Professional Documents
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Contents
CONTENTS....................................................................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................................3
THE BATTLE FRONT:........................................................................................................................................3
THE GREAT WAR:...........................................................................................................................................3
The Facts That Make This War So Great...............................................................................................3
Why It Is Important To Now That This Was A Great War .....................................................................3
Why Did The Size Of The Armies Increase So Greatly...........................................................................3
WAR PLANS...................................................................................................................................................4
THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN (GERMAN):....................................................................................................................4
The Plan..................................................................................................................................................4
Schlieffen’s Plan revised 1906 to 1914...................................................................................................5
Why the Schlieffen Plan Would Have Failed..........................................................................................6
PLAN XVII (FRENCH):.....................................................................................................................................6
Plan.........................................................................................................................................................6
Problems with Plan XVII........................................................................................................................6
MOVEMENT TO STALEMATE.................................................................................................................7
RESULT:..........................................................................................................................................................8
STALEMATE AND MOVEMENT ON THE WESTERN FRONT..........................................................8
A SIGNIFICANT BATTLE, THE SOMME .............................................................................................10
SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCATION:............................................................................................................................10
PROBLEMS IN PLANNING:.................................................................................................................................10
FINAL AIMS:.................................................................................................................................................11
THE PLAN:....................................................................................................................................................11
PROBLEMS:....................................................................................................................................................11
ASSESSMENT OF THE BATTLE OF SOMME:..........................................................................................................12
Losses....................................................................................................................................................12
Success..................................................................................................................................................12
LAMBS TO THE SLAUGHTER:............................................................................................................................13
ONE IMPORTANT MILITARY LEADER, GENERAL HAIG.............................................................13
CHRONOLOGY OF LIFE:...................................................................................................................................13
TWO VIEWS ON HAIG:....................................................................................................................................14
TRENCHES..................................................................................................................................................15
THE TRENCHES FROM ABOVE:.........................................................................................................................15
THE TRENCHES FROM WITHIN:........................................................................................................................16
WHAT IT WAS LIKE IN THE TRENCHES:............................................................................................................17
The Soldiers’ Problems.........................................................................................................................17
What Sustained a Soldier......................................................................................................................20
Other Comforts.....................................................................................................................................21
WHAT IT WAS LIKE FIGHTING IN THE TRENCHES:..............................................................................................21
The Strain and Torment of it All...........................................................................................................21
Going into Battle...................................................................................................................................22
WEAPONS OF WAR...................................................................................................................................25
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RIFLES:.........................................................................................................................................................25
BAYONET:.....................................................................................................................................................25
GRENADE:.....................................................................................................................................................25
LEWIS GUN:..................................................................................................................................................26
MACHINEGUNS:............................................................................................................................................26
MORTAR:......................................................................................................................................................26
ARTILLERY:...................................................................................................................................................26
GAS:............................................................................................................................................................27
Chlorine Gas.........................................................................................................................................28
Phosgene Gas.......................................................................................................................................28
Mustard Gas.........................................................................................................................................28
Response to Gas....................................................................................................................................28
The Problems Germans Had.................................................................................................................28
FLAMETHROWER:............................................................................................................................................28
MINING:.......................................................................................................................................................29
AEROPLANES:................................................................................................................................................29
TANKS:.........................................................................................................................................................29
Disadvantages of Tanks........................................................................................................................29
Role of Tanks in War............................................................................................................................30
Effect of Tanks on War..........................................................................................................................30
THE WAR IN THE AIR..............................................................................................................................31
TASKS DONE BY AIRCRAFT DURING WAR:........................................................................................................31
SUPERIORITY IN THE AIR:................................................................................................................................31
ZEPPELINS:....................................................................................................................................................32
IMPACT OF AIR WAR ON THE WAR:.................................................................................................................32
THE NAVAL WAR......................................................................................................................................33
CHRONOLOGY OF THE NAVAL WAR:.................................................................................................................33
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 1916:......................................................................................................................34
UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE:.............................................................................................................34
THE AUSTRALIAN HOME FRONT........................................................................................................35
KING AND COUNTRY:......................................................................................................................................35
WOMEN OF WORLD WAR I:............................................................................................................................35
ALIENS:........................................................................................................................................................36
PROPAGANDA:................................................................................................................................................37
Purpose.................................................................................................................................................37
How It Was Used..................................................................................................................................37
The Propagandist’s Handbook.............................................................................................................38
CONSCRIPTION:..............................................................................................................................................39
Definition..............................................................................................................................................39
The Lead Up to the Referendums and Consequently ‘No’ to Conscription .........................................40
VICTORY AND DEFEAT...........................................................................................................................43
REASONS FOR ALLIED VICTORY:......................................................................................................................43
Maintenance of Home Front − Allies through.......................................................................................43
CASUALTIES AND THE COST OF WAR:...............................................................................................................44
Economic cost.......................................................................................................................................44
COMING HOME: OPTIMISM AND DISILLUSIONMENT:.............................................................................................44
ENLISTMENTS AND CASUALTIES:.......................................................................................................................45
EUROPE BEFORE (LEFT) AND AFTER (RIGHT) THE WAR:....................................................................................45
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Introduction
For The Causes/Origins of World War I See Origins of World War I
The Battle Front:
• When War started in 1914 most people believed that the war was going to be over
very soon.
• When people were recruited the figures were high.
• However, within four months the war had been bogged in the Western Front, in fact
both sides were to move very little over the next four years.
The Great War:
The Facts That Make This War So Great
• There have been in the past many wars, which were of longer duration.
• There have been none in which the opposing armies were permanently in contact.
• There have been none in which the numbers engaged have been so huge.
• From the first day to the last the guns never ceased firing.
Why It Is Important To Now That This Was A Great War
• Because of how different it was from the previous wars.
• That trench warfare cause mass deaths and theoretically made stalemates
• The troops were consider as object not humans, as it was not “necessary to calculate
how many men could be fed and kept healthy at any given time and place; the
question became how many men capable of bearing arms were available”1
Why Did The Size Of The Armies Increase So Greatly
• The size of the armies expanded because of transport, in that a motor lorry could
carry three to four times as much as the horsedrawn vehicle and could travel much
faster.
1
Major General Sir F. Maurice Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, Vol. 2
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War Plans
17/10/98
The Schlieffen Plan (German):
The Plan
• Developed: 1897 to 1905
• By: Count Alfred von Schlieffen (Chief of General Staff)
• Underlying reason: Germany would, in the future, face a war on two fronts,
against France and Russia.
• Schlieffen believed, justifiably, that Russia would be slow in mobilising its forces at
the start of a war.
• Therefore, Russia was unlikely to be able to attack for a good 6 weeks following the
outbreak of hostilities.
• This gave Germany a great opportunity to launch a massive blow to France leading
to its defeat and this would enable Germany to fight on a single front against Russia.
• Note: Germany had an efficient rail network and could move troops and
equipment from the French front to the Russian front.
• To avoid delays in northeastern France from forts, the Vosges mountains and the
wooded uplands of the Ardennes, the plan was to invade through a small part of The
Netherlands (known as the Maastricht Appendix) and through neutral Belgium and
on into France. Germany regarded the Belgian’s Neutrality Treaty of 1836 as a
‘scrap of paper’.
• The right end (or wing) of the German advance was to be six times stronger than the
left wing.
• The German left wing was to simply hold the French and could even fall back, thus
drawing the French forward a little.
• The right wing would move south, going west of Paris, and then turn to encircle the
remaining French armies from behind.
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Schlieffen’s Plan revised 1906 to 1914
• By: ColonelGeneral Helmuth von Moltke (Schlieffen’s
successor), hard worker, but lacked confidence.
• Why revise: It was thought that a French advance into Lorraine (as per
Plan XVII) threatened German communication.
• Assigned any new divisions created to the left wing and not to the previously much
stronger right wing.
• Removed the advance through The Netherlands – this restricted the right wing to a
bottleneck.
• In retaining a German advance through Belgium, was violating a neutrality treaty.
The French did not expect a German advance through neutral Belgium, and in fact,
the French Plan (Plan XVII) played into the Schlieffen Plan’s hands.
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Why the Schlieffen Plan Would Have Failed
• There was too little attention paid to:
• Overextended supply lines.
• Inadequate communication systems.
• Impact of battle.
• Weariness and drain on soldiers
• The Schlieffen Plan underestimated:
• The strength of Belgian resistance.
• The speed of Russian mobilisation.
• The reaction of Great Britain to the violation of the Belgian Neutrality Treaty of
1836.
• The Schlieffen Plan was too inflexible. If Russia mobilised, Germany’s response
under the Schlieffen Plan was to attack France.
• In practice:
• The German invasion could not be sustained west of Paris and in the end turned
east of Paris. Despite the French government temporarily transferring, Paris was
not taken. This was significant to French morale.
• The gap, which had developed between the German First and Second armies (48
km wide), led to defeat on the Marne. According to J.M. Winter, even if Germany
had won the Battle of the Marne, it could have advanced no further due to the
Schlieffen Plan’s failure to cater for troop exhaustion and communication
problems.
Plan XVII (French):
Plan
• By: General Joseph Joffre, (Chief of General Staff, 1911 to
1916)
• Nature: Attack the Germans with full force!
Note:
Joffre discarded an earlier plan’s proposed defensive allocation of
troops along the FrenchBelgian border.
• Using five French armies, two on the French right wing to push into Lorraine (ideal
for German Schlieffen Plan), another into Metz, the fourth on the left had a couple of
options and use the fifth as a reserve.
Problems with Plan XVII
• Plan partly played into the hands of the Schlieffen Plan.
• Underestimated by:
• The strengths of the Germans through not allowing for the use by the Germans of
reserve units, he strength and breadth of German advance through Belgium.
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Movement to Stalemate
• Germany invaded through Belgium.
• Strong and delaying Belgian resistance, for example Liege held out 12 days.
• Schlieffen Plan relying on speed of attack was already suffering.
• Belgium collapses.
• German right wing moving into France met stiff opposition from Great Britain’s
Expeditionary Force (BEF) (Under Sir John) French especially Battle of Mons
(2123 August, 1914). French thus able to regroup.
• Russia by now (late August) had quickly mobilised and threatened Germany’s eastern
front − ‘war by timetable’ was on the threshold of failing.
• Ending August − 80 km from Paris − exhaustion set in along with lack of food for the
Germans.
• Battle of the Marne, (59 September, 1914), along a 24 km front. French used taxis to
rush troops to defend near the river Maine. When a gap opened in the German lines,
Sir John French thought it was a trick and so held back. General Joseph Joffre
launched a strong attack and opened up the German lines. Germans could not seal
gap − 5 days later retreated to river Aisne and commenced to ‘dig in’.
• “The Battle of the Marne, in which it has been calculated some 57 allied divisions
(eight cavalry) turned back 53 German (seven cavalry) was over, and with it died
the famous Schlieffen Plan. Tactically, its results were disappointing for it was
not fought of the bitter end. Strategically, it was of profound importance, for it
meant all hope of a swift knockout blow was over… Joffre is not generally
numbered among the great captains, but he had won one of the strategically
decisive battles of all time.” 2
• Each side now (September 1914) tried to go around the northern end of the other’s
line (outflanking), an apparent ‘Race to the Sea’ (Consequently the first battle of
Ypres occurred).
• Bloody fighting broke out at Ypres (18 October − 22 November, 1914) when the
Germans (Under von Falkenhayen) tried to move to capture the Channel ports.
Ypres, the last Belgian town held by the Allies, was of limited strategic value.
Nevertheless, tens of thousands of soldiers were killed (British: 56 000, French: 50
000 & Germans: 130 000) . Both sides having fought ferociously had been unable to
force and to hold a breakthrough. Germans had failed in their second great effort of
the short war. The front lines now were unbroken from the North Sea to Switzerland
and were almost stationary.
2
Brigadier Peter Young, The Battle for Northern France
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Result:
• The Allies would not be as close to victory again until 1918. As Moltke realised, the
Germans had lost their chance of a quick victory in France. Germany now faced a
twofront war with trenches already started.
• Trench warfare on the Western Front had begun.
• Stalemate existed.
Stalemate and Movement on the Western Front
Date Battle/Area Main Purpose/Comment
Attackers
6 − 9 September, Battle of the Germans Trying to advance as per Schlieffen Plan.
1914 Marne French halted German advance at the Marne.
Gap in German line forces them to retreat to
river Aisne
14 September − 18 ‘Race to the Both Outflanking manoeuvre
October, 1914 Sea’
February − March, Champagne French Attempt to force Germans back in effect failed
1915 as there were 90 000 casualties for an 8 km
gain
Channel Ports German Germany tried to reach and to take Channel
ports to then make Great Britain vulnerable −
unsuccessful
18 October − 22 1st Battle of German Tried to capture last Belgian town held by
November, 1914 Ypres Allies − unsuccessful − but resulted in a salient
being created and loss of 50 000 British lives.
From this point on Allied determination to
defend Ypres and to try to break out of it
meant a large number of Allied casualties.
Use of Poison gas by Germans
Frontline now basically stationary − from
STALEMATE
North Sea to Switzerland
25 September − 4 Battle of Loos British Unsuccessful − showed up shortcomings in
November, 1915 organisation and leadership. British use gas
21 February, 1916 Battle of German Verdun − a line of forts. German tactics not
− 15 December, Verdun necessarily to take the area, but to force
1916 France to allocate vital troops to defend it,
and for the Germans to kill as many French
as possible − to ‘bleed France white’. This
episode also known as the ‘Verdun Mincing
Machine’. French in the end recovered most
of the ground lost from February. A classic
case of deadlock on the Western Front, of
attrition, and proving yet again the folly of the
SledgeHammer approach. France lost about
377 000 men, Germany about 337 000 men.
In the end, both sides were ‘bled’.
1 July, 1916 − 19 Battle of the British and Aim:
November, 1916 Somme French • To provide relief for French at Verdun.
• To show German line could be broken.
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Heavy bombardment failed to break German
wire, British tanks tried, but stuck in mud −
about 8 km gained − massive casualties − 620
000 (British and French), about 450 000
German − a failure.
9 − 12 April, 1917 Battle of British Aim:
Arros • To draw German reserves from the area
of the Nivelle Offensive on the Aisne.
Vimy Ridge captured (cost 11 000 casualties),
but section of the Hindenburg Line not taken.
11 April, 1917 Bullecourt Australian Australians made it through to the second line
of German trenches on Hindenburg Line but
organisation re British artillery support
woeful. Australia lost 2 258 men out of 3 000
involved. A further damaging blow to
Australian view of British generals.
16 − 27 April, 1917 Nivelle French Aim:
Offensive • Via mass attack to breakthrough
(also known Failure − 187 000 French loss − from 17 April
as Chamin des led to increasing mutiny by French troops.
Dames Nivelle replace by Petain (hero of Verdun) −
Offensive) in apart from improving soldiers’ support,
the area Petain in effect ruled out any more large
around St scale offensives. He was waiting for the USA
Quentin and more tanks. Mutinous French troops were
only about 1 per cent of the total. From about
this time, Haig and the British army took on a
main responsibility for Western Front action.
June, 1917 Messines British and Mines and planted explosives captured a hill,
Australian but hesitancy on the part of Gough (British)
meant this gain could not be exploited.
August − 3rd Battle of British Haig’s attempt to:
November, 1917 Ypres, known • Drive Germans from the Belgian coast
as and break out of the Ypres salient.
Passchendale • Engage Germany in attrition until US
troops arrived, failed. Some 11 km cost
245 000 casualties in atrocious weather.
20 November, 1917 Cambrai British Tanks grouped for a ‘tank assault’ −
successful to reduce pressure on Italians after
Caporetto, and to restore BEF morale
following disaster of the 3rd Battle of Ypres,
but reserves not available to capitalise on
gains of Cambrai. It was shown that such
tactics could break trench deadlock. Germans
also showed that, in regaining much of the
ground the use of short artillery
bombardment, gas, smoke, storm troops plus
many aircraft attacking the ground, trench
deadlock could be broken.
21 March − 5 April, German German Using troops released by withdrawal of
1918 Spring Russia from the war, Ludendorff mounted a
Offensive series of offensives to grab victory − especially
(also known before US troops arrived and built up.
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as Ludendorff Breakthrough, about 50 km
Offensive)
MOVEMENT AGAIN
April − July, 1918 German German Subsidiary attacks also successful in gaining
Spring ground − by 27 May 1918 only 60 km from
Offensive Paris − but German army very battleweary.
continues
8 August − 25 Allied Allied, including Once Allies propped up by fresh US counter
September, 1918 Counter the USA attack − German resistance weak. Allies
offensive regained lost ground.
Allies from 26 September, 1918 are advanced beyond the front of 20 March, 1918 − push to armistice.
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A Significant Battle, The Somme
19/10/98
• Location: Western Front, France, near Maricourt
• Date: 1 July, 1916 − 18 November, 1916
Significance of Location:
• Originally to be a joint BritishFrench attack, the site marked the dividing line
between French and British sectors of the Western Front.
• No other item of particular significance.
• However, by the time the offensive came the French could provide only a small
number of troops, owing to Verdun. Great Britain, for the first time, was to take the
prime responsibility for an offensive on the Western Front.
Problems in Planning:
• Differences between Rawlinson and Haig.
• Haig wanted to hammer the Germans with a massive force and force a
breakthrough.
• Rawlinson was always more cautious, and wanted to ‘bite and hold’.
• German spotterplanes and tunnellers saw and heard preparations. All they did not
know was when, until they intercepted a ‘good luck’ message from Rawlinson.
• Plan, when approved, was too rigid should anything unforeseen occur; the plan was
still to be followed, so that when the German line was well broken, no fresh orders
came and troops merely ‘held’ their position.
Final Aims:
• Draw German pressure off the French at Verdun.
• Breakthrough in the northern part of the assault.
The Plan:
• Very heavy bombardment to drive Germans out of their positions.
• Followed by a drive from infantry to take and to consolidate the German trenches
before Germans returned after the bombardment. (This was a classic offensive
pattern during World War I.)
Problems:
• 24 June to 1 July about 2 million shells were dropped (many did not explode
another unplanned matter).
• In order to consolidate, after taking the German trenches, the soldiers had to carry
much equipment with them, hence, when attacking; they were told not to run.
• For 3 of the scheduled 5 days of bombardment heavy rain fell, forcing postponement
the advance.
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• This meant that ammunition for the big guns had to be spread morethinly to allow
for an extra 3 days’ firing.
• There were too few big guns and too great a reliance on shrapnel, rather than blasts,
to cut the wire.
• The wire was not cut, yet the bombardment so churned up no man’s land that many
Allied soldiers had difficulty getting through.
• Germans had defensive system underground.
• Attitude was such that once the bombardment was over troops would easily walk to
the German trenches. One company from Surrey acted as if it was a big game of
football, kicking footballs into no man’s land in broad daylight. This was not a dawn
raid.
• The notion of long, single lines of soldiers advancing at walking pace was
inappropriate and the French model of short, smaller rushes should have been tried.
• Soldiers were generally carrying 29 kg of gear each. Many didn't even reach beyond
their own wire.
• Artillery guns raised their field of fire too quickly. The infantry could not keep up,
giving the Germans extra time to return to their firing posts.
• The infantry lost the race to get to the German trenches before they returned from
their very well prepared dugouts. The chance to win the battle was already lost.
• 20,000 British dead on first day. 40,000 more injured − machinegun had triumphed.
• Where an advance was successfully made by troops along about 9.5 km of front (out
of a total of around 42 km) and open country could be seen, Rawlinson refused
French requests to send forward the cavalry. These he ordered home, without seeing
any action.
• Battle continued for another five months. Any time there was a burst through; poor
leadership gave the Germans the chance to defend the second line. Haig continued
the offensive beyond September, believing that the Germans would collapse if
pressure were maintained. Haig was wrong.
• In desperation tanks were used, but there were not enough. Many broke down; many
became stuck in the mud. Given the inappropriate terrain, the element of surprise
was lost for the future use of tanks.
• From October the weather was very poor, turning the field into a quagmire.
• The battle was brought to an end by bad weather in November.
Assessment of the Battle of Somme:
• Haig claimed victory.
• He believed that he had:
• Provided relief for the French at Verdun.
• Prevented the transfer of German troops to fight Russia and Italy.
• Inflicted heavy troop losses on the Germans.
• Also tanks were used successfully at Cambrai in 1917, so the element of surprise
was not totally given away by Haig.
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Winston Churchill's point was that no real alteration to the front lines had occurred and
there was no strategic advantage for either side.
Many of those killed on the British side were from the ‘Pals’ companies, formed in the
New Army. There was a devastating loss of morale amongst those remaining at the front
and amongst the communities at home.
In Germany, the losses at Verdun and the Somme were so great that every male between
17 and 60 was conscripted for service for warwork. The war had come home.
With hindsight it is unfortunate that the philosophies of the huge frontal offensive and the
notion that the war was to be won on the Western Front were still both in vogue and in
political favour in Great Britain even after the Somme. Soon after the 3rd Ypres battle
would occur with more senseless losses. Following that, the Allies waited for the USA.
Losses
British: 419 654
French: 204 253
Germans: 600 000 (Note: The German front line remained largely intact.)
Success
Success for the British could be deemed marginal, at best. Germans did put increased
effort into the Somme and less on Verdun, but so little ground (about 6 km) was gained
for so many losses.
Lambs to the Slaughter:
“It was a beautiful sunny morning and in the lull between the bombardment and the start
of the machinegun fire the soldiers could hear the birds singing. As untried civilian
volunteers they were trained simply to clamber over the trench parapet and form ‘waves’
of about 1,000, two paces between each man, and then advance at walking pace towards
the Germans. More waves would follow at 90 metre intervals… they went straight into
the worst slaughter ever suffered by a British army”3
3
C. Mair, Britain at War, 19141919, publication details unknown, Pg. 50
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One Important Military Leader, General Haig
Name: General Sir Douglas Haig
Position: British Field Marshel
Lived: 1861−1928
Chronology of Life:
Officer in cavalry, 1885
Sudan 1898, Boer War with distinction, 18991902 (he was French's Chief of Staff).
Suspicious of new strategies and weapons.
Militarily orthodox, unimaginative, yet highly regarded by colleagues.
At the time of the Ludendorff Offensive of March 1918, when the Allies were driven back,
Haig rallied the cause with his famous words (10 April 1918):
“Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our
backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one must fight on to the
end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct
of each one of us at this critical moment”4
The irony is that Haig spent his postwar years working for exservicemen, especially
disabled ones, many of whom would have been disabled because of the folly of his own
military policy.
From 1906 to 1909 Haig was employed at the War Office, assisting in introduction of
reforms of Haldane (the creation of General Staff, Officer Training Corps, cut
expenditure, made mobilisation quicker, and provided for an expeditionary force). Haig
clearly used his time at home in the War Office well as he was knighted in 1909.
4
Quoted in A. Gilbert, The Illustrated History of World War I, Pg. 163
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In August 1914 Haig went to France as a general commanding the British First Army
through the battles at Mons, Ypres and Loos.
10 December 1915 Haig succeeded Sir John French as British CommanderinChief on
the Western Front.
Haig was a ‘Westerner’, believing that the war would be won on the Western Front, a
front he seldom visited.
Haig was a personal friend of King George V, yet at odds with soontobe Prime
Minister, David Lloyd George, who did not share Haig’s propensity to risk so many lives
through offensives of dubious value and no apparent success.
Haig was the supremo for the disastrous Somme Offensive of 1916. Perhaps showing that
Haig was not the only deluded one at the time as he was made a Field Marshal two
months after the Somme on 1 January 1917 and 2 years later was made an earl.
In April 1918 Earl Haig gained the appointment of the French Marshal Foch as Allied
CommanderinChief of Western Front and they worked in tandem.
Two Views on Haig:
“…as a cavalry man he had little knowledge of an infantry war…His pursuit of
impossible goals on the Somme and at Passchendale cost the British dearly…Haig’s
answer to his critics was to say that he had fought one continuous battle in 19141918
and had won it.”5
“Silent, humourless and reserved, Haig was also shrewd and ambitious and had
unbounded self esteem. He believed that he had been chosen by God to ‘do much good
and benefit’ to his country.”6
5
J.M. Winter, The Experience of World War I, Pg.96
6
A. Livesey, Great Battles of World War I, Pg. 106
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Trenches
26/10/98
The Trenches From Above:
• Both the German and British governments built trenches in central city parks so that
the civilians could see what their troops were going through. This was done too
subtle propaganda attempt to convince those at home that the boys at the front were
being well looked after. These model trenches failed to give a true impression of what
the real trenches were like, for two main reasons:
• Constant bombardment and rain at the front meant that they were never as neat
and tidy as the model trenches. Even more important is the fact that the models
failed to convey the incredible complex nature of the trench formations.
• Behind the front line there was a series of interconnecting trenches, which in some
areas went on for miles. There were observation posts, advance line trenches, dummy
trenches, support trenches, communication trenches and reserve lines
• Behind the front line, there were mortar dugouts, first aid posts, ammunition dumps,
signal depots, field hospitals, horse lines and positions for the heavy artillery guns.
• Further back still were general headquarters and village billets for troops when they
were not fighting. This complexity was true of both Allied and German trenches.
• Between the Allied and German positions was an area that became known as ‘no
man’s land’. This was the area that had to be crossed if one army was to try to
capture the trenches of the other. In some places, noman’s land could be several
kilometres wide, in others as narrow as a few hundred metres. At Zonnebeke in 1915,
German and British troops were less than 10 metres apart. No man’s land was
guarded by barbed wire and often mined.
The Trenches From Within:
• The cross section of a trench shows the idealised, textbook version of a trench. This is
the clean, strong, safe structure that governments wanted the public back home to
believe the troops were fighting from.
• The average trench was about 1.2 metres wide and 1.7 metres deep. On the floor
were duckboards needed because of the frequent rain. Above the duckboard was a
firestep on which soldiers would stand in order to fire. Timber was used to strengthen
the sides. The top of the trench was protected from the impact of artillery blasts by
sandbags and from invading enemy troops by barbed wire. As time went on, the
trenches became more complicated.
• German trenches tended to be more solid than the Allied ones. They were sometimes
reinforced with concrete, with bunkers up to 12 metres deep in which troops sought
protection during a prolonged artillery attack. There were dugouts in which the men
could sleep. There were special chambers built in which ammunition and food could
be stored. In the rear trenches the complexity increased and small rooms were built
off the line of the trench. Officers had much better trenches than their men. Some
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German bunkers captured in the war were found to have wallpaper and even
electricity.
• The reality of the trenches was quite different. After years of artillery bombardment
and torrential rain, the pristine condition of the trenches disappeared.
Top View
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Side View
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What It Was Like in the Trenches:
The Soldiers’ Problems
Weather
“D. Winter suggests that the real enemy in the trenches for soldiers with prolonged
inactivity was the weather and the rough life.”7
Cold
“Soldiers wearing long underwear (longjohns), thick socks, woollen vest and cardigan,
short sheepskin coat, still found themselves unable to escape the cold, even putting on an
extra vest and putting newspapers between layers of clothing did not solve the problem.
Men found that, at times, it was so cold that, within minutes a hot cup of tea froze and
bully beef iced over − these men were cold! (In addition to being shot at and bombed).
Given that fires became impossible (let alone that they might attract enemy snipers) men
resorted to flapping their arms and stamping the ground to try to keep warm. Standing
all night in a muddy trench with sodden clothing, staring at the shadows made the arrival
of the warmth of sunshine in the morning most welcome. Clearly soldiers appreciated a
small comfort.”8
Mud
“Given that the shelling, trench construction and the consequent creation of no man's
land area denuded the countrysideas soon as rain hit the war zone ‘countryside’
became mud nearly 1 m thick. Boyd Orr in As I Recall D. Winter reckoned that 40
Englishmen a night drowned in it. Drowning was something to be very wary of by
soldiers on the front. There were also numerous cases of horses being drowned in shell
holes full of water or mud and equipment was sometimes lost.
For soldiers, sinking about 250 mm into mud meant that even with boots on, the moisture
and dirt got insweated their feet, wrinkled the skin and made trenchfeet a probability.
The men, owing to duty and the dampness and cold, could not dry their clothing and
footwear. In fact, at some stage men who took their boots off found them frozen stiff − and
consequently their boots were even harder to put back on and obviously made their feet
even colder. It was sometimes hard, with wet feet in muddy boots, to even walk on
slippery duckboards.
One instance in the Somme area saw a man trapped for nearly 3 days, with two men
pulling on ropes finally freeing him, only to see his clothing sucked off him by the mud.”9
7
D. Winter, Death’s Men, Pg. 9699
8
ibid
9
ibid
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Vermin
Beetles, ants, caterpillars, Bites could swell up a man’s face badly
greenfly and mosquitoes
More than 100 could be on body at once. They fed 12 times
a day, holding onto clothing fibres, as they drank blood.
Eggs could resist all cold. Not much physical damage was
Lice done, but the lice could be felt moving over the body until,
after a fortnight, each individual bite was felt. Scratching
under trench conditions men risked boils, impetigo, or
ulcers.
Multiplied rapidly as there were no predator cats. Rats fed
on food dropped, and on the many dead bodies. More
numerous in the rest areas where food was more plentiful.
Rats
Many men spoke of killing as many as 30 rats a night. Gas
attacks did kill them off for a short time and then more
would come.
Drawn by the excrement of the thousands of horses (and
Flies men on the front and dead bodies). Winter speaks of one
soldier counting 32 dead flies in his shaving water and 72
on him arm. There were too many flies to get rid of them.
“Time on the front, linked with worsening conditions as the war went on, increased
hospital admissions for nonbattle casualties, including − bad teeth, breathing and
digestive disorders, frostbite, and flu.
D. Winter quotes from a hospital admission register for 1917 showing the extent of
casualties unrelated to enemy action.
Cause of Admission No. of Admissions 1917
Dysentery 6 025
Enteric 1 275
Frostbite 21 487
Meningitis 692
Nephritis 15 214
Pneumonia 2 157
Tuberculosis 1 660
Tuberculosis 1 660
VD (Venereal Disease) 48 508
The noticeably high amount of VD is related to the ability, or more to the point, the
inability of soldiers to get home visàvis the availability of local women on the front.
One could also assume that it was a pleasurable way to get out of the war for a while.
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Often men were punished for being sick. Trench fever was later to be shown to be a real
disease, related to infected lice. Sufferers were given a punitive treatment in hospital.
Some men deliberately wounded or incapacitated themselves in order to be sent home.
Amongst the British such injuries were known as ‘Blighty’ wounds. The army often gave
men ‘a pill’ to get better. Worse cases were then often treated with punishment. Scabies
sufferers were thought to be ‘putting it on’ and were given a starvation diet.”10
Trenchfoot
“Brought on by regular dampness of feet in freezing water, thawing and freezing of feet,
and lack of exercise turned feet blue; some toes even came off and gangrene set in. The
British army made trenchfoot a crime and insisted on regular bathing with a substance
normally used for oiling, rifles or to fuel trench stoves!”11
What Sustained a Soldier
Comforts
These were their mates; they’re longing for home and immediate comfortsthe chief one
of which was food.
Main Comfort = food (note − not sense of duty, devotion to cause, and so on − such
notions had worn away after a while or were not the main comfort to the men). Food
meant a chance to have a brief respite and to share comradeship and memories. It gave a
connection to the notion of ‘homelife’ of sharing a ‘meal’ with a friend.
Indeed for some soldiers their comrades on the front became their family.
When they could eat ‘wet food’ it would be stew and porridge. Other food included: bully
beef (in tins), biscuits (very hard), tea, sugar, jam, Maconochie stew, and bread.
Typical Day’s Food (In Theory!)
Food was divided up on arrival to:
• Breakfast − half a round of biscuit, onethird of a loaf of bread; a tin of butter shared
amongst nine men, tin of jam for six; and halfamug of tea.
• Lunch − a Maconochie stew amongst four men.
• Tea − two thick rounds of bread and jam, halfamug of tea, no milk.
Problems in Soldiers’ Food Supply in Practice
Affecting the theory were:
• Transport breakdowns.
• Damage whilst being carried.
• Mud.
• Being bombed by the enemy.
10
ibid
11
ibid
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• The soldiers carrying the food sometimes fell into shell craters, which meant the
flavour of chemicals, excrement, dead bodies, affected the food.
• Heavy casualties in the group meant that individuals received more for a time, as
there were less to share with.
• Bully beef created a big thirst and more than the tea was needed − sometimes shell
holes full of water were used for a supply, straining the muddy water through a
handkerchief − but D. Winter cites Harrison, who referred to the British using a
particular shellhole for water for several days until the body of a dead German was
discovered in the waterhole.
Other Comforts
Rum and other concessions:
• Issued sometimes when the weather was particularly bad.
• Issued after Stand Down at dawn (oneseventh of a litre), to be consumed in the
presence of an officer so that soldiers could not buildup stocks.
• Soldiers only received rum if times were, or were going to be, tense.
• Cigarettes.
• Occasional chocolate.
• Opportunity for a wash.
• Going to the toilet in peace − unfortunately many latrine areas from the air looked
like a mortar position, meaning that many men preferred to use a bucket or helmet
and toss the contents into no man’s land. It is no surprise that one of the Australian
trench newspapers was called the Wipers Times (and not just as a play on Ypres).
Grass or even the tail of a shirt was also used in lieu of paper. The US soldiers were
issued not only with toilet paper, but soft paper at that.
• Small petssometimes kittens, usually birds. The birds, in particular, with their calls
and activity gave many men some hope and distracted their attention.
What It Was Like Fighting in the Trenches:
The Strain and Torment of it All
“As war went on, the number of behaviour disorder cases unrelated to battle sharply
increased for example in the British army in 1914 there were 1,906 cases, and in 1915,
20,327”12
• Mental anxiety generated severe physical symptoms. Remember there had been little
assessment of the nature of men accepted into the army.
• In this new form of war − even if not engaged in battle or directly at the front − high
explosives could still endanger/kill soldiers. Soldiers could legitimately feel under
threat of death at all times.
• It was very rare that the sight of a corpse was not far awayreinforcing soldiers' own
mortality and perhaps the good luck they had had thus far.
• Some men cracked suddenly; others were gradually worn down, deteriorating over
time − the latter particularly needed their mates.
12
ibid
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In the British and German army soldiers could be shot for cowardice, but not so in the
Australian army.
‘Battle fatigue’ or shell shock was not recognised as a legitimate condition until after the
war.
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Going into Battle
Wait uneasily for sunrise − many hoping in vain for a change in orders to relieve them of going ‘over
the top’, but thoughts of possible death and likely handtohand fighting could not be excluded.
Overwhelming sound of final artillery barrage forcefully reminded soldiers of their impending action.
(In favorable weather conditions, this could be heard in London.) Soldiers spoke of the sound not
going in any direction, but just being in the sky, often accompanied by shaking ground
Soldiers’ responses to the approaching time of attack − included shaking, sweating, dry lips, silly
jokes to settle nerves, looking at letters or photographs of sentimental value; most were silent, eyes
glassy, and skin white. Some shook each other’s hands. Foulmouthed men were known to break into
singing of hymns.
Ten Minutes to Attack Timeorder of events:
• Rum was often issued (c.70 mL)
• Order to fix bayonets.
• Officer checked equipment − picks, shovels, Verey lights, sandbags (needed to reinforce any
captured position), Lewis Gun ammunition, barbed wire. The officer might also pass some brief
word of encouragement or triviality to assist his men.
At designated time of attack − officer blew his whistle, dropped a cap or flag and the men went:
OVER THE TOP
His entire body was now above ground and exposed to the enemy.
The procedure was that along the front line in the area of attack a single line of men, with bayoneted
rifles at the ready, clambered up and out of the trench.
Each soldier protected for so long by the ground he lived below now had his entire body exposed to
enemy machineguns sweeping the parapet with bullets—
Result: Instant Death for AT LEAST some − the soldiers going over the top were totally vulnerable.
A second wave (line) of men followed c. 18 m behindboth waves moved forward into:
NO MAN’S LAND
Problems faced in no man’s land
• Soldiers had to make sure that they did not advance too quickly or they would have been blasted
by their artillery, yet if they advanced too slowly the enemy had time to return to their machine
guns to fire.
• If they advanced even more slowly they were frightened of being charged with cowardice and/or
facing military police pushing them forward. Broken ground/shell holes made it hard to keep the
line and at a uniform pace.
• Shells bursting ground shaking, and general smoke and consequent loss of clear vision were
unnerving. Some soldiers became disoriented and ‘advanced’ towards or parallel to their own
trenches.
• Soldiers tried desperately to both see the next man in line and what he was doing. Soldiers
naturally tended to want to cluster together (to the disapproval of officers) and were fearful of
being isolated, especially as
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Continued…
The deafening noise of shell bursts and other noises meant others could not hear soldiers. If they
could have heard the soldier calling out, or even signalling, it might serve only to attract enemy fire.
Fear of shrapnel.
Fear of being wounded and not rescued, only to die after days of agony or numbness. Having been
trained to follow orders, the soldiers were often now in a position where circumstances changed but
no fresh orders were available − in a situation of terror, a soldier trained to follow orders had to make
his own decisions. It should be noted − that the order and structure of the attack before going over the
top was often, by the time the soldier was in no man's land, simply confusion and chaos.
Fresh orders, when given, were often delayed. Updates on the progress of the attack were also often
delayed, meaning that commanders away from the front were making decisions on battle information
at least one hourold.
OBJECTIVE GAINED
OR
ATTACK DISINTEGRATES WITH
SUCCESS
NIGHTFALL OR POOR WEATHER
OR BATTLE CONCLUDES
OR
FAILURE
ENEMY WITHDRAWS
OR
ATTACK REPELLED BY ENEMY
• Roll call
• Soldiers:
• Weary, mentally and physically.
• Sadnessat loss of colleagues and mates, and at the suffering seen of the wounded. (The
cries and screams of some of the wounded would be still occurring or still ringing in their
ears).
• Anger and irritability, a result of pentup emotion (including fear) released by the end of
the attack and a result of the general poorer physical condition of trench soldiers.
• Burial parties formed where practicable.
• Any wounded who were rescued were taken to hospitals’ where strict regimes and
generally poor medical technology had many soldiers later believing that they were better
off at the front.
Cold
Wet
Mud
BASICALLY, NOW A RETURN TO
‘NORMAL’ TRENCH SITUATION Riflecleaning
Snipers
Predawn Stand
Other duties
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Weapons of War
Individuals In the front line trench neither had few real personal defences, nor could they
cut a swathe through the enemy on their own. It was only ingroups, or through the use of
mass weapons of destruction that any appreciable impact could be made. This made the
individual soldier feel, in many ways, rather helpless with his rifle as his main personal
security blanket, assisted by however many grenades he was allowed.
Rifles:
On the British side the main rifle was the Lee Enfield, thought to be capable of a range
up to 550 m closefire and 1 250 m effective fire. However, the British army focused upon
many men making rapid collective fire, that is a sweep of bullets, rather than individual
accuracy. Indeed, especially as the war dragged on, individuals possessing quality
marksmanship became fewer.
The trenches themselves worked against the effectiveness of the rifle. Mud in a rifle was
always a fear and hence there was a need for regular inspections and cleaning. It was
difficult to hold practicefiring sessions and the enemy, who could have been used for
target practice, were hidden behind their own trenches. The speed at which rifle bullets
moved meant that if a soldier heard the bullet coming it was too late − it had either hit
him, or missed. Therefore there was no need to duck or sway out of the way. There was
indeed no real need to react at all. This must have been numbing upon the soldier’s
senses, reflexes and nerves. It also suggests that the soldier would realise that, if
exposed, he could do little to prevent catastrophe.
Bayonet:
A bayonet resembles a long knife/small sword fitted to the end of a rifle; a weapon which
brought fear into the heart of the soldier. Fitting of bayonets meant that handtohand
fighting − kill or be killed situations were expected. It was one thing for a soldier to fire at
a reasonably distant and anonymous enemy, it was another to have to run him through
with a piece of sharp steel nearly 0.5 m long − or to face the prospect of this being done
to the other.
Grenade:
Another ‘personal’ weapon, (one the soldier could carry, set up and discharge on his
own, was a grenade). Both sides made much use of these, which were tossed at enemy
pockets, exploding within a preset time (such as 5.5 seconds). Sometimes improvised
grenades were used in desperation, particularly in the early period of the war, when
empty tins would be used.
Although everyone threw grenades, there was specialist a grenadier. During the war
some 75 million grenades were tossed, and for many soldiers the grenade became more
popular than the rifle.
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Lewis Gun:
Used by the Allies, the Lewis Gun had a 47shot capacity and could peak at 550 rounds
per minute. Its advantage was that one man could fire it, but it would easily jam with
mud around, required great stocks of heavy ammunition, and great bags of the cartridge
pans were needed.
Machineguns:
Normally organised so that a machinegun could be operational within 4 seconds of an
alarm to fire into a preset gap in the wire, or could sweep the enemy trench, using bullet
belts containing about 250 bullets. However, machineguns were costly to fire and
required as many as 16 men to keep one functional. Enemies of the machinegun were
moisture, sinking tripods (on mud). Generally Allied machineguns were temperamental.
Not perhaps as temperamental as the attitude of Allied generals towards them. Despite
being mown down on the Somme the machinegun never really came into favour in the
Allied camp.
Germany maintained their lead in machinegun technology and effectiveness.
Machineguns, thought initially to be useful attacking weapons, became astounding
defensive weapons with only a handful being able to hold up attacks by large groups of
soldiers. Indeed, it was the defensive capabilities of the machinegun which helped
prevent troops making breakthroughs as more than just attacking troops would be
needed to break through where trenches were defended by machineguns.
Mortar:
Mortar shells became increasingly popular during the early years of stalemate and these
could inflict much damage for little cost or real effort. Though used in the front line they
were more regularly fired from the support line. Germans maintained the lead in this
area.
It was demoralising for men to have to flee as a mortar shell leisurely rolled through the
sky in their direction with the ability to create shell holes the size of large rooms.
Artillery:
Artillery was the main killer on the Western Front during the war. Guns fired shells fast
and low.
Howitzers fired larger shells more slowly in a looping trajectory. Again Germans were
mostly superiors in this area throughout the war. Drawbacks were that it took about 10
men 5 minutes to load and fire one shell of a Howitzer and required a light railway to
move it into position. It created shell holes the size of a house.
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Shrapnel from these guns was an everpresent reality, piercing even helmets, tearing at
bodies.
“…according to almost every memoir of the Great War, shelling was the greatest
inducer of fear”13
Soldiers on the front line often resented their own artillery, for if they fired upon the
enemy the front line troops received the retaliation from the enemy, and if their own
artillery did not fire, they deemed them to be letting them get away with it. One danger of
artillery was that it could inadvertently fire on its own men, another fear for the soldier.
Gas:
Germans first used gas in 1914 then again in April 1918.
Two or three gas alarms per night were common, another disturbance to sleep,
increasing the sense of fear. Most were false alarms.
The war poet Wilfred Owen (1893 – 1918) in his famous poem Dulce et Decorum est,
describes the impact a gas attack had on a group of men withdrawing from the front.
Dulce et Decorum est
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots
Of gas shells dropping safely behind.
Gas! Gas! Quick boys! An ecstasy of fumbling,
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time…
…Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin,
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the frothcorrupted lungs…
Germany led the way:
• Teargas, January 1915.
• Killing gases
• Chlorine, April 1915.
• Phosgene, December 1915.
• Mustard gas, July 1917.
All were delivered in clouds via cylinders to July 1916, and then in shells and mortar
canisters.
13
Ibid. Pg 117
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Chlorine Gas
• Easily smelt, visible to eye.
• Usually able to avoid full effects, but affected body such that the soldier could not
absorb oxygen because he was drowning in the water produced in his own lungs as a
result of gas.
Phosgene Gas
• 15 times as powerful as chlorine.
• Unseen.
• Could receive a fatal dose without immediate irritation.
• Men took 48 hours to drown from their own discharges into their lungs.
Mustard Gas
• Aimed to harass rather than to kill.
• Only small quantities could prevent soldiers from fighting for days.
• Difficult to smell, especially given all the odours of the front. The impact of mustard
gas was only felt after 2 to 3 hours of exposure. Eyelids swell and close, burning
throat, red patches formed on exposed skin. Massive blisters then developed. In more
severe exposures men might cough up parts of their mucous membranes, lose their
genitals, or be burnt to the bone.
• It is thought that about 2 per cent of those exposed to mustard gas died (normally
from associated pneumonia).
• The mustard gas could also settle on shell holes full of water, that water which was
sometimes used for drinking.
Response to Gas
• A series of gas masks were developed to combat the different gases in the early days.
However, until the box respirator appeared in 1917, the soldiers generally found
putting a cloth sock, soaked in urine, over their faces just as effective as the early
masks.
• Gas cylinders, ready for release at the enemy, provided yet another hazard of trench
life − through leakage or explosion.
The Problems Germans Had
• The prevailing winds normally meant that gas released by them would tend to drift
back in their direction.
• They did not always have the ready reserves to consolidate any break in the line.
Flamethrower:
A device, which was carried by a soldier, threw flaming oil about 22 m. It generated a
loud noise and black smoke which added to its terror and the confusion it created.
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Mining:
Where able, both sides tunnelled, filled tunnels with explosives and blew up opposition
held areas.
Aeroplanes:
Most generals regarded the aeroplane like the machinegun, as not being part of the real
war.
However, aircraft did have three impacts:
• Terrifying the men with lowlevel attacks.
• Doing the above, plus dropping bombs on specified spots with accuracy.
• Reconnaissance and aerial mapping meant that secrets were difficult to keep and
knowledge of opposition trenches was held.
However, the aeroplane could not force a breakthrough which required troops on the
ground to be able to back it up; as far as breaking the stalemate was concerned the
infantry could not do this.
Tanks:
• First used in the war by British.
• British government only agreed to idea of tanks if they could travel at 4 mph
(6 kph), turn sharply, reverse, climb a 1in1 slope of at least 5 feet (1.5 m), cross a
gap of 8 feet (2.4 m), range of 20 miles (32 kin) and carry a crew of 10 plus 2
machineguns and a cannon.
• Shipped across the English Channel in crates labelled ‘water tanks’ − first employed
in significant numbers in the Battle of the Somme, 15 September 1916, but in an
uncoordinated fashion.
Disadvantages of Tanks
• Damaged by artillery tire, especially external steering. Tanks broke down and
caterpillar tracks came off.
• Ran out of petrol.
• The early tanks’ steering wheels trailing behind them were easily destroyed by
gunfire.
• Poor conditions for men inside: noise inside of the clattering of movement and guns
and engines deafening; communication done by hand signals. Fumes from engines
and guns. Wore leather jerkins to protect them when thrown about inside onto hot
moving parts. Cramped conditions. More than 3 hours inside the tank and a man was
liable to have a heart attack.
• Not always able to climb shell craters.
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Role of Tanks in War
• No real effective use till battle at Cambrai, November 1917 (part of the wellfortified
Hindenburg Line held by the Germans), 378 tanks used.
• First mass use led two infantry corps against the Germans and in 10 hours
penetration of 6 km deep had been achieved. Lack of reserves meant breakthrough
could not be held, but lessons learnt at Cambrai were used in decisive Battle at
Amiens.
• Amiens August − September 1918, no preliminary artillery bombardment (chopped up
ground), used 462 tanks in attack and gained 16 km’s in first 24 hours (helped by fog
and aircraft).
Effect of Tanks on War
Element of surprise given away somewhat because of poor use and insufficient tanks at
the Somme. Not until more than a year later was effective significant use made of tanks.
Tanks did play a strong role in the final offensive on Germany in late 1918. It was learnt
that the most effective use of tanks was to have them concentrated, en masse, as a strike
force.
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The War in the Air
Brief history of aeroplanes, before World War I, first ever powered aeroplane flight, 17
December 1903 at Kitty Hawk, USA, 12 hp, 750 lb (340 kg) machine. 1908, Wright
supplied a plan to US Army Signal Corps to produce an aeroplane
(To fly at 40 mph/64 kph) for 10 minutes. English Channel first crossed by air in 1909 by
Bierlot.
Tasks Done By Aircraft during War:
• Initially, only used for reconnaissance to report positions of enemy troops, guns and
ships, for example, reporting the gap in the German armies at the Marne in 1914,
which allowed British to push between the two German armies.
• Equipped with machineguns to shoot down opposition aeroplanes, airships,
balloons, ground targets (for example, troops, trucks, trenches, artillery positions,
fuel and ammunition depots, railways and bridges). At first, some pilots would fly
above an enemy aeroplane and drop bricks at the pilot.
• Bombing ground targets: as aeroplanes improved they were able to carry bombs, but
initially these were just thrown over the sides of aeroplanes.
Superiority in the Air:
• 1914 The Germans were superior, having more and betterequipped aircraft than
Great Britain and France. This superiority did not last as each year one side
produced a more advanced aeroplane than the other did.
• 1915 Germans were supreme owing to Fokker monoplane which could fire between
its revolving propeller blades and so could aim by just pointing the aeroplane at the
target.
• 1916 The Fokker was matched by Bristol Scout (Great Britain), Nieuport (France)
which also had interrupter system.
• Late 1916 the Germans regain superiority by producing Albatross, Halberstadt, and
Fokker Triplane.
• April 1917 The greatest air baffle of the war occurred. 195 German aircraft vs 360
British. Average life of new pilot, arriving at front, 3 weeks. High point of German
success in air.
• 1918 German bombers ‘Gotha’ bomb London creating much panic.
• Mid1918 Allied superiority with the Sopwith Camel, which was much more
manoeuvrable than all German aircraft in dogfights. It was the most successful
aircraft (2,140 Camels in use by end of war shot down 1,294 enemy aircraft).
Zeppelins:
• Of German design, these are hydrogenfilled, cigarshaped airships.
• Used largely for bombing raids over Great Britain in 53 raids. Zeppelins caused 556
civilian deaths and 1,358 injuries).
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• The advantages of the Zeppelins were that they flew higher and further than
conventional aircraft at the time.
• Their disadvantages included that bombs dropped from great height have lower
accuracy. Craft could be blown off course and was a death trap as it could explode if
hit by gunfire.
Impact of Air War on the War:
As war progressed the aeroplane evolved from a lightweight spotterplane to an
impressive warplane. Although aircraft played a part in land battles, it was not a
decisive role. Battles still had to be fought and won by men in the muddy trenches; on the
ground.
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The Naval War
When war broke out, many people believed there would be a series of major naval
battles. It came as some surprise when the naval war proved to be so lacking in intensity.
However, the royal navy had several main objectives:
• To keep the sea lanes to Britain and around the world open so that Britain could not
be starved into submission.
• To ensure the safe transportation of men and supplies to France.
• To attempt to blockade the German coast and hinder its overseas trade.
The German navy’s prime aim was to cause as much disruption and destruction of
British shipping as possible. It also aimed to prevent neutral shipping supplying the
British Isles.
Chronology of the Naval War:
The British navy began its main functions of transporting
August, 1914
supplies to France and blockading the German coast.
The German raider, the Eraden, sank 70 000 tons of Allied
August/November, 1914 shipping in the Indian Ocean. The Australian navy sank it in
November.
Battle of Coroneh German Admiral yon Spee’s Pacific
November, 1914 squadron defeated a British squadron under the command of
Admiral Cradock off the coast of Chile.
Battle of the Falkland Isles: Von Spee’s squadron was
December, 1914
defeated, with the loss of four ships.
February, 1915 Germany began limited submarine warfare in the Atlantic.
May, 1915 German Uboats sink the Lusitania.
The Battle of Dogger Bank: the German cruiser, the Blucher,
January, 1916
was sunk following a raid on England's east coast.
May, 1916 The Battle of Jutland.
February, 1917 Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare.
April, 1918 The Zeebrugge and Ostend raids.
The Battle of Jutland 1916:
The most significant naval encounter of the war was the Battle of Jutland in May, 1916.
A squadron of British cruisers under the command of Admiral David Beatty went out to
meet a small German force under Admiral Hipper. Hipper sank two British cruisers.
Beatty turned to retreat chased by the German High Seas fleet. Unknown to the
Germans, Britain had cracked the German navy’s signal code and knew of German
plans. The British grand fleet had been shadowing Beatty. The two fleets came into
contact late on 31 May. Battle raged until the Germans tried to make their escape to
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home ports. During the night, the battle became a matter of hide and seek as the British
tried to prevent the German fleet’s escape.
The British commander, Admiral Jellicoe, was criticised after the battle for having been
too cautious. The Germans claimed a victory, as their losses of 11 ships and 2551 men
were less than Jellicoe’s 14 ships and 6087 men. However, though the British navy may
have missed a chance to destroy the enemy fleet, the German navy did not venture onto
the high seas again during the war.
One of the heroes of Jutland was a young boy called John Cornwall. Cornwall had
joined up underage. He stayed with his gun though seriously wounded and surrounded
by dead comrades. Cornwall died of his wounds but received a posthumous Victoria
Cross. The Cornwall Badge is today the highest award for bravery given by the Scout
movement.
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare:
In February 1917, Germany took the desperate step of launching unrestricted submarine
warfare; that is, any vessel approaching British shores became a target. The aim was to
drive Britain into submission or at least into seeking peace. It nearly succeeded. Up to
1917, Britain had lost over 2.3 million tonnes of merchant shipping. In 1917 alone,
Britain lost over 3.7 million tonnes.
However, the main result of unrestricted submarine warfare was to drag the United
States into the war against Germany. This was to prove decisive. In addition, the British
and US navies developed successful antisubmarine techniques such as the convoy
system a means of protecting merchant ships with warships and the use of barrage
mines and nets, especially in the English Channel, which aimed to hinder German
submarines returning to home base.
Through 1 918, the Allies began to get the better of the German submarine fleet. In April
one of the more daring episodes of the naval war occurred Sir Roger Keyes’ raid on
Zeebrugge and Ostend. This raid sank blockships at the entrances of the canals leading
to the ports, bottling up German Uboats that were resting in the canal areas.
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The Australian Home Front
King and Country:
• The population of Australia in 1914 was 4 million, 70% lived in the cities.
• In 1914 education was compulsory, women had the vote
• The Irish catholic dominated the working class
Women of World War I:
Unlike the English and German counterparts, women were not able to throw themselves
into war work. In Germany and Britain, women found themselves working long hours in
munitions factories, and joining the armed forces. The Berlin underground was built
almost entirely with female labour.
It was not for lack of willingness on the part of the women. The fact that the war was so
very far away seemed to lessen the urgency of war work. Equally important was the
prevailing ‘male chauvinist’ view that a woman’s place was at home, not in the factory
or in uniform. Instead, many women threw themselves into voluntary work. Voluntary
work took a variety of forms − Red Cross work, the Comforts Fund and knitting socks for
the troops in the trenches. It has been estimated that over one million pairs of socks
were, knitted by Australian women during World War I.
Australian women were well mobilised on the home front, even if it was in non
government activities. Apart from the Red Cross and the Comforts Fund, women raised
funds in 226 separate groups. The Red Cross set up convalescent homes and a hospital
visiting service for wounded soldiers. Vera Deakin established the Wounded and Missing
Enquiry Bureau, which assisted people in Australia to contact relatives who were at the
front. In South Australia, the Cheer up our Boys Society held concerts and picnics for
troops about to be transported to fight overseas.
During the war, over 2000 women served as nurses in the Australian Army Nursing
Reserve Service in Egypt, Palestine and Europe. Thirteen nurses were killed during the
war, either clearing causalities from the trenches or on hospital ships. Some women
made it to the front by their own individual efforts. Lady Dudley (Rachel Gurney) set up
what became the busiest field hospital in France. Audrey Churnside used her own car on
the Western Front to drive wounded men to hospital.
Women were also used in the propaganda war. Women were encouraged to persuade
their menfolk to fight. During the conscription campaign, a great deal of attention was
paid to the female vote. Artists like Norman Lindsay depicted the enemy as evil
barbarians, halfnaked women being trampled under foot by German soldiers. This was
a common image.
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The womens role was to be passive they were to sit at home and wait and weep. They
were to make up Red Cross parcel and make socks (a nuturing role). The Red Cross was
made up of uppermiddle class women. The Australian Comforts Fund was made up of
lower class women. Before 1916 is wasn’t compulsory but after 1916 is was compulsory.
Women were also the major organiser of funds. So many teacher enlisted and
government had to past a law to stop them.
Aliens:
People started looking for spies at home, ‘the enemy within’. AntiGerman feeling
became very strong and anyone with a German sounding name became a target and was
labelled a spy. This was especially so in South Australia where there was a large
Germanspeaking migrant population. Yet many of these people were second and third
generation Australians. Some of them had sons fighting for Australia in the trenches!
However, that did not stop them being treated as a potential ‘fifth column’ − and enemy
force working against Australia at home.
Before the war, the German migrants had thought of themselves as Australians, or
GermanAustralians. They had now become ‘aliens’, and were required to report weekly
to a police station. Worse still, many were forced to spend the war years in internment
camps, a kind of prison camp for potential traitors. Almost 7000 GermanAustralians
suffered this fate, as well as 68 women and 84 children. Life in the camps for the
internees was not actually hard and certainly not brutal. It was more humiliating and
intensely boring, a state that caused riots on some occasions.
Some Germans in Australia faced violence. In 1915 the German Club in Broken Hill was
burned to the ground. Many people with Germansounding names or who had been born
in Germany were sacked from their jobs.
A large number of Germans lived near Grafton, in northern New South Wales, and
newspapers of the area became almost hysterical in their antiGerman feeling. The
Coff’s Harbour and Dorrigo Advocate produced articles with headlines such as ‘Cut out
the German cancer’. The police became involved in ‘Hun hunts’ and it was later
suggested that people of German origin should have their land confiscated. Many
Germans of this area eventually ended up at Trial Bay. This attitude must have been
particularly galling for families such as the Hoschkes who had two sons fighting for the
Empire!
There was an almost farcical side to this antiGerman hysteria. A series of name changes
occurred, all the result of patriotism in action. The German Shepherd dog became the
Alsation, named after the French province Alsace. It became almost a patriotic duty to
kick that ‘horrible little German dog’, the dachshund. Many Germansounding place
names were replaced with Anglicised names; for example, Germanton was renamed
Holbrook, after the Allied submarine commander, Norman Holbrook.
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Propaganda:
Purpose
• True Definition: The purpose of propaganda is to convince the targeted group of
the correctness of a point of view, or to persuade people to carry
out (or not carry out) certain actions.
• By People: Propaganda before and at the beginning and the war was seen as
a legitimate means for a government to get information out to the
people.
How It Was Used
• The limited development of the mass media meant that the largescale propaganda
we are familiar with today was not possible (E.g. radio or television)
• The main avenues for propaganda were the press and the billboard.
• Newspapers would carry fullpage posters, reports of government speeches and
regular letters pages.
• Fences and walls around the country were covered with posters propagating an
assortment of ideas.
• During WWI, Australia used propaganda to try to achieve several aims:
• Early in the war, to justify the Allied positions and argues the justice of Britain’s
stance.
• An attempt to promote patriotism and duty and so bolster recruitment.
• To vilify the enemy and an attempt was made to turn the average German into a
monster.
• As the war dragged on, propaganda had to be used to maintain morale. This
might involve covering up blunders that ‘our side’ had made, concealing the truth
or downright lying.
• The government also faced the task of galvanising the population behind the war
effort. Sacrifices had to be justified, government controls had to be seen as
reasonable, internal security had to be maintained and voluntary work was
encouraged for the good of the boys at the front.
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The Propagandist’s Handbook
Good propagandists use certain techniques to get over their message and World
War I was no exception to this.
1. Never personalise the enemy. Do not give them a name or an identity. Instead use
substitute names; for example, do not call the Germans ‘Germans’, but refer to them
as ‘Huns’ or use the French word of the time, ‘Boche’. One poster of the period has
an evil Kaiser Wilhelm looking down at a small child standing on a map of Australia.
There is a burning church in the background. The caption in the poster reads:
DON’T FALTER
GO AND MEET
THE HUN MENACE
2. Good propagandists do not try to be evenhanded instead, they are deliberately
onesided. One way of achieving this is to stereotype the enemy. All Germans are big,
barbaric and ugly; they rape women and kill children. They all wear spiked helmets.
3. The good propagandist should not be afraid of outright lying. During the war, both
the Allies and the Germans showed they were capable of deliberate lying. Australia
was quick to copy any stories that the British connoted. The following examples
illustrate how lying could operate:
• One newspaper printed photographs of smiling Prussian military horsemen
holding the spoils of war after they had sacked a village. It was later revealed
that the photographs had been taken before the war at an army steeplechase.
• In Britain the trials of a young nurse, Grace Hume, were followed eagerly by the
newspapers. She had allegedly been raped, had her breasts cut off and had to
watch cruel Germans burning down a hospital. It was later discovered that Grace
Hume had never left her native Yorkshire.
4. Propagandists need to pinpoint the enemy. It is just as effective to be against
something as it is to be for something.
5. Propagandists do not have to justify anything they say. It is enough simply to assert
that something is the case. Who is to blame for sinking the Lusitania? The German
people. It just needs to be stated, as the source below illustrates.
It is not the Kaiser, not the Kaiser’s generals who sank the Lusitania: it is the men and
women of Germany; the German people. Those gross and loutish savages are mad with
the exposure and the failure of their inglorious war. There is no crime too bad for them.
The Weekly Dispatch, May 1 91 6
6. Propagandists should try at all costs to avoid logic and reasoning. Do not try to
convince people of their rationality of your point of view. Play on their emotions. Use
the image of the mother, the child, the nun, and the burning church. This form of
propaganda was much in evidence during the conscription campaigns.
7. Repeat the message. The more often a propaganda message is repeated the more
likely it is to be accepted. Keep the message simple. If possible, appeal to an
authority source − for example, do not say that ‘16500 men a month are needed from
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Australia’, say that ‘top British military authorities yesterday stated that 16500 men
a month are needed’. Never say ‘reports today have reached us about German
atrocities in Belgium’, say instead ‘eyewitnesses reports today have reached us about
German war atrocities’.
Conscription:
Definition
Conscription is a system of forced recruitment into a nation’s armed forces. Eligible
civilians are by law, forced to register and to undergo various suitability tests. Those
who meet the required standards are then trained and take their place in the armed
forces. Most nations in World War I required men from the ages of 18 to 35 or 40 years
to register. If the need for soldiers was acute the age range was extended.
Usually, workers in jobs vital to the war effort such as primary and some secondary
production were not conscripted as their work was considered necessary for the nation’s
fighting effort.
A conscientious objector is one who, for various reasons, believes they are morally
unable to fight. Some conscientious objectors did accept noncombat roles in the armed
forces such as clerical, engineering or supply services, whilst others refused to do any
work they consider ‘warwork’ or assisting the war effort. Conscientious objectors were
often gaoled and abused for their beliefs.
No nations conscripted women into their armed forces as combat soldiers, although
Russia did use women volunteers in combat battalions.
The Lead Up to the Referendums and Consequently ‘No’ to Conscription
Under the Constitution the Australian government had the power to enforce conscription
but these conscripts could only serve in Australia, and not be sent overseas. This power
was designed to protect Australia from direct attack.
Voluntary enlistment in the AIF peaked in mid1915 as a result of the wave of the
nationalism after the Gallipoli landings. In June and July of 1915, 62,289 men enlisted.
From this peak, however, the general trend of the figures shows a steady decline in the
numbers of volunteers. Obviously information of conditions on the battlefronts and
knowledge of casualties and knowledge of casualties eroded any enthusiasm to enlist.
The great allied offensives of 1916 resulted in an increase in the losses. The Australia
forces, it was estimated, needed 32,500 recruits in September of 1916 followed by an
average of 16,500 per month to maintain the required level of fighting efficiency.
However, the actual level of recruitment fell well below these levels.
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The Prime Minister, William Hughes ‘the little digger’, who became prime minister in
October 1915 had just returned from a visit to Great Britain and the Western Front,
proposed the introduction of conscription to solve the labour shortages.
The idea of conscription had been promoted by various groups in Australia. In 1915 the
USL formed to push for compulsory national service. This group was composed of
mainly conservative middle class to upper class members. It actively canvassed its ideas
in the largely sympathetic press.
Hughes’ own party, Labor, was mainly opposed to the idea. The Labor Party and its
trade union supporters believed that the main burden of conscription would fall on its
support base, the working classes, and not the conservative side of politics. The more
radical unions feared job losses to cheaper labour sources, such as women or
immigrants, if its memberbase was conscripted.
Hughes could not secure a parliamentary majority to institute conscription The majority
of Labor members opposed their leader’s views, and there were insufficient conservative
members to win a vote in the House.
Hughes decided to propose a referendum on the issue. A referendum is a popular vote on
a proposal that changes an aspect of the constitution. The public is asked to vote ‘Yes’ or
‘No’ to a set question. To be passed, under the Australian Constitution, the proposal
must:
• Gain an overall majority of votes across the nation.
• Be agreed to by the majority of states.
The referendum was held on 28 October 1916. The campaigning both for and against the
proposal was fierce. Hughes, as Prime Minister, headed the ‘Yes’ cause. His opinions
and campaigning caused a major crisis in the Labor Party. Hughes, along with other
parliamentary supporters at both federal and state levels, were expelled from the party in
November 1916.
Hughes remained Prime Minister by forming the National Labor Party with his exLabor
colleagues and by gaining support from the Liberal Party. This gave him the
parliamentary majority he needed to govern. Later these two groups were to formally
merge and become the Nationalist Party.
An extreme group against conscription was the IWW, The International Workers of the
World, also known as ‘the Wobblies’. The IWW argued against the war and did not
hesitate to urge workers to go on strike against their government.
Ranged against Hughes was the ‘rump’ of the Labor Party, the majority of the trade
union movement, and amongst other groups, the Catholic Church (note Protestant
churches supported it). It was from the Catholic Church that the perceived ‘leader’ of the
anticonscriptionists was to emerge. Dr Daniel Mannix, Irishborn, was Archbishop of
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Melbourne. He was outspoken in his opposition to Hughes’ proposal. Amongst the Irish,
the British suppression of the ‘Easter
Uprising’ of 1916, an attempt to remove British control of Ireland, was seen as savage
and extreme. AntiBritish sentiment surged in many people of Irish background.
The results of the referendum were close. The ‘No’ vote won by a majority of 72 496
nationally, whilst New South Wales, South Australia and Queensland voted ‘No’, and
Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania supported the ‘Yes’ cause.
Most commentators suggest that the critical votes supporting the ‘No’ cause came from
an unusual quarter, the traditionally conservative farming community It is suggested that
they feared severe labour shortages in their labourintensive industry if conscription was
introduced. Men of the 18 to 40 years age group formed the core of the rural work force.
Though Hughes had lost the referendum both he and his supporters at the state level won
resounding victories in the May 1917 federal election and in state elections. It appears
that the conservative rural voters followed their traditional voting patterns in elections,
but not in the conscription referendum.
The Allied offensives against the German Hindenburg Line in the spring and summer of
1917 again caused huge losses of labour. The government estimated that 7,000 new
recruits were needed per month to maintain the fastdepleting Australian divisions.
Enlistments, however, averaged just below 3,000 per month for the second half of 1917.
Hughes, strongly urged by his fellow exLabor Party member and premier of New
South Wales, William Holman, proposed a second conscription referendum. The vote
was to be held on Thursday, 20 December 1917.
Voting was not compulsory and by holding the referendum on a Thursday it was hoped to
weaken the working class votes against the proposal. The voting rolls were closed 2 days
after the announcement of the poll and all Australians of ‘enemy origin’ were banned
from taking part.
The question put to the voters is worthy of scrutiny:
Are you in favour of the proposal of the Commonwealth Government for reinforcing the
Australian Imperial Force overseas?
The question seems straightforward enough, but it does not tell the full story about the
government’s proposal. If accepted, the Bill would have allowed for the conscription of
men from 20 to 44 years of age to fill the gap between voluntary enlistment figures and
the required 7 000 per month.
The campaigning for and against the issue was more vigorous than in 1916. Hughes, on
top of his election victory, was encouraged by the failure of the strikes of 1917. This
failed industrial action did great damage to the unions and the Labor Party, especially in
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New South Wales, the strongest ‘No’ voting state in the 1916 referendum.
Much to the surprise of many both for and against the proposal, the referendum results
came in favour of the ‘No’ cause. Overall the majority against conscription had in
creased to 166 588. On a statewine basis, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and
South Australia voted ‘No’, Western Australia and Tasmania voted ‘Yes’.
The voting patterns seem to suggest that an increased ‘warweariness’ had eroded the
proconscription base.
Hughes resigned as Prime Minister, but again formed a new government because of the
instability of any other group having the numbers in parliament.
Voluntary recruitment continued until the end of the war eleven months later in
November 1918.
The conscription issue had polarised the Australian political scene and had sharply
divided the nation.
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Victory and Defeat
Reasons for Allied Victory:
• Failure of Schlieffen Plan. Germany was forced, from very early in the war, to fight a
war on two fronts (1914 to late 1917).
• Allied naval blockade in place, held throughout war. This forced privation to German
population (linked with Germany’s failure to recognise need to organise civilian food
distribution and production effectively).
• Germany was let down by its allies which were a regular drain on German labour
force, resources, and strategic thinking. The best that could be said for German allies
is that they provided a diversion to Germany’s enemies.
• The economic strength of the Allies, especially supported by the US loans (and the
USA’s direct involvement from April 1917).
• The four points above, all apparently early in the war, particularly the naval
blockade of Germany, meant that Germany was not going to be able to win the war.
The war on the Western Front, then, from 1914, continued in stalemate through 1915,
1916, and 1917. The result was not yet inevitable.
By 1918 troops from both sides were worn down. Germans were especially so following
the Ludendorff Offensive of 1918. Germany’s limited troop numbers were beginning to
tell.
Maintenance of Home Front − Allies through
• Better use of propaganda.
• Better division of resources between home and war fronts.
• After the collapse of Russia, the unifying effect of being able to claim a war of
democracy vs autocratic monarchy.
• Allied propaganda:
• Convinced general opinion in the USA of need to fight on and to end war to
sustain democracy.
• Boosted Allied confidence, patriotism.
• Fuelled hatred of Germans.
• Successfully lowered morale of many enemy soldiers and civilians (plus
Germany’s allied and neutral countries).
• Once war of movement resumed in 1918 and Ludendorff Offensive, after initially
going so well failed, German morale at the front was (considerably damaged. This
encouraged protests in Germany and German High Command saw that their defeat
was ensuing.
• US support boosted troops, equipment numbers and morale, reinforced blockade
throughout the war. US support was, in 1918, decisive.
• Improved Allied use of tanks in 1918.
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• To some extent, the sensible nature of US President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, in
German minds, gave Germany an easier was out of the war and reduced their
determination to fight on for victory.
• Disintegration of stability within Germany as a result of 4 years of war and
blockade; mutinies and revolts by soldiers and civilians wanting to end war,
opposing those who did not want to give total surrender and indeed wanted to restart
the war (Ludendorff).
Casualties and the Cost of War:
Australia had 416,809 men volunteer for service. 331,781 were sent overseas with
215,597 casualties of which 59,342 were killed or were missing (see A Pictorial History
of Australia at War, Paul Hamlyn, Sydney, 1972, p. 134).
Economic cost
Amounts assessed at the conclusion of the war tallied up to thousands of millions of
pounds, but it was the economic situations created as a result of World War I, rather
than numeric debt figures which were its greatest economic effect.
This effect was:
• Most European countries were debtors to USA.
• Germany faced crippling and unrealistic reparation payments (costs determined in
1921).
Much of this debt was never repaid.
The economic impact thus set the scene for strained economic relations through the
1920’s with economic problems in the USA in 1929, resulting in worldwide depression.
Coming Home: Optimism and Disillusionment:
Soldiers returned to Australia to find optimism turned, for many, to disillusionment:
• Family circumstances had often changed.
• They were, owing to war wounds, unable to be the breadwinners.
• Suffered mental disorders/tensions, which affected everyday life.
• Felt their heroism and suffering was forgotten by some.
• Government schemes to support returning soldiers were ill conceived, that is, Soldier
Settlement where land was made available, but was too small to make a living on.
• By the Depression, 10 years later, it was common to see diggers of Gallipoli and
France and Middle East homeless, without any form of care.
They had fought for a nation and now they had to fend for themselves. For many, life was
simpler and more ordered in the fighting arena, than dealing with the complexities of
rebuilding civilian life.
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In Great Britain similar situations existed, whilst in Germany the ‘heroes’ had to endure
humiliation as they were seen as losers.
Although a whole generation of men was not completely ‘lost’, it is often thought that
that generation’s energies and abilities were sapped from them. This only led to further
disillusionment amongst the men themselves.
Enlistments and Casualties:
Allies
Britain 6.21 15 12 27 39
British Empire 3.29 6 13 19
France 8.5 22 16 36 52
Russia 12 8 14 41 55
Italy 5.5 16 12 17 29
US 4 4 3 5 9
Minor Allies 2.5 15 52 67
Total 42 12% 31% 43%
Central Powers
Germany 11 17 16 39 55
AustriaHungary 8 18 15 45 60
Turkey 3 12 13 25
Bulgaria 1 20 4 12 16
Total 23 15% 36% 51%
Both Sides 65 13 33 46
Monetary cost assessed (at gold values) at
• Direct − £37 6000 m (Britain £9 593 m)
• Indirect − £31 6000 m
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Europe Before (Left) and After (Right) the War:
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