GRAHAM HARMAN'S "THE THIRD TABLE" (part 2)

CONTEXT
Towards the end of the 20
th
Century the intellectual agora in Continental philosophy was
increasingly dominated by a form of partial regression where a diluted pluralism was conjoined
with a refined monism, as one can see most clearly in Badious philosophy. Such a passi!e
regressi!e" conte#t made possible the rise of more radically regressi!e philosophies such as those of
$uentin %eillassou# and of &raham 'arman. ( )ey factor in facilitating the seeming plausibilty of
these nostalgic productions was the propagandistic re*writing of recent intellectual history by
Badiou and +i,e), in!ol!ing in particular the pure and simple deletion of -eleu,es philosophical
de!elopment during the .0s. The later -eleu,e was written off as an interpolation, not the real"
-eleu,e, and Badious and +i,e)s philosophies were offered as constituting an ad!ance on the
-eleu,e of -/001213C1 (3- 2141T/T/53 and 65&/C 50 S13S1. -errida was dismissed as
idealist, and 6yotard, whose research articulated a pluralism deepened and reinforced by a post*
metaphysical ontology, was intellectually marginalised.
'owe!er, other more pluralist forces were hard at wor). 6aruelles non*philosophy can be seen as a
criti7ue of those elements in -eleu,es philosophy of difference that allowed the later misreading
by Badiou and +i,e). -eleu,e himself was led to criticise those same aspects than)s to the
mo!ement in his thought produced by the encounter with &uattari. -eleu,e and &uattari together
thus launched themsel!es into a form of non*standard" philosophy that was sometimes more
euphoric than pedagogical, despite their own warnings about the need not to deterritorialise too fast.
Their appeal to the primacy of a non*philosophical understanding seemed justified by the
enthusiasm of the post*89 public, yet slowly but surely the collecti!e mentality was reset" and the
presuppositions that made their wor) comprehensible were no longer shared, and came to be
forgotten. (n academic reading of their wor) established itself, and its non*philosophical charge
was neutralised in the argumentati!e gi!e and ta)e of those for or against !arious philosophical
theses that could be e#tracted from their writngs.
0ortunately, 0ran:ois 6aruelle was wor)ing all this time on his non*philosophy, aimed at dri!ing a
wedge between such philosophical recuperations and a non*standard approach. 6atour was wor)ing
on a non*philosophical approach to science and technology, culminating in a pluralist ontology of
modes of e#istence. (nd Stiegler was deconstructing what remained undeconstructed within
-erridas philosophy, and within post*structuralism in general, and anchoring his pluralism of
processes of transindi!iduation in a realism borne out by his engagement with the constituti!e role
of technology in such processes.
(gainst the grain of this subterranean pluralist trend, object*oriented ontology proferred the same
type of falsified history presented by Badiou, +i,e), and %eillassou#, to gi!e legitimacy to its own
conceptual inno!ations. &raham 'armans metaphysics and epistemology are monist; there is a
realm of sensual objects, or of simulacra, stemming from and gi!ing rise to a plurality of apparent
)nowledges. But reality itself, the realm of real objects, is a unified withdrawn absolute outside our
)nowledge and independent of it. ( !ery useful summary of his position is gi!en by 'arman in a
little pamphlet called T'1 T'/2- T(B61, which / ha!e re!iewed here. /t is interesting to compare
'armans position, which e#emplifies a regression in relation to the recent Continental philosophy,
to two contemporary thin)ers, 0ran:ois 6aruelle and Bruno 6atour, who defend a more pluralist
!ision.
/ ha!e spo)en in this article principally of &raham 'armans 555 because / do not belie!e that
555 e#ists in general and / also thin) that its apparent unity is a decepti!e fa:ade. There is no
substance to the mo!ement, it is rather a matter of agreement on a shared meta*language, i.e.mutual
reliance on a common terminology and set of themes, under the aegis of which many different
positions can find shelter. / ha!e spo)en here almost e#clusi!ely of T'1 T'/2- T(B61 because
&raham 'armans formulations change from boo) to boo), and in this little boo) 'arman offers us
his meta*language in a pure state. /n his other boo)s 'arman, without noticing, slides constantly
between a meta*ontological sense of object and a sense which corresponds to one possible
instanciation of this meta*language, thus producing much conceptual confusion.
1) LARUELLE AND HARMAN: the !!a"e"t ta#$e
The non*philosophy of 0ran:ois 6aruelle, who is not usually described as a pluralist, eliminates
!arious obstacles to pluralism, and his more recent non*standard philosophy has much in common
with the ideas of e#plicitly pluralist thin)ers such as 4aul 0eyerabend, &illes -eleu,e, and Bruno
6atour. /t is useful to recall that the non*" in non*philosophy is not an operator of negation but of
relati!isation and pluralisation. The analogy is with non*1uclidean geometry, which signalled not a
refutation and abandon of traditional 1uclidean geometry but its pluralisation. Similarly, 6aruelle<s
non*philosophy does not signal the abandon of philosophy, but indicates the suspension of its
limiting principles in fa!our of a greater di!ersity of philosophical practices and of a greater
democracy of their relations to and e#changes with other practices. 3on*philosophy is pluralist in
that it shatters standard philosophys monist paradigm, and negates its =sufficiency= in both senses
of uni!ersalism and of authoritarianism. /t liberates not only our thin)ing but also our concrete
practice and our li!ed e#perience from the transcendental constraints imposed by philosophy.
/t is clear that 'armans idea, e#pressed in T'1 T'/2- T(B61, that the table we )now is an
illusion e#presses a confusion. There are no tables in 4hysics. There are tables in ordinary life, i.e.
the many instances of the common sense table. The 1ddington parado#" of the two tables ser!es to
show up the contrast and the incommensurability between these two images >the scientific image of
the table and the manifest or common sense image?. 555 in 'armans !ersion declares that both
the scientific and the manifest images are false, and that their objects are utter shams" >cf. T'1
T'/2- T(B61, 8?. 0or 6aruelle it is the ordinary table, which e#ists outside our philosophical
specifications, that is real and it is 'armans withdrawn un)nowable imperceptible table that is an
utter sham", a philosophical hallucination.
3on*philosophy and 555 agree that philosophy itself has no pri!ilege, it is itself just one object
amongst others. 0or 6aruelle, objects are real in the last instance" whereas for 'arman they ha!e
an essence that is withdrawn". 0or 'arman the table is real as withdrawn from all relation, and
thus from all determination. 0or 6aruelle the table is real in the last instance, and as such its reality
is determined neither by our >common sense, humanistic, or scientific? )nowledge of it nor by a
totally withdrawn and un)nowable essence.
'armans position is one of a surface pluralism >there are multiple r@gimes of )nowing for an object
such as a table? o!ercoded by a deep monism and demarcationism >for him the common sense, the
humanist, and the scientific tables are utter shams", only the withdrawn table is real? embedded in
a synchronic ontological frame >time is not an ontologically pertinent feature of real objects?.
6aruelle<s pluralism is non*demarcationist; for 6aruelle there is no philosophical foundation for
)nowledge or e#perience, there is no philosophical principle to legitimate scientific or any other
form of )nowing. (ny demarcations that e#ist between !arious )nowledge claims are purely
immanent, and cannot be grouped together under a unified Bifurcation between philosphically
warranted )nowledge and pure illusion. Ahere 'arman demotes both the scientific and the sensual
table to the status of utter shams", 6aruelle, on this account, affirms that the philosophical =third=
table is both unnecessary and unreal.
Thus for 6aruelle the table has its own immanent reality as real*in*the*last*instance, as opposed to a
transcendent withdrawn reality. /t is an abundant reality admitting of many different )nowledge
r@gimes, rather than an impo!erished reality that has been abstracted from those r@gimes >deemed
relati!e and thus illusory? and absolutised as a withdrawn essence. This is surely an impro!ement
o!er 'armans !ersion of 555. But what is missing for me is the sense of diachrony, of becoming.
4erhaps 6aruelle<s notion of =superposition=, which is pluralist in the sense that such superposition
is multiple and !ariable according to the conte#t, is meant to con!ey the diachronic dimension, in
the sense that our perceptions and our scientific theories e!ol!e o!er time, and so does the object.
/n conclusion there are two prongs to 6aruelle<s liberation of the human from philosophical
sufficiency; as philosophers caught up in the principle of sufficient philosophy we need non*
philosophy as part of our anamnesis of the 2eal and of philosophys conditions and conditionings,
to dissipate its illusions and hallucinations. (s ordinary humans we need non*standard philosophy
to pursue our noetic pluralism, and to e#plore different ways of )nowing objects. These two prongs
are the twin !ectors of our process of indi!iduation as it proceeds through philosophy in behalf of
radical immanence.
2) %E&ERABEND AND HARMAN: ph$'('ph)a$ )ar)at*re( '+ )'!!'" (e"(e
/ ha!e gi!en a close analysis of 'arman<s boo), T'1 T'/2- T(B61, where he tal)s about science
in his own name, where he feels confident enough to contradict the 3obel pri,e*winning physicist
Sir (rthur 1ddington. 'e is right to do so, as / belie!e firmly in the necessity and the utility of
contributions by the ordinary citi,en to debates between e#perts on recondite subjects of all sorts,
including that of the nature of reality, which can ha!e an influence on the conduct of our li!es. This
is important if we want to defend a democracy of thought and action against the tyranny of e#perts.
'owe!er 'armans inter!ention in its purport does not go in the direction of greater democracy. 'e
postulates a form of in*itself, the untouchable and un)nowable real object, which is yet somehow
indirectly )nowable, but only by philosophical intellection and artistic allusion. (ll other r@gimes of
)nowledge, including those of science and common sense, are proclaimed to be illusory and ha!e
their objects relegated to the relati!ist status of e7ually illusory modes of e#istence.
'ere 'armans special epistemology of science is flat" or democratic, demoting it to an instance of
the general relati!ism of modes of e#istence. 'owe!er, by fiat, some artistic procedures are partially
e#cluded from this relati!isation. Thus his more general epistemology is not democratic at all, but
aristocratic or @litist. /t is also dogmatic, as no criterion of cogniti!e demarcation is offered to
distinguish between the illusory prehensions of common sense or science that try to capture" the
object and the !eridic allusions of philosophers and artists who are content to approach objects
indirectly. 0urther, 'armans presentation of the world of common sense is more of an abstract
philosophical caricature than a realistic description.
/n 0(21A166 T5 21(S53 0eyerabend argues that Commonsense !iewsBcontain subtly
articulated ontologies including spirits, dreams, battles, ideas, gods, rainbows, pains, minerals,
planets, animals, festi!ities, justice, fate, sic)ness, di!orces, the s)y, sic)ness, death, fear C and so
on" >0T2, 8D?. These subtly articulated ontologies" of commonsense come with their own criteria,
standards, measures and dimensions. 4roblems of )nowledge or reality arise when the ingredients
of comple# worlds of this )ind are subsumed under abstract concepts and are then e!aluated" >0T2,
8D?. This e!aluation of the comple# worlds of commonsense in terms of the abstract concepts of the
philosopher is too often to the detriment of commonsense. &raham 'arman calls the commonsense
table an utter sham" >T'1 T'/2- T(B61, 8? not because he has gained deeper )nowledge of it or
closer ac7uaintance with it, but because he has replaced it with a simplified caricature. 0eyerabend
condemns such judgements e#plaining; They are not fruits of more refined ways of thin)ingE they
arise because delicate matters are compared to crude ideas and found to be lac)ing in crudeness"
>0T2, 8D?.
,) LATOUR AND HARMAN: the !*$tp$e -'r$. '+ )'!!'" (e"(e
Bruno 6atour agrees with 0eyerabend<s analysis. 'e writes about the populari,erBdumbfounded
by the multiplicity of 7uantum worlds" >(3 /3$F/2G /3T5 %5-1S 50 1H/ST13C1, IIJ?
belie!ing that the common sense world has the simplicity of 1uclidean space filled with familiar
solid objects. /f we accept this opposition between 7uantum physics and common sense, we are
faced with 1ddingtons two tables", and with the impression of the comple#ity and strangeness of
the scientific table compared to the simplicity and familiarity of the common sense table. ( strange
sense of incommensurability" and of conflict sets in. Ae li!e in the familiar common sense world
where e!erything seems simple, though the actual simplicities !ary from culture to culture, and also
we belie!e in one uni7ue, though comple#, scientific framewor) and ha!e adapted much of our
beha!iour >and increasingly the beha!iour of people belonging to other traditions? to its products
and precepts.
6atours resolution of this conflict is not to in!ent some ghostly withdrawing third table that would
be the only real one, and to relegate the two other tables to the status of utter shams". 'e does not
allow himself the facility of such a traditional metaphysical mo!e, which costs nothing to ad!ance,
a labour*sa!ing philosophy for the intellectually indigent. 3o, he claims that the populari,er" of
7uantum comple#ity belie!ed in the simplicity of our common*sense world because it cost him
nothing to belie!e that the microphone into which he was spea)ing, the rostrum from which he was
pontificating, his own body, his genes, the walls of the room, the assembly that he was carrying
along in his fren,y, all that too was bathed in a 1uclidean space". /t costs him nothing to belie!e this
simple fable because he does not do the wor) necessary to e#plore the contours of the common
sense world, to in!estigate its multiple dimensions.
(ll the populari,er" has to do, remar)s 6atour, is to begin a little seriously to take the measure of
what he was sayingBto ta)e a woodwor)ers tape measure, a s7uare, a piece of paper and a pencil
out of his poc)etBto draw the piece of furniture in perspecti!e or as a projectionBKto get hold of a
colour chartL to choose the tint and put together another set of samples so he could decide on the
7uality of the wood" >IIJ?. The populari,er", and we are all now to some e#tent scientistic
populari,ers or credulous !ictims thereof, will soon begin to realise the multitude of dimensions
that are necessary for the description of e!en such a simple object as a table. 6atour hopes, for
him, that, after interrupting his tal) for se!eral minutes to take some measures, he will ha!e
modified his conclusion and admitted that the 7uantum world is childs play in comparison with the
multiplicity and comple#ity of the dimensions that are simultaneously accessible to the most
minimal e#perience of common sense" >IIJ*I20?. This world, the world of commonsense, is
un)nown to us. The familiar" world is unfamiliar to our thought and to our descriptions.
The message of 6atour is that we are practicing different )inds of truths, engaging in different
r@gimes of )nowledge, all the time. This cogniti!e di!ersity is not reducible to a single binary
opposition between science" and common sense". 6atour not only begins his analysis by
pro!o)ing the same sort of dilemma as 1ddingtons, but he also gi!es us the means to resol!e it.
0eeling ta)en up in such a dilemma is often caused by a preliminary perception of pluralities
straining at the constraints of their dualistic cogniti!e containers.
5n the 7uestion of the increasing scientism of our society and the supposed e!entual disappearance
of the world of common sense; we may be less scientistic in our daily life than it is usually claimed.
6atour maintains that the common sense world is infinitely less e#plored" than the 7uantum world,
but at least as complicated. /t is true that science and rationalism ha!e been imposed on other
cultures !ia colonisation and e#ploitation, but it is also the case that their presence in our own
culture is not total, but only, as (ndrew 4ic)ering says, hegemonic". They do not constitute a real
majority but are =majoritarian= in -eleu,es sense of a yardstic) for measuring the !alidity of other
minorities. Science and rationalism count themsel!es twice, both as part of the practices and as their
norm, and it is only in this way that they can seem to be the majority situation in our society.
/) BELHA0 1ACEM AND HARMAN: ph$'('ph)a$ )ar)at*re( '+ ()e")e
5ne may raise the problem of the relation between 'armans 555 and Science. The solution seems
to be; there is no relation at all, but if we forget" the huge conceptual disparity between 'armans
and 6atours philosophies, then 6atour can come to the aid of 'arman. This is aesthetic" surgery
in a big way. The only e!idence habitually gi!en in support of this !ery charitable reading is that
'arman has written a boo) on Bruno 6atour, 42/3C1 50 31TA52MS, where he enthuses o!er
the superiority >both political and metaphysical? of 6atours position to that of critical rationalism
and of political engineering. 'owe!er in this boo) 'arman e#plicates 6atour<s ideas but he does not
endorse them, and he goes on to criticise them and e#pound his own ideas, which are in many ways
the e#act opposites of 6atour<s.
5ne must not forger 'armans own e#plicit pronouncements on science >such as the reiterated
claim that the scientific object is not real", that it is an utter sham". There is no pluralism and no
democracy here, but rather monist @litism. 'arman<s doctrine of withdrawal, i.e. his thesis that
objects withdraw from relations, implies a parado#ical stance of epistemological relati!ism with
respect to all )nowledge claims combined with an ontological dogmatism. /t is this notion of strong
or absolute withdrawal that 'arman<s successors ha!e often chosen to wea)en or e!en to abandon.
/n his 61TT21 N T2/ST(3 &(2C/( %ehdi Belhaj Macem prefers to center his analysis on
'arman<s concept of the in*itself rather than on his concept of withdrawal", as the debate centers
on degrees and types of withdrawal. Belhaj Macem does not claim that 'armans in*itself
necessitates relati!ism. 'e argues that 'arman is caught in a two*pronged pragmatic contradiction,
ha!ing to maintain both
I? the in*itself is un)nowable, but 555 can nonetheless )now something about it. Macem argues
that this thesis presupposes at an unconscious structural le!el a set theoretic type ontology, and thus
the implicit primacy and historicity of science. >The primacy of set theory implies the historicity of
science; =Copernicus then &alileoB re!eal what will have been an in*itself pre!iously inaccessible
to human consciousness. This re!elation itself of the in*itself will permit, three centuries later, the
literalisation of the transfinite by Cantor=, Macem, IOD?. 'ere 'armans epistemology of science is
!ertical, enshrining, though unconsciously, the matheme as ultimate legitimation of the little that
can be said philosophically.
2? the in*itself is )nowable, but only by philosophical intellection and artistic allusion, all other
r@gimes of )nowledge, including science and politics, are relegated to the relati!ist status of e7ually
illusory prehensions >this prong has as a conse7uence that there are no e!ents in science that re!eal
what will have been an in*itself pre!iously inaccessible to human consciousness". This use of the
future perfect to denote a retroacti!e transformation of the status of un)nowability of the in*itself, is
central to Belhaj Macem<s understanding of the science*e!ent, but forbidden by 'armans system.
'ere 'armans epistemology of science is flat, demoting it to an instance of the general relati!ism
of prehensions. 'owe!er some artistic procedures are partially e#cluded from this relati!isation, by
arbitrary fiat, as no criterion of demarcation is offered.
Belhaj Macem thin)s that this dilemma can be resol!ed by fully accepting that the in*itself is only
relati!ely un)nowable, that withdrawal is relati!e. This is better than the incoherent pirouette of
ma)ing the real object utterly withdraw from science, the humanities, and common sense >their
objects are utter shams"?, and yet only partially withdraw from some philosophical and artistic
practices. 'arman wants to ha!e his >withdrawn? table and eat >on? it too. So we are left with a
mysterious phenomenon of degrees of withdrawal and of de*withdrawal, that 'arman is obliged to
resort to implicitly without being able to theorise it.
'arman claims that objects can ne!er be caught" >T'1 T'/2- T(B61, I2?, the real object can
ne!er be captured". Macem disagrees;
the in*itself is as infinite as all the rest, and thus ine#haustible. But one cannot then decree it to be
totally uncapturable, on the contrary; science does suppose this in*itself to be capturable, by
definition, without which there would not be any scientific historicity, that is any historicity at all"
>Macem, pIOP?.
'e draws some interesting conclusions from this historicity of science. 5ne of the most important is
that once you ac)nowledge the historicity of science, once you realise that it is not a mere series of
encounters with the real, once you accept that it is composed of mutations and radical conceptual
reconfigurations, then you must accept what he calls an anthropological singularisation". %ore
generally, he argues that the more object*oriented" the philosophy, the less it is able to thin) any
singularity, whether it be that of humanity, animality, life or anything else.
The encounter of the cotton with the fire may resemble my encounter with the table, but all that is
anecdote, as it cannot resemble our scientific encounter with an 1arth that we now )now to be
round, and not flat as it was formerly thought. The transfusion of the 6atourian notion of turning a
heterogeneous collecti!e into a cosmos" will not help here, unless we accept the historicity of this
cosmos >from closed world to infinite uni!erse", for e#ample?;
/t does not really seem that the other animals )now about the accretion of the 1arth, the 3eolithic,
or the fact that the s)y is not a !ault nor is the archi*1arth flat, as we oursel!es belie!ed for such a
long time" >Macem, pIO.?.
'arman<s 555 cannot gi!e us an account of )nowledge that reconcilesr both the historicity and the
realism of science. 'arman has seemed willing to gi!e up the historicity, asserting e#plicitly that
time is unreal, in order to sa!e the realism. 'owe!er, the =realism= that he is left with is the posit of
an in!isible, un)nowable, inaccessible realm of real objects that are unrelated to, =withdrawn= from,
our !arious )nowledge practices.
P? 1-/3&T53 (3- '(2%(3;
Contrary to 'arman<s simplistic presentation in T'1 T'/2- T(B61 1ddingtons position is !ery
comple#. e gi!es a dramatised description of what amounts to the incommensurability of the world
of physics and the familiar world of e#perience. This is implicit in the whole theme of the necessary
aloofness" >#!? that scientific conceptions must maintain with respect to familiar conceptions. /n
the famous introduction to his boo) T'1 3(TF21 50 T'1 4'GS/C(6 A526- >IJ29?,
1ddington begins with an apparent parado#; / ha!e just settled down to the tas) of writing these
lectures and ha!e drawn up my chairs to my two tables. Two tablesQ GesE there are duplicates of
e!ery object about me two tables, two chairs, two pens" >#i?. 1ddington e#plains that there is the
familiar object, the table as a substantial thing, solid and reliable, against which / can support
myself. But, according to him, modern physics spea)s of a 7uite different table; %y scientific table
is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing
about with great speed" >#ii?. 1ddington contrasts the substantiality of the familiar table >a solid
thing, easy to !isualise as such? and the abstraction of the scientific table >mostly empty space, a set
of physical measures related by mathematical formulae?. The familiar world of common sense is a
world of illusions, whereas the the scientific world, the only real world according to modern
physics, is a world of shadows.
1ddington then goes on to pose the 7uestion of the relation, or of the lin)age", between the two.
Sometimes he seems to gi!e primacy to the familiar world; the whole scientific in7uiry starts from
the familiar world and in the end it must return to the familiar world" >#iii?, and Science aims at
constructing a world which shall be symbolic of the world of commonplace e#perience" >#iii?.
Sometimes he gi!es primacy to the world of physics, and seems to declare that the familiar world is
illusory; /n remo!ing our illusions we ha!e remo!ed the substance, for indeed we ha!e seen that
substance is one of the greatest of our illusions" >#!i?, though he attenuates this by adding; 6ater
perhaps we may in7uire whether in our ,eal to cut out all that is unreal we may not ha!e used the
)nife too ruthlessly".
5n the 7uestion of the relation between physics and philosophy 1ddington is no mere scientistic
chau!inist. /ndeed, he gi!es a certain primacy to the philosopher; the scientist B has good and
sufficient reasons for pursuing his in!estigations in the world of shadows and is content to lea!e to
the philosopher the determination of its e#act status in regard to reality" >#i!?. 'owe!er he affirms
that neither common sense nor philosophy must interfere with sciences =freedom for autonomous
de!elopment= >#!?. 'is conclusion is that reflection on modern physics leads to =a feeling of open*
mindedness towards a wider significance transcending scientific measurement= >#!i? and warns us
against a priori closure; (fter the physicist has 7uite finished his worldbuilding a lin)age or
identification is allowedE but premature attempts at lin)age ha!e been found to be entirely
mischie!ous".
>3B; $uotations are ta)en from the introduction to T'1 3(TF21 50 T'1 4'GS/C(6 A526-,
the entire boo) is a!ailable online here; http;RRarchi!e.orgRdetailsRnatureofphysical00eddi?.
Ahat is the relation between the two worldsS 1ddington poses the 7uestion and dramatises the
di!ergence between the two worlds, but finally he gi!es no answer of his own. 'e declares that
premature attempts to determine their relation are harmful ("mischievous"), more of a hindrance
than a help, to research. /n fact, 1ddington refuses to commit himself on the ontological 7uestion
posed in his introduction because he is con!inced that it is empirical research, mobilising di!erse
fields including psychology and physiology as well as physics, which must gi!e the answer. /t is
clear that he would ha!e regarded 555 as just such a premature and harmful attempt.
&raham 'arman in T'1 T'/2- T(B61 discusses this te#t but he ma)es a mess of 1ddingtons
position, treating him as ad!ocating the scientistic primacy of the world of physics. 'arman then
proposes his own solution"; the objects of both common sense and physics are utter shams", the
real object is that of >'armans? philosophy, and to a certain e#tent of some artistic practices. / thin)
that this is a contemporary e#ample of what 1ddington calls premature attempts at lin)age" and
that he finds mischie!ous", i.e. both failed and harmful.
0eyerabend articulates an 1ddingtonian position, one that gi!es primacy neither to philosophy nor
to physics, but defends the open*mindedness of empirical >though not necessarily scientific?
research. 0or me this 7uestion of primacy remains moot in contemporary philosophy. The 7uestion
becomes; to what does a thin)er gi!e primacy C philosophy, physics, or common sense >or to none?S
Badiou and 'arman gi!e primacy to >transcendental, meta*le!el? philosophy, whereas 6aruelle ga!e
primacy to science in his 4hilosoph //, but later included non*standard philosophy and non*standard
artistic practices on the same le!el as the sciences. Similarly, -eleu,e and &uattari in A'(T /S
4'/65S54'GS articulate a position that a!oids the pitfalls of primacy; they situate philosophy on
the same le!el as the sciences >and the arts? but ma)e philosophy capable of meta*operations that
ta)e functions" in physics and affects and percepts in the arts as objects of its own philosophical
concepts.
CONCLUSION
/n his recent boo) 4'(2%(C565&/1 -F 0253T 3(T/53(6 Bernard Stiegler argues that it is
regrettable that in Continental 4hilosophy a direct confrontation with (lthussers positions on the
science*ideology distinction ne!er too) place. This non*engagement with (lthussers dualist and
demarcationist epistemology left the field free not just for scientism >or for its binary opposite,
relati!ism? but also unprotected from the hegemony of technocrats and the tyranny of e#perts, and
also from the primacy of management o!er politics. ( distant conse7uence of this neglect has been
the rise of &raham 'armans 555 pac)aged as contemporary Continental 4hilosophy when it is in
fact its e#act opposite, a regression to a form of (lthusserism, only de*mar#ed, de*politicised, and
de*scientised.
/n T'1 T'/2- T(B61 &raham 'arman gi!es a popularised !ersion his own theoretical position in
the form of a flawed reading of and an unsatisfying response to Sir (rthur 1ddingtons famous
parado# of the two tables. Fnfortunately, 'arman shows himself incapable of grasping the anti*
reductionistic import of 1ddingtons argument and proposes an abstract philosophical dualism to
replace 1ddingtons pluralist !ision of scientific research. /t is tacitly implied that the theoretical
justification for this unsatisfying presentation is to be found elsewhere in 'armans wor)s, but this
is not the case. 'armans position is one of a surface pluralism undermined by a deep monism and
demarcationism >the humanist, the scientific, and the common sense objects are simulacra", only
the withdrawn object is real? embedded in a synchronic ontological frame >time is not an
ontologically pertinent feature of real objects.
Today, 'arman<s 555 is at a loss. /ts hac)neyed set of critical terms >philosophy of access, shams
and simulacra, la!alampy o!ermining, atomistic undermining, streams of becoming, correlationism?
clearly ha!e no point of application at all to the new, pluralist, lines of research opened up in recent
Continental 4hilosophy by major thin)ers such as Bruno 6atour, Bernard Stiegler, and 0ran:ois
6aruelle. 5ne has only to loo) at the utter incomprehension that 'arman has manifested with regard
to 6aruelles non*philosophy to see that his claim to mo!e beyond" post*structuralism is an empty
bluff.
'arman and his disciples ne!er understood the arguments of his philosophical predecessors, despite
their pretentions to pro!iding the contemporary response to the philosophies of deconstruction and
of post*structuralism that flourished at the end of the last century. Thus they are ille7uiped to engage
the ideas of the true creati!e successors. 0ar from inaugurating a new more constructi!e philosophy
that builds on the positi!e achie!ements of the past while rectifying or abandoning its erroneous
problematics and procedures, &raham 'armans T'1 T'/2- T(B61 is yet another compendium
of 555s familiar but disappointing history of misunderstandings and failed encounters, a set not of
conceptual inno!ations but of affecti!e gesticulations that ne!er 7uite cohered into a philosophy.
'armans 555 is not just anti*humanist, in its de*centering of ontology away from the primacy of
the human, but misanthropic. /t is misanthropic because humans, instances of the only concept of
humanity that we )now, belong, according to this system, to the sensual >or unreal? realm, as does
our concept of humanity. /n 'arman<s esoteric language anthropic" >or =human=? signifies sensual,
i.e. illusory. 2eal objects withdraw from the human, and 'arman e#plicitly accuses the humanities
of missing the real table and falling into reductionism. 0or the same reason, 'armans 555 is dar).
(s real objects withdraw, we cannot )now them, only allude to them dar)ly, after a dar) ascesis.
(ny worth" that can be granted to human beings is necessarily sensual worth, and thus must be
understood under erasure, as illusory. 'arman deftly deploys familiar terms, but each predicate
in!o)ed is to be understood in terms of the double language of 555; the esoteric >real? and e#oteric
>sensual? sense. 'arman<s real object is an abstract monster, in!isible, untouchable, un)nowable and
inaccessible. The sensual abundance of our e#perience and the conceptual abundance of our
)nowledge >whether scientific, humanistic, or common sense? are illusions.
The dar)" ontologist with administrati!e powers at the uni!ersity or academic publishing le!el,
able to ma)e or brea) careers, is no laughing matter. (t the go!ernmental le!el it would be
catastrophic, implementing anti*science, anti*anthropic principles in the name of a dar) realism
where our sensual all too sensual" thoughts, feelings, and !alues would be treated as the illusions
that they are for 555.