Rethinking Ethics of Science and

Technology with Pragmatism

Wanderley Dias da Silva
wanderley.diasdasilva@student.kuleuven.be









In this paper I am interested in some prominent themes in science, technology and
ethics notably, how more appropriate perceptions of technological artefacts and
developments in general can improve the quality and effectiveness of contemporary
discourses in the field. It is certain that traditional moral theories seem unable to cope
adequately with the strongly dynamic nature of our technological culture. My second,
more specific task, then, is to lay out an alternative approach to bear upon the broad
question of the place of ethics in a technological world.
1
This question is often thought
to imply a dilemma: should society be involved in the evaluation of science and
technology, or should it leave it to scientists, engineers, technicians, and technocrats?
But, as I hope will become clear, the dilemma is false. For one thing, it is safe to say that
technology is not outside society, but it is rather another element of it. Thus the
technical question is already a social one.
2


The discussion is divided into five sections. I begin with a likely story to illustrate
the false dilemma mentioned above. I focus primarily in the conflict between social
and moral symbolic landmarks on the one hand, and technological development on the
other. In section 2 I outline Keulartz et al.s discussion on the technological blindness
of traditional applied ethics and classical philosophy of technology.
3
Next, in section 3 I
lay out their critique of the normative deficit of the constructivism proposed by
modern technology studies. In section 4 I summarize Keulartz et al.s pragmatist
alternative.
4
By going over these matters I hope to show the unique value of
pragmatism in considering moral issues in our modern technological culture.


1
For this purpose, I have in mind a pragmatist model elaborated by Keulartz et al. See note 3 below
for reference purposes.
2
I follow the account of Guido Van Steendam, in Ethics of Science and Technology, Lectures at
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium; October 10 November 29, 2010. There is nothing new in my
rendering of this argument here.
3
Ethics in Technological Culture: A Programmatic Proposal for a Pragmatist Approach, Science,
Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 29/1 (Winter 2004), 3-29.In this paper Ill provide the reader with in-text
edition and page references.
4
To be sure, I do not pretend to offer a comprehensive review of their pragmatist project here since
that is obviously beyond the scope of this paper but only a clarification of their major arguments.
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1. The False Dilemma

Let us begin with the ending: it is above all else urgent not to think of social evaluation
as divorced from scientific or technological evaluation. Why? The typical question of
whether society should be involved in the assessment of science and technology (or
technology for short) is, at its very best, a false dilemma or even a philosophical myth.
So, it is important to remember that so-called ethical issues in technology do not
actually arise between science and society, but rather between two scientific processes
or practices. This is to say, then, that the question of whether society should be
involved in the evaluation of science and technology, or whether it should leave it to
scientists, engineers, technicians, and technocrats, is groundless. Simply, the alleged
technical question is already a social one. But this can be probably best illustrated
by means of an example.

Consider this likely story. Last week Jack was driving home back from London on M1.
Suddenly he drives through deep standing water, loses control of his car and collides
head-on with a heavy lorry. Jack is rushed to hospital, but physicians declare him dead
minutes later. Now, according to the Human Tissue Act 2004 covering England,
Wales and Northern Ireland if Jack had not, while alive and competent, given consent
for some or all of his organs or tissue to be donated following his death, the medical
staff will have to approach his relatives or other relevant persons to establish any
known wishes of his to do so. As it happens, there is no record of Jacks consent; and
now the hospital is negotiating organs and tissue recovery with his family. We need to
interrupt our likely story now to say more about the dilemma we put aside earlier.

On the one hand, it is safe to say (1) that the organs and tissues recovered from
Jacks body can save the lives of various patients waiting for transplantation. One the
other hand, however, we cannot ignore (2) that there might be some religious and
bioethical arguments against the donation. I do not want to poke into these arguments.
The most important lesson that emerges from this narrative is that: (1) poses the
question of priority; i.e., the claim that, all things considered, we should do our best to
save lives, for example; and (2) is a pointer to the landmark criterion or social
symbolic constructions; i.e., the question of whether the principles underlying our
actions satisfy certain ethical or social standards particularly whether they can be
universalized. It will be no surprise that such landmarks function as conceptual
restrictions for society. As a matter of fact, it is certain that people generally limit their
ethical considerations by holding on to those landmarks. What happens to these moral
or social constructions in the course of history, however, remains to be seen. To this
end, we must return to our story.

Let us suppose for a moment that Jacks accident did not happen last week; but
some time ago, when for religious or philosophical reasons the human heart was still
believed to be the seat of the soul. It is certainly not hard to see that such a principle
would function as a conceptual restriction against heart transplantation. More simply, it
is safe to say that, under the seat of the soul perspective, heart transplantation would
surely be considered morally unacceptable. As a matter of fact, this was exactly the case
when, in December 1967, Dr. Christian Barnard performed the first heart transplant in
history. (And failure of the heart was then the legal and medical definition of death.)
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Of course there is nothing new in this case. From the discovery of Penicillin, there have
always been debates regarding the moral issues involved in new scientific inventions.
So, naturally when the first heart transplant was performed, many considered it
unethical, immoral. What is more, the controversy occupied the front pages of
magazines around the world.

On the face of it, then, we can say that actions which are perceived as contradicting
symbolic constructions or landmarks, come to be morally disapproved; for they seem to
weaken social cohesion. To be sure, it will not be necessary particularly in such a short
essay to dwell laboriously on the peculiarities of how (or perhaps why) society tends
to hold so tight to those landmarks (albeit, to dismiss the power of religious beliefs in
the consolidation of those symbolic constraints would be rather metaphorical and
inconclusive, to say the least). For we are here more interested in the way applied ethics
try to assess and cope with those technological development.

In any case, with the increasing ability of medical experts to resuscitate people with
no heartbeat, the need for a better definition of death became obvious. To cut a long
story short, since the 1960s, legal and medical communities have for obvious reasons
adopted brain death as the legal explanation of mortality. Put simply, the old seat-
of-the-soul landmark was replaced by a new one. Thus heart transplantation no longer
counted as morally objectionable. So, the lesson to be learned is, as Harbers and
Koenis
5
put it, simply this: social and moral standards are not merely determined by
symbolic constructions..., but just as much by material objects: [e.g.,] Fire, food,
money, steam engines, dikes and polders, sewage pipes, viruses and computer systems
have just as strong a binding effects as symbolic constructions, if not more so
(2004:4).

This brings us back to Van Steendams remark that alleged ethical issues in science
and technology do not actually arise between science and society, but rather between
two scientific processes or practices. How is this? Simply, as a matter of fact, we inhabit
a world full of people continuously discovering and inventing new things (and ideas);
and sometimes this strongly dynamic characteristic of society generates conflicts. This is
to say that old ways of life are repetitively being replaced by new ones. Hence, norms
and values are always being put up for discussion, and we regularly find ourselves
confronted with new moral problems (ibid).

Now, presumably, any effective moral theory must be able to accommodate those
changes. But, as I hope will become clear, because traditional philosophy (i.e., applied
ethics and classical philosophy of technology) tends to adopt totally unquestioning
principles as starting points for its inquiries, it surely lacks insight to cope with the
strongly dynamic and pluralist character of our technological culture. That is to say that
contrary to what traditional philosophy supposes the moral conflicts that evolve
in the process of technological development are as much part of society as technology
itself. It is therefore necessary to adopt a more appropriate perception of technological
artefacts and developments in general, if we are to improve the quality and
effectiveness of contemporary discourses on ethics of technology.


5
1999, 4, in Keulartz et al. 2004.
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So, if indeed it seems necessary to propose another moral theory to repair the
technological blindness of traditional philosophy one that seems to accommodate
the fact that social and moral evaluations of technology are more complex than the
typical question of whether society should be involved in the assessment of
technological development I suggest the pragmatist approach sketched by Keulartz et
al. in their essay Ethics in Technological Culture: A Programmatic Proposal for a
Pragmatist Approach. We turn now to their discussion.

2. Technological Blindness of Traditional Ethics and Classical Philosophy

Keulartz et al. begin by giving an overview of the so-called technological blindness
that seems to affect traditional philosophy in general. The main culprit, they say, is the
classical belief that technology and society form each others opposites and, as such,
the idea of a technological culture could only be an oxymoron (ibid:7). They explain
the origin and nature of this technological blindness, as derived from the two traditions
upon which modern philosophy is built. They say modern philosophy is largely shaped
by empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism as modelled by the works of Francis Bacon
launched a utopian program aimed basically at achieving social progress through
scientific and technological means. Rationalism, on the other hand, rests on an
obsession with the so-called unshakable foundation upon which knowledge can be
systematically constructed. So, The imagine of man that arises from modern
philosophy is one of a completely autonomous subject who uses science and
technology in a sovereign way to achieve his or her aims (ibid:5). As it happens, this
humanistic, heroic and self-centred individual is still, they say, to a large extent the
subject of applied ethics in general. To illustrate their point, Keulartz et al. refer to De
Vries thus:

Depending on the sort of ethical theory one supports, attention will be focused either
on the presuppositions underlying actions or on the consequences of actions. In the
former case [rationalism], the question to be answered is whether the principle
underlying the actions satisfies ethical criteria, particularly whether it can be
universalized. In the latter case, one asks whether the action contributes to the
aggregated individual welfare [empiricism] (1999, 19).

In other words, moral theorists seem to restrict their focuses on the cement holding
society together to the values, principles, norms, and rules by which people attune their
actions to each other (2004:5). Whats wrong with this approach? It should clear by
now that societys moral landmarks are not merely determined by symbolic
interpretations, but just as much by scientific and technological developments. This is to
say in line with Harbers and Koenis
6
that science and technology have just as strong
a binding effect as symbolic constructions, if not more so. Against this background,
Keulartz et al. argue that applied ethics seem to view technology mainly in
instrumental terms; it can be used for good or for bad but does not form a subject of
consideration in its own rights (ibid:6). In this view (of technology as a neutral
resource), applied ethics will often evaluate scientific progress accordingly, depending
on whether it conflicts with its symbolic constructions or not.


6
See previous note.
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But this, however, is by no means the only concept of technology that emerges from
the vast sphere of modern philosophy. There is the classical substantive view
professed by traditional philosophy of technology. Two particular names had a direct
impact on the development of classical philosophy of technology, Martin Heidegger and
Jaques Ellul. According to these philosophers, science is anything but neutral an
innocent resource that can be used for good or for bad. On the contrary, for Heidegger,
technology tends to disclose the world as standing reserve (Bestand). In a technological
world, he says, the primary end is that of efficiency and, as such, things come to reveal
themselves to us as mere resources. So, ultimately technology might extinguish all the
other modes of perception. As Keulartz et al. point out, Back in the 1930s, Heidegger
had already predicted that the human being would be relegated to a mere technicized
animal, once he became the main resource for technological control. Ellul, for his part,
talks of a sort of technological determinism. That is, the idea that contrary to what
modern philosophy supposed not man, but technology is in reality autonomous.
Otherwise stated, Technology has not brought about liberation but instead a new
form of slavery. On this picture, then, technology has unmistakably apocalyptic and
prophetic characteristics (ibid:7). But what can we learn from this?

Keulartz et at. believe its quite safe to say that, as a result of the anthropocentricism
of traditional ethics and the prophetic characteristic of classical philosophy of
technology, applied ethics has not yet opened up the black box of technological
development. It surely pays attention to the moral problems invoked by the use of
new technologies. Yet it remains blind to the moral significance of technology itself.
This, they say, condemns applied ethics to be left running to catch up with the facts.
Moreover, as long as it clings to its anthropocentric prejudices, [traditional] ethics will
not be able to accommodate adequately the dynamic character of the present
technological culture. Whats more, the foundationalism that has dominated
traditional philosophy for such a long time is mainly aimed at underpinning moral rules
and judgements on the basis of one or more universal starting points [absolute
landmarks] or principles. As a consequence, little attention or perhaps no attention
at all is actually paid to change of norms and morals over time (ibid:10).

Now, whats the relevance of this account to the problem of ethics? No doubt, says
Keulartz et al., that traditional philosophy seems to have insufficient insight into the
moral significance of technological development and systems and that it cannot cope
adequately with the dynamic character of the technological culture in which we live
(ibid:25). To be sure, few of us would probably entertain any serious doubt about the
significant role of change in the construction of social and moral constructions.
Consider the case of Jack, as we have seen earlier.

Our likely story makes it clear that technological development embodies particular
options and restrictions, i.e., it invites certain kinds of actions or behaviour and
discourage other ones, and thus reinforce or alter existing role divisions and power
structures (ibid). Or, in Van Steendams terms: on the one hand, Jacks story poses the
question of priority: i.e., the claim that, all things considered, we should do our best to
save lives, for example. On the other, its a pointer to the landmark criterion or social
symbolic constructions. But this, we have suggested, is a misconception. Such false
impression emerges from the mistaken assumption that the implications of scientific
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and technological artefacts are limited to the particular practices for which they are
intended. But in reality the functioning of a particular tool depends on a variety of
action anchors or actors. Unfortunately, the significance of this insight for applied
ethics has until now, says Keulartz et al., not been acknowledged sufficiently (ibid).
To sum it up, then, it isnt difficult to see that, as a result of its technological blindness
and foundationalist tendencies, traditional ethics is barely able to cope with the
changes and renewals that are an everyday affair in our technological culture in a
creative or innovative way.

That is precisely why modern science and technology studies (STS) search for a
democratic control and normative assessment of technological developments. That
is, the evaluation of technology, according to STS, isnt within the scope of applied
ethics. This extreme approach, however, is certainly not without its problems; for, by
holding on this agnostic or even antagonistic attitude towards ethics (ibid:12), STS
take moral norms and values on holiday. Now we have to see what Keulartz et al. mean
by this.

3. The Normative Deficit of Constructivism

Keulartz et al. point out that STS have eventually replaced both Heideggers substantive
vision of technology and Elluls technological determinism with a more pluralistic
concept. In their own terms, Modern technology studies have opened up the black
box of technological development and revealed the intimate intertwinement of
technology and society. So its safe to say that, technology does not operate upon
society as an external neutral or otherwise influence, but its actually part of it. STS
holds that both scientific facts and technological artefacts appear to be the outcome
of negotiations, in which many diverse actors are involved. On this view, we must at
any rate understand that technology isnt completely autonomous at all. That is, science
and technology dont follow their own patters but rather are a fairly random result of
social interaction (ibid). The question, therefore, is not how to relate science and
culture, but rather how to understand the way these two are interconnected.

This new way of seeing things is called constructivism. Constructivism does not
view culture as unilaterally subject to technological imperatives, but argues that there is
a coevaluation of technology and society. Thus, to be able to introduce technological
artefacts successfully into society, one must change certain aspects of society, while
one can also say that the development and design of these artefacts takes place in a
social field of influence, with many different players, each with diverse interests, aims,
resources, and means of power. But this, however, is by no means the end of the
matter. According to Keulartz et al., STS have vigorously exposed the normative
significance of technological artefacts (ibid). At this point we ought to slow down and
explain these premises carefully.

Constructivism comes in two broad varieties, moderate constructivism (MC) and
radical constructivism (RC). One form of moderate constructivism in particular, Social
Construction of Technology (SCOT) defends the idea that science and technology can
be explained by social factors like dominant group interests or existing power
structures. In other words, applied ethics needs not worry about technological
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artefacts and development; these can be analysed by following the basis of society and
its structures. This is to say that (1) technological artefacts should not be interpreted as
intrinsic and invariable features and that (2) the kind of script that artefacts display
depends on the specific context in which they are designed, developed, and used
(ibid:13). It isnt hard to see that MC is already lacking in normative assessment. But its
when we turn to RC that normative evaluation goes on astray for good.

For its part, RC blames MC for simply replacing one form of determinism
(technological) with social determinism. So, to explain technological development, RC
subscribes to (1) but not to (2). In this view, both technology and society are mere
fabrications. That is to say that, technological artefacts have no value built into them.
Thus, we cannot determine what the specific context looks like apart from the
interpretations of relevant actors.... In other words, if there is any need for normative
evaluation, we should simple follow the actors of science and technology without
taking sides. Hence, according to RC, what counts as the capacity and effect of a
technology is socially structured and is consequently contingent and open to
renegotiation (ibid). Whats wrong with both forms of constructivism?

Here Keulartz et al. refer to Radder, who thinks that RC is guilty of judgemental
relativism. That is, the assumption that any interpretation is as valid or as invalid as
any other. This, however, as Keulartz et al. point out, cannot work in practice. The best
option seems to be the actor-network approach MC endorses. But, again, Radder
holds that the danger here is that evaluation is based exclusively from the winners
point of view rather than from the losers point of view. Keulartz et al. think, however,
that one thing is for sure: their use is difficult to reconcile with ethical deliberation, in
which justified norms and values are sought in order to evaluate the development of
technologies. Again, Keulartz et al. refer to Radder, who believes that STS should
overcome its fear of becoming explicitly normative. He concludes that one should try
to combine the achievements of the empirical approach their more adequate views on
the practices of science and technology with normative insights concerning the
problematic aspects of our techno scientific world... Its precisely this combination
that Keulartz et al. intend with their pragmatist proposal to ethics in a technological
culture (ibid:14). The following is a summary of that model.

4. The Pragmatist Alternative

As Keulartz et al. explain, given the wide diversity of philosophers, it is clear that
pragmatism must not be understood as a systematic theory in the usual sense, but
rather as a particular series of theses; theses which can be and were argued very
differently by different philosophers with different concerns (ibid:15). Ill, then, take
off from the tripartite pragmatist antitheses Keulartz et al. describe in pages 16-7:

1. Antifoundationalism: That is, pragmatists reject the obsession for certainty which
philosophers have celebrated since Plato. All our convictions, without exception, are of a
provisional nature and are in principle susceptible to repeal or review. More simply,
pragmatists adhere to a particular form of fallibilism (ibid:16).
2. Antidualism: Here we are not talking simply of the dualism of essence and appearance
which, again, philosophers have celebrated since Plato but also other forms of dualism
such as theory/practice, consciousness/external reality, fact/value and duty/inclination and
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so on. It should be clear by now that traditional philosophy and applied ethics are strongly
influenced by some sort of dualism. Pragmatists, on the other hand, deny such an
elevated state to these distinctions and give then only a functional significance, in
accordance with their potential usefulness for problem solving. This is to say that, these
distinctions do not precede research but are formed or construed only during the
research itself, with a view to practice. Hence, the dividing lines between these
distinctions arent clear and fixed forever from the beginning, whatever that beginning
may be (ibid).
3. Antiscepticism: Its important to note that, according to pragmatism, fallibilism should
not be mistaken by scepticism. True, pragmatists deny that absolute truth can be
achieved by metaphysical guarantees, but this does not mean that people are left at the
mercy of universal doubt. Or, in Peirces words, there is a world of difference between
fallible knowledge and no knowledge at all. What pragmatists claim instead is that
there is only more and less reliable knowledge. So for example, the Cartesian
assumption that philosophy must start with real or initial scepticism is seen as an illusion.
Pragmatism assumes instead that we can never begin our research with complete doubt;
i.e., we always enter philosophy with prejudices. So, says Peirce, one must have
reasons to doubt, as well as to believe (ibid:17).

These three antitheses are of vital importance for a pragmatic approach to ethics. A
pragmatic moral theory turns crucially on the possibilities for living and working
together. In Keulartz et al.s own terms, While consequentialists take collective
happiness to be the moral touchstone and deontologists, the obliging character of
moral norms, peaceful cohabitation and fruitful cooperation serve as the moral
touchstone for pragmatism. So, to sum it up, pragmatism rejects both dualism and
scepticism. The former is counterproductive because it encourages black-and-white
thinking, which brings conflicts to a head and leads debates to degenerate into
unproductive boundary disputes, or gets stuck in childish does not does too
exchange. The latter also forms an obstacle to a creative tackling of problems
because it simply cultivates philosophical doubt at the expense of real doubt (ibid).

But how does pragmatism plan to solve the problems created by both dualism and
scepticism? Put differently, how does pragmatism avoid (1) technological blindness and
(2) normative deficit? It would appear that the moral point of reference to cooperation
and peaceful cohabitation typical of pragmatism reinforces two important progressive
problemshifts models (ibid, emphasis added).

(a) Process/Product shift: Keulartz et at. say that because of its attention to the settlement
of conflicts for the sake of further cooperation, pragmatism has always been interested
as much in the process of (moral) inquiry as in its ready-made products (ibid). This is to
say that, to promote fairness and quality of the process of inquiry and deliberation, it is
essential that all those concerned can have their say and that decisions are made on the
basis of a careful consideration of all relevant conflicting moral claims and arguments
(ibid:18).
(b) Justification/Discovery shift: A second shift to which pragmatism gives rise is a shift in
emphasis from the context of justification to the context of discovery... That is,
pragmatists pay as much attention to the justification of moral judgments as they do to
heuristics, to the art of invention. This, says Keulartz et al., avoids the problems of more
traditional philosophical models, which attach too much importance upon justifying moral
values. This shift between contexts is often referred to as the split personality of
pragmatism, a term referring to the distinction between the rationalist [context of
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justification] and the romantic [context of discovery] side of pragmatism. But how does
this work? The rationalist side of pragmatism is concerned with the cognitive capacity for
argumentative problem solving and justification, while the romantic side is concerned
with the creative capacity for the innovation and invention of vocabularies which provide
new meanings and open new perspectives (ibid). Now we need to investigate the
outcome of this progressive problemshifting tools.

It seems that if we combine the distinction between rationalist and romantic aspects
of pragmatism with the distinction between product-oriented and process-oriented
approaches, we arrive at a matrix of tasks for a pragmatist ethics. We shall consider
this matrix of tasks in a while. First, its important to note here that, according to
Keulartz et al., some of these tasks are well known to prevailing forms of applied
ethics, but others constitute supplements that [we] believe are necessary to make
ethics better geared to dealing with moral problems in a technological culture
(ibid:19).

Keulartz et al. explain that, depending upon the moral problem at hand,
pragmatists will switch between these different tasks and their corresponding methods
and tools (ibid). These methods and tools are determined according to the basic
rationalist-romantic distinction described above, and are divided into four groups of
tasks. In connection to the context of justification (the rationalist side of pragmatism),
we are left with two sets of tasks: (a) traditional ethics and (b) discourse ethics; and, in
the context of discovery (romantic side), we have: (c) dramatic rehearsal and (d)
conflict management.

To be sure, different applied ethics models will make use of one of these methods
and respective sets of tasks. It wont be necessary, particular in an essay aiming to
investigate the methods used by pragmatists, to dwell laboriously on this matter. We
are here more interested in the general claim Keulartz et al. make that applied ethics
has insufficient insight to cope adequately with the dynamic character of our
technological world precisely because its limited to one method (ibid:25). I, therefore,
propose to summary their major arguments thus.

So, in the context of justification, (a) will provide the arguments and justifications for
or against specific courses of action. This is often the methods of traditional ethicists,
lawyers or moral scientists. Keulartz et at. point out that the common methods in
applied ethics are principlism, casuistry, cost-benefit analysis, and so on. Meanwhile
(b) aims at improving the structure of public debate and decision making. That is, it
supposes that one should help to develop procedures and institutions that guarantee
equal access to public deliberation and fair representation of all relevant arguments to
ensure that moral decisions are based on the force of the better argument rather than
on the forces of power, money, and the like (ibid:19).

To Keulartz et al. for common and familiar types of problems for which the relevant
ethical considerations are in principle known, the prevailing rationalist tools of applied
ethics and discourse ethics usually suffice, while for new problems for which existing
rules and routines are not adequate, itll be necessary to resort to the romantic side of
pragmatism (ibid). To this end, (c) offers the possibility of criticizing and renewing
vocabularies, exploring possible future worlds, while (d) helps with the open
confrontation of heterogeneous moral vocabularies and worldviews. The former
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involves detailed descriptions of complex scenarios, of various competing possible
lines of action and courses of conduct. The latter aims at dealing with the fundamental
value conflicts that arise from assessment and evaluation of technological
developments (ibid:21). The latter, they say, is possibly the most important for a
pragmatist ethics, since the problems that threaten cooperation and cohabitation are
most pregnant and manifest in handling such value conflicts. It would appear that the
antifoundationalism and antiessentialism characteristic of pragmatism plays a crucial
role here, since pragmatism will look for solutions in a more practical direction instead
of looking for ultimate moral truths or foundations for the only right answer as
traditional ethics tends to do (ibid:23).

With this matrix of tools and tasks, pragmatists believe they can offer an ethics that is
well-equipped for our technological world. Its clear from the model described above
that pragmatists dont propose to radically break with the current practice of ethics, as
its the case with STS, but rather is complementary in character (ibid:24). This is to say
that, unlike more traditional methods, which tend to hold tight to symbolic restrictions
(and thus will be limited by one single method and task for every situation), pragmatists
propose to switch between these different tasks and their corresponding methods or
tools. Keulartz et al. conclude by pointing out, however, that to develop an ethics
that is well equipped for our technological culture, further theoretical analysis of the
tasks we have suggested and practical experimentation with the corresponding tools
are required (ibid:25). I wont attempt to pursue this possibility further here. Rather, Ill
close with some further observations relating the nature and ground of pragmatism.

5. General Comments

So, it will be found, upon consideration, that pragmatism seems to avoid both the
technological blindness of traditional applied ethics and the normative deficit that
disturbs STS. It is worth recalling the simple logic behind Keulartz et al.s project here.
We know that pragmatism from its outset aims at bridging the ever-widening abysm
between two divergent tendencies in modern philosophy: empiricism and rationalism.
Empirical theorists and scientists reject most rationalist propositions because they
lacked, they say, objective evidence. Rationalists, for their part, believe that empiricism
is a threat to moral and religious values. Pragmatism, on the other hand, aims at
mediating between these traditions, combining what was most significant in each of
them. So, like empiricists, the pragmatists thought that we have no conception of the
whole of reality. This is to say that, we know things from many perspectives, and we
must settle for a multifaceted approach to knowledge. And like rationalists and
idealists, [pragmatists] saw morality, religion, and human purpose as constituting a
significant aspect of our experience.
7

As it happens, there is a considerable demand for such approach in the dynamic
technological world we live. We do not have to poke too deeply into the different
assumptions and arguments some of the great moral philosophers have constructed in
the course of history to arrive at one simple conclusion perhaps the only conclusion
possible that they cannot all be correct. There should be little doubt that Plato,

7
For a lucid evaluation of this topic, see Samuel E. Stumpf and James Fieser, Philosophy: History and
Problems, 7
th
edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 372.
Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology
Dias da Silva|11

Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Nietzsche, and so on possessed incredible philosophical
insight. Yet, their various ethical theories differ drastically from each other. On this
picture, it is safe to say that perhaps none of these models is correct. (Or perhaps there
is no metaethical criterion to which we can appeal in order to test them.) Hence, the
only way to check their validity is to see whether they work in practice. And it is not
hard to see that all of them, to one extent or another, could in principle work,
depending on a particular social framework. As we have seen earlier, there are
situations where traditional ethics can cope with moral problems in a technological
world. But the lack of insight (and its amnesia regarding the fact that we inhabit a
pluralist society in which it is clearly difficult to achieve a consensus on controversial
issues particularly the ones that evolve from technological artefacts and development)
turns traditional ethics into a sort of blind uncle.
8
Against this background, we can
surely argue that there is no single theory that can possibly offer a full, real definition of
something as socially and culturally complex as science and technology.
Now I hope the reader will forgive what may seem a rather esoteric route into this
topic, but here I can only remember the tale of the Buddhist master who wanted his
disciples to be aware of the limitations of human understanding. The monk blindfolded
his young students and took them in front of an elephant. Then he asked each one to
touch a part of the animal, and try to describe what they perceived. Each monk
described elephant according to the part of the animal they were holding. Obviously
none of the descriptions were real and complete ones. The point being made is
simply this: any absolute, unquestionable model is bound to fail; it is like trying to
describing an elephant blindfoldedly.
But of course the solution is certainly not to do away with moral principles and social
evaluation of technology altogether as STS suggest. For it should be clear by now that
technology is not separated from society; it is rather a crucial element of it. Social
evaluation is not divorced from scientific or technological evaluation. The technical
question is, as already pointed out, a social one. In this light, what pragmatist ethics is
advocating is that we need to take account of both the role of moral intuition and the
value of development. Metaphorically, we need to try and see the whole elephant i.e.,
if we want to describe it appropriately. To this end, the different methods and tasks
Keulartz et al. propose in their paper can be a source of hope; for pragmatism is better
equipped to cope with the highly dynamic character of our modern technological world.
In short, its various methods and tasks can improve the quality and effectiveness of
contemporary discourses on ethics of science and technology. However, as Keulartz et
al. admit, this pragmatist matrix of tools and tasks needs further theoretical analysis
and practical experimentation. I will not attempt to investigate this claim here.
Meanwhile, it is above all else urgent not to think of social evaluation as divorced from
scientific or technological evaluation....

8
Albeit, as the popular saying has it, a blind uncle is better than no uncle at all.