Content

INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Objectives
1. Evolution of the NATOs open door policy.
2. Keeping the door open.
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY


















I NTRODUCTI ON
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance based on
the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 1949. The organization constitutes a
system of collective defence whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to
an attack by any external party. At the beginning of its constitution, NATO was little more than a
political association, but in our days its essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and
security of its members through political and military means. Through political means, NATO
promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defence and
security issues to build trust and to prevent conflicts. And through military means NATO is
commited to the peaceful resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military
capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations.
In the 1990s, NATO began a course of enlargement and transformation to remain relevant
in Europe's post-Cold War security environment. As part of its commitment to enlargement, it
admitted three new members - Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999 and has
plans to admit more countries in the future. NATO's enlargement has profound military
implications for the United States and its allies in terms of future planning and shaping
strategies. Its enlargement and its transformation, from an organization for the collective defense
of its members to one whose mission includes conflict prevention and conflict management
throughout Europe, have both been driven primarily by political imperatives; not by a sense of
direct threat, but by an environment-shaping agenda of democratization and integration. The
approximately twelve countries that could conceivably join NATO in the next 10 to 15 years are
evaluated according to political, strategic, and military (particularly airpower) criteria to
determine where they stand in relation to NATO's established pre-conditions for membership
consideration and NATO's strategic rationale for issuing invitations to join.
Puropose and Objectives of the topic. The aim of this report consist of performing extensive and
detailed research of the evolution of NATOs open door policy in the process of NATO
enlargement.
In achieving the goal I set out the following objectives:
to identify the process of evolution of NATOs open door policy;
to present a information at subject: Keeping the door open;
Keywords: NATO, open door policy, Washington summit, member states, future members of
NATO.

1. Evolution of NATOs open door policy.
Since the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, seven countries have joined the initial
twelve signatories. Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952, Germany in 1955 and Spain
in 1982. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became members of the Alliance on 12
March 1999. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty reflects the openness of the Alliance to new
members. Following the end of the Cold War, the process was reaffirmed at the January 1994
Brussels Summit, at which NATO leaders stated that We expect and would welcome NATO
expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East. The Alliance has worked
throughout the 1990s to end the divisions of the Cold War. The invitation to the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland demonstrated NATOs willingness to take in new members aspiring to join
NATO and to erase old dividing lines on the continent. Their accession reflects the general
movement towards greater European integration, alongside the enlargement of the European
Union. In the 50 years of its existence, the Alliance has contributed significantly to the
preservation of peace and stability on the territory of its members. The process of enlargement is
aimed at extending the zone of security and stability to other European countries.
NATOs opening up to new members does not threaten any country. NATO is deepening its
cooperative relations with all countries in Europe whether or not they have expressed interest in
membership. The creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the enhancement of the
Partnership for Peace programme, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Charter between
NATO and Ukraine, are all part of this process. The door to NATO membership remains open to
other European countries which are ready and willing to undertake the commitments and
obligations of membership and whose membership contributes to security in the Euro-Atlantic
area. At the 1997 Madrid Summit, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited
to begin accession talks, Alliance leaders undertook to review the enlargement process at their
next meeting - the Washington Summit.
Since its inception in 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme has had an
important role in helping prepare aspiring countries for membership through participation in PfP
activities. The PfP programme provided direct assistance to the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland in their preparations. In December 1998, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to develop in
time for the Washington Summit a comprehensive package of measures to assist aspiring
countries in meeting NATO standards.
A Membership Action Plan (MAP) will be unveiled in Washington, designed to help aspiring
countries prepare for possible future membership. Participation in the Plan will be on the basis of
self-selection and self-differentiation. Aspirant countries will be expected to continue their active
participation in EAPC/PfP. The MAP will provide a list of activities from which aspiring
countries may select those they consider of most value to help them in their preparations for
possible future membership. The Plan will include the submission by aspirants of individual
annual national programmes on their preparations; and mechanisms for feedback and advice on
progress made by them in implementing their programmes. It will also include planning targets
specifically covering areas most relevant for nations preparing their forces and capabilities for
possible future membership; and annual meetings to ensure that the assistance provided by
NATO and its member states is as effective as possible. The Plan will not provide a checklist for
aspiring countries to fulfil, nor will participation in the programme prejudge any eventual
decision by the Alliance on issuing an invitation to begin accession talks. Such decisions will be
made only on a case-by-case basis by all Allies on the basis of consensus. Each year, NATO
Foreign and Defence Ministers will consider progress on activities under the Membership Action
Plan.
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to
accede to this Treaty.
1

NATOs open door policy is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which
states that membership is open to any European State in a position to further the principles of
this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. This open door policy
has its origin and basis in the Washington Treaty, which states that democratic European
countries will be welcomed into the Alliance if they meet certain conditions:
Article 10 - The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in
a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by
depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The
Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each
such instrument of accession. (The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949).
The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process. Since the Alliance
was created in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founding members to todays 28
members through six rounds of enlargement in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004 and 2009.
The first three rounds of enlargement which brought in Greece and Turkey (1952), West
Germany (1955) and Spain (1982) took place during the Cold War, when strategic
considerations were at the forefront of decision-making.

1
NATOs open door policy - http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-eng/04open.pdf (visited
27.02.2014).
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, signalled the end of the Cold War and was
followed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break up of the Soviet Union, ending the
division of Europe. The reunification of Germany in October 1990 brought the territory of the
former East Germany into the Alliance. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe
were eager to guarantee their freedom by becoming integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
NATO enlargement was the subject of lively debate in the early 1990s. Many political analysts
were unsure of the benefits that enlargement would bring. Some were concerned about the
possible impact on Alliance cohesion and solidarity, as well as on relations with other states,
notably Russia. It is in this context that the Alliance carried out a Study on NATO Enlargement
in 1995.
Post-Cold War enlargement. Based on the findings of the Study on Enlargement, The
Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks at the
Alliances Madrid Summit in 1997. These three countries became the first former members of
the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999. At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Membership
Action Plan was launched to help other aspirant countries prepare for possible
membership.Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia were
invited to begin accession talks at the Alliances Prague Summit in 2002 and joined NATO in
2004. All seven countries had participated in the MAP.
Bucharest Summit decisions. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders took a
number of steps related to the future enlargement of the Alliance.Several decisions concerned
countries in the Western Balkans. The Allies see the closer integration of Western Balkan
countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions as essential to ensuring long-term self-sustaining
stability in this region, where NATO has been heavily engaged in peace-support operations since
the mid 1990s.
Albania and Croatia were invited to start accession talks to join the Alliance and joined
NATO in April 2009.
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* was assured that it will also be invited to join
the Alliance as soon as a solution to the issue of the countrys name has been reached with
Greece.
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro were invited to start Intensified Dialogues on their
membership aspirations and related reforms. Montenegro was invited to join MAP in
December 2009 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2010.
Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already
engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December
2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in
efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing
NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission without prejudice to further
decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP.
2


2. Keeping the door open.
Although ratification of the accession of the three central European countries to NATO
engendered less debate in the U.S. Senate than many had feared (or hoped), the Senates
consideration of the issue demonstrated a distinct unease about further enlargement of the
Alliance. In particular, questions were raised about the underlying purpose of enlargement. Some
Senators feared that the addition of many new members would dilute NATOs effectiveness as a
cohesive political-military organization by adding too many voices to the council table and too
little real military capacity to the Alliances military structure. This led forty-one Senators to
vote for the amendment offered by Senator John Warner to delay consideration of additional new
members for at least three years.
Similarly, concern was expressed about the extent of NATOs future enlargement, including
its end. Some Senators worried that further enlargement would alienate Russia too much, while
others feared Russias eventual inclusion in the Alliance, something which would transform
NATOs character from a collective defense alliance into a collective security organization.
Although the Senate voted to provide its advice and consent on the instruments of ratification by
a vote of eighty to nineteen, the concerns expressed during the debate had a major effect on
NATOs original plans for ensuring that the door to membership remains open. When allied
leaders met in Madrid in mid-1997, there was a general assumption that the second round of
enlargement would follow soon, perhaps as early as the next summit. Once the Senate debate
was over, however, a consensus emerged within the Alliance that no new countries should be
invited at the Washington meeting. Expressing this new-found reservation, Secretary Albright
told her Alliance colleagues shortly after the Senate vote that in noting that the Alliances door
will remain open no one should assume that our parliaments will always agree. The U.S. Senate
rejected an arbitrary pause in the process of enlargement, but I can tell you there is zero chance it
will ratify the admission of future candidates unless they meet the high standards set for
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.
3


2
NATOs Open Door Policy - http://bihnato.com/2013/06/05/nato-open-door-policy-politika-otvorenih-vrata-nato-
a (visited 27.02.2014).
3
NATO's Open Door Policy and the Next Round of Enlargement -
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/00winter/hendrick.htm (visited 27.02.2014);
Instead of naming names in Washington, the Alliance planned to focus its open door efforts
on preparing a package of measures to help aspiring members to achieve the political and
military transitions necessary to qualify for membership. This open door package, also referred
to as the membership action plan (MAP), would consist of NATO political and military
authorities interacting directly and intensively with applicant countries in identifying
shortcomings on the political and, especially, military steps that needed to be taken prior to being
invited. There would be systematic reviews within NATO possibly at the council or ministerial
level to assess the progress each applicant country has made. This would enable individual
NATO members to provide direct and targeted assistance when and where needed. In this
manner NATO would help aspiring members, as Secretary Albright proposed, to accelerate
their efforts to become the strongest possible candidates. Without designating them in advance,
we need to provide a road map that shows aspirants the way ahead.
By not singling out countries and instead concentrating on helping them to prepare for
membership, NATO may hope to avoid facing the difficult questions that its open door policy
has raised: who to invite in the next round; how many more rounds the Alliance should consider;
and what the end point of the enlargement process will be (including whether the possibility of
Russias membership should be left open). On the question of whom to invite in a second round,
there is considerable sentiment in the Alliance (led by France and Italy) for inviting one or more
southeastern European countries (Slovenia, Romania, and possibly Bulgaria) in order to
balance the invitation of northeastern countries in the first round.
However, the notion that NATO membership should be a matter of regional balancing is
one most allies reject. Secretary Albright warned her NATO colleagues, If a European country
is important to our security, if it demonstrates that it is ready politically, economically, and
militarily, to contribute to our security, it will be in our interest to welcome it through the open
door. This is the central logic of a larger NATO. A countrys place on the European map
should neither rule it in nor rule it out.20 By that standard, of the respective southeastern
European applicant states under serious consideration for a second round, Slovenia is closest to
meeting the test, followed by Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Just as many NATO countries
bordering the Mediterranean favor Alliance membership for their neighbors, so do the Nordic
countries support possible inclusion of theirs. This includes membership not just to Sweden and
Finland (which have not applied) but also for the three Baltic states. The Clinton Administration
has uttered similarly positive sentiments, when it signed a Charter of Partnership with each of the
three countries in January 1998 that formally expressed support for NATO membership.
However, it has not set a timetable for their possible inclusion or promised that one or all
would be included in a second round. Of course, membership of one or more of the Baltic states,
which regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, poses a particular challenge
to efforts to enlarge the Alliance without further antagonizing Russia. Given Moscows
predictable reaction and the fact that the Baltic states have little to contribute militarily to
NATO, it is difficult to see how their inclusion in the Alliance meets the oft-repeated test for all
new members, namely that their accession to NATO will contribute to wider European stability
and security.
Finally, there is the question of Russias possible membership. For those who view NATOs
core purpose as one of collective defense, Russian membership is excluded a priori (unless
Russias defense against a possible Chinese threat becomes the definition of that core purpose).
As former German Defense Minister Volker Rhe put it, if Russia were to become a member of
NATO it would blow NATO apart. Almost from the beginning of the enlargement process,
however, the Clinton Administration (led by the President himself) has taken a different view of
Russian membership. As early as 1995, President Clinton assured Russia that the United States
favored membership in NATO of the new Russia. Clinton also rejected the notion that NATO
enlargement would isolate Russia:
You can only believe we're isolating Russia if you believe that the great power, territorial
politics of the 20th century will dominate the 21st century; and if you believe that NATO is
inherently antagonistic to Russia's interest and that Russia inherently will have to try to exercise
greater territorial domination in the next few years than it has in the last few. I dispute that. I
believe that enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define
their greatness in more constructive ways. And the threats that we will share that will be genuine
threats to our security will compel us to cooperate in more constructive ways.
4










4
Ivo H. Dalder, NATO in the 21
st
century, April 1999, page 57-59, -
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/1999/4/nato%20daalder/reportch3.pdf (visited
27.02.2014).
CONCLUSI ON
NATO plays an essential role within the developing European Security Architecture.
NATO's membership of like-minded Allies dedicated to working together has, over the course of
its forty-five year existence, helped fundamentally improve the nature of relations between
member states. Moreover, the commitment by all Allies to defend one another's territory has
proven its value, over more than four decades, as an anchor of stability and confidence in
Europe. This commitment has helped Allied countries develop powerful and flexible military
capabilities, firmly under political control.
NATO's reliance on collective defence has ensured that no single Ally is forced to rely upon
its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Sharing these benefits
with new members can help extend security and stability in Europe. NATO's enlargement will
occur as one element of the broader evolution of European cooperation and security currently
underway. NATO's enlargement must be understood as only one important element of a broad
European security architecture that transcends and renders obsolete the idea of "dividing lines" in
Europe. Stability and security in Europe will be strengthened through an evolutionary process,
taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. NATO
enlargement will be part of that process, threaten no-one and contribute to a developing broad
European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe,
enhancing stability and security for all.
The architecture of European security is composed of European institutions and
transatlantic institutions. It includes and the OSCE, whose membership comprises all European
as well as North American countries and is thus the most inclusive European security institution,
in whose framework agreements of particular importance for European security have been
concluded. For its part, NATO has developed cooperation arrangements: the NACC and PfP,
which will continue to play an important role in the European security architecture both in
enlarging the Alliance and in strengthening Alliance relations with partner countries which may
not join the Alliance early or at all.
With regard to the enlargement of the Alliance, at this Chicago Summit there have been
many kind words but very little action. The progress made is not significant. Of the four
candidates for NATO membership, Montenegro is the candidate which seems most likely to be
next. Macedonia still has to deal with the issue of its denomination, as bitter as it is irrelevant to
the majority of the members, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, just like Georgia, still has to carry out
the Membership Action Plan, which means that it has not yet implemented the reforms and
fulfilled the requirements needed to become a member state.

BI BLI OGRAPHY

1. Article about NATOs Open Door Policy in the process of NATO enlargement -
http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_informativos/2012/DIEEEI31-
2012_ChicagoOpenDoor_BPI_ENGLISH.pdf (visited 27.02.2014);
2. NATOs Open Door Policy - http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-
eng/04open.pdf (visited 27.02.2014);
3. NATO's Open Door Policy and the Next Round of Enlargement -
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/00winter/hendrick.htm
(visited 27.02.2014);
4. NATOs Open Door Policy and the process of Keeping the Door Open -
http://bihnato.com/2013/06/05/nato-open-door-policy-politika-otvorenih-vrata-nato-a/
(visited 27.02.2014);
5. Ivo H. Dalder, NATO in the 21
st
century, April 1999, -
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/1999/4/nato%20daalder/reportc
h3.pdf (visited 27.02.2014);
6. Official website of NATO - http://www.nato.int;