Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars

Back issues of BCAS publications published on this site are
intended for non-commercial use only. Photographs and

other graphics that appear in articles are expressly not to be
reproduced other than for personal use. All rights reserved.
CONTENTS
Vol. 30, No. 2: AprilJune 1998
Textbook Nationalism, Citizenship, and War: Comparative
Perspectives, Laura Hein and Mark Selden, guest editors
Introduction
Laura Hein and Mark Selden - Learning Citizenship from the Past:
Textbook Nationalism, Global Context, and Social Change
Four Dimensions of the Current Debate over Textbooks in Japan
Gavan McCormack - The Japanese Movement to Correct History
Nakamura Masanori - The History Textbook Controversy and
Nationalism
Aaron Gerow - Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: The New
Neonational Revisionism in Japan
Inokuchi Hiromitsu and Nozaki Yoshiko - Japanese Education,
Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburos Court Challenges
Problems of Strategy
Kimijima Kazuhiko - The Japan-South Korea Joint Study Group
on History Textbooks and the Continuing Legacy of Japanese
Colonialism
International Contexts
Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal - Identity and Transnationalization in
German School Textbooks
Stevan Harrell and Bamo Ayi - Combining Ethnic Heritage and
National Unity: A Paradox of Nuosu (Yi) Language Textbooks in
China
David Hunt - War Crimes and the Vietnamese People: American
Representations and Silences
Review Essay
Louise Edwards - Gender and Ethnicity: Interventions in China
Studies
Short Review
Sonia Ryang - The Fantastic in Modern Japanese Literature: The
Subversion of Modernity, by Susan J. Napier
BCAS/Critical AsianStudies
www.bcasnet.org
CCAS Statement of Purpose
Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose
formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979,
but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose
should be published in our journal at least once a year.
We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of
the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of
our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of
Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their
research and the political posture of their profession. We are
concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak
out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to en-
suring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the le-
gitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We
recognize that the present structure of the profession has often
perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.
The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a
humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies
and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront
such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We real-
ize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand
our relations to them.
CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in
scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial
cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansion-
ism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a
communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a
provider of central resources for local chapters, and a commu-
nity for the development of anti-imperialist research.
Passed, 2830 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts
Volume30,Number21 April- June1998
TextbookNationalism,Citizenship,andWar
ComparativePerspectives
Guest editors: Laura Hein and Mark Selden
Laura Hein and Mark Selden
Gavan McCormack
Nakamura Masanori
translated by Kristine Dennehy
Aaron Gerow
Inokuchi Hiromitsu and Nozaki Yoshiko
Kimijima Kazuhiko
translated by Inokuchi Hiromitsu
Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal
Stevan Harrell and BamoAyi
David Hunt
Louise Edwards
Sonia Ryang

3
16
24
30
37
47
53
62
72
83
87
Introduction
LearningCitizenshipfromthePast:
TextbookNationalism,GlobalContext,andSocialChange
FourDimensionsoftheCurrentllebate
overTextbooksin Japan
TheJapaneseMovementto"Correct"History
TheHistoryTextbookControversyandNationalism
ConsumingAsia,ConsumingJapan:
TheNewNeonationalistRevisionisminJapan
JapaneseEducation,Nationalism,and
IenagaSaburo'sCourtChallenges
ProblemsofStrategy
TheJapan-SouthKoreaJointStudyGroupon
HistoryTextbooksandtheContinuingLegacy
ofJapaneseColonialism
InternationalContexts
IdentityandTransnationalizationin
GeImanSchoolTextbooks
CombiningEthnicHeritageandNationalUnity:
AParadoxof Nuosu(Yi)LanguageTextbooksinChina
WarCrimesandtheVietnamesePeople:
AmericanRepresentationsandSilences
BookReviews
GenderandEthnicity: InterventionsinChinaStudies.
Engendering the Chinese Revolution: Radical Women,
Communist Politics andMaas Movements in the 1920s,
by ChristinaKellyGilmartin;Changing Identities ofChinese
Women: Rhetoric, Experience and Self-Perception in
Twentieth Century China, byElisabethCroll;Sex, Death
and Hierarchy in a Chinese City: An Anthropological
Account, byWilliamR.Jankowiak
The Fantastic in Modern Japanese Literature:
The Subversion ofModernity, bySusan1.Napier
BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
Contributors
BarnoAyiisAssociateProfessorintheDepartmentofPhilosophy and
theInstituteforResearchonReligionatCentralNationalitiesUniversity
inBeijing,anddirectoroftheBamoSisters'YiStudiesResearchGroup.
AnativeofLiangshan, shehasconductedextensivefieldresearchon
Nuosureligionandsociety.
LouiseEdwards isSeniorLectureratAustralianCatholic University,
Queensland,Australia.HercurrentresearchinterestisgenderinChina.
Hermostrecentbook(jointlyeditedandtranslatedwithKam Louie)is
CensoredbyConfucius: GhostStoriesbyYuanMei(1996).
Aaron Gerow is an associate professor in the International Student
CenterofYokohamaNationalUniversityandhaspublishedwidely in
EnglishandJapaneseonearlyandcontemporaryJapanesecinema.
StevanHarrellisProfessorandChairoftheDepartmentofAnthropol-
ogyattheUniversityofWashington.Hehasbeenconductingfieldwork
onethnicity and ethnic relations inLiangshan and surrounding areas
since1988,andhasjustcompletedamonogmphstudyentitledWaysof
BeingEthnicinSouthwestChina.
Laura Hein teaches Japanese history at Northwestern University. In
1997sheandMark SeldenpublishedLivingwith theBomb:Japanese
andAmericanCulturaiConflictsintheNuclearAge(M.E. Sharpe).Her
mostrecentwork is"InterwarJapaneseEconomists-HowDidThey
PickTheirQuestions?"inJournalofEconomicIssues, June 1998.
InokuchiHiromitsu receivedhisPh.D. fromtheDepartmentofEduca-
tional Policy Studies, University ofWisconsin-Madison. Hisdisserta-
tion,"U.S. MiddleSchoolStudents'DiscoursesonJapan: AStudy of
PoliticsofRepresentation,"analyzesthelanguagesandimagesusedby
U.S. studentswhenwritingandtalkingaboutJapan.
DavidHuntisaprofessorof historyattheUniversityofMassachusetts
at Boston. He has beenteaching andwriting about Vietnam andthe
VietnamWarsincearrivingonthecampusin 1969.
Kimi.iimaKazuhikoiscurrentlyaprofessorofmodernJapanesehistory
atTokyoGalaIgeiUniversity(TokyoUniversityof LiberalArts).Heis
theauthorofsevernlbooks,includingKyokashonoShiso(Thoughtsin
thetextbook)andChoseniKankokuwaNihonnoKyokashonidoKaka-
Wearegmtefulto guesteditorsLauraHeinandMark Seldenandtoall
thecontributorsto this specialissueoftheBulletin for theirgenerous
andprofessionaleffortsintheproductionofVol. 30,No.2(1998).
Effective1March1998all editorialandadministrativecorrespondence
for BCAS and theBulletin should nowbe sentto our new office in
Oakland: BCAS, 1515WebsterStreet,Oakland,CA94612,USA.Tel:
1-510-451-1742.Fax: 1-510-835-9631.E-mail: <tfenton@igc.org>.
Photocreditsandcaptions:Unlessotherwiseindicated,allphotogmphs
andphotocaptionsusedintheBulletinarecreditedto theauthor(s)of
thearticleinwhichtheyappear.Frontcovercredit:InokuchiHiromitsu
andNozakiYoshiko. Backcovercredit:StevanHarrell.
TheBulletin ofConcernedAsianScholors is indexedorabstractedin
theAlternativePressIndex; America:HistoryandLifo;Bibliography
ofAsianStudies;HistoricalAbstracts;IBR(InternationalBibliography
ofBookReviews); IBZ (InternationalBibliographiederZeitschriften
Literatur);InternationalDevelopmentAbstracts;InternationalDevel-
opmentIndex; LeftIndex; Periodica Islamica; PoliticalScienceAb-
stracts;SageAbstracts;andtheSocialScienceCitationIndex.
Bookstoredistributor: UbiquityDistributors,607DeGrawSt.,Brook-
lyn,NY11230,USA. Tel: 1-718-875-5491.Fax: 1-718-875-8047.
Backissuesand photocopies ofout-of-printbackissues areavailable
fromBCAS. Writeforaflyerlistingalloftheavailableissuesorvisit
the BCAS Web site (see below). Microfilms ofback issues ofthe
reteiru/ca(HowJapanesetextbooksrepresentKorea)(co-authoredwith
Sakai Toshiki). His major academic interesthas been the history of
Japanese colonial rule ofKorea. He is also a long-time activist and
supporteroflenagaSaburo'stextbooklawsuits.
GavanMcConnack is ProfessorofJapanese History in the Research
School ofPacific andAsian Studies,AustmlianNationalUniversity.
His mostrecentbooksareTheEmptinessofJapaneseAffluence(M.E.
Sharpe,1996)andthejointlyeditedvolumeJapaneseMulticulturalism:
FromPalaeolithictoPost-Modern(CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).
NakamuraMasanoriisprofessorofmodernJapanesehistoryatHitot-
subashiUniversityinTokyo.Hiswritingsinclude:EconomicDevelopment
andDemocracy(IwanamiShoten, 1993),ShowaPanic inJapan(Shou-
gaku-kan, 1982),andFermentandFascination inHistory(Chikuma-
shobo,1992).
NozakiYoshikoisaPh. D.candidateintheDepartmentofEducational
Policy Studies, University ofWisconsin-Madison. She has taught a
courseongenderandeducationandhas writtenseveralarticlesinthe
areaofsocialscience,feministtheory,andeducation. Shewas asocial
studiesteacherinJapan,specializinginJapanesehistory.
SoniaRyang,aJapan-bornKorean,studiedanthropologyattheUniver-
sityof Cambridge.Sheisnowanassistantprofessorof anthropologyat
JohnsHopkinsUniversity.SheistheauthorofNorthKoreansinJapan:
Language,Ideology, andIdentity(Westview,1997).
MarkSelden teachessociologyandhistoryatBinghamtonUniversity.
His mostrecentbooksareLivingwiththeBomb:JapaneseandAmeri-
canCulturalConflictsintheNuclearAge(withLauraHein)andChina
inRevolution:The Yenan WayRevisited.Heis theeditorof aseriesat
RoutledgeonAsia'sTransfonnationsandofaseriesonSocialismand
SocialMovementsatM.E.Sharpe.E-mail:ms44@comell.edu.
YaseminNuhogluSoysalisAssociateProfessorofSociologyatHarvard
University.Herresearchfocusesonhistoricaloriginsandcontempomry
reconfigurationsofcitizenshipandthenation-state.Sheis theauthorof
Limits ofCitizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in
Europe(UniversityofChicagoPress,1994).
BulletinareavailablefromUniversityMicrofilmsInternational,300N.
ZeebRd.,Ann Arbor,MI 48106,USA. Tel: 1-800-521-0600.
Booksforreview: Alist ofbooksreceivedforreviewconsiderationis
availableattheBCASWebsite: <htlp:llcsfcolorado.edulbcasl>.Con-
tactBCAS bookrevieweditorPeter Zarrowif you are interested in
reviewingoneormoreofthebooksonthelist p.zarrow@unsw.edu.au.
TheBulletinprefersreviewessaysratherthanreviewsofsinglebooks.
The BulletinofConcernedAsianScholors(ISSN0007-4810)ispublished
quarterly.Copyright1998bythe BulletinofConcemedAsianScholars,
Inc.All rightsresaved.
BCASWebsite:http://csf.colorado.edulbcasl
Publisher/managingeditor: ThomasP.Fenton.
Copyeditingandproofreading: MaryHeffron,NancyGruber,
andThomasP. Fenton.
SUBSCRIPTIONRATES-1998
1 year 2 years 3 yean
Regular(USA) $25.00 $45.00 $62.00
OutsidetheUnitedStates $26.00 $47.00 $65.00
IndividualslivingintheThirdWorld $18.00
Students/unemployed $18.00
Institutionsllibraries $55.00($56.00,outsideUSA)
Overseasainnail $18.00additionalper year
Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 30,No.2(1998):3-1S
ISSN0007-4810 C 1998BCAS(Oakland,California)
LearningCitizenshipfrom thePast:
TextbookNationalism,GlobalContext,andSocialChange
Thisintroductionto thespecialissueframes theessaysthatfonowinbothinternationalanddomesticpoliticalcontexts.
Treating textbooks as a key form ofnationalist narrative, we analyze textbooks in fwe nations and controversies
surroundingthemforinsightsintoongoingbattlesovernationandcitizenship.Weargue,tint,thatchangesintheglobal
context, theendofthecold putnewpressures. nationalnarratives.Internationalcontroversyeruptswhen
those narratives do not mesh wen With the newly envIsioned future. Secondly, domestic social change also forces
reevaluationofestablishedstoriesofthenationalpastbecauseformerlysubordinatedgroupsdemandinclusionoftheir
perspectives, transforming the overan story in crucial ways. Sometimes, as when the "military comfort women" are
mentionedinJapanesetextbooks,thosetwoforcescombinetoformaprofoundchanengetoolderversionsoftheJapanese
nationalstory,provokingfurthercontroversy.
by LauraHeinandMarkSelden'"
WhyFightOverTextbooks? Japan, China, SouthKorea, Germany, andthe United States-
and controversies over their content and adoption-all reveal
Textbooksprovideoneofthemostimportantwaysinwhich
competing and shifting definitions ofthe nation, nationalism,
nation, citizenship,the idealized past, and the promisedfuture
andcitizenship.I
are articulatedanddisseminatedincontemporarysocieties. No
History and civicstextbookstypicallyfunction asnation-
wonder,then,thattextbookcontent is atthecenterofpolitical
alist primers that selectively highlight elements ofthe pastto
controversy in somany countries at atimewhenrationalesfor
limn an "official" story and etch the lineages and myths of
nationalunityandinternationalalliancesarebeingrenegotiated.
contemporarypatriotism.Educationisintegralto statebuilding,
Webeginbyconsideringaparticularlylong-runningandacrimo-
theshapingofnationalconsciousness, the articulationofstate-
niouscontroversy,whichhasalsospilledacrossnationalbounda-
society relations, andclarificationofthe boundaries andterms
ries. The Japanese history textbook controversy raises funda-
ofcitizenship. The intensity ofdebatesovertextbooksderives
mental issues about Japan's place in Asia and in the world,
from the fact that education is so obviously about the future, ,
nationalism,citizenship,thelegaciesofwar,and thepoliticsof
reachesso deeply into society, and isdirected by thestate. As
memory. Thecontroversyisalsorootedintransformationsasso-
Michael Apple and Linda Christian-Smith put it, "Texts are
ciated with post-cold warrealignments and domestic change
really messages to and about the future....They participate in
withinJapan.
creatingwhatasociety hasrecognizedaslegitimateandtruth-
Japanisbyno meansthe only placewheredefinitionsof
ful.,,2 Becausetextbooksarecarriedintoneighborhoodschools
nationandregion,andthecelebrationofaputativepast,areunder
andhomes, and because (directly orindirectly)they carry the
negotiation.Nationalism,warresponsibility,andthere1ationship
imprimaturofthe state,they areunusuallyaccessibleandpow-
between citizens and their state are contested in the realm of
erful symbols of community, and hence potential targets of
public memory worldwide. School textbooks are one ofthe
criticism.Moresimply,thestakesseemhighbecauseeducation
importantbattlegroundsforshapingthesenarrativesof pastand
isaimedatchildren.
present. Analysis offered here ofcontemporary textbooks in
Nationalismisamulti-dimensionalphenomenonexpressed
inmanyforms,includingschoolcurricula. SteinTonnessonand
HansAntlovsuccinctlydescribenationalismas"anideological
. Thanks to Uradyn Bulag, Ellen Hanunond, PeterKatzenstein, Jeff
movementfor attainingormaintaining anation-state," butour
Kingston,CeceliaLynch,YaseminNuhogluSoysal,YukiTanaka,Mar-
ilyn Young, and PeterZarrow for their thoughtful comments on an
emphasis here is on two mutually constitutive frameworks in
earlierdraftof thisessay. Thanks alsotoKosekiShoichiand Asanwna
whichideologicalmovementsarenegotiated-theinternational
Shigeruforhelpfuladvice. context and domestic social transformation.
3
Arguments over
Vol. 30,No.2(1998) 3
school textbooks provide a useful window for comparative analysis
of these processes of negotiation, institutionalization, and rene-
gotiation of nationalist narratives.
Two interrelated themes of nationalism that run through
history textbooks everywhere are the focus of the articles gath-
ered here. The first is the relationship between citizens and the
state, often centering on reco gnition (or denial) ofethnic, linguis-
tic, and religious differences. The second is foreign relations,
especially the conduct ofone's own nation in war. Textbooks not
only model behavior for citizens within their own society, they
also chronicle relations with others. In the broadest sense, na-
tional subjects are defmed collectively by distinguishing them-
selves from others although the rituals marking national identity
may consciously emulate ones invented elsewhere, such as the
pomp surrounding British royalty or Chinese dynastic ritual.
4
The stories chosen or invented about the national past are also
invariably prescriptive-instructing people how they ought to
think and act as national subjects.
This orientation toward the future means that the process
of defming the collective voice of nations is never completed.
Various narratives of the nation, including its origins and the
paradigmatic events defining nationhood, like textbooks them-
selves, are always unfinished projects, requiring revision and
reinterpretation if they are to remain relevant in ever-changing
times. Such reinterpretation is essential, inevitable, and often
controversial. The Japanese experience particularly clearly illus-
trates the fact that rapidly changing societies must repeatedly
reassess practices (and textbook assessments of them) that only
decades earlier raised few eyebrows. Textbooks have been cen-
tral to contestation over the meaning of the Japanese nation for
over fifty years and they remain crucial for understanding the
larger debate.
Although the primary audience for national narratives in
general, and for textbooks in partiCUlar, is domestic, controversy
over them sometimes spills over into the international arena. The
connections are particularly sensitive when the subject is an
explicitly international event such as war, or when it involves the
treatment of racially, ethnically, or religiously distinctive social
groups who live both within and beyond national borders. Like
domestic conflicts, these international ones are fiercest when the
future is at stake. Precisely because Japanese relations with
minority peoples and neighboring nations are currently under
negotiation, Asians have stepped up their attention to Japanese
textbook treatments of the history of Japanese colonialism and
war in Asia.
Debates among Japanese over textbook narratives of the
nation have been especially sharp in part because Japanese have
disagreed so passionately among themselves about how to re-
member the recent past. Immediately after World War II both
Japanese and Americans defined textbooks as a central site of
the battle over Japan's future political orientation; they have
remained a powder keg ever since.
5
As Nozaki Yoshiko and
Inokuchi Hiromitsu point out in this issue, historian Ienaga
Saburo, who wrote part of the first postwar history text, has kept
textbook nationalism and government control of textbooks on
the public agenda for the last thirty-five years through a series of
constitutional challenges to textbook censorship. Many other
Japanese historians, social critics, and teachers have demanded
that textbooks present a more democratic vision of the relation-
ship of the citizen to the state and a more critical view of Japan's
Historian Ienaga Saburo, who wrote part of the first postwar history
text, has kept textbook nationalism and government control oftext-
books on the public agenda for the last thirty-five years through a
series of constitutional challenges to textbook censorship. (Professor
Ienaga Saburo at the university in the 19608. Photo courtesy of Inokuchi Hi-
romitsu and Nozaki Yoshiko.)
past international conduct. Foreigners soon added their voices to
the domestic debate.
One reason for the unusual level of international scrutiny
of Japanese texts is that the Occupation authorities made eradi-
cation of nationalism in textbooks a key policy, thereby interna-
tionalizing the issue and allowing Japanese critics of pre-surrender
dogma to join the debate from the start.
6
International controversy
also persists because Asian grievances have yet to be effectively
addressed. Despite several public apologies by Japanese prime
ministers in the 1990s, many Asians who suffered under Japa-
nese colonial rule believe that Japan has neither satisfactorily
apologized nor paid appropriate recompense for its wartime
behavior. Thus, Asians have monitored Japanese textbook treat-
ments of World War II at least since 1982 when press reports
revealed that the government had ordered Ienaga Saburo and
other authors to change the wording of their accounts of the war,
most famously by altering the term "invasion" of China to
"advance into" China.
The Japanese Government, stung by the intensity of Asian
official and popular criticism, has sought to implement damage
control and regain lost diplomatic ground. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs treats textbook controversies as an important
aspect of Japan's international relations. It staffs a large Tokyo
office, which prepares dual-language versions of widely used
Japanese textbooks, maintains a library of older textbooks, pro-
vides curriculum materials about Japan in languages such as
English, Chinese, Thai, and Malay, and fields questions from
overseas teachers who wish to develop their own curricula about
Japan. This is an unusual activity for diplomats; no other gov-
ernment sustains a textbook center of comparable scale and
scope.
7
Bulletin a/Concerned Asian Scholars 4
Indeed, textbook decisions in Japan are unique in having
generated far more sustained international conflict than in any
other case. The fiercest battles have concerned depictions of
World War II. Other nations experience comparable internation-
ally inflected fights over public policy and official commemora-
tion, but often the most public and contested bouts have been
waged over museum exhibits, war memorials, and other public art,
rather than textbooks. In the United States, the 1995 Smithsonian
Institution's Enola Gay exhibit, commemorating the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of World War II, produced far
more international controversy thanhas any American textbook
issue. Yet American textbook authors and historians disagree
vehemently among themselves on many issues such as the Viet-
nam War, the decision to drop the atomic bombs, and depictions
of race and gender relations and religion.
8
Similarly, public
monuments to the Holocaust in Poland, Germany, and Austria
have been far more bitterly contested, both locally and interna-
tionally, than have textbook descriptions of that event in those
countries.
9
Local institutions affect the site of controversy, too. The
intensity of Japanese textbook controversies is rooted in part in
the fact that the government has directly supervised and censored
textbooks since the late nineteenth century, creating a public
perception that textbooks are authoritative statements ofnational
policy and ideology. In the United States, where state review
boards determine adoptions in some states, and local school
boards, principals, or individual teachers choose books in others,
textbooks do not have the same close association with national
authority as in countries in which national agencies authorize texts
(as inJapan and Gennany) orin which govemmentofficialsactually
write them (as in China, Taiwan, and the Republic ofKorea). 10
We explore the effects of two kinds of change in the next
two sections and then end bynoting the increasing interconnec-
tions between foreign and domestic pressures. The first isglobal
realignments marlcing the end ofthe cold war. The new pressures
on cold-war-era nationalist narratives in Japan are similar to
those experienced elsewhere, especially in Gennany. Battles
over historical memory became international news so often in
the 1990s because internal and international relationships have
changed so rapidly, requiring reassessments of the idealized
nation and its boundaries nearly everywhere. Indeed, even the
lack ofovert international conflict in some places may well mean
a problem deferred rather than resolved, as we suggest regarding
both American and Chinese textbooks.
The second is domestic social change, particularly evident
in the rising aspirations of women and ethnic minorities. Social
movements demanding equality, compensatory benefits, and an
end to discriminatory practices have transfonned nationalist
narratives over the last frlly years in many parts of the globe. We
use the debate on Japan's wartime impressment of "comfort
women" to spotlight changing concepts of citizenship but, in all
places, whenever any group wins a larger measure ofcivic rights or
even themost basic recognition as human beings, accepted notions
ofthecitizenand/ornational subject areforced to change. As Nozaki
andInokuchi remind us, contestationisa crucial process of democ-
racyitself. In Japan, publicly acknowledging the human dignity
of the ex-comfort women constituted tacit criticism of wartime
leaders who saw nothing wrong with enslaving them. This
acknowledgement, in turn, forced reevaluation of the wartime
national narrative. Nevertheless, refusal by some to recognize
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
the humanity of these women and so the legitimacy of their
claims on the Japanese state risks a more visceral rejection ofthe
official narrative-and thus of Japanese authority today. This is
because the need for comfort women to sacrifice so much no
longer makes intuitive sense to younger generations ofJapanese,
particularly women. Furthermore, the insistence by fonner com-
fort women that they have been stigmatized for having engaged
in sexual relations (as well as having been forced into them)
constitutes a fundamental critique of the Confucian gender hierar-
chy, which many younger Japanese women have already ques-
tioned and rejected. In important ways, then, the standard vision
of Japanese nationalism of the early 1940s has lost authority.
Coming to terms with that huge social transfonnation is the heart
of the current controversy.
After the Cold War: Nationalism, Regionalism,
and War Memories Inthe 1990s
The end of the cold war and its bi-polar logic of global
organization has focused widespread attention on historical mem-
oryin the 1990s. The collapse of the cold war system opened up
possibilities for new political, economic, and security alignments
at the regional level in both Europe and Asia. The reunification
of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the uncon-
tested handover of Hong Kong to China all exemplify the shifts
that marked the end ofthe cold war system and that now require
a reconceptualization ofpast and present. Those realignments led
people everywhere to adapt national narratives to the new ar-
rangements-or at least to grapple with the implications of
competing versions.
The 1990s witnessed regional economic and political rein-
tegration across old cold war lines in both Europe and Asia. The
new regional configurations had important consequences. Small
nations and semi-sovereign states were able to command greater
international attention and exercise greater leverage than was
possible during the era of the two superpowers. Places once on
the frontlines ofthe cold war could now afford to act with greater
autonomy. This held true for clients ofthe United States, such as
Taiwan and South Korea, and for those of the Soviet Union,
notably Eastern Europe and Vietnam.
1I
The waning of the cold
war also created opportunities for domestic critics of authoritar-
ian regimes in many places, including Taiwan and South Korea,
to demand political concessions and more democratic practices.
By laying bare or even dismantling arrangements that had
been in place since the late 1940s, the collapse of cold war
structures and ideology also turned world attention to earlier
patterns. Suddenly old conflicts and antagonisms born of colo-
nialism and war-suppressed but not forgotten-took on new
urgency. This was particularly pertinent for the fonner Axis
powers, which brought to international negotiations both the
long-neglected baggage they had accumulated during World War
II and that of the cold war.
As Germany and Japan moved out from under decades of
political subordination to the United States (or, in the case ofEast
Germany, to the Soviet Union), they lost the protection they had
enjoyed from accepting full responsibility for their wartime acts.
Grievances once swept under the rug by expensive American
brooms in the name of anti-communist unity were exposed to
public view.
The ebbing of cold war tensions and the expansion of
international economic and cultural contacts meant that countries
5
(
once on the other side of the barricades, notably the People's Japan is not alone in this predicament. Particularly since the
Republic of China, could exert greater pressure on Japan to collapse ofthe Soviet Union, other Axis powers have been forced
reflect on its wartime behavior. This new bargaining power may to reflect on and apologize for their wartime behavior. Japan,
grow far stronger in the future. To date, competition for international Austria, and Germany have had to confront their wartime rela-
recognition between the People's Republic ofChina (PRC) and the tions with other nations as a precondition for negotiating a
Republic of China (Taiwan), and between North and South common future. (By 1997, Germany had provided $58 billion in
Korea, still shields Japan from Chinese and Korean demands for reparations to wartime victims.) Officials of these nations have
compensation as each claimant to the mantle of the divided struggled over how far to go: at times leaning toward forthright
nation bids for Japanese investment, loans, aid, and trade. Should apology and substantial compensation to the victims of wartime
the PRC and Taiwan reach a political accommodation to match atrocities, and at others, approaching victims with begrudging
their rapidly expanding economic and cultural interchange, they apologies, evasion of official responsibility, and minimal com-
could well muster the joint power to extract reparations from pensation.
13
Japan for the fifteen-year invasion that took tens of millions of Indeed, honest assessments of the war years have crossed
Chinese lives. The same logic could apply on a smaller scale to old battle lines. Victors and neutral parties have also had to
a unified Korea. re-examine their official narratives and conduct. Most of the
In short, during the 1990s, Asians gained new leverage to participants have moved away from their own wartime classifi-
insist on a recognition oftheir perspectives in Japanese historical cation of some of their own citizens as unworthy of legal protec-
narratives. That leverage extends beyond official government tion. In 1997, France, Switzerland, the French Catholic Church,
efforts. Victims of Japanese atrocities told their painful stories and the Red Cross all apologized for their complicity in the mass
publicly to sympathetic compatriots and to national and interna- killing of Europe's Jews, after historians and journalists publi-
tional media. Women's movements and champions of minority cized information on their wartime stances. Vocal critics de-
rights, often working with Japanese and international women's manded a narrative that acknowledged ubiquitous European
organizations, took up their causes. Meanwhile, NGOs and in- anti-Semitism in order to pave the way for a less bigoted common
ternational organizations, including the United Nations Com- European future. 14
mission on Human Rights, conducted their own investigations Similar shifts in official stories of patriotism and power
and helped individuals prepare legal and diplomatic cases for during World War II occurred in North America. A few years
apology and restitution. 12 And, as Kimijima Kazuhiko suggests earlier, the federal governments of the United States and Canada
in his report (in this issue) on Japanese and South Korean both apologized and began compensating Americans and Cana-
educators' discussions of Japan's colonial past, future interna- dians of Japanese ancestry, who were deprived of their land and
tional integration is likely to require that Japanese not only accept liberty during World War II. These policy decisions were the
demands for apology and compensation, but also revision oftheir result of successful political campaigns by Japanese-Americans
nation's imperial past. and Japanese-Canadians that had already contributed to a sea
change in public opinion regarding race, citizen-
ship, and national honor in both countries. In
contrast to the Axis powers, however, the Allied
nations have not faced comparable pressures to
re-examine their overseas actions during World
War II, although international criticism of the
atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is
Rewriting textbooks means the strongest counter-example. 15
changing the defmition of the
Germans have fought over memories of the
good Gennan citizen and hislher
war as bitterly as have Japanese, but they have
relation to the state as well as to
moved further toward creating a new vision of
the European community. Ger-
their future and thus a coherently revised story of
many's new place in a united
their past. Once it committed to a post-cold war
Europe is not defmitively re-
international strategy of regional integration in
solved, but more of the institu-
tional and narrative elements of
the European Union, Germany would adopt anew
accommodation are in place internationalist narrative appropriate to that strat-
there than they are in Japan and egy, one that appears in government statements
in the Asia-Pacific region. As Pe-
as well as in textbooks. As Yasemin Soy sal shows
ter Katzenstein puts it, 'The Ger-
here, Germans have created a postwar narrative
manization of Europe is
ofa nation without enemies. They have done this,
indissolubly linked to the
not by concealing the history of Nazism and the
Europeanization of Gennany."
Second World War, but by accepting the need to
Ibis is one important reason
publicize and critically assess that history both
why political integration has de-
domestically and internationally, in orderto make
veloped so much more in the
European Union than in Asia.
a clean break with the Nazi legacy. One official
(European Unity tree. Source: Soysal interviewed made the links between those
Geschicte. vol. 4 [Munich: Bayeris- two changes very clear: "You cannot preach a
cher Schulbuchverlag, 1986]. p. 202.)
European Union and at the same time continue to
Bulletin o/Concerned Asian Scholars 6
produce textbooks with all the national prejudices of the nine-
teenth century." Rewriting textbooks means changing the defi-
nition of the good German citizen and histher relation to the state
as well as to the European community. Germany's new place in
a united Europe is not definitively resolved, but more of the
institutional and narrative elements of accommodation are in
place there than they are in the Asia-Pacific region. As Peter
Katzenstein puts it, "The Germanization of Europe is indissol-
ubly linked to the Europeanization of Germany.,,16
German leaders have adopted a "tamed" national identity
that celebrates both regional diversity within Germany and inte-
gration within the European union. This new narrative, while still
contested, is being institutionalized in various ways. In the realm
of textbooks, German officials participate in a cross-national
discussion process sponsored by UNESCO and other interna-
tional organizations to develop common European Union text-
books. German texts now shazply downplay nationalist in favor
of internationalist themes. This practice, which creates a shared
regional narrative on such contentious issues as the two world
wars, Nazism, and colonialism, has helped diminish the antago-
nisms of Europeans toward Germans and create a foundation for
the European Union. 17
Japanese leaders have had far more difficulty settling on a
post-cold war vision of Japan's place in the world. There are no
easy solutions, and all the possible ones require both adjusting
to demands made by foreigners and directly confronting Japa-
nese actions in World War II. Unlike in Germany there is no
consensus in favor of regional intetrations in Japan. Frustration
with those requirements helps explain much of the intensity of
the Japanese debate, not just over imagining the future but also
on remembering the past.
The old cold war system established in the 1950s channelled
nearly all Asian political, economic, and strategic relations through
bilateral relationships with the United States. American aid and
trade systems served as a hub through which most Asian nations
interacted with each other-or were forbidden to do so. For
Japan, the central aspect ofthat sy stem was subordination to U. S.
policy and power as a strategic foundation for economic growth.
In the first decades of the cold war era, the United States was by
far the most important Asian economic power. In the last two
decades, however, economic growth and intra-regional eco-
nomic links in East and Southeast Asia have shifted that power
balance. Trade, investment, finance, and technology transfers
within the Asian region have transformed East Asia from a minor
outpost of the world economy, with 4 percent of world GNP in
1960, to a region comparable in importance to Europe and North
America, each with 30 percent of world GNP. Asia, moreover,
has grown far more rapidly than other regions. 18 The magnitude
of that change alone means that the United States, although still
important, is no longer the epicenter of Asian economic power.
Despite a deeply felt sense in Japan that the cold war
enforced a humiliating subordination to the United States long
after the occupation ended, the passing of that era has hardly
satisfied nationalist yearnings for a leading Japanese role in
international affairs. Many Japanese expressed shock during the
Persian Gulf War when Americans derided Japan's enormous
$13 billion contribution to the U.S.-led effort against Iraq be-
cause Japan (whose constitution prohibits war making) did not
also send soldiers. The leading figure in the textbook contro-
versy, Fujioka Nobukatsu, has said that this humiliating experi-
ence transformed his worldview and political orientation. He has
tapped into a sense shared by many Japanese that they were
cheated by history: for all the great changes in international
relations over the last hundred years, the one constant Fujioka
and many other Japanese see is widespread mistrust of Japan. 19
Some Japanese have explored Asian regionalism and an
appropriate companion narrative defining Japan's place in Asia
to the U.S. alliance. In many ways, Asian regionalism, whether
established along the lines of the European Union or as a looser
organization, would address Japanese dissatisfaction with the
cold war system. Other Asians have called for stronger regional
integration as well. The requests by Malaysia's Mahathir Mo-
hamad and Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew for a commitment to
"Asian values" and for an East Asian Economic Caucus to serve
as a unified Asian regional voice, independent of the United
States, are important examples.
Any such move to regionalism would also require Japanese
re-evaluation of their behavior in Asia during World War II.
Indeed, the Japanese have made some public gestures compara-
ble to the German ones. The 1 990s witnessed an unprecedented
level of openness in Japanese discussion of the war, including
wide press coverage of such Asian grievances as the comfort
women, the Nanjing massacre, and the grisly experiments of
biowar Unit 731. In the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and
particularly after the December 1989 death of the Showa Em-
peror, Japanese produced huge amounts of testimony, books,
documentary films, and archival research on previously sup-
pressed or ignored aspects of the war.
20
Politicians too began
rethinking the lessons of the war when in 1993 the conservative
Liberal Democratic Party lost the exclusive control of the gov-
ernment it had held since the early postwar years. Previously,
conservative politicians, who built their careers on accepting
Japanese subordination within the U.S. alliance, had derided
concern for Asian anger at the past as the preserve of socialist
dreamers.
Yet, these efforts have been checkmated by countervailing
ones. Beginning in 1993 government leaders took significant
steps toward apology and restitution to some wartime victims,
but they also hedged and prevaricated. They explicitly rejected
the UNESCO model of government-to-government negotiation
over textbook content used by Germany and Poland, for exam-
ple. Moreover, Japanese compensation to victims of its wartime
rule was, through 1997, only a tiny fraction of that provided by
Germany to its victims. Few Japanese politicians have been
willing to stake out clear new positions on the Pacific War and
colonialism for fear of losing the most passionately nationalist
segments of their constituency. Dissension among Japanese thus
translated into political stalemate.
Asian regionalism poses huge contemporary problems for
Japan as well. In contrast to Europe, integration has not meant
institutional unification, security alliance, orpolitical union. This
is in part the continuing legacy of the cold war in Asia, most
clearly symbolized by the divisions into two Chinas and two
Koreas. But other factors are equally decisive. Social as well as
geographic distances are far greater in Asia than in Europe.
Europeans can travel freely and work anywhere in the Union,
they can entrust governance issues to a European Parliament, and
plans are moving quickly toward a common currency. That level of
institutional cooperation is not even on the horizon for Asia despite
eased cold war tensions and substantial economic integration.
VoL 30, No.2 (1998) 7
Despite economic growth throughout East and Southeast
Asia, economic inequality is still enonnous within the region.
Japan enjoys two-thirds of Asia's GNP and the distance between
rich and poor nations is vastly greater in Asia than in Europe.
That disparity is a powerlul disincentive to regional integration.
Japanese and other prosperous Asians are uneasy at the prospect
that Chinese or Vietnamese workers-with incomes less than
one-tenth their own-could move freely through the region. The
decision to preserve barriers to the flow of labor after Hong Kong
reverted to China in 1997 is indicative of the divisions that
continue to undergird the emerging Asian regional economy.
Japan would have to share leadership ofan integrated Asian
region with China. Neither the Japanese nor the Chinese govern-
ments have been willing to make this commitment. German
government and business leaders support European integration
partly because they expect to dominate within it. Neither Japa-
nese nor Chinese can anticipate wielding comparable political
leadership in Asia and each fears domination by the other.
Economically, too, Japanese- and Chinese-centered business
networks have competed to build and connect the Asian econo-
mies. Mutual suspicion between Japan and China helps explain
why Asian regionalism has not emerged, despite much talk about
it.
Instead, Japanese are still working within a modified ver-
sion of the old u.S.-centered Pacific alliance, despite its dimin-
ished value to them. The 1997 U.S.-Japan security agreement
reaffinned the cold war alliance by extending the scope of joint
military exercises, targeting China as the most dangerous enemy,
and thus undercutting possibilities for regional alliance in Asia.
The United States continues to be a major market, investor, and
economic arbiter for Asia, as demonstrated in the collapse of the
South Korean, Indonesian, and Thai currencies in December
1997. Nonetheless, in the newer Pacific alliance, the United
States can no longer fully protect Japan from Asian criticism nor
do Japanese value that protection as much as they once did. Many
Japanese are uncomfortably aware of the need for both a new
strategy and anew narrative of their international future, but they
are uncertain as to what fonn these should take.
21
The United States and China, in sharp contrast to Gennany
and Japan, have never revisited their triwnphal official narratives
of World War II. National narratives in both countries, as ex-
pressed in textbooks and official statements, reiterate official
assessments at the moment of victory: the Second World War for
both nations remains a moment of triumphal national unity in a
just cause. Moreover, neither Americans nor Chinese have had
to confront international challenges to their celebratory national
narratives. Nor has either articulated a clear vision of an interna-
tional strategy in the 1990s to replace the bipolar divisions of the
cold war.
Chinese and Americans have modified their victory stories
to recognize the contributions of domestic groups omitted from
earlier heroic narratives. In the United States this involved not
only representing the efforts of African-Americans and Japa-
nese-Americans, but also apologizing for their treatment as
second-class citizens during the war. Those changes responded
to demands for inclusion by domestic critics and, as Frances
FitzGerald and others have documented, one of the major sites
of those battles over American citizenship was textbook con-
tent.
22
In China, the revisions have been less dramatic, but have
resulted in a re-evaluation of the roles of both the Guomindang
and minority nationalities in the resistance.
Chinese commitment to their story of anti -Japanese resis-
tance as the founding impulse of the new nation has implications
for the regional future as does Japanese recalcitrance on the war.
Chinese officials continue to portray Japanese as monolithically
unrepentant about the war, appropriately taking note ofultra-na-
tionalist pronouncements but ignoring the sharp debate over war
responsibility and war crimes that has been taking place in Japan.
PRC leaders have a strong stake in their vision of an ultranation-
alist and unrepentant Japan; it allows them to reenact-in text-
books and elsewhere-the great victory that originally legiti-
mized their rule. 23 They must imagine a shared future with Japan
before they will be willing to recognize the possibility of Japa-
nese repentance-a transfonnation not yet at hand.
Because textbooks define and disseminate national narra-
tives, controversies over their content signal the existence and
The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented level of openness in Japanese discussion ofthe war, including wide press coverage of such
Asian grievances as the comfort women, the Nanjing massacre, and the grisly experiments of biowar Unit 731. (Headquarters ofUnit
731. Source: Truth in Textbooks. Freedom In EducatIOn and Peace for Children: The Struggle against Censorship ofSchool Textbooks in Japan [To-
kyo: National League for Support of the School Textbook Screening Suit, 1995], p. 2).
thenatureofcontemporaryassumptionsaboutinternationalre-
alignment. They presentvariouscompetingmodelsfornation-
hoodinnewly imaginedcommunities,beitaunifiedGennany
subordinatedtoEurope,theUnitedStatesastheWorld'sPolice-
man,Chinainequallyrighteousisolation,orJapanincontinued
juniorpartnershiptoAmerica,orleaderoftheAsianregion,or,
perhaps,partofamutuallyrespectfulAsia-Pacific.
CitizenshipandHistory
In JapaneseTextbookControvenies
In 1997 two ofJapan's top ten bestsellers were Fujioka
Nobukatsu's edited books, Japanese History Not Taught in
School Texts, volumes 1and2. Chargingthatcurrenttextbooks
demean the nation, Fujioka and his colleagues demand more
positiveviewsofJapanesehistoryandsociety,particularlywith
respect to treatments ofWorld War II. In July 1996, Fujioka
organized a small group ofpublic figures and intellectuals,
notably Nishio Kanji, a specialist on Gennany and author of
books onNietzsche, Gennaneducation, andthe guest worker
policy, and Hata Ikuhiko, a prominent military historian of
modernJapan,intheJiyushugi shikan kenkyukai (LiberalView
ofHistoryGroup).Thegroupaimedtoeliminatefromtextbooks
allcriticismofofficialJapanesepolicyandactions. Sixmonths
later,respondingtocriticismsthattheirmovementwasentirely
negative,theyorganizedtheAtarashii rekishi kyokasho 0 tsukuru
kai towritetheirowntextbook.Althoughaliteraltranslationof
thiswouldbeCommitteeto WriteNewHistoryTextbooks,the
official English name is the Japanese Institute for Orthodox
HistoryEducation,(hereafterOrthodoxHistoryGroUp).24
Themovementmay beunderstoodasadefensivereaction
to several actions: apologies in the 1990s by several prime
ministers for Japan's war crimes and atrocities; government
attempts to establish a "private" fund to compensate former
comfort women; and official approval ofbriefmention ofthe
comfortwomeninjuniorhighschooltexts.Moregenerally,itis
arejectionofthemassivesocialdistanceJapanhastravelledover
thelastfiftyyears,particularly inattitudestowardthedutiesof
national subjects and women's seXUality. Those changes were
dramatizedforall Japaneseby thereflectionsonrecenthistory
promptedby the deathofthe ShowaEmperorin 1989 andthe
fifty-yearcommemorationsofWorldWarII in 1990-1995. The
OrthodoxHistory Groupbitterly rejected any needforofficial
acknowledgment ofJapanese wartime atrocities, let alone for
apology or reparations. Distinctive features ofthe campaign
include intense expressions ofresentment about Japan's low
prestigeintheworld,insistencethatanyexpressionofalienation
from thestateby Japanese is asignofpsychologicalsickness,
and afocusontextbooks as acriticalbattlegroundforcreating
the new Japan. Fujioka baldly states that educational goals
shouldbedefmedby theneedsof thestateandthatif"Japanese
arenotproudoftheirowncountry,theywillnotberespectedin
theworld."2.5
ThecontentoftheOrthodoxHistoryGroup'scriticismof
textbooksishardlynew. Themostwidelyreadof theirworksare
Fujioka'sthree editedvolumescomposedofshortarticlesfJrst
serializedinthebusinessdailySankei Shinbun andthenpublish-
edby Sankei Press. These coversuch topics as (1) nineteenth
centuryheros,Meijipolitics,andstateformation;(2)thecomfort
womenandwartime"incidents"suchastheNanjingmassacre;
(3)thepostwarConstitution,theAlliedOccupation,Japan-U.S.
Vol. 30,No.2(1998)
DESCRIPTIONOFUNIT731
An example oftextbook-screening concerning Unit 731:
Descriptionin thetextbookmanuscript
Aunit specializing inbacteriologicalwarfare calledthe 731st
UnitwasstationedontheoutskirtsofHarbin[China] andWltil
the Soviet Union entered the war, this unit engaged in such
atrociousactsasmurderingseveralthousandChineseandother
non-Japaneseby usingtheminbiologicalexperiments.
Screeningexaminer'scomment(suggestedrevision)
Deleteentirepassage.Nocrediblescholarlyresearchexistscon-
cerningUnit731.It is still premature,therefore,to takeupthis
matterinaschooltextbook.
ProfessorlenagaSaburo'sassertion
ThehistoricalfactsconcerningUnit731 havebeen collaborated
byinnumerablerecordsand docwnents.Bydemandingthedele-
tion ofthis passage the government is 1Iying to conceal, in
academicstudies,thetruthaboutcriminal activities.
Oukomeofthescreening
Thetextbookwasapprovedafter allreferencesto Unit731 were
deleted
Source: Truth in Textbooks, Freedom in Education andPeace for Chil-
dren: The Struggle against Censorship of School Textbooks in Japan
(Tokyo: NationalLeaguefor SupportoftheSchoolTextbookScreening
Suit, 1995),p. 13.
relations and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials; and (4) postwar
economicgrowth.Inshort,theyrecapitulatethegreatscholarly-
political debates ofthe last fifty years: was there something
fundamentally wrong with the Meiji-era state-formation that
explainsthedisasterofWorldWarII?didtheJapanesemilitary
behaveabominablyinAsiaduringthewarand, ifso,why?was
postwarreconstruction and democratization the creature ofan
alienneo-colonialUnitedStates?andwhatarethelargerimpli-
cations ofpostwarhigh-speed economic growth? The articles
presenttheMeijileadersasheros,findnothingreprehensiblein
Japan's wartime behavior, hold that Japan has been unfairly
singledoutforcriticism,andfeel thattheOccupationmeddled
withtoomany elementsofJapanesesociety,leadingtomostof
the problems Japan faces today. They reiterate, in short, the
oft-repeatedlitany ofJapaneserightwingnationalism. Yetthey
have succeeded in attracting public attention to theirmessage
boththroughitscontent,as GavanMcCormackargues, andits
fonn,asAaronGerowsuggests.
TheOrthodoxHistoryGroupattemptstocontrolthedebate
by defmingitasonewithonly twopointsofview: the"Tokyo
Trialsviewof history,"whichblamesJapanforallaspectsof the
Pacific War and glorifies the victor, and a"Japaneseperspec-
tive,"whichtakesprideinthenationandtheJapanesestate.The
membersrejectthepossibilitythatany Japanesecouldadoptan
alternativeperspective,forexample,onebasedonhumanistor
internationalistprinciples. SuchperspectivesonthewartimeJapa-
nesestatearelikelytobedamning,asFujiokatacitlyacknowledges,
when he argues that incorporating information about wartime
9
Japanese atrocities in textbooks will "destroy a ~ a n as a state for
the twenty-first century. This is the real battle." 6
The intensity of emotion, the blurring of the difference
between the psychological and the sociological, and the frenzied
style of debate represented by Fujioka in particular are all new.
Fujioka rejects the prevailing codes of academic discussion in
Japan. He has an extremely aggressive debating style (and a very
loud voice) and revels in the use of passionate, inflammatory
language, exemplified in his critique of"Japan-hating Japanese,"
whose views of their own history amount to "masochism" and
"mind-control." Fujioka dismisses Japanese criticism ofwartime
policy and praxis as "self-flagellation" (jigyaku), that is, not just
psychological sickness but also treason.27 Fujioka and the others
in the group seem to deliberately rej ect traditional standards of
argument (verifiable documentation, logical consistency, moral
coherence, etc.) because they know perfectly well they cannot
win ifthey accept those as the standards on which their ideas will
be judged.
This approach is highly unusual in Japanese academe,
where a logical argument, calm demeanor, and well-developed
codes of civility are prized above dramatic presentation. Many
academics, such as historian Nakamura Masanori, fmd Fujioka's
emotionalism not only vulgar and distasteful but potentially
dangerous. His assessment cuts directly to the heart ofthe subj ect
they debate-if, as Nakamura and many others believe, Japan
threw itself into World War II by following an aggressive and
emotional logic, unsupported by rational calculation ofrisk, Fujioka's
appeals to passion can only replicate the same tragic pattern.
28
The Orthodox History Group is innovative in its use of
popular media and its appreciation of the power of spectacle to
distract people from the content of the discussion, as Aaron
Gerow observes. Drawing on an analysis of film and literary
forms, particularly the melodrama, Gerow examines the packag-
ing of Japanese history by the Orthodox History Group as a
means of attracting a wide audience. Fujioka's most dangerous
move (entirely intended) is then to turn the debate into a spectacle
in which emotion rather than verifiability and reason rule. At one
level, this invokes contemporary postmodem theories that knowl-
edge is always situated and SUbjective. At the same time, it echoes
the "thinking" of the ultranationalist assassins of the 1930s. The
real threat posed by the Orthodox History Group is that it may
succeed in legitimizing this kind of frenzied, emotional attack
and intimidate those who would question ultra-nationalist ortho-
doxy. Members of the g roup are unlikely to prevail on the
specific points they debate since more careful scholars will
inevitably disprove most oftheir assertions (indeed, already have
done so). Yet if mastery of spectacle is to be the battlefield, the
careful fact-based rebuttals prepared by scholars such as Nakamura
and Kimijima are unlikely to speak to the emotions whipped up by
the over-the-top rhetoric of Fujioka, Nishio, and their colleagues.
Thoughtful analysis ofthe issue that the Orthodox History
Group singles out for attention-the military comfort women-
hows that this rejection of reasoned debate is essential to their
refusal to consider any criticism of official Japanese treatment
of individuals. The Group reserves special venom for textbook
acknowledgment of the system of institutionalized rape and
military sexual slave labor established during the Asia-Pacific
War and euphemistically called the "comfort woman" system.
Until the 1990s, there was official silence on this subject. Since
the first few elderly Korean and Filipina women bravely came
forward in 1991 and 1992 to testify about their personal experi-
ences as slaves, the Japanese government has been forced, little-
by-little, to acknowledge that the wartime government was the
chief architect of their misery. 29
In 1996 the government permitted textbook writers to add
one or two bland sentences noting the existence of the military
comfort women to middle-school social studies textbooks. One
text reads: "Many young Korean women and others were sent to
the frontlines as 'comfort women.'" Another states that "there
were also some women from Korea and Taiwan and other places
who were made to work in battlefront comfort facilities."30
Critics sympathetic to the comfort women have censured these
descriptions as inadequate for their failure to discuss, still less
condemn, the system. But the Orthodox History Group decried
even these modest mentions of the comfort women as a danger-
ous precedent likely to weaken Japan morally and politically. The
Orthodox History Group asserts, in the face of abundant contra-
dictory evidence, the original Japanese government position that
the comfort women were ordinary licensed prostitutes who were
paid for their services and that their conditions ofwork were not
so different from those encountered by Japanese prostitutes at
home. Thus, although controversies over textbook depictions of
Japanese wartime atrocities have erupted many times before, the
current flashpoint is new.
We argue that the Orthodox History Group is right to treat
discussion of the military comfon: women as a crucial issue in
defining Japanese nationalism and citizenship. This sordid story,
more than most, is central to current textbook controversies
because the treatment of these women, if actually discussed in
classrooms or in society, forces citizens of all ages to reexamine
their own relationship to the state, gender relations among citi-
zens, and relations between Japan and Asia. It falsifies precisely
the assumptions that the Orthodox History Group strives to
protect: the identity of interests between Japanese citizens and
the state (both in the 1 940s and since) and the claim that there is
nothing to criticize in wartime Japan's treatment of others. Care-
ful attention to stories of the comfort women undermines the
celebratory narrative oftwentieth-century Japan in important ways.
The misery of the military comfort women was ignored at
the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Later, in a revealing exception,
Japanese who had been stationed in the Netherlands East Indies
were charged in B and C Class tribunals with interning Dutch
women in "comfort stations," but not for impressing the many
Javanese and Sumatran women who labored there as well. Rather
than exemplifying "victor's justice," the experience of the com-
fort women suggests that the War Crimes Trials may have been
insuffiCiently harsh in their treatment of some Japanese crimes.
Far from preventing Japan from taking its rightful place at the
head of the Asian table, the "Tokyo Trials view of history" has
not only protected Japan from facing these long-standing Asian
grievances but has also implicated Japan in a global racial
hierarchy that considered the suffering of dark-skinned people
less important than that of light-skinned ones.
31
The legacy of their wartime rampage still colors Japanese
relations with all ofAsia, but the story ofthe comfort women has
particular resonance in Korea Korean women may have ac-
counted for as much as 80 percent: of the estimated one hundred
to two hundred thousand wartime comfort women. Their legal
status as colonial subjects of Japan, and (until 1952) as Japanese
citizens rather than enemy nationals, is one reason why this fact
Bull/!M ofConcemed Aaian Scholars 10
is such an emotionally charged issue for Koreans. Japanese
military planners saw Koreans as ideal candidates for sexual
slavery precisely because they thought of them as both half-as-
similated and racially inferior. They assumed that unmarried
Korean women would be free of venereal disease because of the
Confucian emphasis on female chastity. Since the Japanese
colonial masters had forced Korean schools to teach only in the
Japanese language, they knew that most Korean women would
be able to understand orders given in Japanese. Japanese leaders
thought that, as colonial subjects, Koreans owed allegiance to the
emperor and also that, unlike foreigners, harsh treatment of them
was not covered by international law. Koreans clearly ranked below
Japanese in the comfort women hierarchy; Japanese women were
reserved for officers.
32
The story of the comfort women thus raises the issue of
Japanese racism toward other Asians, with clear implications for
Asians resident in Japan today, including Okinawans, Ainu,
Burakumin, Koreans, and Chinese. All these groups have endured
a long history offorced assimilation into Japanese society (although
in interestingly different ways) accompanied by racist differentia-
tion. Ethnic solidarity movements have emerged among all these
groups, and they are likely to draw comparisons between Japa-
nese discriminatory attitudes toward the comfort women and
toward themselves. 33
Reflection on the experience of the comfort women also
calls attention to the fact that hundreds of thousands of Japanese
soldiers participated in their torment. Unlike some other recently
publicized stories, such as those of the secret Unit 731 which
conducted "medical" experiments on human victims, or the
Nanjing massacre, which involved one particular Army unit, the
entire military was implicated in the exploitation of the comfort
women. Most attention has focused on the issue of recruitment,
particularly on whether women and young girls had agreed to be
prostitutes or were kidnapped or deceived. But the military's
strategies for keeping the comfort women at their posts is at least
as revealing as are the recruitment practices, which varied.
Women who tried to escape were brutally punished, often tor-
tured, and sometimes murdered.
Nor does the assertion hold that all armies acted with equal
violence toward women. The Allied forces also encouraged and
regulated prostitution on a large scale, but they did not system-
atically enslave women for this purpose. Chinese Communist
forces during the anti -Japanese resistance not only did not en-
courage or support prostitution, but acted vigorously to curb it.
Guomindang forces also seem not to have established systems
of military prostitution, perhaps because the private sector in the
areas under their control provided sufficient services. The Japa-
nese military was not alone in organizing and maintaining pros-
titution in order to keep the morale of soldiers up and the
incidence of venereal disease down, but the Japanese govern-
ment stood out for its systematic brutality. The military comfort
woman system was part of the larger story of quotidian abuse of
Asians by the Japanese military and, as such, it was widely accepted
by the Japanese population in general and by millions of men in
uniform who took advantage of the women's services.34
Finally, the comfort women's story undermines the nation-
alist claim that the interests of the state are identical with those
of its citizens, especially Japan's female citizens. The Orthodox
History Group argues, in startlingly contemptuous language, the
now-abandoned Japanese government position that the comfort
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
women were ordinary prostitutes who were paid for their serv-
ices like prostitutes serving other armies. The Group insists
further that the conditions of work for the comfort women, albeit
primitive, closely resembled legal prostitution at home. The
problem for proponents ofthis view is that the last point contains
important elements of truth. Prewar Japanese women were fre-
quently sold into sexual servitude by their impoverished fami-
lies-and those transactions were enforced by state power. Their
working conditions were frequently based on coercion, debt-pe-
onage, wretched physical circumstances, and the general social
and legal assumption that sexual servitude is both a natural and
an appropriate service that women owe men. Like the comfort
women, many endured lifelong stigmatization because of this
labor. War and racism meant that Asian comfort women endured
even more onerous conditions than Japanese prostitutes, but the
commonality of their experience is hard to ignore-and has been
highlighted by Japanese feminists.
Careful attention to the comfort women thus undercuts
ultra-nationalist assertions about the national subject, the state,
and the proper relationship between them. When the Japanese
government allowed mention of the comfort women in text-
books, even though limited to just two short lines, it undermined
the heroic narrative of the war and potentially institutionalized a
dissenting voice. Japanese textbooks, as is true in most countries,
are written in a single, omniscient voice. Breaks in that voice are
few and far between; they usually reflect deep social and political
divisions when they appear. In this case, the very mention of the
comfort women leads the reader to consider two separate dual
perspectives: Japanese vs. colonial subject and (male) soldiervs.
comfort woman. It reminds Japanese that their national borders
not long ago included Koreans, Taiwanese, and other colonized
people who were treated as racially inferior, and that many
residents of those regions remain angry half a century after the
end of colonial rule. It also reminds readers that some wartime
atrocities were committed by ordinary Japanese and cannot be
blamed on a few long-dead generals, prime ministers, or an
emperor. The comfort woman saga evokes the rigid gender
hierarchy and sexual double standard of pre-surrender Japan in
which women's happiness and health were routinely sacrificed
for men. Thus, both as colonial subjects and as women, the
appearance ofcomfort women in Japanese textbooks disrupts the
dominant narrative ofone hundred million hearts beating as one.
This is why nationalists who want Japanese to unquestion-
ingly identify their own interests with those of the state are so
upset by this brief mention of comfort women in school texts.
Nonetheless, the bland references to comfort women or to the
Nanjing massacre in school texts will not alter the celebratory
narrative of the national patrimony unless they are actively
discussed in schools and society. Teaching the contested past is
no easy task even for teachers who have worked out their own
stance toward it, as Kimijima thoughtfully explains in his article
below.
International Citizenship in the Global Village
Mention of the comfort women in officially sanctioned
textbooks represents a breakthrough in another way as well. That
breakthrough came about as a direct response to foreign as well
as domestic critics of Japan's war. It not only implies official
recognition that the charges of Japanese atrocities are true, but
also implicitly institutionalizes a dialogue with the Asian region.
11
Moreover, thedialogueoverthecomfortwomenisasmuchor
morewith groupsadvocatingcontemporary women's andfor-
eignworkers'rightsasitiswithAsiangovernments,sincesocial
activistsdenouncedbothwartimeandpostwarcoerciveprosti-
tutionofAsianwomenfarearlierandmorepowerfullythandid
government officials.
35
Norma Field points out that dialogue
constitutesoneofthetwocomponentsofasuccessfulapology,
alongwithactsconvincingly demonstratingremorse. An apol-
ogyassumesavisionof acommunitybeyondthatdefinedbythe
nationandatleastanimplicitpledgetoworktowardthatvision.
"Apologiesaremadeto thevictimsofpastwrongdoingbut/or
thesharedpresentofvictimsandapologizers,"Fieldwrites,"and
mostofall,forthesakeofacommonfuture.,,36
Thisvisionofasharedfutureis,ofcourse,preciselywhat
theOrthodoxHistory Grouprejectswhenitsproponents argue
that textbooks are for domestic consumption only, that each
nationhasandmusthaveitsowndistinctive,evenbiased,views,
andthatJapaneseoughtnotheedwhatothersthink.Atstakeis
whethertheJapanesestateshouldseemproperlyimperviousor
properlysensitivetoforeigncriticism.
JapanesewhowishonlytocelebrateJapanesenationalism
haveresortedtoaworldviewthattakesasitsthemeopposition
toarrogantWestern(neo)imperialism.Inthatcontext,national-
ist defiance both speaksto a widespread sense ofresentment
within Japan and has a certain contemporary logic, based on
Japan'sfiftyyearsofsubordinationtotheUnitedStates. Onthe
otherhand, nationalists do notwant to encourage nationalism
elsewhereinAsiaorto lookclosely at thehistory ofJapanese
imperialism. Thestrategy, mostrecently articulatedby theOr-
thodoxHistory Group,has beento rely onavisionofJapan's
tiestotheoutsideworldthatemphasizesthebilateralU.S.-Japan
relationship-boththewartimeanimositybetweenJapaneseand
Americans and the postwar alliance. That stance allows the
Group to paint Japan as perennially beleaguered, defensively
protectingthenationalessencefromforeignattack.(Eventhisis
askewedportrayal,giventhemany waystheallianceprotected
Japan during the cold war.) However, it locks Japanese into
wilful ignoranceabouttheirtreatmentofothersduringthePa-
cificWarand,morecrucially,itpaintsallcriticism-internalas
wellasexternal-ofJapaneseactionsasanattackonthenation
itselfandsothwartsanytransnationalvisionofthefuture.
Japanesewho seekwaysto integratetheirnationintothe
fast-changinginternationalworldmustultimately acceptadia-
loguewithAsians abouttheirshared past. Moreover, thatdia-
logue will have to extend beyond government officials. The
SouthKoreangovernment, whosefounding membersincluded
many collaboratorswithJapaneseimperialism,haslittledesire
to discuss that past. From the 1960s to the 1990s the Seoul
government repeatedly statedthatitwouldmakenoclaimson
Japanfor monetary restitution. However, individuals andnon-
governmentalorganizations(NGOs)basedinSouthKoreathink
differently. Notonlyhavethey pressuredJapanforreparations
inthe1990s,theyhavealsodemandedthattheirowngovernment
insistonaJapaneseapologyandreparations.ActivistsinChina,
Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and elsewhere
havemadesimilardemandsontheirgovernments.
Thegrowinginfluenceoftheserestitutionmovementsand
amorehuman-rights-basedconceptofinternationalcitizenship
hasbeenfacilitated by the end ofthecoldwar. Americancold
warriorsinsistedfordecadesthattheirAsian allies andclients
not only mute official demands for restitution from Japan in
exchangeforU.S. economic assistance, butalsothatthey sup-
press private attempts to claim restitution. For example, the
AssociationofVictimsofthePacific WarinSouthKoreawas
foundedin1973,butitsdemandsforrestitutionfromJapanwere
suppressedbytheKoreanCentralIntelligenceAgencyuntilthelate
1980s,whenneithertheUnitedStatesnortheKoreangovernment
couldusethecoldwarasanexcusetovetodemocraticrights.
37
Theseeffortstowardrestitutionhavemany Japanesesup-
porterstoo, someofwhomdrawondecadesofsocialactivism
directed against the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the Vietnam
War,nuclearweapons,environmentaldestruction,andviolations
of women'srightsandhumanrights. Theytoodrawonauniver-
salistic ideal ofcivic community (although this ideal is often
compromisedinpracticeinJapanaselsewhere). Yet,theyhave
not, todate, articulateda generally acceptedvisionofashared
international future for Japan
(embodiedintextbooksor else-
where). On the contrary, as
Gerow notes, cultural signs
&'UggestthatmanyJapaneseto-
"DoNotPainttheWarinaBadLight"
dayfearclosertiestoAsia.
The United States has
ProfessorIenagaSaburoattemptedto includeinhistextbook
thusfaravoidedany sustained
thisphotograph(seeleft)ofanex-soldierwhowasinjuredin
response to foreign criticism
battle.TheJapanesesoldierhad written:
foritsconductduringitsmany
"TheHorrorofWar: Eventhoughthewar cametoanend,
twentieth-century wars. Sig-
eventuallytheannsandlegsofsoldierslostinbattlewill nificantly,theAsianswhohave
neverreturn.This1mgicsighteloquentlyconveysto usthe mobilizedtoprotestpastJapa-
poignantmeaningofthephrasefromtheprefaceto theConsti-
nese military occupationhave
tution,whichreads: '...[we] resolvedthat neveragainshall we
notmountedasimilarly effec-
bevisitedwiththehorrorsofWIU' throughthe actionof the
tive critique of U.S. military
government....,,,
occupationbecauseoftheleg-
IiCY ofWorld WarII alliances,
(Soumz: Truth in Textbooks. Freedom in Education and P,ace for Chil-
()Old War politics, and, above
dren: The Struggle against Censorship ofSchool Textbooks in Japan
all, U.S. power. China, North
[Tokyo:NationalLeagueforSupportoftheSchoolTextbookScreen-
ingSuit, 1995],p.3.)
Korea, and Vietnam were iso-
lated behind the Iron Curtain
until the 1970s. Since then, all three nations have struggled for
international legitimacy, a course that has led them to seek U.S.
assistance. Likewise, continued Japanese subordination to U.s.
strategic designs, together with Japanese vulnerability to coun-
tercharges about its activities during the Pacific War, have muted
official Japanese criticism of the United States.
I
American conduct abroad during the Vietnam War is the
only partial exception to date. During the war, the U.S. govern-
ment faced enormous criticism of its conduct abroad-officially
from Vietnam and its communist allies, but also from its own
I
principal European allies. Many Japanese citizens also protested
the war despite their government's support of it, just as did many
Americans. That legacy of conflict, as well as of military defeat,
has meant that the Vietnam War has required fuller explanation
and a deeper understanding of the enemy than has any other
American war, as David Hunt explains in his article below.
Nonetheless, although American textbooks grapple with that
mandate, most skirt issues that are sensitive for Americans,
particularly atrocities such as the My Lai massacre, the tiger
cages, the saturation bombing, and the environmental devasta-
tion of much of North and South Vietnam. More fundamentally,
as Hunt shows, most American histories-with significant ex-
ceptions-avoid drawing the conclusion that" 'war crimes' were
in the logic of the Vietnam War."
The issues of apology and reparations have not (yet?)
become a subject ofsustained international debate, although both
domestic and foreign critics of U.S. conduct in the Vietnam War
have raised them sporadically. During the war years, the U.S.
"winter soldiers" publicly testified to American war crimes in an
act of patriotism and courage. They eloquently argued that in
denying humanity to the Vietnamese and tolerating war crimes
against them, Americans debased their own nation's fmest tradi-
tions. Their perspective was not institutionalized in national
memory until March 1998, when the U.S. Army awarded the
Soldier's Medal, its highest honor for bravery not involving
conflict, to three soldiers who had rescued Vietnamese civilians
at My Lai from other American soldiers.
38
However, in striking
contrast to pressures mounted on Japan in recent decades by
Chinese, Koreans, and other victims of Japan's wartime aggres-
sion, the Vietnamese have not pushed Americans to apologize or
provide compensation for the war, nor have American activists
pressed the issue. The reasons on the Vietnamese side have
everything to do with the still considerable power of the United
States to shape postwar economic, political, and strategic out-
comes in the Pacific, and the perception by Vietnamese leaders
that their nation's future hinges on the international market, a
realm in which the United States holds the keys to entry and
prosperity. Americans have only just begun to face their history
of war crimes and state-led aggression in Vietnam.
These are precisely the kinds of issues at the heart of the
Japanese debate on its regional and global future. Japan has faced
greater international as well as domestic pressure to atone for its
wartime behavior than has the United States. The American
example-although not the German one-suggests that Japa-
nese nationalists have a point when they complain that other
nations gloss over their own dark chapters while Japan is singled
out for attack.
Reunified Germany gives the impression of having moved
toward a coherent stance for the twenty-first century through
reiteration of its European identity. It has emerged at the center
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
of the European Community after having addressed directly
some of the deepest antagonisms created first by the Junkers and
then by the Nazis. The ability to create a new narrative of the
German nation that convincingly rejects Nazism and celebrates a
European defmition of citizenship is surely a key factor in that
change. The problem of virulent nationalism, however, has hardly
been laid to rest. Some Germans still harbor older versions of the
ideal nation, as indicated by continued racist attacks on guest-
workers and the resurgence of neo-Nazi groups. Serbia and
Croatia, and some of the states of the former Soviet Union, too,
are powelful reminders that Europe is in no way immune to the
reemergence of racist and exterminist national narratives.
In China, the most sensitive issues pertain to the citizenship
of ethnic minorities rather than to the history of anti-Japanese
resistance. As Stevan Harrell and Bamo Ayi show, one of the
most sensitive issues defIning both China's domestic and inter-
national posture is the treatment of minority nationalities in the
state's officially prepared and certified textbooks. Despite the
existence of an extensive afirrmative action program and an
institutionally embodied concept of autonomous regions, China
is far from resolving its future as a muItiethnic nation. If, as
Ernest Gellner insists, nationalism is "the striving to make cul-
ture and polity congruent," the issues remain contentious indeed
for Tibetans, Mongols, Uighurs, and other nationalities seeking
autonomous space, cultural recognition, and resources.
39
With
the Chinese state fIrmly in control of all textbook preparation.
these issues have not been publicly contested at the level of
curriculum but are widely recognized as major sources of ten-
sion. Harrell and Bamo show this in the case of textbooks for the
Nuosu (Yi) people of Yunnan. Moreover, Chinese textbook
depictions ofcitizenship and ethnic identity are likely to develop
an international dimension as time passes, particularly as minor-
ity groups spill across borders as in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.
The campaign mounted by Chinese-in-exile against Chinese
oppression of dissidents has the potential to internationalize this
as it already has other debates. From this perspective. Chinese
leaders have barely begun to clarify a vision of their nation's
place in Asia and the contemporary world.
Current Japanese, Chinese, German, and American debates
over how to envision their respective places in the global future
have wide-ranging implications. In the service of that task, past
actions are continually reinterpreted, making old justifications
obsolete. One key issue is how to imagine links with other
nations. A second involves managing the relationship between
citizen and state in the context of growing demands for civic
rights. Governments have no choice but to reevaluate past be-
havior in ways that constantly incorporate social change. Finally,
governments must take into consideration the views of the citi-
zens of other nations. as well as those of foreign governments.
The ferocity of the debate in Japan can instruct the rest of us: the
issues Japanese wrestle with-nationalism, citizenship, regional
and global cooperation. and social change-are ones faced by all
citizens ofthe contemporary world. Textbooks are oneofthe key
fronts where those battles will be fought. Indeed, the battles are
already under way.
Nota
1. John Meyer, David Kamens, and Aaron Benavot, with Yun-Kyung
ChaandSuk-Ymg Wong, show convincingly the broad common ground
and global standardization among primary school textbooks, cunicula,
13
and educational systems across nations that differ in wealth, political
and economic systems, and culture. Standardization is surely greater at
the high-school level. School Knowledgefor the Masses: World Models
and National Primary Curricular Categories in the Twentieth Century
(London: The Falmer Press, 1992).
2. Michael Apple and Linda Christian-Smith., The Politics ofthe Text-
book (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 4. We would add that textbooks
may also clarify what is illegitimate and threatening to a state and
people.
3. Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlov, Asian Fonns of the Nation
(Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1996), p. 2. We also follow Benedict
Anderson's emphasis on the style in which a nation is imagined. Imag-
ined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism
(London: Verso, 1983).
4. Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in
ModemJapan (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1996);Prasen-
jit Duara, "De-Constructing the Chinese Nation," in Chinese National-
ism, ed Jonathan Unger (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. ShaIpe, 1996), pp. 31-55;
Pamela Crossley, "Manzhou yuanliu leao and the Formalization of the
Manchu Heritage," Journal ofAsian Studies 46, no. 4 (1987).
5. Ministry ofEducation review, censorship, and certification processes
are described in detail by Lawrence Beer, Freedom ofExpression in
Japan: A Study in Comparative Law, Politics and Society (New York:
Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 260-62. See also Yue-him Tam, "To Bury
the Unhappy Past: The Problem of Textbook Revision in Japan," East
Asian Library Journal 7, no. 1 (1994): 7-42; Horio Teruhisa, Educa-
tional Thought and Ideology in Modem Japan: State Authority and
Intellectual Freedom, ed. and trans. Steven Platzer (Tokyo: University
of Tokyo Press, 1988); Ienaga Saburo, The Pacific War (New York:
Pantheon, 1978).
6. Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy and Politics in Occupied
Japan, 1945-1952 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982);
YokoThakur, "Textbook Reform inAllied Occupied Japan, 1945-1952"
(phD. diss., University of Maryland College Park, 1990).
7. The International Society for Educational Information, an arm ofthe
Foreign Ministry, also collects foreign textbooks about Japan.
8. Major conflicts in the United States concern such issues as multicul-
turalism and evolution theory. For a powerful critique of U.S. history
textbooks, see James Loewen, Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything
Your American History Textbook Got Wrong (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995). For a historical account of earlier controversies, see
Frances FitzGerald, America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the
Twentieth Century (Boston: Little Brown, 1979).
9. LauraHein and Mark Selden, eds.,Living With the Bomb: Ameriam and
Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (Armonk, N.Y.: M E.
ShaIpe, 1996); Edward Linenthal and Thomas Engelhardt, eds., History
Wars: The Enola Gay Controversy and Other Battlesfor the Ameriam Past
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996); JamesE. Young, The Texture of
Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1993); G. Kurt Piehler, Remembering War the American
Way (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995); Diane Barthel,
Historic Preservation: Collective Memory and Historical Identity (New
Bnmswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1996).
10. In 1997, a textbook debate that began in Taiwan quickly moved
across the Taiwan Strait. It centered on the treatment of Japanese
colonialism in a social studies textbook used in alljunior high schools.
See Julian Baum, "Schools ofThought: Long Overdue Textbook Recast
Runs Into Controversy," Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 August
1997. Critics of the text, including Yang Yizhou, writing in People s
Daily, 27 October 1997, attacked the text for negating Taiwan's close
historical relationship to China and the Chinese people as well as for
whitewashing the record of Japanese colonialism. The richly illiustrated
social studies text, Renshi Taiwan (Understand Taiwan), which is being
test-taught in 1997-98, is an introduction to historical and contemporary
Taiwan that is attentive to aboriginal life and the mix of peoples that
comprise the Taiwan popUlation. It also addresses a range of social
problems such as income inequality and gender, and, for the fust time
in a school text, grasps the biggest nettie, by introducing the 28 February
1947 Guomindang massacre of Taiwanese.
11. Mark Selden, "China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of
East Asia, 1945-1995," in Network Power: Japan and Asia, ed. Peter
Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997), pp. 306-40.
12. RadhikaCoomaraswamy, "Violem:eagainstWomen: Its Causes and
Consequences. A Prelimiruuy Report Submitted by the UN Special
Rapporteur in accordance with the Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1994/45," The Thatched Patio 7, no. 6 (1994), International
Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka; Tanaka Hiroshi, Zai-
nichi Gaikokujin (Foreigners in Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1995).
13. Forthe $58 billion figure, see AlanCowell, "Gennany the Unloved Just
Wants to Be Normal," New York Times, 23 November 1997; Claudia
Koonz, "BetweenMemory and Oblivion: ConcentrationCamps in German
Memory," in Commemorations: The Politics ofNational Identity, ed.
John R. Gillis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 258-
280; Ian Bununa, The Wages ofGuilt: Memories of War in Gennany
and Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994); R. J. R.
Bosworth, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and
the Second World War (London: Routledge, 1993).
14. Daniel Singer, "France on Trial," The Nation, 19 November 1997,
p. 5; Alan Cowell, ''Swiss Bank Reports Finding $11 Million More in
Unclaimed Accounts from Wartime," New York Times, 24 July 1997;
"Red Cross Admits Failing to Condernn Holocaust," New York Times,
8 October 1997.
15. Gary Okihiro, Whispered Silences: Japanese-Americans and World
War II (Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1996). Japanese from
all points on the political spectrum have argued that the U.S. wartime
saturation bombing, atomic bombing, and other wartime attacks on
Japan were comparable to Nazi barbarism, with, as yet, only small
impact on the U.S. or international discussion. One of the most active
figures in the current Japanese textbook debate has made this argument,
using it to justify a rejection of Japanese reconsideration of their own
wartime conduct. Nishio Kanji, "Acknowledge U.S. War Crimes," Sankei
Shinbun, 9 August 1997, translated inJapan Times, 26 August 1997.
16. Peter Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power: Gennany in Europe (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1997), p. xiii.
17. An exemplar of the new pan-European approach to a common
history is Frederic Delouche, ed., Illustrated History of Europe: A
Unique Portrait ofEurope sCommon History, trans. Richard Moyne
(New York: Henry Holt, 1992). Not all western European nations have
responded to the prospect ofregional integration with equal enthusiasm.
In particular, Britain's 1988 Education Reform Act instituted a ''national
curriculum" to stave off any loss of British identity and sovereignty.
British historical textbook trends and I;onflicts are briefly surveyed in
Stephan Shakespeare, ''Old Britain, New History," The Spectator, 11
October 1997, pp. 11-12. In other parts: ofEurope, moreover, including
within and outside the Union, nationalism is currently a fighting matter.
These include the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, as
well as areas claimed by Basque separatists and Irish nationalists.
18. Peter Katzenstein, "Introduction: A!>ian Regionalism in Comparative
Perspective," inKatzenstein and h i r i s h ~ eds.,NetworkPower, p. 12. This
World Bank calculation is based on multiplying China's GDP by three on
the basis ofpurchasing power parity indexes.
19. Fujioka Nobukatsu in "Koko ga okashii: Rekishi kyokasho ronso"
(This is strange: The history textbook debate), debates with Yoshida
Yutaka, This Is Yomiuri, March 1997, lip. 34-73.
20. As the reference to the death of the emperor suggests, the roots of
change in ideology and consciousness lie partly in domestic factors. On
the breaking ofearlier taboos on public discussion ofwar responsibility,
see Norma Field, ''The Devastating Absence of Surprise," Bulletin of
ConcernedAsian Scholars 27, no. 3 (1995): 18-19; Gavan McCormack,
The Emptiness ofJapanese Affluence (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe,
1996), pp. 244-77; and Herbert Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: A
Reinterpretation," in Hiroshima in History and Memory, ed Michael
Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 80-115.
Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars
14
I
21. For more on the Asia debate and its relation to the u.s. alliance in
Japanese thinking, see Laura Hein and Ellen Hammond, "Homing in on
I
Asia: Renovating Identity in Contemporary Japan," Bulletin ofCon-
cerned Asian Scholars 27, no. 3 (1995): 3-17; Michael Yahuda, The
International Politics ofthe Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Rout-
ledge, 1996), pp. 229-54; Katzenstein and Shiraishi, eds., Network
Power.
j
I
22. See Elliot Converse II et al., The Exclusion ofBlack Soldiers from
the Medal ofHonor in World War II: The Study Commissioned by the
United States Anny to Investigate Racial Bias in the AwanJing ofthe
Nation s Highest Military Decoration (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland,
1997); Okihiro, Whispered Silences; Gordon Chang, ed. Morning Glory
'I
or Evening Shadow: Yarnato Ichihashi and His Internment Writings,
j
1942-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997). For
belated attention to the contributions of women, see Judy Litoff and
David Smith, eds., American Women in a World at War. Contemporary
Accounts from World War II (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources,
1997). For the debate on multiculturalism, see Arthur M Schlesinger
Jr., The Disuniting ofAmerica (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); Henry
Louis Gates, Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992); Joan Scott, "The Campaign against
Political Correctness: What's Really at Stake?" and other contributions
toRadicaIHistoryReview5,no.4(1992);FitzGerald,AmericaRevised.
23. While the dominant heroic text limning the rise of the Chinese
Communist movement in the course ofthe anti-Japanese resistance and
civil war has remained intact, the contribution of individual leaders has
been subject to large swings contingent on their subsequent rise and fall.
See Jonathan Unger, ed., Using the Past to Serve the Present: Histori-
ography and Politics in Contemporary China (Annonk, N.Y.: M E.
Sharpe, 1993), especially David Holm, "The Strange Case of Liu
Zhidan," pp. 104-23, and Susanne Weigelin-Schwiec:hzik, "Party His-
toriography,"pp.151-53.
24. Fujioka Nobukatsu and Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai, eds., Kyo-
kasho ga oshienai rekishi, (The history that textbooks do not teach)
(Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun Nyusu Sabisu, vo1s. 1 and 2, 1996; vol. 3,
1997). Fujioka Nobukatsu, Ojoku no kin-gendai shi: Ima, kokufoku no
toki (Shameful modem history) (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1996). Also
see Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho 0 tsuk.uru kai, ed, Atarashii Nihon no
rekishi ga hajimaru (A new Japanese history is beginning) (Tokyo: Gen-
tosha, 1997).
25. Fujioka Nobukatsu, Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi, vol. 2, p. 11.
26. Fujioka Nobukatsu, ''Nihonjin wa joshiki ni okure," in Atarashii
rekishi kyokasho 0 tsukuru kai, p. 122.
27. Fujioka Nobukatsu, ''Hi-nichi rekishi kyoiku 0 haisu" (Expelling
anti-Japanese history education) in Fujioka, Ojoku no kin-gendai shi,
pp. 81-84. Also Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi, vol. 2, p. 11.
28. See Nakamura in this issue. See also Yoshida YUtaka, ''Heisoku SUlU
nasbionarizumu" (Blockaded nationalism), Sekai, April 1997, pp. 74-82.
29. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jugun Ianfo (Military comfort women) (Tokyo:
lwanami Shoten, 1995). We have benefited from Yuki Tanaka's work
in progress on the comfort women and Japanese policy. See also the
special issue ofpositions. east asia cultures critique 5, no.1 (1997): "The
Comfort Women: Colonialism, War, and Sex"; Maria Rosa Henson, Com-
fort Woman: Slave ofDesti1Q1 (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative
Joumalism, 1996); Keith Howard, ed., True Stories ofthe Korean Com-
fort Women, trans. Young Joo Lee (London: Cassell, 1995); Watanabe
Kazuko, "Militarism, Colonialism, and the Tmfficking of Women:
'Comfort Women' Forced into Sexual Labor for Japanese Soldiers,"
Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars 26, no. 4 (1994): 3-16.
30. Fujioka Nobukatsu, "'Jugun ianfu' 0 chugakusei ni oshieru na"
(Don't teach middle school students about the military comfort women),
in Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho 0 tsukuru kai, ed., Atarashii Nihon no
rekishi ga hojimaru, p. 78, quotes seven textbooks.
31. Dutch prosecutors presented evidence ofthe rape ofDutch civilians
at the Tokyo Tribunal, but not of"enforced prostitution," reserving that
for subsequentB- and C-Class tribunals. Personal communication, Yuki
Tanaka, 29 January 1998. A Batavia tribunal convicted thirteen Japa-
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
nese for the enslavement and rape of Dutch women and executed three.
The tribunal ignored the far larger number of Sumatran and Javanese
women who were often held at the same "comfort stations." Chin Sung
Chung, ''The Origins and Development of the Military Sexual Slavery
Problem inImperial Japan," positions. east asia cultures critique 5, no. 1
(1997): 232-33. See also Yuki Tanaka, "Comfort Women in the Dutch
East Indies," manuscript, 1997. Similarly, Japan was held accountable
at the trials for the several thousand Western POWs forced to work on
the Burma-Thai railroad, but not for the vastly larger number ofSouth-
east Asian forced laborers. Gavan McConnack and Hank Nelson, eds.,
The Bunna-Thailand Railway: Memory and History (St. Leonard's,
New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1993).
32. See Chin Sung Chung, ''The Originsand Development," pp. 219-54;
Watanabe, ''Militarism, Colonialism. and the Trafficking of Women";
and Henson, Comfort Woman. Also George Hicks, The Comfort Women:
Japan sBrutal Regime ofEnforr:ed Prostitution in the Second World
War (New York: Norton, 1994), p. 225 on international law.
33. For a statement by Korean-Japanese tying their solidarity movement
to textbook nationalism, see "Appeal by Concerned Koreans in Japan
concerning the Activities of the Committee to Create A New History
Textbook and the Liberal Historiography Study Group," Ampo: Japan-
Asia Quarterly Review 27, no. 4 (1996): 26-27; Michael Weiner, ed.,
Japan sMinorities: The Illusion ofHomogeneity (London: Routledge,
1996) for general discussion.
34. For discussion of attitudes among Japanese soldiers, see Kano
Mikiyo, "The Problem with the 'Comfort Women Problem,'" Ampo:
Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 24, no. 2 (1993): 40-43. For more ex-
tended discussion of Japanese destruction in China, see Mark Selden,
China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited (Annonk, N.Y: M E.
Sharpe, 1995).
35. Hyun Sook Kim notes that a 1992 South Korean junior high school
text discusses the comfort women much as do the Japanese ones,
including them in a list of Japan.ese colonial practices such as forcing
Koreans to worship at Japanese shrines, to adopt Japanese names, and
engage in forced labor: "[E]ven women became the object of sacrifice
for the war under the name chongsindae (teishintai in Japanese)." Kim
argues that this bland approach reflects the interest of the Korean state
inreinforcing patriarchy. "History and Memory: The 'Comfort Woman'
Controversy," positions. east asia cultures critique 5, no. 1 (1997): 91.
Some critics ofthe introduction ofthe comfort women theme in school
texts also described 1997 Japanese legislation that permitted married
women to use their maiden names in household registers as a compam-
ble example of a break with tradition and morality.
36. Nonna Field, "War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and
After," pOSitions. east asia cultures critique 5, no. 1 (1997): 37.
37. Hiroshi Tanaka, "Why Is Asia Demanding Postwar Compensation
Now?" HitotsubashiJoumal ofSocial Studies 28 (1996): 1-14. These
questions necessarily implicate the United States as well: in particular,
they highlight the U.S. government's willingness to protect the perpe-
trators of such injustices as the human experiments of Unit 731 in
exchange for access to their research results. Sheldon Harris, Factories of
Death: Japanese Biological Waifare 1935-45, andtheAmerican Cover-up
(London: Routledge, 1993). See also John Powell's review of1he book in
Bulletin ofConcernedAsian Scholars 27, no. 2 (1995): 27-28.
38. Themedalswere awarded to Hugh C. Thompson Jr., LawrmceColbum,
and, postlmmously, to GlennAndIwtta. SeeLos Angeles TImes, 19 March
1998, Metro Part B, p. 8.
39. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Come11 University
Press, 1993),p. 43.
o
Selected articles from this special issue of the
Bulletin ofConcernedAsian Scholars
are available at the BeAS Website:
http://c.f.C91orado.edulbcas/
15
Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 30, No.2 (1998): 16-23
ISSN 0007-4810 C 1998 BCAS (Oakland, California)
The Japanese Movement to "Correct" History
Why is it that in Japan the question ofwar responsibiHty seems to have become more acute as time passes?
Following the end ofthe cold war globally and ofLiberal Democratic Party hegemony in the Diet domestically,
a particularly sharp debate ensued in the media, Diet, courts, and in the national community in general As
the 1995 commemoration of the fiftieth annivenary of the war approached, a national consensus in favor of
apology, admission of the aggressive and colonial character of the war, and compensation to the victims,
gradually took shape. In reaction, a counterforce, repudiating apology and reconciliation and insisting on the
absolute purity of the national cause, also emerged. The treatment of the wartime "comfort women" issue
became centraL This paper considen con.iden the evolution of the Liberal View ofHistory Study Group and
the Society for the Making ofNew School Textbooks in History. What does it mean that these groups represent
themselves as "liberal" and what support do they enjoy? The paper concludes that the movement these
organizations represent may be inteUectually incoherent, but it possesses a considerable emotional force as
the voice of a repressed nationalism, and as such deserves close attention.
by Gavan McCormack
"Nothing is more idiotic than to deny today the truth ofwhat one did
yesterday." -Ooka Shohei, Horyoki (l948i
"It is precisely its way of teaching its modem history that is the
crucial detenninant of the constitution of a people as a nation. The
people which does not have a history to beproud ofcannot constitute
itself as a nation." -Fujioka Nobukatsu, Ojoku no kin-gendaishi
"Liberal Historiography" and ''Correct History"
The question of responsibility for the war that ended a half
century ago becomes more pressing for Japan as the war itself
recedes in memory. Social and political rifts over the issue
deepen, and the international ramifications grow more serious.
Since the beginning of the 1990s dozens of lawsuits claiming
apology and compensation have been lodged with Tokyo courts
on behalf of the many victims of Japan's colonialism and aggres-
sion, including the former "comfort women," the victims of the
Nanking and other massacres, survivors of wartime forced labor
programs, and the victims of bacteriological (plague) or chemi-
cal attacks on wartime China. Ofall the issues, that ofthe comfort
women may be the most intractable.
The Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists
issued a report on the comfort women in 1994 that referred to
large numbers of women and girls having been held captive,
beaten, tortured, and repeatedly raped in wartime Japanese mili-
tary installations. In February 1996, a report for the Human
Rights Committee of the United Nations described the "comfort
women" as "sex slaves" and their treatment as a "crime against
humanity." It called upon Japan to compensate victims, punish
those responsible without regard to limitation oftime, and ensure
that educational curricula included the historical facts.
In Seoul, Manila, Jakarta, and the other cities of the old
"Co-Prosperity Sphere" large numbers of angry women began
to speak about what had happened to them fifty years ago. By
early 1997, some 23,000 women in Korea (North and South), the
Philippines, China, Thailand, Indonesia and elsewhere had come
forward by name to give either silent or vocal testimony to their
experience. The focus of war reflections has therefore shifted.
Where men-politicians, soldiers, scholars-had always de-
fined and debated the issues, from the early 1990s, and after fIfty
years of silence, women began to intervene, confronting Japan
with immense moral, political, and cultural questions.
In December 1996 the U.S. Justice Department's Criminal
Division announced that it had drawn up an immigration "ban
list" of Japanese believed to be responsible for war crimes; three
of the twelve (unidentified) people on that list were thought to
be associated with the "comfort women" system, the others being
former members of the Harbin-based Unit 731 responsible for
bacteriolo!cal warfare in China and many horrific crimes against
prisoners. In other words, fifty years after the event, Washington
had decided to place Japanese on the same level as Nazi war
crimes, so uniquely heinous that suspected perpetrators should
not enjoy any protection because of the lapse of time.
4
Within Japan, after decades of official procrastination and
intense effort by various popular organizations, from the early
1990s serious efforts began to made at an official level to
grapple with these problems. In 1993, when the long Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) hegemoJilY over Japanese politics was
o/ConcernedAsian Scholars
16
broken for the first time, the war was described by the prime
minister as aggressive and colonial, and in 1995 the Diet adopted
a resolution expressing formal regret over it. Official involve-
ment in establishing and managing "comfort houses" for Japa-
nese soldiers was admitted, and the government has conceded
that many of the women working in them had been forced to do
so (sojite kyosei datta). A fund, nominally private but with strong
official backing, was established to compensate surviving com-
fort women and specific letters of apology from the prime
minister, accompanying solatium payments, were issued to the
first of the former victims during 1996.
However, these modest advances also served to excite
fierce opposition. Inside the national Diet, LDP members who
insisted on the justice of the war's cause and firmly opposed any
apologies formed a "Dietmembers League for the 50th Anniver-
sary of the End of the War" (headed by former minister of
education, Okuno Seisuke) in December 1994. Under this name
various events were conducted in August 1995, including the
"CelebrationofAsian Togetherness," which invited representatives
of various Asian countries to "thank the war dead and praise
Japan for its contribution to the independence of Asian coun-
tries."s In April 1996 the group changed its name to the "Diet-
members League for a Bright Japan." A corresponding group of
opposition Shinshinto party members (conservatives, led by
Ozawa Ichiro, who had been in the LDP till the split occurred in
1993) in February 1995 formed another group under the title
"Dietmembers League for the Passing on of a Correct History"
(headed by Ozawa Tatsuo).
Outside the Diet, both of these groups were closely linked
to the "Citizens' Association for the Defence ofJapan," founded
in 1981 and headed in the 19908 by the composer Mayuzumi
Toshiro. Nationalist organizations inside and outside of the na-
tional Diet could usually draw also on the support of a range of
other more-or-less traditional rightist or nationalist groups: in-
cluding the National Shrine Association (Jinja honcho), War
Bereaved Families Association (Nihon izokuleai), the Unification
Church (the "Moonies") and its "Professors for Peace Acad-
emy," the World Anti-Communist League, and religious groups
such as Seicho no ie.
6
What are new in the mid-l 990s, however, are the national
organizations formed in 1995 and 1996 by the Tokyo University
professor, Fujioka Nobukatsu: the "Liberal View of History
Study Group" (Jiyushugi shilean kenkyuleai) and the "Society for
the Making of New School Textbooks in History" (Atarashii
rekishi kyokasho 0 tsukuru leai). They are new both in content
and in orientation; formerly rightist and nationalist ideas are for
the first time presented as "liberal," and directed in partiCUlar at
the constituency of students, teachers and academics. If these
elements were to be successfully integrated in a front alongside
the established parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces of
right-wing nationalism, the significance would be considerable.
While Fujioka (on whom see below) is the central figure,
he and his cause are supported by a wide-ranging group of
literary, media, academic, and business personalities, with a
particularly prominent role being played by the cartoonist Ko-
bayashi Yoshinori and the German literature scholar Nishio
Kanji (of Electro-Communications University). Their move-
ment is committed to a far-reaching reappraisal of national
history, and in particular to securing the deletion of all reference
to "comfort women" from middle school history texts. They have
The front cover of a book published in Japan by an organization
documenting Japanese wartime aggression toward Asia and wartime
propaganda. The illustration shows an idealized image ofvarious
Asian nations as children united under Japanese command in Pan-
Asian battle against the evil West." (SOIIrr:e: Norio Kuboi. Nihon no shin-
ryaku SemllOII to Ajia no kodomo. Tokyo; Akoshi Shoten, 1996)
already issued a series of books, with titles such as Kyokasho ga
oshienai rekishi (The history the textbooks do not teachf and
Ojoku no kin-gendaishi (Shameful modern history),8 which have
become best-sellers, and they intend to produce and promote
their own textbooks. Popular magazines regularly feature their
analysis and activities, and the national daily Sankei shimbun vig-
orously promotes them. Kobayashi Yoshinori's cartoons, published
in the magazine Sapio, are widely read among youth. An all-night
debate on the issues of war memory, textbooks, and especially
"comfort women," on Asahi Television on 1 February 1997,
pitted Fujioka and his associates against prominent historians
and representatives ofthe many groups struggling for causes that
these new nationalists oppose, and it became one ofthe outstand-
ing media events of the time.
By choosing the term "liberal," Fujioka and his colleagues
seek to represent their position as a breakthrough out ofthe stale
and unresolved polarities of post-war discourse into something
fresh and new. Some might argue that precisely such a break-
through was occurring anyway in the mid-1990s, and that Fu-
jioka's intervention was either unnecessary or obstructive. They
would point to a national consensus slowly taking shape around
the acceptance of responsibility and commitment to appropriate
compensation, the position stated by Prime Minister Hosokawa
in 1993 and maintained since then in its essentials even by the
current LDP Prime Minister Hashimoto. But Fujioka will have
nothing of this. For him, historical thinking is still locked within
left-right dualism, and only his "liberalism" can resolve it. Using
an expression borrowed from the popular novelist Shiba Ryo-
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998) 17
taro,hedescribesthedualismintennsof"zendama"f'akudama"
("goodies" and "baddies"). On the one hand is the so-called
"TokyoTrialsViewofHistory,"theorthodoxyimposedonJapan
by the Occupation which saw prewar and wartime Japan as
akudama totheUnitedStates'szendama. Fujiokabelievesthis
viewthenbecameinternalizedinJapanesesociety-thankspri-
marily totheeffortsofleft-winghistorians and educators-to
theextentthateventuallyeventheLDPitselfbecamesubverted
and the fundamentally misguided 1990s politics of apology
becameestablished. The opposing view is theonecommonly
knownasthe"Affinnationof theGreaterEastAsianWar"view,
oneperhapsmostfamouslyexpressedintheworkofthehistorian
HayashiFusaoin 1969whichinsistedaboveallontheprimacy
oftheJapaneseroleinachievingtheliberationofAsia.
While Fujioka announced his rejection ofboth ofthese
views,however,inpracticehisfITehasbeenconcentratedexclu-
sivelyonthefonner,andheandhiscolleagueshavemovedever
closerto precisely thesortofaffinnationthatHayashi almost
thirtyyearsagoproclaimed.In movingtotry toappropriatethe
word"liberal"tohiscause,Fujiokawasimplicitlyrecognizing
that his cause would not go far ifseen purely in traditional
nationalisttenns.Howeverthepromiseofa"liberalism"asitis
commonly understood, involvingacommitmentto highlevels
ofobjectivityandtheexplorationofarelativistic,multiplecausal
framework,hasnotinpracticebeenhonoured.
Yet thelevel ofsupportthat greetedtheFujiokamessage
suggeststhatinsomesensehewasright:manypeoplearefedup
with whatthey perceivetobe a fIfty-year-long stalematethat
showsnosignofresolution,andaretiredofongoingdiscussions
ofresponsibility and compensation for things that happened
morethana halfcentury ago. Many seemalso tobeseeking a
positiveidentity androleintheworldappropriatetotheglobal
economicsuperpowerJapanhasbecome.
Setting aside the "liberal" label and claims to superior
objectivity,attheactual coreofFujiokaandhiscolleagues'message
is a view ofhistory centered upon the lament for the loss ofa
"distinctiveJapanese historical consciousness" (Nihon jishin no
rekishi ishiki). What they describe as the postwar, orthodox,
"masochistic"(jigyakuteki) viewof historyistoblameforthiS.IO
Whileclaimingobjectivityandopen-mindedcommitmenttomul-
tiplecausality,inpracticetheyarecommittedto"inculcateasense
ofprideinthehistoryofournation."llForthem,historylacksthose
intrinsicstandards(oftruthorevidence)whichmightmakepossible
theresolutionof conflictinginterpretations;instead,itissubject
totheultimatemoral imperativeofwhetherornotitservesto
inculcateasenseof prideinbeingJapanese.12 Theytakeparticu-
larly strongexceptiontoschoolhistory texts approvedforuse
from April 1997thatrefertothe''forcibleabductionofcomfort
women"(butalsotoaccountsoftheNankingmassacreandother
atrocities). To include suchmaterial in school texts amounts, they
believe,tothelossof"our own"(dokuji no) historical sense;instead,
textbooksshouldrestore"correct history' (emphasisadded:seishl).13
Itisamarkof howoutofsyncwiththeoutsideworldisthe
discourseinJapanthatFujiokashouldmakehiscaseforpolitical
"correctness" under the banner ofits opposite-post-modem
relativism,apparentlyoblivioustothecontradiction,andthathe
shouldbeacclaimed,atleastbythenationalmedia,asaserious
andimportantthinkerfordoingso. By afIrrming theideaofa
"correct history," to be given official status and promotion,
Fujiokaclearly impliesthatthere isalso an"incorrecthistory"
which should be suppressed. He thereby reinstates the very
"zendamal akudama" dualismthatheclaimstooppose, andhe
locateshimselfwithinthelineageof thoseguardiansof political
correctnesswhoknowthetruthand areintolerantofallelse.By
thesestandards,thepre-warbureaucratsdedicatedtotherooting
outof"dangerousthoughts" andtheimpositionofthetrueand
glorioushistoryof theJapaneseempirewereall"liberals."
TheChallengeoftheComfortWomen:
Japanas"GrotesqueSexCrimeState"
Inpractice,nothingisnegatedbythe"liberals"withmore
vehemencethanthecomfortwomen-theirexistence,theirser-
vilestatusundertheImperialJapaneseArmy,theirsuffering,and
theirentitlementtoanyapologyorcompensationfromtheJapa-
nese state. Because the story they tell does not
functiontoincreasethesenseof"prideinthehis-
toryofournation,"itshouldnotbetold,andthose
whotellitarebad,akudama, fordoingso.Further-
more,thebasisofthenegationappearstobeessen-
tially a priori ratherthan empiricist, inthesense
thatitrestsonthepassionatebeliefthattheJapa-
nesestatecould not possibly have been involvedin
thecrimeofabductionandslaveryonalargescale;
thereforethatclaimisutterlyfalseandabhorrent,
andtherecounting ofthematerial inschooltext-
booksamountsto"anti-Japanese"and"masochis-
tic" behavior, which can only serve to "corrode,
pulverize,meltanddisintegrate" Japan.
13
Schools
that teach ''false history" ofcomfort women be-
come like a giant "Kamikuishikimura [the head-
quarters ofthe Aum sect], a mindcontrol centre
stainingtheentirenationwithanti-Japaneseideol-
ogy.,,
14
For Fujioka,thecomfortwomenissueis"an
unfounded scandal created in the 1990s for the
politicalpurposeofbashingJapan."ISItis even"a
grand conspiracy for the destruction of Japan, in
collaboration with foreign elements.,,16 If such a
Bulletin o/ConcemedAsian Scholars
Thisgraphic,whichencoumgesschoolchildnmto seeImperial Japanexpandingout
from thecenterof the world,isreproducedfrom a1941 children'stextbookentitledYo;
Kodama (Goodchildnm).(Source: Norto Ku.bat. Nthon /10 shtmyaku. sennsou toAjta no ko-
damo. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. 1996.p. 15.ISBN 4-7503-0842-0.)
18
falsehood were to be included in school texts Japan would come to be
seen as "a lewd, foolish and rabid race without peer in the world."17
However emotional the deep commitment indicated by
such fonnulations of its position, the "Liberal View of History"
group does also try to cast its appeal in scientific and empiricist
tenns, and for this it relies heavily on the services of a profes-
sional historian well-known and respected for his work on war
history, Hata Ikuhiko. In addressing the complex issues of the
wartime comfort women, the case as constructed by Hata and
Fujioka is that the "comfort women" were professional prosti-
tutes, earning more then a general in the Imperial Japanese Army,
or as much as one hundred times the pay of their soldier custom-
ers.
18
Hata describes the work as "high risk, high return.,,19 In
launching their suits for compensation now, the women are
described as motivated by greed and desire for money, seeing
their suits as a chance to "win the lottery."2o Hata and Fujioka
insist there is no documentary evidence ofcompulsion or official
responsibility, and they reject the evidence of the women them-
selves as not on oath or subject to constraints of perjury laws.
They propose an analogy to illustrate the relationship between
the private contractor-run "comfort stations" and the Imperial
Japanese Army, seeing the "comfort stations" (ianjo) as akin to
the restaurants within the Ministry of Education building, physi-
cally within the premises and subject to certain constraints of
payment of rent, he.alth controls, and the like, but fundamentally
independent in tenns of management and in treatment of their
staff. As the Ministry of Education is not responsible for the
services or the labor relations in restaurants housed within its
building, so they argue the Japanese Anny cannot be held respon-
sible for the conduct ofthe sex business in the old Japanese empire,
at a time when, anyway, prostitution was legal and standards and
values were very different from what they are today. 21
Hata also advances an argument on financial grounds: that
if responsibility to compensate the women were officially recog-
nized, meeting the claims might cripple the Japanese state. At a
figure of, say, 3 million for each act of rape to which they were
subjected, and taking account of the number of such acts of rape
over the years, he estimates that each woman could be entitled
to payments of up to 70 billion, in which case the overall claim
would soon rival the Japanese national debt. 22 It is bizarre that
the argument should here shift ground from principle and truth
to financial considerations and convenience, but such shifts are
characteristic of a discourse only thinly grounded in logic or
moral principle.
Underlying these protestations about the women is the
question ofhow to characterize the Japanese state. Fujioka-and
his colleague Nishio Kanji in particular-argue that, while Japan
may be compared with other modem states, all of which have
committed various crimes or excesses, it is fundamentally dif-
ferent from Nazi Gennany.23 Nishio goes to great 'lengths to
protest that, while what he describes as "Japan's theocratic state
under the emperor as high priest" may have fought "a slightly
high-handed patriotic war" (sukoshi omoiagatta aikoku senso),
it certainly did not commit "crimes against humanity" such as
would warrant its inclusion with Nazi Gennany in the categOlY
of "historically unprecedented terror state."24 Fujioka adds that
it was neither terror state nor a "grotesque sex crime state."25
The difficulty with this is that, although genocidal intent as
such was unique to the Nazis, the casualties and destruction in
the Asian war overall matched, and even exceeded, those on the
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
European front. The crimes were also as abhorrent-particularly
in regard to the comfort women, but also to the crimes of the
Japanese medical and scientific elites (most shockingly known
from the record of Unit 731), and there were similarities in racial
ideology and the "science" of "eugenics,,,26 and more generally
in relation to the wartime "forced labor" (kyosei renko). In many
respects Nazi and Japanese ideology and practice were similar,
and indeed in some respects Japan was guilty of crimes that even
the Nazis did not commit-bacteriological and gas warfare,
trading in opium to finance the activities of its puppet govern-
ments, and (also in China) the forced evacuation of vast areas of
all population (mujin chitaika).27
However, unlike the former Nazi and present Gennan
governments, which are divided by a historical chasm, the pre-
sent Japanese state enjoys a high measure of continuity with its
war-time predecessor; and its wartime head of state, all sugges-
tion of possible war crimes charges against him having been
dismissed on political grounds, continued in office till 1989. If
the analogy is pursued, it becomes clear that the sort of views
upheld by Fujioka and his colleagues-denying the comfort
women, denying Nanking, and denying other atrocities associ-
ated with Unit 73 I-are generically one with those that in the
German (and French) case would be proscribed under the legis-
lation forbidding "Holocaust denial."
Man and Movement
Who, then, is Fujioka? And in what context is his movrnent
and its lineage to be understood? Born in 1943, Fujioka was given
the personal name "Nobukatsu," literally "Faith in Victory," at just
that moment when the tides of war were turning towards defeat. As
a young man he was, by his own account, a believer in "one coun1Iy
pacifism," associated with leftist groUpS28 and, as ajunior academic
in Hokkaido University, enjoyed a modest reputation as a scholar
specializing in educational teaching methodology.29 He moved
to Tokyo University early in the 1 980s, but remained relatively
unknown till he returned in 1992 from a one-year period studying
cultural anthropology at Rutgers University.30 During that year
he underwent the sort of crisis that is commonly referred to as a
"tenko." He experienced a sense of humiliation at the Japanese
response to the Gulf War, and was profoundly influenced by reading
books such as Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars
31
and
Richard Minear's Victor sJustice.
32
"The scales fell from my
eyes," he said, after reading Minear.
33
He came to see Japan as
lacking in the "will as state to protect its security"; to view the
"Greater East Asian" War as a "just war," and the post-war
Japanese peace constitution as a fetter on the Japanese state and an
inhibition preventing the emergence of a proper Japanese sense of
nationalism.
Since it is as much an emotional (or even "religious")
experience he describes as an intellectual one, there is no neces-
sary logical consistency to it. Indeed eclecticism is characteristic.
Of the influences upon him he attaches greatest importance to
Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973, newspaper editor, politician, and
renowned interwar liberal) and Shiba Ryotaro (1923-1995, post-
war novelist specializing in historical themes). What Fujioka
does not recognize is that Ishibashi's "liberalism" made him in
the 1920s a profound critic of the state, an advocate of complete
Japanese withdrawal from its colonial possessions, and a propo-
nent of "small Japan-ism," while Shiba, for all his vivid evoca-
tion of the drama of the Meiji period, even in the book which
19
Fujioka professes most to admire, "Cloud over the Hill" (Saka
no ue no kumo), was withering in his portrayal of the great
nationalist hero of the Russo-Japanese War, General Nogi. He
had no sympathy at all for twentieth-century imperialist Japan,
especially for the war of the 1930s with China, which he de-
nounced as "unjust and meaningless,,,34 and an "aggressive war"
or a colonial war fought for oil and resources.
3S
It would seem to be
in some abstract, spiritual sense that he wishes to appropriate
Ishibashi and Shiba, not the actual ideas or politics they espoused.
The left-right trajectory Fujioka describes is a common
enough historical pattern, but what is unusual is his repre-
sentation of the switch in terms of a transcendence of the histori-
cal stalemate of left-right opposition. In practice, he is uncritical
in his affmnation of the wars of the prewar Japanese state. Save
in his use of the label "liberal," it is difficult to distinguish his
views form those of traditional rightists. Despite the theoretical
incoherence, it is no new liberal view of history that he propa-
gates but the old imperial one, the "kokoku shikan."36 What is
most puzzling and paradoxical, however, is the curious reticence
of Fujioka and his colleagues to address the question of the
emperor himself, or the imperial institution around which the
imperial view of history traditionally has cohered. Furthermore,
like earlier "tenkosha," Fujioka retains much ofthe structure and
"agitprop" style of his "leftist" days in his rightist reborn state.
The same priority to structure that once inclined him to seek
solace in the formulas of the Japan Communist Party appears to
have survived his conversion intact, and to be driving him to
construct a new, no less dogmatic and even more self-righteous,
version of "correctness."
While the "intellectual" foundations of the new "liberal-
ism" were thus constructed by Fujioka, Nishio, and others, the
campaign in the provinces and in the streets also kept pace. It
was characterized by the sort of intimidation and violence famil-
iar from pre- and post-war rightist and ultra-nationalist groups
rather than by anything distinctively "liberal." Demands were
issued to publishers oftextbooks, accompanied by threats, while
convoys of rightist trucks blaring martial music and uttering
intimidatory slogans circled the offending publishing company
offices. The names ofpublishers and the authors ofthe offending
texts have featured prominently in the "Liberal View" books and
pamphlets, and blown-up photographs of the private homes of
the textbook authors have been circulated, with obviously threat-
ening intent. Leaflets praising as a patriotic hero the right-wing
fanatic who assassinated Socialist Party leader Asanuma Inejiro
in 1960 are pointedly delivered to publishing offices, and violent
and fascist organizations, such as the "Sekihotai," which was
responsible for the 1987 attack on the office of Asahi shim bun
(which left one journalist dead), come to lend Fujioka their
SUpport?1 In all of this, it is hard to detect anything new, harder
to detect anything liberal.
However, although Fujioka and his colleagues blitzed the
media with their exhortations and protestations and applied
direct political pressure to the minister of education, their cam-
paign has been signally unsuccessful. After intensive efforts to
get local governing bodies to bombard Tokyo with requests to
revise the textbooks, one prefecture (Okayama) and eleven lesser
local government bodies did submit various resolutions to To-
kyo, but many others simply shelved the draft resolutions.
38
Furthermore, the Okayama outcome so surprised and shocked
local residents, especially women, that a nationwide movement
intent on blocking the attempted campaign elsewhere quickly
emerged.
39
Apart from pursuing the immediate war- and memOly-re-
lated causes, other issues on which this new front is active
include opposition to sex education in schools (stressing chaste
education or junketsu kyoiku), opposition to the retention of
family name by married women, and other "family" causes. It
has yet to declare its hand on the fundamental question of
constitutional reform. In sum, Fujioka'S movement rests upon a
formidable social base, and his successful coalition around com-
fort women issues, moral and family issues, and the project to
create a "bright" history and national identity, point to the emer-
gence of a new configuration. with unpredictable consequences.
Towards Understanding
and Interpretation
The movement at whose head Fujioka has emerged in the
past couple of years may be seen as fmnly rooted in the fabric
of postwar Japanese nationalism. but revised and reformulated
to accommodate to the changed circumstances of the post-cold
war period and to Japan's emergence as a global economic
superpower with aspirations to becoming a supetpower tout
court. Fujioka's personal experience of revelation during his
Gulf War sojourn in the United States, and his overwhelming
sense of shame at Japan's inability to project its power and image
to the world may be representative ofhis generation, ignorant of
and scarcely interested in history. humiliated by what seems to
be constant harping on Japan's supposed crimes and its dark
history and the farcical "diplomacy of apology" conducted by
those who have spoken for the Japanese government in recent
years (while distributing "hard-earned" Japanese yen to an un-
grateful world), and irritated by the low posture constantly
required by the cold war incotporation within the U.S. sphere
(and under its umbrella) and with what is seen as a mixture of
condescension and bashing on the American part.
The clarion call for construction of a proud, pure, and
honorable history seems to call forth a strong emotional re-
sponse. The sense ofresentment may be seen as a kind of "victim
complex" (higaisha ishih). Because of the way the Fujioka
movement moves to appropriate this sense, especial resentment
has to be directed at the claim of others to be victims, and they
find it especially galling that old women should be rising up in
accusation throughout the region. So seriously are their allegations
taken and so gross the slur on Japan's honor, that even the telling of
their stories is judged to be a threat to the very survival of Japan,
even (as noted above) nothing short of "a grand conspiracy for the
destruction of Japan." In this grim role reversal the women victims
are turned into assailants, who conspire to cast violent and threat-
ening slurs on the honor and virtue of Japan.40
The parallels with European revisionism are plain. The
dismissal of the comfort women issue or of the Nanking massa-
cre as myth parallels the dismissal of the Holocaust, and in both
cases the victims are recast as aggressors. Thus, for example, the
1980 words of the French literary scholar, Robert Faurisson,
could be easily rewritten by changing only the context of the
remarks from Europe to East Asia: "The alleged Hitlerian gas
chambers and the so-called genocide of the Jews form a single
historical lie whose principal historical beneficiaries are the state
of Israel and international Zionism and whose principal victims
are the German people ...... 41
i
I
The conundrum at the heart ofprosperous and atlluent
' Japanis the strengthofthese sentimentsofresentment, victim
complex, andlongingforpurity,innocenceandsolace, andthe
. scaleofcommitmenttotheconstructionofa"historyinwhich
peoplecantakepride," as ifthat were the function of history.42
i Pollution is apowerful theme in this discourse, as ifahistory
I
mightbecomepollutedmore by therevelationoftheshameful
I than by the denial oftruth. This group can sweep aside the
I researchesofagenerationofhistorians, andinsomecases(on
I
television) even proclaim proudly that they have not read the
. workand that itwouldtake akind ofpervertto undertakethe
.. sortofintensiveresearchoncomfortwomenthathasbeendone
by thehistorianYoshimi (Yoshiaki).43
Theissuesraisedby thephenomenonare treatedwiththe
utmost seriousness by critics and intellectuals in Japan. The
historianNakamuraMasanoriseestheFujiokaphenomenonin
thecontextofanoscillationthroughoutmodernhistorybetween
nationalismand internationalism, Westernization and chauvin-
ism. MerfIfty years,heseesthedesireforanewandpositive
Japaneseidentityreachingapeak,especially onthepartofthe
presentyouthandstudentgenerationwhohavebeenbroughtup
inignoranceofhistory,surroundedbyimages,andlackinginthe
capacity forindependentthought.44 ForSato Manabu (likeFu-
jioka,aTokyoUniversityprofessorofeducation),Fujiokaand
hiscolleaguesrepresent a"post-bubble, post-Aum" phenome-
nonof"eccentric,egocentricnationalism,"anationalismthatis
curiously deformed in that it has (at least as yet) no outward
expressionbutonly itsinward-lookingdimension.
4s
Thepoliti-
calscientistIshidaTakeshiseesinthephenomenonevidenceof
a general crisis ofJapanese intellectuals, especially at Tokyo
University (where he himselfspent his careertill retirement).
Althoughhesupportstheideaofa"liberal"viewofhistory,he
pointsoutthatthatshouldmeaninpracticeamovementbeyond
the common postwarperspectiveinwhichthe world has been
seenonly throughthe lens ofthe U.S.-Japanrelationship, and
whichincorporatesayearningto see,think, andfeelfrommul-
tiple Asian and multiple"Zainichi" identities, especially from
the perspective of the socially weak, the victims, and those
neglected inthedecadence ofoffIcialacademicism.
46
This isa
"liberalism"directlyopposedtoFujioka'sinsistenceonfInding
andimposingthe"correct"view. Ishida'scriticismisechoedby
SohKyong-sik, theKorean-in-Japancritic, who notesthatthe
spaces within Japanese society forminorities such as hisown
Zainichi community are bound to shrinkto the'extentthatFu-
jioka'scauseadvances.
47
Theapprehensionandastonishmentof
largenumbersofJapaneseintellectualsattheFujiokaphenome-
noniscapturedbyKunihiroMasao,whospeaksofbeingunable
to set aside the fear that what heis witnessing is "therush of
Japanese-stylefascism.,,48
Conclusion
WhileFujiokaseesthe"Tokyo TrialsViewofHistory"as
something imposed by the United States inthe course ofthe
occupationandtherootofsubsequentJapanesehumiliation,that
isahighlyambiguousassessment."Leftists,"asamatteroffact,
havebeen as criticalas rightistsofthetrials, arguingthatthey
weredistorted,notonlybytheassumptionthatguiltwasexclu-
sivetothedefeated-acritiquelongagoacceptedwidelyoutside
Japan-butalsobecauseofthedecisiononpoliticalgroundsto
remove from theirpurview all consideration ofcertain crucial
VoL 30,No.2(1998)
matters: the emperor, Unit 731, and the comfort women. The
more the spotlight is directed, after half a century, onto the
f
problemoftheTokyoTrials,themoreobviousthismustbecome,
t
andthemorelikelythatthedebatewillevolveindirectionsthat
true "liberals" will welcome but which Fujioka and his col-
leagueswillfinddifficulttocontrol.tntimately,theproblemof
thetrials isnotonlythatofwhereresponsibilitywas assigned,
butofwhereitwasconcealedandevadedoften,by asemi-con-
spiratorialjointAmerican-Japaneseagreement.
Thelamentoverthelossofthesenseofstateinanincreas-
inglyborderlessworld,andoverthelossofconservativecontrol
overthe levers ofpowerwithinthat state, iscommon enough
throughoutthe world, butthe passion with which Fujiokaand
others address these matters is extraordinary. Their fear and
vulnerability isdifficulttocomprehendgiventhattheJapanof
which they speak is a global economic giant, claimant to a
permanentseatontheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,andthe
"successstory"ofthetwentiethcentury. Whatexactlyisitthat
theyfear? Analogiesmaybedrawnwiththesortof"politicsof
resentment" that spreads across the industrial world as urban
massesfmd themselvesbecomingvictimofanonymousglobal
forces, butinthe Japanesecaseeconomicfactorsseemto play
only a slight role. Instead Fujioka is driven by fear ofthe
shrinking of the authority of the state, the degradation and
dissolutionofitsauthorityandsymbols.
The Fujioka phenomenon highlights the dilemmafacing
Japaneseconservativeandnationalistideologuesas they strug-
gletocometo termswiththechangedglobalcircumstancesof
thepost-coldwarworld. Whilemoderateelements,withstrong
links to the political and business elites, have concluded that
maintenance ofa "hard" line on questions ofthe history of
JapaneseimperialismandmilitarisminAsiaisblockingthepath
toafuture great-powerorevenhegemonicroleforJapaninthe
twenty-fIrstcenturyandtherefore-whetherforreasonsofprin-
cipleortactics,oroftenacombinationofboth-havechosenthe
pathofapologyandreconciliation,otherslikeFujiokainsiston
thenationalvirtueandpurity,atwhateverthecost. Onemay go
onto suggestthatFujioka'sarticulationoftheJapanesenation-
alist aspiration is peculiarlyvehementbecauseitexpressesthe
senseofdesperationofthosewhoseethemselvesasashrinking
andembattledminority,withthepoliticalmainstream,including
thecorefactionsoftheLDP,havingalreadyshiftedground.Itis
thatshiftthatshouldbeseenasmoresignifIcantthanthefrenzied
opposition it has occasioned, although the latter, a powerful
blend ofintellectual incoherence and emotional force, is cer-
tainlynottobeignored.
FujiokaandhisgroupmaintainthatthegapbetweenJapan
anditsneighborcountriesoverhistoryandmemoryisunbridge-
able, that the depth ofanti-Japanese sentiment on the part of
countriessuchasChinaandKoreaissogreatthat"ifwewereto
trytogetamutualhistoricalsensewithourAsianneighboursit
would be bound to lead to surrenderonourpart."49 To quote
Fujiokaagain,"Becauseweare Japanese,itisonlynaturalthat
weshouldthinkofthingsfIrstfromtheperspectiveofJapanand
itsnationalinterests."soItseemshardtodenythatFujioka'Splans
forapositiveviewofJapanesehistory,andthepoliciesheurges
on the Japanese government, would, ifeveradopted, set back
immeasurablytheprocessofrapprochementwithJapan'sAsian
neighborcountries.If Japanchosetospeaktotheregioninshrill
tones ofcorrectness and narrow Japanese pride, and to adopt
21
textbooks that would substitute for historical education the in-
culcation of an eclectic set of edifying stories designed to pro-
mote traditional virtues and nationalist fervour, closely akin to
prewar ethics textbooks, it would also have to confront its
neighbors, rejecting their histories (insofar as they chose to
recount their memory of Japanese imperialism, aggression and
war) as "incorrect." The regional consequences would be unpre-
dictable but inevitably disturbing.
Yet this late twentieth-century articulation of the Japanese
nationalist aspiration neglects two key dimensions of Japanese
nationalism: the emperor on the one hand and the United States
on the other, the inner and outer axes of national identity, both
of them subject to taboos that prevent free or open discussion.
The Fujioka blend of considerations of national pride, honor and
purity suggests a rootedness in the historically privileged repre-
sentations of Japanese identity built around the quintessential
Japanese self-the unsullied, sublime, imperial essence. For
such an essence to be sullied by the representation of Japan as a
terrorist state, or a "rapist state," is utterly abhorrent. The other
crucial question for Japanese nationalists is also one that they
fear to express and can only repress and articulate in distorted
form: the resentment over the long-continuing military and stra-
tegic dependence on the United States. One may well wonder
how this new attempt to articulate a positive, pure Japanese
identity will in due course address these two questions.
Fujioka and his colleagues have launched the debate into
new waters by the way that they have constructed and attempted
to confer respectability upon a new notion of Japan as unfettered
good, de-linked (so far) from traditional formulations of Japa-
nese identity centered upon the emperor and under the cloak of
liberalism. The ideological mix looks unstable and its prospects
unpredictable. Sooner or later, the nationalist forces currently
supporting Fujioka in his distorted and limited evocation of
nationalist themes are bound to turn to confront the contradic-
tions and inconsistencies in it. When that happens, we will see
what lies beneath the thin veneer of liberalism that cloaks Japa-
nese right-wing nationalism in this, its newest guise.
It is not necessarily worrying that post-cold war Japan
should show such evidence of a strong desire to articulate a
Japanese identity in which past, present, and future could be
meaningfully integrated around a core that could command the
loyalty of its own people and the respect of the world, for that
desire is universal. What is really disturbing is rather the fact that
liberalism and rationalism are used as a cloak for a mode of
reasoning that is both antiliberal and antirational, and that a mode
of politics, which has disturbing echoes of the violent and
intolerant 1930s and which chooses to label as "antinational" or
"masochistic" that with which it disagrees and to victimize those
very same women who were among the most abject victims of
the militarism of a half-century ago, should have emerged as a
significant national movement in late twentieth-century Japan.
Notes
1. Ooka Shoheishu, Chikuma gendai bungaku taikei, Vol. 69 (Tokyo:
Chikuma Shobo, 1975), p. 50.
2. Fujioka Nobukatsu, Ojoku no kin-gendaishi (Tokyo: Tokwna Shoten,
1996), p. 30.
3. Even the fonner Governor of Tokyo, Suzuki Shoo'ichi, was rumored
to be on this list (Hasegawa Hiroshi, "Suzuki zen to-chiji mo risuto
koho," Aero, 30 December 1996 to 6 January 1997,pp. 10-11. See also
Joji Shingo, "Kyu Nihon-gWl kankeisha Bei e nyukoku kinshi," Asahi
shimbun, 23 December 1996.
4. The question of Washington's motives is complex. Suffice it to say
here that concern for the human rights of the women was unlikely to
have figured high among its priorities.
5. See my The Emptiness ofJapanese Affluence (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.
Sharpe, 1996), p. 275.
6. For discussion of these details see: Inoue Sumio, "Chiho gikai 0
arasou 'kusanone de hoshuha' no shitsooen,"Shukan kinyobi, 28 March
1997, pp. 22-25; Suzuki Yuko, '"Jiyushugi shikan' tonaeru yokaita-
chi," Shukan kinyobi, 31 January 1997, p. 11; Nakamura Seiji, "Rekishi
kyokasho kaizan ha to uyoku jimuyaku," Shukan kinyobi, 14 March
1997, pp. 22-25
7. Fujioka Nobukatsu, Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi (History not taught
in textbooks), 3 vols. (Tokyo: Fusosha and Sankei Shimbun, 1996-97).
8. Fujioka Nobukatsu, Ojoku no kin-gendaishi.
9. See Takahashi Shiro inSapio, 15 January 1997, p. 97.
10. Tomoko Otake, "Row over Denial ofSex Slaves Rages," The Japan
Times, 28 December 1996.
11. Kobayashi Hideo, "Ajia to kyocho shite koso han'ei ha aru," Sekai,
May 1997, pp. 200-205, at p. 205.
12. From a report of the fmUlding meeting ofthe group on2 December
1996: Kajimum Taichiro, "Yurushigatai 'Nihon yuetsu shikan'," Shu-
kan kinyobi, 13 December 1996, pp. 16-17.
13. Fujioka Nobukatsu, Ojoku no kin-gendaishi, p. 30.
14. Fujioka Nobukatsu, ''Han-Nichi kyoiku Satian dasshutsu no ki,"
Shincho. July 1996, quoted in Hayashi Miyayuki, '"Jiyushugi shikan'
tojo no haikei to sono keifu," Tsukuru, March 1997, pp. 90-99, at p. 90.
15. Fujioka Nobukatsu, "Sex Slave Issue Is a Scandal Invented to Bash
Japan," Asahi Evening News, 26 January 1997.
16. Fujioka Nobukatsu, ''Ianfu kyosei renko kyoko no shomei," Part 1,
Gendai kyoikugaku, November 1996, quoted in Suzuki, '" Jiyushugi
shikan' tonaeru yokaitachi," p. 11.
17. Fujioka Nobukatsu, "Sex Slave Issue." The adjectives he uses
repeatedly in his Japanese texts are: "koshoku, inmn, guretsu," more
directly translated as "lascivious, depraved, idiotic." Fujioka Nobu-
katsu, Ojoku no kin-gendaishi, p. 27.
18. Hata lkuhiko, ''Iwayuru 'sampa' ha ikanishite ianfu 0 seiiki to
kashita no ka?" Sapio, 15 January 1997, pp. 87-89.
19. Hata Ikuhiko, "JUgWl ianfu mondai de kuni no hoteki sekinin ha
toenai," in Sekai, May 1997, pp. 322-25, at p. 325. Hata, like Fujioka,
seems to have oodergone a transformation in his thinking, because he
is on record in 1985 as holding the view that 70 to 80 percent of the
women were "called up" in a way "approximating to forced labour, but
without written records because they were supernumeraries." (Nihon
rikungun no han: Ssokaisetsu, quoted in Tawara Yoshiftuni, ''Fujioka
Nobukatsu shi no kyokasho kogeki no sajutsu 0 abaku."Shukan kinyobi,
9 May 1997, pp. 30-33, at p. 31.
20. Fujioka Nobukatsu, "Ajia no ianfu mondai no kyoko: Indonesia
genchi chosa hoka kara aburidasu," Sapio, 11 December 1996, pp.
102-105, at p. 104.
21. Fujioka, Ojoku, pp. 25-26; also his ''Mombu daijin e no !rokai
shokan," Voice, October 1996, pp. 72-81, at p. 76. The analogy is
repeated in Hata Ikuhiko, ''Ianfu 'minouebanashi' 0 tettei kensho sum,"
inShokun, December 1996, pp. 54-69, at p. 55.
22. Rata, ''IwaylUU 'sampa' ha ikanishite ianfu 0 seiiki to kashita no ka?"
23. Nishio Kanji and Fujioka Nobukatsu, Kokumin no yudan (Tokyo:
PHP, 1996), p. 150.
24. Nishio a n j ~ 'Waitsuzekka wa seija janai," Ronza, Novanber 1995,
and ''K.otonaru higeki,"Bunge; shunju, 1994, quoted inKajimum Taichiro,
"Rekishi kaizanshugi ha chisei e no botoku de aru," Sekai, July 1997,
pp. 72-84, at p. 80.
25. Fujioka Nobukatsu in Sankei shimbun, 27 September 1996, quoted
in Suzuki, '" Jiyushugi shikan' tonaeru yokaitachi," p. 11.
26. On the eugenics, see Kaneko-Martin, ''Nazi Doitsu to tennosei
Nihon ga kokuji suru chi no shinwa to kokka shiso," Shukan kinyobi,
14 February 1997, pp. 26-29.
Bulletin ofConcemedAsian Scholars 22
27. Kajimura, ''Rekishi kaizanshugi ha chisei e no botoku de aru," p. 80.
28. The Communist Party-affiliated "Minsei," not the "New Left." See
Fujioka, Ojoku, p. 91.
29. Fujioka Nobukatsu, "Ikkoku heiwashugi no moto de sodatta watashi
ga... genba no tondemonai kiki ni ki ga shimasu," Sapio, 9 October
1996, pp. 104-107.
30. For interesting comments on Fujioka's career by his Tokyo Univer-
sity sempai and by Horio Teruhisa, current president of the Nihon
Kyoiku Gakkai, see the interview with Horio in Shukan kinyobi, 31
January 1997, pp. 15-19.
31. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (London: Allen Lane, 1978).
32. Richard Minear, Victor sJustice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1971).
33. Fujioka, Ojoku, pp. 96-97, and, for his brief discussion with Minear,
pp. 101-107.
34. Ishibashi in his journal Toyo Keizai, 1921 (quoted in Sakamoto
Tatsuhiko, "Meiji Taisho no shimbun ni arawareta 'shinryaku' ," Shukan
kinyobi, 4 April 1997, pp. 24-27, at p. 26); on Shiba, see Kunihiro
Masao, "Nihon kareobana ron no naka de saku 'jiyushugi shikan' to iu
adabana," Shukan kinyobi, 14 February 1997, pp. 22-24, at p. 23 (and
sources cited there).
35. Nakamura Masanori, Kin gendaishi 0 do miruka: Shiba shikan 0 tou
(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1997), Iwanami Bukkuretto, no. 427, p. 51.
36. Horio's assessment in Shukan kinyobi, 31 January 1997, p. 18.
37. Sato Akira, "Kore ga uyoku no kogeki to kyohaku no itoguchi da,"
Shukan kinyobi, 21 March 1997, pp. 26-29, at p. 26.
38. "Okayama kengikai ga saitaku,"Asahi shimbun, 18 December 1996.
39. Inoue, "Chiho gikai 0 arasou 'kusanone de hoshuha' no shitsunen,"
pp.22-25.
40. Suzuki, '''Jiyushugi shikan' tonaeru yokaitacbi," p. 11.
41. Quoted inPierreVidal-Naquel,A&Ytmins qfMemory: Essays antheDenial
qftheHolocaust (New Yorlc Columbia University Press, 1992), p. xiii.
42. See the interesting discussion by the social psychologist Miyaji
Shinji, "Seijuku shakai ni shinkuro dekizu kyoko no rekishi ni sugaru
oyaji," Asahi shimbun, 27 March 1997.
43. Nishio Kanji, on "Asamade" late-night television, TV Asahi, 1
February 1997. (See comments by Nakamura Seiji, "Rekishi kyokasho
kaizanha to uyoku jinmyaku," Shukan kinyobi, 14 March 1997, pp.
22-25, at p. 25.)
44. Nakamura Masanori, "'Nihon kaiki' yondome no nami," Mainichi
shimbun, 4 February 1997. (English translation by John Morris, on
"H-Japan" [Internet], 14 February 1997).
45. Sato Manabu, "Taiwa no kairo 0 tozasbita rekishikan 0 do kokufuku
suru ka" (Zadandai discussion with various others), Sekai, May 1997,
pp.185-199,atp.186
46. Ishida Takeshi, interviewed by Utsumi Aiko, "Ishitsu na tasha no
shiteno fumaeterekishio miru,"Gekkan 011lta, March 1997, pp. 15-19.
(English translation as ''Looking at History through the Eyes of the
Other,"inAmpo: Japan-Asia Quarlerly Review 27, no. 4 [1997]: 32-37).
47. Soh Kyong-sik, "Jiyushugishi gurupu ni hangeki suru," Shukan
kinyobi, 7 February 1997, p. 26.
48. Kunihiro, "Nihon kareobana ron no nakade saku 'jiyushugi shikan'
to iu adabana," p. 23.
49. Foundation statement of the "Society for 1lJe Making of New School
Textbooks in History," 2 December 1996. See Nishio Kanji, "Atarashii
rekishikyokasho no amsoi," Voice, February 1997,pp. 108-27, atpp. 110-11.
50. Quoted in John Vachon, "Text Uses Whitewash to TurnHistory into
Propaganda," Asahi Evening News, 8 December 1996.
o
In the Name of the Emperor
The Rape of Nanjing
Produced by ChrIstine Choy and Nancy Tong
(producer and co-producer of
Who Killed Vlncent Chin)
" ... bears witness to humanity's seemingly unlim-
ited capacityJor inhuman behavior. "
-New York TImes
" ... incisive, crttically important documentary."
-Film Journal International
"It is hoped 'In the Name oj the Emperor' will be
seen by as many people as possible. "
-The AsIan Wall Street Journal
SpecIal Jury Award, San Francisco International Film Festival, 1995
Human RIghts Watch International Film Festival, 1995
AsIan AmerIcan International Film Festival. 1995
Hong Kong International Film Festival, 1995
52 mInutes Sale $295. Rental $75.
Available now from Filmakers LIbrary, 124 East 40th Street, New York. NY 10016 USA
Call or wrIte for 1998 catalog: 1-212-808-4980. E-mail: info@ftlmakers.com
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998) 23
Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars. Vol. 30, No.2 (1998): 24-29
The History Textbook Controversy and Nationalism
This article examines the origins of critics' claims that history textbooks in middle schools and high schools
in Japan do nothing but slander Japan and present a gloomy, "self-tormenting historical perspective. " The
study is set against the backdrop of a new version ofthe "Return to Japan" phenomenon, which began as a
reaction to the Civilization and Enlightenment movement at the start of the Meiji period. The author focuses
attention on the arguments of the "Liberal Historiography Study Group," observing that they are highly
ideological and present a distorted view of both contemporary Japan and modem p n e s e history. "What
is the role of historians and teachers in all ofthis?" The author answers that "we must face up to the facts of
history and openly communicate past successes and failures to students .... [T]here is no shame in failure itself.
Rather, it is shameful not to study past failures or to falsify them and so distort the historical consciousness
of the Japanese people. "
by Nakamura Masanori, translated by Kristine Dennehy"
Over the past several years, there have been increasingly
vocal demands to revise modem and contemporary Japanese
history education. Critics claim that middle- and high-school
history textbooks do nothing but slander Japan and present a
gloomy, "self-tonnenting historical perspective" ("jigyaku shi-
kan "). Such an education, they say, prohibits Japanese children
from taking pride in their country's history and does not allow
them to foster a sound nationalism. They add, "Citizens who do
not have a sense of pride in their own country will not gain world
respect." Why have such assertions emerged? There are many
reasons; however, I believe the basic cause is that the desire for
a stronger Japanese identity and nationalism has increased after
a half century in the postwar era.
Historically, since the Meiji period (1868-1912), there has
been a cycle every three decades or so moving from Western-
ization to provincialism, internationalism to nationalism, and
back again. It has been over thirty years now since philosopher
Miyakawa Toro called attention to this "Return to Japan" phe-
nomenon. According to Miyakawa, the first wave of provincial-
ism and nationalism came in 1890-1900 as a reaction to the
Civilization and Enlightenment movement at the start of the
Meiji period. Representative thinkers of that period included
Kuga Katsunan, Miyake Setsurei, Shiga Shigetaka, and Taka-
yama Chogyu. The second wave responded to the cosmopolitan-
ism and democratic mood that bridged the end of the Taisho
period (1912-1926) and the beginning of Showa (1926-1989).
Watsuji Tetsuro, Nishida Kitaro, Suzuki Daisetsu, and the ideas
Thanks to John Morris for translating the frrst section of this essay
and for bringing it to our attention via the Internet discussion group H-Asia.
and arguments of the Japan Romantic School and the Kyoto
School represent these nationalistic currents ofthe 1930s. The third
wave of the "Return to Japan" movement arose in the 1950s and
1960s 1 as a backlash against the internationalism and Americanism
following the Second World War, exemplified by Kuwabara
Takeo and Takeyama Michio's revisionist theories of Japanese
culture, and Hayashi Fusao's "Afftnnation of the Greater East
Asia War." The poet Hagiwara Sakutaro coined the term "Return
to Japan" at that time. Here I will mention only Ishihara Shin-
taro's The Japan that Can Say "No" and the recent diatribes of
Nishio Kanji and Fujioka Nobukatsu.
Common to all four waves of this "Return to Japan" phe-
nomenon are a re-evaluation of tradition, a belief in the supe-
riority of the Japanese race (minzoku), and a call to revive the
role of the Japanese State. In some ways, this cycle of national-
ism is like a "law of motion" distinctive to modem Japan. I
believe that in a few more years things will calm down; however,
even so, we cannot ignore this current trend. In partiCUlar these
most recent tendencies have started to exert a great influence in the
realm of history education for middle and high school students.
What is different about today's "Returnto Japan"? First and
foremost is the collapse of socialism and a decline in the influ-
ence of Marxist ideology. Postwar historiography was domi-
nated by Marxist interpretations and the influence of scholars
such as Otsuka Hisao and Maruyama Masao who studied the
relationships among the individual, society, and the state. Many
early postwar historians also faulted the Emperor-centered view
ofhistory for contributing to the Asia-Pacific War. Their assump-
tions are now being questioned.
Second, not only are today's students a "generation igno-
rant of war," more significantly they are a "generation ignorant
This illus1Jation, taken from a 1941 children's picture book, shows
the signers of the Tripartite Pact Mussolini, Hitler, and Konoe Fwni-
mam, Japan's Prime Minister in 1940. (Source: Nor/oKuboi, Nihon no
shinryaku sennsou toAjia no kodomo, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1996, p. 81.)
of poverty." All they have ever known is a life of abundance and
they believe that Japan is a good country. Even after the burst of
the economic bubble, students still think that Japan is better off
than other countries. Furthennore, this is a generation raised on
television and comic books, to whom concepts such as "struc-
ture" and the "laws of history" no longer appeal. There has also
been a generational shift among middle- and high-school teach-
ers. The majority were born after the period of high-speed
economic growth and have experienced neither war nor postwar
poverty. Teachers and students are becoming increasingly simi-
lar in this regard. This change in the educational environment is
so great as to be beyond my powers of imagination.
Third, postwar Japanese history has been called a history
of Americanization due to the OVerwhelmingly strong ties with
the United States. In recent years, Americans have grown more
critical ofJapan and the Japanese more resentful of this criticism.
For over half a century, the Japanese government and business
i" world have been at the beck and call of the United States.
t Whenever trade friction intensifies, there is a rise in "Japan
I bashing" and threats are made to invoke Super 301 sanctions.
' During the Persian Gulf War, despite Japan's contribution of $13
' billion, President Bush and the Sultan of Kuwait made no men-
, tion of Japan in their declarations of appreciation. The cancella-
} tion of the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian Museum in 1995
under pressure from u.s. veterans' organizations only added to
the feelings among the Japanese people that they were being
treated unfairly. It seems to me that these underlying feelings of
unfair treatment are behind the rapid increase in statements by
I
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
some conservative politicians and scholars, saying that they
reject a view of World War II that the Axis powers-Japan,
Gennany, and Italy-were 100 percent wrong and the Allied
powers (particularly the United States) were 100 percent right.
The recent controversies over bases in Okinawa have also high-
lighted feelings of injustice following consistent discrimination
against Okinawans by the U.S. and Japanese governments in the
postwar period.
Recent calls for a revision of history education thus have
deep roots, and an inquiry into such calls must include an analysis
of the changing national sentiment of the Japanese people and
their assumptions about Japanese history. Discussion must di-
rectly confront hard issues and also occur where many people
will read or hear about it. I learned this lesson from a commen-
tator at a symposium in Yokohama in December 1996, on "Con-
sidering the Tokyo Trials-What Wasn't Judged." After I gave
a presentation entitled "The Tokyo Trials and Contemporary
Japanese History," and criticized Fujioka Nobukatsu (Fujioka
was also a panelist, and was seated next to me), I received about
twenty comments from the audience. One read as follows:
At this stage, Fujioka is no longer simply a troublemaker. Rather the
problem is that most people, and the YOlmger generation in particu-
lar, are influenced by his opinions. Given your responsibility as an
historian, if you limit yourself simply to writing good essays and
books, youcan't oppose the influence ofFujiokaand otherslike him.
Their recent actions are not just a passjng fad.
Certainly, just to criticize Fujioka is not the end of the matter. If
we do not also seriously question the substance of contemporary
and modern Japanese history along with history education, we
will make no progress.
"Liberal Historiography Study Group"
Attention to the arguments of the "Liberal Historiography
Study Group" shows that they are highly ideological and insist
on a distorted view of both contemporary Japan and modem
Japanese history. A good example ofthis is Fujioka Nobukatsu's
Shameful Modem History.2 In this book, Fujioka says that "cur-
rent history textbooks are filled with a self-tonnenting and
anti-Japanese view of history." But this is a warped, one-sided
assertion. As is common knowledge, the Ministry of Education
must first certify elementary, middle, and high school history
textbooks before they are adopted for use in Japanese schools. If
all history textbooks were laden with this self-tonnenting anti-
Japanese view of history, they would not be authorized by the
Ministry of Education. Anyone who knows the details of the
Ienaga Saburo textbook trials understands this.
However, because descriptions of the "comfort women"
appeared simultaneously in all middle school history textbooks
slated for use in April 1997, Fujioka became enraged and met
directly with the Minister of Education (it is said that fonner
prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro facilitated the meeting), and
petitioned for the removal of mention of the comfort women
from the textbooks. Once a textbook has been authorized, dele-
tions are never made and so, as expected, the petition was denied
on the grounds that the descriptions were accurate. Ifthe Ministry
of Education had accepted Fujioka's request, there would have
been a stonn ofprotest domestically, which probably would have
escalated into an international problem.
Fujioka is fighting a battle in which the mainstream of the
chief conservative political party, the LOP, has already conceded
25
alltheimportantterritory. Inarecent interviewwithareporter
fromtheAsahi Shinbun, formerSecretary-GeneralKonoYohei,
whilenotnamingany names,disputedtheclaimsofFujiokain
detail.
3
Kono pointedtoextant public documents whichprove
thatthe Japanese army participated inthe round-up, transport,
and movementofthecomfortwomenand clearly demonstrate
thevalidityoftheex-comfortwomen'stestimony. AsKonoput
it, these are "facts which could only be spokenabout by vici-
tims."Thesamedocumentsshowthateventhoughmostofthe
womenmay nothavebeen literally hunteddownandcaptured
as slaves, an analysisoftherecrutimentproceduresshowsthat
(1)therecruiterscontrolledthewomenwithloanmoneyupfront,
(2) they tricked them by promising them goodjobs, (3) they
threatened thewomenwith armedforce, and (4) somewomen
were kidnapped andabductedby force. Thiscorrespondswith
the results ofinvestigation by distinguished scholars such as
YoshimiYoshiaki.4
Indefianceofthis,the"Committeeto Write NewHistory
Textbooks"setupinDecember1996andrepresentedbyFujioka
andNishioKanji,declaredthatinthetextbooktheywillproduce,
there will not be one line about the comfort women, and no
attempttowrite aboutthe Nanjing massacreorUnit731. Fur-
thermore, Fujiokaargues that the GreaterEast Asia War was
partlyawarofself-defenseand,intheend,ithelpedliberateAsia
from Westernimperialism.
Inshort,theirstanceismalechauvinistic,ethnocentric,and
showsacompletedisregardforhumanrights.Moreover,itisnot
liberal. Recently, in an essay called "'Strong State' 'Weak
State'," I wrotethat"regardlessofEastorWest, theessence
ofliberalismisthedesirefora 'weakstate.,5Ifstateinterven-
tion is called upon to accomplish one's task, use ofthe term
liberalismismeaningless."Itcanbesaidwithoutreservationthat
theLiberalHistoriographyStudyGrouphasturnedintoanationalist
group.
Whatis ShibaRyotaro'sViewofHistory?
Why,then,doesanyonelistentothisgroup?Onereasonis
Fujioka'sclaimtobeextendingtheworkofShibaRyotaro,who
passedawayin 1996.Fujiokahaswrittenthat"ifIhadn'tcome
across theworksofShibaRyotaro, Ithink itwouldhavebeen
difficulttoremovemyselffromthespellbindingpowerofpost-
warhistory education.,,6 Shiba'sworksofhistoricalfiction and
criticism have had unparalled influence onthe historical con-
sciousness ofthe Japanese people.
7
Fujioka wants to capture
someofShiba'spopularity. However,thisepigonehastakenup
thewiseman'sgoodpoints, and distorted andexaggeratedthe
badpoints. Fujioka'smainargumentis nothingmorethansec-
ondhandknowledgeofShibaRyotaro.
FujiokaisrighttoseeShibaascrucialinshapingJapanese
people's views ofhistory. Following the advice I received in
Yokohama,IdecidedtoanalyzeShiba'sviewsinordertounder-
standhowmostJapanesethinkaboutJapanesehistory. Inbrief,
Shiba'sviewofhistory canbecharacterizedasasimpledichot-
omy between "brightMeiji" and "darkShowa." Shibapraised
theMeijiperiod(1868-1912)andcriticizedpresurrenderShowa
(1926-1945). This view ofmodemhistory restsonhis experi-
encesofwaranddefeat.FukudaTeiichi(Shiba'srealname)was
twenty-two when the warwas lost. Shiba has said thatat that
time he thought, "Whendid the Japanese become so foolish?
Whohasmadesuchamessofthisnationandmadethispeople
(minzoku) sopitiful?Thiswasthestartingpointofmynovels."
Aroundagethirty-five,hestartedreadingdocumentsandgath-
eringdata, andthetheme ofhiswritingforthe rest ofhislife
became,"WhoaretheJapanesepeople?EvenifShowawasno
good,Meiji wasdifferent." Inthisway Shibashowedhissym-
pathiestowardthosewhoshapedtheMeijiperiod. AfterShiba
wroteRyoma ga yuku (Ryoma steps forth) and Saka no ue no
kumo (Reaching for the sky), he said, "IfSakamoto Ryoma
8
hadn'tbeenborn,Japanesehistorywouldhavebeenverydiffer-
ent. WhydidJapanwinoverasuperpowerlikeRussiain 1905?
Therationalismandrealismof Meiji.TheMeijiStatewasgood.
Itwasgoodupuntilthattime."Butthingschangedfortheworse
afterJapanwontheRusso-JapaneseWar. "WinningtheRusso-
Japanese War brought on the disease ofimperialism and the
dreadfulencounterwith militarism. Onalargerscale,the sub-
sequentexperiencesanddestructionofthePacificWarwasthe
priceoftheRusso-Japanesevictory.,,9
InKono kun; no katachi (Theshapeofthiscountry),Shiba
wrotethatthefortyyearsfromthejingoisticHibiyariotsof1905
untilthedefeatin 1945wasatimeof"abnormalgestation"and
theArmy General Staffwasthe"devilinthewomb." In short,
from the time ofvictory in the Russo-Japanese war, modem
Japanesehistoryveeredfromitstruecourseandenteredanage
DESCRIPTIONOF
THENANJINGATROCITIES
An example of textbook screening concerning the Nanjing
(Nanking) massacre:
Descriptioninthetextbookmanuscript
Inunediately after the occupation ofNanking, the Japanese
Anny killed numerous Chinese soldiers and citizens. This
incidentcametobeknownastheNankingMassacre.
Screeningexaminer'scomment(suggestedrevision)
Readers might interpretthis description as meaning that the
Japanese Anny unilaterally massacredChinese immediately
aftertheoccupation. Thispassageshouldberevisedsothatit
isnotintetpretedinthatway.
ProfessorIenaga'sassertion
The facts oftheNanking Massacreby the Japanesemilitary
forces weremade knownthrough newsreportsjustafterthe
incidentandthroughdocumentssubmittedduring theTokyo
WarCrimesTrials. Sincethen, moredetailedfacts havebe-
comewidelyknownamongtheJapanesepeople.
Outcomeofthescreening
ProfessorIenagareluctantlyrevisedtheexpressionasfollows:
"While battling the fierce resistance ofthe Chinese armed
forces, the JapaneseAnny occupiedNanking andkillednu-
merousChinesesoldiersandcitizens.Thisincidentcametobe
knownastheNankingMassacre."
Source: Truth in Textbooks, Freedom in Education and Peace for
Children: The Struggle against Censorship of School Textbooks in
Japan (Tokyo: National League forSupport ofthe SchoolTextbook
ScreeningSuit, 1995),p. 13.
Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars 26
of discontinuity. In addition, by calling the General Staff the
"devil in the womb," Shiba imagined an evil and different nation
from the "good" modem Japan born in the Meiji era-the Su-
preme Command nation. The Supreme Command was the high-
est military authority and throughout the Meiji era it was appro-
priately subordinate to civilian authority. This is in large part due
to the wisdom of Meiji-era elder statesmen such as Yamagata
Aritomo and Ito Hirobumi. However, in the 1930s, Japan became
a "supreme command nation." Many Japanese thought that the
1930 London Naval Treaty violated the "independence of the
supreme command," and some ultranationalists even physically
attacked domestic critics of the doctrine ofunchallengeable state
power, such as Minobe Tatsukichi, who argued that the Emperor
was only part of the Japanese state. "From then on, Showa was
headed toward ruin," Shiba argued. 10
Shiba also said that Showa was a spiritually unhealthy age
that turned into madness. Accordingly, he never made up the age
of Showa the subject of his novels. For sixteen years, he com-
piled information on the Nomonhan Incident, but never actually
wrote about it. Or rather, he could not write about it. As is
commonly known, in the 1939 Nomonhan Incident, the Kwan-
tung Army used all of its power in a confrontation with the
Russian Army but was overwhelmed by the mechanized forces
under the command of General Zhukhov. Of the 58,925 men sent
into action, there were 19,786 casualties (33.5 percent). During
the final battle at the end of August, the 23rd division of 15,140
soldiers suffered 10,297 casualties (68 percent). This casualty
rate of seven in ten was an enormous defeat unprecedented in
military history. Just before the battle the staff officers from
Tokyo and Hsinking (present-day Changchun) had said publicly,
"We have known of the stupidity of those Russians since the
Russo-Japanese War. If we charge, they will flee."ll To Shiba,
the battle of Nomonhan exemplified the irrationality of the
Japanese army which ignored technology and relied far too much
on a "Japanese fighting spirit."
Shiba's criticism of the war was severe in other ways as well.
His views on the Pacific War are summed up in "The Japanese
People's Twenty-first Century," in The Shape a/This Country:
The "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was of course a
euphemism. To risk destroying one's own country for the sake of
other Asian countries, in effect, to kill oneself out of benevolence is
a mad national sentiment unheard ofin any country's past, including
Japan. The real objective ofthe Southem Advance strategy-that is,
the strategic plan for the Greater East Asia War-was to procure oil
needed to continue the war in China. The aim was to control the oil
fields of Borneo and Swnatra in Dutch-occupied Indonesia. While
the intention was not to seize territory, nonetheless Japan caused
great hann to many other peoples [minzoku] and conducted a war of
aggression. Some say that the war was a catalyst for the inde-
pendence of Southeast Asian countries in the postwar period, but
even so the true intent was to secure oil. And to protect that
acquisition, Japan attacked the United States and Great Britain and
went on to set up military bases in many locations. If Japan truly had
such virtuous plans to liberate colonized lands, then first they would
have had to free Korea and Taiwan. 12
There is a significant gap between Fujioka Nobukatsu's
view that the Greater East Asia War was a war of self-defense
and Asian liberation and Shiba Ryotaro's view that the Pacific
War was a war of aggression. Shiba wrote of a "sense of pain in
Showa history" that is missing in Fujioka'S view. The essence of
Fujioka's ultranationalism is seen most clearly in the way he
deliberately distorts Shiba's views in order to attract a large
audience.
I do not want to give the impression that I agree with Shiba
on all points either. It is readily apparent that while Shiba lauds
the Meiji period, he disparages Showa, but cannot precisely
grasp the whole structure of modem Japanese history simply by
contrasting "bright Meiji" and "dark Showa." Because the main
institutions of Taisho and Showa were formed during Meiji, it is
too simplistic to posit a great discontinuity and rupture between
Meiji and Showa. Also, we should not overlook the huge change
in international relations during the 1920s and 1930s. Or, to put
it another way, in every age, there are bright and dark sides. There
are bright things in Meiji that turned dark in Showa and the
reverse is also true. Modem Japanese history is not so simple that
it can be grasped merely by a literary contrast of "bright Meiji"
and "dark Showa." Thus, Shiba's view of Japanese history con-
tains problems too.
To give one example, Shiba's view that the Supreme Com-
mand expanded from the beginning of the Showa period, creat-
ing a qualitative change in the Japanese nation that transformed
it into something totally different is not accurate. Actually, the
supporting ideology and system of the Supreme Command was
formulated during the Meiji period, (with the creation ofthe 1878
independent General Staff, the 1882 Imperial Rescript to Sol-
diers and Sailors, the 1893 independent military command, and
the 1900 stipulation that the war minister had to be an active-duty
officer). Because Shiba's historical view disregards such events,
he can say that a sudden dark change came about in the Showa
period, but actually the seeds of Showa's failure already were
being cultivated in the era of "bright Meiji."
Conversely, Shiba claims that when citizens gathered in
Hibiya Park to protest the Portsmouth Treaty on 5 September
1905 the Japanese people became "crazed" and from then on
history went downhill. But Yoshino Sakuzo, a leader of the
Taisho democracy movement, saw things very differently. In his
view, this mass gathering of citizens marked the moment when
the Japanese people dramatically entered the political stage and
so made democracy possible.
13
The high point of Taisho democ-
racy is debated among historians and there are many theories,
but I side with those who use the period from 1905 until the
demise of party politics in 1932 (when Prime Minister Inukai
Tsuyoshi was assassinated and no other party politician felt
secure enough to form a new Cabinet). In economic terms as
well, after the depression following the Russo-Japanese War, the
outbreak of World War I resulted in a sudden improvement in
Japan's economy, not a downturn. This interpretation would
mean a "bright Taisho" sandwiched between darker Meiji and
Showaeras.
As shown above, even a brief examination reveals a number
ofweak points and flaws in Shiba's understanding ofmodem and
contemporary Japanese history. Shiba's historical consciousness
can be characterized in the following way: he depicts a "bright"
Meiji, the brightness of which is necessary to compensate for the
bleak image he has constructed of early Showa (1926-1945).
Moreover, he dates the "fall" of Japan to the years following the
Russo-Japanese War, and accordingly finds little of value in the
Taisho period. Fujioka Nobukatsu follows this aspect of Shiba's
interpretation of modem Japanese history. He imitates Shiba
when he boasts about his theory of "The forty-year cycle of
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998) 27
modern Japanese histoxy," in which the first forty years ofMeiji are
an age of progress and the next forty years are an age of decline.
Given this view, the Liberal Historiography Study Group, despite
its name, ignores the most liberal age in modern Japanese histoxy,
the period of Taisho democracy.
Toward tbe Construction of a New National Vision
In today 's world, the European Union, NAFTA, APEC, and
the like, all indicate the advance of regional integration on a
global scale. Yet, as we enter an age of conflict between nation-
alism and internationalism, we are faced with the paradox that
the waves ofnationalism have gotten stronger. Just as the global
economic depression at the end ofthe nineteenth centuxy ushered
in an age of global imperialism and nationalism, the end of the
twentieth century has brought about the rise of nationalism
throughout the world. Groups in England and France call for a
"Return to Western Europe," while in Germany some historians
argue that Nazi war crimes were not unusually terrible and right-
wing thugs regularly attack Turkish and other foreign workers. In
China, The China that Can Say "No" was a 1.4 million-copy
bestseller and a demand for a "Return to China" has emerged
there as well. According to Japanese newspaper reports, Tai-
wan's President Lee Teng-hui has stressed the need to overcome
the "Guomindang view of history," and has called for education
aimed at strengthening the national identity of the Taiwanese
people. And Australian Prime Minister John Howard faced
protests by historians there when he proclaimed that the coun-
try's histoxy should be portrayed in a more positive light. In sum,
since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of
socialism, the Pandora's box of nationalism has been opened.
The same thing is happening in Japan. The economy has
been in a quagmire of recession ever since the bubble economy
burst in 1991. Politically as well, with the collapse of the "1955
system" there is clearly a deadlock in the "Japanese-made sys-
tem" of power sharing among political parties, bureaucrats, and
big business that has operated for half-a-centuxy now. The search
for a way out of this quagmire has prompted strident demands for a
view ofhistory centered on"national interests" and for a"nationalistic
historical perspective" that promotes pride in Japan's history.
In other words, the grand tale of Japan as an economic
superpower and the world's most stable political system has
already lost its power of persuasion over Japanese citizens.
While no new tale of equal force has been proposed by the left
wing, right wing, or moderates, the right-wing conservative
faction has come closest with its reactionary tale that miscon-
strues and falsifies the past. At the same time, the Japanese right
seeks to construct a political system that would allow for a
detrimental revision of Japan's constitution, a stronger national
defense, and the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces.
In short, while they claim to be making Japan a "nonnal country,"
they are seeking to construct an economic and military super-
power. In the face of this, Japanese opposition forces paint a
vision ofthe nation that would block such constitutional revision,
reduce the military, and construct a welfare state.
Although nationalistic sentiment is becoming stronger in
countries around the world, I do not think such trends will
continue for long. My thinking is not based on the ahistorical
view that the twenty-first centuxy will inevitably bring about a
collision of the' cultures of East and West. Rather, Japan's his-
torical experience, as I said at the outset, is one in which ages of
cosmopolitanism alternate with ages of ultranationalism. How-
ever, this is not inevitable, unlike a law of nature. Thorough
criticism is imperative in order to prevent a rise in ultranational-
ism. In the 1960s, when Hayashi Fusao proposed the "Theoxy
affirming the Greater East Asia War," many historians, politi-
cians, and philosophers joined together in protest and the power
of their influential critique lasted for several years. The main
reason was that Hayashi's statements themselves could not hold
up under historical scrutiny. But even so, if there had been no
organized counterattack, his theories would have had longer-lasting
influence. The same is true for this "Fourth Return to Japan."
As we approach the twenty-first century, the competition
over history textbooks is a cultural war, not only about Japan's
past but also about its future. This is the relevant context for
understanding Fujioka'S attacks on the inclusion of descriptions
about the comfort women in middle school textbooks. At first,
historians, politicians, middle- and high-school teachers were
slow to react but gradually denunciations of Fujioka appeared,
growing in power in 1997. Academic journals and monthly and
weekly magazines such as Rekishi Hyoron (History Criticism),
Kyoiku (Education), Sekai (World), Kikan-Senso Sekinin Ken-
kyu (Quarterly War Responsibility Research), and Shukan Kin-
yohi (Friday Weekly) have been especially critical of the Liberal
Historiography Study Group.
At first, prefectural and local government assemblies in
some areas acceded to the demands of conservative factions to
delete descriptions about the comfort women (the Okayama
Prefecture assembly and nine others). But since the beginning of
1997, there has been a sharp decrease in the number of assem-
blies that have met such demands. For example, in the Aomori
prefectural assembly, opposition leaders forcefully challenged
and defeated conservatives' attempts to pass a resolution that
attacked new middle school textbooks that mentioned the com-
fort women and the Nanjing massacre. They rejected the argu-
ment that "the government should not recognize and should
quickly move to correct textbooks that are infused with a self-
tormenting historical perspective and denies there is anything
good in prewar Japanese history." Additionally, although similar
petitions were submitted to each city council of Kanagawa
prefecture, none was adopted. Likewise, many city councils in
Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Okayama, and Kagoshima prefectures
rej ected similar petitions because of great opposition. According
to Japanese press accounts through I August 1997, with 231
petititions to retain discussion of the comfort women in text-
books versus a mere twenty-eight advocating removal, the con-
servative campaign has ended in complete failure.
A notable moment in the midst of all these barrages and
counter-offensives was the 1 February 1997 television Asahi
broadcast "Live TV 'til dawn" (1 :00-5:00 AM.). The diverse
participants included, on one side, Hata Ikuhiko (historian),
Nishio Kanji (representative of the Committee to Write New
History Textbooks), Fujioka Nobukatsu, and Kobayashi Yoshi-
nori (cartoon artist). The other side included Yoshimi Yoshiaki
(Chuo University professor), Uesugi Satoshi (Director of the Japan
War Responsibility Document Center), and Nishino Rumiko (re-
searcher on gender). The most striking element of this program
was the way Nishio attacked Yoshimi's character by calling him
"sick" and inferring that his behavior was similar to that of the
doomsday cult, Aum Shinrikyo. Seeing this made me think "the
debate is over." When I saw how calmly Yoshimi dealt with the
Bulletin a/Concerned Asian Scholars 28 i
ivulgarway inwhichNishioandFujiokadenouncedtheiroppo-
I.. nents, sounbecomingofcollegeprofessors,Itrulyfeltthatthis
~ debatewasmorethananythingamatterofhumandignity.
l Japanesepublicopinionseemsto haveshiftedaway from
I theLiberal Historiography Study Group as well. Infact, inan
J audiencesurveytakenduringthebroadcast,afaxmessagefrom
oneyoungviewerread,"Idon'twanttotakelessonsfrom such
mean-spirited adults." Also, in response to the question of
whetheritisrightorwrongtohavedescriptionsaboutcomfort
women inhistory textbooks, amongfax respondents, 57.5per-
centagreedtheyshouldbeincluded,37.4percentwereopposed,
and 5.1 percent gave other responses. The totals among tele-
phone respondents were 50.6 percent in favor, 41.3 percent
against, and 8.1 percent "other." Altogether about 40 percent
opposed passages about comfort women while more than 50
percentthoughttheyshouldbeincludedinmiddleschoolhistory
textbooks.Whilethemarginisnotoverwhelming,itisclearthat
Nishio andFujiokahavelostthebattleforpublicopinion.
14
PublicopinionaboutFujioka'sgroup is, inpart, basedon
thepopularunderstandingoftwentieth-centuryJapanesehistory.
InaJanuary 1983 poll by theAsahi Shinbun, thethreereasons
respondentsgavetoexplainJapan'sabilitytosafeguardpeacein
thenearlyfortyyearssincetheendofthewarweretragicwartime
experience,thehardworkoftheJapanesepeople,andthepeace
constitution. These attitudes havenotchangedmuchsincethe
1 980s. In short, the lessons the Japanese people learned from
theirpresurrenderfailures led to their postwar successes. But
sincethe 1990s, someJapanese are gaining dominanceby dis-
avowing the lessons ofhistory and reinvoking the disastrous
attitudesofthepresurrenderera. Theurgenttaskrightnowisto
wardoffthisinfluence.
Whatistheroleof historiansandteachersinallof this?We
I
mustface up to thefacts of
history andopenlycommu-
nicate past successes and
failures to students. As the
saying goes, "Failureisthe
rootofsuccess."Thereisno
shame in failure itself.
Rather, itis shamefulnotto
studypastfailures ortofal-
sify themand so distortthe
historical consciousness of
theJapanesepeople.Inlittle
morethanadecadeafterthe
secondWorldWar,theJapa-
nese people rose like a
phoenix from the ruins of
warandachievedahighrate
of economic growth. We
should celebrate that
achievement, not the ruin-
i
ouswar.
"History does not re-
peat itself, people do." We
can take this adage, attrib-
I
1uted to the eighteenth-cen-
turyphilosopherVoltaire,as
a warning against the hu-
manfolly oflearningnoth-
ingfromthelessonsof history.Conversely,Voltaire'swordscan
beinterpretedasanexpressionoftrustinthewisdomofhuman
beingstoattemptto avoidrepeatingthepast. Thesearethetwo
pathsweface. Wemustnowdecidewhichonetotake.
Notes
1.HagiwaraSakutaro,Nihon Seishinshi Josetsu (Anintroductiontothe
historyoftheJapanesementality) (Tokyo:KinokuniyaShoten, 1966).
2.FujiokaNobukatsu,Ojoku no kin-gendaishi (Shamefulmodernhis-
tory)(Tokyo: TokumaShoten, 1996).
3.Asahi Shinbun, March31,1997.
4. Jugun Ianfu (Thecomfortwomen)(Tokyo: lwanami,1995).
5. Jihyo, May1997.
6.Fujioka,Shameful Modem History, p. 52.
7. Seemy Kingendaishi 0 do miru ka: Shiba shikan 0 tou (Assessing
modernandcontemporaryJapanesehistory:Aninquiryintothehistori-
calperspectiveofShibaRyotaro) (Tokyo: lwanami, 1997), lwanami
booklet,no. 427.
8. Sakamoto Ryoma(1835-1867)wasan important fIgure inJapan's
movefrom feudalism to modernity becauseofhismodernvisionand
negotiatingskills.
9.ShibaRyotaro,Sekai no naka no Nihon (Japanintheworld)(Tokyo:
ChuoBunko,1996).
10. ShibaRyotaro,Kono kuni no katachi (Theshape ofthiscountry)
(Tokyo: BungeiShUl\iu, 1990),p.4.
11.FromSaka no ue no kumo (Reaching forthesky)(Tokyo: Bungei
Shunju, 1969-1972).
12.Shiba,The Shape o/This Country, pp.181-86.
13. See translation ofYoshino Sakuzo's essay ''OnDemonstration"
(Chua Koron, 1914)inDavidJ.Lu,ed.,Japan. ADocumentaryHistory.
Vol. 2. The lAte Tokugawa Period to the Present (Armonk,N.Y.: M E.
Sharpe,1997),pp.377-83.
14.UesugiSatoshi,''DebatewiththeAssassinsofMemory," Kikan: Sensa
Sekinin Kenkyu (QuarterlyWI1I Respousibili.tyResearch),spring1997.
o
Whatistheroleofhistoriansandteachersinallof this?Wemustfaceuptothefactsof historyandopenlycom-
municatepastsuccessesandfailuresto students.Asthesayinggoes,''Failureistherootofsuccess."Thereisno
shameinfailureitself.Rather,itisshamefulnotto studypastfailuresortofalsitY themandsodistortthehistori-
calconsciousnessoftheJapanesepeople.(PhotographofahighschoolclassroominJapan.Source: Truth inTextbooks.
Freedom inEducation andPeace for Children: The Struggle against Censorship afSchool Textbooks in Japan [Tokyo:Na-
tionalLeagueforSupportofthaSchoolTextbookScreeningSuit. 1995].p. 1.)
VoL30,No.2(1998) 29
Bulletin ofConcernedAsian Scholars. Vol. 30, No.2 (1998): 30-36
ConsumingAsia,ConsumingJapan:
TheNewNeonationalistRevisionisminJapan
The of Fujioka Nobukatsu's books and the neo-nationalist historical revisionism they represent
should not snnply be analyzed as the return ofthe old rightwing in Japan. Reacting to the threats seemingly
posed by various Others-a rising Asia, illegal foreignen in Japan, women, an increasingly "alien" youth
culture-Fujioka and his followen have wielded a variety of myths and popular narratives about Japan and
Japanese history to make their media-publicized case to reconstruct the Japanese body politic on the basis of
a "healthy nationalism." This article shows that it is in the way such different texts as fujioka's books and
Iwai Shunji's popular fllm, SwaUowtail Butterfly, commonly participate in a consumption ofthe nation futked
to an erasure of the Other that one can fmd something as equally serious as a revival of the old time right:
what the author calls a "consumerist nationalism."
by Aaron Gerow
History and the National Melodrama
When I first spotted a copy of Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi
(History not taught in textbooks) prominently displayed in a
bookstore, I supposed that this work written by Fujioka Nobu-
katsu and the Liberal Historiography Study Group was a critique
of the Ministry of Education's textbook examination system.
l
I
was thus surprised to find that this best-selling book is actually
a collection of "feel-good" narratives about "great" men and
women in modem Japanese history. Existing textbooks, the book
assumes, "bad-mouth" Japan, promoting a history of "self-
abuse" which, as Fujioka baldly states in the introduction, "origi-
nates in the interests of foreign nations.,,2 History education,
Fujioka argues, must benefit the Japanese state and should make
Japanese of their nation again.
It is certainly possible to counter this rose-colored nation-
alist history by citing facts it ignores or by correcting its numer-
ous errors. The title itself and the presumption that Japanese
* Portions of this essay were originally published on the H-Japan
internet discussion list on 20 February 1997, as a commentary on an
earlier version of Nakamura Masanori's article (above). At !hat time, it
benefited from a considerable number of comments and criticisms
including ones from Abe Markus Nomes, Laura Hein, and MarkSelden:
. I was greatly helped by my colleagues in the WINC (Workshop
m Cntical Theory) study group, particularly Ukai Tetsu, Narita Ryuichi,
and Ouchi Hirokazu, as well as by two anonymous readers ofmy second
draft. The positions expressed herein are ultimately my own, but lowe
all of these individuals deep thanks.
history textbooks are defined by a "self-abusive" view of Japan
seems to warrant this. Anyone familiar with lenaga Saburo's
court case, however, is aware that the Ministry of Education has
in the past consistently opposed including any discussion of
Japanese war atrocities in school texts. The very assertion that
the antiseptically cleansed and excised school books have failed
to present Japan in a positive light is at best disingenuous and at
worst a fabrication. It is the patent absurdity of such a claim,
however, that in a sense makes it immune to positivistic counter-
argument since it is, from the start, not an assertion of fact but
an evocation of certain myths and popular narratives.
Consider the title of Fujioka's book in relation to its pack-
aging. Next to the title, the largest lettering on the front is the
book band (obi), which proclaims, "We really didn't know this
country well. Seventy-eight stories we want to engrave into the
minds of Japanese.,,3 What is interesting about both of these
phrases is that, since their subjects are left unstated in the original
Japanese, they could contextually just as possibly be "I" or "we"
and refer equally to the readers or the authors. The first sentence
most likely designates the readers and the second the authors, but
the shift of subject within a general ambiguity of subjectivity
helps construct (one could say "interpellate") a community be-
tween author and reader conducive to the book's attempt to
reconstruct a national subject (wherein "I" and "we" are insepa-
rable: "we Japanese"). The book band thus invokes a certain
linguistically generated communal/national emotion.
The evocation of national community is further enhanced
in the black and white photo framed in red that dominates the
cover (see p. 31). It is an old photograph (the era is unclear) of a
youngwomanwithasleepingbabystrappedontoherback.The
womancouldbethemother, butgivenherage,more likely an
oldersisterornursemaid.Maybehersisthehistory thathasnot
been told-thatofwomen (there is a section in the book on
"great"women)-orperhapsof thecommonpeople.Yetherface
does not accusingly tell anarrative ofoppression andneglect;
shedoesnotlookthevictim.Hervisageisremarkablycalmand
self-assured,theimageofapoorbuthard-workingwoman,the
proudfigurewhosestorymustbetheoneweavingitswayinto
the hearts ofthe Japanese. The three sequels to this, thefirst
volume, allfeature oldphotographsofboysormen,all signifi-
cantinboththeirinnocenceandnationalistself-confidence(one
showsaproudyoungmanwithaJapaneseflag).
Thetitle, however, tellsusthatthesephotographs are not
simply anevocationofinnocence: thesefiguresare supposedly
untaught,unknownpeople,whowereplacedonthebackshelves
ofthe historical archive and then forgotten. Perhaps Fujioka
promiseshisreadersareturntoinnocence,buttherhetoricofthis
consumer product's packaging implies that the innocence of
thesefiguresissignificantonlytothedegreethatithasbeenlost
andsuppressedfromthepagesofschooltextbooks. Whilethey
don'tlooklikevictims, perhaps it is theirinnocence itselfthat
wassacrificedduringtheintervalbetweenwhenthephotowas
snappedandtoday.Onewouldsupposethatthesubsequentloss
ofinnocencewasaresultofJapan'smodemhistory ofwar,but
theargumentofthebooklaystheblameoncurrentmethodsof
teachingandnarratinghistoryandontheauthoritiesthatcontrol
thosemethods.It doessobyturningthetitlephrase,whichcould
equallybealeftistaccusation againstamilitaristicstate, which
didnotteachpasttruthsinitsapprovedtextbooks,intoindigna-
tionoveraweakdemocraticsystemthatignoresthegoodheroes
ofmodemJapan.
ThepackagingofFujioka'sbookengagesusinnarratives
thatarenotreducibletothebook'scontents.It issignificant,for
instance,thatitisawomanwithachildwhogracesthecoverof
the initial volume, and notonly becauseit perhapsprovides a
virginalcounterparttothecomfortwomenwhoareelidedinside.
Lookingatherface, Iwasremindedofthemelodramatichero-
inesof1950s'hahamono,theJapanesefilm genrethatfocuses
ontheunrecognizedsacrificesofmothers. Thatgenre,onecan
argue,wascentralinthepostwarconstructiononapopularlevel
ofthemythofvictimizationthatreconfiguredawarofaggres-
sionas oneinwhichitwasthe Japanesewho suffered.
4
While
thegirlinthephotomay notbethechild'smotherandsheisfar
youngerthanthemiddle-agedheroinesofthosefilms,thatonly
gives her the same desexualized status as these, usually wid-
owed, womenwho devoted their livesto theirchildren, rather
thantofulfillingtheirowndesires.Allbearapurityof heartthatis
overruledbyforcesbeyondtheircontrolandwe,asreaders/viewers,
aremeanttoidentifywiththeirnarrativeofsuffering.
I
Fujioka'Sbooktiesintosuchvictimizationnarrativesasthe
hahamonothroughthestructuresofreadingandthepleasureit
j
invitesratherthanthroughitscontent.Eachtalereadslikeafilm
I
I
narrative designed tojerkatearortwo orliftthe spiritsofthe
audience, encouraging identification between subject, reader,
i
andauthor,suchthattheultimatevictimsofthishistoricalsilence
about"greatJapanese"becometheJapanesepeoplethemselves.
!
That is why this is not a workthat simply wishes to make its
readersproudtheyareJapanese;thatwouldmakeitnodifferent
thanthe hagiographic biographies ofillustrious Japanese one
I
I
j
Vol. 30,No.2(1998)
1
findsinany schoolli-
brary in Japan. Its
powerlies in the as-
sertionthatthesesto-
ries are supposedly
repressed by educa-
tional and state insti-
tutions,markedasta-
boo for children by
bureaucratic authori-
ties. The pleasure of
reading them, then,
lies in boththe thrill
of breaking taboos,
flaunting a feigned
oppositionality, and
in identifying with
these role models-
notjustbecausethey
aregreat,butbecause
theyhavesufferedby
beingrenderedsilent. CoverofKyokashogaoshienairekishi
As withthe pleasure (Historynottaughtintextbooks). Repro-
of watching melo-
ducedwithpennissionfromthepublisher.
drama,s the enjoy-
mentisfundamentallymasochistic,thedelightinmakingoneself
thevictimofinjusticeso astojustifyone'sownexistence.Itis
revealingthatFujioka'sfavoriteepithetforhisopponentsisthe
chargethatthey aremasochists.
Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi isthus as much concerned
withnarrativesofvictimizationandmelodramaas itiswithan
evaluationofhistoricalfacts. Assuch,itreliesoncertaindesires
and mythicalpatternsthatareimperviousto positivistcounter-
argumentandthatcanbestbeexplainedonly by analyzing the
book as a cultural, discursive, oreven literary text, one that
intersectswithavarietyofothertexts,fromthehistoricaltothe
fictional,fromtheprintedtothetelevisual.Onlythencanwesee
howthenewtextbookrevisionismoperatesasabroadnarrative
structurethatcreatesandinturn iscreatedbycertainconsumerist
desiresmoldedbycontemporaryhistoricalconjuncture.
NationalThreatsin thePost-ColdWarWorld
As a manifestation ofthe narrative ofvictimization, the
textbookrevisionistsrely onbroad-basedJapaneseperceptions
ofbothrealandless-realvictimizers. WhiletheUnitedStatesis
stillevokedasanoppressor,Fujiokahimselfrefrainsfromcriti-
cism ofthe United States andthe U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
Moreprominentinhisrhetoric andthatofhiscolleaguesisthe
potentialthreatthatotherAsiannationspose.
6
Oneseesfrequent
warningsabouttheeconomicriseofAsia,thestrengtheningof
the Chinese state as an international player, and Chinese and
KoreanaspirationswithregardtoislandsthatJapanalsoclaims.
Revisionistsmakeargumentssuchas, "Whymustweteachthe
viewofhistorythatChinesehave?"(i.e.,oftheNanjingmassa-
cre)-asiftoteachsuchhistorywouldrenderJapan"weak,"in
effect betraying the nation in a confrontation with China. Al-
though in objective terms the rest ofAsia cannot now rival
Japan'seconomicstrength, Japan'sprolongedpost-bubbleeco-
nomicslump (evenif itis largelydueto domesticfactors) has
bredaninsecurity thatinspiresa searchforexternalvillainsin
31
the narrative of Japan's economic suffering. In this context, the
rhetoric ofthe neonationalist revisionists describes nothing other
than a war with Asia, one that at this stage may only be economic,
but that eventually may have the leadership of Asia at stake.
Such a confrontation with an external threat would not seem
to merit the urgency Fujioka and his followers exhibit if it were
not for the fact that there is, simultaneously, a perception that
Japan is not ready to meet such an enemy, in part because of
Japan's weakness in the world but even more so because of the
increasing presence of internal threats and divisions-of the
Other making headway on Japanese soil. The formation of the
Committee to Write New History Textbooks is first and foremost
a reactionary phenomenon. an attempt to prevent changes be-
lieved to be damaging to Japan's national strength. Partially as a
result of the Ienaga case and of pressure from Asian nations,
history school books have gradually introduced references to the
darker side of Japanese modern history (though often in an
abridged, undeveloped fashion), a change that accelerated after
the temporary fall from power of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) in 1993. The Committee was thus formed less to create
original textbooks than to prevent these new ones from being
used by students. Now that the LDP is back (the right wing of
which, with elements of the former New Frontier Party, also
opposes the new textbooks), the Fujioka phenomenon can be
read as one element in the general niood of "getting back to
business" after the aberration of a non-LDP government.
That mood, however, is difficult to sustain given the sense
that the forces that previously unified Japanese have weakened
since the end of the Showa era. As a narrativization of this,
Aoyama Shinji's 1996 film Helpless, a brilliant evocation of
youthful alienation and loss of identity, takes place significantly
in 1989, the year of Emperor Hirohito's death, and features a
yakuza in a constant search for his "boss" -the authority figure
whose death he cannot accept because it was so central to his
identity. The loss of narratives about Japanese group identity
provided by Hirohito and Showa has been exacerbated by the
breakdown of the cold war world structure with its comforting
storybook images of good versus evil. As many have pointed out,
this is a crucial intertext to the textbook debates: the loss of the
East-West binary has undermined Japan's identity as the demo-
cratic front against communism in Asia without providing new
structures to supplant it.
7
To many Japanese, and Fujioka in
particular, the Gulf War exposed this vacuum by presenting a
Japan capable only of throwing around money without being
adequately appreciated.
8
To this was added the humiliation of
perceived Japan bashing and Allied celebrations of the fiftieth
anniversary of victory in World War II, particularly the Smith-
sonian Enola Gay debacle. That controversy seemed to underline
the fear that Japan, in spite ofits role as an economic superpower,
has won no respect in the international political arena and thus
has no identity among nations. This sense of shame in being
Japanese, and especially the inability to take pride in oneself in
the face of others, is frequently cited in the writings ofFujioka's
group and is the reason they think Japanese make matters worse
by repeatedly condemning themselves.
Such resentful feelings probably existed before the Gulf
War but, without the narrative ofthe cold war that had channelled
Japanese into the democratic defense of anti-communism, the
new target became postwar democracy itself. The loss of cold
war restraints has given the go-ahead for the expression of
nationalist thoughts that until now have been repressed as alien
to Japan's aspirations to be the model democracy in Asia. War
apologists such as Hayashi Fusao and the militarist right existed
before, but now "normal" media figures like newscaster Sakurai
Yoshiko, novelist Hayashi Mariko, and cartoonist Kobayashi
Yoshinori air the topic of revising Japan's wartime past in a way
rarely seen before. This new generation has aligned itself with
the old right to make this a very public, media- and government-
oriented revisionist campaign, quite unlike the guerrilla-like
tactics found in neo-Nazi revisionism in Europe, as Ukai Tetsu
points out.
9
One of the reasons the campaign is so public, I
believe, is because the feelings on which it is based were con-
structed in popular media, cinema, television, and literature.
While the narratives of the hahamono or mythification of the
suffering at Hiroshima and Nagasaki expressed those feelings,
they were never before allowed to be released in the form of an
articulated nationalism. Repressed by the ideal ofthe "peace-lov-
ing democratic nation," these emotions now emerge together
with a recognition of that ideal's inability to provide a strong,
positive national identity in the new world order.
Much ofthe fear about Japan's weakness isdirected at those
elements within the country that are seen to be undermining the
Japanese sense of themselves as a unified, homogeneous nation.
Inthis fantasy, the Other not only encroaches on Japan's borders,
but is beginning to tear it apart from within, weakening its very
soul. The Other assumes numerous guises in contemporary
Japan. One, of course, is the large number of legal and illegal
foreign workers in Japan, rendered menacing in tabloid tales of
crime by foreigners and illegal immigrant smuggling rings re-
putedly run by the Chinese mafia. EvenKoreans bornand legally
residing in Japan are seen by conservative groups as potential
threats to the state, particularly since some local governments
recently eliminated the citizenship requirement for public ser-
vants. The fear is that the identity ofJapan itself is at stake when
its official agents are not even Japanese. Women too are seen as
persistent menaces, represented most recently by a proposal to
allow women to keep their own family name after marriage.
Conservative politicians successfully rallied to block the pro-
posed change in family law, charging that they would undermine
the unity of the Japanese family and thus the nation. That this
issue is intimately related to the textbook debate is evinced by
the fact that local legislatures have combined calls for the elimi-
nation of references to comfort women in the new textbooks
together with statements protesting the proposed family law
revisions as an integrated set of resolutions. 10
Given their focus on education, the textbook debates are
most directly concerned with another potential threat: theyoung.
Japanese youth do not exhibit the political radicality of their
predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s, but in the eyes of many in
the media, education, and elsewhere, their apathy and lack of
adherence to any metanarratives (Marxism, democracy, or even
Japan itself) bodes ill for Japan's future. The large numbers of
youngsters who dye their hair blond, watch only American
movies, and listen to Japanese bands with English names and
lyrics, rarely choose as their role models the Japanese found in
Fuj ioka's books. The foreign influence onyouth culture is an old
phenomenon. but the recent trend in Japan is to identify with
either African-American culture (the dominance of hip-hop or
street style in youth fashion. the attempt to look black) or Asian
culture (the "ethnic boom," the popularity of Asian idols and
Bulletin ofConcemed Asian Scholan 32
Hong Kong movies, the proliferation of late-night television
shows introducing new trends and fashions in Asian pop culture).
These youth culture identities, however, are fluid. For example,
a star like Katori Shingo--a member of the male singing group
SMAP-plays a Vietnamese in a TV drama and then a Japanese
woman in a Chinese dress in a film. He changes hair styles and
clothes more often than Madonna. Identity boundaries are being
crossed right and left. Many older Japanese are disturbed by the
undermining of gender definitions and the possibility that some
young people may identify with the Hong Kong gangster star
Chow Yun Fat more than with Takakura Ken, the defender of
tradition in the 1960s Toei yakuza line. 11
This unstable identity as Japanese reflects real discontent
with current culture among younger Japanese. This profound
sense of alienation and lack of place among young people is
explored in films by Aoyama such as Helpless andAn Obsession
(Tsumetai chi, 1997) and in Yamamoto Masashi's Junk Food
(1998). The cultural effects of this phenomenon, however, are
deeply ambiguous. On the one hand, cynical disillusionment
with the postwar democratic nation does bring some young
people to sympathize with the neonationalist revisionists, espe-
cially when led by a popular manga artist like Kobayashi. Yet,
when younger Japanese express their lack of belonging by en-
gaging in school-bullying, teenage "compensated dating" (enjo
kosai), and random violence like that of the 14-year-old serial
killer in Kobe, the youth themselves begin to take on the aura of
the non-Japanese Other. The 1997 film Happy People (directed
by Suzuki Kosuke and based on the popular manga by Sawa
Hidekatsu) looks on the surface like a black-humored parody of
the facade ofsocial harmony, showing everyday people commit-
ting insane acts in the name of happiness. Nevertheless it clearly
places the blame for these acts not on those committing them but
on the presence of Others in Japanese society who are forcing
"normal" Japanese to become abnormal. The primary Other in this
fUm is the young, who are portrayed as nothing more than animals.
Educating the Threat and Building the Nation
Textbook revisionists are reacting to these threats through
the ideological apparatuses ofhistory and education. Fuj ioka and
his followers make history a weapon of confrontation, or even
the means by which to build proud Japanese who can win the
war they imagine is imminent. Japanese are not the only people
who treat modern history as booty to be won. Their deformed
history in the service of nationalism bears a strong resemblance
to the history evoked in the United States through the Smith-
sonian Hiroshima exhibition.
Yet the New Textbook group cannot fully be explained by
its effort to make history subject to the nationalist project. As
Narita Ryuichi stresses, Fujioka is in some ways trying to protect
the schoolroom from the invasion of historical research, separat-
ing education from historiography.12 This is one reason why
some of his followers do not deny, for instance, that the war in
China was an "invasion" (shinryaku), yet they still profess to
support him; to them, such tragedies may be historical truth, but
that does not mean they should be taught to children as a part of
a national education program. Since Fujioka himself is a profes-
sor of education at Tokyo University with no credentials as a
historian, and most ofthe members ofthe Liberal Historiography
Study Group are school teachers, the textbook movement must
be seen primarily as an educational issue. Historians may say
Vol 30, No.2 (1998)
whatever they want, the reasoning goes, but schools are meant
to develop and socialize Japanese citizens and, as such, are not
places to impart knowledge that may make children question or
feel ashamed oftheir Japanese identity. As an educational theory
then, "liberal historiography" tries to solve the nation's serious
educational problems by reinterpreting students as receptacles of
national ideology, protected from any knowledge that may prompt
them to question their status as national subjects whose duty is
to serve the state. Schools are seen as ideological state apparatuses
devoted to the national interest, which produce citizens/subjects
rather than individuals with a capacity for criticism. It is not
difficult to seethe similarities to the prewar education system.
Education has functioned as a symbol within the narrative
of the Japanese nation in other conflicts in the recent past. A few
years ago, several school faculty committees released the min-
utes oftheir debates over the issue of the "national" flag. Discus-
sions raged at the time at many schools over whether to obey the
Ministry of Education's decision to require schools to fly the
Rising Sun and play "Kimigayo," which the Ministry described
as Japan's "national anthem." One of the oft-repeated arguments
in favor was that fostering respect for the Rising Sun was a part
of the process of internationalization (kokusaika).13 This may
seem curious (one would think internationalization implies the
toning down of nationalism) but it is logical given two assump-
tions: that Japan does not have a robust national identity and that
the international arena is, in Hobbesian terms, a mean and brutish
place. Without a strong self, Japan would sink under the aggres-
sive waves of other nations according to this scenario; only the
establishment of a firm national consciousness, as a prelude to
entering the international arena, can keep it afloat in the future.
History then is to function like the Japanese flag, providing an
ideological locus through which Japanese can be defined as
.Japanese, in solidarity against the world. History is merely a
collection of signs in a set of myths and stories that are necessary
to create a Japanese national consciousness. In this sense, the
effective interrelation between the discourse of the neonational-
ist revisionists and mythical narratives about the nation is only
an example of the role they hope historical discourse will play in
the school.
Another central myth is constructed from Nihonjinron, or
ideologies about the essence of the Japanese people that help
redefine the boundaries of the national subject. As with much
Nihonjinron discourse, Fujioka often uses the term "we": "We
are Japanese, and therefore it is natural that we think first from
the standpoint ofJapan, ofwhat is in the national interest. ,,14 This
assertion of a "natural" logic is profoundly ideological, creating
an essence to Japaneseness that not only dictates what Japanese
are, but what they must be ifthey want to be called Japanese. The
creation of this unacknowledgedly coercive subject position
effaces not only all those who are ethnically not Japanese, even
if they live in Japan, but also all Japanese who do not subscribe
to this logic (those, for instance, who do not side with the
"national interest" as Fujioka describes it
I5
). In other words, the
coercive "we" not only divides Japanese from all others, but also
eliminates differences among Japanese by silencing those who
do not agree.
Fujioka writes that the question of what Japan must do
should always be considered from the point ofview ofJapan and
"how that must look from the perspective of others. ,,16 Here he
proclaims that his liberal interest takes into account the voices of
33
others, but then his view of history and education are clearly
meant to reunify the national body by effacing traces of the
threatening Other from its midst. If other points of view are to
be considered, it will be only as a mirror of recognition for Japan
and only when outsiders acknowledge Japan's flag and sover-
eignty, and respect its power. If this is internationalism, it is
extremely self-centered internationalism. 17
The treatment of the comfort women is the most revealing
case of rejecting rather than talking to outsiders. One Korean
comfort woman who, when confronted by a Japanese politician
who argued that her recollections could not be true, retorted, "In
the past on the battle front, you defiled my body, and now you
want to defile my soul?,,18 This desire, unfortunately, is the center
of the body politics of the New Textbook group. To rebuild the
Japanese national body and create a "healthy nationalism" (ken-
zenna nashona11lizumu-the revisionists' attractive catch phrase)
in this image, the scarred bodies of comfort women themselves
must be further violated and then forgotten. The violence against
the Asian and female Other again renders the dialogue Fujioka
purportedly desires impossible. Discourse denying the existence
of comfort women cannot be conceived of as part of a dialogue
(no one would make such absurd comments to a Korean, for
instance). "Since these are monologic words," to quote Sato
Manabu, "communication is impossible." Kang Sangjung also
pointed out the fact that the revisionists only "want to reiterate a
monologue without an Other.,,19 The ideology of the textbook
revision movement is thus in many ways the reproduction ofthe
closed society consciousness (sakoku ishiki) of the modern em-
peror system, one which denies the existence of the Other. It is
a set of platitudes meant for Japanese consumption, a potion to
cure the wounded national soul.
The Consumption of Asia and the Nation
Fujioka and the Liberal Historiography Study Group must
also be analyzed as a product to be consumed. I have considered
the packaging oftheir first book, but the packaging ofthemselves
is also noteworthy. Most members take pains to distance them-
selves from old-time rightists who proclaim the glories of the
Greater East Asia War, many like Sakurai Yoshiko acknowledge
the atrocities committed by Japan. They call themselves "liber-
als," and declare themselves bound, as Fujioka writes, neither to
the u.s. view ofJapan represented in the Tokyo Trials nor to that
of the inventors of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Ethnologist Otsuki Takahiro, one of the group's younger mem-
bers, wrote at length about the bankruptcy of both left and right
under the cold war structure; what he declares he wants is a
"healthy nationalism," "which is neither 'right' nor 'left,' neither
'conservative,' nor 'reformist,' nor 'liberal',,,2o and which has
nothing to do with the central symbol of the old right, the
emperor. This is a movement conscious of the post-cold war
atmosphere and the reigning disillusionment with established ide-
ologies; it thus sells itself over the media airwaves as sweeping the
field clean ofold ideological baggage and reconstructing an unbur-
dened nation.
This attractive and less offensive self-packaging may have
cost the movement both clarity and significance. Suga Hidemi,
a commentator not unsympathetic to the revisionists, has argued
that it is impossible for them to win the textbook debate because
their insistence on a liberal image constitutes acceptance of the
rhetorical and discursive structures with which the left defines
the debate. They cannot succeed in creating an ideology of a
strong Japan because, in this age, it is nearly impossible to
construct a citizenry willing to die for the nation.
21
Rightist
rhetoric has become commonplace on the airwaves in a more
palatable form, but as a result it now assumes just about the same
valence as the new Tokyo Beauty Center commercial or teen idol
Amuro Namie's marriage. Increased exposure for the right has
come at the price of its own banality; it lacks power and has been
reduced to the flow of floating signifiers that constitutes con-
sumer culture. Its ideology enforces homogeneity and service to
the state, but those issues must in the end be related to the culture
of consumption in which they reside. If textbook revisionism
poses a threat, it does not do so of itself, but only as part of a
larger text of myths and narratives about Japan that are being
consumed everyday. Fujioka's group is different from the old right
precisely because its location within contemporary consumerism
differs, rendering its nationalism essentially consumerist.
To elucidate the problem of consumerist nationalism, I will
consider the popular film Swallowtail Butterfly (Suwarotei11l),
directed by Iwai Shunji and released in 1996. After the success
of Love Letter (1995), Iwai has been proclaimed by some to be
the savior of Japanese cinema, and, in particular, the repre-
sentative of contemporary youth culture who can fmally bring
the young back to theaters for a Japanese movie. Through the use
of very current, MTV-like aesthetics and popular music, Swal-
lowtail Butterfly sketches less a narrative than a place: a space
called Yen Town, somewhere in Japan, which is popUlated by
Chinese, Americans, Iranians and every other conceivable eth-
nicity. Money rules in Yen Town as part of an international
economy that stands in contrast to the "normal" face of the rest
of Japan, which is supposedly not penetrated by flows of tran-
snational labor. Only a third of the film is in Japanese; the rest
of the dialogue is in Chinese and English and the credits are
entirely in English. Some Japanese actors are cast as Chinese and
actually speak English and Chinese.
At first glance, Swallowtail Butterfly appears to be one of
a series of films critiquing the myth of a homogeneous Japan by
focusing on its ethnic minorities (Otomo Katsuhiro's World
Apartment Horror [Warudo apatomento hora, 1992], Sai Yoi-
chi'sAll Under the Moon [Tsuki wadotchi ni dete iru, 1994], and
Yamamoto's Junk Food are also good examples). It can also be
seen to represent the border-crossing, fluid identities of Japanese
youth that reactionary educators find so disturbing. There are no
model Japanese here, in fact, the purely Japanese characters are
mostly villains, and it appears that there is no unified, linguistic "we"
with which to unite the nation. Swallowtail Butterfly as a cultural
phenomenon seems to embody much of what is threatening about
younger Japanese, who the neonationalist revisionists feel need
educating. Yet, I would argue, it is due first, to the ambiguity of
contemporary Japanese youth culture, and second, to the over-
arching nature of a consumerist nationalism able to unite these
apparently contradictory positions, that the film and Fujioka's
book ultimately share the effort to efface the Other and recon-
struct the nation in a postmodern consumer culture.
Consider first the crucial scene in which the lead character
Ageha, with her friend Huan, ventures off to the opium den to
visit the doctor. There the aestheticization of postcolonial brico-
lage that reigns throughout the film gives way to a terror directed
against the Chinese opium smokers they find there. On the one
hand, the young couple's gaze is colonial, unmistakably viewing
an Other that is both disgusting and inferior. Despite the film's
linguistic (and subtitled) polyphony, the words of these Chinese
are not given subtitles, something that renders them not only
more alien, but also without an internal soul that could raise them
above the level of objects of fear. At the same time, the scene,
with its distorted camera angles and abrupt cuts, reminds one of
a more modem gaze: that of two tourists lost in unfamiliar
territory, suddenly confronted with something not (yet) rendered
consumable by the discourse of tourism. It is a scenario familiar
in film genres ranging from the travelogue to the ethnographic
documentary, from the science-fiction film to The Adventures oj
Indiana Jones.
22
In a film that reduces everything to the same
fetishized, consumable image, here is something not so easily
swallowed: the return of the repressed, the Other making itself
known. That this Other is Asian is indicative of the film's
politics. Asia is cool as long as it is commodified; all that escapes
that consumerist process must be a threat, the Other that com-
modification itself aims to efface.
For all its multicultural celebration of Asian intermixing,
for all its polyphony of languages, Swallowtail Butterfly reveals
a deep-seated fear of Asia and presents the Japanese subjectivity
to conquer it. The film offers less a linguistic
23
than a
visual "we" for Japanese spectators, a subject position
constructed by shot angles and editing through which the
viewer can identify with the terror felt by Ageha and
Huan. This visual point of reference is in the end the
tourist/consumerist gaze, the new identity offered for
young Japanese through which they can simultaneously
consume and silence the Asian Other, venture abroad
while never being threatened as Japanese.
Swallowtail Butterfly dovetails with Fujioka'S pro-
ject by constructing a gaze that effaces the Other and
covers over the historical past (the socio-historical origin
of Yen Town is never explained, for instance). It markets
a "liberal" acknowledgement of other voices similar to
the one Fujioka proclaims, while at the same time repack-
aging those voices for the Japanese consumer, reducing
a supposed dialogue into a monologue. The postmodern
desire for an exotic Asia shown in Swallowtail may seem
far removed from the desires of the textbook group, but
Iwai's consumption of Asia must be seen as the reverse
side of the coin of Fujioka'S consumption of Japanese
history. Both reduce Japan and its Others into images and
narratives that can be reshuffled to reconstruct a mythical
Japan.
Consider the scene towards the end of Swallowtail
Butterfly in which F eihong, an illegal Chinese immigrant,
is brutally tortured to death by Japanese police who
verbally abuse him as a "Yen Towner." His only retort to
them is the exclamation: "Your Jurusato [hometown] is
Yen Town, too." In narrative terms, this operates as
Feihong's attempt to undermine the police's (and thus the
Japanese state's) division between JapanljUrnsato and
Yen Town. In the ideology ofjUrnsato, anyone may have
a hometown, but only Japanese can have a jUrnsato, a
rural origin through which to preserve their ties to tradi-
tional social and family structures in spite of the modern-
ization and urbanization of Japan, allowing them to stay
Japanese even while becoming Westemized.
24
Yen Town
could thus not be ajUrusato given how closely the con-
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
cept is tied to Japanese identity. Feihong's attempt to locate the
police's origins in Yen Town can thus at first glance be consid-
ered as part of the film's larger effort to deconstruct Japanese
identity, especially given how attempts by other characters in the
film (such as Ageha) to name Yen Town as theirjUrusato stretch
and distort the original meaning of the term.
Neither the film nor the characters, however, ever rejects
the concept ofjUrusato or critiques its narrative and the ideologi-
cal role the term plays in constructing the nation. What is never
questioned is the desire to have ajUrusato, to have an origin in
a bordered place. Iwai's film opens up the possibility that non-
Japanese can have aJurnsato, but only by constructing them as
having the same desire the Japanese have for a secure locus
against the vicissitudes of transnational border-crossing. The
Other is then presented as in effect desiring to be Japanese, a
representation that effectively absorbs the Other in the Self. The
constitution of Yen Town as ajUrnsato is then merely the recon-
struction of the narrative of the Japanese nation along the lines
of the consumerist elision of difference typified by Yen Town,
creating a new Japan amidst the detritus ofthe postcolonial era,
a space where all can become Japanese by buying into the image
Aoyama Shinji's 1996 fIlm Helpless, a brilliant e,vocation of youthful alienation
and loss of identity, takes place significantly in 1989, the year of Emperor Hiro-
hito's death, and features ayakuza in a constant search for his "boss"-the author-
ity figure whose death he cannot accept because it was so central to his identity.
(Photograph from "Helpless." Courtesy ofthe distributor.)
35
ofJurusato. In this respect, it shares all too much in common with
Fujioka's effort to reconstruct the Japanese nation from a post-
cold war assemblage of consumable images of great Japanese.
For Japanese youth who have lost their sense of national history
and their pride in being Japanese-who in effect are the equiva-
lent of Iwai's nationless Yen Towners-the neonationalist revi-
sionists offer the commodified icon ofJapan as the new space on
which to narrate the nation.
Fujioka and the New Textbook group have arisen, as I have
argued, due to a complex historical conjuncture at the center of
which is the growing fear ofthreats both internal (the young, etc.)
and external (Asia) Others, which are felt to be weakening the
national Self. This conjuncture cannot be fully understood, how-
ever, without understanding that aspects of these threats are
actually part of the same phenomenon as the neonationalist
revisionists. If Fujioka's group was merely a return of the old
right, and if contemporary youth culture was simply an embrace
of Asia, then the opposition between the two would be clear and
unambiguous. As we have seen, however, the repackaging of
Japanese nationalism must be seen as a sometimes contradictory
part of the same cultural phenomenon as the consumerist cele-
bration ofAsia. The latter offers a vision of Japan accepting Asia,
while the former creates one of Japan accepting itself. Both sell
inoffensive, consumable images of Japan, reducing the nation to
a narration of commodified images and nationalism to consunlp-
tion of those images. Fujioka and the textbook revisionists
should be considered a threat, but not simply because they are a
revival of the old right. It is their use ofthe media and the market,
a use exemplified by the image of the girl and baby on the cover
of Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi and the narratives that book
contains, that makes them share in the equally dangerous nation-
alism of which Swallowtail Butteifly is but one manifestation:
consumerist nationalism.
Notes
1. Fujioka Nobukatsu and Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai, Kyokasho go
oshienai rekishi (Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun Nyusu Sabisu, 1996), p. 10.
2. In Japanese, "Honto wa kono kuni no koto, yoku shiranakatta.
Nihonjin no kokoro ni kizamitai 78 no monogatari."
3. Such mothers typically lost children in the war or struggled greatly
in the poverty-stricken aftermath (both tragedies very real to contem-
porary Japanese), but their sacrifices always go unrecognized by their
or The masochistic pleasure involved in identify-
mg WIth.this a ceIl:tral means by which 1950s Japanese
film audiences narrativJZed wartime and postwar history as a tale of
unjust and umecognized, but still stoically endured misery. Two ofthe
more interesting examples of the genre are Kinoshita Keisuke's A
Japanese Tragedy ("Nihon no higeki," 1953) and Naruse Milio's
Mother (''Okasan,'' 1952).
4. There are many discussions of the relation between masochistic
in feminist film studies, with Mary AnnDoane,
The DeSIre to Desire: The Woman sFilm o/the 1940s (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987) providing a good outline.
5. The ''re!ISianization'' that Laura Hein and Ellen H Hammond have
discussed-in which conservatives have called for Japan to rejoin Asia (as
its I believe the other side ofthe same coin ofthe pelCeption of
Asia as a threat. See "Homing in on Asia: Identity in Contemporary
Japan," Bulletin o/ConcemedAsian Scholars 27, no. 3 (1995): 3-17).
6. ThisthemedominatesmuchofthediscussionbetweenSatoManabu,Kang
Sangjung, Komori Yoichi, and Narita Ryuichi in "Taiwa no biro0 tozashita
rekishikBn 0 do kokufuku smu ka?" Sekai 635 (May 1997): 185-199.
7. Kang Sangjung has pointed to Flljioka's personal experience ofstaying
in theUnited States during 1he War, witnessing both thepower ofAmerican
nationalism and the utter impotence of Japan, as fundamental in this
ex-communist's switch to the right. See his comments in "Taiwa no
biro 0 tozashita rekishikan 0 do kokufuku sum kaT' pp. 187-188.
8. See Ukai's comments in the discussion, "Rekishi to iu senjo kara,"
Impaction 102 (1997): 68-69.
9. A point perceptively made by Kano Milciyo, "Seikimatsu kyokasho
kyosokyoku to sei no daburu standado," Impaction 102 (1997): 36.
1O. The ni"./cyo genre occupied a central position in the output
of the Toel studio m the 1960s after jidaigeki entered into a decline.
Many ofthe plots, such as in theShowa zankyoden or Nihon kyokakuden
featured the between new, modem yakusa (defmed by
therr Western clothes and disrespect for the chivalric codes ofthe gangster)
and the representatives of more traditionally Japaneseyakusa ways (with
Takakura Ken and Tsuruta Koji often representing this faction).
11. See his comments in "Taiwa no kairo 0 tozashita rekishikan 0 do
kokufuku SU1U ka?" 194. Treating historical research as a field uncon-
to public is not new: it was why many of the
histonans continue publishing in specialized journals
,,:el1 mto the 1930s severe regulation. The publicity of the
diSCOurse-and how much It appears before children-has historically
been the measure of how much government oversight it earns. The
history offtlm censorship in Japan compared to that for pUblicationalso
reveals this, given how the stories ofmany WlCensored novels were cut
only when they came to the screen.
12. See for instance, one such set of minutes printed in the AYah;
Shinbun, 29 March 1993, p. 11.
13. Fujioka Nobukatsu and Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai 10.
14. A point Komagome Takeshi makes in analyzing the same phrase:
"Jiyushugi shikan wa watashitachi 0 'jiyu' ni suru no ka?" Sekai 633
(April 1997): 64-66.
15. Fujioka Nobukatsu, Ojoku no kin-gendaishi (Tokyo: Tokuma Sho-
ten, 1996): 135, quoted in Komagome 62.
16. My use of the tenn "self-centered" resonates with Takahashi Tet-
suya's use of"jikochu" to critique Kato Tenyo's controversial assertion
that Japan must bury its dead before it can deal with the dead of Asia.
See his comments in the roundtable talk, "Sekinin to shutai 0 megutte,"
Hihyo kukan II-13 (1997), particularly pp. 13-16.
17. Quoted in Ogoshi Aiko, "'Jugun ianfu' mondai no poritikkusu,"
Hihyo kukan 11-11 (1996): 37.
18. See comments by sato and Kang in ''Taiwa no kairo 0 tozashita
rekishikan 0 do kokufuku sum kaT' 187
19. Otsuki Takahiro, "Boku ga 'Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho 0 Tsukuru
Kai' 0 sukedachi sum wake," Seiron (April 1997): 56.
20. Suga Hidemi, "Kyoiku hihanronjosetsu (6): Sono tame ni shiniuru
'kokka'," Hatsugensha 33 (January 1997): 86-91.
21. Much has been written on the relationship between travelltourism,
the gaze, and (post-)co10niality: how the hierarchy of vision (the seer
and the seen), supported by the economics of consumption, works to
reproduce colonial relations ofpower between the Western traveller and
the Eastemnative. Two recent examples are James Clifford's Travel and
Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1997) and Nicholas Thomas's Colonialism sCulture:
Anthropology. Travel, andGovemment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
l!ess, 1994). For a new anthology of essays on the colonialist
gaze mcmema, seeMatthew Bernstein and Gaylyn Studlar, eds., VISions
o/the East: Orienta/ism in Film (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 1997).
22. The strategic use ofsubtitles, silencing some and allowing others to
"speak," effectively makes Japanese the linguistic locus of the film.
23. The image of Jurusato becomes more and more an object of
consumption, an ideology in need of selling, as many Japanese lose any
real contact with then: rural hometowns. For examples ofthe marketing
ofJurusata, see Marilyn Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995).
o
Bulletin ofConcemed Asian Scholars 36
Bulletin o[Co,,",nedAstan Scholars. VoL 30,No.2(1998):37-46
ISSN0007-4810 C 1998BCAS(Oakland,Califomia)
JapaneseEducation,Nationalism,
andIenagaSaburo'sCourtChallenges
IenagaSaburo'sthirty-two-yearcourtchallengeoftheJapanesegovernment's textbookcensonhip cameto anendin
August1997.TheSupremeCourthandeddownitsdecisiononhisthirdlawsuit,findingthatonseveralaccountsIenaga
had beenwronged bythegovernment'stextbookscreeningprocess.Whilethedecisionwassomethingless thana total
vidory for Ienaga, an opinion delivered by the chiefjustice clearly indicated that school textbooks should include
descriptionsofthesufferingofJapan' s neigbbonasaresultofpast Japaneseaggressionandthatsuchinclusionisapositive
educationalconsideration.ThisarticlesituatesIenaga'sfightsagainstthestate'sdisseminationof anultranationalistand
imperialistviewofhistoryinthecontextofJapan'spostwarideologicalstruggle.It presentsachronologyoflenaga'scourt
battlesandarguesthatthestruggleoverthenation'spastisthestruggleoveritsfuture.
byNozakiY oshikoandInokuchiHiromitsuIlk
"Whocontrolsthepast,"ranthePartyslogan,"controlsthefuture; istic and emperor-centered education in the service of war,
whocontrolsthepresentcontrolsthepast."Andyetthepast,though
persistedinhisdeterminationto securethe imperialstateeven
ofits nature alterable, neverhad beenaltered. Whateverwas true
whileacceptingmilitarydefeat.Inthisway,muchoftheimperial
nowwastruefromeverlastingto everlasting....Allthat wasneeded
system, whichhad committed all sorts ofatrocities, remained
wasanunendingseriesof victoriesoveryourownmemory.
intactatthebeginningofpostwarJapan.
--GeorgeOrwell,Nineteen Eighty-Four
A governsitspeopleinpartbycreating
,
anddisseminatingnarratives. Oneimportantsiteofsuchefforts
Introduction:NationalNarrativeandIdentity isschool textbooks, especially history and social studiestext-
books. Afterall, educationisoneofthemosteffectivewaysto
On15 August1945.thedayEmperorHirohitoannounced
promote a national narrative (e.g., the official history) and to
I
tohis subjects the acceptance ofthePotsdam Declaration,the
make andremake certain identities into the national identity.2
Suzukicabinetresignedenmasse. OtaKozo,theoutgoingEdu-
Thestate,whetherdirectlyinvolvedintheproductionandcircu-
cationMinister,presentedhisfInalinstructiontotheschoolson
lationoftextbooksornot,canreadilyreinforcedominantideolo-
thatday. HismessagewasthatJapan'sdefeathadbeenbrought
gies. In response, alternative and oppositional forces develop
onby thepeople'sinsufficientdedicationtotheemperor,along
their own counter-narratives and identities. Forthe meanings
withtheirfailuretobringintofullplaythespiritnurturedbytheir
attached to a given identity-in this case the national iden-
imperialeducation.Hereafter,heconcluded,studentsandteach-
tity-are"anunstableand'de-centered'complexofsocialmean-
ersoughttodevotethemselveswhollytotheirdutiesasimperial
ingsconstantlybeingtransformedby politicalstruggle.',3
subjectsandtothemaintenanceofthekokutai. I Whenreferring
The ongoing battles overeducational content inpostwar
tokokutai. Otahadinmindtheemperor, whoinpre-surrender
Japan have been one ofthe crucial fronts in a long-running
doctrinewastheessenceofthenationandthenationalidentity.
struggleovertheidentityofthenationitself.Tobesure,struggles
Ota,likemanyotherofficialswhohadpromotedultranational-
over the national narrative existed in Japan before and even
duringWorldWarII,whenofficialnarrativessuchastheImpe-
rial Rescript on Education and other "fme militarist stories"
playedacrucialroleinJapaneseidentityformation.
4
Becauseof
WesincerelythankMmkSeldenandLauraE. Heinfortheir editorial
the state's strict, often violent, oppression, counter-narratives
suggestionsand insightfulcriticismsof earlierversionsofthisarticle.
Withouttheirknowledgeandguidance,thisarticlewouldnothavebeen
(e.g., the proletarian educational movement) were unable to
possible.Wearealso gratefultoRichardMinearandMichaelW.Apple redirectthenation'scourse.lbroughoutthepostwarera,educa-
fortheircommentsandto SylvanEshforhis assistancein writingthis tionwouldbecomeahotlycontestedarenabetweencompeting
article. socialforces andtheirvisionsofJapan'sfuture. IenagaSaburo
Vol. 30,No.2(1998) 37
hasbeenacrucialfigureinthatpoliticalstruggleforcOWlter-nar-
rativesandidentitiesforthelastfiftyyears.
EarlyPostwarStrugglesovertheNationalNarrative
The early occupation period saw substantial changes in
textbook policy as u.s. officials sought to demilitarize and
democratizeJapan.Seekingtokeepmilitaristiccontentsfromthe
sightofoccupationofficials,ortocreateafavorableimpression
onthem,Japanesebureaucratsmadethefirstchangepriortoany
occupationdirectives.
5
It wascalledtextbook"blackening-out"
(suminuri), andit involvedliterallyblottingoutoffendingpas-
sages.On20September1945,theMinistryofEducationordered
schools to deletemilitaristic contents intextbooks and educa-
tionalmaterials,andgaveseveralcriteriafordoingso,without
specifyingtheprecisepassagesthatwereto beblackenedout.
6
However,itleftintactthosepassagesthatcelebratedtheimperial
nationhoodandmorality.
Throughoutthefall of1945, teachers gradually beganto
directstudentstoblackenoutpartsoftheirtextbooks. Because
of theMinistry'svagueinstructions,localofficials,schools,and
teachers developed their own lists for identifying items to be
removedfromtextbooksinallsubjectareas. Asaresult,notwo
blackened-out textbooks were exactly alike, and the locally
developed lists often included far more items than the Minis-
try's.
7
Tosomeextent,adifferentconstructionof nationalnarra-
tivetookplaceineachclassroom.
8
In October, the SupremeCommandoftheAllied Powers
(hereafter,SCAP)issuedseveraldirectivespertainingtocurricu-
lum content and textbooks. On October 22, SCAP ordered the
eliminationofmilitarist andultranationalistmaterialsfromschools.
On December 15, it ordered the abolition ofthe government
propagationofShinto, andbannedsuchstate-authoredteaching
materialsasKokutai no H ongi (ThetruemeaningoftheKokutai)
andShinmin no Michi (Thepathoftheimperialsubject). SCAP
also informally suggested a rewrite ofJapanese history text-
books.Finally,onDecember31,itorderedthesuspensionof the
teaching ofmorals(shushin), Japanesehistory, andgeography,
anddemandedthatexistingtextbooksandteacher'sguidesinthese
subjectsbewithdrawnandnewhistorytextbooksbedeveloped.
Following SCAP's December 31 order, some Japanese
historians,includingIenagaSaburo,begantoaddresstheissues
ofpostwar Japanese history education, textbook writing, and
publishing. In fact, Ienaga, who was a historian as well as a
formerhighschoolandnormal(teachertraining)schoolteacher,
drafted his ownhistory textbook in early 1946. HisbookShin
Nihonshi (NewJapanesehistory)reflectedhisviewthateduca-
tion should be based on verifiable facts, and should convey
democraticvalues andthedesireforpeace.
9
Atthetimeitwas
published in 1947, all textbooks were required to be state-
authored.Ienaga'sShin Nihonshi waspublishedbytheFuzanbo
Press as a general book. The lawsuits he later filed werefor
revisedversionsofthisbook.
TheLastState-AuthoredHistoryTextbooks
TheMinistryof Educationbeganitsprojectof writingnew
historytextbooksinthefallof1945. InDecember,acommittee
wasformedtoexaminethecontentsofexistingelementaryand
secondary school history textbooks and to write new ones.
ToyodaTakeshi,aformerwomen'snormalschoolteacher,who
wasappointedinOctober1945tobeoneofthecompilersofthe
Ministry's Textbook Bureau, was the author for the elemen-
tary/secondary schooltextbook,andMaruyamaKWlio, another
compiler,wasappointedtodevelopthenormalschooltextbook.
The project was canceled in May 1946, with Toyoda having
completed only the section on ancient history. SCAP then in-
sistedthattheMinistrycommissionotherhistoriansnotassoci-
atedwiththeTextbookBureau.10
Thenewprojectwaslaunchedwithaplantodevelopthree
textbooks(forelementary,secondary,andnormalschools),each
dividingJapanesehistory intofourperiods (ancient,medieval,
earlymodem,andmodern/contemporary).TheMinistryofEdu-
cationofficialschoseelevenhistorians,whobeganworkinthe
cafeteria ofthe Historiographical Institute ofTokyo Imperial
University.Eachselectedandorganizedhisowncontent,butall
elevenfollowedthreeprinciples:nopropagandaofanykind;no
militarism, ultranationalism, orpropagation ofShintoism; and
inclusionoftheaccomplishmentsofordinarypeopleinthearea
ofeconomics,invention,scholarship,andart,withmentionofthe
emperor'sachievementsonlywhensignificant. SCAP'sJapanese
employeesexaminedthemanuscriptsdaily,andalthoughSCAP
neveractivelyaskedtheauthorstoincludespecificdescriptions,
itdidvetosomepassages.11
Ienagawasaskedtowritethesectionontheancientperiod
fortheelementaryschooltextbooklaterentitledKuni no Ayumi
(ThecourseofourCOWltry). Becausethemanuscripthadtobe
finished in about a month, he used Toyoda's draft as a basis;
however, hedeleted the sectionsonmythology, beganthetext
withadescriptionofstone-agecivilizationbasedonarcheologi-
cal findings, and described the formation ofJapan as a state
withoutany mentionofimperialistideology.12 Kuni no Ayumi,
publishedinSeptember1946,wasthefrrstpostwarstate-authored
history textbook. It was alsothefirstJapanesetextbookto list
thenamesof theauthors.DespitetheadvancesembodiedinKuni
no Ayumi, itwascriticizedbytheJapaneseleftandby analysts
inseveralforeigncOWltriesforfailing toeradicatecompletely
theemperor-centeredviewofhistory.13
The1947Constitution,theFundamentalLawof
Education,andtheFailureofState-AuthoredTextbooks
Inlate 1946andearly 1947,thelegalframeworkforedu-
cationaldecision-makingchangedtoasignificantdegree,asthe
"DemocratizingofJapan"undertheoccupationmovedswiftly,
at least on the surface. The new constitution, promulgated in
1946, offered a narrative ofJapan's nationhood that differed
substantiallyfromthepresurrenderultranationalistemphasison
theimperialstate.It statedthatsovereigntyresidesinthepeople
(the emperor's statuswaschangedto"symbol" ofthenation),
guaranteedbasichumanrights,andrenoWlcedwar. Simultane-
ously,the"neweducation"tookshape,astheconstitutionguar-
anteedacademicfreedom(Art. 23)andthepeople'srightto an
education(Art. 26). On31 March 1947,the FWldamentalLaw
ofEducationandtheSchoolEducationLawbecamelaw.
TheFWldamentalLawofEducationarticulatedtheprinci-
plesof postwareducation,includingtheaimof educationasthe
"fulldevelopmentof personality"(Art. 1),provisionsfor"equal
opportWlity ineducation" (Art. 3), and"coeducation"(Art. 5).
Mostimportant,itstatedthat"Educationshallnotbesubjectto
impropercontrol,butitshallbedirectlyresponsibletothewhole
people" (Art. 10).14 The law was in a sense an "Educational
Ienaga Saburo has been a crucial figure in that political struggle for
C01Ulter-nmatives and identities in Japan for the last fifty years.
Constitution." As the Ministry of Education put it at the time, it
was "a declaration of new educational ideals." In essence, the
law was meant to replace the Imperial Rescript on Education. IS
By contrast, the School Education Law, which dealt with
the practical operation of schools, stipulated that elementary
school textbooks were to be screened, approved, and/or authored
by "competent authorities" (Kantoku-cho, Art. 21). Similar pro-
cedures were stipUlated for secondary school textbooks. At first,
the "competent authorities" were assumed to be not only the
Ministry ofEducation but also the prefectural school boards that
would be created. In May, however, in the School Education Law
Enforcement Regulations (which was not an actual piece of
legislation), the Ministry restricted what was meant by compe-
tent authorities to the Ministry itself. 16
The new legislation and SCAP policy made it impossible
for the government to insist that schools use only state-authored
textbooks. In September 1947, the Ministry announced that it
would introduce textbook screening in 1948 (forthe 1949 school
year) and it established several committees to develop the plan.
The Japan Teachers Union (hereafter JTU) sent representatives
to participate in the committee meetings.
Although it was not clear at this time who was to have the
legal right to adopt textbooks, the Ministry suggested that the
schools, inconsultation with the teachers, would select textbooks
according to their own educational needs. 17 Many of those con-
cerned with education, including teachers, scholars, and the
editors at publishing houses, welcomed the Ministry's position,
and launched numerous new textbook projects. The JTUinitiated
its own projects, eventually submitting about sixty textbook
manuscripts for screening.
Textbook screening during the occupation was a rather
complicated, two-fold process. Publishers were required to sub-
mit both Japanese and English versions ofmanuscripts. First, the
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
Ministry of Education screened the Japanese manuscripts. Five
commissioned examiners evaluated each manuscript and sixteen
appointed committee members made decisions. Then the Civil
Information and Education Section (hereafter CIE) of SCAP
screened the English versions of those approved by the Ministry.
Ifthe CIE requested a revision, the publishers and authors needed
to resubmit the manuscript to the Ministry's committee. The
1948 textbook screening was rushed and only a small number of
manuscripts were approved. As of August II, 418 of the 584
textbook manuscripts submitted had passed the Ministry's screen-
ing, but only 90 of the 418 had passed CIE screening.
Beginning on August 25, textbook exhibitions were held at
local school districts and sixty-two of the approved textbooks,
including two written by the JTU, were displayed. Many teachers
welcomed the new textbooks in an atmosphere full ofexcitement
and enthusiasm. IS In 1950, with teachers promoting the "nongov-
ernmental" textbooks, the Ministry of Education announced it
would cease writing its own textbooks. It made one further futile
attempt to reintroduce "standard textbooks" in 1952, but when
this last-ditch attempt failed, it discontinued publishing state-
authored textbooks. From 1953 onwards the Ministry began,
instead, to seek ways to ''write'' textbooks by way of textbook
screening.
The Conservative Turn in Education PoHtic.
during the 19SO. 8Ild 19608
After the introduction of the textbook screening system,
Sanseido Press asked Ienaga Saburo to write a high school
history textbook, and, since his Shin Nihonshi was already out
of print, he agreed. He submitted the revised text of Shin Nihon-
shi to the Ministry of Education in 1952. It was rejected when
one of the five examiners gave the manuscript extremely bad
IDaIks, but when Ienaga resubmitted it-with no changes-to a
different group of examiners, it was approved and published (in
1953).
Some of the reasons Ienaga had been given for the initial
rejection disturbed him. For instance, the Ministry faulted his
manuscript for its description of flfth-century diplomatic rela-
tionships between Japan and China, particularly the description
of Japan's envoy bringing tribute to China. According to the
Ministry, the depiction of Japan as politically subordinate to
China would cause students to suffer a sense of inferiority. The
Ministry also argued that too much space had been given to the
Pacific War. It stated that, since the students had experienced the
war themselves, the entire description should be dropped. Other
perceived faults included the description of women's status
during the ancient and early modern periods and descriptions of
poverty and peasant rebellions in the early nineteenth century.
Ienaga publicized his concerns about these criticisms in the Asahi
newspaper. 19
Ienaga's concern was not just imaginary. The recovery of
the Japanese right, including ultranationalists, was underway in
the early 1950s. With the victory of the Chinese revolution and
the Korean War, occupation policy elevated anti-communism
above democratization, and many of those who had been purged
because oftheir cooperation in carrying outJ apan 's war activities
were de-purged and appointed or elected to important posts. Edu-
cational policy took an overtly conservative turn after the Ikeda-
Robertson talks of 1953, in which the United States pressed for the
re-militarization of Japan.
20
This was essentially to require re-
39
versing the new narrative of a peaceful and democratic Japan,
fostered during the early postwar years.
Conservatives attacked peace education curricula and ac-
cused the JTU of promoting a communist agenda. They suc-
ceeded in passing a series of new laws: one in 1953, to give the
Education Minister the authority to screen textbooks, and two in
1954, to limit the political activities ofpublic school teachers and
to ensure the "political neutrality" of compulsory education. In
the general election of February 1955, textbook policy became
one of the major issues, as Nakasone Yasuhiro ofthe Democratic
Party (Minshuto) advocated a more centralized textbook publish-
ing and adoption system-essentially a return to state-authored
textbooks. The election result marked a clear political division.
Out of 467 seats, and against the Democratic Party's 185 and the
Liberal Party's 112, the Socialist Party (Shakaito, hereafter SP)
won 156. With one third of the Lower House seats, the SP held
enough votes to block an undesirable amendment to the 1947
constitution.
As the Diet opened in June, the first postwar textbook attack
came about, and it was a model for later attacks. The right (with
members in both the Liberal and Democratic parties) launched
an attack on education by inviting Ishii Kazutomo, a former JTU
official dismissed in disgrace in 1954, to the Diet to testify on
the textbook adoption bribery case. The move served as the
occasion for an attack on textbooks, since Ishii's main topic
turned out to be "biased textbooks." His principle target was
social studies textbooks, including history textbooks. Ishii later
worked with the Democratic Party on its pUblication ofbrochures
entitled Ureubeki Kyokasho no Mondai (The deplorable prob-
lems of textbooks). 21
In 1956, the Hatoyama administration of the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (Jiyuminshulo, formed in the fall of 1955, hereafter
LDP) submitted three bills intended to gain control over educa-
tion: the first to appoint rather than elect local school boards; the
second to establish a special council for educational reform (i.e.,
to change the Fundamental Law of Education); and the third to
tighten textbook screening and adoption. The protest against
these proposals was immediate and strong, and it arose not only
from intellectuals and educators, but also from the general pub-
lic-in what remains to date the biggest protest in postwar
education history. The administration rammed the first measure
through by bringing police into the Diet, but could not save the
second and third efforts.
Meanwhile, by 1956 the Ministry of Education had tight-
ened screening criteria and brought more conservatives onto the
screening committee (an action that did not require legislation).
After the 1956 Diet, the LDP administration shifted its tactics to
strengthen control over textbooks through "regulations" instead
of legislation. This approach was far more successful. In 1956,
the Ministry rejected eight social studies textbooks as "biased."
Authors were required to make revisions such as eliminating
negative comments on Japanese wartime conduct. While in-
creasing the number of the screening committee members and
making the textbook examiners full-time employees, the Minis-
try also pressured textbook publishers to remove some authors
from their projects.
22
In 1957, the Ministry decided not to give
authors written conditions for approval, but to give its "opinion"
concerning revisions only selectively and only orally. This practice
encouraged "self-discipline" on the part of publishers and authors
by forcing them to revise texts without specific Ministry statements.
In the late 1950s, the Ministry rejected many textbooks,
especially in 1958, when 33 percent of textbook manuscripts
were not approved.
23
The examiners not only checked for factual
accuracy, but also evaluated the level of patriotism of each text.
The Ministry further strengthened its hand in 1958 by making
compliance with Instruction Guidelines mandatory. Finally, in
1963, a bill was passed that made textbooks free to all elementary
and middle school students. But the bill also further consolidated
the adoption process. In the new arrangement, county-level
school boards (consisting of several local school districts), rather
than local schools, were to select the textbooks. In effect, teach-
ers lost control over textbooks, and the process of monopo-
lization of the textbook industry was established. State control
over textbooks became easier and more complete because the
number of textbooks shrank. In short, the system looked more
and more like the state-authored textbook system that was in
place during World War II.
Ienaga's Fint and Second Textbook Lawsuits
When Ienaga submitted a revised edition of Shin Nihonshi
to the Ministry of Education in 1955, it was approved on condi-
tion that he make 216 changes. Ienaga made the changes, and the
textbook was published in 1956. However, he had to revise the
textbook again, as the Ministry issued new Instruction Guide-
lines.
24
His book was rejected in 1957, only to be conditionally
approved in 1958. After another revision, it was eventually
published in 1959. Ienaga revised the textbook again a few years
later, but when he submitted it to the Ministry in 1962, it was
rejected (in 1963). The Ministry disclosed only twenty or so of
its reasons. Ienaga, who had to guess at most of the Ministry's
criticisms (in fact, there were 323 items altogether, a fact that
became known only later through his court battle), revised the
textbook yet again, and it was approved in 1964 on condition that
293 items be changed. He altered the text accordingly, and it was
approved and published.
By this time, Ienaga was convinced that textbook screening
was a form of censorship that was both unconstitutional (e.g., a
violation offreedom ofexpression and scholarship) and contrary
to the Fundamental Law of Education (i.e., a violation of the
principle safeguarding education from no improper control).
Ienaga took his cases to court in the beliefthat the Ministry would
not change its practice without a battle. Even though some legal
scholars and publishers' union members worried that a lawsuit
was risky, he filed his first suit against the national government
in 1965. Many of those opposing textbook screening, especially
the JTU and the Publishing Workers' Union, as well as individual
teachers, scholars, and publishers' staff, supported his decision.
Although he demanded fmancial compensation for the
psychological duress caused by the screening process, Ienaga's
chief objective was to demonstrate that state screening of text-
books was unconstitutional and contrary to the Fundamental
Education Law. To do so, he needed to prove that the Ministry
had abused its power in requesting the specific revisions, which
he listed in his suit. Some of those points were related to the
depiction of Japan's most recent war (i.e., the fifteen-year war
with China, Korea, the United States, and other countries). For
example, Ienaga had stated that "most [Japanese] citizens were
not informed of the truth of the war, and so could only enthusi-
astically support the reckless war." The Ministry of Education
had insisted that calling the war "reckless" was a value judgment,
i
Cover of Truth in Textbooks, Freedom in Education and Peacefor Children, published by
the National League for Support of the School Textbook Screening Suit (Tokyo).
and that it was inappropriate to make such value judgments about
contemporary events. The Ministry had also declared that there
were too many photo illustrations of the "dark side" of the war,
such as an air raid, a city left in ruins by the atomic bomb, and
disabled veterans. It had asked that some be removed. 25
Meanwhile, Ienaga attempted to reinstate several phrases
in the 1967 edition of Shin Nihonshi, which he had changed for
the previous edition under duress. In response, the Ministry held
that his desired changes could not be regarded as "improve-
ments" (in its view, the purpose of revision). In 1967 Ienaga fIled
an administrative lawsuit asking the Minister of Education to
revoke the Ministry's decision on grounds that the rejection of
Ienaga'srevised version was unconstitutional and contrary to the
Fundamental Law ofEducation. The chief objective of Ienaga's
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
second lawsuit was the same as his fIrst, but the
merit in this administrative suit was that its legal
procedure was less complicated than that of the
earlier "damage claim" suit and it involved only
six specifIc points. This kept the debate focused
and resulted in the lawsuit moving more quickly
through the courts.
One of the specific points in the second suit
dealt with Japan's earliest history, particularly the
characterization of myths contained in two eighth-
century texts, Kojiki and Nihon Shoki. Ienaga had
stated that "all [of the myths] were composed after
the imperial family had integrated Japan in order
to justify the origin of its rule." The Ministry of
Education had ordered him to eliminate these
lines. As a result the textbook represented the
myths as if they were facts. Another contention
concerned a description ofthe 1941 Japan-U.S.S.R.
Neutrality Treaty. The Ministry had ordered lena-
ga to add the line "Japan entered the treaty as
U.S.S.R. proposed" and suggested the elimina-
tion of the footnote "after the German army in-
vaded the Soviet Union, Japan collected its army
close to the border under the name of the 'Kwan-
tung Army special maneuvers,' and was prepar-
ing to invade Siberia in the event that the situation
became advantageous to Japan." The Ministry's
intent seemed to be to create an impression that
the Soviet Union's declaration of war against
Japan in 1945 was the sole violation of the treaty.
CourtDecisionsandIenaga's
Achievementsinthe1970s
By the end of 1967, because of the fIrst suit,
details of the textbook screening process and the
exact reasons for the rejection of Ienaga's text-
book were emerging, despite government resis-
tance. It also became known that the Ministry had
kept documents explaining its objections to Iena-
ga's textbook, but the state was refusing to submit
them to the court, insisting on the need for confI-
dentiality. Ienaga's request for a court order to
hand over the documents was granted in part;
however, when the state appealed the disclosure
decision to the higher courts, the first suit stalled.
Meanwhile, the second suit proceeded com-
paratively quickly. The Tokyo District Court, with Chief Justice
Sugimoto presiding, ruled in Ienaga's favor in 1970. Recogniz-
ing the people's educational rights and freedom, the Sugimoto
decision ruled that in the case of Ienaga' s textbook, the state had
clearly exceeded its authority, and that while government screen-
ing in itself could not be considered unconstitutional, as long as
it only corrected obvious mistakes, it could be unconstitutional
when it gave orders to change educational content. 26 The Minis-
ter of Education appealed the Sugimoto decision to the Tokyo
High Court, and fIve years later, with Chief Justice Azegami
presiding, that court dismissed the state's appeal, while avoiding
a direct judgment on the constitutionality of government screen-
ing. Although the decision was less clear-cut, Ienaga had won
again. The Minister appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
41
The first suit began to move again in the early 1970s. After
the Supreme Court dismissed the state's appeal against disclos-
ing the Ministry's documents, and, after considerable public
pressure, the state submitted its file on the case-more than one
hundred pages long. Although the Ministry's file actually sub-
stantiated Ienaga's argument and testimony, the Tokyo District
Court handed him only a partial victory in 1974. The court found
some abuse of power in the decisions made on eleven specific
items (out of the 293 that Ienaga had contested), but it affinned
the government's right to regulate the content of education, and
declared state textbook screening constitutional. Ienaga appealed
to the higher court, and the state also appealed to revoke the
eleven points on which it had lost.
From the beginning, Ienaga's lawsuit attracted strong pub-
lic interest. The two lawsuits focused attention on the textbook
screening system, which had been hidden from the pUblic. The
standards for approval, the existence of two kinds of Ministry
pressure ("request" and "suggestion"), the 1,OOO-point scale by
which textbooks were graded (800 and above was considered
passing), and the existence of an official file on each textbook all
became public knowledge. In particular, the state was forced to
disclose the actual process by which it had censored Ienaga's
textbook and to explain the reasons for its rejection, along with
the names ofthe examiners and the committee members who had
vetoed the textbook. 27 Previously the undemocratic nature of the
system had been known only through complaints made by text-
book authors and publishers, but now the Ministry's own docu-
ments revealed an arbitrary process, rife with abuses of power.
Ienaga's victories in his second suit had an immediate
impact on school textbooks. Following the Sugimoto decision in
1970, the Ministry relaxed its criteria for screening and textbook
authors began to include a wider range of material (e.g., infor-
mation about Japanese wartime atrocities). In 1973, Ienaga's
revised Shin Nihonshi passed the screening review even though
it contained more detailed descriptions of Japan's invasion of
China, Japanese colonial policy in Korea, and peoples' move-
ments against environmental pollution. Some junior high school
history textbooks that contained descriptions of the Nanjing
massacre were approved. Various groups of parents, teachers,
publishers' staff, and researchers, who had been struggling to
establish alternative and oppositional narratives in textbooks,
became empowered through a newfound consciousness of their
educational rights and freedom.28
Renewed Attempts to Enforce Patriotic Textbooks
in the 19808 and 19908
In the late 1970s, the Japanese government and the LDP
attempted to regain control over education, particularly by stress-
ing nationalist (patriotic) curricula. For example, the 1977 In-
struction Guidelines designated "Kimigayo" as the national an-
them, despite the fact that no legal basis for that existed. With
LDP support, a high official ofthe Ministry ofEducation inserted
the modifier "national anthem" before "Kimigayo." That same
year, the Ministry rejected five high school textbooks (one in
ethics/civics, two in Japanese history, and two in world history).
Around this time, it also tightened its textbook-screening rules
again, requiring authors to follow the Instruction Guidelines
more closely.
Conservative politicians, especially younger LDP hawks,
attacked textbooks more vocally after the LDP won a large
majority in both houses in 1980. Charging that most textbook
revisions after the Sugimoto decision were inspired by commu-
nists, they sought stricter legislation to control textbook content.
A nasty campaign was launched in the LDP's weekly newspaper
by Ishii Kazutomo, the same person who took part in the textbook
attack of the 1950s. Ishii and the LDP attacked the authors of social
studies and Japanese language textbooks for supporting the JTU,
the Communist Party, and the democratic education movements.
One of their criticisms was directed at a Russian folk tale,
"Okina Kabu" (A big turnip), which was thought to be promoting
a communist agenda. Originally recorded by folk-
10rist Aleksandr N. Afanase'v (1826-1871), the
story told about a grandpa, grandma, granddaugh-
ter, and their household animals (dog, cat, and rat),
who all joined hands to pull a big turnip out of the
ground. The folktale has long been popular r e d i n ~
material for first-grade elementary school students.
2
Ishii and the LDP falsely stated that the story was
a Soviet folk tale and that Afanase'v was a Soviet
folklorist. They also offered an interpretation that
perhaps no one had thought of-that the story was
about workers, peasants, students, and intellectuals
uniting to bring down capitalists. Rightwing intel-
lectuals, economists, and big business supported
critics' demands for more patriotic curricula.
Troubled by the anti-nuclear movement, the
Science and Technology Agency (STA) joined in
the criticism ofjunior high school civics textbooks.
In 1980, it attacked the textbooks for emphasizing
the negative aspects of atomic power and for raising
public concerns about its safety. The STA pressured
Demonstration after the Tokyo High Court decision of 20 October 1993 in Ienaga's
third lawsuit Ienaga Saburo is holding the bonner. (Source: Truth in Textbooks. Freedom in
the Ministry of Education (unsuccessfully) to change
the descriptions of atomic energy already in the
Education and Peace for Children: The Struggle against Censorship ofSchool Textbooks in Japan textbooks approved for the 1981 school year. The
[Tokyo: National League for Support ofthe School Textbook Screening Suit, 1995]. p. 19.)
Democratic Social Party (Minshato), an opposition
42 Bulletin o/Concerned Asian Scholars
party supported by small business owners, joined the attack,30
and other business groups lobbied for changes in textbook de-
pictions of their industries. Eventually, the Ministty accommo-
dated them by "suggesting" revisions to publishers.
As a result ofthese highly public battles, the media reported
that state control over education had been strengthened and that
the depiction of the Japanese wartime invasion of Asian countries
had been watered down. A focal point of these reports, which
received international coverage (notably in East and Southeast
Asia), was the Ministry's request to replace the term "aggression"
(shinryaku) with "advancement" (shinshutsu)Y InJuly 1982, the
Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the People's Republic of
China lodged formal protests with the Japanese government. By
September, more than 2,000 reports on Japanese textbook
screening had appeared in the press in nineteen Asian countries. 32
In October, the Japanese government formally accepted the
criticisms of its Asian neighbors, and promised to correct the
textbook descriptions. (The South Korean government essen-
tially accepted the promise, but the Chinese government did not.)
The Ministry of Education then announced changes in its screen-
ing policy, including a new requirement that textbooks consider
modern historical relations between Japan and Asia from the
perspective of international friendship and cooperation. At that
point, the Japanese government unilaterally declared the contro-
versy settled, but the Ministry of Education did not change the
nationalistic orientation in its textbook directives. For example,
although it now allowed use of the term "aggression," it contin-
ued to "suggest" that textbooks should report smaller numbers
ofvictims in the massacres that took place in Nanjing, Singapore,
and Okinawa during the war.
lenaga's Third Lawsuit
When the Instruction Guidelines were rewritten in 1979, a
revised text of Shin Nihons hi was approved (in 1980) and repub-
lished (after Ienaga made 420 changes). When the Japanese
government promised (in October 1982) to correct the textbook
depictions of Japan's foreign relations, Ienaga asked the Minis-
try's permission to make corrections, but his request was re-
jected. He submitted the revised manuscript again in 1983, and
it was approved subject to some seventy changes. In 1984, Ienaga
filed a third lawsuit against the state demanding compensation
for the psychological damage the screening process caused him.
His ultimate goal was still to prove the unconstitutionality of
state textbook screening. In this suit, he disputed eight specific
points (six Ministry requests and two suggestions for revision).
Four were related to the Japanese invasion of China, one con-
cerned the Japanese colonization of Korea, another involved the
Battle of Okinawa during the last months of World War II, and
two covered domestic protests against imperial power.
The frrst point concerned the use of the term "aggression"
to describe the Japanese invasion of China. In the 1980 and 1983
negotiations, Ienaga had insisted on the appropriateness of this
term, refusing to change his language despite the Ministry's
repeated "suggestion[s]." He also fought to include two phrases
with respect to the 1937 Nanjing massacre. In the screening
process, the Ministry had requested that Ienaga change the
line-"Immediately after the occupation of Nanjing, the Japa-
nese Army killed numerous Chinese soldiers and civilians"-to
a statement that people died in the "confusion" around the time
of the occupation. The Ministry had also requested that Ienaga
Vol 30, No.2 (1998)
eliminate mention of rape from his description of the Nanjing
massacre (which read: "Not a few Japanese soldiers raped Chi-
nese women [when occupying Nanjing]"), arguing that rape is a
common wartime phenomenon, not limited to the Japanese
Army. The Ministry had also requested that he remove the
mention of Unit 731, a biowarfare unit that had conducted
experiments on live human subjects.
33
It had claimed that there
was no credible scholarly research on Unit 731 and that it was,
therefore, premature to mention it in textbooks.
The fifth point concerned Korean resistance to the Japanese
invasion at the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
Ienaga had described the event as the beginning of a fifty-year
Japanese colonization of Korea, writing that "in Korea, which
was the major battlefield of the war, popular anti-Japanese resis-
tance often took place." The Ministry had requested that he
change the phrase "anti-Japanese resistance," stating that it
would confuse students.
The disagreement between Ienaga and the state rested on
two radically different narratives of Japanese history. Ienaga
attempted to critique the official narrative of Japan's conduct in
World War II and of the years leading up to it. He also presented
a different narrative of the war at home, at least with respect to
the Battle of Okinawa in which an estimated 160,000 civilians,
including women and children, lost their lives, many at the hands
of Japanese soldiers. Ienaga had written that "residents, both
young and old, were killed," and specifically pointed out that
"more than a few of these civilians were killed by the Japanese
Army." The Ministry had responded that "voluntary mass sui-
cides" were the major cause of Okinawan civilian deaths, hold-
ing that the victims willingly gave their lives for the country
(rather than being "killed" or "forced to kill" family members by
the army). In short, the Ministry had downplayed the massacre
of Okinawans by the Japanese Army.
The seventh and eighth points concerned domestic events
in which the righteousness of imperial power was questioned-a
point that the official narrative ignored. Ienaga cited two text-
book descriptions of domestic events that the Ministry had asked
him to change. Both involved portrayals of imperial power as
oppressive. The frrst concerned a protest by Shinran (1173-
1262), the founder of a major Buddhist sect, against the oppres-
sion of new Buddhist sects by the Imperial Court. The second
example involved the description of the volunteer army called
"Troop Somo," which had fought for the emperor during the
Meiji Restoration, but had then been quickly suppressed by the
Meiji government because of its populist orientation.
34
lenaga's Court Battles from the 1980s to 1997
In the mid-1980s, Ienaga was fighting three court cases
simultaneously, all of them moving toward the Supreme Court.
Of the three, the second ended first-without a proper conclu-
sion. After an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Ministry of
Education changed its strategy and argued that Ienaga's case had
"no benefit"-that it was moot-because, even if Ienaga were to
win, the Ministry had already changed the Instruction Guide-
lines, and therefore Ienaga's 1965 textbook, following the old
guidelines, would no longer be used. The Supreme Court referred
the case back to the Tokyo High Court, which dismissed the case
in 1989 on grounds of "no benefit," without declaring anything
more specific. Ienaga decided not to appeal to the Supreme
43
Court, since the earlier decisions, including the ground-breaking
Sugimoto decision, retained their value as precedents.
The first suit, meanwhile, progressed more slowly, taking
twelve years to reach a second decision. In 1986, the Tokyo High
Court, with Chief Justice Suzuki presiding, overturned Ienaga's
earlier partial victory at the District Court. The ruling revoked
the lower court decision on eleven specific points, declaring that
the Ministry of Education had not been "excessively unreason-
able." Ienaga appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Seven
years later, on 16 March 1993, the Supreme Court dismissed the
first lawsuit, handing Ienaga a total defeat after twenty-eight
years of effort. 35
The third suit proceeded more quickly, with decisions con-
sistently favoring Ienaga. Inthe Kato decision of 1989, the Tokyo
District Court found the order to change the Troop Somo descrip-
tion unlawful, ruling that he had been wronged on this point, and
that the government should pay him 100,000 yen in compensa-
tion. Although he won a partial victory, Jenaga appealed the
decision to the higher court (as did the state) because he hoped
to win his main point, that state textbook screening was uncon-
stitutional, as well as all the other specific points of contention.
The latter included arguments concerning the descriptions of the
Nanjing massacre, Unit 731, the Korean resistance, and the
Battle of Okinawa. The descriptions of the Battle of Okinawa
had sparked the most dramatic and powerful testimony of the
case. In 1988, Kinjo Shigeaki, a professor at Okinawa Christian
Junior College, had testified that at age 16 he had participated in
a "mass suicide" in which he killed his mother and younger
siblings on orders of the Japanese Army. Testifying for the state,
Ayako Sono, who had written a documentary-fictional account
of the event, stated that in herresearch she had found no evidence
of a suicide order given by the captain himself.
In the fall of 1993, the Tokyo High Court softened the
district court decision slightly. The court ruled in favor of both
Ienaga's contention regarding the description ofTroop Somo and
his description of the Nanjing massacre, including mention of
widespread rape, stating that on these points the Ministry's
screening had been excessive and thus unlawful. However, it
ruled against Ienaga on Unit 731 and all other points.
36
After
another appeal by Ienaga, the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice
Ono presiding, delivered its final decision in the third lawsuit on
29 August 1997. Ienaga won one additional point, allowing
mention of Unit 731 's cruel experiments. The Supreme Court
decision, while affirming the constitutionality of government
textbook screening, agreed that the orders to change some de-
scriptions of Ienaga's textbook were in violation of the law with
reference to at least the four descriptions. 37 Although Ienaga lost
his attempt to ban government textbook screening as unconsti-
tutional, the court held that the Ministry's requests for revision
must be based on views verified or commonly accepted in the
field of histOI)' studies. This decision will undoubtedly limit the
scope of textbook screening in the future.
A Conclusion: The Signifk:ance of
lenaga's Textbook Lawsuits
Ienaga's lawsuits have been a countervailing force in the
struggle over national narrative and identity construction in
postwar Japan. His concern with history, history teaching, and
textbooks has as much to do with the present and future as it does
the past. Narratives of the past construct (and reconstruct) per-
sonal identities, and, as such, they ''gersuade [persons] to act in
ways they might not otherwise act." In particular, narratives of
"nation" and a nation's past are powerful tools that can involve
people in a shared sense of identity, clarifying who "we" are and
where "we" come from?9 In a sense, then, Orwell's insight (see
above, page 37) could hardly be more discerning. "Who controls
the past controls the future" is an apt explanation of why the
Japanese government and the (ultra)nationalists have tried to
alter narratives of the nation's past. (Orwell's picture of total
Party control over the present does not exactly match the Japa-
nese case, however.)
The historical and political conditions of postwar Japan
have been the context for Ienaga's struggle over Japan's national
narrative. Although most Japanese regard 15 August 1945 as the
"end" ofthe war, for most ofJapan's neighbors, including China,
Korea, and Vietnam, the war entered a new phase on that date.
In 1945, the United States exempted from prosecution in the
Tokyo War Tribunal many of those responsible for Japan's war
crimes, notably the emperor. Japan's acceptance of the tribunal
court judgments meant not only that the pursuit of war crime
issues by the occupation force ended there, but also that pursuing
such matters became "taboo" for Japanese. Until recently, the
Japanese government, under LDP control, ignored both the
question of war responsibility, including that of accountability
for colonial rule, and the voices ofAsians who had suffered from
Japanese actions during the war.
40
The year 1945 was also not the end ofthe struggle for those
Japanese seeking alternative narratives and identities. 41 They had
to continue to grapple with issues of war responsibility, and the
meaning of such terms as democracy and freedom. Ienaga was
one of a very few scholars who, in the 196Os, recognized that
there were two aspects to the ordinary Japanese war experi-
ence-namely, that of assailants (externally) and that of victims
(internally)--and one who unequivocally argued the need for the
Japanese themselves, through their own judiciary, to pursue the
issue of war crimes and responsibility.42 His uniqueness lay in
the fact that he was not just arguing the position, but was himself
pursuing it in his own way. He filed the textbook lawsuits, an
approach totally unfamiliar to many Japanese, and fought in the
name of the 1946 constitution, which speaks of freedom and the
rights of citizens.
Ienaga's lawsuits were, in effect, his way of dealing with
Japanese war crimes and war responsibility. His suit did not pass
judgment on individuals who committed crimes, but made vis-
ible the operation ofthe imperial, ultranationalist power that had
allowed such individuals to commit crimes and that now at-
tempted to conceal it. It is no coincidence that Ienaga's position
resonated with the voices of war victims in China, Korea, and
other Asian countries. The immediate impact of his 1970 victory
(the Sugimoto decision) was to embolden other textbook authors
to document Japan's war atrocities. Ienaga's victories in his third
lawsuit were partial, but they were victories nonetheless (reflect-
ing, perhaps, the changed international situation that compelled
Japan to listen to the victims' voices), and his lawsuits as a whole
succeeded in stimulating both research and public interest in the
wartime conduct of the Japanese military. This paved the way
for many Japanese to accept, or at least begin to listen to Asian
voices that demanded a hearing on unresolved issues of war and
colonialism.
lenaga's thirty-year challenge to the state mises the ques-
tion of whose knowledge oUght to be represented in textbooks
and taught in schools. A related question raised by lenaga's
lawsuits is that of process: Who should decide the content of
education and on what basis? No democratic nation has resolved
these questions; the tendency, in fact, has been to ignore them.
In our view, it is important to develop a democratic process
through which educational content can be debated, negotiated,
and selected. Textbooks need to be produced through a "free,
contributive and common rrocess ofparticipation in the creation
of meanings and values.,,4 The appropriate role of the state is to
ensure the fairness of such a process. The current Japanese
system, which has allowed the state and the (ultra)nationalists to
advance their agenda by incremental extra-legal faits accompli
should be abolished. The alternative, however, should not be a "free
market" system, in which socially dominant and powerful groups
decide what knowledge will be represented in school curricula.
In a society that provides universal education, school text-
books offer teachers and students "symbols to start with," "signs
that some larger community exists," and as such "the possibil-
ity-indeed, the actuality-of a shared collective identity.,,44 A
sifting of knowledge is always involved in the production of
textbooks, however. This "sifting" is inherently problematic
since selective knowledge is given to represent a collective
identity-whether national, regional, or international-and so
the identity constructed necessarily includes some people and
excludes others. It is little wonder, therefore, that social groups
compete over the symbols embodied in textbooks and that con-
troversy accompanies the production of textbooks. This will
always be the case, we believe, as long as a society is committed
to the democmtic process. Critics who think that the problem has
already been settled in their society-any society-are too opti-
mistic, just as those who think democratic textbooks are impos-
sible are too pessimistic. lenaga's lawsuits suggest a third posi-
tion, namely, forming an oppositional narmtive and identity and,
simultaneously, building a consensus around it, one that actually
changes the way people see the world and themselves.
Notes
1. Y8IIllIZumi Masami, Nihon Kyoiku Sho-shi (A concise history of
Japanese education)(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1987), p. 143. The term
kokutai is often translated as "national polity," but the exact translation
of the term is difficult. For further discussion, see Richard Minear,
Japanese Tradition and Western Law: Emperor, State. and Law in the
Thought ofHozumi Yatsuka (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1970), pp. 56-83.
2. Space does not permit us to elaborate this point, but we would like to
remind readers that the actual processes of identity formation through
education needs to be understood as complex and flexible. See Raymond
Williams, ''Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," inProb-
/ems in Materialism and Culture (London: Verso, 1980), pp. 3840.
3. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United
States (New York: Routledge, 1986), p. 68.
4. The Imperial Rescript on Education was in essence the narrative of
the imperial nation. See Byron K. Marshall, Learning to Be Modem:
Japanese Political Discourse on Education (Boulder: Westview Press,
1994), pp. 58-62; and Horio Teruhisa, Educational Thought and Ideol-
ogy in Modem Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988), pp.
65-72. For the presurrender textbook contents, see NakBmura Kikuji,
KyokashonoShakaishi(Asocialhistoryoftextbooks)(Tokyo:lwanami
Shoten, 1992); Nakauchi Toshio, Gunkoku Bidon to Kyokasho (Fine
militarist stories and textbooks) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988); and
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
Ieoaga Saburo, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education,"
IntemationalSecurity 18,no. 3 (winter 1993/94): 113-122.
5. See Nakamura, Kyokasho no Shakaishi, pp. and Yoko H.
Thakur, "History Textbook Refonn in Allied Occupied Japan, 1945-
52," History o/Education Quarterly 35, no. 3 (fall 1995): 265.
6. The exception was the case of second-semester elementary school
textbooks on the Japanese language, for which exact items were speci-
fied. Such items were mainly war-related Stories adulating the emper-
ors remained, along with Kimigayo, a song wishing for the prosperity
of imperial sovereignty. See Yamazumi, Nihon Kyoiku Sho-shi, pp.
148-150. Forthe1ranslation ofthe portion ofthe order, see John Caiger,
"Ienaga Saburo and the First Postwar Japanese History Textbook,"
Modem Asian Studies 3, no. 1 (1969): 2-3.
7. For further discussion on the blackened-out textbooks, see Nakamura,
Kyokasho no Shakai-shi, pp. 220-238; and Yamazumi Masami, Sha-
kaika Kyoiku no Shuppatsu (The beginning ofsocial studies education)
(Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta, 1981), pp. 9-15.
8. The blackened-out textbooks remained in use until 31 July 1946. In
1946 and 1947 the Ministry published and distributed "stop-gap" text-
books in certain subjects. These were in short supply, however. For
details, see Tokutake Toshio, Kyokasho no Sengoshi, (The postwar
history of textbooks) (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 1995), pp.
44-45; and Kyoiku no Sengoshi Henshu Iinkai (Conunittee for the
Compilation of Postwar Education History), Sengo Kyoiku Kai/caku to
sono Hokai enD Michi (The postwar educational refonn and the course
of its collapse) (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1986), pp.l31-32.
9. IenagaSaburo, ''TheHistorical Significance ofthe Japanese Textbook
Lawsuit," Bulletin o/Concemed Asian Scholars 2, no. 4 (1970): 8. See
also Ienaga Saburo, ''Sengo no Rekishi Kyoiku" (Postwar history
education), in Iwanomi Koza Nihon Rekishi (Iwanami lecture series,
Japanese history), vol. 22, Beklam (Special volume) no. 1, (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1968), p. 319.
10. From the beginning there was a conflict between SCAP, seeing
entirely new history textbooks as necessary, and the Ministry, seeking
merely to eliminate militaristic content from existing textbooks. While
Toyoda's text began with archaeological fmdings, which pleased SCAP,
it presented as history the myth of the founding of Japan, which was
quite unacceptable to SCAP. Though SCAP suggested a new deal,
Maruyama, writing the normal school textbook, remained as an author
forthenewJXUjectSeeThakur,''HisImyTexIbook.RefonninAlliedOccupied
Japan,"W 267-68; aodIeoaga, ''SeIlgo no Rckisbi Kyoiku," W. 314-17.
11. Ibid., pp. 318-19. See also Yamazumi, Shakaika Kyoiku no Shup-
patsu, pp. 16-18.
12. Ienaga's specialty was ancient Japanese history. His doctoral disser-
tation was on eighth- to twelfth-century cultural history. According to
Ienaga, most of the members were historians of "empirical tradition"
(jisshoshugi) who were rather apolitical and who had had little experi-
ence teaching history in grade schools. See Ieoaga, "Sengo no Rek:ishi
Kyoiku," p. 319. For fiuther discussion on Ieoaga and Kuni no Ayumi,
see Caiger, "Ienaga Saburo and the First Postwar Japanese History Text-
book"; and Thakur, "History TextbookRefonn inAllied Occupied Japon."
13. For the criticisms, see Thakur, "History Textbook Refonn in Allied
Occupied Japan," pp. 270-271; Yamazwni, Shakaika Kyoiku no Shup-
patsu, pp. 18-19; and Kimijima Kazuhiko, Kyokasho no Shiso: Nihon
to Kankoku no Kingendai-shi (Thoughts in textbooks: The modern and
contemporary history represented in Japan and South Korea) (Tokyo:
Suzusawa Shoten, 1996), pp. 274-78. The biggest shock for those
involved in the history textbook production, however, was perhaps the
introduction of "social studies," which nearly made the textbooks
developed useless. For details, see Kimijima, Kyo/aJsho no Shiso. p. 280;
and Usui Kaichi et al., Atarwhi Chuto Shakaika eno lzanai (An invitation
to new secondary social stud.ies)(Tokyo: Chirekisha, 1992), pp. 155-62.
14. The fear here was of state control over least in a
common interpretation. See Horio, Educationol Thought and Ideology
in Modem Japan, p. 121.
15.Ibid,pp. 108-29. In fact, the Rescript was negated by a Diet resolution
in 1948. Seealso YmnazumiM.asami, ''EducationalDemocracy versus State
45
Control," in Democracy in ConmmporaryJapan, ed. Gavan McCormack
and Sugimoto Yoshio (Annonk, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), p. 95.
16. This situation, which in the Ministry's words was to be the case "for
the time being," in fact became permanent.
17. The Ministry even suggested that each classroom could adopt
different textbooks. See Nakauchi Toshio et al., Nihon Kyoiku no
Sengoshi (The postwar history of Japanese education) (Tokyo: San-
seido, 1987), p. 105; and Tokutake, Kyokasho no Sengoshi, p. 57.
18. Teachers' enthusiasm continued in the following years. See Toku-
take, Kyokasho noSengoshi, p. 59. Note that some ofthe textbooks were
still in production and thus were not available for display.
19. See Ienaga Saburo, Kyokasho Kentei (fextbook screening) (fokyo:
NihonHyoronsha, 1%5),pp. 79-81;andBenjaminC.Duke, "TheTextbook
Controversy," Japan Quarterly 19, no.3 (July-September 1972).
20. Ikeda Hayato was then the head of the Policy Research Committee
of the Liberal Party (Jiyuto). Walter Robertson was the U.S. Assistant
SecretaI)' of State.
21. According to the brochmes, there were four types of ''biased''
descriptions: one supporting the teachers' labor-union and political
activities, one stressing the poverty of the Japanese woIkers and pro-
moting their labor movement, one praising the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China, and one teaching communist ideas.
22. Two prominent academics and textbook authors, Hidaka Rokuro
and Nagasu Kazuji, publicly denounced the screening and withdrew
their contributions to Akarui Shakai, a popular social studies textbook
forjunior high school published by Chukyo Shuppan Press. Around this
time, an editor at the press, Tokutake Toshio, inspired by Ienaga's talk,
explored the possibility of bringing a court case against the screening,
but gave up the idea. See Kyokasho Kentei Sosho wo Shiensuru
Zenkoku Renrakukai (NLSTS, National League for Support of the
School Textbook Screening Suit), ed, Ienaga Kyokasho Saiban Junen-
shi (Ten-year history of Ienaga's textbook screening suit) (Tokyo:
Sodobunka, 1977), p. 255.
23. More books were rejected in 1958 than in any other year except the
year in which the screening system was launched. The Publishing
WoIkers' Union decided to make the rejection reasons public, publish-
ing Kyokasho Repoto (Annual report on textbooks). See Tokutake,
Kyokasho no Sengoshi, pp. 103-15. For further discussion on the
conservative tum in education, see Yamazumi, "Educational Democ-
mcy versus State Control," pp. 95-97.
24. An oVemll, or a partial, revision and screening oftextbooks usually
took place every three years. The term "a tentative plan" was removed
from the titles of the 1955156 Instruction Guidelines, which meant that
they were now ''requirements'' mther than"suggested plans" for instruc-
tion. Furthermore, in 1958, the Ministry began to claim that the Instruc-
tion Guidelines had legal force.
25. For details, see Ienaga, ''The Historical Significance ofthe Japanese
Textbook Lawsuit," pp. 8-10; Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in
Japanese Education," pp. 124-126.
26. For further discussion, see, for example, Ronald. P. Dare, "Textbook
Censorship in Japan: The Ienaga Case," Pacific Affairs 43 (winter
1970-71): 548-56.
27. For example, the main reason for the 1963 rejection was ''flaws in
both accuracy and choice of contents"; the number of "inadequate"
items was 323; and the IIUlIk was 784. In 1964 the text just scraped
through the screening process with 73 requests and 217 suggestions.
28. For further discussion, see Mainichi Shinbunsha Kyoiku Shuzaihan
(Division of Mainichi News covering Educational Affairs), Kyokasho
Sensa (fextbook war) (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1981), pp. 148-60;
Tokutake, Kyokasho no Sengoshi, p. 186; and Tokutake Toshio, Kyo-
kasho Saiban wa Ima (The current state oftextbook screening lawsuits)
(fokyo: Azumino Shobo, 1991), pp. 155-70.
29. This version wastranslated by Saigo Takehiko,alanguageeducation
scholar. A different version, by Leo Tolstoy, was translated by Uchida
Risako. The story has also been popular in the United States. Turnip:
An Old Russian Folktale (New York: Philomel Books, 1990).
30. For details of the party's attack on the textbooks, see Usui et al.,
Atarashii Chuto Shakaika enD Izonai, pp. 172-175. For further discus-
sion ofthe textbook controversy in the 198Os, see Mainichi Shinbunsha
Kyoiku Shuzaihan, Kyokasho Senso; and Y8IIl8Zumi Masami, Gakko
Kyokasho (School textbooks) (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1982).
31. The media reported it as ifit were new, even though requests ofthis
kind had been made since the 1960s.
32. Some labor unions and social action groups in Hong Kong sent a
letter ofcomplaint to the Japanese Embassy; in August, the official party
newspaper of the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) criti-
cized the Japanese official view on this issue, and the Vietnamese
government asked the Japanese ambassador to correct textbook remarks
concerning Vietnam.
33. These were mainly Chinese prisoners ofwar, but they also included
people from Korea, Mongolia, European countries, IIIld the Soviet
Union. See SheldonH. Harris,Factories o/Death: Japanese Biological
Warfare, 1932-45, and theAmerican Cover-up (London and New York:
Routledge, 1994), p. 49.
34. For details, see Ienaga, ''The Glorification of War in Japanese
Education," pp. 126-27; and National League for Support ofthe School
Textbook Screening Suit (NLSTS), Truth in Textbooks, Freedom in
Education andPeaceforChildren: The Struggle againstthe Censorship ,
of School Textbooks in Japan (Tokyo: NLSTS, 1992), pp. 10-19.
"Troop Somo" was vel)' popular with the peasants and played an
important role in drawing peasant support for the Meiji government
Peasants felt betrayed when the government executed the members of
Trpop Somo for allegedly fabricating an announcement about a tax-cut
that would have benefited peasants.
35. The court did not even notify Ienaga before handing down its ruling,
a questionable legal maneuver in itself.
36. By this time, the existence of Unit 731 had become common
knowledge, mainly because of Morimum Seiichi's book Akuma no
Hoshoku (The devil's gluttony) (Tokyo: Kadokawa ShoteD, 1982);
however, the question with which the court was concerned was whether
or not Ienaga's description, or the Ministry's request, was based on
scholarly woIk established by the time ofthe screening.
37. In fact, he won on four of the six points he had changed at the
Ministty's request. The complete text ofthejudgment appears in Kentei
ni IhouAri: Ienaga Kyokasho Saiban SaiJwsaiHanketsu (The screening
is found illegal: The Supreme Court decision of Ienaga's textbook
lawsuit), ed. Kyokasho Kentei Sosho wo Shiensuru Zenkoku Ren-
rakukai (NLSTS) (fokyo: NLSTS, 1997).
38. hnmanuel Wallerstein, "The Construction of Peoplehood: Raciml,
Nationalism, E1hnicity," in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities,
Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), p. 78.
39. Patrick Wright, On living in an Old Country: The National Past in
Contemporary Britain (London: Verso, 1985), pp. 24-26.
40. Wada Haruki and Ishizaka Koichi, "Hajime ni" (Introduction), in
Nihon wa Shokuminchi-shihai 0 do Kangaete Kitaka (How Japan has
thought about its colonial rule), ed. Wada Haruki, Ishizaka Koichi, and j
Sengo Goju-nen Kokkai Ketsugi 0 Motomeru-kai (Group for Request-
ing the Diet Resolution of Japan's War Responsibility) (Tokyo: Nashi-
nokisha, 1996), pp. 1-5.
41. Critical investigations are necessary to understand why many Japa-
nese progressives as well as ordinary people "collabomted" with the
government in its professed ignorance ofwar responsibility. One good
example of such a study is Yoshida Yutaka, Nihonjin no Senso-kan:
Sengo-shi no nakano Henyo (Japanese views on the war: Changes in
the postwar history) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995).
42. Ibid., pp. 160-61.
43. RaymondWilliams,Resouro&S' oj1Iope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism
(London: Verso, 1989), pp. 36-38.
44. ToddGitlin,The TwilightofCommonDream&: WhyAmericaIs Wracked
byCu/ture Wan (NewYorlc: Metropolitan Books, 1995), p. 23.
Bulletino[ConcernedAsian Scholars, Vol. 30,No.2(1998):47-S2
ISSN0007-4810 C 1998BeAS (Oakland,California)
TheJapan-SouthKoreaJointStudyGroup
onHistoryTextbooksandthe
ContinuingLegacyofJapaneseColonialism
ThisarticlesummarizestheargumentsthattookplaceduringtheJapan-KoreaTextbookJointStudyGroupthatranfrom
1992to1994. TheStudyGroup,whichwasthefirstattemptofitskindbetweenJapanandSouthKoreainrecentyears,
focusedonrepresentationsof KoreainJapanesehigh schooltextbooks.KoreanscholarscritiquedJapanesetextbooksfor
theirlackofperspectiveonthehistoryofJapan'scolonizationofKorea.SomeKoreanscholarswerecriticaloftheJapanese
attempttoemphasizetheactivitiesoUhoseJapanesepeoplewhoweresympathetictoKoreaunderJapanesecolonialrule,
thinkingthatthiswoulddownplaytherepressivenatureoftherule.Finally,theauthorobservesthattheexaminationof
KoreanhistorytextbooksinKorearemainsoneofthemostimportanttasksofthefuture.Kimijimadiscussestherecent
trendofKoreanhistorytextbooksinKorea,anditsimplicationsforthepromotionofmutualunderstandingbetweenthe
two countries.
byKimijimaKazuhiko,translatedbyInokuchiHiromitsu*
Since mid-1994, a movement to reinterpret history and AfteravisittoGermany,wherehereadFujisawa'sDoitsu-jin no
historytextbookshasbeengainingmomentuminJapan.Ledby Rekishi Ishiki: Ky okasho ni miru Senso Sekinin (TheGermans'
FujiokaNobukatsu,aneducationprofessoratTokyoUniversity, awarenessof history:Theresponsibilityof warasrepresentedin
themovementdemandsa"revision"ofJapanesehistorystudies textbooks),YiproposedholdingaJapan-Koreajointstudygroup
andhistoryeducation. Basedonaratherbluntformofchauvin- based onthe model ofGerman-Polish exchanges ontextbook
isticnationalism,Fujioka's"historyrevisionmovement"enjoys development.
2
broadsupportfromtraditionalright-wing"intellectuals"andpoliti- Initially, the purposeofthe Study Group wasto examine
calforces,eventhoughitisstillintheprocessof development. collaboratively the history textbooks in Japan and Korea by
Fujioka andothersofhis kindhavelearnednothingfrom focusing ontheirrespectivedescriptionsofmodemhistory. As
the accomplishments of the Japan-South Korea Joint Study it developed, however, the Study Group decided to examine
GrouponHistoryTextbooks(hereaftertheStudyGroup),which modernhistory as represented in Japanesehighschool histOIY
hassubjectedthesesamehistoricalissuestocross-nationalstudy. textbooks, because it seemed important to consider how the
Jointresearch undertakenby JapaneseandKoreanscholarson aggressordepicteditsownaggression.
Japanesetextbooksoffersnewperspectivesontheissues,while Inthebeginningtherewereaboutthirtyparticipantsinthe
illustratingthedifficultiesinachievinghistoricalconsensus. StudyGroup,includinghistoriansofmodernJapanandmodern
Korea, scholarsofhistoryeducationandeducation,highschool
OriginsoftheStudyGroup
andmiddleschoolteachers,textbookeditorialstafffrompublishing
In thesummerof1990,FujisawaHouei,ofKanazawaUni- houses, and graduatelundergraduate students. (The Study Group
versityinJapan,organizedtheStudyGroup,inspiredby theideas hadnodirectgovernmentsupportfromeitherJapanorKorea.)
ofYi rae-yong,aSouthKoreanscholarofGermanphilosophy.' My owninvolvementwasas oneofthe organizersofthe
StudyGroupontheJapaneseside.Attheinternationalmeetings,
IreportedontheJapanesetextbooksystemandon thedescription
of Japan-KoreahistoryinJapanesehighschoolhistorytextbooks.
*FortheromanizationofKoreannames,thisarticlebasicallyfollowsthe
Priorto thefirstjointsession,participantsfromJapanhad
McCune-Reishauermethod,exceptsomecommonlyknownnamesin the
beenholdingstudymeetingsonceamonth,whiletheparticipants
English-speakingcountries(e.g.,SyngmanRhee).1hetranslatorwouldJike
10thank SonGwang-mkandBruceCwningsfortheirhelpin the romani-
from Koreahad convened severaltimes. The internationalJa-
zation ofKoreannames.
pan-KoreaStudyGroupmeetingswereheldatotaloffourtimes,
Vol. 30,No.2(1998) 47
This pyramid ofcorpses illustrates the carnage of the Russo-Japanese
War. Most ofthe war was fought in Manchuria and Korea and also
devastated large portions of both those regions. (From Illustmted
London News, 24 Sept 1904.) (Sollml: Nlhon no shingyaku senso to oj/a 110 /co-
domo [Japan's aggressive war and the children of Asia] [Tokyo: Meiseki Shot.en, 1996])
twice in each country, from the spring of 1991 to the fall of 1992.
Discussions at the international meetings, which attracted about
one hundred people from the public, explored historical contro-
versies not limited to the descriptions in school textbooks.
Issues Raised by Korean Scholars
Among the many issues raised at the Study Group meetings,
I specifically discuss those related to the "conceptualization" of the
historical relationship between modern Japan and Korea.
Views on the "Idea of Conquering Korea"
At the second international Study Group meeting, Japanese
historian Kato Akira (Joetsu University of Education) brought
up the 1873 debate in Japan over whether or not to attack Korea.
In that debate, several leaders of the new Meiji government,
including Saigo Takamori, had argued for the Seikanron, i.e.,
"idea of conquering Korea," insisting that the government should
immediately conquer Korea, even though that government had
established power in Japan only five years earlier.
Korean researcher Yi Hyon-hee (Songsin Women's Uni-
versity) countered Kato's position by exposing the deep histori-
cal roots of the Meiji debate on conquering Korea. The "idea of
conquering Korea," professor Yi argued, had originated even
earlier than the Meiji period, and was already well established in
the late Edo period, when such famous thinkers as Kumazawa
Banzan and Ando Shoeki were "representative advocates" of the
idea, and when Hayashi Shihei, Yoshida Shoin, and others "ex-
plicitly argued for the legitimacy of the idea of invasion."
Yi traced the origins of the idea of Japanese invasion to the
ancient myth, recorded in the Nihon Shoki (written in 720), that
the legendary Empress Jinko had conquered Korea. He also
noted the prevalent Japanese view that in the fourth and fifth
centuries the kingdom of "Mimana" (one of Korea's old regional
kingdoms) had fallen within Japan's sphere of governance. Fi-
nally, moving from legend to established fact, Yi noted that
Toyotomi Hideyoshi had invaded Korea in the sixteenth century,
and that late-Edo thinkers viewed invasion as part of the "recov-
ery of lost territory." Yi concluded that after Hideyoshi's inva-
sion, the Edo thinkers, who internalized the warrior-class ideol-
ogy (Bushido seishin), celebrated the idea of conquering Korea
and further developed the idea that Korea was inferior and
despicable.
Yi was not the only member of the Study Group to take this
position. Most of the Korean scholars situated the early Meiji
debate on conquering Korea within the larger sweep ofJapanese
history and viewed current problems in the Japan-Korean rela-
tionship as an extension of that history.
The claim of the Korean scholars was somewhat disap-
pointing to the Japanese historians because they had made sub-
stantial efforts since 1945 to critique and remove the imperialist
ideology and ethnocentrism in historical studies, and many Japa-
nese historians believed that they had already succeeded. Now
they were forced to recognize that a large number of Korean
scholars, whose country suffered under extreme forms of colo-
nial rule, regarded the Japanese efforts as insufficient. The Ko-
rean approach to history stimulated a reexamination of the Japa-
nese approaches.
Views of the Fifteen-Year War (1931-1945)
Discussions about war between Japan and Korea in modern
times have centered on differences in conceptualizing the scope
of "the war" and in establishing "responsibility for the war." In
Japan, progressive historians have come to conceptualize the
Asian theater of World War II as the "Fifteen-Year War" (the term
is also used in some school textbooks). The "war" is viewed as
a series of wars beginning with the Japanese invasion of the
northeastern part of China (Manchuria) in September 1931, and
ending with the Japanese surrender to the Allied Powers in
August 1945.
In contrast, some conservative Japanese, who wish to con-
ceal the Japanese invasion of China and Southeast Asia, have
generally treated this flfteen-year history (from 1931, when the
Japanese invasion intensified, until 1945) as ifit were composed
of a series of unrelated incidents: The Japanese advanced into
northeastern China in 1931 (and the conflict ended), the Japanese
advanced into China in 1937 (and the conflict was settled), and
the Japanese entered the war against the United States and the
United Kingdom in December 1941 (and this war "ended" in
1945). This framework helps hide the essential nature ofthe war,
which began with the Japanese invasion.
Progressives in Japan seem to have provided a more accept-
able, consistent explanation, arguing that (1) the Japanese inva-
sion of northeastern China was the cause of full-scale war with
China; (2) the deadlock in the war with China was the chief
reason for the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia; and (3) the
invasion of Southeast Asia triggered the Japanese war against
the United States and the United Kingdom. In short, then, con-
ceiving the series of wars as the Fifteen-Year War provides a
more comprehensive picture of the history that also takes into
account the question of war responsibility.
The Korean scholars in the Study Group, however, posed a
series of penetrating questions: What do the Japanese mean by
the "Fifteen-Year War"? How do the Japanese conceive of "ac-
countability for Japan's colonial rule of KoreaT and How does
the "Fifteen-Year War" relate to that colonial rule?
They criticized the concept of the Fifteen-Year War as a
China and U.S.-centered view of history that ignores the earlier
colonization ofKorea. From the Korean perspective, the war that
ended in August 1945 was either a seventy -year war that began
with the Kanghwa Island incident of 1875, a fifty-year war that
started with the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), or a forty-year
war that dates back to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).
Citing the example of the One Hundred-Year War in European
history, the Korean scholars observed that the term "war" is not
limited to periods of continuous fighting. In sum, the central
point of the Korean argument was that Japan and Korea were at
war from at least the time of the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War and
the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. They noted that this point had
been overlooked even by progessive Japanese scholars.
In fact, in the official Korean high school history textbook, the
anti-Japanese resistance during the Sino-Japanese War, which was
fought mainly in Korea, is described as one organized by the
"Tonghak farmers' army." Resistance to Japan after the Russo-
Japanese War, also fought mainly in Korea, is similarly described
as the Anti-Japanese war of "righteous armies" (uibyong).
3
From
this perspective, Korea had been fighting a war of "righteous
armies" ever since the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars.
The same textbook also relates that the Provisional Korean
Government (Taehan Min 'guk Imsi Chongpu), established in
exile in Shanghai, continued the "Anti-Japanese War" after the
March First Independence Movement of 1919 was crushed within
Korea. War resistance efforts by Koreans in Manchuria became
part of the anti-Japanese movement. The Provisional Govern-
ment declared war on Japan when the Pacific War broke out (in
December 1941), and, in the fmal stage of the war, was planning
an operation to recover Korea. This never came to pass because
of Japan's surrender.
4
In the Study Group, professor Chong Chae-jung (City
University of Seoul) argued that the Anti-Japanese War in Korea
intensified during the 1930s and 1 940s (i.e., during the period of
the Fifteen-Year War). He linked this struggle to the resistance
in Manchuria (noted above). Then, just after the Pacific War
began in December 1941, the Provisional Korean Government
declared war against Japan. Chong'S contention was that Japan
was at "war" with Korea throughout the years 1931-45, and that
the "responsibility for war" should be termed "accountability for
colonial rule."
By contrast, while Japanese textbooks have increasingly
included terms such as the "Righteous Soldiers' movement"
(Gihei undo) or the "Righteous Soldiers' struggle" (Gihei toso)
when describing the Korean resistance to Japanese rule, they
have never treated Korea in that period as a separate country
Vol 30, No.2 (1998)
waging a "war" for autonomy. Moreover, if we look at the
textbooks in greater depth, and compare the number of descrip-
tions ofKorea-from the 1873 "Conquer Korea" debate until the
1910 "Annexation" ofKorea-with the number from 1910 to the
1945 "Independence" of Korea, the latter period shows signifi-
candy fewer references than the former. The disappearance of
the independent nation-state of "Korea" in the years 1910-45
results in the erasure of Korea as a nation from the Japanese
textbook descriptions.
The Korean conceptualization of the war poses serious
questions for modem Japanese historians. Modem Japanese
historians are not familiar with the concepts of a "Japan-Korea
fifty-year war" or "Japan-Korea forty-year war." When Japanese
historians refer to the responsibility for "war," they implicitly
assume the Fifteen Year War (that is, mainly the war with China).
Moreover, they have not examined sufficiently the relationship
between the colonial rule of Korea and the Fifteen-Year War.
Thus, Japanese historians do not have a sound basis from which
to respond to questions from the Korean scholars.
Taking the Korean question seriously requires that Japa-
nese historians reexamine the entire framework ofexisting stud-
ies of the last war. This may be an issue Japanese scholars need
to study and discuss among themselves before engaging in
discussions with Korean scholars on equal terms. While Japa-
nese textbooks of recent years have allowed more space for
discussion of the Japanese invasion of Korea and its colonial
rule, no textbooks have responded to, or been written from, this
perspective. The Korean question, in fact, poses a great challenge
for Japanese historians and educators.
Study of Japanese Who Were Sympathetic to Korea
Fujisawa Houei, the central Japanese figure in the Study
Group, has pointed out that some Japanese were critical of
Japan's colonial rule of Korea and sympathized with Korea.
Korean textbooks, he suggested, should mention those people so
that Koreans as well as Japanese could recognize their existence.
Professor Takasaki Soji (Tsuda College) has made similar
claims. For example, at the second Joint Study Group meeting
in Korea, Takasaki reported on Japanese intellectuals' responses
to the colonization of Korea by focusing on the attitudes of
socialists, Christians, and humanists (specifically Kotoku Shu-
sui, Uchimura Kanzo, Yanagi Muneyoshi, and Makimura Hi-
roshi). He discussed their responses to three specific historical
incidents: the "annexation" of Korea, the March First Inde-
pendence Movement, and the Independence Movement under
the Fifteen-Year War. Takasaki, while identifying the limitations
of anti-colonial thought among modem Japanese intellectuals,
argued that it should be noted nevertheless that even in the
darkest days, some Japanese supported and attempted to ally
with the Korean independence movement. He expressed his wish
that Korean people would acknowledge Japanese efforts to honor
their predecessors' anti -colonialist thought and activities.
The Korean scholars objected sharply. Kim Sung-il (Dong-
kuk University), for example, insisted that the brutality of Japa-
nese colonial rule cannot in any way be negated or justified by
enlphasizing the existence of a few Japanese sympathetic to
Korea. Kim criticized each individual name Takasaki brought up,
and he argued that not even the most conscientious Japanese of
the period actively worked to end colonial oppression. Prioritiz-
ing the national interest over individual thought and interests had
49
been the essence of the presurrender Japanese mentality, Kim
argued.
Moderator Yi Won-sun (professor emeritus, Seoul National
University) summarized the Korean position in the debate: "It is
possible to understand [the point of the Japanese argument], but
it is difficult for Koreans to accept it [and include the description
in the textbooks]." Yi had long promoted exchanges in the field
of history education and he understood both Korean and Japa-
nese sensitivities on this point. From the perspective of promo-
tion of Korea-Japan friendship, he understood the significance
of writing about these Japanese individuals, but he held that other
Japanese were evading responsibility for colonial rule by refer-
ring to the very few Japanese critics of colonialism. Arguments
of this kind, Yi concluded, would not convince many Koreans;
thus it is difficult to address this matter explictly in Korean
school textbooks.
Many of the Japanese participants understood the Korean
point of view, but it presented problems for them nonetheless.
Progressive history educators in Japan had wrestled with how to
teach about Japan-Korea friendship in the context of modem
Japanese-Korean relations. They decided to emphasize three
areas of study: the "history of invasion," the "history of resis-
tance," and the "history of solidarity."
The "history of invasion," which deals in detail with the
modern Japanese invasion of Korea and Japanese colonial rule,
has been a central focus in progressive Japanese history educa-
tion. Educators acknowledge two shortcomings with this ap-
proach, however. The first is that it tends to disregard the agency
of Koreans, in that Korea is simply treated as an object to be
invaded and dominated. The second is that teachers have found
that, because colonial rule was so violent and cruel, more than a
few students developed a dislike for history classes after the
"history of invasion" lessons. Students frequently made com-
ments such as "again?" or "too much!"
The "history of resistance" component, which was devel-
oped in response to these criticisms, emphasizes Korean bravery
in the independence struggle against Japanese rule. This ap-
Kon:a was forcibly annexed by Japan on 22 August 1910. Japanese
officials forbid the use of the Korean language and Korean pronoun-
ciation ofnames in order to hasten the assimilation of Koreans into
Imperial Japan. (SOUml: Nono Kuboi, Nihon 110 shillryaku 8eIlllSOU to Ajia 110 ko-
domo, Tokyo: Aktuhi Shot.... 1996, ISBN 4-7503-0842-0. P. 49.)
proach recounts not only the historical events of the "other"
country, but it conveys also the importance of defending one's
own nation against invasion. Educators note problems with this
approach, as well. Teachers found that the following questions
often arose as they taught about the history of invasion and
resistance: Did Koreans and Japanese ever overcome their hos-
tilities or the dynamic of invasion and resistance? Will it ever be
possible for the people of the two countries to develop friendly
relations? Japanese historians developed the "history of solidar-
ity" curriculum unit in order to address questions such as these.
The history of solidarity offers a basis for future solidarity
and friendship by collecting historical data showing that some
people in the two countries understood and helped each other.
Teachers found that in this way their students had opportunities
to recognize the people of Korea as fellow human beings.
Although Koreans might argue that this approach justifies
the Japanese invasion, this new approach has been beneficial for
history education in Japan, helping to promote a good under-
standing of Korea and to build Japan-Korean friendship. Japan-
Korean friendship, it must be emphasized, must be built through
efforts on both sides, and the key to this is how the two countries
come to understand each other's present situation and history.
Criticism that Japanese Textbooks Perpetuate
the Emperor-Centered View of History
In the Study Group meetings Korean scholars repeatedly
pointed out that Japanese textbooks perpetuate the "emperor-
centered view of history" and the "colonialist view of history"
that was prevalent during the war. At first, Japanese scholars
were puzzled by these terms and wondered what the point of
these historical references was.
Twenty years ago, in 1976, Yi Won-sun gave a lecture on
this very point, one that still serves as a good reference for
discussion. Yi argued that history textbooks under Japanese
colonialism were written from an emperor-centered perspective
in order to "foster the character and attitude of conquerors and
to educate Japanese people that Japan had progressed to the
extent that it had by extricating itself from Asia (Datsua shiso)."
Specifically, in the case ofKorea, "the emperor-centered history
attempted to explain, in a historical and rational manner, that
Korea was an object to be invaded and conquered," and it also
"attempted to deny the historical autonomy and creativity ofthe
Korean people, while it created a historical image that all of
Korean history was determined and fostered by forces and cul-
tures in the Chinese continent, and was after aU advanced by
external powers. It represented Korea as having a stagnant char-
acter with no volition of its own.,,5 As far as I know, no Japanese
history textbooks today explicitly expound this view. The ques-
tion, however, is whether this perspective lies embedded in
textbooks in other forms.
In the Study Group, Pak Song-su, of the Academy of
Korean Studies, pointed out that the old idea of the Japanese
imperial state-that Japan "annexed" Korea in order to develop
the civilization of Korea and protect it from colonization by Rus-
sia-swvives in present-day Japanese textbooks in which Japan is
said to be contributing to Korea's autonomous modcmization. Cho
Hang-nae (Sungmyong Women's University) echoedtheseconcems,
stating that distorted images are still implanted in the Japanese stu-
dents' minds through textbook descriptions ofKorea.
Japanese researchers and educators need to recognize that their text-
books still contain elements that remind Koreans ofthe emperor-cen-
tered view of history. These elements include names used to describe
particular historical incidents (e.g., "annexation"), the evaluation of
historical events, and the overall organization of topics in the text-
books. (Pictured above are samples of pre-war state-compiled textbooks that
emphasized emperor worship. Source: Truth in Textbooks, Freedom in Educa-
tion andPeacefor Children: The Struggle against Censorship ofSchool Text-
books inJapan [Tokyo: National League for Support ofthe School Textbook
Screening Suit, 1995J, p. 7.)
Japanese researchers and educators need to recognize that
their textbooks still contain elements that remind Koreans of the
emperor-centered view ofhistory. These elements include names
used to describe particular historical incidents (e.g., "annexa-
tion"), the evaluation of historical events, and the overall organi-
zation of topics in the textbooks. The history of the Japan-Korea
relationship needs to be reexamined from this perspective, too.
Reconciliation and the New Problematic: The Study
Group's Achievements and Tasks for the Future
The Study Group ended after two years, disbanding in
March 1993, and a summary of the meetings was published as a
book. Members moved on to pursue their own studies of text-
books and to exchange views in more depth individually. The
Study Group both produced much of value and raised many
issues, some of which were left unresolved. Below I would like
to discuss some achievements and remaining tasks.
Actual Reading of Textbooks
The most notable achievement was the opportunity to ex-
amine Japanese high school history textbooks through both
Japanese and Korean eyes. Currently, there are several routes of
educational exchange available between Korea and Japan, but
these exchanges have been primarily for research purposes. No
groups have yet read specific textbooks together line-by -line.
6
In the Study Group, Korean scholars did comment on
specific points in Japanese high school textbooks (e.g., biased
presentations of Japanese and world history). Pak Sung-soo, for
example, discussed two textbooks published by Jikkyo Shupp an
press, Japanese History for High School and Japanese History.
He judged them to be generally "well-written" in terms of the
Japan-Korea relationship, but he criticized the textbook descrip-
tion of the massacre of Koreans in Japan just after the Great
Kanto Earthquake of 1923. Pak pointed out that the racist meaning
of the massacre was obscured because the books failed to differen-
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
tiate the mass killing of Koreans from the politically motivated
murders by police of the Japanese anarchist Osugi Sakae and a
group of labor organizers in the Kameido district of Tokyo.
Pak also noted approvingly that Jikkyo Shuppan's Japa-
nese History is the only textbook that refers to the Cheam Church
massacre of 1919,7 but he criticized the last sentence in the
captionofone ofthe book's photographs: "This is the photograph
of a new church built in 1970 funded by Christians in Japan and
others." Pak saw this line as part of an attempt to offset criti-
cisms-and so justify-the Japanese invasion with talk of Japa-
nese donations.
Compared to other Korean criticisms of Japanese text-
books-which often dismissed all textbooks as being "as awful
as" the right-wing, militarist textbook, the New Edition History
ofJapan (published by Hara Shobo Press)-Pak's specific criti-
cisms of the "well-written" Japanese textbooks are timely and
very useful.
Japanese historians and educators should be prepared to hear
more criticism that is based on close readings of actual texts, and
should respond to such criticisms in a serious and sincere manner.
The Need to Study Korean Textbooks
The Study Group did not analyze Korean textbooks, per-
haps the most important area it neglected. Since the estab-
lishment of the South Korean government in 1948, Korean
history textbooks have been changed six times in accordance
with changes in the national curriculum guidelines. The first two
sets of guidelines, adopted in 1954 and 1963-bothwritten under
the influence of President Syngman Rhee's governance-coin-
cided with adoption of the state-certified textbook system, and
several existing textbooks were retained for each subject. The
guiding principles in that period were "anti-communism" and
"anti-Japan. "
In 1973, the start of the third period, President Park Chung
Hee proposed "education with nationalism" and gave the state
the responsibility for writing history textbooks (a system that
continues to date). History textbooks published during this pe-
riod pointed to the Japanese invasion as the major historical
factor disrupting Korea's autonomous development.
The fourth set of curriculum guidelines, adopted in 1981,
stressed continuities in Korea's self-reliant development, in spite
of Japan's invasion and colonization. It described Korean mod-
ern history as a period of anti-feudalism and anti-colonialism,
and portrayed history under Japanese rule in terms of the anti-
Japanese war for independence.
The history textbook written to meet the fifth round of
curriculum guidelines in 1987 described modern Korean history
as an age of "autonomous development" in the areas of politics,
economy, and thought. (The colonial period was said to be the
"period when Korean national identity formed" and "when its
national independence movement developed.") Korean nation-
alism was heavily promoted in this edition of the textbook, and
the significance of the Japanese invasion was toned down and
the anti-Japanese tone was significantly reduced.
The sixth curriculum guidelines took effect in March 1997,
8
and the seventh guidelines, scheduled for 200 1, are currently
being developed. While I have not yet analyzed the textbooks
that follow the 1997 guidelines, Korean textbooks in general now
emphasize the nation's autonomous development and de-empha-
size the impact of Japanese invasion and rule. Korean textbooks
51
stress the struggle for independence rather than the experience
of being oppressed.
This position has not necessarily replaced the earlier one,
however. The history of the invasion and of Japanese oppression
has hardly been forgotten in Korea, nor will it ever be, even if,
as it appears, it is no longer central in Korean history textbooks.
In the world beyond textbooks, a huge center for "anti-Japanese
education" was opened in Ch'onan on 15 August 1987-Inde-
pendence Memorial Hall-illustrating that the old position is
fIrmly established. Researchers who wish to understand the
descriptions of modem Korean history in Korean textbooks need
to recognize the existence of two positions-one stressing Ko-
rea's victimization by Japan, the other stressing Korea's agency
and resistance to Japan-and the occasionally conflicting mean-
ings that these positions represent.
Is a Common Korean-Japanese Textbook Possible?
The Study Group did not resolve the question of whether it
would be possible to create a "common Japan-Korean textbook."
On this point, Korean scholars were divided. While Pak Sung-
soo insisted on the need for a common textbook (in his words, it
is worth pursuing even if it takes a hundred years to develop),
but Yi Won-sun thought the task impossible. Many Japanese
participants shared Yi's perspective, noting the many institu-
tional differences between textbook systems, differences in the
organization of the history textbooks, and, above all, differences
in the interpretation of history between the people and scholars
of the two countries.
I myself am inclined to agree that a common textbook is
impossible, at least for now, for several reasons. First, Japanese
and Korean history textbooks are very different in their organi-
zation of knowledge and topics. In Japanese history textbooks,
Korea is discussed mainly in political and diplomatic historical
contexts. Analysis of Japan's modem-day diplomatic history,
however, generally focuses on Japan's relations with Europe and
the United States first, then China, and Korea last.
In the Korean history textbooks, Korea's relationship with
Japan is central. Even, the description of the period under Japa-
nese rule focuses on Japanese oppression, even in the economic
and cultural realms. (Anti-Japanese literature and anti-Japanese
music are examples of the cultural topics treated in the text-
books.) In other words, Korean modern history textbooks cannot
be written without extensive reference to Japan. There seems to
be no easy way to resolve these differences in a common Ko-
rean-Japanese textbook.
The second reason involves the textbook production sys-
tems in Japan and Korea. Japan uses a state system for screening
and certifying and has produced about twenty history textbooks;
Korea, on the other hand, uses a single state-authored history
textbook. This difference between the two systems needs to be
understood in greater depth by scholars in both countries before
work on a common textbook could be begun.
The third reason has to do with differences in methods and
approaches in the two countries. Though it may be possible to
overcome those differences through scholarly exchanges, it will
require time to bridge the gap.
Having said this, I maintain that the attempt to create a
common textbook and the importance of examining the content
of existing history textbooks can be two separate projects. The
Study Group was able to conduct a focused discussion on the
issue of historical facts,and to explore ways in which the two sides
. connected with each other. The joint discussions also gave us a clearer
sense of the future tasks ofhistory education and history studies.
The project should continue. By jointly analyzing the text-
books of both countries, researchers will be able to begin to
clarify the historic relationship between Japan and Korea, choose
common themes for study, and deepen understandings between
the Korean and Japanese people.
Notes

is currently head ofthe Korea Intemational TextbookResearch Institute.
2. The Study Group was not the first attempt at dialogue on the issue.
A Japan-South Korea textbook dialogue occurred in the late 1960s as a
response to the call in 1965 from UNESCO headquarters, when Japan's
domestic UNESCO committee and Korea's preparatory committee
agreed to establish a History Education Conference. However, the
conference was postponed indefInitely because the textbook lawsuit by
Ienaga Saburo brought on a contlict of viewsregarding textbooks within
the Japanese side. Dialogue ofthis kind only reopened in the mid-l 980s.
3. The "righteous armies" were local armies consisting mainly of
peasants led by the "yangban" class (fonner government officials or
landlords) and local intellectuals in order to resist the Japanese invasion
through military struggle. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War and the
Russo-Japanese War, many groups of righteous armies united and
fought in organized ways.
4. Under Japan's colonial rule, in the course of the March First Inde-
pendence Movement of 1919, several separate groups of Koreans in
various places such as Seoul, Siberia, Manchuria, and Shanghai at-
tempted to establish a provisional Korean government. In April 1919,
the organizers of these groups gathered together to establish the Provi-
sional Korean Government in Shanghai, where Japanese authories were
out of reach and it was easy to develop diplomatic relations with many
countries. The provisional government adopted a republican fonn, and
Syngman Rhee became the fust prime minister. While it organized secret
operations in Korea, it attempted to restore its sovereignty through diplo-
matic means. Kim Kyu-sik, who stayed in Paris, was secretary offoreign
affairs. In spite ofsome difficulty caused by the internal power struggle, the
provincial government continued the independence movement, and de-
clared war with Japan when the Pacific War broke out.
5. In Japan, such a view has been criticized by historian Hatada Takashi
and others as the "view of history that sees Korea as a dependent nation"
(Chosen taritsusei shikan) or the "theory ofKorea as a stagnant nation"
(Chosen teitaiseiron).
6. The Examination of Content of Korean History Represented in
Japanese Textbooks (Nihon Kyokasho ni Detekuru Kankoku-shi no
Naiyo no Kento) (1987, in Japanese) authored by the Korea Education
and Development Institute, is the closest to such a project. Although it
discusses Japanese elementary, junior-high, and high school history
textbooks, it does not provide specific references to titles of textbooks
or page numbers.
7. In Japanese, the incident is called "Teigan Kyokai Jiken." This
incident was one example of severe repression of the Korean inde-
pendence movement. As part of the March First Independence Move-
ment, some Koreans demonstrated near the city of Suwon on April 5.
After the demonstration, on April 15, Japanese police and military
searched for the leaders, and at the village of Cheam-li, they confmed
twenty-one Christian villagers in the chapel and burned them to death.
They also killed two village women and burned the village. They then
killed six Ch'ondogyo (a popular religion) believers in a neighboring
village, because Christians and Ch'ondogyo believers worked together
for independence.
8. The most recent textbook fmally includes the issue of the "Comfort
Women," albeit a short, simple description.
D
Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars 52
Bulletin o[ConcernedAsian Scholars, Vol. 30,No.2(1998): S3-61
ISSN0007-4810 C 1998BCAS(Oakland,California)
Identity and Transnationalization
in German School Textbooks
GermanyprovidesanInterestingpuzzlefromacomparativepenpectivetothestudyofnation-stateidentitiesintextbooks.
UnlikeitsAsiancounterparts,andmore10thanotherEuropeancountries,inGermany,historyandciviatextbooksdisplay
aprudenceinrepresentationsofnationalidentity.Ratherthanassertingnationalmythsandirredentistnarrativesasthe
corecomponentsof nationhood,thetextbooksfocusontherepresentationof amoreglobalizedanddivenifiedworld,and
theplaceof arelatlvizedGermanidentityinit.Inthispaper,theauthorexplicatesthepostwaridentitytrendsasdepicted
inGermantextbooksandoffena setofexplanatoryfactonthatunderwritethesetrend..- thedispositionofGermany
vis-a-vistheEuropeanUnion,theinstitutionalstructureoftheschoolsystemandtextbookproduction,andthenatureof
i
I
I
,
theactoninvolvedintextbookreformationefforts.
byYaseminNuholluSoysal
Introduction
Inrecentdecades,wehaveobselVed asignificantchange
in nation-state identities in response to global and regional
politicalreconfigurations. Onesuchcase,theEuropeanUnion,
projects a transnational political entity-a union of nations,
regions,andlocalities.Whathappenstocollectiveidentitiesand
citizenship(historicallyshapedbytheboundariesofthenation-
state)inasituationinwhichcentrifugalforcesareundermining
thepremiseof nationalcollectivitiesandthenationalclosureof
cultures?PostwarchangesintheEuropeanstatesystemprovide
ample opportunitytoexplorethedefinition andredefinitionof
collective identities andnationhood through the institution of
education.
Thispaperaimstocapturetheshiftsinnation-stateidenti-
ties, specificallyin Germany,asthesearerepresentedinschool
curriculaandtextbooks.
1
Incomparisonwiththestudyofnation-
state identities in the textbooks ofother countries, Germany
providesaninterestingpuzzle.UnlikeitsAsiancounterparts,and
more so than other European countries, Germany displays a
prudence in representations ofnational identity in its social
science textbooks. Rather than asserting national myths and
presentingirredentistnarrativesas thecorecomponentsofna-
tionhood, the textbooksfocus ontherepresentation ofa more
globalizedanddiversifiedworld, andtheplaceofa relativized
Germanidentityinthatworld.Thisdeparturefromthetraditional
representationsofnationalidentity should,nodoubt,beunder-
stoodvis-i-visthecriticaljunctureoftheHolocaustandWorld
WarII. Givenitsharrowingnationalistandmilitaristpast,Ger-
manyhadnochoicebuttoanchoritsidentitywithintheprospect
ofanintegratedEurope andatransnationalcontext.I contend,
however,thatthereareotherdecisivefactorsthatweneedtotake
intoaccountinordertounderstandthepuzzleofpostwarshifts
inGermannation-stateidentity.
In this paper, I explicate the postwar identity trends as
depicted in German textbooks and offer a set ofexplanatoty
factors that explainthese trends--the disposition ofGermany
vis-i-visthe EuropeanUnion,the institutional structureofthe
school system and textbook production, and thenature ofthe
actorsinvolvedintextbookreformationefforts. Myfocusison
theofficialrepresentationofidentitiesintextbooksratherthan
theextenttowhichthetextbooksthemselvesaffecttheattitudes
orshapethebeliefsofindividuals.Furthermore,Idonotintend
toprovideanormativeassessmentofvariousrepresentationsof
identity, instead I deploy the respresentations analytically to
capturetheidentityreconfigurationsinpostwarEurope.
NationandIdentityinPublicDebates
The controversies over histOty and the definition ofthe
nationarenotabsentfromthepublicsphereinGermany. Since
unification in 1989, Germany hashadits shareof"searchfor
nationalidentity"efforts,alongwithdebatesonhowtointerpret
itshistoty.Theunityandnatureof theGermannationhavebeen
called into question over and over again, in struggles over
memorials, monuments, the re-interpretation ofthe Nazi past,
andtheplaceofthearmyinthenewGermany.
Indeedtheyear1994witnessedaheightenedpublicdebate
overidentityandhistoty-notcoincidentally,sincetheyearwas
markedbyaseriesof commemorationsof theendof theSecond
World War. ItwasalsotheelectionyearfortheGermanpresi ..
dency,withimmigration,unification,andthefutureofGermany
I

VoL 30,No.2(1998) 53
among the topics on the electoral agenda Efforts to redefine the
Gennan nation and its history and to discern the role of Germany
in a unified Europe were strengthened as events unfolded in 1994.
When the conservative presidential candidate Roman Her-
zog identified himself as a "patriot" in an interview, stating "Ich
liebe dieses deutsche Yolk (I love this German nation)," the
routine and rather tranquil parliamentary contest for a ceremonial
post turned into a matter for "national soul searching and re-ex-
amination."2 Herzog's comments, interpreted as a drift toward
German nationalism, generated reactions across a broad spec-
trum. While his words found resonance among many, the ensu-
ing debate was not as much about recovering the German nation
as it was about defining a new identity for Germany-involving
a break. from the past and a striving for normalcy as a nation-state
and an assuming of European and global responsibilities.
3
Soon
after his election, Herzog committed himself to this vision of a new
identity, distancing himself from his earlier "volkisches Denken"
(ethnic thinking) and recasting his image as the "president of
everyone living in Germany"-Gennan or foreigner.
4
The controversies surrounding the commemorations of
World War II were also signs of a desire to make a sharp break
with the past and to reconstitute postwar Germany as an equal
among the other European nation-states. Anniversary events in
the summer of 1994 highlighted the urge to "move fOlWard"; at
the same time, the fragility of the same desire in the shadow of
the Nazi past came to the fore with the opening of a nationwide
exhibition on "German resistance" to the Nazi regime; the quest
of the German state to be part of the D-Day celebrations; the
marching of German troops along with the French on Bastille
Day as part of the Eurocorps; and President Herzog's official
visit to Poland and his apology on the day of Warsaw Uprising.
s
Each of these events, while reflecting the efforts of Germany to
reconcile with its neighbors and allies-and recontextualize its
national identity- also revealed the strains of trying to come to
terms with a difficult past.
Not so inadvertently, the quest to normalize the German
nation and identity has coincided with the flaring up of theories and
historical accounts that relativize the Nazi past. Since the mid-
1980s, conservative reinterpretations ofthe Holocaust, which rej ect
the uniqueness of the German experience or deny outright the
existence of the Holocaust, have found their way into historians'
writings. This perspective, however, has been fiercely opposed by
humanist and left-oriented historians,6 and Gennany's constitu-
tional court itself ruled that the denial ofthe Holocaust was uncon-
stitutional.
7
Still, a loosely linked group of writers and historians
continues to appeal for a more self-assertive German identity and
national pride. And history and national identity remain con-
tested issues as Nazi revivals, Holocaust revisionism, and anti-
immigrant violence keep surfacing, despite reactions from wide-
ranging segments of German society.
While the contentions over German history and identity
play out in the public arena, the school curricula and textbooks
appear to be less affected by such controversies. The textbooks
ratheneflect a consensus over the condemnation ofthe Nazi past
and over the exclusion of references to the "past glories and
power of the German nation." The significant absence of public
struggles over textbooks, which is in sharp contrast with the case
of Japan (and also the United States), is part of the puzzle that I
try to untangle in this paper. To do so, I suggest that we need to
take into consideration (1) the specificities of institutional (cor-
poratist) arrangements in Germany, (2) the agency and involve-
ment of international actors, and (3) the role of the unification
process in Europe. It is these variables that underlie the different
trajectory of identity definitions in the European context and
explain the immunity oftextbooks from controversy in Germany.
Nation and Identity in German Textbooks
National textbooks are representative of officially selected,
organized, and transmitted knowledge.
8
They are products of
contestation and consensus. Thus they are indispensable to the
explication of public representations of national collectivities
and identities. My discussion of the emerging nation-state iden-
tity and the changes in the public defmitions of citizenship in
postwar Germany draws upon an analysis of history and civics
textbooks for lower secondary schools, since they reflect more
standardized, mass aspects of education.
History textbooks have an amplified significance, for his-
tory is not only a defmition of the past and present but also an
attempt to foster continuity in national memory. This memory,
in tum, is the foundation upon which collective identity is
constructed and the future is predicated.
9
Thus, historiography
debates do have an important role in shaping the Collective
meanings of identity. My discussion in this paper, however, is
confmed to the textbooks themselves, rather than the debates
ushered in by historians to recast collective memory. In analyz-
ing German textbooks, I focus on three dimensions that delineate
the boundaries of the nation-state identity:
1. The extent of the Europeanization and globalization of iden-
tities presented; and the coverage of topics such as progress,
environment, and human rights, which have a transnationalizing
content.
2. The existence (or nonexistence) of a renewed emphasis on
national identities and the nationalizing content ofeducation; the
nature ofvalues, ideals, loyalties, and civic duties celebrated; and
the degree of the valorization of the nation.
3. The degree to which cultures and histories ofethnic, religious,
and regional minorities are incorporated.
Let me now present some of the "identity" trends as repre-
sented in textbooks in the light of these three dimensions along
with some comparative remarks.
Transnationalizing content of education and
the normalization of the national canon
As Europe becomes a transnational political entity and
sovereignty is increasingly shared between the European Union
and the individual national states, we observe the penetration of
a pronounced European dimension into national education. In
practice, this means, for example, the teaching of Union lan-
guages in schools; the incorpomtion of "Europe" as a formal
subject of study; and an increasing emphasis in school curricula
on wider European ideals and civic traditions (broadly defmed
as democratic principles, social justice, and human rights), re-
placing the nationalist content and the nationalizing mission of
education. School curricula in severnl German states specifically
include four dimensions to be dealt with across all (curricular)
subjects: environment, gender equality, intercultural education,
and the European dimension. Even in Bavaria, a typically more
conservative state, the topics that deal with Europe, democracy,
and human rights have been assigned a higher priority along with
Bulletin a/Concerned Arian Scholars
54
our point of view.',11 Accordingly, the ministry pro-
duces supplementary teaching material specifically
designed to strengthen the teaching ofthe European
perspective in history and civics lessons.
Similarly, the head of the German History
Teachers' Association stressed the need for a shift
in approaches to teaching history:
The aim is more and more to cover what is important
for Europe. For example, in teaching about the towns
and cities inthe Middle Ages, the oldertextbooks spoke
about the German old towns. And we saw expressed in
these towns the typical German character. And now, we
do not study the German character of these towns, but
their European character. For example, we have build-
ings in Poland like buildings in Germany. In former
times, the teacher would say, "Ah! You see in Poland
there are the same buildings as in Germany, therefore
these buildings were built by Germans." Now we say,
"in both countries in this period, people built similar
buildings." This is a question of perspective. You can
teach the same material from a national perspective or
from a European perspective. And now, we have, we
want to have a European perspective.12
The European dimension is being given more
prominent space in the textbooks and it is becoming
visually salient 13 The following exhibits sample the
depictions of Europeanness and European i e n t i ~
from two different German history textbooks. The
fU'St exhibit (left) reaches back in history in the
form of a fourteenth-centwy map that projects a
rather inclusive Europe-from Italy and Germany
to Denmark and from Spain, Gaul and Hungary
to Constantinople. The two posters that appear on
pages 6 and 56 (the second exhibit) orient Europe
to the future and to development. Posters that
celebrate Europe show member nations as unmis-
takenly embodied inthe European Union-and its
youth and future.
In these depictions, the nation exists in the his-
tory and future of Europe, and national i e n ~ is
subsumed under a unified, supranational European-
ness (but not necessarily euronationalism). This is
Exhibit 1: "Europe as Unity." This map from the fourteenth century projects a rather not a static, unchangeable definition of the nation,
inclusive Europe-- from Italy and Germany to Denmark and from Spain, Gaul and
since it implies growth with others. Neither is it
Hungary to Constantinople. The use ofmaps such as tIlls one shows students that the
an unequal portrayal of the nations-each con-
nation exists in the history and future ofEurope, and national identity is subsmned
tributes to a common future and each is equally
under a unified, supranational Europeanness (but not necessarily euronationalism).
"fruitful." And not surprisingly (for Germany) the
(Source: Geschichte undGeschehen. vol. 2 [Stuttgart: Klett, 1987]. p. 101.)
use of tree as a symbol of the European body
resonates with the strong environmentalist em-
more regional themes that emphasize the heimat (homeland, phasis in German education.
as in "my homeland Bavaria,,).10 As a corollary to the trend toward Europeanization, we also
Many of the ministry officials, educators, and the heads of observe a normalization of national canons that glorify discrimi-
teachers' associations I interviewed shared their perspectives on natory uniqueness and naturalistic myths. An example of this is
the increased prominence given to the European dimension in the remaking of the VIkings from warrior forefathers to spirited
f
school curricula. One ministry official stated that the changes in long-distance traders. This is evident in the increasing celebra-
I
~
curriculum were made "in response to the technical, economic, tion ofthe European heritage of the VIkings in history textbooks.
I
and political developments in Germany, Europe, and the whole Similarly, Germanic tribes in civics textbooks are often depicted
world." For him the direction was clear: "You cannot preach a in cultural terms through references to village life, hospitality,
European Union and at the same time continue to produce foodways, and artistic achievements.
14
textbooks with all the national prejudices of the nineteenth Yet another manifestation of this trend toward normaliza-
centwy .... We must lose our national prejudices, we must change tion of national canons is the deliberate attempt to remedy the
I
1
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998) 55
i
conflicting national histories of European countries. Currently,
there are several joint commissions working at hannonizing the
teaching ofhistorical relations between Gennany and its various
neighbors, including Poland, the Czech Republic, and France.
These commissions produce guidelines and proposals for writing
textbooks and for generating a common understanding and vo-
cabulary for the teaching of national histories consistent with
European ideals. (I return to this point below.)
Emphasis on national identities
Responses to Europeanization differ from country -to-coun-
try based on the country's position within the European Union.
Germany, with a secure place in the new Europe, and with a
stronger identification with it, is more open to the transnationali-
zation of its educational curricula and the diversification of
collective identities. The countries in the old core of Europe-
such as Britain and France-have a higher propensity to react to
the intrusions ofEurope by accentuating their national identities.
For example, the 1988 Education Reform Act in Britain
was intended to institutionalize a "national curriculum" with
increased emphasis given to national history and English litera-
ture. The growing presence of the European Union-and a
possible loss of British identity and sovereignty-underscored
the debates surrounding the Reform Act. The installation of a
national curriculum is a major step in the case of Britain, given
that education has alway s been locally organized and the country
has never had a nationally designed curriculum. Not surprisingly,
in the new curriculum, British history occupies a very prominent
place-accounting for seventy -five percent of the time allocated
to history teaching. This percentage is extremely high compared
to Germany, where the European dimension and world history
share relatively equal curricular time with national history. In
Lower-Saxony, for instance, the history cur-
riculum for the fIrst year of secondary school
allocates 39.9 percent of the teaching time to
national history as compared to 49.8 percent
reserved for European themes and 10.5 percent
for non-European civilizations. IS
No doubt, German history books have
the customary narratives ofthe origins, histori-
cal progress, and consolidation ofthe nation-
from the Romans and Greeks and Christian
Middle Ages to the coming of age of the
nation-state. However, in comparison with
textbooks in other European countries, con-
temporary history in German textbooks is
given a more prominent place. Ancient and
medieval history is relatively marginalized in
comparison with coverage of the Weimar Re-
public, the Nazi period, and the cold war. For
example, one popular secondary school his-
tory textbook, Die Reise in die Vergangenheit.
reserves three volumes out of six to the history
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with
separate volumes devoted to the Weimar and
Nazi periods and to postwar world history. In
Zeiten und Menschen, another popular text-
book, out of a total of 237 pages covering
twentieth-century history, half are devoted to
the study of World War II, beginning with the
"crisis of the Weimar Republic." This is not coincidental. In all
German states, curricula guidelines require extensive teaching of
contemporary Gennan history from Weimar on. This dispropor-
tionate attention to contemporary history-given its contentious
nature--makes it difficult to extol the "deutsche Nation and
Volk" through celebratory narratives.
The incorporation of minority/regional cultures
and languages into national curricula and textbooks
By breaching the link between the status attached to citi-
zenship and national territory, the European Union creates a
legitimate ground for various subnational groups to make claims
for their cultural and linguistic identities within national educa-
tion systems. More and more societal groups (immigrant organi-
zations, regional movements, religious groups) are mobilizing
around demands for inclusion into the defmitions and institutions
of national education. Since 1983, for example, organizations
advocating the use of languages such as Cornish, Sardinian,
Occitan, have been w o r k n ~ through the European Bureau for
the Lesser-used Languages. 6 In the last decade, various Euro-
pean states, even those which had long resisted linguistic and
cultural diversity, as in the cases ofFrance, Italy, and Spain. have
passed legislation accommodating and supporting the use of
regional languages in schools.
In Gennany, many local states require "intercultural educa-
tion" as a part oftheir curricula. In history textbooks, intercultu-
ralism has found its way into the teaching about Islamic civili-
zations. More and more, for instance, chronological accounts are
giving way to narratives that depict Islam as a "culture" and a
"way of life." Unlike the coverage of Christianity in German
textbooks, the chapters on Islam invariably include everyday -life
pictures of mosques, prayers, and marketplaces. In civics text-
Exhibit 2
With this poster, the history text-
book celebrates an idea ofEurope
that projects the European Union
as the embodiment ofmember na-
,. I
tions and their future.
(."
(Source: Geschichte. vol. 4 [Munich:
Bayerischer Schulbuchverlag, 1986].
pp.202203.)
Wir leben mit
Menschen
anderer
Lander
zusammen
Exhibit 3: This class photo from a middle school in Hannover, Germany, shows pupils from different coun1ries and is a
typical depiction of "us" and "others." (Source: Welt- und Umweltkuntle, Braunschweig: Westermann, 1993, p. 156.)
books, interculturalism commonly fmds its expression in the
introduction of the "ausl/lnder" (foreigner) under the thematic
title of "miteinanderen leben" (living with each other).
Exhibit 3 (above) is a typical depiction of"us and "others,"
a class photo from a middle school in Hannover, showing pupils
from different countries. The explanation that accompanies the
photo introduces the "virtual German student body" to Zerrin,
daughter of a Turkish guestworker. Through Zerrin's visit to the
village of her parents in Turkey during the summer holiday,
students learn about Turkish culture, traditions, and village life.
Back in school after the holidays, Zerrin meets another "aus-
llndische Mitschuler" (foreign fellow-student), Esra, daughter
ofa Kurdish refugee from Turkey. Zerrin learns about the Kurds,
their history, traditions, and oppression in Turkey. (The text
implies that Zerrin is learning about the Kurds for the flfSt time,
because discussion of this subject is forbidden back in Turkey.)
So, Zerrin meets her "other" as well. But, the chapter does not
end there. After the spring break, a new student arrives in class,
from yet another land, Poland. Stefan is introduced to the class
as the new German student. To Zerrin's swprise, however, he
speaks very little German. With the introduction of Stefan, son
of 811 "Aussiedler" (ethnic German repatriate), the picture of Han-
nOVel" as a multicultmal society becomes complete.
The identities presented in this textbook narrative are par-
ticular and differentiated along ethnic lines. Pupils of German,
Turkish, Kurdish, and aussiedler origin fill the classrooms (the
micro-geographies ofGermany), recognize their differences, and
Vol 30, No.2 (1998)
learn about and from each other. The German nation, "us,"
becomes meaningful together with its others (Turks), and even
with their others (Kurds and aussiedler). Hence, the German
identity is relativized as one among many ethnic and cultural
identities.
The representation of the "other" in this identity trajectory
is rather a positive one, emphasizing the principles of plurality
and harmony and marking a break from an unbefitting past. In
this new trajectory, the threat to "us" (the German nation) no
longer emanates from an "exogenous other" (the barbaric Tude
or some other foreign culture) but from an "indigenous" one that
violates the democratic order and jeopardizes the standing of
Germany in international arenas. This indigenous "other" mate-
rializes in textbooks as the Neonazi youth, who invariably ap-
pears as the natural, present-day extension of the Nazi past.
The dangers posed by the Neonazis are taught through
extensive and negative coverage ofthe Nazi history as a time of
violence, persecution, death, and destruction. And, not coinci-
dentally, in civics textbooks, the sections on "Neonazis Heute"
(Neonazis today) follow the visual and narrative denunciations
of Nazi times, and explicitly connect Neonazis to National
Socialism through comparisons of ideology, activities, and
propaganda. 17
In one of the civics textbooks, the students are asked to
describe and search for similarities between the picture of a
Neonazi gathering from 1990 (uniformed youth in a forest area
with flags, drums, and a camp fIre) and one ofHitler Youth from
57
1934 {assembled in a camp-site in military style).!8 In another
textbook, the section on current Neonazi propaganda against
foreigners warns students that similar propaganda existed before
1933, and that is "how it all started, leading from hateful speech
and race-talk to war and extermination camps."!9
Narratives of suffering and tragedy also connect the Neo-
nazi youth to the Nazi past. The verbal and physical attacks
suffered in school by Nina and Sergtll (a black and a Turkish
student) in the 1990s are juxtaposed against the experiences of
Hanna and Peter (two Jewish students) in year 1933. The stu-
dents are asked to think about Hanna and Peter when recounting
how Nina and Sergtll may have felt.
20
Similarly, a wall painted
with Swastikas and Neonazi graffiti-"Deutschland den Deut-
schen" (Germany of Germans) and "To.rkenRauss" (Turks Out)"
-recalls a Nazi sign from 1938 that prohibited Jews from
entering a neighborhood.
21
Through references to these lessons
ofthe past, civics textbooks emphasize how necessary it is today
to understand the "other" and have solidarity with them as
fellow-human beings.
ExplaiDing the Postwar Trends in German Textbooks
The identity trends to which I referred in the previous
section point to the three distinct ways of conceptualizing iden-
tities: Europeanltransnational, national, and ethnic/community-
based. These identity positions are generally set against one
another and generate much heated debate in popular and schol-
arly circles. When conceptualizing identities and engaging in
political action, globalization is discussed in opposition to local-
isms and nationalisms are set against regionalisms. I argue,
however, that such strict dichotomizing is not productive, either
theoretically or empirically. My research on textbooks reveals
that different identity positions co-exist in postwar Europe, not
necessarily opposing or replacing one another. More oftenthan not,
they are interpreted by each other, and redefined in the process.
German textbooks situate the nation and identity within a
transnational context. As such, the German case does not fit
conventional perspective that poses a conflict between the na-
tional and transnational. In the case of Gennany, national identity
is explicated and recast by the transnational. This sets Germany
apart from the cases of Japan, South Korea, and China, in which
the national dimension still plays a visibly larger role in matters
of defming identities through education.
I would like to offer three explanatory factors to account
for the dominance of the transnational dimension in German
textbooks. The flISt of these factors has to do with the distinct
identity position of Germany vis-a-vis the international commu-
nity in the postwar period. The other two concern the institutional
structure of education and the nature of actors involved in the
production of textbooks and curricula.
The international arena provides "collective expectations
and nonns" for the proper behavior of states as actors, as studies
by John W. Meyer and Peter J. Katzenstein have shown.
22
Hence,
the nature of the international community in which the countries
are immersed has an important role to play in shaping nation-
state identities. After the Second World War, while Germany has
followed the course of European integration (economic and
political) as a possible way to deal with its defeat and regain
national sovereignty, Japan's approach has been to focus on
economic security and competition with the United States.
23
As
Japan's nation-state identity has taken shape vis-a-vis the United
States, both on economic and symbolic grounds-and mainly in
an oppositional configuration, German nation-state identity has
evolved within the unifying project of Europe.
As Katzenstein notes, in the process of integrating with
Europe and East Germany, "Germans have eliminated the con-
cept of 'power' from their political vocabul'!2. They speak the
language of 'political responsibility' instead." 4 Symbolic mani-
festations of identity struggles in Europe are still apparent during
the European Cup matches or in the case of Britain's insistence
on serving beef during a European Summit. However, the inte-
gration process itself and the institutional framework for the
process facilitate denationalization by creating nonnative expec-
tations of equal and tamed nation-states. The dichotomy between
transnational and national does not appear natural in the context
of European unification, for the member states have to prove
themselves asproperplayers within tightly interlinked transnational
security arrangements. In Asia, on the other hand, internal and
external security are exclusively the domain of national govem-
ments, and so national boundaries and identities more salient."lS
This difference in international dispositions is clearly
reflected in the identity definitions and markings ofboundary in
textbooks. Embedded as it is in a larger unifying project, Ger-
many has felt considerable outside pressure to adopt a collabo-
rative attitude in the negotiation of its identity and relationship
with its neighbors. Japan, on the other hand, has managed to
shield itself from such pressures, and has resisted the demands
of its neighbors to collaborate in rewriting the history of World
War II in Asia. As recently as August 1997, the Japanese govem-
ment rejected proposals by South Korea for a joint history textbook
commission with Japan, Germany, Poland, and South Korea.26
Another explanatory factor I would like to emphasize is the
peculiarity of the institutional structure of the Gennan educa-
tional system. In Germany, a tight network exists among the
state, the academy, school systems, and the publishing industry,
meditated by a set of corporatist institutional arrangements.
27
The close connection between educational authorities and other
interest associations-business associations, teachers' unions,
teachers' associations of geography, history, and social studies,
parents' associations, churches, and universities-creates a basis
and a strong incentive for consensus in developing curricula and
producing textbooks.
Germany's federalist system delegates control over educa-
tional matters to the local states, where curriculum matters are
the responsibility of the ministry of education. Curricula are re-
viewed and revised every ten years by a committee that consists of
representatives from the ministry, teachers' unions, teachers, and
academics. Together they set up the themes, the content of the
subjects to be taught, pedagogical guidelines, and the goals and
extent of the curriculum. The curriculum is widely circulated
among a variety of interested parties for commentary and sug-
gestions. In Lower-Saxony, for example, the draft curricula are
sent to four hundred associations, institutions, and universities
throughout Germany for comments and feedback.
28
Teachers and academics, who serve on the curriculum
committees, are usually commissioned by publishing companies
to write and revise textbooks. Approval of the textbooks for use
in state schools is the responsibility of the state's ministry of
education.29 Germany's tight corporatist and consensus-orlented
8lT8Dgement contrasts starldy with the state-centric textbook FUCa
tion and cmriculum development in Japan and South Korea.
Bulletin o/ConcernedArion Scholar& 58
The existence ofcorporatist arrangements in the production
of curricula and textbooks does not necessarily imply the absence
of conflict in Germany. In the aftermath of unification, sex and
religious education, in particular, have been major areas of
contention. This is due in part to the merger oftwo ideologically
very different education and institutional systems and also to the
increasing visibility of religious diversity in Germany. The Ger-
man constitution allows denominational religious instruction in
schools, the content of which has to be approved by the churches
(Protestant and Catholic). Although not to the same extent, both
Jewish and Muslim communities are also consulted in matters
related to religious education. Religious minority students (Jew-
ish and Muslim) are usually exempted from these classes. The
extension of religious education to the new states in the East has
created considerable strains over the nature and content of relig-
ious education and the place of religion in schools. Many new
states, as well as some from the West, offer "values and ethics"
,instruction, where the emphasis is on teaching world religions
(including Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism) in lieu
of religious teaching.
3
!
The major conflict over national curriculum, however,
arose in the late 1 960s in Western Germany, when the state of
Hessen altered its educational system in a rather revolutionary
manner-both in terms of organization (introduction of compre-
hensive schools as an alternative to the stratified system) and in
terms of content. One of the major actors behind the Hessen
reforms was the Young Socialist Student Union, which pushed
for open discussion of the Nazi period, a greater emphasis on
contemporary German history, and equal access to higher edu-
cation. Interestingly enough, the inspiration for these revisions
came from the postwar re-education program initiated by the
U.S. occupation forces in Germany, who founded the first com-
prehensive school and introduced "Nazi Germany" as a compul-
sory subject.32
The Hessen reforms were eventually taken up by other
German states, and by the end of the sixties there emerged a
consensus among political parties for a need to reform the whole
education system. One consequence of these reforms was de-
mocratization and inclusion of a wider spectrum of interest
groups in the decision-making process. This led to the current
institutional basis for consensus. Another consequence of these
reforms was the incorporation of Germany's Nazi past into the
curricula and the devalorization of the "national" in education
about German identity. The current curricula and textbooks still
cany the imprint of the normative principles and institutional
framework established at the time of the educational reforms of
the late 1960s.
Lastly, one has to take into consideration the difference in
the nature of actors involved in the postwar efforts to normalize
history teaching in Germany and Japan. Whereas in Japan the
government has had much more direct control over these efforts,
in the case of Germany the bodies and organizations that have
been particularly active are mostly non-governmental, both in-
ter- and transnational.
In Europe, international attempts to reexamine and revise
textbooks go back to the interwar period. The national and
international committees, set up by the League of Nations, and
in cooperation with teachers' associations in different countries,
sought to eliminate national prejudices and stereotypes from
textbooks. In the 1930s, bilateral consultations were already in
Vol 30, No.2 (1998)
place between German and French, and German and Polish
historians. With the foundation of UNESCO and the Council of
Europe after the Second World War, however, these efforts
gained a more institutional basis. Especially effective was the
German Commission for UNESCO, whose activities culminated
in the foundation of the Georg-Eckert Institute for International
Textbook Research in 1951. Assisted by UNESCO and the
Council of Europe, the institute has facilitated several interna-
tional collaborative projects and promoted the exchange of his-
tory and geography textbooks between countries.
33
Joint com-
missions between Germany, France, Poland, and Israel have
produced recommendations for normalizing contentious histo-
ries and bringing about a rapprochement among "former ene-
mies."34 More recently, with the goal of "integrating national
units [in]to international ones," the Institute has been focusing
on the teaching of Europe, environmental education, human
rights, and multicultural society-themes that are supported by
UNESCO and the Council of Europe and integrated into the
curricula in many German states.
Education is a priority of member states in the European
Union. An advisory committee of national administrators exists
at the European level, but education is still a "battleground" for
sovereignty. There are no formal European Community direc-
tives and education as a policy area is only marginally incorpo-
rated into the Maastricht treaty.3S Nevertheless, over the years,
the European Union has established several educational pro-
grams, most of which deal with issues of vocational education,
harmonization of credentials, student exchange, and the incor-
poration of the European dimension and heritage into national
curricula. More importantly, numerous groups, committees, pro-
fessional associations, and advocacy organizations for regional
languages-loosely associated and funded by the Union-have
been extremely active in the forging of European education and
standards. Experts and academic specialists conduct studies on
behalf of the European Union and give advice on technical, as
well as substantive, aspects. They supply and translate curricula,
form teams to evaluate national education systems, and compare
and rank member-state education systems by performance and
achievement.
Thus, the rather less-structured and less-formalized nature
of education as European Union policy field (unlike the situation
for monetary, economic, and security issues) provides an oppor-
tunity for various groups to seize initiative and create networks
outside the strict intergovernmental negotiation structures. The
European Standing Conference of History Teachers Associa-
tions (EUROCLIO) and the European Academy are two among
many organizations. EUROCLIO, in existence since 1993, aims
to " [eliminate] prejudice in the teaching of history by emphasiz-
ing positive mutual influences between countries, religions, and
ideas in the historical development of Europe...and [ensuring]
that national history does not become nationalist history ... and
include a genuine pan-European dimension.,,36 The European
Academy was founded in Berlin by "concerned Europeanists"
(party members, heads oftrade unions, business representatives,
academics) in the early days of the Europeanization movement
in the 1960s and 1970s. The activities ofthe Academy are funded
by German federal institutions, the Berlin government, and the
European Union.
Both ofthese organizations run periodic, practice-oriented
conferences, which bring together teachers, textbook authors,
59
and curriculum experts from various countries.
37
They also pro-
duce what is referred to as "gray literature," covering topics not
necessarily included in textbooks but required as part of the
curriculum. These complementary materials fmd wide distribu-
tion among teachers.
38
All these activities extend European net-
works, both organizationally and symbolically, and facilitate a
climate of Europeanness and the reconsideration of national
canons in education.
Interestingly, national approaches come to the fore quite
regularly in international collaborative efforts. Historically em-
bedded pedagogical and institutional differences prove to be the
main barriers to the realization of a unified European education.
Nevertheless, ideas diffuse and educational norms evolve, and
these expedite standardization at the national level both in terms
of teaching technologies and subjects covered.
Conclusion
We think of textbooks singularly as tools for teaching
national priorities and for building unified national communities.
We have seen in the case of Germany, however, that textbooks
promote not only national but increasingly local and transna-
tional identities and responsibilities. In contrast to dominant
conceptualizations, national, local, and transnational identities
do not appear to be exclusionary.
The increasing pronouncement of local/ethnic and transna-
tional identities does not necessarily result in the displacement
of national identity. On the contrary, in the process of teaching
and expressing identities, the nation is being reinterpreted and
recast anew. What we are accustomed to thinking and teaching
as national culture-the typical civic values: democracy, pro-
gress, human rights, equality-become part of the transnational
and defme Europeanness. Concurrently, transnational institu-
tions (UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the European
Union) legitimate the proliferation of ethnic, religious, and re-
gional identities by upholding the principle of the right of each
people to its own culture and sovereignty. Hence, we all have our
particularistic identities and cultures to be proud of and to secure
and celebrate. The nation loses its singularity as the principle of
identity. In the process, national identities become more and
more rationalized across nation-states, as equally valid identity
positions and comparable cultural heritages, undermining mythi-
cal geneses and naturalistic canonizations.
In Germany and Europe, as in other parts of the world, the
questions of history and identity in education are periodically
revisited and contested. However, the corporatist institutional
structure of the German textbook production system, and, more
importantly, Germany's disposition within the European Union
and vis-a-vis European integration have led to the relative insu-
lation of textbooks from ongoing public struggles over national
history and identity. German textbooks are the product of com-
plex and wide-ranging consultations and negotiations within
Germany, and between Germany and its neighbors. As Europe
expands, national and European actors and networks involved in
this process multiply, and textbooks become a matter of growing
transnational action.
The postwar evolution of German textbooks and curricula
illustrates the changing context and meaning of identity in a
world where the national is increasingly subjected to reinterpre-
tation by the transnational. In that respect, European integration
provides a unique opportunity to sharpen our analytical and
conceptual tools as we scrutinize the relationship between text-
books and emerging nation-state identities.
Notes
I. The paper draws upon my current project, which explores the
emerging forms of claims-making and mobilization by minority and
regional groups on national education, and investigates the changes in
nation-state identities through a comparative analysis of history and
civic textbooks in postwar Europe. The data for the project come from
national textbooks and public school cwricula for lower secondary
schools in four European countries (Germany, France, Britain, and the
Netherlands). I sample the history and civic textbooks and curricula in
these countries at three time points, the 19508, 19708, and 199Os, when
major educational reforms took place. I also examine public debates,
conflicting claims, and court cases that surround national education
systems and national cwricula, as well as the incoIpOration of minority
culturallreligious provisions into public education systems. I make use
of interviews I conducted with officials from state educational boards
and ministries, school authorities, teachers' and parents' associations,
the representatives of European and national level associations and
networks on textbook and curricular study, and with the leaders of
immigrant organizations and regional movements.
2. Interview with Roman Herzog, Focus, 9 May 1994, pp. 20-25.
3. See the interviews with Johannes Rau, the presidential candidate for the
Social Democrats (die Zeit, 6 May 1994); Hildegard Hamm-BrQcher, the
candidate for the Liberal Democratic party (die Zeit, 13 May 1994); and
Hans Otto Brautigam, the Justice Minister ofthe State ofBrandenburg
(Franl(urter Rundschau, 10 May 1994). Also see the statements by Rita
S1lssmuth, the president of the Parliament from the Christian Demo-
cmtic Party, and Richard von Weis.zacker, the outgoing president (der
Tagesspiegel, 2 July 1994).
4. After being elected, Herzog paid a symbolic visit to the Turkish
community, and presented a ''medal ofhonor" to the mother ofTurkish
children who were burned to death when Neonazis set a rue to their
house in Sollingen.
5. For the portrayal of these conlroversies in the German press, see
"Keine Ruhe vor der Geschichte" (der Tagesspiegel, 20 July 1994);
"Das Band der Sippenhaft: 50 Jahre nach dem Hitler-Attentat vom 20.
Juli 1944, Der Slreit urn den richtigen Widerstand" (Suddeutsche Zei-
twig, 2 August 1994); "Es lebe das freie Polen! Gedenken an den
Aufstand" (Franlfforter Allgemeine Zeitwlg, 2 August 1994); and ''Her-
zog bittet urn Vergebung ft1r Deutsche Verbrechen und bietet den Polen
Deutschlands Freundschaft an" (Suddeutsche Zeitwlg, 2 August 1994).
6. Daniel Levy, "The Future of the Past: Comparing Historians' Dis-
putes in Germany and Israel." Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the Social Science History Association, New Orleans, November 1996.
7. The Constitutional Court, deciding on a freedom of speech case
brought by the extreme-rightNational Democratic party (NDP), argued
that "to deny that Jews died in Nazi camps was to deny a fact, and that
the severity of the insult to the Jewish Community meant the right of
freedom speech did not apply." The court-case regarded the banning of
a talk by David Irving (Britishrevisionist historian) at an NDP congress
(International Herald Tribune, 27 April 1994).
8. See M Young, ed., Knowledge and Control (London: Collier Mac-
Millan, 1971); Ivor Goodson, The Making o/Curriculum: Essays in the
Social History o/Schooling (London: Falmer Press, 1987); Ivor Good-
son, ed, International Perspectives in Curriculum History (London:
Falmer Press, 1987); John W. Meyer et al., School Knowledge for the
Masses: WorldModels and National Primary Curricular Categories in
the Twentieth Century (Washington, D.C.: Fa1mer Press. 1992).
9.CharlesMaier,TheU1ll'lfllStenlblePast:History.Holocaust,andGennan
National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1988);
Levy, "The Future of the Past."
10. A 1991 circular from the Ministry of Education in Bavaria states
that "the European dimension should be in1roduced into all subjects"
and "pupils should become aware of Europe's intellectual and cultural
Bulletin o/Concerned Aaian Scholars
60
heritage and ofcommon European values such as democracy and hmnan
rights" (Council ofEurope, Education News1e1ta', no. 4, Stmsbourg, 1991).
11. Interview with the official responsible for curriculum in the Ministry
ofEducation in Lower Saxony (23 November 1995).
12. Interview with the head of the German History Teachers' Associa-
tion, Jacobson-Gymnasium., Seelen (30 November 1995).
13. Falk Pingel, ed., Macht Europa Schule? Die Darstellung Europas
in Schulbflchem der Europaischen Gemeinschqft [power of European
schools? Representation ofEurope in textbooks in the European Union
countries), Schriftenreiche des Georg-Eckert-Instituts, 'kl. 84 (Frank-
ftut \b"lag Moritz Diesterweg, 1995).
14. See, for example, Welt- und Umweltkunde 5/6 [World and environ-
ment science 5/6), Niedersachsen (Braunschweig: Westermann, 1993),
pp. 138-153, and Menschen Zeiten Rilume 5/6 [people, times, places),
Arbeitsbuch fur Welt- und Umwelkunde in derOrientierungsstufe [Work
book for world and environment science for jtmior high 5/6) (Berlin:
Come1sen Verlay, 1993), pp. 188-231. Following the chapter on Ro-
mans and Germans, both books present the "culture" and the "village
life" ofThrltish migrants and Native Americans, expressively equating
all three peoples across time and space.
15. Karl-Ernst Jeismann and Bernd SchOnemann, Geschichte amtlich:
LehrpliJne undRichtlinien der Bundeslander [Institutional history: Cur-
ricula and instruction guides in federal states). Schriftenreiche des
Georg-Eckert-Instituts, Vol. 65 (Frankftut Verlag Moritz Diesterweg,
1989), p. 75.
16. The European Bureau for the Lesser-used Languages is directly
financed by the European Union and has the goal of protecting fifty
minority languages in the member states ofthe Union.
17. Welt- und Umweltkunde 5/6, pp. 226-229; Menschen, Zeiten, Rilume
5/6, pp. 272-75.
18. Menschen, Zeiten, Rilume, pp. 160, 272.
19. Welt- und Umweltkunde, p. 226.
20. Menschen. Zeiten, Rilume, pp. 266,274.
21. Ibid
22. John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority ofthe Nation-
State," in Studies ofthe Modem World-System, ed. A. Bergesen (New
Yode Academic Press, 1980); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996).
23. Peter J. KaIzenstein and Nobuo Okawam, "Japan's National Security:
S1ructures,NOJDlS, and Policies," International Security 17 (1993):84-118.
24. PeterJ. Katzenstein, ed., TamedPower: Germany in Europe (Ithaca:
Comell University Press, 1997), p. 116.
25. Peter 1. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms andNational Security: Police
andMilitary in PostwarJapan (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1996).
26. Reiner Drifte, "Is the Mombusho Running One of Japan's Most
Sensitive Bilateral Relationships?" Article distributed through SSJ-Fo-
rum, Institute ofSocial Science, University ofTokyo (ssjmod@ shaken.
iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp), 15 August 1997.
27. Peter 1. Katzenstein, Policy andPolitics in the West Germany: The
Growth of a Semi-sovereign State (philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1987); YaseminNuhoglu Soysal, Limits ofCitizenship: Migrants
andPostnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1994).
28. InterYiewwith the official responsible forcwriculum in the Ministry
ofEducation in Lower Saxony (23 November 1995).
29. Each ministry publishes a list of, generally, four or five textbooks
that confonn with the established curricular nonns and requirements.
The schools have the option of selecting books from this list.
30. In Japan. the government authorizes textbooks to be used and has a
right to censor ''undesirable'' content, as exemplifled in the recent
controversy over the treatment ofJapanese war crimes in history text-
books(New YorkTImes,30August 1997). In South Korea, the textbooks
are issued by the state itself.
31. For the controversy over "values and ethics" instruction in the state
ofBrandenburg, see Achim Leschinsky, Vorleben oder Nachdenken?
Bericht derwissenschaftlichen Begleitung flberdenModellversuch zum
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
Lembereich "Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religion .. [Anticipation orretro-
spect? Report on the scholarly debates accompanying the search for
models in teaching the ''lifestyle, ethic, and religion" course) (Frankfurt:
Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, 1996).
32. Interview with Professor Ingrid Haller, University of Kassel. Pro-
fessor Haller was a key figure in the conceptualization and implemen-
tation ofHessen refonns.
33. Like many German institutions, the Institute has a public standing
and is sponsored by the local states. The Governing Board includes
representatives from the states, the Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry
of Education and Science, the German Commission for UNESCO, as
well as independent scholars. The Foundation Act ofthe Institute aims
to submit recommendations for making "more objective" the historical,
political, and geographic representations of Germany and other coun-
tries in textbooks; to organize international meetings of experts for
examining and revising textbooks; and to advise authors and publisha"s
oftextbooks.
34. The recommendations include: the ''German-French Agreement on
Controversial Problems ofEuropean History" (1951), the ''Recommen-
dations for Textbooks ofHistory and Geography oftheFedera1Republic
of Germany and People's Republic of Poland" (a product of the Ger-
man-Polish Commission on textbooks, which has been in place since
1972), and the "German-Israeli Textbook Recommendations" (1985).
Also, since 1981, the French-Gennan Commission has been working
on recommendations for the treatment ofthe Weimar Republic, National
Socialism, and the Vichy regime. The recommendations of the joint-
cmmnissions have been substantially incoIpomted into the cmricula and
textbooks in the respective countries (interviews with experts and re-
searchers at the Georg-Eckert-Institut, Braunschweig, November 1995).
35. The Maastricht treaty was signed in 1991, creating the European
Union (EU) out ofthe European Commtmity. The treaty was a compre-
hensive agreement designed to regulate the transition ofEurope into a
tmion with a common currency and without internal borders. The treaty
dealt primarily with economic issues, but it also emphasized the com-
mitments of EU member states to "humanitarian traditions" of Europe
and created the status ofthe citizen ofthe Union, leading the way beyond
nation-state citizenship to European citizenship.
36. EUROCLIO Bulletin, no. 5 (1996): 15.
37. Many ofthe participants ofEUROCLIO conferences are practicing
teachers, active in their national associations. In 1994, about ninety
history teachers were involved in a year-long project to discuss the
"theoretical and practical aspects of encouraging democratic values
through history education." In 1995, working with the Council of
Europe, EUROCLIO organized a conference on ''Philip IT and His
Times," a prominent and controversial personality in European history,
with the goal of comparing varied interpretations and methods of
teaching. Similar conferences have been held with the ex-Soviet repub-
lics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia) to refoIDl history teaching, and
dealing with the question ofrepresenting women, ethnic minorities, and
human rights in textbooks.
38. The European Academy, for instance, is the publisher oftwo ofthe
most widely used examples of gray literature on Europe: Vom Binnen-
markt zur Europliischen Union and Euro and Cent: Europliische Inte-
gration und Wahrungsunian (by GUnter Renner and Peter Czada).
o
BeAS Back Issues
All issues-in print and outofprint-from volume 1,
number 1, in 1968 until the present are now
available from BCAS or from University Microfilms
International. Please consult our guideindex, which
covers all previous years and has information about
ordering and prices. It is available on our Web site
< http://csf.colorado.edu/bcas/ > or by mail.
61
Bulktin o/Concerned Asian Scholars. Vol. 30, No.2 (1998): 62-71
CombiningEthnicHeritageandNationalUnity:
AParadoxof Nuosu (Yi)LanguageTextbooksinChina
Since the reform of the C?hinese Party's ethnic minority policies in 1984, education in minority
languages has promoted m many Although they participate enthusiastically in minority-
language education, pobtical and educational elites in minority areas are faced with conflicting demands
their local and on the one hand, and the requirement to promote the Party's
poliCies ethmc and unification, on the These conflicting demands are only partially
resolved m the cumculum materials m the Nuosu (Northern YI) language used in Liangshan Yi Autonomous
Prefecture in southern Sichuan Province. This article analyzes first- through Nuosu-language
readen in a case study of this contradiction and of attempted resolutions.
by Stevan Harrell and Bamo Ayi"
Chinese Nationalism and Ethnie Education
Ever since the founding of the People's Republic of China
in 1949, nationalism has been a continuous theme in all sorts of
propaganda, including school textbooks. But the nature of the
nation at the heart of this nationalism has not been changeless.
During the radical years from 1956 to the late 1970s, nationalism
was intimately connected with class struggle; to be Chinese was
to be anti-imperialist, and to be anti-imperialist was to be anti-
bourgeois. All conflicts, internal and external, were fundamen-
tally manifestations of class struggle, and nationalism was an
aspect ofclass solidarity. Since the beginning ofthe era of reform
in the late 1970s, however, the content of nationalism has been
gradually divorced from class struggle. Now, as we show below,
nationalism means national symbols, revolutionary heroes, mod-
ernization and development, and the unity of the great family of
nationalities that constitutes the "Chinese Nation" (zhonghua
minzu). And these themes have become, if anything, more per-
The research leading to this paper was enabled by a Chinese Fellow-
ship for Scholarly Development from the Committee on Scholarly
Commmtication with China, supplemented by a grant from the China
Studies Program at the University of Washington. We are thankful for
the help of both these organizations.
We have also benefitted from detailed comments on earlier drafts by
Laura Hein, Mark Selden, and Janet Upton. In addition, we are gmteful
for the opportunity to present this material to the China Colloquium at
the University of Washington.
Note: The authors use italics for Chinese words and bold face for Nuosu
words in this article. Ed.
vasive in the Chinese party-state's propaganda; without the
connection between nationalism and class struggle, a kind of
purer "national nationalism," focused on the Chinese as a dis-
tinctive nation and a distinctive people, regardless of class, has
gained more emphasis than ever.
1
But China is, of course, not a nation-state in the classic
sense that posits a union of a people, a culture, a language, a
territory, and a government. It is both actually and ideologically
a multi-ethnic state, which includes among its popUlation not
only the 91 percent of the population who are Han Chinese, and
for whom Chinese nationalism is not particularly problematic,
but also by the other hundred million citizens of China who
belong to its officially classified national minorities (shaoshu
minzu). Bringing these people into the body politic, making them
not only compliant but also willing participants in the project of
building China as a multinatonal state, is an important and
sometimes vexing aspect of the ideological mission of the Peo-
ple's Republic and Communist Party leaders.
2
Outright separa-
tism in Xinjiang and Tibetl, and ethnic conflict that falls short of
separtism in almost every region inhabited by minorities, means
that state authorities pay careful attention to ideological work
with minority ethnic groups, to winning the hearts and minds of
Kazakbs, Miao, Mongols and others who must be included if
China is going to succeeed as a multi-ethnic nation with a
multi-ethnic nationalism.
Nowhere are nationalistic themes more strongly empha-
sized than in the "unified national textbooks" (tongyi jiaocai)
used in elementary and secondary schools all over China.
4
The
content of these textbooks is determined for every subj ect by the
State Education Commission, on the basis of documents pre-
pared for each classroom subj ect, known as outlines ofeducation
(jiaoxue dagang). These documents set out the goals for each
subject at each grade level, the means of reaching those goals,
and the content that is to be taught. On the basis ofthese outlines,
writers and editors compile textbooks to be used for all classes
at every grade level.
According to the 1987 Outline for Elementary Language
Class (yuwen Ire) materials, the content of language classes in
elementary school "has not only a skills aspect, but also an
ideological aspect," which aims to teach children to fervently
love the motherland (zu guo), fervently love the Chinese Com-
munist Party, and fervently love socialism.
5
Consequently, edi-
tors of elementary language textbooks include quite a few les-
sons with explicitly nationalistic ideological content.
In developing curricula for minority children, however,
state authorities face conflicting demands. On the one hand,
many of them are sincerely committed to the building of a
multi-national state with a significant degree of pluralism. On
the other hand, they are passionately attached to the idea of
maintaining a unified China. This means that promotion of
cultural pluralism is seen as a specific vaccine against the disease
of separatism; minority policy posits that ifmembers ofminority
ethnic groups see that there is a place for them within China that
aiIows for certain cultural distinctiveness, they wiiI be less likely
to demand a place outside China. At the same time, authorities
are aware that certain aspects of cultural distinctiveness, particu-
larly those dealing with religion and regional histories of inde-
pendence, themselves lead to separatist sentiments. This balanc-
ing act between pluralism and unity stands at the forefront of
"nationalities work" (minzu gongzuo) in general, and it is par-
ticularly salient for minority education. As stated in working
documents used in the compiliation of textbooks, there must be
a balance between local and national content, between celebra-
tion of local particularities and promotion of unified national
goals of unity, progress, and development.
6
Some members of
minority ethnic groups are educated entirely in the Chinese
language; in their classes and curricula the local-national balanc-
ing act is not always transparent.
7
But for those minority peoples
and in those areas where education is primarily or partly con-
ducted in their own, non-Chinese languages and scripts, the
contradictions are ever present. The attempt to deal with this
paradox by the leaders and educators who belong to these minor-
ity groups is the topic of this essay.
Currently, twenty-one of the ftfty-five official minority
ethnic groups actively employ their own writing systems, and of
these the Mongols, Tibetans, Uygurs, Kazakhs, Koreans, Yi,
Zhuang, Kirgiz, Xibe, Dai, and Jingpho use their own languages
and scripts in primary and secondary education. In implementing
education in minority languages, educators have the dual task of
following Party and Government policies about the content of
education, while at the same time paying attention to the special
characteristics of ethnic groups and local areas. The threefold
slogan for conducting this process is "zunzhi dagang, lianxi shiji,
bienyijiehe" (Follow the outline, connect with reality, and com-
bine editing with translation). 8 "Follow the Outline" means that
since China is officially a unified nation with diverse ethnic
groups, the content of minority -language education must remain
in accord with the instructions of the Education Commission.
"Connect with reality" means that the content of education
should proceed from local and ethnic characteristics. "Combine
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
editing with translation" means that some lessons should be
translated from Chinese-language textbooks, while others are
newly composed by local editorial committees. In composing
and translating materials for elementary language textbooks,
educators come face to face with the problem of Chinese national
unity in a way that we believe is unusually illustrative of the
wider problems of nationalism and education.
Our particular illustrative case of nationalism and national
unity in minority language textbooks comes from a careful reading
of language textbooks in the Nuosu language published for the
Sichuan Provincial Education Commission and the Liangshan Pre-
fectural Education Bureau by the Sichuan Nationalities Publishing
House. (The textbooks examined cover the first three grades, plus
the fourth through sixth grades.) The Nuosu are a branch of the Yi,
an official ethnic minority with seven million members in Yun-
nan, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. The Nuosu, who number
over two million, inhabit the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefec-
ture (Liangshan yizu zizhi zhou) in southern Sichuan, and a few
neighboring counties in Sichuan and Yunnan. They are an agri-
cultural people, growing buckwheat, corn, and potatoes on mid-
dle- and high-mountain slopes, and raising cattle, sheep, goats,
pigs, and other livestock. Until 1956, rugged topography and the
military efforts ofNuosu clans had kept the core areas of Liang-
shan quite independent of Chinese government control, and the
establishment of an administrative system at that time was a
primary consideration in the promotion of ethnic education.
During the Cultural Revolution, China's nationalities pol-
icy swung strongly toward assimilation, and little expression of
local cultures beyond the everyday use of the local language was
officially permitted. Slogans such as "eliminate ethnic groups in
ten years; eliminate translation in fifteen" made the official use
of minority languages other than Mongolian, Tibetan, Uyghur,
Kazak, and Korean into a sign ofreactionary thinking, and turned
those who advocated the use of minority languages into objects
ofstruggle and "Ox ghosts and snake spirits.,,9 By the mid-l 970s,
Nuosu intellectuals were afraid that their culture was in danger
of disappearance. When things began to loosen up in the mid- to
late-l 970s, however, and especially after the promulgation of the
new Nationalities Autonomy Law in 1984, a cultural revival
movement developed all over Nuosu territory. The implementa-
tion of Nuosu-Ianguage education and the dilemmas it illustrates
for China's nationalistic curriculum stem primarily from the
cultural revival ofthe I 980s, and it is here that we begin our story.
The Nuosu Cultural Revival in the 19808 and 1990s
Starting from the beginning of the 1980s, when minority
policy turned away from promoting assimilation to Han ways,
the Liangshan prefectural government, the Party committee, and,
in particular, a group of cadres at the prefectural and county
levels began working to revitalize Nuosu culture by incorporat-
ing culturally specific Nuosu themes into official and public life
in a selies of ways. These included the construction of the
Liangshan Yi Slave Society Museum on the outskirts ofXichang,
the adoption ofNuosu architectural and statuary features in urban
construction and design, the standardization and popularization
of Nuosu songs and dances in schools and local government
offices, the sponsorship of a modernized and secularized version
of the summer Torch Festival holiday, and the pUblication in the
Nuosu language of a large number of cultural materials, includ-
ing newspapers, magazines. and collated editions of many tradi-
63
tional books and stories. All ofthese state-sponsored projects can
be seen as aspects of the state's vaccination campaign against
ethnic separatism: allowing a space for hannless expressions of
cultural plurality.
At the same time, the more liberal nationalities policies of
the 1980s have allowed Nuosu intellectuals and ordinary people
to express their ethnic identity in a variety of ways. Some of
these, such as the establishment of scholarly associations and
research societies, have clearly been benign from a government
standpoint, but others, such as the revival of clan leadership in
the villages and the re-emergence of priests (bimo) and shamans
(sunyi), are clearly more problematical; they threaten local gov-
ernment control as well as questioning the state propaganda
objectives of promoting science and atheism.
Thus, the contradiction between unity and pluralism, which
is one of the cornerstones of the Reform-era version of Chinese
nationalism, is at the core of the current relatively liberal ethnic-
ity policy. Here, too, elementary school textbooks illustrate this
contractiction well. How much local content should local text-
books include? How do textbook authors strike a balance be-
tween ignoring local culture and celebrating it? When do lessons
that promote local pride or educate about local cultural themes
become subversive of the very unity among nationalities that
pluralism is supposed to promote?
Standardization and Popularization of tbe Nuosu Script
The Nuosu cultural revival was, more than anything else,
based on the standardization and popUlarization of the Nuosu
script beginning in the middle 1970s. There are several tradi-
tional Yi scripts (related but not mutually intelligible)lo in Yun-
nan, Sichuan, and Guizhou, but until the 1970s knowledge ofthe
script in the Nuosu area was restricted to the bimo and a few
intellectuals. In addition, in the absence of any standardized
forms, individual usages were mixed and varied. In the 19508,
in order to strengthen administration, the Party authorities sent
linguistic experts to Liangshan to work on a new writing system,
using the Latin alphabet. In 1958, forty-two teachers and about
nine hundred students were taught to read using this system.
Beginning with the Great Leap Forward in 1958, however, the
policy changed to "Move Directly to Han Language Education"
and no further attempts to develop or promote any writing system
for the Nuosu language were undertaken until the 1970s.
In the early 1970s, two developments led to the stand-
ardization and revival of Nuosu writing. First, many Nuosu
political leaders and intellectuals reawakened to their own Nuosu
ethnic consciousness. They began to worry that Nuosu culture
and the written language would die out altogether, especially
after the onslaughts ofthe Cultural Revoltuion. Second, Han and
Nuosu educators and educational officials, drawing on their
concrete experience with basic education in Liangshan, began to
feel that it was too difficult to educate rural Nuosu children in
Chinese. In 1974, the Sichuan Provincial Nationalities Commis-
sion established the Working Group for the Standardization of
Yi Writing (Sichuan sheng yiwen guifan gongzuo zu), which
produced the Outline for the Standardization of Yi Writing,
approved in 1975. Over the next few years, the work group
developed a modern, standardized version of the traditional
script used by the bimo. The new script, with a syllabary con-
taining 819 signs selected from the two or three thousand in
traditional use," was approved by the State Council in 1980.
12
Unlike its Romanized predecessor from the 1950s, this
writing system has proved to be wildly popular, and is used not
just in education, but in administration, in anti-illiteracy cam-
paigns, in publishing, and increasingly in the everyday lives of
agricultural communities.
In Liangshan, all important documents and speeches are
translated into standardized Nuosu, along with the complete
proceedings of meetings of the Communist Party, the People's
Congress, and the People's Consultative Conference. Signs for
official government and party offices must also be bilingual. The
official usage of written Nuosu is, however, somewhat forced
and artificial at present, because there are very few officials
capable of using the new technical and administrative vocabu-
lary effectively. Its symbolic value as an indicator of Nuosu local
autonomy is probably greater than its practical value as a tool of
administration.
Anti-illiteracy campaigns began in 1980, using the stand-
ardized Nuosu script, and according to official statistics have
reached up to 80 percent of the young and middle-aged rural
population of the prefecture.
13
It is difficult to know to what
extent the newly acquired literacy skills are used or retained, but
we do know of many examples of literate members of local
communities taking the initiatives to start night classes to meet
the demand for basic literacy training.
In addition to the aforementioned translation of official
documents, provincial, prefectual, and county-level language
and translation offices have also done a large amount of work on
the collection, collation, and publication-in both standard Nu-
osu and Chinese-oftraditional Nuosu books ofstories, legends,
myths, and history, as well as an increasing number of newly
written books on technical and other topics, and a few books of
scholarship such as NlI!psha Nuosu JjiJJbox Jjutuur (History
of the slave society of the Liangshan Nuosu). There is also the
Nuosu-language edition ofthe Liangshan Daily (NiepsbaNyipti
Tepyy), and a monthly arts magazine entitled Niepsha Heplu
Bbu,bbu, (Arts and Literature of Liangshan). The Sichuan Pro-
vincial Broadcast Station began broadcasting in Nousu in 1978;
now, in addition to the newly established Liangshan Station,
there are radio transmitters in every county and most townships,
so that loudspeaker broadcasting reaches about 70 percent of the
Nuosu villages in the prefecture.
Developing a Nuosu-Language Curriculum
When Nuosu cadres and leaders began to promote the
development and popularization of the Standard Nuosu Script in
the 1970s, they realized that ifthe script were to become anything
more than a pet project or an intellectual curiousity, it would have
to be used in the schools; only if people learned at a young age
to write in their own language and script would that script
become a tool for daily communication, and thus be widely used
and preserved. With a school curriculum in place, newspapers,
agriCUltural manuals, public-health pamphlets, and eventually a
wide variety of books and magazines could follow.
Teaching in the Nuosu language naturally required a cur-
riculum and textbooks. In 1978, the Education Bureau of Liang-
shan Prefecture established the Yi Language Curriculum Mate-
rials Office (Yiwen Jiaocai Bianyi Shi).14 The office, which has
grown from six to twenty-six workers in twenty years, is respon-
sible for producing elementary-, secondary-, and normal-school
textbooks, teachers' manuals, supplementary curriculum mate-
Bulletin o/Concemed Asian Scholars 64
rials, and some Nuosu-language reference books. The office has
divisions producing curriculum materials for language and poli-
tics (it is not insignificant, as we show below, that these are
grouped together), history and geography, biology and chemis-
try, and physics and mathematics, plus an administrative unit.
Within months of its inception, the Materials Office had
completed a frrst-grade language reader, and distributed it in
mimeographed fonn for use in a few schools. From 1978 to 1983,
the Office grew to include nine members, and produced volumes
1-8 (grades 1-4) of language readers, and volumes 1-6 ofmathe-
matics texts.
When the Nuosu-language texts were first used, beginning
in 1978, Nuosu was a single class within a broader Chinese-lan-
guage curriculum unit. At the Sichuan Province Yi Language
Education Work Meeting, held in 1984, the provincial Education
Bureau established two models for Nuosu-language education:
Nuosu was to be used as the basic language of instruction in areas
remote from Han 'cultural influence, and in which most people
were monolingual Nuosu speakers; while in other areas with
more Han influence, the Chinese language would be the basic
language of instruction, with Nousu taught as a supplementary
language. In fall 1984, Liangshan Prefecture established Nuosu-
language elementary schools, with Nuosu as the primary lan-
guage of instruction, and Chinese-language instruction reduced
to a single class. During this period, the Materials Office was
primarily concerned with getting as many texts written, printed,
and distributed as possible, since there was an unmet need for
Nuosu-language materials in the new Nuosu and bilingual for-
mat schools. At this time, separate working groups were estab-
lished for humanities and sciences at the elementary and secon-
dary levels, and guidelines were adopted that mandated that
translated and original materials were to be used in approxi-
mately equal numbers in the humanities, but in the sciences
Nuosu texts would simply be translations ofnationally used Han
language materials.
From 1984 to 1989, 143 texts and other curricular materials
were produced, amounting to over fourteen million characters.
With the increased availability ofNuosu-language texts, the frrst
Nuosu-language middle school was established in 1990. At this
time, the Office took on the added responsibility of training teachers
for Nuosu-language classrooms. This training took place in twelve
special teachers' classes, in the Provincial Nuosu-language Middle
School in Xichang, at the Prefectural Nonnal School, and at the
Southwest Nationalities Institute in Chengdu. IS
Production of curriculum materials is something new in Yi
history, and those who participate in the effort do so out of strong
feelings ofattachment for their ethnic group and its language and
culture. Through 1995, 292 books were produced, including
Nuosu-language texts in various subjects at all levels, as well as
teachers' manuals and reference books-altogether nearly a
complete set ofteaching materials to be used in Nuosu-speaking
areas of Sichuan and Ywman.
Despite this remarkable achievement (in such a'short time),
those who produce textbooks in the Nuosu language still face the
contradiction between local pride and national unity. Many of
the educators, despite being successful bureaucrats and profes-
sionals closely connected to the Han-dominated bureaucratic and
scholarly establishments in contemporary China, as well as
members ofthe Chinese Communist Party, are, in their hearts, at
least as committed to the cause of the Nuosu people and Nuosu
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
tic
".la
mop
IUOP po buo
1

kc j{.

r;..

II
I R!
zbo Lllop rep gOIl Lop
..
I
t;fJ [Ft

:f)
'T
Xo
Beijing, Tiananmen, and the Five Star Red Flag are symbols (Ihybo)
ofour country. Our elementary students from the time they are small
should learn to love Beijing and love the motherland. (From the
teacher's mlll1U8l for Volume I,lesson I: 'TIananmen and the National Flag.)
culture (or the Yi nationality and Yi culture as a whole) as they
are to a united China and its nationalist goals. If central policy
makers see limited autonomy as a vaccine against separatism,
many local leaders want to use the state and Party apparatus to
serve local ends, to promote Nuosu- or Yi-centered economic
and cultural development using centrally developed and some-
times centrally funded institutions. But in the case of language
and education, these 10ca11eaders realize that ifthey are going to
popularize the written fonns of their language, and make that
language suitable for everyday communication in a modern,
technologically advanced society, they must do so in the context
ofthe Chinese nation and under the patronage ofthe Communist
Party. Liangshan is not Xinjiang, and there is no possibility of-and
virtually no sentiment in favor of-any kind of independence
movement. So Nuosu-language textbooks, which might in other
circumstances celebrate mostly Nuosu culture and traditions,
must take a moderate stand. They must-like all other textbooks
in China-promote the nationalist agenda of the Chinese Com-
munist Party above all; then, if anything is left over, they can
celebrate local culture and its glories. The remainder of this
article analyzes the particular ways in which Chinese nationalism
is presented in this context.
Chinele :Nationalilm In Nuolu-Language Textbookl
Nuosu-language elementary school textbooks contain a
mixture of lessons directly translated directly from correspond-
65
we all love these things. Getting young children to Table 1
develop ideas about the attachment between "I" and 1--------....,-----------------...;
"country," to learn the concept of country in general, Volume 1, lesson 2
and finally to become valuable workers for the na- Volume 1, lesson 16
tional interest, is of course a primary goal of all Volume 1, lesson 7
Chinese education. It is no less so for the children of Volume 3, lesson 8
the Cool Mountains than for those who can go to Volume 6, lesson 10
Tiananmen on a fieldtrip the week after the class-
room lesson. In the Nousu-Ianguage textbooks, there
Volume 7, lesson 11
are many other lessons on this and closely related
themes. (See Table 1.)
Volume 11, lesson 12
Patriotic terminology used in these lessons il-
lustrates clearly some of the problems of ethnic edu-
cation. The term pupguop (motherland), for exam-
ple, was invented for the purpose of translating the
Han-language term zuguo, by using the Nuosu word
pup, which refers to an ancestor (usually a male
ing Han-language textbooks and original lessons written locally.
In the first five volumes ofthe language textbooks, the principles
of the Outline are implemented not only by lessons translated
from Han-language textbooks, but also by ideological content
that does not occur in, or is different from that found in, the
Han-language materials. First, for example, there are materials
written on topics such as the unity of ethnic groups, maintaining
national cohesion, and developing in students the notion of a
unified nation made up of diverse ethnic groups. Second, lessons
that aim to deVelop love for socialism are often locally written,
and emphasize the themes of contrast between old and new
Liangshan, or between socialist society and "slave society." Here
we give detailed examples from a few representative lessons.
'6
The Flag, Tiananmen, Beijing, the Motherland
Opening the first volume of the Nuosu-language class texts
to the first lesson, the first thing that meets the eye is a picture of
the majestic Tiananmen, with the Five Star Red Flag fluttering
in the breeze above (see page 65 above). The lesson reads
I love the capital Beijing; I love the People's Republic of China.
The teacher's manual explains how to get students to understand
this lesson:
When students study this lesson, they should be made to study the
picture carefully, and understand that our capital is at Beijing.
Beijing is the seat ofthe Central Party authorities and is the political,
cultural, and economic center ofthe country. Tiananmen is the heart
ofBeijing, and is majestic and awe-inspiring. The Five Star Red Flag
is the national flag ofthe People's Republic ofChina. There are five
stars on the flag, one big one and four little ones, showing that the
people of various ethnic groups unite around the Communist Party
to build a new socialist China. Because ofthis, Beijing, Tiananmen,
and the Five Star Red Flag are symbols (shybo) of our country. Our
elementary students from the time they are small should learn to love
Beijing and love the motherland. In order to participate in the
building of the great motherland in the future, they should study hard
to gain knowledge and culture, and advance every day.17
Thus do the ragged, unwashed urchins of the remote moun-
tain villages of Liangshan encounter patriotic education: no
sooner have they stepped into the mud-walled, dirt-floored,
electricity-deprived school buildings than they are confronted
with Tiananmen, the flag, Beijing, and the reality of
the People's Republic of China, and told to learn that
ancestor; the word is related to axpu, grandfather), and combin-
ing it with the borrowed Chinese word guo, or country, nation,
state, government.
18
In fact, almost all words dealing with "na-
tion" or "country" involve either complete borrowings-such as
guopjiet, for "nation" (from the Chinese guojia) or zhoguop, for
"China" (from zhongguo)-or are mixed terms, such as the
aforementioned pupguop or guopyiet, for "national anthem" (a
combination of the Chinese guo with the Nuosu word yiet,
meaning "song"). The whole concept of "nation" is, in fact,
foreign to traditional Nuosu thought; there is the idea ofdifferent
kinds of people, such as Nuosu, Hiepmgat (Han Chinese), and
Opzzup (Tibetans or other Buddhists), and there are named
groupings of Nuosu people by clan, caste, dialect, district, and
occupation. But until 1956, much of the Nuosu homeland had
never been subject to the authority of any national government,
and to this day, old people in remote villages would have no idea
what pupguop was, and would be hard-pressed to define even
guopyiet. The only way to get people like the Nuosu to embrace
a concept of a nation that transcends locality, caste, and ethnicity is
to begin with children, constructing a world through education. 19
A Unified Nation of Diverse Ethnic Groups:
The Minorities Policy, and Ethnic Unity
Nurturing patriotism is a goal of education in all Chinese
schools. But with respect to the Nuosu, there arise the further
questions of love for what kind of country, and what role Nuosu
themselves play in this unified nation. Nuosu-language text-
books address this question frequently and explicitly.
Volume 1, lesson nine is entitled "Ahowo nzinyisila"
(Little friends, unite). The text reads:
Children unite (nzinyi), and become new masters (vipsi) of the new
China.
This is also a lesson that combines text with pictures. The picture
in this case (see facing page) shows a group of smiling children,
dressed in the varied clothes that both officially and locally serve
as markers of ethnic identity, striding forward hand in hand,
flanked by two sunflowers and backed by a radiant, presumably
red sun. The teacher's manual for this lesson reads:
This lesson is accompanied by a picture, which shows children of
various ethnic groups in our country, hand in hand. There are some
sunflowers next to the children, and over their heads is aradiant sun.
The sun and its radiance symbolize the Chinese Commwrist Party,
whose radiance brings warmth wherever it goes.
20
The little friends
holding hands demonstrate that in our country, all nationalities unite
under the leadership of the Communist party to build the country.
The sunflowers symbolize the teaching children is like
sunflowers facing the sun, they face the Party, diligently study
culture and knowledge, and become masters of a new China and
builders ofthe country. (Volwne I, teacher'sm8nual, p. 70).
The teachers' manual specifically explains the two terms
"unite" (nzinyi) and "masters" (vipsi): nzinyi means "loving
each other, and not dividing," while vipsi means "those who
manage and build the countIy." Actually, in the Nuosu language,
ozinyi means those who have good words to say about others,
while vipsi means those who receive guests when they come to
the house; vipsi is used in explict contrast to dipvip or guests.
This presents an interesting problem in translation. On the one
hand, vipsi is as close as ordinary Nuosu language comes to a
translation for zhuren. which in Chinese means not only "host"
but also "lord." Though vipsi has no connotation of lordship or
rule, the text might also suggest to Nuosu children that they are
vipsi in the New China, that is, they are the hosts, which means
that the house of various nationalities to them is their own house,
that they are not guests there. This connotation is stronger than
in the original Chinese zhuren.
Volume 3, lesson 23 (second grade), entitled "Niepsha
c:ocux vytnyi" (The sibling nationalities of Liangshan) takes this
learning to a more advanced level. There are ten ethnic groups in
the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture. These ethnic groups
have always lived together throughout history. and have interacted
with each other, helped each other out, and in the thirty years since
liberation (in 1956, with the Democmtic RefoJDls), all the related
ethnic groupshave strengthenedtheircooperation, theirmutual help,
and their care for one another.
Thus, as China is a multiethnic country, Liangshan is a multi-ethnic
prefecture. And under the leadership of the Communist Party, all
ethnic groups are working together in Liangshan.
This lesson also presents another interesting translation
problem. The original Chinese phrase translated here (even
though the lesson itself is not translated from a Han textbook) is
xiongdi minzu, or, very literally, "big brother and little brother
ethnic groups." The Nuosu, however, is cocux vytnyi, whose
derivation is somewhat different. Co means people; cux is a
borrowing from minchu, which is minchu in the Liangshan Han
dialect (minzu in standard Chinese). Vyt is part of the compound
for older sibling-either vytvu for a man's older brother or
vytmop for a woman's older sister-and nyi is part ofnyimat,
a woman's older sister. Vytnyi thus means simply "siblings," or
"people of the same clan," and cocus. vytnyi is something like
"sibling nationalities," or "related nationalities" or "clan-mate
nationalities." The clear implication in Chinese of the older
brother Han and the younger brother minority does not come
through in the Nuosu translation.
Prominent in the textbooks and the teacher's manuals are
vocabulary terms such as "people of all ethnic groups throughout
the counIIy," "sibling nationalities," "all ethnic groups of China,"
"sons and daughters of all nationalities," and "nationalities unity."
Also emphasized in the relationship of each ethnic group to the
nation, or the motherland, is a concept that is much emphasized.
Volume 3,lesson 8, "Geapmopsu pupguop" (the glorious moth-
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
."9
. vip
j' IT J!t rf BJ+
RRO
t!.H: 1. 6)Xt!.
Children unite (nzinyi), and become new masters (vipsi) ofthe new
China. (Volwne I, lesson 9: Little friends, unite!)
erland) introduces the students to concepts of national unity. in
a text written in a style somewhat reminiscent of a traditional
Nuosu praise song:
Beloved motherland, exalted motherland, motherland of the long
history! Over frlly ethnic groups live together, toiling without fear
ofexhaustion, fighting without fear of death.
All the ethnic groups are working together to develop the moth-
erland; in labor their sweat flows together; when the enemies come,
their blood flows together.
Beloved motherland, exalted motherland, your children and
gmndchildren of every ethnic group eat their fill from your grain;
your laboring children and grandchildren growstrong from drinking
your milk; the people ofall ethnic groups get warmth from wearing
your clothes. Children and grandchildren of various ethnic groups
gather to defend you, to settle their differences, to fight off the
invasions of enemies. Your laboring children and gmndchildren of
all ethnic groups an: building you. and mpidly implemmting the
Four Modernizations.
These texts tell the children rust, that the motherland is a
countIy that is being built by all the ethnic groups together, with
every ethnic group making its contribution, and second, that the
relationship between the motherland and the people is that of
parent nurturing children.
These concepts of a unified nation ofdiverse ethnic groups,
of ethnic unity, and of preserving the national unity, are only
perfunctorily mentioned, usually through including pictures of
67
childrenofvariousnationalities,inthecorrespondingHan-lan-
guagetextbooks, and are notexplicitlyincluded inthe Outline
forElementaryLanguageClassesissuedbytheEducationCom-
mission. In otherwords, the principles ofnational and ethnic
unity are emphasized only with studentswho are educated in
minority languages. Forminority students,theideaof"nation"
hasanextralevel:forthemtheyaremembersofaminzu aswell
asof thenation.AttheFourthNationalConferenceonMinority
Education, heldin 1992,whereminority educationpolicy was
setfor theforeseeablefuture, thechairpersonoftheStateEdu-
cationCommission,LiTieying,stressedtheimportanceofethnic
education,statingthatethniceducation
[I]stheroadthatmustbetakeninordertohavedevelopmentamong
minoritiesandin minorityareas,andisaftmdamentalrequirement
ifwearegoingtomaintain national andethnicunity,andbuild
socialismwithChinesecharacteristics.
2
The chairperson ofthe StateEthnic Commission, Ismail
Aimat,said
Wewantourstudentstobecomedefendersofthesocialistsysem,of
ethnicunityandofnationalunity,tobecomecontributorstonational
flourishing andethnicgroups' progress,to becomereliableinheri-
torsofsocialismwithideals,morals,culture,anddiscipline.
22
Very clearly, the objectives are to strengthen the multi-ethnic
nationalunity,topreventfissure,andtopreservetheunityofthe
nation.
ComparisonbetweentheOldandtheNew Society
Contrastbetweentheoldandthenewsociety,beforeand
after socialism, is still a pervasive theme in textbooks used
everywhereinChina,butinNuosutextbooksittakes aspecial
fonn: comparisonbetweenthe"slavesociety"ofoldLiangshan
and the socialist society ofthe new Liangshan. Forexample,
volume1,lesson15isentitled"Hxiepkatnyuokatdatepyy110
bbo"(Happily goingto school). Itstextreads
WhenGrandpawasseven
Hewenttobegforfood
WhenDaddy was seven
andisalwaysimplicitlymentionedincontrastbothtoHanChina,
wherebeggarswerecommon,andtoLiangshantoday,wherenot
onlyHanbutNousuoccasionallyresorttobegging.
Lesson22involume2isentitled"NlepshaddumdltJji"
(Liangshanspreadsitswings).Partofthetextreads,
Beforeliberation,inthetimeofDarknessoftheSlaveSociety,the
people ofall ethnic groups labored under the oppression ofthe
siaveowners,leadinganoppressedlifeworsethanthat ofhorsesor
cattle.
AftertheDemocraticRefonns,
Withone theycameintosocialism,andinthetwentyyearssince
liberation,24 under the glorious light ofthe Nationalities Policy,
Liangshan'sworkersinagriculture,industry,transport,culture,edu-
cation,health,andmedicinehavemadegreatprogressin allareas.
Therearetwopictureswiththislesson(seebelow). Oneshows
aslaveinchainslaboringon thelandunderdarkclouds,andthe
other shows a mountain gorge with a swift river and dark
evergreens,with atraincrossingatrestlebetweentwotunnels,
andanairplaneweavingamongthemountairspeaks.
In the following lesson, entitled "Nuosulubytnyipclp"
(Two Nuosurhymes),onereads
In theSlaveSociety
Darkcloudsblewacrossthesky
Leopardsandtigersroamedtheearth
Slavescouldnotgoanywhere.
In theNewSociety
Airplanesstreakacrossthesky
Trainsroamtheearth
Onthegreatroadofsocialism
The liberatedslavescan goanywhere.
Other lessons that compare the new and old societies include
volume 3, lesson 3, "Dutzie" (Thetorchfestival), volume 2,
lesson 25, "NleplhamuddixIhyluoluo"(The golden landof
Liangshan), threesuccessivebucolic/industrial praise songsin

Hewas aslave
Ht.

Nowthisyear
I amseven oqtQt .
Withhappy eyesandhappyheart
.f!J,
----
Igotoschooltostudy.
.... .,.1..".
Theobjectiveofthislessonis,accordingtothe
111'."' #11 W./I-:r N.
.It III.
teacher'smanual,"Togetthestudentstomake
Ifl;:KIDl,
a comparison between the old and the new
society,sothattheymay strengthentheirlove
fortheCommunistpartyandforsocialism."
This is a translation ofa lessonfrom a
Han-language primer published.in the late
1 970s;23 thereferencetoslaveshasspecifically
beenaddedfortheNuosuedition. It isironic,
however, that the reference to begging has
beenretained: forastheNoususayingpoints
out,"Thereareno beggarsinNousuterritory"
(Nuosu muddlx zzahmot apJJo). This ab-
-..-
sence ofbeggars is usually attributed to the
kin-based charity providedby thetraditional
clan systembefore the DemocraticReforms, Lesson22involume2: ''NteplhaddurndltjJi"(Uangshanspreadsitswings).
Bulletin o/ConcernedAsian Scholars 68
IIbll! $11
tilet) Y:':f fc Jt 0
ltV,\"'. 0:0 r.IlX

When students study this lesson, they should be made to study the
picture carefully, and understand that our capital is at Beijing. Beijing
is the seat of the Central Party authorities and is the political, cultural,
and economic center ofthe country. (From tbe1eacher's manual for Vol-
ume I, lesson 2: Love Beijing.)
volume 3, entitled "Mgu au" (Beloved, lesson 10), "Mgulad-
desu" (Dear, lesson 11) and "Suu" (Satisfying, lesson 12);
volume 2, lesson 24, "Biji huoche xDa ox" (The train from
Beijing has arrived), and in volume 5, a supplemental lesson
entitled "Nlepaha xiyiet vat JJy vat" (What is best about Liang-
shan?).
All these comparisons of the old and new Liangshan are
designed to get students to love the communist party and social-
ism, and to understand that without the Communist Party, there
would be no New China and no socialism, and without the correct
nationalities policy of the Communist Party, there would be no
leap across thousands of years, no direct transition from slavery
to socialism, no new Liangshan.
Revolutionary Leaden and Heroes
As in Han-language texts, every volume of the Nuosu-lan-
guage elementaIy school textbooks has several lessons that
praise or memorialize the leaders of the Chinese Revolution,
particularly Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De. Most ofthese
lessons are accompanied by portraits of the leaders, helping
students to familiarize themselves with these national heroes.
The texts of these lessons emphasize the leaders' care for
the masses and for the younger generation, along with the plain-
living habits that kept them close to the people. In volume 3,
lesson 3, "Che aho" (Harvesting rice), the young Mao is por-
trayed getting in trouble with his father, because while herding
his family's cows home in a rainstorm, he stopped to help an old
neighbor lady get her rice under cover before it was ruined. In
volume 3, lesson 2, "Ca hlohlo" (Nice and warm) a street-
sweeper on a raw Beijing morning is warmed inside when
Premier Zhou, having worked all night in the Great Hall of the
People, stops on his way home to give some kind words ofthanks
VoL 30, No.2 (1998)
and encouragement. In volume 3, lesson 29, "Zhu Di Bleda"
(Zhu De's carrying pole), the revolutionary general is portrayed
as one with his troops, helping to carry grain up and down
mountain paths to the point where the troops wony about his
health and hide his carrying pole.
The above texts concerning leaders and heroes are all direct
translations from comparable level Han-language materials, and
as such use personal names, place names, and common nouns
that are quite unfamiliar to Nuosu children, especially thO!lC in
the remoter areas where Nuosu is the frrst language of instruc-
tion. But there are also lessons about China's revolutionary
leaders that are presented in a form much more like that of
traditional Nuosu praise songs. For example, in volume 2, lesson
5, "Mop Zhuxy shot" (Remembering Chairman Mao), we frod
a text that is written in a rather traditional Nuosu style, devoid of
any awkwardness in the Nuosu language other than that brought
by the foreign-sounding name Mop Zhuxy, which is of course
a direct borrowing of the Chinese (Chairman Mao). Otherwise,
it reads well in Nuosu:
Looking at a mountain
We think ofpines that can resist the wind
Looking at a plain
We think ofcrops growing green
Looking at the sun
We think of Chairman Mao.
The teachers' manual tells us that this lesson is supposed to teach
students to
Fervently love the Party, fervently love Chairman Mao, inherit the
revolutioIlllI)' legacy ofthe older generation ofthe proletariat, dedi-
catedly study science and culture, and strive to enrichand strengthen
the socialist cons1ruction ofthe motherland bequeathed (to them) by
the previous generation of revolutionaries.
In addition to stories about China's leaders, Nuosu-lan-
guage textbooks also contain many lessons (all of them directly
translated from Han-language teaching materials), about revolu-
tionary heroes-from Liu Hulan, who gave her life rather than
cooperate with the Guomindang reactionaries and Luo Sheng-
jiao, who sacrificed his life to save Korean children, even while
helping fight off the U.S. invaders, to Lei Feng, who had no
enemy to fight except the temptations of the class enemies.
China's revolutionary history and the theme of the unity of
the nationalities are intertwined in two lessons about the Red
Army's visit to Liangshan during the Long March in 1935: The
first (volume 2, lesson 7) is Gotiop hopjo motbutsu gguhomu
mga aix Niepsha xi (The workers and peasant's Red Army
crosses Liangshan on its Long March). The second (volume 5,
lesson 12), which is written at a much higher level of sophistica-
tion, is entitled Hopjo nimu :II (The Red Army arrives in Nuosu
County). This story, which is celebrated in Chinese textbooks
and in Edgar Snow's account of the Long March, tells how the
Red Army commanders overcame the suspicions oflocal Nuosu
leaders and eventually forged a blood-pact of friendship with
them. Notable here is the use of traditional, even florid and literary,
Nuosu vocabulary to tell the story. It is full offour-syllable literary
teons such as suyy sumop (roughly meaning respected and vener-
ated ones and used to refer to Nuosu leaders who negotiated with
the Red Army officers), terms that would be as familiar to elders
in mountain villages as puppop for "motherland" would be
mysterious. The story ends with Zhu De meeting the Nuosu
leader Luopbxo Zupyip in the town ofMianning (called here
69
by its Nuosu name Rrunuo Muke), as the Reds prepare to march
away, promising him that when Jiang Jieshi is smashed (ndup
latjjip),theCommunistswiUretumandrepaytheNuosu'shospitality.
Conclusion
Expressions of Chinese nationalism in minority-language
curricula vary widely, from conventional, translated stories
about Beijing and the Flag, national leaders and heros, to much
more locally sensitive material about the unity of nationalities and
the necessity for cross-ethnic cooperation, or about the advantages
of socialism over what came before, not just in general, but with
specific reference to local events, then and now. It appears from
this material that the curricular materials do in fact follow the
principles for ethnic education: they promote the general ideas
ofnationalism and patriotism, but they also establish connections
with local reality and employ a combination of original and
translated materials.
The real question here concerns the role of minority-lan-
guage textbooks and curricula in resolving the contradiction
between the central policy goals of using a small amount of
ethnic autonomy to serve as a vaccine against larger ambitions
of separatism, and the local leaders' ambitions of using the
protective umbrella of the state and Party apparatus to promote
the goals of local cultural revival, local development for local
ends, and maximum feasible autonomy within the Chinese na-
tion. There are signs already, even in the textbooks we have
analyzed here, that this contradiction may be coming to a head.
The 1995 reprinting of the third reader, for example, removed a
lesson about the Torch Festival, even though the original text had
stressed that reason why the beautiful girls and the handsome
men could enjoy traditional holiday feasts and sports was be-
cause of socialism and the enlightened nationalities policy (co-
cux lypde). And in addition, at the Fourth Work Conference on
Ethnic Education, mentioned above, renewed stress was put on
the ideological content ofelementary readers. There is thus some
indication that curriculum materials are moving away from
locally specific content toward closer compliance with uniform
national norms. If this is the case, it may indicate that central
policy is swinging again and that the vaccine theory is giving
way to a theory ofmore direct control; what it might mean locally
would be that minority leaders would seek to move outside the
umbrella of state and Party patronage to pursue their local
agendas. How far the pendulum will swing, and what results this
will have for ethnic relations, remain at this writing unclear.
Notes
1. For varying views ofthe origins and possible successes or failures of
the new kind of nationalism, see Prasenjit Duara, ''Deconstructing the
Chinese Nation," AustralianJoumal o/Chinese Affairs 30 (1993): 1-26,
andRescuingHistoryfrom the Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995); Edward Friedman, National Identity and Democratic
Prospects in Socialist China (Annonk, N.Y.: ME. Sharpe, 1995),
especially chapters 2, 4, and 8; Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim,
"Whither China's Quest for National Identity?" in China's Quest/or
National Identity, ed. Dittmer and Kim (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University
Press, 1993); and the important theoretical discussion in James Town-
send, "Chinese Nationalism," Australian Journal o/Chinese Affairs 27
(1992): 97-130.
2. For general accounts ofminority policy and its practice, see Thomas
Heberer, China and Its National Minorities: Autonomy orAssimilation
(Annonk, N. Y: ME. Sharpe, 1989); Dru C. Gladney,Muslim Chinese:
Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991), chapter 2; Stevan Harrell, "Introduction: Civi-
lizing Projects and the Reactions to Them," in Cultural Encounters on
China's Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1995), pp. 1-36, and "Introduction," in Negotiating Ethnicities in China
and Taiwan, ed. Melissa J. Brown (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia,
Institute of East Asian Studies, 1996), pp. 1-18; and Colin Mackerras,
China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth
Century (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994).
3. For recent accounts of Xinjiang, see Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis
Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997); for Tibet, see Melvyn Goldstein, The
Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) and Ronald D.
Schwartz, Circle 0/Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
4. To distinguish between the two, we use italics for Chinese words and
bold face for Nuosu words. Chinese words are romanized according to
the pinyin system, while Nuosu words are romanized according to the
Romanization system devised by government linguists in the 1950s and
still used as an aid to reading in textbooks and dictionaries. Nuosu words
never have syllable-fmal consonants, so the letters p, x, and t are used
as markers oflow, middle-rising, and high tones respectively. Syllables
without a tone marker are pronounced in a mid-level tone.
5. See the "Jiu nian yiwu jiaoyu quanri zhi xiaoxue yuwen jiaoxue
dagang" (Outline for elementary language classes in the nine-year
compulsory education system in Cui Nan), Xiaoxue yuwen jiaoxue fa
(Teaching methods for elementary school language classes) (Beijing:
Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1996), p. 332.
6. See Cai Yongxiang, Ma Wenhua, and Hielie Muga, fl'wen jiaocai de
jianshe bixu shiying Yiwen jiaxue de xuyao (Yi language curricular
materials must be adapted to the needs of Yi language instruction),
working paper. See also Ma Etzi, "Qiantan Liangshan Ylzu Degu" (A
superficial discussion ofUle Ndepgu of the Liangshan Yl), Liangshan
Minzu Yanjiu 1 (1992): 99-107. This latter work also contains a sum-
mary of the principles followed in writing Nuosu-language textbooks.
7. For an account of the politics and educational results of teaching in
various mixes of Chinese and minority languages, see Wurlig Bor-
chigud, "The Impact ofUrban Ethnic Education on Modern Mongolian
Ethnicity, 1949-1966," in Harrell, Cultural Encounters on China's
Ethnic Frontiers, pp. 278-300. For a comparative account ofthe success
or failure ofminority education policies in practice, see Mette Halskov
Hansen, Lessons in Being Chinese (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1998).
8. See Erbindalai and Shama Jiajia, eds., Zhongguo shaoshu minzu
wenzi jiaocai jianshe gaikuang (The general situation of the construc-
tion of education in minority scripts in China) (Huhhot: Neimeng Jiaoyu
Chubanshe, 1996), Introduction, p. 2.
9. Wu Mingxian, "Sichuan Sheng Liangshan Ylwen jiaoxue huigu yu
zhanwang" (Retrospect and prospect for Yl-language education in
Liangshan), LiangshanMinzu Yanjiu (1996): 156.
10. The Yllanguages (officially, there are six dialects, all mutually
unintelligible) and their close relatives Lisu, Lahu, Rani, Jinuo, and
Naxi belong to the Yl, or Loloish, branch of the Tibeto-Burman lan-
guage family, which mayor may not be related to Chinese. There are
few recognizable cognates between Yl languages and Chinese, and
sentence structure is very different On the classification of Yl lan-
guages, see David Bradley, "Language Planning for China's Minorities:
The Yi Branch," in A World o/Language: Presented to Profossor S.A.
Wunn on his 65th Birthday, ed D. Laycock and W. Winter (Canberra:
Department of Linguistics, Aus1ra.lian National University, 1990), pp.
81-89; and James A. MatisotI, "Sino-Tibetan Linguistics: Present State
and Future Prospects," Annual Review 0/ Anthropology 20 (1991):
469-504; on attempts to develop various scripts for different Yllan-
guages in different provinces, see Bradley, "Language Planning for
China's Minorities," pp. 81-89.
11. Nuosu writing works like Japanese kana: each distinct sign repre-
sents a syllable; words with the same sound and different meaning (for
Bulletin o/ConcemedAsian Scholars
70
example, yy meaning water, river,
go; mu meaning horse, ear1h, do)
are written with the same sign.
The reason there are so many
different signs is that the Nuosu
language contains forty-two in-
itial consonants, eleven vowels,
and four tones. The reason there
are 819 signs and not 1848 is that
the high-middle tone is indicated
by placing a "cap" over the sign
for the middle tone, and not all
theoretically possible combina-
tions of vowel, consonant, and
tone actually occur. The script in
question is used only among Nu-
osu-speakers, not among other Yi
in Yunnan or Guizhou In those
provinces, standard scripts have
been developed, but not much
used (see David Bradley, ''Lan-
guage Policy for the Yi," in Ste-
van Harrell, ed, Yi SOCiety and
Culture. under consideration for
publication).
12. The relevant documents,
Guowu yuan guanyu Sichuan
Sheng renmin zhengfu zhuanbao
"Liangshan Zhou Geming Wei-
China is of course not a nation-state in the classic sense that posits a union of a people, a culture, a language, a
territory: and a gov'ernment. It is both actually and ideologically a multi-ethnic state, which includes among its
population not only the 91 percent ofthe population who are and for Chinese
is not particularly problematic, but also by the other hundred million CItizens of China who belong to Its offi-
cially classifIed national minorities (shaoshu minzu). Bringing these people into the body politic, making them
not only compliant but also willing participants in the project of building China as a multinatonal state, is an im-
portant and sometimes vexing aspect of the ideological mission of the People's Republic and Communist Party
leaders. (pictured above is a one-yuan currency note featuring a depiction of two representatives of China's
minority populations).
yuanhui guanyu 'Yiwen guifon an de baogao" de pifo. and Sichuan
sheng renmin zhengfo zhuanbao "Liangshan Zhou Geming
guanyu 'Yiwen guifan an' de baogao" de fobao, are reproduced ill
Erbindalai and Shama Jiajia, eds. Zhongguo shaoshu minzu wenzi
jiaocaijianshe gai/cuang, pp. 26-27.
13. For the official statistics see Wu Mingxian, "Zhong guo shaoshu
minzu jiaoyu gaige fazhan de licheng bei" (Retrospect and prospect for
Yi-language education in Liangshan) Liangshan Minzu Yanjiu (1996).
14. The original name was the Curriculum Materials Group (Yiwen
jiaozai bianyi zu); this was changed to Curriculum Materials Office
when Xichang and Liangshan Prefectures were combined in 1979. An
unpublished acount of this group's activities by Bianyishi is entitled
"Sichuan Liangshan Yiwen Jiaocai Bianyishi Jianjie," 1995.
15. Another aspect of the work of the Materials Office was the invention
and standardization of scientific, teclmical, and other specialized termi-
nology in the Nousu language. We hope to deal with the issue of new
vocabulary in a future publication.
16. All examples are taken from Sychotse Saoxjjie Futkur Jjipsaoxdde
Saodu Tepyy, Ddopltlll Bburma (Sichuan Province six-year elementary
textbooks, reading and writing), and unless otherwise noted from the
1985-87 editions, which as far as we know are still in use almost
everywhere. Some minor revisions were made in 1990; we have seen
these only for volume 3. After compiling the fIrst edition, the Materials
Group went on to complete the set of textbooks, including secondaIy
school and science texts, so new editions of the elementary materials
were not prepared. We have a 1995 printing of volume 1, but with the
exception ofa new cover, its contents are identical to the 1985 edition.
17. This last sentence, nratnramu da 550, cypnyip cyphxo Ii, is
undoubtedly a translation of Mao's instructions, to be found on just
about every schoolroom wall in China: Hao hao xuexi; tian tian xiang
shang. A later lesson takes this quotation as its title. Material from
Nuosu-language teachers' manuals is taken from GgukuI Zziezzur
HItIIItIu Saoxjie Futkur Jipsso Nuosu Ddopltlll Bblll'llUl HlIUlIsao
Hxephxex Tepyy (Teachers' references for elementary nuosu language
classes in the six-year curriclum of nine-year compulsory education).
18. Janet Upton informs us that modern Tibetan uses a similar term,
mes-rgyal, in this case composed of two terms of long standing,
combined into a neologism.
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
19. For a general account ofthe way nationalism is imparted in elemen-
tary schools, see Charles F. Keyes, "The Proposed World ofthe School:
Thai Villagers' Entry into a Bureaucmtic State System," in Reshaping
Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural South-
eastAsia (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies,
1991). Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph, no. 36, p. 89.
20. This last is probably a translation of a line from the famous Cultural
Revolution Song, "The East is Red": Gongch(Uldang Xiang Taiyang;
Zhao dao noli. nali liang.
21. From Li Tieying, Dali gaige heJazhan minzu jiaoyu. cujin ge minzu
de gongtongJanrong (Vigorously reform etlmic education, and promote
the common flourishing of all the nationalities), in Zhongguo shaoshu
minzu jiaoyu gaige Jazhan de lichengbei (Mileposts in China's ethnic
education reforms) (Beijing: Jiaoyu Kexue Chubanshe, 1993), p. 2.
22. From Ismail Aimat (Simayi Aimaiti), Tuanjie Jendou jixu qianjin.
shixian shaoshu minzu jiaoyu he quanguo jiaoyku de xietiao Jaman
(Unite and struggle; continue to press forward; Implement the coordi-
nated development of minority education and national eduation), in
Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jiaoyu gaigeJazhan de lichengbei (Mileposts
in China's etlmic education reforms: Collection ofdocuments from the
Fourth National Work Conference on Ethnic Education), compo Guojia
Jiaowei Minzu Jiaoyu Si (Minority areas education section of the State
Education Commission) (Beijing: Jiaoyu Kexue Chubanshe, 1993), p. 18.
23. Jonathan Unger, "Introduction: Primary School Reading Texts and
Teaching Methods in the Wake of the Cultural Revolution," Chinese
Education 10, no. 2 (1977): 4-34. Thanks to Janet Upton for bringing
this text to our attention. Otherwise, with the reference to slavery, we
had thought the lesson was composed for the Nuosu-Ianguage readers.
It does not appear in the current edition of the Han-language reader.
24. Liberation (jiejang) in the Liangshan context, usually refers not to
the communist military takeover in 1949-50, but rather to the beginnings
ofthe New Society with the Democmtic Reforms (minzhu gaige), which
began in 1956. Still, we can see that textbooks currently in use are
somewhat out of date.
o
71
Bulletin o!ConcernedA,ian Scholar" VoL 30, No.2 (1998): 7282
ISSN 0007-4810 C 1998 SCAS (Oakland, California)
War Crimes and the Vietnamese People:
American Representations and Silences
Survey textbook treatments ofthe governments and peoples ofNorth and South Vietnam provide a barometer
of the wisdom achieved by a generation of U.s. scholanhip on the Vietnam War. In their discussions of the
August Revolution and of the 1953-56 land reform and the Air War in the North and the Diem and Thieu
regimes in the South, these books rework old controvenies, thereby demonstrating the pertinence and limits
of received paradigms. In particular, the war crimes debate, driven forward by the "Winter Soldien" and
others, continues to serve as a point ofreference for understanding u.s. intervention and war-induced changes
in Vietnam. An analysis of social consequences helps to situate the Vietnamese in the Vietnam War and the
war in Vietnam's modem history.
by David Hunt*
"War crimes" were in the logic of the Vietnam War. As the
U.S. military sought to extirpate guerrillas living in the midst of
the rural population, Vietnamese peasants paid a high price. With
memories of World War II still fresh, the Tokyo and Nuremberg
Trials provided the anti-war movement a framework for making
sense of the carnage. Veterans led the way in documenting the
case, most notably at the "Citizens Commission of Inquiry"
(December 1970, Washington D.C.) and the "Winter Soldier
Investigation" (January 1971, Detroit), during which returning
soldiers described atrocities they had witnessed and perpetrated
in Southeast Asia.
The "Winter Soldiers" were heroes of the Vietnam War.
Public testimony was part of an effort to recover from combat
trauma, and perhaps there was a hope for atonement as well. But
the hearings were primarily an act of citizenship, an attempt to
force on the American public a recognition of what was going
on in Vietnam. As one veteran put it, the willed incomprehension
of friends and family and of participants in public discussion of
the war impelled him to speak. "The fact that they didn't want to
know," he declared, "told me they had to know.'"
The Winter Soldiers were not satisfied with fixing blame
for crimes committed. Refusing a solipsism that portrayed the
war as a dispute among Americans, they insisted on the reality
of Vietnam. According to their logic, a society guilty of atrocities
could recover its humanity only in connecting to the humanity
of the victims. As part of a collective effort to recover, veterans
For their criticisms and suggestions, I am gmteful to James Hunt and
Peter Weiler and also to BCAS editors Laura Hein and MaIk Selden.
demanded reconstruction assistance for Vietnam and anticipated
peaceful exchanges between the two countries and a wider
understanding ofVietnamesehistory and culturein the United States.
2
Survey texts assigned in college courses on the Vietnam
War convey a sense of how such issues are remembered in the
United States (see appendix below for a list and description of
the books considered here). Redressers of wrongs, the Winter
Soldiers also called for a recognition of the Vietnamese as
participants in their own history, with the implication that they
too were party to questions of power and responsibility raised
during the war. In order to meet the Winter Soldier challenge,
survey authors must enter into the war crimes debate, and they
must engage with the Vietnamese side of the Vietnam War.
Having dealt elsewhere with "images of the Viet Cong," I focus
here on how representative texts present the leaders and citizens
of the Saigon-based Government of Vietnam (GVN) and the
North Vietnamese Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRy).
3
Triumph and Eclipse of the Winter Soldien
A few weeks after the Winter Soldier hearings (28 March
1971), the New York Times Magazine published an article by Neil
Sheehan entitled, "Should We Have War Crime Trials?" When
he was first stationed in Vietnam, Sheehan regarded the "Hun-
like" behavior of U.S. personnel as "unnecessarily brutal and
politically counter-productive," but it had not occurred to him
that such conduct might be classified as criminal. By the time of
the article, he was both advocating and expecting "a long and
painful inquest into what we are doing in Southeast Asia." Alarm
and indignation at the suffering of the Vietnamese had spread
widely within the United States.
Post-war "revisionism" was launched in this atmosphere,
shaped by the anti-war movement. Guenter Lewy 's America in
Vietnam, which sets out to establish the legality and morality of
U.S. war making, portrays the Winter Soldiers and other activist
veterans as "emotionally disturbed individuals" who spoke of
atrocities to gain "approval and acceptance" from the public, or
simply as impostors and liars. At the same time, Lewy is ob-
sessed with war crimes testimony. While exculpating U.S. policy
makers and characterizing the Vietnamese as victims of Com-
munism who needed our help, he recognizes that the countryside
was full of persons the GIs "had good reason to consider un-
friendly." Troubled by the implication that a general assault on
the rural population was required to win the war, he both defends
forced population relocations, seen as admissible according to
the Geneva Convention, and recognizes that this tactic demoral-
ized the peasantry. Napalm, defoliants, and tear gas were also not
illegal, but humanitarian arguments against their use receive a
hearing. My Lai-type massacres did not happen "all the time,"
as critics maintained, but "the lives of Vietnamese were cheap
and not protected by the law of war." In a remarkable passage,
Lewy suggests that if Japanese General Yamashita had been
properly condemned at the end ofWorld War II forfailing ''to take
all possible measures to prevent such crimes," then General William
Westmoreland, who turned a blind eye to the travails of the
indigenous popUlation, should be found culpable as well.
4
Roused to fury by the defamatory character of attacks on U. S.
policy (the "war crimes" argument equated the United States with
the Axis Powers of World War 11), Lewy confronts polemical
adversaries on their own ground Working his way through the
dossier, he repeatedly sbJmbles over evidence of massive firepower
trained on an enemy who lived and fought in the midst of the
Vietnamese people. Detennined to establish that the Americans
waged ajust war, he makes clear that it was a dirty war.
Moral questions imposed by counter-insurgency on the
American conscience also haunt Marilyn Young, The Vietnam
Wars, but in other survey texts published after America in Viet-
nam, the war crimes debate recedes from view. The authors of
these books are critical of Pentagon strategy and tactics. But, to
employ the distinction drawn by Neil Sheehan, they tend to
characterize U.S. intervention as "unnecessarily brutal and po-
litically counter-productive" rather than as a criminal enterprise.
Treatments of the My Lai massacre in these books are less
extensive than the analysis offered by Lewy and Young and do
not emphasize, as they do, that some Americans at the time
thought Washington leaders were war criminals. The issue is
further obscured when terrorist acts by the enemy, such as ''the Hue
Massacre," are made to seem more wanton than u.s. atrocities.
s
Even so, the Winter Soldier message has not been entirely
effaced. When I began to think about Lewy's work and about
other surveys texts, I assumed that most would dwell on the U. s.
role and marginalize the people of Vietnam. But if one adds up
pages devoted to Vietnam's pre-1945 history, the Viet Minh, the
GVN, the DRY, and the Southern guerrillas of the National
Liberation Front (NLF), it emerges that the Vietnamese occupy
center stage in over 40 percent of our collective text.
This near parity with the u.s. side is unique in the annals
of u.s. scholarship on foreign wars. Textbook treatments of
Vietnam are unfmished, but their qualities are obvious when
compared to surveys ofother U. S. military interventions in Asia.
No Vietnam War study comes close to the racism of Max
"War crimes" were in the logic of the Vietnam War. As the U.S. mili-
1aty sought to extirpate guenillas living in the midst of the rural popu-
lation, Vietnamese peasants paid a high price. (photo courtesy of
Ishikawa Bunyo, A Photographic Record o/the Vietnam War).
Hastings, The Korean War, which declares that Korea "stank"
and in which the political tendencies and even dietary prefer-
ences of Koreans are treated with contempt. Their discussions of
the DRV are not satisfactory, but the Vietnam War authors do not
write off Hanoi statements, as does Hastings when explaining
why he paid no heed to North Korean perspectives. They fail to
resolve every question, but the surveys do open the way toward
a discussion that is attentive to the place of the war in Vietnam's
recent history. The Winter Soldiers helped to fashion a scholarly
literature.
6
Story of a Betrayal
Guenter Lewy, Timothy Lomperis, and Anthony James
Joes stand out among the survey authors in their relative sympa-
thy for the GVN and their unwillingness to write it off as a lost
cause. These scholars agree on a number ofpropositions: that the
introduction of U.S. ground forces, necessary to stave off defeat
in 1965, quickly became an obstacle to progress; that Vietnami-
zation was a welcome, if belated, step; that the G VN was headed
in the right direction in the years leading up to 1975; and that the
withdrawal of U.S. assistance after the Paris Peace Agreement
constituted a fatal blow to Saigon.
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998) 73
Joes's treatment of these themes is squarely within the
"betrayal-of-an-ally" paradigm characteristic of right-wing ret-
rospectives on the war. "The United States could have sustained
the south indefinitely," he writes, "but chose not to. The United
States could have stopped the final offensive against Saigon dead
in its tracks, but chose not to. And so, in a real sense, the
Americans defeated the South Vietnamese, and themselves." A
similar interpretation is suggested by Lomperis, who writes that
"at the time of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in
January 1973, the South Vietnamese government had attained
passive legitimacy." But, before "passive" could become "ac-
tive" support, the Americans "let [the GVN] down." Lewy
portrays the peace agreement as an abandonment of South Viet-
nam by its U.S. ally and even (quoting an Australian observer)
a "shameless bug-out." He condemns the "folly" of the anti-war
movement and declares that the "very improvement of the G VN
and the greatly weakened posture of the VC" prompted Hanoi to
launch its 1775 offensive.
7
The GVN Polity
This line of argument leads toward a portrayal of Saigon's
leaders as victims ofthe Americans as well as ofthe communists.
But the history ofthe regime, as narrated in the surveys, does not
support such a view. With respect to the electoral sphere, Joes is
enthusiastic about the 1955 referendum asking voters to choose
between Premier Ngo Dinh Diem and Emperor Bao Dai (it
provoked a "massive turnout of voters" in support of a Republic
led by Diem), but everyone else thinks the contest was rigged.
Joes and Lewy offer justification for cancellation of the Geneva
vote scheduled for 1956, while the other authors are critical, with
George Herring, Michael Maclear, George Moss, James Olson
and Randy Roberts, and Marilyn Young specifying that Ho Chi
Minh would have won if the Vietnamese had been allowed a
choice. On the suspension of village elections by Diem in 1956,
the verdict is unanimously negative, with even Joes, after some
hesitation ("there was justification for this move"), expressing
disapproval ("an unpopular mistake").8
Electoral contests in the era of President Nguyen Van Thieu
prompt a somewhat more spirited exchange. loes regards con-
stituent assembly and presidential campaigns of 1966-67 as a
breakthrough and adds that they were "the fairest ever conducted
in Viet Nam." Lomperis offers a more guarded endorsement,
saying that the elections appealed to "modernists" by "at least
going further than Hanoi in establishing legitimate constitutional
government." He adds that many legislators in the National
Assembly, chosen soon after Thieu's victory at the polls, "did
see themselves as modern ombudsmen and developed links with
the constituents.,,9
These judgments are not seconded in the other texts. Gary
Hess declares that the 1967 vote revealed "the shallowness of the
Saigon government's support," and Herring arrives at a similar
conclusion. Stanley Kamow avers that, "Thieu performed mis-
erably" and dwells on his "astonishingly poor" score. Moss
remarks that the election revealed Thieu's dependence on "the
backing of the Americans," and William Turley concludes that
it pinpointed and sharpened divisions within the Saigon elite. 10
Perhaps most prominent among the skeptics when it comes
to these elections is Guenter Lewy. While citizens trooped to the
poles, Lewy notes, "the government continued to protect a power
structure based on the wealthy urban elements of society." At the
grassroots, "G VN officials, usually drawn from the urban elite
of the country, displayed a contemptuous attitude toward the
people they governed." Lewy's interest is stimulated more by
Thieu's decision to restore village elections in 1970, especially
since this democratic local leadership was given control over
budget funds, paramilitary forces, and implementation of Land-
to-the-Tiller. "A shift of political allegiance toward the GVN on
the part of the rural population seemed to be in the making." But
then, a few pages later, Lewy notes that, "The South Vietnamese
government, despite belated reforms like the Land-to-the-Tiller
program, had been unable to mobilize mass support in the
countryside. In a series of moves in 1972 and 1973, Thieu once
again seriously weakened local self-government by abolishing
authority for the election of hamlet chiefs." II
The survey authors come close to unanimity in their evalu-
ations of the GVN polity, and, in addition to noting the limits of
its electoral practice, many refer to press censorship, concentra-
tion or "reeducation" camps, and thousands of executions. Sev-
eral texts underscore Diem's authoritarianism, with Herring af-
firming that his model was the nineteenth-century Emperor Ming
Mang, Hess noting his regime's "contempt" for the people, and
Moss characterizing the government as "a police state apparatus
with fascistic overtones." Having been allowed to witness GVN
police "interrogation" sessions, Karnow is authorized to testify
that suspects were "often tortured." No improvement, the Thieu
Regime was "an authoritarian, single-party state" (Olson and
Roberts), a "single-party, authoritarian, bureaucratic rule," de-
pendent on "the support of a foreign power" (Turley). In its last
years, Hess declares, the GVN was going backward, and "politi-
cal surveillance and control was even more extensive than under
the Diem government."12
Ready enough to quarrel over details, the GVN sympathiz-
ers fail to unite against this indictment. Lomperis depicts Diem
as an "autocratic Confucian" and is troubled by Thieu's "consid-
erable energy ... in political repression." Lewy minces no words
in labelling the GVN a "lawless and repressive regime." And
even loes grants that the government came to resemble a "Latin
American dictatorship, arbitrary without being effective" and
that its handling of prisoners "often left a great deal to be
desired. ,,13
Saigon and the Peasants
Four textbook surveys provide details on landlessness and
usury in the countryside and eight indicate that the Viet Minh's
pre-1954 land reform had been effective and that Diem's corre-
sponding efforts brought meager benefit to the rural poor and
were politically disastrous. Herring judges that the regime "did
little" to satisfy peasant land hunger. Hess, Lewy, and Moss
specify that only 10 percent oftenants received land from Saigon,
and Kamow is even more pessimistic, citing figures from Long
An Province where fewer than 1,000 out of 35,000 tenants
benefitted. Young concludes that "the overwhelming
of peasants "actually suffered" as a result of Diem's policies. 4
The pro-GVN camp does not contest these judgments.
Lewy remarks that Diem's land reform was "virtually inopera-
tive," and Joes estimates that it "caused even more damage" than
the cancellation of village elections. Lomperis ignores the sub-
ject, but later suggests that Thieu's Land-to-the-Tiller reform in
1970 was the first occasion when "Saigon developed an effective
program" in this area. IS
Vietnam veterans in the United States led the way in documenting the
"war crimes" case, using the Tokyo and Nuremberg Trials as a frame-
work for making sense of the carnage. (Photograph ofmarch by active-
duty U.S. military on 4 July 1974. Source: LNS Women:' Graphics,1974.)
More than any other survey, Lewy's book emphasizes class
struggle in South Vietnam, especially in the countryside, where
the ravages of landlordism and the plight of tenants are fre-
quently noted. "The demand for land ownership became a de-
mand for an end to peonage and for personal freedom," he
declares. So it is not surprising that he regards the Land-to-the-
Tiller program as the most positive initiative in the history of the
GVN. Within three years, it virtually eliminated tenancy, with
the result that "the power ofthe landlords over rural life had been
seriously weakened and a beginning made in changing the per-
ception of government as simply the protector of the rich and the
powerful." Redistribution of land stimulated "a new wave of
prosperity," and related community development efforts, bus-
tling markets, and an expanding school system reinforced an
impression that progress was being made. 16
Joes and Lomperis follow Lewy on this score, and at least
mildly optimistic passages on roads opened, bridges repaired,
schools and health clinics built, and increasing rice production
appear in Herring, Moss, and Olson and Roberts. But most ofthe
surveys do not buy Land-to-the-Tiller as a turning point. Lewy's
own skepticism is palpable. For example, where Joes celebrates
progress in ARVN capabilities, Lewy joins the other survey
authors in reserving judgment. ARVN leadership "camefrom the
middle and upper classes of South Vietnam's urban society and
had great difficulty in relating to their own soldiers, who were
primarily of peasant origin," and to the rural popUlation. The
consequent mistreatment of civilians was "reinforced and aggra-
vated by the reliance on heavy weapons," an "addiction" that
showed no sign ofslackening as the war went on. All in all, Lewy
VoL 30, No.2 (1998)
conveys a sense that Land-to-the-Tiller was only a first step.
Victory on the battlefield would not be forthcoming unless Saigon
brought about a redistribution of power throughout society. I?
To sum up, the surveys make clear the GVN's anti-demo-
cratic practice and estrangement from the peasant maj ority. Most
readers of these books will not be tempted by a Betrayal-of-an-
Ally interpretation of the war, with Saigon leaders as innocent
victims. Even the authors who sound the betrayal chord in their
discussions of the catastrophe that befell the regime in 1975 are
troubled when reviewing the record for the earlier period, and
their most authoritative champion, Guenter Lewy, sharply criti-
cizes the elitism of the regime.
Puppets Who Pulled Their Own Strings
This near consensus on the performance of the GVN still
leaves unanswered the question of responsibility. Were Saigon
leaders unworthy allies who thwarted U.S. good faith efforts in
Vietnam or were they simply following orders from Washington?
Or is a more complex image required, to characterize "puppets
who pulled their own strings"?18
The surveys underscore American responsibility for the
spotty G VN electoral record. Among the most anxious of the
survey authors to blame Saigon, Kamow highlights inattention
and naivete on the US. side ("What the Americans failed to
understand was that [Diem's] mandarin mentality could not
accept the idea of even minority resistance to his rule"). Others
are tougher on Washington. According to Herring, "the US.
government and the American mission in Saigon did little to
promote democracy, or even political reform, until South Viet-
nam was swept by revolution." U S. policy makers got exactly what
they had sought, in the words of Olson and Roberts, "an anticom-
munist government in Saigon-democratic or not." Lewy suggests
that the Americans should have pushed harder for "political and
economic reform," while Lomperis adds that unconditional US.
aid left Diem free to discount the tax-paying public. Joes is the
only author who thinks the Americans were too critical, rather
than not critical enough, of Diem's anti-democratic policies. 19
The ruthless face of the G VN is treated in a more evasive
fashion by the surveys. Young is the most insistent on US.
culpability and pinpoints the role of Michigan State University
in training "the forces of repression" employed against oppo-
nents ofthe Saigon government. She is the only author to explore
this affiliation. When it comes to the Anti-Communist Denun-
ciation Campaign, to torture and concentration camps, the other
surveys blame Diem.
20
Human rights violations perpetrated by Thieu and abetted
by the United States are also not much connected to Washington.
CIA and GVN involvement in the heroin traffic goes virtually
unnoticed, and tiger cages do not loom large, save for Lewy, who
insists-not one of his better moments-that they were more
spacious than anti-war activists claimed. Characteristically un-
willing to ignore the issue, but hard pressed to fend off critics,
he lapses into Oriental ism with the suggestion that abuses may
have been due to the South Vietnamese "low regard for human
life and suffering. ,,21
With respect to Diem and the peasants, the survey treat-
mentsfall again into a blame-it-on-Saigonmode. Six discussions
of Diem's land reform make no mention of the Americans, and
several of the others claim that they were prodding Saigon in the
right direction. Herring declares that Diem acted on the land
75
i
question only at "American insistence," Hess claims that grudg-
ing gestures at reform were undertaken "under pressure from the
U.S.," and Lewy says that the program began with "American
support and advice," but was not carried through by the Vietnam-
ese. Karnow notes that Diem "brought in prominent American
experts like Wolf Ladejinsky, who had planned successful land
reforms in Japan and Taiwan, but he discarded their advice."
Disputing these views, Young describes the GVN initiatives as
"Ladejinsky's land reform program" and suggests Washington
got the policy that it desired.
22
Balance Sheet on the GVN
Analysis in the surveys ofrelations between Americans and
Vietnamese is complex and unfinished, but this collective en-
deavor clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of received para-
digms. Advocates of the Betrayal-of-an-Ally view constitute a
minority, and even they run out of patience when reviewing the
record of Saigon abuses. Blame-it-on-Saigon exerts more influ-
ence, especially when it comes to Diem's repression and class-
based land program, and Young performs a service by insisting
on U.S. involvement, even in the ugliest GVN practices. Still, all
survey authors place at least some of the blame for disaster in
South Vietnam on the United States. Finally, a notion ofthe G VN
as a Puppet Regime has not worn well, as the texts make clear
that Diem and Thieu were not mere mandatories of their foreign
sponsors.
To sum up, interaction between Saigon and the Americans
is a story of differing degrees of power, but also ofjoint respon-
sibility in determining the course of events. No account can leave
out the preferences and actions of the Vietnamese, which in turn
were influenced by regional, ethnic, and generational tensions
within the Saigon milieu. Turley makes a beginning at engage-
ment with these issues when he posits a difference between the
founding fathers of the GVN and the Young Turks who sup-
planted them. He sees Thieu as part of "a new elite-younger,
more career-oriented, and more susceptible to U.S. influence by
comparison with the mandarin Francophiles it displaced." But
Thieu's closeness to the Americans cut both ways. While making
him "more susceptible" to outside "influence," it also allowed
for a shrewder understanding and opened new possibilities for
the Vietnamese. Not even in his most grandiose flights could
Diem have imagined intervening in U.S. presidential politics, as
Thieu did in 1 %8 and 1972. Here and elsewhere on the subject
of the GVN, there is more to be said. 23
A Litany of Resistance to Foreign Domination
In defending Saigon, Joes speaks of"an admittedly corrupt
government with at least some of the institutions and mecha-
nisms of democracy and capable of further democratic evolu-
tion," which he contrasts with "a totalitarian state" in the North,
"explicitly contemptuous of all the political values ofthe Ameri-
can people." Lomperis concludes his commentary on the GVN
record by affmning that "there was still more freedom in the
South than in the North," and he adds that South Vietnam was
"less prosperous" after the war, when it was ruled by the Com-
munists, than "in the days of Nguyen Van Thieu." Lewy agrees
that the GVN can only be judged with reference to the DRY. "A
totalitarian state like Communist North Vietnam, possessing a
monopoly of indoctrination and social control, was bound to
display greater military morale and unity than a fragmented and
barely authoritarian country like South Vietnam." To pursue the
inquiry, one must tum to survey treatments of the North.24
A cold war interpretation of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam holds sway in the three pro-GVN texts. The opening of
Lewy's book, situated in 1950, is constructed to imply coordi-
nated Communist aggression in China, Korea, and Vietnam. The
author appears to accept Washington's claim that the Viet Minh's
battle against the French "was more than a mere colonial war."
Joes asserts that U.s. policy makers reacted rationally when "Ho
Chi Minh openly declared himself a loyal adherent of a self-pro-
claimed monolithic and expansionary world Communist move-
ment." Lomperis says that, "It was really impossible to disguise
the essential foreignness of the Communist ideology. ,,25
Elsewhere in the surveys, one encounters frequent refer-
ences to Hanoi leaders as Vietnamese patriots. A "great man"
treatment ofHo Chi Minh, with the emphasis on his nationalism,
is common. In the words of Herring, "The Vietnamese Revolu-
tion was in many ways the personal creation of the charismatic
patriot Ho Chi Minh." Critical distance is perhaps signaled when
Turley declares that, "As popularly told, Vietnam's history is a
litany of resistance to foreign domination." But in most of the
surveys the point is affmned without irony. As Olson and Roberts
put it, "Vietnam was for the Vietnamese, not for anyone else, and
that passion had driven Ho Chi Minh throughout his life."26
Some of the books that stress Ho's patriotism also take note
of Vietnamese Communism. It would be "naive" to obscure this
aspect, Olson and Roberts warn. Comparing the Viet Minh to
other independence movements in Southeast Asia, Moss de-
clares, "Only in Vietnam did the struggle for home rule also
become a struggle for who should rule at home." Such formula-
tions recall the notion, proffered by the left wing within the
anti-war movement, of the Vietnamese resistance as a social
revolution. 27
The August Revolution
The balance among these conceptions shifts as the surveys
trace the history of Vietnamese Communism, beginning with the
August Revolution of 1945. Joes argues that the Communist
seizure of power in that year was an "elitist movement," resem-
bling "a coup much more than the great revolutions of history."
Moss presents a different emphasis, with the Viet Minh harness-
ing "the vast energies" of the population," leading to "a remark-
able merging of a people and a movement," and allowing "the
Vietnamese people" to reclaim "their national identity.,,28
Other treatments occupy a space between these interpretive
options. A number of passages focus on Viet Minh agency and
portray the masses as instruments of Party leadership in a way
that tilts toward the "coup" version: "the Vietminh opportunisti-
cally filled the vacuum, occupying government headquarters in
Hanoi" (Herring); "the Viet Minh called for a national insurrec-
tion, and its political cadres and army moved southward" (Hess);
"the time had come to grab power" (Karnow); "the Communists
decided to seize the moment ... "the party decided to strike"
(Lomperis); "the Vietminh leaders had the crowd marching
through the streets of Hanoi," then "staged similar people's
rallies" in other cities (Olson and Roberts). Other formulations
make the event sound more like a mass movement: "the August
Revolution swept the Vietminh to power" (Hess); Ho was "rac-
ing to keep up with events" (Karnow); "the Communists rode to
power on the crest of a popular uprising" (Turley); "thousands
and Roberts); "atrocities throughout the coun-
try" and "thousands" of deaths (Karnow).30
On this issue, the latter two texts abandon
their earlier emphasis on Vietnamese patriot-
ism and switch to a lurid view of the enemy.
Karnow transforms Ho Chi Minh from a man
of "gentle temperament" into an ideologue
who was personally responsible for a blood-
bath. The disjuncture is equally stark in Olson
and Roberts. "He was just a wisp of a man,"
they declare in introducing Ho. But in 1954,
"he set out on a misguided crusade," leading to
a torrent of "accusations, lies, informants, and
a neighbor-against-neighbor atmosphere," in
which "thousands" died and "tens ofthousands
more" were placed in labor camps. Both deny
that landlordism was an issue in the North
(such an idea was "insane," Karnow avers) and
therefore imply that the exercise did not have
any legitimate purpose. On this point, Karnow
and Olsen and Roberts are close to Joes and
Lomperis, who insist that land reform was, in
Lomperis's words, an "imperative of Commu-
nist ideology," rather than a response to a real
problem.
3l
Three of the texts see land reform as a
flawed, but successful campaign to satisfy
peasant land hunger. Hess speaks of "errors";
Moss, of "many abuses and atrocities," "thou-
sands" of deaths, and "a residue of bitterness
and distrust" in the countryside; Young, of a
campaign that "frequently left villages not
transformed, but deeply embittered." On the
other hand, Hess cites "substantial results,"
including distribution of land to two million
peasants and increased rice production. Moss
Human rights violations perpetrated by Thieu and abetted by the United States are also not
also notes that two million country dwellers
much connected to Washington. CIA and GVN involvement in the heroin traffic goes virtu- received land and adds that "a new class of
ally unnoticed, and tiger cages do not loom large, save for Lewy, who insists-not one of his landowners composed of middle peasants
better moments-that they were more spacious than anti-war activists claimed. (Photographs
strongly supportive of the Hanoi regime took
ofvictims in Saigon's "tiger cage" prisons. Source: Liberation News Service, no daie given.)
control of the villages." Young agrees that the
of peasants poured into the cities from the countryside, demon-
stratingtheirsupportforthe Viet Minh in huge rallies" (Young).29
To sum up, with respect to the August Revolution, the
Communist "Foreign Other" of cold war discourse signals its
presence, but Vietnamese aspirations, both patriotic and revolu-
tionary, also occupy a prominent place in the survey accounts.
Land Reform In the North
Contrasting images of the North Vietnamese are shuffied
in a different fashion as discussion turns to the land reform of
1953-56. Here the debate is between land reform as an atrocity,
fomented by the Communists as part of their drive for power and
resulting in an immense death toll; and land reform as an episode
in a revolutionary process. Five texts argue that the campaign
was not a reaction to genuine social ills, but instead grew out of
the authoritarian politics or ideology of Communism, with cata-
strophic results: 50,000 to several hundred thousand executions
(Lewy and Joes); "epic disaster" (Lomperis); "disaster" (Olson
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
campaign "deepened popular support for the
govenUllent. ,,32
To sum up, Foreign Other does not win this round, but it
fares better in the land reform phase of the debate than in
discussions of 1945, while Social Revolution struggles to hold
its ground, and Vietnamese Patriotism, unable to gain a purchase
on the evidence, retreats toward the sidelines.
The Air War against the DRV
During the 1956-65 period, the DRV virtually disappears
from the surveys. Olson and Roberts constitute an extreme case.
Mter land reform, "political life in North Vietnam settled down,"
they remark. then drop the topic for good. Young mentions, but
does not explore, both "rewards" and "severe problems" in the
industrial sector and "serious problems" with agricultural co-op-
eratives. Turley comments on the co-operatives, by way of a
flashback during discussion of the Air War, but more with
reference to their role in defending the country than in produc-
tion. Elsewhere, the political and economic systems developed
77
in the North and the health and education policies of the DRV
are ignored. Cultural life under the new regime is neglected, too,
save for the hundred flowers controversy, briefly noted by Turley
and Lomperis.
33
When North Vietnam reappears at the beginning of the Air
War in 1965, a number of the survey authors are unabashedly
admiring. Herring speaks of "great ingenuity and dogged perse-
verance"; Hess asserts that the Vietnamese "proved remarkably
resilient in responding to the damage and in defending their
country"; Olson and Roberts evoke their "cooperative spirit";
and Turley salutes a "well-founded pride" in "collective action
when threatened." Turley is the most probing, as he considers
both patriotic and revolutionary sources for Vietnamese resis-
tance. To be sure, the war effort relied on peasant cooperatives
created by the new government a few years before. But these
institutions "were based on the communities to which almost all
Vietnamese felt a primordial attachment" and drew on an ageless
and "unremitting struggle with nature," as well as on "two
millennia of conflict with China. ,,34
Quoting Brian Jenkins, Maclear singles out the patriotic
aspect (Hanoi leaders "made history work for them"), and Kar-
now takes a similar tack, with the view that bombing "rekindled
their nationalistic zeal, so that many who may have disliked
Communist rule joined the resistance to alien attack." Herring,
Joes, Lewy, and Turley agree that air attacks helped the DRV
solidify mass support, with Turley specifying that it accelerated
the mobilization of Catholics, minorities, and women behind the
war effort. Discussion elsewhere, even if it does not make the
connection explicit, is couched in an idiom recalling earlier
passages on the Viet Minh and Vietnam's history of resistance to
foreign domination.
3s
Exception made for the passages from Turley noted above,
these treatments are more descriptive than analytic and do not
weigh the relative contribution of Vietnamese patriotism or the
Vietnamese Revolution in determining the success of the war
effort. On the other side of the debate, for Lewy and Joes, the
concept of "totalitarianism," connoting both moral bankruptcy
and mass-based dynamism, serves a dual function by placing the
Communists beyond the pale, while also explaining their suc-
cess. But Lewy has nothing to say about political or any other
institutions in the DRY, and neither does Joes, whose reference
to "the familiar machinery of the totalitarian state" is no more
than a rhetorical gesture. Lomperis is just as cavalier, and the
comparison he proposes between North and South is not pursued.
36
To sum up, survey treatments ofNorth Vietnam are cursory.
Joes and Lewy do not try to prove that the DRV was totalitarian,
and rival claims that it was revolutionary are undocumented. The
patriotic aspect is addressed more fully, but passages in this
register are essentialist and, in the last resort, take refuge in a
great-man evocation ofHo Chi Minh. Given this lack ofcontent,
it is impossible to measure the "foreignness" of Vietnamese
Communism. North Vietnam remains the terra incognita of the
Vietnam War.
Invisible History of the Vietnamese
The surveys are not helpful in addressing the social history
of the Vietnamese in the era of the Vietnam War. The problem is
apparent in treatments of the people of the G VN, beginning with
the refugees who moved from North to South after the Geneva
Accords. The surveys are uncurious about the refugees. Lom-
peris says nothing about them, Herring, Lewy, and Maclear do
not explore their motivation, and the other texts are content to
note that they were, in Kamow's words, "fiercely anti-commu-
nist." Even Joes, the most sympathetic, pauses only to afIrrm that
they were fleeing "ever further southward, ever away from
Communist control.,,37
Several texts execute a swift transition from the thoughts
of the refugees to the schemes of those who sought to encourage
their flight. Moss's account jumps from "Catholic peasants" who
"were uncertain and fearful about life under the Communists and
voted with their feet," to propaganda and psychological warfare
authored by the Catholic Church, American and French officials,
and the Diem administration, which induced "reluctant villagers
to flee." It was "not an entirely spontaneous folk movement," he
concludes. Hess ("blunt propaganda slogans"), Maclear (CIA
"scare tactics"), Turley (refugees "egged on by u.S.-supplied
leaflets"), and Young (Lansdale-inspired rumors of u.S. atomic
bomb attacks on the DRY) strike a similar note.
38
Survey readers would not be tempted to attribute much
sophistication to the refugees. Watchwords such as "Christ has
gone to the South," "the Virgin Mary is going South," and "God
has gone South" are credited by Herring, Hess, Karnow, Maclear,
Turley, and Young, and the leadership of parish priests and the
northern Catholic hierarchy is stressed by these authors as well
as by Moss and Olson and Roberts. The patronizing undercurrent
in such passages is made explicit when Olson and Roberts refer
to refugees as "gullible peasants." Karnow's rejoinder to the
effectthatthe subjective impetusmust havebeenmore weighty than
any extemal prodding seems plausible. Yet even in this sensible
passage, Karnow's cedes the floor to the Americans, in the fonn of
Edward Lansdale's self-serving commentary on the migration,
rather than to the Vietnamese who were doing the migrating.
39
A phenomenon of undeniable significance, this movement
of almost a million people remains a mystery that no one seems
interested in exploring, some because they would not welcome
any softening of the anti-communist moral of the story, others
because their notion of Vietnamese as puppets makes further
inquiry seem superfluous. The failure to explain is apparent
when one considers that hundreds of thousands of Catholics
stayed in the North. To account for these choices, one would have
to probe more deeply into the thoughts and experience of the
refugees and of their co-religionists who remained at home.
40
A similar indifference is apparent as the surveys consider
what happened in the following years to Vietnamese in the
Saigon milieu. Several texts note in passing that the war changed
the society of South Vietnam. Young refers to Samuel Hunt-
ington's defense of an "American-sponsored urban revolution,"
achieved as fIrepower and defoliation drove the peasantry from
their villages. Turley says the war stimulated "a cityward migra-
tion" that proved to be "largely irreversible," Hess declares that
it "shattered much of the traditional social structure," and Kar-
now argues that the United States, "motivated by the loftiest of
intentions, did indeed rip South Vietnam's social fabric to
shreds." In the words of Olson and Roberts, "American forces
destroyed the peasants' way oflife.,,41
This transfonnation is not much considered in the texts.
Herring and Moss have little to say about the topic, and. in the
absence of interviews with refugees, neither does Maclear. In an
almost flippant passage, Olson and Roberts remark that Saigon
"had become a city of prostitutes, pimps, black marketeers, petty
thieves, drug dealers, assassins, orphans, refugees, deserters,
Viet Cong, terrorists, and opportunists." Hess strikes a more
poignant note, affirming that, "Family life disintegrated as young
men and women, tempted by the lure of making easy money from
the Americans, abandoned fllialloyalty and became part of the
booming economy that served the American military." Kamow
VoL 30, No.2 (1998)
addresses the topic in almost Victorian tones, claiming that, "For
young women in particular, the primrose path to relative riches
was irresistible.,,42
For their part, Lewy and Joes refuse to endorse a modem-
ization achieved by force and indeed are among the most insis-
tent of the authors in criticizing an indiscriminate U. S. fIrepower
that, in Joes's words, "caused tremendous loss of life and prop-
erty among Vietnamese civilians." Both are convinced that the
war had to be won by protecting, not displacing, the villagers.
These two authors do not support "forced draft urbanization," to
use Huntington's term, but fail to make clear that this policy brought
about a fundamental change in South Vietnamese society.43
A related neglect is evident as survey authors shift their
attention north of the 17th parallel. In discussing the DRY, they
are most interested in military planning by Hanoi leaders, espe-
cially in 1968, 1972, and 1975, and provide only sketchy refer-
ences "from the bottom up." Other sources make clear that the
war in the North uprooted millions ofcountry people, mobilizing
them into the army and sending them to fIght in the South. Many
of the survivors who came home in 1975 had spent their entire
adult lives in the armed forces and were not willing or able to
resettle in their villages. On the home front, family and neigh-
borhood routines had been altered, while an administrative ap-
paratus grew up around the state and the Communist Party,
providing new careers for an emancipated peasantry.
After 1975 it became clear that for North Vietnam the war
had been more revolutionary than the revolution and had moved
the center of gravity in society from the countryside toward the
town, from orally transmitted custom toward the written word,
from face-to-face reciprocities toward bureaucratic anonymity.
The transfonnation was just as significant as the "urban revolu-
tion" promoted by U.S. fIrepower in South Vietnam. To be sure,
peasants in both North and South must still be reckoned with,
but the agrarian order they fought to preserve and enlarge is now
called into question. Thirty years of resistance eventuated in a
triumph over the United States, but it also unleashed market
forces throughout Vietnam, which are now drawing the country
into the world economic system.
44
These issues can be explored only when the focus is placed
not on Ho or Diem or Thieu, but on the Vietnamese people. In
this light, what jumps out is the theme of movement, from the
near million who migrated from North to South in 1954 to the
millions who marched down the Ho Chi Minh Trail or who were
evacuated from cities during the Air War or who fled from their
homes in war zones below the 17th parallel to Saigon or other
towns. Perhaps even more numerous are those who stayed home,
but "moved" socially and psychologically, with profound impli-
cations for age, class, and gender relations in the country.
The survey authors fail to address these issue. The 1954
migration, an early mass movement of the Vietnamese, is slighted.
Disruptions in the South, affecting relations between women and
men and youth and elders, are mentioned. but not with much
sensitivity, as, for example, in Karnow's reference to "the prim-
rose path." And little is said about changes in daily life in the
North, even by authors who note the revolutionary character of
the regime.
Opponents of U.S. intervention borrowed "war crimes"
from the World War II context in order to emphasize that atroci-
ties were being committed in Vietnam, and the conception still
serves a purpose in the classroom, where students of a later
79
generationknownothingabouttherealityofanti-guerrillawar-
fare. It isuseful as well in underscoring the magnitude ofthe
change imposedby waronthepeopleofVietnam, a mutation
thatdeservescomparisontotheenclosuremovementinEngland
orforcedcollectivizationintheSovietUnion.U.S. intervention
disarticulated South Vietnamese society, while the total war
strategy adoptedbyHanoileadersin 1965reworkedthesocial
orderoftheNorth. Inattention in the surveysto "forced draft
urbanization and modernization" is perhaps occasioned by a
failure ofpolitical nerve. Whateverthe source, this reticence
hinders efforts to understand Vietnam's recent history. Social
consequencesrequiretheattentionoffuture scholarshopingto
makesenseoftheVietnamWar.
Notes
1. StatementbyLarryRottmann,inThe Winter Soldier Investigation:
An Inquiry into American War Crimes, ed. VietnamVeteransAgainst
theWar(Boston:BeaconPress, 1972),p. 164.
2.Onthelink betweensoldieringinVietnamandstudyingVietnamese
history, see Keith Taylor, who writes, "As anAmerican soldier in
Vietnam, I could not help being impressed by the intelligence and
resolveoftheVietnamese who opposedus,andIasked: 'Wheredid
thesepeoplecomefrom?''';inThe Birlh o/Vietnam (Berkeley:Univer-
sityofCaliforniaPress,1983),p.xv. SeealsoDavidMarr'sreference
tohisexperienceasaU.S.MarineCorpsintelligenceofficerinVietnam
in1962-1963,inVietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley:
UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1981),p.vii.
3.DavidHunt,"ImagesoftheVietCong,"inThe UnitedStates and Viet
Namfrom War to Peace, ed. RobertSlabey(Jefferson,N.C.:McFarland,
1996),pp. 53-61.
4. OntheWinterSoldiers,seeLewy, pp. 313-21; onevidenceofwar
crimes, ibid., chapter7("AmericanMilitary Tacticsandthe Law of
War"),p. 223 tr. SeetheappendixforafullreferencetoLewy'sbook
andtotheothersurveyscitedinthisarticle.
5. OntheWinterSoldiersandthe VietnamVeteransAgainstTheWar,
seeYoung,p.255if; andalsoHerring,p. 266;Maclear,p. 234;Moss,
p.349;andDisonandRoberts,pp.237and239.Onthe ''Huemassacre,"
seeHunt,"ImagesoftheVietCong,"pp. 54-57.
6. MaxHastings, The Korean War (NewYork: Simonand Schuster,
1987). ForanaccountthatplacesKoreansinthecenteroftheKorean
War, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins 0/ the Korean War. I,
Liberation and the Eme7gence o/Separate Rsgimes, 1945-1947(1989;
firstedition1981},andVolII,The Roaring o/the Cataract, 1947-1950
(1990),bothpublishedbyPrincetonUniversityPress(Princeton,N.J.).
7.Joes,p. 145;Lewy,pp.202,436-437;andLomperis,p. 163.
8.Herring,pp.59-60,
Karnow, pp. 239-240; Lewy, pp. 7-10, 14; Lomperis, pp. 49-50;
Maclear,pp.49-50,53,54-55;Moss,pp.79,81;OlsonandRoberts,pp.
62,64;Turley,pp.6,14-15,52;andYoung,pp. 52-53,56.
9.Joes,p.77;andLomperis,p. 103.
10.Herring,pp. 177-178;Hess,p. 101;Karnow,p.466;Moss,p.232;
andTurley,pp. 104-105.SeealsoLewy,p. 94;Maclear,p. 147;Olson
andRoberts,p. 167;andYOUDg,pp. 184-186.Onthe 1971 presidential
election,seeHerring,pp.269-270;Joes,p. 143;Karnow,pp.635-636;
Lomperis,pp. 87,103;andYOUDg, pp.263-265.
II. Lewy, pp. 94, 189, 218. Seealso Herring, p. 254; Joes, p. 121;
Maclear,p.259;OlsonandRoberts,p.255;andTurley,p. 169.
12.Herring,pp.69,71;Hess,pp. 61, 101;Karnow,p.243;Lewy,pp.
14,297;Maclear, p. 55; Moss,pp. 91-92; DisonandRoberts,pp. 67,
256; Turley, pp. 52, 170; andYoung, pp. 56,60-62. Joesinsiststhat
"Diem was as far as can be imagined from the stereotype ofthe
bloodthirstytyranf'andthatthere wereonly thirty-three"noIYudicial
executions" during his regime (p. 69). Other texts provide a more
substantialbody COWlt 20,000 arrested by 1956("andthecampaign
was subsequently intensified," according to Herring, p. 71); tens of
thousandsarrested (Hess,p.61;Lewy,p. 15);75,000killedand50,000
anested(Maclear,p.55);20,000-75,000killedand100,000anested(Olson
andRoberts,p.67},75,000killed(Turley,pp.18,33);12,000executedand
upto50,000anestedthrough 1956(Moss,p.92;Young,p.56).
13.Joes,pp.65,69;Lewy,p.95;Lomperis,pp. 50,96.
14.Herring,p.70;Hess,pp.62-63;Joes,p.68;Karnow,p.246;Lewy,
pp. 14,94; Moss,pp. 92, 116; OlsonandRoberts, pp. 52,64;Turley,
pp.23,55;andYoung,p.57.Herring,Lomperis,andMaclearmakeno
mentionofVietMinhlandrefonn.
IS.Joes,p.68;Lewy,p. 14;andLomperis,p. 103.
16.Lewy,pp. 186-191.
17.OnLandtotheTiller,seeHerring,p.254;Hess,p.119;Joes,p.121;
Lomperis,p. 83;Maclear,p.259;Moss,p.325;DisonandRoberts,pp.
197, 222; and Turley, pp. 135, 170. On the ARVN, see Lewy, pp.
170-171,181-183;Joes,p.66;andalsoMoss,p.296.
18. The "puppet who pulled his own strings" metaphor is cited by
Karnow,p.251;andTurley,p. 52.
19.Herring,p. 69;Karnow,p.239;Lewy,p. 11;Lomperis,pp. 50-51;
andOlsonandRoberts,p.64.
20.Young,p.61.
21.Lewy,pp. 297,287.Ontheherointraffic,Mossistheonlyauthor
toprovideaSUlllDUll)'ofthedossier(p.332),andheandYoungarethe
onlyauthorstocitethekeytext: Alfred McCoy,The Politics o/Heroin:
CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Brooklyn: LawrenceHill,
1991;fIrStedition, 1972).
22.Herring,p.70;Hess,p.63;Karnow,p.246;Lewy,p. 14;andYoung,
p.57.Notext indicatesU.S.involvementwithThieu'sLandtothe Tiller.
23.Foradiscussionof these themes,seeGabrielKolko,Anatomy 0/a
War: The Vietnamese, the United States, and the Modern Historical
Experience (NewYork: NewPress,1994;first edition1985).Because
the focusinthisarticleisonsurveytexts ofaninlroductorycharacter,
suitable for college courses onthe VietnamWar, Kolko's dense and
fonnidablebookisnotincludedinthediscussion,eventhoughitisin
myopinionthe mostauthoritativetrea1mentofthesubjectOnFranco-
philes and Young Turlcs, see Turley, pp. 103-104. Moss argues tbat
"Thieu'slast-minutedemurral"withrespecttotheParisPeacenegotia-
tions"may havegivenNixonhis slim victory"in1968 (p. 302). For
moreonThieu'seffortstohelpNixonatthatmoment,seeHerring,pp.
238-239;Hess,p.115;Kamow,pp.600-601;OisonandRoberts,p.203;
andYoung,p.233.On"peaceisathand,"Thieu'sbattleswithKissinger,
andtheelectionof1972,seeHerring,pp.277-282;Hess,pp. 131-132;
Joes,pp. 117-118;Karnow,pp.664-666;Lewy,pp.202-203;Maclear,
pp.307,31O;Moss,pp.364-365;OisonandRoberts,p.249;Turley,pp.
150-154;and Young,pp.275-279.
24.Joes,p. 143;Lewy,p.438;and Lomperis,p. 162.Formoreonthe
distinctionsbetween authoritarianismandtotalitarianism, see chapter
10("The'EvilEmpire"')inAbbottGleason,Totalitarianism: The Inner
History o/the Cold War (NewYork: Oxfoni,1995),p. 190if.
25.Joes,p.105;Lewy,pp.3-4;andLomperis,p.53.Thesurveyauthors
are virtually Wl8Dim.ous in distancing themselves from the domino
theory.Lewy'sphrasing(increasesinU.S.aid toFrancewere"accom-
paniedbyanescalationinexplanatory rhetoricand intheimportance
attributedtoanoncommWlistIndochina"[po 5])isnuanced.Preferring
amoraltoaspatialdefinitionoftheForeignOther,Joesconcedesthat,
"InthelastanalysistheNorthVietnameseandViet Congwerenotaliens
butcompatriots"(p. 68}-withoutbacking away fromhisconviction
tbattheycouldandshouldhavebeen defeated.
26.Herring,pp.4-5;DisonandRoberts,p.5;and Turley,p. 1.
27.Moss,p. 15;and DisonandRoberts,p. 15.
28.Joes,p. 18;and Moss,pp.25-27.
29.Herring,p. 6;Hess,p.20;Kamow,pp. 161-162;Lomperis,p. 33;
OlsonandRoberts,p.22;Turley,p.3;andYoung,p. 10.Lewydoesnot
mentiontheAugustRevolution.andMacIearonlyglancinglyrefersto
the event,becausehisinformant,ArchimedesPatti,didnotgettoHanoi
untilaftertheVietMinhwas installedinpower(p. 11).Whereassurvey
authorsseeFrenchandU.S.interventionsasdecisivein theformation
oftheGVN,thetexts assignonlyamarginalroletoextema1 actorsin
the flJ'St days of the DRV. On Japanese, Chinese, French, and, most
important, American pp. assistance to Ho Chi Minh,see Herring, p. 6;
Hess,p. 30; Joes,pp. 18-19,23; Kamow,pp. 149-151; Lomperis,p. 33;
Maclear, p. 11; Moss, p. 24; Olson and Roberts, pp. 21-22; and Young,
p. 10. No one cites any involvement by the USSR or other repre>-
sentatives of international communism in the events of 1945.
30.Joes,p.33;Kamow,p.241;Lewy,p.16;Lomperis,p.51;andOlson
and Roberts, p. 51.
31. Kamow, pp. 133, 240; Lomperls, p. 51; and Olson and Roberts, pp.
5,51.
32. Hess, p. 64; Moss, p. 85; and Young, pp. 50-51. Herring, Maclear,
and Turley saynothing about the aimsand results of land reform. All
three note that "heavy-handed measures," in Herring's wotds, were
employed during the campaign, while also questioning claims thata
''bloodbath'' took place. See Herring, pp. 73-74; Maclear, p. 54; and
Turley, p. 19.
33. Lomperis, p. 51; Olson and Roberts, p. 52; Turley, pp. 19,91-91;
and Young, pp. 50, 345.
34. Herring, p. 162; Hess, p. 92; Olson and Roberts, p. 156; Turley, pp.
91-92,95.
35. Herring, p. 165; Joes, p. 112; Kamow, p. 473; Lewy, pp. 391-392;
Maclear, p. 245; and Turley, p. 96.
36. Joes, p. 139.
37. Kamow, p. 238; and Joes, p. 32.
38. Herring, p. 56; Hess, pp. 58-59; Kamow, p. 238; Maclear, p. 50;
Moss, p. 77; Turley, p. 11; and Young, p.45.
39. Herring, p. 56; Hess, p. 59; Kamow, p. 238; Maclear, p. 50; Moss,
p. 76; Turley, p. 11; and Young, p. 45. The reference to "gullible
peasants" is found in the firstedition ofthe Olson and Roberts text (p.
62), but has been deleted from the 1996 version of the book (p. 63).
40. According to figures cited by Louis Wiesner, 457,000 Catholics
(about 40 percent of the total in the North) remained in the DRV; see
Wiesner, V'rctims and Survivors: Displaced Peraona and other War
Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954-1975 (New York: Greenwood, 1988), p. 17.
Foralocal study ofCatholicswho didnotgo South, seeFrancoisHoutart
and Genevieve Lemercinier, Hai Van: Life in a Vietnamese Commune
(London: Zed Books, 1984). In France, for generations republican
historiansof the French Revolution wrote slightingly of counter-revo-
lutionary peasants, judged to have beenmanipulated by theii parish
priestsand the church hierarchy. But then came Paul Bois, who showed
thatthe"republican" communities ofthe West were"docile,"whiletheir
"right wing"neighbors hadbeenin 1789 the most militant and class
conscious peasants in the region; and Maurice Agulhon, who argued
that the eighteenth-cen.tury "white" engagements of villagers in the
Southeast helped to explain their emergence as "reds" in 1848. When
the refugees of 1954 are treatedmore respectfully, perllaps an equally
complex analysis oftheir motives and behavior will emerge. For more,
see David Hoot, ''Peasant Politics in the French Revolution," Social
History 9 (1984): 277-299.
41. Hess, p. 102; Kamow, p. 454; Olson and Roberts, pp. 163,255;
Turley, p. 103; and Young, p. 177.
42. Hess, p. 102; Kamow, p. 455; and Olson and Roberts, p. 255.
43. Joes, p. 109.
44. Vietnamese literature has opened the way toward an appreciation of
war-time changes in the North. See Le Luu.A Time Far Past, Ngo Vmh
Hai,Nguyen Ba Chung, Kevin Bowen, and David Hoot, trans. (Am-
herst, Mass: University of Massachusetts Press,1997).
MaryknollWorld Productions
ASIA
CLOSE-UP
28minutes- $16.95+ $3.00postage/handling
ChildrenofTheEarthSeries
StudyGuideincluded
JAPAN
A schoolgirl, Satomi Tamura, age thirteen, shares with you her life in historic Kyoto, Japan. She highlights the value
Japaneseplaceon educationasyou follow hertoclassesin English andcharacterpainting.Shealsointroducesyouto
herparentsand homelifeandtakesyou tovisitacemeteryand Shintoshrine. Firstpart:14minutes
CAMBODIA
SokThea,a13-yearoldCambodianboy, losthislegtoalandmineashetendedhisfamily'scowsin hisvillage, 60miles
north ofPhnom Penh.The lossofhis legchanges his relationship with family and friends.Theteenagerstruggleswith
newfeelings, even as helaborstouse hisprosthesis.You visithisfamily and get a rare view into rural Cambodian life.
Sok Thea is one of thousands of people maimed or killed in the aftermath of the country's genocidal civil war.
Second part: 14 minutes @ 1996
This video shows U.S. children the different ways young people live in other parts of the world.
Sendcheckwithorderto:
MaryknollWorldProductions-A
P.O. Box308
Maryknoll, NY10545-0308
Tel: 800-227-8523 Fax: 914-945-0670
Vol 30, No.2 (1998) 81
Appendix
Texts considered in this article include the following:
George Herring, America s Longest War: The United
States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: Knopf,
1979, 1986, 1996).
Gary Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and
Legacy ofWar (Boston: Twayne, 1990).
Anthony James Joes, The War for South Viet Nam, 1954-
1975 (New York: Praeger, 1989,1990).
Stanley Kamow, Vietnam, A History (New York: Penguin,
1983, 1984, 1991, 1997).
Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford,
1978).
Timothy Lomperis, The War Everyone Won:
America s Intervention in Viet Nam s Twin Struggles
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984, 1993).
Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War, Vietnam:
1945-1975 (New York: Avon, 1981).
George Moss, Vietnam: An American Ordeal (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990, 1994).
James Olson and Randy Roberts, Where the Domino Fell:
American and Vietnam, 1945-1990 (New York: S1.
Martins, 1991, 1996);
William Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Po-
litical and Military History, 1954-1975 (New York:
Mentor, 1986).
Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York:
Harper Collins, 1991).
Combining anti-communism with a defense of u.s.
policy, Guenter Lewy's America in Vietnam launched the
Vietnam War survey genre in 1978, in terms that reappear
in studies by Timothy Lomperis and Anthony James Joes.
Lewy devotes many pages to combating (and with surpris-
ing frequency echoing) the anti-war case. His book is the
strongest of the "right-wing" texts.
George Herring's America sLongest War followed
on the heels of Lewy's study. Buttressed by dense and
original research, Herring develops a critique of U.S.
policy, couched in the low-key idiom of the diplomatic
historian. Revised to incorporate recent scholarship and
with graphics added, a third edition in 1996 signals the
resolve of the author and publisher to defend the book's
place as the most frequently assigned text on the war.
Studies by Michael Maclear and Stanley Kamow
were written in the early 1980s to supplement made-for-
TV documentaries produced in Canada and the United
States. Interview-driven, Maclear's work contains inter-
esting passages, but suffers from the limits of its sources.
Kamow's treatment is more realized, but still depends too
much on what the author saw and who he talked to. It
ranked second in influence behind Herring's book in a
1993 review of the most frequently cited texts in college
courses on the war.!
Among recent survey authors, Gary Hess, George
Moss, and James Olson and Randy Roberts are closer in
outlook to Herring and Kamow than to Lewy. Hess's book
contains many impressive passages, but is among the least
noticed of the texts. Moss's treatment, which seems to have sold
well (a third edition is forthcoming in 1998), is almost twice as
long as Herring's book, but is similar to it in shape and argument.
Unburdened by footnotes, Olson and Roberts offer piquant an-
ecdotes and thumbnail sketches of major personalities.
Alone among survey authors in drawing on Vietnamese
language sources, William Turley respectfully attends to the
guerrillas, a strategy that gives his presentation a "left" tone, one
that is heard again from Marilyn Young. Now out of print,
!urley's study is the shortest ofthe texts and is alone in beginning
m 1954 rather than 1945. Young's The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990
is the most readable of the surveys and the closest in spirit to the
anti-war movement.
Among survey authors, Herring, Lewy, Moss, and Young
spend the most time discussing the U.S. side, well over half of
the text in each case, and Herring and Young have the most
insight to contribute on the subject. Lomperis and Joes pay less
attention to the Americans, with Joes not getting around to
examining Washington policy until 1963. Hess also deals rapidly
with the United States, in part because he pays more attention
than do the other authors to Laos and Cambodia. Also assigning
the Americans a minority role in the narrative is Turley, the only
author to devote the same amount of space, around 20 percent in
each case, to the DRY, the GVN, and the NLF.
The surveys are critical of U.S. intervention. Young con-
demns the perpetrators of war crimes, and, while other authors
hesitate to indict American policy in systemic terms, they do
make clear that the Vietnamese were brutally treated. Kamow
claims that the United States was "motivated by the loftiest
intentions," but one sees little of such excuse-making elsewhere
in the surveys. On the pro-war side, Joes lashes out at the bad
faith of "Free World" leaders, and the case Lewy constructs on
their behalf is strikingly ambivalent.
Lewy, Lomperis, and Joes are the most sympathetic of the
authors to the GVN and the toughest on the North Vietnamese.
On. the. Saigon regime, Herring, Hess, Lewy, Moss, and Turley
welgh tn to good effect, while Lomperis stays in a "nation-build-
ing" register, and Joes pities the victims of a "satanic" commu-
nism. Turley is thoughtful on the DRY, while other authors are
content to talk about Ho Chi Minh and strategy debates in Hanoi.
Turley and Young are the only authors to analyze the functioning
of the NLF and to take their distance from the "Hue massacre"
a cold war construct developed by the U. S. Mission in Saigon to
establish that the guerrillas were guilty of the war's most blame-
worthy atrocity.
2
Notes
1. According to a survey conducted in 1990-91, when the "second
generation" of surveys (Joes, Hess, Moss, Olson and Roberts, Young)
was just appearing, Herring ranked first among survey authors (58
mentions out of89 respondents), comparedto Karnow (46), Turley (11),
Moss (7), Olson and Roberts (7), Lewy (2), andMaclear(l); seePatrick
Hagopian, ''Report on1he 1990-1991 Survey ofCoursesonthe Vietnam Waf'
(Fairfax, Virginia: Indochina InstituteIGeorge Mason UniveJ"Sity, 1993).
2. For more on survey treatments of the NLF, see Hunt, "Images of the
Viet Cong."
o
Bulletin ofConcernedASian Scholars. Vol. 30, No.2 (1998); 83-87
Review Essay
Gender and Ethnicity: Interventions in China Studies
Christina K.eUy Gilmartin, Engendering the Chinese Revo-
IMlion: Radical Women, Communist Politics and Mass
Movements in the 1920s (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1995)
Elisabeth CroU, Changing Identities ofChinese Women:
Rhetoric, Experience and Self-Perception in Twentieth
Century China (London: Zed, 1995)
William R. Jankowiak, Sex, Death and Hierarchy in a
Chinese City: An AnthropoWgicalAccount (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993)
Reviewed by Louise Edwards
The intervention of gender and ethnicity into Sinology's
dominant paradigms is fraught with tension. Comfortable cer-
tainties about the ordering of knowledge of China's history and
society are challenged. A common response to such interven-
tions has been to affirm the isolation of these "alternative"
studies as "supplements." This affirmation acknowledges that
the new perspective has scholarly validity but it tempers this with
the understanding that the perspectives therein are partial, excep-
tional oddities. This approach suggests that the dominant para-
digms of Sinology remain largely unchanged but that they are a
little stronger for the diversity provided by the addition of
alternative viewpoints. The compartmentalization ofthe "minor"
voices of women and minorities, and their parenthetic treatment
in "major" studies, has reached the limit of its academic utility.
It could be argued that the sequestration of gender and ethnicity was
a vital nursery stage for scholarship in these areas, but this position
elides the fact that such compartmentalization has setVed to consoli-
date traditional scholarship. Confronted with these alternative posi-
tions, the existing version of"China" can be confmned as the norm.
These three volumes show that discourses surrounding
gender and ethnicity are fundamental, and not tangential to, the
progress of China over the past century. Debates about the relation-
ships between women and men, the composition ofChina's ethnic
identity have been embedded in all the discussions about the
development and strengthening of modem China. Women and
ethnic minorities have performed a host of important ideological
functions as immensely flexible symbols of Chineseness and
China's nationhood. Moreover, controlling the moral authority
to speak for these minorities has been a vital legitimizing tool for
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) because modern China's
nationhood was premised on enunciating victimhood. The CCP's
right to rule was pronounced by its monopolization of the posi-
tion of advocate for the oppressed peasantry/women/minorities
and this discourse ofvictimhood has continued to be an effective
tool for the CCP through to the present. One significant challenge
for China studies is, then, to explore the ideological connections
between the "victim-speak" and the CCP. This will occur if we
take seriously the challenges posed by considering the women!
minority factors as resting at the foundation of our research and
not as quirky fringe elements. I
To this end, Christina Gilmartin has provided both scholars
and students with a volume of immense importance. Engender-
ing the Chinese Revolution is the fIrst in-depth examination of
the influence of women in the history of the CCP. This informa-
tive and readable volume will provide the lead for many other
scholars working in the area ofwomen in communist history and
more generally in studies of the women's movement in China.
Focusing on the decade of the 1920s, Gilmartin discusses the
manner in which gender influenced the "formation of the Com-
munist body politic," in the first half of the book, and continues
with an analysis of the "politics of gender in the national revo-
lution," in the second half. Discussions of the participation of
women in the Northern Expedition, the impact of the May 30th
incident on women, and the signifIcance of Guangdong and
Shanghai as centers of women's activism are all linked by the
interface between the CCP and the women's movement. The
book's major innovation is summarized in Gilmartin's assertion
that "examining the experiences of women in the early Chinese
Communist revolutionary movement through the lens of gender
does not merely augment our understanding of party activi-
ties ... but rather forces a shift in perspective" (p. 2). By this she
suggests that the ideological, cultural, and social facets of the
Party were closely linked to their policy planning and decision
making and the transformation of the status of women was an
integral part of these broad cultural policies. The inclusion of
gender, Gilmartin argues, should not be regarded as an addition
to previous histories of the CCP but rather as a necessary refo-
cusing ofour notions about which issues have been crucial to the
CCP since its inception. The decade of the 1920s, Gilmartin
argues was "a period of peak influence offeminism on Commu-
nist and Nationalist revolutionaries, and a seminal period in
setting critical features of the relationship of women to the
Chinese Communist Party" (p. 3).
These bold assertions are cogently argued and well docu-
mented throughout the two hundred odd pages of text. Gilmartin
clearly reveals that gender was not a minor side issue for the early
Communist Party but a vital factor influencing both Party philoso-
phy and practical policy decision making. In her chapter "In a
Different Voice: Male Communist Rhetoric on Women's Emanci-
pation," she explains that topics such as the nature of marriage,
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
83
male-female relations, and sexual morality were all fiercely
debated during the 1920s among the urban educated from all
political persuasions. The primacy of the issues of gender in
public debate influenced the CCP because its fundamental prem-
ise was social reform and the improvement of the living condi-
tions of the bulk of the population. Engendering the Revolution
details the distinct manner in which the public discourse on
gender had a direct and tangible impact on CCP activities and also
how prominent communists participated in the debate themselves.
Male communists like Mao Dun, Chen Wangdao, and Li Hanjun,
for example, all published on the importance of economic inde-
pendence for women. Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Mao Zedong, and
Shen Zemin were among the many communist men who wrote
on broad social issues such as inequities in the traditional mar-
riage system and its associated notions of female chastity. The
early women's movement, we learn, was dominated by men who
often posed as women in their publications. As will become evident
below, in the discussion of Elisabeth Croll's volume, the CCP's
claim to have the right to speak for women continued for decades.
A major reason for the influence of gender issues on early
CCP activities was the absence of hostility towards the women's
movement from two prominent communists-Li Dazhao and
Chen Duxiu. The support given the women's movement by Li
and Chen contrasted sharply with the attitude of European com-
munists toward the European women's movement. Both Li and
Chen regarded the women's movement (which was focused on
gaining legal, educational, and political equality with men) as a
natural ally of the CCP's-part of one campaign for social
reform. Gilmartin traces the manner in which the CCP actively
encouraged its members to use the networks already established
by the women's movement to gain access to the women workers
and political activists. As an ally of the CCP, the women's
movement was able to expand its influence on broad policy
decisions in the Party. Initial connections between the CCP and
the women's organizations were established by Wang Huiwu and
Gao Junman in the middle of 1921 when they directed "in an
unobtrusive fashion the reorganisation of the Federation of the
Women's Circles in Shanghai" (p. 52). Through this early coop-
eration, schools like the Pingmin Girls' School and journals like
Women Voice were established. These organs were at once
left-wing and feminist; some male CCP members were not all
that comfortable with the results. Later on, the main conduit
between the CCP and the women's groups was Xiang Jingyu,
prominent woman revolutionary and communist martyr. Chapter
Three discusses the manner in which Xiang deftly, but not always
enthusiastically, negotiated the distance between the CCP and
the women's movement. The CCP's self-interest in incorporat-
ing the discontent tapped by the women's organizations quickly
became a tool for continued legitimization ofthe Party's bid to
rule. The strategy of"coopting the victim" is shown to have been
powerful in its immense flexibility: the CCP's right to speak for
women did not mean that women's concerns were always the
Party's prime focus, because women were just one of a host of
"victim-groups" on whose behalf the CCP assumed moral right
to speak (or not speak).
Fluctuations in the CCP's enthusiasm in support of women's
issues are examined in detail in Elisabeth Croll's Changing Identi-
ties o/Chinese Women. A leading figure in studies of women in
China, Croll has produced several books that have kept a wide
range of readers current with changes and developments in the
position of women in China. The main significance of Changing
Identities is its survey of the effects of the social and economic
liberalization on women in China in the 1990s and its analysis
ofthe manner in which the CCP's discourse on "sexual equality"
has affected the lived experience of women in China. Two of
Croll's earlier books, Feminism and Socialism in China and
Chinese Women since Mao, covered the events up to the dates of
publication, 1979 and 1983 respectively.
2
Changing Identities
summarizes the main points from the earlier volumes and then,
in the last third of the book, discusses recent trends. In this
respect the volume is a valuable summary of the changing status
of women in twentieth-century China. As with her other books
on this topic, Croll provides a broad template for major trends in
women's issues in China. This is a task that only scholars with
her depth of experience are able to achieve successfully. The
perspective she adopts throughout this volume is the essence of
its innovation. The detail is framed within the context of the
interaction between national ideology and the actual experiences of
women in China. It is here that Changing Identities will have a
dramatic impact on Sinology as a whole.
Croll plots the manner in which gender, as an analytical
tool, has gradually emerged from beneath/within class in social-
ist China. Indeed, she argues that gender has attained a position
as a legitimate category distinct from class in China of the 1990s.
In the three decades after 1949 women's issues were subsumed
into the broader battles revolving around class struggle. Croll
reveals how the accompanying assertions of sexual equality-
the Party says men and women are equal, therefore men and
women are equal-ultimately led to women's concerns being
ignored by the state. Although the CCP had been proactive in
educating the popUlation about the advent of sexual equality
during the Land Reform and Marriage Law campaigns of the
early 1950s, this activity was not followed up in subsequent
years. Croll argues convincingly that there was a failure to
recognize the importance of the process of gaining sexual equal-
ity. Declarations that "men and women were equal" pronounced
from on high by, what has been often a brutal, authoritarian
regime, ensured that crucial processes of negotiation, where
women assert their right to equality, were largely absent. Absent,
that is, until the 1990s.
Croll argues that the rhetoric of male-female equality was
of benefit to women initially, but later, over the course of the
1 960s and 197 Os, the rhetoric proved disempowering. Ifmen and
women were equal, then it was assumed that women had no
grounds for complaints. Thus, no avenues were established to
manage adequately cases of gross abuse or unfair treatment of
women. By speaking for women, the CCP was quickly able to
silence women with the moral assertion that ''the CCP knows
best." In the case of China, the impact of this conflict between
rhetoric and reality cannot be underestimated because the popu-
lation had been educated to embrace slogans as unproblematic
and "safe" fonns of communication. While Croll argues a con-
vincing case for examining the power of rhetoric in discussions
about the contemporary situation, the possibility of a disjuncture
between rhetoric and reality in contemporary discussions of
"traditional" China is not examined. An uncritical acceptance of
a totally bleak picture of the position of women in pre-twentieth-
century China equates neatly with the CCP's rhetoric of the
backwardness and cruelty of the feudal order. As early as 1981,
Jennifer Holmgren called into question the extent to which we
Bulletin a/Concerned Asian Scholars
84
can generalize so blithely about "traditional" China? The accep-
tance ofthe notion that "things were really bad for women in old
China" can be as disempowering for contemporary women as
was the rhetoric that "you were given equality in 1949." It is as
if to say "even if the current situation is less than perfect, be
grateful you didn't live back in those bad old days." Rhetoric
about the past can be just as empowering/disempowering as
rhetoric about the present.
Ofconsiderable importance in Croll's volume is the section
analyzing the transformation of the All China Women's F edera-
tion (ACWF). Long accepted as a mere mouthpiece for promot-
ing Communist Party policy among the (female) masses, the
ACWF has adopted the role of advocate for women within broad
political and social spheres. This reflects a fundamental and
crucial change in the Chinese political structures over the past
decade, as well as representing a major step forward for women's
rights in China. This trend was hinted at by Honig and Hershatter
in their volume Personal Voices, and later explored in Tani
Barlow's chapter in Engendering China. Croll provides further
evidence that the ACWF is indeed playing a much more proac-
tive role in asserting and defending women's rights.
4
The appen-
dices to Changing Identities include the "Law of the People's
Republic of China on Protection of Rights and Interests of
Women," a document that was adopted in 1992 as a result of
ACWF preparation and initiative.
Croll's last section, "Not the Moon," includes an examina-
tion of the emergence of women's studies as a discipline within
China's academic institutions. She locates the origins of women's
studies, in part, in the new assertiveness of the ACWF, which
encouraged the establishment of study groups, archives, and
research centers on local women's history. The first tertiary
institution to establish a women's studies center was at Zheng-
zhou University in He'nan in May 1987; other universities have
continued to establish research groups that link interested schol-
ars within a range of disciplinary areas. The emergence of
women's studies in China is laudable, but there are dangers if
one of the main thrusts of this new area of scholarly endeavor is
"to evolve a feminism with Chinese characteristics, femininity
with Chinese characteristics ... [and] to emphasize the specifi-
cally Chinese socio-political context of contemporary Chinese
feminism and demarcate its differences from Western feminism"
(p. 178). The product may be a nativist ideology that has little
connection to feminism as an antagonistic political agenda, just
as "socialism with Chinese characteristics" has little to do with
socialism. The tag "with Chinese characteristics" can be read to
mean ''whatever complies with the CCP's latest policy initia-
tive." The CCP's cooption of the women's movement in the
1920s and 1930s (documented in Gilmartin's volume) and its
successful controlling of the rhetoric of "sexual equality" in the
post-l 949 years (explored in Croll's volume) reveal that the CCP
is more than capable ofdisempowering women while pwporting
to be their advocates. The ACWF is a wing of the CCP and
although it may be adopting a more adversarial role in relation
to the Party and government, I remain wary of heralding the
emergence ofa culturalist feminism within the rubric ofwomen's
studies. A version of women's studies that embraces a form of
feminism that consolidates a socialist patriarchy can do as much
harm as good for China's women.
3
Chineseness is a powerful ideological card; it is one that is
being played more and more frequently internationally. How-
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
ever, calls for scholars to consider and incorporate alternative
viewpoints have often resulted in an excessive cultural particu-
larism. Recognition of the specificity of culture has the danger
of becoming both a new form of "orientalism" (through the
assertion of "cultural essentialism" in the case of China studies),
and also a powerful legitimizing tool for the Chinese leadership
(through their encouragement of cultural chauvinism in recent
times). Neither the "China" nor the "Chinese culture" that claims
to set the parameters for such discussions are stable or neu-
tral-they have changing boundaries that respond to distinct and
fluctuating political requirements. The indigenization offeminist
theory may result in its neutralization. These tools offeminism's
political agenda may be rendered useless for antagonistic, oppo-
sitional analysis and action.
The diversity of China is demonstrated in William Jank-
owiak's in-depth account of life in Huhhot, the capital of the
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR). Sex, Death and
Hierarchy in a Chinese City covers a range of issues including
ethnicity, family relations, mortuary rites, and dispute mediation,
as well as sexual attraction, romance, and mate selection. Jank-
owiak spent several years in Huhhot during the 1980s and the
essence of the material in this book has been drawn from inter-
views and observations he made at that time. These are placed
in historical context so that the interviews and statistics are
understandable in a sociological sense. This a fascinating study
-one that displays a disarming frankness about the process of
"fieldwork" that makes anthropological studies refreshing and
immensely readable. There has been little research carried out on
!MAR and little is known about Minority -Han relations on a
day-to-day level. For these reasons Jankowiak's contribution to
the field is both valuable and timely. Understanding ethnicity is
particularly important now, given the increase in inter-ethnic
strife within China. .
Sex, Death andHierarchy explores and details daily events
in Huhhot and describes the habits ofits population. Included are
reports on the resolution of disputes after bicycle accidents, the
behavior of parents and children in playground settings, the
frequency of marital intercourse, and patterns of mate selection.
The book provides readers with a framework in which to appre-
ciate the broader significance ofthese occurrences in a cross-cul-
tural context. The interviews and observations paint a picture of
a city in transition between the tight CCP control of the 1970s
and the relative freedom of the 1980s. The chapter on hierarchy,
honor, morality, and power is a particularly poignant snapshot of
the increasing complexity of China. Jankowiak reports: "The
public's opinion of the entire cadre stratum, as well as the small
entrepreneur stratum, remains disjointed, confused, and often
hostile .... In 1983 the small entrepreneur was ranked near the
bottom of the occupational prestige scale, even below that of a
barber and shop assistant, but in 1987 the position was elevated
considerably higher, though still below both the cadre and the
intellectual." Cadres, however, are feared and respected-but not
admired-because the respect is based on intimidation rather
than the "substantive fullness of genuine appreciation at the heart
of admiration" (p. 96). This chapter documents the transitional
attitudes of a population that has emerged from decades in which
extensive use of class terminology reflected a cowed obedience
to a notion of "rectification of (class) names" akin to time-hon-
ored Confucian precepts. Jankowiak enables the voices of ordi-
nary Chinese to express their perceptions of "class" as a so-
85
ciopolitical category rather than a political label. This is no small
achievement when one considers the extent to which class was
a crucial tool for exerting social and political control rather than
exploration for several decades.
The chapters on sex and mate selection are similarly en-
lightening for their incorporation ofgender as a prime organizing
category. Where the role of sex/gender was Wlderemphasized
prior to the late 1970s and class was upheld as being the singu-
larly most important category for understanding human relation-
ships, Jankowiak documents the manner in which Huhhot's
residents negotiate gender differences. Boundaries of gender are
fundamental to their daily life since marriage and family life
imply a daily negotiation of spheres of activities deemed mascu-
line or feminine. Chapter 9 explores the attitudes of husbands
and wives toward each other in relation to household power.
Jankowiak notes that many men look longingly back to the days
when they (supposedly) had more influence in the family. Al-
though "no one in my sample believed it proper or correct for a
wife to be dominant within the family," he writes, "everyone
agreed that it is typically the case" (p. 236). All of the women
Jankowiak interviewed stated that they were equal with their
husbands, but they also noted that "men did less work and had
greater freedom of movement" (p. 237). These sorts of results
make for fascinating reading because they generate questions
about perceptions, rhetoric, reality, and expectations vis-a-vis
male-female relations in a changing China.
Jankowiak opens new possibilities for the dynamic analyti-
cal tool of ethnicity. Most studies of Chinese society ignore the
considerable differences among the various ethnic groups within
China's borders. This elides the important role that racial and
cultural diversity performs in consolidating the geopolitical bor-
ders of China. Jankowiak reveals how state ideology regarding
racial harmony has been only partially successful in suppressing
dissent. Resistance to the dismantling of Mongolian culture by
the expansion of Han bureaucratic and educational institutions
is evident in the city, but it faces tremendous difficulties as
assimilationist tendencies dominate. For example, paths to pres-
tige require success in the Han system and this means that
Mongolian culture remains marginal or curiously exotic to many
Huhhotians. Tensions between Han and Mongol Huhhotians are
clear from Jankowiak's detailing ofthe common stereotypes each
group holds about the other. The Han believe that Mongols are
"simple people," "not civilized," "stupid," "drunkards," "lazy,"
"ugly," and "dirty," and that they "beat their wives." Mongols
describe Han Chinese as "crafty," "dishonest," impolite," "dog-
eating," "greedy," and "slippery." Interestingly, he notes that
"both Han and Mongols believe that Mongols are more 'trust-
worthy' and 'reliable' whereas the Han are more 'intelligent'"
(pp. 37-38). Jankowiak's refreshing analysis reveals the strength of
the anthropological method in debunking political rhetoric-{)f
which there has been no dearth in China during the last few decades.
The uniqueness of Huhhot as a Mongolian city with sub-
stantial numbers of Han, Mongolians, and Muslims is apparent
from the second chapter on; the importance of ethnicity (stereo-
typed perceptions ofHan by Mongolians and vice versa) emerges
in the third chapter. Huhhot is not like Tianjin, Shenyang, or
Guangzhou because the Mongolian residents regard the land as
their homeland. The central government recognizes this in its
designation of the area as an autonomous region. While these
points are clear from the outset, the remainder of the book, with
the exception of the excellent chapter on mate selection, fails to
expand on the ethnic distinctions it explains so well. In the
chapter on hierarchy, for example, we are never told whether
Mongolians and Han have identical hierarchies of respect and
honor. Do the different racial groups differ in their handling of
disputes? Have Mongolians in Huhhot adopted the Han style of
mortuary rites described in chapter 107 Given that the case for
Huhhot uniqueness and the importance of inter-ethnic distinc-
tions is made in the fIrst two chapters, the issue of the presence
or absence of cross-cultural differences throughout the remainder
of the book would have strengthened this already important work.
Clearly Jankowiak's goal was to provide a detailed picture
of life in Huhhot and not to write a history of the politics of
minorities in the PRC, but it was nonetheless a little disconcert-
ing to read the repetition of an unproblematized "official line"
on minorities at various points in the book. Jankowiak writes, for
example, "The Chinese government's ethnic entitlement policy
is a product of historical expediency and a genuine concern for
protecting the interest of its minorities" (p. 33). The govern-
ment's concern may well be genuine but its interpretation of the
"interests" of the minorities is a highly contentious issue, just as
its adoption of the right to speak for women is
Indeed, Jankowiak documents the disputes between Han and
Mongolian Huhhotians throughout chapter 3 in an explication of
people's perceptions about the effects of government policy on
Mongolian culture. A strong case could be mounted to show that
the Chinese government's enthusiasm for speaking on behalf of
the oppressed (be they women or minorities) is tempered by its
overwhelming concern with maintaining its continued hold on
power. The advocacy of the rights of women and minorities not
only comes a distant second to this primary goal, but it also plays
an important part in buttressing the CCP's claim to have the
legitimate right to rule the geographic boundaries China in the
1990s. We owe Jankowiak a great debt since through his detailed
and thoroughly accessible study many of these issues of inter-
ethnic relations and Chinese government policy can be explored.
It is extremely valuable to have access to the lived reality of
cross-cultural interaction in the PRC because these insights
enable us to dismantle the rhetoric.
Notes
1. This point is explored more fully by Rey Chow, who writes: "The
Chinese Communist government serves a good example of an agency
speaking for 'minorities' in order to mobilise an entire nation. As such,
its governance is in accordance with a nation of marginality 'which
implicitly valorises the centre'." Rey Chow, Writing Diaspora: Tactics
ofIntervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1993), p. 112.
2. Elisabeth Croll, Feminism andSocialism in China (London: Routledge,
1979), and Chinese Women sinceMao (London: Zed, 1983}
3. Jennifer Holmgren, "Myth Fantasy or Scholarship: Images of the
Status of Women in Traditional China," The Australian Journal of
Chinese Affairs 6 (1981): 147-59.
4. E. Honig and G. Hershatter, Personal Voices: Chinese Women in the
1980s (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); Tani E.
Barlow, ''Politics and Protocol ofFunu: (Un)making National Woman,"
inEngenderingChina: Women, Culture, and the State, C. K. Gilmartin
eta!. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1994),pp. 339-359.
5. See my chapter "Consolidating a Socialist Patriarchy: The Women
Writers' Industry and 'Feminist' Literary Criticism," in Female Mat-
ters: The Construction ofthe Chinese Woman, ed. AntoniaFinanne and
Anne McLaren (Monash University Asia Institute, forthcoming 1998),
for a discussion on the manner in which feminist methodologies have
been ignored in studies of contemponuy Chinese literature because of
the cowrtervailing discourse established by the anti-feminist "Women
Writers' Industry."
CJ
The Fantll8tic in Modern Japanese Literature: The Subver-
sion ofModernity, by Susan J. Napier (London and New
York: Routledge, 1996). ~ 3 pp. Nissan Institute/Routledge
Japanese Studies Series.
Reviewed by Sonia Ryang
Susan Napier's fashionable account of "the fantastic" in
modern Japanese literature is one of the most entertaining books
published in the field of Japanese studies in recent times. The
Fantastic in Modern Japanese Literature introduces English-
language readers to a number of important yet hitherto untrans-
lated authors and books along with a strange collection of aliens
and ghosts and tales of miracles and fantasy from Japanese
literature published since the late nineteenth century. Napier's
book includes both lesser-known "fantastic literature" tales by
popular authors such as Natsume Soseki and Akutagawa Ryuno-
suke, along with writings by authors whose names rarely appear
in English-language studies of Japanese literature. The book is
methodologically sophisticated, guiding readers through texts
that range from general accounts to those by Akutagawa and
Natsume, among others, that bear closer investigation through
multi-faceted interpretation and multi-angled reading.
Napier writes in a lucid manner and in an engaging sty Ie,
but she avoids the exoticization of Japan as an entertainment kit
for Western readers by emphasizing the relevance of Japan in
current debates in the field of literary criticism.
Napier's psychoanalytical readings of some works in this
genre are insightful. Her account of Kurahashi Yumiko's Ama-
nonkoku Okanki (Record ofa voyage to the country ofAmanon),
is a perfect example. Amanonkoku Oktmki is a sci-fi travel story
in which the protagonist-male and foreign-lands in Amanon,
a country inhabited only by women. In Napier's reading, Ama-
non is a womb in which the male protagonist-supposedly a drop
of semen-takes it to be his mission to corrupt women by
engaging in an all-out sexual orgy that is televised throughout
Amanon. The women of Amanon respond positively and in the
end the Amanon country-the womb-gives birth to a hideous
creature. The birth is accompanied by a devastating explosion,
as if the womb had become a bomb, while the semen-drop
protagonist escapes with his secretary, the only Amanon woman
who did not enjoy having sex with him. (In fact, she had at-
tempted to cut his penis off with a pair of scissors, as television
viewers watched [pp. 169-175].)
Napier interprets this story as a power struggle: "All the
characters ... are fighting for power, since the elite hope to ma-
nipulate P [male protagonist] as much as he plans to use them. It
is this struggle, endemic to humanity in general, which also
characterizes the impossibility ofAmanon's continuation. In this
regard it is important that the ultimate site for this fight for power
is the womb" (p. 175).
Placing Kurahashi's Amanon in the stream in which the
logic ofthe inversion ofutopian dreams occurs, Napier illustrates
the process by which what was originally a sense of optimism
Vol. 30, No.2 (1998)
about technological innovation and progress (as in Miyazawa
Kenji's Ginga Tetsudo no Yoru [Night of the Milky Way Rail-
way]) becomes scepticism about modem utopias that are des-
tined to be destroyed, either by self-explosion or external force.
Throughout this book, Napier's foremost concern is to
make a connection between modernity and the forms the fantas-
tic takes in Japanese literature. In so doing, she exhibits a
pessimism that shows itself in the expression of her belief that
the fantastic in the "earlier modernity" was a manifestation of
nostalgia for premodernity, while the fantastic in the "later
modernity" is nothing but dystopia and disillusionment amid the
chaos and alienation of modern life. Indeed, her emphasis on the
change offemale fantastic characters over the century following the
Meiji restomtion of 1868 shows this shift consistently: Women in
fantastic litemture prior to World War IT personify tradition as
against modernity (a conservative position, perhaps, but one that
offers a home for secure identity, in addition to being a powerful
yet caring and life-giving source). By contrast, women in post-
war fantastic literature, while not absent altogether, display a
nihilistic indifference that is depicted to be a form of resistance
and subversion to the pressures that modem-day social life
inflicts on individuals. The lack of communication between the
sexes and the images of sinister, soulless female characters
drawn both by male and female authors alike in postwar Japan
all play a part in this.
The notion of modernity as something that fantastic crea-
tures are supposedly reacting to or subverting is a central point
of departure for Napier. Drawing on the writings of Tzvetan
Todorov and Rosemary Jackson, on the one hand (pp. 7-8), and
the field of psychoanalysis, on the other, Napier endorses the
fantastic as the "unsaid" and "absence" and, hence, inversion of
modern life. This point is more or less taken for granted in
Napier's text without further theoretical ado. However, how a
literary genre is connected to a history, culture, and society, either
as a discursive metaphor or a linguistic strategy, and how such a
genre is socio-culturally and historically made effective are not
as obvious as Napier hopes the reader will assume. The category
"fantastic," despite Napier's definition, remains unclear and in-
herently inconsistent. For example, mimcles recorded in the
Bible may be fantastic to some, including those who are not
religious and those who are religious but live in the secular,
"modern" period, while they may indeed be fantastic to others
who are believers. Here "fantastic" can be true or false: a miracle
can be fantastically truthful or fantastically false. Likewise, for
a non-believer, "fantastic" miracles can be nothing but an irony.
As long as Napier herself is an interpreter and a critic of a certain
fInite number of texts, while she deals with a socio-historical
phenomenon called Japanese modernity, there seems to be a gap
that can only be f11led by accounts on culture-specific, historically
deternrined conditions ofproduction, distribution, and consumption
of the texts within the socio-historical realm concerned.
Napier's approach raises the issue of the relation between
"modernity" and the text. If modernity emerges in a historically
conditioned cultural field, the discourse is not simply a verbal
subversion of it; it is also a part of the modernity concerned. The
term modernity and its relation to the texts-and vice versa-
need to be more carefully defmed or at least elaborated. It seems
that one more level of mediation is necessary in order to connect
the "subversive" fantastic to the material conditions of literary
production and consumption. Such an account would have to be
87
supported by epistemological discussion oftextuality and repre-
sentation and of the role played by the texts in production and
reproduction of meanings. Napier's frequent switching between
historical narrative and psychoanalytical analysis may not be
helpful in this regard. In the postwar "modernity" of Japan,
Napier suggests, there is no womb-no home for identity and
personal security (e.g., p. 93). In her reading, as shown in Kura-
hashi'sAmanon, the womb now is an explosive site where no one
can feel at home and which gives birth to a horror. A historically
minded feminist reading ofthis text would be that the articulation
of the womb and the body of discourse emerging around it are
now appropriated and redefmed by women writers. This need
not be taken to be female revenge against male social domina-
tion, but rather as an effort to define feminine text and women's
literary field. The "struggle" Napier hopes to read resides in the
text as a part of modernity. This mediation is not brought to the
foreground ofher discussion. Hence, there is conflation between
the text and the reality, on the one hand, and a simple dichotomy
between the modernity and the text as its reflection, on the other.
Neither is satisfactory; both lack theoretical elaboration.
Although Napier detects gender relations and struggle for
power in Kurahashi's text, her psychoanalytical register satisfies
her without further exploration ofhistoricity ofthe text. The shift
of the notion "womb" is a shift in discursive power relations in
the literary field and not the change of ontological status of
"womb" as applied, psychoanalytically, to "Japan" (as ifpsycho-
analyzing a society is possible). In this particular connection,
Napier's reading of the womb-as a home for identities-is
essentialist in its history-less fixation of meaning. The demon-
strated meaning of the notion "womb" changes depending on
who uses it and under what conditions. The same problem applies
to other creatures in fantasy literature: ghosts, monsters, aliens, and
the rest; these are specific products and protagonists within the
historically defmed power asymmetry and it may not be possible to
bring them together under the banner of "anti-modernity."
Napier's text also lacks a historical postulate ofmodernity. She
says that women in the fantastic literature of late nineteenth/early
twentieth-<lentury Japan "stand as sentries to a longed-for other world
oferotic and traditional richness" (p. 45), but, by the mid-twentieth
century, women disappear altogether from the fantastic genre:
"There are no longer any old roads back to a past" (p. 80). The
appearance and disappearance of women cannot be taken as
subversion of or reaction to the one-and-the same modernity, as
ifmodernity comes into being at one point in history and is existent
thereafter without transforming itself. Japan went through a drastic
traJlSformation following the Meiji restoration and modernization
and the later period ofoppressive militarization and defeat by the
BCAS BOOKS
FOR REVIEW
For a list of books received by BCAS
1hat are eligible for review In 1he
Bulletin of ConcernedAsIan Scholas
please VIsIt 1he BCAS Website at
http://c&f.colorado.edU/bcas/
Con1act Fater ZarrO'll at <p.zarrow@unsw.edu.au>
West. Napier tries to bridge this historical transformation with
the changing contents of the fantastic. But, her approach suffers
from rather a simplistic one-to-one correspondence between one
particular "era" and one ethos. So, according to her, the Taisho
period (1912-1926) "was a time of intense urbanization and
industrialization, [in which] the initial unity of the Meiji period
[was] replaced by an increasing tendency toward conflict on the
part of political and other pressure groups, and by a fascination
with self-discovery and self-transformation on the part of the
newly urbanized, newly consuming population" (p. 118). The
female fantastic that corresponds to this period is an "oasis
woman" who represents "a space outside ofthe real which offers
comfort and revitalization to the weary male" (p. 23). What is
problematic with this kind of assumption is that this is probably
the case for some (but only for some) in a given time period, in a
particular place, in relative terms. The burst offree love in postwar
Japan, for instance, produced hundreds of "oasis women" stories
set against the backdrop of"intense urbanization and industriali-
zation" of the 1 960s and 1970s. This was in marked contrast to
the atmosphere of militaristic self-control throughout the nation
during the war. But then again, "oasis women" were there even
under the increasing militarization of the society, in the form not
of free sex or libertarian lover, but of devoted, dutiful, and
patriotic horne-front womanhood. The meaning of "oasis" shifts
historically. The ethos of a certain historical period cannot be
judged by generic statements; it needs to be explored and inves-
tigated in its specificity. It is precisely here that we see the
relevance of the fantastic: as a part-not a mirrored reflec-
tion-of such a period. Napier appears to implicitly presuppose
in her analysis an unchanging component of modernity: moder-
nity has basically the same technical components including
technological innovation, labor-intensive production, urbaniza-
tion, and industrialization, despite historical changes that Japa-
nese society went through in terms of cultural norms, political
organization, and social conventions. The position taken by the
fantastic goes through historical transformation-from the posi- ,
tive, utopian dream of Miyazawa's Night of the Milky Way
Railway to the dystopian nihilism of Tsutsui Yasutaka's Ganmen ,
Hokai-but the components of modernity remain unchanged
Technology, science, and industrialization play key roles in her
notion of modernity, while modernity is never a cluster of tech-
nological innovation: modernity itself is an ethos correlated with
"fantastic" aspects of modernization. To oppose modernity and
the fantastic, in this sense, seems not only conceptually unten-
able, but also a-historical in approach because it disregards the
historical change in our own perception of what is "modem" and
"non-modern."
Napier's accounts are not as simplistic as that, but there are
underexplored aspects in her use of the term modernity, espe-
cially historicization, and this fixes the image of modernity as
some kind of a technologically determined phenomenon, as if
history and culture are outside such a realm.
o
Corredion: In a review published in BCAS, Vol. 29, No.4
(1997), pp. 87-88, the author ofHong Kong in Chinese History:
Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842-1913,
Jung-Fang Tsai, was mistakenly said to be a female. We regret
the error and extend our apologies to (Mr.) Jung-Fang Tsai.
I

Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Back issues of BCAS publications published on this site are

intended for non-commercial use only. Photographs and

You might also like