emerging
as the most imminent strategic and security threat to the current system of
government. Syrias civil war has served as a lifeline to Jordans Salafsts. Tey
beneft from an injection of cash from certain sources in Persian Gulf countries
and the freedom to undertake the kind of charity work that Salafsts have used in
other countries to grow their support base. Te Salaf jihadists active fghting role
in Syria has catapulted them to prominence. Teir cadres, which have now been
inspired by nearby revolution and jihad, will ultimately set their sights on the
Jordanian regime.
Recommendations for U.S. policy include:

Continued support for Jordan in response to the Syria conflict. Te United
States already provides signifcant assistance to Jordan, but Jordan will require
additional support to meet the needs of the more than 600,000 Syrian refugees
already in the country. To this end, the United States should leverage its substan-
tial humanitarian assistance portfolio to motivate the Persian Gulf countries to use
more of their considerable oil wealth to help the Syrian refuges living throughout
Jordan. Te United States should also make available high-end intelligence and
surveillance capabilities to help the Jordanian military beter manage its border.

Increased intelligence cooperation on the evolving nature of Islamist ideolo-
gies to counter violent extremism. Te United States and Jordan should work
together to formulate an analytical efort that tracks the evolution of ideology
among various Islamist groups, particularly in light of the conficts in Syria and
Iraq. Te United States should also enhance ongoing eforts to counter violent
extremism in Jordan through support for at-risk youth, messaging that counters
extremist narratives, and building Jordans capacity to undertake these eforts.
Te proposed $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund announced by
President Barack Obama in May could be particularly benefcial in helping
Jordan deal with the problems of extremism.
2

4 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm

Support for inclusive political and economic reform. Te United States should
continue to urge Jordans government to implement a realistic but serious pro-
gram of political and economic reform. Tis program should include continued
eforts to develop political parties, increase press freedom, and fnalize electoral
law reform. Te United States should work with Jordan and other donors to
encourage investment in projects that deal with strains on Jordans infrastructure
and help create jobs. It should also renew a fve-year aid package that is due to
expire later this year. However, the United States should add incentives to ensure
that additional assistance serves as a bridge to long-term economic reforms that
create jobs rather than fostering continued dependency.
In recent years, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has withstood repeated shocks
to its system. Massive refugee fows, strain on the economy, and new forms of
Islamist extremism have threatened Jordans stability. Trough it all, Jordan has
persevered, and U.S. military, humanitarian, and economic assistance have been
key ingredients of its success. Going forward, however, Jordan will need to under-
take meaningful reforms. Only through more inclusive politics and an economy
weaned of aid dependence can Jordan put itself on a stable and sustainable path
over the long term.
5 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Jordans response to regional
changes and internal
challenges since 2011
Jordan has weathered regional pressures for decades, including the millions of
Palestinian refugees from successive Arab-Israeli wars and the Iraqi refugees who
have arrived over the past decade. But the country faces new and unique pres-
sures from the civil war in Syria, with more than 600,000 Syrian refugees straining
Jordans fragile infrastructure, economy, and political system. When the wave of
popular protests swept across much of the Middle East in 2011, new questions
arose about the viability of Jordans political and economic system.
Similar to most other countries in the region, Jordan witnessed street protests.
But its movements were muted in comparison to what transpired in Egypt and
Tunisia. Te government used the same playbook it has used in the past: It
announced a modest, incremental pathway for political and economic reforms
and slow-rolled their implementation.
3
Te security services worked aggressively
to prevent any possible security threats. Unlike in Egypt and Yemen, they played
this role quietly and remained loyal to the regime.
Te following factors have shaped Jordans response to the underlying pressures
that have driven the Arab uprisings.
Unity among the ruling elites
Te unity among Jordans ruling elites is perhaps the single most important factor
contributing to the countrys continued security and the limited changes it has
experienced in the more than three years since the start of the Arab uprisings.
As one minister in Jordans current government explained, It is a stable regime
in Jordanthe important things are under the regime, and it has things under
control. Te opposition can come and go, but the regime stays the same. Tere is
a strong authoritythe military and the intelligence, and the prime minister is
monitored by the king.
4
Tere was no split between the ruling authorities and the
leaders of the internal security services, unlike in other countries in the region.
What makes us diferent is that we have a military and intelligence that stays in
the backgroundwe have professionals here, the minister added.
5

6 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Negative perceptions of Arab uprisings
A second factor that took the wind out of the sails of major political and economic
reform in Jordan was the turmoil and uncertainty witnessed in other countries.
Tis was especially true for conservative East Bank Jordanians, many of whom
argued against major political reforms. Tese reforms, they claimed, could open
the door to the destructive turbulence that has characterized some of the Arab
uprisings.
6
Tese arguments gained credence as Syria descended into civil war and
the political transition in Egypt experienced many problems. Reform slowed in
Jordan, explained one former government minister:
Because of the impact of what happened in the region. Te Muslim Brotherhood
lost their support. People said maybe these people are not the model for
change, maybe they are not the success story they were claiming to be. So what
happened in Egypt played a role. Syria played a role because people said we
should not rock the boat so we dont end up like that.
7
Tis viewthat Jordan does not want to take the reform risks that other coun-
tries haveis broadly shared. Some opposition voices argue that the Jordanian
government has cynically used this as an argument to delay even modest reforms.
One activist from an Islamist movement maintained, Te regime exploited the
waterfall of blood in Syria and the refugees. Either accept the status quo here in
Jordan or we will end up like Syria, the regime said.
8
Lack of coherent political opposition
A third factor that explains the limited changes inside Jordan since 2011 is the lack
of an organized opposition that presents a compelling alternative to the current
governing system. Te political oppositions weakness is partly due to the lack of
a long-term vision that challenges the current order. Some Jordanians fnd faults
in the current system, but few have been able to articulate a substitute that a
meaningful number of Jordanians fnd persuasive. A current government min-
ister explained the failure of popular protests to produce any major shifs. Te
problem is just like in Egyptthe non-Islamists had 130 diferent heads, a lot of
them were just kids propelled by emotions, the government minister said. When
they grew up, American consumerism was what drove themthey did not know
political life.
9
7 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Political party life in Jordan is nearly nonexistent and lacks deep roots in Jordanian
society. Te government allowed the founding of political parties in 1992 follow-
ing a 36-year ban, and there are nearly 30 registered political parties today.
10
Here,
the most important divide is between conservative stalwarts who support the
traditional order in Jordan and a group of more than two dozen reform-minded
independent parliamentarians in a coalition called Initiative who demand politi-
cal reform.
11
But none of these parties have broad grassroots support, and many of
them serve as litle more than patronage networks. Jordans King Abdullah II has
publicly outlined the need for Jordanians to create political parties based on ideas
representing a broad ideological spectrum.
12
Jordans lack of a vibrant political debate is related in part to a strong focus on
economic problems and the basic needs of ordinary peoplea vicious cycle in
the countrys political economy. For years, Jordanian political forces have not
presented strong alternatives for governing the country and growing the economy.
As a consequence, people have grown increasingly cynical about the possibility
that political forces can change their lives. One former member of parliament
from the Islamic Action Frontthe political wing of the JMBexplained that
most ordinary people today are disengaged from formal politics, saying, People
do not want to work with us. Tey dont want politics. People want to eat and the
economic situation is terrible.
13
Endemic economic challenges
Te economic problems that Jordan faces are exacerbated by spillover efects
from Syrias civil war, which place further strains on the country. Many Jordanian
voices do not see long-term sustainability for the current economy. Te country
has high levels of debt and dependency on foreign aid, and it has not mapped out
a strategy to create jobs for its next generation. Tere is high debt, and this is
due to failed policies. Jordan did not take advantage of its resources and instead
became dependent on foreign aid, said one Islamist opposition activist.
14
A wide
range of interlocutors also pointed to economic mismanagementconnected
with poor governance and insufcient atention to the problem of corruption
as a long-standing challenge in Jordan.
15
Current government ofcials and opposition fgures both believe economic chal-
lenges will remain central to Jordans debate as it moves forward. As one leading
Salaf voice argued, Jordanian citizens are living in poor economic conditions, and
they are tired of protests and empty slogans. So they are looking for alternatives and
8 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
to pressure government in order to bring about positive change.
16
Figures serv-
ing in the current government acknowledge that the economy is a very political
issueindeed, that the two are deeply intertwined. A current minister said, Some
people say that whomever takes economic decisionsthis is a political issue.
Economic reforms mean tough decisions that afect peoples lives. For people to
trust these economic reforms, they need a politician they can trust.
17
Moving forward, many Jordanians express the view that unless Jordan keeps all of
its key societal and political factions intact, it runs the risk of experiencing the neg-
ative consequences seen in other countries. I think we cannot transition without
every faction feeling that it is a partner. In Jordan, we came up with this initia-
tive to save Jordan from the fate of other Arab countries, said one Islamist opposi-
tion leader.
18
One of the key elements of Jordanian society is the Islamistsand
Jordan has carved out its own path to deal with its various Islamist voices.
9 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Jordans response
to Islamist movements
Islamists have fgured prominently in many of the Arab countries gripped by upris-
ings since 2011. Te Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its Tunisian equivalent,
Ennahda, roseand fellfrom power in the turmoil of the past three years. In both
countries, Salaf movements have played a role in the narrative arc of transition, at
times as a partner to the Brotherhood and at other times as a competitor. In Syria,
Salaf jihadists have emerged as some of the most potent fghters on the batlefeld.
Te struggle over political Islam has turned biter in the Persian Gulf, souring
regional relations between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.
In Jordan, political Islamist movements have fgured prominently at crucial junc-
tures in the kingdoms political history. But their actions have remained largely
within monarchy-sanctioned boundaries. Tis is no accident of historythe regime
has worked hard for years to co-opt Islamist forces. While the road has not always
been smooth, the Hashemite monarchy has largely managed to neutralize the
Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the Jordanian power structure. Unlike Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, Jordan does not feel the need to ban
the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, it has at times worked to incorporate the Muslim
Brotherhood into political life. By any measure, Jordans Salaf communities are not
the largest nor the most organized in the region, but the more radical elements have
been galvanized and strengthened by the wars in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, the Syrian
theater has become the epicenter for Jordans jihadists. As these elements capability
and organization grow, they could pose a more direct challenge to Jordans stability.
Jordans long-standing strategy of co-opting
the Muslim Brotherhood endures
Te Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is perhaps the largest and most organized
force in the countrys political opposition. As such, it wasin theorywell posi-
tioned to ride the initial wave of protests that broke out in 201l. When the Muslim
Brotherhood came to power in Egypts 2012 parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions, some predicted a windfall for their Jordanian counterparts. But the JMB was
10 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
not able to capitalize on these events in either case. Much of this failure can be atrib-
uted to the fundamental dynamics described above, which helped inoculate Jordan
against the uprisings that swept the Arab world. However, an important part of the
answer lies in the unique history of and relationship between the monarchy and the
JMB, as well as the laters internal divisions and vulnerability to events in the region.
Looking at the JMB as Jordans most organized opposition force refects the
broader dynamics that have shaped the countrys politics and the monarchys
approach to political competitors. Te most visible competition can be seen in
the strained relationship between the elite from the East Bank and those from the
West Bank, who originated from Palestine.
A special relationship
For decades, the JMB has cultivated a special relationship
19
with the Jordanian
monarchy. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere in the region, the JMB has
maintained close ties to the monarchy since its registration as a charity orga-
nization in 1946.
20
Te JMB has played a major but episodic role in bolstering
the monarchys legitimacy. When Jordan batled Palestinian lefists in the early
1970sin what later came to be known as Black Septemberthe JMB remained
on the sidelines, electing not to back the Palestinian fghters. For this, the govern-
ment handsomely rewarded the group, and its charity and educational infrastruc-
ture fourished.
21
Te Islamic Center Charity Society, or ICCSthe backbone of
this infrastructure and the JMBs patronage systemeventually acquired more
than $1.5 billion in assets by the mid-2000s.
22

Te mood soured in the 1990s, however, when the JMB rejected Jordans 1994
peace treaty with Israel and the Jordanian monarchy supported the U.S. invasion of
Iraq.
23
Te government moved to contain the Muslim Brotherhood, replacing the
board of the ICCS.
24
Two decades later, the JMB struck a defant stance once again,
emboldened by the Arab uprisings and their brethrens rise to power in Cairo.
25
Despite this uneven historical relationship with the JMB, the monarchy has
resisted pressures from the Persian Gulf and elsewhere to ban the Muslim
Brotherhood. Te special relationship remains intacta fact the Jordanian
authorities are quick to assert. As one government minister explained, Te
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has always been a partner. It is the Jordanian
11 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
approach. We accommodated themwe did not give them a drop of fuel to
burn us with. Tey thought they had won, but they were wrong.
26
Another fgure
close to King Abdullah II observed:
You cannot compare the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia with
Jordan. In Egypt and Tunisia, they have been working underground and are not
part of the political fabric. Tey have been imprisoned and banned. In Jordan, it
is completely diferent. Tey have been a part of the system and society.
27

The struggle to remain relevant
For its part, the JMB fnds itself captured by this relationship with the state. Te
JMB struggles to remain relevant, as its political wingthe Islamic Action Front,
or IAFhas boycoted general and municipal elections since 2007. Te move-
ment has done so to protest electoral laws, which it claims were designed to limit
its electoral representation, but the boycot has failed to pressure the government
to amend these laws. Te JMB now seeks to build alliances outside parliament and
to quietly and carefully encourage dissent. At the same time, it is careful not to
challenge the monarchys legitimacy directly. Turning away from the legislature,
the group, according to one JMB leader, has elected to work through the people
and work with Jordanian society.
28
As part of this strategy, the JMB aims to forge common ground with some conser-
vative East Bankers and tribes on sensitive issues. As an IAF Shura Council mem-
ber explained, Today we agree with tribes and other sectors that want the same
goals.
29
Tis leader elaborated, saying, Te Islamic movement is no longer alone;
we have several partners that agree on political issues. We replaced the type of
partners we work with. We used to ally with political parties, but now our partners
are big tribes and other fgures, we have movement in the Bedouin areas. Tey are
the biggest opportunity [for us].
30
Tis approach leaves the JMB with modest political impact. Its core demands
remain reforms that would allow it to legislate with a degree of freedom if it were
to return to parliament. It is calling for changes in the electoral law, rallying around
populist causes related to the economy, and protesting cuts in subsidies and ris-
ing government debt. A leader in the IAFs Shura Council explained, Te JMB
is not in opposition to the regime, but rather to some of its policies. Terefore,
the Muslim Brotherhood is not in constant opposition. Tis is diferent from
political parties who oppose for the sake of opposition.
31

12 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Internal divisions and dissent
Disagreements and divisions within the JMBs ranksover strategy, leadership,
and visionhave further weakened its position. A group of mostly East Bank
Muslim Brotherhood members and other Islamists formally broke of to found the
Islamic al-Wasat Party in 2001.
32
In 2012, mostly East Bank Muslim Brotherhood
members founded the Zamzam Initiative to encourage political participation and
emphasize the JMBs Jordanian character.
Te dominance of East Bankers in these splinters and disagreements is signif-
cant. Te JMB has long struggled to identify itself as a national actor. But the
predominance of Jordanians of Palestinian descent and Palestinians in the JMBs
ranks has long created tensions with the countrys ruling East Bank elite, who
not only fear an Islamist rise to power but also a dominant political role for
the countrys majority Jordanians of Palestinian descent. Te East Banker-led
rumblings inside the group, as well as their Jordan-frst rhetoric, raise questions
about the JMBs true Jordanian character.
Te JMB has reacted defensively to the emergence of these factions. Party lead-
ers ofen dismiss al-Wasat as agents of the regime and have threatened Zamzam
Initiative members with internal trials. Indeed, they expelled the Zamzam
Initiatives three leading fgures from the JMB.
33
Tellingly, one Shura Council
member dismissed them as Islamist dcor.
34
Some in the leadership view these
divisions as part of a state conspiracy to weaken the JMB. According to a former
IAF member of parliament, Tere are Islamist parties that were started by the state
to be an alternative to the Brotherhood. [Te] government cannot combat
religion directly, but it has to contain and manage religion in a way that fts it.
35
Leaders of the Zamzam Initiative and even al-Wasat are at pains to clarify that
there are no core ideological diferences between their movements and the
JMB. Te major diference remains the East Bank-West Bank split. One al-Wasat
leader stressed that the key diference between his party and the JMB is that [al-
Wasat] is not part of the international Muslim Brotherhood [it] is a part of
our nation, the Jordanian issue is central for us.
36
To underscore the East Banker
Jordanian nature of al-Wasat, he added, I am from a big and powerful tribe.
37

Te leaders of these JMB splinter groups are also specifcally at odds with the
current JMB leadership. Speaking of the current JMB leaderships failures, one
Zamzam Initiative leader elaborated:
13 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
[Tey] have a failure in understanding reality. [Tey] are unrealistic.
Te regime succeeded in showing that the Muslim Brotherhood is made up
of Palestinians. Indeed, the East Jordanians are the most important factor for
change in Jordan. [JMB] cannot lead a wide national current. Zamzam tries
to go beyond that.
38
It will be difcult for the JMB to ignore these dissident voices. Al-Wasat benefted
greatly from the JMBs decision to boycot the last election, capturing a plurality
of seats in the 2013 parliamentary elections. Having ceded its political position in
the legislature to al-Wasat, the traditional JMB leadership now fnds itself pited
against the Zamzam Initiative in a competition to reach out to Jordans powerful
East Bank and tribal constituencies. Te JMB may fnd itself at a disadvantage in
this contest as it struggles against popular perceptions that the JMB represents
Palestiniansand that they do so at Jordans expense.
Trouble in the neighborhood
Te JMB has been afected by the rise and fall of Islamist movements in the region.
Te Middle East is in the midst of an intense struggle for power and infuence
among many countries. Richer, more internally cohesive countries, such as Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, are contending for infuence among less wealthy and internally
divided countries, such as Jordan and Egypt. Te Muslim Brotherhoods status
remains a main point of contention between countries such as Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have
efectively declared war on the group through support for the ouster of Muslim
Brotherhood member and former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and through
Saudi Arabias classifcation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.
39

Te JMB leadership sees itself as a victim of this perceived regional war against
the Muslim Brotherhood. As one JMB leader put it, Tey want to end the role
of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world, since [Egyptian] King Farouk
[(19361952)] they have been trying. So where are those who fought the Muslim
Brotherhood, and where is the Muslim Brotherhood now?
40
In this regional
war, Saudi Arabia is viewed as the primary antagonist. A JMB leader explained,
Te Saudis are trying to destroy the Muslim Brotherhood because the Muslim
Brotherhood wants liberation [of Palestine], jihad [against Israel], and unity. Tey
also want to be the sole representatives of Islam.
41

14 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Te July 2013 coup that ousted former Egyptian President Morsi has put addi-
tional pressure on the JMB. One Islamist activist argued, Afer the coup, it was
apparent that Jordan was one of the countries that had previous knowledge of the
coup and played a role in preparing for the coup. Tis created a split between
the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.
42
Te activist went on to explain
that relations between the regime and the JMB have been heavily infuenced by
these regional trends, but both camps have chosen not to escalate the issue. A
close observer of Islamist movements noted that the blow to Egypts Muslim
Brotherhood paralyzed the JMB. Te Muslim Brotherhood do not have a plan or
a vision. Tey do not know how to deal with the crisis in Egypt.
43
Some in the JMB are holding out hope that regional dynamics could still tilt in
their favor. A JMB leader remarked, When it comes to the situation in Jordan
today what if the coup fails in Egypt? What if the Muslim Brotherhood return
to rule in Egypt? What if revolution in Syria succeeds? So should Jordanians just
look at the current stage or what is to come?
44
Taking a longer-term view, this
Islamist leader framed the recent events in Egypt as a temporary setback, arguing,
Tese were coups against Islamist movements and some say Islamism is retreat-
ing. Tis is just temporary. For a revolution to reach its goals, it needs a few years.
Te street in Egypt is still active.
45

Many JMB leaders claim that Saudi Arabias campaign to contain the Muslim
Brotherhood and the coup in Egypt will strengthen Salaf jihadists and other
strands of Islamic extremism. One JMB leader warned, Islam will remain. It is
either moderate or extremist. If you weaken the person that represents modera-
tion, then there will be extremism.
46
A similar sentiment was echoed by another
JMB leader who said, Te U.S. led a war against terror without defning what ter-
rorism is. Who has an interest in mixing Al Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood? ...
Tis will lead to more extremism in the future.
47
Mounting challenges posed by Jordans Salafists
Salafsts are increasingly prominent in the Jordanian political and religious land-
scape. Te civil war in Syria is a major driver of the resurgence of Salaf ideology
in Jordan, serving as a rallying cry and recruitment tool for Salafsts of all stripes.
Salafsts in Jordan range from nonviolent apolitical quietists who pledge loyalty to
the monarchy to some of the worlds most determined and violent jihadists. Tese
communities have enjoyed substantial growth in Jordan since the 1970s due in
15 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
large part to the connections that Jordanians have made while studying and work-
ing in Persian Gulf countries.
48
Violent Salaf jihadists in particular pose a strategic
risk to Jordans political and security future as the movement not only readily
adopts violence, but also cannot be neutralized by incorporation into a political
system that it rejects and deems apostate.
Conservative Salafism
Tere are three notable currents present in Jordans Salaf landscape. Te frst is a
quietist conservative current carried on by the followers of notable 20th century
scholar Nasiruddin al-Albani, an Albanian national who resetled in Jordan in 1979
and died there two decades later.
49
Al-Albanis brand of Salafsm rejects political
partisanship and political parties and afrms the authority of Jordans monar-
chy.
50
Followers of this conservative current reserve their harshest repudiations for
Salaf jihadists, who they reject as takfrifellow Muslims who are denounced as
apostates and condemn as modern-day khawrejthose who went against the
Caliph Ali and are condemned by Muslims as deviants.
51
Tese Salafsts do not pose
a direct challenge to the monarchy, and the authorities largely leave them alone.
Tey have undermined other Islamist currents by declaring their political aspirations
to be corrupt, including those of the JMB.
Reformist Salafism
Te second current is the so-called reformist Salafsm, which has more defned
political aspirations and a focus on changing society and laws to abide by Islamic
Sharia. Te group emphasizes charity work and is currently enjoying a period of
revival, largely due to the crisis in Syria. Te movement, which is the driving force
behind Jordans al-Kitab wal-Sunnah Association charity, has been fooded with
millions of dollarsmostly from the Persian Gulfin recent years to reinvigorate
its educational and charity infrastructure.
52
It now operates eight feld ofces that
reach tens of thousands of families in need.
53
Al-Kitab wal-Sunnah was founded in
1993 by a group of Salafsts who came to reject conservative Salafsm over its fail-
ure to condemn American intervention in the frst Gulf War.
54
Al-Kitab wal-Sun-
nah included many Salaf jihadists early on, but relations soured between the two
afer the 9/11 terrorist atacks, and the jihadists were expelled from the group.
55
16 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Te reformist Salafsts emphasis on charity work is ofen mistaken for political
quietism. As one reformist Salaf leader clarifed:
We care about all things, including politics. When we say we do not work in
politics, this does not mean leaving politics alone. When the right environment
comes, we will participate if we see there is a beneft in doing so. Te security
clampdown prohibits us.
56
Salaf reformists disagree with conservative Salafsts over the laters loyalty to
Jordans king. One leader of al-Kitab wal-Sunnah explained, Te state likes this
kind [conservative Salafsts], because they have no political agenda or reform role
nor do they look at what is going on in the street and so they have the freedom
to do what they want.
57
He further explained that the relationship between the
two currents is tense and unlikely to be repaired. Teir way has allowed for cor-
ruption. Tey live in ivory towers.
58
Reformist Salafsts consider their movement to be an alternative to the JMB. A
reformist Salaf sheik observed, People no longer trust the Muslim Brotherhood.
Te Muslim Brotherhood dragged people into mazes and disappointed peo-
ple. So people look for alternativessomething that can balance regional issues
with local issues and a balanced approach to reforms. Ten people will fock to
us. However, the sheik noted that the movement is still taking shape and that it
has in fact begun to quietly consider organizing politically, saying, Salafsts do
not yet have a clear program. If Salafsts take care of their message, then thou-
sands will fock to them.
59

Salafi jihadists
Te third current is a violent strand of Salaf jihadism. For years, Jordan has
served as the worlds reservoir of jihadi ideology.
60
Some of the most promi-
nent ideologues hail from Jordan, most notably Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi, who has been described as the most infuential living Jihadi Teorist.
61

Te jihadists are a minority among Jordans Salaf community. Te Palestinian
character of their early leadership hampered their ability to recruit from a wider
segment of Jordanians.
62
Indeed, rallying around the Palestinian efect has
long been a primarily motivational mechanism for jihadists.
63
To expand their
infuence, leaders of Jordans jihadi movement started trying to recruit more East
Bankers at the turn of the 21st century.
64

17 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Tis efort has been successful. Among the most notable leaders of the Jordanian
Salaf jihadi movement today is Mohamed al-Shalabi, widely known as Abu
Sayyaf. Abu Sayyaf and Abu Musab al-Zarqawiwho was the leader of Al Qaeda
in Iraq until his death in 2006were recruited in part because of their East Bank
tribal origins.
65
Today, Abu Sayyaf boasts of recruiting thousands of Jordanian
youth from East Bank communities and the tribes of his hometown, Maan. Tese
Salaf jihadists, drawn from the most traditional quarters of Jordanian society, not
only oppose the monarchy but also consider it to be an apostate enemy.
Unlike their reformist counterparts, the Salaf jihadists in Jordan lack formal orga-
nization and a robust network of charity and patronage. Instead, the jihadi current
has been riding on a wave of popularity fueled by the conficts in neighboring Iraq
and Syria. Abu Sayyaf explained that the social presence of Salafsts is in good
shape afer people saw how we helped the oppressed [Syrians].
66
Te physical
sacrifces of the Jordanian Salaf jihadists allow them to accrue popular sympathy
without having to actually help people.
Some inside the movement have also recognized the mistakes of what they
describe as the Iraqi experience
67
that saw Jordanian al-Zarqawi instigate a brutal
sectarian war and alienate many Muslims. Tey express concerns that something
similar is underway in Syria. Te jihadi message has diferent leaders for diferent
consumers and is well spread across Jordan. On one end, men such as Abu Sayyaf
can atract tribal youth and engage in simple, populist rhetoric to encourage them
to fght. On the other end, men such as Dr. Eyad al-Qunaibi win support from the
educated class. Al-Qunaibi is a sof-spoken, U.S.-educated intellectual who is well
versed in English and has more than 100,000 followers on Twiter.
68
He was cited
as a marjaan inspiring religious reference
69
by Dr. Sami al-Uraydi, the senior
cleric of al-Nusra Front, Al Qaedas afliate in Syria.
70
Al-Uraydi is also a Jordanian.
For Salaf jihadi leaders such as Abu Sayyaf, the experience of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan underscores the futility of political participation as a
means to achieve their goal to establish Islamic law. Abu Sayyaf opined:
Te [JMB] didnt get close to the red lines like the head of the state. When we
would sit down and talk with them, we would ask how are you diferent fom
the others? Tey would say, We have a policy of gradualism, our goal is the
head of the regime, but we have to start fom the base and work up. But in
reality nothing changed.
71
18 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Te Jordanian government has initiated programs in the past to contain jihadist
ideology, but its eforts will likely be overshadowed by current regional dynamics
that allow the funneling of funds from the Persian Gulf through Jordan to extrem-
ist groups in Syria such as al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, or ISIL.
72
Jordanian security ofcials say that these Salaf jihadi groups are
monitored
73
and merely number in the few hundreds. However, as the confict
drags on in Syriaand as recruiters such as Abu Sayyaf continue to funnel young
men across the borderthe grip that Jordans security services claim to have is
coming increasingly under question, and some worry about the impact that those
who return from Syrias civil war may have on Jordans stability.
Potential long-term challenge from Salafists to Jordan
For now, Jordans Salaf jihadists are focused on other conficts. Tis preoccupa-
tion elsewhere, as well as their rejection of politics, may give the deceptive impres-
sion that jihadists are not concerned with Jordan. Tis may, in part, be due to the
relative tolerance and degree of freedom the Jordanian government afords jihadi
ideology and fghters focused abroad.
74
However, as a current Jordanian govern-
ment minister acknowledged, Te Salaf forces are not visible on the political
scene. It is working on the ground because of poverty there. It is a major dormant
force in Jordanthe danger is that it is not visible, like a political iceberg.
75
Salaf jihadists make no efort to hide that if and when they secure victories in
Iraq and Syria, they will turn their atention to Jordan. Tis fact makes the jihadi
community a credible future threat to Jordanian stability as hundreds of embold-
ened Jordanian fghters return home from the Syrian batlefeld. Tus far, they
have enjoyed a wide degree of freedom and movement: Te black banners of Al
Qaeda fy freely in some cities, especially in tribal Maan, and security forces seem
incapable ofor unwilling toconfront the increased public profle of the Salaf
jihadists. Abu Sayyaf said:
Today, we consider that our most important duty [repeated twice] is to remove
these regimes. I talked many times before that the regime that rules in Jordan
is an apostate [regime] that we must remove. But this is tied with ability and
capability. When we become capable, this regime will not be lef alone.
Tey [intelligence services] would interrogate us and we would tell them this.
Tey know what we think.
76
19 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Although atention must be paid to Jordanian fghters returning from Syria, the
ambitions of Salaf jihadists in Syria remain a concern.
For Abu Sayyaf, the next step would be to establish an Islamic state in Syria that
would serve as a new base for Islamists.
77
Tey could then use this base as a foun-
dation to focus their atention on Jordan and their highest enemy, Israel.
78
Abu
Sayyaf warned, If the youth take over Syria they will not leave Palestine for it is
the highest goal and the Holy Land.
79
20 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Recommendations
for U.S. policy in Jordan
Jordan remains one of Americas closest and most reliableindeed, most
trustedpartners in the Middle East at a time of great regional uncertainty and
change. Top ofcials in Jordans government recognize the high level of support
and coordination that the United States provides. As one ofcial in the royal pal-
ace acknowledged, We are very comforted by U.S. supportWashington under-
stands 100 percent the impact the crises have had on Jordan.
80
Jordan enjoys
broad support in the executive branch and strong bipartisan support in Congress,
and the Obama administration has worked with Jordan to meet the range of the
challenges it faces as a result of regional and internal pressures.
Moving forward, U.S. policy needs to focus on three areas: the immediate security
threats posed by the crisis in Syria, the longer-term challenges posed by Islamist
forces operating inside Jordan, and the longer-term opportunities for Jordans
political and economic reform. Te United States has done a good job on the frst
of these focus areas, but the constantly shifing situation inside Syria requires an
ability to adjust to new factors. Te two other focus areas are very much inter-
linked, and the United States needs to work with a wider range of Jordanian lead-
ers to help the country stand on its own and adapt to changes.
Continued support to Jordan in response to the Syria conflict
Jordanian ofcials give U.S. policy on Syria mixed reviews. Tey are critical of what
they see as reluctance on the part of the Obama administration to act decisively
regarding the civil war in Syria. One minister serving in Jordans government said,
Te impression in Jordan is that Americans are very hesitant. Te policy of the
U.S. has to be announced clear and understandable.
81
But Jordanian ofcials remain
reticent when it comes to deeper engagement in the form of overt assistance to the
Syrian opposition from Jordanian territory. Instead, they are focusing on inoculating
Jordan from the sizable spillover of the Syrian confict. Te United States already
provides signifcant assistance to help Jordan shoulder this burden. Some of the key
areas in which Jordan will require additional long-term support include:
21 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm

Leveraging additional humanitarian and infrastructure assistance. Tere are
more than 600,000 Syrian refugees in Jordana number some expect to grow
to between 800,000 to 1 million by the end of this year.
82
Syrian refugees already
constitute 10 percent of Jordans population.
83
Te opening of a new camp in
Azraqwhich can hold up to 130,000 additional refugeesis an important
step.
84
But 80 percent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan live outside the camps
in host communities.
85
Tese refugees are taxing Jordans education and health
services, as well as its electricity, transportation, and water networks. Jordan
recently requested an additional $4.3 billion over the next three years to manage
the spillover of the Syrian crisis.
86
Te United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for Syria,
having provided more than $1.7 billion in aid to date.
87
Of this, the United
States has provided more than $268 million to meet the immediate humanitar-
ian needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan.
88
Te United States should leverage this
assistance to motivate the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf to increase their
direct humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan. More importantly,
the United States should encourage Persian Gulf states to bolster budget sup-
port to the Jordanian government in order to help mitigate the long-term strain
the Syrian crisis has imposed on the kingdoms infrastructure and social services.

Increasing border control. Te Jordanian military is stretched thin as it defends
the wide stretch of desert along the Syrian border. A government minister out-
lined the elements of the problem, saying:
Te Jordanian armed forces are now doing the job of both the Jordanians
and Syrians. Te Syrians are not doing their job. Factions in Syria are
engaged in human trafcking, weapons, and drugs smuggling, and it is
draining Jordans budget. Te biggest drain on our budget is energy spend-
ingthe second is keeping Jordan secure and safe.
89
To help meet Jordan meet this challenge, the United States should continue
its eforts to steadily increase its assistance to the kingdoms armed forces and
security services to help ease the burden on troops deployed along the border.
Tis assistance could include additional intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance capabilities.
22 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Increased intelligence cooperation on the evolving nature
of Islamist ideologies to counter violent extremism
For decades, the United States and Jordan have worked closely together on
security and intelligence operations inside the country, across the Middle East,
and even in places as far fung as Afghanistan.
90
Te nature of this cooperation has
largely focused on defending both countries against immediate security threats
and thwarting terrorist plots.
Te rapidly evolving situation in Syria and its spillover efects in Jordan and other
neighboring countries present another long-term challenge for the United States
and Jordan. Tese ideologies are inspiring a new generation of youth to engage in
conficts in ways that could ultimately undermine security and political stability in
the Middle East. Jihadi networks have successfully exploited the Syrian civil war,
and some of the most infuential opinion leaders in this movement are based in
Jordan. To date, the United States and Jordan have been reactive to the emerging
security threats from Islamist terrorist networks. Such reactions are necessary but
insufcient to address the issue. Two steps should be taken:

Conduct academic and intelligence analyses on the evolving nature of Islamist
political ideology. Te United States and Jordan should work together to for-
mulate an analytical efort that closely tracks the evolution of ideas and ideol-
ogy among various Islamist groups. Te two countries have done a strong job
of countering terrorist plots and heading of immediate threats, and they could
extend this joint efort to include long-term analysis that focuses on the evolving
nature of the Islamist ideological debateparticularly in light of the conficts in
Syria and Iraq.

Enhance efforts to counter violent extremism. In many countries around
the world, including Jordan, the U.S. Department of State has worked with
partner countries to implement programs aimed at countering violent extrem-
ism as part of the United States strategic approach to counterterrorism. Tese
eforts include providing alternatives for individuals who are most at-risk
of being radicalized, messaging that counters violent extremist narratives,
and increasing partners capacity to undertake these eforts. Te $5 billion
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund proposed by President Obama in May
if approved by Congressshould dedicate more resources to addressing the
evolving nature of Islamist ideologies.
23 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Support for inclusive political and economic reform
Te United States must continue to urge Jordans government to implement a prag-
matic and realisticbut nonetheless seriousprogram for political and economic
reform. Such a reform program is essential to help Jordan manage the demographic,
social, and economic pressures that could undermine its long-term stability.
Over the past decade, the United States has made many statements about the
need for political reform in the region. But opposition forces in partner coun-
tries, including Jordan, have exploited the gap between these statements and the
actual policy. One leading Islamist opposition voice in Amman underscored that
Washingtons actions did not keep pace with its stated commitment to democracy:
I looked a lot at the U.S. policy of democratization. Tis was based on a noble
reading; they looked at the fact that most of those who hit the towers [on
9/11] were Saudis. And so they came to the conclusion that repressive societ-
ies is where terrorism spreads. But America didnt continue on this track. It
changed in 2005 [the Muslim Brotherhoods parliament victory in Egypt] and
2006 [with Hamas].
91

Te United States can help Jordan avoid the instability experienced in places such
as Egypt and Syria by closing this gap and helping reform the political and eco-
nomic systems, thus making it more inclusive in its governance and helping the
country foster a more open economy that creates jobs. Some of the steps that the
United States and Jordan can take in this area include:

Support political party development and other political reform initiatives.
Jordans political system lacks viable political ideologies organized into political
parties. Some of the traditional political party development tools have not had a
major impact, and part of the challenge is the lack of coherent political thinking
regarding concrete policy proposals to improve the lives of ordinary Jordanians.
Nongovernmental organizations in the United States and Jordan should con-
tinue their eforts to support current members of Jordans parliament, as well
as others not currently in politics, to develop coherent political party platforms
that address the problems ordinary Jordanians are experiencing.
In addition to political party development, Jordan should loosen restrictions
on press freedom and conclude the years-long debate on electoral law reform
by implementing measures that would encourage the development of coherent
political parties. Tese political parties need a wide reach based on ideas rather
than on tribes or particular sectors of society.
24 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm

Work with Jordan to outline a long-term effort for economic reform that
encourages job growth. Jordans eforts to implement an International
Monetary Fund program have taken steps to deal with macroeconomic imbal-
ances, but the overall efort does not provide much room for fscal fexibility.
Te United States should work with Jordanand other countries that provide
support to Jordanto encourage investment in projects that deal with strains
on Jordans infrastructure and help create jobs. Tis long-term plan means that
Jordan will require continued and predictable international assistance.
To this end, the Obama administration should work to fulfll its pledge to renew
the fve-year aid package and the accompanying memorandum of understand-
ing reached between the United States and Jordan in 2008.
92
Te agreement
provided for a total of $660 million in foreign assistance and is due to expire
later this year.
93
Te new memorandum of understanding between the United
States and Jordan should link conditions for assistance to economic reforms
within Jordan to grow the economy and create jobs. Te next phase of U.S. aid
to Jordan should prioritize decreasing Jordans overall dependence on outside
assistance and help Jordan create a path toward self-sustainability.
Te private sectors of both Jordan and the United States have an important role
to play in helping Jordan create a new economic model that stands on its own.
25 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Conclusion
Jordan remains a key U.S. partner and cornerstone of stability in the Middle East.
Te Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has weathered repeated storms in recent
years, from the wars in the bordering countries of Iraq and Syria to the deepen-
ing regional turbulence of the Arab uprisings. Tese external forces have threat-
ened Jordans stability through massive refugee fows, an increasing drain on the
economy, and the rise of new, virulent strains of Islamist extremism. Trough it all,
Jordan has remained resilient. Unity among its ruling elites, negative perceptions
of events in the region, and the lack of a coherent opposition to the monarchy
have made the country resistant to change. But the cracks in the kingdoms armor
are becoming more apparent.
Te United States has already done much to support Jordan, and President
Obama has underscored U.S. resolve to help Jordan remain an anchor of stability.
To this end, the United States should use its sizable package of humanitarian aid
to leverage additional assistance from the Persian Gulf to help Jordan deal with its
Syrian refugee population and the strain it is producing on Jordans infrastructure
and economy. It should also make available high-end intelligence and surveil-
lances capabilities to help the Jordanian military beter manage its border.
Over the longer term, the United States and Jordan should deepen their shared
analytical efort to understand the evolution of Islamist ideology and to beter man-
age the violent extremism likely to emerge. Perhaps most importantly, the United
States should continue its support for meaningful long-term political and economic
reform. Only through more inclusive politics and an economy weaned of aid
dependence can Jordan build up the resilience required to manage future external
shocks and the internal socioeconomic pressures the kingdom will inevitably face.
But change does not come easily to Jordan. Te factors that have insulated the
kingdom against the tumult gripping the region may well hinder eforts at more
measured reforms. Te extreme dependency on external sources of support to
26 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
manage short-term crises have ofen closed of pathways to the political and
economic reforms necessary for Jordan to achieve long-term sustainable security.
As one former government minister said, Te basic problem is what kind of
Jordan do we want? Tere are now two answers. Te King sometimes gives both
answers.
94
If Jordan is to remain a bulwark of regional stability, it must give a
clearer answer to this question.
27 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
About the authors
Brian Katulis is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, where his
work focuses on U.S. national security policy in the Middle East and South Asia.
Katulis has served as a consultant to numerous U.S. government agencies, private
corporations, and nongovernmental organizations on projects in more than
two dozen countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Egypt, and
Colombia. From 1995 to 1998, he lived and worked in the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip, and Egypt for the National Democratic Institute for International Afairs.
Hardin Lang is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he
focuses on U.S. national security and multilateral afairs, Middle East policy, and
the role of Islamists in the region. He comes to CAP with 18 years of experience
in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and stabilization, including a 12-year career with
the United Nations. Most recently, Lang was a senior fellow in the international
security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Mokhtar Awad is a Research Associate with the National Security and
International Policy team at the Center for American Progress. His work focuses
on Islamist groups, Middle Eastern politics, and U.S. foreign policy toward the
region. Prior to joining CAP, he was a junior fellow in the Middle East Program
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has been published in
Foreign Policy and Te Washington Post.
Acknowledgements
Te authors would like to thank CAP Policy Analysts Ken Sofer and Peter Juul for
their edits to this paper.
28 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
Endnotes
1 Humeyra Pamuk, Number of Syrian refugees in
Turkey exceeds 600,000: Turkish ofcial, Reuters,
October 21, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/10/21/us-syria-crisis-turkey-refugees-
idUSBRE99K04O20131021.
2 David Nakamura, Obama lays out new approach to
foreign policy in second term, The Washington Post,
May 28, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/obama-wants-to-set-
up-new-5-billion-counterterrorism-fund/2014/05/28/
c5ee3362-e662-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html.
3 Courtney Freer and Shadi Hamid, How Stable Is
Jordan? King Abdullahs Half-Hearted Reforms and the
Challenge of the Arab Spring (Doha, Qatar: Brookings
Doha Center, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/research/fles/papers/2011/11/jor-
dan%20hamid%20freer/10_jordan_hamid_freer.pdf.
4 Current Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 6, 2014.
5 Ibid.
6 Jefrey Goldberg,The Modern King in the Arab Spring,
The Atlantic, March 18, 2013, available at http://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-
in-the-middle/309270/?single_page=true.
7 Former Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 5, 2014.
8 Islamist activist, interview with authors, Amman,
Jordan, March 8, 2014.
9 Current Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 6, 2014.
10 Ibtissam al-Attiyat, Musa Shteiwi, and Suleiman Sweiss,
Building Democracy in Jordan: Womens Political
Participation, Political Party Life, and Democratic Elec-
tions (Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005), available at
http://www.idea.int/publications/dem_jordan/upload/
Jordan_country_report_English.pdf.
11 Khaled Neimat, Senators mull joining MP-led reform
initiative Hamarneh, The Jordan Times, December
10, 2013, available at http://jordantimes.com/senators-
mull-joining-mp-led-reform-initiative----hamarneh.
12 Goldberg, The Modern King in the Arab Spring.
13 Former Islamic Action Front member of parliament,
interview with authors, Zarqa, Jordan, March 10, 2014.
14 Islamist activist, interview with authors.
15 Former Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 5, 2014.
16 Jordanian Salaf leader, interview with authors, Amman,
Jordan, March 11, 2014.
17 Current Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 6, 2014.
18 Zamzam Initiative leader, interview with authors, Am-
man, Jordan, March 10, 2014.
19 Muhammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh,
The Islamic Solution in Jordan: Islamists, the State,
and the Ventures of Democracy and Security (Amman,
Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq, 2013),
p. 43, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-fles/bueros/
amman/10360.pdf.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Mohammad al-Fodeilat, How Jordans Islamists Came
to Dominate Society: An Evolution, Al-Monitor, Sep-
tember 10, 2012, available at http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/culture/2012/09/jordan-muslim-brother-
hood-islamists-salafsts-sufs.html#.
23 Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, The Crossroads of Mus-
lim Brothers in Jordan, Global Research in International
Afairs Center, March 4, 2010, available at http://www.
gloria-center.org/2010/03/escobar-2010-03-04/.
24 Nathan J. Brown, Jordan and Its Islamic Movement: The
Limits of Inclusion? (Washington: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 2006), available at http://
carnegieendowment.org/fles/cp_74_brown_fnal.pdf.
25 David Schenker, Down and Out in Amman: The Rise
and Fall of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Foreign
Afairs, October 3, 2013, available at http://www.
foreignafairs.com/articles/139982/david-schenker/
down-and-out-in-amman.
26 Current Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 9, 2014.
27 Royal Hashemite Court representative, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 10, 2014.
28 Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 9, 2014.
29 Former Islamic Action Front member of parliament,
interview with authors.
30 Ibid.
31 Islamic Action Front Shura Council member, interview
with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 10, 2014.
32 Asharq al-Awsat, History of the Jordanian Muslim
Brotherhood Part Two, December 30, 2005, available at
http://www.aawsat.net/2005/12/article55268387.
33 Taylor Luck, Muslim Brotherhood expels three over
Zamzam initiative, The Jordan Times, April 21, 2014,
available at http://jordantimes.com/muslim-brother-
hood-expels-three-over-zamzam-initiative.
34 Former Islamic Action Front member of parliament,
interview with authors.
35 Ibid.
36 Al-Wasat Party leader, interview with authors, Amman,
Jordan, March 11, 2014.
37 Ibid.
38 Zamzam Initiative leader, interview with authors, Am-
man, Jordan, March 10, 2014.
29 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
39 Rania El Gamal Saudi Arabia designates Muslim Broth-
erhood terrorist group, Reuters, March 7, 2014, avail-
able at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/
us-saudi-security-idUSBREA260SM20140307.
40 Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader, interview with
authors.
41 Former Islamic Action Front member of parliament,
interview with authors.
42 Islamist activist, interview with authors.
43 Jordanian academic, interview with authors, Amman,
Jordan, March 8, 2014.
44 Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader, interview with
authors.
45 Ibid.
46 Member of the Shura Council of the Islamic Action
Front, interview with authors.
47 Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader, interview with
authors.
48 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Salaf Movement in Jordan,
International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2) (2000):
219240.
49 Rumman and Hanieh, The Islamic Solution in Jordan.
50 Ibid., p. 19.
51 Ibid., p. 312.
52 Jordanian Salaf leader, interview with authors, Amman,
Jordan, March 11, 2014.
53 Sarah Hasselbarth, Islamic Charities in the Syrian Con-
text in Jordan and Lebanon (Beirut, Lebanon: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, 2014), available at http://library.fes.de/
pdf-fles/bueros/beirut/10620.pdf.
54 Jordanian Salaf leader, interview with authors, Amman,
Jordan, March 11, 2014.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Jordanian political analyst, interview with authors, Am-
man, Jordan, March 10, 2014.
61 William McCants, Militant Ideology Atlas (West
Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), avail-
able at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2012/04/Atlas-ExecutiveReport.pdf.
62 Jordanian political analyst, interview with authors, Am-
man, Jordan, March 10, 2014.
63 Thomas Hegghammer and Joas Wagemakers, The
Palestine Efect: The Role of Palestinians in the Trans-
national Jihad Movement, International Journal for the
Study of Modern Islam 53-3-4 (2013): 281314.
64 Jordanian political analyst, interview with authors.
65 Ibid.
66 Abu Sayyaf, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan,
March 7, 2014.
67 Ibid.
68 @EYADQUNAIBI, Twitter, available at https://twitter.
com/EYADQUNAIBI (last accessed June 2014).
69 Minbar Alansar, The White Lighthouse, our creed and
doctrine, an interview with Dr. Sami al-Uraydi, October
21, 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PVR1kwEmFh4.
70 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center, Sheik Sami al-Uraydi: Portrait of a Jordanian
cleric who serves as a senior religious authority for the
Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaedas Syrian branch, available at
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20623 (last
accessed June 2014).
71 Abu Sayyaf, interview with authors.
72 Rana al-Sabbagh, Jordan faces growing Salafst-jihadist
threat, Al-Monitor, February 4, 2014, available at http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/02/jordan-
faces-salafst-jihadist-threat.html#.
73 Current Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 9, 2014.
74 Jordanian political analyst, interview with authors.
75 Former Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 5, 2014.
76 Abu Sayyaf, interview with authors.
77 Ibid.
78 Jordanian political analyst, interview with authors.
79 Abu Sayyaf, interview with authors.
80 Royal Hashemite Court representative, interview with
authors.
81 Former Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 6, 2014.
82 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014 Syria
Regional Response Plan: Jordan (2014), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/docs/syria-rrp6-jordan-
response-plan.pdf.
83 Jeremy M. Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Rela-
tions (Washington: Congressional Research Service,
2014).
84 Rana. F Sweis, New Refugee Camp in Jordan Tries
to Create a Community for Syrians, The New York
Times, May 30, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/05/31/world/middleeast/new-refugee-
camp-in-jordan-absorbs-food-from-syria.html?_r=0.
85 Ibid.
86 Elizabeth Dickinson, To host ever more refugees,
Jordan wants extra cash no strings attached, The
Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 2014, available at
www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0528/
To-host-ever-more-refugees-Jordan-wants-extra-cash-
no-strings-attached.
87 U.S. Agency for International Development, Syria,
available at http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria (last ac-
cessed June 2014).
30 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm
88 Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations.
89 Current Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 9, 2014.
90 Tom A. Peter, CIA killings in Afghanistan spotlight
Jordan as key US intelligence partner, The Christian
Science Monitor, January 6, 2010, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0106/
CIA-killings-in-Afghanistan-spotlight-Jordan-as-key-US-
intelligence-partner
91 Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader, interview with
authors.
92 Sarah Wheaton and Mark Landler, Obama Promises
New Aid to Jordan in Refugee Crisis, The New York
Times, February 14, 2014, available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/02/15/us/politics/syria-is-expected-to-
be-main-topic-as-obama-meets-with-king-of-jordan.
html; Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations.
93 Ibid.
94 Former Jordanian government minister, interview with
authors, Amman, Jordan, March 5, 2014.

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