Jain Ethics

mc-1/D/Buddhism/ETHICS/ETHICS Compose-2.
p65 (46) (3rd Proof)

Dedicated
to
My Esteemed Philosopher and Guide
Professor Ramaranjan Mukherji
the Doyen of Indological Studies.
Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics
TUSHAR KANTI SARKAR
I. INTRODUCTION
The set of metaphysical assumptions and the conceptual net-
work that underlie and support the philosophical system of Jainism
form a very intricately woven integral whole. Their physics (study
of space, ti me, matter and moti on), thei r metaphysi cs
(anekntavda, sydvda, nayavda), their philosophical methodol-
ogy (conceptuo-linguistic analysis or vibhajyavda) and finally their
ethics are, so to speak, mutually-supportive intertwined strands
of a network. Hence, I find it extremely difficult to write on
Jaina ethics in isolation from the rest of their system, especially
their physics i.e., their theory about the universe or cosmos. I
shall call it 'Jaina cosmology' for short.
Jaina cosmology starts with a scheme of classification of the
different kinds of things that are there in the universe. 'Things',
in this context, should be taken to include real entities, theoretical
entities as well as explanatory principles. According to the Jainas,
such 'things' constitute all that is there in the universe and they
together form a system, having sufficient explanatory power to
account for all cosmic phenomena involving mind, matter and
consciousness. Ethical theory of the Jainas forms an integral part
of Jaina cosmology in this sense.
Since the original works on Jaina philosophy are all either in
Prkt or in Sanskrit, or it is often very difficult to find suitable
expressions in English for many of the technical terms used by
the Jaina thinkers. A few remarks about the translation of some
of the technical terms of Jaina philosophy may not be out of
place here. Some terms, expressing key concepts, such as 'apna',
'arhat', 'siddha', 'keval', 'ley' etc. have been left untranslated
(into English) in this essay, in order to minimise the risk of
introducing unintended distortions through translation. How-
ever, when any one of these technical terms occurs for the first
time in this paper, the nearest English equivalent of it (which I
consider appropriate) has been given. For some other technical
terms, I have given 'sense-translations' rather than literal trans-
lations. For example 'dravya' has been translated as 'entity', 'tattva'
as 'theoretical constructs' or simply as 'constructs', 'ajva' as 'physi-
cal entities' and 'pudgala' as 'proto-matter', or simply 'matter' for
short. It is obvious that I consider it important not to conflate
the notion of materiality with that of physicality. Finally, I have
used the term 'real(s)' as a generic term for both dravya and
tattva of the Jainas.
II. COSMOLOGY
The Jaina theory of the universe i.e., their cosmology (in the
sense already indicated in the previous section) starts with two
broad classificatory schemes
__
one listing six (or seven) dravyas
and the other listing nine tattvas.
The seven dravyas are: jva, ajva, ka, dharma, adharma, kala
and pudgala. Some writers lump j va and aj va together and count
them as one. This reduces the number of dravyas from seven to
six.
1
The nine tattvas enumerated in Jaina cosmology are the fol-
lowing: jva, ajva, rava, puya, ppa, bandha, samvara, nirjar
and moka.
2
Not all Jaina writers include ppa and puya in their
list. That exclusion reduces the number of tattva to seven. How-
ever, since some of the oldest Jaina texts include puya and ppa
in their list, we shall discuss all nine of them here.
A couple of points about the two schemes of classification
may be noted here. First, there is no rigid uniformity about the
use of the terms 'tattva' '' '' and 'dravya' . ' . ' . ' . ' . What we have called 'dravya'
are called 'tattva' (and vice-versa) in some Jaina works.
3
Secondly,
although the basic scheme of classification is accepted univer-
sally, yet the principle of classification may differ. Thus some
SARKAR : Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics 7 1 7 2 ETHICS : An Anthology
mc-1/D/Buddhism/ETHICS/ETHICS Compose-2.p65 (47) (3rd Proof)
writers prefer to follow a dichotomic scheme of division and
put everything either under the heading j va (i.e., entities which
are consciousness-incarnate, called tm or soul in other systems
of Indian philosophy) or under the heading 'ajva' (other than
jva). For such writers tattvas are of just two kinds, j va and aj va
4
.
Keeping the above points in mind we may now proceed to
briefly elaborate the nature and philosophical significance of
each of the six items listed under dravya and the nine items listed
under tattva.
A) SIX DRAVYAS
i) The first dravya mentioned is jva. Capability of reflective
awareness (upayoga) )) )) is the mark or characteristic feature of
jva.
5
Some Jaina texts add the capabilities of acquiring
knowledge (j na), abstract conceptualisation (dar ana), moral
character (critra), bliss (nanda), etc. to upayoga as charac-
teristic marks of J va.
6
In its intrinsic nature all jvas are of
the same status.
7
In its pure and essential nature j va is char-
acterized by infinite knowledge, infinite wisdom (darana),
infinite power (vrya) and infinite bliss (nanda). These four
infinite potentials (ananta catuaya) are actualised, as limiting
cases, only when a j va attains liberation (moka) and be-
comes a keval .
8
However, worldly souls (j vas) are, as a matter
of fact, always far removed from that ideal potential state
because, all such jvas are, so to say, enwrapped in multiple
layers of shells of impediments or imperfections. The greater
the number of such shells already unwrapped or discarded
by a jva, the higher it is in the scale of evolution toward
the ideal limit of perfection. From this standpoint, depend-
ing on the stage of spiritual evolution in which a j va pres-
ently is, the Jainas assign different status to different jvas
and classify them into different types. All jvas are classified
into two types
__
immobile (sthvara) and mobile (trasa). Mo-
bile jvas again are classified into single-sensed (ekendriya)
two-sensed (dv ndriya) and so on upto fi ve-sensed
(pacendriya). Man is pacendriya i.e. endowed with five
sense-organs. Only five-sensed jvas are fit to have the
potential of attaining moka because it is only they that can
be endowed with the capacity of critical reflection about
moral values and other things. Such a j va which has this
capacity of critical reflection is called samanaska , those which
lack it are called a-manaska.
'Jva' in Jaina philosophy may mean a soul or tm as such;
it may also mean a besouled creature i.e. an embodied con-
sciousness. Specific contexts of use would clearly indicate the
intended sense.
Abstractly considered, j va is infinitely divisible but it is nei-
ther actually decomposable nor is it composed of pre-existing
parts.
9
The infinitesimal elements of j va are non-segregable like
the two poles of magnet or like the two sides of a page. Such
non-decomposable but infinitely divisible wholes we shall call
mereological wholes (in contrast to a compositional [samghta]
whole like a table or a chemical compound, say, H
2
O). So jvas
are mereological wholes. They also have three main characteristic
features
10
viz., not having any perceptible form (arp), sponta-
neously dynamic in nature (sakriya) and capable of affectivity
(bhokt).
Everything else (other than j va) fall under the category ajva.
There is an infinite number of ajvas in the universe.
ii) ka or space is the second dravya. It is characterised by
the following features :
a) It is arp,
b) It is an infinitely divisible mereological whole,
c) It is only one in number,
d) It is inactive or lacks dynamicity (nikriya),
e) It is the receptacle of everything real,
f) It provides the gap or void (vivara) which is a precondi-
tion of the very possibility of change of position or mo-
tion of things in space.
g) It comprises of two regions
__
operative space (lokkaa)
and trans-operative or absolute space (alokka). Lokka
is the limit beyond which all laws of motion and causal
sequence become inoperative and lose all operational
meaning.
11
iii) Dharma is a technical term, having a unique meaning in
Jaina philosophy. It may be paraphrased as 'the auxilliary
supportive condition for the continuation of any given state
of motion'. It is roughly what the law of inertia of motion
would be without Newton's first law to back it up. Thus
dharma, by itself, does not cause motion, it only helps the
state of motion to continue unimpeded. In short, dharma
is the auxilliary facilitating condition of continuation of
motion just as water is the facilitating condition of the
movement of a fish or swan.
12
The role of dharma is like
that of the basal stone of a potter's wheel in the produc-
tion of a pot.
iv) Adharma as a concept may be regarded as the dual of
dharma. If we replace the expressions 'inertia of motion',
'motion' and 'dharma' by the expressions 'inertia of rest',
'rest' and 'adharma' respectively, we get the corresponding
characterisation of adharma. In every other respect the two
share the same features. For example, both dharma and
adharma are :
a) Formless (ar p),
b) Mereological wholes,
c) Each is a unique single entity,
d) They lack dynamicity (nikriya),
e) They are the udsna hetu (non-causative, auxilliary, sup-
portive conditions) of motion and rest repectively,
f) They are needed to account for any state of motion or
rest or changes therein of an entity be it that of a soul
(jiva) or of matter (pudgala) in any of its forms,
g) The sphere of application of both dharma and adharma
is lokka in which they are located like j va and pudgala.
13
v) Kla (time) comes next. It is postulated as a principle with-
out which, the Jainas claim, we would not be able to ac-
count for the change of state of a thing (e.g., the change
of colour of a mango from green to yellow) or the change
of state of a motion. Kla is the cause of such changes in
the sense that it alone can generate the sense of simultaneity
and succession which makes the notion of any change in-
telligible. There is a controversy among the Jaina thinkers
about the objective reality of time. Uttardhyana-stra de-
scribes k la as a real, characterised by vartan.
14
Some gama texts deny the objective reality of time,
15
while
some scriptures consider time as the objectively real sixth dravya.
16
Time has the following characteristics:
a) It has no spread or extensity (tiryag pracaya)it has only
one dimension (rdhva pracaya),
17
b) It is the cause of any change in state of motion or of
rest. But unlike dharma/adharma, time is not an udsna
hetu. It is a participating cause like the potter's wheel.
18
c) It is anastikya i.e. lacks summable extensionality.
d) It is one and single,
e) It is formless (arp), inactive (nikriya) time non-
terminating,
19
i.e. without beginning or end,
f) It is located in the lokka only.
20
Some Jaina thinkers distinguish between phenomenal time
(vyavahra kla) and noumenal time (pramrthika kla), and re-
gard the latter as the foundation of the former. For such think-
ers phenomenal time (vyavahra-kla) has a beginning and an
end. So, it is not non-terminating in nature.
21
vi) Pudgala (matter) is the last of the six dravyas. Its defining
characteristic is that it goes through a ceaseless process of dynamic
change of state through accumulation and dissolution of parts.
22
Other characteristic features of pudgala are the following :
a) It has form (r p),
b) It has atoms (paramnu) as its ultimate constituents,
c) It is active (sakriya),
d) The five sense organs, mind (manas), karmic (material),
pr a (biological vitality), apna are all forms of pudgala,
23
e) Sound, light, shadow, hot radiation, darkness, colour, taste,
smell, touch etc. are marks of pudgala.
24
'Pudgala' is used to signify both single material atoms as well as
their combinations. Like j va, pudgala is essentially dynamic (sakriya)
and innumerable in number. But unlike jva, it is rup, lacks af-
fectivity (not a bhokt) and has a natural tendency to fall down-
ward, while j va naturally tends to move upward.
25
The characteristics of the other ajvas fall in-between those of
j va and pudgala. In so far as each one of them viz., adharma,
ka or k la is a unique singular inactive entity, they differ from
both j va and pudgala (which are infinite in number and active
in nature). On the other hand, they (other ajvas) share the prop-
erty of 'lacking consciousness' with pudgala and they also share
one property with j va in so far as they are arp like jva.
26
Again all the dravyas except k la are called astikya i.e., entities
with extensive magnitude. Time or k la is unique and distinct
from all the other entities because it lacks extensive magnitude.
So k la (time) is technically called anastikya dravya. It should be
kept in mind, however, that not all astikya dravyas are astikya
in exactly the same sense. A precise definition of 'astikya' in
Jaina context may be put thus:
X is an astikya, if X is (a) either a mereological whole or (b)
a compositional whole or else (g) X is itself of an extensive
atomic magnitude.
It should be clear from the above definition that jva, dharma,
and k a are astikya because they all satisfy requirement (a);
pudgala is astikya because it satisfies (b) above in so far as it is
a composite chunk of matter and satisfies (g) when considered
as individual material atoms (pudgalnu). Time is not astikya (i.e.
anastikya) because it can be neither a mereological whole nor a
compositional whole, since different ultimate units of time (i.e.
instants) do never exist simultaneously to be collected together
into a whole at any given moment.
Trivial technicalities apart, the above characterisation of astik ya
has important philosophical implications, particularly in the con-
text of Jaina theory of eternality and their theory of destruction.
Since, Jaina cosmology provides the conceptual foundation of
Jaina ethics, the distinction between mereological and composi-
tional wholes has direct relevance to Jaina ethics.
B) NINE TATTVAS
The six (or seven) dravyas discussed above constitute the totality
of the types of entities that are present in the universe. However,
just an enumeration of the entities in the universe is not enough
for a systematic explanatory model of the universe. On top of
the entities (e.g. space, time and matter in modern physics) we
also need some explanatory principles and dynamical laws which
would give a systematic account of the patterns of interaction
among the entities. The Jaina scheme of nine tattva does provide
just such an explanatory model. Just as the laws of motion in
modern physics necessarily rely upon the notions of space, time
and matter, similarly the explanatory principles and the dynamical
laws of Jaina cosmology have, of necessity, to bring in the notions
of the basic entities (dravya) admitted in Jaina cosmology. Broadly
speaking, according to the Jainas, the dravyas are of two types-
conscious ones (jva) and those lacking in consciousness (ajva).
It is roughly analogous to the consciousness
_
matter dichotomy
in modern philosophy. Accordingly, j va and aj va are repeated
and mentioned in the list of nine tattvas. It is clear therefore,
that, of the nine, only seven are new concepts. Out of these
seven again, some thinkers exclude ppa (demerit) and puya
(merit) as independent notions and drop them out of the list of
tattvas. On doing so, the number of new concepts in the list of
tattvas come down to only five. In our exposition we shall
consider pu ya and p pa as derivative, secondary concepts.
Accordingly, the two will be discussed rather briefly in this paper.
We are, therefore, left with the following seven basic tattvas viz.
jva, ajva, srava, sa vara, bandha, nirjar, moka. Of these, the
first two have already been discussed. So, we shall start with
rava, after making some brief remarks about a few basic
presuppositions of Jaina philosophy in general and Jaina ethics
in particular.
1) Jva (soul or self or locus of consciousness), per se, has
unlimited j na (knowledge), dar ana (wisdom), v rya
(power/prowess) and nanda (bliss). It is also free of all
sorts of externally imposed constraints
__
causal or other-
wise. In such a constraint-free state a j va is called mukta.
In all other states it is called baddha (bound/in a state of
bondage). A j va can be baddha in different degrees. The
degree of bondage is an index of a jva's fallen-ness or
deviation from its ideal state of perfection i.e. its intrinsic
nature. Such bondage (of any degree) is a defect or im-
perfection. It is the cause of making a j va susceptible to
sufferings and miseries by subjecting it to the cycles of
death and birth.
2) The ultimate aim of every j va in this world is to shake
off its defects with a view to getting back to its original
state of ideal perfection. Such a state is called moa
(liberation). Every j va has the potential of attaining
mok a
27
.
3) Any change of state or of motion (from its initial state)
of any entity (dravya) requires and does have an explana-
tion in accordance with an inviolable, uniformly univer-
sal, autonomous and mechanistic (i.e. not requiring inter-
vention by a conscious super-being like God) principle
or law of causation.
4) The dichotomy of consciousness (j va) and matter {pudgala)
is ultimate and the state of segregation between the two
is natural.
5) Bondage i.e., deviation of a j va from its ideal nature, is
caused by the break-down of the natural boundary of
segregation between jva and pudgala and the resulting
intermingling of j va with one kind of aj va viz., karma
pudgala. Such an intermingling is described more pictur-
esquely as an infusion of a special sort of pudgala par-
ticles into the interstices of jva. The special kind of
pudgala particles that penetrate the interstices of a j va
(under specific conditions only) are called karma pudgala
or karmic matter or karma-particles.
Keeping the above background information in mind we may
now discuss the nature of the seven tattvas (excluding j va and
ajva) which are postulated by the Jaina thinkers to give a rational
explanation of the dynamical interaction between j va and pudgala
in one of its forms.
i) rava
'rava' literally means influx or infusion.
28
It denotes the first
stage of a multistage process of interaction between jva and
karma-pudgala or karma-particles or karman, for short. As its
very name suggests, rava is the process whereby karman enters
into the jva through different inlet channels, so to say. Analogy
of a piece of sponge (j va) being soaked with water (karma pudgala)
through three inlet-pipes (viz., body, mind and speech) seems to
be an appropriate one. This analogy is quite appropriate because
it naturally suggests a few questions which need to be answered
for the model to be acceptable and adequate.
First, what are the channels ?
Second, when did this process of influx i. e. , rava
begin?
Third, what active role, if any, does a j va have to play to
get rava started?
Fourth, what conditions does a j va (the sponge, here) have
to fulfill so that it absorbs karma-pudgala (water) and
undergoes bondage (i.e., gets wet, in terms of the anal-
ogy used here) ?
Fifth, what is the process, if any, whereby the inlet pipes
can be turned off, so that there is no more inflow (rava)
of water (karman) into the sponge (jva)?
Sixth, supposing that the influx has been stopped, how is
it possible to squeeze the water (karman) out of the
sponge-pores (interstices of jva) completely?
Last, supposing such a complete squeezing out (nirjar) of
water (karma-pudgala) from the sponge (jva) is achieved,
what would be the condition of the sponge (jva) which
has thus been squeezed dry, so to say?
As I shall try to show, each one of the tattvas has been postu-
lated by the Jaina thinkers to answer one or more of the above
questions.
In order to answer the first question, it has been postulated
that there are three channels of influx viz. body (kya), mind
(manas) and speech (v k).
29
The rationale for this is not far to
seek. We, as subjects of experience (jva), can interact with our
environment (i.e. with others) either physically (using our body),
or mentally (through our thoughts) or communicationally
(through language). Clearly, if one can shut off these channels
then rava will be stopped. Now, all the three modes of inter-
action between a j va and its environment requires some effort
or activity. Hence, if there is no activity on the part of the jva,
then there is no interaction with the 'others' (neither bodily nor
mental nor lingual) as all the channels are inoperative now.
Consequently, there can be no rava (inward flow) either. The
rava-generating activity is technically called 'yoga' by the Jaina
thinkers.
30
Therefore, we can say that in order to stop rava, one must
restrain the influx channels and desist from yoga. The act of
restraining the channels of influx is technically called gupti. So
there are three kinds of gupti
__
(kya-gupti, mano-gupti and vk-
gupti) which are essential for stopping rava. The notion of
yoga had been brought in to provide an affirmative answer to
the third question listed above. Naturally, corresponding to the
three restraints or gupti there are three yoga or unrestrained
activity viz., kya-yoga, mana-yoga and vk-yoga.
31
As regards the second question the Jaina thinkers hold that
the intermingling of karma-pudgala and jva is coming down
from eternity.
32
It has no beginning in time (andi). Gold-ore
contains pure gold as well as its baser impurities right from the
very a beginning. Similar is the case with jva-karma complex.
This implies that we cannot think of a point time when j va in
its purity and karma particles by themselves were in a sort of
per- intermingling stand-off position. Given the rigidly invio-
lable theory of causation of the Jaina thinkers, the beginningless-
ness of jva-karma intermingling is an indispensable requirement.
If there were point of time before which there was no intermin-
gling, then the later occurrence of intermingling would require a
causal explanation. But no such explanation could be given within
the Jaina framework because, according to them, j va in its pure
state cannot have any reason to indulge in any activity {yoga)
and as such there would be no rava and hence no influx of
karma pudgala into the structure of jva.
I have used the term 'rava' in one of its various senses. The
other senses in which it is used in Jaina literature may be indi-
cated briefly.
a) rava as the collective name for the three inlet channels
or channels of karma-influx. Here, I have used it in that
sense and it also happens to be most common usage.
For brevity and future reference we call it rava-as-chan-
nel view.
b) Instead of the channels, rava may also mean the pro-
cess of influx as such. We call it srava-as-a-process view.
c) Again rava may not be used in any of the above two
senses. Instead, it may be used to denote that which gets
into a j va through the inlet channels. Here, ' rava' means
the karma-particles themselves.
d) Sometime rava is used to denote the state of a jva
which has been infused with karma-particles to any de-
gree whatsoever. In this sense, 'rava' becomes inter-
changeable with 'bandha'
__
the tattva that we are going to
discuss next. The virtual equivalence of ' rava' and
'bandha' are justified on the ground that the causes of
rava are the same as the causes of bandha, and also
because of the fact that rava as a state-description of
j va is invariably correlated with a certain degree of bond-
age (bandha) of the j va concerned.
33
This is somewhat
analogous to equating the concavity and convexity of a
given surface because the two expressions denote the
same curvature from two different points of view.
e) Lastly, 'rava' is often used by Jaina thinkers to denote
the cause that lead to the process of rava
34
. In other
words, those causative factors which initiate any process
of influx at one point of time or another, may be called
rava.
The third, the fourth and the fifth senses of rava shall be
referred to as rava-as-a-state-description view, rava-bandha-
equivalence view and rava-as-a-cause view respectively.
ii) Ppa and Punya
From the account given above it follows that any influx of
karma-particles into the structure of j va causes deviation from
the j va's ideal perfection resulting in its bondage. However,
there is a difference of opinion on this point among the Jaina
thinkers. All of them agree that any karma-influx causes bond-
age and ultimately all karma-particles need to be purged from
the j va in order that liberation be possible. However, not all of
them think that each and every karma-influx is equally harmful
to jva's moral uplift. So, some thinkers distinguish between two
types of karma
__
good and bad. Influx of good karma (puya) is
called puysrava and that of bad karma (ppa) is called ppsrava.
From this point of view puya and ppa are treated under rava
35
On the other hand, texts like Pancstikyasra
36
tend to treat
them independently. Some other Jaina thinkers consider puya
and ppa as forms of bandha.
37
Given the rava-bandha equiva-
lence view it is only natural that some writers would go for one
alternative and others for another. Manibhadra's commentary
on Sat-darana samuccaya elucidates nine kinds of puya and
eighteen kinds of ppa. A closer look at the entire of the list
would unmistakably reveal the socio-humanitarian concern of
Jaina ethics. However, in this essay I will not go into the discus-
sion of that aspect of Jaina ethics.
38
Some Jaina writers did make a sort of detailed fine-grain
analysis of the topic and put forward a list of forty-two channels
of rava. Seventeen of them are more important. They include
five sense-organs (bodily factors), four mental attitudes, called
kaaya, (mental factors), non-pursuance of the five mahavrata
(combination of bodily, mental and lingual factors) and three
gupti (already mentioned). It is obvious that the list involves
some repetitions under different labels. We shall frequently come
across similar instances.
iii) Bandha
39
As I have already pointed out, bandha is a state-description of
the level of purity of a j va which has been infused with karma-
particles through the process of influx or rava. However, there
may be different kinds and degrees of influx of karma-particles.
Accordingly, depending on the nature, extent and type of karma-
influx into a jva, bandha or bondage is categorised into four
types; prakti bandha (nature of the state of bondage), sthiti bandha
(based on the staying power of bondage), anubhga bandha (based
on its affective depth or intensity) and pradea bandha (spread
or extensity).
40
Of these, two types of bondage viz., pradea
bandha (extensity) and prakti bandha (nature) are caused by yoga
(improper activity), while the other two are caused by kaya.
The four mental attitudes viz., anger (krodha), greed (lobha),
pride (moha or ahamkra) and deluded vision (my) are called
ka ya because, they function as a sort of sticky glue pertaining
to a jva. Whenever j va is under any one or more of those four
mental attitudes, kayas arise in it. Kayas are comparable to
moisture in a wet cloth, because, kayas make the infused karma-
particles stick to the self, just as moisture makes dust-particles
stick to the wet cloth.
41
If there were no kaya, the infused
karma-particles would drop off the jva, instead of staying stuck
to it. In that case, despite rava, there would be no state of
bondage (bandha) of jva.
42
iv) Samvara
The notions of yoga and kaya discussed above are, clearly,
theoretical constructs (like the. Freudian 'libido' or 'unconscious')
introduced in Jaina philosophy for the purpose of finding a
rational answer to the third and the fourth questions that are
suggested by the water-inlet model of rava and bandha.
Now, granted that bondage is a deviation (from the ideal
norm) caused by the influx of karma-particles into jva (basic
presupposition #5) and that the ultimate aim of every j va is to
shake off or purge out the karma-particles from its core (basic
assumption #2) it follows that if liberation is to be possible then
there must be a way of flushing out the karma-particles from a
jva. Samvara is the first step in that direction. 'Samvara' literally
means 'putting on hold'. If we take the wet-sponge model of
jiva-in-bondage, and our aim is to squeeze the sponge dry, then
we must admit that before we start squeezing it, we must make
sure that no more water trickles in through the inlets (thereby
causing the sponge stay wet) as we struggle to squeeze it dry.
Similarly, the Jaina thinkers maintain that before the process of
purging or squeezing out of karma-particles from a j va starts,
we must be able to put the process of inflow/influx to an end.
This putting-to-an-end of rava is called samvara. It is a kind of
force that counter-balances and neutralizes the force of influx
SARKAR: Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics 8 3 8 4 ETHICS : An Anthology
i.e. rava.
43
That is why it is said that if, at any given moment,
a jva attracts neither good nor bad karma-particles (puya or
ppa karma) then at that moment it (jva) is said to have attained
the state of samvara.
44
Like 'rava', 'samvara' is also a word with more than one
sense. Samvara, as we just saw, can be viewed as a force that
counter-balances the force of rava. We have also seen that
there are some improper mental attitudes (cruelty, anger, greed
etc.) which cause rava. Hence, samvara must be construed as a
sort of psychical counter-force generated by the adoption of proper
mental attitudes (there are sixty-two of them) which prepares the
ground for holding the process of influx (rava) in check. As
a result, there is stoppage of actual influx of karma-particles into
a jva. Thus samvara has two aspects
__
a ground (i.e. generation
of the required psychical counter-force) and the consequence (i.e.
actual stoppage of the influx of karma-particles). Accordingly,
Jaina thinkers classify samvara into two types
__
the psychical
ground-condition which is called bhva-samvara, and its actual
physical consequence which is called dravya-samvara. Clearly, bh va-
samvara
45
is the more fundamental of the two.
There are sixty-two ways of achieving bhva-samvara i.e. the
psychical ground-conditions. These sixty-two are categorised under
seven groups
46

:
1. Five kinds of samiti i.e. manifest intra-community behaviour
of proper types,
47
2. Pursuance of the five vrata (moral vows),
48
3. Three kinds of gupti or restraintful use of body (kya),
mind (mana) and language (v k),
49
4. Ten types of dharma
50
(collectively called ' '' ''daa yatidharma')
i.e. states of excellence to be achieved with regard to one's
body, mind and language,
5. Twelve kinds of anuprek or deep reflection,
6. Twenty-two kinds of parahajaya (endurance of hard-
ships),
51
7. Five kinds of critra or moral conduct.
52
Each item under any of the seven categories has been minutely
analysed by the Jaina philosophers. Since they are more relevant
for studying the social relevance of Jaina ethics (and not so
much relevant for an understanding of the basic structure of
Jaina ethics as a theory of morality) I shall not go into those
details here. Instead, shall now move on to discuss the next
tattva viz., nirjar.
v) Nirjar
An answer to the fifth question suggested by the water-inlet
model is found in terms of the notion of samvara. Suppose that
one has been able to plug the dripping fawcet of rava (i.e.
samvara has been achieved)
__
what next, if he wants to get the
wet sponge back to its dry state ? If the model proposed is a
proper one, there can be only one answer-'squeeze it dry by
wringing out water completely from it'. The analogue of it in
Jaina ethics is the concept of nirjar. It is the last but one tattva
or theoretical construct in the Jaina model of moral causation.
Nirjar therefore, is defined as the act or process of segregating
j va from those karma-particles which trickled into j va and stayed
stuck to it.
53
One other alternative of getting the wet sponge dry again is
to leave it in the open to dry naturally in course of time. The
first alternative requires human effort but is less prolonged, the
other alternative requires human effort but may be a quite pro-
longed process. But still, both are theoretically feasible alterna-
tives. Analogously, the Jaina thinkers speak of two types of nirjar
viz., vipkaja (involving no effort) and avipkaja (requiring posi-
tive effort).
54
The former takes place after the karma-particles
drop off the j va in due time after coming to maturity. The latter
requires human effort in the form of tapasy (steadfast pursu-
ance of the goal of moka by enduring all sorts of hardships).
55
Tapasy again is of two kinds internal and external. Internal
tapasy is more effective than external tapasy for achieving
nirjar.
56
Each one of these two types of tapasy is further clas-
sified into six sub-types each.
The six kinds of external tapasy are the following :
1) Anaana (fasting),
2) Avamaudarya or uodar (partial fasting),
3) Vttisamkepa (curtailing the greed for various things of
enjoyment),
4) Rasa-tyga (giving up of enjoyment of delicacies like butter,
honey etc.),
5) kyaklea (undergoing self-imposed physical hardship),
6) samlnat (overcoming temptation by controlling mental
attitudes e.g. the kayas, bodily actions like indiscrete
movement, choice of living conditions etc. and control-
ling speech which is improper or indiscrete. Samlnat is
just the three guptis and a few of the samitis repeated
under a different garb).
The six types of internal tapasy, on the other hand, are the
following:
1. Pr ya citta (atonement for moral wrong-doing like non-
pursuance of the five vratas etc.)
2. Vinaya (modesty and reverance)
3. Vaivttya (rendering humanitarian service to others)
4. Svdhyya (study of relevant scriptures)
5. Vyutsarga (renunciation, i.e. giving up the sense of posses-
sion by overcoming the feeling of mine-ness)
6. Dhy na (mental concentration), which again is subdivided
into four types viz., rta-dhy na, r udra-dhy na, dharma-
dhyna and ukla-dhyna,
57
Here, again we skip the details as they are not directly relevant
for our purpose.
vi) Moka
It is the last tattva in the list of nine. Moka means transcendence
of the state of bondage leading into the realm of ideal freedom.
This state is achieved when even the last bit of karma-particle is
purged out of the jva. At this stage, mundane morality ceases to
have any relevance for the liberated self. State of liberation or
moka is a trans-ethical or metaphysical concept and therefore,
does not directly bear upon the moral issues in the ordinary
sense. Hence, we shall make only a few such very brief com-
ments about it as would have some relevance to our line of
approach.
First, moka is defined as that state where all causes of bond-
age have been destroyed through the process of purging (nirjar)
of all karma-particles and thus freedom from all karma has been
achieved. It brings all sufferings to an end and leads to bound-
less bliss.
58
Secondly, moka is of two types viz., bhva-moka and dravya-
moka which roughly correspond to the concepts of jvan-mukti
and videha-mukti respectively.
59
Thirdly, a liberated self or j va can never be subject to the
cycle of birth and death again.
60
Finally, after dravya-moka the liberated j va resumes its natural
upward movement and continues to move up until it reaches the
upper boundary of lokka,
61
where it stays for ever. A liberated
self cannot, however, move further up into the alokka for the
simple reason that according to the Jainas there is no dharma or
adharma
62
(the indispensable auxilliary conditions of motion and
rest) in the alokka.
One who has attained moka is called a keval in Jaina litera-
ture.
63
Since such a j va is free of all trammels that may act as im-
pediments to achieving its four original potentialities {ananta
catuaya), a keval attains infinite knowledge, wisdom, bliss and
power.
64
According to the Jaina thinkers, a keval is an acme of perfection
and, as such, he can be viewed as God i.e. as the noblest object of
worship.
65
Other than that, there is no God. The postulation of
God is a needless hypothesis according to the Jainas. 'Law (vidhih),
creator (sraa), legislator (vidh t ), destiny (daiva), previous karma
(karma purkrtani) and Isvara (God) are synonymous,' says the Jaina
dipura,
66
III. CAUSATION AND KARMA
Jaina theory of causation and their view about the nature of law of
karma form the theoretical foundation of Jaina ethics. In this
section we discuss them one after the other.
A) CAUSATION
Jaina theory of causation has some peculiar features, the significance
of which can be best appreciated by looking at them from a broader
perspective. Probably the earliest attempt to give a systematic
account of the regularities found in the universe was in terms of
ta, postulated as a cosmic ordering-principle. Its range of
application was universal in so far as it ranged over both the physical
as well as the psychical spheres. ta, however, always had an
anthropocentric orientation. This notion of ta was taken up and
later modified with sophistication into the comprehensive concept
of k rya-k ra a-v da by the later Indian thinkers. The general
tendency, however, was to adapt it to a dichotomic approach.
Krya-kraa (causality in the restricted sense), was invoked as an
expl anatory pri nci pl e pertai ni ng to the physi cal events. A
corresponding causal principle, called ada (or some equivalent
notion) was invoked to explain the transphysical (including both
psychological and moral) events. Ada usually brought with it
the notion of a moral dispensor (vidht or God with a supervisory
role) to ensure that ada works without glitches. It was probably
one of the first attempts to adopt a dualistic (consciousness and
matter) model of the universe. In the process, there was a
bifurcation of the explanatory principle ta into krya-kraa-vda
(causality in a restricted sense) applying to physical phenomena
and ada (destiny) applying to the non-physical, especially moral,
phenomena. The Jaina model of causation was an attempt to revert
to a unified scheme of explanation like the ta but the model differs
from it in being a rigidly mechanistic (but not deterministic)
67
and
non-anthropo-centric principle of explanation.
68
Keeping the above background in mind, we may note a few
salient features of Jaina theory of causation.
i) The Jainas divide causes into three types
a) Material cause (updna kraa) e.g. gold in a ring,
b) Efficient cause (kart) e.g., goldsmith who makes the ring,
c) Instrumental or auxiliary cause (sdhana or kraa) e.g. the
hammer of a goldsmith.
Jaina concept of instrumental cause (sdhana) is wider than the
corresponding notion used by the Naiy yikas in so far as the Jainas
drop the requirement that any instrument has to be something
which is used by a conscious agent. An instrumental cause may,
however, still be viewed as any indispensable (but not always con-
sciously effected) condition of an effect. Thus even the role of the
basal stone of a potter's wheel in the production of the effect pot
or the role of warmth of fire as a cause of easier concentration in
study during the winter, would count as auxiliary causes (sdhana
or kraa) according to the Jainas. It is in this sense that dharma
and adharma are considered by the Jainas to be causative factors
instrumental to the production of motion and rest respectively.
69
Such a view implies that something may be causally explained with-
out postulating a conscious manipulator.
ii) No change without a cause
Every origination (as a new state coming into being) involves a
change of an existing state of affairs. Hence, every origination
requires an explanation, which must be a causal one according to
the Jainas. But causal explanation need not entail a purpose or
conscious intervention. Jaina theory of origination and destruc-
tion were developed in keeping with this requirement. They di-
vided all processes of creation/destruction into two types
__
(a)
pryogika (involving conscious effort) and (b) vaisrasika (natural
i.e. without requiring conscious effort). Production of a pot (or its
destruction on purpose) are examples of pryogika creation and
destruction respectively.
Similarly, the origin of a mountain or of changes in the states
of dharma (of a thing in motion) are examples of natural (vaisrasika)
creation. So is the case of cloud-formation in the sky. Dissipation
of a cloud or of a wind-swept sand-dune are examples of natural
(vaisrasika) destruction.
70
iii) All effects must end in a finite time
Another important theoretical presupposition underlying the Jaina
theory of causation needs mention here. Although it is nowhere
so explicitly stated in the Jaina literature, yet it is unmistakably
implied by what other things are explicitly stated in some of
them. The presupposition is this: No effect which is of the
nature of a deviation (from an initial or pure state of anything)
can continue for ever. Thus if we throw a stone, its state of
motion (which is a deviation from its initial and natural state of
rest) will be gradually dissipated and completely lost after a finite
span of time. On the other hand, once the stone is set into
motion, if we want to bring it to a stop before due time, we
have to apply some motion-opposing or retarding force to it.
The stronger the retarding force applied, the sooner the previ-
ous effect is counter balanced or neutralized. This principle or
presupposition is quite analogous to the principle of increase of
entropy of a natural system. It says that in natural states entropy
(disorder) tends to increase towards a state of equilibrium. If the
entropy of a natural system is artificially decreased by conscious
intervention, then the system naturally tends to revert back to a
state of higher entropy as soon as it is left to itself without
intervention. No effect (decrease of entropy) can continue for
ever (being a deviation from the initial state of perfect equilib-
rium). The point of this analogy is difficult to miss. Hence, we
shall call this specific presupposition of the Jaina theory of cau-
sality 'the entropy principle'.
B) THEORY OF KARMA:
i) General Features
Jaina theory of karma is an aspect of their more inclusive theory
of causation. The important features of the Jaina concept of
karma are the following:
i) Karman is a special form of pudgala
71
and atomic in nature,
ii) It has the natural property of adhogurutva, (downward gravi-
tation) in contrast to the upwardly gravitation or levity
(rdhagurutva) of souls,
72
iii) Karman interacts with a soul through the channels of body,
mind and speech,
iv) Karman is the root of birth and death and of all worldly
sufferings and enjoyments,
73
v) The status and the type of being that a j va is in this life is
due to its own karman.
74
vi) Depending on its own karma a j va may be born as a
worm, as an insect, as an ant, either as a katriya or as a
candla or in a mixed caste,
75
vii) The law of karma is inexorable i.e. there is no exception to
it. No one can avoid undergoing the effects of his karma,
76
viii) Effects of karma are non-sharable and non-transferable
77
i.e. the doer alone is to bear the whole impact of the effects
of his own karma. On the other hand, the consequences of
no one else's action can be thrust on him,
ix) There are eight types of karman vi z. , j n vara ya,
daranvaranya, mohanya, vedanlya, antarya, yu karman,
nma karman, and gotra karman.
78
Of these, the first four
are called ghi (destructive) karma, because they obstruct
and destroy true knowledge and faith and thereby destroy
a jva's chances of emancipation (moka). The last four are
called non-destructive (aght), because although they pro-
duce effects on a jva's state of existence yet they do not
adversely affect its chances of moka,
79
x) There are two ways in which the so-called karma- contami-
nation of a j va can come to an end. In due course, when
their potency is used up, the karma-particles fall off natu-
rally. This is purgation (nirjar), through maturity (vipkaj
nirjar). Alternatively, one may, through conscious effort,
(e.g. tapasy, pryacitta, etc.) flush the infused karma-par-
ticles out of jva. This is effort-based flushing of karma-
particles (avipkaj nirjar). That there must be a vipkaj
nirjar follows as a corollary from the entropy principle
itself,
xi) The law of karma is autonomous i.e. it does not require the
postulation of any superhuman consciousness or God, be-
cause it is a special case of their non-anthropocentric, mecha-
nistic theory of causation. Law, creator, karma, God all refer
to the same inexorable principle
80
according to the Jainas.
ii) Common mechanistic framework
I claimed earlier in this paper that Jaina cosmology and ethics
share a common mechanistic (but non-deterministic) framework.
Now we may note some of the more significant points of con-
vergence between their cosmology and their ethics.
i) Jva is utterly different from pudgala, yet its nature is mod-
elled mechanistically in so far as j va is characterised as a
mereological whole, having interstices into which karma-
particles may percolate,
ii) Jva has rdhvagurutva (levity),
iii) It requires the help of dharma for its motion just as any
other material object does,
iv) It has spatial extension (deaparima), though it does not
fill or occupy any volume of space,
v) Sense organs (indriya), mind (manas), life force (pra) and
apna are all material (paudgalika) in nature. Not only that,
karman also has form (rp) according to the Jainas,
81
vi) Both j va (at its mundane level) as well as pudgala (matter)
are subject to the same set of mechanistic laws viz., that of
causality and karma,
vii) The inlet-channel-cum-wet-sponge model of the nine tattva,
as we saw, is a fully mechanistic one in which the causes of
rava and bandha can be viewed as forces of attraction
acting on karma-particles whereas causes of savara and
nirjar are the corresponding repulsive forces acting on them,
viii) Pursuance of the five mahvratas (ahis, asteya, amithy,
arati and aparigraha) and their ritualistic details are prescrip-
tions for generating the karma-repelling forces,
ix) Non-pursuance of the five vratas and indulging in the mental
attitudes of greed, anger (the kayas) etc. are ways of letting
the karma-attracting forces to become operative and thereby
of preparing the ground for bondage of self.
82
The socio-
ethical aspects of these are enormously important but are
not discussed here,
x) Kaya (the stickiness-producing property pertaining to a
jva) are coarsely mechanistic-physicalistic in nature,
xi) Not only that, a jva, according to the Jainas, can even take
up colouration (red, blue, white etc.) depending on the type
of karma-pudgala infused into it. Such colouration of a j va
is technically called 'ley,
83
in Jaina philosophy,
xii) Finally, it may also be noted that the Jaina classification of
karman into three different types (on the basis of their period
of fructification) nicely fits in with the well-known physical-
istic model that depicts the transformation of potential energy
into kinetic energy.
84
The first of the three types of karman
is satt i.e. such karman as were acquired by a self in the past
but are yet to start bearing their fruits. Second comes bandha
karman (i.e. karman currently being acquired which will bear
fruit only in future). Last, there is udaya karman i.e. karman
which has already started bearing its fruit. The analogy be-
tween these and a previously wound-up spring (in its vari-
ous stages of unwinding) very naturally comes to mind here.
This and similar issues I plan to develop later.
C) CONSEQUENCES OF THE MODEL
Philosophical implications of the mechanistic-physicalistic model
of Jaina cosmology and ethics are quite interesting. The worth
of any model is measured in terms of its power of systematization
and explanation. How well does our mechanistic-physicalistic
model (MP-model, for short) fare by this criterion?
i) Physicalistic ethics
If the parallelism drawn earlier between Jaina cosmology (i.e.
physics in a broad sense) and their ethics has any plausibility
then it follows that in Jainism physics and ethics should be
unified within a common physicalistic framework. As a matter
of fact, that happens to be the case too. In nineteenth century
physics Joule's famous experiment was prompted by a concep-
tual framework in which the principle of conservation of energy
was sacrosanct. Similarly, among a number of other things, the
Jaina hypothesis about the transmigration of souls was a logical
consequence of their theory of karma
85
(which clearly fits the
MP-model). This is certainly very interesting. However, what
bestows uniqueness on Jaina ethics is not its physicalistic orien-
tation (which the crvkas and some twentieth century reduc-
tionists did have) but the fact that Jaina ethics, despite being
physicalistic (yet non-materialistic) in a broad sense, is a non-
reductionist and non-deterministic (but strictly causalistic) system.
Instead of going for a physicalistic reduction of self, what they
did may be called a 'transductive physicalism'
__
a sort of physical-
ism where physical elements (like earth, water, plants etc.) are
placed at the lower end of the continuum of be-souled reals
86
which are, in principle, transducible (upgradable) to the level of
a full-fledged jva.
ii) Godless world of human dignity
It is a historical fact that any worldview dominated by a physi-
calistic orientation would tend to look for the explanatory prin-
ciples it needs within the physical world itself. Naturally, in such
worldviews, world-transcendent things like God, creator etc.
would become redundant and dispensable. If the law of karma
be universal and inescapable and every individual difference of
type and status in the present state of existence is to be ac-
counted for in terms of differences in previous karma, then a
world-creator God can have no place in such a system. Natu-
rally, in Jainism there is no God in the ordinary sense of a
transcendent being. With no God, there is no question of re-
demption (attaining mok a) through divine grace alone.
87
Being
inexorable, non-sharable and non-transferable their law of karma
ensures that man's open-future is shaped by his own karma
alone. There is nothing called a 'free-ride' or a 'forfeited' paid
ticket in a universe in which the law of karma reigns supreme.
So one owes respectful submission only to this supreme law of
karma which even Gods (if there be any) cannot disobey.
88
Now God being dead every man becomes the maker of his
own destiny by his own karma. Those beings who by dint of
their own efforts and karma reach the ideal limit of perfection
(moka) become the embodiments of all the divine virtues, for
the alleged possession of which the so-called God is worshipped.
Such self-perfected beings are called keval, siddha, arhat etc. by
the Jains. It follows as a corollary that such men (rather than a
superstitiously hypothesised God) should be the proper object
of worship. It is very clearly expressed through the sacred chant
of worship used by the Jainas.
89
Thus it is the Jaina ideal of
moral perfection that defines the object of worship or Godhead
instead of a transcendent hypothetical notion of perfection (viz.
God-hood) defining the goal of moral perfection. It is a sort of
Copernican revolution insofar as instead of viewing man as a
forever-imperfect copy of divine perfection, Jainism regards God
as man-perfected. So man plays a more central role than God
in Jaina ethics. This primacy-of-man orientation of their ethics
comes out more explicitly when, in addition to equating God
with a liberated self called a 'siddha' they maintain that among
the different types of siddhas, the position of a tirthankara is
more exalted because he continues to serve humanity (by way of
propounding dharma) after liberation.
90
Not only that, Jainism
further holds that 'Each self can become paramtman by self-
culture and self-effort', that every man is God, potentially.
91
Even
more radically homocentric is the Jaina claim that 'Liberation is
attained through human body only. Heavenly Gods....[cannot]
attain the supreme state of liberation directly from their state of
godhood'.
92
Gods have to be born as man in order to be eli-
gible to achieve moka. Moka must be an achievement by the
liberated rather than an endowment thrust on him.
Had the law of karma not been supreme and inexorably
mechanistic, extolling the dignity of man above that of God
would not be a logical corollary of Jaina ethics. It is unmistak-
ably clear that only an MP-model of ethics (dovetailing physics
with ethics) could provide the required foundation.
iii) Loneliness of man
From the MP-model of Jaina ethics the inexorability of the
mechanistically rigid impersonal nature of law of karma follows
as a corollary. This corollary, in its turn, entails that in Jaina
ethics there is no scope of getting 'forgiveness' for one's sins
through divine grace. As one sows, so he must reap. Man alone
is fully responsible for his own actions and he is the lone fighter
to struggle his way up to moka
__
a sort of transcendence of his
state of fallen-ness. Unlike in Christianity this state of 'fallen-
ness' is not original, it is a sort of self-inflictment caused by one's
own karma. This view is very succinctly stated in various texts.
Uttardhyana Stra
93
clearly states:
a) '...people in this life and the next cannot escape the effect of
their own actions'. (4.3)
b) 'One's relations cannot share the fruits of a person's actions
when they mature'.(4.4)
c) 'Alone he accumulates merit; alone he enjoys happiness in
heaven; alone he destroys karma; alone he attains moka.'
94
Moreover, it may also be noted that of the sixty-two ways of achieving
samvara arranged in seven groups, the fifth group consists of twelve
anuprek (deep and meditative reflection). Of them one is a ara a
anuprek (reflection on helplessness of man in the face of death
and suffering). Another is, ekatva anuprek (reflection on man's
aloneness). It requires one to reflect thus: 'I am alone, the doer of
my actions and enjoyer of the fruits of them. No one can help
me, nor can I expect help from others.'
95
This emphasis on the
recognition of man's helplessness and aloneness is strongly sugges-
tive of an existentialistic undertone in Jaina ethics. Man's being
thrown into this world, his helpless and aloneness remind one of
the existentialist notion of facticity
96

with the important difference
that man himself is responsible for his being thrown into the world
according to Jaina philosophy, while in existentialism this 'thrown-
ness' is painted as due to a cosmic conspiracy against hapless man.
iv) Non-deterministic causalism
Let us suppose that (a) our proposed MP-model, is an adequately
powerful model of the structure of Jaina ethics, that (b) the karma-
particles, mind (manas), principle of vitality (pra) etc. are mate-
rial in nature
97
and that (c) the law of karma is rigidly causal, inflex-
ible and mechanical-physical in nature.
98
What kind of view about
the criterion of moral responsibility and about freedom of will
should we expect to encounter in a system of ethics based on the
above three assumptions ? Well, what do we expect to happen if
water drips on a dry sponge from a tap ? Irrespective of whether
the tap was turned on intentionally or just happened to be turned
on purely accidentally, the result is the same, the sponge gets water
soaked. Similarly if our MP-model is correct then even uninten-
tional actions (good or bad) would cause an influx of karma-par-
ticles (here, water particles) into the jva (here, the dry sponge)
causing the j va to be permeated by the karma-particles. This will
cause j va to lose its state of purity (corresponding to the loss of
dryness of the sponge due to the influx of wet water particles into
its pores). The sponge-getting-wet is a useful analogy of jva laps-
ing into a state of bondage because the sponge analogy suggests
that even unintentional actions may cause bondage to the self and
when it does, the onus of freeing itself of such bondage-producing
karma-particles rests on the j va concerned. That is what, accord-
ing to the Jaina theory of morality , really happens. In short, the
Jainas maintain that unintentional actions need not be morality-
neutral i.e. non-moral actions. They should, instead, be counted
either as 'moral' or as 'immoral' actions depending on the nature
of the unintended action.
99
This is a radical departure from the
standard Western scheme of classification of all actions into moral,
immoral and non-moral ones.
Moreover, the Jainas distinguish between bhvsrava (srava
induced by kaya-inducing psychological attitude) and
dravysrava (actual influx of karma as a consequence). The rela-
tion between bhvsrava and dravysrava is that of ground and
consequence (rather than a straightforward cause-effect relation),
where bhvsrava. being the ground, plays a more significant
role in setting the process of influx ( rava) in motion. The
moral-theoretic consequence of this is that according to the
Jaina theory of evil (or good) intentions by themselves are potent
enough to generate moral consequences (p pa or puya) thereby
making the agent morally responsible for his evil (or good)
intentions, even if such intentions are never carried out into
action.
To sum up, according to the Jaina view (a) even an unin-
tended accidentally done action can be morally good or bad;
100
And (b) even a non-action (e.g. intention to harm someone
without really doing any harm to him) can make the agent
responsible for moral wrong-doing.
101
The degree of such
responsibility, however, is less than what it would be if the said
evil intention were followed by causing actual harm. The first
feature (a) implies that intention is not a necessary condition for
imputing moral responsibility, while (b) implies that it is a
sufficient condition by itself. This is a unique position which
does not fit in well with any standard Western framework.
Clearly, such a radical departure would make a system of crimi-
nal justice, based on Jaina moral theory, significantly different
from those based on another (e.g. the Western) kind of moral
theory. Some of the penological
102
consequences of Jaina ethics
I have discussed elsewhere.
103
That even in the absence of any overt action the mere inten-
tion to act in a particular way can make the agent morally
responsible is a logical corollary of the MP-model of Jaina eth-
ics. If karma-particles are material in nature, and operate mecha-
nistically, and if yoga (any activity of body, mind or speech) in-
evitably causes influx (srava) then mere evil intention, being
what it is, a sort of mano-yoga (i.e. an activity of mind) must
have moral consequences. That is why the Jainas interpret ahis
in a very broad sense to exclude from it not only actual acts of
cruelty but also all thoughts involving cruelty (e.g. cruel intention
of killing someone). S. K. Maitra gives specific examples of such
actions from a Buddhist source. He points out that in
Mdhyamikaviti of Candrak rti virtues are classified into four
kinds of which the fourth viz., Cittbhisamskrmanaskarma are
the examples in point. Cittbhisamskrmanaskarma is the merit
(or demerit) arising from manaskarma, a conscious resolve... of
the mind in the direction of righteousness (or unrighteousness)
... this conscious determination is a mental act (manaskarma)
without objective or physical manifestation.'
104
The above account makes one thing very clear. In Jaina
ethics moral virtue (also moral vice) is a function of two inde-
pendent variables
__
intention (mental aspect) and overt action
(physical consequence). Just as unintended destruction of life
(e.g. trampling on an ant) can be morally bad, similarly the plan
to kill a beef-cattle for food (but ultimately dropping the plan)
can also be morally bad. So intention and execution, the two
variables of an action are delinked from one another. This leads
to a queer consequence. What if an action with good conse-
quence gets done with an evil intention (e.g. setting up a chari-
table trust with a view to tax-dodging) ? Or what if an action
with bad consequence gets done with morally good intention
(e.g. handling an accident victim improperly at a desolate place
causing his death despite the good intention to help him sur-
vive) ? Until a few years ago, as per Canadian criminal law, such
an act was a crime, for which well-meaning do-gooders of the
above type could be sued and punished. Now, the law has been
sensibly modified. However, the basic point is clear
__
moral is-
sues of the type discussed above are too complex to have easy
solution. The Jainas classified such complex cases into four types:
(1) good actions coupled with good intentions (puny nubandh punya),
(2) good actions done with bad intentions (ppnubandhpunya),
(3) bad actions done with good intentions e.g. robbing Paul to
help Peter (punynubandhppa), (4) bad actions with bad inten-
tions (ppnubandhppa).
Of these four, (1) and (4) are pure or non-problematic cases
of morally right and morally wrong actions respectively, while
(3) and (2) are of mixed type and may be called cases of virtue-
laced-with-vice and vice-laced-with-virtue respectively.
105
There is one more conceptual problem here. If the law of
karma is so rigidly mechanistic that even a mere bad intention or
an unintended action with bad consequences sullies the moral
character of a j va, then what happens to our freedom of will ?
And without it how can any sense be made of moral account-
ability or responsibility ? May be, just as drinking does not go
with driving, a mechanistic physicalistic causalism cannot go with
any adequate theory of morality. But is it really so? To find an
answer to this question we move to the next point pertaining to
the MP-model of Jaina ethics.
v) Causalism, freedom and suffering
It is a very common practice in philosophy to lump together
expressions which are similar in meaning. Normally, it works
well. Sometimes, however, not paying heed to the subtle nuances
of meaning causes confusion. Lumping 'physicalism' with
SARKAR : Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics 9 9 1 0 0 ETHICS : An Anthology
'materialism' and 'mechanistic' with 'deterministic' often causes a
lot of conceptual confusion. I have already indicated that we
must not equate 'physicalism' with 'materialism' or 'mechanistic'
with 'deterministic'. A mechanistic explanatory framework is one
which does not allow any mentalistic notion as an explanatory
parameter. Any such scheme, when it is strictly causal (i.e. assumes
that every event that needs an explanation can be explained
causally) we shall call a 'causalistic' scheme. The framework of
Jaina ethics is in this sense, mechanistic-causalism, rather than a
mechanistic-determinism. If it were deterministic, there would be
no scope for freedom of will in it. An analogy may be used to
illustrate the distinction between determinism and causalism.
Think of an infinitely long row of vertically standing bricks,
arranged faces parallel and each placed half a brick-length apart
from the next. Now think of starting a domino effect (pushing
down a brick on to the next) as the beginning of a causal
sequence. The process will continue in a predictably fixed linear
order, (if it is sealed off from all external interceptions). This is
deterministic. On the other hand, allow the possibility of exter-
nal intervention (e.g. by lifting two successive bricks away from
the row) then the domino effect stops at that gappy stretch.
From that point onward another domino effect may be started
anew or the arrangement of bricks at the tail-end may be modi-
fied by altering their position, face-angles etc. If intervention of
the type is allowed at any arbitrarily chosen point of time after
the start of the initial domino-effect, the sequence of falling
bricks would be regular but not predictable for all time to come.
So, in such a case the domino effect is regular but not predictable
because, it can be modified at any time during the process. Such
interminable, unpredictable but regular (i.e. not haphazard) se-
quence would be a model of mechanistic-causalistic sequence or
sequential causalism but not of mechanistic-determinism.
The Jaina model of causation, (which includes their law of
karma) being a type of mechanistic causalism, can easily
incorporate in it the notion of free will and that of man's
control over his own action (karma) without any inconsistency.
This possibility leaves open the scope of Jaina ethics being a
mechanistic causalism without lapsing into inflexible
determinism
__
a system in which no man can be held morally
responsible for his action.
The dialogue of Lord Mah v ra with Sadd laputta in
Uvsgadaso-sutta clearly shows that Mah v ra considered de-
terminism (niyativda) )) )) unacceptable, as it leads to idleness, dull-
ness and hypocrisy but at the same time emphasized that one
can never deceive the well-established order based on causa-
tion.'
106
The same anti-deterministic view is also found in
S trak t nga 1.2.2. which 'attacks the teaching of the niyativdins
that ones suffering is not due to one's actions but due to fate
(predetermined destiny)'.
107
Similarly, Siddhasena in his Sanmati-
tarka says that none of time, nature, fate (daiva), past actions
(karma-phala) and human effort (puruakra) is the sole deter-
mining factor. The role of each one is to be duly emphasized (as
determiners of man's state of existence)
108
. Haribhadra in his
Yogavindu goes a step further, first emphasizing the mutual
dependence between karma and human effort and then explic-
itly stating that weak fate or destiny can be overcome by human
effort.
109
However, eulogising human effort is one thing and outlining
a concrete method of making puruakra win over destiny (as
shaped by one's own karma) is another. Does Jaina ethics have
any such concrete scheme to offer ? Yes, they do.
If we look deeper into the details of Jaina law of karma we
find the following :
(i) No karman starts to produce its effect right after it is done.
There is a specific time-lapse between a karman and its
effectuation. This is called avdhakla (latency period). Until
the specific avdhakla for a karma is over, it cannot start
bearing its fruit.
(ii)Every effect of karman has a finite span of duration. It must
wear itself off in course of time. Let us call it the 'staying
period' of a karma.
( iii) Depending on how indelible the effects of a karma is, there
is a classification of stages of karma into different types viz.
nidhatti, nikcan etc. Karma in its nikcan stage is called
'nikacita karma'. Effects of such karma, according to the
SARKAR : Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics 1 0 1 1 0 2 ETHICS : An Anthology
Jainas, are most indelible, but still, according to Jaina think-
ers like Up dhy ya Ya ovijaya, even the virtually unalter-
able (nikacit) karma can be altered and even destroyed
(neutralised) by human effort.
110
The nikacita karmas can be
destroyed by tapas (austerity).
111
(iv) The staying period of a karma can also be modified (pro-
longed or shortened) by human effort. Prolongation of
staying-power is technically called udvartan, while its short-
ening is called apavartan.
112
(v) Not only that, the effects of karma can even be prematurely
actualised by human-effort. This is called udran.
113
(vi) From (i) to (v) above it follows that for any given action
(karma) there is a fixed amount of consequences
(karmaphala) which has to be endured for a fixed (but
finite) duration by the agent of action. However, the agent
has a choice. He can have the period of suffering pre-dated
(udran) as well shortened (apavartan) provided (a) the
total amount of suffering to be undertaken remains
constant, and (b) the austerity (tapasy) practised [which is
the human-effort component] is of required matching
intensity. This point is illustrated by Hemacandra in a slokah
on D haprah ri
114
in Yoga stra, 1.12.
Tapasy, as we saw, is a possible means of nirjar (flushing out
of karma-particles from the core of jva). One of its six external
forms is kyaklea (self-inflicted torturing of body). Similarly,
one of the requirements for sanivara (checking the influx of
karma-particles) is prahajaya (overcoming mental distractions
due to physical hardships) which includes staying naked in
winter, being indifferent to bodily uncleanliness etc. How come
these sorts of crude discomforts of body be considered by the
Jainas as conducive to moral progress ? Should we not take it as
symptomatic of something quite perverse in there ?
It should be kept in mind here that Jainism does not
recommend austerity (self-inflicted hardships) just for the sake
of austerity. It has to be practised with a view to cultivate the
power of endurance and of maintaining mental peace, tranquility
and equanimity.
115
If mortification of body (austerity) is
undertaken with a view to simply causing pain to the body or
just for drawing public attention etc. it would be a product of
ignorance lacking any moral-spiritual value. Thus Ya ovijaya in
his Tapo'aka, says that one should practice austerities in such a
way that the powers of mind, speech and body do not dwindle
and bodily organs may not become weak. We should not subject
the body to pointless hardships and sufferings nor should we
pamper it with undue indulgence. We should abandon the two
extremes and adopt the middle path.
116
Now, let us assume that the bodily suffering of the type
mentioned are practiced in right spirit. How can it have any
relevance to morality ? First, we should keep in mind that both
sanivara and nirjar are forces opposed to the forces of srava
and bandha and the Jainas believe that austerity helps to generate
these karma-dispelling forces. Secondly, through austerity we
undergo voluntary suffering. Since the total amount of suffering
due for each one of us is a function of his/her actions and so
is already fixed and constant, by undergoing self-inflicted suffer-
ing ahead of the time when the results of one's actions are due
to come into effect, one may finish his term earlier (udran) and
quicker (apavartan).
117
It is like working overtime during the
week in order to earn a paid long weekend.
Like the Jainas, Schopenhauer also views suffering not as
something to be shunned but as something having a positive
value which can bring in welcome changes in our customary
world-orientedness. Though Schopenhauer starts from a com-
pletely different philosophical orientation, yet what he says has
more than surface-similarity to the Jaina view of suffering. This
is not very surprising in view of the fact that he himself claimed
affinity between his views and Buddhist philosophy. As Miri
points out, 'true wisdom, according to Schopenhauer, lies in the
renunciation of life, in the denial of will. The man who really
denies the will welcomes suffering since it purifies him...'
118
Schopenhauer's own thought contained, by his own admission,
"the triple tradition of quietism, (i.e. the giving up of all willing),
asceticism, (i.e., intentional mortification of one's will), and mys-
ticism, ,, ,, (i.e., consciousness of the identity of all beings, or with
the kernel of the world."
119
vi) Relativistic contextualism in ethics
Jaina ethics is based on a rigid (inexorable) mechanistic
causalism. Such a system is usually expected to yield a very rigid
system of moral codes and moral evaluation. However, when we
look at Jaina ethics in its applications, we see that their moral
doctrines are highly flexible and accommodative. Let us take a
few examples.
First, Jaina ethics insists that moral progress is possible only
by strictly pursuing the five primary vows (panca mahvrata) viz.
ahi s, amithy, asteya, aparigraha and brahmacarya. Then they
define his, satya (i.e., amithy) etc., so broadly that no activity
remains theoretically free from violence
120
and even telling a
fictional story to a child counts as telling a lie (mithy).
121
But,
Since neither ahis nor satya in such a sense can be practicable
for ordinary people, the Jaina theoreticians distinguished be-
tween two degrees of pursuance of the vows: one strict and ideal
meant for the sdhus (ascetics), the other loose and practical
meant for the householders. These latter weakened forms of
vows are called mini-vows (anuvrata) in contrast to the primary
vows (mahvrata). First the anuvratas (or mini-vratas) enjoin one
only to avoid gross cruelty. Next, the Jaina theoreticians narrow
down the original and very broad definition of his so that
farming, killing of the lowest type (one sensed) of creatures etc.
are exempted from being counted as hi s. When even this is
found wanting, his is classified into four types viz. those un-
avoidable for leading a domestic life (ghrabh) hi s ; those
unavoidable in certain professions (e.g. in fishing, farming etc.)
(udyog his); those necessitated by the cause of justice, protec-
tion and self-defence (virodh hi s) and premeditated inten-
tional violence (sa kalp his). Of these only the last is prohib-
ited while the other three are conditionally permitted.
Similarly, concession is made with regard to telling of truth.
Not telling the truth or even telling a lie is made morally permis-
sible if it results in greater benefit of living beings.
122
Similar is the case with the remaining three vows, mutatis
mutandis.
Again it is found that not all aspiring sdhus (ascetics) have
the ability to follow the five mahvrata with absolute rigidity. So
exception is made again by distinguishing between jinakalp
(those who are required to pursue the vows very rigidly without
even minimal deviation) and sthavira kalp sdhus (those who
pursue them in a milder form).
123
As if these were not climb-downs enough, the Jainas even
propose to contextualise/relativise the very criterion of moral
evaluation. Bhagavat-stra mentions an incident where Jayanfi
asks Mah v ra whether lying asleep (most of the time) is good
or is it good to stay awake ? Mah v ra's answer is that staying
asleep is good so far a habitual wrong doer or criminal is con-
cerned but for a saintly man (who devotes his life for the benefit
of mankind) staying awake for longer periods would be good.
124
Clearly, one can substitute 'telling a lie' or 'killing a man' for
'lying asleep' and their opposites (viz, 'telling a lie' or 'saving a
human life') for 'staying awake' in Jayant 's question and one
would still get true (relativised) statements of Jaina ethics.
This is not all. There is historical evidence that in south India,
at one time, there originated a martial class the members of
which were all devout Jainas.
125
All these go to show that despite being based on a rigid
mechanistic-causalistic framework, Jaina ethics was a very
flexible, keenly context-sensitive and highly adaptive system.
How can this relativistic flexibility of Jaina ethics be reconciled
with its rigid mechanistic-physicalistic framework ?
Without going into the details here, we may just point out
that the whole tenor of Jaina ethics was determined by their
mechanistic-physicalistic cosmology on the one hand and by
their metaphysical doctrines (sydvda, anekntavda, nayavda
and vibhajyavda) on the other. The rigouristic aspects of Jaina
ethics were prompted by their causal-mechanistic cosmology;
while the catholic-relativistic aspects of it have their roots in
Jaina metaphysics, especially sydv da and anekntavda.
IV. A BRIEF CHARACTERISATION OF JAINA ETHICS
Many of the conceptual issues raised in Jaina ethics have direct
relevance to some contemporary views about morality and
moral values. For example Jaina ethics has significant points of
contact with Existential Ethics, Christian Ethics, Situational Eth-
ics, Minimal and Maximal Ethics, as well as with what may be
called Discourse Ethics (of Habermas) besides having points of
similarities with as well as divergence from modern types of
utilitarianism (a la J. L. Mackie, John Rawls etc). A separate
paper can be devoted to a comparative study of this type. Pend-
ing that, a brief and non-misleading (but not necessarily ad-
equate) way of characterising Jaina ethics could, I think, be this:
Ii is a relativistic-humanistic system of ethics based on the joint
foundations of mechanistic-physicalism and metaphysics of
anekntavda (non-one-sidedness) carried to its logical end.
Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
1. a) Jiv pudgal k la dharm dharmau tathaiva k a (TAS, 1.4).
b) Cidacid dve pare tattve (SDS. Ch. 3).
c) Aj va puna j eya pudgala dharma adharma k a (BDS, 15).
Also see Uttar dhyana S tra 28/7.
2. J vaj va bh v pu a p va ca sava tesim. Samvara-nijjara-
bandho mok o ya havanti a h . (Pa c stik ya ara 108).
3. J v jiv srav -bandha-sa vara-nirjar -mok a tattva (TAS 1.4).
4. Cidacid dve pare tattve vivekastad vivevacanam. (Padmanand ).
5. Upayogo lak a a J va (Tattv rthasutra 2/8).
6. a ca da sa a ceva carita ca tapo tah . V riyam upa-oga ya
eyam J vassa lakkha a . (Uttr. Su 28/11).
7. 'Ekavidh tm na 'quoted by Sinha (1990) from Abhidh na
R jendrako a.
8. a) Mok a k ay d j nadar an vara ntar ya k ay d kevolam (TAS 10).
b) Sa sarvaj anadar labhate sukhamanindriya anantam (PKS).
9. "The space-points of the above mentioned four non-material substances
are of a special type. They are... absolutely inseparable and form a
perfect unity." Shah (1998), p.15.
10. a) k sa-k la-j va dharm dharmau ca m rti parih n , m rta pudgala-
dravyam, j va khalu cetan ste u (PKS 97).
b) Caitanya svarpa parinm kart skt-bhokt svadehaparima
pratiketra bhinna paudgalik d tav n ca ayam. (PNT 7.5).
11. a) J v ceva aj v ya esa loe viy hi e. Aj va desam g se alo. e sc viy hi
e (Uttr. Su 36/2).
b) Lok k am alok k am iti dvividha (BDS 19).
c) Dharm dharmau k la pudgala-j va ca santi y vatike k e sa loka ,
tata parata loka ukta (BDS).
d) Yath ha sa jala avag hate ... tath j va pudgal k a
avag hante. [Quoted by Sinha (1990) from Tattv rthar ja-V rtika].
12. a) Na c sya hetukart tva nikriyasya viruddhate. yato nimittam trepi
hetu kart tvam i yate (TS 3.4).
b) Pad rth n kumbhak racakrasya dh ra l vat s tak l dhyayana
agnivat. [Quoted by Sinha (1990) from BDS].
c) Gatimat m gate sthimat sthite upagraho dharm dharma
yorupak ra ( TAB 5.17).
13. "... dharma is without any form ... It exists in the lokka, ... but not
in the alokka." Sinha (1990), p.56.
14. Varttan lak a a ca k la (PKS 24): varttan pari ma kriy
paratv paratve ca k lasya. (TAS 5.22).
15. See quotation from Bhagavati-s tra in Shah (1998), p.226.
16. "Anuyogadvra-stra refers to kla as addh samaya... The Uttardhyana-
stra describes kla as real characterized by vartan." Sinha (1990) p.54.
Also see Shah (1998) p.228 for further textual references.
17. a) K le prade a-pracayo yasm t n st ti nirdi am (GS).
b) M rtte trividha prade h k lasya eka na tena sak ya (BDS 25);
k lasyatu n sti k yatv (PKS 102).
18. See note 12 above. Also cp. Dharma gatikraa. gatikriyyuktn
karaabhta svaya akrya (PKS 84).
19. "K la is one and not produced by the combination of parts. It is non-
conscious. formless, inactive and infinite." Sinha (1990), p.54). Also see
note 10(a) above.
20. See note 11(c) above.
21. "Foundation of phenomenal time is noumenal time known differntly
as nicaya-kla, dravya-kla or pramrthika-kla." Sinha (1990), p.54.
22. Pura d galan dapi pudgalan svabh vaj ai kathyate pudgal (TS
3.55).
23. ar ra-va mana pr p na pudgala (TAS 5.19).
24. Saddadhayra-ujjao-pah-chy-tvei v. Vannarasa-gandha-phasa
puggalam tu lakkha a . (Uttr. S . 28/12)
25. a) rdhagat svabh v t rdha eva rohati (TRV 10.7.6).
b) Tadanantara rdha gacchati lok nt t. (TAS 10.5).
26. See note 10 above.
27. c rya Hemacandra in his Triathatak Purua caritra (I. 3.474) says:
niyantrana tatra naiva vikath na k cana. Also cp. mok a pr pti prati
na ve a pr dh nya , kimtu samabh va eva niv tti hetu. (Gu avinaya's
commentary on Sambodha Saptati, verse 2).
28. Pu ya p p gama dv ralak ana srava. ( TRV 1.4.16).
29. "Yoga is the activity of body, speech and mind. Yoga causes the inflow
of karmic matter in the soul. (Tattvrthdhigamastra of Um sv ti 6.1-2),
Quoted by Y. Krishnan in Jainthology, p.83.
30. Yath sara salilav h dv ram tad sravanak ranatv t srava iti khy yate,
tatha yoga pr n likay tman karma sravati iti yoga srava iti
vyapade am arhati. Also cp. j vasya ya hi akti karm -gamana-k rana
yoga (GS 216)
31. K ya v mana karmayoga (TAS 6.1).
32. "...we cannot say that first the soul was alone and only afterwards the
karma came into existence. Nor can we say that first the karma alone was
there. ... Thus, when these two alternatives are found untenable, the
only third alternative that the soul and the karma both are bound
together from the beginningless time gets automatically established."
Shah (1998), p.20. [Therefore] "both were bound together from time
immemorial", Ibid, cp. Kundakunda in his Pravacanasra (2.77).
33. "... yoga (activity) is the cause of both the influx and the bondage.
Similarly, mithytva etc. which are the causes of bondage can also be
regarded as [causes of] srava (influx). ... In this way, the identity of
influx and bondage is shown to us." Shah (1998), p.280. A verse (IV.
78) from Ac rya Hemcandra's Yogastra with his own commentary is
quoted in support.
34. See reference to Yogastra in (30) above.
35. See note (26) above.
36. a) Sutha parin mo pu a , asuha p vo ti havadi J vassa. Donha
poggalosatto bh vo kammao a patto. (Pa c stik yas ra 13).
b) ubha pari mo pu yam, a ubha p pa . (PKS 132).
37. "Punya and P pa are, really speaking, types of bandha. Hence, many
include p pa and puya under bandha and speak of seven tattvas."
(Translated from Introduction of Jaycryer Anusanval, p.49).
38. For a detailed discussion see my paper 'Social Dimensions of Jaina
Thought'.
39. a) Saka yatv jj va karma o yogy n pudgal n datte sa bandha (TAS
8.2.3).
b) tmakarma oranyonya prade nu prave a lak a o bandha (TRV
1.4.17).
c) Mithy dar an virat pram da-ka yayoga bandhahetava (TAS 8.1).
40. Prak ti-sthiti anubh ga prade abhed t tu caturvidho bandha . (BDS
33).
41. Yath rdra vastra samant d v t n tam re uj t m up datte, tath
ka ya-jalardra tm yog n tam karma sarvaprade ai g hn ti. (SDS
ch.3).
42. a) "The karmas cannot bind in the absence of mental influx [and the
kayas]": Y. Krishnan in Jainthology, p.92.
b) srava-bh va abh ve na pratyay -bandhak bhanita . Also cp. srava
bh vena vin hetava na pratyay bhavanti. (Samayas ra)
43. See note 32 (b) above.
44. Yassa yad khalu punna yoge p va ca natthi viradassa. Samvara a
tassa tad suh suhakadassa kammassa. (PKS 140).
45. Cetan pari amo ya karma a srava-nirodhane hetu sa bh va-
samvara (BDS 34).
46. Vrata samiti guptayo dharmnuprek parahajaya ca critram
vahubheda. (BDS 35).
47. ry bh saisa d na nik epotsarga samitaya (TAS 9.5).
48. Hi s n ta stey brahmaparigrahebhyo viratirvrata (TAS 7.1).
49. Samyag yoganigraho gupti (TAS 9.4).
50. Uttamak am m rdav rjava satya auca sa ya a tapas ty g ki canya
brahmacary i dharm (TAS 9.6).
51. M rg cyavan nirjar y par orhavy par ah (TAS 9.8). For a list
of 20 par asaha see V, Samgvi, pp.35-36.
52. S m yika chedopasth pana parih ra vi uddhi s k ma sampar ya yathakhy tam
iti critram. (TAS 9.8).
53. Ekadea karmasamaya laka nirjar (TRV 1.4.19). Also cp. Uptta
karmaa pto nirjar dvividh ca s. dy vipkaj tatra dvity ca avipkaj.
(TS 7/2).
55. Yath k lena tapas ca bhuktarasa karmapudgalam yena bh vena sa ati
j eya tat sa ana ceti nirjar dvividh (BDS 36)
56. Nirjar kara e v hy cchre ha bhyantara tapa (Yogas tra IV 91).
57. For an elaboration of the different types of tapasy and stages thereof
see Shah (1998) pp.133-139.
58. a) Vandha-hetvabh va nirjar bhy k tsnakarma-vipramok o mok a
(TAS 10.12).
b) Savva dukkh antam karenti (US 29.1).
c) Atulam sukha sampr pta (US 37.67).
59. "Liberation is of two types bhva-moka and davya-moka. ... Bhva-
moka accepted by the Jainas is identical with jvanmukti." Sinha (1990),
125-127.
60. "It is free from bodily entanglement and from the circle of birth and death."
(Sinha (1990) 129). Also cp. Dagdhe vje yath atvanta prdurbhavati
nnkura karmavje tath dagdhe na rohati bhavnkura. [Quoted by Sinha
(1990) p.149] from Manibhardra's commentary on SDS 46).
61. Tadanantaram rdha gacchati lok nt t (TAS 10.5).
62. "Thus, going upwards, the liberated self reaches a place lying at the top
of ... lokka ... it (i.e.. liberated self) [cannot] enter into the alokka,
for there is no principle of motion there." (dharm stik y bh v t) (TAS,
10.8)See Sinha (1990) p. 127: also Shah (1998) pp.12-13 and p.229.
63. Mok ak ay t j nadar an vara ntar ya k ay cca kevala (TAS 10.1).
64. Sarvam tato j n ti pa yati ca ... bhavati anantasukh k t rtha; sa
sarva nadar labhate sukham anindriyam anantam (PK.S 28).
65. See Sinha (1990) pp.148-149: Shah (1998), pp.152-153. cp. devo
arhanparame vara (SDS, ch. 3)
66. Vidhi sra t vidh t ca daivam karma pur k tam vara ceti pary ya
vijay karma vedhasa . dipur a IV.3.
67. As Y. Krishnan observes, "The straktga 1.2.2 attacks the teaching of
the niyativ dins that one's suffering is not due to one's action (na te sayam
kaam dukkham) but due to fate. The Straktga 1.12.1.4 says:
sayameva kadehim ghhanti na tassa muccejja aputhayam. (Persons) go
round (in the cycle of existence) for the acts done by themselves; without
experiencing their results, there is no release." Jainthology (1991) p.87.
68. The controversy between the schools of M m s k regarding category-
distinction between moral-causality and physical-causality is worth not-
ing here. As Maitra puts it, "The Pr bh karas rightly point out that
causality as an ethical category is to be distinguished from causality as
a psychological or physical category. The Bh as however do not
recognize any essential difference between the two." Maitra (1963)
p.232.
70. For further details see Sinha (1990) 44-45 and 53-59.
71. Pa c stik ya 82 is very specific about the material character of mind
and karma. It says that things enjoyable by the senses, the five senses
themselves, the bodies, the mind, the karmas and other material
objects
_
all this is known as matter (pudgala). Also see note (22) above.
72. "According to the Jainas, karman is a form of matter, pudgala and
atomic in nature. It has the property of downward gravity. adhogurutva"
Y. Krishnan in Jainthology (1991, 81.
73. See S trak t nga 1. 2. 3. 18. "All living beings own their present form
of existence to their own karman; Due to their karma j vas happen to
be, timid, wicked suffering latent misery, subject to birth, old age and
death". Ibid., 85.
74. See note (63) above.
75. Uttar dhyana s tra 3.4 and 3.3
76. Haribhadra Suri's SDS 48: ubh ubha karmakart bhokt
karma
_
phalasya ca.
77. a) Na tassa dukkham vibhayanti nayio na mittavagga na subha na
bandhava ... kart ramevam anujai kammam. (US 13.2)
b) Ikko kavedi kammam ikko vi yiya pavaye mokkham. (Quoted by
Krishan from K rt key nuprek -76
78. Uttar dhyanas tra 33. 1-15.
79. Shah (1998) points out that there is another expression for 'aghti' viz.
'bhavopagrh'. It literally means 'that which sustains the cycle of birth
and death and the associated body'. Footnote 2, 28.
80. "Jainas hold that the whole process is mechanical: no intelligent prin-
ciple is required for its guidance.': Sinha (1990) p. 138. Also see: Atha
svabh vata tarhi acetanasy pi jagata eva svabh vata prav ttirastu, kim
tat kart tva kalpanay ? (TRD p. 122). Quoted in Sinha (1990) p.151
and S. N. Dasgupta, HIP, Vol. I, 205-6.
81. "They argue that formless entities like sky, space, etc. have no action,
while karman has as it is proved by the fact that the fruits of karma in
the form of happiness and misery are experienced by the self. That is
why karman must be regarded they say, as having some form". Sinha
(1990) pp.69-70. For textual support see PKS, 133: TRY, 2. 36. 9.
82. Those socio-ethical issues are enormously important, but are not discussed
here.
83. "That whereby the soul is tinted, identified with merit and demerit (punya
and ppa) is called ley". [G S-489]. Quoted and translated by Krishnan in
Jainthology (1991), 82.
84. I have a plan to devote a separate paper to this and similar other issues.
85. Shah (1998) 17.
86. See Shah (1998), 8-10 for classification of different kinds of jva e.g.
earth-bodied, vegetative-bodied, water-bodied etc. Also see Jaycrya
(1982) 3.
87. "According to the Hindu idea there can be not only no vicarious sin and
punishment but also no vicarious redemption". Maitra (1963), 9. This is
equally true of Jainism.
88. The following verse quoted in Sinha (1990) is relevant here
_
namastat
karmabhyah vidhirapi na yebhyah prabhavati. ( nti ataka, Verse 1, Vi va
Tattva Prak a, 56.)
89. "The idea of God as the world-creator is not to be found in Jaina literature.
... Tirthankaras are not messengers of God. They are human beings just
like us. They attained liberation by developing their selves to the state of
immaculate perfection through steadfast contemplation. (Jay c ryer
Anusanval, 31. Translated by the present author.) According to the
Jainas the arhats themselves are Gods. That's why the mantras used by the
Jainas as ovation were composed keeping the arhats at the center of the
focus. Cp. Sarvaj o jita r g didos-astrailokyap jita , yath sthit rth v d
ca devo'rhan parame vara '.
90. See Shah (1998), 31, footnote.
91. Sinha (1990), 149; also see note (78) above.
92. Shah (1990), 30.
93. Taken from Krishnan's article in Jainthology (1991) 88-89.
94. See note (67b) above.
95. See aaranuprek and ekatvnupreka in Shah (1998), 88-91.
96. See notes 67, 76 and 84 above.
97. See PKM 4.10.
98. "It is a consequence of the material character of the karmas that intent is
not the only ingredient in committing a lapse or offence; the Jainas recognise
unintentional lapses. This also made the law of karma comparatively in-
flexible and partially mechanical." Y. Krishnan in Jainthology, p.93. Also
see note (70b) above.
99. TAS. 6.6; Krishnan in Jainthology (1991), 83.
100. a) "In Jainism intent is not an essentinl precondition of sin or wrong
conduct. Evil intent forms only one of the modes of committing sin.... The
S trak t nga 2. 2. 4-23 specifies thirteen kinds of sinful actions, of these
... sins done through accident and error of sight (leading to error of fact)
and not involving the mind actively also attract bad karman."
Y. Krishnan in Jainthology (1991), 89-90.
b) "The S trak t nga 2.6.26-27, sets out with disapproval the Buddhist view
that a person cannot be guilty of murder if he has committed it as a result
of mistake of fact". Ibid
101. "The Straktnga 1. 1. 2. 29 says: manasaje paussantiputtam tesi na vijjai:
a man who bears ill-will, his mind is not pure" Ibid. The point is stated
even more clearly in Vidy nanda's classification of virtues in his
Aahasr which maintains that 'morality and immorality do not arise
merely from results.... But depends on subjective intention or
abhisandhi.... Such an abhisandhi, when impure, (sa kle nga) caus s
unrighteousness (ppa). For details see Maitra (1963), pp.217-221.
102. "In its original structure, penology studies and analyses the history,
theories, purposes and effects of punishment in relation to crime-
causation and crime-prevention. In its modern outlines ...penology
would require a new definition in its confrontation with the....Jaina
scriptures." R. C. Laler in Jainthology, p.73.
103. In my paper, 'Social dimensions of Jaina thought'.
104. Maitra (1963), p.224.
105. For details see Shah (1998) pp.102-106.
106. The dialogue is given on pp.232-233 in Shah (1998).
107. See note (57a) above.
108. " c rya Siddhasena in his Sanmati says of the five, viz., Time, Nature, Fate,
Past Action and Human Effort, to favour one alone is the wrong view", but
to accept all of them giving them their due place is the right view". Shah
(1998) p.223.
109. c rya Haribhadra in his Yagavindu, verse 327 says that sometimes karma
can weaken daiva and vice-versa:
daivani puruakrea durbalam hy upamanyate, daivena caia'p ty eta...
110. "Up dhy ya Ya ovijayaji shows as to how one can destroy even the unalter-
able (nik cita karmas) in the following verse of his 27th Dvatrini k : nik eit n m
api yah karma m tapas h k aya so'bhipretyottama yogam ap rvakaranodayam.
Taken from Shah (1998), p.276.
11l. See note (99) and also note (103).
112. See Shah (1998). pp-296-98 for detail.
113. Ibid., p.298.
114. Brahma-str -bhr a-gogh tap tak n narak tithe |
D haprah riprabh ter yoga hast balambanam ||
Yogastra of Hemacandra. 1.12.
115. This emphasis on fortitude, equanimity and tranquility of mind as precon-
ditions for spiritually motivated proactive of austerity takes up special
significance in the context of the Jaina concept of sallekhan (self-termi-
nation of life). We may use autothanasia' for 'sallekhan' to underline the
radical difference between sallekhan on the one hand and suicide and
other-assisted termination of life i.e. euthanasia, on the other.
116. a) A s dhu aspiring to become a J na voluntarily undergoes a great deal of
suffering; why should we then wilt under sufferings that are nothing but
unsignificant ? (Translated from Jayac rya's annu sana, 333).
b) Ability to stoically undergo suffering with calm and inward balance is the
basis of true happiness, destroyer of many ppa and producer of many
puya. (Translated from Jayach rya's annu sana-338. p.31).
The quotations above clearly show the Jaina belief that voluntarily
undergoing suffering is a way of burning down/destroying the effects of
bad karma.
117. Miri (1976). p.57; Victor Fr nkel's view that one can go through tremendous
suffering if he/she sees a meaning in it, explains how existential ethics was
SARKAR : Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics 1 1 3
lived through by some inmates who survived a Nazi concentration
camp. Fr nkel (1984).
Kierkegaard considered suffering as a criterion of authenticity. Accord-
ing to him there are two kinds of suffering: (a) redeeming suffering and
(b) dark suffering that leads to death.
118. Quoted in Miri (1976), 63, from Edward Conze: Thirty Years of Buddhist
Studies.
119. See Shah (1991), 48.
120. Ibid., 115.
121. When telling the truth is likely to cause greater harm. crangastra recom-
mends that man must simply maintain silence or say that he docs not
know even if he knows. This is closely parallel to what we find in
Manusmti and also in the Mahbhrata:
Ukte'n tc bhaved yatra pr n pr arak a as
an ta tatra satya sy t satyamapi an t bhavet.
122. See V. Samgvi, 45 for the classification of Jaina sdhus.
123. See S. Jain's article in Jainthology (1991), 129-133.
124. See Vasantha Kumari : 'Power and Tranquility' in Jainthology (1991)
171-177 for details.
125. Some of these points have been discussed in my paper 'Social Dimen-
sions of Jaina Ethics, in K. Roy (cd.), 'Fusion of Horizons', Calcutta.
(2000).
Bibliography Bibliography Bibliography Bibliography Bibliography
1. Banerjee, S. R. (comp.) Jay c ryer anu san vali (in Bengali) (Calcutta:
1982).
2. Bhargava, D. Jaina Ethics (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1968).
3. Bhargava. D. (comp. and tr.) Jaina Tarkabh of Ya ovijaya (New
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973).
4. Bhattacharya, H. S. Reals in Jainism (Bombay: Seth H. S. Santidas Khetry
Charitable Trust, 1965).
5. Dasgupta, S. N. History of Indian Philosophy (New Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1947).
6. Gopalan, S. Outlines of Jainism (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1973).
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sion Institute of Culture, 1997).
9. Lawani, G. (ed.) Jainthology (Calcutta: Jain Bhavana Publication, 1991).
10. Maitra, S. K. Hindu Ethics (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1963).
11. Matilal, B. K. The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Ahmedabad: L.D.
Institute of lndology, 1981).
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Unwin, London, 1980).
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Beach Publications, 1997).
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Parisad, 1994).
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Banarsidass, 1998).
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1990).
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20. Sogani, K. C. Epitome of Jainism (Sholapur: 1967)
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1970).
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Rider, 1976).
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1983).
Abbreviations Abbreviations Abbreviations Abbreviations Abbreviations
[AS] c r nga-s tram & S tra-k t nga-s tram. Sudharma Swami. New Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.
[BDS] Brhad-dravya Samgraha of Nemichandra. Agas: Srimad Rajacandra
rama, 1967.
[GS] Gommata-S ra of Nemicandra. Agas: Srimad Rajacandra rama,
1978.
[JTB] Jaina Tarka Bh of Ya ovijaya. Ed. and tr. D. Bhargava. New Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1973.
[PKM] Prameya-kamala-m rta ya of Prabh candra. Edited by M.K. Shastri.
Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1967.
[PKS] Pa c at -k ya-s ra of Kundakund c rya. New Delhi: Bharat ya
J nap tha, 1975.
[PTNL] Pram a-naya-l tv lok lank ra of V d deva S ri. Edited by H. S.
Bhattacarya. Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1967.
[PS] Pravacana-s ta of Kundakund c rya. Edited by A. N. Upadhye. Agas:
S. R. rama, 1984
[PSU] Puru rtha-siddhyup ya.
[SDS] Sat-dar ana-samuccaya of Haribhadra S ri with Gunaratna's commentary.
Edited by Suoli. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1991.
[SDS] Sarva-dar ana-samgraha of S yana M dhava. Pune: Bhandarkar Oreintal
Research Institute: 1978.
[SM] Sy dv da-manjari of Mallisen. Edited by A. N. Dhruva. Bombay:
Bombay University Press, 1933.
[SS] Sarvartha-siddhi of P jyap da. New Delhi: Bharatiya J napith
Publication,1985 (a Commentary on TSU).
[TAS] Tattv rth dhigama-s tra of Um sv t . Agas: Srimad Rajacandra rama,
1932.
[TS| Tattv rtha-s ra of Amritacandra-s ri.
[US] Uttar dhyayana-s tra.
[VTP] Visva-tattva-parikrom . Sholapur: 1964.
[TSU] Tattv rtha-s tra of Um sv t . Edited by J. L. Jain. Arah: Bibliotheca
Jainica, 1920.
Sankhya Theory of
Bondage and Liberation
TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABARTI
In the Snkhya system, bondage is said to arise out of aviveka jna,
i.e., non-discriminative knowledge of purua and prakti. Libera-
tion, therefore, is arising out of viveka jna or discriminative
knowledge of them. Before discussing what is meant by discrimina-
tive or non-discriminative knowledge let us consider another cause
of bondage, and so of liberation, that we find in Snkhya philoso-
phy. The Snkhya philosophers point to our existence in the bodily
frame as the cause of our threefold sufferings. Hence bondage is
due to the continuation of sufferings in earthly existence. So long
as we enter into sa s ra and continue to suffer, we are in chains.
Liberation can come only out of cessation of sufferings for ever.
Let us first of all try to analyse the twofold causes of bondage, and
also of those of liberation, that we find in Snkhya literature. We will
try to explain subsequently whether the twofold causes are ultimately
reducible into one.
I
In the Snkhya system, purua and prakti, the two ultimate realities
are viewed as heterogeneous and diverse in nature. Purua stands
for pure consciousness, is inert or inactive and does not undergo
any sort of transformation or change. Prakti, on the contrary,
being composed of three guas of sattva, rajas and tamas held in
a state of equilibrium (smyvasth) is always active, does undergo
change at every moment but is an unconscious material (jada or
acetana) principle. It has been compared with a blind man (andha)
as opposed to purua who is but a lame man (khanja or pangu).
Purua, being lame, cannot perform any activity whatsoever. It is a
mere witness (sksi) or seer (dra). It is absolutely indifferent
(nirlipta) about what is going on in the world. It is prakti which
unfolds and manifests itself into the things and beings of the world
and is thus solely responsible for the evolution of the world. Of
course, prakti needs the assistance of purua just as a blind man
requires the co-operation from a lame man to achieve a goal. But
purua being akart (devoid of activity) does nothing. Its mere
presence will help disturb the equilibrium of prakti. As a result
prakri starts manifesting itself first as mahat or buddhi, then as
ahakra, then as ekdaa indriya (five sense-organs, five motor
organs and manas), paca tanmtra (five subtle elements) and finally
as paca mahbhta (five gross elements). The following diagram
will help remember the products of prakti better.
Prakti
Mahat or Buddhi
Ahankra
Paca jnendriyas Paca karmendriyas Mana Paca tanmtras
Pa ca mah bh tas
A casual look to the above diagram will help us understand that
Prakti is the root cause (mla kraa) of everything but itself has no
cause (amla). It is, according to Snkhya, the material cause
(updna kraa) of the world. And material cause, for Snkhya, is
the true cause. It gets repeated in the effect (anubtta) and therefore
its absence in the effect is impossible. For example, mttik (lump
of clay) is said to be the material cause of the effect, say, jar (ghaa).
It is inherent in jar; for the jar is also a mnmaya padrtha or
earthen entity. The clay cannot be absent in the jar. On the contrary,
the nimitta kraa or efficient cause of jar is said to be the
kumbhakra or the potter. According to Snkhya, the nimitta
kraa is necessary (prayojana) only to remove the obstacle which
hinders manifestation of the effect in the cause. The effect is already
CHAKRABARTI : Snkhya Theory 117 1 1 6 ETHICS : An Anthology
present in the cause even prior to its effectuation. Hence the effi-
cient cause does nothing, really speaking, except manifesting what
remains unmanifested in the cause. Nobody can produce something
out of nothing. That which is not inherent in the cause in some
form or other cannot be made manifest. That is why, the concept
of nimitta kraa in Snkhya philosophy differs substantially from
other Indian systems which advocate it. For Snkhya, nimitta kraa
is responsible only to remove the obstacles on the way to manifes-
tation which is implicit in the cause already. It cannot do anything
to produce effect from the cause where it is not present, as the
naiyyikas believe. As Vcaspati says that even hundreds and thou-
sands of artisans cannot transform blue into red for the simple
reason that red is never present in the blue. This is why the Snkhya
philosophers do not attach much importance to the notion of
efficient cause. That the efficient cause is not to be regarded as a
cause proper or cause worth the name can be shown from another
standpoint. The Snkhya philosophers look upon prakti and its
evolutes as well as purua from another angle. They claim that tattva
or reality can be classified under four heads, viz, (1) prakti or that
which stands for a cause only, but never an effect; (2) vikti or that
which stands for an effect only, but never a cause, (3) prakti-vikti
or that which is of the nature of both, i.e., to say which can be
regarded as both a cause and an effect; and (4) aprakti-avikti or
that which is neither a cause nor an effect. In Tattvakaumudi, prakti
is defined as that which produces other tattvas but is itself
unproduced
_
tattvntaraprasti but not tattvntaraprasta. In the
Snkhya theory of evolution cited before, we have seen that prakti
which heads all its evolutes, and is thus the cause of everything but
itself remains uncaused is to be considered as no (1). Vikti which
stands for sixteen types of effects only, viz, paca jnendriyas
(caku, karna, jihv, nsik and tvak), paca karmendriyas (vk, pani,
pba, py and upastha), manas (which stands for both a
jnendriya and marmendriya) and paca mahbhtas (kiti, ap,
teja, mart, byom) are tattvntaraprasta, but not tattvataraprasti.
Vikti thus is to be considered as no (2). Prakti-vikti stands for
seven entities viz, mahat or buddhi, ahakra and paca tanmtras
(rpa, rasa, abda, gandha and spara). These are both of the nature
of causes and effects
_
tattvdntara prasti and tattvntaraprasta.
Mahat or buddhi which is an effect of prakti causes ahakra in
its turn. Therefore, it is both a cause and an effect. Similar is the case
with ahakra (a product of buddhi but the producer of kdasa
indriya and paca tanmatra) and paca tanmtra (a product of
ahakra but the producer of paca mahbhta). This is repre-
sented in no. (3). But that which can stand for neither a cause nor
an effect
_
neither tattvntaraprasta nor tattvntaraprasti
_
is the
purua. This aprakti-avikti is represented in no. (4). It may be
argued by some that paca mahbhtas are not to be considered as
effects only. For, ghaa (jar) etc. arises out of kiti (earth) etc. But the
Snkhya philosophers point out that ghaa is non-different from its
cause in respect of gurutva (weight) and other properties and hence
a similar tattva but not tattvntara. What remains unquestionable is
that purua is neither a cause nor an effect, according to Snkhya.
It becomes now evident that though purua is looked upon as
nimitta kraa, it is not that essential. Hence in Snkhya philosophy,
the material cause is the real cause. What we call an efficient cause
is but a cause by courtesy so called.
From the above discussion it follows that purua and prakti are
in essence antagonistic and opposed to each other. But sometimes
prakti assumes to have the property of consciousness which is not
really belonging to it. As a result, buddhi or ahakra appears to be
conscious though as a matter of fact they are really unconscious.
What happens in such cases, according to Snkhya, is that the con-
sciousness of purua gets reflected in the sattva element of buddhi
or ahakra. Of the three guas, sattva is light (laghu) and of
illuminating character (prakaka). Being transparent (svacchva),
reflection of consciousness on it becomes possible. This is the cause
of caitanybhimna (pseudo-sense of consciousness) in prakti. But
this knowledge is simply accidental (bhimnika) and not its essential
nature. Similarly owing to its association and proximity with prakti,
purua assumes the property of karttva as it were. This
karttvbhimna is simply accidental to it as it is devoid of all activi-
ties whatsoever. Purua being pure consciousness and consciousness
being self-illuminating, reflection of the activity of prakti is taken to
be its own activity. Hence at the time of creation, this dual process
of caitanybhimna in prakti and karttvbhimna in purua is
brought to existence out of non-discrimination between them, re-
sulting in sa s ra. And this is the cause of our bondage. Purua
continues to enjoy (bhoga) at that time, giving rise to all sorts of
sufferings. Its real nature gets lost. Liberation from this state takes
place when discriminative knowledge between purua and prakti
takes place. That is to say, when purua or prakti realizes its respec-
tive nature, liberation is attained. That is why it is held in Snkhya
philosophy that prakti starts creating the world for the dual pur-
pose of enjoyment of purua (puruasya daranrtham) and subse-
quent liberation (kaivalyartham) to be attained. Whether and how
purua who is devoid of all the guas (nistraigunya) and inactive can
enjoy is but another question. Further purua is looked upon by
Snkhya as nirlipta or indifferent. How one who is indifferent can
enjoy is very difficult to answer. Again, purua who is nitya mukta,
i.e. liberated eternally can aspire after freedom may appear to be an
Achiles' heel. These problems apart, non-discrimination between
Purua and Prakti is the sole cause of bondage.
II
In Snkhya, we find another trend which explains our bondage and
liberation. It is stated that every j va or embodied soul is subject to
threefold sufferings
__
dhytmika, dhibhautika and dhidaivika.
The first only relates to our sufferings from body and mind. In
Snkhya, tm stands for subtle and gross bodies, manas and other
antakaraas. Hence dhytmika dukha is either bodily or mental,
i.e., intraorganic in nature. Though every kind of suffering is caused
by manas and felt by manas and in that sense manomtrajanya, yet
bodily suffering is not simple manomtrajanya but arising out of
body besides manas. Body or arra, according to Snkhya, is con-
stituted by three elements of vyu, pitta and lema. When these
elements are in a state of equilibrium, we are said to possess sound
health. When the equilibrium is lost out of the preponderance of
any of the elements, we have bodily suffering or rra dukha. It
is also called bydhi as distinguished from dhi or mnasa dukha.
Mental suffering or mnasa dukha is arising out of frustrated desire
etc. In Tattvakaumudi it is aptly put as: mnasa kma-krodha-
lobha-moha-bhaya- rsy -vi da-vi ay vi e dar ananibandhana.
It is to be remembered here that both these kinds of suffering are
due to interal causes
__
either of disturbance in the equilibrium of
three elements (dhtuvaiamya) or of kma, krodha etc. In the
former case, the gross body undergoes changes while, in the latter
case, it is the subtle body that undergoes transformation. However,
dhytmika dukha is arising out of either bydhi or dhi and hence
the name. A word of caution here. We will see presently that
dhibhautika and adhidaivika dukha are also due to ada which
is also an internal cause. Hence to distinguish them from the
dhytmika variety, we should say that the latter is ntaraupya-
mtrasdhya, i.e., to say, is arising out of internal causes alone. But
neither dhibhautika nor dhidaivika are ntaraupyamtrasdhya.
They are no doubt arising out of ada or unseen internal cause but
they require some other causes as well besides ada. Herein lies the
difference. Be that as it may, dhibhautika dukha arises out of
either man, beasts etc. or five elements of earth, water, fire, air and
ether. The word 'bhta' means both mobile objects like men, ani-
mals etc. or immobile objects like earth, water etc. Hence our suf-
fering due to harsh words uttered by other men or from snake-bite,
etc., is an instance of dhibhautika dukha. Similarly, suffering due
to ativi or anavi etc. may be regarded as instances of
dhibhautika dukha. But it must be remembered here that yaka,
rasa etc. are also mobile, yet the Snkhya philosophers use the
word 'jangama' (mobile) here only in the sense of man and sub-
human animals. dhidaivika dukha, according to Snkhya, is
caused by devajoni, i.e., vidydhara, apsar, yaka, rasa,
gandharva, kinnara, guhyakasiddha, bhta etc. Sometimes our suf-
ferings due to the different planetary bodies (graha) are also in-
cluded within this fold. Some Snkhya philosophers, however,
mention our sufferings from ativi, anvi, silvi, ulkpt,
jhanjhvt etc. as instances of dhidaivika dukha.
That every j va suffers from this kind or that kind of suffering
is a positive fact of experience. Dukha is pratytmavedaniyam i.e.,
experienced by every soul. Hence no one can deny its existence. In
Snkhya literature, dukha has been looked upon as rajapari-
nmabhedah i.e., arising out of some sort of transformation of
rajah. A word of caution here. For the Snkhyas, dukha is not
present in tm (tmavtti) which is pure consciousness. It is present
in antakaraa (antahkaranavtti). By antahkaranavtti is meant a
kind of relation of the property of antahkarana as posed on purua
being reflected in antahkaranavtti. However, according to
Isvarakna this continuation of suffering gives rise to an enquiry
(jijs) in our mind whether there is a way to remove this suffering.
He points out first of all that there are da and nuravika ways
of removing these sufferings. But these ways, though easy, cannot
put an end to all sufferings forever. They are only temporal remedial
measures and therefore cannot be depended upon. The surest and
the only way how we can stop all sufferings for ever is to take resort
to Snkhya sstra with the acquisition of knowledge of vyakta,
avyakta and ja. Let us explain this point.
The Snkhya philosophers believe that if there are easier ways to
remove suffering, no one endeavours for a harder one. If honey is
available in the corner of the house, no one makes an attempt at
going to a forest for its acquisition. Who is there to dig a pond in
order to quench his thirst if thirst can be quenched by the easily
available water in the house? Thus we can put an end to our bodily
suffering by consulting a physician and taking medicine as advised
by him. Similarly the mental suffering too can be removed by easier
means by making available palatable dish, good wife etc. But the
Snkhyas point out that these are only temporary means. No one
can guarantee that a man who has overcome disease by medicine
will not fall prey to it again. Similarly mental suffering which is
removed by this or that means may again re-appear. There is no
sure way to remove these dhibhautika dukha for ever. This is true
with regard to other varieties of sufferings as well. The Snkhyas
also point out that the nuravika or vaidika way of removing
suffering by attaining svarga (heaven) by means of sacrificial rites is
but temporary. For the enjoyment will not be there for ever. It is
looked upon as kay, i.e., destructible in nature. Svarga will be
enjoyed for a period after which one will have to be born again.
Moreover, it is aviuddha or impure. For the performance of vedic
rites one has to indulge in some sort of violence, thereby attaining
ppa or dukha. Further, there is difference in the happiness in
heaven enjoyed by different persons. This may lead to some sort of
uncomfort, i.e., dukha in the mind. That is why, nuravika upya
cannot be taken to be a solution for ever. The Snkhyas use two
terms viz., tyantika dukha nivtti, i.e., cessation of sufferings for
ever and aikntika dukha nivtti, i.e., there will be no further
chance of the suffering re-appearing which merit serious consider-
ation. This is why, the path shown by the Snkhya philosophers,
though very difficult to attain, is the only path of removing suffer-
ing. According to them, it is the knowledge of vyakta, avyakta and
ja that helps one overcome suffering for ever. Vyakta stands for
the effects which are all manifested. Even a casual look at the
Snkhya theory of the evolution of the world will make us convince
that the entities beginning with mahat or buddhi down to pafica
mahbhutas are looked upon as vyakta. Avyakta stands for the cause
or the Great Unmanifest. It is no other than Prakti who is viewed
as amla mla kraam, i.e., the cause of everything but itself has
no cause. Hence by vyakta and avyakta they mean prakti and all its
evolutes. The rest is ja, i.e., pure consciousness which is no other
than purua. Here the Snkhya philosophers do not specifically use
the word vivekajna which alone helps us to distinguish between
purua and prakti. But they use the expression 'vijnt' i.e., out of
true knowledge of vyakta and avyakta, on the one hand and ja, on
the other, that we can finally overcome all sorts of sufferings for
ever. A moment's reflection will reveal that the two answers that we
find in Snkhya literature to put an end to our sufferings are at
bottom one.
III
Let us now look at an interesting but apparently inconsistent aspect
of the Snkhya theory of bondage and liberation. Initially it was
held that purua was baddha (in fetters) and moka (liberation)
finally arose out of vivekajna between purua and prakti. But
almost at the end of Snkhyakrik it was argued that really purua
was neither baddha nor mukta. It was really prakti which was
baddha owing to conjunction (sayoga) with, or semblance of
conjunction (samyogabhsa) with or mere proximity (snnidhya
mtra) with purua. This prakti becomes mukta when such
vivekajna dawns. To elaborate: in verse 21 of Snkhyakrik
Isvarakna argues that creation or evolution of the world out of
primordial prakti starts for the fulfilment of twin purposes of
enjoyment of purua and ultimate release of Him from the clutches
of prakti. ankara rightly observes that neither enjoyment nor
liberation is ever possible on the part of purua. For purua is
utterly inactive and enjoyment is never possible without some kind
of activity. Moreover, if purua is said to continue to enjoy, there
will be no cessation of enjoyment. Prakti will continue to create
objects ceaselessly for the enjoyment of purua and purua will get
entangled in such enjoyment for ever, thereby making liberation
impossible. Again, purua being mukta from the very beginning,
cannot be truly said to be liberated. Mukti, being its swarpa, is not
obtainable but is always obtained. Again, if for argument's sake, the
liberation of purua is at all admitted, it will continue for ever,
thereby making the cycle of creation impossible. Snkhya seems to
realize the untenability of its own position when it emphatically
declares in verse 62 that bondage, liberation and migration do not
affect purua at all. In reality, purua is not bound at all
__
na kacit
purua vadhyate. Nor is it migrated to the world and assume
sa s ra
__
na kacit sasarati. Nor is it ever liberated
__
na kacit
mucyate. As a matter of fact, bandhana, sasra and moka are not
the essence of purua at all. A person who is in real bondage
endeavours to put an end to his bondage and thereby seeks
liberation. Truly speaking purua can never be in a state of bondage,
for klea, karma and aya are not possible in purua who is utterly
indifferent, unchanging and devoid of guas. As Vcaspati rightly
observes: savsanakleakarmaynnca vandhanasamakhyn
purue aparinminyasambhavt. By 'Vsan' is meant saskra
which arises out of previous impressions. By klea is meant avidy,
asmit, rga, dvea and abhinivea. 'Karma' stands for dharma and
adharma arising out of our good or bad deeds. saya means citta.
Purua being nirlepa (untouched by any of these) aparin mi (being
unchangeable) and nikriya (being utterly devoid of any activity)
remains unaffected by vsana, klea, karma and aya. Hence,
vandhana, sasra and moka are not purua's real nature. These
are only attributed to purua secondarily (aupacrika). This
attribution is comparable to a process whereby an army's success or
defeat is attributible to a king whose army it is. As a matter a fact,
it is prakti which is bound or liberated. Prakti is nnraya i.e.,
related to different puruas by virtue of its close proximity with
them. Bandhana etc. are the results of threefold guas which
belong to prakti. It is due to the absence of non-discriminative
knowledge of purua and prakti and also its close proximity with
Purua that the nature really belonging to prakti appears to be
belonging to purua. In truth however, bhoga and apavarga are
secondarily attributed to purua who is above everything.
In verse 55, the author of Snkhyakrik explains this fact of
attribution by saying that jarmaraakta dukham prpnoti
cetana purua. Purua appears to suffer from misery brought
about by old age and death. We know from Snkhya literature that
purua is visuddha caitanya
__
pure consciousness. It is thus nitya,
uddha, baddha and mukta and therefore jar and maraa cannot
be its dharma or property. From the etymology of the word purua
(Puri linge sete iti) we come to know that purua rests in the subtle
body. And that which is primarily connected with the body seems
to be related to purua as well. Hence so long as purua gets
associated with the subtle body, there is no deliverance from pain,
misery and the like. Jarmaraa which really affects this body seems
to be attributed to purua which rests in the body but is untouched
by the affections of the body. That jar or old age disables our
body, cripples our memory and affects many bodily and mental
changes is a positive fact of experience. Its influence is universal and
inescapable. Similarly, the influence of maraa cannot be overcome.
No one can get rid of this suffering. Hence if one is born, one must
suffer from old age and death and there is no avoidance from this.
This bodily suffering is attributed to conscious purua who out of
non-discrimination looks upon the suffering of the body as its own.
In truth, however, purua in its purity remains untouched by bodily
affections.
A note of caution here. It may be asked why Isvaraka leaves
aside janma which is generally regarded as a cause of suffering as
well. Does not purua get affected by birth also along with old age
and death ? To answer to this query, it may be submitted that
suffering due to birth is not universal. Human beings and lower
animals suffer from birth no doubt. But the divine beings are not
subject to this. Moreover, there is a difference between these two
kinds of sufferings
__
sufferings arising out of birth and sufferings
arising out of old age and death. In the former case, only the
victim
__
the mother and the child
__
seem to suffer but not the
relatives of the victim. They are rather eager to celebrate and enjoy
the appearance of the new-comer. In the latter case, however, both
the persons, in death-bed or jargrastha and their relatives equally
suffer.
The evolution of prakti is spontaneous just as milk flows from
the udder of the cow. But prakti has no interest of its own but
looks upon the interest of another as its own. This is comparable
to the nourishment of the calf as the interest of the cow itself. As
a matter of fact, prakti being devoid of consciousness altogether
cannot plan evolution at all. So the evolution of prakti for the
salvation of purua cannot be admitted. The truth is that prakti
evolves spontaneously without being guided or controlled and the
release of purua arises only as a result. As the activity of prakti
precedes and the release of purua succeeds it is said that prakti
evolves for the emancipation of Purua. In truth however, the ac-
tivity of Prakti for the release of Purua is not real but apparent.
Prakti evolves for the benefit of Purua and looks upon his benefit
as her own. Prakti never expects her spirit of self-sacrifice to be
reciprocated by Purua. Just as the cook prepares the food for the
satisfaction of his master and turns away from the kitchen when the
food is cooked, similarly prakti evolves for the emancipation of
each purua
__
pratipuruavimokrtha
__
and looks upon the in-
terest of purua as her own
__
svrtha iva parrtha. Incidentally it
may be mentioned here that Snkhya philosophers like most other
Indian philosophers admit both jivanmukti and videhamukti. The
moment the discriminative knowledge between purua and prakti
dawns, a purua becomes liberated here and now. But his bodily
existence may still continue on account of the momentum of the
past deeds, i.e. prrabdha karma. As the liberated purua though
embodied, feels no association with body owing to vivekajna and
so does not reap any further fruit of karma henceforth. The
videhamukti or final emancipation however, arises as an outcome of
death when the body gets completely dissociated from the Spirit.
The Snkhya philosophers bring about the exact nature of the
relation of purua and prakti by means of three analogies. The first
is that of a dancing girl who entertains the audience or the specta-
tors and desists from her art or skill as soon as the audience gets
satisfied. This analogy, however, has an obvious disadvantage. For
the dancing which ceases at present may recommence afterwards by
the request of the enthusiastic audience. But the activity of prakti
cannot recur. It must be final. For otherwise, there will be no pos-
sibility of the emancipation of purua. This is why the Snkhya
philosophers take recourse to a second analogy of a modest bashful
lady who takes special precautions never to re-appear within the
sight of the stranger after accidentally exposing herself to him for
the first time. But this analogy too is imperfect and should not be
pushed too further. The bashful lady intends to protect herself not
only from the sight of a particular stranger but also from all strang-
ers. But the cessation of the activity of prakti relates only to that
purua who has chanced to see her. This is possibly the reason why
the Snkhya philosophers refer to the third analogy of the blas
couple who being tired of pleasure from intimate union have ceased
to care for each other. They may live together being present to the
other constantly. But there remains no impulse for creation at all.
According to Mthara, this is comparable to the unproductive union
of an elderly couple. When discriminative knowledge is attained
between purua and prakti, their co-presence yields no result. At
that time purua attains the vivekajna as purua realises himself to
be different from prakti. Similarly, prakti being seen by purua
desists from creation. As aviveka or discriminative knowledge does
not exist at that time, the conjunction of Purua and Prakti though
present does not lead to the desired creation. In other words, the
avivekajna which is one of the causes of creation (besides the
sayoga of purua and prakti) being absent, the effect, i.e., cre-
ation, is likewise absent. This discriminative knowledge is pure
(viuddham), being entirely free from doubt (saaya) and error
(yiparyaya). Such a kind of knowledge is further characterised as
apariea (residueless), for there remains nothing to be left known.
Even a bit of ignorance which binds one in sara cannot exist
at that time as a residue. This pure discriminative knowledge is
characterised in Snkhya krik as 'nsmi, na me naham iti'. The
three forms of this negative knowledge are differently interpreted.
'Na asmi', i.e., 'I do not exist' means I do not act. All activity belongs
to primal matter or prakti. Consciousness, being pure and devoid
of any form, is also devoid of all sorts of activity. 'Na me', i.e.,
CHAKRABARTI : Snkhya Theory 127 1 2 6 ETHICS: An Anthology
'Nothing is mine' means absolute indifference (udsnatva) on the
part of purua which is pure residueless consciousness. As purua is
nikriya (devoid of activity) it is also devoid of enjoyment
(bhokttvabhva)
__
mat sambandhi na kincit. When purua realizes
himself to be akart in the true sense, he realises himself also as
nirlepa or asanga. That is to say, nothing belongs to him and he is
not possessor of anything. 'Na aham' or 'I am not' means 'I am
not the agent' as activity does not belong to purua. Thus purua
first realizes himself to be inactive (nikriya). Being inactive he then
considers himself to be akart (not the doer). And being akart , he
finally realizes that he does not get associated with anything. For
only the kart can become the possessor (swm). Vcaspati offers
an alternative explanation. For him 'nikriyatva mtra' i.e., mere
inactivity cannot be understood to mean by the expression 'nasmi'
If activity is merely denied by this expression then the subsequent
expression 'nha' turns into repetition and thereby useless.
Hence 'Na asmi' should be taken to mean 'N asmi' i.e., to say,
'I am not' Purua in the sense that I am prasavadharm i.e.,
capable of producing anything. As purua realizes himself to be
purua, he knows him to be ktastha. He does not undergo any
change
__
aparinami. Karttvabhva is explained from the fact of
aparinmitvat. 'Naham' is the expression standing for this
karttvabhva. Further this Karttvabhva leads to aswmitva or
sabandasnyatva. This sort of realization is the true realization.
Only when such realization dawns mukti or liberation follows.
That is why vivekgraha or non-difference is regarded as one of
the causes of liberation.
IV
A close look at the S nkhya theory will make us convince at
once that it is riddled with inconsistencies. The S nkhya
philosophers began by cutting off all links between purua and
prakti and declare that they both are eternal, absolute and
independent. If prakti were really independent, i.e., needed no
assistance from purua, then the cycle of creation (svarga) and
destruction (pralaya) would remain unexplained. For, the
difference in effect cannot be brought about by the same cause.
According to S nkhya, prakti is the real material cause and
purua does nothing except helping manifestation of that which
was already present in the material cause. It is common
knowledge that if manifestation does not take place without the
assistance of somebody, then that somebody should be
regarded as one of the causes. Otherwise manifestation would
become impossible. To hold that manifestation is spontaneous,
like the flowing of milk from the udder of the cow, is to
overlook the brute fact that the cow is a conscious agent and
flowing of milk is conditioned by the motherly affection and
love towards its offspring. But purua is utterly unconscious and
so its spontaneous changes are ruled out. If for argument's sake
such spontaneous movement is at all admitted, then it remains
to be explained how and why prakti evolves the world in one
case and destroys them in another. In other words, the
equipoise (smavasth) of prakti needed to be disturbed for the
evolution of the world by the presence of purua
__
whether that
presence is real, apparent or mere proximity is not that
important. The important fact is that there must be some
contact between purua and prakti so that the equilibrium gets
disturbed and the subsequent preponderance of one gua over
the rest becomes possible, resulting in creation. How then can
prakti be absolute or independent ? It may be asked further if
both purua and prakti are eternal (nitya) and all-pervading
(bibhu), their contact must also be viewed as eternal. As a result,
creation will continue endlessly and dissolution will not take
place at all. If, on the contrary, dissolution is regarded as the
svarupa of prakti for in that state alone prakti is in a state of
smavasth which is its real nature, then prakti will refuse to
undergo changes being afraid of loosing its real nature (svarupa
prana bhay). Hence creation and destruction cannot be
explained in terms of prakti alone. For that, we require a
contact or semblance of contact or mere proximity or absence
of that contact etc. with Purua. This convinces us that prakti is
not absolute (nirapeka) or independent (svdhna). Again,
consider why and how an absolute or independent prakti can
subserve the purpose of purua. If somebody cares to serve the
purpose of another, as a cook for his master, then he becomes
subservient to that other. This curtails the independence of
prakti over which the S nkhya philosophers beat their drum so
much. To say that prakti serves the interest of purua in a spirit
of detachment without minding her own interest or receiving
any acknowledgement from him is not to explain how such
prakti can be called blind. It is true that a blind person cannot
execute perfectly what he plans. But the fact that he is able to
plan goes against his unconscious nature. As a matter of fact
both a lame man and a blind man are conscious agents and
both are capable of doing certain activities. The lame man may
not walk but is certainly capable of verbal utterances which guide
the blind man, and these utterances are undoubtedly his
activities. Moreover, the lame man is capable of carrying out
movement through his hands and other organs and of course
to a certain extent through his feet. Hence the simile of a lame
man for purua who is utterly inactive and that of a blind man
for prakti who is utterly unconscious does not bear scrutiny.
Moreover, if prakti is viewed as blind and non-intelligent,
evolution should have been mechanical and devoid of purpose.
But the world which prakti evolves is full of harmony design,
order and purpose. How can then prakti be blind? Again
prakti is compared to a dancing girl who exhibits her
performance before an audience and thereby becomes
conditioned by them. Further, the claim of the S nkhya
philosopher to the effect that prakti vanishes for that purua
who has seen her but continues to exist for others does really
make prakti relative. In that case, we have to posit multiplicity
of prakti or think of different praktis to enable one purua
liberated and others in bondage. In other words, if prakti
vanishes for one purua and continues to exist for others, then
prakti becomes relative and many instead of one and not
eternal in the true sense. Does not this fact curtail the independent
nature (anapeka svabhva) of prakti ?
Moving on to purua we are beset with all sorts of confusions
and contradictions. Purua is looked upon as pure consciousness
(viuddha caitanya or caitanya kevala) and is untouched by bond-
age or liberation or transmigration. Yet the Snkhya philosophers
speak of plurality of puruas on the flimsy ground of birth, death
and activity (janaamaraa karannm). Even a casual look will
make us feel that birth etc. cannot affect consciousness as such
which is nitya and nikriya. Hence birth etc. may be regarded as the
qualifications of the phenomenal ego or jivatm who is a product
of the reflection of purua in buddhi. Purua, on the contrary, is
transcendental to all these. Yet the Snkhya philosophers never
make a distinction between these two kinds of self
__
purua proper
and jva. If we look closely at the argument advanced for the ex-
istence of purua, we will be convinced, sooner than later, that all
of them proves the existence of jvas and none of them purua
proper. It is beyond one's comprehension why Snkhyas fail to
reduce the many jvas into one absolute purua in the manner of
the manifold material entities being reduced into one primal matter,
called prakti ? What is the harm of applying the same logic in the
case of purua as it is applied in the case of prakti ? It is not
perhaps out of place to mention that this inherent inconsistency has
led certain commentators like Gaudapda, Vcaspati and Vijna
Bhiku to abandon the multiplicity theory of the purua and accept
the theory of one purua instead. Again, consider the inconsistency
that one finds in the beginning and later comes across at the end.
The Snkhya philosophers emphatically declare at the outset that the
movement of prakti for the evolution of the world is arising out
of the purposes of enjoyment and liberation of purua. Subse-
quently, however, the Snkhya philosophers retrace their steps by
declaring that purua is not really bound, liberated and migrated. It
is prakti which really binds herself, liberates herself and migrates
herself. The so-called bondage of purua is simply secondary or
attributed falsely (aupacrika) because of the close association of
purua and prakti. These two accounts are not in keeping with
each other and the Snkhya philosophers are making a mess out of
them. If activity belongs to prakti and enjoyment to purua then
it overthrows the moral law of karma altogether, prakti performs
actions and purua has to reap .their fruits. Again prakti brings
about different enjoyable objects without being able to enjoy them.
This brings in the charge of vicarious liability. Consider also the fact
how enjoyment on the part of purua is possible at all. Purua is
passive, inactive and indifferent. It is formless. How can then enjoy-
ment be possible? Enjoyment (bhoga) certainly requires some activ-
ity (kriy) and some form (kra). Purua having none is not surely
the enjoyment. That the Snkhya philosophy is riddled with inher-
ent contradictions has been well-shown by ankara in his commen-
tary on Brahmastra. Any interested reader is advised to look into
ankara's commentaries on 2.21. to 2.2.10
Suggested Reading Suggested Reading Suggested Reading Suggested Reading Suggested Reading
1. Snkhyakrik ed. Suryanarayan Shastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1973).
2. Snkhyakrik by Iswaraka, ed. Purnachandra Vedantacancu (Pascimbanga
Rajya Siks Parsad).
3. S nkhyatattvakaumudi by V caspati Misra, Translated and elaborated by Narayan
Chandra Goswami (Calcutta: Sanskrita Pustak Bhandar, 1982).
4. Yuktidipik (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House, 1938).
5. Snkhya - Pravacana - Bhy.
6. M tharav tti.
7. Ved nta Dar ana , Dwitiya Adhy ya. Ed. & elaborated by Swami Viswarup nanda
(Advaita Ashrama).
8. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy by Chandradhar Sharma (New Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1987).
The Anomaly in Hindu Culture
KANAKPROBHA BANERJEE
Hindu culture is not of a piece, its speculative basis and its socio-
political practice being completely out of step. This is a common
malady affecting nearly all known cultures
__
Christian, Islamic,
Buddhist etc. But I shall confine my studies within the limits of
the one culture which is known to me first-hand and the good
of which is my primary concern as affecting my life directly. To
start with I intend to make a study of the Hindu speculative
framework and then I shall pass on to an analysis of the Hindu
socio-political set-up.
But, first, a warning: Hindu philosophy is a blanket term with
no corresponding exact referent. Hindu culture has a long his-
tory, intellectually virile and analytic. The result is that we find
Monism, Deism, Dualism, Dualistic Pluralism, even Nihilism of
a sort
__
all under the canopy of Hindu culture. But in spite of
this diversity there is an underlying unity of spirit, and that is
relevant to our discussion.
A second point to be remembered is the continuity of our
culture through the ages. Unlike the Greek, Roman and
Egyptian cultures Hindu culture has retained a living contact
with its past. So we have to go back to our ancient philosophical
systems to understand the theoretical basis of Hindu culture. For
nearly three to four thousand years Hindu culture evolved on its
own, more or less isolated from other cultures and retaining its
identity. Whatever changes there were emerged from within its
own fold. Later, exposure to Islamic and Christian cultures
changed it no doubt, but these new cultures were absorbed
successfully, the Hindu culture still retaining its identity. The
Islamic and Christian Strands in modern Indian culture deserve
BANERJEE : The Anomaly in Hindu Culture 1 3 3 1 3 4 ETHICS : An Anthology
competent handling by thinkers more intimately acquainted with
them. Of course, my handling of the Hindu speculative systems
also will necessarily be sketchy for my interest does not lie in
critically analysing the theories but in pointing out the
contradiction between theory and practice in our culture.
I
Vedantic monism (Advaita Ved nta) has long been mistaken as
the representative Indian philosophical system. So it should
come first in our discussion. It may very sketchily be presented
as follows. There is only one reality
__
pure consciousness.
Through a temporary misapprehension it takes on the appear-
ance of a material world of multiplicity. My is at the root of
this evil. This false cognition is sublated by a complete realization
of Brahman as the only reality. The active social individual j va
also will be cognised, at that level, as what it is in reality, viz.
brahman. The duty of the social individual is to live a life of
detachment and non-involvement. Joy and sorrow are equally
illusory. Karman does not affect the tman and heaven with its
lure of enjoyment is an illusory end. The end should be brahma-
vihra with a firmly established comprehension of truth. In the
Gt there is a description of such a state:
yah sarvatra anabhisneha tat tat pr pya ubh- ubham |
n bhinandati na dve i tasya praj prati hit ||
1
S mkhya is very similar to Ved nta, except that it admits two
ultimate realities:
1. Pure consciousness, the eternal inactive viewer, millions of
it as separate points of view.
2. Ever-active mechanical energy, constantly presenting the
world of motion to the purua or conscious points of
view.
The first is absolutely different from the second. Puruas are
falsely identified with prakti specially at the level of buddhi and
ahamkra, intellect and ego-sense. This leads to bondage. The
Gt has given a proper description of the puru a as:
Acchedyo'yam abhedyo'yam akledyo a o ya eva ca|
Nityah sarvagatah sth nuracaloya san tanah.||
2
Prakti alone evolves, suffers and entices. It is fallacious to think
that the purua acts or is acted upon.
Ya ena n vetti hant ram yascaibai manyate hatai |
Ubhau tau na vij n to n ya hanti na hanyate.||
3
What then is the duty of this purua? It is to get detached from
prakti and attain discriminatory cognition
__
Vivekakhytiand
remain as the eternal viewer of this universe.
The pluralistic systems of Ny ya and Vai e ika also do not
admit determining qualities in the ultimate ontological spiritual
entitiesexcept for special funds of merit and demerit puya and
ppa, dharma and adharma and these are kept in abeyance in the
tms at the time of periodic mahpralayas (complete withdrawal
of the universal process)
__
to bear fruit at the next phase of unversal
process. The tm s then acquire bodies befitting their dharma and
adharma and enjoy and suffer according to their deserts. The
disembodied souls have neither cognition nor desire, neither
attachment nor aversion. The body stands in the way of the final
good
__
the end of all misery for ever. Understanding the true nature
of reality, helped by divine grace leads to final liberation
__
the
attainment of a state where all the irrelevant features of cognition,
happiness, misery, desire, attachment and aversion are shed by the
tmans. The aim in life should therefore be to get rid of false
knowledge which is at the root of all evil.
A discussion of Jaina and Bauddha attitudes would be relevant
here as they are very near in spirit to the systems already discussed.
The Jainas, for example, support a thesis similar to the Hindu
pluralistic one, except that according to them virtue and vice do
not wait as potentialities but immediately transform themselves into
material particles, which cover up the transparent spiritual atoms
leading to their embodiment and consequent suffering. The
spiritual atoms have infinite comprehension and infinite power.
They can grasp all the partial views in the synthetic whole. The aim
BANERJEE : The Anomaly in Hindu Culture 1 3 5 1 3 6 ETHICS: An Anthology
in life is to shed the material covering of the spiritual particles
through the practice of ahi s , satya, asteya, brahmacarya and
aparigraha. Women have, first of all, to shed their feminine bodies,
get reborn in male bodies and then attain final liberation.
The Buddhists think that the universal process, starts from
avidy i.e. wrong knowledge. This wrong knowledge leaves be-
hind a deposit of mental potentialities leading to streams of
consciousness which are bemused and kept in bondage by the
world of multiplicity and finitude, misery and rebirth. The aim
is to attain complete comprehension, and the stoppage of this
stream of consciousness. The prescribed method is one of re-
nunciation of the world, and leading a cloistered life in the
monastery, practising austerity and meditation and finally attain-
ing nirva. Though theoretically there was no bar to women
also striving for this end, Buddha was hesitant to allow women
to enter the fold. Very unwillingly, he permitted separate nun-
neries to function, but kept them subordinate to the dictates of
the superior monks.
The above is a very sketchy presentation of the different
schools of Hindu thought. There has been no conscious devia-
tion from the authentic version in any case though many points
must have been left out. We may summarise the common strand
of thought running through all the systems viz., the tman or
tmas, jvas or vijna santnas or even nya, call it by any name
you like is essentially pure free from all determinations and suf-
fering. It bears no discriminatory marks of caste or gender.
Suffering or misery starts with embodiment, illusory or real. To
liberate oneself one must inculcate the attitudes of tyga and
vairgya and attain true comprehension.
II
We shall now take up Hindu practice as embodied in the socio-
political set-up and its principles as codified in the Sa hit texts.
A hierarchical system of social organisation called Varrama
dharma was prescribed and practised for ages in our country.
This aimed at social harmony and spiritual progress. A very
mutilated form of this is still rampant in the rural areas. A hi-
erarchical system need not necessarily be unjust and essentially
bad. Provided there are sufficient checks and balances to stop
favouritism and injustice a hierarchical system may be more
compatible with empirical evidence regarding human nature.
Men are temperamentally and physically unequal. Abilities and
potentialities vary from individual to individual. Nor is it pos-
sible for all men to pursue the same profession. A properly
organised society is based on a division of labour. Varn rama
was an attempt at social organization based on such consider-
ations. Society, as well as the life of the individual were divided
into four well-marked classes and four distinct stages. The Brah-
min had the duty of learning the Vedas and imparting the Vedic
learning to disciples. He had the duty of performing the Vedic
rituals according to tradition and Vedic principles. Katriyas
learnt the military arts and protected the Vedas, the Brahmins
and people in general from enemies. The vaiyas had to produce
wealth and practise commerce. The dra's sole duty was to
serve the other three groups. Life, for the members of the
different classes, excepting the dras, passed through the stages
of brahmacarya, grhasthya, vaprastha and sannysa. The well-
organised society was supposed to look after the good of the
individual as a member of society as well as his good in heaven
after death and ultimate good (mok a) beyond this cycle of
birth and death. Such a system could have served its purpose,
provided,
i) it kept avenues for spiritual and material progress open for
all,
ii) it did not allow social stratification to fossilise and did not
make such stratification dependent on irrelevant consider-
ations,
iii) it acknowledged the spiritual dignity of all individuals, and
iv) was guided by the principles of equity and justice.
The supporters of Varn rama dharma quote the Lord K a
who said in the G t Cturvarya may sam
The Anomaly in Hindu Culture 1 3 7 1 3 8 ETHICS: An Anthology
gunakarmabibhgaah. Commentators try to prove the inherent
flexibility of the system by laying emphasis on the guakarma
part of the saying. This may have been the case in a very distant
past when brothers from the family took up different profes-
sions and came to be regarded as brahmins, katriyas or vaiyas
according to their temperament and profession. But this state of
affairs did not last long. Manu Samhita
__
that very old and au-
thoritative treatise (date circa 800-900 A.D. for the latest edited
version drawing inspiration from a much earlier tradition about
by a thousand years at least) which even today rules Hindu
practice to a large extent, gives a different picture. I shall try to
prove with the help of quotations from the Manu Samhit how
Hindu practice fails to meet requirements mentioned above. This
results in an unjust and divided society which holds out false
hopes to the exploited. I shall confine myself to those prescrip-
tions in the Manu Sa hit which, i) grant special prerogatives
and extra protection to brahmins, ii) which support discrimina-
tory behaviour towards studies, iii) which take away the basic
rights of women and support discrimination against them.
III
BR HMINS: A br hmin, according to Manu, is born the
best among all, and everything
__
his own belongings as well as
those of others, belong to him by right. He is the best of all and
owner of all (MS, I. 96-100). Of course, the learned among them
are better than the rest. Having the exclusive right (others are
barred) to study and teach the Vedas the br hmin is the best
guide and law giver for all. Universal love was supposed to be
the mark of a br hmin. He is to be amply rewarded and main-
tained by the king and the community. As a learned class the
Br hmins made the best advisers to the rulers. The king re-
warded the advisers by allowing a half share of his booties and
giving him special exemption even when he broke the laws of
the land. This went to the extent of condoning even murders
committed by br hmins. A death-sentence could never be
passed against a br hmin, the highest punishment was to banish
him, but even then he was allowed to carry away the whole of
his property.
Na j tu Br hma a hany t sarvap pe vapi sthita |
R r den bahi kury t samagra dhanam ak atam ||
(MS VIII, 380)
It was admitted that there were bad Br hmins also
__
thieves,
non-believers, addicted to vices, infected with vile disease, en-
gaged in inferior professions like medicine and dramatics
__
dancing, singing etc. married to a woman from a lower class,
charging fees for teaching the Vedas, admitting dras as dis-
ciples, torching other peoples' houses, administering poison to
others etc. Manu condemns them. But
__
and this is a big but
__
even such Br hmins remained pure because they were the
highest of all by birth.
Eva yadyapi ani e u vartate sarvakarmasu |
Sanvath Br hma p jy parama daivatam hi tat ||
One can go on continuing in this vein, but what has been said,
I hope will, establish my point.
DRAS : 'The dras' sole duty is to serve the upper three
classes without malice:
Ekameva tu drasya prabhu dharma sam di at |
Ete m eva var n m u rumanas yay ||
(MS 1/91)
As devoted servants they deserve to be given,
Ucchi amanna d tavya j r ni vasan ni ca |
Pulak caiva dh ny n j r a caiva paricchad ||
(MS 10/125)
The dra had no right to the upanayana sansk ra or agnihotra.
This means his initiation into all cultural activities was effectively
barred. At the nmakaraam ceremony any pejorative was
deemed good enough for a dra, k panaka, d na, s baraka etc.
The dra was not to amass wealth even when capable, lest he
insulted a member of an upper caste through pride of wealth.
dras could not act as judges and the king was to see to it that
the dras never became a majority in his kingdom. Among the
dras some were d sa or slaves. The slaves could belong to any
of the seven class mentioned below:
i) Dhawaj h ta: prisoners of war.
ii) Bhaktad sa: enticed by the promise of food.
iii) G haja or garbhad sa: children of slave women forced to
pregnancy by the master.
iv) Kr tad sa: bought from a previous master
v) Datrima: donated by such a master in the hope of amassing
pu ya or out of love.
vi) Paitrika: slaves who remain so through generations
vii) Dan ad sa: one who opts for slavery in lieu of some other
punishment.
These d sas could not own anything. Whatever they earned
belonged to their masters.
Of course Manu advises the masters not to quarrel with the
servant. This was a covert admission of the usefulness of dras in
the social system. Yet, however useful, they were not granted any
dignity.
Br hmanasya mukham sid v hu r janya k ta |
ru tadasya yad vai yam pad bhy dro'aj yata ||
5
Such a person could not have any right to enter the learned
fold
__
for who then was to do the menial jobs ? This is parallel to
the argument against female education
__
who is to tend to the
menial jobs if women also took to learning?
WOMEN : It is often claimed that women were highly respected
in our society. If providing them with jewels and costly apparel
but denying them the right to education, the right of any indepen-
dent choice of profession, the right to property
__
even when earned
by her own labour
__
are marks of respect
,
then of course, women
were highly respected. The main aim in life for a woman was to
get married, preferably to a man of 30 when she was 12. The
bridegroom was to be chosen by her parents and all through life
she was to be under the control of men
__
father in her childhood,
husband in her youth, son in the old age. Women according to
Manu are over-sexed and bent on chasing and misleading even
pure and learned men. Women should remain loyal to their
husbands even when they were drunkards, adulterers etc. After
the wife's death, the husband could remarry but not the wife after
the husband's death. Women, in short, were treated as commodi-
ties, not as equal partners.
ATITHIS OR GUESTS : As for the dignity of the human soul
the prescription for the proper treatment of atithis or guests will
show how the poison of caste vitiated the humanity of both the
host and the guest. For instance, if a k atriya was the guest of a
br h in, the host should first of all feed the br hmin guests and
then only the k atriyas were to be fed. As for vai yas and dras,
they were to be fed with the servants. They were not proper atithis
but were to be treated as objects of compassion.
As for var asa karas or cross-breds born of inter-caste mar-
riages, they were to be treated as the most despicable of all fruits
of crime, specially if the female partner came from a higher caste.
Thus it was that a set of selfish guidelines codified by an inter-
ested group for its own benefit, struck at the root of high spiritual
principles to be found in the dar ana stras. Politicians and law-
givers have often been shrewd self-seekers ('self' here might mean
a whole group). But the Indian law-giver has gone one better. He
has been seeking his own self-interest, and at the same time, mouth-
ing hypocritical professions of loyalty to higher principles. Thus
Manu at the conclusion of his Sa hit says:
Eva ya sarvabh te u pa yaty tm nan tman |
Sa sarvasamat mety brahmabhyeti para padam ||
(MS 12/125)
If it is objected that such criticism is invalid and irrelevant, hav-
ing reference only to past practices and prescriptions, today's
society being free from such discrimination and injustice, the
answer is that though there has been a regeneration and spiri-
tualization of our culture in recent times yet we should not for-
get the vast rural population of India, still steeped in our ancient
laws and prejudices, taking them to be sacrosanct. However
unpalatable it might be we must admit that it was our contact
with the outer world, even though through colonial imperialism
that brought a change in our mental make-up and general atti-
tude. We should now formulate a new ethics for the neo-Hindu
society which will shun the bad and retain the good in our
culture. Rabindranath and Vivekananda might give us proper
guidance.
Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
1. Gt II 57
2. Ibid II 24
3. Ibid II 19
4. Gt (IV, 13)
5. gveda (10.90.12)

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